Quotes of the Day:

"As soon as we abandon our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is end to our troubles."

– Bertrand Russell

"If most of us remain ignorant of ourselves, it is because self-knowledge is painful adn we prefer the pleasures of illusion."

– Aldous Huxley

"Beware of false knowledge; it is more dangerous than ignorance." 

– George Bernard Shaw

1. Partnerships and Political Action (Irregular warfare)

2. SOCOM Boss Warns of Increasingly Dangerous World

3. Trump’s Plans for the Intelligence Agencies Chart a Dangerous Course

4. CNA Explains: The rise of hybrid warfare, where states attempt 'winning without fighting'

5. Fighting Ideologies: Lessons Learned from the War on Terror and Their Application to Strategic Competition

6. China's Massive Espionage Machine: Can the U.S. Effectively Fight Back?

7. Hybrid warfare on the seabed?

8. Ukraine warns of Russian 'psychological attacks' after spooked embassies shutter

9. The US Is Calling Out Foreign Influence Campaigns Faster Than Ever

10. Global Engagement Center leader talks disinformation, technology and reauthorization

11.  Education as a countermeasure against disinformation

12. A Call to Act in the Indo-Pacific

13. America’s Rivals Have a New Favorite Weapon: Criminal Gangs

14. An Offensive Strategy Against the Houthi Threat

15. The return of America’s Puritans

16. Can Trump tame the Pacific Dragon?

17. Philippines a strategic winner when Trump takes the helm

18. How Taiwan’s Authoritarian Past Shapes Its Security Politics Today

19. Suspected sabotage by a Chinese vessel in the Baltic Sea speaks to a wider threat

20. World War III has officially begun, Ukraine’s ex-top general says

21. It’s the end of the world as we know it, and more military news

22. Air Force's Special Operations Crop Duster Plane Will Be Flown for Training at Oklahoma Base

23. Nothing Can Stop the U.S Army's Green Berets

24. Promotion delayed for general who was the last US service member out of Afghanistan

25. US scrambles as drones shape the landscape of war: 'the future is here'

25. IN SEARCH OF A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PME

1. Partnerships and Political Action (Irregular warfare)

​A long and important read for anyone who focuses on Irregular warfare. It is so important that it is difficult to select any highlights as this covers a lot of ground.

I am curious (and trying to figure out) who the author is: 

Henry C. Pulaski is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the author, a leader in special operations.

​The PDF of this article from Military Review can be downloaded here. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Nov-Dec-2024/Redefining-IW/Redefining-IW-UA.pdf?utm

​Conclusion:

Over the next several decades, we are likely to witness the various protections and deterrents that prevent total war stretched to their limits. In addition to its role in conventional and strategic deterrence, the U.S. military and especially the USSOF community should offer policymakers and senior leaders options that either effectively neutralize an adversary’s asymmetric aggression or allow for the application of throttled pressure against an adversary in a manner unlikely to escalate to a direct strategic conflict. While our potential adversaries have high concentrations of conventional capability in their proverbial backyards developed to address their national security priorities, they all remain highly dependent on their networked global access for economic survival, raw material imports, and influence. This IW concept represents a capability that could be applied to erode our adversary’s global access and impose costs proportional to those levied against us. However, effective execution of this concept will require significant evolutions within the USSOF formation including, but not limited to, structural adaptations at the maneuver-unit level, the acquisition of specific authorities and funds, and professional development pathway optimization. Despite the obvious hurdles, the return on the investment would be worth it if we could match, contest, and reverse the success of our adversary’s asymmetric campaigns against our interests and influence.

Partnerships and Political Action

armyupress.army.mil33 min

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Henry C. Pulaski

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Since the conclusion of the Second World War, the U.S. military has been responsible for defending against national security threats that fall into three general categories: nuclear conflict, large-scale conventional conflict, and asymmetric challenges. The first two categories are existential challenges. The United States is faced with the rise of adversarial nation-states whose resources enable the growth and maintenance of militaries capable of challenging the United States in a global head-to-head contest. Our national strategy to avoid such a contest has been deterrence: ensuring such overwhelming conventional and strategic military superiority that the conflict appears futile to the potential challenger. The pursuit of deterrence has placed a national defense resourcing priority on the development and maintenance of conventional and strategic capabilities. The investment has delivered, and the U.S. military is unquestionably the world’s most advanced fighting force with unrivaled strategic depth and force projection capability. The U.S. military’s strength is the bedrock of America’s national defense and underpins multiple defense alliances that protect U.S. interests, influence, and allies globally. For the last seventy years, the U.S. military’s conventional and strategic strength has successfully deterred existential threats. However, deterrence has not dissuaded our adversaries from all attempts to erode U.S. influence and the U.S.-underpinned world order. Instead, it has driven our adversaries to develop successful asymmetric capabilities and initiatives that erode U.S. influence while simultaneously remaining below the threshold that would warrant U.S. conventional retaliation.

There is a common thread in the successful asymmetric challenges to U.S. interests: our adversaries have repeatedly dominated the ideological penetration of target populations. Through the proliferation of ideology, our adversaries co-opt target populations, winning the contest of influence. Without an analogous tool to effectively and reliably contest our adversary’s expansion of influence and encroachments on U.S. interests, the U.S. military has resorted to deploying conventional forces, lowering their readiness for large-scale combat. Interventions in these scenarios have proven ineffective at securing long-term gains in U.S. influence. Instead, these interventions frequently conclude with the adversary’s influence strengthened. To arrest what has now become a cycle of strategic defeat in asymmetric contests, the U.S. military is faced with a clear problem. How does the United States meet asymmetric challenges without decreasing readiness to address existential threats of nuclear or large-scale conventional conflict? On the one hand, the U.S. military must continue to maintain conventional and strategic overmatch. On the other hand, the U.S. military must develop the ability to compete and win on the same plane as its adversaries—in the contest for influence over target population groups.

Within current U.S. military doctrine, an adversary’s asymmetric challenge would be dealt with under one of two activities, unconventional warfare (UW) or foreign internal defense (FID). In unconventional warfare, the United States aids a resistance movement in coercing or overthrowing a government; in foreign internal defense, the United States aids a host-nation government as they counter an insurgency or resistance force.1 While both address the military component of the challenge, neither incorporates deliberate political action (ideology, political system, or governance structure), even when a successful force application is anticipated to result in a political vacuum. This article argues that fortifying U.S. influence against rising global threats and providing U.S. policymakers with low-cost options to expand U.S. influence requires the cultivation of a new concept within the U.S. special operation forces (USSOF) spectrum of activities, one that incorporates political action as a deliberate component when the circumstances dictate. This concept is proposed under a revised and focused definition of the term “irregular warfare.”

Irregular warfare (IW) is defined here as the combination of nontraditional force and political action in pursuit of an influence-based objective. Following this definition, IW becomes another special operations subtask alongside the likes of UW, FID, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. In this construct, USSOF elements executing IW are responsible for the development and integration of political action alongside, and as a priority above, the cultivation of nontraditional force (guerrilla, paramilitary, nonaligned partners). The mechanics of this IW concept are rooted in the theory of “Revolutionary Warfare” (RW) initially popularized by journalist, academic, and war correspondent Bernard Fall in the mid-to-late 1950s.2 Fall developed this theory through his close observation and study of the Vietminh during the French Indochina War and the U.S. Vietnam War. His RW theory illuminated the criticality of political action in the Vietminh’s strategy against the French and subsequent U.S. forces. Fall intended that his work on RW would help allied leaders understand the power of RW, as it was being applied by our Cold War adversaries. He hoped that RW would act as an instructional primer for allied special operations forces who could use the understanding to cultivate their own supported RW campaigns. Perhaps it was Fall’s early death in Vietnam alongside U.S. troops, or perhaps it was that generation of military leader’s inclination toward conventional force application, but Fall’s ideas about RW were not broadly integrated into military doctrine. Instead, it was eschewed for a hypermilitarized version of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare that focused principally on the elimination of the adversary’s military force. Regardless of its popularity within the U.S. military, Fall’s theory of RW continued to accurately characterize adversary-backed movements throughout the developing world during the Cold War.

Over the last twenty years however, the mechanics of Fall’s theory, which highlights the power and importance of the combination of nontraditional force and political action, continued to explain the success of a number of movements adversarial to the United States. The Islamic State employed a combination of Islamic terrorism (force) and Salafi-jihadism (political action) in the pursuit of Islamic caliphates (influence). The Iranian regime employed the powerful combination of the Quds Force (force) and Islamic radicalism (political action) to cultivate a series of actors; Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi Movement Ansar Allah (influence). Moreover, the mechanics were not limited in application to movements embracing Islamic radicalism; the Russian Federation employed the combination of state-sponsored private military companies (force) and clandestine coup d’etats and mutinies (political action) in the pursuit of autocratic alliances (influence). While Fall would have certainly recognized these activities for what they were, I doubt even he would feel the term “revolutionary warfare” still applies. In its place, I would like to think he would approve of the use of “irregular warfare,” to more comprehensively address the variance of political ideologies employed.

This paper will take this concept of IW through various forms of military application. The term “IW strategy” is used to capture how the United States could employ IW at the national level to seek a specific influence-based outcome through the application of a nontraditional force combined with a political action. The term is “IW campaign” is used to discuss the specific details of the execution of an in IW strategy from the initial development of potential force and political-action options through to a stabilized influence outcome. And, the term “IW operation” is used to describes the military framework necessary to assemble authorizations and the appropriate capabilities to execute an IW campaign. Moving forward, this revision of IW will serve as the foundational concept from which the USSOF community can develop offensive IW capabilities, pursue the development and acquisition of unique IW authorities, and justify structural evolution of USSOF formations for IW optimization.

Strategic Objective Alignment

The adversary’s perspective. The last two decades have provided U.S. adversaries the opportunity to observe firsthand the U.S. military’s expeditionary force projection capability. In response, our adversaries have shown us how to combat a dominant conventional force with overwhelming technological and firepower superiority by displacing the conventional forces’ influence over a target population. Understanding how the adversary accomplishes this feat provides insight into the mechanics of an effective IW campaign, which can help inform USSOF IW operational design.

To establish influence over a target population and undermine U.S. military efforts, our adversaries cultivate political action within the target population that encourage beliefs inherently antithetical and incompatible to U.S. interests. Second, the adversaries raise, train, and employ an indigenous cadre to ensure ideological proliferation within the target population. This two-part strategy has seen successful employment by U.S. adversaries in a variety of global environments and circumstances, ranging from the Third International (a.k.a. Communist International) operating in the developing world to international and transregional Salafi-jihadist movements.3 Each actor that employed a strategy with these components well has found success expanding their influence over time, usually at a cost to our own. We have found over the last several decades that our adversaries’ influence-focused strategies are difficult to contest, especially with the application of conventional force.

In recent contests, the United States has attempted to use conventional forces to counter our adversaries’ IW campaigns. The adversary harbors no hope of defeating U.S. conventional forces in direct ground combat. However, the presence of conventional forces provides the adversary with two opportunities. First, it allows the adversary to reinforce its narrative of permanency; second, it creates the opportunity for the adversary to begin inflicting casualties on U.S. uniformed troops, broadly understood by our adversaries as the fastest way to erode U.S. domestic support. When attacking U.S. conventional forces, the adversary concurrently conducts a propaganda campaign intended to fortify cooperation within the indigenous population. The central narrative of the propaganda campaign is as dangerous as it is simple: “Regardless of what happens on the battlefield from day to day, eventually the Americans will leave, and we will remain.” This narrative is powerful because it is grounded in demonstrated truth. The world is aware of historical and recent examples in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. When conventional forces are deployed into ambiguous situations to combat asymmetric threats and mounting casualties erode domestic support, this narrative becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. To see this narrative through, all the adversary needs to do is wait. Balancing their lives between U.S. conventional forces who isolate themselves from them and the adversary that lives among them, the civilian population hedges in favor of the adversary.

But the U.S. military does not have to endure this cycle forever. The adversary’s application of this strategy stands as both evidence and a model for USSOF IW campaigns that can combat this adversarial approach.

Envisioning a different outcome. One of the U.S. military’s greatest strengths is a cultural focus on candor and openness about lessons learned and mistakes. We learn from our failures and the adversary’s successes in combat, and we use those lessons to improve. However, our adjustments and realignments are designed too often based on our own operational biases and do not consider the adversary’s definition of defeat. From the adversary’s perspective, the supreme objective is to secure favorable influence over the target population. The adversary needs the target population to provide insulation from conventional attack and to act as an ideological estuary. For an adversary in conflict with the U.S. military, influence over the target population is existential. For this reason, counterinsurgency theorists correctly identified influence over the population as the center of gravity.4 Inversely, the U.S. military has chosen too often to define operational success as control of geographic terrain. The presence patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2004–2007 time frame stand as an excellent example. This misalignment in the understanding of the importance of the population from an influence perspective creates conditions in which the U.S. military successfully secures terrain occupied by a population that the adversary has successfully brought under their influence. In this situation, the U.S. military and the adversary both believe they are achieving their strategic objectives in the same time and physical space. However, there is no argument that the adversaries influence within the population is of greater strategic value in the modern context. When the U.S. military and the adversary operate on two separate plains of understanding, we are, in effect, failing to close with the enemy. To enter a decisive engagement with the adversary, we must ensure that the U.S. military’s objectives and the adversary’s objectives are inversely aligned.

If we understand the adversary’s operational objective is to achieve his political action plan and establish resilient influence over the population, then we can confidently state that the following situational characteristics would represent the adversary’s failure:

These conditions would not only make it impossible for actors and agents of the adversary to move freely within the population, but it would also place the population on the path to active rejection of the adversary’s ideology and active assistance to the friendly forces. In this situation, the environment necessary for the adversary to fortify and expand influence would cease to exist. In other words, it would result in the adversary’s defeat.

With this understanding of the adversary’s failure as our guide, we can craft an IW strategy that delivers an end state we can define as victory. Like our adversaries, the objectives of our IW strategy must be population and influence focused. We must establish effective indigenous force partnerships for access to the operational area and indigenous population, support the development of partner influence through political action (preferably one that is also incompatible to the adversary), and synchronize the application of both force and political action in the pursuit of stable influence over the population at a cost to that of the adversary.

Irregular Warfare Campaign Design

In the last section, we dissected an adversarial application of irregular warfare. The intent of this examination was to highlight core aspects of the strategy that can then be either co-opted by USSOF in their own IW strategy and employed back at the adversary or intentionally mitigated through disciplined execution. This section takes the examination one step further by using the core aspects of the adversary’s irregular warfare strategy to inform the development of a template for USSOF irregular warfare strategy through the various phases of execution. Based on key lessons learned from the adversary’s application of IW, this USSOF IW strategy is framed by three central constraints:

Establishing a partnership and setting operational conditions. Despite the USSOF community’s emphasis on indigenous partner operations, there is a high degree of ambiguity within current USSOF doctrine about how indigenous relationships are initiated that threatens effective relationship development. U.S. Special Forces UW doctrine explicitly acknowledges that other government agencies or higher echelons would likely be responsible for the identification of, initial contact with, and policy deconfliction for potential indigenous partners of resistance forces prior to the involvement of Special Forces operational elements.5 While there are certainly situations in which this may be the case, decoupling the operational element from the relationship establishment process or delegating that process to other organizations sows potential conflict and confusion into the relationship from the onset. While other government agencies are obviously competent in the cultivation and development of relationships for their agency’s own purposes, if a military or paramilitary application of the relationship is the long-term goal, then the USSOF executing elements should strive to be involved from the earliest possible point and at the highest possible echelons. In contrast to UW doctrine, the IW methodology dictates that in an ideal situation, the development and management of the relationship with the indigenous partner is the responsibility of the executing military entity continuously from relationship inception through stabilization. This ensures clarity and continuity in the conditions and expectations framed in the establishment of the relationship for both parties. The initial establishment phase of any relationship is the most sensitive and critical phase. As the operation grows in scale and consequence, the conditions and expectations agreed upon at establishment will be placed under immense strain and pressure. If the managing element was not party to the agreements established in the initiation of the relationship, the relationship will bend to meet the partner’s circumstantial needs, potentially to the detriment of the campaign.

Political action. While the U.S. military has a long and mixed history of developing indigenous partnerships, for the last seventy years, the U.S. military has avoided responsibility for the development and implementation of political action. This avoidance is based on the belief that military activities are apolitical and, therefore, must be tied strictly to definable and quantifiable tactical and operational objectives. But this traditionally was not the case. The U.S. military occupied much of the North American continent and later conducted expert occupations of Germany and Japan precisely because they recognized the importance of attaining governance objectives. This in no way conflicts with neutrality in internal U.S. partisan politics. Instead, detaching the U.S. military’s activities from a desired political outcome and the necessary governance development that must occur concurrent to combat operations just ensures that the U.S. military will fail to achieve its strategic objectives. If the U.S. military truly assumes responsibility for reaching its strategic objectives, it must recognize the practical and critical role that that political and governance functions play. Any activity inherently required to achieve a strategic military objective should be considered within the scope of traditional military activities. The divorce of military and governance affairs does not stand as a wise, time-tested precedent.

World War II is frequently used as an example of the U.S. military’s ability to unilaterally conclude a conflict and to usher in an era of stability as it did in both Germany and Japan. This historical recollection often omits that the U.S. military had its own Military Government and Civil Affairs Branch specifically designed and developed during ongoing combat operations with the explicit intent of establishing effective governance as a vehicle for stability in the wake of operations.6 While it may not be necessary to reestablish a governance branch within the U.S. Army, the importance of ensuring the effective concurrent development of an indigenous government alongside the development of an indigenous force as collective components of the indigenous movement cannot be overstated.

Political action is the vehicle that ultimately delivers stability and influence. The path to successful indigenous government requires cultivation through every phase in IW. An aligned governance component is the tool that ties the legitimacy created during combat operations to the stability desired at their conclusion. USSOF should ensure the delivery of effective indigenous government exists as a component of the indigenous partner’s strategy from the onset of the relationship. Effective IW execution requires USSOF to provide appropriate organic experience and expertise to shape and influence the agenda and policy of the indigenous government through its development and implementation. Just as force application and political action are most powerful in concert, so must the USSOF military advisors and political-action advisors work in concert to ensure the appropriate resourcing and support to political action development as the priority throughout the IW campaign. This is one of several aspects of the IW methodology that has been absent from USSOF doctrine and modern operational history, at least in the last several decades. The lack of U.S. involvement in the development of political action can lead to counterproductive situations in which the United States finds itself with an operationally successful partner who implements an incompatible governance or political position. If the end state is incompatible and U.S. influence has not been expanded or fortified, the effort is for naught.

When political action is not a priority, the probability of policy incompatibility between the United States and indigenous governments is high, leading to significant risks to indigenous government legitimacy. As a matter of necessity, the indigenous government will develop policies and laws continuously. Without intimate and constant involvement in the development process of these policies, it is highly likely that the indigenous government will implement policies that conflict with U.S. national interests or values to a degree that the U.S. government cannot endure. In these instances of conflict, USSOF influence can be used to alter, modify, or retract policies in question. However, post-decisional retractions are fraught with risk. They fuel the narrative of incompetency at best or foreign control at worst, serving to undermine the legitimacy of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. The adversary will attempt to convince the population that the indigenous government is nothing more than a puppet regime of the U.S. government. The most effective way to buttress against this narrative is to ensure synchronization during the indigenous government’s policy development process—to be so intimately involved in the development of laws, policies, and declarations that their content can be influenced before they’re ever made public. This upstream involvement requires a high concentration of talent and resources, but it is the most effective way to ensure compatibility without the risk of eroding the legitimacy of the indigenous government.

Indigenous governance and population integration. Effective political action helps prevent policy collisions as the indigenous government ushers in stability at the conclusion of combat operations. However, political action during the execution of combat operations is of equal or greater importance. From the initiation of combat operations, the local government operates in concert with the indigenous force to assume an ever-increasing role representing the broader ideological movement in the population. This is especially true for population groups that fall under the control of the indigenous movement through the progress of combat operations. While the indigenous force will earn legitimacy in the eyes of the population during combat operations, the population instinctively recognizes that a military force cannot govern and hedges against the indigenous partner unless a more permanent structure falls into place following the advance of the indigenous force. IW strategy requires USSOF to work to set conditions for compatible indigenous governance through political action prior to the commencement of combat operations.

The learned experience of the last two decades tells us that the endless pursuit of tactical and operational objectives, the sterile and dogmatic pursuit of the militarized arm of the adversary, does not bring about a favorable strategic outcome. Effective targeted military pressure serves only to diffuse the adversary back into the population. Only the combination of a purposefully cultivated indigenous force and government can defeat the militant manifestation of the adversary and truly turn the population caustic against the adversary’s presence. It is true the indigenous-U.S. military force will defeat the adversary in the terms we traditionally associate with counterinsurgency, FID, and UW, but it will be the indigenous government that actually ushers in the independent stability that the U.S. military has never been able to effectively realize. These two components are interdependent and indispensable and must be developed concurrently from a singular unified command-and-control construct. This approach is a significant departure from doctrinal and cultural comfort zones of the U.S. military, but any reasonable definition of strategic success depends on it. They must both be at the forefront of the USSOF IW strategy during the buildup to the displacement of the adversary. Commencing displacement without the framework of both an indigenous force and government reduces the chances of success significantly.

Active displacement. Once the relationship is established, the partner force is developed and resourced, an indigenous government is positioned to assume control, and the indigenous movement is ready to confront the influence of the adversary. Optimally, this confrontation is militaristic in nature. In every historical instance noted, the adversary underpinned its ideological expansion with the threat or use of violence. Legitimacy is not always earned righteously. If an adversary can employ violence as a tool to underpin ideological expansion and is able to do so without consequence, the population will inevitably view the adversary as legitimate. We must not fail to recognize this challenge for the opportunity it is. Challenging the adversary’s monopoly on violence is the most efficient way to displace influence. If a demonstration of military capability is required to establish the indigenous force’s legitimacy, what better way to put it on display than by applying it against the adversary? An established and overt adversary military or paramilitary force provides the optimal scenario to supplant adversarial influence while simultaneously establishing the indigenous movement’s legitimacy. An indigenous force that defeats an adversary’s military capability in open combat has provided the population with visual evidence that is impossible to ignore. However, we must also recognize that this phase of an IW campaign presents the greatest risk of USSOF inadvertently undermining the legitimacy of its own indigenous partner.

When advising the indigenous force during combat operations, USSOF personnel are naturally inclined to assume the role they were selected and trained to perform. USSOF elements at the operational level will face immense internal pressure to assume the command of the indigenous force, lead in combat, and close with the enemy. To meet the intent of the IW strategy, USSOF ground force commanders will be required exercise extreme discipline in the application of unilateral U.S. capability. Leaders must take into consideration the impact of USSOF unilateral action on the indigenous force’s legitimacy, which directly impacts strategic success. Any USSOF unilateral action or perceived direct command of indigenous forces reinforces the adversary’s narrative that the indigenous force is not capable of winning without U.S. support. If applied, U.S. unilateral force should focus on creating optimal conditions for indigenous partner operational momentum and be conducted in such a way to reduce indigenous population awareness. This change in force application guidance places indigenous movement legitimacy at the center of the decision-making process. In some instances, it may reduce or limit the application of U.S. unilateral capability to prevent adverse cost to indigenous movement legitimacy.

In addition to the cultivation of legitimacy, combat also provides an excellent opportunity for command-and-control crystallization and coalition development within the indigenous movement and among the indigenous movement and aligned opposition groups. The challenges of combat create the conditions for the creation of resilient teams and alliances that allow distinctly different groups to set aside petty differences and unite for collective success. The United States is no exception. The alliances formed during the two European-based world wars remain a heavy influence on our foreign policy today. As the indigenous force accrues successes on the battlefield, it will concurrently recruit personnel and groups to its ranks. USSOF should reinforce a chain of command with the indigenous force as the preferred central authority in the indigenous coalition. The provision of materiel to the developing indigenous coalition through the primary indigenous partner will also act to strengthen the desired command relationships and architecture, with the added benefit of creating leverage with the primary indigenous partner if required. Indigenous force central authority of the expanding coalition will ensure USSOF presence can remain minimal, hence protecting the broader indigenous movement’s legitimacy. There is a natural inclination in the U.S. military, especially prominent in USSOF culture and practices, to build direct relationships at the lowest possible echelon of the indigenous force structure. If the intent is to protect and fortify the indigenous force’s legitimacy while simultaneously attempting to centralize control of the developing coalition, this common USSOF practice is counterproductive and should be avoided at all costs.

USSOF responsibility for the concurrent and synchronized development of political action along with an indigenous fighting force under a single unified command is one of the central tenets of this strategy and one of the strongest departures from U.S. military campaign strategy that emphasizes these activities sequentially, not concurrently. For decades, the U.S. military has struggled to eliminate the adversary’s access to and freedom within the indigenous population. This methodology addresses that struggle through political action. Political action will often take the form of a concurrently developed indigenous government that fills any political vacuum created by the conduct of the IW campaign. The role of political action, and of the indigenous government, is to force a confrontation of influence within the target population. This function of the sponsored indigenous government is one of the key features missing from our unconventional warfare doctrine. In this IW strategy, political action supported indigenous government assumes the responsibility for integrating secured populations, fosters a collective sense of ownership through population involvement, diversifies the internal security services, and cultivates a sense of agency within the population that assists inculcation of the indigenous movement’s governing ideology. In the areas under indigenous movement control, the indigenous government begins the steady and deliberate transition to stability, deconstructing the stasis of military control and building connective tissue with the population, driving the postcombat transition to full indigenous government control.

The transition to stability. The elimination of adversary main combat units, physical occupation of terrain, and the complete transition of target population control and management to the indigenous government security services represents the commencement of the stability phase. This is where the hard work protecting the legitimacy of the indigenous movement during the combat phase of operations pays off. While the indigenous force will continue to exist, it will begin the demobilization process and transition to a standing force. The retention of a smaller standing force ensures the indigenous government has the resources to reinforce its security services to prevent the resurgence of the adversary’s influence, provide external national defense, and address crisis response in support of the civil government.

Where the primary activity of the military in this phase is to step back, the primary responsibility of the civil government is to step forward. In our current doctrine, there is a great deal of ambiguity about who specifically in the U.S. government should assume lead in advising the indigenous government through this transition phase. Any gap between combat operations and the commencement of effective indigenous government will irrevocably erode the perception of legitimacy and competency of government in the eyes of the population. People are not patient. The transition from combat operations under the command of the indigenous force and steady-state stability under the indigenous government should be considered a decisive point for achieving the desired strategic end state. The execution of the strategy up to this decisive point has been responsibility of USSOF. Certainly, there will be government-focused advisors (both U.S. military and other government agencies) involved in advising the indigenous government throughout the various phases of the campaign. Despite the primary focus on transition from combat operations to stability and the success of the indigenous government during this phase, USSOF should retain overall command to ensure the steady flow of resources, provision of support through the transition, and continuity of focus on the desired end state of the IW strategy. This period is the indigenous government’s “zero day.” Leaders should recognize that they will only have one chance to deliver on the expectations of the population. Any critical failures during this period of transition risk corrupting the foundations of the indigenous government, which stability is ultimately built on.

Failure to ensure the nascent indigenous government survives and thrives through the transition places the entire enterprise at risk. The deliberate focus on a governance component of the indigenous movement from the onset of the campaign is specifically intended to set optimal conditions for this transition period and beyond. The indigenous government’s primary strategic purpose (from a U.S. perspective) is to stabilize the population, defend against a resurgence of the adversary, and fortify U.S. aligned influence gains. If the population loses confidence during the transition, it returns the momentum to the adversary and sets the partner on a negative trajectory extremely difficult to arrest. If popular dissatisfaction results in the transition from the sponsored indigenous political and governance partner, the adversary will work to cultivate and co-opt the entity that arises to fill the void. This failure will also serve as a practical warning to other potential partners in the target area and region, as we are now seeing.7 The common perception may become, “While the U.S. may be there to provide the support necessary to meet mutual tactical and operational objectives, it will hang us out to dry when it comes time to solidify our political position.” If this narrative prevails, it can easily undermine the U.S. military’s options for IW activities in an entire region for an entire generation.

