Quotes of the Day:
“As we express our gratitude, we must never forget that the highest appreciation is not to utter words but to live by them.”
- John F. Kennedy in his 1963 Thanksgiving proclamation, issued before his death.
“Gratitude is a quality similar to electricity: it must be produced and discharged and used up in order to exist at all.”
- William Faulkner
Proclamation of Thanksgiving
This is the proclamation which set the precedent for America's national day of Thanksgiving.
Washington, D.C.
October 3, 1863
By the President of the United States of America.
A Proclamation.
The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies. To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God. In the midst of a civil war of unequalled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and to provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union. Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle or the ship; the axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom. No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American People. I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens. And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquillity and Union.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this Third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the Eighty-eighth.
By the President: Abraham Lincoln
William H. Seward,
Secretary of State
1. North Korea’s Push for Reunification Isn’t Just Empty Rhetoric
2. Meeting North Koreans outside the country in freedom
3. N. Korean border patrol's food provisions heavily impacted by COVID-19 border closure
4. Why Has North Korea Struggled to Normalize Trade With China?
5. Will Japan-South Korea Relations Ever Get Back on Track?
6. S. Korea-U.S. talks on OPCON transfer proceed 'very amicably': official
7. North Korea bans leather coats to stop citizens from copping leader’s iconic look
8. FM Chung says comfort women 'atrocity' should not be forgotten
9. Seoul monitoring possibility of new N.K. event marking 2017 ICBM launch
10. Lee says appeasement more effective than sanctions in dealing with N. Korea
11. South Korea longs for Trump’s focus as efforts to engage Pyongyang stall
12. U.S. Shows up Korea's Lack of Investment Strategy
13. South Korea presidential hopeful seeks closer ties with Pyongyang
14. North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: Further Evidence of 5 MWe Reactor Operations
15. The North Korea-Iran Relationship: An Anti-American Alliance or Transactional Partnership?
1. North Korea’s Push for Reunification Isn’t Just Empty Rhetoric
Important analysis on north Korea's intent on unification. I also recommend BenjaminYoung's book: Guns, Guerrillas, and the Great leader - North Korea and the Third World.
I agree with 99% of this with one cautionary note. I agree with the DIA assessment that the nKPA does not have the capability to unify Korea by force. We must not misunderstand this assessment and we must not become complacent based on this assessment. It does not mean Kim will not try. And more importantly (and dangerous) when faced with conditions that threaten the survival of the regime Kim may believe his only option is to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula by force as the means to regime survival.
Conclusion:
None of this means that Kim’s forces are likely to invade South Korea anytime soon. The regime’s reunification strategy is a long-term goal, and despite swirling rumors concerning his health, the young Kim likely has many years left to rule the country. He may be calculating that current trends are working in his favor. The regime’s only ally, China, is continuing to grow its economy and modernize its military at a break-neck pace. In the future, it’s possible that a more empowered and risk-tolerant Beijing, working with an illiberal and accommodationist president in Seoul, could lend its backing to a reunification process on terms favorable to the Kim family regime.
Would the United States go along with such a plan? That may depend on who is in the White House. Recall that the Trump administration openly considered reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea. If a similarly inclined U.S. president were to follow through on that in the future, it could further embolden Beijing and Pyongyang to carve out the peninsula as an anti-U.S. bulwark.
All of this underscores the need for U.S policymakers to ignore the caricatures of North Korea as a cartoonish and irrational country and recognize the regime for what it is: a nuclear-armed and sophisticated asymmetric threat that has never abandoned its goal of Korean reunification. That means treading with extreme caution when it comes to Moon’s efforts to formally end the Korean War. Consistent U.S. engagement on this issue should prioritize long-term stability over a short-term peace declaration that gives credibility to Pyongyang’s drive for reunification.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers a speech at a celebration of the 76th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party, in Pyongyang, Oct. 10, 2021 (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service photo via AP).
North Korea’s Push for Reunification Isn’t Just Empty Rhetoric
In the final months of his single term in office, South Korean President Moon Jae-in is making a strong push to formally end the Korean War. As part of his efforts, Moon is reportedly seeking a summit between the leaders of the four main participants in the conflict—the United States, China and the two Koreas—to coincide with the Winter Olympics in Beijing. In response, the North has signaled its openness to the proposal, provided its conditions are met.
Setting aside for a moment the policy debate over whether that would be a good idea, it is worth considering the logical end of such a peace treaty: Korean reunification. While many in the West assume reunification of the two Koreas would occur on Seoul’s terms, history and recent developments on the peninsula suggest that might not be the case. Since the Korean War ended with a truce in 1953, North Korea has never given up its goal of reunifying the peninsula on its own terms.
In July 2012, months after Kim Jong Un ascended to power in Pyongyang, a revolutionary hymn dedicated to Kim began airing on North Korean state-run media. Entitled “Onwards Toward the Final Victory,” the propaganda song’s lyrics emphasized national pride and loyalty to the Kim family regime: “Let’s go, Great Baekdu-mountain nation, by the calling of the political party. Onward, onward to the final victory.”
While foreigners may debate what “final victory” means, North Koreans know that it implies the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under Pyongyang’s red banner. Since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948, the “final victory” of reunification has been the basis of Pyongyang’s long-term strategic ambitions. Under Kim, this revolutionary idea has not faded away. On the contrary, the 37-year-old dictator has prioritized it in his public statements.
The Kim family regime’s sacred goal of reunifying the two Koreas began with the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In a letter to Joseph Stalin dated Aug. 31 of that year, North Korea’s founding leader, Kim Il Sung, wrote, “We are fully determined to fight until final victory in the battle against the Americans and the other interventionists striving to again enslave Korea.”
More than 70 years later, North Korean political elites have not abandoned this nationalistic fervor for reunification, nor has Pyongyang relinquished its claim as the sole legitimate government on the peninsula. For example, in April 2019, North Korea’s state-run media began referring to Kim Jong Un as the “Supreme Representative of all the Korean People.” A 2017 North Korean propaganda book put it bluntly: “Korea’s reunification is inevitable because, first, putting an end to domination and intervention by outside forces and reunifying the divided country into one is the aspiration and demand of all the Korean people.”
Reunification occupies a central place in North Korea’s utopian ideology of total self-reliance, known as Juche, which was first developed by Kim Il Sung. In the Kim regime’s view, the independence and national sovereignty of the Korean people can never be fully achieved unless they reunify their two countries into one ethno-state and completely remove the U.S military presence from the peninsula. Under Kim Jong Un’s rule, self-reliance has been even further reinvigorated as the ideological basis of the DPRK’s national dignity and identity.
While many in the West assume Korean reunification would occur on Seoul’s terms, history and recent developments on the peninsula suggest that might not be the case.
Importantly, Kim’s emphasis on achieving reunification is not limited to nationalistic rhetoric and ideology. North Korea’s recent military development suggests that the regime aims to do more than simply ensure its survival. Under Kim, the Korean People’s Army has emphasized the advancement of asymmetric capabilities, such as special operations forces, cyberattacks and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
According to a recently published report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the KPA does not currently have the capability to forcibly reunify the Korean Peninsula, “but Kim’s forces are developing capabilities that will provide a wider range of asymmetric options to menace and deter his regional adversaries, quickly escalate any conflict off the peninsula, and severely complicate the environment for military operations in the region.” Aside from its robust nuclear arsenal and sophisticated cyber capabilities, North Korea’s recent testing of a hypersonic missile, which would likely evade missile defense systems, could further tilt the balance of military power on the peninsula in Pyongyang’s favor.
