Please note that I may be off the net for a couple of days as I am having cataract surgery in both eyes today.

Quotes of the Day:

“He that cannot reason is a fool. He that will not is a bigot. He that dare not is a slave.”

– Andrew Carnegie

“Change your opinions, keep your principles, change your leaves, keep intact your roots.”

– Victor Hugo

“In individuals, insanity is rare: but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs, it is the rule.”

– Friedrich Nietzsche 

1.  Irregular Warfare – Defining the Debate

2. Continuous Transformation – Institutional Transformation in Contact

3. Confronting Irregular Warfare in the South China Sea

4. Chinese military disguised as fishing boats? Philippine defence chief raises concerns

5. Taiwan says Chinese balloon detected near island

6. How to Counter Russia’s Hybrid Threats? First, Make Them a Priority

7. The Rolling Middle East Earthquakes by Mick Ryan

8. tariffs - different application ahead

9. Will Musk’s ‘Algorithm’ reduce military inefficiency—or increase risk?

10. New US drones tested on Ukraine front line hailed as 'game changer'

11. The U.S. Is Losing the Ability to Deter War With China

12. Making sense of Trump’s national security team

13. Ukraine’s Armed Forces Recall Thousands of Dud Mortars

14. Washington May Permit US Defense Contractors to Assist Ukraine

15. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024

16. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 26, 2024

17. Focus: Why the US Green Berets are the World’s Most Unique Special Forces Unit.

18. GT investigates: How will American special operations team intervene in S.China Sea?

19. Trump Returns to ‘Maximum Pressure’ as Era of Biden Alliances Ends

20. When Maritime and Continental Powers Collide: A Historical Framework for US Asymmetric Competition with China

21. How to Fix a Broken Defense Department to Beat China and Russia

22. This is Not the Status Quo You’re Looking For

23. Trump Ally Holds Up Promotion of Army General Involved in Afghanistan Evacuation

24. A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

1. Irregular Warfare – Defining the Debate

We spend more time arguing about definitions or coming up with new words than we do on understanding the phenomena we face.

That said the debate is what leads to understanding and it is more important than agreement on terms (though I know the doctrine guys will say we must have precise definitions because everything flows from there).

We now have a Joint definition and an Army definition for IW. Is that going to help us or hurt us? I do not care if we have two definitions as long as we address the irregular threats we face with our own irregular and political wrfare campaign plans in the gray zone of strategic competition as well as before, during, after, and in support of large scale combat operations.

Irregular Warfare

Defining the Debate

Col. Todd Schmidt, PhD, U.S. Army

Download the PDF 

Col. Todd A. Schmidt, PhD, U.S. Army

Director, Army University Press

There is a debate over how to define “irregular warfare.” Conventional thinking advocates for a conservative definition of irregular warfare that hinges on adversarial engagement utilizing lethal force that is violent and militarized. For example, the 2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”1

However, there is a growing awareness and recognition that classical irregular warfare doctrine requires rethinking and a less conventional understanding and approach. Forward-thinking theorists believe that irregular warfare exists across the cooperation-competition-crisis-conflict continuum. Irregular warfare is increasingly used to describe the ever-present condition of enduring competition among nations, whether that competition is lethal or nonlethal; militarized or nonmilitarized; embroiled in armed conflict or below the threshold of armed conflict. Current doctrine found in Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfighting, for example, defines irregular warfare as “a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.”2

This debate of definitions is important, because it ultimately informs U.S. national security, defense, and military policies. It also informs how resources are allocated. Thus, it is a political issue, as well. Given this complexity, predicting what future warfare and battlefields will look like is a dangerous and risky business, and pundits or subject-matter experts are rarely accurate in their predictions. Moreover, the U.S. military has often been accused of preparing for the war that it wants to fight, not the wars in which it is required to fight.

Current U.S. Army doctrine and readiness focuses on large-scale combat operations. Large-scale combat operations are, by nature, extensive multinational, joint combat operations involving multiple corps and division size units and include conventional and irregular forces on both sides.3 But what happens if an adversary elects for a strategy that depends wholly on unconventional and asymmetric tactics and operations to achieve a desired end state?

There may be a scenario wherein a sophisticated adversary seeks to engage and attack the United States in a manner for which it is unprepared. For example, it is often stated that the support of the populace in democratic nations is a center of gravity in war. However, a democratic society, such as the United States, can be divided and polarized to such an extent that trust between political parties does not exist. Truth and facts can be called into question and politicized for personal and partisan gain. The populace can be divided, confused, frustrated, and hopeless to such an extent that they lose significant trust and confidence in public institutions.

At a critical moment, perhaps during a major natural disaster or a national event such as a presidential election period, for example, an adversary could conduct an asymmetric attack that damages or destroys critical national infrastructure; debilitates our military and strategic deterrence capabilities; or significantly damages our international influence. Can a nation so polarized and lacking trust in national leaders and institutions see past their partisan divides to focus on an external enemy? If a devastating attack under the threshold of armed conflict can achieve a strategic objective of the enemy or deny and damage the strategic interests of the United States and its allies, it may be worth the risk. And without the support of the public or electorate in a democracy, our leaders cannot mobilize the Nation for war.

Irregular warfare, liberally defined, takes these scenarios into consideration. We must have the political will, resources, doctrine, and capabilities to meet the enemy where they are, not where we wish them to be. We must be willing and able to engage our enemies with all levers of national power on their homeland, in their homes, on their airwaves, and against their national interests. We must be willing and able to engage with persistent staying power to achieve long-term gains. We must be willing and able to dominate our adversaries in a comprehensive, absolute game of narrative, perception, influence, and information.4 We must be willing and able to engage in infinite irregular warfare.

The articles that follow in this special edition discuss all manner of issues and topics in irregular warfare. We are deeply appreciative of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, for curating this edition and thank the authors for their submissions. We hope you enjoy this edition and that it instigates further constructive, professional debate and discourse.

Editor’s note: The 2025 General William DePuy Writing Competition, the U.S. Army’s premier writing contest, is focused on the topic of security challenges presented by a world that is increasingly borderless, multicultural, and interdependent. The theme of the 2025 DePuy writing competition finds roots in the definition of irregular warfare, wherein state and nonstate actors struggle and compete for power. Read how to enter the contest at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.

Notes

1. Department of Defense (DOD), Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Washington, DC: DOD, 11 September 2007 [obsolete]), 5, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA496061.pdf.
2. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfighting, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 27 August 2023 [CAC required]), II-7, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp1vol1.pdf.
3. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2023), para. 1-46.
4. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “China—A Deadly ‘Infinite Game’: Army Chief McConville,” Breaking Defense, 29 March 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/china-a-deadly-infinite-game-army-chief-mcconville/.