The purpose of this section was to emphasize the need for continuity in the leadership of the U.S. executing element throughout all phases of the campaign until the strategic objectives are met and to ensure that responsibility for campaign leadership remained firmly with USSOF in an IW campaign. While the necessity for continuity is clearly justified in doctrine like Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, it routinely breaks down at this transition point in practice.8 This may be in part due to the understanding by U.S. military leaders that the success of the indigenous government is ultimately the responsibility of governance and diplomatic experts from other departments and agencies in government. This strategy diverges from the past on this specific point. The objective of this IW strategy is the specific displacement of adversarial influence through political actions. The indigenous force is the catalyst for this process, but the strategic objective of influence is not achieved until the indigenous government has assumed control and is fully functional and successful. The indigenous government is the vehicle that delivers stability. It is that stability over the long term that fortifies U.S. influence expansion at the cost of the adversary.

To the victors go the spoils: post-operation partnerships. The fortification of influence is the not the only benefit of the successfully conclusion of an IW campaign. Influence within the indigenous force and government will inevitably remain strong, especially for those forces and personalities from USSOF instrumental in facilitating the successful outcome. Much like our adversaries during the Cold War benefited strategically for decades from the relationships established during their sponsorship of communist and nationalist movements in the developing world, IW strategy sees the same opportunities for the U.S. government in today’s environment. It is not hard to imagine the development of a constellation of stable partners that have unique regional influence, expertise, and knowledge created through the execution and success of IW and, almost more importantly, experience in the conduct and execution of effective IW methodology. These partners will continue to defend mutual interests, illuminate opportunities to expand influence of mutual benefit, and may even be well positioned to contribute to new efforts themselves. While influence is the objective of this strategy, the relationships cultivated through the pursuit of influence will inevitably yield strategic utility and benefit in and of themselves.

The Way Ahead

Truly embracing IW strategy and its methodology as a core USSOF function will require more than simply agreeing to the logic of its application. There are several concepts and principles introduced here that are difficult, if not impossible, for the vast majority of the USSOF community to execute due to structural and authority limitations. This section explores some of the possible structural and authority evolutions that would empower USSOF in the effective and optimal execution of IW.

Form follows function. To optimize for the successful execution of the IW methodology, USSOF would need to alter the composition and disposition of the operational units tasked with its undertaking. Specifically, operational elements would adopt a formation size that inherently minimizes signature and supports the perceived legitimacy and independence of partners, increases the mean level of seniority and experience to a level sufficient to effectively manage a comprehensive IW campaign, and ensures the integration of specialists with expertise not only in indigenous force development, but also political action. Absent these adaptations, USSOF elements tasked with the execution will struggle to manage the IW efforts and to see them through to the desired strategic end state.

The size of the executing element has huge impacts on both the development of the relationship with the indigenous partners as well as the perceived legitimacy of the indigenous partner in the eyes of the population. Through either observed interaction or the natural alignment of policies, the adversary will accuse the indigenous partner of being a puppet of the West or the United States in the normal course of the propaganda component of the conflict. This accusation will live, ever present, in the minds of the indigenous population. It is the executing element’s responsibility to ensure the IW campaign in execution is not playing into the adversary’s narrative. Executing-element signature reduction is one of the key tools to address this challenge, and a key component to signature reduction is committing the fewest possible personnel required to meet the operational requirement. A reduced USSOF element size also has the added benefit of creating a situational of mutual dependency between the USSOF element and the indigenous partner. A USSOF element at an optimal size to address primary mission requirements, the development of the indigenous partner, and the protection of the partner’s legitimacy will likely be too small to organically address all its support and security needs. Inevitably, this should lead to a situation where the USSOF elements support and security needs are addressed by the indigenous partner. The natural interdependence this encourages supports the cultivation of trust and the strengthening of the relationship. However, this course of action is not without obvious physical and operational risk. USSOF will require competent, empowered operational personnel, trusted to assess the risk effectively and endowed with the discretion to adjust the operation accordingly.

Designing an operational-element structure optimally suited for the execution of IW is not limited solely to considerations over size. The breadth of the operational element’s management and development portfolio, including both indigenous force and government, requires a very high mean level of competency, viewed as a factor of experience and training, within the USSOF executing element. This required mean level of competency is not present in the current USSOF team-level maneuver unit due to the high percentage of relatively junior soldiers. The effective execution of IW will also require an alteration to the USSOF professional development and assignment policies, increasing the percentage of senior, experienced soldiers. This allows the executing USSOF elements to manage the complexities of concurrent indigenous force and indigenous governance development and synchronization. Even if unique expertise not organic to USSOF is brought in specifically to shape and influence political action development, it will remain the responsibility of the USSOF leadership to ensure comprehensive IW strategy consistency through the execution of the campaign, especially during the combat phase.

Lastly, even with a small cadre of experienced and highly trained personnel, the USSOF executing element will lack the organic expertise to influence and shape the development of the indigenous governance structure in a way that ensures long-term compatibility with U.S. policy. There are options for tapping into this experience in both the U.S. military and in other government departments. However, to ensure maximum synchronization, U.S. military advisors with the competency to undertake this role would be preferable. These advisors would be fully integrated into the USSOF element, regardless of their home-station organizational affiliation, and would be under the command of the USSOF element responsible ultimately for the execution of the IW campaign.

Optimization for IW will inevitably require some degree of evolution and adaptation from the USSOF community. While it may be possible for USSOF to assemble a purpose-built element specifically to service an IW requirement, it would be a missed opportunity for organizational modernization. The IW methodology has broad application. IW represents a far more applicable and efficient core employment model for USSOF in the defense of U.S. interests than retaining USSOF maneuver-unit formation construct optimized for USSOF support to conventional forces in a large-scale conventional war against any of our primary adversary-state actors.

Supporting authorizations. Even if USSOF pursues an aggressive modernization and optimization campaign designed to adapt its formation for optimal execution of IW operations, structural changes alone will be insufficient. USSOF is also restricted from the comprehensive execution of this IW strategy by a distinct absence of persistent authorities and funds.

In a declaration of war or authorization of the use of military force, USSOF formations can access appropriated funding to support indigenous forces (albeit not indigenous governments). The initiation of an IW campaign may or may not be a supporting function to a declaration of war or a broader authorization of the use of military force. For the optimal degree of flexibility, USSOF should consider advocating for an authority and appropriation that allows for support of IW campaigns and operations in situations where the broader pursuit or defense of influence is the U.S. national interest. These low-cost, low-intensity IW campaigns would fall well below the threshold of a declaration of war but would allow the United States to defend or expand its national interest when under threat from adversary states or movements. A standing authorization would afford the U.S. military flexibility and would position the U.S. military to act at the speed of opportunity.

In addition to the establishment of funding lines explicitly intended to support IW, the Department of Defense (DOD) must also pursue funds and expertise in the field of political action. While it should remain the intent of the DOD to establish partnerships with other U.S. government departments and agencies to provide personnel to assist in the development and execution of political action, the integration of personnel from other department or agencies is not always circumstantially possible. The DOD should be prepared to address this requirement organically. There is some capability and capacity to address this requirement within the Civil Affairs Branch, but the capability within civil affairs was not designed specifically for this purpose, indicating a need for either adaptation in civil affairs or the need for the establishment of a new USSOF political action cadre altogether. Adopting the tenets of this strategy and optimizing USSOF elements for it will be half measures if the U.S. military is not prepared to address the concurrent political action requirements critical for long-term stability and influence fortification.

Conclusion

Over the next several decades, we are likely to witness the various protections and deterrents that prevent total war stretched to their limits. In addition to its role in conventional and strategic deterrence, the U.S. military and especially the USSOF community should offer policymakers and senior leaders options that either effectively neutralize an adversary’s asymmetric aggression or allow for the application of throttled pressure against an adversary in a manner unlikely to escalate to a direct strategic conflict. While our potential adversaries have high concentrations of conventional capability in their proverbial backyards developed to address their national security priorities, they all remain highly dependent on their networked global access for economic survival, raw material imports, and influence. This IW concept represents a capability that could be applied to erode our adversary’s global access and impose costs proportional to those levied against us. However, effective execution of this concept will require significant evolutions within the USSOF formation including, but not limited to, structural adaptations at the maneuver-unit level, the acquisition of specific authorities and funds, and professional development pathway optimization. Despite the obvious hurdles, the return on the investment would be worth it if we could match, contest, and reverse the success of our adversary’s asymmetric campaigns against our interests and influence.

2. SOCOM Boss Warns of Increasingly Dangerous World

Three lenses:

"Convergence:" “The first lens would be the convergence of the adversaries that have been so named in our National Defense Strategy,” F

On the ground in Ukraine, he pointed out, the second lens shows that the character of war has been turned on its head with World War I-style trench warfare made more terrifying and deadly by unmanned technology.

The threats are exacerbated by a third prism, namely shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, where over the past two years there have been bellicose actions against commercial and U.S. vessels as well, he said.

“We’re watching the markets fracture,” Fenton said, recalling how the Ukrainians were interrupted trying to export their wheat. 

SOCOM Boss Warns of Increasingly Dangerous World

ausa.org · November 21, 2024

Photo by: U.S. Army/Ruediger Hess

Thu, 11/21/2024 - 08:30

A “convergence” of adversaries is threatening global security, a development made more complex by the proliferation of battlefield technology and commercial disruptions, a senior Army officer said.

Gen. Bryan Fenton, commanding general of U.S. Special Operations Command, said he sees the security environment through three lenses, the first of which is the volatile alliance formed among the adversaries of the United States and its allies.

“The first lens would be the convergence of the adversaries that have been so named in our National Defense Strategy,” Fenton said Nov. 18 during an event hosted by the Economic Club of New York.

Topping the list, he said, is China, which is flexing its military and diplomatic muscles.

“In singularity, the People's Republic of China has manifested in the military space a very large military presence in the Indo-Pacific,” he said. At the same time, “they’ve got a diplomatic corps that we … assess is all about diplomatic pressurization and combined with economic coercion at times to really turn countries in a different direction from even, at times, relationships with the United States and other partners and allies that we all have.”

Close behind is Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine is underscored by an industrial base “that’s starting to crank up again with armaments and materiel” with a speed that is challenging not only Ukraine, but NATO and allies, Fenton said.

Iran poses a special threat with not only its nuclear capabilities, but with long-range missiles and weaponry and its use of regional proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria, Fenton said.

North Korea, which deployed some 10,000 soldiers to Russia “to add to Russian capability against the Ukrainians,” poses a nuclear threat not only on the Korean peninsula but in the Indo-Pacific, Fenton said.

“What we see is it’s Ukraine against Russia, plus Iran, plus now North Korea, and certainly in materiel solutions, [China],” Fenton said. “That’s a fusion that concerns not only the Ukrainians and NATO, but certainly the U.S. and our security senior leaders.”

On the ground in Ukraine, he pointed out, the second lens shows that the character of war has been turned on its head with World War I-style trench warfare made more terrifying and deadly by unmanned technology.

“If you look up in the skies, its 21st century moving into 22nd century type warfare with uncrewed anything—big drones, little drones, one-way munitions, things you can’t see in the electromagnetic spectrum that’s knocking these things down, there’s the infusion of space and cyber, the maritime surface and subsurface vessels that have no one in them being used for reconnaissance or kinetic effect,” Fenton said.

The threats are exacerbated by a third prism, namely shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, where over the past two years there have been bellicose actions against commercial and U.S. vessels as well, he said.

“We’re watching the markets fracture,” Fenton said, recalling how the Ukrainians were interrupted trying to export their wheat. “The commercial shipping in the Red Sea is at risk based on the Houthi actions over the last two years plus, not only against Israel, not only against the U.S. fleet, but also against the commercial shipping that many of them now … are having to find alternate routes to bring their goods to market.”

Together, “those three prisms are making it one of the most complicated times that I certainly think I’ve ever seen,” Fenton said.

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ausa.org · November 21, 2024

3. Trump’s Plans for the Intelligence Agencies Chart a Dangerous Course

Loch Johnson is one of the "deans" of intelligence studies in academia.

Excerpts:

Another important deterrent against the abuse of intelligence power is the professional ethos of intelligence officers. They understand that, if asked by the White House to break the law, they have several avenues of recourse. Each intelligence agency has an inspector general to whom they can report inappropriate policy orders. On Capitol Hill, the committees’ members and staff privately hear and investigate charges of intelligence malfeasance. Intelligence professionals have also turned to the media as a way of exposing illegal operations, as in the Church Committee inquiry.

The Constitution lives on and its checks and balances provide a unique protective shield against the abuse of secret power. Yet these checks ultimately rest on the vigilance of citizens inside and outside the government, and their courage to speak out against attempts to erode the democratic principles that have guided this nation since its founding.

Trump’s Plans for the Intelligence Agencies Chart a Dangerous Course

The president-elect appears determined to prioritize loyalty over impartial expertise, in moves that may test the checks and balances limiting executive power

Loch K. Johnson

Loch K. Johnson is the Regents Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia and a former senior aide to the chair of the Church Committee

newlinesmag.com · November 21, 2024

Retribution. Revenge. Enemies from within. Court martial “woke” generals. Mass detentions and deportations of immigrants. Dismantle the Department of Justice. Dictator on day one. We’re coming after you.

The rhetoric of Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign alarmed many observers. But one element of the incoming administration’s agenda that hasn’t grabbed as many headlines is its goal of dismantling America’s intelligence agencies, which is high on its list of priorities. Without these organizations operating as objective windows on reality, decision-making in the White House will resemble something like the pronouncements offered by the Wizard of Oz. Just like the wizard — supposedly the ruler of the Emerald City, but in reality a would-be sorcerer hiding behind a screen that illuminated and enlarged his stature — Trump in his presidential campaigns has relied on a facade of lavish pep rallies, noise and disinformation to advance his political aspirations. He is an illusionist. To make rational decisions in the White House, he will be badly in need of reliable intelligence reporting that reminds him of the real world.

Leading thinkers have long pondered the attributes of wise leadership. From Plato’s “Republic” onward, their works have emphasized that knowledge of threats and opportunities — an accurate understanding of security and success in a hostile world, as well as the options most likely to achieve them — is a vital prerequisite for guiding a nation. In turn, knowledge entails gathering information, including intelligence collected by spies and, in modern times, by machines. “Techint,” or technical intelligence, includes wiretapping telephones of adversaries and photographing their military facilities from cameras mounted on satellites. Although the machinery for this kind of spying is expensive, with the total annual budget for intelligence topping $90 billion, the knowledge it yields equates to power. George H.W. Bush, who was director of central intelligence prior to becoming president in 1989, is an outstanding example of a commander in chief who understood the importance of information for decision-making. In the 1991 Gulf War, fought to liberate Kuwait from an Iraqi military takeover, U.S. surveillance — especially through satellite spying — gave Bush superior situational awareness. This was an enormous boon that allowed for precision U.S. targeting of Iraqi troops and weaponry and brought the conflict to an early end. Subsequently, in October 1994, U.S. satellite photography revealed the unexpected mustering, yet again, of Iraq’s elite Republican Guard forces just 30 miles from the Kuwaiti border. This early warning allowed President Bill Clinton to quickly send U.S. troops and weaponry to Kuwait, successfully blocking a second invasion.

In 1975-76, I served as senior aide to Democratic Sen. Frank Church of Idaho, who chaired a special Senate investigation into allegations of domestic spying abuses by the CIA that were reported in The New York Times in 1974, and which turned out to be correct. The committee examined not only CIA activities but those of the other intelligence agencies, giving me a rare opportunity to join with Church in learning about the work of these hidden organizations. I also served as senior aide to Democratic Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin as he led a White House Commission on Intelligence in 1995 and 1996. I would later continue my studies of intelligence and edited the international journal Intelligence and National Security. These practical experiences, plus my own university-based research, placed me in a position to evaluate U.S. intelligence reports, among them the President’s Daily Brief.

The President’s Daily Brief is viewed as a gem of intelligence reporting. It draws together the global findings of all the U.S. secret agencies into a single daily document distributed to the president and a few other top officials by the CIA on behalf of the 18 organizations that make up the officially designated U.S. Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to inform officials about important worldwide events that have transpired over the preceding 24 hours — say, for example, the status of Russian military advances into Ukrainian territory. The president can discuss the contents of this “newspaper” with seasoned intelligence officers. Bush would often go beyond his scheduled briefing, carrying on a lively Q&A session with intelligence experts, often lasting over an hour. In this sense, the President’s Daily Brief is not so much a document as it is a process. Bush kept the intelligence agencies hopping and, as a result, was better informed when weighing options for the United States.

Intelligence can be wrong. Humans, including intelligence analysts, have a limited capacity for piercing the fog of the future. Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks took America by surprise. Most of the time, though, the intelligence services have provided valuable information to the White House.

U.S. intelligence agencies closely tracked the activities of the Soviet Union, for example, including the location of its troops and weaponry. This information lessened the likelihood of another Pearl Harbor. The best-known intelligence success during these years was in 1962, when the CIA’s U-2 aircraft spotted Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. This photographic intelligence revealed that the missiles would not be operational for two more weeks — information that gave President John F. Kennedy a precious gift of time. He delayed a U.S. invasion of Cuba that might well have escalated into a nuclear war between the superpowers and, during this period, was able to negotiate a removal of the missiles.

America’s spy agencies engage in a wide range of operations, such as gathering data on advanced weaponry held by nations around the world, on drug cartel shipments, on cyberattacks and on attacks being planned against U.S. troops and diplomats overseas. They report, too, on pandemic outbreaks and even climate conditions. In 1994, Bush wrote in a letter to me that the President’s Daily Brief and other Intelligence Community reporting was better than CNN and The Wall Street Journal “on almost every count.”

In his first term, Trump’s relationship with the intelligence agencies was fraught. He viewed them as an untrustworthy “deep state” intent on subverting him. This hostility began with Trump’s belief that the FBI had spied on his 2016 presidential campaign. The bureau had been concerned about the activities of some campaign aides, including Gen. Michael Flynn, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Flynn had conversed in Moscow with high-level Russian spies in 2016 — not the usual behavior of a former defense intelligence chief. To have ignored these interactions by the staff of any presidential candidate, regardless of party affiliation, would have been an abandonment of the bureau’s counterintelligence duties.

Then came the judgment of several top intelligence officials, including CIA Director John Brennan, that Russian interference in the 2016 election had been crucial in the defeat of Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton. Since Trump preferred to believe he had won that election on his own, his relations with the CIA went into a tailspin. On the eve of Trump’s reelection this year, Brennan noted on CNN that Trump continued to “fear” America’s intelligence agencies and to “disparage and undermine” their work.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump rejected the briefings on international affairs that the CIA had provided to presidential candidates since 1960. “I don’t need that briefing,” he told ABC News. In 2017, he reiterated his mantra that intelligence reports were a waste of time. He failed to appreciate that a president needs top intelligence officials present in high councils of government — that is, individuals prepared to focus on the facts, without any policy axes to grind. As the former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms once emphasized to me during an interview, the director “should be the man who calls things the way he sees them, the purpose of this being to give the president one man in his administration who is not trying to formulate policy, carry out a policy or defend a policy — the man who would keep the game honest.”

Early in his first term, Trump opined during a press conference at CIA headquarters that its officers were involved in behind-the-scenes plotting against him. This intrigue, he said, reminded him of Adolf Hitler’s methods of defaming adversaries during the Third Reich. The comparison left CIA officers stunned by this disrespect for their work. Trump also rejected several CIA reports to the White House, including the widely supported conclusion that the crown prince of Saudi Arabia had arranged the murder of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, went on to have lucrative business dealings with the Saudis.

What will be Trump’s approach to intelligence during his second presidency? One can anticipate a continuation of his wars with the intelligence agencies, accompanied by an ongoing low regard for the information they provide. Clues appear in a recent Project 2025 study prepared by the conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation as a blueprint for the incoming administration. Several former Trump administration officials authored the study and the chapter on intelligence does not mince words.

Project 2025 recommends placing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence directly under White House control, as well as eliminating the requirement that the appointed director be confirmed by the Senate. The Heritage Foundation preferred a dependable loyalist for this top position, rather than one who might adopt the Helms approach of independent intelligence leaders speaking truth to power. Trump clearly agreed, selecting Tulsi Gabbard, someone with virtually no intelligence experience — and deeply dubious foreign policy views.

Gabbard has said that Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator, is no enemy of the United States — this despite the Assad regime’s “crimes against humanity of extermination, murder, rape … torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance and other inhuman acts” documented by the U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, along with the regime’s “industrial-scale killing machine,” as David Crane, a war crimes prosecutor and founder of the Syrian Accountability Project, described it.

On top of all these repugnant internal acts of repression stand the facts that Russia is one of Assad’s chief allies and that U.S. troops have been killed inside Syria while engaged in international counterterrorism operations. Yet Gabbard also believes that Russian leader Vladimir Putin would make a good friend for America, despite the fact that he violated the most fundamental tenet of international norms since the end of World War II by invading the sovereign state of Ukraine. The bottom line: Gabbard is even less well-qualified for a senior intelligence position than John Ratcliffe, Trump’s choice for CIA director.

Ratcliffe, too, is a loyalist of the MAGA cause. A former U.S. representative from Texas, he opposed the two first-term impeachment attempts against Trump. As a reward, Trump picked him to serve as director of national intelligence in 2020. Ratcliffe had slim credentials for the position, having served only briefly on the House Intelligence Committee. My interviews with staff on that committee indicate that his attendance was poor and, even when present, he rarely remained for long or asked serious questions. Upon his selection as director of national intelligence, a senior intelligence official remarked to me that Ratcliffe “didn’t have a clue about what the DNI does or why …. this will be like a pig looking at a wristwatch.”

A third recent Trump appointee is also important with respect to intelligence: the secretary of defense. For this job — perhaps the most difficult managerial challenge in the world, given the massive scale of the Pentagon — Trump has chosen, in former Fox News personality Pete Hegseth, someone devoid of major administrative experience, either in government or with large civilian organizations, and someone with little exposure to strategic intelligence issues. Although well-educated, he will find the Department of Defense an overwhelming bureaucracy. Within its structure are nine of the Intelligence Community’s agencies — half of the total — over which he will share management responsibility with the director of national intelligence. Hegseth has a respectable record of military service as an Army National Guard infantry officer, winning two Bronze Stars while serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, where he was also a consumer of tactical intelligence in the field. Nevertheless, he will be at sea when it comes to the worldwide strategic techint programs conducted by the eavesdropping National Security Agency, as well as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for imagery intelligence.

Democratic Sen. Tammy Duckworth of Illinois is a former Blackhawk combat pilot in the Iraq war and lieutenant colonel who lost both legs when an RPG struck her helicopter. She summed up the meaning of these three appointments, telling television reporters that Trump had “gutted” the Intelligence Community — America’s first line of defense.

The Trump administration and its legislative allies claim the intelligence agencies have been “weaponized” against them. This “deep state” has supposedly evolved into an intricate bureaucracy politicized by Democrats. The Heritage Foundation’s answer is to replace the current intelligence leadership and many rank-and-file officers with Trump loyalists, in a sweeping expansion of political appointments within the agencies. The think tank further recommended that the traditional requirement of Senate judgment on the qualifications of proposed senior intelligence officials be relegated to the dustbin, with these individuals placed in office via “recess appointments” that do not require Senate confirmation.

These ideas have generated concern that extremist ideologue Trump aides will take the place of unbiased intelligence officers. Moreover, the Heritage Foundation’s recommendations encourage Trump to skip the normal FBI background checks on political appointees, a long-standing filter to ensure that candidates are qualified to access classified intelligence documents.

Trump will likely continue his first-term practice of belittling the President’s Daily Brief and other intelligence reporting, preferring to rely on political advisers and, above all, his own instincts as a guide to foreign policy. However accurate and timely analytic reports might be, they could become so many self-licking ice cream cones, serving no wider purpose as they are rejected by the Trump administration for failure to fit into the president’s worldview. So much for the fleet of surveillance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft and espionage agents across the meridians that provide a stream of information to the White House on global affairs.

A core criticism that the Trump team levels at previous Democratic administrations is their alleged limited use of covert action as a weapon for advancing America’s interests abroad. Covert action relies on the CIA to employ secret operations to nudge history in a favorable direction for the United States. This approach can sometimes reap benefits, as when the Reagan administration helped thwart a Soviet takeover of Poland with this hidden hand. Yet rather than lessening the frequency of covert actions since the 9/11 attacks, both political parties have relied more heavily than ever on these methods to counter international terrorism, Russian adventurism, Chinese cyberespionage and other dangers.

It is true, though, that the first Trump administration increased the frequency of CIA drone attacks overseas to the highest level ever, and Trump is apt to continue his fascination with CIA drone warfare. He displayed no hesitation in ordering the Pentagon to assassinate the Iranian official Qassem Soleimani with drone missiles, despite an executive order signed by President Gerald R. Ford in 1975 that prohibits U.S. assassinations of foreign leaders.

Of great concern is the possibility that the White House will adopt the darker arts of intelligence for use against domestic critics. Such methods have been tried before. In 1970, President Richard Nixon ordered the creation of a master spy plan known as the Huston Plan (after its architect, White House staffer Tom Charles Huston). The plan was designed to counter opponents of Nixon’s continuation of the Vietnam War. These “enemies” were chiefly young Americans exercising their rights to peacefully protest the war. Approved by Nixon, the Huston Plan mobilized the CIA, the FBI, the NSA and military intelligence against the protesters, with the directors of these agencies signing off on the proposal. The full range of clandestine surveillance tools was unleashed against the “peaceniks” — until J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director, decided to withdraw from this short-lived intrigue, worried that it might leak to the media and cost him his job. Absent Hoover’s support, Nixon reluctantly rescinded the plan.

Would it be possible to create a new master spy scheme, this time focused on Trump’s critics? The intelligence agencies were complicit in illegal operations during the Nixon years. Perhaps they would succumb again, with the proper Trump loyalists in place in high leadership positions.

In a 1975 appearance on “Meet the Press,” Church emphasized the country’s need to know what its enemies were doing, but he also had a warning: Intelligence operations could be turned against our own citizenry. “No American would have any privacy left,” he said. If a dictator took charge in the United States, the agencies’ surveillance prowess could enable him to impose total tyranny. “There would be no place to hide, no way to fight back,” Church continued, “because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know.” Here was “the abyss from which there is no return.”

Historian Theodore H. White recalled that, even in 1970, the Huston Plan allowed the intelligence agencies to reach “all the way to every mailbox, every college campus, every telephone, every home.” Today, Church and White would be doubly alarmed about the possibilities of a Big Brother in the United States. In 2013, newspaper leaks revealed that the NSA’s “metadata” eavesdropping program could wiretap every telephone in the country. Two decades later, America’s spy agencies enjoy even greater surveillance sophistication, augmented by artificial intelligence. Whether these Orwellian capabilities are turned against Americans — during the second Trump presidency or in future administrations — will depend in part on the durability of the governmental checks and balances established at the birth of the American republic in 1787, when the U.S. Constitution was signed.

The genius of America’s founders at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was their recognition of the corrosive effects of centralized power. King George III had taught them well. In drafting the Constitution, they prescribed safeguards against the abuse of power, including a prudent separation of authority into three branches of government, with Congress assigned a major role in budget approvals, diplomacy, war-making and the broad review of executive initiatives.

Congress will continue to examine White House intelligence programs during Trump’s second term, led by members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Church Committee inquiry into CIA domestic spying recommended the creation of these oversight panels in 1976, and, with occasional lapses, they have contributed significantly to the supervision of the spy agencies through the passage of strong intelligence laws and the close monitoring of intelligence programs. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment, for instance, requires written presidential approval of covert actions and timely reporting to both committees. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act mandates court warrants for national security wiretaps; and the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act stipulates a review by the committees before any important covert action is implemented. Even when some illegal operations have been sneaked past their scrutiny (as with the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan administration), these oversight committees soon learned of the transgressions and took corrective action. Together, the Senate and House committees have trained a searchlight on America’s intelligence operations, which once operated largely in darkness.

