​Quotes of the Day:

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

–​ John F. Kennedy

​"My fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.​"

–​ John F. Kennedy

​"Let us not seek the Republican answer or the Democratic answer, but the right answer. Let us not seek to fix the blame for the past. Let us accept our own responsibility for the future.​"

–John F. Kennedy

​

On this Day in History:

President John F. Kennedy is assassinated

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/november-22/john-f-kennedy-assassinated

1. U.S.-China Economic AND Security Review Commission: 2025 Annual Report to Congress

2. Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front

3. US-Philippine task force to reestablish South China Sea ‘deterrence’

4. China’s Sahel Gamble Falters as Insurgencies Rage

5. How To Win the War in the Next Decade, Part II: Our Unsustainable Debt​

6. Recognition and Care for Women Combat Veterans in SOF - Jax Act Reintroduced - SOAA

7. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll on transforming the armed forces

8. Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine, Annotated

9. Latest Push for Peace Is Zelensky’s Toughest Moment Since Start of War

10. Don’t let a scandal undermine the defence of Ukraine

11. Trump Uses Gaza Peace Playbook in Ukraine

12. Americans Show Consensus on Many Democracy-Related Matters

13. Jonathan Pollard, Mike Huckabee meet at US Jerusalem embassy

14. The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

15. The Ukraine War Is a Draw No One Wants to Accept

16. China takes spat with Japan over Taiwan to UN, vows to defend itself

17. US, China held maritime security talks in Hawaii, Chinese navy says

18. The Thucydides Trap Is Coming for America

1. U.S.-China Economic AND Security Review Commission: 2025 Annual Report to Congress

​Comment: Video and PDFs of the report are at this link: https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2025-annual-report-congress

2025 Annual Report to Congress

uscc.gov

U.S.- CHINA | ECONOMIC and SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

U.S.-China Economic AND Security Review Commission

• About Us
• 
  
• About the Commission
• ​The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is a legislative branch commission created by the United States Congress in October 2000 with the legislative mandate to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.

Topics this year include China’s revisionist ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea; China and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; how Beijing built its manufacturing and innovation engine; China’s ambitions to dominate space; China Shock 2.0; Beijing’s weaponization of supply chains; China’s electrification drive; and a review of Taiwan, Hong Kong, economics, trade, security, politics, and foreign affairs development in 2025.

Opening Statement of Chair Reva Price

Opening Statement of Vice Chair Randy Schriver

Report PDFs

Annual Report to Congress

Executive Summary

Recommendations to Congress

Part 1 – The Year in Review

Chapter 1 - U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)

Chapter 2 - U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

Part 2 - Efforts to Remake the World Order

Chapter 3 - Axis of Autocracy: China’s Revisionist Ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea

Chapter 4 - Crossroads of Competition: China and Southeast Asia

Chapter 5 - Small Islands, Big Stakes: China’s Playbook in the Pacific Islands

Part 3 - Competition in Contested Frontiers

Chapter 6 - Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China's Manufacturing and Innovation Engine

Chapter 7 - The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space

Part 4 - Exposure to China's Economic Distortions and Coercion

Chapter 8 - China Shock 2.0

Chapter 9 - Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains

Chapter 10 - Power Surge: China’s Electrification Drive and Push for Global Energy Dominance

Taiwan and Hong Kong

Chapter 11 - Taiwan

Chapter 12 - Hong Kong

2. Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front

​Summary:

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has accelerated information warfare cooperation among authoritarian regimes, especially Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing treat the information space as a core power and security domain, coordinating narratives, media projects, and “traditional values” messaging. Russian state media exploits TikTok and Chinese platforms, using AI content and recruitment ads, while both amplify each other’s propaganda and support for far-right, anti-establishment forces in Europe. The authors argue this authoritarian “information axis” is reshaping global politics and must be treated by Western governments as a tier-one security threat requiring coordinated EU–NATO red lines, exposure, and real penalties.

​Comment: When are we going to learn to "lead with influence" and conduct more effective political warfare than our adversaries using strategy with American characteristics versus strategies with authroitatartian characteristics like the Dark Quad or the CRInK?? As Mao said - War is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed.

Axis of authoritarians poses mounting threat on the global information front

atlanticcouncil.org

By William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/axis-of-authoritarians-poses-mounting-threat-on-the-global-information-front/

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, there has been growing alarm over the support that Moscow is receiving from fellow authoritarian regimes including Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and China. However, while Western officials have publicly raised concerns over material support for the Russian war effort, the issue of cooperation in the information sphere has received less attention.

This is short-sighted. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of the information front in modern conflicts. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have not been lost on the Kremlin, which invests vast sums to finance information operations and has repeatedly used disinformation to destabilize its opponents. China is also well aware of the increasing role played by information capabilities and has established a range of powerful tools. This is creating potentially significant challenges for Western policymakers.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Many Western countries continue to view the issue of information warfare as primarily a matter of fact-checking and debunking fakes. In contrast, there are growing indications that Moscow and Beijing share a vision of the information space as a key element of their power projection and national security strategies.

A recent meeting between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang signaled deepening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing on the information front. The annual summit held in Hangzhou in early November featured commitments from both sides to partner on media initiatives, countering disinformation, and promoting traditional values.

Moscow already has extensive experience in information operations designed to disrupt and reshape Europe’s political landscape, and is widely regarded as a global pioneer in the use of multimedia information operations to advance foreign policy objectives. Beijing has also faced accusations of playing a role in these activities, which are aimed at exploiting social divisions and boosting polarizing narratives with a view to generating support for anti-establishment political forces throughout the Western world.

While measuring the success of information operations is not an exact science, there is certainly no shortage of evidence to suggest that these tactics are having an impact. Support for far-right political parties is now surging across Europe. While each party has its own individual agenda, these populist political forces tend to share a sympathetic stance toward Russia while enjoying extensive coverage on Kremlin-linked media platforms.

Perhaps the clearest indication of cooperation between Russia and China in the information arena is the growing Russian state media presence on TikTok. This is alleged to include coordinated campaigns and the use of AI technologies.

Disinformation watchdogs from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council have accused the Kremlin of using the TikTok platform to conduct information campaigns designed to demoralize Ukrainian society and undermine resistance to Russia’s invasion. Ukrainian officials claim Moscow has employed AI to create videos featuring “ordinary Ukrainians” conveying pessimistic messages.

Russia is also reportedly using Chinese social media platforms to recruit Chinese citizens for the war in Ukraine. The large volume of recruitment adverts across China’s strictly controlled and monitored social media sphere has been interpreted by some as a sign of tacit approval from the authorities in Beijing.

Chinese and Russian information ecosystems appear to be engaging in significant cross-promotion. Kremlin outlets actively promote war-related content on platforms such as China’s Weibo. Meanwhile, Chinese state media and officials amplify key Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and framing sanctions policies as self-defeating. Both Beijing and Moscow employ similar language to describe the war in Ukraine, which they typically depict as a defensive reaction to the West’s provocative policies.

As information cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and other authoritarian regimes expands, Western policymakers must recognize that information warfare is now a tier-one national security threat requiring a comprehensive response. This should include signaling that information offensives will be treated as comparable to other violations of sovereignty, with the European Union and NATO working to establish clear diplomatic, legal, and economic red lines in the information domain.

Efforts must be undertaken to defend the information space more effectively by combining the initiatives of individual governments along with civil society. This could draw on a wide range of specific examples, such as Ukraine’s wartime experience and recent elections in Romania and Moldova. Greater accountability for hostile information operations is also crucial. Western governments must be prepared to publicly expose attacks and impose tangible costs.

The authoritarian axis that has taken shape since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is currently setting new standards in terms of coordinated information operations across media platforms. The West’s response must be equally systematic. The tools and frameworks exist; Western governments must now demonstrate the necessary political will.

William Dixon is an associate fellow of the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy and security analyst with a focus on Ukraine, Russia, European security, and EU-Ukraine cooperation.

3. US-Philippine task force to reestablish South China Sea ‘deterrence’

​Summary:

The United States and the Philippines are creating Task Force-Philippines, a joint headquarters in Manila to speed responses to Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. With about 60 staff and no new combat forces or bases, it will fuse sensitive intelligence in near real time, tighten interoperability, and improve crisis reaction. Analysts say it modestly restores deterrence, reassures both allies, and helps institutionalize the alliance before Philippine politics potentially swing back toward Beijing. China may test the task force with more aggressive patrols or blockades, raising accident risks even as it is forced to recalculate its strategy and posture.

Comment: A significant development. However, when I see the phrases "re-establish deterrence" or "restore deterrence" I always wonder if we know what actually deters our adversaries. Is it one size fits all or are specific actions, forces, statements required for each specific adversary? Does simple presence demonstrate strategic reassurance and strategic resolve. I do believe that the foundation of deterrence against all our adversaries) to prevent nuclear and conventional war) is the demonstrated capability and will to fight and win the war against our adversaries. That is job one for our military (capability) and political leaders (demonstrated will). Of course the paradox is that the more credible our ability to fight and win is, the more likely the adversaries will resort to political and irregular warfare in the gray zone below the threshold of war. 

As an aside, we were developing the campaign plan for OEF-Philippines in October 2001 and we conducted a strategic assessment. Working with our Philippine counterparts we started with a strategic national security review in Manila and conducted a tactical assessment of Baslian. As we looked at their assessed threats they were of course focused on the existential threat at the time which was the CPP/NPA (communists), and then MNLF/MILF/JI/ASG (insurgency and terrorist organizations). Notably absent to us even at the time was China. There was no mention of a threat to the Philippines from China in 2001. There was nothing in their strategic documents about China. We have come a long way.

But we have to ask what if we had prepared for a China threat beginning in 2001 instead of only focusing on CT/COIN? The reason for not doing so is twofold. One is assumption. There seemed to be no reason to believe that China would be a threat. This was based on the erroneous assumption that as China continued to liberalize economically it would politically liberalize and be a responsible member of the international community. The second reason is from Eliot Cohen and John Gooch and their book, MIlitary Misfortune. They determined that all military failures are a result of three things: failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. Yes our crystal balls were pretty cloudy in 2001 and the only thing we saw clearly was the terrorist threat. But we should remember that in 1999 two PLA colonels wrote Unrestricted Warfare. I still have a copy of the first FBIS translation of that book. I had read it before 9-11 but I still did not anticipate what China would be doing today, even though the two colonels laid out the playbook for us. In 2004, I asked the Chinese Defense Minister when he was visiting the National War College in DC if the PLA used this book to inform their strategy and doctrine. He pointedly told me that the book had been debunked and not to believe everything I read. (My thought was Shakespeare and "he doth protest too much.")

And I am also reminded of this statement in 2024:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

 – Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

US-Philippine task force to reestablish South China Sea ‘deterrence’

Defense News · Leilani Chavez

By Military Times Staff

 Nov 21, 2025, 11:09 AM

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/11/21/us-philippine-task-force-to-reestablish-south-china-sea-deterrence/

BANGKOK — The United States and the Philippines have announced the creation of a joint task force aimed at further deterring what U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called Beijing’s “coercion” in the South China Sea.

It is the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, where not only the Philippines but also Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam have overlapping claims with China in the sea, a major international shipping route.

Analysts tell Military Times the task force could help deter Beijing’s efforts to enforce its sweeping claims to the sea by allowing U.S. and Philippine forces to react much more quickly to Chinese ships in contested waters around the Philippines, where the two countries have often clashed.

Hegseth and his counterpart, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr., unveiled Task Force-Philippines on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations defense ministers’ summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Oct. 31.

“We don’t seek confrontation, but of course we’re ready to protect our interests, individually and mutually. And that’s why we’re publicly announcing the Task Force-Philippines here with you today,” Hegseth told a press conference.

He called it “another step in our cooperation, increasing interoperability, exercising and preparedness for contingencies, so that we can decisively respond to crises or aggression and reestablish deterrence in the South China Sea.”

The U.S. Pacific Fleet later added in a statement that the task force, which covers the full sprawl of the Philippines archipelago, will have about 60 dedicated staff and be led by either a one-star general or flag officer. The fleet said it would not involve new combat forces, offensive operations or permanent military basing.

RELATED

Philippines tests new battle plan for fending off invaders alone

In the event of a war, officials believe local forces must hold out for at least a month before reinforcements from allies arrive.

By

Rommel Jude Ong, a professor at Ateneo de Manila University, told Military Times that the task force is the culmination of growing cooperation between the U.S. and Philippines, which have been defense treaty allies since 1951.

He cited the annual Balikatan military exercise, the more limited joint task forces in past years, and a pact the two countries signed in 2024 to share classified military information.