2. Continuous Transformation – Institutional Transformation in Contact

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The Army stands at a pivotal moment in its history. The challenges it faces today are as complex and unpredictable as they have ever been. However, TRADOC is at the heart of Army transformation through I-TiC, ensuring that the institutional Army is not only aligned with today’s operational demands but is also prepared for the battles of tomorrow.

As we move forward, the lessons learned from I-TiC will inform the Army’s next phase of transformation. The transition into deliberate transformation and concept-driven change will build on the foundation laid today, ensuring that the Army is constantly evolving and improving. These phases will continue to refine the Army’s organizational structures, leadership development, and training methods, aligning with the strategic imperatives of the future.

Through its contributions to doctrine, organization, training, and leadership, TRADOC adapts to the evolving needs of the Army, playing a critical role in ensuring the institutional Army remains aligned with operational demands. Through its focus on responsiveness, adaptiveness, and efficiency, TRADOC ensures that the institutional Army is always prepared to support the operational Army, providing it with the leadership, training, and doctrine it needs to succeed in any environment. This transformation is not just about the future—it is about ensuring that the Army is ready, capable, and dominant today.

Looking ahead, the work of transformation will continue, but the Army is already on the right path. The foundation laid through I-TiC will ensure that the Army remains agile and capable of outpacing any adversary, now and in the years to come.

Continuous Transformation

Institutional Transformation in Contact

Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr., U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Tyler J. Rund, PMP, U.S. Army

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2024-OLE/Institutional-Transformation/

Download the PDF 

Lt. Gen. Milford Beagle Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Combined Arms Center, delivers a presentation on transforming in contact, deliberate transformation, and concept-driven development 10 September 2024 during the first day of the annual Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore, Georgia. The annual conference gathers U.S. Army senior leaders and subject-matter experts from across the globe to discuss the way forward for maneuver forces. (Photo by Patrick A. Albright, U.S. Army)

The Army operates in an environment that is more complex, dynamic, and unpredictable than ever before. The rapid pace of technological advancement, coupled with the evolving capabilities of near-peer adversaries, has created a battlefield that demands adaptability and constant innovation. To succeed in this environment, the Army must not only be ready to fight today’s battles but also be prepared to win tomorrow’s wars. This is where transformation in contact (TiC) becomes essential. TiC is not just about modernization—it’s about enabling the Army to adapt in real time, evolving in sync with the demands of the operational environment while maintaining strategic overmatch.

The chief of staff of the Army’s vision for TiC is rooted in the belief that the Army must remain responsive, capable, and lethal across all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber. However, this transformation is not just about the operational forces on the front lines. It extends deeply into the institutional Army, the engine that drives the training, sustaining, and equipping of soldiers and leaders for the fight and ensures its Army civilian professionals remain a vital part of the enterprise. The institutional Army must undergo its own transformation to ensure it can continuously adapt and support the operational force, providing it with the necessary tools, skills, and leadership to succeed.

As the heart of the institutional Army, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) plays a critical role in this transformation. Working closely with Army Futures Command (AFC), TRADOC is responsible for ensuring the Army’s doctrine, organization, training, and leadership evolve in response to operational demands. TRADOC, through the efforts of the Combined Arms Center and the Center for Initial Military Training, ensures that TiC translates from concept to practical action, driving real change within the Army. This article explores how TRADOC leads this effort, which will ensure that soldiers are not only prepared for today’s challenges but also ready to face the threats of tomorrow.

Time as a Factor in Transformation

Transformation does not happen overnight, especially in an institution as large and complex as the U.S. Army. While technology may evolve quickly, the process of integrating new systems, updating doctrine, adapting training, and developing leaders requires well-thought-through timing and prioritization. Time is a critical factor in the Army’s ability to transform, and different components of transformation move at different speeds.

Contrary to popular belief, doctrinal changes are among the fastest to evolve. As the Army gathers lessons from the battlefield, doctrine is updated to reflect real-world experiences. The Quick-Fire process and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) assessments allow TRADOC to integrate feedback from operational units and rapidly update doctrinal publications like Army techniques publications and field manuals (FM).1 While doctrine can be updated quickly to reflect new operational insights, fully preparing soldiers and leaders to implement these changes across the force takes time. This process includes technical training and structured development through NCO and officer professional development programs, ensuring personnel return to their units equipped with the latest skills and knowledge to meet evolving Army requirements.

Training adaptation is closely tied to doctrinal changes. TiC, in some cases, requires adjusting training models. Modernizing training methods and ensuring soldiers can apply new tactics and technologies in a multidomain environment requires synchronization across resources, personnel, and time. While training centers and simulations allow for rapid updates, the broader integration of new training approaches—especially at scale—requires a deliberate process. This is where the Distributed Simulation Environment plays a pivotal role.2 By developing user stories and contributing to next-generation constructive simulations, Distributed Simulation Environment enables low-overhead training environments that mirror real-world operational demands without the need for heavy infrastructure. This allows the Army to modernize training more quickly and efficiently, but the challenge remains in ensuring that soldiers can absorb and retain these new skills effectively.

Leadership development has been and always will be a trademark of our Army. Developing leaders takes time because it requires a balance of formal education, hands-on experience, and continuous learning in the operational environment. The formal “schoolhouse” professional military education (PME) must be reinforced at the unit level. This slower pace of leadership development means that while doctrinal changes and training updates may happen rapidly, it can take years for those changes to be fully realized in the leaders who command the Army’s formations.

In short, while some elements of transformation can happen quickly—like doctrinal updates—others, such as training and leadership development, require a more deliberate approach. Understanding these timelines is essential for prioritizing efforts and ensuring that institutional transformation in contact (I-TiC) supports the operational Army effectively without overwhelming the force.

Identify Problems First, Then Introduce Solutions

The Army’s success in transforming itself lies not just in its ability to develop solutions but in its ability to clearly identify the problems it faces. In an operational environment that is increasingly complex, distributed, and multidomain, understanding the challenges is the first step toward meaningful transformation. Often, the solutions the Army adopts—whether technological, organizational, or doctrinal—are the result of a detailed examination of the battlefield challenges it encounters. Through I-TiC, TRADOC takes the lead in identifying critical challenges and proactively develops the systems and structures needed to solve them.