Sometimes, the Senate Intelligence Committee has taken the lead on oversight, and, on other occasions, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has, depending on the motivation and skills of the panel chairs. Recently, under the leadership of Democratic Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, the Senate committee has been particularly active. Democrats and Republicans alike have demonstrated an interest in intelligence accountability. For example, Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona — known as “Mr. Republican” during the Reagan administration — periodically reined in the overzealous CIA director at the time, William J. Casey, who had served as the president’s former campaign manager. The senator’s institutional pride kicked in, and Goldwater defended the upper chamber against the disdain for Congress that Casey often expressed.

Trump will no doubt lean on lawmakers to toe the line on recommended administration appointees and foreign policy objectives and, as has been shown again and again, many members of Congress will bend a knee to him. Nevertheless, members of the committees can push back. Current Speaker of the House Mike Johnson may roll over when scolded by the White House, but there are still Goldwaters around who don’t like to see Congress humiliated and perhaps even destroyed as a check against government excesses by the executive branch. Among them, prominent Republicans Susan Collins of Maine and James Lankford of Oklahoma are both admired members of the Senate committee. And although both committees have a strong ethos against leaking classified information, and they rarely have, the so-called “leak-item veto” of informing the press about covert action is another tool available to Congress in extremis for revealing to the American people illegal and immoral intelligence initiatives launched by an administration.

Another important deterrent against the abuse of intelligence power is the professional ethos of intelligence officers. They understand that, if asked by the White House to break the law, they have several avenues of recourse. Each intelligence agency has an inspector general to whom they can report inappropriate policy orders. On Capitol Hill, the committees’ members and staff privately hear and investigate charges of intelligence malfeasance. Intelligence professionals have also turned to the media as a way of exposing illegal operations, as in the Church Committee inquiry.

The Constitution lives on and its checks and balances provide a unique protective shield against the abuse of secret power. Yet these checks ultimately rest on the vigilance of citizens inside and outside the government, and their courage to speak out against attempts to erode the democratic principles that have guided this nation since its founding.

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newlinesmag.com · November 21, 2024

4. Fighting Ideologies: Lessons Learned from the War on Terror and Their Application to Strategic Competition

​I would say ultimately and ALWAYS to this statement:

• Ultimately, we need to consider how our actions uphold or undermine our adversaries’ ideologies and fight both the military capacity and the ideology of our adversaries in a synergistic way where both are undermined simultaneously.

This applies to more than just counterterrorism. It applies to the strategic competition and conflict with authoritarian regimes as well.

Fighting Ideologies: Lessons Learned from the War on Terror and Their Application to Strategic Competition - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Heather S. Gregg

Bottom Line

• Ideology—an overarching narrative that explains what is wrong with the world, an ideal state for how the world ought to be, and a course of action for realizing that world—is a critical warfighting capability that helps adversaries explain and sustain their military actions over a prolonged period.
• The United States, along with its allies and partners, devoted critical time and energy to countering the ideology of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham as part of a comprehensive strategy to defeat these groups in the Global War on Terror. Some of these lessons have application to today’s fight against state actors in an era of strategic competition.
• Ultimately, we need to consider how our actions uphold or undermine our adversaries’ ideologies and fight both the military capacity and the ideology of our adversaries in a synergistic way where both are undermined simultaneously.

This article was initially presented as a paper at the Post-9/11 Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned Conference in Annapolis, Maryland from September 17-18, 2024. The conference was sponsored by FPRI’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and the Department of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Center.

Heather S. Gregg

Dr. Heather S. Gregg is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Introduction

The United States along with its allies and partners devoted critical time and energy to countering the ideology of al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as part of a comprehensive strategy to defeat these groups in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). These ideologies, which were part of a larger interpretation of Islam called Jihadi Salafism, formed a critical warfighting capability for these terrorist groups that explained what was wrong with the world and who was to blame for it, an ideal state for how the world ought to be, and how to get there.

Today, the United States and its allies face threats posed by strategic state competitors, especially Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. While considerable focus has been placed on these countries’ military capabilities, including their nuclear ambitions, considerably less attention has been paid to understanding and fighting their ideologies. As with AQ, ISIS, and other Salafi Jihadis, ideology plays a critical role in the warfighting capabilities of our strategic competitors, and we should be actively taking measures to undermine their ideology.

Some (but not all) of the lessons learned from countering Jihadi Salafism have application to today’s fight against our strategic adversaries. Most importantly, we need to understand ideology as a warfighting capability and consider how our actions uphold or undermine these ideologies. Additionally, we need to fight both the military capacity and the ideology of our adversaries in a synergistic way where both are undermined simultaneously. And, while doing this, we need to be careful of increased apocalypticism in our adversaries’ ideologies, which could signal a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.

Ideology as a Warfighting Capability

It is important to first understand the critical role that ideology plays in conflict of any shape and size. Ideologies are an important warfighting capability because they offer an overarching narrative that explains the current state of the world we live in, who is to blame for the suffering and injustice people face, and why violence is needed to right these wrongs. Ideologies perform several important functions in times of prolonged conflict. First, they encourage recruitment and retention of those supporting the fight; in fact, one could argue that since the birth of the levée en masse, ideologies have been necessary for encouraging recruitment of mass armies and sustaining their numbers. This is also true of creating and sustaining a fighting force for nonstate actors. Second, ideologies provide leaders and followers with a “cause” that they can point back to during military setbacks and provide hope that the fight is not in vain. Powerful ideologies also situate setbacks within a wider context of victory, which may not happen in this lifetime, but will occur. The most powerful ideologies explain failures and setbacks as actual successes in the grand scenario and a better world for which individuals and groups are fighting.

When considering ideology as a warfighting capability, one useful definition includes three subparts: a critique for how the world currently is, a set of beliefs for how the world ought to be, and a course of action for realizing that world. Each of these subcomponents provides opportunities to both understand the messaging of the adversary and create possible countermeasures to their worldview.

Critique of the current world

Critiquing the current state of the world is arguably the most important component of an ideology because it identifies the problem, explains how things came to be this way, and assigns blame for the situation people find themselves in. Critically, assigning blame also offers a target to channel one’s outrage and to begin to address the problem. The critique, in other words, draws the battle lines between “us” and “them” and explains who needs to be targeted and why.

This part of an ideology, if constructed well, should be able to sustain minor setbacks to the war and be broad enough to absorb specific inconsistencies in facts and circumstances. It should be able to draw the widest number of supporters within the population it seeks to mobilize. As counterinsurgency expert David Galula famously noted in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, it is easier to get people to agree to be against something than to be for something. Most powerful ideologies, therefore, provide details on the problem but are more abstract on the solution (see below).

Finally, powerful ideologies do a good job explaining the problem with history, culture, identity, religion, and other tools that personalize and emotionalize the struggle. The threat is not some distant, abstract problem, but it is here and now, and deeply personal. It requires both an individual and a collective response to defeat the threat.

How the world ought to be

As stated above, powerful ideologies provide more detail on their critique of the world, including especially who is to blame, than on the solution. Typically, a description of how the world ought to be is aspirational; it is light on details because specifics can divide people and therefore undermine active and passive support. The Islamic State, the Caliphate, the Worker’s Utopia, the Empire of the Sun, the Reich: these are all examples of ideal states that, while thin on details of the end state they were seeking, drew broad support from their target populations.

The course of action

The course of action in an ideology, like the solution, is usually broad and philosophical. It is more abstract than a specific strategy for what to do. Three approaches are particularly important for the types of political ideologies we face today: violent (including but not limited to the use of terrorism), nonviolent, and apocalyptic, which calls for the figurative destruction of the world as we know it with the hope of ushering in a new, better world in its place (the solution).

Examples of each of these courses of action abound. Karl Marx’s articulation of the communist revolution argued that the capitalist system could only be changed through violence; the system and the people that upheld it had to be destroyed by force rather than reformed. Mahatma Gandhi stated the only way to end colonialization in India was through non-violent activism against the British; this was the philosophical underpinning of the “Quit India” movement. One strain of White supremacism aims to foment a racial holy war “RAHOWA” with the goal of ridding the world of people of color, who bear the stain of the sins of Cain, and to usher in a new, better, racially pure world in its place.

It is important to note that broad ideologies can support different courses of action to arrive at how the world ought to be. Salafism, as an ideological interpretation of Islam, supports a peaceful movement and a political approach, as well as a violent incarnation. These different approaches to realizing their ideal state provide opportunities for countermeasures that can exploit these ideological disagreements.

Salafi Jihadi Ideology of AQ and ISIS

Salafism is not a new ideology. Most scholars trace this interpretation of Islam back to the 19th century and include ideologues such as the Saudi ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb. Salafism as an ideology offers a compelling critique of the current state of the world, claiming that society is in rapid decline, which is evident by the number of wars, social unrest, moral decay, and overall suffering in the world. One strain of Salafism purports that the world is in the end of times and draws on apocalyptic expectations outlined in the Qur’an, the Sunna, Hadith, and other sources as evidence that the end is near, including natural and manmade disasters.

Salafism identifies two broad causes of the world’s rapid decline. The first and most important culprit is failed Muslim leadership, including the Ulama, or Muslim scholars, who have relied on past interpretations and rulings in Islam, instead of the words of the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet Muhammed to guide the community. This approach has led not only the Ulama off the true path of Islam but also society and has led to confusion and disunity in the umma, which is the worldwide Muslim community. Muslim rulers have contributed to the umma’s downfall by supporting and upholding these false teachings.

The second cause of decline is the presence and influence of the West, which includes its actual colonization of much of the Muslim world, its support of the state of Israel, and its introduction of Western secularism and democracy, ideas that have led Muslims away from God’s rule. Western social influences in the Muslim world, including Western education, feminism, and homosexuality, have further led to its downfall. The Muslim world has fallen into a state of Jahiliya, ignorance, from the examples set by the West and by Muslims leaders who blindly follow these bankrupt and corrupt ideas.

The solution to these problems is a return to the right path of Islam as articulated in the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet Muhammed, and to turn away from bid’ah, or any religious innovation, as well as Western ideas. Salafis further emphasize the need to recognize the indivisibility of God, or tawhid, in all aspects of life. Returning to the pure path of Islam will end divisions among Muslims, including Shia and Sunnis, and unify the umma. Ultimately, returning to what they believe is the pure path of Islam as articulated by the Qur’an and exemplified by the Prophet Muhammed’s life and the purification of the dar al Islam, the land and people connected to the faith, from foreign influence will create the conditions for the end of times, with a new world of justice and peace emerging in its place.

Importantly, Salafism as an ideology is not de facto violent. According to Quintan Wictorowicz, Salafis fall into three categories of actors to realize their ideal state: what he calls nonviolent purists, politicos (those that aim to work through the state to realize Salafi goals), and jihadists, or those who see violence as the necessary path to realizing their utopic goals.

Clearly, AQ and ISIS are proponents of the jihadi course of action for realizing Salafi ideology. Both movements see violence and shedding blood as necessary for realizing a unified umma, free of internal corruption and external influence, adhering to the oneness of God. Both groups also see the return of the Caliphate, the one right ruler, to the dar al Islam as a necessary state for returning Islam to the right path.

Despite these similarities, ISIS and AQ also have some important differences. ISIS is deeply apocalyptic in its vision of the world and its salvation. Its messaging is steeped with symbols and references to Muslim expectations of the apocalypse, including discussions about a great battle in “Dabiq” with “Rome” (the West), which is an apocalyptic expectation, as are twelve righteous rulers in Islam, the eighth of which was believed to be ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who was killed in 2019), to name a few. ISIS, in fact, justifies its mass atrocities and shedding blood as a necessary pathway to realizing the apocalypse and ushing in a new and better world. Graeme Wood’s 2015 Atlantic article “What ISIS Really Wants” summarizes, “In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.”

Countering Salafi Jihadi Ideology

Throughout the GWOT, the United States and its allies implemented several initiatives aimed at countering the ideologies of AQ and ISIS. Three broad efforts are particularly important: countering the message, stopping the spread of the message, and creating a new message altogether. When done together and synchronized with other efforts, including military action, these efforts began to counter the ideology.

Countering the Message

The United States and its allies and partners took the ideology of AQ and ISIS seriously from the earliest days of the GWOT. There was an understanding that the ideology was important—that their interpretation of Islam mattered and needed to be addressed to curb recruitment and sympathy for these groups. For example, in the first one hundred days following September 11, the White House issued a statement outlining how the United States had responded to the attacks. Within the details of forming an international coalition to counter al Qaeda and its use of military action, it included “respecting Islam” as one of the actions taken. The statement quoted President George W. Bush, who asserted: “The Islam that we know is a faith devoted to the worship of one God, as revealed through the Holy Qu’ran. It teaches the value and importance of charity, mercy, and peace.” The statement included discussions about protecting Muslims in the United States and celebrating Iftar at the White House.

To specifically address claims that the West does not care about Islam or Muslims, the United States took several measures aimed at countering al Qaeda’s message. In 2003, the U.S. Department of State created the YES (Youth Exchange and Study) program, which gave students from Muslim-majority countries the opportunity to study in the United States. It also wrote a booklet called Muslim Life in America, which aimed to counter the specific message that the United States was hostile to Islam. The State Department also helped to fund the P2P (Peer to Peer): Challenging Extremism project, which aimed to amplify local voices speaking out against extremism. The United States has continued to emphasize its commitment to religious tolerance throughout the GWOT.

However, efforts aimed at emphasizing Western countries’ tolerance toward Muslims and support of Muslim countries have most likely fallen on deaf ears for several reasons. First, these words and programs were overshadowed by U.S. and allied military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond, which provided key data points for AQ, ISIS, and others of Western aggression toward the Muslim world. Second, the United States specifically lacks credibility over its support of Israel and, by extension, Israel’s actions toward Palestinians and neighboring countries. Third, key European powers, including France, Belgium, and Great Britian, lack credibility in some parts of the world due to the legacy of colonialism. In other words, the messenger has corrupted the message. Taken together, these actions by themselves were unlikely to have successfully countered the anti-Western message of AQ and ISIS.

Another major effort at countering the ideology of Salafi Jihadi was deradicalization programs, which aimed to turn individuals that embraced Salafi Jihadism back into healthy members of society. Some deradicalization efforts were government-sponsored, such as Saudi Arabia’s program to rehabilitate low-level jihadis they had apprehended. Other programs were initiated by nonprofits, such as the now shuttered Quillium Foundation in Britain. While this approach to countering the message was less strategic, it was still a major effort in countering Salafi Jihadi ideology.

These programs also have faced considerable criticism since their implementation. One critique is their inability to measure overall effectiveness in countering Salafi Jihadi ideology, particularly when the target of these programs was individuals. Another is that these programs unjustly targeted conservative Muslims and aimed to paint all Salafis in a negative light. Finally, in Great Britain and elsewhere, several “rehabilitated” jihadis were released from prison and went on to perpetrate terrorist acts, including the 2019 London attack by Usman Khan that killed two and the 2020 knife attack by Sudesh Amman. These acts have raised considerable doubt on the efficacy of deradicalization programs in Great Britain.

Preventing the Spread of Ideology

The United States and allied powers also engaged in several efforts aimed at preventing the spread of AQ and ISIS ideology. Although controversial, one approach was to take ideologues off the battlefield. The 2011 killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, a U.S. citizen, is one example of this effort. The death of ISIS media personnel is another example of this approach. Yet another approach was to disable the ability of AQ and ISIS to spread their ideology through the Internet. Task Force Ares is credited with disabling a range of Internet activities of ISIS.

As with efforts to counter Salafi Jihadi ideology, measuring the effectiveness of preventing the spread of ideology is nearly impossible to do; it amounts to trying to measure something in the future that may, or may not, happen. Similarly, attributing measurable changes in behavior, like a downtick in recruitment, to one activity is difficult to do when a multitude of variables are occurring at once, what is known in academia as “overdetermined.” Furthermore, as with most education programs, in addition to being overdetermined, changes in behavior may only be visible over time, making measuring these effects in the present difficult.

Creating a New Message

A third approach to countering the ideology of Salafi Jihadism has been to provide an entirely new message, as opposed to countering the ideology or trying to prevent its spread. One program, the Australian Beyond Bali Project, created a publicly available curriculum aimed at introducing peace and tolerance education in public schools. In Indonesia, the Muhammadiya School system, which was created in response to Dutch and British schools systems during colonialism, aims to reinforce the tolerant strain of Islam indigenous to Indonesia, which is distinct from Salafi Jihadism.

As with the other countermeasures aimed at blunting the ideology of Salafi Jihadism, measuring precise effects of these programs is unlikely given the vast number of variables that influence why individuals and groups support a set of beliefs over another, and if those beliefs solely influence behavior.

Finally, in addition to looking at various actions taken to deliberately try to undermine Salafi Jihadi ideology and change violent behavior, it is important to also address actions taken that reinforced the ideology, whether intentional or not.

The full-scale military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, while undertaken for specific reasons and with broad political and military objectives, were actions that reinforced Salafi Jihadi narratives that the United States and the West more broadly were out to destroy the Muslim world. The fact that neither of these wars went according to plan and left both countries fragile and unstable has provided evidence that supports the Salafi Jihadi narrative that the West is out to destroy Islam.

One could also point to the prolonged drone campaign in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as another example that has reinforced the messaging of Salafi Jihadis of Western intentions toward Muslims and the Muslim world. Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen wrote in a 2009 New York Times op-ed about the negative consequences of U.S. led drone strikes in Pakistan. He summarized that “while violent extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a faceless enemy that wages war from afar and often kills more civilians than militants.”

Clearly, some of these military actions were necessary to fight transnational jihadis; however, it is critical to keep in mind how military actions might become examples that jihadis will use to reinforce their ideology.

 Applying Lessons Learned in GWOT to Countering State Ideologies

While there are many important distinctions between AQ, ISIS, and state adversaries today, we can still draw important lessons from the twenty-one years fighting Salafi Jihadi ideology in the GWOT. Four salient lessons are proposed here with their application to our current state adversaries in an era of strategic competition.

Ideology matters as a warfighting capability.

The United States and its allies and partners took the ideology of AQ and ISIS seriously and understood it as something that contributed to the warfighting capability of the adversary.

Today, the ideologies of our current strategic competitors, including Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, matter just as much. In fact, these adversaries are using some of the same themes as AQ and ISIS in their own ideologies. Take, for example, this quote from Vladimir Putin in a speech on February 24, 2022, the day of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: “[The West] sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people from within, the attitudes they have been aggressively imposing on their countries, attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature. This is not going to happen. No one has ever succeeded in doing this, nor will they succeed now.” This quote easily could have come from Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Awlaki, or Baghdadi. These are not new themes, and we have experience addressing them.

As with AQ and ISIS, countering ideology is important because of its effects in luring potential recruits to the fight, both domestic and foreign, and sustaining support for the war in the long term. State actors are no different in these pursuits. Russia and China, for example, have used polarizing language about the West, including about colonialism, in efforts to draw more countries to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) alliance and to argue that BRICS is the best way to counter Western power through alternative economic, financial, and security alliances. As with the GWOT, we need to understand which themes are resonating with whom, why, and to what effect.

We need to fight the ideology and the military capacity of our adversaries synergistically.

In Russia, Putin’s ideology is playing a critical role in explaining and sustaining his aggression. He has devised an ideology of nationalist imperialism, what he calls “scientific Putinism,” which goes far beyond financial profits and includes the restoration of the Russian Empire to its former territorial, political, economic, religious, and civilizational glory, free from Western influence. This government is using education at all levels to indoctrinate the population to this vision, and it is believed to have considerable support within the Russian Federation. We should not ignore this warfighting capability and should take measures to undermine and discredit his ideology. The same goes for the ideologies of our other strategic competitors.

In the GWOT, academics spent considerable time and energy trying to understand the ideology of AQ and ISIS, how it was resonating with target populations, and why. Organizations like the Pew Foundation conducted repeated surveys on a variety of topics in Muslim-majority countries to get a sense of attitudes and level of support for Salafi Jihadism. Additionally, these same efforts also considered how U.S. and allied foreign policy affected populations, their attitudes toward the West, and their views toward Salafi Jihadism.

We need to consider how our actions feed our adversaries’ ideologies and, wherever possible, work to undermine the message, not reinforce it. Successfully doing this requires understanding the message, those who create and propagate it, those who believe the ideology and those who do not, and how our actions affect the message.

As with the GWOT, the messenger is as important as the message itself. If Western countries are the adversary’s target of the ideology, standing up and saying how great we are, or what we are (or are not) doing, is unlikely to be effective. This is a lesson learned from the GWOT, and it applies to our current era of strategic competition as well.

Additionally, if we have a good messenger, partnering closely with that individual or organization may do more harm than good, especially if we are the adversary’s target. Rather than overtly embracing these individuals and groups, it is better to partner with them silently or not at all.

We need to be careful of increased apocalypticism.

As with the highly apocalyptic images and language of ISIS, we need to take increased apocalyptic rhetoric from our state adversaries seriously because this message could be the harbinger of mass death and destruction. Unlike ISIS or AQ, Russia, China, and North Korea all have weapons of mass destruction, and Iran has aggressive nuclear ambitions. In other words, these states have access to weapons that could make their dreams of the apocalypse come true. We therefore should pay attention to increased messaging and symbols that have an apocalyptic tone because this rhetoric could signal efforts to prepare populations for mass atrocities, including the use of nuclear weapons or attacking nuclear facilities with the promise of cosmic victory and ushering in a new era. Dimitry Adamsky’s fascinating book, Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy, warns of such a possibility.

Measuring effectiveness is difficult.

Within all of this, measuring effects in efforts to counter ideologies will be plagued with challenges of overdetermination. This does not mean we should abandon these efforts. Rather, at the strategic level, it is important to keep in mind that it is the totality of efforts across multiple domains and instruments of statecraft that have an overall effect on success or failure of objectives in modern war. Focusing on things that can be easily measured, such as spent ammunition, deaths, sorties, or territory lost or claimed, in most cases will not provide a comprehensive picture of the war’s trajectory. Synchronizing these efforts toward a clear goal should be the pursuit, with macro-level indicators that help identify success or failure in meeting the war’s goal.

Ultimately, as with other warfighting capabilities, including materiel, money, industrial capacity, and manpower, the veracity of an ideology will contribute to the intensity and duration of our adversaries’ warfighting capabilities. We ignore the ideology of our adversaries at our own peril.

Image: US Army Reserve photo by Spc. Jeffery J. Harris

fpri.org · by Heather S. Gregg

5. CNA Explains: The rise of hybrid warfare, where states attempt 'winning without fighting'

​The author failed to acknowledge Frank Hoffman's contribution to the understanding of hybrid warfare.

This is a seminal work on Hybrid Wars. Download the 72 page report at the link. 

Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars

https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf

​

CNA Explains: The rise of hybrid warfare, where states attempt 'winning without fighting'

CNA looks at how the term originated, historical examples and the implications.

Emil Chan

21 Nov 2024 04:59PM

(Updated: 22 Nov 2024 03:25PM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/hybrid-warfare-russia-ukraine-europe-conventional-4760451

channelnewsasia.com

SINGAPORE: Ukraine on Wednesday (Nov 20) said Russia was trying to sow panic and apply "psychological pressure" by circulating fake messages about looming attacks, amid a war between the two countries that has now passed 1,000 days.

The day before, two undersea cables cut in the Baltic Sea in 48 hours led to European and American officials labelling the incident as an example of “hybrid warfare" by malicious actors”, similarly linked to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

What is hybrid warfare?

While conventional warfare is generally understood as direct military action, there is no perfect nor fully agreed upon definition of hybrid warfare, which also goes by names such as non-linear warfare or indirect strategy.

The NATO military alliance defines it as a combination of “military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces”. 

These may also include industrial espionage, the use of proxies or insurgencies, diplomatic pressure or even military action that is below the threshold of an armed conflict.

“Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations. They aim to destabilise and undermine societies,” said the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on its website.

Related:

NATO holds large Arctic exercises in Russia's backyard

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What are its origins, and how has it been used?

The concept is arguably as old as war itself.

Ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu once remarked that winning without fighting, or subduing an adversary without relying on military action, is the “acme of skill”.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union employed hybrid warfare during the Cold War, through clandestine sabotage operations among several other tactics.

But Russia's association with hybrid warfare was solidified in 2013 after military chief Valery Gerasimov published an article noting that the rules of war have changed.

“The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness,” he wrote, citing the use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other measures in coordination with the "protest potential" of a population.

The ensuing years saw well-documented instances of alleged Russian meddling in American and European elections.

Even before its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow had denied involvement in aiding pro-Russia separatists in the east. It also initially denied involvement in the annexation of Crimea.

“Hybrid warfare seems to have become an integral part of Moscow’s policy vis-à-vis the West,” researcher Arsalan Bilal wrote in NATO's magazine earlier this year.

Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov attends an expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board at the National Defence Control Centre in Moscow, Russia, on Dec 19, 2023. (Photo: Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin…see more

China has also integrated hybrid warfare into its doctrine.

In 1999, two senior Chinese military officers published a book titled Unrestricted Warfare, in which they argued that war would unfold on a “borderless" battlefield, with boundaries between soldiers and non-soldiers now broken down.

“It is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense, nor is it possible to protect these stratified national interests,” wrote People's Liberation Army colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.

“We no longer have to be like our ancestors who invariably saw resolution by armed force as the last court of appeals. Any of the political, economic or diplomatic means now has sufficient strength to supplant military means.

“Obviously, warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units and military affairs; and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists and even bankers. How to conduct war is obviously no longer a question for the consideration of military people alone”.

Related:

China, Russia must fight US 'containment': Russian security chief

Boots on the ground: China in a spot as North Korea marches into Russia’s war on Ukraine

China has also publicly adopted a "Three Warfares” concept referring to psychological operations, media manipulation and legal warfare.

Among numerous instances of these at play over the years was the US arrest of two New York City residents in April last year, for allegedly operating a Chinese “secret police station”. Beijing has denied this, saying the stations existed mainly to provide citizen services.

In September, research by an intelligence company pointed to a Chinese social media influence operation pushing divisive messages ahead of the US presidential election. 

Beijing also earlier this month drew a baseline for “territorial waters” around the disputed Scarborough Shoal, its latest salvo in pushing claims in the South China Sea.

“China’s continued use of blurred tactics and quasi-military forces in the maritime domain manifestly demonstrates Chinese use of coercive force in innovative ways,” wrote Frank Hoffman and other analysts in a commentary for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the US.

“China has been carefully adapting its maritime assets and extending its influence, conducting hybrid or grey zone actions with ‘Chinese characteristics’.”

Play Video

47:42 Min

Technology is transforming 21st century battlefields, but a more sinister form of warfare is emerging to invade a country without full blown military action. Divian Nair travels to Ukraine to find out how hybrid war…see more

Why is hybrid warfare on the rise?

In the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in hybrid warfare as the two nuclear powers wanted to avoid outright confrontation.

Hybrid warfare provided enough plausible deniability to avoid direct armed retaliation.

After the Soviet Union broke up, Russia found its military might diminished, which only encouraged the further use of hybrid warfare to avoid direct military confrontation with the West.

“What is common in both Russian and Chinese thinking is the core idea of avoiding Western military strengths and attacking its weaknesses - the essence of indirect strategy,” wrote Dr Kumar Ramakrishna, a professor of national security studies at Singapore's S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, in a paper.

Another advantage of hybrid warfare is the ability for countries and groups to wage war for cheap.

As the costs of conventional conflict in a nuclear era continues to grow, so do the risks of escalation, said experts. As such, countries are even more inclined to engage in hybrid warfare.

“It is much more feasible to sponsor and fan disinformation in collaboration with non-state actors than it is to roll tanks into another country’s territory or scramble fighter jets into its airspace,” wrote Bilal, the researcher.

“The costs and risks are markedly less, but the damage is real.”

One outcome of Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election was mainstreaming of right-wing populism in the US, with erosion of trust in state institutions as a result.

“As right-wing populism contributes towards and intersects with declining trust in mainstream media, disinformation can be employed to create security woes within target states," Bilal added.

"Russia strategically uses disinformation to achieve political and strategic goals."

Then there is generative artificial intelligence (AI). It has already become ever more commonplace and easy for nefarious entities to use the tech to spoof credible news platforms and government websites, further eroding trust.

Due to the diffused nature of hybrid warfare, countries may also be unaware they are under attack, leaving them unable to develop a response.  