U.S. military leaders have recently begun to take note of North Korea’s reunification strategy. As the DIA report clearly states, “The North Korean military, once considered a threat that would be confined to the 20th century, has never abandoned its ambition of dominating the peninsula and, if possible, reunifying it under Pyongyang’s rule.” A 2017 report to Congress from the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense warned that the regime’s recent rhetoric and activities suggest it “seeks to achieve a capability that goes beyond minimal deterrence to one that could provide greater freedom of action for North Korean aggression or coercion against its neighbors.” Whether U.S. policymakers will act on these reports remains to be seen, but the Pentagon appears willing to at least acknowledge the destructive nature of the Kim family regime’s end goals.
While it may seem absurd to posit that economically prosperous and culturally vibrant South Korea could ever be taken over by the totalitarian North, the prospect is not as implausible as Western observers might think. There have been increased calls in recent years from both sides of the 38th parallel to draw down U.S. troops, which could lead to a change in the status quo that ends with reunification under terms that Pyongyang finds acceptable.
Indeed, Moon’s progressive administration has shown just how deferential Seoul can be to North Korea’s sensitivities. In 2018, the government abruptly ended financial support for the U.S.-Korea Institute, a think tank affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University that was deemed “too conservative.” Then, last year, Seoul imposed a ban on the common practice of South Korean activists and defectors from the North sending leaflets across the Demilitarized Zone via balloon, drawing fierce criticism that it was violating its own citizens’ rights in order to placate Pyongyang. Whether driven by expedience or ideological convergence, such infringements of basic freedoms to advance a political agenda would be right at home in Pyongyang.
None of this means that Kim’s forces are likely to invade South Korea anytime soon. The regime’s reunification strategy is a long-term goal, and despite swirling rumors concerning his health, the young Kim likely has many years left to rule the country. He may be calculating that current trends are working in his favor. The regime’s only ally, China, is continuing to grow its economy and modernize its military at a break-neck pace. In the future, it’s possible that a more empowered and risk-tolerant Beijing, working with an illiberal and accommodationist president in Seoul, could lend its backing to a reunification process on terms favorable to the Kim family regime.
Would the United States go along with such a plan? That may depend on who is in the White House. Recall that the Trump administration openly considered reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea. If a similarly inclined U.S. president were to follow through on that in the future, it could further embolden Beijing and Pyongyang to carve out the peninsula as an anti-U.S. bulwark.
All of this underscores the need for U.S policymakers to ignore the caricatures of North Korea as a cartoonish and irrational country and recognize the regime for what it is: a nuclear-armed and sophisticated asymmetric threat that has never abandoned its goal of Korean reunification. That means treading with extreme caution when it comes to Moon’s efforts to formally end the Korean War. Consistent U.S. engagement on this issue should prioritize long-term stability over a short-term peace declaration that gives credibility to Pyongyang’s drive for reunification.
2. Meeting North Koreans outside the country in freedom
We have a lot to learn from escapees from north Korea. And we need to support more escapees.
Casey Lartigue makes an interesting argument for Korean overseas workers. Unfortunately most of them are now only working in Russia and China.
It is a complex issue. The issue is a humanitarian one due to the suffering and exploitation of the Korean people which he acknowledges. It is also an important issue because of the funds it generates that directly supports the Kim family regime and its malign activities (to include nuclear and missile development).
I think the 6 points he makes are important and useful. But for their benefits to outweigh the humanritan and illicit funding issues would mean that there needs to be a deliberate effort to build on those 6 points, make contact with Korea overseas workers and provide them with information through contact and of course help them with their "next big decision." This would take a comprehensive strategy and campaign plan along with coordination with host nations in which these Korean overseas workers are being employed and exploited. Could we develop such a strategy and plans? Yes, of course. But do we have the will to do so?
And we could do this under current conditions. We would not (and should not) have to support sanctions relief on overseas workers as the regime still continues to conduct such operations. But instead of being a money maker for the regime we could turn such operations into liabilities that undermine the regime in the short and long term.
I for one would like to see a global overseas Korean worker campaign to target these workers to achieve long term effects on the regime.
Meeting North Koreans outside the country in freedom
By Casey Lartigue Jr.
With North Korea's border closed due to COVID-19 concerns, could the world be missing an opportunity to engage and even rescue North Koreans who have been dispatched by North Korea to work or study abroad but can't return now?
"Modern slavery" is how the International Society for Human Rights describes what happens to North Koreans dispatched by the regime to work abroad. In late 2017, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the repatriation by the end of 2019 of all North Korean nationals earning income abroad.
I concede all arguments about North Korean overseas workers being exploited by the gangsters running the North (e.g., physical abuse in slave-like conditions with insufficient safety measures and confiscation of their income).
As someone working directly with North Korean refugees, however, I have observed six good reasons for welcoming North Koreans (not just workers) abroad despite that exploitation.
One, North Koreans can safely engage with people outside of the North. Lee Seo-hyun said in a speech at a Freedom Speakers International (FSI) conference that she had been brainwashed until she was intellectually challenged by a taxi driver when she was studying in China. Tourists to North Korea are unlikely to challenge North Koreans, with both sides knowing they are probably getting monitored by North Korean agents.
Two, North Koreans outside of the North have more opportunities to learn about the outside world. A few years ago, a refugee contacted me shortly after he arrived in South Korea. As a staff member at a North Korean embassy in an Asian country, he tracked people deemed to be a threat to Pyongyang. He said he kept coming across my name and a word he was unfamiliar with: "Volunteering." After he escaped, I was one of the first people he met once he was in freedom, and he was able to study with some of those volunteers.
Three, it is better for North Koreans to start their escapes from places like Malta or Poland rather than on North Korea's border evading guards with shoot-to-kill orders. It was international news when a young North Korean math whiz escaped during a trip to Hong Kong as he was participating in an international math competition. After escaping, he studied English in my organization and was a typical university student in South Korea.
Four, North Koreans living abroad begin enjoying freedom outside of the North and dread returning to the country. Thae Yong-ho was the former deputy ambassador to the North Korean embassy in the U.K. until he escaped in 2016. As a career diplomat, he could defend the regime. As a dad, he couldn't keep lying to his children. "Dad, the internet helps me with my homework, why won't our great leader let us use it?"
Thae decided he didn't want his children growing up in slavery in North Korea. This weekend, I will be moderating a forum at which he will be one of three former North Korean diplomats answering the question: "What the world should know about North Korea?"
Five, North Koreans outside of the North can interact with other North Koreans in freedom. Some refugees say North Koreans abroad are often fans and some have directly contacted them. How many people in North Korea can watch YouTube without the threat of death or even dare to contact those YouTubers or TV personalities? Some of the North Korean refugees who are public figures have counseled North Koreans abroad contemplating the next big step to complete freedom.
Six, North Koreans can tell their stories in freedom, even when their memoirs fail to measure up to the Ivy Tower standards of Western academics. A handful of North Korean refugees have published books and become public speakers.
Songmi Han, co-author with me of the forthcoming book, "Greenlight to Freedom," puts it well: "I didn't have a voice in North Korea. My friends and family will be so shocked that I am publishing a book and that others want to hear about my life even though I was starving in North Korea and I wasn't part of the elite."
Researchers, reporters and North Korea watchers look to be dazzled about the latest trends in North Korea, but the everyday stories about escaping North Korea and living in freedom can inform and inspire North Koreans in the North or living abroad.
I understand the intentions behind blocking the North Korean gangsters from exploiting the handful of North Koreans the country dispatches abroad. However, it would be preferable for North Koreans to live in freedom so they can engage in more honest discussions, learn about the outside world, get used to even limited freedom, have safer opportunities to escape, can interact with other North Koreans in freedom, and can even tell their stories to the world after they escape.
