​Quotes of the Day:

"Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy."

– Franz Kafka

“Wisdom is the right use of knowledge. To know is not to be wise. Many men know a great deal, and are all the greater fools for it. There is no fool, so great a fool as a knowing fool. But to know how to use knowledge is to have wisdom.”

– Charles Spurgeon

“Nothing in the world is so strong as a kind heart.” 

– Frances Hodgson Burnett

1. Civil Resistance and Irregular Warfare Education

2. FACT-CHECK: Did America’s Most Popular Podcaster Joe Rogan Just Parrot a Bunch of Kremlin Propaganda?

3. Affordable Drones and Civilian Supply Chains are Transforming Warfare

4. Musk Wants $2 Trillion of Spending Cuts. Here’s Why That’s Hard.

5. After Trump’s Tariff Threat, Is a China Currency War Next?

6. Musk's government roles create 'clear avenues for serious conflicts of interest'

7. The Three I’s: Will We Learn from Decades of Quagmires? What I've Witnessed

8. How generals and admirals get promoted now and how that may change under Trump

9. ASU as the 'New American University' sets the model for higher education reform

10. ATACMs? What are they thinking?

11. Underwater Geopolitics: How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

12. How to overthrow America's war cartel (Book Review)

13. Lawmakers press Pentagon to re-ground Ospreys over safety issues

14. The Operational and Strategic Genius of the Kursk Offensive

15. The Implications of a Second Trump Presidency for Europe’s Defense-Industrial Efforts

16. How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired

17. US forces are under regular attacks by militants at base near Syrian government airfield

18. Back to the Basics: Rediscovering the Roots of Special Forces

19. 'Everybody's going to have to figure this out': Army, Air Force debate base defense amid new threats

1. Civil Resistance and Irregular Warfare Education

​Conclusion:

A military education that includes irregular warfare ought to include the study of civil resistance. Deep expertise may not be required for all military professionals, but an introductory grasp of the theory and practice of nonviolent resistance is crucial in irregular domains. Civil resistance is powerful and omnipresent, whether employed for or against one’s objectives. We know that our adversaries fear it, anyone can access it, our allies train to it, and so soldiers must understand it.

Civil Resistance and Irregular Warfare Education

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http://armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Nov-Dec-2024/Civil-Resistance-and-Irregular-Warfare-Education?utm

Col. Brian Petit, U.S. Army, Retired

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To a soldier, the practice of nonviolent resistance might appear disconnected from the study of armed, violent warfare. Surprisingly, the opposite is true. An education on power, the use of force, and tactics achieving strategy is incomplete without an understanding of nonviolent means to undermine, coerce, or contest a more powerful foe. While civil resistance is not needed in all military curricula, its inclusion in an irregular warfare education is essential.

This article reasons why and recommends how to study nonviolent resistance for irregular warfare practitioners. First, civil resistance is defined and located within irregular warfare. Next, four reasons are given why nonviolent resistance deserves an enduring place in military education and irregular warfare programs. Finally, this article recommends what that education might look like for the military professional.

What Is Civil Resistance?

Civil resistance (used synonymously here with nonviolent resistance) is a “form of collective action that seeks to affect the social, political, or economic status quo without using violence or the threat of violence against people to do so.”1 Civil resistance is a form of confrontation, a mode of conflict, and, when planned properly, a campaign waged by organizations with leadership, training, discipline, and resiliency. Like armed warfare, civil resistance is underpinned by a developed philosophy, a doctrinal framework, and a broad set of tactics that aim to achieve strategy.2 Civil resistance is a form of subversion.3

Civil resistance is undertaken by collective action, absent the use of violence, that confronts, challenges, and confounds an adversary, thereby complicating standard response options. Tactics include boycotts, noncooperation, marches, strikes, sit-ins, emplacement of symbols, protests, hunger strikes, satire, and other subversive acts.4 The immediate goal is to undermine power structures and create dilemmas for governments, occupiers, or other targets. The long-term goal is to arrange these ways and means to achieve strategic ends.

Who Are the Noted Practitioners?

Well-known theorists and practitioners include Russian author Leo Tolstoy; Indian lawyer Mohandas K. Ghandi; Americans Henry David Thoreau, Gene Sharp, Rosa Parks, and Martin Luther King Jr.; Irish hunger striker Bobby Sands; Serbian activist Srdja Popovic; Hong Kong student Joseph Wong; and Russian punk rock band Pussy Riot.5 These canonical resistors have no common heritage, origin story, or pedigree. They do, however, share a set of practices that have toppled governments and defeated oppressors. On a lower register, such campaigns have won concessions, deterred actions, and exposed abhorrent behaviors to wider audiences, amplifying a narrative and mobilizing minds to act for a cause.

Example: The Battle That Wanted to Be a Campaign, Occupy Wall Street

One attempted campaign was Occupy Wall Street, the 2011 sit-in protest that lasted thirty-eight days in Zuccotti Park, New York City.9 The grievance was the unequal distribution of wealth in the United States as symbolized by the wealthiest 1 percent juxtaposed against the remaining 99 percent.10 Occupy gained viral notoriety, caused disruptions, forged a novel cooperative model, and produced revolutionary appeals to remedy this wealth imbalance. In amplifying this grievance and igniting similar protests, Occupy was a success. Strategically, Occupy failed in that it could not forge a cohesive strategy with achievable objectives.11 The movement did not transfer anti-elitist sentiment into an enduring campaign. After thirty-eight days in an increasingly unhygienic and disruptive tent city astride Wall Street, the New York Police Department dismantled the protest in a predawn raid.12 In military terms, Occupy could be described as a battle briefly won, but a war conclusively lost.

Civil Resistance and Irregular Warfare

The civil resistance definition, when placed next to the U.S. Army or the joint force definition of irregular warfare, shows the likeness. The U.S. Army defines irregular warfare as “the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.”13 The Department of Defense’s irregular warfare definitions, past and present, contain four common components: populations, power, coercion, and nonstandard methods.14 These anchor points of irregular warfare are nearly identical to the accepted pillars of civil resistance.

Civil resistance is a method of irregular warfare. Despite its nonviolent approach, these campaigns are often met with violence, suppression, or repression. Thus, civil resistance sits in that definitional gray area: it does not employ the tactics of violence, but it reliably triggers violent countertactics. No matter the categorization of civil resistance, it is the most frequent, most distributed, and, arguably, the most effective form of asymmetric action.15 Civil resistance often finds opportunities where there is limited political operating space and where controlling authorities regularly use brutal suppression methods.16 Even if the U.S. military is not the developer or deliverer of this type of power, ignoring or misunderstanding this energy has proven fatal to many great powers, iron-fisted governments, and competent security forces.

Why Does Civil Resistance Belong in a Military Education?

The study of civil resistance, often called “people power,” belongs in an irregular warfare education for four reasons. First, nonviolent resistance is an alternative to or complementary of combined arms power. Second, the U.S. relative combat power advantage over a growing number of adversaries is shrinking, thus making unconventional, and less costly approaches, more useful. Third, U.S. allies and partners are building nonviolent forms of power into their state resistance plans. Finally, examining Chinese, Russian, or Iranian countermeasures to civil resistance gives us insights into their psychology, methods, and vulnerabilities. Each is discussed below.

An alternative form of power. One promise of irregular warfare is to deliver nonstandard forms of power against the vulnerabilities of adversaries. In pursuit of this goal, the data on nonviolent resistance is striking. In a comprehensive and ongoing study compiled by Harvard researcher Erica Chenoweth, nonviolent resistance movements with maximalist aims (i.e., overthrow, expel) against governments or occupiers is statistically more successful than armed violence.17 This research should interest military strategists and tactical operators whose primary task is to win with force or the threat of force as one of many means to do so.

Chenoweth’s dataset contains 627 revolutionary campaigns from 1900 to 2019. Over 50 percent of the nonviolent revolutions succeeded, where 26 percent of the violent campaigns achieved their goals.18 Though revolution might not be the aim for readers of this article, weaker powers have consistently and successfully contested stronger powers with nonviolent campaigns.

Notably, nonviolent resistance movements have increased in frequency in the last fifteen years yet show a markedly reduced success rate.19 Chenowith and other researchers point to several trends: challenged governments have co-opted the nonviolence playbook, state “smart repression” tools and strategies are pervasive and technologically advanced, COVID-19 restrictions allowed governments to exert crackdowns in the name of public health and safety, and the “post-truth” era has muddied facts that has reduced the power of nonviolence movements to use truth and justice as a foundation.20

Examples of superpowers and despotic governments yielding to nonviolent movements demonstrate that civil resistance is not a feeble alternative or an inferior method used only when armed violence is infeasible. The historical record suggests that the employment of nonviolent resistance, whether successful or not, is a fixed component of war, irregular warfare, and the ongoing tussle between people and those in power. For these reasons, military planners should be grounded in the fundamentals of civil resistance to understand this power and to locate its impact within enemy and friendly approaches.

The disintegrating combat power advantage of the United States. Second, the United States lacks sufficient military power to contest the growing aggregation of global threats. Two major theater wars or a series of roiling conflicts would rapidly exhaust U.S. military resources. In such a scenario, national leaders and policymakers would seek options to deter, defend, contest, or delay on vulnerable fronts. Among the irregular options could be support to nonviolent disruptors possibly tied to disenfranchised populations, agitated social groups, or third-party spoilers.

The idea that the U.S. Department of Defense would purposefully engage in nonviolent, social-movement type resistance is controversial. Structurally, U.S. national leadership would decree whether the U.S. military, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, or some other federal agency could (or should) engage in forms of power that could resemble political chicanery. This is warranted. The United States has a checkered history in tinkering with political movements to achieve national security aims.21

One successful example of U.S. support to a nonviolent movement is the covert support to the Polish Solidarity organization in the 1980s. Solidarity (Solidarinosc), a labor organization movement, challenged the communist Polish and Soviet governments with a yearslong wave of strikes, boycotts, marches, and protests.22 Solidarity ultimately cracked the Polish Communist government and stymied an effective Soviet response. The stridently anticommunist Reagan administration was wary of contaminating this authentic Polish movement with “U.S. fingerprints.”23 Thus, the United States opted to provide covert, nonlethal support. It worked. Hidden-hand U.S. monetary support helped keep the movement active, assisted in keeping striking workers solvent, and indirectly supported nonviolent underground activities such as printing presses and radio broadcasts.24 Nonviolence, it can be argued, fueled the tipping point that won the Cold War.

U.S. allies are preparing civil resistance to contest adversaries. Third, a high number of NATO allies have embraced this form of resistance and have formally incorporated it into their national defense strategies.25 This is not conceptual or theoretical; it is an actual campaign pillar. Its form and function are not tightly scripted, and rehearsals can be impractical. In this way, the use of civil resistance is generally not deterministic in war plans. It is instead the task of a trained cadre and informed citizenry to respond to enemy actions and exploit situational vulnerabilities.

This ambiguity of operational employment brings advantages and disadvantages. With no prescripted templates, putative civil resistors are difficult for enemy forces to identify, template, and target. If attacked, civil resistance is a form of power that changes rapidly, adjusts unpredictably, and contorts itself well to new realities. Leaders quickly replace leaders, fronts rapidly open and close, and innovative methods emerge. A disadvantage is that a military plan cannot squarely account for what this power can and might accomplish against a determined foe. With such uncertainty, it is hard to war game or ascribe a value to something so formless. This haziness can lead to nonviolent methods being reduced, dismissed, or simply forgotten.

We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people ...

Mandela the Disruptor

Nelson Mandela was a lifelong activist against the apartheid government of South Africa, and he was one of the key leaders responsible for the final dismantlement of apartheid and the establishment of South Africa’s first democratically elected government. In contrast to other Black African movement groups espousing the mass expulsion of white South Africans mainly through violence, he embraced the concept of a multiracial front employing a diversity of approaches, including a mixture of organized pacifist resistance, legal challenges to the system from within, organized pressure campaigns involving foreign governments and cultural figures from outside, and at times armed insurgency, a conviction for which he spent twenty-seven years in prison. He was an avid reader who drew his ideas from many sources, including concepts dealing with active resistance against established governments by Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Fidel Castro, and Mao Zedong. In formulating his personal philosophical creed shaping his actions, he stated that “he found [himself] strongly drawn to the idea of a classless society which, to [his] mind, was similar to traditional African culture where life was shared and communal.”1 In May 1994, he became the country’s first black head of state and the first elected in a fully representative democratic election. During his presidency, his government focused on dismantling apartheid and fostering racial reconciliation.

1. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, Volume I: 1918–1962 (New York: Little, Brown, 1994), 172.

Smaller countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia acknowledge that Russian forces could quickly penetrate their borders and partially occupy their sovereign territories before NATO could muster a full-throated response. Such countries envision violent and nonviolent responses, acting in tandem, to block, disrupt, delay, or defeat advancing Russian formations.26 A Latvian citizen readiness pamphlet instructs on actions to take in the event of an enemy occupation: “If you choose to resist, you have the right to exercise civil disobedience, i.e., non-compliance with the laws passed by the occupation forces.”27 If our most geographically vulnerable allies have this in their defense schemes, it follows that U.S. military practitioners should have a fundamental understanding of this form of power to improve our interoperability.

Insights into our adversaries’ strategies, methods, and vulnerabilities. Finally, civil resistance provides insight into adversaries’ playbooks. Contrary to their stated position, the Russian Federation leadership does not fear NATO invasion; rather, they fear the “color revolutions” that have challenged, disrupted, and toppled autocracies.28 The Georgian Rose Revolution (2003), Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004), and Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity (“Euromaidan” 2013) are some of the movements that have discomfited Russian autocrats.

Civil resistance reveals much about the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The study of Chinese joint force operations is said to be challenging because China has not engaged in full-spectrum war since 1979.29 However, the PRC has repeatedly combatted nonviolent movements at home and abroad. Thus, valuable observational learning comes from how the PRC contests nonviolent resistance.

The Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong citizens contesting the Chinese takeover is a revealing “action-reaction-counteraction” case. Initiated in 2014 by Hong Kong citizens, umbrellas were used to defend against the use of pepper spray to disperse protestors. The umbrella soon became a symbol of a population resisting unwanted Chinese-imposed laws on Hong Kong.30 The movement, a widely inclusive group of citizens and organizations, reached its zenith on 16 June 2019 when approximately two million of the seven million inhabitants of Hong Kong’s population took to the streets; often, but not always, peacefully.31 Their stated goal was to force China to accept the status quo terms of Hong Kong self-governance and release incarcerated citizens.

The Umbrella Movement demonstrated the ingenuity and brilliance of Hong Kong resistors contesting a totalitarian takeover of Hong Kong’s political, judicial, and commercial sectors. It also showed the strategic patience and tactical acumen of the PRC-aligned Hong Kong leadership at the contact layer of the crisis. Rather than reflexive-response brutality, the PRC absorbed these protests, suitably contained them, and used violence more selectively than past efforts.32 The PRC then followed with a multiyear campaign (ongoing) to restrict, restrain, arrest, and incarcerate the movement’s leading lights.33 The PRC won—or won this round—via a campaign of asphyxiation. They knitted together surveillance, lawfare, information, suppression of political action, the shuttering of independent media outlets, and exhibited tactical patience. Hong Kong showed how China used population and resource control measures to manage restive populations, eradicate dissent, and dodge international scorn.34 For observers, Hong Kong reveals a possible PRC approach to subjugate Taiwan should the PRC achieve political inroads on the island-nation that favors such a strategy.

What Might a Civil Resistance Education Look Like?

If a curriculum merits civil resistance modules, what might that look like? The basics of nonviolent resistance can be taught in a two-hour lesson reinforced by the conceptualizing and modeling of civil resistance. This can be done in conjunction with maneuver-type warfare in tabletop war games or planning exercises. While more time is required for a complete education, professional military education institutions and qualifying courses already face tough challenges on adding or cutting topics central to tactical competency. Thus, the two-hour recommendation is practically minded and feasible for most education institutions, units, or study programs.

In 2018, I piloted the National Resistance Course at the direction of the Joint Special Operations University and in conjunction with Special Operations Command Europe. This five-day course educates how states incorporate the principles of resistance into their defense strategies and structures. I have since delivered this education to over 2,500 students in the United States and eleven countries with roughly 65 percent of those attendees from special operations communities.35 This has led me to two observations on civil resistance.

The first observation is that two hours is sufficient to introduce nonviolent principles, contextualize the meaning for military and civil practitioners, and to provide the basic tools to analyze movements. In exercises, students are required to plan for civil resistance as part of a campaign to become familiar with the principles and to work with the form.36 Students spend roughly four hours out of fifty-two total hours (classroom and homework), or 7 percent of their time, contending with civil resistance. Post course, this education conditions students to be critical observers of any number of nonviolent protests that rise to their attention. In this way, the ability to analyze movements becomes a habit of mind outside of military education and four hours can soon become “four hundred” hours.

My second observation is that the U.S. Army civil affairs and psychological operations communities have embraced civil resistance as a part of their professional competencies. While this article stops short of recommending a proponent for civil resistance, these two branches are the natural and logical focal points for the development of civil resistance education and expertise. There are some pockets of excellence in these communities, but admittedly, civil resistance is still a hit-and-miss proposition in their formal education pathways.

Where to Start?

For military minds, Thomas E. Ricks’s Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1968, is an excellent start.37 Ricks, a former war correspondent and military historian, frames the civil rights movement in a military context that overlays terms common to both: small-unit cohesion, deep operations, disciplined cadres, lines of communication, and decisive points. For those in the profession of arms, this book will illuminate the strategy, training, battles, advances, and retreats that are as harrowing as any war chronicle published. Ricks’s analysis comes with the stinging reminder of the injustices and cruelties that compelled such a campaign to develop on U.S. soil.

How to Start a Revolution is a 2011 documentary that profiles Gene Sharp and his work.38 His controversial legacy should not detract from his analysis of the practice of nonviolent resistance. Will Irwin’s How Civil Resistance Works (and Why it Matters to SOF) is an exceptional source for special operations forces.39 For planners, Ivan Marovic’s “The Path of Most Resistance: A Step-by-Step Guide to Planning Nonviolent Campaigns” is an eye-opening look into campaign design.40 Finally, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s research project “Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies” offers a multivolume work on all forms of resistance.41

Conclusion

A military education that includes irregular warfare ought to include the study of civil resistance. Deep expertise may not be required for all military professionals, but an introductory grasp of the theory and practice of nonviolent resistance is crucial in irregular domains. Civil resistance is powerful and omnipresent, whether employed for or against one’s objectives. We know that our adversaries fear it, anyone can access it, our allies train to it, and so soldiers must understand it.

Notes

1. Erica Chenoweth, Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 1–6.
2. Ibid., 6–28.
3. Summer D. Agan et al., Science of Resistance (Fort Liberty, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command [USASOC], 2019), 6–7, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/typology-resistance.pdf.
4. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Non-Violent Action (Boston: Porter Sergeant, 1973), 1–25, https://www.aeinstein.org/on-nonviolent-action.
5. Thomas Merton, ed., Gandhi on Non-Violence: A Selection from the Writings of Mahatma Gandhi (New York: New Directions, 1964), 3–4; Chenoweth, Civil Resistance, 95–100.
6. Sharp’s The Politics of Non-Violent Action is a three-volume work.
7. Joshua Ammons and Christopher J. Coyne, “Gene Sharp: The Clausewitz on Nonviolent Warfare,” The Independent Review 23, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 149–56.
8. “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” Albert Einstein Institute, accessed 6 September 2024, https://www.aeinstein.org/198-methods-of-nonviolent-action.
9. Saget Bedel and Archie Tse, “How Occupy Wall Street Turned Zuccotti Park into a Protest Camp,” New York Times (website), 5 October 2011, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/05/nyregion/how-occupy-wall-street-turned-zuccotti-park-into-a-protest-camp.html.
10. Ezra Klein, “Who Are the 99%?,” Washington Post (website), 4 October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/who-are-the-99-percent/2011/08/25/gIQAt87jKL_blog.html.
11. Chris Cillizza, “What Occupy Wall Street Meant (Or Didn’t) to Politics,” Washington Post (website), 13 September 2013.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/09/17/what-occupy-wall-street-meant-or-didnt-to-politics/.
12. James Barron and Colin Moynihan, “City Reopens Park After Protesters Are Evicted,” New York Times (website), 15 November 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html.
13. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, October 2022), 1-9.
14. Ibid.; Philip Wasielewski, “The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, Political Warfare,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 20 June 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/the-constant-fight-intelligence-activities-irregular-warfare-and-political-warfare/.
15. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 1–26. Updated statistics on Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset.
16. David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2020), 34.
17. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 1–32.
18. Erica Chenoweth, “Can Nonviolent Resistance Survive Covid-19?,” Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 3 (2022): 304–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2022.2077085.
19. Ibid., 308–13.
20. Ibid., 306–15.
21. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Penguin Random House, 2008), xix–xxii.
22. Seth G. Jones, A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018), 274–97.
23. Ibid., 128, 139, 157.
24. Ibid., 127–29, 200–5.
25. Anna Binnendijk and Marta Kepe, Civil-Resistance in the Baltic States: Historical Precedents and Current Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), 77–111, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA198-3.html.
26. Ibid., 76–114.
27. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, 72 Hours: What to Do in Case of a Crisis (Riga, LV: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, 2022), 15, https://www.sargs.lv/sites/default/files/2022-04/72hours.pdf.
28. Samual Charap et al., Russia Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021), 24–26.
29. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 70–79.
30. Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Protests and Beyond,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2 (2015): 111–21, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0030.
31. Jin Wu, K. K. Rebecca Lai, and Alan Yuhas, “Six Months of Hong Kong Protests: How Did We Get Here?,” New York Times (website), 18 November 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-arc.html.
32. Ibid.
33. Kari Lindberg, “Activist Joshua Wong to Plead Guilty in Hong Kong’s Biggest Security Case,” Time (website), 18 August 2022, https://time.com/6206947/joshua-wong-hong-kong-trial/.
34. Mike Ives, “Hong Kong’s New Security Legislation Took Decades to Pass. Here’s What to Know,” New York Times (website), 19 March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/19/world/asia/hong-kong-security-law-article-23-explained.html.
35. “National Resistance Course,” Joint Special Operations University, accessed 6 September 2024, https://jsou.edu/Courses/Index/334.
36. Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Jonathon B. Cosgrove, and Erin N. Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance (Fort Liberty, NC: USASOC, 2019), https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/typology-resistance.pdf; Agan et al., Science of Resistance.
37. Thomas E. Ricks, Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1968 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022), 1–36.
38. Will Irwin and Charles Cleveland, How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters to SOF) (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2019), https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/32.
39. Ivan Marovic, The Path of Most Resistance: A Step-by-Step Guide to Planning Nonviolent Campaigns (Washington, DC: International Center of Nonviolent Conflict, 2018), 1–14, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/path-most-resistance-step-by-step-guide-planning-nonviolent-campaigns/.
40. USASOC, Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies, 5 vols. (Fort Liberty, NC: USASOC, 2019), https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html.

2. FACT-CHECK: Did America’s Most Popular Podcaster Joe Rogan Just Parrot a Bunch of Kremlin Propaganda?

​This could be better than Mike Tyson's last fight.

FACT-CHECK: Did America’s Most Popular Podcaster Joe Rogan Just Parrot a Bunch of Kremlin Propaganda?