“It is often difficult to fully diagnose an active or recent hybrid threat,” said Bilal.

“The target’s decision-making process may be damaged because a non-attributable force has conducted the hostile action, or there is plausible deniability on the part of the aggressor.

"Polarisation may be deepened on state and societal levels due to disinformation.”

What are the consequences?

China's actions in the South China Sea, for one, have sparked several confrontations with the Philippines and other countries with overlapping claims.

In one altercation earlier this year, a Filipino sailor lost a thumb in a melee with Chinese coast guard personnel wielding knives and other weapons.

The Philippines and the United States have a mutual defence treaty. That incident could have escalated into a wider direct, armed conflict.

As part of US-China rivalry, a trade war may also lead to a scenario where developing countries face falling export earnings, falling inward investment, higher inflation, higher interest rates and an increased external debt burden as growth slows everywhere.

Away from the superpowers, global markets have also been affected by Iran’s proxy war with Israel, with Houthi rebels in Yemen firing upon civilian cargo ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

In Singapore, authorities have periodically warned of hybrid warfare's threats and implications, amid publicised action taken against foreign actors.

In October, the government blocked 10 websites set up to potentially mount hostile information campaigns, with one of them linked to Russia.

Related:

Malicious foreign actors playing 'long game' using credible-looking websites and gen AI: Analysts

Earlier this year, social media accounts linked to an anti-Beijing Chinese tycoon were blocked after he alleged that Singapore was in the “pocket of a foreign actor”.

This came after a Singaporean businessman with links to China’s top political advisory body was also put on notice for advocating Chinese interests.

In its most recent messaging, Singapore authorities urged the public to be vigilant against moves by malicious foreign actors to sway the population's sentiments, to advance their own interests.

“They do so by inciting social tension, exploiting societal fault lines, manipulating elections, or undermining confidence and trust in public institutions.”

Want an issue or topic explained? Email us at digitalnews@mediacorp.com.sg. Your question might become a story on our site.

6. China's Massive Espionage Machine: Can the U.S. Effectively Fight Back?

​Excerpts:

In response to China's growing espionage activities, the United States has crafted a robust counterintelligence strategy to mitigate the theft of critical information and intellectual property. This article explores the evolving tactics of Chinese espionage, the U.S. response, and the broader national and global security implications. The "National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2024" outlines key measures to outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, particularly China, which the U.S. sees as one of its most significant espionage threats. Chinese intelligence operations target everything from advanced technologies to sensitive government data, infiltrating not only federal systems but also private industries, research institutions, and academic settings. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the dismantling of Flax Typhoon and other botnets, have heightened awareness across sectors and driven immediate enhancements in countermeasures, reinforcing the need for coordinated responses.

The U.S. strategy to combat this threat is multi-pronged, focusing on both defensive and offensive measures. It emphasizes the need to "Detect, Understand, & Anticipate Foreign Intelligence Threats" by expanding innovative intelligence collection methods, integrating these capabilities across federal, state, and local levels, and enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies, local governments, and international allies. Offensively, the strategy aims to "Counter, Degrade, & Deter Foreign Intelligence Activities & Capabilities" through advanced tools like artificial intelligence and cyber operations. Protecting America's technological edge, combating cyber intrusions, and addressing influence operations are key pillars of this approach. The National Counterintelligence Strategy provides a comprehensive framework to outpace adversaries by developing an integrated, proactive, and resilient posture, ensuring the U.S. retains its strategic advantages in an era of persistent threats.

China's espionage campaign demands an intensive and effective U.S. effort to safeguard American information. The American people must be made aware of the evolving threat posed by Chinese espionage, the multifaceted response outlined in the U.S. counterintelligence strategy, and the necessity for resilience in protecting national security. Despite the challenges presented by an open society, the United States must be transparent about the nature of these attacks and be prepared to respond decisively, fostering a deterrent effect. For too long, China has been allowed to draft off the intellectual work of Americans. It is imperative that the U.S. remains vigilant, ready to defend its technological and intellectual assets, and committed to preventing further exploitation by foreign adversaries.

Former President Donald Trump’s return to the political stage raises questions about his cybersecurity policies. While Trump’s administration previously took a hard line on China, his inclination to reduce regulations could weaken U.S. defenses against espionage. For instance, Trump’s focus on deregulation may make it easier for Chinese firms to penetrate critical sectors under the guise of business investments. Reports suggest that Trump’s cyber policy will likely prioritize economic concerns over national security. This approach could relax scrutiny on Chinese tech companies operating in the U.S., potentially enabling espionage under the pretext of trade and investment agreements. Critics argue that balancing economic and security interests will be crucial to countering Beijing’s growing influence.

The incoming administration's choice of security or economic priorities could open the door to the Chinese even wider or curtail the steady hemorrhage of information to China. The advantage for China is enormous, and no short-term economic gain would be worth it.

China's Massive Espionage Machine: Can the U.S. Effectively Fight Back?

STRATEGY CENTRAL

By Practitioners, For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - November 23, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/china-s-massive-espionage-machine-can-the-u-s-effectively-fight-back

Introduction

In response to China's growing espionage activities, the United States has crafted a robust counterintelligence strategy to mitigate the theft of critical information and intellectual property. The "National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2024" outlines key measures to outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, particularly China, which the U.S. sees as one of its most significant espionage threats. Chinese intelligence operations target everything from advanced technologies to sensitive government data, infiltrating not only federal systems but also private industries, research institutions, and academic settings. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the dismantling of Flax Typhoon and other botnets, have heightened awareness across sectors and driven immediate enhancements in countermeasures, reinforcing the need for coordinated responses.

The U.S. strategy to combat this threat is multi-pronged, focusing on defensive and offensive measures. It emphasizes the need to "Detect, Understand, & Anticipate Foreign Intelligence Threats" by expanding innovative intelligence collection methods, integrating these capabilities across federal, state, and local levels, and enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies, local governments, and international allies. Offensively, the strategy aims to "Counter, Degrade, & Deter Foreign Intelligence Activities & Capabilities" through advanced tools like artificial intelligence and cyber operations. Protecting America's technological edge, combating cyber intrusions, and addressing influence operations are critical pillars of this approach. The National Counterintelligence Strategy aims to provide a comprehensive framework to outpace adversaries by developing an integrated, proactive, and resilient posture, ensuring the U.S. retains its strategic advantages in an era of persistent threats.

Does the U.S. have the right approach to counter China’s espionage? Countering certainly won’t be enough, as a passive defense is already failing. As the Typhoon series of attacks highlights, the U.S. is vulnerable to Chinese information attacks. This article explores the evolving attack angles of Chinese espionage, the U.S. response, and the broader national and global security implications.

 A Global Web of Espionage

China’s use of technology for espionage has reached unprecedented levels. A significant disruption occurred with the FBI and allied intelligence agencies dismantling a botnet network, Flax Typhoon, comprising 260,000 infected routers, cameras, and other devices. Operated by a Chinese state-affiliated contractor, Integrity Technology Group, the network targeted the United States, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Germany, collecting sensitive government, corporate, and military data. Another network, Salt Typhoon, infiltrated major U.S. telecommunications providers, potentially compromising sensitive data through vulnerabilities in Cisco routers and core network systems. These operations illustrate Beijing’s capacity to exploit commercial telecommunications carriers for surveillance.

Exploiting telecommunications is the tip of a staggering iceberg. Here is a small sample of China’s espionage activities across a swath of U.S. information vulnerabilities:

• Telecommunications: A Gateway to Espionage. China has exploited vulnerabilities in U.S. telecommunications infrastructure to collect sensitive data. In one of the most advanced operations, hackers linked to the Chinese Ministry of State Security compromised major mobile networks in a campaign named Salt Typhoon. Over eight months, these operatives infiltrated systems at Lumen Technologies and other carriers, stealing call logs, unencrypted texts, and audio from high-value targets, including senior U.S. officials and political figures like Donald Trump and J.D. Vance. This breach highlighted the systemic weaknesses in telecommunications networks and the dangers posed by state-backed cyber adversaries.

Further complicating matters, a congressional investigation revealed that Chinese-manufactured cargo cranes used at U.S. ports could function as espionage tools. These cranes, built by ZPMC, were found to have embedded cellular modems capable of bypassing firewalls and gathering intelligence. Investigators flagged these vulnerabilities as potential tools for sabotage during a conflict, particularly in scenarios involving Taiwan.

• Infrastructure Espionage: Targeting Critical Systems. Volt Typhoon has been active since at least 2021 and primarily focuses on U.S. critical infrastructure. This group employs stealth techniques known as living-off-the-land (LOTL), which means they utilize built-in system tools rather than traditional malware, making detection more challenging. Volt Typhoon’s operations have mainly targeted communications infrastructure, particularly in Guam, a crucial U.S. military hub. The group often gains access through compromised Fortinet devices. Then, it extracts credentials to move further into the network, which remains hidden using proxy devices such as SOHO routers and firewalls.

• Academic Espionage: Targeting Knowledge and Innovation. China’s espionage efforts extend into U.S. academia, exploiting the open nature of educational institutions. Beijing recruits researchers to transfer intellectual property and sensitive technologies through programs like the Thousand Talents Program. A Center for Strategic and International Studies study documented numerous cases where Chinese nationals exploited access to cutting-edge research in fields such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, often redirecting these innovations to support China’s military and economic objectives.

American universities have become a battleground for Chinese intelligence operations. While many Chinese students and researchers contribute positively, a minority act under directives from the Chinese Communist Party. This has increased scrutiny over collaborations with Chinese institutions, especially in high-tech and sensitive areas.

• Artificial Intelligence (AI): The Ultimate Intelligence Amplifier. Beijing’s espionage strategy centers on utilizing advanced AI capabilities. By analyzing massive datasets, China can create detailed profiles of individuals, aiding in intelligence operations. Data stolen from sources like the Office of Personnel Management and Marriott International is used to identify potential recruits, monitor undercover operatives, and build comprehensive dossiers on American leaders.

AI-driven tools also enhance China’s ability to exploit telecommunications data. For instance, Salt Typhoon hackers reportedly applied AI algorithms to the stolen information, enabling Beijing to map social and professional networks of American political and military figures. This level of insight significantly bolsters China’s strategic capabilities, providing a framework for both espionage and influence operations.

• Influence Operations: Shaping Public Opinion and Policy. China’s influence campaigns are designed to shape public opinion and policy within the United States. A high-profile example involves Linda Sun, a former aide in the New York governor’s office who acted as an agent for Beijing. Sun promoted Chinese interests through her position, influencing U.S. policymakers and suppressing criticism of China’s human rights abuses.

Additionally, Chinese operatives have infiltrated cultural and community organizations, particularly in American Chinatowns. These efforts propagate Beijing’s narratives while gathering intelligence on Chinese-American communities and U.S. political figures.

The most egregious act of influence this year was when U.S. authorities uncovered a covert Chinese police station operating in New York City, designed to intimidate and collect information on Chinese nationals residing in the area. The clandestine station, set up in the heart of Manhattan, was part of China's broader campaign to monitor and exert influence over members of the Chinese diaspora, often using coercion to silence dissidents critical of Beijing. U.S. law enforcement agencies conducted a thorough investigation, leading to the arrest of individuals involved in managing the site, and emphasized that such operations posed significant threats to national sovereignty and individual freedoms.

• Cyber Espionage on the Rise. Recent revelations from Bloomberg and other outlets underscore the breadth of China’s cyber-espionage campaign. Beijing has been accused of orchestrating a “broad and significant” hacking effort that penetrated multiple sectors. This includes compromising wiretap systems law enforcement uses, further underscoring the vulnerabilities in U.S. digital infrastructure. Chinese government-linked hackers have burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure and are waiting "for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow," FBI Director Christopher Wray said in a speech at Vanderbilt University in April of this year.

Wray explained that an ongoing Chinese hacking campaign known as Volt Typhoon has successfully gained access to numerous American companies in telecommunications, energy, water, and other critical sectors. Twenty-three pipeline operators were targeted. China is developing the "ability to physically wreak havoc on our critical infrastructure at a time of its choosing," Wray said at the 2024 Vanderbilt Summit on Modern Conflict and Emerging Threats. It plans to land low blows against civilian infrastructure to induce panic."

• Espionage in Action: High-Profile Targets. Revelations indicate that Beijing may have targeted prominent figures like Donald Trump and Senator J.D. Vance. Chinese hackers have monitored U.S. political and corporate systems by embedding spyware in telecommunications networks. Other breaches include voter registration systems in the U.K., Indian power grids, and U.S. water and energy networks, demonstrating Beijing’s ability to disrupt critical services.

• Espionage in Action: Military Targets. In 2024, two U.S. sailors were arrested and charged with espionage for allegedly passing sensitive military information to China in exchange for cash payments. The sailors, Jinchao Wei and Wenheng Zhao were based in California. They held positions that provided them access to classified information, which they are accused of sharing with Chinese intelligence officials over several months. Wei, stationed on the USS Essex, allegedly shared operational plans. At the same time, Zhao, who worked at a naval base in Ventura County, provided photographs, videos, and documents about the Navy's operational strategies. These revelations underscored the growing threat posed by Chinese intelligence operations targeting U.S. military personnel for espionage purposes.

Counterintelligence and Countermeasures

In response to China's growing espionage activities, the United States has crafted a robust counterintelligence strategy to mitigate the theft of critical information and intellectual property. The "National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2024" outlines key measures to outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, particularly China, which the U.S. sees as one of its most significant espionage threats. Chinese intelligence operations target everything from advanced technologies to sensitive government data, infiltrating not only federal systems but also private industries, research institutions, and academic settings.

The U.S. strategy to combat this threat is multi-pronged, focusing on defensive and offensive measures. Central to the plan is the drive to "Detect, Understand, & Anticipate Foreign Intelligence Threats" by expanding innovative intelligence collection methods, including artificial intelligence, technical tools, and human sources. The strategy emphasizes integrating these capabilities across federal, state, and local levels to ensure a coordinated and efficient approach. Moreover, the United States is enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies, local governments, private sectors, and international allies to address this growing challenge.

Offensively, the strategy highlights the need to "Counter, Degrade, & Deter Foreign Intelligence Activities & Capabilities." This includes utilizing advanced tools, such as artificial intelligence and cyber operations, to disrupt adversaries' espionage campaigns and dismantle their infrastructure. The United States is increasingly proactive in detecting and preempting Chinese intelligence activities, ensuring American policymakers are equipped with actionable insights to counter these operations effectively. Efforts are also being made to degrade Chinese intelligence operations by targeting their non-traditional assets, which include embedded researchers and commercial proxies that facilitate espionage.

Protecting America's technological edge is a significant priority under this strategy. The United States aims to safeguard critical technology and economic sectors essential to national security. China has actively sought advanced technologies, often leveraging commercial espionage and intellectual property theft. In response, U.S. counterintelligence efforts have ramped up engagement with the private sector and academia, which are frequent targets of Chinese espionage, to better protect critical innovations. The emphasis is on strengthening supply chain security and mitigating risks that foreign actors could exploit.

Another critical strategy pillar is combating China's cyber operations to steal U.S. secrets. Chinese hackers often target government databases, research institutions, and private firms to acquire sensitive information. To counter these threats, the United States is building a coalition of partners at home and abroad to share threat intelligence and develop innovative tools to respond to cyber intrusions. By fostering strong public-private partnerships, the U.S. aims to introduce more significant uncertainty for foreign intelligence actors, increasing the costs of their activities.

Finally, the U.S. approach includes "Protecting Democracy from Foreign Malign Influence," addressing the growing concern over influence operations that aim to manipulate public opinion and policy. The U.S. sees China's activities in this area as an effort to undermine the integrity of democratic processes, often using social media platforms to spread disinformation. The strategy includes expanding cooperation with social media companies, improving the detection of covert influence campaigns, and enhancing transparency to expose and counteract these tactics.

The National Counterintelligence Strategy provides a comprehensive framework to ensure that America retains its strategic advantages in the face of persistent Chinese espionage. It prioritizes resilience through investment in emerging technologies, the development of a skilled counterintelligence workforce, and strengthening alliances domestically and internationally. In an era of strategic competition, the United States seeks to outpace its adversaries by developing an integrated, proactive, and resilient counterintelligence posture.

Despite China’s long-standing espionage activities, recent actions have heightened awareness and countermeasures:

• Botnet Disruptions: U.S.-led operations dismantled Flax Typhoon and other networks, underscoring the importance of international cooperation.
• Corporate Accountability: Governments increasingly hold companies accountable for network security. Firms like Cisco and Microsoft play crucial roles in identifying vulnerabilities.
• Public Warnings: Intelligence agencies have intensified efforts to educate businesses and individuals about Chinese espionage risks, emphasizing vigilance in digital and interpersonal interactions.

As mentioned above, will the counterintelligence strategy and actions be enough to stem the massive tide of information pilferage? It is difficult to see behind the veil of counterintelligence actions and activities, so public trust in the intelligence communities will likely have to suffice for now. Given the breadth, depth, and volume of Chinese information gathering and outright spying, and despite a seemingly sound strategy and abilities, it is hard to believe our open society can stay ahead of the Chinese to guard our valuable intellectual, industrial, personal, governmental, or intellectual information. 

 Strategic Implications

In response to China's growing espionage activities, the United States has crafted a robust counterintelligence strategy to mitigate the theft of critical information and intellectual property. This article explores the evolving tactics of Chinese espionage, the U.S. response, and the broader national and global security implications. The "National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2024" outlines key measures to outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, particularly China, which the U.S. sees as one of its most significant espionage threats. Chinese intelligence operations target everything from advanced technologies to sensitive government data, infiltrating not only federal systems but also private industries, research institutions, and academic settings. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the dismantling of Flax Typhoon and other botnets, have heightened awareness across sectors and driven immediate enhancements in countermeasures, reinforcing the need for coordinated responses.

The U.S. strategy to combat this threat is multi-pronged, focusing on both defensive and offensive measures. It emphasizes the need to "Detect, Understand, & Anticipate Foreign Intelligence Threats" by expanding innovative intelligence collection methods, integrating these capabilities across federal, state, and local levels, and enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies, local governments, and international allies. Offensively, the strategy aims to "Counter, Degrade, & Deter Foreign Intelligence Activities & Capabilities" through advanced tools like artificial intelligence and cyber operations. Protecting America's technological edge, combating cyber intrusions, and addressing influence operations are key pillars of this approach. The National Counterintelligence Strategy provides a comprehensive framework to outpace adversaries by developing an integrated, proactive, and resilient posture, ensuring the U.S. retains its strategic advantages in an era of persistent threats.

China's espionage campaign demands an intensive and effective U.S. effort to safeguard American information. The American people must be made aware of the evolving threat posed by Chinese espionage, the multifaceted response outlined in the U.S. counterintelligence strategy, and the necessity for resilience in protecting national security. Despite the challenges presented by an open society, the United States must be transparent about the nature of these attacks and be prepared to respond decisively, fostering a deterrent effect. For too long, China has been allowed to draft off the intellectual work of Americans. It is imperative that the U.S. remains vigilant, ready to defend its technological and intellectual assets, and committed to preventing further exploitation by foreign adversaries.

Former President Donald Trump’s return to the political stage raises questions about his cybersecurity policies. While Trump’s administration previously took a hard line on China, his inclination to reduce regulations could weaken U.S. defenses against espionage. For instance, Trump’s focus on deregulation may make it easier for Chinese firms to penetrate critical sectors under the guise of business investments. Reports suggest that Trump’s cyber policy will likely prioritize economic concerns over national security. This approach could relax scrutiny on Chinese tech companies operating in the U.S., potentially enabling espionage under the pretext of trade and investment agreements. Critics argue that balancing economic and security interests will be crucial to countering Beijing’s growing influence.

The incoming administration's choice of security or economic priorities could open the door to the Chinese even wider or curtail the steady hemorrhage of information to China. The advantage for China is enormous, and no short-term economic gain would be worth it.

 Bibliography

• Colchester, Max, and Daniel Michaels. "Scale of Chinese Spying Overwhelms Western Governments." Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2024. 
• Krouse, Sarah, Robert McMillan, and Dustin Volz. "Chinese-Linked Hackers Breach U.S. Internet Providers in New ‘Salt Typhoon’ Cyberattack." Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2024. 
• McMillan, Robert, Dustin Volz, and Aruna Viswanatha. "China Is Stealing AI Secrets to Turbocharge Spying, U.S. Says." Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2023. 
• Menn, Joseph, and Ellen Nakashima. "U.S. and Allies Seize Control of Massive Chinese Tech Spying Network." Washington Post, September 18, 2024. 
• Peterson, Kristina, et al. "Was There a Chinese Agent Working in the New York Governor’s Office?" Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2024. 
• Office of the Director of National Intelligence. National Counterintelligence Strategy 2024. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2024.
• National Intelligence Council. Foreign Malign Influence Lexicon. August 2022.
• Executive Order 14017. "America's Supply Chains." February 24, 2021.
• Colchester, Max, and Daniel Michaels. "Scale of Chinese Spying Overwhelms Western Governments." Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2024. 
• Volz, Dustin, et al. “China Hack Enabled Vast Spying on U.S. Officials, Likely Ensnaring Thousands of Contacts.” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2024. 
• Volz, Dustin. “Chinese Cargo Cranes at U.S. Ports Pose Espionage Risk, Probe Finds.” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2024. 
• “Have Chinese Spies Infiltrated U.S. College Campuses?” News Nation Now. 
• Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States: 2000–2022.” 
• “U.S. Accuses China of Broad and Significant Cyber-Spying Effort,” Bloomberg News, November 13, 2024. 
• “Trump’s Cyber Policy Likely to Focus on China, Relaxing Regulation,” Bloomberg News, November 8, 2024. 
• Cooper, Helene, and Edward Wong. The New York Times, August 4, 2024; Stelloh, Tim. NBC News, August 3, 2024.
• Kanno-Youngs, Zolan, and Karen Zraick. "U.S. Arrests Two in Connection with Secret Chinese Police Station in New York." The New York Times, July 10, 2024.
• Reuters. "FBI Says Chinese Hackers Preparing to Attack U.S Infrastructure." Reuters, April 18, 2024.  

7. Hybrid warfare on the seabed?

Hybrid warfare seems to be returning to the forefront (or perhaps the vanguard as the communists might say).

Hybrid warfare on the seabed? – DW – 11/22/2024

Thomas Latschan

11/22/2024​ November 22, 2024

Two communications cables in the Baltic Sea have been cut in quick succession. Investigators suspect sabotage. It wouldn't be the first time the region was targeted. How dangerous are attacks on critical infrastructure?

DW

It's an inconspicuous cable, thinner than a firehose, but equipped with eight high-performance fiber-optic pairs coated in steel and a waterproof protective layer.

The underwater communication cable Cinia C-Lion 1 connects the Finnish capital, Helsinki, with the German port city of Rostock, about 1,200 kilometers away. It serves as a sort of data highway, connecting data centers in northern and central Europe.

When it was laid across the Baltic Sea, an underwater plow was used to carve a meter-deep trench in the seabed to ensure that the cable would be very well protected. And yet, despite this, it was broken near Oland, an island just off the coast of Sweden, in the night of Sunday into Monday. Shortly before, another data cable running between Sweden and Lithuania sustained similar damage off the coast of Gotland, another Swedish Island.

The crew of a Chinese freighter, along with its Russian captain, are now suspected of sabotage. The cargo ship is believed to have passed both sites when the damage occurred. Citing public maritime data, the Swedish television channel SVT reported that the ship sailed from a Russian port. It was also said to have temporarily switched off the transponder required to determine its position.

According to the website marinetraffic.com, the ship is currently anchored in open water between the coasts of Sweden and Denmark. The Danish authorities report that their navy is closely monitoring the vessel.

A Danish naval vessel keeps the Chinese freighter Yi Peng 3 under surveillance in the Kattegat straitImage: Mikkel Berg Pedersen/Ritzau Scanpix Foto/AP/dpa/picture alliance

Not the first incident in the Baltic Sea

Moritz Brake, an expert in maritime security at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic, and Integration Studies (CASSIS) at the University of Bonn, says these events closely resemble an incident on October 7, 2023, which also occurred in the Baltic Sea.

Here too was a Chinese cargo ship involved. A container freighter sailing between Sweden, Finland, and Estonia under a Hong Kong flag damaged two data cables and the "Baltic Connector" gas pipeline with a trailing anchor — supposedly by accident.

Brake does not believe this was unintentional. "The anchor was dragged across the seabed for about 180 kilometers. That can't possibly be an accident, where nobody notices that it's happening."

Furthermore, the freighter was accompanied by supposed Russian research vessels, and the incident occurred on the birthday of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"Those are just too many coincidences coming together all at once," says Brake.

Western intelligence agencies have long been concerned about supposed Russian research ships cruising the seas of northern Europe and potentially spying on Western infrastructure.

Russia's spy ships comb the Baltic sea

As far as the recently damaged data cables are concerned, they may not have needed to. The locations of undersea cables worldwide can easily be found in open-source data online.

In the case of the severed C-Lion 1 cable in the Baltic Sea, the Finnish operator Cinia had previously explained in a promotional video (now archived) that a large part of the cable was laid in 2015 parallel to the Nord Stream pipeline, which supplied Europe with Russian gas. This allowed Cinia to "rely on existing seabed surveys, enabling the project to be realized just one year after planning was initiated."

The Nord Stream pipeline was itself targeted with explosives in September 2022. It has still not been established who was behind that attack.

Gas leaking from the Nord Stream pipeline, which was targeted with explosives in September 2022Image: Danish Defense Ministry/Xinhua/picture alliance

Limited damage but a powerful signal

The actual damage from this latest act of sabotage is limited.

"It happens 100 to 150 times around the world that cables are accidentally damaged," Brake told DW. "That's why infrastructure is designed so that other cables can offset the damage. It's really not a problem; generally, users don't even notice."

However, Brake emphasizes that this is critical infrastructure. More than 90% of global data traffic flows through undersea cables.

"If you deliberately target key nodes, if you demonstrate, as here, that two cables can be damaged within a short space of time, then it's possible that next time, even more cables could be damaged. And then we'll quickly encounter serious problems."

These acts of sabotage also affect our market economies, he says. Investors might be deterred from putting money into maritime infrastructure if protection cannot be guaranteed.

"In Sweden, the government had to cancel several offshore wind projects because of defense concerns," Brake explains.

Sweden, a global leader in wind power, was forced to cancel projects in the Baltic Sear over defense concernsImage: Dalibor Brlek/picture alliance

These actions also indicates something that should not be underestimated: There is a developing and "increasingly close collaboration between not just China and Russia, but also Iran and North Korea," Brake says.

"They've been working together for a long time now to act against Western interests worldwide, sometimes with extreme measures, and now we see it in cases like these."

He believes that the West is being tested by these acts of sabotage. "The question is: How will we react to such an incident? Detaining the ship, NATO channels, information sharing — this is definitely the other side testing our response strategies."

Impossible to provide 100% protection

But how can we better protect ourselves against these acts of sabotage? Oceans cover three-quarters of the Earth's surface, and more than 500 data cables now lie in their waters, a total length that would go around the Earth 30 times. Data networks, maritime trade, oil and gas pipelines — all are affected, and, as Moritz Brake says, it's impossible to monitor and secure all of them comprehensively and all of the time: "The enemy only needs to succeed in one place, while we must constantly protect the entire global system."

Analyst Moritz Brake believes NATO will need to expand its naval surveillance capabilities to counter-sabotageImage: Ramon van Flymen/ANP/IMAGO

So Western societies will have to find ways of dealing with acts of sabotage — but Brake says they are not powerless against them. "We can at least strengthen our monitoring capabilities so that we will be able to detect, document, prove, and reveal when other actors are wreaking havoc on our infrastructure."

This, he says, could be a way of deterring them. "We can show them: If you threaten us somewhere here, we can take countermeasures. Not in the same place, maybe, but somewhere else."

To Brake, the meaning of the latest incident is clear: "There are aggressors at sea who hope to remain unidentified. And we have to do something about that."

This article has been translated from German.

DW

8. Ukraine warns of Russian 'psychological attacks' after spooked embassies shutter

Ukraine warns of Russian 'psychological attacks' after spooked embassies shutter- Washington Examiner

Washington Examiner · November 20, 2024

Ukrainian officials are now dismissing these concerns, urging the public to remain vigilant but not give too much thought to what they believe is information warfare.

The Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence said in a public announcement that messages propagated through online channels and social media about a “particularly massive” airstrike on urban areas are “fake.”

The directorate pointed out that the flurry of warnings, which originated from an unknown source, contained “grammatical errors” often seen in Russian psychological operations. It is asserted that the panic caused by the threats is part of a larger attempt by the Kremlin to destabilize Ukrainian cities.

The U.S. Embassy in Ukraine had earlier published a public alert warning of “a potential significant air attack,” saying it received “specific information” on the threat.

Similar precautions were taken by other foreign embassies in the country, including those operated by Italy, Greece, and Spain.

Ukrainian authorities are urging civilians to stay aware and adhere to air sirens or other warnings from official channels but not to overreact to what is likely a form of information warfare.

“On this 1,001st day of the full-scale invasion, the threat of Russian strikes remains just as relevant as it has been for the past thousand days,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi, according to Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainska Pravda.

He continued, “We believe it would be appropriate for our partners to respond on the 1,001st day in the same way as they did during the previous thousand days, without any additional information overreaction.”

The confusing situation at the U.S. Embassy comes amid boiling tensions between the United States and Russia after President Joe Biden authorized the Ukrainian military to strike targets deep inside Russian territory and implement antipersonnel land mines for defense.

The former has generated threats of retaliation from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, while the latter has outraged some humanitarian organizations that worry about the long-lasting threat to bystanders posed by indiscriminate land mines.

Land mines planted during war often lie dormant in the ground for years, outliving their defensive necessity and instead becoming a threat to civilians in times of peace.

More than 150 countries have previously signed international treaties banning the use of antipersonnel land mines, including Ukraine, but major powers, including Russia, the U.S., and China, maintain no such ban.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the BBC on Wednesday that he understands the “moral ramifications for human rights defenders” posed by antipersonnel land mines.

“But we’re fighting a war against a vicious enemy, and we must have the right to use everything we need within the realm of international law to defend ourselves,” he said.

Washington Examiner · November 20, 2024

9. The US Is Calling Out Foreign Influence Campaigns Faster Than Ever

​Good.

Recognize the enemies' strategies, understand them, EXPOSE them, and attack them with a superior political warfare and information strategy.

The US Is Calling Out Foreign Influence Campaigns Faster Than Ever

The 2024 elections were a high-water mark for naming and shaming threat actors from foreign governments. There’s still work to be done, though, on how to attribute disinformation campaigns most effectively.

Wired · by Lily Hay Newman · November 22, 2024

Ahead of the the 2024 US elections, the US intelligence community and law enforcement were on high alert and ready to share information—both among agencies and publicly—as foreign malign influence operations emerged. Tech giants like Microsoft similarly sprang into action, collaborating with government partners and publishing their own information about election-related disinformation campaigns. The speed and certainty with which authorities were able to pin these efforts on threat actors in Russia, China, and Iran was unprecedented. But researchers also caution that not all attributions are created equal.

At the Cyberwarcon security conference in Arlington, Virginia, today, researchers from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab are presenting initial findings on the role of attribution in the 2024 US elections. Their research compares the impact of quickly naming and shaming foreign influence actors to other recent US elections in which government attribution was far less common.

“We’re building on a project that we did back in 2020 where there was a lot more context of concern that the Trump administration was not being forthcoming about foreign attacks,” says Emerson Brooking, director of strategy and resident senior fellow for DFRLab. “In contrast to 2020, now there was an abundance of claims by the US government of influence operations being conducted by different adversaries. So in thinking through the policy of attribution, we wanted to look at the question of overcorrection.”

In the lead-up to the 2016 US presidential election, Russia’s extensive influence operations—which included hack-and-leak campaigns as well as strategic disinformation—caught the US government by surprise. Law enforcement and the intelligence community were largely aware of Russia's digital probing, but they didn't have an extreme sense of urgency, and the big picture of how such activity could impact public discourse hadn't yet come into view. After Russia's hack of the Democratic National Committee in June that year, it took four months for the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security to publicly attribute the attack to the Kremlin. Some officials had said in the weeks following the incident that formal confirmation from the US government might never come.

Even in the highly politicized landscape that followed, federal, state, and local collaboration around election security expanded dramatically. By 2020, the researchers say, 33 of the 84 influence operation attributions they studied related to the 2020 US elections, or about 39 percent, came from US intelligence or federal sources. And this year, 40 of the 80 the group tracked came from the US government. DFRLabs resident fellow Dina Sadek notes, though, that one important factor in assessing the utility of US government attributions is the quality of the information provided. The substance and specificity of the information, she says, is important to how the public views the objectivity and credibility of the statement.

Specific information confirming that Russia had manufactured a video that purported to show ballots being destroyed in Bucks County, Pennsylvania was a high-quality, useful attribution, the researchers say, because it was direct, narrow in scope, and came very quickly to minimize speculation and doubt. Repeated statements from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Foreign Malign Influence Center warning very broadly and generally about Russian influence operations is an example of the type of attribution that can be less helpful, and even serve to amplify campaigns that otherwise might not register with the public at all.

Similarly, in the lead-up to the 2020 elections, the researchers point out, statements from the US government about Russia, China, and Iran playing a role in Black Lives Matter protests may have been mismatched to the moment because they didn't include details on the extent of the activity or the specific objectives of the actors.

Even with all of this in mind, though, the researchers note that there was valuable progress in the 2024 election cycle. But with a new Trump administration coming into the White House, such transparency could start to trend in a different direction.

“We don’t want to come across like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, because the state of affairs that was is not the state of affairs that will be,” Brooking says. “And from a public interest perspective I think we got a lot closer on disclosure in 2024.”

Wired · by Lily Hay Newman · November 22, 2024

10. Global Engagement Center leader talks disinformation, technology and reauthorization

Yes, this is a critical capability. ​Is this the right organization? How do we synchronize all our actions and activities across the government?

Excerpts:

CG:. It is critical that government have this capability to combat foreign information manipulation overseas. It is important that Iranian, [Chinese], Russian — nefarious and covert networks of information manipulation are exposed and disrupted — and that we can work with our international partners to protect our national security overseas.

I hope people recognize that this is a critical piece. It’s also important that we work together with the private sector and civil society and our international partners. We do communicate with private-sector partners to share tactics, techniques, and procedures that we see and understand what they’re seeing. We do not do any directive kind of meetings. We do not tell them what to do. They do not tell us what we should be doing. But it’s important that we’re able to share that information, because it is a whole-of-society approach that we need to take.

FS: If funding does continue, what are the things that you might hope to do, especially thinking about the role that AI might play in the information environment?

CG: Looking forward, we want to be able to build our expertise on these technologies, work with the interagency — as AI grows — to find ways that we can label, identify and authenticate content. That would be critical. But also, [part of] being able to do that is having the technology expertise in-house. 

Global Engagement Center leader talks disinformation, technology and reauthorization

Amid a fight to stay operational, a top official with the State Department office makes the case for its mission.

By

Rebecca Heilweil

and

Derek B. Johnson

November 18, 2024

fedscoop.com · by rheilweil · November 18, 2024

As the Global Engagement Center faces potential elimination, a leader within the State Department’s foreign disinformation-fighting unit is emphasizing the success that it’s had using technology to combat disinformation created by foreign actors and spread outside the United States.

The agency will lose its funding at the end of the year without congressional intervention.

In an interview with Scoop News Group, Carrie Goux, an acting deputy coordinator who helps lead the Global Engagement Center, said that her team plays a critical role in the foreign information space — and that the government needs to understand the emerging technology’s place it. The Global Engagement Center has repeatedly emphasized that its work does not focus on Americans or the United States.

“We need to continue to invest in our ability to understand the information space, to use emerging technologies, [and] to understand how emerging technologies are being used,” Goux said. “That means we need to have the technical expertise to do that and to have the technical solutions to do that. This is only moving faster, and it’s not going away.”

The GEC does face some constraints: For starters, it’s not yet able to focus on audio and visual disinformation, though that’s a goal. Like those doing similar work in academia and in the private sector, it’s also difficult to measure the ultimate impact, which involves understanding how online behavior might affect real-life behavior, like the outcome of an election.

Still, Goux argues there’s a strong reason to keep the organization intact.

This interview was edited for clarity and length. Rebecca Heilweil asked questions for FedScoop and Derek Johnson asked questions for CyberScoop.

FedScoop: For a lot of people now, the term disinformation is a pretty loaded term. When you talk about disinformation, what are you talking about exactly? Can you give some examples?

Carrie Goux: At the GEC, when we’re talking about disinformation, we’re looking at foreign actors overseas and networks of disinformation, how they are spreading disinformation, how they are spreading narratives in ways that are hidden. This content may look like it comes organically from local sources, but it is lies from foreign actors.

There are many channels. This is intentional messaging meant to manipulate the information environment. … Disinformation is as old as time, but right now we see it moving a lot faster because of technology.

FS: I know your team had a major success identifying a big effort from the Kremlin to push disinformation narratives in Africa. I’m curious if you can talk about the role that AI plays for those actors. Is there AI involved? How does it manifest? What are you seeing?

GG: What we’re seeing is that these networks are using all sorts of new and emerging technologies in very, very dangerous ways. What we’re trying to do is kind of reduce some of those risks that these new technologies present, while also harnessing the benefits ourselves. … Technology is allowing the narratives to move quicker. It’s allowing foreign actors to get these narratives to their purveyors in a format where they can move it out through social media platforms — in ways that are not only fast and nefarious, but also hidden.

FS: What is GEC doing with AI machine learning algorithms in terms of its own research and the studies that you’re trying to conduct? How do you see AI playing a role in what you’re doing?

CG: We are using innovative tools. … For example, you’ve talked to our team about text similarity tools, text similarity analysis, which is a very novel way for us to be able to deploy natural language processing and to really understand — at volume — the reach of narratives and how those narratives spread.

FS: Has anything changed or evolved — this institution has been around for a few years — in terms of the types of tools that you have at your disposal, given the development of AI? Have things gotten more advanced? Are there improvements that you’re making?

CG: We’re broadening how we can see the structure of the information environment. The natural language processing that — and this particular [text similarity] tool that we’re talking about — allows us to look at really specific narratives, but now we can look at themes. We can look at specific pieces of language. We can start to understand how these networks form so that we can get ahead of these narratives, so we can preempt or even disrupt these networks.

We’re actually seeing how these foreign actors are trying to covertly distribute content from state media outlets to local media outlets without that clear attribution. They’re also making changes to text to avoid detection. These tools could identify that activity.

CyberScoop: One of the biggest challenges that we see a lot of times in the disinformation space is measuring impact. When it comes to measuring impact, how do you quantify [your] work, particularly when you’re talking to outside parties or in the context of your upcoming reauthorization challenge?

CG: In the communications world — this is always one of the most difficult things to do — is to measure your impact. First of all, you’re going through so many different channels. There’s not easy data you get to measure. You’re trying to make a connection between something that’s gone out [on social media] and then a real-life behavior change. The question is: how do you measure something that doesn’t happen? We look for signs. One of the things that we did recently, together with our partners, the UK and Canada, is we exposed networks of disinformation that were trying to intervene in the election in Moldova.

We were pretty aggressive about that kind of exposure and taking action against that. I’m not saying there’s causation here, but I am saying that we’re looking for signs that perhaps some of what we did contributed to certain outcomes. We hope that’s the case. In the Moldova election, President Sandu has won — and that the nefarious Russian networks that were working against her did not achieve their goals.

CS: I think a counter to that would be what happened in Georgia, where the pro-Russian party maintained control in the elections. How do you measure some of the work that you do in instances like that?

CG: I can’t really speak to Georgia. At the GEC, we weren’t deeply involved in that. … I can only speak to places where … we’ve done some of that exposure work.

FS: One of the things that the framework to counter foreign state information manipulation talks about is technical capacity. I’m curious about how you would discuss the technical capacity of not just the GEC, but the partners you work with. Does it seem like everyone’s up to date and using the most advanced techniques?

CG: Because technology is moving so quickly, because this is somewhat of a new area, on many levels and channels of communication are quickly proliferating. What we want to do is create a common operating model of how we see the information space together with like-minded partners.

Different partners are at different levels of capacity. We are leading the charge to help build capacity and working with our higher-capacity partners to work with those who need additional resources with analytics and creating that common way of looking at the information environment.

We’re working on some technology systems and platforms that allow us to share information among partners and have this structured understanding of tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is an ongoing project.

We have made a lot of progress with partners to build the system, have these data exchanges and have a platform that will work for everybody.

CS: When you look at the work that you do, and particularly when you compare it to the commercial threat intelligence and other entities out there that track a lot of this activity in different ways, how do you justify your value add? How do you make the case that the work that the GEC is doing is invaluable?

CG:. It is critical that government have this capability to combat foreign information manipulation overseas. It is important that Iranian, [Chinese], Russian — nefarious and covert networks of information manipulation are exposed and disrupted — and that we can work with our international partners to protect our national security overseas.

I hope people recognize that this is a critical piece. It’s also important that we work together with the private sector and civil society and our international partners. We do communicate with private-sector partners to share tactics, techniques, and procedures that we see and understand what they’re seeing. We do not do any directive kind of meetings. We do not tell them what to do. They do not tell us what we should be doing. But it’s important that we’re able to share that information, because it is a whole-of-society approach that we need to take.

FS: If funding does continue, what are the things that you might hope to do, especially thinking about the role that AI might play in the information environment?

CG: Looking forward, we want to be able to build our expertise on these technologies, work with the interagency — as AI grows — to find ways that we can label, identify and authenticate content. That would be critical. But also, [part of] being able to do that is having the technology expertise in-house.

fedscoop.com · by rheilweil · November 18, 2024

11.  Education as a countermeasure against disinformation

​Download the 26 page report here: https://www.psychologicaldefence.lu.se/sites/psychologicaldefence.lu.se/files/2024-11/Education%20as%20a%20countermeasure%20against%20disinformation_Eng.pdf

 Education as a countermeasure against disinformation

THOMAS NYGREN | ULLRICH K H ECKERLUND UNIVERSITY PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE | WORKING PAPER 2024:3

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 4 

2 Educational efforts that work .......................................................... 8 

2.1 Good news that educates ........................................................ 8 

2.2 Media and information literacy training .................................... 9 

2.3 Learning to identify manipulation by manipulating others ........ 9 

2.4 Acting as a fact checker ........................................................ 10 

2.5 Ability to use digital verification tools ..................................... 11 

2.6 Analytical thinking and thoughtfulness .................................. 12 

2.7 Integration of subject knowledge for specific areas ............... 12 

2.8 Repetition and long-term effects ............................................ 13 

2.9 Potential side effects ............................................................. 13 

2.10 Changing attitudes and developing digital civic literacy ......... 14 

2.11 Summary of challenges and opportunities of education against disinformation ........................................................... 15 

3 References...................................................................................... 17 

1 Introduction

At a time when digital information is flooding the world, the ability to identify and manage disinformation has become one of the most critical skills of our time. Disinformation - information deliberately created to mislead - spreads effectively through social media and other digital platforms (Juul & Ugander, 2021). It can be difficult to detect and even more difficult to prevent. Disinformation takes many forms and its effects can be harmful and far-reaching, ranging from undermining trust in public institutions to influencing elections and harming public health (European Commission, 2022a; Ecker et al., 2024). Disinformation is, therefore, a challenge to the democratic process. Misleading information can affect our ability to make informed decisions and participate in society as informed citizens. The availability of increasingly sophisticated generative AI has enhanced the ability to spread propaganda and disinformation (Goldstein et al., 2024). The education system now faces the challenge of equipping people with the knowledge, skills and constructive attitudes to deal with this complex reality. It is now evident that education can and should play a central role in this effort (e.g. European Commission, 2022a). This has led to increased efforts to develop interventions aimed at helping individuals become better at critically evaluating information and resisting disinformation.

Disinformation education, often focusing on media and information literacy (MIL), can play an important role in strengthening people's ability to identify false information and develop the cognitive skills needed to examine information critically. However, research shows that there are no quick fixes to this problem (Bateman & Jackson, 2024) and that instruction needs to be well-designed to achieve long-lasting effects. There is also a risk of side effects from MIL interventions, such as excessive scepticism or confidence boosts that are not accompanied by corresponding increases in skill levels (Haider & Sundin, 2019; Nygren et al., 2024). We all encounter misleading information and everyone sometimes has difficulty distinguishing true from false. Even professors and students at elite universities can have great difficulty distinguishing credible information from nicely packaged but misleading information (Wineburg & McGrew, 2019). Young people in particular have difficulty navigating digital information and are therefore more susceptible to misleading information and propaganda than is often assumed (see e.g. Breakstone et al., 2021; Kyrychenko et al., 2024; Nygren & Guath, 2022). Several studies from different parts of the world show that people have difficulty distinguishing opinion​ from fact and fake from real (e.g., Arechar et al., 2023).

12. A Call to Act in the Indo-Pacific

​Excerpts:

The U.S. cannot afford further delays in addressing the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific. Swift, unified action is essential to safeguard regional stability and maintain U.S. influence.

Actionable policies to strengthen deterrence, streamline Pentagon practices, deepen economic ties, reinforce alliances, and partner with industry are necessary. At the same time, while focusing on the Indo-Pacific, none of this is to suggest that we should neglect our commitments in Europe as the convergence of threats from China and Russia demonstrates the need for a comprehensive approach.

By acting decisively now, the U.S. can shape a secure, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring its interests and values endure for generations to come.

A Call to Act in the Indo-Pacific

By Kimberly Lehn

November 23, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/23/a_call_to_act_in_the_indo-pacific_1074247.html

As the United States prepares for a new administration, it faces a defining moment in the Indo-Pacific region. The decisions made now will have lasting implications for regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. The Trump administration has the opportunity to implement its earlier strategy directives aimed at building effective deterrence and competitive actions against China as well as build on earlier directives and initiatives inherited from the Biden administration that strengthened alliances, partnerships, and the defense industrial base. To counter mounting threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, the U.S. must prioritize decisive action over prolonged assessments and focus on five critical areas: reinforcing military capabilities, reforming Pentagon bureaucracy, expanding economic engagement, strengthening alliances, and integrating industry partnerships.

Reinforce Military Capabilities and Deterrence

China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, its collaboration with Russia, and North Korea’s provocations underscore the urgency of bolstering U.S. deterrence. These adversaries are testing U.S. resolve, seeking to reshape the global order. Any hesitation risks emboldening their ambitions.

The U.S. must grow and modernize its nuclear arsenal, invest in long-range precision fires, and underwater capabilities, enhance air and missile defense systems, focus on logistics, and strengthen cyber defenses. Strategic positioning of assets to cover hotspots like the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Korean Peninsula is crucial to ensuring a credible deterrent. Delays in reinforcing these capabilities only provide adversaries with the opportunity to advance their own military power unchecked.

Reform Pentagon Bureaucracy and Reallocate Resources

The Pentagon’s inefficiencies hinder timely responses to evolving threats. While long-term reforms are necessary, immediate measures can improve cross-service collaboration in the Indo-Pacific. A senior official dedicated to Indo-Pacific prioritization should be appointed to report directly to top defense leaders and streamline resource allocation. This role would bypass bureaucratic delays, ensuring that Indo-Pacific commands receive the support they need without unnecessary obstacles.

Quickening decision-making processes and reallocating resources to align with Indo-Pacific needs will enable the U.S. to address mission-critical objectives effectively and efficiently.

Expand Economic Engagement for Security

Military strength alone cannot counterbalance China’s influence. Economic leadership is equally vital. By investing in telecommunications, infrastructure, and emerging technologies, the U.S. can solidify its position as a preferred partner in the region.

U.S. agencies such as the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Export-Import Bank (EXIM) should be mobilized to support strategic investments in Indo-Pacific nations. Encouraging secure telecommunications solutions over providers like Huawei will enhance regional security. Tax incentives, grants, and loans can promote local and allied sourcing for defense and technological products, fostering economic security and reducing dependence on China.

Additionally, partnerships with Indo-Pacific nations to share talent, establish joint manufacturing centers, and collaborate on technology will strengthen regional ties and economic resilience.

Strengthen Alliances and Build Regional Resilience

To counter adversarial coercion, the U.S. must enhance its diplomatic presence, fortify supply chains, and expand defense partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Initiatives like the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Resilience should be continued and expanded, focusing on industrial resilience and joint defense capabilities.

Enhanced training exercises, robust infrastructure development, and supply chain fortification will build trust and cohesion among regional allies. These efforts will encourage partners to take greater responsibility for their own defense, mutually benefiting collective security.

European allies also have a vital role to play. Initiatives such as freedom of navigation operations, AUKUS collaboration, and the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge strengthen transatlantic contributions to Indo-Pacific security. These efforts align with the shared goal of deterring aggression and replenishing defense stockpiles critical for both the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.

Engage Industry as a Key Strategic Partner

The private sector’s innovation and agility are essential for maintaining a technological edge in national security. Clear communication of mission requirements and objectives will enable industry to align its resources and capabilities with defense priorities.

Multiyear contracts can incentivize industry participation, fostering commitment and innovation in critical areas like data security and information sharing, defense technologies and armaments, and logistical support. By involving industry in strategic planning from the outset, the U.S. can accelerate progress and ensure a united approach to counter adversarial advances.

In an environment where adversaries leverage resources to disrupt U.S. influence, a robust public-private partnership is crucial to maintaining a competitive edge.

A Call to Act

The U.S. cannot afford further delays in addressing the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific. Swift, unified action is essential to safeguard regional stability and maintain U.S. influence.

Actionable policies to strengthen deterrence, streamline Pentagon practices, deepen economic ties, reinforce alliances, and partner with industry are necessary. At the same time, while focusing on the Indo-Pacific, none of this is to suggest that we should neglect our commitments in Europe as the convergence of threats from China and Russia demonstrates the need for a comprehensive approach.

By acting decisively now, the U.S. can shape a secure, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring its interests and values endure for generations to come.

Kimberly Lehn is the Senior Director for the Honolulu Defense Forum at the Pacific Forum. The Honolulu Defense Forum is a solutions-based conference that partners with U.S. and ally government stakeholders and the defense and technology industry to discuss ways of overcoming defense and economic security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It will take place on February 13-14, 2025, in Waikiki.

13. America’s Rivals Have a New Favorite Weapon: Criminal Gangs

​Excerpts:

Western governments have traditionally had good reasons for separating intelligence from law enforcement. In the U.S., limiting the FBI to domestic policing and the CIA to foreign activities is meant to protect civil liberties and prevent the government from using espionage for domestic political purposes.

But in response to new threats, governments need to do more to collect intelligence on organized crime, Felbab-Brown said: “This needs to become a much higher priority because of the nexus and merger with state actors, but also because criminal groups can create enormously destabilizing outcomes in and of themselves.” 

Russia, China, Iran and other countries are increasingly outsourcing their dirty work to drug traffickers, cybercriminals and paid assassins.

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas-rivals-have-a-new-favorite-weapon-criminal-gangs-3c12a35f

By Sune Engel RasmussenFollow

 and Daniel MichaelsFollow

Nov. 22, 2024 11:00 am ET

Hassan Daqqou is known as the King of Captagon, an amphetamine-like drug produced mostly in Syria that has become the stimulant of choice across the Middle East. At his recent trial for drug smuggling, held behind closed doors in Lebanon, Daqqou said that he had collaborated with the Syrian Army and flashed an ID card from its Fourth Division, which is commanded by President Bashar al-Assad’s brother Maher, according to leaked court transcripts published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a network of investigative journalists. He also admitted to working with Hezbollah, the Lebanese group that is at war with Israel and has a history of overseas terrorist attacks.

Spies and criminals have long mingled in the shady realm of espionage and sabotage. But Daqqou personifies a growing threat facing Western security agencies already stretched thin by war and terrorism: alliances between adversarial states and criminals, including drug gangs and lone wolves hired online. Dealing with crime was once the domain of law enforcement, while threats from foreign countries were the responsibility of intelligence agencies. Today the confluence of these foes is increasingly rendering such distinctions obsolete.

Numerous incidents in recent years have awakened Western intelligence officials to the problem. Among their allegations: Russia recruits criminals on social media to commit acts of sabotage across Europe. China outsources overseas cyberattacks to private hackers. Iran hires teenage boys in Scandinavia to lob grenades at Israeli embassies. North Korea deals in drugs and cyber-fraud. Even the Indian government contracted a notorious gangster’s associates to kill a Sikh separatist in Canada.

In July 2020, Italian police seized 84 million captagon tablets at the port of Salerno. The drugs, worth 1 billion Euros, were manufactured by the Islamic State group in Syria, which uses drug trafficking to finance its terrorist operations. Photo: Napoli/Giacomino/Zuma Press

The new threat is forcing Western governments to rethink decades of national-security and intelligence practices. “For a long time you have had governments that would be tolerating and engaging with criminal groups domestically,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors at the Brookings Institution. “What is now different is the explicit usage of criminal groups and other mechanisms for sabotage, assassinations abroad.” 

Today’s criminal organizations are more powerful and globally connected than ever before; some international drug gangs have more cash and resources than many states. And social media has made it easier for governments and criminals to find each other.

For the gangs, destabilizing Western authorities helps their operations, and working for a rogue state can help them secure sanctuary. For governments, using criminals as proxies offers deniability and cuts the risk of retaliation. “The element of doubt means they can act without serious consequences,” said Edmund Walter Fitton-Brown, former coordinator with the United Nations’s sanctions panel on al Qaeda, Islamic State and the Taliban.

North Korea was an early mover into state-sponsored crime, primarily as a source of revenue. In 2010, the U.S. Army War College published a report on what the authors called Pyongyang’s “criminal sovereignty,” including government-led drug trafficking, currency counterfeiting and smuggling. Since the report, North Korea has branched into cybercrime and cryptocurrency theft.

Most of Pyongyang’s illicit activities are state-led, but other countries employ independent criminal groups, say analysts. Russia has long used criminals to conduct sabotage and assassinations, but these efforts became more visible after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s foreign military-intelligence agency, the GRU, “is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets,” Ken McCallum, director of Britain’s MI5 spy agency, said last month. 

Moscow is tapping the social-media network Telegram, widely used by Russians, to recruit people to commit malicious acts, including mailing incendiary packages through commercial shipping networks, potentially causing passenger planes to crash. “We see the Russians are crossing red line after red line, using so-called Telegram agents,” said Michal Koudelka, director of the Czech Republic’s Security Information Service. These agents often don’t know that the person who hired them online is working for the Russian government. A Telegram spokeswoman said: “Attempts at recruitment for illegal activity are not allowed and always removed by moderators.”

A man makes fentanyl in a clandestine laboratory in Sinaloa, Mexico, August 2022. China is the predominant source of precursors chemicals used by Mexican drug syndicates. Photo: Yael Martínez/Magnum Photos for WSJ

Earlier this year, House Speaker Mike Johnson accused China of colluding with drug cartels, “backed by Cuba and Venezuela, to poison Americans with fentanyl.” China is the predominant source of precursor chemicals used by Mexican drug syndicates, including the Sinaloa cartel, to cook up fentanyl that is shipped to the U.S. 

Many intelligence analysts say Beijing turns a blind eye to drug gangs rather than actively supporting them. But the Biden administration has accused China’s Ministry of State Security of hiring criminals to conduct cyber espionage against American companies to gain unfair commercial advantage. European intelligence agencies have identified an ecosystem of private hackers that conduct cyberattacks on foreign targets, often in parallel with ones launched by the Chinese military and the security ministry. 

Russia also recruits among the global criminal hacking community and nurtures cybercriminals to conduct attacks on enemy soil, Anne Keast-Butler, director of the British signals-intelligence agency GCHQ, said earlier this year.

Iran is increasingly allying with drug bosses and gangsters to pursue perceived opponents in Europe and the U.S. A recent wave of suspected Iranian-ordered attacks include hand grenades thrown at the Israeli embassies in Stockholm and Copenhagen and a Spanish politician shot in the face in broad daylight after voicing support for an Iranian dissident group.