Casey Lartigue Jr. is co-author along with Songmi Han of the forthcoming book, "Greenlight to Freedom," and co-founder, along with Eunkoo Lee, of Freedom Speakers International (FSI).
3. N. Korean border patrol's food provisions heavily impacted by COVID-19 border closure
Will there be a breakdown of the three chains of control and a loss of coherency among security and military forces? If so we will need to have our contingency plans ready for execution.
Being reduced to a "pack of thieves" is a pretty strong indicator of internal instability among security forces.
N. Korean border patrol's food provisions heavily impacted by COVID-19 border closure - Daily NK
Border troops have been reduced to a “pack of thieves preying on the property of the people," a source said
By Kim Chae Hwan - 2021.11.25 9:26am
Daily NK has confirmed that the protracted closure of the Sino-North Korean border is having a major impact on food provisions to North Korean troops on the border.
Daily NK’s continuous tracking of a specific border patrol unit in Yanggang Province (left unspecified for security reasons) since the closure of the border in January of last year has determined that the troops have never received their proper daily ration of 750 grams per person.
Rations to the unit were reduced to 500 grams per person between March and September of last year. In October, they rose to 600 grams.
However, they were again reduced to 500 grams this January. Between April and August, the troops reportedly received no rations at all.
A sentry post on the Sino-North Korean border in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. / Image: Daily NK
Rations were provided in September, but they amounted to just 400 grams per person, including unhusked corn.
A source said border patrol troops responded to the situation by obtaining food from local residents where they were stationed.
This is because commanders have ordered units to use “whatever means necessary” to obtain 20 kilograms of food per officer, including rice, corn, potatoes, wheat, and barley.
The source said soldiers went to obtain food from locals, but in the end, this also led to theft and other incidents. He said border patrol troops who once had trouble-free access to food have been reduced to a “pack of thieves preying on the property of the people.”
He added that since the closure of the border, unit ration systems have collapsed to a state akin to the “Arduous March” of the 1990s. Even commanders are worrying since units are not receiving the food and daily necessities required for training ahead of December’s winter exercises.
Daily NK reported on Nov. 16 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un issued an order early in the month calling on local party organizations to take charge of feeding local military units.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
4. Why Has North Korea Struggled to Normalize Trade With China?
We cannot imagine the amount of suffering taking place inside north Korea. but it is all due to Kim Jong-un's decision making. Kim is using the excuse of COVID defense to impose greater control over the Korean people living in the north to esnure his continued reign of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Excerpts:
While the development of a PCR test and construction of quarantine facilities should help, capacity is likely to be an issue. Part of the WHO’s recent shipment of COVID-19 aid to North Korea included masks and reactive agents for tests. It is unclear what capacity North Korea has for the production of its own tests without imports of reactive agents. It is also unclear how much cargo can be moved through North Korea’s quarantine facilities with seven-day quarantines. Each of these factors, along with the inability to resume regular truck traffic, will be a constraint on North Korea’s ability to import and export goods.
North Korean officials have also recently called for better measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 along the border with China under the expectation that conditions could worsen during the winter. In essence, North Korea is looking to tighten rather than loosen its quarantine provisions, which augurs an additional constraint on trade.
North Korea has also indicated that the public may need to endure three more years of hardship due to the pandemic. This suggests that North Korea does not expect trade with China to resume to pre-pandemic levels in the near future even if border restrictions are loosened.
As long as China and North Korea utilize versions of zero COVID-19 policies to prevent domestic spread of the coronavirus, trade will continue to face disruptions. Trade for the foreseeable future will likely be limited to rail service, but still face constraints from moving goods in and out of quarantine. As a result, trade levels will not likely reach pre-pandemic levels anytime soon. Until North Korea can manage these issues through the acquisition of vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and mass testing, it will continue to struggle to normalize trade with China.
Why Has North Korea Struggled to Normalize Trade With China?
Since North Korea slammed its borders shut in the initial stage of the pandemic, it has made several motions toward resuming normal trade. None has panned out.
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According to recent reports, North Korea and China are close to resuming trade. However, this isn’t the first time since the pandemic began that reports have suggested the two sides were close to restarting trade over land routes. Each has ultimately proved a false start.
With the rest of the world having largely resumed trade over a year ago, why is North Korea struggling to normalize trade?
Prospects were looking up earlier this year. There had been multiple indications that North Korea might loosen its border restrictions to allow more trade. After bottoming out in May, trade also seemed to be increasing. For four straight months trade increased and hit a new pandemic high in September. However, trade between North Korea and China declined by 40 percent in October.
October’s decline was likely partially due to China’s own self-inflicted coal shortage, which followed a ban on Australian coal imports to punish Canberra for requesting an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19. The resulting power shortages have impacted the border region.
In addition, the spread of the Delta variant in China remains a significant drag on trade. While North Korea and China resumed regular rail service on November 1, rail service had to be suspended about a week later due to an outbreak of COVID-19 in Dandong. The lockdown in Dandong may last for a month.
In addition to the outbreak in Dandong, China is now dealing with its most significant outbreak of the Delta variant in Dalian, another major city near the North Korean border.
The harsh reality is that those four months of China-North Korea trade growth masked a more difficult year. Since the pandemic began, trade between North Korea and China has been declining, and that has continued so far in 2021.
In 2020, Chinese exports to North Korea fell by 81 percent from 2019, while North Korea’s exports to China declined by 78 percent. 2021 has not seen a recovery. Through October, imports from China had fallen from $487.5 million in 2020 to just $191.5 million this year, a 61 percent decline. North Korean exports to China didn’t fall as drastically, but were still down 21 percent through October of last year and only amounted to $35.6 million.
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We shouldn’t expect November trade numbers to be any better.
While the pandemic continues to impact trade, the primary reason North Korea and China have been unable to normalize trade is that both continue to follow zero COVID-19 policies. These include the use of strict lockdowns and tight border controls to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
In China, cities can be locked down for weeks and undergo mass testing for COVID-19. These local lockdowns have resulted in idled factories and closed transportation links that have further added to global supply chain disruptions.
North Korea has taken a similarly strict approach, but more by necessity than choice. North Korea was among the first countries to tighten its borders when the pandemic began. On January 22, Pyongyang halted tourism. Only a few days later it imposed border control measures. While in the process of shutting its border, it implemented its own emergency quarantine system on January 24.
Because North Korea did not have access to COVID-19 test kits, it extended the quarantine time for suspected infectious diseases from 14 to 30 days. North Korea initially put in place a 10-day quarantine for goods entering the country, but has reportedly reduced that to seven days as part of its effort to resume train traffic.
Similar to China, North Korea has locked down entire cities, such as Kaesong along its border with South Korea, for suspected outbreaks (although Pyongyang has yet to confirm a single case of COVID-19 within the country). It also has in place mask requirements, bans on non-state events, and restrictions on travel.
However, in some cases North Korea has taken stronger measures than China. It established a buffer zone along its border with China where troops are under order to fire on those who enter, and it is using draconian level fines and threats of being sent to a labor camp to enforce its domestic COVID-19 protocols.
The need to suspend train service so quickly after resuming it at the beginning of November illustrates the challenges in normalizing trade under a zero COVID-19 policy.
In the absence of vaccines, therapeutics to treat COVID-19, and access to robust testing, North Korea has needed to maintain strict measures and limit its trade to forms that require less human interaction such as cargo trains. This means excluding regular use of trucks, which require more human interaction and therefore pose a greater risk of spreading COVID-19.
Even getting to this point has been a challenge. Earlier this year, North Korea developed its own PCR test with WHO help, which should allow it to better track COVID-19 cases among those dealing with trade. It has also constructed quarantine facilities along its border to decontaminate goods entering the country.
