Quotes of the Day:
"The fire-breathers are almost always civilians."
- Robert M. Gates
“...people burn books, and that they ban books is, in a way, a good sign. It's a good sign because it means books have power. When people burn books, it's because they're afraid of what's inside them...”
- Marcus Sedgwick, The Monsters We Deserve
“The media controls the mind.”
- Jim Morrison
1. No State Funeral for Chun Doo-hwan
2. Undoing Moon’s policies, or going beyond them?
3. Observing changes in North Korea's slogans from across the border
4. Moon’s Inter-Korea Peace Process Deadlocked in China-US Tensions
5. Former Chinese ambassador says Beijing supports efforts for end-of-war declaration
6. North Korean sentenced to death after students caught watching Squid Game
7. US drive for security group expansion poses policy dilemma for Korea
8. Chinese envoy butters up Korea, Japan ahead of Beijing Olympics
9. Samsung Electronics picks Taylor, Texas, for big chip investment
10. Korea faces growing pressure to join stand against China
11. Australia and South Korea losing the middle ground
12. At least 210 coronavirus cases are linked to a South Korean religious settlement.
13. S. Korean Conservatives Vow to Get Tougher on China
14. The Life of Diplomats in North Korea
15. U.S. and South Korea finalizing end of war declaration text
1. No State Funeral for Chun Doo-hwan
No surprise. I wonder if he had apologized and shown remorse for Kwangju if the Moon administration would have done more for him (and his family) though I doubt it would have given him a state funeral.
No State Funeral for Chun Doo-hwan
November 24, 2021 12:08
Ex-President Chun Doo-hwan, who died Tuesday, will be laid to rest in a private ceremony.
Long-term aide Min Jeong-ki told reporters in front of Chun's house in northwestern Seoul, "A private funeral will be held at Severance Hospital and the body will be cremated," according to the ex-president's will.
Chun would have been eligible for a state funeral, but his family are apparently mindful of the ire he still stirs up for refusing to face responsibility for the bloody 1980 Gwangju massacre of democracy protestors. Chun will be laid to rest near the Daejeon National Cemetery rather than a national cemetery because he was convicted of a spate of crimes.
Cheong Wa Dae spokeswoman Park Kyung-mee told reporters, "We offer our condolences to the family of former President Chun Doo-hwan" but added he "didn't reveal the truth of history until the end. It is regrettable that there was no heartfelt apology." She added President Moon Jae-in has no plans to send flowers or pay a condolence visit.
A portrait of former President Chun Doo-hwan stands on a memorial altar at Severance Hospital in Seoul on Tuesday. /Newsis
Chun was convicted of treason and bribes in 1996 and sentenced to death the following year with a forfeiture of more than W220 billion, but pardoned later (US$1=W1,189).
But Chun insisted that the Gwangju pro-democracy protest was a rebellion and denied responsibility for the massacre. Even at the time of his death an appeal was underway of his suspended sentence for defaming an eyewitness to the massacre.
Prosecutors said they will seek to retrieve W95.6 billion in additional forfeiture Chun failed to pay. The government has retrieved only W124.9 billion or 57 percent of the money, but the process is normally halted when an offender dies.
Meanwhile, Min claimed that Chun's health deteriorated shortly after getting his Pfizer coronavirus jab. He said he met Chun in June or July this year and found him looking thin and Chun's wife told him that he lost 10 kg because he suffered dietary problems after getting vaccinated. Chun had been suffering from multiple myeloma, a type of blood cancer.
2. Undoing Moon’s policies, or going beyond them?
This is the choice the Korean people in the South have in March.
When you select text while you’readin it'll appear here
[KH Explains] Undoing Moon’s policies, or going beyond them?
By Ko Jun-tae koreaherald.com5 min
The presidential race is heating up, with contenders from the two largest parties -- Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party and Yoon Seok-youl of the People Power Party -- dominating the news.
However, there are four candidates backed by parties with a presence in the National Assembly. In addition to the two leading candidates, Sim Sang-jung of the Justice Party and Ahn Cheol-soo of the People's Party are in the running.
This is a close look at the four party-backed candidates’ key initiatives and perspectives.
Lee Jae-myung
Representing the ruling Democratic Party of Korea as a politically progressive candidate, Lee Jae-myung would largely continue the Moon Jae-in administration’s work while rolling out extensive reforms of the nation’s welfare and housing programs.
His policies are often deemed too "populist" by critics, as he emphasizes an increased government role in economic growth, development and welfare initiatives. Lee has vowed to aggressively push for a universal basic income program while hinting at the possibility of a four-day workweek.
In his nomination speech, Lee also vowed to focus on helping the struggling economy recover from COVID-19, with an emphasis on fairness and sustainability. It is widely believed that he will increase taxes on the "privileged" classes and open up more jobs and opportunities for those in low-income groups.
Lee also promises extensive reforms of housing policies in response to the public outcry against policies laid out by the Moon Jae-in administration. He seeks to bring down real estate prices by supplying more affordable rental homes and crack down on speculation by targeting owners of multiple homes.
Lee is an outspoken man who has not shied away from blunt public comments, and his diplomatic vision reflects his personality.
In line with the liberal bloc's long-held anti-Japanese sentiment, it is widely believed that Lee would be aggressive toward Japan and revisit the issues of wartime sexual slavery and forced labor. He is also expected to maintain closer ties with China than the United States and to prioritize talks with North Korea.
Lee has in the past called for South Korea to take the lead in its own defense, adding that the country should prepare its own defense strategies even if that meant the withdrawal of US troops from the country.
While he said he would make demands of North Korea as needed, he has so far made no comments on specific issues such as denuclearization or resuming the Kumgangsan tourism program. Not much of a change in direction could therefore be expected from a Lee government when it comes to inter-Korean relations.
Yoon Seok-youl
Former Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-youl is a prominent anti-Moon administration figure representing the main opposition People Power Party. He too has vowed to launch extensive policy reforms based on fairness and equality.
As he is new to politics, his stance on issues is little known, but it appears likely that he would work to undo some of the Moon administration’s moves.
Details are still missing from Yoon’s pledges, but he has made it clear that he would ease regulatory limits on reconstruction projects to encourage developers to increase the supply of housing. He has openly emphasized that the government should "assist" the private sector in this matter rather than "drive" changes.
On welfare, he appears in line with his party in favoring selective welfare policies and asking the business community to take the lead in creating jobs and growth with help from the government as needed. Yoon is also open to cutting taxes and lifting regulations as a way to encourage firms to invest and expand.
In stark contrast to his ruling party rival, the candidate is pro-nuclear energy, having vowed to abolish Moon’s nuclear phaseout plans. He would also reset the timeline and goals for the country’s transition to carbon neutrality after discussing the matter with relevant industries.
And in keeping with the traditional stance of the conservative bloc, Yoon is looking to strengthen the alliance between South Korea and the US. He would expand the military exercises and strengthen cooperation between the two countries to bolster defenses against Pyongyang.
Denuclearization is at the top of Yoon’s mind when it comes to inter-Korea relations, but he has made it clear he would not bring nuclear missiles from the US to South Korea. He supports active participation in the US efforts to maintain a dominant presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Yoon told reporters last week that he would also work to mend the "damaged" diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, vowing to focus on "pragmatism in concern of the benefits of the two countries." He hasn’t said much about what to do about China thus far.
Ahn Cheol-soo
Ahn Cheol-soo of the minor opposition People's Party is making his third bid for the presidency, this time armed with heavy criticism of the Moon administration.
Like the other candidates, Ahn still needs to fill in the details of his pledges, but he has emphasized economic growth through scientific advances and investment in new industries. He is drawing on his background as a physician, scientist and businessman.
Addressing the current administration's shortcomings is likely to take up much of Ahn’s campaign strategy and can be expected to encompass real estate, education, labor and welfare policies. But he has been weak in terms of taking sides on issues like diplomatic relations and North Korea.
The past suggests he may not be in the race by the time voting booths are installed in March. He has appeared indecisive and dropped out of races in the past, so we can't say for sure that he will stay put this time.
Just before the 2012 presidential election, he withdrew his candidacy and threw his support behind Moon. He did the same for former Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon when he ran for the mayoral seat in 2011.
Sim Sang-jung
Possibly the most politically progressive contender in this race, Rep. Sim Sang-jung of the minor left-wing Justice Party is all for liberal reforms. Some of her campaign promises look similar to Lee's.