American law enforcement in July arrested a Pakistani national with alleged close ties to Iran after he tried to hire an undercover FBI agent posing as a hit man to assassinate a U.S. politician. Earlier this month, the Justice Department said it had charged an asset of Tehran who had been tasked with directing a criminal network to further Iranian assassination plots against President Trump and other targets.

The Israeli Embassy in Stockholm, seen here in January 2024, was attacked in October by teenagers affiliated with the gang of drug trafficker Rawa Majid. Photo: Henrik Montgomery/TT News Agency/Associated Press

An image of Rawa Majid posted by Interpol, which sought his arrest for years on charges of murder and drug trafficking. Photo: INTERPOL

Rawa Majid, the head of one gang contracted by Iran, is also known as the Kurdish Fox, after a nickname he used on the encrypted Encrochat phone service, which was later breached by European intelligence agencies. He has been on the run from Swedish authorities and Interpol for years, accused of murder and drug trafficking.

Last year, Majid was arrested in Iran after entering the country on a false ID, according to the Swedish government. Months later, Majid’s father told Swedish media that Iran had released his son. The Kurdish Fox hasn’t been heard from in public since, but experts in Sweden say he appears to be repaying Iran for his freedom with violent favors. Around the time of his release, teenagers affiliated with his gang attacked the Israeli embassy in Stockholm with hand grenades. Another teenager was caught in a taxi on the way to the embassy, carrying a semiautomatic weapon. Israeli intelligence believes Majid’s gangsters are acting on behalf of Tehran, potentially in return for protection.

Western security agencies are grappling with this new trend by reconsidering old distinctions.

“We have had counterterrorism, we have had counterespionage, and we have fought organized crime,” said Fredrik Hultgren-Friberg, spokesperson for the Swedish Security Service. “Formerly separate, isolated islands of security work are merging, and we have to develop our work in accordance with that,” he said.

Britain’s MI5 last month warned that crimes committed on behalf of hostile states would not be treated as merely a law-enforcement matter. “If you take money from Iran, Russia or any other state to carry out illegal acts in the U.K., you will bring the full weight of the national security apparatus down on you,” McCallum said. He added that Iran had ramped up its hostile operations on U.K. soil, hiring criminals “from international drug traffickers to low-level crooks.” The agency has recorded 20 known plots since 2022, mostly targeting dissidents or critics of the Iranian regime.

An arsonist set fire to a London warehouse holding relief aid bound for Ukraine, March 21. The man charged with the crime was accused of acting on behalf of Russia’s Wagner Group. Photo: London Fire Brigade

The U.K. has also introduced national-security legislation in response to the threat of hostile criminal activity, such as sabotage, espionage and assassination. Earlier this year, a British man was charged under the act for an arson attack against an east London warehouse linked to a Ukrainian businessman organizing aid for Kyiv. Prosecutors accused the man, Dylan Earl, of acting on behalf of Russia’s Wagner Group. 

China, Russia and Iran all use criminal groups to surveil and sometimes kidnap or attack dissidents abroad. Even friendlier nations have used such tactics on Western soil. Canada has accused Indian government officials of hiring gang members working for kingpin Lawrence Bishnoi to commit murder in Canada. Bishnoi, who is imprisoned in India, is so notorious in his homeland that he has become an object of pop culture fascination; he is the subject of a forthcoming web series, “Lawrence—A Gangster Story.” 

Earlier this year, Indian citizens living in Canada on student visas were charged with the 2023 murder of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canada’s allegation that they were working for the Indian government sparked a diplomatic brawl, with both countries expelling each other’s diplomats. Last month, U.S. federal prosecutors charged an Indian intelligence official with plotting to recruit a criminal to kill another Sikh activist on American soil.

The drug trade is one of the most fertile grounds for criminals pursuing political ends. Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese group, is not only a political party in Lebanon and a U.S.-designated terror group. It is also a major international drug smuggler, which benefits financially from its alliance with the governments of Iran and Syria. The 2021 arrest in Lebanon of Daqqou, the alleged drug baron, showed how Hezbollah’s activities range from the deserts of the Middle East to the Persian Gulf and the ports of southern Europe. 

Daqqou came from a modest background and built his wealth transporting fuel for the Syrian al-Qaterji company, which the U.S. has sanctioned for brokering oil sales between the Assad regime and its nominal enemy, Islamic State. During the Syrian civil war, Daqqou allegedly used his contacts to facilitate captagon trafficking. 

Policemen escort drug kingpin Lawrence Bishnoi at court in New Delhi, India, April 2023. Canadian authorities have accused Indian government officials of hiring gang members working for Bishnoi to commit murder in Canada. Photo: ani/Reuters

Syria’s government makes more than $2 billion annually from captagon, about half of what the infamous Colombian Medellín cartel made at the height of its powers. Hezbollah, whose fighters secure captagon labs and smuggling routes from Syria into Lebanon and Jordan, has used its drug profits to skirt sanctions and fuel its current war against Israel. Captagon has also reached Europe: Dutch and German authorities have busted captagon labs, and Italian police in 2020 seized a record haul of captagon pills worth more than $1 billion in the port of Salerno.

Experts say Hezbollah has recently shifted tactics, mirroring Iran’s practice of hiring mercenaries to attack its enemies. Last year in Brazil, where Hezbollah has long had a presence among a Lebanese diaspora of up to 7 million, authorities arrested two businessmen of Syrian and Lebanese origin. They were suspected of recruiting Brazilian nationals to attack Jewish targets, including two synagogues in the capital Brasília. One of the men, Mohammad Khir Abdulmajid, has spent time in Iran and fought as a member of Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war, according to Brazilian court documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

While imprisoned, the two businessmen are likely to receive protection from the First Capital Command, or PCC, one of Latin America’s largest crime syndicates, which has a massive presence in Brazilian prisons. According to Brazilian media, the country’s intelligence agencies have for years documented links between Hezbollah and the PCC, which offers protection for Lebanese convicts held in Brazilian prisons in return for access to arms markets abroad.

“Hezbollah uses local Brazilians as soldiers,” said Maria Zuppello, a São Paulo-based author of a book on the convergence of drug trafficking and Islamist terrorism. “If you have a region entirely taken over by drugs, which is happening in Brazil, you have more elements to nourish your criminal operations.”

Western governments have traditionally had good reasons for separating intelligence from law enforcement. In the U.S., limiting the FBI to domestic policing and the CIA to foreign activities is meant to protect civil liberties and prevent the government from using espionage for domestic political purposes.

But in response to new threats, governments need to do more to collect intelligence on organized crime, Felbab-Brown said: “This needs to become a much higher priority because of the nexus and merger with state actors, but also because criminal groups can create enormously destabilizing outcomes in and of themselves.” 

Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 23, 2024, print edition as 'America’s Rivals Have A New Favorite Weapon: Criminal Gangs Rogue-State Henchmen'.

14. An Offensive Strategy Against the Houthi Threat

​Excerpt:

Some may argue that the United States should not allocate significant resources to addressing the Houthis, given more urgent threats like the conflict in Ukraine and tensions with Russia. However, the Houthi threat warrants serious attention because the group undermines the principle of freedom of navigation, a cornerstone of global stability. Once this principle is compromised, it opens the door for other malicious actors to challenge it in critical regions. The U.S. must determine whether defending freedom of navigation is a priority, as neglecting it could lead to threats in strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal, Taiwan Strait, Lombok Strait, and Strait of Gibraltar. If the U.S. concludes that this principle is indeed worth defending, it must adopt a more assertive military posture against the Houthis and target their financial and logistical support from Iran.

An Offensive Strategy Against the Houthi Threat

By Kevin Zhang

November 22, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/22/an_offensive_strategy_against_the_houthi_threat_1073929.html

Foreign policy analysts increasingly refer to the "axis of upheaval" to describe the growing cooperation among anti-Western powers—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iranian-backed groups. While much of the focus has been on the strategic partnership between Russia and China, the threat posed by Iranian-backed terrorist groups like the Houthis should not be overlooked. Multiple intelligence sources indicate that Iran is facilitating talks between the Houthi rebels and Russia to secure Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, significantly boosting the Houthis' capacity to target vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis are also reportedly granting Chinese cargo ships safe passage, given China's strong diplomatic ties with Iran.

The Red Sea is a critical artery for global commerce. Yet the United States has largely failed to effectively address the growing Houthi threat. Responsible for 10-15% of global maritime trade, the Red Sea has seen a dramatic decline in container shipping—down over 90% since December 2023. Houthi attacks on vessels have forced companies to reroute ships around the southern tip of Africa, adding 1-2 weeks to travel times and increasing fuel costs by $1 million per trip. These disruptions have intensified pressure on already strained global supply chains, amplifying the economic impact on international trade. The U.S. must develop a clear policy toward the Red Sea to address this escalating crisis.

The Biden administration, however, lacks strategic clarity in its efforts to counter the Houthis. In December 2023, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian with the support of 20 countries to protect commercial shipping from Houthi attacks by intercepting drones and missiles. However, the price of U.S. forces and technologies deployed in the Red Sea—such as interceptor missiles, Reaper drones, and precision-guided bombs—vastly outweighs the relatively low cost of the Houthis' disruptive drones. Washington loses tens of millions of dollars with each downed Reaper, while Houthi casualties remain minimal, and commercial vessels continue to face threats.

The Pentagon has requested $1 billion over the next two years to develop "cost-effective" solutions to drone warfare, with a focus on Replicator drone swarms. However, this crucial initiative would prove futile if the root cause of the problem remains unaddressed. U.S. policy thus far has been one of deliberate de-escalation, primarily focused on defending against Houthi attacks. Unfortunately, this strategy does not establish a clear end objective. Rather than eliminating the Houthi threat and securing freedom of navigation, the Biden administration seems to believe that continued downing of Houthi missiles will act as a deterrent, which has not been proven the case. The Biden administration’s approach risks leading to prolonged and costly engagements while remaining entangled in a conflict with the Houthis.

Instead, the United States should go on the offense against the Houthis by going after their command and control centers, logistical infrastructures, arms shipments, and drone production facilities. According to the U.S. Naval Institute, as of November 12, 2024, the United States has a guided missile destroyers and a guided missile submarine in the Red Sea . The USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group was also recently deployed, including the Carrier Air Wing 1 with nine aviation squadrons, one guided missile cruiser, and two guided missile destroyers. These forces would be most effectively employed by taking the initiative against the Houthis.

Without a shift to an offensive posture, the Houthi threat will persist. The group’s opposition to Western influence and its regional ambitions will continue to destabilize the area. Failure to decisively neutralize the Houthis would only allow them to regroup, signaling that their aggression successfully pressures the West. This could encourage further escalation, with the Houthis expecting that future confrontation will similarly weaken Western resolve.

In addition to adopting a more aggressive military posture, the United States should also take bold actions on other fronts. The United States should focus on disrupting Iran’s financial and logistical support that enables the Houthis' operations. This involves expanding targeted sanctions on Iran’s financial institutions and the IRGC and applying secondary sanctions to deter third-party entities from facilitating transactions that support the Houthis. These measures would increase the economic pressure on Iran, forcing it to reconsider the cost of its involvement in Yemen. Additionally, offensive cyber operations should play a key role in dismantling Iran’s informal financial networks, such as hawala systems and potential cryptocurrency channels that fund Houthi activities.

The U.S. should also continue to conduct cyberattacks against Iranian military assets and Houthis, as evidenced by recent cyber operations targeting an Iranian spy ship that was facilitating intelligence sharing with the Houthis. This strategic disruption is essential to curbing the Houthis' ability to target Red Sea vessels. Furthermore, as Russia and China are likely to increase their support for Iran’s defense industry--weakening U.S. defense capabilities while strengthening Iranian-backed militias--it is critical that the U.S. counters this dynamic. The U.S. should advocate for reforms within the United Nations' Verification and Inspection Mechanism to enhance oversight of goods entering Yemen and ensure stricter enforcement of sanctions.

Some may argue that the United States should not allocate significant resources to addressing the Houthis, given more urgent threats like the conflict in Ukraine and tensions with Russia. However, the Houthi threat warrants serious attention because the group undermines the principle of freedom of navigation, a cornerstone of global stability. Once this principle is compromised, it opens the door for other malicious actors to challenge it in critical regions. The U.S. must determine whether defending freedom of navigation is a priority, as neglecting it could lead to threats in strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal, Taiwan Strait, Lombok Strait, and Strait of Gibraltar. If the U.S. concludes that this principle is indeed worth defending, it must adopt a more assertive military posture against the Houthis and target their financial and logistical support from Iran.

Kevin Zhang is a research assistant at the Yorktown Institute and a graduate student at Georgetown University, where he is pursuing an M.A. in Security Studies with a focus on Military Operations. He also holds a B.S. in International Politics from Georgetown University.

15. The return of America’s Puritans

​A Brit comparing the UK, France, and America.

Excerpts:

There is, of course, a vital historical difference at stake here. The United States is a profoundly Puritan society, and Puritans believe that everyday life should be subordinate to religious faith. 

​...

In America, by contrast, there was no such traditional order to temper revolutionary energies. This is one reason why ideology loomed so large, another being that you have to think big in order to make a revolution. This is why the French have far too many ideas, at least in the eyes of some of those in Dorking or East Grinstead. They have concepts while we have common sense. But it’s also because aristocrats find ideology vulgar and unnecessary. Gentlemen don’t need to argue about rights and property and political interests. They just feel these things in their bones.

Hence the great quarrel between Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke at the turn of the 18th century. Paine was deeply involved in both the French and American revolutions, and in his astonishingly popular The Rights of Man is much taken with abstract concepts of freedom and equality. For his part, Burke counters this seditious stuff with custom, habit, piety, tradition, affection and sentiment. If you have to argue about these things, you’ve already betrayed the fact that you don’t understand them. Ideas break skulls, whereas sentiments bind citizens together. An Irishman from a neglected, half-famished colony had to leap to the defence of aristocratic Britain against revolutionary France, just as the Irish had to write much of the nation’s great literature for it.

​...

Not long ago, when History was declared to be at an end, the West had rationality while the East had ideology. The question was whether a rather anaemic Western pragmatism and liberalism were tough and resourceful enough to withstand the absolutism of radical Islam, or were they altogether too effete, over-civilised an affair to deal with the likes of Bin Laden. Now, however, the fanatics and barbarians are well and truly within the citadel. As I write, the news comes through that Trump has given the go-ahead for a Jeffrey Epstein Center for Family Values. That’s not true. But in a nation where the line between fact and fantasy becomes ever fainter, it might just happen.

The return of America’s Puritans

The revolutionary spirit can't be tamed

unherd.com · by Terry Eagleton · November 23, 2024

'The fanatics and barbarians are well and truly within the citadel.' Brent Stirton/Getty Images

Terry Eagleton

November 23, 2024 6 mins

Ideology matters far more in the United States than in Europe. Over here, you won’t hear many politicians talking about “this great country of ours” or making pious allusions to God. In Brussels or Wolverhampton, you would simply stare at your shoes and wait for this kind of thing to stop.

The florid, high-pitched, hand-on-heart tone of American political discourse is religious at root. In fact, one can’t understand much about the USA without grasping how very godly the place is. The US and the UK are not only separated by the same language, as George Bernard Shaw commented, but by the question of metaphysics. Americans are more at ease with bulky abstractions such as freedom and divinely ordained rights than the more empirically-minded British. Some wit once remarked that it’s when religion starts to interfere with your everyday life that it’s time to give it up, which captures the British sense of these matters exactly. Religion in Britain rarely takes to the streets, but it does so all the time in the States. People talk about God over there as they talk about Gary Lineker over here. Anglican vicars, however, don’t rant on about the demonic forces controlling the Boy Scout Association as they’re too busy organising the village fete.

There is, of course, a vital historical difference at stake here. The United States is a profoundly Puritan society, and Puritans believe that everyday life should be subordinate to religious faith. Not long ago, it might have seemed that not much remained of this noble doctrine in the land of Las Vegas and Stormy Daniels beyond the high-minded tone that its political rhetoric borrows from the preachers. With the rise of the Maga Right, however, an ugly form of theocracy now threatens to engulf the country.

The Puritans are back in business with a vengeance, not least because they can boast of actually having founded the country. The US is still young enough to feel the vibrations of its revolutionary past, in which the God of Puritanism was on the side of subversion. Like all nations born in anti-colonial struggle, America’s origins are insurrectionary. Violence, dissent, anarchic individualism and a suspicion of state authority are thus built into its very fabric, unlike those parts of the world for which there is conservative order on the one hand and rebellion on the other. Anarchic individualism can always be channelled into the free market; but once that market gives way to the transnational corporation, which smacks of the same kind of absolute sovereignty as Church and monarch once did, it isn’t surprising that symptoms of insurrection should break out afresh.

We manage things rather differently over here. Britain was awash with religious ideology in the 17th century, as Puritan and revolutionary forces clashed with the established order and beheaded the king; but that order had had a long time to entrench itself, and so was able to come to terms with these unruly powers. Hence the legendary English talent for compromise and the middle way. Middle-class entrepreneurs began to marry into the nobility, while the sons of dukes were educated side by side with the sons of merchants in the public schools.

Hence the great quarrel between Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke at the turn of the 18th century. Paine was deeply involved in both the French and American revolutions, and in his astonishingly popular The Rights of Man is much taken with abstract concepts of freedom and equality. For his part, Burke counters this seditious stuff with custom, habit, piety, tradition, affection and sentiment. If you have to argue about these things, you’ve already betrayed the fact that you don’t understand them. Ideas break skulls, whereas sentiments bind citizens together. An Irishman from a neglected, half-famished colony had to leap to the defence of aristocratic Britain against revolutionary France, just as the Irish had to write much of the nation’s great literature for it.

“Ideas break skulls, whereas sentiments bind citizens together.”

You might claim, however, that the British could afford to look askance on the abstractions of Robespierre. After all, they themselves had been through this turmoil of revolutionary ideas themselves over a century earlier, and having come through it and settled down to the more sober business of making money had no great wish to be reminded of it. Besides, if you throw up the barricades yourself, you might teach those below you to do much the same. The era of revolution in America and France is also the time when a new actor — the industrial working class — is about to emerge on the political stage, and throughout the 19th century the middle classes lived in fear of this threat to their very existence.

The contrast between Burke and Paine, tradition and ideology, isn’t as clear-cut as either man seems to think. People nowadays use the word “ideology” to mean a system of abstract ideas, as opposed to a more pragmatic approach to political affairs. I see things as they are, you have ideology and he is a fanatic. But ideology isn’t just about ideas. It’s the invisible colour of everyday life, too close to the eyeball to be objectified. It, too, is a question of habit, instinct, custom and sentiment. In the language of Donald Rumsfeld, it’s a question of unknown knowns — things we know but don’t know we do, because they are built into the very framework of our knowledge. Keir Starmer is quite as ideological as Jeremy Corbyn; it’s just that a lot of his ideas are currently accepted as common sense, whereas a lot of Corbyn’s still have to be argued over. Why is the command economy ideological but the right to private property isn’t? Why is it ideological to be nationalistic but not to be patriotic?

On the whole, advanced capitalism is averse to ideology, which is one of the many aspects of Trump which make him so exceptional. The ideal is for the system to work automatically, without relying on anything as chancy as beliefs. As long as you turn up to work, smash a bare minimum of shop widows and don’t try to overthrow the state, you can believe whatever you like. Nobody cares whether you’re a Jain or a Seventh Day Adventist. In fact, nobody even knows what they are. Material interests will always pull rank over visions and principles. Since convictions are a source of conflict, they are generally discouraged. In postmodern culture, convictions are almost equivalent to dogmatism. This is why people say things like “It isn’t necessarily that inequality is being reduced”. They mean that it isn’t being reduced at all, but since that sounds too doctrinaire it’s prudent to add “necessarily”. “It’s like getting worse” is a lot less table-thumping than “It’s getting worse”. Some people in this agnostic climate even have a problem with saying “It’s nine o’clock”.

If you banish ideology, however, the danger is that it will reappear in pathological form, as it is currently doing in the States. We may all be moving back to the 17th century. Men and women don’t just want prosperity and security; they also want recognition. They want to be assured that they are loved and needed, cared about and included. These are not activities at which bureaucratic states and transnational corporations are particularly adept, which is one reason why populism and fascism are on the increase. US Steel can give you wages or supply you with commodities, but they can’t give you meaning. For that you have to turn elsewhere, to sex and sport, snake oil salesmen and aspiring autocrats, crooked preachers and neo-Nazi louts, Hollywood mystics and bent bishops, each of them seeking to out-loony his neighbour. Rampant irrationalism begins to breed at the very heart of technological rationalism. The more reason is reduced to a set of scientific calculations, the more school children are massacred and little green men peer inquisitively in at your bedroom window.

Not long ago, when History was declared to be at an end, the West had rationality while the East had ideology. The question was whether a rather anaemic Western pragmatism and liberalism were tough and resourceful enough to withstand the absolutism of radical Islam, or were they altogether too effete, over-civilised an affair to deal with the likes of Bin Laden. Now, however, the fanatics and barbarians are well and truly within the citadel. As I write, the news comes through that Trump has given the go-ahead for a Jeffrey Epstein Center for Family Values. That’s not true. But in a nation where the line between fact and fantasy becomes ever fainter, it might just happen.

Terry Eagleton is a critic, literary theorist, and UnHerd columnist.

unherd.com · by Terry Eagleton · November 23, 2024

16. Can Trump tame the Pacific Dragon?

​Excerpts:

It’s not all bad news. Close analysis indicates that, while Beijing preferred a Harris victory at the polls, knowing habitual Democratic kowtowing to China, Chinese foreign policy mavens have been preparing for another Trump presidency for months. There are opportunities here as well as risks.

If Trump chooses to engage China from a position of frankness and strength in equal measure, he may be able to fundamentally shift U.S.-China relations in a manner that reduces the threat of war.

However, this can only be achieved by confronting the China threat honestly while understanding that strength, not hope, is what deters armed conflict and a possible World War III.

Can Trump tame the Pacific Dragon? - Washington Examiner

By​ John Schindler

November 21, 2024 8:00 am

Washington Examiner · November 21, 2024

The China problem our 47th president is inheriting from the Biden administration is grave. Like the two terms of former President Barack Obama’s White House before him, President Joe Biden’s China policy has telegraphed diffidence and weakness against a backdrop of American military decline. Two years into his presidency, Biden blurted out that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, ending decades of “strategic ambiguity” with Washington’s posture vis-à-vis Taipei and Beijing. Biden then repeated this statement at least three other times, with the White House rowing back his rhetoric on each occasion.

Yet Biden never followed up his policy change with action. As a result, Beijing never took our outgoing president particularly seriously. During the embarrassing early 2023 China spy balloon incident, the Defense Department’s efforts to talk with Chinese counterparts to defuse the crisis fell apart because the Chinese military wasn’t taking our hotline calls. In his final meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday, an elderly Biden was unable to project strength, while this week, an effort by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to meet with his Chinese counterpart at a security conference in Laos was rudely rebuffed. The Chinese Communists no longer hide their contempt for Team Biden.

This dynamic can and must change come noon on Jan. 20, 2025, when Trump returns to the Oval Office. Here, the new commander in chief has an opportunity to demonstrate to Beijing that he will not be publicly disrespected like Biden was. This plays to Trump’s personality and will show China that America takes the threat it poses seriously.

However, the unfortunate reality is that America’s military position against a rising China has declined precipitously even since 2020. Decades of underinvestment in our military, particularly regarding shipbuilding and Navy maintenance, means that the Pentagon can no longer look across the Pacific with confidence that China can be defeated if “the balloon goes up” over Taiwan.

This week, Adm. Samual Paparo, the Pentagon’s point officer on the China threat as the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, bluntly stated that there are no technical fixes or superweapons that can change the balance of power in the Pacific. Drones and technological prowess alone can’t save us. As Paparo sarcastically explained, “Oh let’s just quit on everything. We’ve got some drones. Alright, well [China]’s got 2,100 fighters. They’ve got three aircraft carriers. They have a battle force of 200 destroyers. Oh well, roger, we’ve got a couple drones. No problem. You know, we’ve got that Ukraine thing licked.”

Paparo continued that strong Pentagon support to Israel in its proxy struggle against Iran, plus Ukraine’s continuing defensive war against Russia, has significantly degraded U.S. high-end military readiness against China. “Now, with some of the Patriots that have been employed, some of the air-to-air missiles that have been employed,” he said, “it is now eating into [our] stocks … and to say otherwise would be dishonest.”

Pentagon concepts to defeat China’s dramatically growing air and naval power, which greatly outnumber U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, are grounded in the technological superiority of our precision weapons. But we are using these up rapidly in the Middle East and Ukraine. This is particularly serious because there’s no short-term fix for this depletion of Pentagon missile stocks, and our surge production capacity is limited. Meanwhile, U.S. generals and admirals take seriously the notion that Xi plans to reunite Taiwan with China by any means necessary. Xi is 71, just a year younger than Russian President Vladimir Putin, and both men know that they have perhaps a decade of political life left to change the world to their liking.

The threat of the Great Pacific War starting during Trump’s term is real and serious. Biden-era avoidance of the China threat has cost us time. Therefore, the new administration has no time to waste. It must grapple with how to avoid war with China from its first day back in the White House.

Job No. 1 is making plain to Beijing that Washington welcomes frank bilateral dialogue on all matters, including Taiwan and the South China Sea, where increasingly aggressive Chinese air and sea patrols are causing deep worry in the Pentagon. These are exercises designed to test and wear out Taiwanese resolve, and America’s too. Such triggering demonstrations of military force will continue, more or less peacefully, lulling the Pentagon and Taipei into false tranquility until, one day, the Chinese military launches an invasion, or more likely a blockade, of Taiwan, and war is upon us.

Trump must make plain to Beijing that resolving the Taiwan matter by force is not acceptable to the U.S. Moreover, that island, which constitutes the cornerstone of the First Island Chain in the Western Pacific, is vital to regional security. The Taiwan matter isn’t just about Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. There are other key stakeholders, especially Japan, that would view any Chinese move against Taiwan as an existential threat to their countries. Because Tokyo is one of our closest allies, with whom we enjoy a strong bilateral defense treaty, if Japan fights for Taiwan’s independence, the U.S. may wind up in that war whether we want to be or not.

Just as important as telegraphing strength to the Communists in Beijing is communicating frankly with Taipei that they are not doing enough in their own defense. The answer to Taiwan’s fear of the Chinese military cannot simply be: Call Washington to save us. Contrary to alarming statements about the dire threat to Taiwan emanating from the mainland, its defense spending remains laggard. Taiwan can make its island a dense hornets’ nest of missiles that the Chinese military would find difficult to crack. Yet, Taipei still doesn’t choose to take its defense seriously. Trump must bluntly inform Taipei, privately, that America cannot be expected to risk World War III for Taiwan until it gets more serious about military spending and readiness. Trump coaxed NATO countries to spend more on collective defense during his last term, and he must do the same with Taiwan now.

That said, the Trump administration needs to spend whatever it takes, as soon as possible, to fix U.S. shipbuilding to get our Navy ready for war against China. Loss of naval supremacy, under fire, in the Western Pacific would unravel American hegemony once and for all while threatening the security of our homeland. We must make China understand that there can be no easy victories against us in the Western Pacific. Right now, the odds of who wins that war can be termed even, as Congress just admitted. We need to do better than that to deter Xi’s adventurism in the South China Sea and against Taiwan.

Last, Trump must order our intelligence agencies to execute a full-court press against the China matter. Our spy agencies need far-reaching reforms anyway, and the China threat offers a test case for getting foreign espionage right. U.S. intelligence operations against China have too often been blown by shoddy security, while Beijing’s cyberwarriors pillage American companies and government agencies without consequence. Serious clandestine pushback is required, employing American spies to send China a message it cannot fail to understand. The Xi regime must be allowed no more easy pickings of the American economy and national defense secrets.

It’s not all bad news. Close analysis indicates that, while Beijing preferred a Harris victory at the polls, knowing habitual Democratic kowtowing to China, Chinese foreign policy mavens have been preparing for another Trump presidency for months. There are opportunities here as well as risks.

If Trump chooses to engage China from a position of frankness and strength in equal measure, he may be able to fundamentally shift U.S.-China relations in a manner that reduces the threat of war.