For example, the concept of multidomain task forces (MDTF) was developed in response to the need for the Army to operate effectively across multiple domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber—simultaneously. MDTFs did not emerge simply because they were a technological advancement; they were introduced because the Army needed formations that could coordinate complex, distributed operations and leverage capabilities across all domains. Similarly, C2 Fix—the initiative to refine command-and-control (C2) structures—was designed to address specific gaps in the Army’s ability to maintain situational awareness and command fluidity across large, dispersed units.3

By focusing on the problem first, TRADOC ensures that the solutions it introduces—whether they involve new force structures like MDTFs, doctrinal updates through C2 Fix, or training enhancements with next-generation constructive technology—are directly relevant to the Army’s operational needs. This approach prevents the Army from implementing technology or systems for the sake of modernization alone. Instead, each solution serves a clear, identified purpose, ensuring that the institutional Army remains responsive and adaptive in support of the operational Army.

Doctrine: A Continuous Process

Doctrine is the foundation of the Army’s ability to fight and win, but it is not static. Since 2017, the Army’s doctrine has been continually transformed to reflect operational needs, ensuring that it remains relevant to the evolving battlefield. Under I-TiC, this process of doctrinal transformation has accelerated, driven by the recognition that agility in both fighting and preparing to fight is essential for success in a multidomain environment.

TRADOC plays a central role in ensuring that doctrinal updates are both timely and relevant. This process is driven by real-time feedback from the battlefield, which is gathered and analyzed by CALL. Through the Quick-Fire process, TRADOC rapidly integrates lessons from operational environments into updated doctrine, ensuring that the latest tactics and techniques are reflected in Army publications. Recent doctrinal changes related to electronic warfare based on direct feedback from soldiers encountering adversaries using the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt communications are a prime example of this process. TRADOC led the doctrinal revisions, ensuring units are prepared to meet these challenges head-on. While cyber warfare has also been a focus in recent years, the immediate lessons learned from electronic warfare operations prompted swift doctrinal updates that had an immediate impact on the force. This included updating Army Regulation 525-24, U.S. Army Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Warfare Operations, in 2023 and FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Warfare, which is set to be published this fall, along with the creation of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWPMT) to enhance operational capabilities in this domain.4

While cyber warfare has also been a focus in recent years, the immediate lessons learned from electronic warfare operations prompted swift doctrinal updates that had an immediate impact on the force.

It is important to recognize that doctrinal transformation is not new. TRADOC has been modernizing doctrine for years, in close collaboration with AFC and CALL, to ensure that doctrine remains aligned with the Army’s evolving operational needs. The ongoing focus on multidomain operations is just one example of how doctrine has continually adapted to support the Army’s strategic objectives. This partnership among TRADOC, AFC, and CALL ensures that the Army’s doctrinal foundation is not only forward-looking but also rooted in real-world experience.

Organizational Adaptation: Making Difficult Decisions

Adapting the Army’s organizational structures to meet the demands of modern warfare requires strategic decisions in a resource-constrained environment. In a zero-sum game, where resources, manpower, and funding are finite, every decision carries trade-offs. Army senior leadership and TRADOC face the task of ensuring that the force is structured to meet both current operational demands and the complexities of future conflicts.

TRADOC actively refines and shapes the organizational framework to ensure it supports evolving force structures, making necessary adaptations based on real-time feedback. Through continuous assessments, TRADOC ensures that organizational changes are scalable and adaptable across different types of units. This adaptability is essential because battlefield conditions change rapidly, and organizational structures must be flexible enough to meet those evolving demands. For example, the mobile/light brigade combat team (M/L BCT) concept is one area where TRADOC is enabling change. M/L BCTs are designed to offer greater mobility and responsiveness, enabling units to operate across a range of environments with speed and agility. The focus is on reducing unit footprints while maintaining combat effectiveness, ensuring these formations are both flexible and lethal.

Another critical initiative is the ongoing modernization of combat training centers (CTC). TRADOC’s assessments at CTCs are not just about training soldiers; they are integral to refining the Army’s organizational design. The lessons learned at these centers help shape decisions about how units should be structured and how they should operate in multidomain environments. These assessments ensure that organizational changes are not made in isolation but are based on feedback from the field, ensuring they are scalable and applicable across the force.

The C2 Fix initiative also plays a significant role in organizational adaptation. C2 is the backbone of military operations, and TRADOC is working to refine how C2 structures function in large, dispersed units. By testing and adjusting command frameworks through assessments, TRADOC ensures that these structures remain robust enough to handle the complexity of modern warfare while also remaining flexible enough to adapt to shifting battlefield dynamics.

Training: Addressing Real Problems

The Mobile Advanced Readiness Training (MART) program is a critical initiative that ensures units can rapidly adapt to new tactics, technologies, and operational environments. MART is designed to bridge the gap between institutional training and operational readiness, providing units with the flexibility to incorporate cutting-edge systems into their training cycles without disrupting their operational tempo. This adaptability is key in today’s fast evolving, multidomain operational landscape.

One of the core strengths of MART is its ability to deliver customized, scalable training solutions to units wherever they are located, reducing the need for costly, large-scale training events. Instead of requiring units to relocate to specific training centers, MART brings advanced training directly to them, allowing soldiers to practice integrating new systems, tactics, and technologies within their own operational context. This flexibility not only saves time but also ensures that units can train under realistic conditions that closely mimic their deployment environments.

The program’s emphasis on multidomain operations makes it particularly relevant in preparing soldiers to confront threats across land, air, sea, space, and cyber. MART allows units to develop and refine their capabilities in these diverse domains, ensuring they remain effective and resilient when faced with evolving threats. This approach enables soldiers to build the agility and adaptability necessary to operate across multiple domains simultaneously, a requirement in modern conflict.

Additionally, MART integrates feedback from ongoing operations and incorporates lessons learned into its training cycles. This continuous loop of real-time adaptation ensures that the training remains relevant and up to date with current battlefield realities. The ability to rapidly adjust and refine training to match emerging threats is one of the hallmarks of the initiative, keeping units at the forefront of readiness.

However, the success of training is not solely dependent on systems like MART. It hinges on soldiers’ ability to retain and apply what they have learned when faced with the pressures of real-world operations. This is where CTCs and the Mission Command Training Program play vital roles. These centers offer full-scale, multidomain training environments where soldiers and units are placed in scenarios that mirror the complexities of modern combat. By integrating new systems and tactics into realistic settings, CTCs and the Mission Command Training Program help units refine their decision-making processes, strengthen cohesion, and improve their overall combat effectiveness. The feedback gathered from these training environments is directly integrated into TRADOC’s broader training programs, ensuring that the Army continuously adapts its training based on real-time operational needs.

As TRADOC refines its training programs, the focus remains on ensuring relevance and applicability. The process is not just about incorporating new technologies or refreshing doctrine—it’s about guaranteeing that soldiers are equipped to perform at their highest level in the most complex and contested environments. By continuously adapting training to incorporate lessons learned from real-world operations, TRADOC ensures that the Army remains agile and ready for any challenge.