“Those are developments that need to happen before you can actually have an operational task force,” he said. “Because they were resolved, a task force is now a viable mechanism.”

Now that it is viable, the two forces should be able to share sensitive intelligence “almost in real time,” said Jude Ong, a retired rear admiral who served over three decades in the Philippine navy.

Until now, operational information typically had to travel back and forth between Manila and Hawaii, where INDOPACOM is headquartered.

“That is a cumbersome way of doing business and is dependent on a secure communication setup that has very stringent protocols to use,” Jude Ong said.

“Having the [Task Force] Philippines based in Manila allows for a faster and convenient way of collaborating on combined operations … between the two allied militaries,” he added.

To truly deter China, he said, the United States and other Philippine allies would have to commit far more ships to patrolling the contested waters and maybe even basing them in the Philippines. In its statement, the U.S. Pacific Fleet ruled out basing its ships in the Philippines, but Jude Ong said he believed the task force may yet encourage the development of more related U.S. logistics in the country.

By helping U.S. forces react to events in the South China Sea in real time, though, the task force could still add some deterrence as it is, said Euan Graham, a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think tank established by the Australian government.

“Part of the problem is that the Chinese have learned that the Americans come for exercises like Balikatan and then they sail off, and they [the Chinese] can very quickly come in and out from their new bases in Mischief Reef and elsewhere, and that obviously undercuts the American deterrence proposition,” he said.

Mischief Reef is an artificial South China Sea island that Beijing has turned into a military base.

The task force, Graham added, makes the U.S. “more agile and more responsive so that things don’t just have to get put all the way up the decision chain into INDOPACOM headquarters or Washington.”

He said the creation of a standing task force also helps reassure Manila and Washington of each other’s long-term military commitments should moods change in either capital.

Philippine relations with the United States have warmed under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who succeeded the more China-friendly administration of Rodrigo Duterte in 2022. Duterte’s daughter, Sara, however, who shares her father’s China leanings, is the current frontrunner for president in elections due by 2028.

“So, this [task force] may be part of the trend to institutionalize this alliance and other security partnerships as far as possible while the political window is open under Marcos. Because if the Dutertes get back in, that’s clearly not going to be good for the U.S.,” said Graham.

In the meantime, tensions continue to run high between Beijing and Manila, with several encounters around contested shoals in recent months.

Graham said the task force could, in time, help stabilize the situation by allowing U.S. forces to respond more effectively to the pressure being applied by China.

Starting off, though, he said it may face “teething issues” as both sides work out where to draw ships for the joint operations from, and that China may try testing the task force to see whether and how much those operations actually improve the Philippines’ defenses.

China may also react by scaling up its own patrols or blocking Philippines supply ships to some shoals more aggressively, said Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a security analyst and academic adviser at the Australian National University.

He said that would raise the odds of an accident, which could in turn stoke tensions further.

“Most likely it may lead to increased tensions, because once you have a task force, you have more military activities. … And how will the Chinese respond? Will [more] Chinese war ships actually patrol and try to monitor Philippines-U.S. activities?” he asked.

“More military activities mean more potential for accidents to happen.”

However Beijing reacts, Rahman Yaacob said the task force will force China to reevaluate its approach.

“This task force will … cement further the American military presence in this part of the world, and … this will force Beijing, or China, to actually recalculate its strategic policy vis-à-vis the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia,” he said.

4. China’s Sahel Gamble Falters as Insurgencies Rage

​Summary:

China’s development-first gamble in the Sahel is unraveling as jihadist insurgencies in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso turn Belt and Road projects into targets. Attacks on Niger’s Agadem–Benin oil pipeline, lithium mines in Mali, and solar plants in Burkina Faso expose Chinese workers, halt exports, and inflame anti-foreign sentiment. Beijing’s Global Security Initiative provides arms, training, and limited military aid, but its non-interference and regime-first diplomacy tie China to unpopular juntas losing territory and legitimacy. As violence spreads and Chinese citizens are evacuated, analysts warn that presence without protection leaves Beijing dangerously exposed and forces a rethink of its Sahel strategy.

​

Comment: Does Bonaparte apply here? "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." Are China's strategy and tactics a mistake? Will they fail under their own weight? Or can and should their errors be exploited and if so, how?

China’s Sahel Gamble Falters as Insurgencies Rage

asiasentinel.com · Nov 21, 2025∙ Paid

China’s Belt and Road projects have become prime targets

Nov 21, 2025

∙ Paid

By: Robert Bociaga

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/china-sahel-gamble-falters-insurgencies-rage

Military guard in Niger. Photo from Depositphotos

In early 2025, Chinese engineers working on Niger’s US$4.6 billion oil pipeline to Benin were forced to flee their worksites under armed escort.

For days, convoys burned on the desert highway linking Agadem to Zinder, after the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL), an insurgent faction splintered from local militias, detonated explosives beneath a pumping station. The explosion sent black smoke twisting into the Sahel sky and halted exports just months after the pipeline’s inauguration.

By May, Chinese hostages were appearing in jihadist videos from border zones once considered secure.

For Beijing, the incident was more than a local security failure. It symbolized a broader unraveling of China’s grand experiment in stability through development: a strategy that poured billions into fragile states while avoiding their politics.

Across the Sahel – a strategic band between North and sub-Saharan Africa – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are now the epicenter of surging Islamist insurgencies that have turned China’s Belt and Road projects – pipelines, solar farms, and lithium mines – into targets.

A Region on Fire

The Sahel today accounts for more than half of global terrorism deaths. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, fatalities have risen nearly tenfold since 2019, reaching 4,794 in 2024 alone.

Jihadist networks – the al-Qaida-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) – operate across porous borders, exploiting the power vacuums left by Western military withdrawals.

French troops exited Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023, followed by the closure of U.S. drone bases in Niger in 2024. China, by contrast, stepped up its engagement guided by its “economics first” approach, which seeks to tackle the “root causes of extremism” through trade, jobs, and infrastructure.

At the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing announced US$51 billion in new funding over three years, including military aid through its Global Security Initiative (GSI). Yet as bulldozers and cranes arrived in the Sahel, so did militants.

Niger has become a striking example of both China’s ambitions and its vulnerabilities. Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) invested US$2.3 billion in the country’s Agadem oilfield and another US$4.6 billion in the 2,000-kilometer pipeline to the Benin coast. The goal was to transform Niger into a regional oil exporter; instead, the project has turned into a security nightmare.

Following the 2023 coup, militant activity surged 66 percent. By 2025, insurgent groups were targeting not just security forces but economic arteries. The FPL and JNIM carried out repeated attacks on pumping stations, convoys, and construction camps. Chinese engineers were kidnapped near Diffa and Gao, their captors demanding an end to “foreign exploitation.”

Tensions with Niger’s ruling junta compounded the crisis. In March 2025, authorities expelled three CNPC executives for “violating local labor laws,” citing unequal pay between Chinese and Nigerien staff. Two months later, the government suspended work permits for dozens of expatriates amid a dispute over taxes and debt payments exceeding US$500 million.

China’s reaction revealed the limits of its diplomacy. It appointed its first defense attaché to Niamey in February 2025 and mediated a border dispute with Benin over pipeline transit fees. But these moves failed to halt the violence – or the perception that China was backing an unpopular regime losing control of its own territory.

Shadow of Jihad

In neighboring Mali, Chinese mining companies face a similar predicament. The Goulamina lithium project – a US$250 million venture in which Ganfeng Lithium holds a 40 percent stake – was meant to anchor Beijing’s supply chain for electric vehicle batteries. Instead, jihadists have turned the region into a war zone.

Since 2024, JNIM and IS cells have raided industrial convoys and seized mining outposts. In May of this year, militants abducted several Chinese employees from sites near Bougouni, prompting the Chinese Embassy in Bamako to order a temporary suspension of operations.

Beijing has invested heavily to stabilize Mali’s junta through the GSI, providing US$136 million in military aid for training and equipment. But these efforts, coordinated with Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group), have not improved Mali’s deteriorating security environment. The number of jihadist attacks rose 20 percent in early 2025, and large stretches of territory are now beyond state control.

The dilemma for Beijing is that it is difficult to protect Chinese assets without violating its own doctrine of “non-interference.” The support available under the GSI is limited, leaving Beijing exposed in a country where the line between combatant and contractor has become blurred.

Burkina Faso in chaos

Further west, Burkina Faso – once hailed as a success story for China’s renewable energy investments – has slid into chaos. With 1,532 terror-related deaths in 2024, the country ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index. JNIM and IS fighters now encircle the capital Ouagadougou, controlling most of the country’s north and east.

Chinese-backed projects – a 100-megawatt solar plant and a new cement factory – were unveiled with fanfare under Beijing’s Green Energy Initiative. Both remain incomplete, stranded behind front lines guarded by exhausted soldiers. The US$49 million solar loan that was supposed to light rural Burkina Faso now powers only a fraction of its grid.

The country’s junta, part of the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States alongside Mali and Niger, has welcomed Chinese arms shipments, including vehicles, drones, and communications gear supplied by NORINCO under the GSI. But anti-foreign sentiment is rising, fueled by propaganda describing foreign contractors as colonizers. In online forums, Chinese companies are accused of “profiting from blood contracts,” echoing the resentment once directed at France.

China has pledged to train 7,500 African officers and police by 2027 and has provided US$136 million in military aid to the Sahel juntas. It frames this as “cooperative capacity building,” and claims that it is distinct from Western interventionism.

Yet critics see the GSI as a risky half-measure – and in the Sahel, China’s “development as security” model faces its harshest test. The region’s juntas, which Beijing embraced for their stability rhetoric, are quickly losing territory.

Corruption, unpaid salaries, and arbitrary arrests have alienated communities once open to Chinese investment. Militants exploit this resentment, framing Beijing as a new outsider propping up illegitimate rulers.

A May 2025 article from the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce warned that “state-owned enterprises now operate in complex environments of hybrid conflict” and risk reputational damage from association with juntas accused of abuses.

China’s non-interference doctrine compounds the problem. By refusing to engage politically beyond regime channels, Beijing forfeits influence over the very communities that determine its projects’ survival. Its “regime first” diplomacy secures contracts but not legitimacy.

In practice, all of this ties Beijing more deeply to regimes whose control is eroding and whose forces are accused of atrocities. As the violence spreads south toward Benin and Togo, China is considering new naval logistics bases in Equatorial Guinea or Gabon to protect shipping routes. This expansion pushes it closer to the kind of military footprint that it long denounced Western governments for.

China already operates a naval base in Djibouti, where April 2025 joint exercises with African partners tested rapid-response evacuations. But while this gives it the ability to evacuate citizens and assets, it cannot yet stabilize territories.

The Sahel as Testing Ground

Anti-foreign sentiment has intensified across the Sahel. Once directed at France and the United States, it is now taking aim at China.

The Chinese government’s response remains cautious. It has quietly recalled hundreds of citizens from high-risk zones, while private security firms with ties to China’s state-owned enterprises have expanded operations in West Africa, mirroring Russian and Turkish models. Beijing still insists its presence is “purely economic,” even as it dispatches more military advisers under the GSI umbrella.

The Sahel has become a laboratory for China’s new global security ambitions, in which it exports its blend of development aid, arms sales, and political non-interference. Unlike in Latin America or Southeast Asia, China cannot simply buy goodwill here. Its BRI projects sit atop fractured polities where state authority often barely exists and where religion and ethnic affiliation command greater loyalty than the nation-state.

Beijing’s exposure in the Sahel reveals an important strategic vulnerability. For two decades, China has built power through commerce, eschewing formal alliances and the promotion of any particular ideology. Now it finds itself dependent on unstable partners who demand arms and aid while failing to deliver security. In Niamey, Bamako, and Ouagadougou, regimes that once praised China as a “reliable friend” are now threatening to renegotiate contracts and nationalize assets.

At home, Chinese analysts have urged a rethink. Commentary in state-linked journals acknowledges that “development alone cannot resolve complex security challenges.” Yet President Xi Jinping is unlikely to abandon the country’s principle of non-interference.

The Sahel’s wars are no longer someone else’s problem for China. The African region was supposed to prove China could succeed where the West failed. Instead, it has revealed that presence without protection is just another form of exposure.

