Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Those proficient praise no one, blame no one, and accuse no one. They say nothing concerning their self as being anybody or knowing anything."

– Epictetus

"The ultimate choice for a man, inasmuch as he is driven to transcend himself, is to create or to destroy, to love or to hate."

– Erich Fromm

"The greatest challenge to any thinker is stating the problem in a way that will allow a solution."

– Bertrand Russell

1. How the U.S. Drafted a Russia-Friendly Peace Plan for Ukraine

2. Top Army Official Meets Russians in U.A.E., Signaling New Phase in Peace Talks

3. Pentagon Officials Begin ‘Grooming’ Army Secretary Dan Driscoll as Talk Grows Pete Hegseth Will Get the Boot Early Next Year

4. Opinion | What a Good Ukraine Peace Looks Like

5. Trump–Xi and Strategic Recalibration

6. Irregular Whorefare: How the CCP Turned Influence Into a Transactional Art

7. China’s Xi Rewrites History

8. CRINK in 10 Charts

9. China’s Xi Calls Trump in Unusual Move to Discuss Taiwan, Ukraine

10. Battle for Ukraine splits Trump’s top team

11. The Human Algorithm: Why Disinformation Outruns Truth and What It Means for Our Future

12. Taiwan Has Reached Its Tipping Point

13. Russian Disinformation Comes to Mexico, Seeking to Rupture U.S. Ties

14. Xi Jinping pledges support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro

15. Space-Guided Supremacy: How China’s Satellite Systems Strengthen its Missile and Hypersonic Forces

16. Aid Policy in East Africa Needs an Endgame

17. Book Review | Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice

18. Drones Aren’t Antithetical to Maneuver Warfare—They’re the Key to Unleashing its Effectiveness

19. A 15-Point Plan to Get to a Ukrainian-Russian Settlement

20. A Historic Resolution, an Unworkable Plan: The Uncertain Future of Gaza’s New Mandate

21. Moscow’s Offshore Menace

22. How Xi Played Trump

1. How the U.S. Drafted a Russia-Friendly Peace Plan for Ukraine

Summary:

POTUS ordered envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to draft a Ukraine peace plan that drew heavily on input from Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev, producing a Russia-leaning 28-point framework. After leaks sparked outrage in Europe and Congress, officials rushed to revise terms in talks with Kyiv and allies this week.

Comment: I do not know this but I would guess that Kirill Dmitriev speaks near perfect or at least very good English. We are always swayed by foreigners who speak English well.

How the U.S. Drafted a Russia-Friendly Peace Plan for Ukraine

WSJ

Crucial input from a Kremlin confidant influenced the document that for a week roiled relations among the U.S., Ukraine and Europe

By Robbie Gramer

Follow, Alexander Ward

Followand Lara Seligman

Nov. 24, 2025 7:22 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-us-peace-plan-kremlin-f144d498?mod=hp_lead_pos2

President Trump ordered a plan to end the Ukraine war, leading to a 28-point peace framework drafted by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
The initial plan, influenced by Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev, favored Russia, causing concern among European governments and U.S. lawmakers.
Following backlash, top Trump officials met with Ukrainian counterparts in Geneva to draft a revised version of the peace deal that would be more acceptable to Kyiv.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

President Trump ordered a plan to end the Ukraine war, leading to a 28-point peace framework drafted by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

WASHINGTON—It started with an October order from President Trump to his national security team: Come up with a plan to end the Ukraine war just as they had halted the fighting in Gaza.

On a flight back from the Middle East, in the afterglow of brokering a deal between Israel and Hamas, envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner began writing the first draft of what would eventually become a 28-point peace framework to end the four-year war, according to U.S. officials and a person familiar with the situation.

Witkoff and Kushner’s monthlong effort to draft the proposal relied on input from a Kremlin insider who held secret meetings with the aides in Miami, U.S. officials and people familiar with the matter said. A senior Ukrainian official also organized at least two calls with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, officials said.

But when the plan leaked last week, its terms were weighted in the Kremlin’s favor, shocking European governments and Kyiv’s supporters in Congress and sparking a multiday trans-Atlantic crisis for the Trump administration.

U.S. officials said the plan reflected a good-faith attempt by Witkoff and Kushner to gain the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has rebuffed repeated attempts by the White House to halt the fighting in Ukraine, without abandoning Kyiv.

“The idea that the United States of America isn’t engaging with both sides equally in this war to bring it to an end is a complete and total fallacy,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters Monday.

The Russian input came from Kirill Dmitriev, a Kremlin envoy with close ties to Putin who also has a longstanding relationship with Kushner. They brought him to Miami the weekend before Halloween for what would be three days of intensive discussions over dinner and extended conversation at Witkoff’s home, according to U.S. officials and people familiar with the matter.

Kirill Dmitriev, in blue tie, a Kremlin envoy who offered input for the peace plan, with Steve Witkoff in Russia in April. Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Kremlin/Reuters

The three men had similar views on what a proposal should look like, though Dmitriev had far more specific ideas in mind, officials said.

Witkoff, through conversations with U.S. and foreign officials and reading intelligence assessments, concluded that Ukraine was in the weaker position militarily, officials said.

Despite absorbing Russia’s all-out invasion in February 2022 and forcing it to fight at great cost for small territorial gains, Ukraine is still at a disadvantage, the officials said. It would need to concede more than Moscow in a peace deal to have any hope of getting the Kremlin to halt the war.

Echoing longstanding Kremlin demands, Dmitriev insisted Ukraine could never join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should withdraw completely from the Donbas region and other territory wanted by Russia. Ukraine’s military, he suggested, should be capped at a figure far lower than its current 900,000-strong force.

Appealing to Trump’s eagerness to expand U.S.-Russia economic ties, Dmitriev suggested that the U.S. and Russia should sign economic agreements in the areas of artificial intelligence, energy and much more.

Dmitriev didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky ozan kose/AFP/Getty Images

When Witkoff and Kushner invited Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s national security adviser, to Miami to show him the plan, he told them bluntly it was a better deal for Russia than Ukraine, people familiar with the matter said. He recommended getting Zelensky on the phone to brief him.

On Nov. 16, Kushner and Witkoff walked the Ukrainian president through the 28-point plan, people familiar with the matter said. Zelensky thanked them—and Trump—for their efforts to broker a peace deal. He promised to get back to them with his thoughts, saying it needed work. Zelensky held a second call with Umerov and Witkoff that weekend, a person familiar with the matter said.

“We continuously conduct consultations, and we are grateful to the United States for listening to us, supporting us and discussing all aspects with us,” Umerov said in a statement.

A majority of the plan’s provisions were written by Witkoff and Kushner before they consulted Russian and Ukrainian representatives, a person familiar with its drafting said.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio was handed a copy of the plan at the White House during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Nov. 18 visit to Washington, a person familiar with the situation said. Axios reported the draft’s existence that evening. Rubio was aware of the Witkoff-Kushner initiative but didn’t know the full scope of what they had drafted before then, officials said.

A separate U.S. initiative to break the diplomatic deadlock between Ukraine and Russia that was already under way shifted to include the newly drafted plan.

Ukrainian servicemen traveling near the front line town of Pokrovsk in the country’s Donetsk region this month. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

A residential building in Kyiv was damaged earlier this month in a Russian drone and missile strike. Alina Smutko/Reuters

Sent by the White House, U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll arrived in Kyiv on Nov. 19 to discuss defense issues and the prospects for a peace with Russia. After a flurry of phone calls with Vice President JD Vance and other officials, Driscoll received approval to brief Ukrainian defense officials on a version of the U.S. plan, including Zelensky the following day.

Driscoll also issued a reminder: The White House had cut off intelligence and weapons assistance to Ukraine months earlier before resuming the aid, insinuating Trump could do it again if Kyiv balked at reaching a peace deal, U.S. and Ukrainian officials said.

With the details of the plan out in the open, the White House faced a sudden crisis over the one-sided terms. Rubio fielded calls from irate European officials and lawmakers, officials said.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Steve Witkoff met with a Ukrainian delegation in Geneva over the weekend about a U.S. plan to end the war. Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images

Sen. Angus King of Maine, an independent who serves on the intelligence committee, texted Rubio on Saturday morning voicing his concern and confusion about the plan. Rubio also called King and then two other senators at a security conference in Halifax, Canada—Sens. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican Mike Rounds of South Dakota.

The lawmakers told reporters at the conference that Rubio told them that the initial draft was influenced by a Russian without naming Dmitriev. He told other lawmakers that the plan included elements from Umerov and other Ukrainian officials.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tells an international summit that it is a ‘critical moment’ for Ukraine as U.S. peace plan negotiations advance. Photo: POU/Zuma Press

Rubio disputed the lawmakers’ claim. “The peace proposal was authored by the U.S.,” he said in a statement, adding, “It is based on input from the Russian side. But it is also based on previous and ongoing input from Ukraine.”

Rubio, Witkoff and Kushner hastily arranged a meeting with Ukrainian and European officials in Geneva and agreed to changes in the plan to make it more acceptable to Kyiv, including a higher cap on the size of Ukraine’s military and removal of language barring it from membership in NATO. Officials promise the final peace plan will secure Ukraine’s core objectives.

Even Trump seems optimistic. “Is it really possible that big progress is being made in Peace Talks between Russia and Ukraine???,” he posted Monday on social media. “Don’t believe it until you see it, but something good just may be happening.”

Write to Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

WSJ

2. Top Army Official Meets Russians in U.A.E., Signaling New Phase in Peace Talks

Summary:

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, tapped by POTUS as an unconventional envoy, meets Russian officials in Abu Dhabi to push a modified Ukraine peace plan. After backlash to an earlier Russia-leaning framework, he refines terms with Kyiv and European partners, signaling a new, more direct phase of negotiations for peace there.

Comment: Seems unusual for the SECARMY to be involved in such negotiations - yes I think he is an unconventional envoy. But POTUS is the master of unconventional diplomacy so I guess this fits. But I think he also chooses those who he thinks can get the job done, regardless of their position or title.

Top Army Official Meets Russians in U.A.E., Signaling New Phase in Peace Talks

WSJ

By Lara Seligman

Nov. 25, 2025 2:36 am ET

Driscoll continues in his unexpected diplomatic role

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/top-army-official-meets-russians-in-u-a-e-signaling-new-phase-in-peace-talks-c72f0bf1

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll has traveled to Kyiv, Geneva and Abu Dhabi for peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine war. Michael Brochstein/Zuma Press

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll met with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi to advance talks to end the war in Ukraine.
Driscoll presented a modified peace proposal, refined in Kyiv and Geneva, to the Russian delegation.
The initial 28-point plan caused anxiety over concessions to Russia, including territorial cessions and NATO restrictions.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll met with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi to advance talks to end the war in Ukraine.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll met with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi on Monday and Tuesday, a sign that talks to end the war in Ukraine have hit a new phase involving direct negotiations with the Russians.

Driscoll, fresh off peace talks in Kyiv and Geneva with Ukrainian officials, landed in Abu Dhabi on Monday to meet with the Russians, according to U.S. officials. After holding initial meetings, he planned to conduct more substantive engagements with the delegation on Tuesday, the officials said.

Trump’s decision to turn to the civilian head of the Army, whose job is normally focused on training and equipping soldiers, to try to revive the stalled talks was driven by the belief that Kyiv and Moscow might be more open to military-brokered negotiations, according to the officials.

Senior U.S. Army leaders have maintained close relations with their Ukrainian counterparts throughout the four-year war; meanwhile U.S. officials think Moscow might have more respect for U.S. military leaders.

“President Trump appreciates Secretary Driscoll’s efforts to gather input from both the Russians and the Ukrainians in order to craft a deal that secures a durable and enforceable peace,” said White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly.

Driscoll’s travels to Kyiv last week vaulted the Army secretary, a friend and former Yale Law classmate of Vice President JD Vance, into an unexpected diplomatic role not normally held by a civilian head of a military branch.

Driscoll is well-liked in the administration; Trump called him a “killer” in an Oval Office announcement that he was deploying the National Guard to Memphis, and refers to him as “the drone guy,” a nod to Driscoll’s focus on fielding a million new drones for the Army.

Driscoll planned to present the Russians with a modified peace proposal—initially based on a leaked 28-point plan advanced by the U.S.—that emerged from negotiations with senior Ukrainian military and government officials in Kyiv and Geneva over the weekend, the officials said. The White House said those talks Sunday had resulted in an “updated and refined peace framework” but acknowledged that work still remained to reach a final agreement.

Negotiators in Geneva on Sunday were able to “fine-tune” the 28-point plan, and now there are a few remaining points of disagreement officials continue to work through, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Monday.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky across from Army Secretary Dan Driscoll during talks last week in Kyiv. Ukrainian Presidential Office/AP

Driscoll’s arrival in Abu Dhabi is the latest wrinkle in the Trump administration’s effort to revive peace talks. Trump sent Driscoll to Kyiv last Wednesday to kick-start the talks, with an initial directive to speak to the Ukrainians about how the U.S. Army could support Kyiv in a new round of negotiations.

But as Driscoll boarded an overnight train from Poland, a media leak disclosed that U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff had been working with the Russians on the 28-point plan that would hand major concessions to Moscow.

After phone calls with Witkoff and Vance, Driscoll described the 28-point plan to Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv as a jumping-off point for negotiations, the officials said. The result of those talks was a modified version of the plan, which Driscoll presented directly to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in an hour-long meeting on Thursday.

The hectic and quick-changing nature of the talks continued late in the week. Driscoll had tentatively planned to fly to London after Kyiv to continue talks with the Ukrainians in a more formal setting, the officials said. But the Europeans had such a negative response to the leaked plan that Driscoll’s team decided instead to head to Geneva, where he met up with Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tells an international summit that it is a ‘critical moment’ for Ukraine as U.S. peace plan negotiations advance. Photo: POU/Zuma Press

The initial 28-point plan had spurred anxiety in Europe and Ukraine because it handed several wins to Russia, including requiring that Kyiv cede territory to Russia, blocking Ukraine’s ambitions to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and capping the size of Kyiv’s military.

But early Monday, Trump posted an optimistic note on social media regarding progress made in the talks. “Is it really possible that big progress is being made in Peace Talks between Russia and Ukraine???,” he said on Truth Social. “Don’t believe it until you see it, but something good just may be happening.”

Meanwhile, Rubio cast the 28-point plan in a social-media message as “a list of potential ideas” that could be developed further and not a take-it-or-leave it plan. He said the U.S. and Europe had agreed to discuss provisions involving NATO and the European Union separately.

Zelensky was more cautious in his statement, saying Monday that the U.S. and Ukraine had “managed to keep extremely sensitive points on the table.”

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

WSJ

3. Pentagon Officials Begin ‘Grooming’ Army Secretary Dan Driscoll as Talk Grows Pete Hegseth Will Get the Boot Early Next Year

Summary:

Pentagon officials predict Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will be removed in early 2026, citing chaos, indecision and Trump’s displeasure. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, a close ally of Vice President Vance, is seen as successor after high-profile diplomacy on Ukraine, expanded domestic roles and rapidly growing stature within the Trump administration.

Comment: Who are these "Pentagon officials?" And how do they know this? That said it is unusual for a SECARMY to be engaged in such activities as peace negotiations with Russia and to present plans to the President of Ukraine. This kind of reporting has to create a lot of friction within the Pentagon and especially between SECWAR and SECARMY.

Pentagon Officials Begin ‘Grooming’ Army Secretary Dan Driscoll as Talk Grows Pete Hegseth Will Get the Boot Early Next Year

‘We’re hearing that Hegseth is not going to last deep into ’26,’ a Pentagon official tells the Sun.

CAROLINE McCAUGHEY

Published: Nov. 24, 2025 04:00 PM ETUpdated: Nov. 25, 2025 04:18 AM ET

nysun.com

https://www.nysun.com/article/pentagon-officials-begin-grooming-army-secretary-dan-driscoll-as-talk-grows-pete-hegseth-will-get-the-boot-early-next-year?utm

Secretary Pete Hegseth will be pushed out of his role heading the Department of War early next year and Army Secretary Dan Driscoll will be his likely successor, a Pentagon official tells The New York Sun.

“We’re hearing that Hegseth is not going to last deep into ’26,” the official said, “because Trump has been very dissatisfied with him, and that Driscoll is seen as the best replacement.”

This official said the mood in the Pentagon is “positive” about the change, and “everybody’s kind of prepping themselves for a shuffle.” He said he met with a general this week who told him of Mr. Hegseth, “I can’t wait for him to go, because he’s the least qualified Sec Def we’ve ever had.”

The Pentagon official called Mr. Hegseth “a chaos agent,” and said the secretary is “decision averse,” which is negatively impacting the functionality of the department. “And one of the things that Trump doesn’t like is that Hegseth is a f***ing glory hound, and Trump’s feeling is that he’s the main guy,” the official said.

Mr. Driscoll, a friend of Vice President Vance from Yale Law School and only 39 years old, is fast becoming a rising star in the Trump administration. President Trump dispatched Mr. Driscoll to Kyiv last week for a surprise visit with Ukrainian president, Volodmyr Zelenskyy, where the Army Secretary was tasked with presenting the administration’s latest 28-point peace plan, which would require Ukraine to make serious concessions.

Mr. Driscoll, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, met with Ukrainian officials in Geneva on Sunday to further negotiate a peace deal with Russia. Notably absent was Mr. Hegseth.

“They’ve been grooming him for some time with the work that he’s doing lately,” the Pentagon official said of Mr. Driscoll. “The stuff that he’s been doing in the meetings in Davos, for example, are not the kinds of things that the Secretary of the Army does.”

Mr. Driscoll’s job description has expanded in other ways as well. He now not only leads the Army but is the acting head of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and is the point person for National Guard deployments to United States cities and the border.

Mr. Driscoll defended Mr. Trump’s deployment of National Guard troops to American cities in an interview with Politico last week, saying “crime has plummeted in D.C.” and calling it “a noble use of the National Guard.” In that interview he also notably departed from Mr. Hegseth in his assessment of whether women can hold combat roles, saying he hopes his seven-year-old daughter joins the Army Rangers when she’s old enough.

A combat veteran in Iraq, Mr. Driscoll met Mr. Vance at Yale, and they have remained close friends. “Dan’s relationship with JD certainly helped him get the job, but all of his success has been on the merits,” a person close to the White House told Politico.

CNN reported that there will likely be Cabinet shakeups early next year, naming Homeland Secretary Kristi Noem, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and Mr. Hegseth as possible departures. Talk of replacing Mr. Hegseth reached a fever pitch earlier this year after The Atlantic reported that the secretary and other high level officials were allegedly sharing classified information over the encrypted messaging app Signal.

The upcoming release of a Pentagon watchdog report on Mr. Hegseth’s use of Signal could reignite calls for him to resign. It’s not unusual for some Cabinet members to leave after the first year of an administration. The Pentagon official stressed that Mr. Hegseth’s departure is the talk of the building but that nothing is set in stone.

The Pentagon did not return the Sun’s request for comment. Mr. Trump’s press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, denied CNN’s report and any talk of a Cabinet shakeup.

“This story is 100% Fake News,” Ms. Leavitt posted to X. “The truth is: President Trump could not be happier with his Cabinet.”

nysun.com

4. Opinion | What a Good Ukraine Peace Looks Like

Summary:

Any Ukraine peace must preserve sovereignty, allow Kyiv to choose Western alignment, and provide robust long-range military capabilities plus credible multilateral security guarantees. It criticizes POTUS' Russia-leaning plan, rejects permanent NATO exclusion, and warns a weak deal would invite renewed Russian aggression and endanger European and U.S. security.

Comment: Seems like the WSJ Editorial Board has outlined the non-negotiable aspects of a peace plan (from a Ukraine, European, NATO, and US perspective). Hopefully POTUS is executing the art of the deal and this is what he will end up having in an agreement.

On the other hand, a friend and retired intelligence professional shared with me that his assessment is that whatever agreement Puitin makes he will break it and continue to seek his objectives in Ukraine and Europe. If that is correct (and I fear it is), then what good is any agreement?

Opinion | What a Good Ukraine Peace Looks Like

WSJ

By The Editorial Board

Nov. 24, 2025 5:54 pm ET

Kyiv must have the military means and Western guarantees to defend its sovereignty.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/what-a-good-ukraine-peace-looks-like-5742dce6

Russian President Vladimir Putin service/handout/epa/shutterstock/Shutterstock

President Trump on Monday touted “big progress” on talks to end the Ukraine war, and Kyiv is doubtless willing to make painful concessions to avoid surrender or U.S. abandonment. No one wants the war to end more than the Ukrainians who are fighting and dying.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Marjorie Taylor Greene’s Resignation Highlights Cracks in the MAGA Coalition

Marjorie Taylor Greene announces she will leave Congress in January after a public split with Donald Trump on a variety of GOP policy stances. What does her exit say about who will lead the Republican party in the future? Plus, a Republican redistricting plan to redraw the map in Texas backfires, leading the way for the Supreme Court to decide.Read Transcript

But the crucial issue continues to be what kind of peace? So it’s worth describing the conditions that would create a peace with honor in Ukraine and deter a new war whenever Vladimir Putin chooses to invade again.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday described the U.S. peace offer as a “living, breathing document,” and we welcome the red pen to the original 28-point plan that bent hard toward Vladimir Putin. That document would leave a neutered Ukraine that is banned from associating with Western security institutions and vulnerable to a new invasion.

The overriding goal of any peace is letting Ukraine survive as an independent nation that can determine its own future. If its people want to align with Russia, so be it. But every indication is that they want to align with the West, including the European Union and NATO.