A clash over Russian missile strikes and World War III is pitting US super-influencer and jujitsu black belt Joe Rogan against Ukrainian heavyweight boxer Wladimir Klitschko

by Stefan Korshak | November 25, 2024, 4:20 pm

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · November 25, 2024

Ukrainian heavyweight boxer Wladimir Klitschko on Sunday called out hugely popular entertainer and commentator Joe Rogan for, Klitschko said, broadcasting Kremlin narratives and factual errors about Ukraine to America’s biggest podcast audience.

Kyiv Post fact-checkers found that, by and large, Rogan was wrong and Klitschko was right.

A martial arts enthusiast and holder of three black belts, Rogan during a Saturday broadcast of “The Joe Rogan Experience” attacked Ukraine and its President Volodymyr Zelensky for committing aggressive acts against Russia and bringing the world to the brink of a Third World War.

In a profanity-laced diatribe during a two-hour interview/chat with US entertainment industry performer and executive Scott Storch, Rogan tore into Zelensky for, in Rogan’s view, provoking Russia by ordering missile strikes against targets in Russia.

“Zelensky says Putin is terrified. F**k you man (Zelensky)! F**k you people! (Ukrainians). You f*****g people are about to start World War III! They (Russia) fired an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time ever. It’s the first time one of those has ever been used. It’s f*****g insanity because those intercontinental ballistic missiles can have nukes on them. This one didn’t. But if it does, the whole world changes, and it changes because the military-industrial complex, and because of the money that’s going to Ukraine.”“It’s a proxy war. The whole thing is f*****g insane. Come to the negotiating table. Sit down. Work this out. Stop killing everybody,” Rogan said. He went on to ask his producers to find a CNN report praising the Ukrainian missile strike against Russia Rogan “had heard about,” but during the broadcast they didn’t locate it.

Other Topics of Interest

Russia Claims Ukraine Fired 8 Ballistic Missiles, Likely ATACMS Again

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the incident in its daily briefing but did not specify the missile type or exact location of the interception.

Rogan went on to say of Ukrainian missile strikes against Russia: “Let’s f*****g calm everybody down and stop being so f*****g tribal. You’re so crazy that you think that everything the Left is doing is right because you’re on the Left. This is insanity. And for anyone that’s a Left-wing progressive person that somehow another missiles (sic) are a good thing, God d**n it. God d**n it you people. You’re out of your f*****g minds. It’s never the answer. This is craziness. Especially with Russia. God d**n! That’s the s**t that keeps me up, man.”

Rogan’s remarks about US foreign policy and the Russo-Ukrainian War were sandwiched between a discussion with Storch about a robber exhibitionist in Manhattan, and then comment that, in Rogan’s view, incoming US President Donald Trump’s leadership skills put America in a strong position for negotiating with the Taliban, China, and Russia.

Ukrainian Wladimir Klitschko, younger brother of Viltaly Klitschko, the undisputed world heavyweight boxing champion from 2011 to 2015, in a Sunday video posted on the platform Twitter/X hours later, took Rogan to task for, he said, repeating Russian state propaganda talking points about Ukraine.

A longtime top contender himself, Wladimir held multiple heavyweight world championship belts between 2000 and 2015. The elder brother Vitaly is the Mayor of Kyiv.

“You are repeating Russian propaganda, (in fact) Putin’s Russia is in trouble. They want to scare you and people like you. His (Putin’s) war supposed to last three days. It has lasted three year thanks to the heroism and sacrifice of us Ukrainians. So they are using the only weapon they can use: propaganda,” the younger Klitschko said.

. @joerogan , I disagree pic.twitter.com/tSGvwUnXOQ

— Klitschko (@Klitschko) November 24, 2024

Kyiv Post fact checks of Rogan’s points found direct contradiction of the factual record of the Russo-Ukraine War, and at times repeated Kremlin official state narratives almost verbatim.

Klitschko’s response was accurate as regards the content of Russian propaganda, but his suggestions that Russia’s warfighting effort was weakening and that its national leadership was frightened could not be proved, and that there was evidence contradicting that claim, fact-checkers found.

Rogan claim 1: The Russo-Ukrainian War is a proxy war between the US and Russia H2 Please

This is false. Russia, in 2022, invaded Ukraine with the objectives of eliminating Ukrainian independence and, by many measures, the Ukrainian people. At the time, the main US response to that invasion was not to intervene in Ukraine’s support because Biden administration leadership was sure Ukrainian resistance would collapse.

US arms support to Ukraine by value is less than by Europe, and US financial support to Ukraine is substantially less than Europe’s, so it is inaccurate to say the US is fighting a nuclear superpower proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, or that the US is Ukraine’s only source of support. From the European perspective, the Russian invasion of a neutral country and the ignition of a major war on NATO’s eastern flank is an existential security threat.

Rogan claim 2: Ukraine is about to start World War III

This is demonstrably false and repeats almost word-for-word Kremlin warnings that continued Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion could lead to a nuclear exchange initiated by Russia.

From the point of view of logical cause and effect, and also per classic international law about a nation’s right to self-defense, Russia initiated hostilities. Were Russia to use an atomic weapon against Ukraine – it would be a Russian, not a Ukrainian decision to employ that nuclear device.

Rogan claim 3: The Western military-industrial complex is responsible for the Russo-Ukraine War

The war started when Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24 2022. It is possible to debate why the Kremlin leadership made that decision, but in any case, it clearly wasn’t because major American arms manufacturers like Raytheon or Boeing put the Russian government up to it.

Rogan claim 4: Russia just launched the first ICBM fired in anger ever

This is technically and operationally false. On Saturday, based on debris found by Ukrainian emergency response teams searching the impact site, a Russian missile, with a range well short of cross-oceanic reach, struck a mixed residential-industrial area of Dnipro. By definition, the missile was not an ICBM, but an IRBM, an Intermediate Range Ballistic missile.

The Russo-Ukraine War has seen Ukraine launch approximately 100 of its own IRBMs, and about 50 US-donated IRBMs. Russia, by Ukrainian counts, in a systematic bombardment of Ukrainian homes and businesses since Fall 2022, when the bombardment campaign was kicked off, has launched more than 11,000 medium- or long-range missiles at targets in Ukraine, of which around 3,000 were ballistic missiles.

Rogan claim 5: The Russo-Ukraine war can be ended by both sides “working it out”

This is a grossly simplified and, by many measures, an absurdly optimistic analysis of a hugely complicated subject.

Any negotiated end to fighting in the Russo-Ukraine War would require not only a cessation of actual hostilities, but resolution of responsibility, and potentially material compensation for an estimated half-trillion dollars’ of property damage, the forced migration of 3-4 million Ukrainians, and the death or injury of, probably, at least 200,000 Ukrainians. Were any peace deal to encompass transfers of sovereign territory, or security commitments, or mandated force levels, or a third-nation presence, negotiations would become correspondingly more complicated.

Rogan claim 6: Ukrainian missile strikes against Russia are “never the answer”

As noted, Russia has fired 11,000+ missiles at Ukraine. Rogan is arguing Ukraine should not defend itself by the same means, which is unreasonable assuming Ukraine and Ukrainians have the right to exist.

Moreover, Ukrainian missile strikes against Russia have been effective, repeatedly.

One of the best-known successes scored by Ukrainian missile gunners was against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which came under Ukrainian missile fires early in the war and since then has repeatedly lost warships. Currently, about one out of three of the warships the Russian navy deployed to the Black Sea at the outset of the war is now on the bottom of the Black Sea, and by deadweight tonnage more than half have been sunk or destroyed. In October 2023 the Russian navy abandoned its home base in Sevastopol, in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, because of the threat of continuing Ukrainian missile strikes.

Three days before Rogan attacked Ukraine for dragging the world closer to World War III, Ukrainian air force bombers launched 10-12 missiles at a Russian army headquarters in Russia’s Kursk region. Subsequent satellite overflight imagery and Ukrainian intelligence estimates indicated the missile strikes demolished the headquarters, killed a senior Russian general and dozens of his staff. According to unconfirmed reports, a North Korean general present at the scene was badly injured as well. Speculative reports have placed the number of North Korean rank and file killed in the strikes at 4-500.

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · November 25, 2024

3. Affordable Drones and Civilian Supply Chains are Transforming Warfare

​Ukraine is a laboratory for the study of the future of war.

Excerpts:

On the physical battlefield, Ukrainian civilians have also taken on a critical role in providing drones, which are essential to Ukraine’s defense strategy. Lt. Col. Pavlo Kurylenko emphasized this reliance, stating, “We’re only holding back the Russians with crowdfunded drones.” He noted that FPV (first-person view) drones, 90 percent of which are supplied by volunteers or military divisions, are a crucial element preventing Russian breakthroughs on all fronts.

Demand for drones far exceeds supply, and Ukraine has depended heavily on volunteers to manage drone supply chains since the start of the invasion. Dzyga’s Paw, a fund that has supported over 100 military units, has played a key role in delivering essential tech supplies. Former tech professionals from the fund have coordinated drone operations for Ukrainian forces, building robust tech supply chains for the military. Volunteers have also devised innovative solutions, such as using Google Meet to livestream drone footage, providing commanders with real-time battlefield intelligence.

Despite the efforts of volunteers, Ukraine still faces challenges due to limited access to Chinese-made drones. Kostyantyn Mynailenko, a commander from an aerial reconnaissance unit in the Liut Brigade, said, “The Russians have many more drones than us. They have a stable supply chain sourced directly from China, whereas we must order our Chinese drones indirectly through Europe.” This procurement gap has made Ukraine heavily reliant on volunteers to source Chinese drones for nearly two years.

Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, head of Ukraine’s navy, stated that after the war, Ukraine will publish a naval warfare textbook for NATO military academies, drawing on their extensive experience with naval drones. Ukraine’s approach demonstrates the importance of efficiency in modern combat. Affordable $500 drones are reshaping the frontlines, enabling precise and cost-effective strikes. Both sides now hide their expensive systems, acknowledging that advanced technology and heavy armor is extremely vulnerable in this new kind of warfare.

However, Ukraine faces continued challenges from low-cost drones like the Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, which help overwhelm air defenses. These drones, priced as low as $20,000 according to The New York Times, are small, fly at low altitudes, and are challenging to detect and intercept. Often deployed in swarms, Shahed drones can overwhelm air defense systems, forcing Ukraine to use costly missiles to neutralize much cheaper threats. This has led to a unique battlefield environment where even affordable technology can impact high-cost defenses, redefining the economics of warfare.

Affordable Drones and Civilian Supply Chains are Transforming Warfare

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/affordable-drones-and-civilian-supply-chains-are-transforming-warfare/

by David Kirichenko

|

11.26.2024 at 06:01am

The Washington Post previously reported that “cheap drones” deployed in Ukraine have fundamentally changed modern warfare, initially giving Ukrainian forces an edge on a battlefield where they are consistently outnumbered and outgunned. Drones now play a versatile and essential role in Ukraine’s defense, handling reconnaissance, directing artillery, evacuating soldiers, and executing bombing attacks. Notably, FPV (first-person view) drones are used to drop explosives or serve as single-use kamikaze drones, wreaking havoc on infantry sitting on the frontline trenches and limiting the use of heavy armor on the front. 

In March 2023, Ukrainian officials revealed that the country required 20,000 artillery shells daily to sustain its ground operations, supported by around 300 Western-made artillery systems. This volume was essential for maintaining the intensity of Ukraine’s battlefield actions. However, supplies have consistently fallen short. At its peak, Ukraine managed to secure 9,000 shells per day—less than half the required amount—allowing for somewhat sustained operations. Recently, however, daily supplies have dwindled to just 2,000 shells most often.

In response to these shortages, Ukrainian units have increasingly relied on drones, especially FPVs, to strike targets when artillery fire is limited. These drones provide significant tactical advantages, offering precision strikes and reconnaissance capabilities that can disrupt enemy operations. For example, Ukraine has deployed “Dragon drones” that release thermite on Russian positions, igniting enemy cover and forcing exposure. However, as Stacie Pettyjohn pointed out in War on the Rocks, “even large numbers of small drones cannot match the potency or volume of artillery fire and thus cannot substitute for howitzers.”

Nonetheless, Ukrainian drone units are holding entire parts for the frontline like in Chasiv Yar. The Ukrainian drone unit Yasni Ochi, part of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in the Avdiivka sector, in a six month period, the 150-strong team eliminated over 1,500 Russian soldiers, either killed or injured, while incurring minimal casualties.

Drones are also reshaping other aspects of battlefield strategy. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces now often use motorcycles instead of armored vehicles, as motorcycles generate less dust, reducing visibility to enemy drones. This agility and reduced battlefield profile have become more advantageous than the protection provided by traditional armored vehicles. Soldiers on motorcycles are less likely to be detected by aerial surveillance, enabling more nimble and covert maneuvers.

Earlier in 2024, AP News reported that Ukraine withdrew US-provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from the frontline due to their vulnerability to drone attacks. Ukrainian tank units in areas like Toretsk have shifted to primarily artillery roles to minimize exposure. However, American officials caution against overgeneralizing these lessons, noting that the flat landscapes of Eastern Ukraine are ideal for drone operations. In contrast, US forces would deploy tanks alongside air support and defense systems for added protection.

This widespread use of drones poses a substantial threat to traditional armored units. Equipped with precision-guided munitions and advanced surveillance, these UAVs can easily target and disable even sophisticated tanks. One Ukrainian FPV drone commander envisions “a future where vehicles will not be able to move within a 12-mile grey zone” due to drone dominance.

In August 2024, a Ukrainian FPV drone recorded the first confirmed downing of a helicopter during combat, striking the aircraft mid-air. Within days, Ukraine downed another Russian helicopter using FPV drones. Samuel Bendett, an expert in drones and military robotics, noted, “the rapid rise of commercial-grade drones such as the DJI Mavic, along with the unprecedented impact of thousands of FPV drones, has created a battlespace that is increasingly transparent, with numerous remote-controlled ISR assets guiding combat drones ready to pounce on any target.”

On the physical battlefield, Ukrainian civilians have also taken on a critical role in providing drones, which are essential to Ukraine’s defense strategy. Lt. Col. Pavlo Kurylenko emphasized this reliance, stating, “We’re only holding back the Russians with crowdfunded drones.” He noted that FPV (first-person view) drones, 90 percent of which are supplied by volunteers or military divisions, are a crucial element preventing Russian breakthroughs on all fronts.

Demand for drones far exceeds supply, and Ukraine has depended heavily on volunteers to manage drone supply chains since the start of the invasion. Dzyga’s Paw, a fund that has supported over 100 military units, has played a key role in delivering essential tech supplies. Former tech professionals from the fund have coordinated drone operations for Ukrainian forces, building robust tech supply chains for the military. Volunteers have also devised innovative solutions, such as using Google Meet to livestream drone footage, providing commanders with real-time battlefield intelligence.

Despite the efforts of volunteers, Ukraine still faces challenges due to limited access to Chinese-made drones. Kostyantyn Mynailenko, a commander from an aerial reconnaissance unit in the Liut Brigade, said, “The Russians have many more drones than us. They have a stable supply chain sourced directly from China, whereas we must order our Chinese drones indirectly through Europe.” This procurement gap has made Ukraine heavily reliant on volunteers to source Chinese drones for nearly two years.

Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, head of Ukraine’s navy, stated that after the war, Ukraine will publish a naval warfare textbook for NATO military academies, drawing on their extensive experience with naval drones. Ukraine’s approach demonstrates the importance of efficiency in modern combat. Affordable $500 drones are reshaping the frontlines, enabling precise and cost-effective strikes. Both sides now hide their expensive systems, acknowledging that advanced technology and heavy armor is extremely vulnerable in this new kind of warfare.

However, Ukraine faces continued challenges from low-cost drones like the Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, which help overwhelm air defenses. These drones, priced as low as $20,000 according to The New York Times, are small, fly at low altitudes, and are challenging to detect and intercept. Often deployed in swarms, Shahed drones can overwhelm air defense systems, forcing Ukraine to use costly missiles to neutralize much cheaper threats. This has led to a unique battlefield environment where even affordable technology can impact high-cost defenses, redefining the economics of warfare.

Tags: drone warfare, drones, Russo-Ukranian War

About The Author

• 
  
• David Kirichenko
• David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @DVKirichenko.

4. Musk Wants $2 Trillion of Spending Cuts. Here’s Why That’s Hard.

​Useful graphics and charts at the link.

Musk Wants $2 Trillion of Spending Cuts. Here’s Why That’s Hard.

Trimming U.S. government spending is tough, even by amounts that are much less astoundingSpending as a share of gross domestic product

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/government-spending-doge-elon-musk-trump-administration-60477bc5?st=aDmqTJ&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

1970

’80

’90

2000

’10

’20

3.0

Defense

3.3

9.0%

Nondefense discretionary

3.3

Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid

and other mandatory programs

14.7

4.8

1.2

Net interest

3.1

Note: Chart is based on data published in June, which may be updated. Fiscal 2024 is estimated.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

By Justin Lahart

Follow

 and Rosie Ettenheim

Follow

Nov. 26, 2024 5:30 am ET

The U.S. federal government spent $6.75 trillion in the most recent fiscal year ended Sept. 30, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Walk around town handing $20,000 to everyone you see. Now do that for the entire U.S. population, all 337 million of us. That is about how much the U.S. spent.

Elon Musk has been tasked alongside biotech company founder Vivek Ramaswamy with leading President-elect Donald Trump’s effort to reduce this government spending through the new Department of Government Efficiency.

Musk has suggested he could cut at least $2 trillion, though he didn’t specify whether he meant annually or over time. DOGE, as the organization is known, will sit outside the government and won’t have decision-making power.

Congress generally controls the government’s purse strings, not the president, though Trump has signaled he would like to change that. A lot of U.S. government spending is considered mandatory—benefits that are paid without any annual vote by Congress. 

Mandatory vs. discretionary spending

Mandatory spending and interest payments

Discretionary

Non-Defense

$948 billion

Medicare and Medicaid

$1.49 trillion

Net interest

$949 billion

Other mandatory spending

$1.23 trillion

Social Security

$1.45 trillion

Defense

$849 billion

Note: Numbers don't add up to $6.75 trillion, because some categories are from the CBO's November report; others are from data released in June and may change.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

The government’s big-ticket items provide healthcare for Americans and money for retirees. Social Security benefits cost the government $1.45 trillion in the most recent fiscal year, according to CBO estimates published this month. Medicare and Medicaid were a combined $1.49 trillion.

Trump has promised to protect Social Security and Medicare benefits. Medicaid could be a target for cuts, but the politics of doing so could prove difficult. In June, the CBO estimated that 56% of Medicaid benefits in fiscal 2024 would go toward the aged, blind and disabled. Many nursing homes receive a substantial share of their revenue from the program. 

The amount spent on these mandatory categories has gone up and up, driven by rising healthcare costs and an aging population tapping into Social Security and Medicare benefits. Mandatory spending was equal to nearly 15% of the U.S. GDP this past year, compared with about 10% two decades ago. These obligations will only continue to grow. 

Other, smaller mandatory categories include items such as retirement benefits for military and federal employees, and support for states to help with foster care and adoption. 

Beyond those mandatory spending categories, the U.S. must also pay the interest on its massive pile of debt. Its net interest payments came to about $950 billion this past year. Combined, mandatory spending and interest payments amount to about three-quarters of what the federal government spent. 

Mandatory spending and interest payments

Medicare

$870 billion

Medicaid

$618 billion

Net interest

$949 billion

Other programs

$407 billion

Federal civilian and military retirement

$99B

Other major

health

programs

$143B

Social Security

$1.45 trillion

Income security

programs

$380 billion

Veterans programs

$200 billion

Note: Some categories are based on data from the CBO's November report; others are from data released in June and may change.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

What remains is discretionary spending, which Congress votes for every year. It breaks down into two main categories. The first is defense. The money spent on, among other items, maintaining equipment and bases, buying everything from aircraft carriers to mess-hall meals, and paying nearly 1.4 million uniformed military personnel, was about $850 billion, according to CBO estimates published in June.

The second category is what is called nondefense discretionary spending, and it includes everything else: funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, farm programs, housing assistance, and on and on. Spending on this was estimated at about $950 billion.

Efforts to cut government spending are usually focused on nondefense discretionary categories. These are estimated to amount to only about 14 cents of every dollar the U.S. spent this past year.

Discretionary spending

NonDefense: $948 billion

Natural

resources

and environ-

ment

$52 billion

Veterans benefits

$139 billion

Education, training

and social services

$117 billion

Health

$100 billion

Community and

regional development $49B

Administration of justice

$77 billion

Transportation

$128 billion

Income security

$105 billion

Other

$106 billion

International affairs

$75 billion

National defense

$849 billion

Note: These categories are from data released in June and may change. Categories classified as "other" include agriculture, community and regional development, and general space, science and technology.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

Musk and Ramaswamy have argued that some savings could come from cutting the number of federal employees. But pay represents just a fraction of spending.

Estimated pay and benefits for federal employees in the past year cost $384 billion, according to the White House Office of Management and Budget. That includes everyone from the president to air-traffic controllers in Cleveland, to Labor Department statisticians in Washington, to food safety inspectors in Houston to park rangers in Yellowstone. Throw in military personnel, and it came to $584 billion. 

Excluding the Postal Service, there are about 2.3 million people working for the federal government in civilian jobs in the executive branch. About one-fifth of them work for Veterans Affairs.

A large portion of the federal budget is spent on benefits that flow directly or indirectly to individual Americans, and come from direct contributions from workers. There are about 73 million people receiving retirement, disability, supplemental security or survivor benefits from the Social Security Administration each month.

There are about 68 million people enrolled in Medicare and 72 million enrolled in Medicaid. Those programs provide substantial income support for many communities in the U.S. 

The government spends a huge amount on goods and services. A company that makes the screws and other fasteners that help keep a combat jet together is making money from the government. The same goes for landlords with tenants who receive housing assistance, farmers who receive subsidies and a university biochemistry lab that gets federal grants.

But American tax dollars don’t cover all that spending. A lot of it is paid for with debt. U.S. government receipts this past year, or what it took in from individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes and other sources, came to $4.92 trillion, according to the CBO. The difference between that and the $6.75 trillion spent is the budget deficit of $1.83 trillion. That is an amount equal to 6.4% of U.S. GDP. 

The deficit-to-GDP ratio has been larger, but only rarely, such as during World War II or in crisis situations, when the economy was plunging into recession and the government was rushing in with support. When the pandemic struck in 2020, it swelled to nearly 15%. Mandatory spending is projected by the CBO to increase by over $2 trillion over the next decade, and net interest payments are expected to double.

Write to Justin Lahart at Justin.Lahart@wsj.com and Rosie Ettenheim at rosie.ettenheim@wsj.com

5. After Trump’s Tariff Threat, Is a China Currency War Next?

After Trump’s Tariff Threat, Is a China Currency War Next?

While China could offset American tariffs by letting its currency fall, that might endanger Beijing’s recent efforts to stabilize the economy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/26/business/trump-tariffs-us-china-currency.html

For China, a cheaper currency could partially or entirely offset the effects of extra tariffs on Chinese goods.Credit...Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

By Keith Bradsher

Reporting from Beijing

Nov. 26, 2024, 5:15 a.m. ET

Beijing has a powerful tool for responding to President-elect Donald J. Trump’s threatened new tariffs on Chinese goods: It could start a currency war, a step that poses formidable risks for China as well as the United States.