However, this can only be achieved by confronting the China threat honestly while understanding that strength, not hope, is what deters armed conflict and a possible World War III.

John R. Schindler served with the National Security Agency as a senior intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer.

Washington Examiner · November 21, 2024

17. Philippines a strategic winner when Trump takes the helm

​Excerpts;

The Philippines is also still home to several big-ticket Chinese strategic investments. By and large, Marcos Jr’s administration has sought to avoid full alignment with Washington by maintaining broadly functional ties with Beijing, a top trading partner.

But a second Trump administration is expected to put pressure on Asian allies to more overtly side with the US in the name of preserving a US-led regional order.

“Hedging doesn’t make sense [since] geopolitically and from a defense perspective I would not hedge, because you are too important [as a frontline state]…[so] pick a side and make sure you are not a ‘no man’s land’,” Elbridge Colby, a key architect of Trump’s National Defense Strategy, told this writer earlier when asked about Southeast Asian states’ unwillingness to pick a side in between the two superpowers.

“Being half-pregnant is a bad idea; half-measures are dangerous,” the former US deputy assistant secretary for defense said.

Philippines a strategic winner when Trump takes the helm - Asia Times

US-Philippines reveal joint task force for checking China in South China Sea, a tightening of defense ties expected to endure under Trump

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · November 22, 2024

MANILA – After years of negotiations and delays, the United States and the Philippines have finally signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which will facilitate sensitive intelligence-sharing and cybersecurity cooperation in anticipation of a regional conflict with China.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin finalized the much-anticipated agreement during a week-long visit to the Philippines, during which the defense chief also made the first public acknowledgment of a new joint task force formed to check China in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

Established to prevent a forcible Chinese takeover of the Philippines’ de facto military base on the contested Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin in Filipino), the new US Task Force-Ayungin has been providing direct US operational support to the Philippine Navy and other relevant agencies.

“Task Force-Ayungin enhances US-Philippine alliance coordination and interoperability by enabling US forces to support Armed Forces of the Philippines activities in the South China Sea,” Kanishka Gangopadhyay, spokesperson at the US Embassy in Manila, said in a statement acknowledging the task force’s existence.

Meanwhile, Philippine officials welcomed the GSOMIA as a critical step to facilitate the Southeast Asian nation’s “access to higher capabilities and big-ticket items from the United States” and to pave the way for “similar agreements with like-minded nations” in the region, including fellow US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia.

The US and Philippines also inaugurated a new combined coordination center at Camp Aguinaldo, which houses the Philippines’ key military facilities and Department of National Defense headquarters. The new facility is expected to oversee joint US-Philippine operations in the event of a contingency, including a possible conflict over Taiwan.

“This center will enable real-time information sharing for a common operating picture, and it will help boost interoperability for many, many years to come. And it will be a place where our forces can work side by side to respond to regional challenges,” US defense chief Austin said during the groundbreaking ceremony.

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief of staff General Romeo Brawner Jr characterized the new center as “a vital nexus for our joint operations, a gateway for information-sharing and strategic coordination” that will enhance the two allies’ “ability to collaborate during a crisis, fostering an environment where our strengths combine to safeguard peace and security in our region.”

Austin also visited a military camp in Palawan, a frontline province facing the South China Sea, including the highly contested Spratly group of islands where Philippine troops control more than half a dozen features whose ownership is disputed by China.

During the visit, Austin observed the Philippine Navy’s deployment of T-12 unmanned surface vessels acquired through Washington’s foreign military financing (FMF) program – a cornerstone of bilateral military cooperation.

Starting with the first Trump and continuing under the outgoing Biden administrations, the Pentagon has made clear that it’s obliged to come to the Philippines’ defense should any third party, namely China, seek to forcibly dismantle the Philippines’ base atop the Second Thomas Shoal.

The 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) covers any attack on Philippine public vessels, aircraft and personnel operating in the South China Sea and the broader Pacific Ocean area.

China’s foreign ministry has warned the Philippines that any defense pact with external powers “should [not] target any third party or harm the interests of any third party…Nor should it undermine regional peace or exacerbate regional tensions.”

In a thinly veiled criticism of growing Philippine-US defense cooperation, China said that the “only right choice for safeguarding national security and regional peace and stability is to uphold good neighborliness and friendship and maintain strategic independence.”

The Asian power, however, can assume Manila will up its security ties with the US under a Trump 2.0 administration. Trump’s appointment of known China hawks such as Marco Rubio (as secretary of state) and Mike Waltz (as national security adviser) likely means the Philippines will be integral in his government’s pressure tactics on China.

During his congratulatory phone call, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr held a reportedly “very friendly and productive” conversation with the newly elected US leader.

The Filipino leader even went so far as to claim that the millions-strong Filipino-American community “overwhelmingly voted” for Trump and that “I’m sure [Trump] will remember that when we see each other.’’

Pre-election polls, however, have shown that, similar to other Asian-American groups, a healthy majority of Americans of Filipino descent actually favored outgoing Vice President Kamala Harris.

“I was able to talk to him this morning and the Philippines was in his thoughts,” Marcos told reporters while visiting the northwestern province of Catanduanes, which has been repeatedly battered by super typhoons in recent weeks, most recently Man-yi.

“I expressed to him our continuing desire to strengthen that relationship between our two countries, which is a relationship that is as deep as can possibly be—because it has been for a very long time,” the Filipino president added.

On his end of the call, Trump reminded of his historical bonds with the Marcos family, dating back to their heyday in Manhattan, by asking after the leader’s mother, former First Lady Imelda Marcos, who is now 95 years old. At one point, the Marcoses owned a Trump building.

“He is friends with my mother. He knew my mother very well. He asked about her. ‘How is Imelda?” I told him that she also sends her greetings,” Marcos said.

The two leaders didn’t apparently discuss any substantial bilateral issues, including concerns over how a more draconian immigration policy under a second Trump presidency could severely affect large numbers of Filipino-Americans illegally residing in the US.

The US is expected to expand defense aid to the Philippines under Trump, despite the leader’s call on allies to pay larger bills for US security guarantees.

A newly released report by the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that is expected to play an outsized role in Trump’s second administration, has called for the affordable transfer of high-end defense items, including F-16 fighters, as well as the deployment of state-of-the-art Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, to defense allies.

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The Philippines may also seek to acquire the mid-range US Typhon missile system, which was deployed to Philippine soil for joint military exercises earlier this year but has not been redeployed to the US since. China has complained loudly about the Typhon, which has the capacity to hit Chinese cities from the Philippines.

At the same time, the new Trump administration will likely have limited patience for any dilly-dallying by key allies, especially frontline states such as the Philippines.

Marcos Jr, for instance, has yet to clarify his stance on a potential contingency in neighboring Taiwan and, accordingly, has demurred from either direct high-level military engagement with Taipei or full-scale involvement in any US-led plans to ward off a future Chinese kinetic action against the self-ruling island.

The Philippines is also still home to several big-ticket Chinese strategic investments. By and large, Marcos Jr’s administration has sought to avoid full alignment with Washington by maintaining broadly functional ties with Beijing, a top trading partner.

But a second Trump administration is expected to put pressure on Asian allies to more overtly side with the US in the name of preserving a US-led regional order.

“Hedging doesn’t make sense [since] geopolitically and from a defense perspective I would not hedge, because you are too important [as a frontline state]…[so] pick a side and make sure you are not a ‘no man’s land’,” Elbridge Colby, a key architect of Trump’s National Defense Strategy, told this writer earlier when asked about Southeast Asian states’ unwillingness to pick a side in between the two superpowers.

“Being half-pregnant is a bad idea; half-measures are dangerous,” the former US deputy assistant secretary for defense said.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @RichHeydarian

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asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · November 22, 2024

18. How Taiwan’s Authoritarian Past Shapes Its Security Politics Today

​Excerpts:

A Clean Break?

Since Chu took the reins at the KMT two and a half years ago, a host of new entities have been rolled out to rejuvenate the party and broaden its appeal. There is now a Youth League, a Department of Youth, a Youth Working Group, KMT Studio, a New Media Department and, just before the elections, the launch of KMT Girls.

Such image-building efforts, though, are largely cosmetic and unlikely on their own to excite youngsters about a party that projects itself as center-right conservative. A clean break is needed.

Typical members with a pro-China worldview, such as the legislator Wu Sz-huai, are in their 70s and will have died out in a decade or two. If the KMT wants to retain its position as one of Taiwan’s main political parties, more fundamental measures are needed in the socio-historical and identity realm.

As Brian Hioe, one of the protesters in the Sunflower Movement a decade ago, wrote on the movement’s 10th anniversary in March: “The same fundamental issues that the movement addressed – that of Taiwan’s ambiguous position in the world and the future of its people – are still unresolved.”

How Taiwan’s Authoritarian Past Shapes Its Security Politics Today

thediplomat.com

The legacy of Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship continues to shape the island’s polarized society and security policies today.

By Friso Stevens

November 23, 2024

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On February 28, 1947, the Kuomintang (KMT) government led by Chiang Kai-shek launched a harsh crackdown in Taiwan by indiscriminately gunning down protesters. On that fateful day, protesters had gathered to denounce two years of chaos and corruption under the KMT after the Allies had handed Taiwan back to China. The violent crackdown, known as the 228 Massacre, cost thousands of lives and ushered in a period known as the White Terror.

The legacy of Chiang’s dictatorship continues to shape the island’s polarized society and security policies today.

At the most recent annual memorial of the 228 Massacre in Memorial Park, the guest of honor was Chiang Wan-an, the young KMT mayor of Taipei and the alleged (illegitimate) great-grandson of Chiang Kai-shek. Ma Ying-jeou, 70, the KMT president from 2008 to 2016, led the procession hand in hand with a survivor of the killings, and laid a wreath both at the start and end of the ceremony.

Chiang Wan-an, 45, apologized to the family members of the victims who sat before him for his speech, framing those massacred as “our elders” who needed to be remembered, instead of reflecting on his family’s and party’s role as perpetrators.

The bitter irony of the ceremony being led by two leading KMT members was not lost on a group of young protesters. A vast police presence prevented them from storming the altar as they had done the previous year, but the message on their paper sheets was unchanged: “There is no solution for the matter, forgiveness is impossible.” “The matter” was written in Taiwanese rather than Mandarin, underscoring that they spoke for the generations of Taiwanese who had lived on the island before the KMT takeover.

Martial law under the KMT only ended in 1987 amid a wave of democratizations in the region, paving the way for the first direct parliamentary elections in 1992 and the first direct presidential elections in 1996. The Tangwai, or “outside the party” movement, propelled this change and emerged in 1986 as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has held Taiwan’s presidency since 2016. Over the last eight years, the DPP has moved toward delivering transitional justice, albeit incrementally.

A Present Past

It is surprising that the KMT remains one of the two major political parties in Taiwan. It is as if Francisco Franco’s Movimiento Nacional, abolished in 1977, was still a viable player in Spanish politics today. By voluntarily opening up the political system, the KMT managed “to have a democratic second life,” said Professor Ming-sho Ho of National Taiwan University.

At a more fundamental level, the battle over historical memory on display at the remembrance ceremony reflects different conceptions of identity. Many KMT supporters seem to live in the past – an era in which the Republic of China (ROC), as Taiwan is still officially called, was on standby, ready one day to take back the mainland from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

It is in this period that the notion of one undivided China encompassing both sides of the Taiwan Strait is anchored, a notion still held by the KMT but disputed by the DPP, which views the island as already being an independent and sovereign state.

The descendants of the million Chinese who fled the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek form much of the KMT base. Known as waishengren, literally “outside province person,” they are the children and grandchildren of the soldiers, police officers, bureaucrats, and teachers who were regime loyalists. Only in the 1990s were the people in these professions not “encouraged” to join the party.

Hou Yu-ih, 67, the mayor of New Taipei, effectively the greater metropolitan region of the capital, and the KMT candidate for the January 2024 presidential elections, started his long career in the police force in the last decade of the dictatorship. The base, however, wasn’t happy with Hou because, in the end, he is Taiwanese. He was born to parents who lived in Taiwan before 1945 and so is not considered a waishengren.

That’s why Jaw Shaw-kong, 73, whose father fought the communists on the mainland in the KMT army, was selected as the party’s candidate for vice president. Hou sought to keep his distance from the old guard of One China believers in the party but Jaw, an old KMT stalwart with impeccable nationalist credentials, was still calling for reunification with China in the early 1990s – under Taipei.

The argument of the “Deep Blue” supporters, so called after the KMT’s colors, is that people on both sides of the strait are at their core racially and culturally the same. This line of thought implies, as does China, that resisting unification with the zuguo, or ancestral land, makes no sense. This belief among older generations is unsurprising given that the government instilled the notion in the population until the 1980s.

The One China narrative has a direct impact on policy preferences. In 2022, Jaw was part of the legion of DPP antagonists that derided the progressives’ attempt to strengthen Taiwan’s defense against China. He questioned the usefulness of President Tsai Ing-wen’s signature defense reform to extend military service from four to 12 months, asking: “Is it just like Ukraine, with just a few more days of delay and many more deaths?”

Hou more recently went as far as calling the January elections a choice between war and peace, making it the main topic of debate in the campaign.

The broader narrative that the United States cannot be trusted to come to the island’s aid – “abandoning [Taiwan] once again,” as one KMT academic put it – plays neatly into the hands of mainland disinformation pushing the idea that Taiwan, as Ma echoed right before the elections, could never win a war with powerful China.

The DPP serving as the pro-military party is a remarkable reversal of positions. It was born out of the anti-militarist movement, after all. Yet it was Tsai, dressed in military fatigues for drills, who led the charge to increase war-readiness as the regional balance of power changed drastically.

Taiwan still had air superiority until the late 1990s and Japan until a decade later, but Beijing has had the upper hand militarily for at least the last decade and a half, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Pivotal Choices

Taiwan’s security policy has not been spared entanglement in the DPP-KMT divide. With pivotal defense choices needed in the next four to eight years, this is a significant vulnerability.

Few examples illustrate the furious contestation over defense policy better than Taiwan’s indigenous submarine project. Slated to cost $16 billion over a decade, or about 85 percent of the 2024 defense budget, it will produce eight diesel-powered vessels.

It may be an appealing trump card on paper, but according to a former Pentagon official involved in defense procurement for Taiwan the submarine is based on 50-year-old technology. An untested design, the submarines have no air-independent propulsion (AIP) and no pump jet, making them easier to track.

As such, there are legitimate reasons to ask whether the secretive program is indeed a DPP vanity project, as the KMT has portrayed it. The opposition party has vowed to delve into allegations of misspending and has proposed new investigative powers to do so. The DPP lost its majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, in January’s elections.

The dispute over Taiwan’s submarine program is part of a broader debate about the direction Taiwan’s military strategy should take. Should it sustain its traditional posture, trying to counter China with comparable assets – ships, planes, and tanks – or should it opt for the “porcupine strategy,” which seeks to turn the island into an impenetrable fortress full of mobile and shoulder-launched anti-vessel and anti-aircraft missiles.

Taiwan’s 2023 Defense Report, issued by the Ministry of National Defense, reflected the conundrum by failing to make a clear choice. It was full of references to the porcupine strategy, but at the same time referred, unrealistically, to “joint sea control” and listed desired purchases of F-16s and Abrams tanks.

Given China’s overwhelming firepower, these assets would be taken out within the first hours of engagement, according to Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund.

When I asked the incoming vice president, Hsiao Bi-khim, whether there was still disagreement about Taiwan’s military strategy and procurement, she told me that was “old news,” and that the island would take the asymmetric route.

One retired general suggested the military leadership thought differently. Presented with Hsiao’s quote, he retorted: “They are just politicians, they don’t understand the military.” A KMT foreign affairs observer also spoke of a rift. “All high-ranking officers have doubts,” he said. “The DPP gets a lot of pushback not to abandon traditional defense.”

Lamenting the DPP’s dismissal of dissenting voices, he added: “They call them Chiang Kai-shek’s army, trained by the KMT. They get no respect, no honor.”

Taiwan’s most senior generals do hail from the Chiang dictatorship, and they are steeped in the idea of attacking China rather than defending against it. The father of the asymmetric doctrine and chief of the general staff from 2017 to 2019, Lee Hsi-ming, is tellingly now persona non grata at the defense ministry.

The KMT’s Burden

The problem for the KMT is the opposite: its close affiliation with the old guard risks putting the party out of touch with the emerging Taiwanese identity.

“We still do not appeal to the young generation,” a political assistant to the KMT’s chair, Eric Chu, told me. “Only three to five percent of the electorate is Deep Blue, pro-China, but they account for nearly half of the KMT membership.”

Chu has led a major revamp of the party to attract more young people into its ranks. His main reform has been to break the power of the retired military officers who have traditionally dominated the party. They long operated independently as their own central branch, with their own funding and intra-party channels. The chapter, called Huang Fuxing, has been brought under the authority of local city branches, which will allow for the selection of candidates with broader appeal to the run for the 2028 presidential and parliamentary elections.

However, it remains to be seen whether Chu’s reforms will go far enough to overcome other obstacles to young people joining the KMT. In the words of Johnny Chiang, the party’s leader in the Legislative Yuan: “We’re too old. The party is too old … Compared with the other two major parties, which have their origins in Taiwan, the KMT has a very long and complicated history, and that is sometimes a burden.”

A KMT staffer who hosted the party’s regular happy hour for the foreign press was more blunt. “It’s easier to come out as gay than as a KMT member,” she said.

Much of the apprehension among younger voters comes together in the very name of the party. The KMT’s official name is still the Chinese Nationalist Party, implying, as did Chu’s political assistant, that it serves all huaren, the people of the Chinese ancestral land.

And there is a powerful faction in the KMT centered around former President Ma that wants to keep it that way. Its regular interventions in the public discourse on cross-strait relations and Chinese/Taiwanese identity, and those of commentators on outlets such as ChinaTimes and TVBS that share its viewpoint, prevent the party from moving forward.

A costly case in point was Hou feeling compelled, three days before the election, to publicly reject Ma’s remarks about Taiwan not standing a chance against China. Ma later met Xi Jinping for an audience at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on April 10.

The Bold Newcomer

The main battleground for the youth vote is the digital realm, on messaging apps such as LINE and WeChat, and video-sharing platforms such as TikTok and YouTube.

The newcomer in parliament, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), jumped in the polls in the last weeks before the elections thanks to anti-establishment messages and funny clips of its populist candidate, Ko Wen-je, that were widely shared online.

As KMT legislative candidate Wennie Wu put it: “Taiwanese people love scandal and gossip, and algorithms give you what you like. We’re just not seen as cool, so it is really hard for us to get to the youth.

“The running joke among us is that we’re the army party while they excel in the air war,” she said, referring to the KMT’s Mao-inspired grassroots approach versus the TPP’s online strategy.

Without much of a set policy agenda, the TPP won eight out of 113 seats in Taiwan’s legislature, mostly on the persona of Ko. With the KMT and DPP holding 52 and 51 seats, respectively, the TPP could be decisive in passing a DPP-proposed defense budget and readiness reforms.

A Clean Break?

Since Chu took the reins at the KMT two and a half years ago, a host of new entities have been rolled out to rejuvenate the party and broaden its appeal. There is now a Youth League, a Department of Youth, a Youth Working Group, KMT Studio, a New Media Department and, just before the elections, the launch of KMT Girls.

Such image-building efforts, though, are largely cosmetic and unlikely on their own to excite youngsters about a party that projects itself as center-right conservative. A clean break is needed.

Typical members with a pro-China worldview, such as the legislator Wu Sz-huai, are in their 70s and will have died out in a decade or two. If the KMT wants to retain its position as one of Taiwan’s main political parties, more fundamental measures are needed in the socio-historical and identity realm.

As Brian Hioe, one of the protesters in the Sunflower Movement a decade ago, wrote on the movement’s 10th anniversary in March: “The same fundamental issues that the movement addressed – that of Taiwan’s ambiguous position in the world and the future of its people – are still unresolved.”

Authors

Guest Author

Friso Stevens

Friso Stevens holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Leiden University is currently a senior fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

He was in Taiwan in February and March 2024, when he took part in the German Marshall Fund’s Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program. He wishes to thank Bonnie Glaser and Ming-sho Ho for their input and the people he interviewed for their valuable time.

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thediplomat.com

19. Suspected sabotage by a Chinese vessel in the Baltic Sea speaks to a wider threat

​Good. EXPOSE the enemy's strategy (and one attack it).

Excerpt:

But being open about the threats, not to mention the attacks, is a first step. Pistorius deserves credit for saying that “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed” and for calling it “sabotage,” which has brought a larger public spotlight on this evolving drama. Sweden’s minister of civil defense, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, has gone further, regularly telling Swedes in no uncertain terms about the hybrid threats the country faces and exhorting citizens to do their part to thwart the power of hybrid attacks. That matters, because the attacks will continue—and not just under the sea.

Suspected sabotage by a Chinese vessel in the Baltic Sea speaks to a wider threat

atlanticcouncil.org · by jcookson · November 21, 2024

Officially the Yi Peng 3 is just a bulk carrier, one of countless such ships carrying everything from grain to coal, aluminum, and fertilizer. But as she left Russia’s Baltic port of Ust-Luga last week, the Chinese-flagged ship may have had a rather different mission. Authorities and the open-source intelligence (OSINT) community have zeroed in on the Yi Peng 3 as potentially responsible for cutting two undersea cables on her journey through the Baltic Sea, and Germany’s defense minister has already called this a hybrid attack. More such incidents should be expected.

On November 17, an undersea cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was cut, and less than twenty-four hours later, the only communications cable connecting Finland with Germany was also severed. As OSINT investigators quickly gathered, the Yi Peng 3 was at the scene both times. Swedish, Lithuanian, Finnish, and German authorities have not yet publicly blamed the bulk carrier, but as she sailed from the Baltic Sea toward Denmark’s Great Belt and from there toward the Atlantic Ocean, her actions have drawn scrutiny. By the time the bulk carrier reached the Great Belt, on November 19, she was being followed by Danish Navy vessels.

Undersea cables and pipelines are acutely vulnerable to geopolitically motivated harm.

On November 19, Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, expressed what most observers had also concluded. One had to assume, he said, that the incidents were hybrid aggression, and he described them as “sabotage.” Indeed, given that cables and pipelines are painstakingly detailed on navigational charts, it’s nearly impossible for a ship to sever not just one but two cables by accident.

This is the second time within about a year that a Chinese merchant vessel has apparently damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. The last time, in October 2023, the container ship Newnew Polar Bear quickly left the scene after dragging its anchor across a gas pipeline and, it appears, two undersea cables. It then sailed through the Great Belt and continued northward along the Norwegian coast, and from there on to Russia’s Arctic coast. There wasn’t very much Sweden, Finland, or Estonia—in whose exclusive economic zones the damage had occurred—could do except ask China to cooperate in the investigation. Beijing declined their request. Was this, too, sabotage? Was the Chinese government involved? What about the Russian government? After all, Newnew Polar Bear had just left a Russian port before the cables and the pipeline were hit.

Undersea cables and pipelines are acutely vulnerable to geopolitically motivated harm, and such aggression can be carried out by persons and entities that officially have no link to the government instigating the aggression. The world’s fast-growing offshore wind farms are acutely vulnerable, too. Land-based infrastructure, for that matter, is also vulnerable, and in recent months Sweden and Finland have seen break-ins into water plants. But the world’s oceans are especially exposed. They are a global commons, guarded against military assaults by countries’ navies but otherwise protected mostly by a collection of treaties, conventions, and rules agreed by countries over the generations. (I discuss this in depth in reports for the Atlantic Council’s maritime threats project.)

At the time of writing, the Yi Peng 3 is stationary in the Kattegat, on the Danish side of this small body of water between Denmark and Sweden. She may still get away, or the Danes may decide to detain her. Regardless of the outcome, there will likely be more sabotage of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and other primarily Western waters. Each time, Western governments will face the dilemma of how to respond. For governments committed to the rule of law and the rules-based international order, it’s not enough to argue that if something looks like a duck and walks like a duck, then it’s a duck. Gray-zone aggression, in fact, presents a dilemma for the defender. (That’s why I called my book on the subject The Defender’s Dilemma.)

But being open about the threats, not to mention the attacks, is a first step. Pistorius deserves credit for saying that “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed” and for calling it “sabotage,” which has brought a larger public spotlight on this evolving drama. Sweden’s minister of civil defense, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, has gone further, regularly telling Swedes in no uncertain terms about the hybrid threats the country faces and exhorting citizens to do their part to thwart the power of hybrid attacks. That matters, because the attacks will continue—and not just under the sea.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

​20. World War III has officially begun, Ukraine’s ex-top general says

World War III has officially begun, Ukraine’s ex-top general says

The former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army has a grim outlook on the state of the war.

https://www.politico.eu/article/ww3-officially-begun-ukraine-ex-top-general-valery-zaluzhny/?mc_cid=7e687e06a5&utm

Zelenskyy fired Zaluzhny in February after rising tensions between the two on how the war in Ukraine should be fought. | Alexey Furman/Getty Images

November 21, 2024 7:50 pm CET

By Ketrin Jochecová

Ukraine's former military Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny said that the direct involvement of Russia's autocratic allies in its war on Ukraine means that World War III has started.

"I believe that in 2024 we can absolutely believe that the Third World War has begun," said Zaluzhny, who is now Ukraine's envoy to the United Kingdom, during a speech at Ukrainska Pravda's UP100 award ceremony.

"Because in 2024, Ukraine is no longer facing Russia. Soldiers from North Korea are standing in front of Ukraine. Let's be honest. Already in Ukraine, the Iranian 'Shahedis' are killing civilians absolutely openly, without any shame," said Zaluzhny, adding that North Korean and Chinese weapons are flying into Ukraine.

Zaluzhny urged Ukraine's allies to draw the right conclusions.

"It is still possible to stop it here, on the territory of Ukraine. But for some reason our partners do not want to understand this. It is obvious that Ukraine already has too many enemies. Ukraine will survive with technology, but it is not clear whether it can win this battle alone," he said.

Zaluzhny's speech at the ceremony is in line with his grim outlook of the war. In similar comments in his essay for The Economist last year that infuriated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Zaluzhny compared the state of the conflict to a stalemate like World War I.

Zelenskyy fired Zaluzhny in February after rising tensions between the two on how the war in Ukraine should be fought — as well as Zaluzhny's growing popularity, which made him a potential political threat.

Zaluzhny was credited for successfully halting and pushing back Russia's initial attack launched on Feb. 24, 2022, which was later tarnished by the failure of last year's counteroffensive. His role was taken over by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is seen as closer to the president.

21. It’s the end of the world as we know it, and more military news

It’s the end of the world as we know it, and more military news

The missiles are flying in Russia and Ukraine. The defense secretary pushes back on criticism about women in combat roles. The U.S. military needs more munitions.

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/pentagon-rundown-ukraine-russia-missiles/

Jeff Schogol

Posted 24 Hours Ago

The MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Image via Wikimedia Commons.

Happy Friday! Every time I walk into my local Starbucks, a barista I know asks me if World War III has started. It’s a reasonable question considering Ukraine claims Russia fired a non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile on Thursday at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters on Thursday that Russia had fired an “experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile” based on Russia’s RS-26 Rubezh ICBM, and Russian authorities notified the United States briefly before the launch through nuclear risk reduction channels.

Singh also said this is the first time the United States has seen this missile used on the battlefield, and that U.S. officials recently briefed Ukraine about the possibility that it could be used.

The latest Russian attack comes after the United States allowed Ukraine to use its Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, to strike targets inside Russia — although under what conditions remains unclear — and the U.S. government has agreed to provide the Ukrainians with antipersonnel landmines.

Things haven’t been this tense since 1983, when the United States and Soviet Union nearly stumbled into nuclear war, first in  September and again in November. The recent talk about the possibility of World War III has prompted me to ask Pentagon Rundown readers: Which is the most depressing nuclear war movie of all time – “The Day After” or “Threads”? Send your votes to schogol@taskandpurpose.com and increase the peace! 

But enough about the potential for Armageddon. Here’s your weekly rundown.