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While the development of a PCR test and construction of quarantine facilities should help, capacity is likely to be an issue. Part of the WHO’s recent shipment of COVID-19 aid to North Korea included masks and reactive agents for tests. It is unclear what capacity North Korea has for the production of its own tests without imports of reactive agents. It is also unclear how much cargo can be moved through North Korea’s quarantine facilities with seven-day quarantines. Each of these factors, along with the inability to resume regular truck traffic, will be a constraint on North Korea’s ability to import and export goods.
North Korean officials have also recently called for better measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 along the border with China under the expectation that conditions could worsen during the winter. In essence, North Korea is looking to tighten rather than loosen its quarantine provisions, which augurs an additional constraint on trade.
North Korea has also indicated that the public may need to endure three more years of hardship due to the pandemic. This suggests that North Korea does not expect trade with China to resume to pre-pandemic levels in the near future even if border restrictions are loosened.
As long as China and North Korea utilize versions of zero COVID-19 policies to prevent domestic spread of the coronavirus, trade will continue to face disruptions. Trade for the foreseeable future will likely be limited to rail service, but still face constraints from moving goods in and out of quarantine. As a result, trade levels will not likely reach pre-pandemic levels anytime soon. Until North Korea can manage these issues through the acquisition of vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and mass testing, it will continue to struggle to normalize trade with China.
5. Will Japan-South Korea Relations Ever Get Back on Track?
I think ever "being on track" is relative. I hope the relations can some day get on a better track. But I am not optimistic.
Conclusion:
This is really unfortunate. Looking forward, Japan and South Korea have more shared concerns and challenges than disagreements. Their common interests include not only traditional security challenges such as North Korea and China, but also supply chain resiliency, climate change, and economic revitalization in post-pandemic era, to name a few. In particular, as strategic competition between the U.S. and China continues, it is more mutually beneficial for Japan and South Korea to get their relationship back on track.
Japan’s new prime minister, Kishida Fumio, can be a good partner for South Korea’s new president, whoever it will be, to reset their relationship. Kishida is a moderate conservative who does not have the “right wing” image that his predecessor Abe suffered from. Furthermore, Kishida, who negotiated and signed the 2015 Comfort Woman Agreement as Abe’s foreign minister, is a proponent of re-constructing Tokyo’s relationship with Seoul. Whether Kishida can find a willing partner in Seoul to reset the relationship, however, is far from clear.
Will Japan-South Korea Relations Ever Get Back on Track?
There has been a fundamental shift in the dynamics surrounding Japan-South Korea relations, with both sides hardening their approach.
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Japan’s relations with South Korea – its geographically closest neighbor and a fellow U.S. ally – have always been complicated, with almost cyclical ups and downs. The ebb and flow of the relationship is intimately related to historical grievances that have existed between the two countries since their diplomatic normalization.
Under the current Moon administration, however, the relationship has fallen to a new low. The South Korean police chief’s visit to the Liancourt Rocks – called Takeshima by Japan, which claims the islands, and known as Dokdo in Korean – while Washington was hosting the South Korean and Japanese vice foreign ministers for a trilateral consultation was the latest example of the fraught relationship. The Japanese vice foreign minister subsequently refused to hold a joint press conference in protest. The episode was a reminder that there is little hope left for improvement in Japan-South Korea relations before Moon leaves office in May 2022.
In the past, when Japan-South Korea relations hit a deadlock, many in Japan looked at South Korea’s presidential elections as an opportunity to “reset” the relationship under a new South Korean president. This has been particularly the case because many South Korean presidents, as their poll number slides toward the end of their presidency, have tapped into anti-Japanese sentiment in the country to boost their popularity. The most dramatic example was former President Lee Myung-bak who, despite a strong desire he demonstrated earlier in his tenure to move Japan-South Korea relations beyond their historical grievances, decided to visit the Liancourt Rocks in a desperate effort to prop up his poll numbers toward the end of his presidency. He was the first South Korean president to travel to the disputed islands.
In recent history, the only exception to this trend has been the now-disgraced Park Geun-hye. In the later years of her presidency, Park institutionalized the Japan-South Korea intelligence-sharing arrangement by signing General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) as well as reaching the 2015 Comfort Woman Agreement, in which the two countries agreed to a series of steps to be taken by both governments to reach a “final and irreversible” resolution of the issue. Unfortunately, Park’s political downfall, which saw her impeached in 2017, has also tarnished the decisions she made on Japan policy.
Given the historical trends, one might think the upcoming South Korean presidential election in March 2022 could serve as a chance for a reset of the relationship. However, from what has been said from the presidential candidates so far, Japan has little reason to be hopeful for such an opportunity. For instance, Lee Jae-myung, the presidential nominee of Moon’s liberal Democratic Party of Korea, said that he is opposed to a trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea alliance, even questioning, “Is Japan a friendly country which is always trustworthy?” Yoon Seok-youl, the candidate from the conservative People Power Party, also said that he would demand a “sincere apology” from Japan regarding wartime issues. In short, the two candidates seem to be competing over which of them has a more hardline position against Japan.
These statements from the two main presidential candidates are an example of a fundamental shift in the dynamics surrounding Japan-South Korea relations: Japan-related issues have been so politicized in South Korea that it is not possible for the two governments to focus on the issues of today, many of which they have shared concerns about.
There has been change on the side of Japan as well. In the past, whenever there was an anti-Japan action and/or statement from South Korea that was related to history issues, Japan used to rush to reiterate past apologies and looked for opportunities to patch up the relationship. However, Tokyo no longer feels compelled to be the first one to move to repair its relations with Seoul. “Apology fatigue” had already been strong in Japan before Moon took office, and it only got worse during the Moon administration.
This is really unfortunate. Looking forward, Japan and South Korea have more shared concerns and challenges than disagreements. Their common interests include not only traditional security challenges such as North Korea and China, but also supply chain resiliency, climate change, and economic revitalization in post-pandemic era, to name a few. In particular, as strategic competition between the U.S. and China continues, it is more mutually beneficial for Japan and South Korea to get their relationship back on track.
Japan’s new prime minister, Kishida Fumio, can be a good partner for South Korea’s new president, whoever it will be, to reset their relationship. Kishida is a moderate conservative who does not have the “right wing” image that his predecessor Abe suffered from. Furthermore, Kishida, who negotiated and signed the 2015 Comfort Woman Agreement as Abe’s foreign minister, is a proponent of re-constructing Tokyo’s relationship with Seoul. Whether Kishida can find a willing partner in Seoul to reset the relationship, however, is far from clear.
6. S. Korea-U.S. talks on OPCON transfer proceed 'very amicably': official
We will need to wait to see the results of the 53d Security Consultative Meeting and the 46th Military Committee Meeting next week.
S. Korea-U.S. talks on OPCON transfer proceed 'very amicably': official | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 25 (Yonhap) -- Talks between South Korea and the United States over the envisioned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) have been proceeding in a "very amicable" manner ahead of their annual defense ministerial talks slated for early next month, a Seoul official said Thursday.
The upbeat remarks by the defense ministry official raised hope for potential progress in the allies' consultations on the conditions-based OPCON transfer, a key topic on the agenda for the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) set to take place in Seoul on Dec. 2.
South Korea has been pushing to retake the OPCON from the U.S., but the process, including a set of tests to verify Seoul's capabilities to lead wartime operations, has slowed due to COVID-19-induced restrictions and other issues,
The allies conducted the initial operational capability (IOC) test in a three-stage program in 2019. But they have yet to complete the full operational capability (FOC) test due in large part to restrictions caused by the prolonged pandemic. The full mission capability (FMC) test is the last part of the verification program.