She has vowed to introduce a four-day workweek and a guaranteed basic income of 300,000 won ($252) per month for workers in the agricultural and fisheries sector. She has also promised a one-time payout of 30 million won for all South Koreans when they reach 20 years of age.
The four-term lawmaker supports reducing the power of conglomerates in favor of labor unions and small and medium-sized enterprises. She also wants to apply pressure on platform tech firms through stronger anti-monopoly rules.
What makes her stand out from the crowd is her determination to continue most of the Moon administration’s real estate policies, only with greater intensity. She seeks to crack down on owners of multiple homes and apply high taxes on lucrative real estate deals.
Sim is keen for South Korea to continue working toward its carbon-neutrality goal by cutting carbon emissions 50 percent through 2030. She also leans toward being friendly to North Korea, and seeks to invite the reclusive state to join the global economy.
3. Observing changes in North Korea's slogans from across the border
No surprise. Ideological "purity" is the priority for the regime.
Excerpt:
Even just a few years ago, many propaganda slogans along the Sino-Korean border said “Hurrah for Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” Now, at the same places, they say “Hurrah for the Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas.” The signs look recently installed because their paint looks new. In short, the slogan “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas” has replaced the call for more adherence to “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” The new slogans seem to be related to the recent emphasis of Kim’s status as the country’s supreme leader and the “good fortune” the people have from him being their leader.
Observing changes in North Korea's slogans from across the border - Daily NK
Even just a few years ago, many propaganda slogans along the Sino-Korean border said “Hurrah for Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism," but now...
In early November, I went to a Unification Observatory in Ganghwa (Ganghwa Peace Observatory) and one in Gimpo (Aegibong Observatory). At a single glance, I was able to see busy North Korean citizens in gold-colored rice fields wrapping up the fall harvest and gathering leftover grain.
Red propaganda signs that appear to wrap around entire whole villages are massive emblems of the North Korean regime. Since North Korean propaganda slogans reflect the thinking of the Workers’ Party of Korea, they are important clues to interpreting North Korean society.
A propaganda slogan reading ““Hurrah for the Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas” seen from the Ganghwa Island observatory / Image: Kang Dong Wan
One propaganda sign that stood out to me read: “Hurrah for the Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas.” This slogan was visible at all the North Korean villages that I could see from the observatories in Ganghwa and Gimpo. The slogan “Let’s defend our revolution with rice” that I saw at the Sino-Korean border seems to have the same meaning as the slogan, “Let’s support the Workers’ Party with rice.” Signs calling for self-reliance and for “cherishing the people” have been in place for many years.
Even just a few years ago, many propaganda slogans along the Sino-Korean border said “Hurrah for Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” Now, at the same places, they say “Hurrah for the Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas.” The signs look recently installed because their paint looks new. In short, the slogan “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas” has replaced the call for more adherence to “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” The new slogans seem to be related to the recent emphasis of Kim’s status as the country’s supreme leader and the “good fortune” the people have from him being their leader.
North Korean soldiers working on building fences on the Sino-North Korean border. / Image: Kang Dong Wan
I view this change as North Korea’s intent to strengthen Kim’s status as a leader, rather than a move to erase traces of his forebears. Like it has been in the past, the slogan “Let’s be thoroughly armed through the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” can still be found inscribed at the front of “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism revolution research centers,” which are located in all North Korean towns.
In the ten years since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, his consolidation of authority in the country has accelerated, but the lives of North Korean citizens have become more and more impoverished. With fences of high-tension power lines and trace lines (areas set up to leave tracks) being created to stop defectors, one can only guess when the winds of change will blow in this huge prison-like country.
Indeed, I was filled with doubt when I saw a slogan on a school that read “Thank you esteemed General Kim Jong Un.”
Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
4. Moon’s Inter-Korea Peace Process Deadlocked in China-US Tensions
Stuck in the middle with you.
Moon’s Inter-Korea Peace Process Deadlocked in China-US Tensions
U.S. President Joe Biden has opened the possibility of a diplomatic boycott for the Beijing Winter Olympics, potentially killing the final hope the Moon administration had to see productive results.
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South Korean President Moon Jae-in has only six months left to reactivate his peace process and bring the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un back to the negotiating table. In May 2021, the term-limited Moon will leave office. While the South Korean president is feeling a sense of urgency, however, other countries involved have little interest in pushing forward Moon’s peace process at the moment.
U.S. President Joe Biden said on November 19 that his administration is “considering” a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, due to concerns over China’s human rights violations.
Moon had been eyeing the Beijing Winter Olympics as the potential impetus for a breakthrough on restoring dialogue with North Korea. However, with Washington publicly expressing the possibility of a diplomatic boycott of the Olympics next year, Seoul’s hands are tied. It looks likely that Moon’s peace process will fall victim to rising China-U.S. tensions.
Biden held a virtual meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on November 16 to discuss the regional issues and ease tensions between the two countries. However, the meeting could not narrow the two leaders’ different views on major points of friction – especially human rights in Xinjiang and Taiwan – and the leaders did not bring up new measures on North Korea during the meeting.
Additionally, as the South Korean presidential race has kicked off, other countries see no rush in dealing with the North Korea issue. The candidates of the ruling Democratic Party and conservative People Power Party have introduced different overtures on major foreign policy issues, including North Korea and Japan. Depending on the result of the presidential election in March, there could be a major shift in Seoul’s approach, and it seems the U.S. and China are content to wait to see what happens.
Since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea has demanded that the United States make concessions and meet its demands first in order to renew nuclear talks. However, North Korea has not accepted any of the quiet suggestions from the United States, nor responded to consistent efforts from South Korea to improve the inter-Korean relations.
Kim has continued to beef up his nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea has not tested any nuclear weapons since 2017, keeping with Kim’s self-imposed moratorium, but in January at the Eighth Party Congress Kim declared that he will build a stronger military capability with more advanced weapons of smaller size.
Experts say Beijing’s role is crucial more than ever to tackle the North Korea issue, given Kim’s reluctance to even engage in talks. But China’s deteriorating relationship with the United States has caused Beijing to stand in the middle of the U.S. and North Korea’s hardball game. China has taken up the role of a bystander, not a player, on the issue.
Washington has urged Beijing to do more on the North Korea issue, as it is the largest trading partner and biggest ally of North Korea. But while Beijing has been delivering rhetorical support for Seoul’s efforts to promote peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, China has not shown a sincere willingness to fully play its role. As both Biden and Xi have more important regional issues to handle now, North Korea’s growing missile programs are unlikely to be a top priority of the two countries’ foreign policy for a while.
“The United States would not feel the necessity to actively cooperate with North Korea if Pyongyang just keeps testing short-range missiles and produces nuclear weapons silently,” Cheong Seong-chang, a senior fellow at the Sejong Institute think tank in South Korea, told The Diplomat. Cheong added that a strong will from Biden to sit down with Kim to make productive results in nuclear talks and a peace treaty would be necessary to bring Kim back to the negotiating table.
Moon has proposed an end-of-war declaration as a method to convince Kim to restore communication channels with Seoul and Washington, but Cheong is skeptical. “The end-of-war declaration cannot proceed without reaching an agreement over the denuclearization negotiation and peace treaty.”
“Rather than pushing ahead with the end-of-war declaration individually, it is desirable for the Korean government to seek consensus with the nations that participated in the Korean War on measures to move toward a substantial end-of-war declaration, even if it takes time,” Cheong said.
South Korea’s foreign affairs officials have been actively consulting with their U.S. and Japanese counterparts on a formal declaration of the end of the Korean War since Moon proposed the initiative in September. It is his final attempt to gain momentum to make the related countries – especially China and the U.S. – focus more on the North Korea issue.
The United States and South Korea have shown different stances on the timing and sequence of such a declaration, however, and with his term rapidly drawing to an end, Moon’s leverage as a mediator and negotiator is minimal.
5. Former Chinese ambassador says Beijing supports efforts for end-of-war declaration
Of course China does. It is a no brainer. Support it and when it does not come to pass, it can blame the US.
Former Chinese ambassador says Beijing supports efforts for end-of-war declaration | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 24 (Yonhap) -- The former Chinese envoy in South Korea said Wednesday Beijing supports efforts to declare a formal end to the Korean War as one of the signatories to the armistice agreement that effectively ended the 1950-53 conflict.