Leadership: Preparing for the Crucible of Modern Warfare

Leadership is the cornerstone of the Army’s ability to operate in the unpredictable and fast-paced environment of modern warfare. The demands on today’s leaders are greater than ever before, as they must be prepared to contest adversaries across multiple domains while navigating the complexities of ever-evolving battlefield conditions. Under I-TiC, TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that leadership development keeps pace with these demands, equipping commanders with the skills, mindset, and adaptability required to succeed in an era of constant change.

The reality of modern warfare is that adversaries have capabilities that rival or exceed those of the United States across multiple domains including land, sea, air, space, and cyber. Leaders must be ready to confront these adversaries who are able to contest U.S. forces in all operational environments with lethal and sophisticated systems. As a result, leadership development must focus on preparing commanders for a future in which they are constantly challenged to make quick, informed decisions in high-pressure, complex scenarios.

One of the key challenges in leadership development is ensuring that commanders are not only knowledgeable but also adaptable. Leadership training and education under I-TiC must be flexible enough to evolve alongside changes in doctrine, technology, and the nature of the threats the Army faces. TRADOC’s philosophy is to educate leaders for uncertainty, preparing them to thrive in unpredictable environments. This philosophy is reflected in TRADOC’s leadership development initiatives, which focus on fostering agility, critical thinking, and creativity. The goal is to ensure that future leaders can think critically and make informed decisions in situations where they have limited time and incomplete information, enabling them to navigate the complexities of modern warfare with confidence.

To support this, TRADOC continuously updates its programs of instruction, integrating lessons learned from the battlefield to ensure leadership training remains relevant. These updates are not just theoretical; they are informed by real-world experiences that directly impact how leaders approach challenges in the field. While some updates may take time, the process does not always take three years. A key part of this modernization is the focus on warrant officer PME, ensuring that these specialized leaders are trained to meet the demands of modern multidomain operations.

Additionally, data literacy has become an essential component of PME, preparing leaders to operate effectively in data-rich, complex environments. By integrating data literacy into PME, TRADOC ensures that future leaders can interpret and act on data quickly, a critical skill in decision-making across multiple domains.

Addressing Innovation and Risk Management

Innovation has always been at the heart of the Army’s success. In the face of an increasingly complex global threat environment, the Army must continue to innovate not only in technology but also in how it organizes, trains, and leads its soldiers. TRADOC’s goal under I-TiC is to capture and scale innovation across the force while managing the risks associated with rapid transformation. The Army cannot afford to stagnate, but it also must ensure that the pace of innovation does not overwhelm the force or undermine its current readiness.

One key area where innovation is being driven forward is through the Line of Departure platform, with the Harding Project serving as the impetus to spark professional dialogue and discourse among leaders.5 By linking innovators with end users, Line of Departure provides a structured platform for facilitating these discussions, ensuring that ideas generated within the force are practical, grounded in real operational needs, and quickly implemented. This approach bridges the gap between theory and practice, ensuring that soldiers on the ground are equipped with solutions that address their immediate challenges.

Innovation also requires balancing risk. As new systems, doctrine, and organizational structures are introduced, there is always the potential to overextend the force or push changes too rapidly. The Army must manage these risks by carefully prioritizing its initiatives. Leaders must focus on what is most important and achievable, ensuring that resources and attention are concentrated on initiatives that will have the greatest impact on readiness and operational capability.

In recent years, TRADOC has adopted a more methodical approach to risk management, ensuring that innovations are aligned with strategic objectives and phased in gradually to avoid overwhelming the force. For example, innovations introduced through programs like the counter-small unmanned aircraft system (C-sUAS) initiative have been successful because they were implemented with a clear focus and timeline, allowing for proper integration without disrupting overall operations. The success of the C-sUAS program highlights TRADOC’s ability to foster innovation while managing the associated risks, ensuring that the Army remains agile, adaptable, and ready for the challenges of modern warfare.

Ultimately, TRADOC’s role is to ensure that the Army stays ahead of emerging threats by fostering a culture of innovation while also mitigating the risks associated with rapid change. Innovation cannot come at the cost of readiness, and the challenge for TRADOC is to strike the right balance—capturing new ideas and technologies, scaling them across the force, and ensuring that soldiers can incorporate these innovations without feeling overwhelmed by the pace of transformation.

Urgency and Focus

The global security landscape is evolving in ways that demand swift and decisive action from the Army. From the war in Ukraine to China’s growing influence, these events underscore the need for the Army to accelerate its transformation efforts. The battlefield of the future will not wait for us to catch up. We must anticipate, adapt, and respond faster than our adversaries. That sense of urgency is embedded in I-TiC, where TRADOC plays a critical role in ensuring that the Army remains agile, responsive, and focused on the right priorities.

But with transformation comes the need for clarity. The Army must remain laser-focused on what it can influence and control while working in tandem with joint and coalition partners to address larger, systemic challenges. TRADOC’s role is to focus on the aspects of transformation that it directly shapes—doctrine, organization, training, and leadership—while collaborating with other Army entities and joint forces to solve issues that fall outside its purview.

The urgency also lies in ensuring that transformation is not only a top-down initiative but also something that permeates every echelon of the Army. Soldiers on the ground must feel the effects of transformation in their day-to-day operations. The challenge for TRADOC is not just in driving large-scale institutional change but in making sure that this change translates into tangible, practical improvements for soldiers in the field. The true test of transformation is how well it equips soldiers to perform their missions.

In short, TRADOC’s focus remains clear: it must ensure that the Army can meet the challenges of the future while ensuring that the force remains combat-ready today. This balancing act requires both urgency and discipline, ensuring that transformation efforts are sustained and that they deliver measurable results where they are needed most.

Conclusion

The Army stands at a pivotal moment in its history. The challenges it faces today are as complex and unpredictable as they have ever been. However, TRADOC is at the heart of Army transformation through I-TiC, ensuring that the institutional Army is not only aligned with today’s operational demands but is also prepared for the battles of tomorrow.

As we move forward, the lessons learned from I-TiC will inform the Army’s next phase of transformation. The transition into deliberate transformation and concept-driven change will build on the foundation laid today, ensuring that the Army is constantly evolving and improving. These phases will continue to refine the Army’s organizational structures, leadership development, and training methods, aligning with the strategic imperatives of the future.