"Regarding the timing of the FOC test, it is a very sensitive matter, and we are conducting consultations at the last stage," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity. "Unlike the SCM last year, discussions are proceeding in a very amicable atmosphere."
The official also pointed out the issue of the OPCON transition is unlikely to be described in any negative tone in a joint statement to be issued at the close of the upcoming defense ministerial meeting.
Defense Minister Suh Wook and his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, are set to meet for the 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).
High on the agenda is expected to be the OPCON transition as well as joint efforts for the complete denuclearization and establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and for the development of the bilateral alliance in a "comprehensive and mutually beneficial" way, the ministry said.
On the eve of the SCM, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Won In-choul and his U.S. counterpart, Gen. Mark Milley, will also meet for the 46th Military Committee Meeting.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. North Korea bans leather coats to stop citizens from copping leader’s iconic look
It is a cool looking coat. But Kim does really want to be one of a kind. If I were working on an information and influence activities campaign I would be sending images of world leaders in leather coats into the north.
Excerpts:
The leather-clad officials included Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who many believe may be the next in line to lead the country, and several other powerful women, according to the source.
“So now the leather coat has become a symbol for powerful women too,” the source said.
“As leather coats began to be recognized as a symbol of power, private clothing merchants asked trading company officials to import synthetic leather since September of this year. … They copied the design of the leather coats worn by the Highest Dignity and the officials and now they are being sold in the marketplace,” said the source.
But the police in Pyongsong recently started their crackdown, confiscating the coats from sellers and people wearing them in public, according to the source.
North Korea bans leather coats to stop citizens from copping leader’s iconic look
Literal fashion police confiscate pleather trench coats from citizens who dare wear them in public.
By Hyemin Son
2021.11.24
Authorities in North Korea are cracking down on residents wearing leather trench coats, saying that it is disrespectful to emulate the fashion choices of the country’s leader Kim Jong Un, sources in the country told RFA.
Leather trench coats became popular in 2019 after Kim appeared on TV wearing one. At first, real leather coats imported from China were snapped up by rich people who could afford them, but soon garment makers began to import fake leather to make them domestically.
Soon almost every North Korean marketplace was selling them and many young men could be seen sporting faux leather slickers of their own.
To put a stop to the cheap imitations, and the cheap imitators who wear them, literal fashion police patrol the streets to confiscate the jackets from sellers and citizens sporting the look.
But another TV appearance by Kim and his cohort this year popularized the look with a new demographic, a resident of the city of Pyongsong in South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA’s Korean Service Nov. 21 on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“During the military parade at the 8th Party Congress in January of this year, the Highest Dignity and all the high-ranking officials were shown wearing leather coats also,” said the source, using an honorific term to refer to Kim.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves during a ceremony for the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang, North Korea January 14, 2021 in this photo supplied by North Korea's Central News Agency Credit: KCNA via Reuters.
The leather-clad officials included Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who many believe may be the next in line to lead the country, and several other powerful women, according to the source.
“So now the leather coat has become a symbol for powerful women too,” the source said.
“As leather coats began to be recognized as a symbol of power, private clothing merchants asked trading company officials to import synthetic leather since September of this year. … They copied the design of the leather coats worn by the Highest Dignity and the officials and now they are being sold in the marketplace,” said the source.
But the police in Pyongsong recently started their crackdown, confiscating the coats from sellers and people wearing them in public, according to the source.
“Young men protest, saying they bought the coats with their own money and there is no reason to take them away,” the source said.
“The police respond to the complaints, saying that wearing clothes designed to look like the Highest Dignity’s is an ‘impure trend to challenge the authority of the Highest Dignity.’ They instructed the public not to wear leather coats, because it is part of the party’s directive to decide who can wear them,” the source said.
Though the leather trench coat look is a recent trend, North Koreans have been wearing leather jackets since at least the early 2000s, a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA.
“That was when South Korean films began to spread in provincial cities, and the leather jacket worn by the South Korean actor Jang Dong-gun became all the rage and is still in vogue,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
South Korean actor Jang Dong-gun poses for photographers in front of his portrait in Hong Kong January 14, 2002 to promote his action movie "Friend." Credit: Reuters
“As the demand for leather jackets has increased, finished leather jackets imported from China as well as those made domestically have been sold continuously in the marketplaces,” said the second source.
Leather trench coats, however, have become more popular than leather jackets ever since Kim Jong Un’s TV appearances in cowhide, according to the second source.
“Rich entrepreneurs are able to import the fabric for the coats by placing an order with state-run trading companies who have partially resumed maritime smuggling,” the second source said.
Though North Korea and China officially stopped trading at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in January 2020, “official” smuggling, or covert trade by state run firms in items that are not allowed by U.N. and U.S. nuclear sanctions, partially resumed in April of this year.
A recent Chinese customs document obtained by RFA confirmed that North Korea imported various fabrics from China, including dozens of meters of synthetic leather this month.
“When these leather coats became popular, the law enforcement authorities went after the companies that made the coats that look too much like the Highest Dignity’s. They also go after people wearing them in public,” the second source said.
“Residents protest against the crackdown asking how there could be anything impure about the choice to wear a leather coat.”
Leather coats in North Korea are prohibitively expensive. Those made of real leather cost about 170,000 won (U.S. $34), and about 80,000 won ($16) for fake leather.
The average North Korean monthly salary in 2018 was about 4,000 won (U.S. $0.66), according to the Korea Joongang Daily, a South Korean newspaper.
Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
8. FM Chung says comfort women 'atrocity' should not be forgotten
One of the many reasons we will not see an improvement in ROK-Japan relations.
FM Chung says comfort women 'atrocity' should not be forgotten | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said Thursday the "atrocity" of wartime sexual slavery should be "never forgotten or repeated" as he touched on the tragic ordeal of the victims during Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.
Chung made the remarks in a recorded speech for the 3rd International Conference on Action with Women and Peace in Seoul, referring to his past meeting with one of the surviving victims, Lee Yong-soo.
"I felt a great responsibility to restore their honor and dignity, and make sure such an atrocity is never forgotten or repeated," the minister said.
"The sad truth is that these atrocious acts may not be just distant memories of the past but, unfortunately, an ongoing reality for many victims in many parts of the world," he added.
Chung also reiterated the importance of the "survivor-centered" approach, stressing it is the "only way" to heal the wounds of the victims and recover their honor and dignity.
"It would be immoral for the perpetrator to wish for a shameful act to be forgotten by denying the truth, even revising history or waiting for the survivors to pass away," he said.
Chung's remarks came as bilateral relations have remained strained amid a prolonged row between Seoul and Tokyo over Japan's wartime sexual slavery and forced labor, and a renewed spat over Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. Seoul monitoring possibility of new N.K. event marking 2017 ICBM launch
The regime does like to make a splash on anniversaries. Will we see something? If so, what will Kim be trying to achieve by conducting some kind of event?
Seoul monitoring possibility of new N.K. event marking 2017 ICBM launch | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is closely monitoring the possibility of North Korea holding an event celebrating its 2017 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a unification ministry official said Thursday.
North Korea's calendars began to mark Nov. 29 as an anniversary for its "rocket" development this year. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared the completion of the country's nuclear force after firing the new ICBM, the Hwasong-15, on the day in 2017.
"We are keeping monitoring signs of celebratory events or related media reports as North Korean calendars began to mark the anniversary for the first time this year," the official told reporters on background.
The North's official media outlets have yet to report on the designation of the new anniversary.
"We will continue monitoring as there hasn't been any official explanation on the anniversary," the official added.
North Korea has been forging ahead with its nuclear and missile programs as seen in its tests earlier this year of new weapons, such as a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in October.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. Lee says appeasement more effective than sanctions in dealing with N. Korea
An interesting translation of Lee's words. I wonder if there is a picture of Chamberlain next to the Korean translation of appeasement in the Korean language dictionary. I do not think the Korean word for appeasement has the same baggage as the English word.