Qiu Guohong, who served as ambassador to Seoul from 2014 to 2019, expressed hope the end-of-war declaration, if realized, will help further reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and resume talks with North Korea.
"China supports the efforts of all the countries involved with regard to the end-of-war declaration," he said during a peace forum here. "China will continue to play a corresponding role as a party directly concerned in the armistice agreement." He stressed Beijing should participate in the move itself for the declaration.
Qiu gave a positive assessment of Pyongyang's response to President Moon Jae-in's renewed call in September to issue the declaration between the Koreas and the U.S., with the possible addition of China.
"It is expected to play a favorable role in maintaining the Korean Peninsula security situation with tensions eased today and break the impasse in negotiations and the dialogue phase," he said.
Seoul and Washington have been in consultations to draft the declaration, but uncertainty remains over whether Pyongyang would accept their offer.
In September, Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, called the declaration an "interesting" and "admirable" idea but urged Seoul to abandon its hostile policy toward Pyongyang in order to start relevant discussions.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. North Korean sentenced to death after students caught watching Squid Game
north Korea is a real life Squid Game for the people. Especially for those in the Gulags.
But money still talks in north Korea.
North Korean sentenced to death after students caught watching Squid Game
Locals say rich parents were able to bribe authorities to spare a student from punishment.
By Myungchul Lee
2021.11.23
North Korea has sentenced to death a man who smuggled and sold copies of the Netflix series “Squid Game” after authorities caught seven high school students watching the Korean-language global hit show, sources in the country told RFA.
The smuggler is said to have brought a copy of Squid Game into North Korea back from China and sold USB flash drives containing the series. Sources said his sentence would be carried out by firing squad.
A student who bought a drive received a life sentence, while six others who watched the show have been sentenced to five years hard labor, and teachers and school administrators have been fired and face banishment to work in remote mines or themselves, the sources said.
RFA reported last week that copies of the violent drama had arrived in the reclusive country despite the best efforts of authorities to keep out foreign media. They began spreading among the people on flash drives and SD cards.
Sources in that report said that the show’s dystopian world -- in which marginalized people are pitted against one another in traditional children's games for huge cash prizes and losing players are put to death -- resonates with North Koreans in risky occupations and insecure positions.
“This all started last week when a high school student secretly bought a USB flash drive containing the South Korean drama Squid Game and watched it with one of his best friends in class,” a source in law enforcement in North Hamgyong province told RFA’s Korean Service Monday.
“The friend told several other students, who became interested, and they shared the flash drive with them. They were caught by the censors in 109 Sangmu, who had received a tipoff,” said the source, referring to the government strike force that specializes in catching illegal video watchers, known officially as Surveillance Bureau Group 109.
The arrest of the seven students marks the first time that the government is applying the newly passed law on the “Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture,” in a case involving minors, according to the source.
The law, promulgated last year, carries a maximum penalty of death for watching, keeping, or distributing media from capitalist countries, particularly from South Korea and the U.S.
A scene from Squid Game. Credit: Netflix
“Residents are engulfed by anxiety, as the seven will be mercilessly interrogated until the authorities can find out how the drama was smuggled in with the border closed due to the coronavirus pandemic,” said the source.
“It means that the bloody winds of investigation and punishment will soon blow,” said the source, implying that a lengthy investigation would reveal the chain of distribution as each new person under investigation would be forced to tell where they got their copy from and who else they shared it with.
Punishments will not stop with the smuggler and students who viewed the video, however, as others with no connection to the incident will also be held responsible, according to the source.
“The government is taking this incident very seriously, saying that the students’ education was being neglected. The Central Committee dismissed the school principal, their youth secretary, and their homeroom teacher,” the source said.
“They were also expelled from the party. It is certain that they will be sent to toil in coal mines or exiled to rural parts of the country, so other school teachers are all worrying that it could happen to them too if one of their students is also caught up in the investigation,” said the source.
In the aftermath of the students getting caught, authorities began scouring markets for memory storage devices and video CDs containing foreign media, a resident of the province told RFA.
“The residents are all trembling in fear because they will be mercilessly punished for buying or selling memory storage devices, no matter how small,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“But regardless of how strict the government’s crackdown seems to be, rumors are circulating that among the seven arrested students, one with rich parents was able to avoid punishment because they bribed the authorities with U.S. $3,000,” the second source said.
“Residents are complaining that the world is unfair because if parents have money and power even their children who are sentenced to death can be released.”
This handout image Courtesy of Netflix shows a scene of South Korea's "Squid Game" Season one. Credit: AFP Photo / NETFLIX
RFA attempted to contact Netflix for comment but received no response.
An August 2019 Washington Post report documented how certain South Korean media are considered dangerous by North Korean authorities because they encourage people to escape. K-pop and American pop music has had an instrumental role in undermining North Korean propaganda, it said.
It also cited a survey of 200 North Korean escapees living in South Korea, in which 90 percent said they consumed foreign media while living in the North, with 75 percent saying they knew of someone who was punished for it.
More than 70 percent said they believed that accessing foreign media became more dangerous since Kim Jong Un took power in 2011, said the survey by South Korea’s Unification Media Group.
Squid Game is Netflix’s most watched show ever, ranked first in 94 countries and viewed in 142 million homes worldwide after only a month, according to the company’s third quarter earnings report.
The show is even more popular than those figures indicate.
RFA reported in mid-October that Squid Game was pirated on around 60 streaming sites in China, according to South Korea's ambassador to China, who asked Beijing to take action over illegal viewing.
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
7. US drive for security group expansion poses policy dilemma for Korea
But the US is also very concerned with the security of the ROK. And security of allies cannot be compartmented.
Excerpts:
With the Sino-America ties increasingly colored by competition rather than cooperation, analysts called attention to the stark reality of world politics: Pressure will build on Seoul to join Washington-led security initiatives at the expense of its ties with China.
Among the initiatives could be the AUKUS deal that the U.S., Britain and Australia announced in September to equip Australia with conventionally armed yet nuclear-powered submarines.
The U.S.' first such nuclear submarine pact since the last one with Britain 63 years ago marked a culmination of its drive to build what analysts call "minilateral" platforms with its allies.
Last week, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, an architect of the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" strategy, cast AUKUS as an "open architecture" in a sign of the U.S.' desire to bring in more partners like South Korea to join the nascent security platform.
"This part of the arrangement is meant to be an open architecture, and we expect that other countries both in Asia and Europe will participate with us, perhaps not immediately but over time," he said in a discussion hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace.
US drive for security group expansion poses policy dilemma for Korea
The Korea Times · by 2021-11-24 13:04 | Foreign Affairs · November 24, 2021
In this 2014 March file photo, U.S. marines are engaged in joint military exercise with South Korean soldiers in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province. AP-Yonhap
Be it the new nuclear submarine pact with Australia or the Quad security forum, the United States' push for expanding regional security groupings of "like-minded" countries amid a deepening Sino-U.S. rivalry is posing a tricky policy challenge to South Korea, especially months ahead of the launch of a new administration, analysts said Wednesday.
The Joe Biden administration has been striving to rally its allies and partners to weave, revitalize or flesh out trilateral or broader multilateral security networks in the face of an increasingly assertive China.
The move comes as the presidential nominees of South Korea's major parties are formulating their policy platforms for the March 9 poll to navigate the convoluted geopolitics in the midst of the great-power rivalry on security, trade, technology and other fronts.
With the Sino-America ties increasingly colored by competition rather than cooperation, analysts called attention to the stark reality of world politics: Pressure will build on Seoul to join Washington-led security initiatives at the expense of its ties with China.
Among the initiatives could be the AUKUS deal that the U.S., Britain and Australia announced in September to equip Australia with conventionally armed yet nuclear-powered submarines.
The U.S.' first such nuclear submarine pact since the last one with Britain 63 years ago marked a culmination of its drive to build what analysts call "minilateral" platforms with its allies.
Last week, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, an architect of the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" strategy, cast AUKUS as an "open architecture" in a sign of the U.S.' desire to bring in more partners like South Korea to join the nascent security platform.
"This part of the arrangement is meant to be an open architecture, and we expect that other countries both in Asia and Europe will participate with us, perhaps not immediately but over time," he said in a discussion hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace.