Letting China’s currency, the renminbi, lose value against the dollar would be a tried and true answer to tariffs. A cheaper renminbi would make Chinese exports less expensive for overseas buyers, mitigating the harm to China’s competitiveness from Mr. Trump’s tariffs. Beijing did just that in 2018 and 2019, when Mr. Trump imposed tariffs in his first term.

A cheaper renminbi could partially or entirely offset the effects of the extra 10 percent tariff on Chinese goods that Mr. Trump said on Monday he would order on his first day in office. He also said he would slap a 25 percent tariff on goods from Canada and Mexico, while demanding that they, along with China, halt flows of drugs to the United States.

A strategic devaluation of China’s currency, which is tightly controlled by the country’s central bank, could allow Beijing to supercharge its powerful export machine. China’s overall volume of exports to all destinations already surged nearly 12 percent in the first nine months of this year versus last year. China is poised for further gains, as its banks step up lending to build new factories.

But allowing China’s currency to fall could endanger the country’s economy. Confronting a weaker renminbi, Chinese companies and affluent families might rush to shift money out of the country instead of investing at home.

A weaker exchange rate for the renminbi against the dollar could also hurt the Chinese public’s confidence, undermine consumer spending and erode share prices. It could also work at cross purposes to recent efforts by policymakers to shore up the economy, which has been slammed by a housing market collapse that has erased much of the savings of China’s middle class.

Image

A new housing development in Shanghai. A collapse in the property market in China has erased much of the savings of China’s middle class.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, drew international criticism when it suddenly devalued the renminbi in August 2015, and has been wary of allowing such an abrupt move again. Liu Ye, the head of the international department, said at a news conference on Friday that the central bank will “maintain the basic stability of the renminbi exchange rate at a reasonable equilibrium level.”

But China is deeply hostile to any new tariffs. Responding to Mr. Trump’s threat on Monday, the Chinese embassy in Washington said: “China believes that China-U.S. economic and trade cooperation is mutually beneficial in nature. No one will win a trade war or a tariff war.”

Chinese companies have substantially strengthened their manufacturing capacity in other countries in recent years, building factories that assemble components from China into finished goods for sale in the United States and elsewhere. This has allowed some of them to bypass tariffs imposed by the United States during the first Trump administration.

Many Chinese business owners have been moving money overseas in recent weeks to further beef up their foreign operations and make sure that China can maintain robust exports even if Mr. Trump imposes additional tariffs.

Wang Shouwen, China’s chief international trade negotiator, speaking at a news conference on Friday, promised strong support for exporters. He said that China would provide more trade financing and export insurance for these companies.

China’s exports to the United States have stayed strong despite the 2018 and 2019 tariffs, as many Chinese companies have broken their exports into shipments small enough to avoid tariffs or tracking by customs officials. China has also increased exports rapidly to Southeast Asia and Mexico, where goods are then often processed and reshipped to the United States with little or no tariffs collected.

In the days after Mr. Trump’s election victory this month, the value of the renminbi slipped about 2 percent against the dollar. It has stabilized in the past week at around 7.25 renminbi to the dollar. Many other currencies have also weakened against the dollar since the election, not just the renminbi. The Mexican peso and Canadian dollar tumbled after Mr. Trump targeted both countries with potential tariffs.

The People’s Bank of China sets a daily band of exchange rates, buying and selling currencies in cooperation with state-controlled banks to keep the renminbi in a narrow range. Some currency market observers say that the state banks may be selling dollars now and using the money to buy renminbi, to preserve the current exchange rate.

Arthur Kroeber, a founding partner of Gavekal, an economic research firm, said that the renminbi could fall another 9 or 10 percent if the United States imposes steep tariffs on Chinese goods. That would mean nearly 8 renminbi would be required to buy a single dollar, a level not seen since 2006.

But many other analysts are skeptical that China would tolerate such a steep decline in the renminbi. They predict a floor for the currency at 7.3 to 7.5 per dollar.

China for many years was willing to allow the renminbi to remain weak to power its exports. But the central bank has begun to face an unusual ideological obstacle to any sharp weakening of the currency. At a rare gathering in January of Politburo members, ministers and provincial leaders, Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, gave a speech describing his vision for “high-quality financial development.”

Mr. Xi said that maintaining a strong currency was necessary for China to be a financial power, along with other key elements like a strong central bank and financial institutions.

Image

A People’s Bank of China official said on Friday that the central bank will “maintain the basic stability of the renminbi exchange rate at a reasonable equilibrium level.”Credit...Adek Berry/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

That speech was incorporated into a book published under Mr. Xi’s name, injecting a strong renminbi into the country’s guiding ideology.

When China allowed its currency to slide during the first Trump administration, the White House discussed deliberately weakening the dollar in 2019 as a response, but Mr. Trump refrained from doing so.

Currency policy is likely to be a priority in the new Trump administration: Mr. Trump’s choice for Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, is a hedge fund manager with decades of experience in currency trading. But he is better known for taking positions on the British pound and Japanese yen than the renminbi.

There is an obvious temptation for China to push the currency weaker before Mr. Trump takes over, as precautionary protection against tariffs. But Brad Setser, a former official in the Obama and Biden administrations who has long specialized in China’s currency policies, expressed doubt that Beijing would do so.

“It clearly runs the risk of provoking an angry Trump administration,” and could prompt Mr. Trump to set tariffs even higher, Mr. Setser said.

Li You contributed research.

Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He has lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic. More about Keith Bradsher

6. Musk's government roles create 'clear avenues for serious conflicts of interest'

Musk's government roles create 'clear avenues for serious conflicts of interest'

The SpaceX CEO, who leads a company with more than $10 billion in government contracts, is also the face of a new body aimed at getting rid of government waste.

https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2024/11/musks-new-role-spacex-gets-extra-attention/401284/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

defenseone.com · by GovExec Space Project

As a SpaceX Starship rocket steered its way back to Earth Nov. 19 before ultimately landing in the Gulf of Mexico, President-elect Donald Trump watched from Texas alongside Elon Musk.

Musk is the founder of SpaceX, the space company that handles launches for NASA, the U.S. Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office. Following Trump’s election he is also the co-chair of the cheekily named commission, Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, which is a dog-themed cryptocurrency.

And Musk is once again a central figure, if not the central figure, at the hub of a web of complicated, sometimes contradictory, positions surrounding the U.S. government’s spending and policy on space.

He leads a company that has more than $10 billion in government contracts, and is also the face of a new body aimed at getting rid of government waste. He wants to win new space launch and satellite contracts with the U.S. Space Force and intelligence community, but his reported calls to Russian President Vladimir Putin according to the Wall Street Journal, have raised questions about national security. And his company is now accused of having a near monopoly on some space technologies, a charge he levied against United Launch Alliance a decade ago when he was trying to break into the market to launch national security satellites.

All of this comes as he’s sparred with government agencies, such as the Federal Communication Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Labor Relations Board.

Two defense analysts contacted by The Space Project said it was still unclear how Musk’s relationships and new role with the Trump administration may play out. (Musk has made a practice of not following convention. Gen. William Shelton, the former head of Air Force Space Command, once said of Musk, “Generally, the person you are doing business with, you don’t sue.”)

On Nov. 13, the nonprofit Project for Government Oversight, used the Musk-owned social media outlet X to tweet: “If Elon Musk is running a Dept. of Government Efficiency AND his own companies—especially ones that work with the gov’t—there are clear avenues for serious conflicts of interest. Public servants need to be dedicated to serving the public above all else.”

On Nov. 15, two Democratic Senate leaders, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island asked the Department of Defense’s Inspector General and Attorney General to review whether Musk’s security clearance was at risk following reports of calls to Putin.

In a separate letter, they also asked the Secretary of the Air Force, Frank Kendall, about concerns of overreliance on SpaceX as a single provider for global broadband connectivity in low Earth orbit.

“Mr. Musk’s reported behavior could pose serious risks to national security, and as CEO of a company with billions of dollars in sensitive defense and intelligence contracts, warrant reconsideration of SpaceX’s outsized role in DoD’s commercial space integration,” the letter to Kendall read.

The senators asked for a response and briefing no later than Dec. 1.

Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said from a contract perspective he did not expect much to change. He pointed to SpaceX’s record of “outperforming” other launch companies and said the company’s advantage “is so great that I don't think any kind of political favoritism would come close to what they've won fair and square.”

Where there may be an advantage for Musk, Harrison said, is if Trump were to push for a human mission to Mars around fiscal year 2027.

“They're in the best position to compete for that, not because of political favoritism, but just because of how they've innovated in their company,” he said.

However, he suggested “we could see a complete revamp and reorientation of NASA's budget, slashing a lot of Earth science missions, slashing a lot of education-related funding, and reinvesting all of that and making sure we get back to the moon during Trump's second term.

But changes at the FAA and the FCC for SpaceX’s launch licensing process and environmental review are already underway during the Biden administration, Harrison noted, as is a long-standing shift to fixed-price commercial contracts.

“Elon is going to push for that, but he's pushing on an open door,” Harrison said.

defenseone.com · by GovExec Space Project

7. The Three I’s: Will We Learn from Decades of Quagmires? What I've Witnessed

​A new trinity (to accompany "passion, reason and chance," and "fear, honor, and interest" and so many others that I like).

Interest, Ideology, and Institutions—the "Three I's."

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

The "Three I's" framework—Interest, Ideology, and Institutions—offers a lens to understand international decisions. By applying this model, the U.S. can craft a nuanced foreign policy that realistically addresses contemporary challenges, while avoiding the quagmires of the past.

As a new administration prepares to take office in January 2025, adopting a balanced, pragmatic approach, with a heavy secret engagement on Quiet Diplomacy will bring forth a fruitful harvest. This will be critical for advancing American interests while promoting global stability, peace, and security.

The Three I’s: Will We Learn from Decades of Quagmires? What I've Witnessed

Ken Robinson

National Security, Counter Terrorism, Cyber Security, and Multi-Media Entertainment Professional

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/three-we-learn-from-decades-quagmires-what-ive-ken-robinson-yddyc

November 26, 2024

By Ken Robinson

Introduction

International decision-making hinges on a dynamic interplay of Interest, Ideology, and Institutions—the "Three I's." These factors shape how nations identify goals, justify actions, and organize efforts.

One clear example: We got the “Three I’s right, once upon a time, because “enough, was enough.”

We received the mission, “Capture, or Kill” Pablo Escobar, and destroy the entire “Medellin Drug Cartel.” Don’t come home till you get it done, give us a list of what you need.

We received an unambiguous, clear mission statement, we were properly resourced, properly led, we were allowed to do our job, without interference, and we got it done.

Then, they said, “Ok, do it again, and now “Capture or Kill Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, and destroy the entire “Cali Drug cartel.”

Got it. We accomplished that mission too!

Clear guidance, national will, vigorous support from the chain of command, and the best Special Mission Unit’s in the Department of Defense, working seamlessly with the SOUTHCOM Commander, and American Embassy Country Team – including the CIA station, FBI, DEA, and our Colombian “Search Block” partners.

A whole of government effort.

This framework of unambiguous missions, clear guidance, and proper resources is the only thing that will solve our current Mexico problem, and our China, Russia, Iran, & North Korea problem.

It is vital for understanding past policy quagmires, like the Vietnam War, and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) where we declared war on a “tactic.”

Sometimes, the wrong ideology, like NeoCon’s, leads to quagmires.

A case in point, declaring a war, and committing the prestige, and resources of the United States proved tragic, and ineffective, when declaring a war, on a tactic.

“Terrorism,” has no nation/state, or flag, or standing Army that will mass, and meet us on the field of battle, there will be no “Waterloo,” but “Man Hunting” we do quite well, and the systematic dismantling of defined organizations, we follow the money, we follow the girlfriend, we watch the sick Grandma, in the local hospital, and go to endless weddings, we use the authority of FISA, and the robust collection resources of the United States, and we never stop.

Ever.

But, even though we accomplished both national missions, don’t we still have a drug problem? Yes, we do. Why, because our nation has a consumption problem.

We are the consumers of these illicit drugs. There, I said it.

Because the problem is larger than the life of a drug lord, it’s so complex, it has so many branches and sequels of an endless long hallway, a house of mirrors, trying to manage a Rubik’s cube with your left hand, while firing your Glock with your right hand, while blindfolded, and running on an oily Formica tile floor.

That’s a good day.

In Afghanistan and Iraq we sent 18 year old’s, our blood & treasure, the American fighting soldier, and asked them to be ambassadors on one city block, policeman on the next, then door-kickers on night raids that same evening. Hard to build trust. And… don’t forget to be a City Mayor, and nation/build.

We ignored the iron will of the complex web of tribal rivalries, the distributed populations still living in the time of Moses.

Soldiers spent endless days of boredom, in mini-Americas, in Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s), then, ventured out on “show of force” patrols, and received a generation of Mild Traumatic Brain Injuries (mTBI). Those were the lucky ones, who were permanently maimed, and disfigured, they survived the IED bombs, supplied by Iran.

Did I mention Iran?

In Viet Nam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, again, and again, we fought the last war, not the war we are currently - fighting.

In Viet Nam, U.S. decisions were influenced by the perceived need to counter communism, Kissinger’s domino theory’s, and attempted to align our Cold War calculous with our perceived democratic values, and conflict of interests with the military industrial complex – our deep seated institutional malfunctions.

Viet Nam was a Ten Year “meat grinder.” We ignored the population, and its WILL to resists occupiers, while we rotated a generation of soldiers through the meat grinder, 360 days at a time. It tore our nation apart (to this day).

I grew up attending the funerals of my best friends – their fathers, an assembly line of body bags, throughout the late 1960’s. Sometimes, every weekend – at Camp Lejeune, NC.

This brings us to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union - a new day on the global stage, with no peer competitor.

Iraq, and the first Gulf War (1990): a true legitimate liberation of a people, being slaughtered by an aggressor. I fought in that war, as the Operations, and Intelligence officer, Team F, PROJECT 5, a TOP SECRET unit, directly attached to General Schwarzkopf, by the Chief of Staff, US Army, then detached, and assigned to the Theater Reserve, the 1st CAV Division, where we tenaciously fought our way - deep into the heart of the Center of Gravity, of Saddam’s special Republican Guards.

We defeated them in 100 hours. America was back!

Then in September 11th, 2001, Al Qaeda attacked America, from sanctuary in Afghanistan. That invasion, and war was originally about our righteous retribution, getting the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on America.

Until, suddenly, it wasn’t.

This policy change happened on the side of a mountain, in a fire-fight, the minute we ordered Delta Force to stop pursuit of Bin Laden, and allowed Al Qaeda to seek sanctuary across the imaginary Duran Line, into Pakistan (with our shitty excuse for an alliance partner), and their ISI enablers – proxy war.

Senior US Army leaders were averse to casualties in the mountains of Tora Bora, Delta was at its finest, and ready to complete the mission, but were prevented, ordered to stand down, upon pain of end of career. The people who attacked us were allowed escape, on the “promise” that Pakistan would pick up the task.

Right (no one believed that)! I watched it in real-time, sickened, with utter dismay.

So, we decided the Army should stay, why not? We’re already here, we spent the gas money to get here, we might as well get something out of it all, right?

So we spent twenty years waging war on tribes, and bringing democracy and freedom to a population that wanted neither, and had successfully defeated every occupier since Alexander the Great.

But, this time, things would be different.

What could possibly go wrong?

The same identical “well meaning” neocons had another bright idea! Why not “nation build,” and give Afghanistan a “Jeffersonian Democracy,” ignoring a thousands of years of culture, religion, tribal hatred, ethnicity, & ideologies.

Let’s just write them a piece of paper, we will call it their constitution, drafted by a US Army JAG officer, not the legacy leaders who enjoy legitimacy, who actually run Afghanistan, the tribal elders.

That should work? Right?

Nope!

I attended the emergency loya jirga (Pashto for "grand assembly") held in Kabul, Afghanistan, between 11 and 19 June 2002 to elect a transitional administration.

The loya jirga was called for by the Bonn Agreement, brokered by the Bush administration – because they just broke a nation/state, and now they had to own the problem (had not thought that one through).

The agreement (designed by us, and fed to Afghan leaders with zero legitimacy) was drawn up in December 2001 in Germany.

Bonn, Germany, a place many Afghans don’t even know exists.

I then attended the training of the first battalion of the Afghan National Army, (ANA), a sad looking collection of disheveled, malnourished, illiterate men who did not want to be there, and had little in common with their fellow soldiers, due to language, and tribal barriers.

It was a clear “Tower of Babel” that would never work.

The US special forces, from 5th Special Forces Group, tasked with this training mission worked valiantly, diligently, tirelessly, & honorably! But, their nation should never have asked this of them.

Especially, only to then snatch their critical Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) resources, and Tactical Air Support as we shifted priorities, to go play regime change in Iraq.

Another mission impossible.

How did the Afghan adventure work out?

Well, other nations tried before us, including the Persians, Greeks, Indians, Kushans, Arab caliphates, Mongols, Timur and the Mughal Empire, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and now the United States.

It ended in utter failure, with the disastrous withdrawal, which became identical to the final days of Viet Nam - all over again.

Rinse and repeat.

We did not bring Afghanistan, and Iraq the blessings of liberty, but, we did create a solemn 14-acre section at Arlington National Cemetery that is largely reserved for our heroes, deceased US veterans of these two quagmire-wars.

No one was ever held accountable for this tragic loss of life, our brave soldiers, or the innocent civilians, caught up in the middle of our policy experiments.

Gulf War II, 2003 (the sequel) was really about regime change, not WMD. I was previously a member of the CIA WMD Working Group, as part of my last assignment in the Army, working for the Secretary of Defense, where we conclusively showed that Iraq no longer possessed a viable WMD program, also concurred by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the most invasive inspection regime ever imposed on a nation state (Iraq).

But, this did not deter the neocon ideology – that our manifest destiny was to somehow bring a new day to the Middle East, and give them a good dose of our freedom.

How did that work out?

We created millions of Iraqi diaspora, that flooded Europe, and continue to destabilize it, to this day. We enabled the rise of ISIS, whose wholesale slaughter of Iraqi, and Kurds alike was breathtaking in its inhumanity, in the name of their marginalized twisted version of Islam. They were soundly dealt death blow, after death blow, by a determined JSOC, General Stanley McChrystal and General Michael Flynn. But, we never had enough soldiers to secure the country.

That’s on Rumsfeld, and his eternal hubris.

For Gulf War II, I embedded with the Commanding General, Combined Forces, Land Component Command, at CFLCC HQ, where we produced Inside the War Room, an Emmy-nominated documentary that delivers a gripping, behind-the-scenes portrayal of the United States' military and strategic command during the lead-up to and execution of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, also known as the Second Gulf War. We had brokered unprecedented access, to the CFLCC headquarters, the nerve center for planning and directing the ground campaign (Phase III, defeat Saddam’s regime).

Unambiguous mission. It was flawless.

The problem was SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, who ignored, then relieved his Chief of Staff of the Army, who contradicted the wishful thinking - force structure estimate of Paul Wolfowitz, his Über NeoCon, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in a Congressional hearing. The Chief of Staff warned that it would require twice the force structure Rumsfeld authorized, to successfully win Phase IV (Occupation of Iraq).

He was fired, for honestly answering a question, posed by a Congressional oversight committee, during the congressional debate, and the road to war.

Wolfowitz countered gleefully, famously, that US forces would be “greeted in the streets with flowers.” Rumsfeld got a pass, General Flynn was proven correct about ISIS, (they were not the Junior varsity), they were a clear and present danger to American strategy.

Oh, but yes, Wolfowitz was correct, US soldiers were greeted, but not with flowers, instead they received almost two decades of IED’s, and Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI), if they were lucky enough to survive. Now, they fight for fair treatment from the Veterans Administration, and try to assimilate back to society - while more than 25 a day commit suicide, a national pandemic. The generational consequences of a war of choice.

Did I mention the IED's were manufactured, and supplied by Iran?

We stole critical military resources from the soldiers we left in Afghanistan, who we asked to be policeman, and nation-build, so we could pursue regime change in Iraq. This cost lives, and impeded an already ‘mission impossible’ ask of the US military for another ill-advised neocon - political experiment.

In summary: I was in Afghanistan from the earliest days of the invasion, I was in Iraq, from the earliest days of the Invasion, and continued to deploy back, to both, for 18 long, bloody years, which does not include my 24 years of active service in Special Operations, and Military Intelligence (42 years in total).

My best friend, my brother (followed me into Special Forces, and Ranger’s) is buried in Section 60, along with my dear friends I grew up with, served with, laughed with, cried with.

I have a legitimate, informed opinion, covering all of this debacle, inside the Pentagon, war rooms, tactical operations centers, and front line FOB’s. Please watch “The Hornets’ Nest” to fully understand the day in the life of a deployed soldier. Our documentary was inducted into the National Infantry Foundation, at Fort Moore (Benning).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9UpmtaC-3w

Back to the Three I’s.

We must apply this model to the key protagonist of our national security geopolitics—Russia, China, Iran, & North Korea. I am trying to elucidate why nation states make certain decisions. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. foreign policy in anticipation of the new administration in January, 2025.

The Three I’s Framework

Interest: National Needs and Goals

National interest is often defined by a need for security, resources, or influence. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. pursued its interest in curbing the spread of communism to protect its global trade networks and regional stability. The domino theory encapsulated this interest, predicting that a communist victory in Vietnam would cascade across Southeast Asia.

• Historical Example: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964) exemplifies how interest can drive intervention. The “false” attack on U.S. ships was framed as a threat to American interests, justifying deeper involvement in Vietnam. The Navy Admiral who verified the “false attacks” to me, personally, when I asked him, directly, as I sat at his supper table, (as a teenager, worrying about my own father’s safety). He just turned 100 years old, this past week. He is still mad.

Ideology: Values and Beliefs

Ideology shapes how nations frame their goals and justify actions to domestic and international audiences. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. perceived itself as the vanguard of democracy, opposing an existential threat posed by communist authoritarianism.

• Historical Example: President Kennedy’s "pay any price" rhetoric reflected ideological motivations, aligning U.S. intervention with broader democratic ideals.

Institutions: Mechanisms of Decision-Making

Institutions provide the frameworks through which nations operationalize their interests and ideologies. In the Vietnam War, institutions like the U.S. Congress (via the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) and SEATO underpinned military escalation, ensuring the U.S. had both domestic authorization and international alignment.

Application of the Three I’s to Modern Geopolitics

Russia

Interest: Russia seeks to restore its influence as a global power, secure its borders, and maintain energy dominance.

• Historical Example: Annexation of Crimea (2014), driven by strategic interest in maintaining access to the Black Sea and countering NATO's eastward expansion.

Ideology: Russian nationalism and opposition to Western liberalism justify its actions.

• Example: Vladimir Putin frames Russia as a bulwark against Western decadence.

Institutions: The centralized Russian state, dominated by Putin, allows for decisive but opaque decision-making.

• Example: The use of oligarchic networks and state-controlled media to consolidate control.

China

Interest: China focuses on economic growth, territorial integrity, and regional hegemony.

• Historical Example: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates China's interest in global economic influence. If they can, they will attempt to help Russia KILL the US petrodollar, and upend the post WW II world order.

Ideology: The Chinese Communist Party emphasizes socialism with Chinese characteristics, prioritizing stability and party dominance, they coerce, and demand aid in espionage from their diaspora communities, and get it.