This means a sovereign Ukraine with the means to defend itself militarily. How to do that should be Ukraine’s prerogative, and not subject to a U.S., much less a Russian, veto. Ukraine will need guarantees of premiere Western firepower, including an arsenal of long-range weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles that can reach into Russia and deter Mr. Putin from restarting his conquest.

A peace that welcomes Ukraine into NATO may be untenable today, and Mr. Putin knows Ukraine isn’t close to joining anyway. But sovereignty means more than a spot on the map that says Ukraine. If NATO membership is ruled out for now, it shouldn’t be for all time. And if it is ruled out, Ukraine will need security guarantees that are more than paper promises.

All the more so if it is being asked to cede the entire Donbas region, including areas Russia doesn’t hold now. The original Trump plan mentions a vague American security guarantee, but Kyiv would be unwise to rely on the U.S. alone, especially with the emerging isolationist forces in both political parties.

A credible guarantee would have to come from a complement of countries in the West, and include Western troops at least training in Ukraine. Yet the draft deal bans troops operating under NATO’s banner in Ukraine. The case for the ban is that Mr. Putin won’t accept such troops, which may be true. But that should tell the U.S. Administration that it is currently pressuring the wrong negotiating party.

The Administration’s realpolitik case for tilting toward Russia is that Ukraine is losing the war. “People that are critical of this right now, they don’t really have another plan,” Missouri GOP Sen. Eric Schmitt said over the weekend. “They live in this fantasy world that another round of sanctions, or another round of weapons, or another round of cash is going to solve the problem. It won’t.”

So sue for peace because the next deal in six months will be even worse.

But the military experts we talk to, including retired Gen. Jack Keane, say Ukraine isn’t losing the war. Russia is still gaining ground in the east, but at tremendous cost. Ukraine has overperformed—holding out nearly four years longer than anyone expected, even while fighting with too few weapons too often delivered too late. The West has a fighting ally on the front lines against an adversary that threatens to use nuclear weapons. The best we can do is negotiate its ally’s surrender terms?

And more sanctions wouldn’t matter? The decisive enabler of Mr. Putin’s conquest is the Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. has made no real attempt to cut this lifeline, say, with secondary sanctions. Mr. Putin is also facing more economic and manpower problems on his own domestic front.

The real fantasists are Republicans in Congress and the White House who think Mr. Putin can be coaxed into giving up his Ukraine ambitions with commercial deals and “cultural exchange.” This reminds us of John Kerry thinking a nuclear deal would cause Iran’s mullahs to give up their jihadist dreams. Mr. Putin thinks Ukraine belongs to Russia—full stop.

***

The test of any peace agreement isn’t that the fighting stops for a time. The test is whether a deal creates the conditions for a durable peace. A false peace will plant the seeds of future bloodshed and broader threats to European and U.S. security.

Review & Outlook: Likening the global threat level to that of 1939, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unveils reforms to the Pentagon acquisition process that will ‘rebuild the defense industrial base into a new arsenal of freedom.’

Appeared in the November 25, 2025, print edition as 'What a Good Ukraine Peace Looks Like'.

WSJ

5. Trump–Xi and Strategic Recalibration

Summary:

The POTUS–Xi call signals tactical recalibration, not détente, as both seek to control escalation while preserving strategic competition. It creates a gray zone in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, offering middle powers, especially Vietnam, room to maneuver. Yet without institutional resilience and coherent strategy, they risk remaining reactive, dependent actors in great-power rivalry.

Comment: We need our silk web of friends, partners, and allies to be strengthened and operationalized for mutual defense and mutual prosperity in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. That is where we should invest for "institutional resilience" and coherent strategy.

Trump–Xi and Strategic Recalibration

substack.com · Asia Sentinel

The phone call and implications for the Indo-Pacific

Nov 25, 2025

By: Khanh Vu Duc

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/donald-trump-xi-jinping-strategic-recalibration?r=7i07&utm

The November 24 phone call between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping signals more than a temporary pause in bilateral tensions. Amid heightened pressures over Taiwan, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and fragile global supply chains, both powers appear to be testing a new rhythm of strategic competition: one that prioritizes tempo control over confrontation.

For middle powers and regional actors in the Indo-Pacific, including Vietnam, the conversation offers a window into both risk and opportunity — provided these countries possess the institutional capacity and strategic foresight to respond effectively.

While official summaries emphasized trade disputes, Taiwan, and Ukraine, the subtext is critical. Trump is focused on stabilizing markets, preserving leverage, and calibrating a strategic stance without provoking escalation. Xi, meanwhile, seeks to buy time for industrial and military reorganization while mitigating external pressures.

This controlled approach to rivalry is not a détente; it is a tactical adjustment that temporarily tempers confrontation while leaving the underlying strategic competition intact. Regional actors must interpret these signals carefully: misreading the new cadence could magnify vulnerabilities and constrain maneuverability.

Strategic Signaling and the New Competition Tempo

The Trump–Xi call illustrates a recalibration in strategic signaling. For the US, maintaining credibility with allies while avoiding an unnecessary military entanglement remains paramount. For China, signaling restraint on immediate confrontational fronts – such as maritime maneuvering around Taiwan – allows domestic priorities to take precedence without appearing weak internationally.

This synchronized moderation introduces a “gray space” in the regional security environment: Japan and South Korea are expected to deepen security cooperation with Washington, Taiwan faces persistent but predictable gray-zone pressures, and ASEAN states must hedge more delicately between reassurance and strategic autonomy.

The recalibration also reshapes expectations for engagement. Smaller states and middle powers can temporarily benefit from reduced pressure points, but only if they possess a clear framework for interpreting great-power intentions. In practice, many regional capitals may find themselves navigating ambiguities, balancing between signaling alignment and preserving strategic independence.

Middle Powers Under Pressure: Vietnam

Vietnam exemplifies the challenges confronting middle powers in a highly competitive Indo-Pacific. Its “bamboo diplomacy,” flexible, resilient, adaptive, has long served to navigate the pressures of US–China competition. Yet flexibility alone cannot substitute for strategic depth. Hanoi’s approach has historically prioritized regime preservation over long-term national strategy, sending mixed signals to both Washington and Beijing. This caution, while protective, may constrain Vietnam’s ability to translate temporary openings into durable strategic gains.

The Trump–Xi adjustment exposes a structural vulnerability: Vietnam’s internal governance – limited transparency, centralized decision-making, and constrained strategic debate – hampers its capacity to act decisively. Without a robust national framework, a middle power cannot leverage shifts in great-power competition effectively. Credibility in the eyes of both the U.S. and China derives not from hedging skillfully but from demonstrating consistent strategic priorities anchored in national interest.

Strategic Implications

The Indo-Pacific now exists in a delicate equilibrium of controlled rivalry. For middle powers like Vietnam, the opportunity is clear: temporary recalibration by great powers offers space for strategic consolidation. Yet seizing this window requires more than diplomatic acumen. It demands institutional resilience, rule-based governance, and a coherent national strategy that prioritizes long-term national interest over regime maintenance.

Countries that cultivate such resilience can engage with both Washington and Beijing from a position of agency rather than dependency. They can shape the terms of engagement, reinforce territorial and economic security, and strengthen their regional influence. Those that fail to do so risk remaining passive actors, perpetually reactive and constrained by the agendas of larger powers.

For policymakers, FDI investors, NGOs, and international think tanks observing the region, the lesson is clear: the recalibration is not an end in itself. It is a strategic opportunity and a cautionary tale. Middle powers must translate temporary pauses in great-power competition into lasting institutional and strategic advantage. The Trump–Xi call is less a resolution than a reminder that agency, institutional depth, and strategic clarity are the true currencies of influence in the Indo-Pacific.

substack.com · Asia Sentinel

6. Irregular Whorefare: How the CCP Turned Influence Into a Transactional Art

Summary:

Beijing has perfected “irregular whorefare,” turning influence into a transactional export that looks like diplomacy. China buys access and behavioral alignment through debt-fueled infrastructure, elite capture, cadre training, digital systems, and narrative shaping. Clients trade autonomy for protection, while dependence invites calibrated punishment. Sovereignty becomes negotiable and Chinese power quietly expands.

Comment: Quite the provocative title. I have found my next new term of art. This only seems to support my assessment that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

So now we can say China has unrestricted warfare and FOUR Warfares: psychological warfare, legal warfare or lawfare, media or public opinion warfare, and now Irregular whorefare.

Graphic at the link. (The CCP's "Influence menu.")

Irregular Whorefare: How the CCP Turned Influence Into a Transactional Art

When soft power turns hard, and everyone pretends it’s still diplomacy.

Erika Lafrennie

Nov 25, 2025

https://www.xinanigans.com/p/irregular-whorefare-ccp-influence-transactional-diplomacy?utm

Some countries project power with aircraft carriers. Others prefer infrastructure loans, party-to-party trainings, and carefully cultivated dependencies. But only one major power has perfected influence as a billable service.

Welcome to irregular whorefare: Beijing’s most refined export since silk, now delivered through policy briefings, UN voting blocs, telecommunication backdoors, and the administrative wiring of your government. It operates below the threshold of war, influence engineered to look like consent.

Because what is diplomacy today if not a courtship ritual? And what is Chinese foreign policy if not a long, methodical seduction that ends with the other party wondering whether they ever had a choice?

When Soft Power Turns Hard

For years, Western analysts reassured themselves that China lacked soft power. No blockbuster films, no cultural magnetism, no charisma.

They missed the point entirely.

China pursued access, not affection. And access is easier to purchase than admiration.

Beijing discovered something better than cultural stickiness: elite legitimacy, rapid liquidity, and silent compliance, delivered discreetly and with no ideological paperwork. Call it strategic seduction. Call it soft power. Just don’t confuse it for anything reciprocal.

If soft power attracts, whorefare extracts.

China stopped trying to be liked and started buying what it actually wanted: behavioral alignment.

The Toolkit of Irregular Whorefare

Beijing calls this global business model “win-win cooperation.”

Everyone else calls it influence operations and pretends the distinction matters.

Debt Diplomacy: Infrastructure with a Lease Term

Hambantota was never a warning sign; it was a blueprint. Loans that can’t be repaid become ports that can’t be reclaimed. “Connectivity” becomes strategic tenancy. Sovereignty becomes a line item.

Elite Capture: Loyalty at Market Rates

Political parties, media conglomerates, business dynasties: all suddenly discover that their views on China feel more… harmonious. No bribes, of course. Just well-compensated honoraria, consultancies, and partnerships that come with editorial obedience baked in.

Bureaucrat Reprogramming: Governance by Download

Fragile-state civil servants are flown to Guangzhou for “capacity building workshops.” They return with PowerPoint decks on harmonious governance and a bureaucratic template that nudges their entire state apparatus toward authoritarian efficiency. This functions as administrative annexation by training.

The Digital Silk Rope: Modernization with Strings

Huawei routers, surveillance suites, telecom infrastructure: modernization that doubles as instrumentation. A country upgrades its network and wakes up inside China’s behavioral data pipeline. Congratulations. Welcome to the future. We’ll be monitoring your progress carefully from now on.

Narrative Alignment: Manufactured Consensus

Think tank reports co-authored by Beijing. Academic centers funded into silence. Guest op-eds ghostwritten by intermediaries and recycled in UN citations. Influence doesn’t require censorship when the target pre-edits their own conclusions.

Why China Wins the Bid

Western influence still arrives with parliamentary debates, human rights clauses, and monitoring frameworks.

Chinese influence arrives with cash, speed, and plausible deniability.

▸ Washington demands transparency.

▸ Brussels demands rule-of-law.

▸ Beijing demands only loyalty, and delivers on time.

This is influence stripped of moral theater: prestige without accountability, access without reform, development without democracy.

For many regimes, that’s the point — the sales pitch.

What the Client Really Buys: Strategic Intimacy

China offers something Western democracies cannot: protection without scrutiny.

Teetering regimes get:

financial lifelines,
diplomatic cover,
insulation from human rights condemnation,
and a seat at the international table — no questions asked.

Why invade a country when the Minister of Information already owes you a favor? Why deploy troops when the mayor’s cousin just signed an MOU with Guangdong?

This is voluntary dependency, engineered through perfectly legal agreements.

Plausible Deniability: The True Genius

The engine of irregular whorefare is consent, not coercion. The client says yes. The deal looks legitimate. The world applauds the “win-win.”

Ports are leased, not seized.
Politicians attend workshops, not indoctrination.
Journalists “self-moderate.”
Think tanks “diversify funding.”
Diplomats quote talking points written 6,000 miles away and call it their national position.

Western governments whisper about influence while attending ribbon-cuttings. Multilateral organizations cash the checks. Global South elites praise the infrastructure while muting their microphones on Taiwan.

It’s not secrecy that protects Beijing.

It’s the target’s desire to pretend nothing happened.

Diplomatic Johns and Ideological Pimps

Let’s not moralize: plenty of countries want what China is selling. A development model with no democratic overhead. Legitimacy without elections. Sovereignty without scrutiny. Economic uplift without transparency.

China offers a governance arrangement where accountability becomes optional and obedience becomes convertible currency.

This is a strategic partnership in which ambitious elites trade their autonomy for stability, and an authoritarian superpower invests in their continued rule.

When the Client Can’t Pay

This is the part where the romance ends.

When loans sour, governments turn, or new leaders decide to flirt with Washington again, Beijing doesn’t rage.

It recalibrates.

Silently. Precisely. Punishingly.

targeted tariffs
bureaucratic freeze-outs
cyber harassment
sudden “anti-corruption” leaks
orchestrated online mobs
diplomatic ambiguity
weaponized audits

The relationship concludes in correction, a predictable recalibration.

China only asks for loyalty long enough for dependence to calcify.

We’re All Working the Same Room

There’s a reason leaders praise Beijing on camera and whisper to Washington afterward. They’re not confused. They’re navigating a marketplace where influence is a commodity and sovereignty is negotiable.

The world calls this “engagement.” Beijing calls it strategy. And the system works because both sides pretend the transaction is something else.

China advances through participation alone.

It only needs you to keep showing up.

A Quick Thanksgiving Note

This post is going out just before the holiday, and I want to say thank you!

The support for Xinanigans these past few months has been incredible—smart readers, thoughtful feedback, generous shares, and the kind of word-of-mouth momentum you can’t manufacture. I’m truly grateful.

Wishing you a joyful, restful, and well-fed holiday. May your conversations be sharp, your inbox quiet, and your turkey properly basted.

You’ve already given me so much... but I wouldn’t stop you from sharing this.

7. China’s Xi Rewrites History

Summary:

The NY SUN Editorial Board criticizes Xi Jinping for portraying Taiwan’s subordination to Beijing as part of the World War II settlement, erasing Free China’s role alongside America against Japan. It contrasts democratic Taiwan, rooted in Sun Yat-sen’s republic, with communist rule, urging the U.S. to resist revisionism and reaffirm its security commitment.

Comment: We need more of this. RUEA - we must recognize PRC/Xi's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it (as we see here) and then attack that strategy with a superior political warfare strategy.

Editorials

China’s Xi Rewrites History

The communist party boss thinks Free China needs to surrender to the communists at Beijing to ‘jointly safeguard the victory of World War II.’

nysun.com

THE NEW YORK SUN

Nov. 24, 2025 03:42 PM ET

https://www.nysun.com/article/chinas-xi-rewrites-history

It beggars belief to hear President Xi Jinping tell President Trump that Free China needs to surrender to the communists at Beijing to “jointly safeguard the victory of World War II.” After all, the free Republic of China and America were wartime allies. They helped defeat the Axis powers while Mao’s communists subverted the war effort. After Japan’s surrender, America sidelined Free China, which retreated to Taiwan when Mao captured the mainland.

In 1949, Mao declared a “People’s Republic of China.” Yet Mao’s regime was a poor substitute for the Republic forged in 1912 by the pioneer of Chinese democracy, Sun Yat-sen, a New York Sun contributor. After World War II, Sun’s vision for Chinese self-rule eventually blossomed on Taiwan as a vibrant multiparty system took root on the island. Taiwan’s democracy is a rebuke to Beijing’s tyranny — which is why Free China rankles Mr. Xi.

This animus among the mandarins at Beijing informs Mr. Xi’s remarks with Mr. Trump this morning. The chairman’s comments, reported by Xinhua, suggest a “Through the Looking Glass”-style inversion of reality. Mr. Xi is trying to convince the president of America — which has for decades defended Free China’s autonomy against Beijing’s depredations — that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.”

Mr. Xi, in Xinhua’s account, crooned to Mr. Trump that “China and the U.S. fought shoulder to shoulder against fascism and militarism,” making it “even more important” to preserve the settlement that emerged after World War II. That victory in 1945, though, was achieved at the cost of millions of lives by the collaboration of America and the Free Chinese forces under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek — not the communists under Mao.

Mr. Xi’s attempt to erase Free China’s role in World War II echoes the misleading rhetoric at Beijing in September during the 80th anniversary celebrations of the end of the conflict. Reuters pointed out then that Mr. Xi and the communists were taking “credit for leading the fighting when most of it was done by forces of what was then the Republic of China.” One imagines that Mr. Trump sees through Mr. Xi’s effort to rewrite history on this head.

Even so, Xinhua reports that Mr. Trump responded to Mr. Xi’s deceptions by noting that “China was a big part of the victory of WWII,” and America “understands how important the Taiwan question is to China.” The White House has offered no details about the discussions over Taiwan, though a visit to the mainland was mooted. One wouldn’t want to read too much into that, per se, though a defense by Mr. Trump of Taiwan would be apt.

By contrast, Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, recently piped up, as the AP reported, to say that the Japanese “military could get involved if China were to take action against Taiwan.” Mr. Trump recently approved some $330 million in arms sales to Taiwan, to the dismay of Mr. Xi’s regime. The sale of weaponry suggests that actions speak louder than words when it comes to the defense of an American ally like Free China.

The longevity of that alliance is worth marking when authoritarian revisionism seems to be on the march. Taiwan’s president grasps the stakes, stressing that the Republic of China and its ideals predate the Beijing regime. It’s in America’s interest to defend that vision. The “dream” of Free China’s founders, including Sun Yat-sen, Lai Ching-te has said, “was to establish a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people.”

nysun.com

8. CRINK in 10 Charts

Summary:

CSIS charts show China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea forming an asymmetric but tightening anti-U.S. alignment. China and Russia anchor trade, energy, dual-use tech, and military cooperation, while Iran and North Korea arm Moscow in Ukraine. Joint drills and treaties grow, even as UN voting reveals limits to full cohesion.

Comment: Please go to the link to view the 10 useful charts from CSIS.

As an aside, when we were in London this past July some members of the Foreign Office and scholars from Cambridge took us to task for using the CRInK or Dark Quad, telling us it was not a thing and that we should not talk about it for fear of making it a reality.

Asia-Pacific Policy Strategy Dialogue – UK Parliament

Part 1: Introduction to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

By Hee-Eun Kim, CAPS President & CEO

Part 2: “Opportunities, Engagement and Challenges in Relation to North Korea”

By Dr. Thomas Schäfer, CAPS Senior Advisor

Part 3: “America First, Allies Always: Securing the Asia/Indo-Pacific Together”

By David Maxwell, CAPS Vice President

https://apstrategy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Asia_Pacific-Policy-Strategy-Dialogue_20250701.pdf

CRINK in 10 Charts

Commentary by Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Maria Snegovaya, and Mona Yacoubian

Published November 24, 2025

csis.org

https://www.csis.org/analysis/crink-10-charts

Illustration: Fabio Murgia/CSIS; Getty Images; Wikimedia Commons

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) are increasingly working together in ways that challenge the United States and global governance. The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department released a series of briefs that leverage data to analyze the nature and degree of CRINK alignment across the economic, diplomatic, and security domains. This page draws on the data collected in those reports to highlight key insights, focusing on how China and Russia anchor CRINK cooperation and how Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated alignment among the four countries.

1. CRINK at a Glance

Remote Visualization

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea share a mutual desire to challenge U.S. and Western influence. Collectively, they can bring to bear considerable power on the world stage. CRINK countries are home to over one-fifth of the global population, and they generate one-quarter of global GDP. Militarily, the four countries account for roughly one-fifth of the world’s defense spending, and Russia, China, and North Korea collectively possess over half of all nuclear weapons.

2. CRINK Power Asymmetries

Remote Visualization

While CRINK countries share a common goal of undermining Western influence, they differ vastly in several respects, leading to notable asymmetries of power. China’s economy is nearly 9 times larger than Russia’s, 43 times bigger than Iran’s and roughly 1,100 times the size of North Korea’s economy. Their militaries differ greatly as well. China and Russia far outspend the others on defense, and Iran stands out as the only one of the four to lack nuclear weapons. Iran is also geographically separated from the others, which share borders in Northeast Asia.

3. Bilateral Trade Between CRINK Countries

Remote Visualization

Power asymmetries among CRINK countries are evident in their trade relations. At over $245 billion in 2024, trade between China and Russia overwhelmingly surpasses bilateral trade between all other CRINK pairs. The next biggest trade relationship is between China and Iran. According to official customs data, their trade stood at about $13 billion in 2024, but this excludes approximately $29 billion of sanctioned oil, which Iran exports to China through intermediary countries. Russia-North Korea bilateral trade has risen significantly amid heightened cooperation during the war in Ukraine, but detailed figures are unavailable since the two countries stopped reporting bilateral trade statistic in 2022.

4. Russian and Iranian Seaborne Oil Exports to China

Remote Visualization

Energy has become a key area of economic cooperation among CRINK countries, especially since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Western energy sanctions against Russia, China ramped up purchases of discounted oil from Russia, providing Moscow much-needed injections of funding for the war. In the first half of 2025, China imported an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Russia—an increase of 80 percent from the same six-month period in 2021. Chinese imports of Iranian oil grew by an even larger 400 percent over that same timeframe, offering Iran an economic lifeline amid biting Western sanctions.