Through its contributions to doctrine, organization, training, and leadership, TRADOC adapts to the evolving needs of the Army, playing a critical role in ensuring the institutional Army remains aligned with operational demands. Through its focus on responsiveness, adaptiveness, and efficiency, TRADOC ensures that the institutional Army is always prepared to support the operational Army, providing it with the leadership, training, and doctrine it needs to succeed in any environment. This transformation is not just about the future—it is about ensuring that the Army is ready, capable, and dominant today.

Looking ahead, the work of transformation will continue, but the Army is already on the right path. The foundation laid through I-TiC will ensure that the Army remains agile and capable of outpacing any adversary, now and in the years to come.

Notes 

1. Quick-Fire is a rapid doctrinal update system used by TRADOC to integrate real-time feedback from soldiers and units, ensuring lessons learned from operations and training are quickly disseminated and applied across the Army. Observations can be submitted directly through the CALL Quick-Fire Observation Portal at https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/; see also Eric Hillner, “Quick-Fire Observations: Rapidly Resolving Issues and Informing the Force,” Army.mil, 19 January 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/273050/quick_fire_observations_rapidly_resolving_issues_and_informing_the_force.
2. Science and Technology Report TR-MSG-086-Part-II, Guideline on Scenario Development for (Distributed) Simulation Environments (Brussels: NATO, January 2015), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA623040.pdf.
3. Mark Pomerleau, “Army Developing Next Generation of Command and Control for All Units, Echelons,” DefenseScoop, 30 May 2024, https://defensescoop.com/2024/05/30/army-developing-next-generation-command-control-for-all-units-echelons/.
4. Army Regulation 525-24, U.S. Army Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 12 July 2023); Field Manual 3-12, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Warfare (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, forthcoming); “Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT),” Program Executive Office Simulation, Training and Instrumentation, accessed 13 November 2024, https://www.peostri.army.mil/Weapon-Systems/-PM-CT2/PdM-FTS/IEWTPT/.
5. Line of Departure, accessed 29 October 2024, https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/.

Lt. Gen. Milford Beagle Jr., U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he is responsible for integrating the modernization of the fielded Army across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy. He has served in multiple leadership capacities from platoon through division levels, and his career deployments span the globe from Hawaii to the Republic of Korea. He previously served as the commanding general of 10th Mountain Division (Light). He holds a BS from South Carolina State University, an MS from Kansas State University, an MS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and an MS from the Army War College.

Lt. Col. Tyler Rund, U.S. Army, is the assistant executive officer to the Combined Arms Center commanding general. His role at Fort Leavenworth involves leading military training and strategic planning initiatives, reinforced by his academic commitment to advancing leadership and operational effectiveness within the Army. He is currently pursuing a PhD in adult learning and leadership, complementing his advanced degrees in military arts, adult education, and business administration. He holds certifications as a Project Management Professional (PMP) and an FAA-rated pilot, along with advanced technical scuba qualifications. He is a twenty-year U.S. Army infantry officer with extensive combat and operational experience.

3.Confronting Irregular Warfare in the South China Sea

Confronting Irregular Warfare in the South China Sea

Lessons Learned from Vietnam

R. Kim Cragin, PhD

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Nov-Dec-2024/IW-South-China-Sea/

Download the PDF 

China Coast Guard vessels shoot water cannons at fishermen on 10 December 2023 in Bajo de Masinloc (also known as Scarborough Shoal), disputed territory claimed by the Philippines and China. (Photo courtesy of the Philippine Coast Guard)

On 5 March 2024, the Philippine government released a video of Chinese maritime militia shooting water cannons at a coast guard vessel near the Spratly Islands. Water crashed through the windshield and injured several sailors on board.1 It was just one of many ongoing confrontations in the South China Sea between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the nations of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The hostilities exemplify how state actors aggressively pursue their political objectives and yet remain below the level of armed conflict in modern irregular warfare.

This article explores irregular warfare in the South China Sea, focusing on the activities of the Chinese maritime militia and Vietnam’s response. It then derives lessons from Vietnam’s experiences for the U.S. military.

Most studies on the Chinese maritime militia examine the Philippines. This makes sense—the Philippines remains an important U.S. ally, and it has come under pressure from the militia. Further, in May 2009, the Philippines asked the United Nations to recognize its claim to the outer edge of the continental shelf, two hundred nautical miles from its baselines. This claim elevated what had been perceived as a regional security challenge. Vietnam and Malaysia followed.2 The PRC refuted these countries’ claims. In its response, the PRC released publicly a map of what is now referred to as the “Nine-Dash Line,” asserting jurisdiction over approximately 90 percent of the disputed territory (see map).3

Since then, the disputes among the PRC, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines have escalated.4 Each country has historical claims to the South China Sea. Each also has political, economic, and security interests in controlling at least parts of it. The seabed has yet to be fully explored, but it is assumed to hold significant oil deposits. In March 2024, for example, the state-run Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced the discovery of a one-hundred-million-ton oil field near the coast of Guangdong Province.5 Approximately 12 percent of global fishing occurs in the South China Sea. Further, the People Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) ballistic missile submarine fleet is stationed at the Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island.6

Regional experts for the most part judge the PRC as having been the most successful in asserting its claims to this territory. It has seized control of the Scarborough Shoal, creating 3,200 acres of new land by dredging and building artificial islands, as well as establishing twenty outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in the Spratlys.7 However, Vietnam has been surprisingly effective at managing tension with the PRC even as it defends its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The U.S. military would, therefore, benefit from a closer examination of Vietnam’s approach.

China’s Dashed-Line Map from Notes Verbales of 2009

(Map from Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Notes Verbales CML/17/2009 [7 May 2009])

Enlarge the map

Prior studies, journal articles, news reports, and social media posts related to irregular warfare in the South China Sea support this argument. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, for example, publishes maps of disputed reefs, islets and, importantly, outposts.8 These sources highlight the PRC’s expanding presence. That said, the most significant findings in this article draw from the author’s field research in Vietnam and Singapore conducted in April 2023.

Defining Irregular Warfare

What is irregular warfare? Several official documents address the topic of irregular warfare. The current U.S. National Defense Strategy, released in 2022, discusses irregular warfare in the context of integrated deterrence. It presents irregular warfare as a means of imposing direct costs on U.S. adversaries so that they reconsider aggression toward the United States.9

Interestingly, this characterization differs from the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy. The Irregular Warfare Annex identifies the tools of irregular warfare—“unconventional warfare, stabilization, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency”—and defines irregular warfare as follows:

Irregular warfare [IW] is a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.10

This definition seems to treat “irregular warfare” as synonymous with “population-centric warfare.” It limits irregular warfare to a struggle for legitimacy as perceived by local populations. It assumes that diminishing an adversary’s legitimacy will, in turn, erode the state or nonstate actor’s power. As such, it is remarkably different from the 2022 National Defense Strategy.