Robert Bociaga is a traveling photojournalist specializing in international affairs. This article is the result of a cooperative sharing agreement with The Diplomat, a Tokyo-based current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region.

asiasentinel.com · Nov 21, 2025∙ Paid

5. How To Win the War in the Next Decade, Part II: Our Unsustainable Debt​

​Summary:

America cannot win future wars while burdened by exploding entitlement spending, interest costs, and a $38 trillion-plus national debt. Fiscal drift erodes defense budgets, political will, and deterrence. He urges confronting benefits, taxes, and borrowing now to restore solvency, rebuild military strength, and avoid strategic bankruptcy soon.

​Comment: Graphics at the link.

How To Win the War in the Next Decade, Part II: Our Unsustainable Debt​

​​

Seven decades ago, President Johnson initiated his “war on poverty,” that gave birth to entitlements.

Friday, November 21, 2025  2 min read

By: Bing West

https://www.hoover.org/research/how-win-war-next-decade-part-ii-our-unsustainable-debt

How To Win the War in the Next Decade, Part II: Our Unsustainable Debt

By: Bing West

Seven decades ago, President Johnson initiated his “war on poverty,” that gave birth to entitlements. This conferred upon politicians a patina of nobility to hand out money in exchange for votes. Washington runs well over a hundred separate benefit programs, each with its own rules and constituencies. Year after year the payouts rise automatically. The sheer scale makes it almost impossible to track who gets what. Congress paid for these programs, collectively called entitlements, by borrowing more and more money. In 2025, the national debt stands at $38 trillion; every American owes $110,000.

About 150 to 200 million Americans enjoy more entitlements than they pay in taxes for those entitlements.^[1] Roughly 40% of all households pay no federal income tax. Half the population (161 million) receive benefits from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). These programs alone comprised 51 percent of the federal budget in 2025. Medicaid for 80 million people cost one trillion dollars. Obamacare enrollment reached 24 million, costing $80 billion. Food stamps (SNAP) served 42 million people for $100 billion. Housing aid for 10 million people cost $60 billion. These constituencies have grown too vast for any politician to oppose them and be elected.

So visceral has become the defense of federal spending that half of the Democrats in the House (127 of 212) opposed a bill to recover $100 billion in fraudulent and stolen pandemic payments. The Democrats in the Senate shut down the government for weeks in a demand to increase Obamacare by $350 billion. Benevolence toward those with lesser incomes had corroded into bitter demands.

Our productivity and Congressional self-discipline are not robust enough to decrease the debt. At some point in the next decade, the debt will cause a bond selloff equivalent to the market crash of 1929. Many economists warn that the debt vigilantes will rush for redemptions when debt service consumes 25% of all revenues, likely within a decade.

Only then will Congress cut some entitlements and slap on a Value Added Tax. The Fed will respond by injecting more bonds at higher yields, but that drives up inflation and lowers the value of the dollar. This weakens our international power, even as our Defense spending, squeezed by the debt service, drops below 2% of GDP. A rise in external threats and a decrease in our standard of living will follow. Wealthy nations can disintegrate with astonishing speed. Back in the fifth century AD, the Roman senate annually shaved the silver from the coins of the realm. Eventually, the coin was thinner than a wafer, with scant purchasing power. The legions walked off the job, while the barbarians could no longer be bribed. The illustrious city of Rome and the cohesion of the Western Roman Empire collapsed between 406 and 476 AD, a span of seventy years.

Alistair Cooke, the insightful British journalist and broadcaster, wrote that “civilizations decline when they lose confidence in their founding values and worry more about their entitlements than their obligations.” Our debt portends our decline.

At a May 2025 press conference, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said, “The economy’s in a good place…debt is on an unsustainable path.” Welcome to Washington, where procrastination reigns. Our leaders know the path is unsustainable and refuse to change course.

[1] From Chat GPT, August 8, 2025:

1. Medicaid & CHIP—Around 91 million people were enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP as of 2024. Medicaid alone costs about $850 billion annually.
2. ACA (Obamacare)—About 12-15 million are covered via ACA subsidies, costing roughly $50-100 billion depending on subsidies and state contributions.
3. Food Stamps (SNAP)—Around 42 million people receive SNAP benefits, costing about $120 billion annually.
4. Housing Assistance—About 10 million people receive federal housing aid, costing around $60 billion.
5. Child Care and Welfare Programs—40 million in various child care and TANF-related programs account for $20-40 billion.

Adding these together, the estimated cost is roughly in the $1.1 trillion range. These programs serve 150 to 200 million Americans (with overlap in enrollment between different programs).

6. Recognition and Care for Women Combat Veterans in SOF - Jax Act Reintroduced - SOAA

​Summary: 

The bipartisan Jax Act would correct records for USASOC Cultural Support Team women, finally granting recognition and VA benefits for their often invisible wartime service.

Recognition and Care for Women Combat Veterans in SOF - Jax Act Reintroduced - SOAA

soaa.org

https://soaa.org/jax-act-reintroduced/

Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), a bill that seeks long-overdue recognition and care for the women combat veterans who served on U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Cultural Support Teams (CSTs). These teams, deployed in some of the most dangerous and sensitive missions of the Global War on Terror, supported elite Special Operations Forces by engaging directly with local female populations in areas where male soldiers could not.

Named after Jaclyn “Jax” Scott, a CST veteran and a current board member of the Special Operations Association of America (SOAA), the Jax Act aims to ensure these veterans receive the benefits and recognition they earned through their direct combat service. Although many CSTs served under combat conditions, they were often excluded from formal recognition and access to VA benefits due to outdated policies that failed to account for the evolving roles of women in combat zones.

“The Jax Act isn’t just about amending personnel files. It’s about telling the truth, recognizing courage under fire, and fighting for those who fought for all of us,” said Rep. Issa. “While this reform bill is named for Jaclyn ‘Jax’ Scott, literally hundreds of other brave women service members were asked to volunteer for the most dangerous missions, did so without hesitation, and now need us to set this right.”

The legislation first gained momentum last Congress, drawing bipartisan support in both chambers. While the bill cleared committee, it did not receive a full vote before the House.

“SOAA has been the driving force behind the Jax Act from day one. As a founding board member, I’ve witnessed firsthand the organization’s relentless dedication to ensuring that those who served in silence are finally seen and supported.” said SOAA Board Member, Jaclyn “Jax” Scott. SOAA Founder, Daniel Elkins added, “The Jax Act represents every Cultural Support Team member who stood shoulder to shoulder with our nation’s most elite forces, carrying out missions that changed history yet often went unrecognized. This bill is not just legislation, it’s a promise kept to the warriors who gave everything for this country.”

With support from lawmakers including Representatives Jason Crow (D-CO), Jennifer Kiggans (R-FL), and Chrissy Houlahan (D-PA), all veterans themselves, the Jax Act reflects a deeply bipartisan effort to correct past oversight and ensure CST veterans have access to the care and support they were promised.

SOAA has submitted a letter to Speaker Mike Johnson, urging him to prioritize the Jax Act for floor consideration. As the bill moves through the legislative process once again, we will continue to press for its passage and highlight the stories of CST veterans who served bravely, yet often invisibly.

Read our Press Release

Read our Letter of Support

Read our Letter to Speaker Mike Johnson

soaa.org

7. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll on transforming the armed forces

​Summary:

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll outlines tech-driven reforms, agile institutions, and drone-equipped soldiers to prepare the Army for hybrid wars and future catastrophic conflicts worldwide ahead.

Comment: 44 minute video at the link (only the first part with with SECARMY)

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll on transforming the armed forces

Driscoll detailed what technological and institutional reforms are necessary to bring the Army into a new era of warfare.

By POLITICO Staff

11/21/2025 05:00 AM EST

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/21/army-sec-dan-driscoll-on-revolutionizing-the-military-00663338

share.google

Driscoll detailed what technological and institutional reforms are necessary to bring the Army into a new era of warfare.

11/21/2025 05:00 AM EST

Dan Driscoll made history earlier this year when, at 38, he was sworn in as the youngest Army secretary in U.S. history.

And he just made news again this week when he became the highest-level Trump administration official to visit Kyiv for the White House’s secret peace talks in effort to end Russia’s war on Ukraine. Driscoll joined high-level talks with Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as news broke about a potential peace deal on the horizon.

Driscoll is a veteran of the Iraq War, and as a result, has felt the effects of Pentagon decisions firsthand. He’s set out to reshape the U.S. Army and the Pentagon into an agile institution that can make better use of existing resources and channel the best practices of the private sector.

“When you are creating defensive and offensive solutions, you have to think even 10 years out when the war really gets to its most catastrophic moment, ‘What are the very basic tools of warfare that can’t be impacted by the enemy,” Driscoll said.

In this week’s episode of The Conversation, Driscoll sits down with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns to delve into the future of warfare, his plans for reinvigorating the Army’s technology and the innovation spurred by conflict.

“I think the best guess is if the United States entered a conflict with a peer in a couple of years, it would be a hybrid war where nearly every human being on the battlefield would be empowered and enabled with a digital tool,” Driscoll said. “I think we believe every infantryman in the United States Army will carry a drone with them into battle.”

CNN “NewsNight” host Abby Phillip also joined Dasha to chat about her new book, “A Dream Deferred: Jesse Jackson and the Fight for Black Political Power,” Jackson’s influence on today’s political landscape and Phillip’s approach to her own roundtable show.

Filed Under:

• Department Of Defense
• Pentagon
• U.S. Army

share.google

8. Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine, Annotated

​Summary:

Trump’s 28-point Ukraine peace plan would cap Kyiv’s military, bar NATO membership, legitimize Russian territorial gains, reintegrate Moscow economically, and use frozen assets for joint ventures. Most proposals mirror Kremlin demands, clash with Ukraine’s red lines and Europe’s security aims, and rely on Russian promises Kyiv deems unreliable.

Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine, Annotated

WSJ

Ukraine and its European allies are likely to push back on many aspects of the U.S. plan

By Matthew Luxmoore  and Laurence Norman

Nov. 21, 2025 5:57 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trumps-peace-plan-for-ukraine-annotated-1685868b

President Trump has said he wants Ukraine to agree to a 28-point peace plan by Thanksgiving. The problem for Kyiv is that many of the points cross their red lines and reflect demands long made by Moscow. The Kremlin has said it wasn’t consulted on the plan.

Here’s a breakdown of some of the key points in the plan and how Ukraine and its European allies might respond.

The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel:

WSJ Analysis

Ukraine and its European allies say that a strong military is a guarantee against future Russian aggression, and it has spent more than a decade building up its forces with U.S. assistance. It says that any limit on the size of its army would leave it vulnerable to future attacks.

Ukraine has an estimated two million people in its military, with around 900,000 active duty personnel.

With support from European officials, Kyiv has insisted on a peace deal that would include robust security guarantees from its allies. Some Ukrainian officials have cited as a model the powerful military built by Israel as a deterrent to its adversaries. European Union officials have talked about turning Ukraine into a “steel porcupine” by giving it access to advanced weaponry. Capping its military would make it harder to achieve that goal, Kyiv says.

Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future:

WSJ Analysis

Privately, Ukrainian officials say they understand that any membership in the military bloc is many years away, and the U.S. has publicly said it doesn’t see this as a viable prospect soon. But Ukraine has described its goal of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as crucial to its long-term security, and the aspiration has been written into the country’s constitution. Reversing that position would be controversial and require legal changes that aren’t easy to approve.

The plan says that there would be no prohibition against Ukraine joining the EU, a multiyear accession process Kyiv has begun. Russia has said it isn’t opposed to Ukraine joining the EU.

NATO has always insisted it will remain open for membership of any potential aspirant.

The U.S. guarantee:

• The U.S. will receive compensation for the guarantee;
• If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee;
• If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked;
• If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.

WSJ Analysis

Ukraine has always pushed for a strong and clear security guarantee from the U.S. to help defend it if Russia comes back and attacks the country again, a widely held fear in Kyiv and Europe. The Trump administration initially dismissed the need for a security guarantee but came around to the idea over the summer.The plan calls for a “decisive coordinated military response” if Ukraine is attacked in future, although the U.S. hasn’t been specific about what role it would play in that. Many doubt Western countries would risk a war with Russia by sending military forces into Ukraine. The U.S. dropped support for a European reassurance force to enter Ukraine under a peace deal, because of Russian opposition. Russia has recently demanded veto power in any discussions about the shape of a future peacekeeping force in Ukraine.

Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

• The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and on a case-by-case basis.
• The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
• Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8.

WSJ Analysis

Europe and Ukraine have said that there must be no return to business as usual after the war, and they want to see Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials held criminally responsible for the war. Europe has enacted a plan to stop importing Russian oil and gas by 2027. European leaders are also likely to resist permitting Russia’s return to the group of countries that became known as the G-7 after Moscow was kicked out in 2014.