5. Chinese Exports of “High Priority” Dual-Use Goods to Russia

Remote Visualization

China has also been crucial to sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine by providing dual-use goods that have both military and commercial applications. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, China quickly ramped up exports to Russia of “high-priority items,” a set of 50 key dual-use goods that are divided into four tiers based on the level of risk they pose. According to Chinese customs data, the bulk of China’s exports to Russia were “tier 3” goods comprising electronic and mechanical components for weapons systems. However, China’s exports of “tier 4” goods saw a much bigger jump. In particular, tier 4B goods—which include machine tools and components for precision manufacturing—rose over 3,000 percent compared to January 2021, aiding Russia in the production of materials to support the war effort.

6. Russian Net Arms Transfers to China, Iran, and North Korea

Remote Visualization

Transfers of military weapons have emerged as another key accelerating area of CRINK cooperation since the start of the war in Ukraine. Historically, Russia was a major supplier of arms to Iran, North Korea, and especially China, but this trend has completely reversed. As North Korea and Iran began shipping weaponry to Russia to sustain the war in Ukraine, Russia transformed from an arms supplier to other CRINK countries to being a net importer of weapons from them.1 North Korea has supplied Russia millions of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and other systems, and Iran has provided Russia with ballistic missiles, armed drones, and other equipment.

7. Joint Military Exercises Among CRINK Countries

Remote Visualization

The strengthening of CRINK security ties since the Ukraine war is also evident in more frequent joint military exercises. According to data collected by the CSIS China Power Project, there have been 37 joint exercises involving at least two CRINK countries since 2022, an average of nearly 10 exercises per year. That is a major uptick from the preceding years: Between 2003 (when the first China-Russia exercise occurred) and 2021 (the year prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), CRINK averaged just over three exercises per year. China-Russia bilateral exercises drive much of that growth, but there is emergent trilateral cooperation, including a 2024 exercise in which North Korea participated as an observer in a rare instance of China-Russia-North Korea trilateral activity.

8. Security Cooperation with Russia during the Ukraine War

Remote Visualization

Iran and North Korea have gone even further to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty, after which North Korea deployed an estimated 14,000–15,000 troops and thousands of additional workers to support the war effort. Iran likewise signed a new treaty with Russia in January 2025 (without a binding defense obligation). Iran also sent drone trainers and technicians, but unlike North Korea, it has stopped short of deploying large numbers of troops. China has been more restrained, withholding lethal weapons and troops, but its unmatched dual-use exports and economic support have been crucial to Russia’s war.

9. Senior Diplomatic Meetings Between CRINK Countries

Remote Visualization

Growing security and economic cooperation among CRINK countries has been supported by engagements between top leaders and their diplomats.2 Since Russia and North Korea signed their mutual defense pact in June 2024, their top officials have significantly increased the frequency of their meetings. However, it is China and Russia that meet with each other the most. Since January 2022, their political leaders and diplomats have met nearly 50 times, significantly more than the other CRINK pairs.

10. China-Russia Vote Alignment on the UN Security Council

Remote Visualization

Not all areas of cooperation have shown clear signs of strengthening in recent years. In the United Nations Security Council, where China and Russia are permanent members, the two powers frequently align their votes on key issues—especially to counter U.S. initiatives. Yet their vote alignment has slightly decreased since 2022, compared to the four years before the war.3 Meanwhile, the share of partially aligned votes (where one abstains while the other votes yes or no) has increased, and in November 2024, the two voted opposite of each other, making the first such instance in over two decades.

Remote Visualization

These data points show that CRINK countries are not unified actors and that there are significant differences in their capabilities and willingness to engage in different types of cooperation. Yet the data also shows a clear pattern of accelerated cooperation—especially since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—demonstrating how these four countries can work together to challenge the United States and its allies and partners.

Footnotes

[1] While Russia is a net arms importer based on transfers with China, Iran, and North Korea, it is still a net arms exporter when including all its global exports.

[2] This data includes only bilateral meetings between top leaders (e.g., presidents, premiers, and vice premiers) and/or foreign ministers. Multiple meetings occurring during one visit count as one data entry. Figures exclude multilateral meetings and meetings between ministers of defense, finance, etc., unless those ministers met with top leaders or diplomats.

[3] Excludes UNSC resolutions that passed unanimously. Includes UNSC vetoed resolutions and passed resolutions that were not unanimously passed. Based on data through July 17, 2025.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

9. China’s Xi Calls Trump in Unusual Move to Discuss Taiwan, Ukraine

Summary:

Xi Jinping made a rare move by initiating a call with POTUS to press Beijing’s claim that Taiwan’s “return” is part of the post-war order and to keep Washington tied to One China. Trump instead highlighted Ukraine peace talks, trade and fentanyl, touting strong ties and agreeing to visit Beijing in April. Xi seeks to exploit what he sees as an opening to shape Trump’s Taiwan stance as Japan grows more vocal on Taiwan’s defense and U.S. aid to Taipei wavers. Beijing also wants a visible role in any Ukraine settlement after backing Russia diplomatically and economically to its advantage.

Comment: Does this mean Xi is worried? Is he under pressure and off balance? Or is Xi trying to assert himself because he sees an opportunity? Or is he just seeking to create dilemma's for the US and the rest? Are we really wavering on support to Taiwan (I hope not).

China’s Xi Calls Trump in Unusual Move to Discuss Taiwan, Ukraine

Beijing is pushing its position that Taiwan should return to the mainland, while Trump steers the conversation to Ukraine peace talks

By Lingling Wei

Updated Nov. 24, 2025 2:46 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-calls-trump-in-unusual-move-to-discuss-ukraine-taiwan-add503b3

President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea, in October. Yonhap News/Zuma Press

In an unusual diplomatic move, China’s leader Xi Jinping initiated a phone call with President Trump on Monday to discuss Taiwan, a flashpoint that has surged to the forefront in recent days as Japan takes a more assertive stance on the island’s autonomy.

While Taiwan was Xi’s focus, Trump steered the conversation to Ukraine, said people familiar with the matter, as Washington-Kyiv peace talks appear to make progress and Trump tries to decisively end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The two issues—Taiwan and Ukraine—are sensitive for U.S.-China relations, but they are rarely linked in discussions between the two leaders. Xi made the outreach, people close to Beijing said, turning the high-level communication into a rare diplomatic overture from China.

During his call with Trump, Xi said, “Taiwan’s return to China is an important component of the post-war international order,” according to an official account of the conversation by China’s state media. In a pointed historical parallel, Xi also asserted that since China and the U.S. “fought side-by-side against fascism and militarism” during World War II, they should now work together to safeguard those achievements. The statement indicates that China is grounding its claim over Taiwan in historical treaties, rather than just its own narrative.

For his part, Trump affirmed that the U.S. “understands the importance of the Taiwan issue to China,” Chinese media said.

In a social-media post Monday, Trump didn’t mention Taiwan or the diplomatic crisis between Beijing and Tokyo—an omission that likely will rattle U.S. allies in the region already concerned about wavering American commitment. Trump said he and Xi discussed the war in Ukraine, fentanyl and soybeans, among other things. Trump said he had accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing in April, adding that Xi would visit the U.S. later next year.

“Our relationship with China is extremely strong!” Trump wrote.

Xi initiated the call as tensions accelerate between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan. Beijing places strategic value on ensuring that Washington—Tokyo’s treaty ally—remains committed to its “One China” position, which asserts its claim that there is but one China. Beijing views Taiwan as a territory that must be “unified” with the mainland, by force if necessary.

The recent tension was sparked by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Nov. 7 warning that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would trigger Japan’s involvement in any conflict. The remarks sparked an angry diplomatic response from Beijing, including a formal letter to the United Nations, accusing Japan of threatening “an armed intervention.” Also drawing Beijing’s fury was a State Department post on X reaffirming its unwavering commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and firmly opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

Xi sees a strategic opening to influence Trump’s thinking on Taiwan, the people close to Beijing said. The businessman-turned-president, unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, has avoided explicitly stating whether the U.S. would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan.

Battle for Ukraine splits Trump’s top team

JD Vance and Marco Rubio hold rival views on path to peace, and whoever’s vision triumphs will leave a lasting mark

Memphis Barker

Senior Foreign Correspondent. Connor Stringer

Washington Correspondent

25 November 2025 8:31am GMT

The Human Algorithm: Why Disinformation Outruns Truth and What It Means for Our Future

thecipherbrief.com

24 November, 2025

By Jennifer Ewbank

Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation

Jennifer Ewbank, served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation from October 2019 until January 2024, where she led transformation of one the world’s most sophisticated and secure digital technology ecosystems.

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/disinformation-human-algorithim

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In recent years, the national conversation about disinformation has often focused on bot networks, foreign operatives, and algorithmic manipulation at industrial scale. Those concerns are valid, and I spent years inside CIA studying them with a level of urgency that matched the stakes. But an equally important story is playing out at the human level. It’s a story that requires us to look more closely at how our own instincts, emotions, and digital habits shape the spread of information.

This story reveals something both sobering and empowering: falsehood moves faster than truth not merely because of the technologies that transmit it, but because of the psychology that receives it. That insight is no longer just the intuition of intelligence officers or behavioral scientists. It is backed by hard data.

In 2018, MIT researchers Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral published a groundbreaking study in Science titled The Spread of True and False News Online. It remains one of the most comprehensive analyses ever conducted on how information travels across social platforms.

The team examined more than 126,000 stories shared by 3 million people over a ten-year period. Their findings were striking. False news traveled farther, faster, and more deeply than true news. In many cases, falsehood reached its first 1,500 viewers six times faster than factual reporting. The most viral false stories routinely reached between 1,000 and 100,000 people, whereas true stories rarely exceeded a thousand.

One of the most important revelations was that humans, not bots, drove the difference. People were more likely to share false news because the content felt fresh, surprising, emotionally charged, or identity-affirming in ways that factual news often does not. That human tendency is becoming a national security concern.

For years, psychologists have studied how novelty, emotion, and identity shape what we pay attention to and what we choose to share. The MIT researchers echoed this in their work, but a broader body of research across behavioral science reinforces the point.

People gravitate toward what feels unexpected. Novel information captures our attention more effectively than familiar facts, which means sensational or fabricated claims often win the first click.

Emotion adds a powerful accelerant. A 2017 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences showed that messages evoking strong moral outrage travel through social networks more rapidly than neutral content. Fear, disgust, anger, and shock create a sense of urgency and a feeling that something must be shared quickly.

And identity plays a subtle, but significant role. Sharing something provocative can signal that we are well informed, particularly vigilant, or aligned with our community’s worldview. This makes falsehoods that flatter identity or affirm preexisting fears particularly powerful.

Taken together, these forces form what some have called the “human algorithm,” meaning a set of cognitive patterns that adversaries have learned to exploit with increasing sophistication.

Save your virtual seat now for The Cyber Initiatives Group Winter Summit on December 10 from 12p – 3p ET for more conversations on cyber, AI and the future of national security.

During my years leading digital innovation at CIA, we saw adversaries expand their strategy beyond penetrating networks to manipulating the people on those networks. They studied our attention patterns as closely as they once studied our perimeter defenses.

Foreign intelligence services and digital influence operators learned to seed narratives that evoke outrage, stoke division, or create the perception of insider knowledge. They understood that emotion could outpace verification, and that speed alone could make a falsehood feel believable through sheer familiarity.

In the current landscape, AI makes all of this easier and faster. Deepfake video, synthetic personas, and automated content generation allow small teams to produce large volumes of emotionally charged material at unprecedented scale. Recent assessments from Microsoft’s 2025 Digital Defense Report document how adversarial state actors (including China, Russia, and Iran) now rely heavily on AI-assisted influence operations designed to deepen polarization, erode trust, and destabilize public confidence in the U.S.

This tactic does not require the audience to believe a false story. Often, it simply aims to leave them unsure of what truth looks like. And that uncertainty itself is a strategic vulnerability.

If misguided emotions can accelerate falsehood, then a thoughtful and well-organized response can help ensure factual information arrives with greater clarity and speed.

One approach involves increasing what communication researchers sometimes call truth velocity, the act of getting accurate information into public circulation quickly, through trusted voices, and with language that resonates rather than lectures. This does not mean replicating the manipulative emotional triggers that fuel disinformation. It means delivering truth in ways that feel human, timely, and relevant.

Another approach involves small, practical interventions that reduce the impulse to share dubious content without thinking. Research by Gordon Pennycook and David Rand has shown that brief accuracy prompts (small moments that ask users to consider whether a headline seems true) meaningfully reduce the spread of false content. Similarly, cognitive scientist Stephan Lewandowsky has demonstrated the value of clear context, careful labeling, and straightforward corrections to counter the powerful pull of emotionally charged misinformation.

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Organizations can also help their teams understand how cognitive blind spots influence their perceptions. When people know how novelty, emotion, and identity shape their reactions, they become less susceptible to stories crafted to exploit those instincts. And when leaders encourage a culture of thoughtful engagement where colleagues pause before sharing, investigate the source, and notice when a story seems designed to provoke, it creates a ripple effect of more sound judgment.

In an environment where information moves at speed, even a brief moment of reflection can slow the spread of a damaging narrative.

A core part of this challenge involves reclaiming the mental space where discernment happens, what I refer to as Mind Sovereignty™. This concept is rooted in a simple practice: notice when a piece of information is trying to provoke an emotional reaction, and give yourself a moment to evaluate it instead.

Mind Sovereignty™ is not about retreating from the world or becoming disengaged. It is about navigating a noisy information ecosystem with clarity and steadiness, even when that ecosystem is designed to pull us off balance. It is about protecting our ability to think clearly before emotion rushes ahead of evidence.

This inner steadiness, in some ways, becomes a public good. It strengthens not just individuals, but the communities, organizations, and democratic systems they inhabit.

In the intelligence world, I always thought that truth was resilient, but it cannot defend itself. It relies on leaders, communicators, technologists, and more broadly, all of us, who choose to treat information with care and intention. Falsehood may enjoy the advantage of speed, but truth gains power through the quality of the minds that carry it.

As we develop new technologies and confront new threats, one question matters more than ever: how do we strengthen the human algorithm so that truth has a fighting chance?

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in

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12. Taiwan Has Reached Its Tipping Point

Summary:

Taiwan has hit a strategic tipping point. China’s coercion and military buildup are squeezing the island, while doubts about U.S. reliability grow. POTUS' mix of stronger deterrence and tariffs, delays, and pressure for unrealistic defense spending unsettles Taipei. At the same time, Taiwan’s politics are polarized, threatening passage of a crucial special defense budget. If Washington and Taipei cannot repair trust and expand trade and defense cooperation, Chinese pressure plus mutual doubt could erode Taiwan’s will to resist and undermine the U.S. position along the vital first island chain in the Pacific.

Comment: Oh no. I hope Dr. Brands is wrong. But if he is then what is Taiwan (and the US and all those who support freedom) to do?

What about the Taiwan will to resist? I only have anecdotal evidence based on talking to friends from Taiwan but it seems that the desire to resist and build resilience in the face of PRC threats is growing. If they are willing to fight and die for their country shouldn't like minded democracies and freedom loving countries want to provide support to them?

And then we must assess the larger strategic picture? What happens if Taiwan falls to China? Chip manufacturing aside, how does the geostrategic situation in the Asia-Indo-Pacific change with the PLA based on Taiwan and the PRC/CCP in control of Taiwan? If that results in an unacceptable geostrategic situation for the US what are we willing to do now to prevent it?

Taiwan Has Reached Its Tipping Point

With China squeezing harder and the US getting less reliable, the next few months will dictate the island's long-term future.

November 23, 2025 at 4:00 PM EST

By Hal Brands

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2025-11-23/china-and-the-us-have-pushed-taiwan-to-a-tipping-point?utm

For years, I thought that China’s strategy for taking Taiwan was failing. I’m not so sure anymore.

China has long used coercion short of war in a bid to make Taiwan fold without a fight, while also readying a military hammer to crush that island democracy if required. Until fairly recently, that strategy was mostly backfiring, by strengthening Taiwan’s will to resist forced unification, while also strengthening its ties to the US. But today, cracks in Taiwan’s morale—and in its relationship with Washington—are starting to show.

I recently traveled to Taiwan, for conversations with government officials, political figures, and analysts, to better understand how that country is navigating a tricky, three-way dynamic with Washington and Beijing. I came away with a strong sense that Taiwan and the US are reaching a crucial inflection point — one that could produce a stronger, more durable relationship, or bring on a destructive crisis.

American actions over the past year have sown uncertainty and anxiety in a government that relies heavily on US strength. Taiwan, for its part, has been tied in knots politically just when unity and urgency are imperative.

The upshot is a knotty tangle of issues — pertaining to trade, defense spending and US President Donald Trump’s negotiations with China — that threatens to destabilize the US-Taiwan relationship, just as Beijing is ramping up its efforts to destabilize Taiwan. The next few months will be critical if Washington and Taipei are to avoid an ugly turn that could ultimately jeopardize Taiwan’s survival and America’s strategic position.

It’s Not Just TSMC

These days, Americans often think of Taiwan as a democratic success story or a semiconductor superpower. It’s both of those things, and yet Taiwan’s importance is geostrategic at its core.

Glance at a map of the Western Pacific. You’ll see that Taiwan controls access to a long, economically valuable stretch of China’s coastline. It is positioned between the two great inner seas of East Asia, guarding the East China Sea from the south and the South China Sea from the north.

Taiwan’s Survival Is Now at Risk

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Anti-landing spikes on the coast of Kinmen. Photographer: Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images

Taiwan also sits right in the middle of the First Island Chain, which runs from Japan in the north to Indonesia in the south. In friendly hands, it connects a cordon of features that constrains China’s maritime power. In Chinese hands, it could be used to threaten the Philippines and Japan and rupture the US security system in the Western Pacific.

For Beijing, then, Taiwan is more than a symbol of the so-called Century of Humiliation, when China was carved up by foreign powers. It is not simply an unresolved legacy of the Chinese civil war, where the losing Nationalist side fled to safety. Taiwan is the key to ruling the vital waters off China’s coastline and breaking out into the open ocean beyond.

An American-backed Taiwan, one Chinese analyst has argued, serves as a “lock around the neck of a great dragon.” Beijing has developed a multipronged strategy for taking Taiwan down.

China’s Multipronged Strategy

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s first preference is to win without a devastating, unpredictable war; his method is encompassing, steadily escalating coercion. Chinese military exercises squeeze Taiwan physically, slicing away at its sovereignty, exhausting its military, and advertising its susceptibility to invasion or blockade.

To drive home Taiwan’s seclusion, Beijing has cut undersea cables that link that island to the outside world. Constant Chinese cyberattacks, disinformation and political meddling roil Taiwanese society. Pressure on Taiwan’s foreign relationships, and its membership in international organizations, constrict the island’s diplomatic space.

This is a classic “Anaconda strategy,” meant to get progressively tighter until Taiwan yields. Isolation and demoralization will ultimately produce capitulation, the thinking goes.

Tourists look on as a Chinese military helicopter flies past Pingtan island, one of mainland China's closest points to Taiwan.Photographer: Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images

China is simultaneously preparing more decisive options. Thirty years ago, American strategists joked that it would take a “million man swim” for a bloated, antiquated People’s Liberation Army to cross the strait. Now, China boasts a modernized military that is continually improving its ability to blockade or quarantine Taiwan. Beijing has invested massively in missiles and aircraft needed to bombard Taiwan; airborne and amphibious capabilities needed to invade it; and a host of weapons needed to keep the US from coming to its defense.

This buildup gives Beijing a backup plan in case coercion fails. Yet it is also meant to support that coercion strategy — by creating a sense, in Taiwan, that Chinese power is overwhelming; fostering a belief, in the US, that intervention is just too costly; and thereby convincing the people of Taiwan, someday, that their best option is to give up without a fight.

Is the US Dependable?

The Chinese buildup has certainly fueled fears that war is coming. In August 2022, just after Beijing responded to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan with demonstrations of military fury, one US official told me he worried that America and China would be at war in the next five years. But until recently, Xi’s strategy wasn’t demoralizing or isolating Taiwan. It was mostly having the opposite effect.

Chinese pressure was hardening Taiwanese resistance to unification by showing just how much the population had to lose if it came under an aggressive tyranny’s control. The Democratic Progressive Party, the more diplomatically assertive of Taiwan’s two major parties, won three straight presidential elections from 2016 to 2024 — a first in the country’s history — relegating the more accommodationist Kuomintang to the opposition. Polling showed that the population was growing more skeptical of an eventual tie-up with Beijing (even as a strong majority also opposed formal independence); more likely to consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese; and more willing to defend the island’s freedom.

The Taiwanese government decisively reversed a long downturn in defense spending. It adopted a smart, asymmetric strategy meant to use lots of small, relatively cheap weapons — mobile missiles, sea mines, drones — to inflict high costs on a Chinese invasion force until American help arrived. That help seemed ever more likely to come in a crisis (even though Washington technically declines to say what it will do if Taiwan is attacked) because the relationship with the US and other key countries was getting tighter.

Trump’s first administration deserves real credit. Trump himself was always ambivalent about the US commitment to Taiwan. Nonetheless, his 2018 National Defense Strategy reoriented the US military toward defeating Chinese aggression in the Pacific after 15 years centered on killing terrorists and insurgents in the greater Middle East. His administration made record-breaking arms sales to Taiwan.