• Example: Policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan reflect ideological commitments to sovereignty.

Institutions: A one-party state system enables long-term planning and strategic consistency.

• Example: Five-Year Plans guide domestic and international policy.

Iran

Interest: Iran seeks regional dominance and security against perceived threats from the U.S. and Israel.

• Historical Example: Support for proxy groups like Hezbollah, & Hamas enhances their regional influence.

Ideology: Shia Islamism underpins Iran's revolutionary ethos, opposing Western imperialism.

• Example: Anti-Western rhetoric and the export of its Islamic revolution reflect ideological motivations.

Institutions: Theocratic governance blends religious and political authority.

• Example: The Supreme Leader's role ensures ideological consistency in foreign policy. But, there is a silver lining, its young people, and its urban youth bulge. They are fed up. They just want to dance, like normal teenagers, wear blue jeans, and travel. Eventually, they will solve our Iran problem for us. It’s just a matter of the “trigger event” and it will all come crashing down.

North Korea

Interest: Survival of the regime and deterrence against foreign intervention are paramount.

• Historical Example: Development of nuclear weapons ensures leverage and regime survival.

Ideology: Juche, or self-reliance, justifies isolation and militarization.

• Example: State propaganda frames nuclear development as a patriotic necessity.

Institutions: A dynastic dictatorship centralizes power and decision-making.

• Example: Kim Jong Un’s absolute authority facilitates aggressive posturing.

Opportunity: 10,000 North Koreans just left home for “winter camp” in Ukraine. They have discovered this thing called “Porn Hub” thanks to Elon Musk, and Star Link. As they said after WW I, “How ya gonna keep them down on the farm, after they’ve seen Paris?” They now know The Big Lie. “Water finds a path,” maybe we should help it along?

United States

Interest: As a global power, the U.S. seeks to maintain security, economic strength, and influence.

• Historical Example: Post-9/11 interventions were driven by security concerns.

Ideology: The U.S. champions democracy and free markets as universal values.

• Example: The Marshall Plan showcased ideological alignment with rebuilding Europe.

Institutions: Democratic processes and alliances shape U.S. decisions.

• Example: NATO and the United Nations provide institutional frameworks for action, we should strengthen them, it only makes the US stronger, when we have collective interlocking security.

Recommendations for U.S. Foreign Policy (2025 and Beyond)

1. Refocus on Pragmatic Interests

• Prioritize clear, achievable goals over ideological crusades. For example, engage China on climate change and trade artfully, while containing its military ambitions, and hammer them heavily for its theft of Intellectual Property, and hostile intelligence collection, and threats to our critical infrastructure. Like Russians, they only respect strength, and raw power, not diplomatic jibber-jabber. Fang them, make them feel it, where it hurts. Title 50!

2. Modernize Alliances

• Revitalize NATO and foster new partnerships in Asia, such as Indonesia, to counterbalance China and Russia. Strengthen regional groupings like the Quad.

3. Balance Ideology and Realpolitik

• Promote democracy and human rights selectively, avoiding overreach. Example: Prioritize supporting Taiwan and Hong Kong without excessive militarization.

4. Leverage Institutions

• Reaffirm commitment to multilateralism by re-engaging with international bodies like the UN, where appropriate. Leverage institutions like the WTO to skillfully address trade disputes. Every problem is not a nail, every solution is not a hammer.

5. Develop Resilient Deterrence

• Supercharge cybersecurity and modernize nuclear deterrence to address threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Whole of government.

6. Engage Iran and North Korea through Quiet Diplomacy

• Pursue novel engagement with Iran and North Korea, carefully, strategically, using sanctions relief as leverage, separate them from their State-sponsor – Russia, carefully, it’s possible, we have to try, consider nuclear and regional strategic concessions, in a reality based world, and Nobel recognition will be automatic, because we are on the brink, these are such dangerous times.

“He who dares – wins!”

Conclusion

The "Three I's" framework—Interest, Ideology, and Institutions—offers a lens to understand international decisions. By applying this model, the U.S. can craft a nuanced foreign policy that realistically addresses contemporary challenges, while avoiding the quagmires of the past.

As a new administration prepares to take office in January 2025, adopting a balanced, pragmatic approach, with a heavy secret engagement on Quiet Diplomacy will bring forth a fruitful harvest. This will be critical for advancing American interests while promoting global stability, peace, and security.

References

• Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs.
• Suri, J. (2011). Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente. Harvard University Press.
• Herring, G. C. (2002). America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. McGraw-Hill.
• Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Books.
• Zakaria, F. (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton University Press.

8. How generals and admirals get promoted now and how that may change under Trump

​This excerpt reminds me of the words of one of my former bosses and long time mentor. When I was promoted to Colonel he quietly said to remember that this is the last promotion I will receive .... pause... based on merit. :-) 

Excerpt:

Before reaching colonel, officers get promoted based on merit, “after that, it’s who you know,” an Army public affairs officer said noting that it’s not unlike the private sector or any other career field.

How generals and admirals get promoted now and how that may change under Trump

A 'plucking board' of retired generals thinned out senior officers prior to World War II. Trump officials have proposed a similar plan.

Patty Nieberg

Posted 17 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

How the U.S. military chooses and promotes its generals and admirals — the highest-ranking officers in the military — rarely gets attention. That changed this month with reports that officials appointed under President-elect Donald Trump may take a far more direct role in shaping the military’s general officer corps

Last week, the process that moves three- and four-star generals upwards came to the forefront when a promotion for Army Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue was blocked by a Republican senator — a potential early warning sign of the Trump Administration’s reported plan to target senior military leaders who were in command during the military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Donahue was the ‘last man out of Afghanistan‘ as the commander of the 82nd Airborne in the final days of the military’s exit from Kabul and was up for his fourth star to command Army Europe and Africa.

Donahue’s hold-up came just after a Wall Street Journal report that Trump officials have drafted an executive order that could put three- and four-star officers on the chopping block for “lacking in requisite leadership qualities.” To do that, Trump officials may assemble a “warrior board,” according to some reports, of retired generals to review and recommend removals of three- and four-star officers they deem “unfit.” How such a board would define “unfit” remains unclear but Trump’s pick for Secretary of Defense, Fox News host Pete Hegseth, has previously talked about firing senior generals who have been “involved in, any of the DEI woke s—,” referring to diversity, equity and inclusion policies, on the Shawn Ryan Show podcast. “Either you’re in for warfighting, and that’s it. That’s the only litmus test we care about.”

Retired generals and experts interviewed by Task & Purpose worried that any board designed by political figures could be a de facto loyalty test to Trump or an effort to get rid of generals who promote diversity policies instead of an assessment of leadership qualities, past performance and merit — something that the current process aims to look at when choosing officers.

World War II ‘Plucking Board’

There is precedent for retired generals coming together to weed out current senior leadership in the military. In 1941, Gen. George C. Marshall’s “plucking board” reviewed records of senior serving military officers to replace them with younger junior officers.

That board was approved by Congress as World War II loomed ahead to prune through an Army that did not have ‘up-or-out’ rules, but rather a bloated, aging officer corps in which below-average leaders could stay in one job or rank nearly indefinitely and where senior positions often opened up only due to retirements.

In the decades that followed, promotion and retention rules could vary within a service.

The modern military’s rank and promotion structure began in 1980. According to Kate Kuzminski, director of the Military, Veterans, and Society Program at the Center for New American Security, a Washington DC think tank noted the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act which “set into rhythm this 20-year up-or-out retirement system.” The law enshrined up-or-out, and standardized rules, requirements and timeframes for promotions, including for generals.

“If you’re not promoted to the next rank, you’re forced into retirement. We didn’t have that system back in the day and so that was the only other model that we had,” Kuzmiski said. “That again was not based on any kind of loyalty test, but rather on a kind of stagnation.”

Today, the time frame for an officer to become a general is nearly 25 years to become a brigadier general and almost 40 to become a four-star general, Kuzminski said.

The number of generals at the top of the military has garnered the attention of Congress, which authorizes the number of general and flag officers. Though the proportion to the total force has risen, it still remains “substantially lower” than during the Cold War when the military was “much larger in size,” according to the Congressional Research Service. In 1965, the military had one general for every 2,000 troops, while today’s military has roughly one for every 1,600, according to CRS. A 2022 Defense Department demographics report, shows 866 officers with the rank of brigadier general and above with the majority coming from the Army and Air Force.

Critics have said that the higher number of general flag officers adds to the layered bureaucracy and is wasteful in part because of the high salary costs; the average 2019 salary ranged between roughly $200,000 and $239,000 per year, according to CRS.

Defense Department officials explained the growing general officer population to the Government Accountability Office for a 2014 report as a necessity to the larger number of commands, overseas contingency operation plans and congressionally directed positions like director of Defense Department’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office.

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Three- and four-stars

The process for selecting and nominating three and four-star generals can vary widely based on the preferences of the administration and secretary of defense.

Military service chiefs and secretaries typically select three-star candidates with input from the secretary of defense approval and the White House. Four-stars are generally handled the same way, but with a “much higher likelihood” that the defense secretary or President gets involved, a senate aide said.

Current Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, for instance, “does a formal interview process,” a former four-star officer told Task & Purpose. “Everybody does it a little bit different. Then of course I had an interview with the President.”

Task & Purpose spoke to six former general officers for this story. Some requested to speak anonymously because of the desire to remain apolitical and the pressure former high-ranking officers feel to not speak publicly about current military leaders and choices.

Former generals also noted that three- and four-star billets are different from the lower ranks because nominees are not promoted into the rank and then assigned to a job, but rather are chosen for a specific command or job and then promoted to assume that role. As a result, knowledge of a geographic region, field experience, or previous deployments might qualify or disqualify a general for promotion to a position rather than the strict evaluation of their performance in previous jobs that determine promotion lower in the ranks.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates responds to a question as Gen. George Casey, commander multi-national forces-Iraq looks on, during a press conference in Baghdad, Iraq, Dec. 22, 2006. DoD photo.

Retired commanding general in Iraq and Army chief of staff, four-star Gen. George Casey said as a service chief, he met with the chairman of the joint chiefs and Defense Secretary Robert Gates about twice a year to discuss which two-stars could fill three-star positions and which three-stars would make good four-star picks. In practical terms, they were picking officers to mentor and groom for future three- and four-star jobs, he said, giving the example of the first woman to become a four-star, Gen. Ann Dunwoody.

“She was a logistician and so she was clearly going to the Army material command and we groomed her in several three-star positions to prepare her for that job,” Casey said.

In the U.S. military, there are no permanent grades above major general — meaning three and four-star generals assume the number of stars once they are in the position. If a four-star general officer leaves their job and stays on active duty but does not assume another four-star position, they revert back to major general.

Four-star nominees typically meet with the Secretary of Defense but again it depends on the personality. Casey noted it was common practice for former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to meet with four-star nominees based on his experiences in the private sector.

“[Rumsfeld] said, ‘I want to interview every three- and four-star nominee,’ and that took people back,” Casey said. “Some people were affronted by it. I saw it as: he’s exercising his appropriate level of civilian control,” Casey said.

While not a hard and fast rule, the President will also meet with important four-star billets like Casey, who was nominated to be a commander in Iraq during the war. Casey said he and his wife were invited by Rumsfeld to a dinner that former President George W Bush was having for former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte.

“That’s the first time I met him. We were able to interact over dinner,” Casey said. “For the key four-star billets, there’s usually face-to-face interaction with the President. There is not in every case.”

‘Needs of the Army’

During the general officer promotion process for one and two-star generals, promotion decisions are based on criteria handed down by the service secretaries that may specify the number of officers needed who have certain field experiences or skill sets, former generals said. For instance, the brigadier generals selected for promotion are determined by the “needs of the Army” in terms of overall number as well as specific backgrounds or competencies like infantry, public affairs, Special Forces, aviation, intelligence, one retired general officer who served on a couple of boards said.

Retired Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton gave the example of, “one board I watched, we needed to have a Chinese speaking brigadier general, preferably combat arms to serve as defense attache in China.”

Before reaching colonel, officers get promoted based on merit, “after that, it’s who you know,” an Army public affairs officer said noting that it’s not unlike the private sector or any other career field.

A star is on display during the promotion of Air Force Gen. Maryanne Miller. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Michael Cossaboom.

At the junior officer levels, the services have adopted new policies aimed at countering an officer pipeline reliant on the “good ol’ boys club” which has generally referred to the majority white male officer corps promoting and shielding their own from punishments. In 2020, the Department of Defense announced that the services would eliminate officer photos from promotion packets to reduce any racial bias from raters. The changes have been intended to create a more diverse pipeline of junior entrants which “sets the stage” for who can be retained and promoted to senior officer positions, according to a 2023 RAND Corporation report focused on the Army.

Retired generals interviewed by Task & Purpose acknowledged personal bias based on characteristics not germane to an officer’s work in the military as an inevitable part of the people-centric process where previous assignments and reputations matter. At the same time, some former generals said that merit brought them so far until luck kicked in.

“You don’t know how lucky you are until you sit on a board and see all those folks that are so good and you kind of sit there and say how the hell did I make it?” said retired Maj. Gen. William Nash, who served on a number of selection boards, including one for promoting brigadier generals.

“My timing was great for me. It was lucky and it worked out but I’m under no illusions that I’m the only person that could have done that job,” the retired four-star officer said.

The Senate’s role

The President has the authority to appoint three and four-star general officers but they are ultimately confirmed by the Senate — a framework according to the Congressional Research Service which allows for congressional oversight “while providing substantial latitude” to the executive branch.

The Senate is involved in confirming all active duty officers who reach the rank of major (O-4) and above. The list, which can contain thousands of names, go through the Senate Armed Services Committee and once approved, go onto the Senate floor where they are usually passed by a unanimous consent vote, a Senate aide said.

Typically, Senate confirmation hearings are reserved for four-star command positions like combatant commanders, military service chiefs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, major theater commands, and agency chiefs. However, there are other four-star positions that are not required to go before the committee like staff positions and functional commands. Rarely do 3-star nominees go before the committee, the aide said.

Nominees sign a general sheet where they agree to provide “a personal view even if it differs from that of the Administration,” Casey said. They also submit answers to 100 or so Advance Policy Questions at least a week in advance to the Senate Armed Services Committee that cover operations, strategy, and policy topics. Most nominees also try to meet with as many SASC members a possible ahead of their confirmation hearings. There, senators usually ask about their leadership plans or try to get their commitments on policy proposals, the senate aide said.

“The Senate Armed Services Committee controls it. If you don’t get by them, you’re not gonna get the job,” the retired four-star officer said. “It doesn’t matter what the President wants. It doesn’t matter what your service wants. It doesn’t matter what the joint chiefs want. If you don’t get by the SASC, then you’re not gonna get that job.”

The number of general flag officer positions in each military service and their required duties are dictated by federal statute and can be altered by federal lawmakers. For example, in 2011, Congress specified that the chief of the National Guard Bureau should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with “the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.”

Kuzminski said the White House has the authority to do a “wholesale realignment” but it still requires oversight from Congress.

“A president can unilaterally fire a general officer, but he cannot unilaterally confirm a general officer,” Kuzminski said. “If he goes ahead and fires all the sitting generals right now, then there has to be a Senate confirmation of every single general officer that backfilled that fired individual.”

What would this mean? Kuzminski said, “a good picture of what that could look like” in reality could be similar to the situation caused by Sen. Tommy Tubberville’s (R-Ala.) protest against the Defense Department’s abortion travel policy which held up more than 200 general officer confirmations.

“Holds are a useful tool that the Senate should have when they have questions about the performance of the person being reviewed for confirmation — so if you did something bad, you failed at your job, you did not live up to the principles of being a general officer — the Senate has every right to place a hold, investigate and not confirm you,” she said. “This is just a blanket hold. We don’t like what the civilians of DoD are doing. We’re gonna make it hurt.”

The holds led to hundreds of officers in “acting” roles rather than confirmed positions.

“You had someone acting who did not have the experience, did not have the authority in that position,” she said. “If a conflict breaks out between China and Taiwan and your Army commander in the Indo-Pacific Theater is not a confirmed individual, just acting, there are severe limitations on the decisions that they can make.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• We showed the new Marine Corps recruiting ad to some teenagers. Here’s what they thought of it.
• Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, who commanded 82nd Airborne in Kabul, caught by Senate hold for fourth star
• The Army built a giant concrete pyramid in North Dakota and only used it for six months
• Navy fires commander of E-2 Hawkeye squadron for “loss of confidence”
• Bears got into a food locker at an Alaska Army base and left a huge mess

Patty Nieberg

Senior Staff Writer

Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She’s reported on the military for five years, embedding with the National Guard during a hurricane and covering Guantanamo Bay legal proceedings for an alleged al Qaeda commander.

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

9. ASU as the 'New American University' sets the model for higher education reform

My experience with ASU has been very positive. I have never seen such an innovative academic institution. ​It has been very enjoyable working with the ASU team as they worked to revitalize Small Wars Journal and give us SWJ 2.0 while honoring the legacy of Dave Dilegge. (https://smallwarsjournal.com/​)

​Institutions of higher education should learn from ASU. Of course the reason for ASU being such an outstanding academic institution is leadership. President Crow is a dynamic and visionary leader who makes things happen by empowering his team (a pretty basic and simple formula which does not seem to be widely practiced in this modern era.)

ASU as the 'New American University' sets the model for higher education reform

Presented 10 years ago, ASU Charter lays out commitment to students, community

https://news.asu.edu/20241106-sun-devil-community-asu-new-american-university-sets-model-higher-education-reform

The charter monument at the Tempe campus. The charter was presented to the Trustees of ASU on Nov. 12, 2014. Photo by Deanna Dent/Arizona State University

By Mary Beth Faller | 

November 07, 2024

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Arizona State University’s charter is only 46 words long, but it’s a bold promise that’s a model for the reinvention of higher education.

The document, formally introduced by ASU President Michael Crow to the Trustees of ASU on Nov. 12, 2014, set out the university’s commitment to the inclusion and success of not only its students, but also the wider community.

ASU is a comprehensive public research university, measured not by whom it excludes, but by whom it includes and how they succeed; advancing research and discovery of public value; and assuming fundamental responsibility for the economic, social, cultural and overall health of the communities it serves.

While the charter was officially announced in 2014, the concept was birthed on the day that Crow was inaugurated, in 2002. Nearly halfway into his inauguration speech, he said:

“I want to propose to you a new model for an American research university. One that measures its academic quality by the education that its graduates have received rather than the credentials of its incoming classes, one at which researchers while pursuing scholarly interests also consider the public good. … One that does not just engage in community service but rather takes on responsibility for the economic, social and cultural health of its community.”

The idea had been percolating for years as Crow saw Columbia University, where he was then executive vice provost, and other higher education institutions become increasingly static and insular — and ever more expensive.

He drew from books — including “The Creation of the Future: The Role of the American University” by Frank Rhodes and “A University for the 21st Century” by James Duderstadt, and from philosophers he studied, such as Lorenz Von Stein.

“(Von Stein) had this theory of the role of the public entity like us. He says, ‘The most important thing is to have some identification of yourself that you aspire to be,’” Crow said.

“I became kind of obsessed with the notion of how you could design a new kind of university.”

He had turned down several university presidencies, but when the job came open at ASU, he took it.

“I was familiar with Arizona and I thought this was the one place where there was enough open-mindedness and the one place where the faculty culture was still committed to the people that you could birth a new kind of new American university,” he said.

His first day was July 1, 2002, and he used the summer to brainstorm his “New American University” concept.

“I spent all that time basically talking to people in the community, going to softball games and baseball games and church meetings and community meetings and everything that you could imagine. And listening, listening, listening.”

Video by EJ Hernandez/ASU News

He also worked hard to get faculty on board — a group not always open to change.

Nancy Gonzales, now the executive vice president and university provost, said that when the charter concept was debated by faculty, they had a range of reactions. She was then an associate professor in the psychology department.

“I think there were faculty who said, ‘No, that’s never going to work,’ because the idea of excellence and access being combined was revolutionary for higher education.

“There were probably plenty of faculty who were just sort of neutral about it.

“And then there were faculty, and this is the category I was in, who said, ‘This is the reason I'm in academia — to do exactly what's outlined in this charter.’ So I loved it,” Gonzales said.

And some of the skeptics have changed their minds.

“So many have come back around to say, 'Aha, I doubted it, but now I've done something that makes me so proud and I realize how powerful this is,'" she said.

One example was online education, a key component of expanding access, although some faculty resisted it. Then they tried it.

“And they said, ‘Wow, not only is this really good, it's actually better than what I've been doing. And I've now gone back and rethought how I've been teaching now that I understand these new ways of doing things,’” she said.

The charter is a great recruitment tool. When Gonzales was associate dean of faculty in The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, she did a lot of hiring.

“And I would love to see how by the time they got to me, and they had been in meeting after meeting after meeting, it had clicked, and they would leave knowing about the charter,” she said.

Now, people who are seeking leadership positions will mention the charter in their applications.

“They’ve heard about it, they've read about it, they know the president, and that's what they want,” she said.

Along with the charter is a set of goals that lays out what the university will do. One of the goals for student success is “undifferentiated outcomes based on family income.”

“We don't have that yet,” Crow said.

“I can still predict your success at the institution based partly on your family income. We have a lot of performance goals that we still need to hit.”

And that success has to be achieved at scale — not just at ASU.

“Most people that have gone to colleges or universities of the United States have no diploma. The majority of people with debt have no diploma or certificate, nothing. And that's a failure.

“We have to demonstrate the institution's ability to think about all people, not just the people that come to college,” Crow said.

The mission to widen accessibility, enhance student success and increase local impact plays out every day in the ASU community. 

Here are 10 of those stories to celebrate 10 years since the launch of the charter:

The charter monument at the Downtown Phoenix campus.

Empowering youth in Maryvale

Allison Mullady, director of the Design Studio for Community Solutions in the Watts College of Public Service & Community Solutions

The Design Studio was created in 2018 with the $30 million naming gift from Mike and Cindy Watts, owners of Sunstate Equipment Co., and the main project is the Maryvale One Square Mile Initiative.

From its creation, the mission has been to work with the Maryvale community, not swoop in with pre-conceived plans. The 10-year gift allowed time for dozens of meetings over the years, with neighborhood groups, school districts and health care providers, which has led to strong partnerships.

“The community of Maryvale is very robust and there's a lot of things already happening that are really positive and great,” Mullady said.

“We want the community to feel that we're genuinely there to support their goals and their social health."

Mullady said feedback from the community led to a focus on young people. Projects include a Youth Leadership Program, financial literacy classes, a volleyball league and a youth justice lab with the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice that helps people with juvenile records get access to jobs, housing and scholarships.

The young people wanted to beautify the local canal path, so they canvassed the neighborhood, met with the Phoenix Streets Department and with their local city council member, then interviewed local artists and hired one to paint a mural.

“They’ve had all these really great experiences around civic engagement and leadership and have been really engaged in it because it's something they've wanted to do,” she said.

“We try to hold ourselves to a very high standard of how we engage with people because of the charter and wanting to represent ASU.”

A different student population

Ayanna Thompson, Regents Professor of English and executive director, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies

Almost every time she has a speaking engagement, Thompson talks about the charter.

“It explains why I'm here and not at Yale or Harvard or Princeton,” she said.

“I am really, really committed to the fact that we want to be judged by whom we include and how they succeed. To me, that is everything about what the best of education is,” she said.