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai speaks during a meeting with local business leaders in Seoul, Nov. 20, in this photo provided by the Federation of Korean Industries. YonhapChina has lambasted AUKUS as a formation of a maritime "clique" and warned that it would only exacerbate an arms race in Northeast Asia and undermine global efforts against nuclear proliferation.
China's swipe at the AUKUS pact reinforced concerns that Seoul's entry into such an arrangement could risk friction with Beijing, its crucial partner for trade, tourism and, not least, efforts for enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.
A debate has already been ongoing in Seoul and Washington about the idea of South Korea joining an expanded version of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance or the Quad, which is formally named the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
The Five Eyes grouping consists of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while the Quad forum is comprised of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India.
In a joint statement after the May summit between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Biden, the allies acknowledged the "importance of open, transparent, and inclusive regional multilateralism, including the Quad."
"As the U.S. already has well-established bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan, it may want to weave a multilayered web of trilateral ― or minilateral ― security networks," Nam Chang-hee, professor of international politics at Inha University, said.
Both Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Seok-youl, the presidential nominees of the ruling Democratic Party and main opposition People Power Party, respectively, appear rather cautious, for now, about Seoul's full-fledged participation into U.S.-led security groupings, apparently with their top policy priority placed on sensitive domestic issues during the election campaign season.
Announcing his foreign policy stance in August, Lee stressed, "There is no need to limit our wiggle room by choosing either the U.S. or China."
"Making the U.S. and China choose cooperation with South Korea is an able diplomatic approach," Lee added.
In a meeting with the foreign press earlier this month, Yoon said South Korea does not need nuclear-powered submarines anytime soon in an apparent allusion to the AUKUS deal.
Yoon also noted the need for South Korea to participate in Quad working groups and cooperate with the Five Eyes alliance but stopped short of supporting Seoul's full entry into those groupings.
Washington has apparently pushed for minilateral platforms as unlike large groupings, they would make it easier for members to reach consensus swiftly and maneuver more nimbly given a higher level of cohesion expected from such small groupings, professor Nam noted.
In his article published in the U.S. Foreign Affairs magazine in January, Campbell, a key driver of Biden's Asia policy, already signaled his desire for minilateralism.
"Rather than form a grand coalition focused on every issue, the United States should pursue bespoke or ad hoc bodies focused on individual problems," he wrote. "These coalitions will be most urgent for questions of trade, technology, supply chains and standards," he added.
Whatever regional security architectures the U.S. would conceive, it might envision South Korea and Japan ― its two long-standing treaty allies ― as key players, observers said.
"In light of the potential expansion of AUKUS, the U.S. cannot help but think of South Korea and Japan, the core U.S. allies that are well-positioned to keep China in check given their geographical locations, economic and military capabilities," Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
But complicating the U.S.' efforts to get the two allies on board will be persistent historical and territorial rows between the Asian allies stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
The security front aside, the U.S. has also been trying to forge a coalition of like-minded nations for economic cooperation.
During her recent trip to Seoul, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai has reportedly pitched an Indo-Pacific economic framework related to cooperation on supply chain resiliency, digital economy, clean energy and other areas.
The framework still remains sketchy, but some observers assumed this might develop into a broader campaign to reorganize global supply chains away from China and create yet another U.S.-led partnership ― a move reminiscent of the former Donald Trump administration's drive for a similar initiative, called the Economic Prosperity Network.
After all, it boils down to the question of whether South Korea will demonstrate "strategic clarity" between the two major powers or stick to a stance of "strategic ambiguity," analysts said. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · by 2021-11-24 13:04 | Foreign Affairs · November 24, 2021
8. Chinese envoy butters up Korea, Japan ahead of Beijing Olympics
I think China's world diplomacy has undermined the credibility of its soft power. We will be able to test this hypothesis in the coming months.
Wednesday
November 24, 2021
Chinese envoy butters up Korea, Japan ahead of Beijing Olympics
Liu Xiaoming, Chinese special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs and former Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Egypt and Britain. [REUTERS]
Liu Xiaoming, Chinese special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs, stressed the importance of Chinese-Korean-Japanese trilateral ties on his Twitter account Tuesday, in what appears to part of a growing movement by Chinese officials to tone down calls to boycott the Beijing Olympics.
“China, Japan and the ROK are close neighbors & partners,” Liu wrote in his tweet. “China-Japan-ROK cooperation meets the common interests of the three countries and is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia. China attaches great importance to the trilateral cooperation.”
Liu's statement comes as talks on boycotting the Olympics over Beijing’s human rights abuses have been gathering attention in the United States and Europe.
Last week, U.S. President Joe Biden said at the White House during a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that he is considering a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics to protest China’s human rights violations.
For the same reason, the European Parliament had already voted in the summer to boycott the Beijing Winter Olympics.
The calls to boycott gained additional traction when Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai alleged in a social media posting earlier this month that she was sexually assaulted by former Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli. The post on her Weibo account was censored, as well as any other discussions of her allegations, and Peng has disappeared from the public eye since then.
Chinese officials have openly countered the boycott calls.
Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming in an interview on Monday with YTN, a local media outlet in Seoul, stressed the Olympics “should not be politicized,” adding that China is ready to welcome all sportsmen and women from around the world.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has also been emphasizing in recent press conferences that leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin will be attending the Beijing Olympics.
The international movement for a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics could be a setback for those in the Moon Jae-in government working to reach a peace initiative with the North before the remaining six months of Moon’s tenure comes to an end, including its push to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War.
The armistice agreement signed by the U.S.-led UN Command, North Korea and China on July 27, 1953, brought a complete ceasefire to hostilities until a final peaceful settlement was achieved. Thus, the two Koreas remain in a technical state of war.
The Beijing Olympics was a venue that the Moon administration was hoping to maneuver to realize some of its peace initiatives and to try to get the inter-Korean and North-U.S. dialogue back on track in the spirit of sports diplomacy, something it was able to pull off during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.
A diplomatic boycott would mean that government officials including U.S. President Biden would not attend the Beijing Olympics, though it would not prevent the athletes from competing.
BY PARK HYUN-JU, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
9. Samsung Electronics picks Taylor, Texas, for big chip investment
Wednesday
November 24, 2021
Samsung Electronics picks Taylor, Texas, for big chip investment
Texas Governor Greg Abbott, left, shakes hands with Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Kim Ki-nam at an event Tuesday where the Korean company confirmed its plan to build a $17 billion chip factory in Taylor, Texas. [YONHAP]
Samsung Electronics selected Taylor, Texas, as the location for its $17 billion U.S. chip investment, a key move in the company's battle to compete with Hsinchu, Taiwan's TSMC in the manufacturing of high-performing processors.
The deal was announced Tuesday in the United States during an event attended by Texas Gov. Greg Abbott and Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Kim Ki-nam.
Samsung Electronics plans to break ground at the site – located some 50 miles from its existing chip plant in Austin - in the first quarter of 2022 with the aim of commencing operations in the final quarter of 2024.
"As we add a new facility in Taylor, Samsung is laying the groundwork for another important chapter in our future," Kim said during the event, which was held in Austin. "With greater manufacturing capacity, we will be able to better serve the needs of our customers and contribute to the stability of the global semiconductor supply chain."
It will be the largest single investment by Samsung Electronics in the United States, according to a statement from the company.
The City of Taylor issued a statement detailing the massive spending.
“Samsung is planning on investing $17 billion in land, buildings, equipment, and other personal business property for the project, which will include $6 billion in buildings and other real property improvements, $11 billion in machinery and equipment, and the purchase of more than 1,000 acres of land for the 6 million square foot semiconductor manufacturing facility,” the statement read.
Taylor, a semi-rural area with a population of about 18,000, is known for its barbecue and has frequently been used as a site for the filming of movies.
The planned $17 billion fab is slated to become the first overseas chip plant for Samsung Electronics using advanced manufacturing techniques, like extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV), a departure from its strategy of locating higher-end chip plants in Korea.
The existing Austin factory, opened in 1996, fabricates chips primarily used in conventional home appliances. The chip manufacturer also runs production facilities in Xian, China, for memory chips, but the manufacturing process there is not considered cutting-edge and doesn’t employ EUV machines. Its most advanced semiconductors are produced in semiconductor complexes in Korea, where the company runs production lines in Pyeongtaek and Hwaseong, Gyeonggi.