Lee says appeasement more effective than sanctions in dealing with N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Nov. 25 (Yonhap) -- Ruling Democratic Party presidential nominee Lee Jae-myung said Thursday he believes a policy of appeasement has been more effective in dealing with North Korea than a policy of confrontation and sanctions.
The remark suggests Lee will largely inherit the policies of the Moon Jae-in administration when it comes to the ongoing effort to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
"Judging based only on the current situation, I believe the current policy of appeasement is proving to be more effective than a hard-line confrontational policy or sanctions policy," he said during a discussion with the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club.
"I think it's difficult to say with 100 percent certainty that the hard-line policy of sanctions and pressure led to as much results as hoped for by Western countries," he added.
Lee made clear that the overriding goal in Seoul's North Korea policy is to prevent another war on the peninsula and that the choice of an appeasement policy or hard-line policy will depend on the political situation at a given time.
Neither policy is always correct and both can be used in turn or simultaneously and given different weight, he said.
Lee also noted the need for both sides to keep their promises and pointed to the North's 2020 destruction of an inter-Korean liaison office as something that "should not have been done" and "a big shame."
"We have to stick to our agreements and clearly point out faults while constantly talking and communicating to find a mutually beneficial path," he said. "It will require a lot of effort but it is fully worth that time and effort."
Lee also shared his view on Japanese companies' refusal to obey the South Korean Supreme Court's 2018 ruling ordering them to compensate Koreans who were forced to work for them under Tokyo's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
"It's practically impossible to decide not to follow a ruling involving the offending companies and the civilian victims," he said. "We must find a solution that is premised on acknowledging that."
Lee claimed that the Korean victims' main aim is not to receive money but a sincere apology and that he believes any outstanding matters of compensation can easily be resolved after that.
On his own policy toward Japan, Lee said he would pursue a "two-track" approach of separating historical and territorial issues from social and economic cooperation.
He said perceptions that he is a Japan hawk are a "misunderstanding" because he personally loves the Japanese people and thinks highly of their frugality, diligence and politeness.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
Related Articles
11. South Korea longs for Trump’s focus as efforts to engage Pyongyang stall
Yes but... The problem is not Trump or Biden policy. The problem is Kim Jong-un and his failure or inability to be a responsible member of the international community.
Pew Global Indicators data show that support among South Koreans for Trump’s North Korea policy reached 78 per cent in 2019.
“Despite misgivings about Trump himself, there was strong bipartisan support for his policy of engagement with North Korea,” said Steven Denney from the University of Vienna who has analysed the data.
“There is some nostalgia in South Korea for Trump’s maximalist approach: conservatives miss his ‘maximum pressure’ approach of 2017, while progressives miss the summitry of 2018-2019,” said Wilson Center’s Terry.
“Few have any affection for President Trump personally, and they were upset over his transactional approach to the alliance with South Korea. But there is a sense that at least he tried.”
Analysts said hopes that Trump would make a breakthrough may have been illusory, but the Biden administration could not simply wish the issue away.
Victor Cha, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said: “They can’t just keep saying ‘we’re not Trump, we’re not Obama, we’ll meet any time, any place’. That’s not a policy, that’s a bumper sticker.”
South Korea longs for Trump’s focus as efforts to engage Pyongyang stall
Joe Biden’s lack of ambition in finding a diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea has left some South Koreans missing the flamboyant summitry of Donald Trump.
The Biden administration has adopted a “calibrated, practical approach” to North Korea, maintaining that it was willing to engage diplomatically without preconditions once Pyongyang was ready to do so.
But observers in Seoul and Washington say an unwillingness to spell out proposals and a lack of engagement at the highest levels indicate a desire to manage rather than solve the North Korea issue, even as Kim Jong Un enhances his missile and nuclear programmes.
“The administration wouldn’t put it like this, but their policy on North Korea is really one of benign neglect,” said Sue Mi Terry, director of the Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center in Washington and a former CIA analyst.
“They seem to have given up hope of any breakthrough, and for totally understandable reasons,” adding that the administration’s focus was on China.
When North Korea in 2017 tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the US mainland, Trump declared that he would rain down “fire and fury” on the east Asian nation.
After a period of acute tension and bellicose rhetoric that policymakers in both Seoul and Washington feared could lead to war, the two leaders met in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019. The summits upended America’s traditional approach to the Korean peninsula.
Donald Trump told North Korea he would rain down ‘fire and fury’ after Pyongyang tested an intercontinental ballistic missile © AP
Their meetings were accompanied by a series of inter-Korean summits in 2018 that produced a historic handshake between Kim and Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president, at the demarcation line dividing the two Koreas.
“There was a really stark sense of possibility, even euphoria in Seoul at the time,” said Ankit Panda, a North Korea weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Everybody thought Kim Jong Un was coming to town. There was a sense that South Korea was on the front lines of history.”
But the process collapsed at Hanoi amid disagreements over sanctions relief and the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programme. Kim has not engaged in talks since, his isolation exacerbated by the lockdown he imposed on his country in response to the coronavirus pandemic.
For Biden administration officials, the failure of Trump’s North Korea gambit justifies their low-key approach.
“We have no hostile intent toward [North Korea] and remain open to meeting with them without preconditions,” said a state department spokesperson.
“We hope the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] will respond positively to our outreach. However, to date, we have not received any substantive response from the DPRK to our offers to meet.”
A senior western government official said: “A lot of the criticism directed at the Americans is coming from people who think that the key to solving the North Korean problem is finding the magic formula that will suddenly satisfy the North Koreans.
“It’s not for the rest of us to be chasing after the North Koreans, especially when they’ve given no sign they want to come to the table — we’re not in the game of just trying to make Kim Jong Un happy.”
But the US insistence that the ball is in Kim’s court has exasperated members of the Moon administration. It has tried unsuccessfully to persuade the US to grant sanctions relief and declare a formal end to the Korean war in a bid to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.
“The American position is one of stable management, and the Korean government is losing patience,” said Moon Chung-in, chair of the Sejong Institute think-tank and a former special adviser to President Moon. “We have been urging the American government to send some positive signals; it is very natural for North Korea not to respond to empty proposals.”
A member of the South Korean president’s inner circle told the Financial Times: “The Biden administration pretends to care about our proposals, but it has not yet accommodated them.”
In September, the chair of South Korea’s ruling Democratic party said that “even though the Trump administration had many problems, the Biden administration must continue the previous administration’s policy, which sought to solve problems with North Korea through dialogue”.
Pew Global Indicators data show that support among South Koreans for Trump’s North Korea policy reached 78 per cent in 2019.
“Despite misgivings about Trump himself, there was strong bipartisan support for his policy of engagement with North Korea,” said Steven Denney from the University of Vienna who has analysed the data.
“There is some nostalgia in South Korea for Trump’s maximalist approach: conservatives miss his ‘maximum pressure’ approach of 2017, while progressives miss the summitry of 2018-2019,” said Wilson Center’s Terry.
“Few have any affection for President Trump personally, and they were upset over his transactional approach to the alliance with South Korea. But there is a sense that at least he tried.”
Analysts said hopes that Trump would make a breakthrough may have been illusory, but the Biden administration could not simply wish the issue away.
Victor Cha, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said: “They can’t just keep saying ‘we’re not Trump, we’re not Obama, we’ll meet any time, any place’. That’s not a policy, that’s a bumper sticker.”
Additional reporting by Kang Buseong
12. U.S. Shows up Korea's Lack of Investment Strategy
Interesting critique of South Korean decisions. But good for Texas and the US.