Frozen funds will be used as follows:

• $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine;
• The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen. The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.

WSJ Analysis

This part of the plan, which refers to about $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets, would need European support. Much of that money is held in Belgium under EU sanctions, which Washington doesn’t control.

European leaders had been working on a plan to use those assets to loan Ukraine around $213 billion. That wouldn’t be possible under the terms of Trump’s peace plan, which designates $100 billion for rebuilding Ukraine and the remainder for a U.S.-Russia investment vehicle.

Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine:

WSJ Analysis

The U.S. plan rests on a series of promises by Russia, including legislating in its parliament a policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine. Other promises include recognizing the sovereignty of Ukraine and keeping troops out of a demilitarized part of the Donbas.

Ukraine has argued that Russia has repeatedly broken its promises in the past—including the 1994 Budapest memorandum in which Russia pledged to accept Ukraine’s borders in exchange for Ukraine handing over Soviet-era nuclear weapons on its territory. Kyiv and its European backers say the Russian pledges can only be enforced by security guarantees and the threat of a clear military response. They also say enshrining laws in the Kremlin-controlled Duma gives Russian promises no additional weight.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine—50:50:

WSJ Analysis

Ukraine has long demanded that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant be returned to Ukraine at the end of the war. The plant produced around 20% of the country’s power before the war and sits close to the front lines.

Russia has talked about getting the plant back up and running to provide electricity to Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine. The plant’s six reactors are currently shut down. The International Atomic Energy Agency has said the plant shouldn’t be operated as long as fighting continues.

Territories:

• Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
• Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.
• Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
• Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

WSJ Analysis

Ukraine has insisted it wouldn’t cede any land to Russia, saying that any concessions would only encourage Russia to regroup its forces during a cease-fire to attack Ukraine again.

Ukraine has built a vast network of defenses across the eastern Ukrainian region of the Donbas, where Moscow’s forces have been steadily grinding forward in recent months at a high price in human lives. Kyiv’s troops still hold many strategically significant positions in the region, and Ukrainian officials say relinquishing them would give Russia an opportunity to pursue further offensive operations from a position of greater strength.

A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve outstanding issues:

• All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an ‘all for all’ basis.
• All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.
• A family reunification program will be implemented.
• Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict.

WSJ Analysis

This is one part of the deal that is likely to be endorsed by both sides, as both Moscow and Kyiv have said that bringing their prisoners-of-war and detained civilians home is a priority. But there will be points of contention.

There will likely be disagreement over which POWs Russia is willing to repatriate to Ukraine, since many have been convicted in Russian courts on charges of terrorism that they deny. Ukraine also says Russia doesn’t want many of its own POWs to return home because thousands of returning war veterans can destabilize the political situation inside Russia.

The question of the 20,000 Ukrainian children that Kyiv says Russia has forcibly transferred to its territory during the war is another disputed issue. Russia says it was simply saving these children from the fighting, and argues that at most several hundred children qualify for a return to Ukraine after lengthy consultations, and only if their legal guardians step forward.

Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days:

WSJ Analysis

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who was elected to a five-year term in 2019, has been able to extend his mandate because of martial law imposed since Russia’s invasion. He has said he is open to holding new elections if there is a way of ensuring any vote can be free and fair, including in regions partially occupied by Russia. But he has dismissed the idea of holding elections under Russian pressure, especially as his Russian counterpart, Putin, has used the lack of elections in Ukraine to argue that Zelensky is an illegitimate leader. Kyiv also says any national vote would be a prime opportunity for Russia to sow disinformation inside Ukraine and push its own pro-Russian candidates to victory.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

WSJ

9. Latest Push for Peace Is Zelensky’s Toughest Moment Since Start of War

​Summary:

Facing a U.S. ultimatum to accept POTUS' contentious peace plan or risk losing aid, Zelensky confronts his hardest choice of the war. Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject territorial concessions and amnesty, yet setbacks, blackouts, corruption scandals and looming budget gaps increase pressure. Allies debate whether Ukraine can keep fighting without U.S. support.

Latest Push for Peace Is Zelensky’s Toughest Moment Since Start of War

Ukrainian leader is trying to prepare his people for ‘a very difficult choice’ after almost four years of full-scale conflict with Russia

By Ian Lovett

Follow

Nov. 21, 2025 8:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-ukraine-trump-russia-peace-plan-dd1f1885

WSJ

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a difficult choice between accepting a potentially humiliating peace deal and risking the loss of a key ally.
• President Trump has given Ukraine a week to agree to the peace deal, after which Ukraine and its allies fear that important support could end.
• A recent poll shows that some 71% of Ukrainians opposed pulling back voluntarily from territory that their country still controls.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a difficult choice between accepting a potentially humiliating peace deal and risking the loss of a key ally.

On the second day of full-scale war, when Russian forces were advancing toward Kyiv and some Western officials were urging Volodymyr Zelensky to flee the country, the Ukrainian president recorded a video message outside his office.

“The president is here,” Zelensky said. “We are all here defending our independence and our state.”

Nearly four years later, Zelensky, clad in black, recorded another video near the same spot—more downcast than defiant, preparing his people for the potential loss of a major ally. The U.S. wants him to sign a peace deal with provisions that most Ukrainians find odious.

President Trump has given Ukraine a week to agree to the proposal, after which Ukraine and its allies fear that important support could end, including intelligence sharing and weapons.

“Ukraine may find itself facing a very difficult choice,” Zelensky said. “Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.”

The U.S. ultimatum comes at a moment when Zelensky already finds himself in a vice. A corruption scandal has ensnared members of his cabinet, and led to calls—including from members of his own party—for an overhaul of his government.

In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces are advancing, and now appear poised to take two large cities. Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have left much of the country with power for only a few hours a day.

Damage to a residential area in the Donetsk region of Ukraine early this month. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

In the midst of all those challenges, Zelensky will have to decide if Ukraine can keep fighting without U.S. support, or if he will have to persuade his country to accept an agreement they might find unjust and humiliating.

“Remember that first day of the war. Most of us made a choice. A choice in favor of Ukraine,” he said. “Our unity was aimed at protecting our home from the enemy. And we need unity now more than ever.”

So far, Zelensky has chosen caution, at least in public. He has said he would work with the U.S. on the proposal, and held discussions with an array of European allies. It isn’t yet clear if Moscow will endorse the American proposal, though Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday the plan “can form the foundation of a final peace settlement.”

Privately, Zelensky gathered members of his ruling party at Ukraine’s Parliament, known as the Rada, on Thursday night to discuss the issues the country is facing.

The U.S. proposal includes a series of provisions that Zelensky has loudly rejected in the past, including withdrawal of troops from the parts of the eastern Donetsk region that Kyiv still controls, as well as a limit on the size of Ukraine’s military.

Zelensky didn’t go through the specifics of the plan, but told the gathering he would be involved in serious peace negotiations in the days ahead, including with the U.S., said Mykyta Poturaiev, a member who was present at the meeting.

“He predicted that negotiations will be difficult,” Poturaiev said. “But he is still optimistic, and he hopes the Ukrainian position will be heard and that in any case we can be absolutely sure that he is not going to deny any of our key national interests.”

Discussing the corruption scandal, Zelensky said he would soon put forward his own plan for reorganizing the cabinet, adding that anyone in any way tied to the corruption scandal would be out, Poturaiev said. Zelensky refused to engage directly on the question of removing his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, whose resignation many members of the Rada have been demanding.

“He said, ‘This is my zone of responsibility, and I will make my own decisions,” Poturaiev said.

A spokesman for Zelensky on Friday didn’t respond to a request for comment.

On social media, Ukrainians’ outrage over the U.S. proposal drowned out the previous demands for action in response to the corruption scandal. In their posts, they often made note of the hardships Ukrainians now endure daily, including long power outages while loved ones have been away fighting for months or years.

Many were particularly galled about a provision in the U.S. plan that extended amnesty for actions taken by all parties during the war.

Iryna Tsilyk, a Ukrainian filmmaker whose husband is serving in Ukraine’s military, posted descriptions of the destruction from a Russian attack this past week on the western Ukrainian city of Ternopil.

Members of a rescue team searched Friday through rubble in Ternopil, Ukraine, after a Russian strike. Maxym Marusenko/EPA/Shutterstock

“A mother and daughter, hugging each other, burned alive,” she wrote on Facebook. “And next to it is a plan of surrender, which proposes to accept that Russia will pay nothing for this.”

A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey released in October found that a majority of Ukrainians still opposed giving up any territory, even if that means prolonging the war. Some 71% opposed pulling back voluntarily from territory that Ukraine still controls.

At least for now, Zelensky remains largely popular at home, despite the corruption scandal, with a majority of Ukrainians still indicating that they trust him as a wartime leader, according to polling conducted this past week by KIIS.

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, former executive director of Transparency International Ukraine, an anticorruption group, and now a lawmaker from an opposition party in Parliament, said the U.S. ultimatum will, at least temporarily, take pressure off Zelensky to make changes within his administration.

“We will keep fighting, with Western partners or without them, because it’s impossible to adopt what the U.S. has proposed,” Yurchyshyn said.

He said that losing access to U.S. intelligence would be difficult, but that other Western allies could replace most of the weapons America supplied, if there was the political will.

“Yes, we’re in a tough circumstance,” he said. “But we’ll keep fighting, because it’s about our sovereignty, our lives.”

Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics and a former Ukrainian economy minister, said that, given the leverage the U.S. seems willing to exert, Zelensky would need to consider the peace proposal seriously, even though it would be hard for Ukrainians to accept. Mylovanov cited a large hole in Ukraine’s budget for the coming year, which Kyiv will need Western aid to fill.

A Ukrainian flag was displayed on a screen Thursday during a power outage in Kyiv. Sergei Gapon/AFP/Getty Images

“We don’t have money for the spring,” he said. “We have a domestic political crisis, and Europe and the U.S. are not that willing to continue to fund us.”

He said Zelensky would likely be able to convince the country—and the Rada, which would have to approve the plan—on some provisions that are unpopular. As the weather gets colder and the blackouts become even worse, the public will likely grow more eager to end the conflict.

“I think his ability to sell this is much higher than people think,” Mylovanov said. “The real question is whether Ukraine can hope to get a better deal.”

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Should Zelensky agree to the U.S.’s peace plan? Why or why not? Join the conversation below.

Poturaiev, the member of Parliament from Zelensky’s party, said he believed territory could be part of the negotiations.

“The key point is whether we can continue to be Ukrainians, and keep our national identity and our national sovereign state,” he said. “We will never agree with officially recognizing the occupation of our territories, but this can be discussed, in my opinion.”

“The war,” he said, “is for our right to be Ukrainians.”

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

WSJ

10. Don’t let a scandal undermine the defence of Ukraine

​Summary:

Ukraine’s Energoatom kickback scandal is explosive, revealing wartime graft and damaging Zelensky, yet also proving anti-corruption bodies can still function. Outrage must not derail aid: Ukraine has never been clean, but its defeat would embolden Putin, destabilize Europe, and cost the West far more than continued support.

Excerpt:

A victory for the Kremlin there could mean a nation of over 30m in its thrall on the EU’s doorstep, awash with weapons and bitterness. Mr Putin might turn his attention towards NATO or Moldova. There could be huge refugee flows. Supporting Ukraine is not an act of selfless principle, but an exercise in hard-headed realism. The defence of Ukraine is the defence of Europe. If the profiteers are guilty, they deserve to rot in prison. But the West must not let a nasty scandal blind it to the greater danger that looms from Moscow.

Don’t let a scandal undermine the defence of Ukraine

Outrage is justified. Letting Vladimir Putin win would be disastrous

The Economist · Nov 19th 2025

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/11/19/dont-let-a-scandal-undermine-the-defence-of-ukraine

An intelligence officer likens it to an atomic bomb exploding in Volodymyr Zelensky’s face. A scandal involving kickbacks and money-laundering centred on Energoatom, a state-owned nuclear-power agency, is fast becoming the worst crisis Ukraine’s president has faced since Russia invaded his country almost four years ago. Two ministers have already been removed, one arrested; more high-level casualties seem certain. For Ukraine’s Western supporters, the news is infuriating. For ordinary Ukrainians—whether fighting on the front or living under daily Russian missile and drone attacks—it is far worse. While their country is engaged in an existential struggle, bigwigs are alleged to have misappropriated huge sums, perhaps $100m. If guilty, they have deprived their own troops of resources.