“And I don't want to be at an institution that values itself based on how many people they reject. It just seems to me insane in this moment in the 21st century.”

She believes other universities will have to join in the ASU charter’s mission.

“We can't go in the same direction that we've been going for the past 150 years of higher ed in the U.S.,” she said.

Thompson has used the charter to recruit nationally regarded faculty members, though they sometimes think it’s too good to be true — until they start teaching.

“This is just a different student population. They're so hungry. They're here because it's really important for their lives and for their families,” she said.

After 10 years, the charter is still aspirational, she said.

“I would say that we would have written a bad charter if it was, ‘Check. Check. Check. We’re doing these things so we’re fine,’” she said.

“We want something that keeps us aspiring to be better.”

Building a sense of community

Sedra Shahin, student body president, West Valley campus

Shahin wasn’t necessarily aware of the charter when she came to ASU as a first-year student, but as she got very involved with student clubs, she learned more.

“During my training in student government, they brought up the charter on a slideshow and I was like, ‘This is everything we stand for.’”

Shahin, who is a triple major in business administration, business law, and public service and public policy, is grateful that she gets to apply the ideals of the charter in her position.

“Inclusion was one of the pillars that I ran on,” she said.

So she and the other members of the student government hosted a weeklong “ASU 202” fair on the West Valley campus with a different theme each day to connect students to resources — such as “career day,” “major day” and “club day.”

“It focused on making sure that everybody feels included and that they have a sense of community,” she said.

“As a student leader, I honestly feel privileged to be able to help carry out this mission.”

The charter monument at the West Valley campus.

Evolving with student needs

Ina Seok, director of the Student Success Center

The charter is one of the reasons Seok came to ASU nearly two years ago.

“I’m new to higher education, so I really wanted to hold onto this idea of inclusion and accessibility that I had as a K–12 school leader,” she said.

“The charter is so well crafted in terms of the holistic point of view. It’s not just being inclusive — it’s also making sure that the folks we include are being successful.”

Since she’s arrived, Seok has added innovative ways of coaching students, infusing art or outdoor activities into the coaching time and placing coaches into the classroom to support students.

“We’re evolving with student needs and not just doing the same thing that we did many years ago and then hoping that it works for this generation of students.”

'It's an energy'

Kielli Lilavois, associate director of academic support for the College of Integrative Sciences and Arts, Polytechnic campus

Lilavois will celebrate 25 years as an ASU employee on Nov. 8 and she’s supported a wide variety of students, including student-athletes and those in exploratory majors. Now, she works with students with academic integrity issues and she also supervises schedulers.

She remembers that in 2014, employees received cards with the charter printed on them.

“My supervisor said, ‘OK, here’s the charter.’ I knew it was a really big deal to work with students and that no matter the situation, whatever the boundary is in their mind, we’re going to help them,” she said.

Lilavois was explaining the charter to her mother and said, “It’s an energy.”

“I go, ‘Mom, it means we don't exclude anyone no matter the barrier. Is it financial? Is it emotional? We’re going to start you from square one. We’re going to get you the support you need.’

“I can call someone in admissions or I can call someone in career services or I can call President Crow.”

Seeing the difference at ASU

Jason Marcuson, executive director of enterprise education, ASU Learning Enterprise

Before Marcuson came to ASU two years ago, he worked in a company that partnered with many universities.

“And I could definitely see a difference,” he said. “This place just definitely had the innovation component, the ways they wanted to open access to people no matter where they were in life. You don’t see that everywhere.”

Marcuson works with corporate partners to create workforce development.

“So if they need leadership training or they are looking to upskill on AI or sustainability, we can team up with all of the great subject matter experts around the university to create whatever that company needs to enable their talent,” he said.

The Learning Enterprise offers education across the life spectrum, including in the workforce.

“One of my favorite things we do here is provide that chance to have access back in,” Marcuson said.

Everyone gets the same chance

Shania Lee, biomedical engineering graduate student, Tempe campus

Lee has been able to put the charter into practice through her activities as a student, including her time with The Difference Engine at ASU, an interdisciplinary center based at the Downtown Phoenix campus in which students and faculty collaborate to address social equity issues. She was a researcher for the Women’s Power and Influence Index, which rates 66 companies for pay equity, career growth, workplace standards and work-life balance.

“We quantified each company in terms of their benefits for women, such as maternity leave and the wage gap, which we looked into a lot because it’s still a huge inequality issue,” said Lee, who also earned her bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering at ASU.

She also worked as a success coach at Global Launch, the ASU unit that teaches English and welcomes international students.

“There are a lot of frustrations that come with someone not understanding you all the time. So I did a lot of making sure they were in a good head space and letting them talk about anything, like if they’re missing their family,” said Lee, who is originally from Malaysia.

“Global Launch is honestly such an amazing small community at ASU.”

Lee often walks past the charter monument on the Tempe campus.

“I really like it because it’s about accepting anyone regardless of your background and everyone gets the same chance to get their education,” she said.

The charter monument at the Polytechnic campus.

Sharing the tough parts

Jocelyne Moore, success coach at EdPlus at ASU

Moore works with students in the Starbucks College Achievement Plan, which covers tuition for more than 150 ASU Online degree programs for people who work at Starbucks.

“The thing that resonates with me is that ASU doesn’t just admit them and say, ‘You're left to your own devices.' We have a whole support system that's built into it,” she said.

Moore steps up as soon as her students enroll in their first class, coaching them on time management and connecting them with other ASU resources, such as tutoring, counseling or career services.

“I tell my students that I'm here to be your cheerleader, but also your guide as you go through your degree,” she said.

Moore is excited to see several of her students graduate this December.

“It’s nice to be there for the good parts, but also the tough parts and see them realize, ‘I can do this. I can get through tough things.’”

Inclusion at the interpersonal level

Martine Garcia, assistant director of strategic initiatives, ASU Career Services

Garcia supports first-generation, undocumented and DACA students, along with other historically underrepresented students.

Garcia was at ASU as an undergraduate, grad student, management intern and then professional staff — a total of eight years. When he was a student worker, he began to feel the importance of the charter.

“It’s been really great to measure the work compared to the charter and make sure that all the pieces fit,” he said.

Recently, Garcia used a $20,000 grant from Ford to create programming to meet the needs of first-generations students, who told him they wanted more industry connections. He set up events including a networking practice and an etiquette dinner.

Garcia thinks about inclusion at the interpersonal level.

“True inclusion happens in those everyday moments. So I think about how I interact with students in a way that embodies the charter every day. And how do I set up my staff members to be in a space where they can do that every day, every hour?

“It’s important to be reminded that we’re walking the walk and embodying what it means.”

Improving the health of the community

Susan Norton, assistant director of sustainability practices, Polytechnic campus

Norton created and runs the Garden Commons at the Polytechnic campus, which she believes is a perfect example of inclusivity. It’s open to any student, staff, faculty or community member.

“What I really like in the charter is ‘discovery of public value.’ A lot of the students are discovering urban agriculture, gardening and hyper-local produce and what that means for the first time at the Garden Commons. That feels really exciting to me,” she said.

“We have a citrus orchard. We have a fully functioning compost pile. We have pretty much a business of running a farm stand. We have the actual growing process. We start our own seedlings. So there's just lots of different ways to feel that and experience it.”

The Garden Commons is also a place to unwind.

“It’s a wonderful experience for them to let go and not think about coursework and have an outdoor experience,” she said.

“The tactile experience of sight, smell and touch in the garden definitely helps mental well-being.”

The garden is organic and seasonal, and everything used is biodegradable.

“It’s definitely healthy for our community,” she said.

10. ATACMs? What are they thinking?

I disagree with much of this analysis by my friend Grant. The reasons for the decision on ATACMS may be correct but it misses the point. The fundamental question is whether we are committed to helping Ukraine defend itself from Putin's invasion. Yes the restrictions on ATACMS should have been removed long ago or never imposed at all. But to focus on US  political reasoning is not helpful. And the argument is unnecessary because the new President can reverse the decision if he so desires (which will hopefully only happen after he thoroughly assesses and explains how it supports US national interests - e.g., is it in the US interests for Ukraine to fall to Putin?)

ATACMs? What are they thinking? - The Sunday Guardian Live

sundayguardianlive.com · by Grant Newsham · November 23, 2024

Handcuffing an incoming President? Or even just giving him a worse situation to deal with? This was once unthinkable, but is the sort of churlishness one expects from this administration.

Washington, DC: It’s perhaps appropriate that the Biden administration is finishing up with another foreign policy move that leaves one wondering “what could they possibly be thinking?”

Team Biden’s late-in-the-day authorization for Ukraine to use US-provided ATACMs mid-range missiles to attack targets inside Russia is the latest—but far from the first—head scratching move by the “adults in the room”.

From a purely military perspective, these weapons are helpful—especially when you are allowed to use them against more targets. But hitting targets inside Russia won’t have a decisive effect on the Ukraine fighting either way.

In warfare, timing is everything. If Ukraine had been given ATACMs (and other weapons it requested) earlier, say, about nine months into the war when the Ukrainians had the Russian forces discombobulated, a clear-cut victory might have been possible. Or at least a negotiated settlement on very favorable terms.

However, Team Biden dithered and the window of opportunity closed on the Ukrainians, who in short order found themselves battering against Russian forces in fixed, defensive positions, and are now worrisomely stressed by Russian forces on the offensive—which presumably explains Team Biden’s recent authorization to supply anti-personnel mines to Ukraine.

The administration hasn’t explained its latest move regarding ATACMs in any useful way. So observers are left speculating. The two most common reasons offered are that Biden (or whoever is making the decisions) are:

* Punishing Moscow for deploying North Korean troops onto the Ukrainian battlefield.

* Providing Ukraine with added military capability that strengthens its position on the battlefield and in any future negotiations with the Russians. And this, according to administration thinking, makes it harder for the incoming President, Donald Trump, to “sell out” the Ukrainians by forcing them into a bad deal with Russian President Putin—or even worse, cutting them off from US support.

One supposes it all may be about “cost imposition” and setting things up for eventual negotiations. Fair enough, even if ill-advised.

But handcuffing an incoming President? Or even just giving him a worse situation to deal with? This was once unthinkable, but is the sort of churlishness one expects from this administration.

At the end of the day—and assuming Putin doesn’t “go nuclear”, admittedly a risky assumption—the ATACMs won’t make much difference.

Rather, it’s just another step in a line of missteps that have cost a million lives on both sides since Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022—during the second year of the Biden administration. That’s a million human beings. And in 21st century Europe that supposedly had outgrown such conflicts.

This latest move is best viewed in the context of Biden’s handling of Ukraine, and even the administration’s broader foreign policy.

By only timid, incremental, and oh-so-“nuanced” flexible deterrent options—the incompetents have now backed the Western democracies into an increasingly small corner.

Their approach with Ukraine from the beginning has been McNamara-esque. Incremental to the point of ineffectiveness—while hoping the other guy will give up or ask for a deal that lets us leave claiming success.

These are the people who thought running from Afghanistan in 2021 was a good idea, and still insist it was a success.

And they thought they’d brought peace to the Middle East—as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan wrote in Foreign Affairs, claiming the region was “quieter than it had been in two decades.” A week later on October 7, 2023 the place exploded.

It’s even less surprising given that so many administration officials cut their teeth during President Obama’s era. Yes, the same Obama who dismissed Putin’s tough-guy act as just his “shtick”. Hardly. Putin is the sort who can smell weakness and felt emboldened enough not long afterwards to seize Crimea and a slice of eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Biden’s foreign policy team has all the smarts of a gang of graduate students tossing around terms like “flexible deterrence options” and “escalation dominance” and solving the world’s problems in a late-night dorm room rap session. They’ve got it all figured out.

PUTIN GOES BALLISTIC

Now what about Mr Putin? He wasn’t going to just sit still with the ATACMS announcement.

And he’s threatening to use nuclear weapons—as he’s threatened before.

The Tyrant is clearly frustrated, his targets are actually unifying, however imperfectly, against him. Germany’s leader in the 1930s also used to break out in loud angry tirades, shaking his fist and fulminating.

And Senior administration officials assure us Putin is just signalling—or, “acting up”.

Maybe.

But recall Jake Sullivan’s boast mentioned above about a peaceful Middle East.

If they were wrong about that, maybe they’re wrong about Putin.

But even if Putin doesn’t use nukes, that’s small consolation.

He won’t give up his stated objective of restoring Russia to earlier glory, including reestablishing influence (at the least) in its old Soviet Union era boundaries—presumably to include the Baltic nations, and who knows, maybe as far as the Elbe. And his saboteurs are already active in Western Europe—and presumably just awaiting orders.

WORLD WAR THREE?

Which leads us to remember this latest crop of bow-tied swells who entered office in January 2021 insisting “the adults are back in charge” and they would restore diplomacy and prevent Word War Three.

Instead they’re creating the conditions for a world war—and maybe it has already started.

The Chinese and the Russians are tighter than ever. The Iranians are full participants, providing Russia with drones—and a diversionary “front” in Lebanon and Gaza (with Chinese support). And the North Koreans—a starving hell-hole dependent on Beijing’s good graces (and oil, food, and money) for survival has now become a genuine player in what is for now a European war—providing Russia with millions of artillery shells, rockets, and at least 10,000 troops, for starters.

How tight is the alliance? Tight enough. Consider that Putin is willing to absorb the humiliation (he is Russian after all) of relying on Asians for support and survival—and even playing second fiddle to the Chinese—who have their own military objectives, close to home for now, and far beyond eventually.

And in the western hemisphere Venezuela—effectively a Chinese satrap that is destabilizing its region—is readying to seize half of neighbouring Guyana (with a lot of oil) and daring America to do something about.

Chinese political warfare is ascendant almost everywhere—as seen at the new Chinese-built port that opened in Peru the other week. Africa? A similar story. Pacific Islands, same thing.

It is hard to argue that in the time the “adults” have been back, the world has become safer.

ATACMs is a story that will be forgotten in a week or two.

But intentionally or not, President Trump will enter office having been handed the keys to the Augean Stables by the aforementioned bow-tied swells—who’ll soon be scurrying off to sinecures in think tanks and lobbying firms or Ivy League teaching positions—as “professors of practice” of all things.

Trump and his team will have to clean up their mess. It’ll take a good sized shovel.

* Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine officer and former U.S. diplomat. He was the first Marine liaison officer to the Japan Self Defense Force, and is a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of the book, “When China Attacks: A Warning To America.”

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sundayguardianlive.com · by Grant Newsham · November 23, 2024

11. Underwater Geopolitics: How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

​Excerpts:

China's seabed mapping strategy has significant military implications, particularly in the South China Sea. In this region, where China has constructed artificial islands such as Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, high-resolution seabed data enables precise deployment of missile systems, naval patrols, and underwater drones. Detailed seabed mapping supports the construction and fortification of these islands, allowing for the installation of surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and the operation of military airstrips. Additionally, China's deployment of unmanned underwater vehicles like the Sea Wing (Haiyi) gliders enhances their ability to collect oceanographic data crucial for submarine navigation and anti-submarine warfare. These activities have raised concerns among neighboring countries and the international community about the dual-use potential of China's maritime endeavors and their impact on regional security.

By controlling seabed mapping data, China influences submarine cable networks, which carry 95% of global internet traffic and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. China's involvement in projects like the South Pacific Cable Project through state-owned China Mobile led to concerns over data interception capabilities. Its presence in Arctic seabed mapping, facilitated by icebreaker vessels like Xuelong 2, underscores ambitions to secure alternative maritime routes and resources under the guise of scientific research.

China's approach to subsea mapping data has raised concerns about transparency and shared access in the global community. While international initiatives like the Seabed 2030 Project encourage open sharing of ocean floor data to advance scientific research and environmental understanding, China has been criticized for not fully sharing the extensive seabed data it collects. For example, much of the data gathered by Chinese vessels in international waters is not readily available in global databases like those managed by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) or the General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO). This selective sharing limits other nations' ability to leverage valuable information and contrasts with global norms promoting cooperation and transparency in oceanographic research.

Underwater Geopolitics

By Carlo J.V. Caro

November 26, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/26/underwater_geopolitics_1074698.html?mc_cid=1ca8ddbf1f

How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power

Cable Routing Protocols

The rapid construction of undersea cables has brought a hidden but crucial issue into focus: the manipulation of the protocols that control how data travels beneath the sea. These protocols determine the pathways internet data takes, influencing speed, costs, and even exposure to surveillance. Even small changes in these pathways can tilt the global balance of digital power. China’s increasing role in this area demonstrates how technology can be used strategically to reshape geopolitics.

At the heart of this issue is a technology called Software-Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows data traffic to be managed and optimized in real time, improving efficiency. But this same flexibility makes SDN vulnerable to misuse. Chinese tech companies like HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks), ZTE, and China Unicom are leading the way in SDN development. China also holds sway in international organizations that set the rules for these technologies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This influence gives China a hand in shaping global standards and governance.

Africa illustrates how this influence plays out. Chinese investments in digital infrastructure across the continent are massive. For example, the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable, which links East Africa to Europe, was designed to avoid Chinese territory. Yet, thanks to SDN technology, its traffic can still be redirected through Chinese-controlled points. This redirection could introduce delays of 20 to 30 milliseconds per hop—not much for casual browsing, but a serious issue for latency-sensitive activities like financial trading or encrypted communication.

In Southeast Asia, similar risks are evident. The Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC), which connects Singapore to Japan, relies on several landing stations influenced by China. During a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea, some data intended for Japan was mysteriously routed through Hainan Island, under Chinese jurisdiction. Such cases suggest technical routing decisions may sometimes have political motivations.

These examples are part of a broader strategy. By exploiting SDN, China can turn submarine cables into tools for surveillance and control. Data traffic from Africa or Southeast Asia destined for Europe could be secretly rerouted through Shanghai or Guangzhou, exposing it to China’s advanced surveillance techniques like deep packet inspection. This threat extends to cloud computing, as major providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Alibaba Cloud rely on undersea cables. With SDN, Chinese cloud providers—aligned with state interests—could redirect sensitive inter-cloud traffic, putting critical communications at risk.

Manipulating global data routes gives any actor significant geopolitical power. For instance, in a crisis, China could degrade or even sever internet connectivity for rival nations. In the Taiwan Strait, this could isolate Taiwan from global markets, disrupting financial transactions and trade. In Africa, where Huawei has built a significant portion of the continent’s telecommunications infrastructure—reportedly constructing around 70% of 4G networks—there is concern that this reliance could create vulnerabilities. If political tensions were to arise, China could cause slowdowns or disruptions to reinforce dependence, making countries more vulnerable in political standoffs.

The numbers highlight the stakes. Submarine cables carry 99% of international data traffic—over 1.1 zettabytes annually. Significant portions of intra-Asia-Pacific data flows pass through key submarine cable landing stations, including Hong Kong, which is under Chinese jurisdiction. With Chinese firms increasingly involved in substantial global submarine cable projects—such as those undertaken by HMN Technologies—Beijing's influence over the internet's physical backbone is growing.

The economic impact of internet disruptions on highly connected economies is substantial. For instance, the NetBlocks Cost of Shutdown Tool (COST) estimates the economic impact of internet disruptions using indicators from the World Bank, ITU, Eurostat, and the U.S. Census. According to data presented by Atlas VPN, based on NetBlocks' COST tool, a global internet shutdown for one day could result in losses of about $43 billion, with the United States and China accounting for nearly half of this sum. Additionally, Deloitte has estimated that for a highly internet-connected country, the per-day impact of a temporary internet shutdown would be on average $23.6 million per 10 million population.

A deliberate attack on routing protocols could cause widespread financial and operational chaos. In today’s interconnected world, where digital infrastructure underpins economic stability, the ability to manipulate undersea cable traffic represents a subtle but powerful geopolitical weapon.

Addressing this threat goes beyond simply building more cables. It requires rethinking how routing protocols are governed. Transparent global standards must ensure no single country or company can dominate these systems. Routine independent audits should be conducted to detect anomalies that may signal interference. Efforts like the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative and Japan’s Digital Partnership Fund must focus on creating alternative routes to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled nodes.

This issue highlights a new reality in global politics: control over data flows is becoming a key form of power. While most attention has been on building physical infrastructure, the quiet manipulation of routing protocols marks an equally profound shift in global influence. To protect the integrity of the internet, the world must act decisively at both technical and governance levels.

Fiber-Optic Cable Repair Networks

China's disproportionate control over fiber-optic cable repair networks reveals potential vectors for intelligence dominance, coercive leverage, and disruption of digital sovereignty. Globally, an estimated 60 dedicated cable repair ships service the planet's 1.5 million kilometers of submarine cables. China controls a substantial percentage of the fleet, including ships operated by state-affiliated enterprises like Shanghai Salvage Company and China Communications Construction Group. In contrast, the United States and its allies maintain a small patchwork fleet, mostly concentrated in the North Atlantic and lacking coverage in the Indo-Pacific, where over 50% of global internet traffic routes through key subsea cables.

China's fleet is heavily concentrated in the South and East China Seas, regions critical to global connectivity due to chokepoints like the Singapore Strait and the Luzon Strait. With maritime exclusivity bolstered by China's claims in disputed waters, its repair ships have nearly unrestricted access to monitor, repair, or potentially tamper with cables under the guise of routine maintenance.

Repair missions involve exposing critical cable infrastructure, including repeaters, amplifiers, and branch units—hardware that boosts signal strength over long distances but also represents points of vulnerability. Chinese vessels are equipped with advanced robotic submersibles and precision cutting-and-splicing technologies, designed for repairs but capable of installing signal interception devices. Such tools could include optical fiber taps capable of harvesting unencrypted metadata or capturing latency patterns to infer sensitive traffic flow.

China's advancements in photonics and quantum communication technologies underscore its capacity to exploit these vulnerabilities. The Chinese Academy of Sciences has reported significant breakthroughs in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, raising the possibility of developing quantum-based methods to crack encrypted data intercepted during repairs. Integration of AI-driven data sorting tools could automate the extraction and classification of intercepted information, rendering bulk data acquisition during repairs a strategic advantage.

The high seas, where many repair operations occur, are governed by fragmented international frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which inadequately regulate activities involving critical infrastructure. The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) provides voluntary guidelines for repair operations, but enforcement mechanisms are weak, leaving the system vulnerable to exploitation by state actors.

Repair missions are often classified as "emergency operations," requiring expedited approvals that bypass detailed oversight. In one case, a cable break in the South China Sea in 2021 prompted Chinese repair ships to operate without transparency for over three weeks, raising concerns about potential covert activities. These incidents are rarely reported, as they fall outside the jurisdiction of most maritime monitoring bodies.

The lack of countermeasures by the United States and its allies amplifies the risks posed by China's dominance. The U.S. Navy operates no specialized repair ships, relying on private operators like Global Marine Group, whose fleet is aging and ill-equipped for operations in contested waters. This contrasts with China's state-backed model, integrating its repair fleet into broader maritime networks, providing dual-use functionality for civilian and military objectives.

The financial model of undersea cable operations further constrains Western responses. Submarine cables are predominantly privately owned, with firms like Google, Meta, and Amazon investing heavily in infrastructure but lacking incentives to prioritize geopolitical considerations. This privatization leaves strategic gaps in surveillance and monitoring, as governments must negotiate access to privately controlled repair missions.