U.S. Shows up Korea's Lack of Investment Strategy
Samsung has announced that it will build a W20 trillion microchip factory in Taylor in the U.S. state of Texas, the biggest investment Samsung has made in America so far (US$1=W1,188). The White House and U.S. Department of Commerce issued statements welcoming the investment. Early this year, President Joe Biden announced plans to thwart China's ambitions to become a semiconductor powerhouse and bring global chipmakers like Samsung and Taiwan's TSMC to America. The world's largest foundry, TSMC, has already announced plans to invest in the U.S.
But Samsung's investment is not based solely on political calculations. The U.S. offered a massive carrot to attract it. The Senate passed a radical bill proposing a maximum 40-percent tax cut for businesses that build chip factories in the U.S, which is being discussed by the House of Representatives and is widely expected to pass.
According to the bill, Samsung will benefit from up to W8 trillion in tax cuts should it invest W20 trillion. It will also enjoy another W1.2 trillion in tax cut from Taylor city and Williamson Country. If Samsung built the plant in Korea, it would receive at most W2 trillion in tax benefits. The chipmaker is saving W7.2 trillion just by building the foundry in the U.S., so the choice was a no-brainer. Semiconductors account for 20 percent of Korea's total exports, but the government does not even have a strategy to keep production here.
The governor of Texas thanked Samsung repeatedly, saying the investment "will have an impact not only in Texas, but around the world." It is expected to create more than 2,000 high-tech jobs, thousands of indirect jobs and at least 6,500 construction worker positions. The world's biggest economy has pulled out all the stops to attract businesses and create jobs. In contrast, the Moon Jae-in administration has never tried to convince a foreign business to invest here or a Korean business to keep production at home by offering any incentives. Instead, the president has created a paradise for militant unionists.
13. South Korea presidential hopeful seeks closer ties with Pyongyang
I wonder how much this will really resonate with the majority of Koreans in the South.
Of course Kim Jong-un has a vote on this.
South Korea presidential hopeful seeks closer ties with Pyongyang
Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung said Thursday that he would pursue a pragmatic approach toward North Korea that favors economic cooperation and targeted sanctions relief. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI
SEOUL, Nov. 25 (UPI) -- Lee Jae-myung, the liberal party candidate in March's South Korean presidential election, said Thursday that Seoul should take the lead in inter-Korean affairs and reset relations with the nuclear-armed North around engagement and economic cooperation.
Lee, the nominee for the incumbent Democratic Party, echoed many of the positions of current President Moon Jae-in, but said that he would bring Seoul, rather than Washington, into the driver's seat on North Korea policy.
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"In succeeding the Moon Jae-in administration, the Lee Jae-myung government should act as a more independent and active mediator and problem-solver," Lee told international reporters at a briefing in downtown Seoul.
Lee, 56, said that while inter-Korean security is one of many topics on Washington's foreign policy agenda, it is an existential issue for those living in North and South Korea.
"For the people living on the Korean Peninsula, it's a matter directly related to our future and our very lives," he said.
Lee pledged to actively work with North Korea on humanitarian, health and environmental issues as president.
He also said he would try to drum up international support for targeted sanctions relief, questioning the effectiveness of the hardline stance that has been a cornerstone of Washington's approach towards Pyongyang.
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"Have strong policies of continued sanctions and pressure had the results that the Western countries have wanted and intended?" he asked. "I think it's difficult to say with 100% conviction that it has worked."
Lee added that he would take a practical approach when navigating the growing strategic competition between the United States and China.
"I will pursue pragmatic diplomacy that goes beyond the logic of ideology and forced choices, putting [South Korea's] national interests first," he said.
Lee's foreign policy positions offer a contrast to his opponent, conservative People Power Party candidate Yoon Seok-youl, who has said that he would work to strengthen defense ties with the United States and has vowed to take a no-compromise approach towards denuclearizing Pyongyang.
For voters in South Korea, domestic issues look to dominate the upcoming election, with soaring real estate prices, growing income inequality and the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic weighing down the incumbent Democratic Party.
Lee rose to national fame as a progressive firebrand, first as the mayor of Seongnam, a satellite city of Seoul, and then as governor of Gyeonggi Province, building a reputation as a hard-charging populist who was able to implement some of the country's most ambitious social welfare programs.
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In Gyeonggi, South Korea's largest province, Lee launched a pilot basic income program for young adults that he was able to expand to all citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The candidate has said he will implement universal basic income in South Korea as president and will use other large-scale government programs and reforms to tackle inequality.
A former human rights lawyer, Lee grew up in poverty and rose through the political ranks as an outsider, a status that might help him maintain distance from the anti-incumbent sentiment many voters have expressed.
At the same time, Lee continues to be dogged by allegations that he was connected to a corrupt real-estate development project in Seongnam while he was mayor. Yoon, the former prosecutor-general, is facing his own corruption probe over abuse of power and election-meddling charges.
Yoon surged to a large lead in opinion polls earlier this month after winning his party's nomination, but Lee has closed the gap over the past week.
In a recent Gallup Korea poll, Yoon led Lee by a margin of 38.4% to 37.1%. Another survey by local pollster Korea Society Opinion Institute found 40% of respondents supporting Yoon and 39.5% backing Lee.
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14. North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: Further Evidence of 5 MWe Reactor Operations
North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: Further Evidence of 5 MWe Reactor Operations
Commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center from November 24 provides further evidence that the 5 MWe Reactor is operating. Steam is emanating from the reactor’s generator hall, indicating that at least one of the generators is running. Additionally, water continues to be discharged from the auxiliary pipe into the channel leading to the Kuryong River. The 5 MWe Reactor can produce up to six kg of plutonium per year, although it appeared to be shut down from 2018 until recent months. This new activity is notable since resumption of plutonium production is likely needed to accomplish the ambitious goals for further nuclear weapons development announced at the Eighth Party Congress earlier this year.[1]
Construction of the new building south of the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) continues, although there are no signs of operations starting at the ELWR.
Figure 1. Steam emanating from generator hall at 5 MWe Reactor.
Satellite image © 2021 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2. Continued construction of new building near ELWR.
Satellite image © 2021 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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15. The North Korea-Iran Relationship: An Anti-American Alliance or Transactional Partnership?
This is too often overlooked.
It is interesting that north Korea is at the nexus of the revisionist powers (China and Russia) and connected to a fellow rogue power (Iran). And its proliferation of weapons and training to conflict areas around the world has at least an indirect benefit to violent non-state actors. We must never underestimate the malign activities of the regime or geographically limit the north Korean problem to the peninsula and KTO.
The North Korea-Iran Relationship: An Anti-American Alliance or Transactional Partnership?
Four decades after the Iranian Revolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) maintains a close partnership with Iran. On June 20, 2021, North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un congratulated Ebrahim Raisi on his presidential election victory and wished him success in “building a powerful Iran.” This rhetoric coincided with evidence of growing security cooperation between the two countries. A recent United Nations (UN) report revealed that North Korea and Iran are cooperating on long-term missile development projects, which included the shipment of parts in 2020. North Korea’s hypersonic missile tests have also raised concerns about technology transfers to Iran, which developed a testing facility for hypersonic weapons in 2014.
Although North Korea’s partnership with Iran is often explained by shared anti-American sentiments, the Tehran-Pyongyang relationship is more complicated than it appears. While their relationship appears unassailably strong, the Iran-DPRK partnership has been beset by periodic disagreements, and North Korea remains a wedge issue between Iranian reformists and conservatives. The main areas of Iran-DPRK cooperation lie in the spheres of military technology, especially ballistic missiles, and in Pyongyang’s close relationship with Tehran-aligned proxy militias in the Middle East. Therefore, Iran and North Korea possess a transactional partnership, which can threaten US interests but is also prone to considerable fluctuations.