Of course, national defense strategies are by definition political documents. They are rewritten with each new administration. Thus, it is important to interpret the Irregular Warfare Annex in its political context. It was written in the wake of U.S. security forces’ withdrawal from Syria and in the midst of negotiations with the Taliban. The Irregular Warfare Annex stood as a reminder that population-centric warfare should not be rejected. But, in doing so, it arguably placed too many constraints on irregular warfare and its role in U.S. defense strategy and policy.

By comparison, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, represents foundational doctrine for the use of military force. It describes how the joint force should be prepared to prevent armed conflict and, if that is not possible, to win. Joint publications tend to be somewhat less political than national defense strategies. Released in August 2023, JP 1 deemphasizes efforts to influence populations and affect nation-states’ legitimacy. It instead focuses on indirect efforts to achieve competitive advantage over adversaries as well as manage strategic risk. It states,

IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. The term “irregular” highlights the character of this form of warfare, which seeks to create dilemmas and increase risk and costs to adversaries to achieve a position of advantage.11

JP 1 provides a much broader definition of irregular warfare. It also notes that irregular warfare might be pursued as an alternative to conventional war or in concert with it. Most importantly, it emphasizes that irregular warfare seeks to “create dilemmas and increase risk and costs” for adversaries as means of achieving advantage. This definition has application beyond population-centric warfare. It also addresses the complexity of the current strategic and operational environments better than the others; therefore, it is the definition used in this article.

Chinese Maritime Militia

The PRC’s use of its maritime militia fits the above definition of irregular warfare. The militia creates strategic and operational dilemmas for the United States, its allies, and partners. It imposes costs. It increases risk. The militia itself can be traced back to the late 1940s. A newly victorious Chinese Communist Party initially trained and funded the maritime militia, comprised primarily of fishermen, to assist with coastal defense.12 But over time the maritime militia has expanded and, increasingly, augmented the PLAN and Coast Guard.

In January 1974, the PLAN fought the South Vietnamese navy for control of the Paracel Islands.13 The PLAN used a combination of conventional and irregular forces to defeat the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces. The United States, moreover, did not intervene or push back against the PLAN’s combined forces’ control over the Paracel Islands. According to some experts, this reinforced the value of indirect, nonattributable, and asymmetric maritime tactics in the minds of Chinese strategists.14

The Chinese maritime militia has become larger and more advanced since the 1970s. Estimates vary on the exact number of vessels in the militia, as well as people employed. Some analysts assert that the militia has as many as 439,000 vessels, while others put the number closer to 23,000.15 Recent studies also have observed divergent patterns in the militia’s behavior. The so-called “Spratly backbone fishing fleet” reportedly does not engage in active hostilities. The individuals on these vessels receive a salary and some limited training.16 But the fishing fleet seems to be used to overwhelm other nations’ vessels by sheer numbers and presence. The fishing fleet sometimes inadvertently provokes an attack, but multiple experts confirm that it has been directed by the PLAN to avoid initiating a confrontation.17

In contrast, the “maritime militia fishing vessels” receive more training, are better equipped, and seem to have closer ties to the PLAN.18 This maritime militia partners with China’s Coast Guard vessels to enforce the so-called fishing moratorium declared each year between May and August by the PRC.19 It rams other countries’ fishing and coast guard vessels, deploys water cannons, boards other vessels and arrests their occupants. It also cuts the cables of oil exploration and surveillance ships.20 It has disrupted efforts by the Philippines to resupply its South China Sea outposts. In sum, the maritime militia fishing vessels pursue PRC interests more aggressively than the fishing fleet, but still hover just below the level of armed conflict.

In May 2013, PLA Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong put a name to this basic approach. He used the analogy of a “cabbage.”21 As Zhang described it, the PLAN layers fishing vessels, surveillance vessels, maritime enforcement ships, and warships just like the layers of a cabbage. The intent is to expand PRC control over the islets and reefs incrementally but not provoke a military response. In essence, the PLAN utilizes the “cabbage” approach to balance two somewhat competing priorities in the South China Sea: maintain regional stability versus exert sovereignty.

Vietnam’s Response

Vietnam has a similar “three-layer” maritime presence in the South China Sea: navy, coast guard, and fishing vessels. It also has approximately fifty outposts on islets and submerged reefs.22 But, practically speaking, there is not much of a comparison. Vietnam has a smaller navy and coast guard. Its commercial fishing vessels for the most part are not armed, although some reports suggest that Vietnam has plans to provide them with reinforced steel hulls, infrared technology, and more advanced communication equipment.23 Vietnam’s economy also is deeply intertwined with that of the PRC. Thus, officials must balance multiple competing interests in their response to Chinese militia activities in the South China Sea.24

That said, Vietnam has been the most assertive of its neighbors in responding to the PLAN and its militias’ presence within and around the Paracel Islands. Three key incidents exemplify Vietnam’s approach. The following paragraphs describe each incident according to the behavior of the Chinese maritime militia, dilemmas posed by this behavior, and Vietnam’s response.

First, in May 2011, the Chinese maritime militia approached the Vietnamese research vessel Binh Minh 02 and cut its seismic survey cables. The Binh Minh 02 belonged to the oil and gas company PetroVietnam and was operating approximately eighty miles off the coast of Vietnam in its exclusive economic zone.25 The Chinese militia had grown more aggressive in its harassment of Vietnamese fishing vessels between 2005 and 2010. But the May 2011 incident marked a shift toward larger-scale and physical disruption of oil exploration. A month later, Chinese militia again cut the cables of a different vessel named Viking II. Like the Binh Minh 02, the Viking II was chartered by PetroVietnam for oil exploration in the South China Sea. PRC diplomats simultaneously demanded that Vietnam (and the Philippines) end all oil exploration in the area.26

This incident presented the Vietnamese government with a dilemma. For the most part, Vietnam had been able to manage tension with the PRC in the South China Sea informally, especially the fishing moratorium. But threats against Vietnam’s claim to oil resources were more serious. The political and economic costs were higher. According to one interviewee, Vietnam’s leaders had worked to create (and demonstrate) a stable environment for Western oil companies. The cut cables undermined these efforts. This necessitated a more assertive response.27

Vietnam’s response included both formal and informal approaches, as described by experts in the region. Formally, it announced and conducted live-fire drills in the disputed territory off its coast.28 Vietnam also sent its vice foreign minister, Ho Xuan Son, to Beijing to meet with PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo. These discussions eventually led to a diplomatic agreement between the two countries titled “Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues,” announced four months later on 12 October 2011.29 Informally, Vietnamese officials reached out to build international diplomatic support through multilateral channels such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It also permitted popular protests against China; the summer of 2011 witnessed the most expansive anti-China protests in Vietnam since the early 1990s. Collectively, these efforts appear to have influenced (at least temporary) the withdraw of Chinese maritime militia from Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.30