Outrage is justified. But it is vital to understand what this scandal means—and what it does not. First, the graft it reveals is not new. Ukraine, though far less corrupt than Vladimir Putin’s Russia, has a long history of sleaze. The Western mission to encourage reform was always destined to be slow. The effort predates Mr Zelensky and will outlast him.

Second—if you squint—the scandal contains a glimmer of good news. Despite Mr Zelensky’s clumsy and quickly reversed attempt to curb their independence in July, the country’s anti-corruption agencies appear able to do their job. That is precisely what Ukraine’s supporters have hoped to see, and today’s revelations may end up strengthening them.

Third, at least for now, Mr Zelensky himself is not directly implicated, though all bucks stop at his desk and one of those named is his former business partner. His position is clearly damaged. His chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, is now under pressure and may be sacrificed. Mr Zelensky must do a much better job of fighting corruption to maintain morale at home and support abroad. And if the scandal were to render his position untenable, so be it. At the war’s outset he proved himself a hero by refusing to flee, but no leader is indispensable. Britain changed prime ministers in both world wars; America fought on to victory after the death of FDR in April 1945.

Yes, the danger that this will poison support for Ukraine is real. Details emerged this week of a “peace” plan that would give Mr Putin much of what he wants and severely weaken Ukraine. It is not yet clear how seriously Donald Trump’s administration views this proposal. But critics of Ukraine in the West—from America’s MAGA Republicans to European populists—have seized on the corruption scandal as proof that Ukraine is unworthy of support. They have long hunted for an excuse to justify throttling aid or normalising relations with Moscow. This affair gives them a superficially plausible one.

But only superficially. Viewed through a geopolitical lens, this scandal does not change anything. Ukraine is not, and never has been, a model of clean governance. That is not why the West has spent some $400bn—and counting—to help defend it. Were Western support to falter, the only winner would be Mr Putin. He would be closer to crushing Ukraine and turning it into an even more corrupt client state. If that were to happen, the eventual cost to Europe (and to America, should it continue to honour its NATO commitments) would be vastly higher than the cost of continuing to support Ukraine.

A victory for the Kremlin there could mean a nation of over 30m in its thrall on the EU’s doorstep, awash with weapons and bitterness. Mr Putin might turn his attention towards NATO or Moldova. There could be huge refugee flows. Supporting Ukraine is not an act of selfless principle, but an exercise in hard-headed realism. The defence of Ukraine is the defence of Europe. If the profiteers are guilty, they deserve to rot in prison. But the West must not let a nasty scandal blind it to the greater danger that looms from Moscow. ■

Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “The power and the fury”

11. Trump Uses Gaza Peace Playbook in Ukraine

​Summary:

POTUS applies his Gaza cease-fire playbook to Ukraine, pushing a one-week ultimatum for a 28-point peace plan seen as favoring Russia. Putin backs it; Europeans and Kyiv are alarmed. Zelensky calls it a choice between dignity and losing a partner. Critics say capped forces and vague guarantees leave Ukraine exposed.

Trump Uses Gaza Peace Playbook in Ukraine

WSJ

White House gives Ukraine less than a week to sign on to plan requiring major concessions

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow

Nov. 22, 2025 5:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-uses-gaza-peace-playbook-in-ukraine-081bd21c

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Trump during a meeting at the White House in August. mandel ngan/AFP/Getty Images

• President Trump’s 28-point plan for Ukraine, similar to his Gaza strategy, aims to end the conflict quickly.
• The plan has Russian President Putin’s support but faces anxiety in Europe and Ukraine due to its perceived one-sidedness.
• Ukraine’s President Zelensky stated the ultimatum presents a choice between ‘loss of dignity’ or ‘losing a key partner.’

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• President Trump’s 28-point plan for Ukraine, similar to his Gaza strategy, aims to end the conflict quickly.

WASHINGTON—President Trump’s push to end Russia’s war with Ukraine takes a page from the playbook he used to obtain a cease-fire in Gaza. By force of personality and deadlines, he is trying to jam though a plan to stop a grinding conflict between two reluctant warring parties.

A breakthrough would fulfill Trump’s goal of finally stopping the brutal war, which he vowed during his days on the campaign trail to end within 24 hours after returning to the White House.

So far, Trump has succeeded in securing a measure of support from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has said a 28-point draft U.S. plan could be the basis for resolving the conflict. But Trump’s demand that Kyiv accept the proposal within a week has spurred deep anxiety in Europe and Ukraine, whose officials are looking for ways to rework what they see as a one-sided plan.

“Trump’s 28-point plan for ending the war in Ukraine follows the same script as his 20-point plan for Gaza—a short term, transactional take it or leave it approach to quickly end the fighting but not the war,” said Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. Middle East negotiator who is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“Both were clearly designed to heavily favor one of the combatants—Russia in case of Ukraine; Israel in Gaza,” Miller added.

Israelis gathered with national flags in October outside a military base in southern Israel to welcome hostages released by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. maya levin/AFP/Getty Images

As part of the Gaza cease-fire and hostage-exchange deal, Palestinians were released from Israeli prisons. omar al-qattaa/AFP/Getty Images

Like the Gaza plan, the White House blueprint was worked on by special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner. But this time, Kremlin confidant Kirill Dmitriev was involved in the consultations, officials have said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “will have to learn to like it,” or will have to keep fighting, Trump said. It was a sharp shift in tone from recent statements in which Trump suggested the U.S. could bolster Ukraine by sending long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and predicted the country might recapture all territory seized by Russian forces since 2022.

A White House spokeswoman also insists that Trump is still open to suggestions from Kyiv and Moscow, building on the president’s success in getting a cease-fire in Gaza. “Just like you saw with respect to Israel and Gaza, we are hearing out both sides of this war to understand what can you commit to do to end the war,” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said Thursday.

In Gaza, after repeated attempts at securing a cease-fire, Trump warned Hamas in late September that it had “three or four days” to agree to the detailed U.S.-crafted cease-fire deal or they would “pay in hell.” Trump also privately pressured a reluctant Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the terms.

Trump announced agreement on the deal on Oct. 8. Many elements of the Gaza plans remain incomplete, including disarming Hamas, deploying an international security force, standing up a new governing authority and settling on a reconstruction plan. Both sides still mount isolated attacks, though a fragile cease-fire remains in place.

Trump is using a similar pressure campaign against Kyiv, though some former officials say the stakes are even higher than they were in Gaza as Ukraine’s sovereignty and Europe’s security is at stake.

“What’s on the table is so much more consequential for the parties. We weren’t asking Israel to agree to a Palestinian state,” said Richard Haass, the former head of the Council on Foreign Relations and a State Department official under George W. Bush. “It is one thing to jam people on something that is relatively modest; something else to jam them on something that is existential.”

Zelensky said on Friday that Trump’s ultimatum confronted Ukraine with “one of the most difficult moments in our history,” he said in a video address. “Now Ukraine may find itself facing a very difficult choice. Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” He added, “We choose dignity.”

Zelensky indicated Friday after speaking with Vice President JD Vance that he hadn’t given up on persuading the White House to amend the terms of the U.S. plans. He and Vance agreed to have their advisers work “to find a workable path to peace,” Zelensky said.

Similar to a Board of Peace headed by Trump in the Gaza agreement, the plan to end the Ukraine conflict calls for establishment of a “Peace Council’ to monitor the implementation of the settlement that he would also head.

A parallel accord on security guarantees provides for consultations by the U.S. president with Ukraine, NATO and European governments if Russia carries out a “significant, deliberate and sustained armed attack” after a peace agreement is implemented in Ukraine.

Emergency responders use a crane to retrieve the bodies of residents who were killed when a Russian missile hit an apartment building in Ternopil, Ukraine. Thomas Peter/Reuters

The potential response to such a Russian attack listed in the document includes military action, the sharing of intelligence and logistic support for Ukraine, as well as economic and diplomatic steps. Some former Trump administration officials see that as a noteworthy Russian concession.

“Getting Russia’s agreement to a Western-exclusive security guarantee is a significant achievement for the administration,” said Andrew Peek, who served as the top National Security Council official for Russia issues in Trump’s second term before leaving in May.

But other former officials and analysts say Trump’s plan asks Ukraine to trade tangible security arrangements for a mere promise of consultation. Provisions of the 28-point plan would require Ukraine to cap its military at 600,000 while precluding the deployment of a European-led “reassurance force” inside the country to deter future Russian aggression.

“Even if this goes nowhere, the Russians have set in place a narrative,” said Rebeccah Heinrichs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. “It looks like Russia is making some kind of concessions and they are not. So it throws the NATO alliance and Ukraine sort of in turmoil and puts us at odds with each other.”

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

12. Americans Show Consensus on Many Democracy-Related Matters

​Summary:

A large national Kettering Foundation/Gallup survey finds broad shared democratic values despite polarization. Around 80% of Americans reject political violence, favor elected leaders compromising to get things done, support free nonviolent expression, and see racial, religious, and cultural diversity as a national strength. Yet they split evenly on whether cultural change is happening too fast and on whether government or individuals should ensure basic needs are met, with sharp divides by party, age, education, and income. Americans are also conflicted over limiting “radical” candidates and majority rule that may disadvantage minorities, revealing tension between shared ideals and contested democratic practice.

Comment: Data and graphics at the link. Some very good news here. We are more united than divided.

Americans Show Consensus on Many Democracy-Related Matters

by Jeffrey M. Jones and Ellyn Maese

https://news.gallup.com/poll/696494/americans-show-consensus-democracy-related-matters.aspx

Story Highlights

• Eight in 10 endorse compromise; 83% reject political violence
• 84% say U.S. benefits from having a mix of cultures
• Public split on whether cultural change is happening too fast

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Eight in 10 U.S. adults agree on a variety of issues that reflect core aspects of U.S. democracy. These include that using violence to achieve political goals is never OK; that elected leaders should compromise to get things done; and that having a mix of races, religions and cultures benefits the nation. Americans also express a desire to limit the political influence of wealthy individuals and businesses and believe there is a difference between facts and opinions.

These findings are the first from the Kettering Foundation/Gallup Democracy for All Project and are based on a multimodal (web and mail) survey of over 20,000 U.S. adults, conducted July 7 to Aug. 25. This is a five-year project designed to measure Americans’ views of how well democracy serves the U.S. and Americans from a variety of different backgrounds. The full report details how Americans largely agree that democracy is the best form of government but do not believe it is functioning well right now.

As part of the survey, Americans were shown five pairs of contrasting perspectives on how democracy and U.S. society should function and were asked to choose which perspective comes closer to their view. Large majorities of all key subgroups of Americans reject violence, favor compromise and embrace a multicultural society.

There are modest differences in some of these views by party, age and education. For example, Democrats, independents and college graduates are somewhat more likely than Republicans and non-college graduates to see multiculturalism as a strength. Older Americans and Democrats are more likely than younger Americans and Republicans to endorse compromise. Age differences are even more pronounced when it comes to rejecting the use of political violence, with senior citizens most opposed and young adults the least. This relationship will be explored in more depth in an article to be released next week.

Another question in the survey, asked on a five-point agree/disagree scale, finds that eight in 10 Americans strongly agree (39%) or agree (41%) that everyone, regardless of their views, has the right to free, nonviolent expression. Just 5% disagree, and 15% are neutral.

Americans Evenly Split on Pace of Cultural Change

While Americans embrace the idea of a multicultural society, there is a decided lack of consensus over the pace of cultural change. Forty-nine percent believe cultural changes in the U.S. over the past 25 years have happened too fast, while an equal share say those changes have occurred at a reasonable pace.

Close to two-thirds of Republicans (64%) think cultural changes have happened too fast, while the same proportion of Democrats hold the opposing view. But all other subgroups, including political independents and U.S. immigrants themselves, are more evenly divided on the question.

The 84% of Americans who view multiculturalism as a strength divide about evenly as to whether cultural change is happening too fast or at a reasonable pace. Overall, 45% of Americans view multiculturalism as a strength and are comfortable with the speed of change, while 39% see it as a strength but believe change is occurring too fast. More Democrats fall into the former group and more Republicans into the latter.

Responsibility for Meeting Basic Needs Also Divides Americans

Americans also divide about evenly when asked whether the government (48%) or people themselves (50%) should be responsible for making sure people’s basic needs are met. The divisions mainly reflect partisan differences, as 72% of Republicans say people should meet their own needs, while 69% of Democrats say the government is responsible for making sure individuals’ needs are met.

Younger and older adults also tend to disagree on this matter, with 63% of younger adults, those aged 18 to 29, seeing the government as responsible for meeting people’s basic needs, while just under 60% of those aged 50 and older say individuals are responsible.