“Samsung Electronics will likely manufacture upcoming 3 nanometer chips in the new factory instead of 5 nanometer chips currently in production since the company noted that the site will be used for advanced chip products,” said Jeong In-seong, a semiconductor specialist who authored a book “The Future of the Semiconductor Empire.”
“Focusing on 5 nanometer chips would not be in Samsung’s interests, given that the chip range doesn’t have a competitive edge over TSMC’s 5 nanometer chips,” he said.
The chipmaker announced last month that it will fabricate 3 nanometer chips in the first half of 2022, earlier than TSMC’s roadmap for its 3 nanometer chips.
Samsung Electronics stated in an application for tax incentives that the facility in Taylor will be used for its foundry, or contract fabrication, business and will primarily supply to large U.S. clients, including Qualcomm, Nvidia, IBM and Tesla.
The decision by Samsung Electronics marks a major win for the Biden administration, since the U.S. government is pushing to bring chip production to U.S. soil in an effort to insulate itself from a shortage of chips and possible conflict in Asia.
U.S. Senate passed the “CHIPS for America Act” earlier this year to subsidize domestic semiconductor research, design and production. At the same time, the administration has kept pressuring the chipmakers to ramp up production in the U.S. through events like the “chip summit.”
“The U.S. has used carrots and sticks for chipmakers, which prompted Samsung to make the decision,” Jeong said.
The announcement comes after months of market speculation about exactly where the plant would be located and when the company would make its decision. Another location in Texas has been under consideration, while New York state and Arizona were also mentioned.
Texas has become a leading destination for big name companies. Tesla plans to shift its headquarters from Palo Alto, California to Austin, while Hewlett Packard Enterprise and Oracle have already moved to the Lone Star State.
Intel and TSMC are making their own multi-billion dollar semiconductor investments in the United States and are slightly ahead of Samsung Electronics in getting their projects started.
Intel recently broke ground on two new chip-making plants in Arizona, projects to which it will be committing $20 billion. TSMC started construction of a $12 billion chip factory in Arizona in April and may build a chip plant in Japan jointly with Sony.
BY PARK EUN-JEE [park.eunjee@joongang.co.kr]
10. Korea faces growing pressure to join stand against China
Rather than against - I think the correct description should be standing up for values, for national interests, and for a rule based international order.
Korea faces growing pressure to join stand against China
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield / AP-YonhapBy Kang Seung-woo
Pressure appears to be mounting on Korea coalescing around the so-called democracies' movement to isolate China.
The U.S.'s Biden administration has sent and will send its senior officials to Seoul, while Britain has also invited Korea to next month's G7 foreign ministers' meeting, in which China is expected to top the agenda in the face of Beijing's increasing assertiveness.
At first glance, the longtime allies are seemingly engaged in boosting bilateral cooperation across the board, but many believe that the United States is once again urging Korea to choose Washington in its unfolding superpower rivalry with Beijing.
Korea is one of the two key Asian allies of the U.S., but it is also regarded as the weakest link among the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo security structure to contain China because Beijing is Korea's largest trading partner.
According to diplomatic sources, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield will visit here next month to participate in the so-called U.N. Peacekeeping Ministerial, slated to take place in Seoul from Dec. 7 to Dec. 8, on behalf of State Secretary Antony Blinken. She would be the third minister-level official from the Biden administration, following Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Blinken, who traveled here together in March.
While in Seoul, Thomas-Greenfield is also expected to hold meetings with senior officials from the foreign ministry, during which the China issue may be on the agenda.
During her Senate confirmation hearing in January, veteran diplomat Thomas-Greenfield called China a "strategic adversary."
"Their actions threaten our security, they threaten our values and they threaten our way of life, and they are a threat to their neighbors and they are a threat across the globe," she said at the time.
Ahead of the planned U.N. ambassador's visit, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Kritenbrink and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai visited here earlier this month.
Kritenbrink, a China expert, made a three-day trip to Korea, Nov. 10, and held meetings with senior officials from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, as well as Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs Lee Seong-ho under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the American diplomat also met with senior officials of local major business groups.
Kritenbrink's itinerary raised speculation that he may have explained Washington's push to rally allies to establish supply chains that exclude China ― a top priority of the Biden administration as part of its efforts to curb Beijing's global influence.
Tai arrived in Seoul last week, and agreed with Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo to establish new dialogue channels to enhance cooperation on supply chains and other trade issues of mutual concern.
U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai speaks during a meeting with local business leaders in Seoul, Saturday. Yonhap
In addition, she told a radio interview that the U.S.'s recent restriction on Korean chipmaker SK hynix's plan to bring advanced equipment to a Chinese factory was made out of legitimate concerns that there could be risks to national security, in terms of where this technology ends up.
Korea ― along with Australia, India, South Africa and countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ― has been invited to the G7 foreign ministers' meeting, scheduled for next month in Liverpool.
The Chinese government has seen the expansion of the G7 as an attempt to curb its global influence.
"I want us to build a worldwide network of liberty that advances freedom, democracy and enterprise and encourages like-minded countries to work together from a position of strength," British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said, raising expectations that they will discuss China's increasing clout.
The foreign ministers are expected to discuss economic resilience after the coronavirus pandemic, human rights and China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
"While surely Team Biden wants the Moon Jae-in government to be a more active part of what is clearly a growing anti-China coalition, it seems unlikely the Blue House will cave to any pressure," said Harry Kazianis, senior director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest. "The Blue House" is the English term for Cheong Wa Dae, the Korean presidential office.
Kazianis continued, "Korea must continue its difficult balancing act, trying to juggle emerging economic ties with China and a much-needed security alliance with America. That won't be easy, but it has been something President Moon thus far has excelled at."
11. Australia and South Korea losing the middle ground
Strained national strategies and strained maneuver?
Perhaps we should assess the alliance structures and relationships to determine how to provide more options for alliance partners while providing more dilemmas for those who oppose our alliances.
Australia and South Korea losing the middle ground
As China-US rivalry intensifies, US allies find national strategies strained, and room for maneuver constrained
SEOUL – As China and the United States square off across the region, what path can those middle powers that rely on Beijing for trade and Washington for security take?
This vexed issue was the subject of a webinar held on Wednesday by the Seoul branch of the New York-based Asia Society, “Australia and Korea: Middle Powers in Uncharted Waters.”
The timing was fortuitous. It had been revealed a day prior, that South Korean President Moon Jae-in would be visiting Australia late this year – the year the two countries celebrate 60 years of diplomatic relations.
Canberra and Seoul have much in common. They both fought on the same side, under US leadership, in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. They are complementary economies, with Australia a raw materials producer and South Korea a finished goods exporter.
Perhaps most critically, the two liberal democracies must juggle their security partnerships with Washington and their heavy trade reliance upon Beijing. They are doing so at a time when there is “… a perilous level of distrust between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region,” said Yvonne Kim, who directs the Seoul branch of the Asia Society.
As China’s military and economic power rises to match that of the US, Washington is increasingly leaning on its allies in terms of both economics and security. But in the latter area, Canberra and Seoul share little ground.
Anglosphere Australia has taken a confrontational approach, which has seen it upgrade regional military alliances with the US while pushing back hard against Chinese economic retaliation.
Conversely, China’s neighbor South Korea has sought to keep its head below the parapets. Seoul has declined to join China-facing alliances, even though Chinese economic blows hammered South Korean investments and exports in 2017 after the deployment of a US THAAD anti-missile battery on its soil.
But economic blows have come from another direction, too. Now Washington is pressuring South Korea not to deploy advanced semiconductor technologies to China.
Overall, this region-wide competition is eroding the ability of middle powers to act independently. If they are to retain relevance outside the spheres of the superpowers, they need to find common ground, create pragmatic linkages and speak with united voices, the experts said during the webinar.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in has sought to keep his country clear of China-US animosities. Photo: AFP
Strategic differences
While the two countries agreed in June to upgrade their relations to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” Moon and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison may struggle, during their meet in Canberra, to plot a comprehensive course on regional strategy.
“South Korea and Australia’s trajectories to deal with China are so divergent, neither will see the other as taking the correct approach,” said Jeffrey Robertson, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University College of Asia & the Pacific, and an associate professor at Seoul’s Yonsei University.
Calling these approaches “fundamentally different,” Robertson said: “South Korea is balancing interests, Australia has aligned itself with the US. Until South Koreans and Australians understand each other’s points of views and their trajectories, there is not going to be a lot of cooperation that can proceed.”