DPRK-Iran Relations Since 1979: A Close but Intermittent Partnership
Although Iran established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1973, the Iranian Revolution resulted in a rapid expansion of Tehran-Pyongyang cooperation. After the Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980, North Korea transferred Soviet T-54/T-55 tanks, ammunition and Chinese-made equipment to Iran. These arms transfers peaked from 1981-1983 but diminished during the second half of the war due to quality concerns. During the latter stages of the conflict, North Korea acted as a deniable conduit for Soviet and Chinese military equipment, such as anti-shipping missiles, and after Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s 1985 visit to Pyongyang, North Korean military-technical advisors arrived in Iran. In November 1990, North Korea’s Defense Minister Marshall O Jin U met with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) head Mohsen Rezai in Tehran and authorized the sale of 500-km Scud-C missiles to Iran.
This paved the way for greater Iran-DPRK cooperation in the ballistic missile sphere and established new bonds between the two countries. Solidarity between both countries against US sanctions, which was highlighted by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s August 2018 visit to Iran and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s April 2019 pledge to visit Pyongyang, has not rebooted bilateral trade for several underlying reasons. The legacy of North Korea’s efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq during the 1980s created latent mistrust with Iran. North Korea’s aversion to military interventions against Sunni extremist organizations, such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State (ISIS), clashed with Iran’s hawkish policies towards these groups.
The depth of Tehran-Pyongyang cooperation has been limited by disagreements between Iranian factions. Hardline media outlets, such as Kayhan, routinely blame the US for escalating tensions with North Korea and uncritically amplify content from North Korean state media outlets, such as Rodong Sinmun. However, these hardline views have not been consistently embraced by moderate figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani or Javad Zarif, as Iran has assiduously maintained close relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Even the September 2019 clash between Tehran and Seoul over the freezing of $7 billion in Iranian assets held by South Korean banks did not cause Tehran to choose Pyongyang over Seoul or expand its cooperation with Pyongyang. Given these contradictions, the Iran-DPRK partnership is not an all-weather, anti-American axis, as is often depicted, but is instead transactional and prone to major inconsistencies.
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Cooperation With Iran
Since its initial tranche of arms sales to Iran during the 1980s, North Korea has cooperated closely with Iran on ballistic missile development. Although China and Iran signed a 10-year military cooperation agreement in 1991, North Korea became a major supplier of missile technology to Tehran during the 1990s. In 1995, North Korea shipped Scud transporter-erector-launchers to Iran, and in November 1999, US intelligence investigated the transfer of 12 Nodong missile engines from North Korea to Iran. Despite stringent UN sanctions against North Korea, which were imposed after its 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests, the North’s ballistic missile cooperation with Iran continued at a rapid pace. A May 2011 UN report revealed regular flights between North Korea and Iran, which transferred missile-related equipment. These flights were chartered by civilian airlines, such as North Korea’s Air Koryo and Iran Air, and passed through China’s airspace.
These war materiel transfers reflected Iran’s enduring interest in North Korean military technology. During the 2000s, Iran purchased North Korea’s Musudan system to complement its Nodong stockpiles, and the Iranian Navy’s Ghadir-class submarines, which were unveiled in 2007, were inspired by North Korean prototypes. North Korea also assisted Iran’s development of an 80-ton rocket booster for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
A 2016 Congressional Research Service report warned that ballistic missile technology cooperation between Iran and North Korea is “significant and meaningful.” These revelations culminated in US Treasury Department sanctions in 2016 against Iranian entities that cooperated with North Korea. While evidence of these shipments diminished from 2016-2019, Iran’s Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center received “support and assistance” from North Korean missile specialists for a space launch vehicle (SLV) in 2020.
While North Korea’s missile technology assistance to Iran garnered more attention, these transfers of military know-how eventually went both ways. Iranian technicians were present at North Korea’s 2009 and 2012 Unha rocket launches. In October 2010, North Korea unveiled a new Nodong missile warhead that strikingly resembled Iran’s Shahab-3 triconic warhead. The Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), a subsidiary of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, sent technicians to North Korea in exchange for valves, electronics and measuring equipment used for ballistic missiles. SHIG’s relationship with the sanctioned Korea Mining Development Trading Company (KOMID) was also announced by the US Treasury Department in January 2016. Therefore, the September 2012 Iran-DPRK military-technical agreement could have considerable practical significance for both Tehran and Pyongyang.
The well-documented record of DPRK-Iran ballistic missile cooperation has fueled periodic concerns about Pyongyang’s assistance to Tehran’s nuclear program. North Korea’s assistance in constructing Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor, which was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in September 2007, is a potential prototype for future assistance to Iran. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a dissident group that exposed Iran’s Natanz facility in 2002, alleged that North Korean nuclear scientists visited Iran in 2015. While the intensification of Iran’s uranium enrichment since the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 could lead to greater cooperation with North Korea, there is insufficient evidence of large-scale collaboration between the two countries in the nuclear sphere.
North Korea’s Partnerships With Iran-aligned Proxy Militias
Due to their shared antipathy towards Israel and support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, North Korea and Iran maintain cordial relations with Shia proxy militias in the Middle East. North Korea’s cooperation with Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen is especially close. Concerns about North Korea’s cooperation with Hezbollah date back to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, which saw the Lebanese militia group withstand intense Israeli bombardments. While North Korea had informally established contact with Hezbollah in the 1980s, it embarked on an ambitious military training program in 2000, which taught Hezbollah how to build underground bunkers for arms, food and medical facilities. In December 2007, the Congressional Research Service lent credibility to these reports, as it listed Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers as key destinations of North Korean military assistance.
Concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Hezbollah subsided after the US announced North Korea’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list in June 2008. While Israel accused North Korea of supplying Hezbollah and Hamas after the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-detained ANL-Australia arms cache was discovered in July 2009, US officials insisted the supplies were only destined for Hamas. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 revived these concerns in the US and Israel. According to US intelligence reports, North Korean engineers helped manage missile plants in Syrian bases, such as Hama, Adra and Barzah, which possessed large concentrations of Hezbollah fighters. North Korea has also been accused of helping Iran construct Hezbollah’s “Land of Tunnels,” which stretch from its headquarters in Beirut to its defensive positions in southern Lebanon.
North Korea’s military cooperation with the Houthis is less extensive and likely confined to clandestine arms transfers. In August 2015, South Korean television network Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) asserted that Houthi missiles used against Saudi Arabia in June closely resembled Scud-C or Hwasong-6 missiles used in past North Korean military parades. An August 2018 UN report revealed that KOMID was trying to supply conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthis. While the scale of North Korean arms transfers to the Houthis is unknown, Syrian arms dealer Hussein al-Ali served as an interlocutor between Pyongyang and the Houthis.
Conclusion
As Ebrahim Raisi’s ascension to the presidency emboldens hardliners within Iran’s foreign policy establishment and the JCPOA negotiations remain stalled, prospects for Iran-DPRK cooperation are bright. US policymakers should pay close attention to the conversion of rhetorical solidarity between Iran and North Korea into collaboration in the ballistic missile production sphere. However, the Iran-North Korea partnership’s inconsistencies and transactional dimensions suggest that it is not bulletproof. Greater US engagement with Iran, which leads to the restoration of the JCPOA and the amelioration of sanctions, could deter Tehran from expansive military cooperation with Pyongyang. An improvement in ROK-Iran relations, which are strained by $7 billion in frozen Iranian funds in two South Korean banks, could also dilute DPRK-Iran cooperation. In the short term, however, concurrent US efforts to isolate Iran and North Korea will likely preserve the Pyongyang-Tehran partnership.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