Adults in lower-income households are more inclined than those with higher incomes to see the government as being responsible for meeting basic needs.

The age differences on this question are seen in all party groups. Younger Democrats, independents and Republicans are more likely than their older counterparts to believe the government should make sure people’s basic needs are met.

Two other items asked on a five-point agree/disagree scale also show close divisions between agreement, disagreement and a neutral position. These include whether people holding radical views should be prevented from running for office (33% agree, 27% neutral, 38% disagree) and whether laws should be created based on what is best for the majority of people, even if it negatively impacts minority groups (37% agree, 31% neutral, 32% disagree).

Bottom Line

The Kettering Foundation/Gallup Democracy for All Project’s inaugural survey reveals a strong foundation of shared democratic values among Americans at a time when many see the nation as starkly divided. There is broad support for the democratic ideals of nonviolence, compromise, multiculturalism and freedom of expression — key principles that underpin free, democratic and civil societies.

Yet, the data also reveal discord over how democracy should function, including how much power the majority should have, tolerance of radical voices in politics and the pace of cultural change. People’s political orientation, age, education and, in some cases, income are associated with deep societal divides over how to become a better union.

Read the full report.

Stay up to date with the latest insights by following @Gallup on X and on Instagram.

Learn more about how the Gallup Panel works.

13. Jonathan Pollard, Mike Huckabee meet at US Jerusalem embassy

​Summary:

Convicted spy Jonathan Pollard said his off-schedule Jerusalem embassy meeting with US Ambassador Mike Huckabee was purely personal thanks, not political. He claims CIA station officials and ex-ambassador Dan Kurtzer “weaponized” the visit to undermine Huckabee. Pollard urges Trump to retain Huckabee and completely purge the entire embassy’s intelligence staff.

Comment: What was the Ambassador thinking? What possible good could have come of this meeting? What effect was the Ambassador trying to achieve? Are we going to take firing recommendations from someone like Pollard?

Jonathan Pollard, Mike Huckabee meet at US Jerusalem embassy | The Jerusalem Post

Pollard told The Jerusalem Post that the meeting was a personal affair to thank the ambassador for private matters, and emphasized that the event was taken out of context.

ByCORINNE BAUM, JERUSALEM POST STAFF

NOVEMBER 20, 2025 15:25

Updated: NOVEMBER 20, 2025 21:06

Jerusalem Post

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-874623

Convicted Israeli-American spy Jonathan Pollard said that his meeting with US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee at the American Embassy in Jerusalem was a “personal” conversation to express gratitude, not a political exchange, in a phone conversation with The Jerusalem Post on Thursday.

“The meeting, simply put, was a personal affair. That’s it," he said. "The reason I wanted to meet him was to express my deep and sincere appreciation for everything he had done to help me when I was in prison."

According to Pollard, the meeting was “misinterpreted” and used by certain figures, both within the US Embassy and the Trump administration, to try to remove Huckabee.

The convicted ex-spy said he requested the session through his lawyer and emphasized that the discussion was about personal matters, not policy. He added that Huckabee was “very gracious,” and that he would not have considered such a routine conversation as something requiring formal reporting to Washington.

Pollard emphasized that the talk focused on thanking Huckabee for his support and kindness to his late wife, Esther. He also alleged that elements inside the embassy and the US administration misinterpreted and “weaponized” the meeting to discredit the ambassador.

Jonathan Pollard seen during a tour of the Sovereignty movement and the Bik'at HaYarden Regional Council in the Jordan Valley, in the West Bank on February 12, 2023. (credit: GERSHON ELINSON/FLASH90)

Pollard to 'Post': CIA affected interpretation of meeting with Huckabee

He added that he believed “elements in the CIA station” played a role in how the meeting was interpreted.

Pollard singled out former US ambassador Dan Kurtzer and said he believed someone at the embassy had alerted officials in Washington about the meeting.

"Dan Kurtzer is someone I characterize as an enemy of the State of Israel. He has made some very intemperate remarks concerning me that I find, frankly, kind of shocking," Pollard stated. "I understood, the minute I read the article, where this was coming from."

Pollard claimed to have confirmation on the matter.

He added that he spoke to the New York Times to prevent conspiracy theories, but maintained the meeting was a personal affair.

The Post reported earlier Thursday that Pollard and Huckabee met at the US Embassy in Jerusalem, in a conversation that was not on the ambassador’s public schedule. The meeting drew concern among some US officials, according to that report.

Separately, Huckabee has outlined a conservative diplomatic approach in interviews this year, and Pollard, who moved to Israel after serving a US prison sentence for spying, has increasingly been active in public life.

Pollard urged US President Donald Trump to keep Huckabee in his post, arguing the envoy is representing the administration “better than anyone else I could imagine,” and reiterated his view that the embassy’s intelligence staff should be replaced with a smaller team.

"These people are not friends of Israel, and frankly, I wouldn't even consider them friends of the Trump administration either," he said, adding that Trump should "clean out" the CIA.

"The entire CIA station at the US Embassy should be sent home, and a smaller, more professional team should be brought in. A depoliticized team should be brought in to represent the agency."

The White House was not aware of Huckabee and Pollard's meeting, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said later on Thursday. "But the president stands by our ambassador, Mike Huckabee, and all that he is doing for the United States and Israel," Leavitt said at a press briefing.

Jerusalem Post

14. The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

​Summary:

Iran’s accelerating nuclear program and north Korea’s maturing arsenal are converging into a two-front nuclear challenge that could overstretch U.S. deterrence, crisis management, and alliance cohesion. Pyongyang is moving toward a survivable – even warfighting – capability with diversified, potentially first-use nuclear options. Tehran retains technical capacity and fissile stock to “break out,” may adapt north Korea’s model, and could seek DPRK assistance. Simultaneous flare-ups in the Middle East and Northeast Asia would force parallel U.S. decision cycles under a credibility cloud. The article urges updated wargaming, tighter allied integration, and a redesigned U.S. strategy to deter both regimes at once.

Excerpts:

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

​Comment: Iran "could" seek DPRK assistance? I think we should assume they have already sought DPRK assistance and will continue to do so. One thing this illustrates is why we cannot treat the four members of the Dark Quad or CRInK as discrete or separate threats. We must recognize and address their collusion. Congress should pass the DISRUPT Act to address these security threats.

Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/congresss-disrupt-act-the-blueprint-for-political-warfare-against-the-dark-quad/

The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

By Hollie McKay

Contributing Cipher Brief Reporter

Hollie McKay is a Cipher Brief contributing writer, war crimes investigator, and author of "Only Cry for the Living: Memos from Inside the ISIS Battlefield". She previously worked as an investigative and international affairs/war correspondent for Fox News Digital for over fourteen years with a focus on war, terrorism, and crimes against humanity. 

19 November, 2025

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/nuclear-iran-north-korea

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, arrives for talks with Xi Jinping on September 4, 2025 (Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images) and an Iranian flag waves on top of a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during a war exhibition commemorating the 45th anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) in southern Tehran, Iran, on September 23, 2025 (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images).

DEEP DIVE — While Washington is focused on Iran’s accelerating uranium-enrichment program and increasingly aggressive regional posture, an equally consequential shift is unfolding with seemingly less fanfare: North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile advancements are quietly reshaping the global threat landscape.

For U.S. policymakers, the danger is no longer a pair of isolated challenges but a converging two-front nuclear problem—one that threatens to push America’s deterrence posture, crisis-management capacity, and alliance coordination closer to a breaking point. To understand how these two fronts could interact, experts emphasize that Iran and North Korea share a long-standing strategic alignment.

“The Iran–North alliance represents a four-decade-long partnership driven by shared hostility toward the United States, economic needs, and strategic isolation,” Danny Citrinowicz, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former head of the Iran Branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in Israeli defense intelligence, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Iranians need to rearm and prepare for another campaign, which requires additional and fresh thinking regarding the depth of the relationship between Tehran and Pyongyang.”

He also warns that this moment may become an inflection point.

“If Iran seeks to change its nuclear strategy, it could ask North Korea for nuclear bombs or highly enriched material or spare parts for the destroyed nuclear facilities, such as the conversion facility in Isfahan,” Citrinowicz continued. “The potential damage in the event of such an event is so severe that it is essential that the intelligence organizations of the United States, South Korea, and Israel identify signs of this.”

related

Uncovering the Truth Behind Trump’s Call to Resume Nuclear Testing

Trump’s Next Test: Kim Jong Un’s Bid for Legitimacy and a Nuclear Normalization Deal

Pyongyang’s Nuclear Threat

Despite UN sanctions and diplomatic efforts, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) brief underscored that North Korea continues to surge forward with both nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile development. For Kim Jong Un, analysts note, nuclear weapons are a guarantor of regime security, and he has no intention of abandoning them.

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine and capability sets are evolving in troubling ways. The 2025 CRS brief states that a September 2023 law expanded the conditions under which Pyongyang would employ nuclear weapons, lowering what had been a high threshold for use. The same report noted the regime “promised to boost nuclear weapons production exponentially and diversify nuclear strike options.”

On the delivery side, the brief outlines how North Korea is fielding solid-fueled road-mobile ICBMs, sea-based launch systems, and pursuing multiple warheads on a single missile — all elements that raise the question not just of deterrence but of crisis stability and escalation control. In short, Pyongyang appears to be reaching toward a survivable deterrent — or perhaps a warfighting capability — that can impose calculations on the U.S. and its allies in a far more challenging way than before.

“Kim’s investment in new nuclear-capable delivery systems reflects the strategic importance of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, tells The Cipher Brief. “North Korea is better positioning itself to evade and overwhelm regional missile defenses and target the U.S. homeland.”

Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward, reinforces that intelligence picture, stressing that open-source assessments now “frame North Korea as a maturing nuclear-warfighting state,” with doctrine “trending toward first-use options in extreme regime-threat scenarios.” He notes that U.S. intelligence already evaluates Pyongyang as having achieved miniaturization: “A 2017 DIA assessment judged DPRK miniaturization sufficient for SRBM-to-ICBM delivery.”

Taken together, those capabilities point to a shifting threat environment for Washington.

“North Korea has tested missiles with the range necessary to target the continental United States,” Davenport underscored. “U.S. military planners have to assume that North Korea can target the United States.”

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Iran’s Nuclear Surge

Meanwhile, Iran is not standing still. Tehran has begun openly emulating aspects of Pyongyang’s nuclear playbook, indicating that if Western strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure forced Tehran to go underground, it could adapt quickly. That duality matters: Iran can arguably deploy its program overtly, under inspection and diplomatic cover, but at some threshold, it may decide the only path to survival is accelerated weaponization. If that happens while North Korea is already pushing new strategic capabilities, the U.S. is confronted with two simultaneous flashpoints — one in the Middle East, the other in Northeast Asia.

Deterrence, by definition, demands clarity of purpose, credible capabilities, and correctly calibrated signals. When the U.S. must manage a nuclear-armed North Korea and a near-breakout Iran at the same time, the risk is that strategic bandwidth becomes overstretched.

“Despite the failure of that approach, Iran maintains that its nuclear doctrine is unchanged and it does not intend to pursue nuclear weapons,” Davenport noted. “(But) without a pragmatic diplomatic approach that addresses Iranian economic and security concerns, Tehran’s thinking about nuclear weapons could shift.”

That potential shift in Tehran’s calculus becomes even more concerning when paired with broader warnings about Western inattention.

“If Western focus on the Iran threat dwindles, there is a risk the regime could take a new, covert path to nuclear weapons using remaining or reconstituted assets or foreign help,” Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Such a lack of focus is similar to how North Korea became nuclear-armed.”

Tehran, experts caution, still retains deep technical capacity.

“Iran retained enough fissile stock and technical expertise to rebuild quickly, meaning the setback was tactical rather than strategic,” Wheat noted.

From Washington’s vantage point, the real danger is a dual crisis hitting at once — an Iranian enrichment surge or strike on its facilities in West Asia, paired with a North Korean missile volley or nuclear test in East Asia. That scenario forces the U.S. into parallel decision-cycles, stretching military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources, straining alliances, and creating openings that adversaries could exploit.

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

U.S. Intelligence and Strategic Implications

Open-source intelligence paints a worrying picture: North Korea may have enough fissile material for perhaps up to 50 warheads, though the accuracy and reliability of delivery remain questions. It also signals Pyongyang’s development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and multiple-warhead ICBMs. The regime has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.

The IAEA’s November 2025 report says it can no longer verify the status of Iran’s near–near-weapons-grade uranium stockpile after Tehran halted cooperation following the June 2025 Israeli and U.S. strikes on Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan.