To mitigate China's strategic advantage, a multipronged response is essential. The United States and its allies must develop state-owned or state-subsidized repair fleets to operate in contested regions like the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Enhanced maritime surveillance systems, such as underwater drones and sonar-based monitoring arrays, should be deployed to track repair ship movements in real time.

Revising international frameworks by expanding ICPC mandates to include mandatory reporting of repair operations could curb opacity. Collaboration with regional partners, particularly nations in the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), could bolster collective maritime domain awareness and create redundancies in cable repair capabilities.

Maritime Data Through Automated Vessel Tracking

China's exploitation of automated vessel tracking systems exemplifies a sophisticated component of its global digital strategy. At the heart of this initiative lies the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a maritime safety technology mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for vessels exceeding 300 gross tons engaged in international trade. While originally intended to improve navigational safety by broadcasting vessel identities, locations, courses, and cargo details, AIS has been effectively repurposed by Beijing into a dual-use asset that supports both economic intelligence gathering and military surveillance.

Chinese firms, including the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System and Alibaba Cloud, have developed advanced platforms that aggregate AIS transmissions from shipping lanes worldwide. These platforms integrate AIS data with artificial intelligence-driven predictive analytics, enabling Beijing to monitor and analyze global maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal, and the Suez Canal—key arteries of international commerce. By doing so, China gains critical insights into global shipping patterns, strategic trade routes, and supply chain dynamics. As of 2023, the global merchant fleet comprised around 60,000 ships.

During the 2021 Suez Canal blockage, Chinese logistics firms, leveraging real-time AIS data, rapidly identified alternative routes through the Arctic and along the Indian Ocean, allowing Chinese exporters to reroute goods while Western competitors faced delays. Similarly, in the Strait of Malacca, a waterway facilitating the transit of over 16 million barrels of oil daily and 40% of global trade, Chinese analysts have used AIS data to optimize resource flow, preempt congestion, and study vulnerabilities in energy supply routes.

AIS data plays a pivotal role in China's military strategy, especially in the Indo-Pacific. By combining AIS information with satellite imagery and data from undersea acoustic arrays, China has established a surveillance network capable of tracking naval deployments with precision. AIS data has been used to monitor patrol patterns of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, revealing that over a third of its South China Sea operations in 2022 followed predictable routes. This surveillance allows the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to anticipate U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and position its assets accordingly.

China's manipulation of AIS extends to conflict simulations and asymmetric warfare. During military exercises near Taiwan in 2023, Chinese forces reportedly deployed unmanned surface vessels programmed to mimic civilian AIS signals, complicating the identification of hostile assets.

Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing has exported various forms of maritime technologies that incorporate Automatic Identification System (AIS) capabilities. China often provides financial incentives to promote the adoption of its technologies abroad, which may enhance its access to regional maritime data. This asymmetry grants China an informational advantage and risks reshaping maritime transparency norms in its favor.

Rare Subsea Mapping Data

China's increasing investment in subsea mapping has positioned it as a significant player in oceanographic intelligence, impacting scientific, commercial, and military domains. China has been actively mapping its claimed maritime territories using state-funded research vessels and autonomous systems. These efforts contribute to international initiatives like the Nippon Foundation-GEBCO Seabed 2030 project, which aims to map the entire global seabed by 2030 and had mapped approximately 23.4% as of June 2022 with international contributions. China's activities extend to strategic regions in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Indian Ocean, raising concerns over the dual-use potential of its data collection.

Subsea mapping data is critical for submarine cable routing, undersea infrastructure development, and naval operations. China's repository of high-resolution bathymetric maps—including surveys of key chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and the Bashi Channel—provides a tactical edge. These chokepoints are vital for global trade and serve as strategic naval passages for power projection and anti-access/area-denial operations. The People's Liberation Army Navy uses seabed data to optimize the placement of undersea sensor arrays, critical for its "Great Underwater Wall" initiative, integrating hydroacoustic monitoring to detect foreign submarines.

China's advancements in autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) enhance its capabilities. In 2021, the Hailong III and Qianlong II AUVs were deployed for deep-sea mapping missions in the South China Sea, gathering data at depths over 6,000 meters. These AUVs have multi-beam sonar systems achieving sub-meter resolution, surpassing commercial standards. Their ability to operate autonomously over long durations allows China to map intricate undersea topographies critical for resource exploration and undersea warfare.

China has used seabed mapping as a diplomatic tool to extend influence over smaller nations. Through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Beijing has signed agreements with over 20 countries, granting Chinese research vessels access to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Between 2015 and 2022, Chinese expeditions in Pacific Island nations' EEZs often involved dual-use mapping activities.

In 2019, the Chinese survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 conducted seismic surveys near the Vanguard Bank within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), collecting bathymetric data that aligns with key undersea routes potentially useful for submarine operations. This incursion led to a tense standoff with Vietnam, drawing international criticism over China's assertive actions and raising concerns about the dual-use potential of the data collected. Similarly, in 2018, China's proposed involvement in undersea cable projects connecting Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands through Huawei Marine raised significant security concerns. Fearing risks to the security of undersea communication cables and potential espionage, Australia intervened by funding and undertaking the projects themselves, highlighting apprehensions about granting Chinese entities access to critical seafloor data in the region.

China's seabed mapping strategy has significant military implications, particularly in the South China Sea. In this region, where China has constructed artificial islands such as Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, high-resolution seabed data enables precise deployment of missile systems, naval patrols, and underwater drones. Detailed seabed mapping supports the construction and fortification of these islands, allowing for the installation of surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and the operation of military airstrips. Additionally, China's deployment of unmanned underwater vehicles like the Sea Wing (Haiyi) gliders enhances their ability to collect oceanographic data crucial for submarine navigation and anti-submarine warfare. These activities have raised concerns among neighboring countries and the international community about the dual-use potential of China's maritime endeavors and their impact on regional security.

By controlling seabed mapping data, China influences submarine cable networks, which carry 95% of global internet traffic and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. China's involvement in projects like the South Pacific Cable Project through state-owned China Mobile led to concerns over data interception capabilities. Its presence in Arctic seabed mapping, facilitated by icebreaker vessels like Xuelong 2, underscores ambitions to secure alternative maritime routes and resources under the guise of scientific research.

China's approach to subsea mapping data has raised concerns about transparency and shared access in the global community. While international initiatives like the Seabed 2030 Project encourage open sharing of ocean floor data to advance scientific research and environmental understanding, China has been criticized for not fully sharing the extensive seabed data it collects. For example, much of the data gathered by Chinese vessels in international waters is not readily available in global databases like those managed by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) or the General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO). This selective sharing limits other nations' ability to leverage valuable information and contrasts with global norms promoting cooperation and transparency in oceanographic research.

Carlo J.V. Caro has a master's degree from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst.

12. How to overthrow America's war cartel (Book Review)

A book review from the Quincy Institute.

​Is "primacy" a danger to America and Americans?

Excerpts:

A grand strategy of restraint is Harris’ preferred alternative, but it is worth noting that the political and policy reforms that he wants to see would open up American foreign policy debate. As he says, the “goal is not to replace America’s primacist cartel with a restraint-oriented counterpart, but to imagine a more pluralistic environment within which the American people might be exposed to a wider range of ideas about foreign policy.”

Harris envisions a more inclusive and democratic political system that would also make it possible for the U.S. to retrench.

The U.S. is endangered by the current strategy of primacy. Indeed, Harris says that current strategy is a “recipe for conflict with China.” Primacy makes the U.S. less secure by design, and it “heightens the risks of the United States sleepwalking into a disastrous confrontation with a great-power rival.” To avoid that calamity, the U.S. needs to retrench, and in order to retrench it must reform itself at home.

How to overthrow America's war cartel

A new book calling for retrenchment says the country needs a radical overhaul of domestic politics, including elections and Congress.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/restraint/?mc_cid=1ca8ddbf1f

Analysis | Washington Politics

1. washington politics 
2. restraint

Daniel Larison

Nov 25, 2024

The U.S. must retrench for the sake of its own security, but there are many domestic political obstacles that make retrenchment practically impossible under current conditions. The status quo strategy of military primacy is too deeply entrenched and there are too many established interests committed to its preservation.

To change that, there needs to be a major overhaul of America’s domestic political system and its foreign policy, and neither can succeed without the other. That is the heart of Peter Harris’ case for reform in his excellent new book, “Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might).”

It is essential reading for advocates of foreign policy restraint.

The first half of the book details how the U.S. adopted a strategy of military primacy and how that strategy transformed the country. Harris defines military primacy as “a grand strategy of maintaining and exploiting America’s military advantages over global and regional competitors, with a view to leveraging these structural advantages in service of favorable political and economic outcomes.”

America’s current strategy of primacy is not only ill-suited to an increasingly multipolar world, but it also represents a serious threat to the security of our country by putting the United States on potential collision course with great power rivals. As Harris puts it, “Even if it is accepted that primacy made some sense during the so-called ‘unipolar moment’…it cannot be argued that the same unilateralist policies are suited to a world that can punch back.”

The U.S. needs a less ambitious and dangerous strategy, and to get to it the U.S. needs retrenchment. Retrenchment is simply “the reduction of overseas forces and security obligations.”

While Harris is interested in scaling back America’s military footprint, he makes clear that he believes that U.S. international engagement in every other respect should continue and, in some cases, intensify. The foreign policy agenda he spells out in the final chapter is what he calls “internationalism anew” with an emphasis on increased peaceful American engagement with the rest of the world. Even as the U.S. military pulls back from its forward-deployed positions, the U.S. would remain very much involved in global affairs.

The obstacles to reform and retrenchment are considerable. Any system that has been in place for 80 years would be difficult to alter. The “militarist redoubt,” as Harris sometimes refers to it, is going to be unusually difficult to overcome. Arguments for retrenchment do not get anything like a fair hearing in the current system because, as Harris shows, the “US political system is designed to reject them.”

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

The institutions of the national security state exist to implement a strategy of primacy, and that has created entrenched interests in Washington and across the country hostile to any major overhauls. Bureaucrats working in the government, local communities benefiting from military spending, and ideologues wishing to use U.S. power to advance their agendas are all likely to resist any significant changes to the existing strategy. As Harris tells us, “Simply put, programmatic attempts at retrenchment are doomed to failure in the present context because there are too many Americans who profit from militarism, who regard primacy as a means of promoting their values abroad, or who would be across-the-board retrenchment as an assault on their sense of national identity.”

Harris’ analysis of the barriers to changing U.S. foreign policy can seem disheartening at first, but he is not counseling despair. He points out that “informed and analytical description can be a clarion call to evaluate the status quo when otherwise it might have gone unchallenged or even unnoticed.” If advocates of restraint are to make any headway in changing how the U.S. operates in the world, it is critical to have a clear view of the steep and treacherous climb ahead of us.

The proposals for domestic renewal in the book may seem overly ambitious, but they will have to be if they are going to produce the kind of sweeping changes to our political system and foreign policy that need to be made. Among other things, Harris suggests significant changes in our elections and our party system, including moving towards a system of proportional representation.

He calls for Congress to reassert itself in matters of war and to claw back powers from the national security state. Harris also recommends expanding both houses of Congress to make elected officials more responsive to their constituents, and he suggests granting statehood to U.S. territories or incorporating them into existing states so that they are fully represented in the government.

A grand strategy of restraint is Harris’ preferred alternative, but it is worth noting that the political and policy reforms that he wants to see would open up American foreign policy debate. As he says, the “goal is not to replace America’s primacist cartel with a restraint-oriented counterpart, but to imagine a more pluralistic environment within which the American people might be exposed to a wider range of ideas about foreign policy.”

Harris envisions a more inclusive and democratic political system that would also make it possible for the U.S. to retrench.

The U.S. is endangered by the current strategy of primacy. Indeed, Harris says that current strategy is a “recipe for conflict with China.” Primacy makes the U.S. less secure by design, and it “heightens the risks of the United States sleepwalking into a disastrous confrontation with a great-power rival.” To avoid that calamity, the U.S. needs to retrench, and in order to retrench it must reform itself at home.

Daniel Larison

Daniel Larison is a regular columnist at Responsible Statecraft, contributing editor at Antiwar.com, and a former senior editor at The American Conservative magazine. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago. He writes regularly for his newsletter, Eunomia, on Substack.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

13. Lawmakers press Pentagon to re-ground Ospreys over safety issues

​I met an AFSOC wing commander in Korea last week and she is very bullish on the Osprey. Even though she is a gunship pilot she said her favorite aircraft is the Osprey.

Lawmakers press Pentagon to re-ground Ospreys over safety issues

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp · November 26, 2024

Three lawmakers are asking Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to consider re-grounding the military’s fleet of V-22 Ospreys until solutions can be put in place to address safety and design issues identified by The Associated Press in its recent in-depth investigation of the aircraft’s accident record.

In a letter sent to the Pentagon on Monday, Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey and Rep. Richard Neal, all Democrats from Massachusetts, wrote to Austin that “given the current concerns about the safety of the V-22, the aircraft should be grounded, and should not be deployed again until the platform’s significant deficiencies are fully addressed.”

The Osprey, which flies like both a helicopter and an airplane, has been in more than 21 major accidents, many of which can be tied back to choices made in its design, the AP found.

RELATED

Marine who tried to save Osprey pilots posthumously awarded top medal

The Marine Corps presented the Navy and Marine Corps Medal to the parents of Cpl. Spencer Collart, who died last year after an Osprey crashed in Australia.

By Tara Copp, AP

The whole fleet was grounded for three months this year following a deadly crash in Japan in November 2023 that killed eight service members, including one from Massachusetts.

Ospreys, which are operated by the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and used in the presidential fleet, have now returned to flight operations, with some restrictions.

Osprey pilots have told the AP they do not want to see the aircraft grounded, despite safety concerns, because of its unique capabilities. Program officials have said they are working on fixes to improve the V-22s safety and reliability.

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the letter.

The lawmakers also cited the AP’s reporting that pilots are having to push the V-22′s “interim power” feature to be able to land safely — but are advised against it because it can wear down parts. Interim power was a factor in the most recent accident in October when a Japan Self-Defense Forces Osprey violently tilted and struck the ground on takeoff. An investigation determined the pilots were to blame for not turning on the interim power during takeoff.

“The reality for pilots is that they have to push the aircraft to its limits to stay safe,” the lawmakers wrote.

About Tara Copp, AP

Tara Copp is a Pentagon correspondent for the Associated Press. She was previously Pentagon bureau chief for Sightline Media Group.

​14. The Operational and Strategic Genius of the Kursk Offensive

​Excerpts:

The Kursk offensive has also increased the Ukrainian military’s operational reach. The Ukrainian forces have already destroyed some key supply bridges supporting Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also been able to destroy fuel depots, particularly oil, deeper into Russia, threatening both the Russian economy and the ability of Russia to continue to supply its mechanized units. Ukraine has also been able to hit an oil refinery and a power station deeper into Russia. The loss of the refinery could seriously damage oil exports, which are already lagging due to economic sanctions imposed by the West.

Putin is also suffering from a foreign policy and narrative perspective. Several pundits have noted that Putin seems to be losing allied support as Ukraine demonstrates its ability to compete with Russia in Ukraine and, shockingly, take Russian territory. Putin cannot carpet-bomb Ukrainian positions now that they are on Russian soil. Further, even though Putin diverted thirty thousand troops in an attempt to repel the Kursk incursion, their move will likely be insufficient for the task. The recent addition of some ten to twelve thousand North Korean troops to the Russian counter-offensive may tilt the odds a bit in Russia’s favor, but also telegraphs Russia’s lack of a strategic reserve and was the catalyst for Western countries to allow Ukraine to use their weapons to strike inside Russia. Now, Putin is facing a dilemma that he may have to throw poorly trained conscripts at the situation. He promised he would not do this; many of these conscripts are ethnically Russian, so their deaths carry more negative political weight for Putin, who cannot afford a collapse in support for his war among ethnic Russians.

All of these negative strategic dilemmas are now on Putin’s shoulders. Further, he now has to consider that a long border between the Donbas region, which Russia controls, and Belarus is now at risk. He can hardly respond to the Kursk incursion. Another incursion at a different point along the border would be devastating.

Pundits reporting that the Kursk offensive has failed because Putin continues a costly advance at a snail’s pace in eastern Ukraine are short-sighted. Recent polls show that trust in Putin has fallen precipitously in the wake of the Kursk offensive. Putin might find himself in political trouble because the planners of the Ukrainian offensive successfully linked operations to strategic ends, placing Putin on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

The Operational and Strategic Genius of the Kursk Offensive - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Dan Cox

​November 22, 2024

https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/11/the-operational-and-strategic-genius-of-the-kursk-offensive/

Current analysis of the recent offensive conducted by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia is incomplete at best and misguided at worst. Most of the pundits are focused on speculating whether the recent offensive will anger American politicians, lead to an eventual victory, or halt the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Dealing with the anger of American politicians first, it is unlikely that Ukraine conducted this counteroffensive in a vacuum. American politicians were likely aware of the operation. Dealing with the next question, speculating on whether one operation will “tip the scales” fits into the American culture of viewing events, wars, and almost everything as a black-and-white or win-lose dichotomy. Finally, the attack on Russia was not intended to halt the main Russian offensive in Pokrovsk. At most, this attack was aimed at drawing troops from the Russian attack on Kharkiv, which, being one of the largest population centers in Ukraine, would represent a major loss for Ukraine, should it fall into Russian hands.

Instead of entering this American cultural quagmire, this essay examines the situation by looking at the Kursk campaign holistically and through the intersection of military operations and strategy. This intersection is often referred to as the area where operational art occurs. By examining the Kursk offensive holistically, this approach does not fall into the rut of determining winners and losers. Instead, myriad potential opportunities and pitfalls can be examined simultaneously. The evidence shows a great deal of cleverness and foresight in developing the Kursk battle plan. The West should support this new propensity in the system as it puts Vladimir Putin and his military planning staff on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

A Brief Analysis of the Kursk Campaign So Far

One of the best analyses of the Kursk campaign comes from Foreign Policy Magazine. However, the debate is emblematic of the narrowness and black-and-white construct of argumentation over the Ukrainian military campaign. This debate between two Foreign Policy Magazine columnists produces some curious insights into the Kursk offensive.

Emma Ashford took the con side of the debate, arguing that it was unlikely that Ukrainian forces could hold what they had taken. She painted the operation as producing, at best, a short-term narrative shift in Zelensky’s favor. She concluded that the offensive is not likely to produce lasting positive results; although, she admits later in the debate that Putin has at least temporarily lost the claim of freezing the conflict and easily controlling what they have already taken in Ukraine.

Matt Kroenig countered by noting that the offensive accomplished several key strategic aims, such as taking the war home to Russia (hundreds of thousands of Russians had to be evacuated), challenging Putin as a wartime leader, buoying Ukrainian morale, and shocking the West. The narrative of “shocking the West” is common in analyzing the Kursk offensive and is dubious. It is doubtful that NATO military planners had no idea of this offensive. Whether or not Ukraine directly informed the US and other Western policymakers, the level of coordination between Ukrainian and Western military planners makes it likely that Ukraine’s partners were able to infer an impending operation. This assertion may prove untrue in the future, but that would only point to deeper strategic problems between the West and Ukraine. It is not the case that any of the assertions are necessarily wrong. The main complaint is that they are incomplete and largely reside in narrow strategic and political arguments and assertions. 

Other standard refrains in the analysis so far are that this operation was a gamble for Ukraine and the offensive was ineffective at stopping the Russians’ forward progression in eastern Ukraine. Few military operations are a true gamble despite current assertions to the contrary. Military planning revolves around assumptions and risk. The main risk in this mission is that the assumptions are wrong. I would posit that the most likely assumptions that preceded this operation have, so far, proven to be correct.

Likely Assumptions and Risks in the Kursk Campaign

The first set of assumptions had to be that Putin’s military had no strategic reserve and was so desperately trying to win in Ukraine that Russia had devoted little or no attention to defending the Russo–Ukrainian border from the Russian-controlled Donbas Region to the border of Belarus. The ease with which fifteen thousand soldiers were able to take land in Kursk supports such assumptions on the ground. A little over a few divisions’ worth of Ukrainian forces expanded past the initial incursion of a few hundred square kilometers to more than double that area in just a few weeks. The Ukrainian planners also likely assumed that they could make it far enough into Russian territory to threaten logistical lines and necessary electrical and gas hubs supplying troops in Ukraine. Since Ukrainian forces have been able to destroy several critical Russian bridges that resupply its troops and an oil depot, this assumption has borne fruit as well.

The planners must have also assumed it was better to use fifteen thousand troops to advance into Russia and build defensive positions than to hold positions that would likely be overrun. Therefore, fifteen thousand Ukrainians could potentially hold out against a force five times that size or larger in Russia depending on whether the force sent to dislodge is ill-trained and ill-equipped conscripts. Putin ordered thirty thousand soldiers from eastern Ukraine to march to the Kursk region to defend it, and he has also apparently thrown some eight thousand against the Ukrainian incursion. This represents a significant expansion of war and a de facto admission of Russia’s limited ability to generate labor. Eventually, the Russian offensive in Donetsk might be put at risk because of the Kursk campaign, even though this was not the main point of invading Russia.

Finally, the Ukrainian military and political leaders assessed that an invasion of Kursk would change the narrative in their favor. Further, this would place Putin at a strategic disadvantage and expose fundamental weaknesses in Russia continuing the war. The discussion below points to these assumptions also being true.

Placing Putin on the Horns of Multiple Dilemmas

The Kursk offensive exposed many deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the Russian offensive as the war approached the third-year mark. Unfortunately, some pundits and news outlets prefer to view the Kursk offensive as a gamble or even a failure. France 24 recently reported that Russia is making gains in eastern Ukraine despite the Kursk action. The news outlet also reported that Ukrainian planners had hoped to draw Russian troops away from this offensive, but it did not happen. This is factually incorrect and an overly narrow view of the Kursk offensive. It is factually incorrect to assert there was no effect on the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russia redeployed thirty thousand troops to stop the advancement of the Ukrainian forces into Russia. Whether this puts the Russian offensive at risk remains to be seen, but it does not matter as much as some think. The move illustrates to the world that Putin has no strategic reserve to put into the fight and is likely desperate. Further, arguing that delaying the Russian offensive was the only operational objective is short-sighted. The fact that Russia is pressing on with its offensive may counterintuitively be good for the Ukrainian war effort. Russia continues to take unsustainable losses, and the Kursk offensive has accelerated that trend. They have already taken an additional 6,600 casualties and lost 70 tanks because the Ukrainian military infiltrated Russia. 

Putin panicked and made yet another strategic mistake by telling his own people that the Ukrainian forces would be dislodged from Kursk by October 1 of this year. By early November, Putin had finally garnered a force to attack the Kursk oblast. However, the ground retaken is negligible and the losses the Russians are suffering are great. Putin is desperate. Every day beyond October 1 that the Ukrainian forces remain in Russia, Putin is losing political credibility.

Further, this is the second summer in a row that Putin has faced a major credibility challenge. Last summer, the leader of the Wagner Group private military organization, Yevgeny Prigozhin, mounted an insurgency that briefly marched toward Moscow. This summer, Ukrainian forces successfully invaded Russia in the historic Kursk region. To add insult to injury, the Ukrainian success in Russia came mere months after Putin gave a speech commemorating the Russian sacrifices during World War II in Kursk.