A Taiwan-produced Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV on display at the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology.Photographer: Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images

President Joe Biden increased the momentum. He explicitly pledged, several times, to come to Taiwan’s defense if war erupted (even as his policy of refraining from directly intervening in Ukraine raised questions about whether he really meant it). His administration worked to provide Taiwan with arms taken directly from US stockpiles.

Perhaps most important, Biden’s team worked with friendly countries, in the region and beyond, to strengthen diplomatic support for Taipei. It began cobbling together a coalition — anchored by the US, Japan and Australia — that might fight to defend Taiwan in a war.

Back then, my concern was that all the ways in which Xi’s coercion strategy was failing might drive him to lash out militarily instead. But the situation has lately been evolving, due to developments in the US and Taiwan.

And Then Came Trump’s Tariffs

Trump’s record, in the first term, created a widespread impression that his second presidency would be just as hawkish toward China and just as helpful to Taiwan. But the record, so far, has been a mix of constructive policies along with initiatives that have thrown Taiwan and its president, Lai Ching-te, badly off balance.

On the plus side, Trump’s Pentagon has tried to put the US on something closer to a war footing when it comes to making munitions, and to slash through bureaucratic inertia that hinders America’s ability to prepare for a Pacific fight. The top Pentagon policy official, Elbridge Colby, has long advocated a laser-like focus on deterring a Chinese invasion.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (L), US President Joe Biden (C) and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (R) during the AUKUS summit on March 13, 2023.Photographer: Leon Neal/Getty Images

Trump has pushed ahead with important Biden-era policies, like the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom, and the search for new basing options from the Philippines to the Central Pacific. He is, rightly, prodding allies and partners to get far more serious about their own defense. Yet Trump has also made moves that foster pervasive, palpable anxiety in Taiwan.

Taiwan wanted a free trade agreement with the US. Instead, it got slapped with high tariffs (initially 32%, now 20%) that make Taiwan’s officials feel that America doesn’t treat its friends much better than its enemies. The Pentagon has repeatedly demanded a level of military spending — 10% of GDP — that Taipei deems politically and economically impossible, especially given that deliveries of American weapons that Taiwan has tried to purchase are already delayed by months or years.

Taiwan’s leaders lament that the Pentagon seems solely focused on the invasion threat, rather than the gray-zone intimidation that erodes Taiwan’s sovereignty and batters its resolve every day. The combination of these policies has put the Lai government under great political pressure at a time when the president (who has also suffered some self-inflicted wounds over the past year) has little capital to spare.

Trump’s policy toward China hasn’t helped much. Over the summer, the White House discouraged Lai from visiting the US, which would have angered China. His administration reportedly paused some US arms deliveries, and downgraded unofficial defense talks, so as not to upset trade negotiations with Beijing.

Taiwan’s audible sigh of relief after Trump didn’t make concessions at its expense in his meeting with Xi last month simply showed just how unnerving the president’s policies had become. Uncertainty about US intentions, in turn, has revived a quiet debate about the wisdom of the asymmetric defense strategy: How can Taiwan adopt a posture that requires hunkering down and waiting for help that may not come?

Taipei’s Political Problems

The problems aren’t just made in America, of course: They come from Taiwan, as well. To its credit, Taiwan has been striving to strengthen its defenses. Its military exercises have become more ambitious and realistic; its government is reforming a conscription and reserves system that has been pretty much useless for years.

Taipei is importing lessons in how to fight subversion and disinformation from Russia’s European neighbors. Taiwanese military outlays are slated to rise above 3% of GDP next year; Lai’s government is soon to introduce a special military budget that could take the number above 5% by 2030.

Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te at his inauguration ceremony on May 20, 2024.Photographer: Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

Yet prospects for passage in the legislature are fraught because the political atmosphere is poisonous. The two main parties attack each other with the fury one might think they would reserve for foreign enemies. The KMT and its third-party ally, the Taiwan People’s Party, control a legislative majority and have often stymied Lai’s initiatives.

Taiwan’s political system may prove too fractured, too polarized, to deliver results when the island desperately needs them. At the same time, Lai’s tendency to push the line rhetorically in dealing with Beijing has annoyed some US policymakers, who fear he is inviting a crisis that could embroil America.

The US-Taiwan relationship underpins peace and stability in the Western Pacific. For months, it has been plagued by doubt and frustration on both sides.

Expanding the Defense Budget

This isn’t unprecedented, or even particularly unusual. Even the closest strategic partnerships hit bumps from time to time. The US-Taiwan relationship is inherently hard to manage, because the lack of official diplomatic ties makes even routine communication more challenging. Taiwan perpetually craves American reassurance, because it perpetually fears aggression from the hostile giant across the strait.

Crises are a normal feature of such a partnership, and it’s possible that all this turmoil could ultimately put the relationship on a firmer footing.

Taiwanese officials say they have put an attractive trade deal on Trump’s desk. They’re offering to make big purchases of US farm products and weapons, and big investments in US semiconductor production and other industries, in exchange for lower tariffs. Once that deal is done, Taiwan can claim that it is aiding America’s re-industrialization and building a more resilient free-world tech stack.

A US-made F-16 fighter jet belonging to the Taiwanese air force taxis after landing at a base in Hualien in eastern Taiwan.Photographer: Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP/Getty Images

The DPP government knows that the special budget is a make-or-break moment for Taiwan: If it can win enough support among moderate KMT legislators, the country will be on the path to 5% military spending. That would make Taiwan an Indo-Pacific standout and ease doubts about its commitment to its own survival.

Lai, for his part, has recently toned down his rhetoric, less to appease Beijing than to reassure Washington. Trump, notably, has approved two arms sales totaling roughly $1 billion in the last two weeks, despite Beijing’s vocal displeasure. And if the US-China trade truce collapses sometime in the next year under the weight of an intensifying rivalry, a more hawkish mood in America might once again boost Taipei.

If this scenario materializes, Trump could claim credit for building a better partnership and a stronger Taiwan. But events could also take a more perilous path.

Beijing Has Supporters

After all, the special budget could fail. The new party chair of the Kuomintang, Cheng Li-wun, has said defense spending is already too high. She has railed against the DPP for allegedly fawning over Trump.

Cheng comes from the most China-friendly wing of the KMT and has mused about starting a direct dialogue with Xi. Early analysis hints that Chinese disinformation may have aided her surprise victory in the contest to lead her party last month. If the special budget stalls or is slashed by the legislature, America Firsters will point to Taiwan as a poster child for free riding.

That outcome would empower critics who don’t believe the US should defend Taiwan if it won’t defend itself, as well as those who are simply looking for a reason to cut the island loose. It would also feed a perception in Washington that one of Taiwan’s two major parties is just not serious about national security, which would create a toxic diplomatic dynamic if the KMT reclaims the presidency in 2028.

US President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping greet each other as they arrive for talks in South Korea on Oct. 30, 2025.Photographer: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

On the US side, there’s the danger that Trump might once again throttle support for Taiwan so as not to upset ties with China. One possibility is that Beijing will seek changes in US policy on cross-strait relations — for instance, a shift from “not supporting” to “opposing” Taiwan’s independence — at a follow-up summit with Trump next spring. Or Beijing could subtly tighten export controls on rare-earth minerals if Trump approves more arms packages or seals a trade deal with Taiwan.

China’s goal would be to freeze key elements of US-Taiwan relations, and to show that Trump is now subordinating his dealings with Taipei to his détente with Xi.

If this happened, it could well crater Taiwan’s confidence. There could emerge a vicious cycle in which leaders in Washington and Taipei lose faith in each other, just as Chinese pressure grows.

The result might not be immediate disaster or surrender. But the longer-term risks would rise considerably as Taiwan suffers just the demoralization Xi’s strategy is meant to sow.

Precarious Balance of Power

The neo-isolationist members of Trump’s coalition might welcome this: Washington’s ambiguous commitment to Taiwan is precisely the sort of arrangement they worry might drag the US into unwanted wars. But that’s the wrong way of looking at it.

Taiwan isn’t some international charity case. It anchors technological supply chains and the First Island Chain. It connects the northern and southern halves of America’s alliance system in the Western Pacific. Japanese leaders understand this: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently announced that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would imperil her country’s vital interests. (In response, a Chinese diplomat threatened on social media to behead her, and Beijing stepped up its military pressure around the disputed Senkaku Islands.)

As mutually vexing as it can be, America’s ties to Taiwan have helped preserve the peace in the Taiwan Strait for many decades, while also preserving a balance of power that favors Washington and its democratic friends. A strong US-Taiwan relationship is a cornerstone of security in the world’s most vital region. The next few months could determine how strong that relationship will be in the years to come.

Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the co-author of “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China,” and a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.

Russian Disinformation Comes to Mexico, Seeking to Rupture U.S. Ties

NY Times · Maria Abi-Habib · November 24, 2025

A U.S. government cable said that Kremlin-run outlets had scaled up their efforts across Latin America, seeking to turn people against the United States and garner support for Russia.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/24/world/americas/russia-disinformation-mexico.html

The RT control room in Moscow in 2018. Kremlin-owned media outlets in Mexico have expanded greatly in recent years.

Reporting from Mexico City

Nov. 24, 2025

Leer en español

Russia’s disinformation efforts across Latin America have intensified over the last two years, partly aimed at sowing discord between the United States and its allies in the region, according to an American diplomatic cable and new report by watchdog groups.

The campaign is spearheaded by Kremlin-owned media outlets like Sputnik and RT, officials say, describing an effort to stoke anti-American sentiment, especially in Mexico, the world’s largest Spanish-speaking nation and Washington’s biggest trade partner.

In April 2024, American diplomats in Mexico City raised alarms over the “sudden and dramatic expansion” of RT in the country, according to an internal diplomatic cable titled “Mexico: RT’s Invasion” and reviewed by The New York Times.

“RT’s aggressive investment in Mexico and its strategy to build its credibility and undermine the United States, poses a threat to current popular perception,” the cable reads, adding, “mission Mexico needs more resources to counter RT’s well-funded efforts.”

The Russian Embassy in Mexico City denied that Moscow was spreading disinformation, calling Sputnik and RT, formerly called Russia Today, unbiased alternatives to American media.

The U.S. Embassy cable says the audience of “RT en Español” catapulted online, from 191,000 views on X in 2022 to 715 million a year later. With RT widely blocked in Europe and the United States, the network scaled up its presence in Latin America, a potential audience of some 670 million people.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Mexico and Russia? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The embassy cable partly blamed the “allegedly sympathetic abettors in President López Obrador’s administration” for the expansion of Kremlin-owned media outlets in Mexico.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term as Mexico’s president ended last October. The party that he founded, Morena, still governs Mexico and includes officials sympathetic to Russia, current and former American officials say.

Mr. López Obrador and Morena officials did not respond to requests for comment.

British and French officials raised concerns with Mexico’s foreign ministry about Russia’s activities, according to three people familiar with the discussions. The ministry declined to comment.

The cable’s findings were supported by a 2024 Justice Department investigation that uncovered a Russian government-sponsored influence campaign called Doppelgänger, targeting American citizens and Washington’s allies.

“The campaign intended to encourage ‘anti-American sentiment’ as well as to exacerbate confrontation between the United States and Mexico,” according to a Justice Department affidavit in the case, which closed down websites involved in the campaign.

While it is unclear whether the operation is still trying to drive a wedge between Washington and Mexico, Kremlin-sponsored media outlets continue to publish Spanish-language content discrediting the United States.

This year, former President Dmitri Medvedev accused Ukraine and the United States of recruiting Mexican and Colombian cartels to fight Russia, an accusation picked up by Spanish-language media in the region. That followed a similar accusation spread by the Russian Embassy in Mexico City, which was shared by several Morena politicians.

Those claims appeared to draw from the stories of Colombian military veterans who, largely driven by financial reasons, volunteered to fight for Ukraine.

One official who has regularly shared Russian government media content on social media is Jenaro Villamil, head of Mexico’s State Broadcasting System, whose TV and radio stations have vast reach nationwide.

Mr. Villamil said that he shares news from various outlets and that his personal account does not represent the government.

Last year, he shared a Sputnik article linking the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to the 2021 assassination of Haiti’s president, adding: “another D.E.A. intervention in Latin America.” While a former freelance D.E.A. informant was linked to the killing, he had stopped working for the agency before then.

Across Latin America, RT has also held training sessions for journalists and students, according to a new investigation by the German Marshall Fund, a Washington-based research group, and Factchequeado, a nonprofit that monitors Spanish news media.

During recent RT training for journalists in Venezuela, the room erupted into chants of “Long live Russia!” and “Long live Putin!” according to the investigation.

In Mexico, RT has built a partnership with the Journalists Club, an industry association that has received funding from Mexico’s Senate. The club has also hosted RT for training sessions.

The club’s biweekly magazine consistently publishes RT articles, with roughly 53 percent of its content from Kremlin-owned media outlets since April, according to the investigation.

The Journalists Club in Mexico City. More than half of its magazine’s content has come from Kremlin-owned media outlets since April.Credit...Marian Carrasquero for The New York Times

Mouris Salloum George, the president of the club, said that the magazine started republishing Russian government media because RT approached it offering free content.

Some Western experts worry that Washington is outmatched in the information war, especially after the Trump administration moved to dismantle an office that counters disinformation and also Voice of America, the U.S.-run news agency founded to fight Nazi propaganda.

“This is the problem: You have the U.S. retreating from the information space globally, and in comes Russia,” said Bret Schafer, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

“There remains a bit of a Cold War mentality about Russia taking it to the U.S. in their own backyard because they feel like the U.S. does it to them and their so-called sphere of influence,” he said. “To gain influence, Latin America has long been seen as a priority for the Russians.”

Emiliano Rodríguez Mega contributed reporting.

A correction was made on

Nov. 24, 2025

An earlier version of this article mischaracterized Mexico’s State Broadcasting System. Its TV and radio stations have vast reach across the country, but does not control hundreds of stations nationwide.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at Learn more

Maria Abi-Habib is an investigative correspondent reporting on Latin America and is based in Mexico City.

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, RT (TV Network)

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NY Times · Maria Abi-Habib · November 24, 2025

14. Xi Jinping pledges support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro

Summary:

Xi Jinping sent Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro a message reaffirming China’s backing amid U.S. naval deployments and Operation Southern Spear. Xi condemned external interference and pledged support for Venezuela’s sovereignty, security and stability. Putin also voiced solidarity, while tensions rose and airlines suspended Caracas flights over warnings about military activity.

Comment: CRInK-V?

Xi Jinping pledges support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro

Chinese president urges respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty, warns against foreign interference as US ramps up regional military activity

South China Morning Post

Igor Patrickin Rio de Janeiro

Published: 4:05am, 25 Nov 2025Updated: 6:00am, 25 Nov 2025

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3334007/xi-jinping-pledges-support-nicolas-maduro-and-criticises-us-actions-venezuela

Chinese President Xi Jinping has reaffirmed Beijing’s steadfast support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, sending a congratulatory letter on the eve of the embattled leader’s birthday that pledged continued backing for the South American country’s sovereignty amid mounting regional tensions and US military pressure.

In the message, released by Venezuela’s Foreign Ministry over the weekend, Xi described China and Venezuela as “intimate friends, dear brothers and good partners”.

He vowed to keep supporting Caracas in “safeguarding its sovereignty and national security, the dignity of the nation, and social stability”.

The Chinese leader also used the letter to condemn foreign interference in Venezuelan affairs, remarks widely seen as a response to Washington’s latest actions.

The US has deployed nearly a dozen warships and about 12,000 sailors and Marines to the Caribbean region and off Venezuela’s coast as part of what it calls a counter-narcotics and maritime security operation.

The US Navy’s Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group sails towards the Caribbean Sea during a counter-narcotics and maritime security operation earlier this month. Photo: US Navy via Reuters

“China resolutely opposes the meddling of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext,” Xi wrote, echoing Beijing’s long-standing position on the principle of non-intervention.

The Chinese Embassy in Caracas did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

The message came as both China and Russia reiterated their political backing for Maduro, whose government faces renewed diplomatic and military pressure from the United States.

Russian President Vladimir Putin also sent a message calling Maduro a “dear friend” and vowing to deepen the “strategic partnership” between Moscow and Caracas. Both letters were revealed by Venezuela’s foreign minister, Yvan Gil.

Xi’s statement was consistent with Beijing’s position laid out last week by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, who criticised Washington’s newly announced Operation Southern Spear.

The campaign, unveiled by US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, targets “narco-terrorist networks” in the Western Hemisphere and designates the Cartel de los Soles, allegedly led by Maduro, as a foreign terrorist organisation.

“China firmly supports the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace,” Mao said at a regular press briefing on Wednesday.

“We oppose any moves that violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other countries’ sovereignty and security, and any interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext.”

She urged Washington to “choose a course of action conducive to peace and stability” in the region, stressing that disputes should be resolved through lawful, multilateral frameworks rather than unilateral measures or military posturing.

In the region, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has also intensified his calls for a high-level security dialogue involving the United States, China and regional partners to defuse the growing crisis.

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro delivers a speech in Cali, Colombia, on Friday. Photo: AFP

Petro said he wants Mexico and Colombia to play central roles in any talks and has invited China to participate.

The proposal follows a series of US air and naval operations in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific targeting drug-smuggling vessels, which regional governments say have raised fears of a broader confrontation.

Tensions escalated further over the weekend when the US Federal Aviation Administration warned commercial pilots to “exercise extreme caution” in Venezuelan airspace because of worsening security conditions and heightened military activity.

The advisory, issued late on Friday, said unspecified threats “could pose a potential risk to aircraft at all altitudes”, prompting several international airlines to cancel or suspend flights to Caracas.

By Sunday, carriers including Iberia, TAP Air Portugal, LatAm, Avianca, Gol and Caribbean Airlines had halted services indefinitely, according to the Venezuelan Airlines Association. Turkish Airlines said it would suspend flights from Monday to Wednesday.

The US Department of Defence also announced on Monday that General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Donald Trump’s top military adviser, is visiting troops in Puerto Rico who have been conducting counternarcotics operations off the Venezuelan coast.

It would be Caine’s second visit to the island. In September, he visited Puerto Rico with Secretary of War Hegseth, days after the arrival of US Marine ships for what the Pentagon described as “training exercises”.

Caine is considered one of the masterminds behind Operation Southern Spear.

South China Morning Post

15. Space-Guided Supremacy: How China’s Satellite Systems Strengthen its Missile and Hypersonic Forces

Summary:

China has fused Beidou navigation, GEO/LEO ISR, mega-constellations and counterspace tools into a space-enabled kill web that sharpens missile and hypersonic strikes, eroding U.S. advantages. Washington counters with proliferated LEO networks, while Chinese space exports build dependencies. Outcome hinges on integration, norms and future crisis stability and management.

Excerpts:

China has combined its satellite systems into a powerful force multiplier for missile and hypersonic capabilities. These include BDS-3 for precision, GEO/LEO ISR for persistent targeting, mega-constellations for reliable communication, and counterspace tools to block enemy vision. This space-guided supremacy is a moving target that the United States is trying to stop with its own spread-out architectures, while many other countries are quickly building their own capabilities. The winner of the contest will not be determined by a single satellite or test, but by who can integrate sensors, shooters, networks, and decision systems the fastest while still making the domain usable.

China has already shown that it can change markets, challenge the U.S. as the world’s top power, and make partnerships in space. For Washington and its allies, the challenge is to build resilience, interoperability, and shared situational awareness in orbit without accelerating escalation risks. This requires investing in joint space governance mechanisms, multinational early-warning architectures, and transparent operational norms that deter miscalculation. Sustainable cooperation and controlled competition must coexist if space is to remain a strategic enabler rather than an uncontrollable battleground of the future. Washington and its allies need to out-innovate and out-network each other, but they don’t want to turn the heavens into a permanent battlefield.

Space-Guided Supremacy: How China’s Satellite Systems Strengthen its Missile and Hypersonic Forces

by Tahir Azad

11.25.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/25/space-guided-supremacy-china-satellite-missile-hypersonic/

Introduction

A decade ago, talk of “space dominance” meant the United States and, increasingly, Russia. The strategic picture is now clearly three-polar, and in many mission areas, it’s even two-polar. The U.S. and China are now in a fast-paced race to control the high ground of orbit. Beijing’s growing satellite networks, which include navigation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and missile early warning, are creating a “kill web” in space that makes it easier for the PLA’s missile and hypersonic forces to find and shoot down targets.

Beijing views space integration as the key to achieving information dominance and missile precision, giving it a decisive edge in both deterrence and strike capability. This matters because space superiority now underpins strategic stability, early warning, and real-time targeting, allowing China to combine cyber, electronic, and kinetic domains into a unified warfare network. The United States increasingly fears that China’s space-enabled precision warfare could neutralize traditional U.S. advantages in command, control, communications, intelligence, and missile defense. Top officials in the U.S. Space Force have warned about a “mind-boggling” Chinese military buildup that could upset the balance of deterrence and shorten decision-making times in a crisis.

Beidou, Precision Strike, and the Shift to Space-Guided Warfare

China’s integration of it’s satellite architecture with advanced missile systems is at the heart of this change. The BeiDou-3 (BDS-3) global navigation network now offers very accurate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). Official papers and technical evaluations show that the PPP-B2b service is broadcasting from GEO with real-time positioning accurate to the decimeter level (after convergence). It is supported by inter-satellite links and short-message service. These are features that go beyond a basic GPS equivalent and can be used for both precision strikes and re-targeting.