The last confirmed data, from September, showed Iran holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent — a short step from weapons-grade and potentially enough for up to 10 bombs if fully processed. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi says most of this material is now entombed in damaged facilities. Moreover, satellite imagery activity around storage tunnels in Isfahan has raised serious red flags. The IAEA further cautions that oversight of this highly-enriched uranium site is “long overdue,” warning that the agency has lost “continuity of knowledge.”

Moreover, before the strikes, the IAEA assessed Iran could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb in about a week using part of its 60 percent stockpile at Fordow. Damage to centrifuges has likely slowed that timeline. Still, the larger question is political: whether Iran, under renewed UN sanctions and scrutiny, decides that staying within NPT safeguards costs more than openly moving toward a weapon, particularly if work resumes at undeclared or rebuilt sites.

“The U.S. and Israeli strikes have created a window of respite. What happens next depends greatly on Iran’s will to provoke new Israeli strikes,” Stricker said. “North Korea is a wild card and could provide nuclear fuel, facilities, and equipment to Iran.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Looking Ahead

For Washington, the takeaway is stark: systems designed to manage one nuclear threat at a time may crumble should two crises flare simultaneously. The U.S. would need tighter allied coordination, faster intelligence sharing, and stronger, more flexible military deployments to cope.

Yet above all, policymakers must anticipate the possibility of simultaneous escalation in different theatres.

In the coming months and years, key indicators will include North Korea’s choice to conduct a seventh nuclear test or field a credible submarine-launched nuclear force, and Iran’s enrichment trajectory or decision to strike a covert breakout path. The U.S. must also watch for signs of cross-coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang, or between Tehran and Pyongyang — though open links remain murky.

From a policy perspective, a dual-front scenario demands updated wargames, an inter-theatre force posture review, and close allied coordination across NATO, the Indo-Pacific, and Middle East partners. Washington must also guard against the “umbrella illusion” — the belief that the same deterrence logic will apply unchanged across two theatres facing two distinct adversaries with differing doctrine, capabilities, and thresholds.

Finally, media and public attention naturally tend to focus on Iran’s progress or North Korea’s missile launches — one at a time. However, deterring two simultaneous nuclear-adversary theatres demands strategic awareness that the world may not be sequentially configured. For the U.S., what happens in one theatre may shape adversary calculations in the other. The risk is that by the time Washington pivots from Iran, Pyongyang — or Tehran — may have forced a new reality.

In this two-front nuclear dilemma, the question is no longer whether to monitor Iran or North Korea, but how the U.S. will deter both at the same time — and whether its strategic framework is ready for that challenge.

Emerging forms of collaboration amplify that challenge.

“More concerning is that North Korea is positioning itself to benefit from Russian expertise and to further refine its missile systems using data collected from Russia’s use of North Korean systems against Ukraine,” Davenport added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

15. The Ukraine War Is a Draw No One Wants to Accept

​Summary:

 The war is settling into a Washington-shaped negotiated draw: Ukraine survives as a sovereign, pro-Western state but without its lost territories or NATO entry, while Russia keeps key Donbas and land-bridge gains. Neither side wins outright; both claim partial, costly success.

​Comment: This can't be good for Ukraine. Will it result in a stronger, more emboldened Putin?

The Ukraine War Is a Draw No One Wants to Accept

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Andrew Latham · November 21, 2025

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-ukraine-war-is-a-draw-no-one-wants-to-accept/

Article Summary – Nearly four years into the full-scale invasion, the Ukraine war is drifting toward a negotiated draw shaped in Washington.

-Kyiv has survived as a sovereign, pro-Western state, but with roughly a fifth of its territory under Russian control and little prospect of restoring its 1991 borders by force.

Ukraine War TOS-2. Image Credit: X Screenshot.

-Moscow has failed to topple Ukraine, yet secured Donetsk, Luhansk, and a land bridge to Crimea while effectively blocking NATO membership.

-Both sides can claim partial success and deep disappointment. The emerging 28-point settlement reflects that grim balance: Ukraine lives, Russia holds, and neither achieves the victory it wanted.

Ukraine’s War Is Ending Where Reality Begins — In a Cold Negotiated Stalemate

Russia set out in February 2022 to break Ukraine’s sovereignty; Ukraine set out to prevent its own political extinction. Nearly four years later, with Washington now pressing Kyiv to accept a U.S.-brokered 28-point settlement, both have achieved enough of their core objectives to claim success, yet neither has achieved what it truly wanted. This is not the story of an outright Ukrainian victory, nor is it the triumph Moscow once promised its people.

It is the story of a war that has moved toward a negotiated draw — the kind of rough, unsentimental equilibrium that emerges when political aims collide with military limits and outside powers push for a compromise both sides can live with but neither fully embraces.

Ukraine has survived, and that survival is meaningful. But Russia has taken and kept the territory it cares most about: Donetsk and Luhansk, along with a defensible arc across the southeast. Kyiv remains a sovereign state; Moscow holds the ground it considers vital. That is the strategic shape of the war as it now stands.

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron taxis at the 86th Air Base, Romania, in support of NATOs enhanced Air Policing (eAP) capabilities, Sept. 22, 2023. European partners and U.S. forces continue to conduct engagements and multinational exercises, which enhance interoperability to improve regional cooperation, maritime security and stability in the region. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Albert Morel)

Survival Without Restoration

Ukraine has done something extraordinary by enduring. A state that was supposed to collapse in days not only held but fought the Russian Army to a standstill across a thousand-kilometer front. Survival is not trivial; it is the condition that makes all future strategic choices possible.

But survival is not synonymous with victory. Ukraine’s territorial integrity has been shattered, and its goal of fully restoring its 1991 borders is now politically constrained by the terms Washington is advancing — terms that many in Kyiv and across Europe are already publicly pushing back against.

Kyiv remains alive, independent, and aligned with the West — but with roughly twenty percent of its territory under Russian control and little prospect of reversing that fact militarily under the likely contours of a settlement. This is not humiliation, but it is not triumph either.

It is the strategic reality of a war poised to end at the point where the defender stabilized the front but could not reverse the tide — and where its principal patron is signaling a preference for a negotiated freeze over a long war.

Russia’s Costly Success in the East

Russia, for its part, has failed in its most maximalist ambitions: no regime change, no rapid overthrow of the Ukrainian state, no march to Odessa or Kyiv. But to say Russia has failed entirely would be to ignore what it has achieved. Moscow now holds the Donbas heartland — the industrial and symbolic core of its political justification for the invasion — and has secured the land corridor to Crimea, which any U.S.-drafted settlement would almost certainly lock in.

These gains were not the grandiose objectives of February 2022, but they are the objectives Russia has since consolidated around and that the prospective agreement would effectively ratify. The Kremlin’s war cabinet repeatedly signaled that Donetsk and Luhansk were always the irreducible minimum.

It would now have them with international acquiescence, if not full recognition. That territorial anchor gives Moscow a strategic outcome it could live with — even if it is far smaller than the one it originally pursued.

A Neutralized Ukraine, in Practice and Potentially in Law

Russia’s other strategic success is less territorial than political. The proposed settlement would formalize what the battlefield had already made clear: Ukraine is not joining NATO anytime soon. Its future security guarantees would be bilateral and conditional, not alliance-based.

Western leaders can speak of long-term support, but the core of the plan rests on the understanding that NATO membership would be deferred indefinitely to avoid a direct U.S.–Russia confrontation.

To Moscow’s leadership, a Ukraine integrated into the EU but explicitly outside NATO is an acceptable equilibrium. It would mean no NATO missiles on Russia’s border. It would mean Ukraine’s military future, while Western-equipped, is bounded by the commitments written into the settlement. And it would mean that whatever Ukraine becomes, it will not become a formal NATO outpost in the foreseeable future.

One can call this reality unjust. One cannot call it irrelevant. A neutralized Ukraine — de facto before, and potentially de jure under a negotiated deal — is a core Russian objective that the prospective agreement is designed to deliver.

Two Partial Successes, One Negotiated Draw

What emerges from this mix of survival and loss, gain and frustration, is a strategic balance in which neither side achieved the political end-state it wanted. Ukraine did not restore its borders; Russia did not break the Ukrainian state. Each side inflicted enough cost to block the other from achieving total victory. Each secured enough of its minimum objectives to live with a settlement drafted in Washington and contested in both Kyiv and Europe.

This is the textbook definition of a draw in great-power conflict: a political outcome that neither side wanted but both sides may accept because the alternatives are worse.

To call the war a Ukrainian victory ignores the territorial and political concessions embedded in the plan.

To call it a Russian victory ignores the monumental cost and the failure to remake Ukraine in Moscow’s image. The truth lies in between — a hybrid outcome born of hard power restraints, mismatched political ambitions, and American pressure to end the conflict on manageable terms.

A War That Ends Where Reality Begins

Wars rarely end where leaders intend. They end where political will, military capacity, and external pressures intersect. Ukraine’s will outstripped expectations; Russia’s capacity proved more resilient than Western analysts predicted; and the United States now appears ready to force a political equilibrium rather than bankroll an open-ended war.

The result is a potential settlement shaped not by triumph or collapse but by endurance, attrition, and the narrowing of political aims. This draw is neither stable nor final — it could rupture, freeze, or evolve — but it is real, and it reflects a deeper lesson about modern great-power war: states often emerge with enough success to claim vindication, enough loss to feel wounded, and enough uncertainty to fear what comes next.

Ukraine lives. Russia holds. And in the cold logic of geopolitics, that is what a draw brokered in Washington would look like.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for the National Security Journal.

More Military

The U.S. Military Is In ‘Crisis’

Canada’s F-35 Stealth Fighter Mistake Is Just Around the Corner

The Mach 2.23 F-4G Wild Weasel Has a Message for the U.S. Air Force

The U.S. Army’s XM30 Crisis Looks Unavoidable Now

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Andrew Latham · November 21, 2025

16. China takes spat with Japan over Taiwan to UN, vows to defend itself

​Summary:

China has escalated its dispute with Japan to the UN, accusing Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of threatening armed intervention over Taiwan and vowing self-defence. Beijing calls her remarks a grave legal violation amid a bilateral crisis in years. Tokyo rejects the charge as tensions spill into trade and sharp rhetoric.

Comment: PRC portraying itself as a victim in this scenario? Really? Perhaps the UN could use this opportunity to censure the PRC/CCP over its threats to Taiwan? But that is not likely to ever happen.

China takes spat with Japan over Taiwan to UN, vows to defend itself

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi committed "a grave violation of international law" and diplomatic norms when she said a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo, said a senior Chinese official in a letter to the UN on Nov 21.

22 Nov 2025 02:40PM

(Updated: 22 Nov 2025 11:14PM)

channelnewsasia.com

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-japan-taiwan-tensions-united-nations-5484266

BEIJING: China has taken its growing dispute with Japan to the United Nations, accusing Tokyo of threatening "an armed intervention" over Taiwan and vowing to defend itself in its strongest language yet in the two-week-old dispute.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi committed "a grave violation of international law" and diplomatic norms when she said a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo, China's UN Ambassador Fu Cong wrote in a letter on Friday (Nov 21) to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

"If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression," Fu wrote, according to a statement from China's UN mission. "China will resolutely exercise its right of self-defence under the UN Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity."

BIGGEST BILATERAL CRISIS IN YEARS

Beijing views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory and has not ruled out the use of force to take control of the island. Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's claims and says only the island's people can decide their future.

Japan's Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's Office could not immediately be reached on Saturday for comment on Fu's letter, the strongest criticism of Takaichi yet from a senior Chinese official in the biggest bilateral crisis in years.

The ministry emphasised that Japan's commitment to peace was unchanged and dismissed China's claims as "entirely unacceptable".

Takaichi, a conservative nationalist who took office last month, ditched the ambiguity that Japan and the US have long used regarding Taiwan when she told a questioner in parliament on Nov 7 that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan - which lies just over 100km from Japanese territory - could be deemed "a situation threatening Japan's survival".

That is a legal designation that allows a Japanese prime minister to deploy the nation's military.

Takaichi's remarks sparked the tit-for-tat dispute with China that has spilled beyond diplomacy in recent days, with China saying it has "severely damaged" trade cooperation, while concerts of Japanese musicians in China have been abruptly cancelled.

Fu demanded that Japan "stop making provocations and crossing the line, and retract its erroneous remarks", which he said were "openly challenging China's core interests".

Ahead of this year's 80th anniversary of Japan's World War Two defeat, Beijing has increasingly invoked Tokyo's wartime atrocities and China's postwar role in setting up the UN as it criticises its Asian neighbour and seeks to reshape the international governance system.