The Kursk offensive has also increased the Ukrainian military’s operational reach. The Ukrainian forces have already destroyed some key supply bridges supporting Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also been able to destroy fuel depots, particularly oil, deeper into Russia, threatening both the Russian economy and the ability of Russia to continue to supply its mechanized units. Ukraine has also been able to hit an oil refinery and a power station deeper into Russia. The loss of the refinery could seriously damage oil exports, which are already lagging due to economic sanctions imposed by the West.

Putin is also suffering from a foreign policy and narrative perspective. Several pundits have noted that Putin seems to be losing allied support as Ukraine demonstrates its ability to compete with Russia in Ukraine and, shockingly, take Russian territory. Putin cannot carpet-bomb Ukrainian positions now that they are on Russian soil. Further, even though Putin diverted thirty thousand troops in an attempt to repel the Kursk incursion, their move will likely be insufficient for the task. The recent addition of some ten to twelve thousand North Korean troops to the Russian counter-offensive may tilt the odds a bit in Russia’s favor, but also telegraphs Russia’s lack of a strategic reserve and was the catalyst for Western countries to allow Ukraine to use their weapons to strike inside Russia. Now, Putin is facing a dilemma that he may have to throw poorly trained conscripts at the situation. He promised he would not do this; many of these conscripts are ethnically Russian, so their deaths carry more negative political weight for Putin, who cannot afford a collapse in support for his war among ethnic Russians.

All of these negative strategic dilemmas are now on Putin’s shoulders. Further, he now has to consider that a long border between the Donbas region, which Russia controls, and Belarus is now at risk. He can hardly respond to the Kursk incursion. Another incursion at a different point along the border would be devastating.

Pundits reporting that the Kursk offensive has failed because Putin continues a costly advance at a snail’s pace in eastern Ukraine are short-sighted. Recent polls show that trust in Putin has fallen precipitously in the wake of the Kursk offensive. Putin might find himself in political trouble because the planners of the Ukrainian offensive successfully linked operations to strategic ends, placing Putin on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

This analysis represents the opinions of the author and does not represent in any way the US Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, or any Department of Defense or US government office.

Dan Cox has been teaching at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies for almost two decades and has had the honor of participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The author is currently researching issues of disinformation, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the future of warfare. The author is also interested in the role design and systems thinking plays in tackling military problems

Image: Facebook | Сухопутні війська ЗС України

15. The Implications of a Second Trump Presidency for Europe’s Defense-Industrial Efforts

​Conclusion:

Paradoxically, despite Trump’s insistence to cut down on U.S. security commitments to Europe, the incoming president’s transactional approach will likely exacerbate existing dependencies, pushing European countries to prioritize U.S. procurement over building autonomous capacities. While European defense spending may increase, the strategic alignment of those resources could drift toward reinforcing bilateral ties to Washington, rather than fostering a genuinely integrated and self-sustaining European defense industry. In this environment, Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy continues to be more rhetoric than reality, as geopolitical pressures and market realities accumulate to keep Europe tethered to American defense production and a benevolent presidential administration.

The Implications of a Second Trump Presidency for Europe’s Defense-Industrial Efforts - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Lucas F. Hellemeier · November 26, 2024

As debates intensify around the defense policy consequences of a second Trump presidency for Europe, much of the commentary misses a critical dimension: the material realities shaping European security and defense. The war of attrition in Ukraine has laid bare Europe’s urgent need for a stronger defense industrial base. Following the U.S. Department of Defense, the E.U. Commission published its first defense-industrial strategy in March 2024, setting even more ambitious targets for joint development and procurement than those previously unmet. The strategy underscores the link between a “buy European” preference in defense procurement and the political goal of strategic autonomy.

Yet, the return of Donald Trump is very likely going to undercut these efforts. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign affairs will heighten the appeal of U.S.-made defense equipment, making it even harder for European countries to resist “buying American.” As a matter of fact, European experts have argued for “the purchase of signature U.S. platforms and munitions” in these pages to increase the bloc’s bargaining power and to prohibit even worse security policy outcomes for the old continent.

Known for his enthusiastic promotion to expand U.S. arms exports, Trump could narrow European firms’ home and potential export markets — a serious challenge given Europe’s already rather fragmented market and European defense companies’ export dependence, especially in contrast to their more self-sustaining U.S. counterparts. As a result, and somewhat paradoxically despite renewed insistence to view Trump’s re-election as a wake-up call for European defense to become more serious and autonomous, the continent will become more dependent on the United States for its security. Warnings over the president-elect’s volatile and erratic character and America’s unreliability as an alliance partner will be glossed over by the continued allure of buying American weapon systems.

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Back to the Future

During Trump’s first term and following the Brexit vote, E.U. officials rekindled the then rather dormant field known as the bloc’s Common Security and Defense Policy by launching instruments such as the industrial policy-focused European Defense Fund. Echoing earlier concerns, Trump administration officials were quick to denounce efforts to exclude non-E.U. entities from funding opportunities as a “dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector.”

Labeling the trans-Atlantic defense sector as “integrated” might seem ironic to European defense industry representatives, who have lamented the sector’s one-way-street dynamic for nearly half a century. A 1980 report to the Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William J. Perry, captured this sentiment, noting, “The significant aspects of the NATO arms trade are the low level of such trade within NATO, the U.S. dominance as a producer, developer and exporter and, finally, the sporadic and limited nature of arms cooperation.” Three years earlier, President Jimmy Carter had promised his European counterparts the promotion of “a genuinely two-way transatlantic trade in defense equipment.”

As a remedy, in his final year as under secretary of defense, Perry proposed a “family of weapons” agreement aimed at ending competitive development among allies by fostering licensed production of standardized systems. This approach included a U.S. concession of the Western short-range air-to-air missile market, long dominated by the Sidewinder since the 1950s, to a British-West German missile. In return, Europeans would license-produce the forthcoming Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile for beyond-visual-range capabilities.

However, unmet commitments on U.S.-licensed production of the Franco-German Roland air defense system, coupled with increasing U.S. protectionism in arms production, strained these ambitions and led to the agreement’s eventual failure. France, skeptical from the outset, had hedged its bets by developing the Missile d’Interception de Combat et d’Autodéfense, designed to bridge short- and beyond-visual-range requirements. This positioning was strategic: U.S. export restrictions banned beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile sales to regions without such capabilities, targeting areas like the Middle East and Taiwan, both of which soon became the French missile’s first customers.

Weapons for Troops, Bilateral Security Instead of Collective Defense

These historical episodes elucidate that America’s European allies have a political economy problem in their arms production efforts, namely U.S. market power originating from decades of outspending its European allies by a wide margin. They face an inherent and inescapable tension between equipping their armed forces with market-available defense equipment from the world’s leading military power on the one hand, and securing their long-term industrial capacities on the other. Recent analysis, drawing on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — the foremost authority on international arms trade — reveals the enduring reality of the one-way street in arms procurement, especially for the most technologically complex weapon systems such as fighter aircraft. Even when Europeans can sell their products to the United States, they face the oligopsonist market power that requires technology transfer as well as significant U.S. shares in production.

In examining the likely future of European defense, historical patterns offer insight. The above-mentioned 1980 report reminds readers that U.S. weapons purchases by West Germany “from the mid-1960s until 1977, have been made under an agreement by which the Germans agreed to offset U.S. foreign exchange costs for troops stationed in Germany.” Buying U.S.-made weapons to secure the continued deployment of these forces has been a recurring theme, especially under Trump’s first term, and is likely to intensify in the sequel. While Trump’s rhetoric makes this connection explicit, U.S. allies have long aimed to link their internal and external balancing efforts through American weapons purchases. Such acquisitions not only enhance national military capacity but also reinforce alliance bonds, with the supplier-recipient relationship intended to strengthen ties with the United States.

Studies from prominent European think tanks offer differing views on how much of Europe’s increased defense spending has been directed toward the United States or non-European suppliers, such as South Korea and Israel. A recent report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies presents a more optimistic outlook, noting that 52 percent of platform contracts signed after February 2022 went to European suppliers, compared to 34 percent allocated to U.S. suppliers. In contrast, a September 2023 report from the French Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques claims that 63 percent of contracts favored the United States. These discrepancies underscore the need for better data to inform the ongoing debate about Europe’s defense industrial future — a task that could well be undertaken by the European Defence Agency.

Perceiving American purchases as the most efficient path to security carries a substantial cost. Signature European defense programs, vital for developing next-generation capabilities, face severe funding challenges. Officials have made it clear that these programs ought to rely on exports to achieve meaningful success. Executives from the British-Italian Global Combat Air Programme have emphasized that Japan’s inclusion is designed to unlock the East Asian export market. Similarly, Saab has stated that its strengthened partnership with Brazil, a key Gripen customer, aims to secure entry into the South American market, where nations are looking to modernize their aging fleets with affordable 4.5th-generation fighters like Sweden’s Gripen model. The aircraft’s affordability originates from the inclusion of market-available subsystems and components such as the licensed-produced engine of U.S. origin.

While the exact mechanisms for opening these markets remain unclear — Japan lacks significant arms trade relationships within East Asia, and Brazil’s connections within South America have only recently rebounded — these declarations reveal the European need to envision a viable export market as essential to sustaining their defense projects through the so-called valley of death that multi-billion-dollar developments must traverse after their initial funding surge. A U.S. government that not only loosens arms export restrictions but actively promotes arms sales as a tool for strengthening alliances complicates Europe’s efforts to achieve the economies of scale necessary to make these projects viable.

Europe Is Capable — Really?

Defense may be the most politicized market, but it remains a market. Hence, European defense-industrial capacities are fundamentally shaped by demand expectations that transcend national and often even continental boundaries. A Trump administration, with its likely insistence on higher European defense spending tied to increased purchases of American-made equipment, poses a threat to these sources of demand. Forcing Europeans to shoulder more of their own security burden only strengthens European capabilities if the material means that meet these new security demands are generated within Europe, not simply acquired from the United States.

Research indicates that countries with substantial defense industries tend to allocate more funding toward defense in general, with higher expenditures on equipment and research and development in particular. The claim that “a marked reduction in U.S. military presence will almost certainly end Europe’s decade-long reluctance to spend more on defense” misinterprets the causal relationship. While proposing a U.S. withdrawal might spur increased spending, Europeans will likely tie their purchases of American equipment to the maintenance of the U.S. military presence. The fact that Germany and Italy — two of Europe’s major defense industry stakeholders — host the largest numbers of U.S. troops does not bode well for efforts to boost European autonomy in arms production. Both nations will aim to retain U.S. forces on their soil, while other European purchasers of American equipment, especially those closer to Russia, will compete for a stronger U.S. troop presence.

Viewing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as the catalyst for a united Europe acting in lockstep against a common threat often highlights economic sanctions, a field where the European single market’s institutions have clear advantages. However, such interpretations overlook the fact that the worsening security situation has, if anything, intensified longstanding divisions within Europe’s defense industry. This fragmentation is most evident in the Franco-Italian frustration over Germany’s European Sky Shield Initiative, which underscores the persistent challenges to genuine cohesion in European defense.

The Dilemma for U.S. Grand Strategy

The material foundation of the trans-Atlantic alliance presents a strategic dilemma for U.S. grand strategy, challenging both proponents of restraint and advocates of deep engagement. For the latter, who aim to promote burden-sharing among U.S. allies, this entails accepting a more balanced trans-Atlantic defense-industrial competition, even if it requires surrendering some market share. Further, allowing European defense firms a larger portion of their own market may help address proliferation concerns by reducing Europe’s reliance on non-European markets, thus opening the door to a trans-Atlantic arms cartel. Although the relatively small share of exports in U.S. defense contractors’ revenues might make this economically feasible, it is unlikely that Trump administration officials would view it with the same rational perspective.

Advocates of a restrained U.S. grand strategy might find this insight unsurprising, interpreting deep engagement as, at least in part, a concession to the interests of U.S. defense contractors. From their perspective, ceding market share and allowing Europeans a larger role in defense production is essential to reducing the undue influence of defense contractors in Washington. Yet, a U.S. administration driven by a transactional approach could inadvertently intensify Europe’s dependence on the United States as a security provider, undermining genuine European autonomy rather than fostering it.

Paradoxically, despite Trump’s insistence to cut down on U.S. security commitments to Europe, the incoming president’s transactional approach will likely exacerbate existing dependencies, pushing European countries to prioritize U.S. procurement over building autonomous capacities. While European defense spending may increase, the strategic alignment of those resources could drift toward reinforcing bilateral ties to Washington, rather than fostering a genuinely integrated and self-sustaining European defense industry. In this environment, Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy continues to be more rhetoric than reality, as geopolitical pressures and market realities accumulate to keep Europe tethered to American defense production and a benevolent presidential administration.

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Lucas F. Hellemeier is a Ph.D. Candidate at Freie Universität Berlin’s John F. Kennedy Institute and has recently submitted his Ph.D. thesis on the political economy of European defense. He was a Fulbright visiting researcher at Boston University in 2024 and a Hans J. Morgenthau fellow at the University of Notre Dame in 2022–23.

Image: Wallycacsabre via Wikimedia Commons.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Lucas F. Hellemeier · November 26, 2024

16. How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired

​Excerpts:

De-risking—reducing the vulnerabilities that the United States and its allies face from technology leakage to China, overdependence on Chinese supply chains, and insecure data and critical infrastructure—has brought some improvements in the United States’ economic security, but there have been substantial unintended consequences. And if the Trump administration takes even more radical steps to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies, the economic and national security downsides will be even more pronounced.

Washington should take steps to ensure that the United States continues to make pathbreaking advances in science and technology. The incoming Trump administration and Congress need to recognize that there are potential tradeoffs between economic prosperity goals, such as greater innovation and wealth, and economic security goals, such as greater resilience and protecting against technology leakage. U.S. policymakers must set measurable goals, conduct cost-benefit analyses of different policy options and scenarios, and carefully evaluate the actual results of various policies.

Washington needs to set clear priorities, identifying the most urgent threats that deserve a response. Otherwise, the United States will be dragged into a game of whack-a-mole or, more worryingly, try to block all commercial ties with China. To the extent that the United States attempts to deny technologies to China, the only sustainable approach involves working with allies and other countries so that the United States is not outflanked by China and lose technology leadership in the rest of the world. If the Trump administration pursues extensive decoupling from China, the result will most likely be an isolated, poorer, and weaker United States.

The Trump administration would also be unwise to ignore global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, as doing so would dramatically raise the likelihood of unbounded conflict. Instead, Washington should intensify multilateral cooperation to set new rules for global economic activity in order to avoid a race to the bottom. The United States may in some instances need to take unilateral steps to maintain its relative technology superiority, but excessive economic security measures will mean less innovation, slower economic growth, reduced profits, and fewer jobs. With a combination of wise domestic policies, collaboration with allies, and investment in international institutions, the United States can achieve both prosperity and security.

How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired

And Why Trump’s Plans Would Make Things Even Worse

By Scott Kennedy

November 26, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Scott Kennedy · November 26, 2024

In late September, the Biden administration issued a draft rule that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market. This is one of the latest of many steps that U.S. policymakers have taken to protect the United States’ economic security. Under the first Trump administration, Washington placed restrictions on the telecom companies ZTE and Huawei. President Joe Biden has maintained many of Trump’s policies toward China and advanced new ones, including initiating broad export controls in late 2022 on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment. As the incoming Trump administration appears ready to accelerate and expand these restrictions further still, it’s worth considering the track record of these policies—and take stock of the tradeoffs that they entail.

Washington’s array of tools is highly expansive: export controls, tariffs, product bans, inbound and outbound investment screening, constraints on data flows, incentives to shift supply chains, limits on scholarly exchange and research collaboration, industrial policy expenditures, and buy-America incentives. The goals of these measures are equally diverse: slow China’s progress in the most advanced technologies that have dual-use potential, reduce overdependence on China as a source of inputs and as a market for Western goods, deny China access to sensitive data, protect critical infrastructure, push back against economic coercion, protect the United States’ industrial competitiveness, and boost its manufacturing employment.

Beijing’s shift toward a more expansive and assertive form of mercantilist techno-nationalism poses genuine risks to the prosperity and economic security of the United States and others. Something must be done, to be sure, but Washington’s increasingly restrictive policies have yielded highly mixed results. Take the goal of slowing China’s technological progress at the cutting edge and maintaining the United States’ relative technological advantage. In pursuit of this objective, Washington has seen progress in some areas, such as slowing China’s semiconductor sector, but witnessed even more rapid Chinese success in others, such as in electric vehicles and batteries. There are inherent tensions between Washington’s various economic security goals, with progress in some inevitably slowing progress in others. Additionally, U.S. policymakers have not adequately considered how China and others would adapt to U.S. restrictions.

As President-elect Donald Trump returns to power, his administration would be wise to reflect on the fact that existing restrictions on Chinese technology have yielded decidedly mixed results. The Biden administration has described its strategy as a “small yard, high fence,” or placing high restrictions on a small number of critical technologies. That yard is already growing, with negative unintended consequences for the United States. If the Trump administration pursues an even broader decoupling, the costs will be magnified exponentially.

MIXED RESULTS

The effectiveness of U.S. actions looks clearest when examining the state of the specific companies and industries that have been targeted, particularly with export controls and restricted access to the American market. China’s semiconductor industry has encountered the most difficulties. Over the last few years, the U.S. Commerce Department has placed roughly 850 Chinese institutions and individuals on its Entity List, which effectively bars them from gaining access to the United States’ most advanced technology. In October 2022, the Commerce Department also imposed severe restrictions on U.S. firms selling advanced semiconductors and equipment to Chinese companies. Washington also compelled other chip powerhouses, most notably Japan and the Netherlands, to restrict sales to China. The impact was immediate and devastating for several Chinese firms, which were no longer able to buy certain chips, such as Nvidia’s most advanced semiconductors used in artificial intelligence applications. Moreover, Western equipment and software providers walked out of their manufacturing facilities in China, leaving the Chinese to figure things out for themselves. As one Chinese executive recently told me, “We went from being cooks in the kitchen to farmers in the field.” Lower yield rates and poorer performance left the affected firms further behind their Western competitors than before.

Beijing has given Chinese chip firms a blank check and every regulatory incentive imaginable in an effort to fill these holes and close the gap, but they are still far behind their counterparts in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. And Chinese manufacturing equipment makers and software providers are even further behind. Entrepreneurs at Chinese AI firms told me that the banning of Nvidia’s chips has hampered their efforts to train their large language models and develop other kinds of bespoke business applications.

Now, the United States is in the early stages of adopting measures against other industries. The high tariffs Biden imposed on electric vehicles and batteries this year, coupled with the potential forthcoming ban on imports of connected and autonomous vehicles, will effectively make the U.S. market off-limits to all Chinese automakers. It is possible the United States will even block U.S. pharmaceutical firms from using Chinese companies to conduct clinical trials, restrict U.S. pharmaceutical investments in China, and disallow drugs developed in China from accessing the U.S. market. And if China can ramp up production for its new commercial airliner, the C919, and start to export it around the world, Washington may well add some of the plane’s U.S.-made components to the export control list, which would be a crushing blow to COMAC, the Chinese producer, given that almost every system that keeps the C919 in the air is from a U.S. or European supplier.

Beyond individual sectors, U.S. pressure is indirectly dampening China’s economy. Treating China as a strategic competitor has led the leadership in Beijing to emphasize national security even more than was already the case. Beijing’s hyperfocus on technological self-reliance has meant overinvestment in high-priority sectors, generating oversupply, which has hurt the bottom line of many Chinese companies and generated tensions with trading partners. The resulting uncertainty has not sat well with Chinese private entrepreneurs and many households, contributing to a decline in investment and consumption. Beijing deserves much of the blame for a slowing economy, but its policies are to some degree a response to growing Western pressure.

Many Chinese economists are alarmed by the nationalistic direction of their country’s economic policy and skeptical that self-reliance will work. They believe that a return to a more market-friendly approach is necessary. Some have aired their worries publicly, but the danger to their careers is real, and so most keep quiet.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

As damaging as Western restrictions have been, the tightening controls have also spurred Chinese technological advances that otherwise would not have occurred. When I recently asked about whether U.S. restrictions have unintentionally incentivized China’s tech efforts, one U.S. official involved in these policy deliberations retorted, “Wouldn’t they have done all of this anyway?” The answer is an emphatic “no.”

Since the Opium War ended in 1842, China has made greater self-reliance a strategic goal. But the recent U.S.-led measures have resulted in Beijing turbo-boosting this mission. The core goal of the country’s “Made in China 2025” plan, announced in 2015, was to raise the prominence of Chinese technology products in global markets. It wasn’t until after Washington began flexing its muscles that Beijing’s aim shifted toward indigenizing its supply chains from beginning to end, particularly in strategic technologies such as semiconductors, telecom, and artificial intelligence. Over the last five years, China has invested extensive resources in the most advanced areas of semiconductor equipment and tools, and Beijing also has tried to develop high-tech solutions based almost entirely on Chinese components in an effort to “Delete A”—that is, remove American tech from their supply chain.

The U.S.-Chinese tech conflict, once a preoccupation of Chinese officialdom, has now become integral to the business strategy of both state-owned and private firms. Whether for reasons of national loyalty or commercial ambition, Chinese companies and research organizations have aimed their sights higher and higher, expanding investments and R&D beyond their shores, in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

U.S. restrictions on Chinese technology have yielded unintended consequences.

Ironically, the very restrictions meant to curb China’s technological progress have, in some areas, helped to spur it. China has seen improvements across multiple sectors, in terms of research and development, manufacturing output, and greater domestic content in exports. My own recent visits to Chinese electric vehicle battery firms and automakers revealed companies that have a clear sense of the global competitive landscape, strong capabilities in product and process innovation, and the financial resources to get ahead. The top representatives of foreign firms in China are upset with China’s discriminatory industrial policies, but they now consistently emphasize that their main challenge is a growing cohort of highly capable Chinese competitors.

Chinese firms are still far behind the competition in the semiconductor industry, but they are gradually building a domestic ecosystem and supply chain. They are hoarding foreign lithography equipment and making incremental progress with local equipment and software makers. Domestic firms appear to be following Beijing’s instructions to increase the use of domestic chips. Chinese researchers are exploring new pathways in materials, chip architecture, and computing methodologies that could potentially allow Chinese semiconductor manufacturers to leapfrog their foreign rivals in the same way that Chinese makers of electric vehicles have surpassed Western dominance in internal combustion engines. When I queried Chinese AI tech executives about which Chinese firms are most likely to succeed in semiconductors and AI, they most often mention Huawei, a firm that was knocked down, but not out, by U.S. sanctions. Its smartphone business took a huge hit, but it now has an entirely independent operating system, Harmony, running on its devices.

China is also now outcompeting the United States and the rest of the world in cleantech. Its risky bet on electric vehicles has paid off, with impressive results in raw-material processing, batteries, telematics, car models, and charging infrastructure. The same is true for solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear power. Most recently, Chinese firms have made substantial progress in the development of autonomous vehicles and the related infrastructure. China is also the source of a growing share of innovative drugs that reach late-stage trials and enter global markets. And even as Western multinationals are diversifying away from China, some of the largest new investors in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin America are Chinese companies. Tech restrictions meant to deny them access to Western technology are leading them to globalize and build extensive transnational networks faster than they otherwise would have.