China has also built a lot of electro-optical, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), and electronic-intelligence (ELINT) satellites that speed up the find-fix-finish process. Ludi Tance-4, the world’s first GEO-based SAR, and Yaogan-41, a high-resolution GEO optical platform, together give us constant, weather-independent views of large ocean and coastal areas. This is a big step up from episodic LEO overflights. Independent studies say that Ludi Tance-4 has a SAR resolution of about 20 meters and that Yaogan-41 might have an optical resolution of a meter or more. The mission is officially “civil”, but the performance, orbit, and program lineage are all in line with PLA ISR. Together, these platforms fuse imagery and signals intelligence into a seamless targeting web that enables rapid detection, tracking, and strike coordination across maritime and terrestrial theatres, fundamentally enhancing China’s precision-strike readiness and operational tempo.

Yaogan-30 satellites, which are often launched in groups of three, are thought to do ELINT and geolocate ships by measuring the time and angle difference of arrival of their radio emissions (similar to the U.S. NOSS). They are used for ocean surveillance and anti-ship targeting. This network tells other sensors and shooters what to do, which lets them kill moving targets like carrier groups and logistics convoys. At the same time, open-source analysts link the Tongxin Jishu Shiyan (TJS) series in GEO to missile early-warning tests(Huoyan-1) and signals intelligence, which is another part of a growing strategic ISR and warning system.

Hypersonic Strike Integration and the Kill-Web Advantage

China is also working on communications that spread out in LEO. The state-run Guowang (China SatNet) broadband mega-constellation, which is supposed to have about 12,992–13,000 spacecraft, has had several launch batches since late 2024. By mid-2025, at least eight batches had been reported, and dozens of spacecraft were already in orbit. This creates a sovereign alternative to Starlink with direct dual-use implications for resilient PLA command, control, and autonomy. China’s larger LEO push also includes more “ten-thousand-star” projects, like Qianfan/Thousand Sails, that are meant to speed up coverage and make China less dependent on foreign networks.

This orbital structure is what has allowed the PLA to change from a straight “kill chain” to a moving “kill web”. Chinese missile units can find, follow, and hit moving naval or land targets much faster thanks to near-real-time targeting across the Indo-Pacific. According to U.S. reports, the PLA has deployed the DF-17 medium-range missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), the DF-26 IRBM (including anti-ship variants) extends hold-at-risk ranges, and a longer-range DF-27 is said to have been tested in 2023 and talked about in U.S. government reports as being able to do both. The ISR and PNT data from China’s growing satellite network, which turns speed into deadly accuracy, is what makes these systems work. At the same time, Beijing is deploying a counterspace toolkit to protect its own networks and stop or disrupt an enemy’s space services: direct-ascent ASAT testing legacy, jamming/spoofing, cyber, and rendezvous/proximity operations (RPO) in space. The Secure World Foundation and CSIS do yearly evaluations of China’s demonstrations in almost every major counterspace category.

They also warn that non-destructive effects, like uplink/downlink jamming, dazzling, and cyber, are already a steady-state feature of competition. Security in the aerospace industry co-orbital capabilities are not just ideas: In 2022, Shijian-21 did a widely watched grapple-and-tow of a dead satellite to a graveyard orbit. This was useful for getting rid of debris, but it also showed that dual-use RPO works. Washington’s growing worry can be traced back to a number of technological trends. First, GEO ISR at scale (SAR + optics) provides imaging that last all the time and in all kinds of weather over huge areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is perfect for cueing salvos of DF-26/DF-27, timing land attacks and anti-ship strikes, and keeping track of logistics that are spread out. Second, proliferated LEO broadband (Guowang , Qianfan) aims to provide resilient C2 for distributed forces and unmanned swarms, mirroring lessons from Starlink’s battlefield utility in Ukraine that Chinese defense writings have studied closely. Third, hypersonic-space integration, which includes BDS-3 PNT, space-based ISR cueing, and early warning for missiles, makes it possible to quickly change targets and make decisions more quickly, which increases the risk of instability in a crisis. Finally, on-orbit servicing and inspection (like SJ-21) makes normal capabilities that could be used to grapple, tug, or nudge in a conflict.

Orbital Diplomacy and the Export of Space Power

China’s strategy goes beyond it’s own capabilities to include what is known as “orbital diplomacy”. Beijing sells satellites, launch services, ground infrastructure, financing, and training through China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and other state-owned businesses. Pakistan’s PRSS-1 and PakTES-1A, Nigeria’s NigComSat-1R (the replacement for NigComSat-1), Venezuela’s VRSS-2, Algeria’s Alcomsat-1 (with two control stations and operator training in China), Laos’s LaoSat-1, Belarus’s Belintersat-1, and Egypt’s MisrSat-2 (with local assembly and training) are all examples. The package usually includes everything from hardware to launch to ground segment to people, making them dependent on Chinese standards and ecosystems for a long time. Journalistic and policy reporting says that more than 20 African countries now have active space partnerships with China, which combine technology with training and, in some cases, access to data.

This has raised concerns in Washington about the use of these technologies for both military and civilian purposes. By exporting space infrastructure, China extends its strategic footprint, binding partner nations into long-term technological dependencies that translate into diplomatic leverage and influence across emerging geopolitical frontiers.

China has turned orbit into a thriving space economy at home. In 2024, there were a record number of launches (about 68 attempted/orbital launches), and about 257 spacecraft were deployed by Chinese operators, most of which are commercial. This shows activity from both the government and private sector. The global space economy is worth about $570 billion in 2023, with about 80% of that coming from businesses. Private companies like Land Space, Galactic Energy, and iSpace are working on methalox propulsion and reusability. It is clear what this means: satellites and launches aren’t just strategic tools; they’re also growing industries that make China’s tech presence around the world even bigger.

Beijing has strategically weakened what was once thought to be an American monopoly on important orbital services. The U.S. no longer has an unchallenged edge in precision PNT(BDS-3), exquisite ISR (China has unique GEO SAR and GEO optical assets), or sovereign broadband low-Earth orbit (LEO) networks (Guowang/Qianfan). U.S. officials are increasingly calling China and Russia “pacing threats”, with Beijing’s space build-up being the most dynamic.

The U.S. Response: Proliferation, Resilience, and Distributed Space Networks

Washington’s response is to focus on growth and strength. The Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) is sending hundreds of LEO satellites into space to provide global missile warning and tracking (including hypersonic), low-latency data relay, and battle management. At the same time, the Missile Defense Agency’s HBTSS adds fire-control-quality infrared. The first launches of these programs took place in early 2024 and continued through 2025 (Tranche-1 milestones). This was part of a U.S. plan to fight through attacks. It is easy to see why: a big, spread-out LEO swarm is harder to blind or kill than a small number of high-quality GEO assets, and it also lowers latency in areas where there is competition.

This combination of space and missile technologies is already changing how the world plans its defenses. Persistent ISR and high-speed C2 make crisis stability worse because they make decisions faster and make it more tempting to strike first, whether to disarm ISR nodes or missile units. Counterspace actions like jamming, dazzling, cyber, and RPO “bumping” could be misunderstood and lead to more trouble. Maritime denial depends on space-enabled targeting: with strong cues from Yaogan and other sensors, the DF-26 family can threaten U.S. bases and carriers all the way to the Second Island Chain; a more complex ISR web makes terminal accuracy and salvo timing better.

The U.S. Department of War says that both sides are now fighting for PNT. With BDS-3 global, both sides are putting money into receivers that can withstand jamming, multi-constellation chips, and backups on land and in low Earth orbit. As longer-range Chinese systems, like DF-27 HGV profiles, come into play, homeland and allied defense calculations are changing. This has led to more interest in layered counters (SM-6 afloat; even PAC-3MSE at sea in experimental planning) that are backed up by space-based tracking. With co-orbital “inspectors”, GEO ISR, and mega-constellations, norms and risks in GEO are growing. If there aren’t shared norms for RPO and interference, accidents or secret actions could quickly get worse.

More countries are developing their own space capabilities, not just the U.S. and China. India’s Chandrayaan-3 made the first soft landing near the lunar south pole on August 23, 2023. It is also adding new satellites (NVS-02 launched January 29, 2025) and L1 support to NavIC, which strengthens PNT sovereignty. Japan landed SLIM on January 20, 2024, to show off its ability to land precisely. QZSS/CLAS adds centimeter-level accuracy, showing how important precise navigation services are. The UAE’s Hope Mars mission, South Korea’s Danuri lunar orbiter, and Iran’s Noor-2/3 show that even small programs can have military-related aspects like ISR, communications, and prestige. This wider participation creates new markets and security problems: more satellites to protect (and maybe target), more ground stations, more data flows across borders, and more partners for both Washington and Beijing to court. China’s export model is not just about hardware; it also includes financing, launching, building infrastructure on the ground, and human training. Contracts often include ground control stations and training (like Algeria’s Alcomsat-1) and sometimes even co-development and assembly (like Egypt’s MisrSat-2) to help local ecosystems while tying partners into Chinese supply chains and standards. This is strategic statecraft by other means, and Western officials are worried about the possible data-sharing and dual-use effects. What’s going to happen next? Space is the center of gravity for modern strikes. The PLA’s missiles and hypersonic get a lot of their power from space-based sensing and guidance.

Expect more money to be spent on GEO persistence, LEO density, and AI-assisted fusion to speed up cueing. Guowang/Qianfan-class networks will support distributed C2, autonomy, and resilient communications. Protecting and disrupting them will be a top priority in the first week of war.

Space proliferation and resilience are better than delicate vulnerability. The U.S. shift to PWSA + HBTSS shows how to deal with attacks: spread out, reassemble, go around damage, and close the loop from orbit to shooter. Counterspace is now a part of everyday life. Jamming, dazzling, cyber, and RPO will all be steady-state tools. Militaries need to plan for degraded space as the norm, which includes multi-constellation PNT and hardened receivers. It is important to follow the rules and stay within the lines. As co-orbital inspectors and GEO ISR crowd the same lanes, the chances of making a mistake go up. RPO behavior, laser illumination, and interference reporting need to be given immediate attention.

In conclusion

China has combined its satellite systems into a powerful force multiplier for missile and hypersonic capabilities. These include BDS-3 for precision, GEO/LEO ISR for persistent targeting, mega-constellations for reliable communication, and counterspace tools to block enemy vision. This space-guided supremacy is a moving target that the United States is trying to stop with its own spread-out architectures, while many other countries are quickly building their own capabilities. The winner of the contest will not be determined by a single satellite or test, but by who can integrate sensors, shooters, networks, and decision systems the fastest while still making the domain usable.

China has already shown that it can change markets, challenge the U.S. as the world’s top power, and make partnerships in space. For Washington and its allies, the challenge is to build resilience, interoperability, and shared situational awareness in orbit without accelerating escalation risks. This requires investing in joint space governance mechanisms, multinational early-warning architectures, and transparent operational norms that deter miscalculation. Sustainable cooperation and controlled competition must coexist if space is to remain a strategic enabler rather than an uncontrollable battleground of the future. Washington and its allies need to out-innovate and out-network each other, but they don’t want to turn the heavens into a permanent battlefield.

Tags: China, China strategic influence, co-orbital systems, Counterspace, hypersonic, Missile Defense, Satellites, Space Domain, U.S. - China Relations

About The Author

Tahir Azad
Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. He previously served as an Affiliate Researcher at King’s College London and held fellowships at Sandia National Laboratories (USA), the University of Bristol, the University of Georgia USA, the Graduate Institute Geneva, ISDP Stockholm, and PRIF Germany. He completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Leicester and holds a PhD in Strategic & Nuclear Studies from National Defence University (NDU), Pakistan. Azad also worked as a Research Fellow and Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), Pakistan. His research focuses on nuclear politics, missile proliferation, China’s military modernisation, politics & security in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East regions, and South Asian strategic affairs.

16. Aid Policy in East Africa Needs an Endgame

Summary:

East Africa’s aid regime sustains refugees but not solutions. Violence, revenge economies, and high fertility drive endless displacement while camp policies block jobs and integration and fuel dependency, corruption, and resource violence. He urges an “endgame” that centers security, integration, and refugee-led governance and employment to build independence.

Comment: Chart at the link.

Aid Policy in East Africa Needs an Endgame

by Daniel Gregorio

11.25.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/25/aid-policy-in-east-africa-needs-an-endgame/

“Run.” The Ugandan worker took off in an awkward waddle and a cloud of dust. Before me stood a ragtag group of South Sudanese soldiers on the side of the road wearing gym shorts, pistol belts, flip flops, and a few surprisingly new uniforms. I quickly spun and retook my place as the only foreigner – or “muzungu” – on a bus from Kampala, Uganda, to Juba, South Sudan.

This summer, I travelled through three large-scale refugee camps, two intrastate conflict zones, and six frontier border crossings. I interviewed 12 refugees and consulted with dozens of locals concerning nearby conflicts and foreign aid policies. Interview participants completed a consent form, and the data were anonymized. A breakdown of participants is included in the appendix.

The refugees I interviewed exemplified resilience despite horrific life stories. The little stability and nourishment they knew came from foreign aid programs. But the foreign aid programs I encountered didn’t address the root causes of the refugee crisis: security issues driving displacement, and reintegration. Even in host nation camps, refugees are subject to violence and unable to secure jobs. With no clear endgame, foreign aid creates increasing dependency.

Perpetual Refugee Growth

East Africa’s political complexity and economic straits fuel violence that drives displacement. The number of differentiated armed groups and the resulting violence is difficult to fathom. Peace deals mean little, and militias fracture constantly. Child soldiering and mass rape are used by militias and national armies. Conflict has doubled Africa’s refugee population since 2018. Every refugee I met was displaced by violence.

The refugees interviewed said the pattern of conflict is motivated by revenge cycles and stable incomes. A refugee in Kyangwali told me, “Militias are the best jobs.” Other interviews supported this claim, stating that militias receiving foreign funds offer even better compensation. In contrast, South Sudanese guides mentioned that national soldiers feed their families by collecting meager bribes, despite serving since childhood. A refugee from the DRC said that similar conditions led to soldiers handing out weapons to encourage racketeering.

Malnourished kids in a village near Mgahinga. Source: Author

In much of the countryside, armed militias blend into tribal hierarchies. Family obligations to defend honor and land spiral into generational conflicts. Two refugees I met in Kakuma had fled violence from their extended family. One girl left Uvira, DRC, at 5 years old because her mother was from the wrong tribe. Her father’s family claimed he had created “evil blood” and tried to murder his children. Another man from Cibitoke, Burundi, had fled when his father was murdered by his uncles to steal the father’s land. Being male, this refugee was perceived as a threat to the land and forced to flee. His sisters stayed to marry into another family’s land.

Refugees understand the importance of conflict drivers. Some interview participants even suggested that funding should be allocated to security programs instead of their own camps. But peacekeeping interventions often fail, and ending wars may not reduce displacement from tribal and familial violence. Without solutions for peace and stability, the migrant crisis will worsen, and aid policies will remain unsustainable.

In addition to displacement, refugee populations grow from high fertility rates. In border towns and refugee camps, sons are seen as crucial to farming and controlling land, while daughters are married for valuable dowries. Many refugees I met had half a dozen kids while subsisting on food distributions. High fertility contributes to malnutrition and Kwashiorkor disease. High rates of displacement and fertility perpetuate the refugee crisis faster than aid can solve it.

Integration Failure

Once displaced, East Africa’s aid programs fail to address refugee integration. Kenya limits refugees’ ability to leave camps and compete for jobs with locals. Kakuma’s refugees are left dependent on UN food distributions and NGO services. Kenya’s Shirika plan promises refugee integration but faces implementation issues. In Kyangwali, refugees farm, raise cattle, and trade with each other. They leave camp to find work, but often return due to discrimination. Stuck in an impoverished area, leaders devote resources to securing international funding for basic services.

Refugees need jobs to survive and create a sense of purpose. As psychologist Viktor Frankl argues, meaning is essential for mental health and resilience. Lacking jobs, refugees rely on aid and are deprived of meaning. But integration takes decades and is limited by host country politics and the fragility of local economies. Without independence, refugees remain victims of circumstance and are subject to unstable aid policies.

An Artificial Industry

For host countries, foreign aid funds an artificial industry. In Kenya in 2022, over 71,000 people were employed by NGOs. At this scale, aid becomes a fragile pillar of the local economy. A USAID contractor I met in Juba hadn’t heard from her new State Department supervisors in weeks but planned to work until funds ran out. A Kenyan NGO staffer expected to lose her job due to donor cuts. Locals told me that high NGO wages inflate prices around refugee camps, making it harder for refugees to survive independently.

In Kakuma, budget cuts and inequality fuel systemic violence. A differentiated food distribution system was built to favor vulnerable refugees. But interviews indicate that relatively wealthy refugees receive more, while single parents and the disabled get less. Refugee leaders reported multiple suicides and weekly attacks over resources, especially targeting those few refugees with jobs. I was shown multiple images of stab wounds and witnessed one refugee going to work with a gash on his head. With aid shrinking and jobs disappearing, every refugee I spoke to predicted worsening resource violence, in line with claims by the UN Relief Chief.

Refugee Independence

Despite their plight, many refugees strive for independence by starting small businesses and community-based organizations (CBOs). They elect leaders to represent them to host countries, the UN, and international NGOs. Many take what local jobs they can find and dream of working in Western countries to send remittances home.

Kyangwali meat market. Source: Author.

CBO leaders were especially inspiring, pouring their energy into funding proposals and services for their neighbors despite budget cuts and camp violence. When asked about these problems, one leader in Kakuma said, “For me, I have hope as long as I am still breathing.” After enduring some of life’s most horrific experiences, all refugees need is a chance to move on and policies that will allow them to do so.

Without peace or integration, aid cultivates reliance. Aid organizations face historic budget cuts, layoffs, and shuttered programs, leaving millions of refugees with shrinking food rations, few jobs, and violence. But the refugees that the aid system was built to help can become part of a sustainable solution. Hiring refugees instead of host country nationals would reduce economic reliance on aid, create purpose and integration, and stimulate policy solutions from people with motivation and lived experience.

Refugee leaders navigate daily security issues in multicultural camps, developing peace and mediation skills. They are uniquely suited to join policy efforts targeting the conflicts that created them. Refugee-led governance initiatives could augment interventions and local stability, while creating a path to resettlement. With policies targeting peace and integration, refugee independence is possible.

Classroom in Kyangwali at a school started by a refugee. Source: Author.

The humanitarians working in East Africa are heroes. The money and policies behind them have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. But aid has not stemmed the region’s flow of refugees or created integration. For aid to be sustainable, refugees need strategies for security and resettlement. Forming such policies is a daunting task, but without them, foreign aid will be throwing good money after altruistic money, and watching refugees starve all the same. East Africa’s foreign aid should not be cut, but it does need an endgame. Refugees should help build it.

Appendix:

ParticipantOriginLocation NowReason

for FleeingPredominant ViewsP1

Server

Age: ~30

Goma, DRCGoma (M23 Control)Finances prevent fleeing.Conflict has hurt their income.P2

Security Guard

Age: ~ 30

Goma, DRCGoma (M23 Control)Finances prevent fleeing.Conflict has hurt their income.P3

Student

Age: 19

Goma, DRCGisenyi, RwandaViolence against friends and family.Afraid of being drafted to the Congolese Army. Thinks better rule of law under M23.P4

Student

Age: 23

RwandaGoma (M23 Control)Unable to leave – unable to discuss reason.M23 has better rule of law and better security. Classes and transportation limitations hindering studies.P5

Business Owner

Age: 38

Goma, DRCGisenyi, RwandaMaltreatment from state forces (FARDC).M23 has better rule of law and better security. Business access became worse after the M23 takeover but slowly improving.P6

CBO Founder

Age: 29

Goma, DRCKyangwaliFled violence/corruption – said local Congolese soldiers started rackets by giving guns to gangs.Believes foreign groups giving weapons and fostering local conflicts to enable mineral trade.P7

CBO Manager

Age: 26

Rutshuru, DRCKyangwaliFriends recruited or killed by Mai-Mai, FDLR, Nyatura, M23.Militias offer revenge and the best available job. Politicians send families abroad and don’t care to fix it.P8

Pharmacist

Age: 37

Central African RepublicKakumaFled local tribal violence and Wagner Recruitments via government.Thinks conflict will never end due to religious and tribal differences. Foreigners exploit local conflicts for resources.P9

CBO Founder

Age: 32

Baraka, DRCKakumaP9’s brother was blamed for a local attack on an orphanage. They fled fearing revenge from the village.Problems with locals implementing aid policies. Money needed to resolve conflicts in home countries to facilitate returns.P10

Student/Teacher

Age: 21

Uvira, DRCKakumaFather’s family was intent on murdering his wife and children for marrying the wrong tribe. Believed it created “evil blood”.Moved to Kakuma at 5 years old. Feels hopeless of ever leaving the camp. Feels lack of identity with Congo or Kenya.P11

Elected Leader

Age: 37

Cibitoke, BurundiKakumaFather was killed by relatives who wanted his land. P11 had to flee as a male who could retake the land. His sisters could stay because they married into another family’s land.Focused on providing for the refugee neighborhood that elected him. Looking for funding and resources. Preoccupied with security issues in the camp due to gangs competing for resources.P12

Hospital Clerk

Age: 27

Uvira, DRCKakumaP12’s father and brother were killed by local militias.Thinks root of conflict in Kivu is lack of identity, Rwandans born in Congo should be Congolese and cut ties with Rwanda. Believes Mai Mai are just trying to defend themselves from M23 and Rwandan funded aggression. Thinks the refugee crisis needs refugee led policy building.