Moreover, the two countries have customarily taken opposite approaches on national defense.
“Australia has always had a forward defense policy,” a person familiar with the situation told Asia Times. “We have always tried to push our defensive lines as far from our own borders as possible.”
Hence, Canberra dispatched combat troops to join US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and under the recent AUKUS agreement, will be positioned to deploy nuclear submarines on long, wide-ranging patrols in the flashpoint South China Sea.
South Korea – after the bloody experience of the Vietnam War, where it lost more than 5,000 people in what proved to be a losing conflict – has largely pulled back its perimeter to its own frontiers, where it is aligned against North Korea.
While Seoul has taken part in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations and anti-piracy patrols in such theaters as Iraq, South Sudan and the Red Sea, it has declined to join the kinetic expeditions its alliance partner the US so frequently engages in.
And while Canberra is a member of the Chinese-facing Quad as well as the AUKUS alliance, South Korea has been extremely careful not to irk China, its then-Korean War foe and now-leading trade partner.
This means that beyond joint, multinational exercises, the countries are far from aligned in their views on the exercise of power.
“Australia has sought to impose norms and rules, South Korea has sought to balance and counterbalance,” Robertson said. “These are different conceptions of what it means to be a middle power.”
Economic conundrums
Both US allies have had to respond to Chinese trade pressures applied under the Xi Jinping administration. The related risk of decoupling, which appeared during the Donald Trump administration and has transitioned seamlessly across to the Joe Biden administration, has led to fears that the golden days of unrestricted global trade have passed.
“As open trading nations, both Korea and Australia face growing pressure to mitigate geo-economic risks associated with our dependence on foreign trade,” said Choe Wongi, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and the Asia Society’s Australia-Korea fellow. “For Korea, over 70% of GDP comes from international trade, so we are vulnerable to outside shocks.”
For an export-reliant nation, the risks of angering its leading export buyer are enormous. Perhaps due to these risks, South Korea has essentially sat tight under Chinese – and more recently, US – pressure, while deploying placatory diplomacy.
“The Korean approach so far is kind of taking a positon of strategic ambiguity,” Choe said. “The prevailing Korean approach is that this is an issue between two great powers so we should minimize the risk of entrapment.
“We Koreans have more things that we should learn from Australia than we can teach to Australians.”
But Australia’s more assertive policy has been no bed of roses. Having clearly sided with the US, it has consequently suffered far more from Chinese economic weaponizing.
“Australia has been subject to coercive economic measures, from coal to beef to barley to lobsters,” said Hayley Channer, senior policy fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre.
With economics now “meshed with security and diplomacy,” a key Australian response has been the diversification of export destinations. “When China exerted pressure on Australian coal – when China received coal from other markets – other buyers like South Korea, Japan and India sought Australian coal,” Channer said. “So that worked in a way China did not perhaps intend.”
But while these hedging measures may provide some relief, the sheer size of Beijing’s trade and investment in Australia cannot be gainsaid – meaning diversification efforts will be the work of years.
Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison has pushed back hard against Chinese economic pressures. Photo: AFP / Thomas Samson
In the meantime, the Morrison administration’s confrontation with Xi’s Beijing is stressing Australia’s national polity.
“In Western Australia, 60% of trade is with China,” Channer said. “A lot of politicians in Western Australia think the government’s approach toward China is too harsh, and we should be more accommodating.”
Western Australia has a big voice. Its resource-rich state economy is critical to the wider Australian national economy.
Social stresses have appeared, too.
Noting that some 2.5% of today’s Australians were born in China, Channer said that the community is “… feeling this period much more acutely than other Australians.” And with an elected politician having publicly asked Chinese-Australians where their allegiances lie, she added that the debate is becoming “poisoned.”
But Channer’s analysis is that Beijing’s policies will not change.
With China engaging economic means to “fulfill its strategic ambitions,” she said, “in some areas it will be successful, in other areas, it will backfire.” And even backfires can be leveraged by Beijing domestically.
“China is really focused on domestic, internal messaging,” she said. So, regardless of disruptions to trade and diplomacy “… there is a net positive effect internally, when nationalism is ramped up.”
According to surveys, only 22% of South Koreans hold a positive view of China she said – and similar negative sentiments are being recorded elsewhere. But from the viewpoint of Beijing, this may not matter.
“China wants to be feared more than it wants to be loved,” Channer assessed.
All this is putting immense pressure on brainpower in multiple capitals and boardrooms.
“A lot of countries that are overly reliant and dependent on China are needing to rethink their foreign policy and defense and economic strategies,” she warned.
Evolving great power dynamics are also putting immense pressure on middle powers in general, and Australia and South Korea in particular.
Quo vadis, middle powers?
“All middle powers have interests in containing the power of those above, and imposing order on those below,” said Robertson. But in the changing environment of China-US competition, “lots of traditional middle power tools no longer work.”
“In policy circles in South Korea, Australia is totally irrelevant,” he stated.
Indeed, South Korea’s diplomatic brain trust has traditionally focused on inter-Korean relations, as well as surrounding major rather than middle powers, Choe said: China, Japan, Russia and the United States.
“We Koreans frame the issue as we are being squeezed between two whales and we are a shall shrimp caught in the crossfire,” he said.
But South Korea’s global importance is rising. Not only does it occupy key strategic real estate, it is now a G10 economy and a critical player in the global supply chain. This means its future ability to play all sides is questionable.
“The room we can maneuver in … is getting smaller and smaller,” Choe said.
Given the multiplicity of constraints, Robertson suggested areas where South Korea could, feasibly, expand.
He noted that South Korean diplomats or policymakers in Beijing or Washington argue for the national interest on the basis of a “sole, single middle power.” To increase leverage, he suggested Seoul cast a wider diplomatic net around like-minded states and non-state actors.
“I would go round to other places, to get the support of Sweden and Norway and Canada and Australia and NGOs – then go to Washington or Beijing,” he said. “That is coalition building and innovative mid-power diplomacy.”
The lack of a community of Australia-Korea experts in both countries, building ties and establishing shared interests, is problematic the three agreed. Still, there are a wealth of areas that could be focused upon in the upcoming Moon-Morrison summit.
Channer suggested that Moon and Morrison could begin discussions on a SOFA (status of forces agreement) between Australia and South Korea, which would enable upgraded armed forces ties. Related discussions are underway between Canberra and Tokyo.
Choe noted that there is ample ground for cooperation on hydrogen power generation – a key national priority for Seoul – and defense equipment sales. He also suggested that, with Seoul-Tokyo ties now dire, Canberra could argue for Seoul’s inclusion in the multinational Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade pact.
But Moon – who leaves office next May – is visiting Canberra very late in his term. “There is a big difference in continuity between Japanese politics and South Korean presidential administrations,” Robertson said, warning that whatever papers Moon signs may well be overlooked by his successor.
“These two states are ideal diplomatic partners, but maybe not strategic partners,” he said. “Working together on global governance and regional issues – that is where the real key for the two states lie.”
12. At least 210 coronavirus cases are linked to a South Korean religious settlement.
At least 210 coronavirus cases are linked to a South Korean religious settlement.
Nearly half of the residents at the facility in the city of Cheonan tested positive for Covid, an outbreak that comes as South Korea’s case levels surge.
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People wearing face masks on a street in Seoul last week.Credit...Jeon Heon-Kyun/EPA, via Shutterstock
By
Nov. 23, 2021, 8:12 a.m. ET
South Korean officials said on Tuesday that they had shut down a religious facility in the city of Cheonan after 210 of its 427 residents tested positive for the coronavirus this week, an outbreak that comes as the country’s cases surge to record highs.
At least 191 of the settlement’s residents who contracted the virus were unvaccinated, said Lee Sunhee, the director of the infectious disease control team for Cheonan, in South Chungcheong Province. Officials did not release the name of the religious organization, citing disease control laws meant to protect privacy.
Churches around the world have been at the center of several outbreaks throughout the pandemic. In South Korea, the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, which many South Koreans consider a cult, was at the center of more than 5,000 cases that drove the country’s first virus wave. Officials have blamed the church for obstructing efforts to fight the pandemic by failing to provide a full list of its members to the government.
South Korea has since largely avoided major outbreaks and begun slowly reopening to some visitors. While cases have surged to record levels in the past two weeks, they have remained relatively low compared to much of the world: 5 daily cases per 100,000 people, compared to 29 in the United States, 36 in Singapore and 159 in Austria.
Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University. The daily average is calculated with data that was reported in the last seven days.
“The situation itself is not so bad nationwide,” said Kwon Jun-wook, deputy chief at the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency and director of the Korea National Institute of Health, last week, adding that it was “not severe enough to warrant halting the reopening.”
But officials have said the number of severe cases has imposed a burden on the country’s health system. Intensive care units have reached 77 percent capacity in and around Seoul over the past week, the director of K.D.C.A, Jeong Eun-kyeong, said on Monday, adding that the agency would continue to work on securing additional beds.
The members of the religious settlement in Cheonan lived and worshiped together. About 70 of them had participated in a large kimchi-making event on Nov. 15 and 16, said Kim Eunchong, an official in the infectious disease control division of the province’s health office.
Mr. Kim said that these cases have made the settlement the site of the largest cluster of coronavirus cases that the province has ever recorded — and some residents have yet to be tested.
13. S. Korean Conservatives Vow to Get Tougher on China
There are stark differences in foreign policy between the conservatives and the progressives.
S. Korean Conservatives Vow to Get Tougher on China
November 23, 2021 2:47 AM
SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA —
South Korea’s main conservative party is signaling it will take a firmer stance on China, and place a bigger emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy, if it wins back the presidency in a hotly contested March election.
Though the shift would likely be welcomed by the United States, which has tried to rally its Asian allies and partners to contain China, many analysts question whether South Korean conservatives would really oversee such a dramatic change.
South Korea faces a delicate balancing act with the world’s two most powerful countries. It relies on the United States, its longtime treaty ally, for protection. But it is also deeply intertwined with next-door neighbor China, its biggest trading partner.
In many important ways, Seoul has already chosen to be closer with Washington. The country’s outgoing president, Moon Jae-in, has expanded South Korea’s participation in several U.S.-led multilateral forums, including some that exclude or have criticized Beijing.
But notably, Moon has appeared reluctant to directly criticize China over issues such as its crackdown on Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement or abuse of Uighur Muslims in the western region of Xinjiang.
‘Strategic clarity’
Yoon Seok-youl, the presidential nominee of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), has hinted at a more direct approach.
In recent months, Yoon has indicated he would more explicitly align South Korea with the United States, appearing to reject the so-called “strategic ambiguity” Seoul has used to balance its relationship with Washington and Beijing.
“You have to lead the nation’s business with strategic clarity,” Yoon recently told a South Korean newspaper.
Speaking at a policy forum Monday in Seoul, Yoon called for diplomacy based on “universal values,” such as liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Yoon has shown a willingness to risk China’s ire. He has referred to the novel coronavirus, first detected in the central Chinese city of Wuhan, as the “Wuhan virus.” He has also said Chinese immigration to South Korea should have been cut off early in the pandemic.
Others in Yoon’s conservative party are even more forceful in their calls for South Korea to align itself against China.
In an interview with VOA, PPP chief Lee Jun-seok criticized the current South Korean government for “hesitating to say whether it will ally itself with the side of democracy or the enemies of democracy.”
“We must stand in support of democratic ideals — it’s a matter of essential values,” said Lee.
China suspicions
South Koreans appear increasingly wary of China’s growing strength and more combative posture.
In 2015, only 37% of South Koreans had a negative view of China, according to the Washington DC-based Pew Research Center. By 2020, that figure had more than doubled to 75%.
The turning point appears to have been 2017, when South Korea installed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) U.S. missile defense system to counter North Korea. Beijing objected, since THAAD's radar can see deep into China.
In response, China waged a painful campaign of economic retaliation, which is estimated to have cost South Korea billions of dollars.
“It was when THAAD was deployed that many South Koreans began to question whether China could be a partner or a friend,” said Lee, the conservative party chief. “People still remember that.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping is seen on screen near the slogan "The people's yearning for a better life is the goal we strive for" at the Museum of the Communist Party of China here in Beijing, China, Nov. 12, 2021.
Dependence on China
But few expect Seoul to treat Beijing as an adversary, due in large part to Chinese influence over South Korea’s economy.
So far this year, China has accounted for 26% of South Korea’s exports and 23% of its imports.
In a reminder of China’s influence, South Korean drivers this month frantically lined up to purchase urea, an additive used in diesel vehicles to reduce emissions, after China tightened exports due to an energy shortage.
South Korea relies on China for 97% of its urea. It is just one of hundreds of products in South Korea that are sourced nearly entirely from China.
“We need to be smart,” said Kim Ji-na, a research fellow at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. “Turning China into an enemy economically could seriously undermine South Korea’s national interests.”
Is there really a choice?
Yoon himself rejects any notion that Beijing is an adversary. His campaign platform calls for a “new era of cooperation” based on “mutual respect” with China.
His main rival, former provincial governor Lee Jae-myung, is expected to largely continue Moon’s foreign policy if he wins, though polls suggest Yoon has a slight lead.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a Korea specialist at King’s College London, predicts if Yoon becomes president the biggest change may be that he is simply more vocal about China.
“I think there won’t be much change in policy, in the sense that even under the current administration you have seen a hardening of attitudes (toward China),” Pacheco Pardo said.
As evidence, he cites South Korea’s participation in this year’s expanded G-7 summit, its attendance at the Quad Plus meeting on pandemic cooperation, and its expected attendance at next month’s Summit of Democracies to be held virtually at the White House. South Korea also joined a U.S.-led statement calling for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.
While the United States has repeatedly insisted it will not force its partners to choose between Washington and Beijing, some feel South Korea in many ways has essentially already taken a side.
“South Korea is a democracy, a market economy. Eighty percent of its people have a negative view of China. And 85-90% have a positive view of the alliance with the U.S.,” Pacheco Pardo said. “So I really don’t see how South Korea could make any other choice.”
Lee Juhyun contributed to this report.
14. The Life of Diplomats in North Korea
I recall a British diplomat telling us at a conference in Washington that Pyongyang is the only city that you have to leave to find out what is happening inside. He said he learned more coming to the US to talk to Korea watchers and US government and intelligence officials than he could learn in Pyongyang.
The Life of Diplomats in North Korea
Internal U.N. documents detail the burden foreign envoys face from sanctions and a stiflingly controlling government in Pyongyang.
By Colum Lynch, a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy.
NEW FOR SUBSCRIBERS: Click + to receive email alerts for new stories written by Colum Lynch
Foreign diplomats catch a view across the Demilitarized Zone into North Korea from the observation deck at Aeigibong Peace Ecopark in Gimpo, South Korea, on Oct. 5. Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images
On Sept. 12, 2011, Russia’s then-ambassador to North Korea, Valery Sukhinin, regaled a gathering of United Nations Security Council envoys with stories of the challenges of diplomatic life in Pyongyang in the age of sanctions.
The Russian Embassy, he protested, had to haul sacks of cash from Moscow and Beijing to cover its expenses and pay staff salaries, because Western banks wouldn’t approve bank transactions. Japanese carmakers, including Toyota and Mitsubishi, wary of sanctions, would not sell cars or spare parts to service the embassy’s fleet, while Volkswagen rebuffed a request to purchase a jeep for use by the Russian Consulate in a region with unpaved roads, insisting it was a banned luxury item.
“Despite appeals to two successive German ambassadors, the Russian Embassy had been unable to purchase from Mercedes an official vehicle for its Ambassador,” Sukhinin complained, according to an internal U.N. account of the meeting. “In the end, the vehicle had been purchased by the Russian Embassy in Beijing and driven across the border to Pyongyang.” The entire process, he added, took two years.
On Sept. 12, 2011, Russia’s then-ambassador to North Korea, Valery Sukhinin, regaled a gathering of United Nations Security Council envoys with stories of the challenges of diplomatic life in Pyongyang in the age of sanctions.
The Russian Embassy, he protested, had to haul sacks of cash from Moscow and Beijing to cover its expenses and pay staff salaries, because Western banks wouldn’t approve bank transactions. Japanese carmakers, including Toyota and Mitsubishi, wary of sanctions, would not sell cars or spare parts to service the embassy’s fleet, while Volkswagen rebuffed a request to purchase a jeep for use by the Russian Consulate in a region with unpaved roads, insisting it was a banned luxury item.