China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has repeatedly emphasised two postwar declarations envisioning that Taiwan and other territories that had been occupied by Japan would be "restored" to Chinese rule.

The Potsdam and Cairo declarations form the basis for China's legal claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, though many governments view them as statements of intent, not legally binding accords.

Moreover, the declarations were signed by the Republic of China government, which fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong’s communists. Taiwan held China's UN seat until 1971, when it was transferred to the Beijing government of the People's Republic of China.

Source: Reuters/ia/dc

Newsletter

17. US, China held maritime security talks in Hawaii, Chinese navy says

​Summary:

The United States and China held maritime security talks in Hawaii Nov. 18-20, described as frank and constructive. Both sides reviewed naval and air encounters and ways to improve safety. China condemned U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations near Taiwan and the South China Sea. An MMCA working-group meeting is planned for 2026.

US, China held maritime security talks in Hawaii, Chinese navy says

The US and Chinese militaries held "frank and constructive" maritime security talks, the Chinese navy said.

22 Nov 2025 03:24PM

(Updated: 22 Nov 2025 07:35PM)

channelnewsasia.com

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-us-maritime-security-talks-5484161

East Asia

The US and Chinese militaries held "frank and constructive" maritime security talks, the Chinese navy said.

A Chinese coast guard ship near the Philippine-occupied island of Thitu (known as Pag-asa in the Philippines) in the disputed South China Sea on Jun 3, 2025. (File Photo: AFP/Ted Aljibe)

22 Nov 2025 03:24PM (Updated: 22 Nov 2025 07:35PM)

BEIJING: The US and Chinese militaries this week held "frank and constructive" maritime security talks, the Chinese navy said on Saturday (Nov 22), as the two superpowers gradually restore military-to-military communications after several months of trade tensions.

The working-level meetings took place November 18-20 in Hawaii, according to a posting on the official social media account of the People's Liberation Army Navy.

US and Chinese military officials previously held talks in April - the first such working-level meeting on military issues since the beginning of the second term of US President Donald Trump. The twice-yearly talks are known as the military maritime consultative agreement (MMCA) working group.

"The two sides had frank and constructive exchanges ... mainly exchanging views on the current maritime and air security situation between China and the US," China's navy said in its posted statement.

China also criticised US freedom-of-navigation operations in the statement. These are frequently carried out in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, international waters over which China claims sovereignty.

"China ... resolutely opposes any infringement and provocation," China's navy said in its statement, referring to those maritime and overflight transits by US forces.

Both sides also discussed "typical cases of naval and air encounters between the two militaries ... to help the front-line naval and air forces of China and the US interact more professionally and safely," it said.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth raised concerns about Chinese activity in the South China Sea and around Taiwan in a meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun last month.

China has been steadily boosting air, naval and coast guard deployments around democratically-governed Taiwan, which it claims as its own. Taiwan's government rejects China's claims of sovereignty over the island.

The Pentagon has been pushing for improved communications with China over its military modernisation and regional posture, calling for greater transparency on its nuclear weapons build-up and more theatre-level discussions with military commanders. The working group will have a follow-up meeting in 2026, the statement said.

Source: Reuters/ia

Newsletter

​18. The Thucydides Trap Is Coming for America

​Summary:

The U.S. is springing the Thucydides Trap on itself. Rather than China overturning a U.S.-led order, Trump’s second term is wrecking that order through threats, tariffs, alliance-bashing, and retreat from multilateral institutions. New research suggests China is largely status quo, focused on regime security and limited aims like Taiwan, while America behaves like an anxious, declining hegemon. Trump’s militarism, domestic crackdowns, and tariff politics are inward-looking, making the U.S. resemble China’s authoritarian model. As power diffuses in a multipolar world, Washington must choose between cooperative leadership and brittle domination. Polgreen warns Trump has chosen the ruinous path.

​Excerpts:

The bipartisan consensus, now showing signs of strain, was built on a misreading of China’s intentions. That, at least, is the argument of a provocative paper published recently in the M.I.T. journal International Security by three East Asia scholars. “China is a status quo power concerned with regime stability,” the authors write, “and it remains more inwardly focused than externally oriented.”

This cleareyed analysis was based on an examination of a vast corpus of Chinese documents and publications, from official speeches to school curriculums. The conclusions were striking. China’s stated territorial concerns, the authors found, do not extend beyond its long-held claim to Taiwan and relatively small border areas. “China’s aims are unambiguous; China’s aims are enduring; and China’s aims are limited,” they write.

​Comment: A brutal critique. Have we misread Chinese intentions? Is Taiwan a "limited aim?" What happens if the PLA attacks Taiwan? WIll it remain "limited?" Will the effects of an attack remain "limited?" I think it is best to consider some wisdom from China (Sun Tzu): "Never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible."

I will stand by my assessment that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion​ and other malign activities. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

Opinion

Lydia Polgreen

The Thucydides Trap Is Coming for America

Nov. 21, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/21/opinion/america-china-trump-g20.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

By Lydia Polgreen

Opinion Columnist

In Washington, a decade of rancorous polarization just gave us the longest ever government shutdown. But one belief has endured on both sides of the aisle: that the world order, built and led by the United States, is under threat from China, which aims to usurp America’s rightful place atop it.

There’s a phrase that encapsulates the theory: the Thucydides trap, referring to the violent clash that comes when a rising power challenges the ruling hegemon. In Thucydides’ time, it was Athens that successfully challenged the pre-eminence of Sparta. But it is a pattern that has played out repeatedly through history, with the ambition and aggression of the challenger almost always ending in bloodshed.

President Trump’s second term has upended this assumption. With its litany of chaos, the administration has pursued all on its own a root-and-branch destruction of the global order America made — threatening invasions, deploying punitive tariffs indiscriminately and all but abandoning longstanding alliances. China, by contrast, has responded mostly with a steely insistence on the status quo. In a startling reversal, it is America, not China, that seems determined to spring Thucydides’ trap. At the world’s summit, America is overthrowing America.

The bipartisan consensus, now showing signs of strain, was built on a misreading of China’s intentions. That, at least, is the argument of a provocative paper published recently in the M.I.T. journal International Security by three East Asia scholars. “China is a status quo power concerned with regime stability,” the authors write, “and it remains more inwardly focused than externally oriented.”

This cleareyed analysis was based on an examination of a vast corpus of Chinese documents and publications, from official speeches to school curriculums. The conclusions were striking. China’s stated territorial concerns, the authors found, do not extend beyond its long-held claim to Taiwan and relatively small border areas. “China’s aims are unambiguous; China’s aims are enduring; and China’s aims are limited,” they write.

Much of China’s foreign policy, rather than exporting its ideology abroad, is aimed at shoring up the power of the Communist Party at home. What outside observers take to be aggressive moves are often aimed at solving internal problems. Take its Belt and Road Initiative, which some see as a quasi-imperial effort to win the loyalty of developing nations. One of the paper’s authors, Zenobia Chan, a scholar of international relations who teaches at Georgetown University, said that the initiative was driven more by internal considerations than global ambition.

Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter  Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.

“A lot of it is driven by domestic needs, excess industrial capacity after the global financial crisis,” she told me. China has for the most part not sought to use these investments as leverage for its global ambitions, she added, beyond its longstanding demand that its partners adhere to a One China policy and avoid recognizing the independence of Taiwan. It certainly has not asked developing nations to choose between itself and the United States.

China, to be sure, is hardly a virtuous or even benign actor on the global stage. Its aggression in the South China Sea, vicious repression in Xinjiang, crackdown on Hong Kong and implacable desire to claim Taiwan — no matter what the Taiwanese people want — pose serious challenges to peace and order in Asia and challenge basic principles of human rights. Its escalating diplomatic spat with Japan, suspending seafood imports and advising Chinese citizens to avoid travel there, demonstrates China’s capacity for menace.

But these actions, however brutal, fall far short of a fundamental reordering of the world. China seems to be asserting what it views as historical claims and domestic prerogatives within the existing system, bending the rules in ways the United States, especially under Trump, is hardly in a position to protest. The distinction matters: A power defending the status quo, even aggressively, poses different challenges than one seeking to remake the world in its image.

It may be outmoded, in any case, to think of a single power superintending the world. “It is not simply that the United States is in relative decline, or even that China is rising, but rather that compared with earlier decades, power is held more widely and by a variety of powers in different regions,” Emma Ashford writes in her bracing new book, “First Among Equals.” “The United States and China are ahead of the pack, but by far less than their Cold War counterparts.” Multipolar complexity, not bipolar confrontation, is the future.

Trump, it’s fair to say, is not responding well to this reality. Of his wild threats, the recent one suggesting military action against Nigeria — on the grounds that it “continues to allow the killing of Christians” — is perhaps the most symptomatic of his frustration. The United States, of course, has always played by its own set of rules. But Trump has abandoned even a fig leaf of fealty to principle. “It’s one thing to say: There’s some rules of international law that don’t apply to us,” the political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta told me. “It’s another thing to say: I really don’t care what international law is.”

Trump or no, the military adventurism of the past two decades has become an unmistakable sign of decline. “If we’re having to maintain primacy by invading this country that’s not posing a threat to us and launching a global campaign of antiterror, clearly, we’re on the decline,” Van Jackson, a progressive foreign policy scholar and an author of “The Rivalry Peril,” told me. “It has always been the case in these cycles of history that when the dominant power starts investing and playing this military role globally, you have rising powers who are stepping up, playing a more important economic role globally.”

History is littered with examples of the dangers of aggression for declining powers — Spain’s crusading military folly in the 16th century, the late Ottoman Empire’s embrace of ethnic nationalism, Britain’s vain attempt to cling to its unsustainable imperial position between the world wars. Each ended the same way: an astonishingly rapid loss of power and prestige on the global stage.

This might not be exactly what’s happening. For all Trump’s threats of military action abroad, with the exception of the brief airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and the bombing of small boats in the Caribbean, he seems most interested in deploying the military to police American citizens. In part, this may be training troops — as he told the military brass — for adventures abroad. But it’s hard not to think that waging battles against people who live in Democrat-governed cities is an end in itself.

Likewise, Trump’s aggressive tariff warfare has less to do with the world than it seems. The volley was supposedly about leveling the playing field with countries that are “ripping off” America and punishing countries whose policies harm Americans. (Fentanyl is a prime example.) But the recent Supreme Court arguments over Trump’s use of tariffs made clear that these levies raise cash mostly from Americans, bypassing the constitutional power of the purse vested in Congress. The tariffs, in short, looked global but hit locally.

This leads to an irresistible irony. Far from beating back China, America under Trump may come to resemble it. The country is on its way: obsessed with regime stability and willing to use almost any means to keep its people under control; jealously guarding its near periphery while remaining largely uninterested in leading the world; and building a cult of personality around its autocratic leader in an atmosphere of ethnonationalist triumphalism.

Trump, despite his vituperative campaign rhetoric, has never really been a China hawk, even if some around him have led the charge for more aggressive policies to blunt China’s might. Indeed, he has often lavished praise on Xi Jinping, a man who has the kind of virtually limitless power Trump clearly craves. “President Xi is a great leader of a great country,” Trump cooed at their meeting in South Korea last month.

This praise comes as the United States is retreating from the multilateral bodies that it helped create — the United Nations, the World Health Organization and more. As for the Group of 20 meeting starting this weekend in South Africa, Trump announced months ago that he would not attend and would dispatch Vice President JD Vance instead. Vance has played the role of finger-wagging attack dog, lecturing Europeans about free speech and dressing down President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. One can only imagine what he might have said in Johannesburg.

But we will never know, because Trump abruptly announced this month that the United States would boycott the meeting entirely, preposterously claiming that white South Africans were the victims of persecution and genocidal violence at the hands of the country’s Black majority. “No U.S. Government Official will attend as long as these Human Rights abuses continue,” Trump wrote on social media. Then on Thursday, the administration changed course again, asking to send a small, low-level delegation after all, though it would not participate in the summit discussions.

China is playing a much longer and more sophisticated game. Premier Li Qiang, Xi’s top emissary, will be in Johannesburg, accompanied by a vast retinue of officials, ready to talk with the world’s major economies about the problems and possibilities of the emerging multipolar order.

As its primacy fades, the United States now faces a choice: meet rising nations as respected partners in building a new, more equitable multipolar world or seek the costly, brittle power that comes from domination. Trump has chosen the latter; China, it seems, seeks the former. History tells us which path leads to peace and prosperity, and which is the road to ruin.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com