• “We need you.” CNN rising star and Task & Purpose alumna Haley Britzky pressed Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week about comments made by Pete Hegseth, President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, that women do not belong in combat roles. Austin responded that the “very courageous and very proficient” women he has led in combat are examples of the incredible things that women in the military do. “I think our women add significant value to the United States military and we should never change that,” Austin said in Laos on Wednesday. “And if I had a message, to answer your question, to our women, I would tell them that, you know, we need you, we have faith in you, we are appreciative of your service, and you add value to the finest and most lethal fighting force on Earth.”
• Speaking of voluntary service. The Marine Corps is out with its newest moto recruiting commercial as part of its “Made for This” campaign, which features the tag, “You don’t join the Marines, you become one.” Task & Purpose asked a panel of teenagers who are in the Corps’ target demographic what they thought of the commercial. While they sensed there are less glamorous aspects of Marine life that the commercial didn’t show — such as “sitting around doing nothing” — they also picked up on many of the recruiting ad’s themes. “It definitely showed the variety of what you can do,” said Colin, a high school junior. “There were, like, guys jumping out of helicopters and then it clipped to a guy running through a snowstorm. And then spinning a weapon around. I don’t know, just a bad ass on the move all the time.”
• Saying the quiet part out loud. Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, acknowledged on Tuesday that the U.S. military’s stockpile of artillery shells and other munitions is dwindling due to the amount of aid being provided to Ukraine and Israel. The Army expects to ramp up production of 155mm artillery shells to 100,000 per month by the end of 2025 — more than three years after the Ukraine war started. One limiting factor has been that the United States has had to import TNT, a major component of artillery shells. Although the Army recently awarded a contract to build a TNT factory in Graham, Kentucky, it is not expected to be completed until 2028.
• Using the military to deport illegal immigrants. This week’s news has moved so quickly that it would be easy to forget that Trump confirmed on Monday that he plans to use U.S. troops as part of his efforts to deport illegal immigrants. The law he will likely use to do so is the Insurrection Act, which gives presidents, “almost unrestricted latitude for the domestic use of the United States military for law enforcement purposes,” said Kori Schake, head of the defense policy team at the American Enterprise Institute think tank in Washington, D.C. While Trump may be challenged in courts, U.S. troops are not allowed to disobey orders because they disagree with them.
• Small Wars Journal reboot. The Small Wars Journal, a blog that was initially launched in 2005 and focuses on unconventional or irregular warfare, insurgency, and guerilla warfare, is being relaunched under the Future Security Initiative at Arizona State University, said John P. Sullivan, an associate editor with the publication. The original site was founded by retired Marine Maj. Dave Dilegge, who died in May 2020. “The new Small Wars Journal (SWJ), or SWJ 2.0. under the leadership of ASU’s Future Security Initiative (FSI) and in collaboration with ASU Media Enterprises publishes serious, authentic voices from across the spectrum of small wars stakeholders,” Sullivan told Task & Purpose.

And on a personal note: The Pentagon Rundown will be off next week for the Thanksgiving holiday. On behalf of everyone at Task & Purpose, I wish you and your families all the best!

22. Air Force's Special Operations Crop Duster Plane Will Be Flown for Training at Oklahoma Base

​This seems like it will be a pretty special aircraft (no pun intended).

Excerpts:

"The OA-1K aircraft are truly awesome machines," Lt. Col. Jesse Ziegler, incoming 17th Special Operations Squadron commander, said in the news release. "These [block] zero models are not fully modified yet and serve as an initial training aircraft, until both air crew and aircraft reach operation status."

Mission-ready OA-1Ks are expected to arrive in 2025, the news release said.

Creation of the formal training unit at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base comes amid a time of skepticism by government watchdogs into how the military plans to use the modified crop duster for special operations missions.

Air Force's Special Operations Crop Duster Plane Will Be Flown for Training at Oklahoma Base

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · November 22, 2024

An Air National Guard base in Oklahoma will host the first formal training unit for the service's armed recon crop duster plane used for special operations, an announcement that comes as watchdogs question the aircraft's future in combat.

In a ceremony last week, Will Rogers Air National Guard Base in Oklahoma City announced it would become home to Air Force Special Operations Command's newest aircraft, the OA-1K Sky Warden, an armed single-engine aircraft modified from an Air Tractor frame that has been traditionally used by farmers as a crop duster.

The new OA-1K aircraft, which are not yet fully outfitted, will replace the long-standing twin-engine MC-12 Liberty reconnaissance aircraft, which are being phased out by 2027. The new mission will bring "an increase of 150-200 permanent personnel" to Will Rogers Air National Guard Base, the installation said in a Monday news release.

"The OA-1K aircraft are truly awesome machines," Lt. Col. Jesse Ziegler, incoming 17th Special Operations Squadron commander, said in the news release. "These [block] zero models are not fully modified yet and serve as an initial training aircraft, until both air crew and aircraft reach operation status."

Mission-ready OA-1Ks are expected to arrive in 2025, the news release said.

Creation of the formal training unit at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base comes amid a time of skepticism by government watchdogs into how the military plans to use the modified crop duster for special operations missions.

The Government Accountability Office, Congress' watchdog agency, issued a report in late December revealing that Special Operations Command "decided on the size of the fleet before conducting the required analyses" and that it did not fully justify acquiring 75 of the aircraft.

And changes to the U.S. military's presence in the Middle East and other theaters limit many opportunities for use of the aircraft, the report added.

"Specifically, geopolitical changes since SOCOM established the acquisition target in 2019, such as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and leadership changes in African countries, may affect where and how these aircraft can be used in the future," the GAO report said.

That criticism also comes as the Department of the Air Force has been undergoing major organizational and strategic changes to counter the rising threat of China's military in the Pacific -- which some critics and officials have previously told Military.com means a notable shift away from the Middle East.

While SOCOM reduced its buy to 62 planes earlier this year following that GAO report, Lt. Gen. Michael Conley, the head of Air Force Special Operations Command, told reporters during the Air and Space Forces Association's conference near Washington, D.C., in September that he believes 75 aircraft are still necessary.

"Our requirement still remains 75 based on what we've determined," Conley said. "I think from when OA-1K was conceptualized and decided on, until now, the world's changed a little bit. So we look at some different opportunities. I think it still provides a cost-effective close-air support platform, which is one of the missions that it was designed for."

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · November 22, 2024

23. Nothing Can Stop the U.S Army's Green Berets

​I had to chuckle when reading the clickbait title.

​But seriously, I think the core mission for Green Berets is unconventional warfare. It is UW that informs all other missions: FID, DA, CT, and SR when conducted by Green Berets. And it is UW thinking and UW philosophy that informs all activities by Green Berets across the spectrum of conflict from the gray zone of strategic competition to large scale combat operations to post conflict operations and back to the gray zone of strategic competition. (https://smallwarsjournal.com/2023/05/29/unconventional-warfare-mindset-philosophy-special-forces-must-be-sustained/​)

Excerpt:

-Their core missions include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counterterrorism, and special reconnaissance.

Nothing Can Stop the U.S Army's Green Berets

The National Interest · by Christian D. Orr · November 22, 2024

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Army Special Forces, known as the Green Berets, were officially established on June 19, 1952, with the creation of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Gaining fame through Barry Sadler's 1966 song "The Ballad of the Green Berets" and the 1968 film starring John Wayne, they became an iconic symbol of military excellence.

-Their core missions include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counterterrorism, and special reconnaissance.

-From significant roles in the Vietnam War—where they earned numerous honors—to modern operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Green Berets have a storied history. Equipped with specialized weapons like the M4A1 carbine and Browning M2 machine gun, they continue to be a critical component of the U.S. Armed Forces' special operations.

Inside the Green Berets: America's Elite Special Forces Unveiled

“Fighting soldiers from the sky/Fearless men who jump and die/Men who mean just what they say/The brave men of The Green Beret.” Thus goes the opening verse to “The Ballad of the Green Berets,” sung by the late U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler, a song which spent five weeks on the Billboard Hot 100 charts in 1966, and was redone in a choral rendition by Ken Darby in the 1968 John Wayne film ”The Green Berets.”

That song and movie combo made the U.S. Army Special Forces, better known as the “Green Berets” the first component of the U.S. Armed Forces’ Special Operations community to gain fame in the American public eye.

But beyond the pop culture embellishments, what makes the real-life U.S. Army Special Forces so truly “special?”

Green Berets: Where It Began

The special forces officially trace their creation back to June 19, 1952, with the establishment of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (10th SFG[A]) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. According to the group’s official history page:

“The group’s mission was to conduct partisan warfare behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe. The 10th Special Forces Group originally attracted many former members of the OSS, Rangers and Airborne units from World War II as well as many foreign nationals … The Green Beret was authorized for wear at Bad Tölz by the Group commander, Col. William Ekman, on 17 November 1955, and its usage became group policy. Every soldier in the unit wore a green beret as part of the uniform. The Department of the Army (DA) did not recognize the beret as official headgear, and only after President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg in October 1961 was the wear of the Green Beret authorized. President Kennedy, a major champion of the Special Forces, issued a Presidential Directive recognizing the Green Beret as the ‘Symbol of Excellence’ and the official headgear of Special Forces.”

Besides being the year that the green beret was authorized as a uniform, 1955 was also a significant year for special forces insofar as that was the year the 10th SFG was recognized publicly for the first time, thanks to two articles that the New York Times published about the unit, describing them as a “liberation” force designed to fight behind enemy lines. Hence the highly apropos motto “De Oppresso Liber” (To Free the Oppressed).

Cold War Service: From the Vietnam War to the early 1990s

Hollywood notwithstanding, it was indeed during the Vietnam War that the so-called “Green Berets” first earned their real-world fame. Though I can’t do their history full justice within the confines of a 1,000-word article, suffice to say that the SF operators’ Vietnam service began in June 1956 when the original sixteen members of the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment (SFOD) arrived in-country to train a cadre of indigenous Vietnamese Special Forces teams; on October 21 of that same year, Captain Harry Griffith. Cramer, Jr. of the 14th SFOD became the first American soldier to die in Vietnam (he was thirty-one years old at the time of his death).

Fast-forward to July 6, 1964, and then-CPT (later COL) Roger Hugh Charles Donlon of the 7th Special Forces Group became the first soldier to receive the Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War.

The 5th SFG was the most famous SF unit of the war; its soldiers ended up winning sixteen of the seventeen Medals of Honor awarded to the SF troops during that controversial conflict, plus one Distinguished Service Medal; ninety Distinguished Service Crosses; 814 Silver Stars; 13,234 Bronze Stars; 235 Legions of Merit; forty-six Distinguished Flying Crosses; 232 Soldier’s Medals; 4,891 Air Medals; 6,908 Army Commendation Medals; and 2,658 Purple Hearts.

Subsequent to the Vietnam drawdown, the special forces’ mystique was further bolstered from 1977 onward when COL Charles Alvin “Chargin’ Charlie” Beckwith founded Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), better known simply as Delta Force.

The Green Berets’ last major combat action of the Cold War was during the 1991 Persian Gulf War (aka Operation Desert Storm). Though it’s been twenty-five years since I read Douglas C. Waller’s book The Commandos: The Inside Story of America’s Secret Soldiers, I recall that it gives a detailed and harrowing account of a special forces unit’s firefight against some of then-Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s troops. Long story short: in spite of extremely difficult odds, the special forces troops came out on top.

Special Forces After the Cold War

After the 9/11 attacks and the resultant Global War on Terror, the Green Berets’ existence took on a new degree of importance. The story of their “Horse Soldiers,” who helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban (along with a bit of help from U.S. airpower) is the stuff of legend. And during the 2003 Iraq War, subsequent to the overthrow of Saddam, they created and trained Iraqi special operations units to fight against the insurgency.

Today, the core special forces mission set consists of five doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; direct action; counterterrorism; and special reconnaissance.

Weapons of Army Special Forces

As per the American Special Ops website, Army Special Forces use:

· Handguns:

o Beretta M9 9×19mm

· Carbines and Assault Rifles:

o MK 13 CQBR - 5.56 x 45mm

o MK 16 SCAR-L - 5.56 x 45mm

o Mk 17 SCAR 7.62x51mm NATO

· Sniper and Anti-Material Rifles:

o MK 12 Mod 0 - 5.56 x 45mm

o M24 SWS 7.62x51mm NATO

o M110 Semi-Automatic Sniper System (SASS) 7.62x51 mm NATO

· Machine Guns

o Mk 46: a variant of the M249 SAW adapted for special operations forces

o Mk 48: a 7.62 x 51mm version of the Mk 46

o M240: 7.62 x 51mm

o Browning M2 (the legendary “Ma Deuce”) .50 caliber

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image Credit: Main image is from Chinese State Media. All others are Creative Commons.

The National Interest · by Christian D. Orr · November 22, 2024

24. Promotion delayed for general who was the last US service member out of Afghanistan

​I never served with the general but I know he has a great reputation as an honorable leader. Why would a senator block his promotion? (Yes I know it is all politics).

Excerpts:

It remains unclear why Donahue’s nomination to become commanding general of U.S. Army Europe and Africa and receive a promotion to four-star general was not included. Often such an omission is the result of a senator’s hold on the promotion.

It is unknown whether a senator stepped in to obstruct a typically unanimous approval process for military nominees. The Senate Armed Services Committee approved nearly 1,000 promotions, including Donahue’s, earlier this week before advancing them to the full upper chamber.

Promotion delayed for general who was the last US service member out of Afghanistan

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · November 22, 2024

Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, right, an officer who oversaw the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and is now nominated to lead the Army in Europe and Africa, was left out of a batch of military promotions approved by the Senate on Thursday, Nov. 21, 2024. (Sgt. Alison Strout/U.S. Army photo)

WASHINGTON — A batch of military promotions approved by the Senate on Thursday left out Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, an officer who oversaw the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and is now nominated to lead the Army in Europe and Africa.

It remains unclear why Donahue’s nomination to become commanding general of U.S. Army Europe and Africa and receive a promotion to four-star general was not included. Often such an omission is the result of a senator’s hold on the promotion.

It is unknown whether a senator stepped in to obstruct a typically unanimous approval process for military nominees. The Senate Armed Services Committee approved nearly 1,000 promotions, including Donahue’s, earlier this week before advancing them to the full upper chamber.

Then-Major Gen. Chris Donahue, commander of the Army 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, boards a C-17 cargo plane at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Aug. 30, 2021. (Alex Burnett/U.S. Army)

The timing of Donahue’s promotion is now uncertain with the Senate not expected to return from recess until December. A senator’s hold on his nomination could be bypassed with a time-consuming vote on the Senate floor.

The chamber resorted to such a procedure last year after Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., blocked the promotions of hundreds of general and flag officers for months in a failed bid to overturn a Pentagon policy providing troops with access to abortion and other reproductive health care.

Donahue is best known for being the last U.S. service member to leave Afghanistan, a moment that was captured in a grainy night vision photo that went viral in 2021. He led the 82nd Airborne Division at the time and was responsible for securing the airfield at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.

The chaotic evacuation of Americans and Afghan refugees from Kabul continues to be a frequent target of criticism by Republicans who blame President Joe Biden’s administration for a suicide attack at the airport that killed 13 service members.

A 2022 independent review by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said decisions made by Biden as well as former President Donald Trump were key factors in the rapid collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces.

As Trump readies for a second term, he is reportedly searching for a way to prosecute U.S. military officers who were directly involved in the violent withdrawal. He has called the hectic exit of American troops from Afghanistan after 20 years of war a “humiliation.”

Donahue was pictured boarding the last plane out of Kabul, walking up a ramp with an assault rifle in hand. He sent a message to his troops as the C-17 cargo plane got off the ground: “Job well done, I’m proud of you all.”

Donahue has served as the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Liberty, N.C., since 2022 and, if confirmed, would replace Gen. Darryl Williams at the Army’s Europe and Africa headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany.

He has had a distinguished career in the Army since entering service in 1992, with roles as an Army Ranger and in the elite Delta Force. He deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere and served as the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s deputy director for special operations and counterterrorism.

In 2022, Donahue was part of an 82nd Airborne contingent that arrived in Germany shortly before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · November 22, 2024

25. US scrambles as drones shape the landscape of war: 'the future is here'

US scrambles as drones shape the landscape of war: 'the future is here'

Ukraine's fighting forces go through an estimated 10,000 drones a month

 By Caitlin McFall Fox News

Published November 23, 2024 6:30am EST

foxnews.com · by Caitlin McFall Fox News

FIRST ON FOX: The U.S. Army this week took steps to advance American military capabilities by ordering close to 12,000 surveillance drones small enough to fit in a backpack as the reality of battle shifts in favor of electronic warfare.

Conflicts around the globe, particularly the war in Ukraine, have drastically changed how major nations think about conducting war, explained drone expert and former U.S. Army intelligence and special operations soldier Brett Velicovich to Fox News Digital.

The nearly three-year-long war in Ukraine has often depicted scenes not witnessed since World War II, with children loaded onto trains, veins of trenches scarring the eastern front and renewed concern over how the geopolitics of this conflict could ensnare the entire Western world.

1,000 DAYS OF WAR IN UKRAINE AS ZELENSKYY DOUBLES DOWN ON AERIAL OPTIONS WITH ATACMS, DRONES AND MISSILES

A UJ-22 Airborne (UkrJet) reconnaissance drone prepares to land during a test flight in the Kyiv region of Ukraine on Aug. 2, 2022. (Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images)

But Ukraine’s scrappy response to its often outnumbered and at times outgunned reality has completely changed how major nations look at the modern-day battlefield.

"Think about how we fought wars in the past," Velicovich, a Fox News contributor, said, pointing to the Vietnam War. "When you were fighting the enemy over that trench line, you didn't know who was over that hill. You saw a red hat and you fired at it."

"Now you have the ability to see what's over that hill and maneuver your forces quickly based on that," he added.

A report by The Wall Street Journal this week said the U.S. Army secured potentially its largest-ever purchase of small surveillance drones from Red Cat Holding’s Utah-based Teal Drones.

This move is a significant step that the U.S. has been eyeing for more than a decade after terrorists first began employing small-drone tactics against the U.S. military in the Middle East.

According to Velicovich, who routinely visits Ukraine to advise on drone technology, the U.S. is trailing its top adversaries like Russia and China when it comes investment in drone capabilities.

Ukrainian soldiers look for a drone in a trench at their infantry position in the direction of Kupiansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine, on March 10. (Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images)

US BRIEFED UKRAINE AHEAD OF PUTIN'S 'EXPERIMENTAL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC' ATTACK

While the U.S. invested heavily in sophisticated systems like Predator and Reaper drones — which are multimillion-dollar systems designed for intelligence collection and lengthy navigation flight times and possess missile strike capabilities — it is the small, cheaply made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which are changing battlefield dynamics.

"These handheld, small UAS systems that you are able to take a drone with a bomb strapped to it [have become] basically an artillery shell now. It's guided artillery shells," Velicovich said in reference to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which include not only the UAV, but also the controller manned from the ground. "Frankly, it's changing how countries are going to fight wars in the future, and the U.S. has been so slow to get ahead of this."

It has reportedly taken the U.S. Army some 15 years to start beefing up its Short Range Reconnaissance program with these backpack-sized drones, in part because there was a mental hurdle the Department of Defense needed to push through.

"It's the mentality of senior leaders," Velicovich explained. "These guys are hardened battle infantry guys. They didn't grow up with fancy technology."

"It really takes a lot of people understanding, changing their thought process. And that's happening now because of the accelerating war in Ukraine, where they've seen how effective drones are," he said, noting that drones can no longer be dismissed as gimmicks or toys of the future.

"Now it's real. Now it's here, the future is here," Velicovich said. "We will never fight another war without drones."

The U.S. Army has acquired nearly 12,000 Black Widow drones from Red Cat's Teal Drones in a move to beef up its short-range reconnaissance capabilities as battlefield realities turn to electronic warfare. (Red Cat Holdings)

Teal Drones worked to develop a UAS system based on battlefield needs identified by the U.S. Army, and eventually created the drone that has been dubbed the Black Widow, explained Red Cat CEO Jeff Thompson to Fox News Digital.

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION TO ANNOUNCE $275 MILLION UKRAINE WEAPONS PACKAGE THIS WEEK

This sophisticated system is capable of being operated by a single man, can resist Russian jammers, has strike capabilities, and can fly in GPS-denied zones — an important factor that has been highlighted by the war in Ukraine.

"The Short Range Reconnaissance drone is really going to be able to help the warfighter be more lethal and be a safer soldier," Thompson said.

The U.S. Army greenlighted the purchase of nearly 12,000 drones. Each soldier kitted out with the Black Widow technology will be given what is called a "system," which includes two drones and one controller — all of which can fit in one's rucksack.

Each system, including the drones and controller, costs the U.S. government about $45,000.

But, as Johnson pointed out, Ukraine’s armed forces are going through about 10,000 drones a month — which suggests the U.S. will need to acquire far more than 12,000 drones.

A soldier with the 58th Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Army catches a drone while testing it so it can be used nearby as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, near Bakhmut, Ukraine, on Nov. 25, 2022. (Reuters/Leah Millis)

The war in Ukraine has shown that affordably made drones, particularly FPV drones, which stands for "first-person view," can be made for as low as $1,000 a drone and frequently strapped with explosives and utilized as kamikaze drones.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

But drone warfare is about significantly more than sheer quantity — it’s a "power game."

"This is a cat and mouse game," Velicovich said, explaining that drone and counter-drone technology, like jamming systems, are constantly evolving. "This is playing out at a level that most people don't realize."

"It's like we were almost peering into the future," he continued. "We are seeing what's happening on the ground now, there in Ukraine, and eventually we'll have to fight a war similar to it, and we just need to be ready."

foxnews.com · by Caitlin McFall Fox News

25. IN SEARCH OF A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PME

IN SEARCH OF A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PME

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Thomas Crosbie · November 22, 2024

Over the last several weeks War Room has run a 7-part series of articles that have examined how professional military education should be designed. In this final article of the series, Thomas Crosbie and Holger Lindhardtsen, the organizers of the effort, advocate for a competency-based approach to course design. They emphasize the importance of aligning courses with the specific needs and desired outcomes of the officers being trained. The authors suggest that course directors should first design an ideal curriculum with little to no concern for the realities of the teaching environment, then adapt it to fit the practical constraints of their institution. They also highlight the importance of considering multiple courses of action and identifying key priorities, using tools like center-of-gravity analysis. They call for the establishment of a Competency Development Center of Excellence to foster consensus, refine training approaches, and share best practices across PME institutions.

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the eighth and final installment in a multi-part series that examines how professional military education should be designed. This and subsequent articles will look through the lens of the competencies required of officers as the global security environment changes once again. The collection of articles can be found in a collection here once they have been published.

A successful end-state approach to course design will produce an unusable first draft, one that is optimized to develop officers who are able to fight the sorts of wars that their country is preparing to fight, but which makes no concessions to the organizational realities of the teaching environment.

Over the past several weeks, War Room has featured seven articles in our series on competency development and professional military education (PME). Those articles stand on their own merits as arguments in favor of one or another approach, each of which has some degree of legitimacy in the practitioner and researcher worlds. In this final article, we aim to strengthen our case by making explicit three aspects which informed all of the previous articles. These are: 1) an “end state” approach to competency development; 2) an acknowledgement of multiple legitimate courses-of-action and centers of gravity; and 3) an implied sphere of consensus, sphere of legitimate controversy, and area of deviance. We will briefly explain each in turn before making our final case for a competency development structure.

First, let us make explicit our “end state” approach to course planning. On those rare occasions when course directors are given the responsibility to significantly revise their programs, they will typically use their existing model as a starting point and will look to more prestigious programs for inspiration. This has given rise to a “copy-paste” logic of course revision that has in turn led to Frankenstein courses that boast many sound components, but which often fit together poorly. As experienced course directors ourselves, we have struggled to find resources to guide course revision in a logical manner that connects to the deeper purpose of what we do. Lacking international guidelines and guardrails, we have instead worked backward from our local context to figure out the best end state for our nations and services. Not surprisingly, we discovered that these needs look very different from one context to another. The first lesson we gained is that we need to decouple institutional logic from competency development logics. A successful end-state approach to course design will produce an unusable first draft, one that is optimized to develop officers who are able to fight the sorts of wars that their country is preparing to fight, but which makes no concessions to the organizational realities of the teaching environment. The art of course design is then to develop a subsequent draft that is fitted to reality, with an honest assessment of how far it falls short of the ideal.

The real-ideal tension brings us to our second insight, concerning the local nature of course of action and center of gravity identification. As course directors work toward their first draft, they should keep in mind that the desired end state may be reached by various courses of action. For countries focused on fighting what Mary Kaldor called “new wars,” for example, one option may be to optimize the program in the ways described by Todd Greentree and Craig Whiteside in their article. Alternately, it may instead follow the approach described by Heather S. Gregg in her article. Likewise, a “future war” orientation may resemble the MDO approach described by Katrine Lund-Hansen and Jeff Reilly, or the technology focus described by Vicky Karyoti. Local context is everything. Planning methods can be used to help untangle these difficult judgment calls, and often an adapted center-of-gravity analysis can be particularly helpful. For example, the competency development center of gravity for one country may be the overriding requirement for its officers to be able to deploy into component commands within a joint force. In that case, a single-component approach of the sort we previously outlined may be preferred to the joint approach described by James Campbell.

The final point we want to make explicit concerns the nature of legitimacy. In civilian academic programs, course directors derive their learning objectives from the mature academic fields in which they have specialized. In PME, new and emerging focus areas are often imported from military policy arenas without the supporting academic frame.

As a result, we must derive legitimacy from a combination of the policy and practitioner worlds as well as the relatively small academic world of military studies, although this is not without its challenges. One challenge that we face is over-correction when a new and trendy concept arrives on the scene. There is also a danger that unfounded views voiced by influential figures but based on tiny samples or bureaucratic compromises may exert undue influence over a local context. To guard against these tendencies, it is helpful to visualize competency development as the outcome of a global debate about the changing character of war and the evolving body of professional military expertise, a debate that includes practitioners and researchers.

This debate can be modeled using communication scholar Daniel Hallin’s famous spheres. The inner sphere represents the sphere of consensus, where we assume we all agree on the core competencies officers need, regardless of local context. These need not be endlessly debated. All countries want officers to be effective leaders with a basic knowledge of military affairs, a basic orientation toward national strategy and global politics, and so on. Of greater interest is the sphere of legitimate controversy that surrounds the sphere of consensus. This is loosely structured, but does have structure: legitimate positions are based on compelling evidence from the world of practice, research, or both. Beyond this sphere is the large area of deviance, where heterodox views are expressed and where new ideas generally first appear.

Figure 1: The Sphere of Consensus, Sphere of Controversy, and Area of Deviance

Having made explicit the deeper logic uniting the articles in this series, we would like to conclude with two final points. First, and to repeat ourselves, NATO countries should recognize that PME is not an end in itself, but is rather the best available means to achieve competency development. It is time, in our view, for the field of PME studies to stop focusing on institutional characteristics (e.g., whether courses should be taught by civilian or military instructors), and start focusing on desired outcomes. The goal of militaries is to fight and win wars. The goal of our PME should be to develop competencies that aid nations in fighting and winning their sorts of wars.

Second, PME institutions struggle to develop appropriate competencies because we lack a Competency Development Center of Excellence or other similar structure. Such a structure could provide enormous benefits if it did just three things: clarify the sphere of consensus (what every officer needs to learn); continuously refine the contours of various courses of action within the sphere of controversy (aiding policymakers in focusing their priorities); and share best practices in developing the various competencies implied by the developed alternatives . We view this collection of articles as a call for NATO or other international organizations to develop such a structure. In the meantime, we encourage our fellow course directors to focus as much as possible on competency development, rather than the distractions that plague PME.

Thomas Crosbie is an Associate Professor of Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the series editor of Military Politics (Berghahn Books) and has published widely on topics including the military profession, military politics, Professional Military Education. He is currently the director of the Educating Future Warfighters Project.

Holger Lindhardtsen is a researcher at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is a project member of the Educating Future Warfighters Project, focusing on competency development for future conflicts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: L: Grant Hall located at 415 Sherman Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS, home of the United States Army Combined Arms Center Headquarters; R: The Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Photo Credit: L: Don Middleton, U.S. Army; R: Courtesy of the U.S. Army CGSC Twitter account

warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Thomas Crosbie · November 22, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com