Second, in May 2014, the state-run CNOOC deployed an oil rig near the Paracel Islands and within the territory claimed by Vietnam. The oil rig was accompanied by the Chinese maritime militia. This deployment came in the midst of the annual PRC-declared fishing moratorium. It also occurred in a wider geopolitical context. Namely, Southeast Asian countries had become increasingly alarmed at PRC efforts to establish new outposts in the South China Sea. In January 2013, for example, the PRC issued a new map with claims to 130 islets and reefs.31 The Philippines issued a formal protest to the United Nations about the PRC’s construction activities soon thereafter. The presence of the CNOOC oil rig, therefore, was only one of many smaller incidents that had been escalating over a period of eighteen months. These, collectively, prompted a more assertive response from Vietnam.

Vietnam’s response followed a somewhat similar pattern to the summer of 2011. It pursued deescalation through formal diplomatic channels. Vietnam also allowed anti-China protests in the streets of Hanoi and elsewhere. Rather than live-fire drills, Vietnam sent approximately thirty of its own fishing and coast guard vessels to confront the CNOOC oil rig and accompanying militia.32 According to interviewees, Vietnam wanted to respond more assertively than in May 2011 but still keep its response below the level of armed conflict. Vietnam’s fishing and coast guard vessels were relatively small in comparison to the Chinese militia. They reportedly had been given to Vietnam by South Korea.33 The fishing militia and coast guard, in this sense, were sent simply to prevent the oil rig from establishing a permanent presence. But they were overpowered. The Chinese militia rammed the Vietnamese vessels, causing extensive damage and injuring several sailors.34

Unlike in the summer of 2011, Vietnam’s collective efforts in the summer of 2014 did not yield a publicly announced resolution. CNOOC did, however, withdraw its oil rig one month earlier than scheduled (July versus August 2014). Some analysts have attributed this early withdrawal to Vietnam’s response.35 Yet it was not fully successful, as tension simmered below the level of armed conflict throughout the summer and fall. Soon thereafter, the Vietnamese government echoed the Philippines complaint to the United Nations about PRC construction in the South China Sea. The U.S. military also began regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) near the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

This video was the first evidence of PLA bombers landing in the South China Sea; it demonstrated that the bombers could span the entire area, including Guam and northern Australia.

Third, in March 2018, PetroVietnam informed the Spanish oil company, Repsol, that it could no longer develop the Ca Rong Do oil field. Ca Rong Do, also referred to as the “Red Emperor,” is located 273 miles off the coast of Vietnam’s southern coast and close to the Nine-Dash Line.36 According to unnamed Repsol executives, PetroVietnam’s action resulted from PRC threats to Vietnamese outposts in the Spratly Islands.37

Importantly, Vietnam had attempted to increase its capabilities after the May 2014 incident. It had invested in submarines, reinforced its outposts, and expanded its own fishing militia to as many as eight thousand vessels.38 Vietnam also invited a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to Vietnam in March 2018; it was the first visit since the war between the two countries.39 But these efforts were not enough to deter Chinese threats against oil exploration by Vietnam. Instead, they arguably added to tensions. In an obvious response to the Carl Vinson, for example, the PLA-Air Force posted a video on its social media account of a long-range bomber taking off from a base in the Paracel Islands. This video was the first evidence of PLA bombers landing in the South China Sea; it demonstrated that the bombers could span the entire area, including Guam and northern Australia.40

In sum, the PRC has utilized its maritime militias in classic irregular warfare fashion against regional competitors in the South China Sea. The militia have created security dilemmas, presented risks, and increased costs for Vietnam and its neighbors. The Chinese maritime militias also have managed to forestall a direct U.S. military response. Experts in the region perceive Vietnam as losing ground against the PLA and its militia forces. That said, Vietnam has inarguably faced a much stronger force in the PLA and its maritime militias. It should be given credit for preventing even greater territorial and economic losses over the past decade. As such, Vietnam’s experiences can provide the United States with some important lessons.

Implications for the U.S. Military

First, Vietnam uses a combination of official and backchannel responses to PRC aggression in the South China Sea as enacted by its maritime militia. Official bilateral engagements tend to be somewhat conciliatory, as evidenced by the October 2011 “Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues.” By comparison, Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy reflects an effort to increase risk and costs for the PRC and its use of the maritime militia. Vietnamese diplomats are better positioned to manage these official and backchannel responses, given longstanding ties between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam. Nevertheless, they provide an example for how the United States could support countries in the region as they attempt to manage threats posed by the Chinese maritime militia.

Second, Vietnam partners its diplomatic engagements with irregular warfare activities. These activities include expanding Vietnamese outposts in the South China Sea, strengthening those outposts, and arming Vietnamese fishing and law enforcement vessels so that they can better monitor and confront the Chinese maritime militia. But Vietnam does not have the resources to support its fishing or law enforcement vessels on-scale with the PRC. This provides an opportunity for the United States, its allies, and its partners to support Vietnam or other ASEAN countries. To be sure, the United States, Japan, India, and others have expanded their support to ASEAN countries in recent years, particularly efforts to increase maritime domain awareness. But more could be done.

Third, like with its diplomatic engagements, Vietnam reaches for multilateral support if its official or unofficial bilateral efforts are not sufficient. This support tends to be in the form of FONOPs. But FONOPs alone are not sufficient to counter an irregular warfare threat. While the U.S. military brings a larger and more capable force than Vietnam alone, the PLAN’s use of a maritime militia complicates a U.S military response. The perceived asymmetry between the fishing militia and U.S. Navy is difficult to overcome. Any such response appears overly aggressive. Additionally, FONOPs are temporary in nature. Although often welcomed, the ships soon depart, and tensions rise all over again. U.S. Coast Guard vessels could provide an important complement, if not alternative, to U.S. Navy ships. Some of this has already begun. The U.S. Coast Guard has rotated ships through the Western Pacific since 2018. Nevertheless, this presence, as well as relationships with regional coast guards, could be expanded.

Finally, this study demonstrates that even “great powers” can benefit significantly from irregular warfare tactics. The PRC has used a combination of its military, law enforcement, and militia to expand its presence and control over the South China Sea. While this article only focuses on the maritime militia, it is easy to see how the militia has contributed to the PRC’s overall success. Given its successes, the U.S. military should anticipate this trend to continue and work to refine its responses.