ECONOMIC BLOWBACK

U.S. policymakers must weigh how the United States' economic security measures have both slowed and accelerated China’s tech drive. Beyond that, they must take stock of how these measures have shaped the United States’ own technological trajectory. Here, too, the results have been mixed.

Major pieces of legislation, such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, have budgeted over $600 billion for basic sciences, the semiconductor industry, cleantech, and other investments. Such measures also are meant to mobilize private capital and foreign investment, and there has indeed been a surge in investment in semiconductor fabs, electric vehicle batteries, and other technologies.

But Washington has also placed restrictions on U.S. innovation that so far outweigh the good that has come from the investments. Export controls have reduced business opportunities for American semiconductor firms; less revenue means less investment in R & D and less innovation. Specific restrictions, coupled with the chilling effect produced by increased geopolitical tensions, have reduced opportunities and income for U.S. firms.

The U.S. Justice Department has placed restrictions on scholarly cooperation with China, causing the productivity of American science and technology scholars to drop. A high proportion of AI scientists in the United States hail from China; a decline in their numbers means a drop in innovation in the United States and more opportunities for others, including China, to step up. Washington has also imposed restrictions on Chinese students pursuing science and technology graduate degrees in the United States, depriving American universities of many highly talented students.

The United States' economic security measures have both slowed and accelerated China’s tech drive.

As the Chinese government has pushed indigenous solutions, Chinese companies have tried to excise American technology from their products and ecosystems. There are signs that other countries, worried about high tariffs and other restrictions, are also shying away from American technology.

Higher tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles will shield U.S. automakers from unfairly priced imports, and a ban on Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles will reduce data security risks of American consumers. But such protection likely means fewer American electric vehicle models, continued high prices, a slower energy transition in transportation, and less competitive U.S. firms internationally.

Industrial policy may nurture some infant industries that otherwise would not develop, but it is just as likely that Washington will spend profligately on white-elephant projects. Each of the new multibillion-dollar semiconductor fabrication plants being built in the United States, partially at American taxpayers’ expense, may be defensible. But given concurrent state-backed investments in fabrication plants in Brazil, China, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it is highly likely that there will be substantial global overcapacity within the next decade, which will mean some of today’s investments will be unsustainable, resulting in unsold inventories, underperforming firms, and job losses.

It is likely that in at least a few sectors the United States and its allies are gradually sharing, or even ceding, leadership to Chinese counterparts, measured not by the technical feat of any individual technology but by dominance of ecosystems and diffusion of their products. Although China’s emergence as a science and technology powerhouse is not simply the result of responding to Western pressure, tensions have likely accelerated its progress. As Chinese firms broaden their reach, U.S. technology will be less indispensable in some parts of the world.

THE MIDDLE PATH

De-risking—reducing the vulnerabilities that the United States and its allies face from technology leakage to China, overdependence on Chinese supply chains, and insecure data and critical infrastructure—has brought some improvements in the United States’ economic security, but there have been substantial unintended consequences. And if the Trump administration takes even more radical steps to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies, the economic and national security downsides will be even more pronounced.

Washington should take steps to ensure that the United States continues to make pathbreaking advances in science and technology. The incoming Trump administration and Congress need to recognize that there are potential tradeoffs between economic prosperity goals, such as greater innovation and wealth, and economic security goals, such as greater resilience and protecting against technology leakage. U.S. policymakers must set measurable goals, conduct cost-benefit analyses of different policy options and scenarios, and carefully evaluate the actual results of various policies.

Washington needs to set clear priorities, identifying the most urgent threats that deserve a response. Otherwise, the United States will be dragged into a game of whack-a-mole or, more worryingly, try to block all commercial ties with China. To the extent that the United States attempts to deny technologies to China, the only sustainable approach involves working with allies and other countries so that the United States is not outflanked by China and lose technology leadership in the rest of the world. If the Trump administration pursues extensive decoupling from China, the result will most likely be an isolated, poorer, and weaker United States.

The Trump administration would also be unwise to ignore global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, as doing so would dramatically raise the likelihood of unbounded conflict. Instead, Washington should intensify multilateral cooperation to set new rules for global economic activity in order to avoid a race to the bottom. The United States may in some instances need to take unilateral steps to maintain its relative technology superiority, but excessive economic security measures will mean less innovation, slower economic growth, reduced profits, and fewer jobs. With a combination of wise domestic policies, collaboration with allies, and investment in international institutions, the United States can achieve both prosperity and security.

• SCOTT KENNEDY is Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Foreign Affairs · by Scott Kennedy · November 26, 2024

17. US forces are under regular attacks by militants at base near Syrian government airfield

​A forgotten conflict?

US forces are under regular attacks by militants at base near Syrian government airfield

Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · November 25, 2024

Georgia Army National Guard soldiers enter a CH-47 Chinook helicopter during a training mission in western Iraq on Oct. 30, 2024. They are part of a coalition to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. U.S. forces have repeatedly come under attack by militants in the two countries over the past year. (Tyler Becker/U.S. Army)

U.S. forces are fighting Iranian-backed proxies in Syria frequently as they come under militant attacks that analysts say have been aided by the Syrian government.

Dozens of those rocket, missile and drone attacks have focused on a strategic American base at a gas field in northeastern Syria near the Iraq border, a de facto territorial dividing point between forces backed by Iran and the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State group.

Mission Support Site Conoco has been attacked about 40 times since October 2023, U.S. Central Command said in a statement this month.

Many of those attacks have taken place in recent months, after U.S. and Iraqi officials announced the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and in the aftermath of Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Soldiers assigned to the 37th Infantry Brigade of the Ohio Army National Guard fire an M777 howitzer during an exercise at Mission Support Site Conoco in Syria in December 2022. Conoco has been attacked about 40 times since October 2023, U.S. Central Command said. (Julio Hernandez/U.S. Army)

Conoco, a dusty outpost about 5 miles from an airfield controlled by the Syrian regime, has become the front line for an Iranian proxy attempt to pressure U.S. forces to leave Syria altogether, said Charles Lister, the director of Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs at the Middle East Institute.

Some of the attacks appear to be directly facilitated by the Syrian regime, said Lister, citing unidentified official U.S. sources.

The U.S. has repeatedly hit back with artillery strikes, mostly targeting Iranian proxies. But it’s also struck Syrian government positions, Lister said.

“We’re not just looking at war in Gaza, we’re not just looking at war in Lebanon, but the U.S. is actually fully engaged in a hot conflict right now, involving Iranian proxies and the Syrian regime in eastern Syria,” Lister said.

On Friday, the Pentagon said U.S. forces had been attacked 125 times in Syria and 79 times in Iraq since October 2023, according to Reuters.

CENTCOM did not respond to earlier Stars and Stripes questions about how frequently the U.S. was responding to militant attacks and whether Syrian government locations were among those being targeted by American artillery fire or other retaliatory strikes.

Although groups linked to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government attacked U.S. forces over the past year, the regime didn’t take a very active role, said Renad Mansour, a senior research fellow and director of the Iraq Initiative at the London-based think tank Chatham House.

An AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter takes off for a mission in July 2024 at Irbil Air Base in Iraq. U.S. forces are part of a coalition to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. American service members have repeatedly come under attack by militants in the two countries over the past year. (Joseph Kumza/U.S. Army)

But the Syrian government and other groups could be changing their thinking “as it becomes clear that are just no red lines for Israel from their perspective, and that they are also at war, and Israel will attack the Syrian regime,” Mansour said.

A U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Syria is working to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. About 900 U.S. service members and an undisclosed number of contractors are operating in Syria, where they support local Kurdish forces.

An additional 2,500 American military forces are in Iraq, the Defense Department said in September. That same month, the White House announced an agreement with Iraq to wrap up the U.S. military mission there next year, though it didn’t specify whether the agreement would mean a full troop withdrawal.

Some of those attacks in Iraq and Syria over the past year have killed or seriously injured American military personnel. Eight U.S. service members suffered traumatic brain injuries and smoke inhalation from an Aug. 9 militant drone attack at Rumalyn Landing Zone in northeastern Syria.

Days earlier, four U.S. troops and a defense contractor were injured in a rocket attack Aug. 5 at al Asad Air Base in Iraq.

And three soldiers were killed and dozens more injured in a one-way drone attack at an American outpost in Jordan just across the Syrian border on Jan. 28.

Soldiers assigned to the 44th Infantry Brigade of the New Jersey Army National Guard fire an M121 120 mm mortar system in northeastern Syria on Oct. 16, 2024. U.S. forces have come under attack by Iran-backed proxies in Syria more than 120 times in the past year. (Kyle Marr/U.S. Army)

CENTCOM seldom has announced the attacks or U.S. retaliation against the groups responsible for them. But earlier this month, the command revealed a series of recent U.S. retaliatory strikes against militia groups in Syria for attacks on American service members and facilities.

Those actions included a Nov. 12 strike targeting a weapons bunker and logistics headquarters of an unnamed Iranian-proxy group for an attack on U.S. and coalition forces at Patrol Base Shaddadi in northeastern Syria.

Last month, the command said the base at Shaddadi had been attacked 22 times since October 2023.

The militant attacks and U.S. response have followed a cyclical, tit-for-tat pattern, said Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and expert on military and security affairs in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf states.

“For the third time this year, we’re probably in a cycle where (militant groups are) going to keep pushing the envelope,” Knights said. “And then we’re going to crack them a couple of times and then they’re going to stop again for a while. That’s where we are right now.”

New Jersey Army National Guard soldiers assigned to the 44th Infantry Brigade prepare for an exercise alongside the Syrian Free Army in southern Syria on Oct. 27, 2024. The Syrian government has provided support to Iranian-backed militants attacking U.S. forces in the country, some analysts say. (Scott Maraldo/U.S. Army)

Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · November 25, 2024

18. Back to the Basics: Rediscovering the Roots of Special Forces

​My 1995 thesis was "Special Forces Missions: A Return to the Roots for a Vision of the Future."

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/tr/ADA299300

Abstract:

This study traces the development of Special Forces SF missions from the 0SS in 1944 to the present to determine how the doctrinal missions evolved. Five specific operations​ e​​​vents are examined including the Jedburghs and Operational Groups in France, Unconventional Warfare during the Korean War, Operation White Star in Laos, Special Forces conduct of the CIDG program and its participation in MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War, and SF operations in the Dominican Republic. The possible characteristics of conflict in the Post Cold War World are established. These characteristics are compared with the five specific operations examined to determine the likenesses and differences among them, as well as lessons learned that will have application for future Special Forces training. The study concludes that because the Post Cold War World will be characterized by chaos and uncertainty, SF requires the broadest training possible. It should focus on two missions and all others should become collateral activities. The wartime mission should be Unconventional Warfare and the peacetime mission should be Unconventional Operations. Training for these missions provides flexible, language capable, culturally aware, highly skilled, and disciplined soldiers that will meet the requirements across the spectrum of conflict.

​JSOC is a great organization. It is the premier CT national mission force in the world. But it is not a model for long duration, population centric, unconventional and irregular warfare that is characterized by the need for presence, patience, and persistence.

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Special Forces were never intended to be a scaled-down version of JSOC. Their original purpose was to engage with and empower local populations, using cultural fluency, language skills, and unconventional tactics to achieve strategic objectives. While their success has expanded their mission set, it has also led to a drift away from their roots. As geopolitical competition intensifies and irregular threats become more complex, SF must refocus on the fundamentals that have historically set them apart. By prioritizing human connections, cultural understanding, and adaptability over technological fixation, Special Forces can remain a vital tool in navigating the challenges of modern warfare. History has shown that victory in irregular conflicts depends not on having the best technology but on mastering the art of influence and human engagement. It is time for Special Forces to rediscover this truth and reclaim their original mission. This can only occur if the JSOC commanders within USASOC allow it.

Back to the Basics: Rediscovering the Roots of Special Forces

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/back-basics-rediscovering-roots-special-forces-sal-artiaga-n11ue/?trackingId=Ex2y77miZhDXi1QT7gfhSg%3D%3D

Sal Artiaga

Irregular Warfare & Latin America National Security Commentator

November 26, 2024

The story of Special Forces (SF) shows how vision, flexibility, and operational ingenuity shaped their history. From their inception, SF units were designed to serve as small, elite teams capable of carrying out unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), and operations that relied on cultural and human expertise. However, as the world changed and SF proved they could do many things well, their jobs grew beyond what they had first set out to do. This growth often came at the expense of their core ideas. In recent times, with new leaders at 1st Special Forces Command and USASOC (United States Army Special Operations Command), SF has moved away from UW and FID. Instead, they're trying to look more like a smaller version of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and other Special Mission Units. While new tech and modernization matters, Special Forces must return to their roots. They must focus again on human dynamics, language proficiency, basic tactics and techniques, and cultural understanding. Time and again, history has shown that tech alone doesn't win wars. To succeed in irregular warfare, you need to connect with people and be adaptable.

The Original Intent Behind Special Forces

The establishment of Special Forces was born out of a need to fight wars that conventional military forces could not. During World War II, the seeds of what would become Special Forces were planted in units such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and British Special Operations Executive (SOE). These units carried out sabotage missions, guerrilla warfare, and resistance support in Nazi-occupied Europe and Asia. They were not focused on massive troop formations or technological superiority but on building relationships with indigenous forces, leveraging local resistance movements, and achieving cognitive dominance over adversaries through unconventional means.

When the U.S. Army created the Special Forces in 1952, it had a clear goal: to organize, train, and assist indigenous forces in unconventional warfare. The Green Beret, which stood for SF identity, became linked with creativity, cultural understanding, and the skill to work behind enemy lines with little to no support. SF teams were small, quick, and well-trained in languages, cultures, and the ins and outs of human behavior. Their job was to enable local forces to fight their wars, a cheap and effective way to achieve strategic objectives.

Victims of Their Success

During the Cold War, Special Forces proved their worth in many operations, including backing anti-communist rebels and advisory positions in foreign armies. As SF kept getting results in these areas, their fame grew, and so did the demand for their expertise. Over time, their mission's scope widened, pulling them away from their original core focus.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) quickly sped up this change. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Special Forces became the go-to group for various tasks. Their knack for quick and decisive action made them crucial but also spread them thinly across many missions. SF teams were increasingly tasked with additional missions that had historically been the purview of Special Mission Units. While special missions often brought high-profile successes, they sidelined the long-term and nuanced nature of UW and FID. The skills that once set Special Forces apart, relationship-building, cultural immersion, and language proficiency, began to take a backseat to kinetic operations.

Recent Leadership Shifts and the Move Toward a JSOC Model

The recent leadership directions at the 1st Special Forces Command and USASOC have exacerbated this drift from the original mission. The recent increase in JSOC officers commanding USASOC and 1st Special Forces Command appears to be pushing to “make 1st SFC more Operational.” There is a growing emphasis on transforming SF into a more action-oriented force resembling a smaller version of JSOC. The allure of high-profile raids, advanced technology, and tactical dominance has led to a disproportionate focus on direct action, often at the expense of SF’s core competencies.

This shift risks undermining what has historically made Special Forces unique. Unlike JSOC units, which excel in surgical precision and high-stakes missions, SF is designed to be the “force multiplier.” Their value lies in their ability to work with, train, and assist partner forces. Turning Special Forces into a bad carbon copy of JSOC not only duplicates existing capabilities but also neglects the importance of UW and FID in shaping the strategic environment over the long term. Yes, it is excellent to give JSOC and other SMU officers command positions within USASOC, but it is more important to maintain the Green Beret essence if that is still a thing.

The Need to Return to the Basics

Special Forces must return to their roots to maintain relevance and effectiveness in today’s complex geopolitical environment. At its core, irregular warfare is about understanding and influencing human behavior. It is a battle of minds and wills rather than sheer firepower or technological prowess. Here are my three key areas where Special Forces should refocus their efforts:

1. Human Nature and Relationships: The essence of SF operations has always been about human connection. Building trust with partner forces, understanding the motivations of insurgents, and working within the intricate web of local dynamics are skills that drones or algorithms cannot replace. History shows that winning wars often requires winning people. During the Vietnam War, for instance, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program saw Green Berets living and fighting alongside Montagnard tribes to counter Viet Cong influence. The success of this program came not from technology but from relationships forged in the field.
2. Language and Cultural Proficiency: Language and culture are the gateways to understanding and influencing foreign populations. During World War II, the OSS prioritized training operatives in local languages and customs, recognizing that this knowledge was critical to mission success. Today, as geopolitical competition with China and Russia intensifies, SF must prioritize these skills to navigate the complex landscapes of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, where Irregular Integrated Deterrence must occur.
3. Deprioritizing Technology Fixation: While technology is a valuable tool, it should not overshadow the fundamentals of human engagement. Historically, technologically superior forces have often failed against more adaptable and resourceful adversaries. The U.S. experience in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan are stark reminders that superior weaponry does not guarantee victory. Similarly, in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents using rudimentary tactics and equipment were able to frustrate and outlast a technologically advanced coalition. With limited tech available, the U.S. Army should use Special Forces as Red Cell Teams to test concepts and new technologies to find the gaps in their desired operational models. This concept would be a win-win training environment and prepare both SF and Conventional Forces for the fights of the future.

Lessons from History: Technology vs. Human Connection

History offers numerous examples where technological superiority failed to translate into strategic success. The British Empire, with its advanced military capabilities, struggled to suppress insurgencies in places like Ireland and India, where cultural and political grievances drove local resistance. More recently, the Soviet Union’s reliance on brute force in Afghanistan failed to counteract the Mujahideen’s use of local knowledge and asymmetric tactics. And we all know what happened with the U.S. efforts against the Taliban.

Conversely, successful irregular warfare campaigns often emphasize human connection over technological might. During the Malayan Emergency, British forces adopted a “hearts and minds” approach, focusing on isolating insurgents from local populations through political and social reforms. This strategy, rooted in understanding human behavior, ultimately proved more effective than military force alone.

Conclusion

Special Forces were never intended to be a scaled-down version of JSOC. Their original purpose was to engage with and empower local populations, using cultural fluency, language skills, and unconventional tactics to achieve strategic objectives. While their success has expanded their mission set, it has also led to a drift away from their roots. As geopolitical competition intensifies and irregular threats become more complex, SF must refocus on the fundamentals that have historically set them apart. By prioritizing human connections, cultural understanding, and adaptability over technological fixation, Special Forces can remain a vital tool in navigating the challenges of modern warfare. History has shown that victory in irregular conflicts depends not on having the best technology but on mastering the art of influence and human engagement. It is time for Special Forces to rediscover this truth and reclaim their original mission. This can only occur if the JSOC commanders within USASOC allow it.

19. 'Everybody's going to have to figure this out': Army, Air Force debate base defense amid new threats

​"as long as adequate funding" is provided – I am sure some bean counter will figure out how much the Army spends on "base defense" (nothing directly as there is likely no line in the budget for base defense) and then shift that amount of funding from the Army to the Air Force.

'Everybody's going to have to figure this out': Army, Air Force debate base defense amid new threats - Breaking Defense

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall recently suggested his service could take over the task of defending its air bases from the Army, as long as adequate funding was provided.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · November 25, 2024

A U.S. Army MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile system is fired for a coastal air defense event during Balikatan 23 at the Naval Education, Training and Doctrine Command, Philippines (Photo: US Marine Corps)

WASHINGTON — When President-elect Donald Trump’s new defense secretary takes the reins of the Pentagon next year, they may quickly be faced with an internal debate to settle: whether the Army should continue with its traditional role of providing defenses for air bases, or whether the Air Force steps up to the task on its own.

At the core of the issue is not only the capabilities brought to the fight by each service, but how they will be funded. The Army has traditionally been charged with defending air bases, which is part of the reason why systems like Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) reside under the service’s control. But tepid investment during the Global War on Terror years, alongside the proliferation of missile threats from China and Russia, has led Air Force officials to begin openly grumbling that they feel the Army can’t, or won’t, make air base defense a priority — and that a change may be due.

Recent comments from Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall seemed to bring the issue to a head, after he reportedly suggested his service could take over the air base defense mission from the Army in its entirety. Of course, if that happens, Air Force advocates would likely want to see more dollars distributed to the service, whether they come out of the Army’s coffers or elsewhere.

Asked about the ongoing discussion on Nov. 20, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said he recently met with his Air Force counterpart, Gen. David Allvin, to help chart a way forward. But George made it clear that in his mind, protection responsibilities have to fall on the entire joint force going forward.

“I do believe that every formation that’s out there — Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines — you’re going to have to protect yourself against long-range fires. You’re going to have to protect yourself against drones. Everybody’s going to have to figure this out,” he said at the National Security Innovation Forum event in Washington.

George’s comments seem to fall in line with a growing consensus that having one service responsible for base defense writ large isn’t going to work in a modern era filled with a variety of threats.

Tom Karako, a missile defense expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says George’s point that every service will need to have some internal base defense capability is “reflecting reality” that “all services are gonna have to get into air defense at some kind for the new threat environment,” not just for missiles but for drones as well.

“People keep saying, ‘Why isn’t the Army defending our air bases?’ And the answer is, there is nowhere near enough missile defense capacity for everything we need to defend. That is true of air bases, and true of lots of other kinds of bases, it’s true in Ukraine, in Israel — it’s not just the Air Force assets that need tons more help, it’s everything,” Karako said.

He pointed out that the Marines are going out and trying to buy their own Iron Dome-like system to counter rockets and small drones, and that while there is a benefit in having a specialist branch of the Army that just does air defense, there will never be enough people in that unit to cover all the needs.

“Does the Air Force have a point that there is utility in specialization? Sure. But we are where we are, we got where we are today as a joint force and we’re gonna have to deal with it as a joint force,” Karako said.

New Air Force Tactics

Services are also trying to shift tactics as the threat from adversaries like China grows, with the Air Force adopting a new, dispersed method of operations known as agile combat employment (ACE). The ACE concept is a necessary, but not sufficient, approach for protecting troops and assets; even with the concept, Air Force officials have become worried that air bases in the Indo-Pacific are still vulnerable against Beijing’s burgeoning missile arsenal and other budding weapons.

Higher-end systems like Patriot or Aegis cruisers are placed where joint task force commanders think critical defensive capabilities are needed, and air bases have generally been protected as a result, Lt. Gen. David Harris, deputy chief of staff of Air Force futures, said in an interview with Breaking Defense at the Pentagon.

“But there could be a point in time in the future where the critical asset list or the defended asset list, there’s other things in the region that might be more important than our air bases,” Harris continued. “So this is where things are split.”

Harris noted it’s critical for disparate systems fielded by the services to connect into a common architecture, using an example where data can be passed from an Army theater defense system to a local air base. Echoing comments from other officials, Harris also said installations might need to operate their own systems to defend themselves from threats like small to mid-size drones, or “maybe” even cruise missiles. Depending on the environment — with Harris using the example of struggles to combat small drones flying over bases on US soil — that could range from more limited defenses to a “full package” that could take out threats spanning drones to ballistic missiles.

“So there’s an aspect of this base defense that I think as an Air Force that we need to be thinking about next. Because if we’re starting to march our way forward, part of our survivability as we go into a higher threat intensity, that’s going to start to matter more,” Harris said.

George, for his part, said he’d like to see more dollars put toward the base defense mission and for development efforts to move more quickly.

“I think we need to spend more [and move] faster on these problems and have the flexibility to get out there and innovate,” he said. “So I think everybody’s going to have to figure this out, and we’re going to figure this out with the Air Force.”

Aaron Mehta contributed to this report.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · November 25, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com