Tags: Africa, civil and ethnic conflicts, Conflict Analysis, Foreign Aid, humanitarian, humanitarian aid, refugees, Sustainability

About The Author

Daniel Gregorio
Daniel Gregorio is a former U.S. Army officer and researcher focused on international development and security policy. He is based in Washington, D.C.
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/daniel-g-b47542123/

17. Book Review | Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice

Summary:

Praises McRaven’s Spec Ops as the foundational theory of special operations, built from eight case studies and his concept of relative superiority achieved through simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. Notes limits on long-duration post-9/11 missions but concludes the book remains essential for SOF practitioners and scholars.

Comment: A view from Romania. This is an important book that only describes one side of SOF (though it is the 90% known "half" of SOF). Admiral McRaven has provided a very useful theory of direct action and surgical strike capability especially how a smaller force can overcome a larger one.

For the other side of SOF we need COL Mark Boyatt's Special Forces: A Unique National Asset "through, with and by". This provides the special warfare side of special operations.

https://www.amazon.com/Special-Forces-Unique-National-through/dp/1478770821

Here is a description of COL Boyatt's book from my "research assistant" (AI)

"Special Forces: A Unique National Asset: Through, with and by" is the title of a 2016 book by U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Mark D. Boyatt. The phrase "through, with, and by" describes a U.S. Special Forces doctrine of working with local forces to achieve objectives. It means Special Forces advise, train, and support local partners to conduct operations, rather than engaging in frontline combat themselves.

The "through, with, and by" doctrine

Through: Special Forces operate through local partners, who are the main actors, while Special Forces advise and assist them.
With: Special Forces work alongside local forces, operating directly with them in the campaign.
By: Special Forces support local forces from a distance with training, equipment, and intelligence, but are not directly involved in combat.

The book "Special Forces: A Unique National Asset"

Author: Colonel Mark D. Boyatt.
Topic: It explores the history and methods of U.S. Special Forces, particularly unconventional warfare.
Significance: It is considered an insider's guide to the Green Berets and is used as a resource for both military and civilian leaders interested in national security.

I used both books (among many others) in my class on "Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for Policy Makers and Strategists."

Book Review | Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice

by Ciprian Clipa

11.24.2025 at 05:33pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/24/book-review-spec-ops-case-studies-in-special-operations-warfare-theory-and-practice/

Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice.By William H. McRaven. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996. ISBN: 978-0891416005. Pp. 432. $17.49 at time of review.

William H. McRaven’s Spec Ops is a classic of military theory that fills a notable gap in strategic thought. As McRaven himself notes, military literature spans from Kahn’s nuclear deterrence to Liddell Hart’s indirect approach and Clausewitz’s friction of war, yet “nowhere is there a theory of special operations.”

This absence is striking because special operations systematically defy Clausewitz’s principle that superior numbers determine battle outcomes. McRaven’s work offers the first sustained explanation of why small, specialized forces can defeat larger, entrenched enemies. Comparing eight classic operations, from the German glider assault on Fort Eben Emael in 1940 to the Israeli raid at Entebbe in 1976, McRaven develops his relative superiority theory, the moment of decision at which a weaker force gains and retains superiority over a larger enemy. Spec Ops became required reading among soldiers, policy officials, and scholars in search of a realistic account of why David can, and does, defeat Goliath in modern warfare.

A United States Navy SEAL officer and early graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict curriculum (now the Defense Analysis Department), McRaven bases his theory on detailed case studies of World War II through the 1970s. Based on official reports, declassified materials, and interviews with mission planners and participants, he develops rigorous and compelling examinations of each operation. This multi-source method enables him to examine not only what occurred, but why, by analyzing the links between planning, preparation, and execution across various operational settings.

McRaven’s case studies effectively demonstrate how his six principles operate under real-world conditions. Not surprisingly, he does not limit himself to successes: the United States raid at Son Tay exemplifies both the power and limitations of his framework. The mission achieved near-flawless tactical execution in harmony with his principles. Yet it failed to yield strategic effects due to an intelligence gap; the POWs had been relocated weeks earlier. This case illustrates how even near-flawless execution can be reversed by the war’s friction, particularly the ambiguity surrounding time-sensitive intelligence, revealing an inherent constraint on what tactical excellence alone can achieve.

McRaven’s core argument is that special operations succeed when they rapidly achieve relative superiority. He identifies six principles that enable this outcome: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. These principles, when applied effectively, reduce what Clausewitz called the friction of war to manageable levels. Supporting this framework is the concept of the area of vulnerability, the window of maximum exposure between mission launch and the attainment of relative superiority. By charting this period with his relative superiority graphs, McRaven gives planners a tool for visualizing and compressing risk. The rescue mission of Mussolini from Gran Sasso in 1943 is a classic example: McRaven’s graph demonstrates that Skorzeny’s nine-man glider force obtained relative superiority within four minutes of landing, though it had to deal with 250 Italian guards. The period of vulnerability included a mere 12 percent of the mission schedule, showing how speed and surprise can establish a decisive advantage even for a numerically inferior force.

McRaven’s Relative Superiority Graph for the Rescue of Mussolini mission

The greatest strength of Spec Ops lies in this theoretical innovation. McRaven takes a series of bold raids and weaves it into a unifying explanation of not only what was done but why it was done. His combination of theory, diagram/graphs, and eyewitness evidence closes the gap between scholarship and practice, and the resulting book is simultaneously intellectually rich and operationally informative.

Although the book is equally intense and detailed, there are caveats. Tactical details in some of the case studies might overwhelm broader strategic insights, potentially putting off readers less familiar with military operations. German, Italian, British, American, and Israeli examples become exhaustive, with less-studied Soviet or Asian strategies remaining unexploited. McRaven’s principles might also sound over-deterministic, negating the influence of luck, technological superiority, or enemy miscalculations; factors that sometimes matter as much as planning and execution.

More significantly, the book’s 1995 publication date limits its applicability to post-9/11 special operations. McRaven explicitly acknowledges that “holding actions are not conducive to special operations” because they require maintaining relative superiority for extended periods. His theory centers on rapid raids—operations lasting minutes or hours, not weeks or months. Yet post-9/11 conflicts involved precisely what his framework struggles to address: village stability operations, combat outposts, and multi-month partnered campaigns. The contrast is stark: the Son Tay raid lasted 26 minutes on target with complete withdrawal, while forces in Mosul or Raqqa sustained operations for years. The theory excels at explaining discrete strikes like the 2011 bin Laden raid (Operation Neptune Spear), but offers limited guidance for the long-duration, presence-based missions that characterized much of NATO SOF’s recent operations (Afghanistan, Iraq).

Despite these caveats, Spec Ops remains a landmark study. Its lessons continue to shape SOF education and doctrine, and McRaven’s later leadership of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden underscores the durability of his insights. But new challenges, such as operations against near-peer competitors with integrated air defenses, cyber-enabled missions which merge physical and digital domains, and counter-drone operations, require updated applications of his principles. For military professionals, the framework offers practical guidance for high-risk missions; for scholars, it provides a rare example of theory built inductively from history; and for general readers, it delivers compelling narratives of some of the most audacious operations of the twentieth century.

Tags: Carl von Clausewitz, Friction of war, McRaven, Military strategy, Relative superiority theory, Spec Ops, Special Operations Forces, Special operations theory

About The Author

Ciprian Clipa
LCDR Ciprian Clipa is a Romanian Special Operations Forces officer with over a decade of distinguished SOF service and is currently pursuing a Master of Science in Defense Analysis, majoring in Irregular Warfare, at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His research focuses on the role of SOF in countering Russian hybrid threats in the Black Sea region, with particular emphasis on Romania.

18. Drones Aren’t Antithetical to Maneuver Warfare—They’re the Key to Unleashing its Effectiveness

Summary:

Drones complement, not contradict, maneuver warfare. Properly integrated, they give units real-time ISR, precision strikes, electronic warfare and mass at low cost, boosting tempo, initiative and mission command even in contested airspace. Over-focusing on counter-drone defenses risks ceding initiative instead of arming maneuver forces with decisive robotic capabilities.

Excerpt:

Future conflicts are likely to be characterized by a contested air domain, cyber domain, and electromagnetic spectrum. Adversaries will seek to disrupt the Army’s ability to project power and sustain operations. Offensive drone capabilities can help mitigate these challenges by providing flexible and resilient options for engaging the enemy. The diffusion of drone technology today is in fact a revolution in warfare in that the commanders of the future will have the potential to access more information than ever before. Far from being misaligned with the Army’s way of war, therefore, drones can amplify our strengths in tempo, initiative, and violence of action to ensure that maneuver forces retain their asymmetric advantage. By integrating drones into its operations, the Army can preserve its ability to dictate the terms to our adversaries, adapt to emerging threats, and achieve decisive outcomes on the battlefield. The Army should embrace the transformative potential of drones in the spirit of expeditionary and offensive operations while leveraging emerging technologies to maintain dominance in an increasingly complex and contested operational environment. The US way or war, which lives and breathes in how our platoons, batteries, and squadrons train, will be best preserved with maneuver on the future battlefield if leaders at echelons are armed with the technology that is changing warfare.

Drones Aren’t Antithetical to Maneuver Warfare—They’re the Key to Unleashing its Effectiveness - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Charlie Phelps · November 25, 2025

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/drones-arent-antithetical-to-maneuver-warfare-theyre-the-key-to-unleashing-its-effectiveness/

Drones won’t save us? That’s the argument Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe made in a recent MWI article urging caution as the US Army, reacting to the drone-saturated battlefields of the Russo-Ukrainian War, seeks to aggressively buy and integrate drones into its formations and operations. And their argument, that drones are misaligned with maneuver warfare, the Army’s preferred way of fighting, is compelling. They are correct to warn against learning the wrong lessons from Ukraine. Applying adoption-capacity theory, they question more broadly how innovation can clash with culture and urge resistance against the notion that drones are an all-purpose solution for retaining a decisive edge in modern land warfare. But in dismissing drones because they are misaligned with maneuver, their argument fails to recognize how these systems can be leveraged to amplify the Army’s strengths through increases in tempo, initiative, and precision. Their perspective overlooks the transformative potential of drones in supporting maneuver warfare and enhancing offensive capabilities, particularly in the context of future large-scale conflicts. Drones are not only compatible with the American way of war but are essential for maintaining dominance in future conflicts. Redirecting the Army’s focus toward countering enemy robotic systems risks rather than integrating its own means choosing not to arm maneuver formations with the very tools that will allow them to maneuver.

Revels and Uribe are correct in their fundamental assertion that maneuver warfare, as practiced by the Army, emphasizes rapid tempo, initiative, and the ability to disrupt adversaries through the offensive. But they follow this assertion by arguing that integrating drones into Army doctrine risks undermining these principles by shifting the Army toward the Russian preference for firepower and attrition. To be sure, Russian thinking, adaptations to doctrine, and application of emerging technologies like drones should not dictate that the US Army responds in kind. And they are correct in highlighting the Gulf War, the bombing campaign in Afghanistan, and the Yom Kippur War as examples highlighting the critical linkage between airpower and offensive maneuver that is foundational to the American way of war, which differs dramatically from Russia’s doctrinal preference for massed fires. It is incorrect, however, to assume that the Army’s current emphasis on the technical application of drones must naturally follow Russia’s in Ukraine and limit their use solely to improving firepower and “modernizing attrition.” The Army would be severely limiting the potential for drone application if planning and doctrine rest exclusively in one warfighting function. Drones at the tactical level can enhance maneuver warfare by providing real-time situational awareness to enable commanders to make faster and better-informed decisions. Drones can also act as a force multiplier, extending the reach and effectiveness of maneuver units without requiring a fundamental shift in doctrine.

One of the defining characteristics of maneuver warfare is the ability to act decisively in response to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Drones can provide unparalleled situational awareness, allowing commanders to visualize the battlespace in real time. Reconnaissance drones equipped with advanced sensors can identify enemy positions, track movements, and detect vulnerabilities that can allow maneuver forces to exploit gaps in the enemy’s defenses. This capability aligns perfectly with the principles of maneuver warfare, which prioritize initiative and the ability to seize opportunities as they arise. For example, during the Gulf War, the US Army’s “left hook” maneuver relied heavily on intelligence to identify weak points in Iraqi defenses. Drones could have further enhanced this operation by providing persistent surveillance and reducing reliance on slower, more vulnerable reconnaissance assets. To this point, drones will support the principals of mission command by providing commanders at echelon enhanced situational awareness and thereby facilitating decision-making and initiative. Imagine if H. R. McMaster, leading a formation integrated with piloted and autonomous drones, had conducted a deliberate attack at 73 Easting instead of a react to contact.

Drones can also act as force multipliers, enabling smaller units to achieve effects traditionally reserved for larger formations. For instance, loitering munitions and first-person-view strike-capable drones can provide precision-strike capabilities to maneuver units, allowing them to neutralize high-value targets without waiting for air or artillery support. Deployed en masse, drones can overwhelm enemy defenses, saturate airspace, and create openings for maneuver forces. These systems can be used to target enemy command-and-control nodes, logistics hubs, and artillery positions, disrupting the adversary’s ability to coordinate and sustain operations. By integrating offensive drone capabilities into maneuver units, the Army can achieve effects that were previously unattainable without extensive air support or long-range fires at a cost-to-kill ratio significantly lower than the application of precision-guided munitions. This capability is particularly valuable in contested environments where air superiority may be challenged, as it ensures that maneuver forces retain offensive options even in the absence of traditional airpower support. Additionally, drones can be used to deploy electronic warfare payloads, disrupt enemy communications, and create confusion, further enabling maneuver forces to exploit the chaos and maintain operational tempo. As seen in the conflict in Ukraine, the application of emerging technologies like drones are only constrained by the limits of users’ creativity.

Investing instead in countering enemy drones, such as integrated air defense systems and electronic warfare, reflects a defensive mindset that risks ceding the initiative to adversaries. While counterdrone technologies are undoubtedly important, they should not come at the expense of offensive capability. In maneuver warfare, maintaining initiative is crucial. The ability to act faster than the enemy can respond often determines the outcome of engagements. Drones can help preserve initiative by enabling rapid and decentralized decision-making. We are not far from a future where small drones equipped with artificial intelligence can autonomously identify targets and execute strikes, reducing the time required to process information and act. Again, the decentralized nature of drone operations aligns with the Army’s emphasis on mission command, allowing subordinate units to act independently while adhering to the commander’s intent.

Future conflicts are likely to be characterized by a contested air domain, cyber domain, and electromagnetic spectrum. Adversaries will seek to disrupt the Army’s ability to project power and sustain operations. Offensive drone capabilities can help mitigate these challenges by providing flexible and resilient options for engaging the enemy. The diffusion of drone technology today is in fact a revolution in warfare in that the commanders of the future will have the potential to access more information than ever before. Far from being misaligned with the Army’s way of war, therefore, drones can amplify our strengths in tempo, initiative, and violence of action to ensure that maneuver forces retain their asymmetric advantage. By integrating drones into its operations, the Army can preserve its ability to dictate the terms to our adversaries, adapt to emerging threats, and achieve decisive outcomes on the battlefield. The Army should embrace the transformative potential of drones in the spirit of expeditionary and offensive operations while leveraging emerging technologies to maintain dominance in an increasingly complex and contested operational environment. The US way or war, which lives and breathes in how our platoons, batteries, and squadrons train, will be best preserved with maneuver on the future battlefield if leaders at echelons are armed with the technology that is changing warfare.

Major Charlie Phelps is a Special Forces officer and currently serves as a company commander in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with.

Image credit: Sgt. Eric Allen, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Charlie Phelps · November 25, 2025

19. A 15-Point Plan to Get to a Ukrainian-Russian Settlement

Summary:

Ryan Evans criticizes POTUS' 28 point Ukraine plan as front loading concessions and unworkable. He proposes a 15 point framework of principles on security, territory, humanitarian issues, reconstruction, and verification to structure talks. He stresses compellence: sustained military aid, sanctions, and clear red lines to push Moscow toward serious negotiations.

Conclusion:

None of this is about humiliating Russia for its own sake. It is about convincing the Kremlin that the status quo path leads to greater military risk, tighter economic constraints, and growing diplomatic isolation, while a settlement along the lines sketched above offers a way to lock in some security gains and avoid worse outcomes. If Washington rushes to front-load concessions simply to entice Moscow to the table, it will confuse inducement with unilateral concession and undermine the very compellence that gives diplomacy a chance to work. The tragic tradeoff is that compellence itself carries costs, especially for Ukrainians who continue to fight and suffer while pressure builds. The alternative, however, is a process that treats negotiations as a favor to Russia rather than as the least bad option it is forced to accept.

A 15-Point Plan to Get to a Ukrainian-Russian Settlement

warontherocks.com · November 25, 2025

Ryan Evans

November 25, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/a-15-point-plan-to-get-to-a-ukrainian-russian-settlement/

I do not know the origins of the Trump administration’s 28-point peace plan to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian War, but I can safely say it has caused quite a stir in Kyiv, in the capitals of our European military allies, and among American legislators — including many Senate Republicans who find the document at best risible and at worst a product of Russian authorship.

It also contains some oddities: There are references to START I, a treaty that no longer exists and has already been replaced. There are also holes you could drive a truck through — or even a swarm of drones — such as restricting Ukraine from firing long-range missiles at St. Petersburg and Moscow while saying nothing about rockets or drones.

Setting these aside, the more serious problem with the document is that it tries to settle major issues up front that should be settled only through sustained and serious negotiation. It would be much more effective to have a list of principles for negotiation that each side must agree to before real negotiations can actually proceed.

For example, the 28-point plan calls for the immediate withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donetsk to create a specific demilitarized buffer zone, when instead it should establish the principle that any ceasefire line may be provisional and distinct from questions of legal sovereignty, freezing positions to stop the fighting while deferring the final status of disputed territory to a separate, longer-term diplomatic track that will require difficult compromises from both sides. Instead of this approach, we see the president’s chief crisis diplomat (a different person from the secretary of state, it seems) trying to impose a fait accompli of sorts before Thanksgiving.

America’s European allies released their counter-proposal, which is essentially a pro-Ukraine version of the Witkoff plan. It keeps the structure of the original document (28 points, the “Board of Peace” chaired by President Donald Trump, the U.S. compensation), but it removes the provisions that amounted to a Ukrainian capitulation — such as demanding that Ukraine withdraw its forces from the approximately 14 percent of the Donbass it still holds and recognize Crimea and the Donbass as “de facto Russian territory.” While it is an improvement on the Witkoff plan, it will likely not be successful as the basis for the beginning of serious negotiations between the belligerents. So, beyond signaling Europe’s resolve to not have the White House’s or perhaps just Witkoff’s will simply imposed (admittedly an important exercise), it otherwise is not useful for negotiations.

The president’s strong desire for a ceasefire and to foster a serious and durable peace is a good one, as the human and economic costs have been enormous and it is unlikely that this war will be settled on the battlefield in the near- or mid-term, but Witkoff’s plan tries to do everything at once. In the face of so much serious opposition — including from its own political allies — perhaps the Trump administration is amenable to a different approach: one that builds momentum by getting to yes on easier concepts and broad principles before tackling the difficult details and most contested disputes.

In that spirit, I offer what principles I think (not what War on the Rocks thinks) Washington ought to be getting Kyiv and Moscow to commit to so that serious negotiations can proceed and succeed. What follows is not a peace treaty, but a set of principles that can get both belligerents to “yes” on structure, process, and some red lines without forcing any side to accept final outcomes in advance.

The right time for my proposed approach might not yet be here. The 28-point plan has already morphed into something else after Secretary Marco Rubio’s meeting with Ukrainian counterparts in Geneva. And it will likely morph again. Russia will probably refuse to engage with the 28 points (or the 19 points it may have been whittled down to) in their next form and there will be a need for a fresh start in the new year, when both sides see how well they have coped with the winter.

Please do not mistake the below for my personal views on how I want the war to end. International diplomacy in war is often about confronting tragic tradeoffs between justice, security, and the lives that can still be saved. This framework is meant to sketch how the United States could structure talks that are militarily realistic, politically survivable for both parties, and at least defensible to its own allies and public. At the end of this article, I close with some more thoughts about what may be required to get Russia to the table and how that is different from the Trump administration’s current approach.

BECOME A MEMBER

Security and Military Framework

1. Agenda for Mutual Security

Russia and Ukraine agree that the primary objective of the negotiation is to draft a mutual security arrangement in the form of a treaty that ensures neither state can threaten the political independence of the other. This is referred to hereafter as “final settlement.”

2. Limitations on Conventional Forces

Russia and Ukraine agree to the principle that the final settlement will establish specific ceilings on the size, type, and location of military personnel and heavy weaponry. These limits will be reciprocal and subject to verification.

3. Enforceable Security Architecture

As a part of the final settlement, Russia and Ukraine agree to negotiate a U.S.-brokered security architecture that moves beyond the non-binding assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. The new framework will prioritize enforceable guarantees, potentially involving third-party guarantor states with defined mandates.

4. Demilitarized and Buffer Zones

Russia and Ukraine agree to the principle of establishing demilitarized zones along the line of contact. The specific depth and governance of these zones will be determined during technical negotiations.

5. Strategic Stability and Nuclear Safety

Russia and Ukraine reaffirm their commitments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The final settlement will establish a specific protocol for nuclear energy facilities (including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant) to ensure their safety under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Territorial and Political Resolution

6. Separation of Ceasefire Lines from Border Recognition

Russia and Ukraine agree that any initial ceasefire will separate military lines of contact from questions of legal sovereignty and border recognition. Upon such a ceasefire, they commit to a “renunciation of force” principle under which military lines are frozen for the purpose of halting hostilities, without prejudice to either side’s legal positions, including Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. The final status of disputed territories will be addressed on a separate, longer-term diplomatic track, in which all parties acknowledge that a durable, final settlement will require difficult compromises.