“Despite appeals to two successive German ambassadors, the Russian Embassy had been unable to purchase from Mercedes an official vehicle for its Ambassador,” Sukhinin complained, according to an internal U.N. account of the meeting. “In the end, the vehicle had been purchased by the Russian Embassy in Beijing and driven across the border to Pyongyang.” The entire process, he added, took two years.
For Sukhinin, the indignities were part and parcel of a system of economic penalties that have had the unintended consequence of punishing those who least deserve it, including North Korean civilians and foreign diplomats. But for his Western counterparts, including the ambassadors of Britain and Germany, sanctions exacted fewer hardships, and much of the foreign diplomatic corps could find workarounds to temper the inconvenience of sanctions. Whatever difficulties the diplomatic corps faced, according to the Europeans, were the fault of a North Korean regime that has funneled the nation’s wealth into an illicit nuclear and ballistic missile program, as well as luxuries for the ruling elite.
A few months after Sukhinin’s visit, Britain’s then-ambassador to North Korea, Karen Wolstenholme, traveled to New York, where she challenged the Russian’s account. She told a U.N. sanctions expert that while it had proved impossible to import two new vehicles through China and Japan, “it had proven easy to arrange for these to be brought from Thailand. It had taken only a few telephone calls.” But Wolstenholme also noted that erratic supply of water and electricity had forced the compound housing the British, German, and Swedish embassies to rely on a generator. The Cubans and Mongolians didn’t fare so well: Their generator had broken down entirely.
These exchanges were drawn from a trove of thousands of pages of confidential internal documents from the U.N.’s North Korea panel of experts, including travel schedules and interviews with foreign diplomats, experts, and aid workers. They reflect the ongoing battle between Russia and China on the one hand and the United States and its Western allies on the other to shape the international narrative over the benefits and pitfalls of sanctions, particularly in countries that are enduring extreme economic strains. But the documents also provide a rare snapshot into the lives of some 300 foreign diplomats posted in North Korea, including more than 100 from the Russian Embassy.
The diplomats face extraordinary hurdles in collecting even the most basic information about North Korea’s political and nuclear activities, including an effective ban on social interaction with most North Korean diplomats and government officials, strict limits on travel around the country, and a virtual prohibition on access to nuclear sites. Even a routine trip to visit a humanitarian aid project requires a government escort, inhibiting the ability of diplomats to have unmonitored discussions with aid workers and locals.
North Korea has been the target of U.N. sanctions since 2006, shortly after it tested its first nuclear device. The measures, which were initially tailored to prevent North Korea’s trade in nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, have expanded over the years, limiting trade in fuel and charcoal, and banning the import of luxury goods, even as North Korea has achieved ever-greater military advances.
The big-power squabbles over the impact of sanctions on the lives of North Koreans continue to play out in U.N. headquarters, particularly during discussions on humanitarian conditions in the country. The COVID-19 pandemic upended diplomatic life in Pyongyang, as most foreign delegations, confined to their embassies, decided to leave North Korea. But border closures and travel restrictions complicated efforts to get out of the country. This February, Russian diplomats endured an arduous 34-hour train and bus journey to the border, where they had to finish the trip on a hand-powered pump trolley.
But the kind of bureaucratic tribulations endured by the Kremlin’s man in Pyongyang a decade before were shared by others, including diplomats from Brazil, Egypt, and Pakistan. “The Brazilian Embassy in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been unable to make direct transfers from its account in Banco do Brasil (Miami branch) to its account in a local bank in the DPRK,” according to a letter from the Brazilian mission to the U.N. sanctions experts. “Transfers must be made through a Chinese bank in Beijing. In addition, the latter bank requires that the general purpose of each transfer be disclosed before the transfer is authorized to the bank in Pyongyang.”
The Syrian government complained its embassy in Pyongyang was struggling to purchase basic office equipment, including computers and photocopiers. “It is difficult to buy cars and spare parts on the local market and to find spare parts or maintenance for cars that have been bought abroad,” the Syrian mission protested in a letter to the U.N. “There are no food items on the Korean market that are likely to appeal to non-local residents.”
“The sanctions make the movement of diplomats difficult: international airlines have no offices and no flight services and there are no travel agencies and only one airline company,” the Syrian mission added. “It is not possible to find such luxury goods as, inter alia, consumer items, home furnishing necessities, or electrical and electronic appliances. Such as are available are very much more expensive.”
The anecdotes underscored the challenges of conducting diplomacy in a country that has undergone the double whammy of extreme government controls over every aspect of human life and the extensive U.N., U.S., and European sanctions, which curtail a broad range of economic activities—but not for everybody.
Western delegations posted in Pyongyang, including those of Britain, Germany, and Italy, downplayed the impact of sanctions on their diplomatic activities, instead highlighting the excessive bureaucratic constraints imposed by the government. Germany’s then-ambassador to North Korea, Gerhard Thiedemann, hosted a gathering of U.N. sanctions experts on Dec. 9, 2011, and painted a picture of diplomatic life for a Western diplomat in North Korea, where a ban on luxury goods did little to prevent North Korean elites from purchasing 18-year-old whisky at a local shop.
Western diplomats have extremely limited access to North Korean officials, who are prohibited from socializing with most foreigners; Thiedemann only met with the foreign ministry’s director of European affairs. To travel to the countryside to monitor a humanitarian aid project, the German diplomat required official authorization and a government escort. Requests to visit the North Korean nuclear facility at Yongbyon were routinely rejected. “[W]ithout a clearance and an escort, he is not even allowed to drive to the Chinese border,” according to an account of the meeting.
Life in Pyongyang also provided an opportunity to witness North Korea’s relations with other sanctioned countries, including Iran, suspected of sharing nuclear and missile technology with Pyongyang. Thiedemann noted that the Iranian ambassador was very active in Pyongyang and that he had seen quite a number of Iranians at the airport during a recent visit.
He also pointed out that the Iranian ambassador had assured him in a recent conversation, without having been asked, that Iran only cooperates with North Korea on “economic and cultural matters, and ‘certainly not’ on nuclear issues.”
Colum Lynch is a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @columlynch
15. U.S. and South Korea finalizing end of war declaration text
Perhaps it is a text of how the alliance is going to approach the issue. I remain skeptical of reports that the alliance is going to unilaterally announce the text of an end of war declaration and actually state that the war is over.
U.S. and South Korea finalizing end of war declaration text
Politico · by Alexander Ward · November 23, 2021
Presented by Lockheed Martin
PROGRAMMING NOTE: NatSec Daily will be off for Thanksgiving this Thursday and Friday but back in your inboxes — still confused by the composition of canned cranberry sauce — on Monday, Nov. 29.
The U.S. and South Korea are finalizing an end of war declaration document, but both sides remain at an impasse over how to include language about “denuclearization,” two people familiar with the talks told NatSec Daily.
The administration of South Korean President MOON JAE-IN aims to improve relations with North Korea and considers an end of war declaration — which would formally bring the Korean War of the 1950s to a close — a good first step. President JOE BIDEN’s team is working on the document in an effort to coordinate with allies ahead of still-elusive talks with North Korean officials.
The document is nearly done, the people familiar told us, supporting recent comments by South Korean Foreign Minister CHUNG EUI-YONG that discussions are “in the final stage,” adding “the format and content of the end-of-war declaration” are nearly settled.
The remaining issue is how to insert a clause about denuclearization. “It’s not so much a sticking point. Both sides agree. It’s just how to phrase it to get the DPRK to bite or at least not dismiss,” one of the people said, using the acronym for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
But agreeing on text is the easy part. The hard part is actually getting all four parties to the war — the two Koreas, the U.S. and China — to sign on. As of now, Pyongyang has shown no desire to accede.
"If [South] Korea ... restores sincerity in its words and actions and abandons its hostility, we would then be willing to resume close communication and engage in constructive discussions," KIM YO JONG, North Korean leader KIM JONG UN’s powerful sister, said in a September message.
Further complicating matters is that Moon’s term ends in May 2022, and it remains unclear if the next administration would push as hard for a declaration.
Analysts remain split on the wisdom of formally ending a war that hasn’t raged for decades. Some argue it’s an unnecessary concession to North Korea, while others insist it’s a trust-building measure that could lower tensions on the peninsula.
A senior administration official wouldn’t comment on the negotiations, but offered that “the United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK. That is why we remain prepared to engage in diplomacy with [the] DPRK.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