7. Protection of Minority Rights

Russia and Ukraine commit to the principle that the final settlement must align with international standards (e.g., Council of Europe) regarding the protection of linguistic and cultural minorities, ensuring that domestic laws in both states reflect these rights.

Humanitarian and Legal Issues

8. Comprehensive Humanitarian Resolution

Russia and Ukraine agree to the objective of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war and the return of civilian detainees. A specific working group will be established immediately to establish a framework for the reunification of families and children.

9. Differentiated Justice Mechanism

As a part of a final settlement, Russia and Ukraine agree to distinguish between combatant amnesty and command responsibility. While a general amnesty for combatants can be negotiated to ensure peace, the parties agree that specific categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity will be addressed through a designated legal mechanism. However, both countries agree that their heads of state in charge during the war will be exempt from these investigations if a durable final settlement is secured.

Economic and Reconstruction Framework

10. International Reconstruction Investment

Upon final settlement, Ukraine will consent to an internationally managed reconstruction authority. To ensure sustainability, this authority will prioritize return on investment models rather than simple aid, utilizing legally cleared funding sources.

11. Strategic Energy and Resource Partnership

Ukraine agrees that the post-war economic architecture will include specific bilateral agreements with guarantor states (e.g., the United States) to develop, modernize, and secure critical energy infrastructure and strategic mineral resources.

12. Economic Normalization and Sanctions Relief

Russia agrees that the implementation of a peace treaty will be linked to a phased lifting of sanctions. Sanctions relief will not be immediate but will be conditional upon verified compliance with the treaty’s security provisions.

13. Freedom of Navigation and Critical Infrastructure

Upon final settlement, Russia and Ukraine will guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and access to international waterways, consistent with existing treaties, agreements, and international law.

Implementation and Verification

14. Independent Monitoring and Verification

Upon final settlement, Russia and Ukraine will agree to the creation of a robust, international monitoring mission (e.g., United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or a mixed commission) empowered to verify compliance with ceasefire lines, troop limitations, and heavy weapon withdrawals.

15. Dispute Resolution Mechanism

The parties agree to establish a standing joint commission to resolve disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the treaty, ensuring that minor violations do not lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

Some Final Notes on Setting the Stage for Negotiations

Some of these principles are not close to everything those of us who support Ukraine want to see. Perhaps the most difficult principle to accept for those who, like me, want to see Ukraine prevail will be the ninth, which proposes exempting Russian President Vladimir Putin from war crimes investigations if a final settlement is reached. He deserves to be in prison for the rest of his life. But the challenge now is getting meaningful negotiations to start at all. While the first principle listed above might seem underwhelming to some readers, it may be the most challenging for Moscow to accept because it requires the Kremlin to openly express willingness to give up on its maximalist war aims: the toppling of Ukraine’s government and its replacement with a Russian puppet.

Russia will only take negotiations seriously when the alternative looks worse. Getting to talks is not just a matter of drafting the right principles or finding the right mediator. It is a matter of compellence — of convincing Moscow that continuing the war will hurt it more than entering into a legitimate settlement.

The Trump administration has taken some steps in this direction, including tightening sanctions and making Russian oil exports to India more expensive. That is a start, but compellence has to be systemic rather than episodic.

Diplomatically, compellence means convincing Moscow that there is no better deal coming if it stalls, escalates, or seeks to crack Western unity. That requires consistent signals about what Washington will and will not accept, and a clear link between Russian behavior and the political, economic, and military pressure it faces. Every time the Trump administration suddenly hints it might recognize more of Moscow’s gains or force concessions on Kyiv, only to walk it back, it teaches the Kremlin that patience and intransigence are rewarded. That erodes the credibility of U.S. threats, makes assurances to Ukraine and European allies look contingent on the president’s mood, and turns diplomacy from an instrument of compellence into a series of disconnected gambits Moscow can try to game.

On the military side, any negotiation track will be meaningless if the Kremlin believes time is on its side. That means Washington and its allies should sustain a flow of assistance that preserves Ukraine’s ability to hold the line and, where possible, improve its position: intelligence support, air defense, long-range strike, electronic warfare, and the industrial support to keep ammunition and spare parts moving. The point is to deny Moscow confidence that a grinding war of attrition will eventually sort things out in its favor.

Economically, compellence means treating sanctions and export controls as tools to erode Russia’s long-term war potential and bargaining leverage, not just as a moral statement. That includes enforcing existing measures more ruthlessly, closing off the easy workarounds through third-country shipping, insurance, and financial intermediaries, and tightening controls on the components that feed Russia’s missile and drone production. On this front, the Trump administration’s resolve to get India off Russian oil has been positive. But it would also be productive to exert more pressure on the handful of states that are quietly enabling sanctions evasion. The goal is not to collapse the Russian economy overnight, which is not realistic, but to make clear that a long war leads to an inevitable strangling of Russia’s fiscal and technological base.

None of this is about humiliating Russia for its own sake. It is about convincing the Kremlin that the status quo path leads to greater military risk, tighter economic constraints, and growing diplomatic isolation, while a settlement along the lines sketched above offers a way to lock in some security gains and avoid worse outcomes. If Washington rushes to front-load concessions simply to entice Moscow to the table, it will confuse inducement with unilateral concession and undermine the very compellence that gives diplomacy a chance to work. The tragic tradeoff is that compellence itself carries costs, especially for Ukrainians who continue to fight and suffer while pressure builds. The alternative, however, is a process that treats negotiations as a favor to Russia rather than as the least bad option it is forced to accept.

BECOME A MEMBER

Ryan Evans is the founder of War on the Rocks.

Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · November 25, 2025

20. A Historic Resolution, an Unworkable Plan: The Uncertain Future of Gaza’s New Mandate

Summary:

UNSC Resolution 2803 creates a two year international administration and stabilization force for Gaza, signaling historic U.S. led engagement. Yet unclear mandates, reluctant troop contributors, Hamas and Israeli entrenchment, and shaky reconstruction financing risk entrenching division, echoing UNIFIL’s limits, and producing another stopgap absent a credible path to Palestinian statehood.

A Historic Resolution, an Unworkable Plan: The Uncertain Future of Gaza’s New Mandate

warontherocks.com · November 25, 2025

Jonathan Lincoln

November 25, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/a-historic-resolution-an-unworkable-plan-the-uncertain-future-of-gazas-new-mandate/

With the authorization of an international administration and stabilization force for Gaza, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803 marks a historic endorsement of the U.S.-led plan to reinforce the ceasefire and rebuild the territory after two years of horrific conflict. But volatility on the ground, alongside a lack of clarity over how the resolution aims to overhaul the political and security reality in Gaza, threatens to turn this laudable effort into yet another untenable plan to resolve one of the world’s most intractable and increasingly destructive conflicts.

The U.S.-drafted resolution establishes an important point of international law by authorizing an international administration for a period of two years, alongside an international stabilization force to deploy “under unified command” and in coordination with Israel and Egypt. The references to Palestinian self-determination and an eventual state under certain conditions are notable for the Trump administration, given its previous reluctance to openly endorse such an outcome. But for most countries, it is the bare minimum given the overwhelming international consensus in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The text also enjoyed broad regional support, including from the Palestinian Authority. But with regard to mobilizing international engagement in the form of troops or financing, a lack of clarity on the political horizon, as well as more practical issues — such as who is expected to participate in the international administration and force — will give some nations pause.

The last time the Security Council came close to pronouncing on Gaza’s legal character was in 2009, two years after Hamas’ violent takeover of the territory, through Resolution 1860. That resolution stressed that “the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the territory occupied in 1967 and will be a part of the Palestinian state.” It also made reference to the responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority and Israel for ensuring the flow of humanitarian and development assistance as well as the movement of people and goods in and out of the territory, as agreed after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. It further relegated the ultimate removal of Hamas as the de facto government in Gaza to the outcome of an internal Palestinian political process, mediated by Egypt. Today, as clarified in several documents such as the NY Declaration and the current resolution, there is broad agreement that, in the wake of Oct. 7, Hamas should no longer rule Gaza. But what that actually means in practice and how to achieve it is still unclear.

BECOME A MEMBER

Creating an International Stabilization Force

As history has shown, when it comes to forging multinational military coalitions, getting a resolution in place is one thing, actually forming and deploying a force is another, and ensuring that the troops act in accordance with the mandate is something else entirely. According to the resolution, the international stabilization force is expected to be the linchpin in the process of removing Hamas from power. It will secure Gaza’s borders, support the eventual deployment of Palestinian police forces, and protect humanitarian aid delivery, as well as oversee the decommissioning of weapons belonging to Hamas and others. But even following its authorization, significant questions concerning its composition and operations remain.

As much as the United States and its partners might want to draw on recent examples like Kosovo and Timor Leste, from a political and security perspective at least, Gaza looks more like recent debacles in places like southern Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Conditions on the Ground

Indeed, since the ceasefire came into effect, both Israel and Hamas moved quickly to consolidate their positions and effectively entrench a new security regime across the territory.

Israel has redeployed its forces to a buffer zone that comprises around 50 percent of Gaza’s territory, from which it has conducted strikes against perceived threats. This freedom of action in buffer zones corresponds with Israel’s overall security posture with regard to Lebanon and Syria since Oct. 7. Additionally, it provides a degree of confidence to the Gaza envelope communities, perhaps the most traumatized section of Israeli society given their experiences on Oct. 7, by creating a physical buffer between Israel and what remains of Hamas’ forces. None of this should be taken for granted, especially as this is an election year in Israel.

On the other hand, Hamas, in a clear show of force, spent the first days of the ceasefire both testing Israel and, perhaps most importantly, settling scores with other Palestinian factions. This was done through a series of public and less public moves such as executions and military confrontations with rival clans and others it accuses of collaborating with Israel or undermining its rule. As much as this was about reestablishing itself in Gaza, it was also a warning shot for any forces that might seek to dislodge it from power. This includes the Palestinian Security Forces loyal to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, which could deploy alongside the international force, as well as any would-be foreign troop contributors. The message: Hamas is far from a spent force.

The idea for a stabilization force in Gaza is not a new one. In July 2024, the United Arab Emirates, presumably in consultation with other Arab states, publicly endorsed the idea of its participation in a multinational force, but under certain conditions. The Palestinian Authority, which comprises the government of the State of Palestine — that is now recognized by 156 of 193 U.N. member states — would need to invite the force, undergo significant reforms, and be empowered by Israel to take the lead in Gaza, and the United States would need to recommit to pursuing a two-state solution. The idea of Arab and Muslim forces close to the United States and Israel, and others with ties to Hamas, like Qatar, makes tremendous sense on some level. The deterrence factor alone would, in theory, be invaluable in addition to the fact that this force would work with and seemingly on behalf of Palestinian forces.

The new resolution comes close, but not close enough, for the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia. While they have offered critical support to the plan, they seem to have ruled out any troop deployments according to the current mandate and are likely wary of other factors, such as Israel’s continued insistence on sidelining the Palestinian Authority, regardless of how much it undergoes reform.

But without the original cast of troop contributors, the political considerations are different. Israel will be reluctant to accept troops from adversarial countries with ties to Hamas, such as Turkey, deploying in Gaza. Reports indicate that Azerbaijan and Indonesia are ready to send troops. Even if these countries want to curry favor with Washington or have budding relations with Israel, the optics of being seen to fight for Israel or to fight against Palestinians, even if attacked, will raise serious dilemmas for any country, let alone these two Muslim majority nations.

Beyond this, there are a host of operational concerns and questions. What will be the troops’ rules of engagement? How will they be financed? How many troops will deploy? Will they deploy in the area controlled by Hamas? In the buffer currently occupied by Israel or in a smaller zone where Israel has pulled back from, but without a Hamas presence? And of course, how will Hamas react to any of this? The answers to these questions will be the difference between success and failure, as well as in large part the willingness of countries to put their troops in harm’s way to advance the plan.

Even with the resolution authorizing the stabilization force with broad powers, the concern is that the overall approach is based on a post-conflict paradigm, when the reality on the ground is anything but. Indeed, while the fighting in Gaza between Israel and Hamas has more or less stopped, the conflict itself has only become more complicated to resolve following Oct. 7 and the subsequent war. Hamas’ reaction to the resolution, rejecting the presence of any foreign military personnel inside Gaza, is also cause for concern.

Recovery and Reconstruction

If countries are reluctant to commit troops, will they be willing to finance other aspects of the plan, including Gaza’s eventual reconstruction? This is also unclear. Of course, this is not the first time that the international community has been mobilized to reconstruct Gaza’s civilian and institutional infrastructure after a war. The last time this happened was in 2014, but the scale of the devastation on the ground today bears little if any resemblance to that significant, but far smaller reconstruction bill ($4.5 billion as opposed to an estimated $70 billion, respectively). Instilling sufficient confidence that this time will be different will take unprecedented efforts. Yet it is unlikely that this resolution alone is enough to make it happen, with many countries adopting something more akin to a wait and see approach.

Bad Precedents

Although a different context, the history of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war is instructive. It is a cautionary tale for any international force operating in a politically uncertain environment with potential spoilers in the form of strong non-state actors. While in 2006 Israel wanted anything but a U.N. peacekeeping force along its northern frontier, the political reality on the ground left no other options. But in the case of the 2006 war, it was the rapid deployment of a significantly strengthened U.N. force in Lebanon, with thousands of mostly European troops, that helped end the war. But it was this force’s weak mandate, and its inability to confront or even report on Hizballah’s rearmament out of fear of reprisals, which foretold the inevitability of the next Israel-Hizballah confrontation. Of course, that came in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks. But it begs the question of how forces should operate in areas where non-state actors are determined to rearm at all costs. In the end, Hizballah’s disarmament, which is now being discussed more seriously than ever within the Lebanese body politic, will have to proceed primarily from within the Lebanese political system. It’s difficult to see things proceeding in a fundamentally different way in the Palestinian context with regard to Hamas, whose presence is, of course, not limited to Gaza.

The impact on the ground is difficult to forecast. There is certainly a scenario that many are predicting in which Gaza remains divided in two, split between zones controlled by Israel and Hamas. There could even be a modified version where a specific zone is set up with the deployment of the stabilization force alongside an accelerated push for recovery and reconstruction, enticing Gazans to move from the Hamas zone. All of these are risky and could end up exacerbating the deeply worrying limbo that most Gazans currently find themselves in, or quite possibly make it worse.

Either way, the major operations of the war are over, the living Israeli hostages are home, many Palestinian prisoners have been released, and there is sufficient pressure and political will on all sides to ensure that the ceasefire remains in place. If nothing else, this resolution is a demonstration of U.S. leadership and political will in support. This is significant. But absent a fundamental shift in the political framework from all parties and a clearer path towards a Palestinian state and the end of conflict, we might just be working towards another stopgap on the path to the next confrontation.

BECOME A MEMBER

Jonathan Lincoln is a professor of the practice and the director at the Center for Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He previously spent 15 years with the United Nations working on and in the Middle East and North Africa.

Image: Jaber Jehad Badwan via Wikimedia Commons

21. Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Summary:

Russia’s “shadow fleet” of sanctions evading tankers is now a forward base for hybrid warfare in Europe. Drones launched near Danish, Polish, German, Norwegian, Belgian, and Dutch facilities appear tied to these offshore vessels, some carrying Russian personnel in uniform and operating with naval escorts. This builds on Soviet traditions of using civilian ships for intelligence, sabotage, and covert insertions, now fused with cheap drones and combat trained operators from Ukraine. The result is low tech disruption of airports, bases, and undersea infrastructure. Europe must treat the fleet as a security threat, tighten inspections, and invest heavily in counter drone and maritime defenses.

Excerpts:

Some encouraging steps are now in play. As Reuters has reported, following the November incursion near Brussels Airport, Belgian authorities requested assistance from British, French, and German anti-drone teams, including some 20 British Royal Air Force specialists with expertise in signal jamming. On November 20, European officials also discussed new measures that could be taken against shadow fleet vessels, including enhanced authority to board vessels as well as new forms of sanctions.

But these mysterious boats navigating close to European shores are no longer simply a means for Russia to sell oil to sustain its military-industrial base. They are also a military and intelligence threat in their own right. To truly address the threat, Europeans must recognize that the fleet is already destabilizing their countries and some day might serve to support and even provide a launch point for offensive operations in Europe.

Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Foreign Affairs · More by Andrei Soldatov · November 25, 2025

How the Shadow Fleet Enables Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Europe

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

November 25, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/moscows-offshore-menace

A suspected Russian “shadow fleet” vessel near Saint-Nazaire, France, October 2025 Stephane Mahe / Reuters

ANDREI SOLDATOV is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities.

IRINA BOROGAN is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Deputy Editor of Agentura.ru.

They are the authors of Our Dear Friends in Moscow: The Inside Story of a Broken Generation.

More by Irina Borogan

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At the October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum for Russian policy talks that has in recent years become a platform for Kremlin ideology, Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked an unusual question. “Mr. President, why are you sending so many drones to Denmark?” Putin initially dismissed it, joking that he would not send drones to “France, Denmark, or Copenhagen.” But the Russian leader did not stop there. He went on to say that “many eccentric characters,” especially young people, were capable of launching those drones over Europe—an enigmatic assertion that recalled his veiled comments about the nonuniformed Russian soldiers who helped seize Crimea in 2014 or about Russian interference in the U.S. election in 2016. He added that those young people would be launching these drones “every single day.”

Even before the Valdai meeting, Russia had begun making good on Putin’s pledge. In mid-September, a group of Russian drones, three of which were armed, entered Polish airspace. In response, for the first time since World War II, Poland scrambled fighter jets to defend its territory and shot down the drones. Three days later, Romania reported a Russian drone incursion into its airspace, the first of a series of such incidents in Romania this fall. In late September, several Danish airports, including Copenhagen’s, were forced to close briefly in response to drone incursions.

In early October, just days after the Valdai Club meeting, multiple drone sightings were reported near military installations and airports across Germany. A few days after that, Norway briefly suspended flights from Oslo airport after drones were spotted nearby. In November, Belgian authorities were forced to close Brussels Airport after multiple drones were sighted nearby. And in the Netherlands, after drones were identified near Volkel Air Base, which houses a U.S. air force squadron assigned to NATO, the Dutch military used ground-based weapons to try to intercept them; air traffic was also briefly suspended over the south of the country.

Although the Kremlin has continually denied involvement in these incursions, few European officials are convinced. But what has been less noted is the logistics that are supporting this new hybrid warfare campaign. In many cases, Russia does not appear to be launching drones from its own territory. Instead, it appears to be relying on its so-called shadow fleet, the hundreds of Russian-controlled third-party boats that are used to evade sanctions and that often navigate waters around Europe.

When drones were spotted in Danish airspace, for example, the oil tanker Boracay, a Benin-flagged vessel that had left the Russian port of Primorsk loaded with Russian oil in September, was tracked off the Danish coast. The ship had previously been blacklisted by the UK and the European Union for helping Russia evade sanctions. After the drone incursion, French naval commandos boarded the ship and briefly detained the ship’s captain, who was a Chinese national. French President Emmanuel Macron said that France could not rule out a connection between the ship and the drone attacks, although definite proof has not yet surfaced. The Kremlin called the French allegations “hysteria.”

According to a new report by the Danish investigative outlet Danwatch, Danish maritime officials have also spotted Russian men in military uniforms aboard shadow fleet vessels this fall. As the report put it, such a presence indicates that Moscow “may be installing its own personnel aboard outlaw merchant tankers.” Although many questions remain about how Moscow is deploying the shadow fleet, it is increasingly clear that the seas around Europe have become a central arena of Russia’s pressure campaign against the continent. On November 19, UK Defense Secretary John Healy announced that a Russian surveillance ship had entered British waters in recent weeks and aimed lasers at UK military pilots. Healy called the ship’s activities “deeply dangerous” and said that the UK was preparing various military options in case of an escalation.

For Russia, a seaborne hybrid warfare strategy has multiple advantages. Using ships allows Russia to get much closer to Western Europe, and launching hybrid attacks from ships, rather than land, is less risky and more convenient, operationally, for Russian agents. The shadow fleet is also by its nature murky, making it harder for European governments to link activities to Moscow. Moreover, for the Kremlin, such a strategy can draw on long experience: going back to the Soviet era, Moscow has used ships as a key part of its intelligence operations in Europe and elsewhere, and Russian intelligence agencies today have strong connections to the country’s maritime activities. If European leaders hope to curtail Putin’s increasingly bold hybrid warfare strategy, they will need to adopt a much firmer approach to the shadow fleet.

DRONES OVER DENMARK

Until the fall of this year, Western attention on Moscow’s hybrid warfare campaign in Europe largely focused on land-based sabotage operations. As we documented in Foreign Affairs, multiple land-based attacks in Western Europe in early 2024, including incidents of arson, sabotage, and cyberattacks in at least 15 countries, have been linked to Russia or Russian-affiliated agents. These attacks have continued, though at a slower pace, perhaps as a result of heightened Western security.

But throughout the war with Ukraine, Russian intelligence services have also been quietly developing seaborne capabilities as well. Geographically, this makes sense: most Western European countries have coastlines, and the sea represents a vulnerability that can be exploited. Russia also had new incentives to turn to offshore operations following the advent of European counterintelligence measures and the massive expulsion of Russian diplomats from Europe after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Undersea sabotage was the first to be activated: starting in 2023, a growing number of incidents involving merchant ships cutting or damaging undersea power and communications cables and gas pipelines in the North and Baltic Seas were linked to Russia. Several cases involved Chinese merchant vessels that appeared to have visited Russian ports shortly beforehand.

Since 2022, Moscow has also poured significant resources into acquiring hundreds of third-party ships, including aging oil tankers and other vessels, which it has used to evade Western sanctions. Some of these ships have openly used Russian ports. But since ships must use automatic identification system transponders to transmit their location in real time, Russia has made increasing use of ship-to-ship transfers at sea: vessels that have been tracked to a Russian port can switch cargo to waiting tankers offshore with their transponders switched off. Even large cargoes of oil can be transferred between ships quickly, in as little as 12 hours. Those offshore vessels, which have not been directly traced to Russian ports, can then blend in with other vessels that are legitimately anchored in international waters, where they may remain for months—waiting for market prices to go up before resale, according to the established commercial practice.

Police responding to drone reports at an airport in Copenhagen, September 2025 Steven Knap / Reuters

As the shadow fleet has rapidly grown, it has spurred a cat-and-mouse game with European officials. Thus far, the European Union has banned access to its ports for vessels engaged in ship-to-ship transfers if there are reasonable grounds to suspect violations of the embargo on Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Although such measures may complicate Russian oil and gas exports, they are unlikely to disrupt sabotage operations, which require no access to ports.

Indeed, advances in drone warfare have added to the advantages of the sea. With its low-technology land operations, such as its sabotage and arson attacks on the continent, Russia recruited untrained local proxies for one-off jobs. Drone operation, however, requires some degree of specialized training. In this sense, Russian-linked vessels can provide both effective cover for Russian agents and convenient launch platforms for drones of limited range. As a result, the shadow fleet has taken on new importance in Russia’s hybrid warfare in Europe.

In an October interview published by the Kremlin-controlled Interfax, Pavel Gudev—Russia’s leading expert on the Maritime Security and Ocean Policy at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, or IMEMO—offered a defiant response to Western efforts to curb the Russian shadow fleet. His message was blunt: ship-to-ship transshipment continues and cannot be stopped. Although the vessels are tracked and barred from European, U.S., British, and Canadian ports, he noted, “if they need to replenish provisions or refuel, they can call at other countries and other ports.”

SOVIETS AT SEA

Moscow’s willingness to engage in aggressive seaborne operations has a long history. Throughout the twentieth century, the Soviets used nonmilitary ships in its intelligence activities, as well as for launching sabotage operations from the sea. From almost the beginning of the Bolshevik era, Soviet agents used merchant, cargo, and other civilian ships to move agents around Europe—or bring them back to Moscow if they had fallen afoul of the regime.

In 1930, for example, Soviet agents snatched General Alexander Kutepov, the leader of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS)—the military arm of the main anti-Soviet émigré organization—from a street in Paris. They drugged him, packed him unconscious into a car, drove to Marseille, and placed him in the hold of a Soviet merchant vessel bound for Novorossiysk, a port on the Black Sea. Kutepov never made it to Soviet Russia, dying in the ship’s hold. But Kutepov’s successor at ROVS, General Yevgeny Miller, in 1937 was also kidnapped in Paris and transported to Moscow in the hold of a Soviet steamship before being executed at Lubyanka.

Soviet intelligence continued to use the merchant fleet throughout the Cold War. That was one of the duties of Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB officer and later an MI6 double agent, when he was posted in Copenhagen, Denmark, in the late 1960s. “My task was to discreetly place [intelligence operatives] on one of the steamships plying between Le Havre and Leningrad. Each such transit operation was meticulously planned,” Gordievsky recalled in his memoirs: “It was necessary to negotiate with the ship’s captain or even recruit him as an agent.” The merchant fleet was also used for the exfiltration of compromised Soviet agents. This was how Kim Philby, the British double agent, escaped arrest in Beirut: he fled to the Soviet embassy and was subsequently transferred aboard the Soviet freighter Dolmatova, bound for Odessa.

During these same decades, the Soviets also laid the groundwork for sophisticated sea-launched sabotage operations. In 1938, a state-of-the-art Soviet submarine was submerged in a bay near Vladivostok in a top-secret exercise aimed at, according to the military order that described it, “landing troops for reconnaissance and carrying out sabotage operations on shore.” Soviet officials deemed the exercise successful. During World War II, Soviet intelligence made extensive use of submarines to deploy operatives in the Baltic region, although with mixed results. In 1941–1942, Moscow lost three submarines while attempting to land Soviet saboteurs onshore.

The Soviets concluded that civilian ships could be used for sabotage operations against Europe.

Then, in 1953, the Soviet Navy and Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, established naval saboteur units within the Soviet fleets. The newly formed units, called Naval Intelligence Points, or MRP in Russian, were set up in the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and were assigned to carry out sabotage operations on shore, among other tasks. Although it was never activated during the Cold War against Western targets, the sabotage program remained a focus of Soviet intelligence. The Naval Intelligence Point headquartered on a small artificial island in the Black Sea near the town of Ochakov became the main center for training naval special forces of military intelligence and was expanded in 1968.

In the 1970s, these twin long-standing Soviet practices—the use of merchant vessels for intelligence purposes and planning for naval sabotage—finally merged. As NATO member states—including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom—began intensive oil and gas extraction in the North Sea, Moscow’s intelligence agencies saw new possibilities for covert deployment using civilian ships. A team of Soviet naval saboteurs was dispatched on a research trip, and its report concluded that civilian ships, alongside submarines, could now be used to insert saboteurs for operations against Western countries.

During the final years of the Soviet Union, the soldiers on the artificial island also began training operatives of the KGB’s special operations unit Vympel, which had a mandate to conduct covert missions abroad. The sea sabotage training was probably the only area in which military intelligence and the KGB didn’t compete.

LOW TECH, HIGH ANGST

The collapse of the Soviet Union deeply disrupted Moscow’s sabotage capabilities. In 1992, GRU officer Stanislav Lunev defected to the United States and revealed KGB and GRU contingency plans for sabotage operations in the West. The end of the Soviet empire also took a heavy toll on Russia’s sabotage infrastructure. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, the Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Crimea, remained under Russian control, but the brigade of naval saboteurs on the artificial island came under the authority of the nascent Ukrainian naval forces—striking a blow to Russia’s sabotage capabilities.

But the training and institutional framework were not entirely lost. As Russian intelligence regrouped under Putin’s leadership, the sabotage option was reactivated. And with the full-scale war in Ukraine—which the Kremlin and its agencies see as an existential war with the West—Russian intelligence has put major resources back into the strategy. Today, the main base of Russian naval saboteurs is the Naval Intelligence Point in the Kaliningrad region, in the Baltic. A return to seaborne sabotage was likely given a further boost by the appointment of Igor Kostyukov, a seasoned navy admiral, to head the GRU in 2018, and Nikolai Patrushev, a long-standing ally of Putin and former head of the Security Council and the FSB, to chair Russia’s Maritime Collegium, the highest government agency coordinating maritime activities by the Russian state, in 2024.

Traditionally, Russian intelligence has suffered from poor coordination between separate agencies. But because sea operations are based on joint military-intelligence operation, they appear to have largely escaped this problem. Since Soviet times, Moscow’s different intelligence services, including the military intelligence and the FSB, have cooperated closely at sea. Moreover, the presence of official military boats, like the surveillance ship observed near the UK this fall, alongside shadow fleet ships, suggests the extent to which shadow tankers may be coordinating with the military and intelligence apparatus. Over the past six months, Russian warships have also been observed escorting shadow fleet vessels in the Baltic Sea and even the English Channel.

Russian warships have been observed escorting shadow fleet vessels.

The final element in this return to sea-based hybrid warfare has been Russia’s rapidly growing drone program. These drones don’t need to be accurate, technologically advanced, or armed to achieve their purpose—the very sightings of drones disrupted the activities of airports for hours, if not days. At the same time, the large-scale and bloody battlefield in Ukraine provides excellent conditions to train substantial numbers of drone operators hardened by real combat.

Already, the results of Russia’s campaign have been significant. With small numbers of drones, Moscow has disrupted civil aviation in multiple European countries, bringing the threat much closer to the European public. It can also disrupt important military installations by flyovers or surveillance, as the November incident at the Netherlands’ Volkel Air Base shows. To counter this tactic, Western governments have little choice but to intensify counterintelligence and countersabotage efforts and increase stop-and-search operations in the Baltic and the North Sea as well as investing big time in protection of airports and other national infrastructure.

Some encouraging steps are now in play. As Reuters has reported, following the November incursion near Brussels Airport, Belgian authorities requested assistance from British, French, and German anti-drone teams, including some 20 British Royal Air Force specialists with expertise in signal jamming. On November 20, European officials also discussed new measures that could be taken against shadow fleet vessels, including enhanced authority to board vessels as well as new forms of sanctions.

But these mysterious boats navigating close to European shores are no longer simply a means for Russia to sell oil to sustain its military-industrial base. They are also a military and intelligence threat in their own right. To truly address the threat, Europeans must recognize that the fleet is already destabilizing their countries and some day might serve to support and even provide a launch point for offensive operations in Europe.

Foreign Affairs · More by Andrei Soldatov · November 25, 2025

22. How Xi Played Trump

Summary:

Xi has turned POTUS' promised hard line into a sequence of concessions that advance Beijing’s position. While POTUS swung between tariff escalation and deal seeking, China retaliated, then used rare earth export controls and trade leverage to pull the US into narrow commercial bargaining over chips, TikTok, and soybeans, sidelining strategy, Taiwan, and human rights. By offering only reversible tactical pauses, Xi preserved his techno-industrial agenda and showed POTUS will not sustain pressure. Public US commitments to repeated summits further strengthened Beijing’s hand. China now believes time and US dysfunction favor it, so it pockets concessions and avoids real détente.

Excerpt:

The United States still has points of leverage it can use against China. But the strategic incoherence of Liberation Day, the subsequent de-escalation of the trade war, and the administration’s efforts to mollify Beijing ahead of the South Korean meeting have led China to conclude that Washington is not prepared to escalate. To the extent China does want a stable equilibrium, it wants to get the United States accustomed to a new one—on Beijing’s, rather than Washington’s, terms. A year into the second Trump administration, it has made startling progress toward that objective.

How Xi Played Trump

Foreign Affairs · More by Jonathan A. Czin · November 25, 2025

Beijing Gambled and Is Now Reaping the Rewards

Jonathan A. Czin

November 25, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-xi-played-trump

U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, October 2025 Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

JONATHAN A. CZIN is Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and a Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He was Director for China at the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 and previously served as a member of the Senior Analytic Service at the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Although U.S. President Donald Trump promised to unleash an economic fusillade on China after his return to the presidency, Beijing has enjoyed a remarkably strong year of diplomacy. The Trump administration resurrected and expanded its first-term trade war with Beijing, claiming it would use trade negotiations with other countries to put pressure on China. Yet Beijing has hardly been isolated internationally: in the months leading up to his October meeting with Trump in South Korea, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted a gaggle of foreign heads of state for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and a military parade. Nor has China yielded in the face of U.S. threats. After spending much of the year simply reacting to U.S. policies, Beijing went on the offensive, imposing an expansive export control regime on the supply chains for rare-earth elements just weeks before the meeting with Trump. And although the Trump administration has exhorted Beijing to make sweeping structural reforms to its economy, Xi has doubled down on his techno-industrial economic ambitions for China’s next five-year plan—a plan that according to analysts, could exacerbate global trade imbalances by expanding China’s share of global manufacturing even further. Whereas most countries targeted by Trump’s tariffs have rushed to the negotiating table, China has instead dug in.

China has gained, not suffered, from this obduracy. Xi has secured Trump’s commitment to several meetings in 2026, as well as concessions from the administration on incredibly contentious issues: Taiwan and U.S. export controls. By every measure, China is diplomatically, strategically, and technologically better off than it was a year ago. In contrast, the Trump administration’s strategy, which has lurched from attempts to clobber China economically through tariffs to attempts to mollify China through serial concessions, has achieved little. Beijing has been neither cowed nor assuaged. The United States seems less able to either reassure or deter China; Chinese officials have learned that the Trump administration, for all its bluster, will not follow through on its promises or its threats.

China’s decision to retaliate rather than capitulate reflects an important difference between Xi and Trump. Unlike Trump, whose perceived dealmaking acumen is central to his political identity, Xi is not interested in striking a grand bargain. As a result, Beijing has tied Washington up in relatively marginal commercial negotiations, with Xi happy to string Trump along while deflecting U.S. pressure on the challenging issues at the heart of the relationship.

Beijing has weathered Washington’s escalatory onslaught. The White House now risks finding itself in the worst of all possible worlds, with a confused China policy that ensures friction but lacks a disciplined approach to competition, a negotiating partner in Beijing that has conceded little while steering Trump back to the status quo ante, and a year of theatrics that has produced no tangible gain for the United States.

ALWAYS BE CONCEDING

During the first Trump and the Biden administrations, China’s responses to U.S. tariffs and export controls and the tightening alignment between Washington and its allies and partners were remarkably muted—until late 2024. At that point, Beijing began responding to a slate of U.S. technology controls imposed by the outgoing Biden administration with countermeasures of its own, likely in preparation for a second trade war with the incoming Trump administration.

Since returning to the White House, however, Trump’s China policy has seesawed between hostility and engagement. The administration announced its “Liberation Day” tariffs in April, which ultimately escalated to a 145 percent penalty on Chinese goods—a de facto embargo. Then, after the United States and China agreed to de-escalate the trade war in May, Washington took a few modest competitive actions at the margins, including closing loopholes in U.S. export controls that China had been exploiting. But the Trump administration then went out of its way to make substantial concessions to Beijing following negotiations in June. Washington ultimately eased its export controls on advanced semiconductors, reversing the decision to ban the sale to China of Nvidia’s H20 chips, whose sophistication fell just below the legal threshold for triggering U.S. export controls. According to The Wall Street Journal, in the run-up to the October meeting, Trump considered discussing with Xi the sale of Nvidia’s cutting-edge Blackwell chips before the U.S. president’s advisers cautioned against it.

That risky outcome was avoided, but another has become apparent. The latest trade truce, in which China postponed its own expansive export controls, set a pernicious precedent by vitiating the Biden administration’s tenet that export controls are off-limits in negotiations with Beijing because they are meant to safeguard U.S. national security. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has also pulled back its support for Taiwan, pressuring Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te to cancel a planned transit through the United States and offering scant moral support as Beijing has continued its pressure campaign.

Moreover, the administration’s single-minded prioritization of trade has led it to sweep other, thornier points of diplomatic contention under the rug. Strategic issues have fallen off the agenda, including China’s intensifying pressure on territories in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines and its wide-ranging Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon cyber-intrusions into U.S. digital infrastructure systems. Long-standing U.S. concerns about China’s egregious human rights abuses have receded far into the background, a notable shift from the first Trump administration, which shined a spotlight on the gross mistreatment of the country’s Uyghur minority. Indeed, the second Trump administration appears content to let Beijing off the hook rather than hold it accountable—as long as Washington can claim it has made a splashy deal, regardless of how shallow, narrow, or fragile that deal might be.

Beijing has weathered Washington’s escalatory onslaught.

In the aftermath of the South Korean summit, it is difficult to discern where and on what issues, if any, the United States is competing with China in any meaningful way. The administration deserves some credit for taking long overdue steps to mitigate U.S. exposure to China’s chokehold on rare-earth elements and processing. But weaning Washington off its reliance on Chinese-refined critical minerals will likely be a longer and more arduous process than the administration admits. Beijing’s agreement to pause its restrictions on some rare-earth exports for a year could lull the United States, its allies, and the private sector back into complacency in the meantime.

In fact, the tactical concessions Beijing has made to Washington have simply returned bilateral relations to their pre–Liberation Day status quo ante, a tolerable, if not entirely comfortable, position for Beijing. China has demonstrated flexibility in the implementation of its export control regime, realized just how much leverage it has over Washington and global supply chains, and lost little by employing its new export controls. The cost of this bounty was negligible. The Trump administration’s decision to defer enforcement of a U.S. law mandating the sale or ban of TikTok and instead include its fate in trade negotiations further enhanced Beijing’s position, giving China a bargaining chip it could trade away at little cost to its own interests.

The TikTok case reflects Beijing’s diplomatic tactic with the second Trump administration: whittling down the scope of the discussions from the major strategic issues at the heart of U.S.-Chinese relations to relatively narrow commercial issues ancillary to the competition but of outsize importance to the Trump administration and its key constituencies. That senior U.S. officials have been haggling with their Chinese counterparts over TikTok, rather than meaty and long-standing concerns about China’s unfair, nonmarket practices, is a coup for Beijing.

The same logic applies to China’s pledge to buy soybeans from the United States. Trump held the deal up as a significant concession extracted from Xi in South Korea, even though soybean exports had not been a major trade issue in recent years. By narrowly construing discussions with Washington as commercial negotiations, China ensnares U.S. policymakers in a game of whack-a-mole in which Washington, distracted from addressing the major concerns about China’s economic policy that ostensibly animated the Liberation Day tariffs, must beseech Beijing for relief on specific issues as they arise. The Trump administration has repeatedly taken the bait, seeking headline-grabbing “wins” rather than any advance in the arduous, unglamorous process of gaining leverage over Beijing.

PLAYING FOR TIME

But Xi remains focused on the long-term strategic competition, even if Trump is not. While Trump considers himself a consummate dealmaker, Xi prefers to bide his time until he can strike at his opponent and manage any fallout. He took a calculated risk that he could roll out expansive export controls on rare-earth elements prior to the summit; he wagered that such a gamble would not prompt a U.S. response because Trump was so keen to make a deal. That gamble paid off.

When Beijing looks at Washington, it observes not the United States’ lack of leverage but rather its domestic dysfunction. Chinese analysts recognize that Washington has cards to play; it could, for instance, cut off China’s access to important supply chains that run through the United States. But China believes that the Trump administration will not take such steps because it is too wary of the domestic backlash that might follow the pain caused by any Chinese economic retaliation. Xi arrived in South Korea having just demonstrated his political dominance at home by purging a number of senior officials and outlining his five-year vision; Trump arrived having presided over the longest government shutdown in U.S. history. Already, some Chinese scholars assess that the Trump administration will cede more leverage to Beijing in the coming year because of economic headwinds from inflation and greater domestic political pressure following Democratic victories in state and local elections in 2025.

Beijing is likely planning its diplomacy with the Trump administration around next year’s midterm elections, betting that Trump will be anxious to secure a deal he can tout on the campaign trail in support of Republicans—and that in his eagerness, he may end up making significant concessions. Trump’s hunger for a deal led to the end of the trade war in his first term in 2020, which concluded with the rather paltry and largely unimplemented Phase One trade agreement. The Trump administration is keenly aware of the Phase One agreement’s shortcomings, most notably that Beijing did not follow through on its purchasing commitments, but so far that has not precluded Washington from seeking new deals with China.

Xi’s objective is to keep Trump invested in his game of whack-a-mole. In doing so, Xi risks frustrating Trump. The president could lash out and unleash his administration’s China hawks, who have otherwise been muzzled since senior U.S. economic officials began their intermittent dialogues with Vice Premier He Lifeng in May.

That prospect, however, appears unlikely in the coming months. By proclaiming on social media that he intends to meet with Xi three times in 2026, Trump surrendered one of his most important bargaining chips: the prospect of presidential engagement. Beijing, which will want to hold any possible concessions in reserve to keep Trump locked into the future engagements to which he has already committed, has little incentive to cede ground to Washington. Time is Beijing’s greatest asset in this negotiation—and by publicly committing to these meetings, Trump has given Xi more of it.

DEAL OR NO DEAL

For all its shortcomings, the Trump administration’s attempts to mollify Beijing have been a useful natural experiment about whether concessions to Beijing can purchase a rapprochement or even a détente. The evidence suggests that Beijing has little interest in reaching a détente. Despite making significant concessions on two of the major issues at the heart of U.S.-Chinese tensions in the past decade—Taiwan and technology controls—the Trump administration has gotten exceedingly little from Beijing in return. China is pocketing U.S. concessions, identifying new points of leverage over the United States, and using the tactical truces to further fortify itself for the long-term competition with Washington. The line between détente and appeasement is always a thin one, but the ready rebuke of appeasement—that it invites only more requests for concessions, if not more aggression—appears to be bearing out.

The Trump administration, with its maladroit attempts at diplomacy and erratic shifts in policy, might appear ill equipped to pursue a détente with China. But Trump has already demonstrated his unique capability to break the consensus on China that he himself ushered in during his first term without facing political blowback. For all his early missteps, Trump could yet shift U.S. policy if he were truly committed to pursuing a détente and willing to expend political capital to do so.

The true obstacle to a more enduring rapprochement is not the Trump administration but Beijing. Xi is not interested in a big deal or a détente because he judges that time is on China’s side, that China will be in an even stronger position in the years to come, and that a deal now would only constrain Beijing. Moreover, Beijing views the constituent elements of a deeper détente, such as arms control negotiations, which Trump pursued in his first term, with suspicion, seeing in them the same stratagems that Washington successfully deployed against the Soviet Union to prevail in the Cold War. The idea that China’s leadership seeks stability in the bilateral relationship has become a truism in Washington, but that assessment is inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. Instead, China’s actions since Trump’s return make clear that Beijing wants to constrain the United States’ ability to push back against China.

The United States still has points of leverage it can use against China. But the strategic incoherence of Liberation Day, the subsequent de-escalation of the trade war, and the administration’s efforts to mollify Beijing ahead of the South Korean meeting have led China to conclude that Washington is not prepared to escalate. To the extent China does want a stable equilibrium, it wants to get the United States accustomed to a new one—on Beijing’s, rather than Washington’s, terms. A year into the second Trump administration, it has made startling progress toward that objective.

Foreign Affairs · More by Jonathan A. Czin · November 25, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

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