Notes

1. Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Kevin Broad, “What It’s Like on Board an Outnumbered Philippine Ship Facing Down China’s Push to Dominate the South China Sea,” CNN, 6 March 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/06/asia/philippines-china-south-china-sea-confrontation-intl-hnk-dst/index.html. Approximately one hundred islets and reefs make up the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have military bases on half of them.
2. Leishangthem Bimolchand Singh, “China’s Strategy on the South China Sea Disputes,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 21, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 80–99.
3. Angela Poh Ming Yan, “The Myth of Chinese Sanctions over South China Sea Disputes,” Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 143–65; Kevin Baumert and Brian Melchior, Limits in the Seas, No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 5 December 2014), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/LIS-143.pdf.
4. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023. Sources disagree on the exact date that the escalation began. Most interviewees claimed that the situation “went downhill” in 2010 or 2011 but agreed that the PRC’s strategy predates this, beginning as far back as 2005.
5. “Chinese Gas Giant Finds New Oilfield in South China Sea,” Newsweek (website), 12 March 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/china-gas-giant-finds-new-oifield-south-china-sea-1877155.
6. Mark Raymond and David Welch, “What’s Really Going on in the South China Sea?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 41, no. 2 (March 2022): 214–39.
7. “China Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), accessed 4 September 2024, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/. The maps of territorial control in the South China Sea demonstrate obvious PRC dominance in the South China Sea.
8. See, for example, Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Before and After: The South China Sea Transformed,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, 18 February 2015, https://amti.csis.org/before-and-after-the-south-china-sea-transformed/.
9. The White House, 2022 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), 22, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
10. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2 October 2020), 2, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.
11. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfighting, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 27 August 2023 [CAC required]), II-7, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp1vol1.pdf.
12. Brad Lendon, “Beijing Has a Navy It Doesn’t Even Admit Exists, Experts Say. And It’s Swarming Parts of the South China Sea,” CNN, 13 April 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/12/china/china-maritime-militia-explainer-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html.
13. Toshi Yoshihari, “The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016): Article 6, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=nwc-review.
14. Ibid.; “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia” (online event transcript, CSIS, 18 November 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/pulling-back-curtain-chinas-maritime-militia-0.
15. Kristin Huang, “China, Vietnam ‘Likely to Clash Again’ as They Build Maritime Militias,” South China Morning Post (website), 12 April 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3079436/china-and-vietnam-likely-clash-again-they-build-maritime; Huseyin Korkmaz, “Hybrid Warfare and Maritime Militia in China,” Anadolu Agency, 2 July 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-hybrid-warfare-and-maritime-militia-in-china/1897259.
16. “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia.”
17. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023.
18. “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia.”
19. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023.
20. Phuong Hoang, “Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy: An Examination of Anti-China Protests in Vietnam and Vietnamese Policy Towards China Regarding the South China Sea,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 6, no. 1 (March 2019): 1–29; Carlyle Thayer, “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (December 2011): 348–69.
21. Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Sharks and Minnows,” New York Times (website), 27 October 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/index.html; Robert Haddick, “America Has No Answer to China’s Salami-Slicing,” War on the Rocks, 16 February 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-chinas-salami-slicing/.
22. “Vietnam Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, accessed 5 September 2024, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/vietnam/.
23. Derek Grossman and Nguyen Nhat Anh, “Deciphering Vietnam’s Evolving Military Doctrine in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Update, CSIS, 11 May 2018, https://amti.csis.org/deciphering-vietnams-doctrine-south-china-sea/; Shashank Bengali and Vo Kieu Bao Uyen, “In China’s Shadow: Fishermen Become Prey Out on a Strategic Sea,” LA Times (enewspaper), 15 November 2021, https://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=717f63e0-491b-4451-9b8a-58db047b45d9; author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023. Note that interviewees stated the steel hulls and other equipment had yet to materialize as of spring 2023.
24. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023. Note the term “managing tension” was used by academics and officials as an alternative to “managing escalation.”
25. Ibid.
26. Hoang, “Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy.”
27. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023.
28. Louisa Lim, “A Dispute at Sea Escalates China, Vietnam Tensions,” NPR, 14 June 2011, https://www.npr.org/2011/06/14/137182730/tensions-escalate-between-china-vietnam.
29. Hoang, “Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy.”
30. Ibid.
31. Singh, “China’s Strategy on the South China Sea Disputes,” 80–99.
32. Phuong, “Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy.”
33. Author interviews, Vietnam and Singapore, April 2023.
34. Zhu Feng, “Oil Rig 981 Friction in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, 23 December 2014, https://amti.csis.org/oil-rig-981-friction-in-the-south-china-sea/.
35. Hoang, “Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy.”
36. Bill Hayton, “South China Sea: Vietnam ‘Scraps New Oil Project,’” BBC, 23 March 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43507448.
37. Ankit Panda, “China’s Successful Coercion of Vietnam in the South China Sea Deserves US Attention,” The Diplomat (website), 17 April 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-successful-coercion-of-vietnam-in-the-south-china-sea-deserves-us-attention/.
38. Anh Duc Ton, “Vietnam’s Maritime Security Challenges and Regional Defence and Security Cooperation,” Soundings 14 (Canberra, AU: Sea Power Center, March 2018): 8–9, https://seapower.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-papers-vietnams-maritime-security-challenges-and-regional-defence; Shang-su Wu, “The Development of Vietnam’s Sea-Denial Strategy,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 1 (2017): Article 7, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/7; Grossman and Anh, “Deciphering Vietnam’s Evolving Military Doctrine.”
39. Derek Grossman, “Vietnam’s Remarkable Month of Balancing against China in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, 26 March 2018, reprinted by RAND at https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/03/vietnams-remarkable-month-of-balancing-against-china.html.
40. “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, 18 May 2018, https://amti.csis.org/china-lands-first-bomber-south-china-sea-island/.

Dr. R. Kim Cragin is the director of the National Defense University’s Center for Strategic Research and a Distinguished Fellow for Counterterrorism. She has extensive experience conducting field studies abroad, including in Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka. Cragin received her undergraduate degree from Oklahoma Baptist University, a master’s in public policy from Duke University, and a PhD in cultural history from the University of Cambridge (Clare College).

4. Chinese military disguised as fishing boats? Philippine defence chief raises concerns

The Philippines

This Week in AsiaPolitics

Chinese military disguised as fishing boats? Philippine defence chief raises concerns

Latest comments also spark espionage fears as lawmaker claims Chinese intelligence officers may be working in to-be-banned offshore gaming hubs

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3287962/chinese-military-disguised-fishing-boats-philippine-defence-chief-raises-concerns

Sam Beltran

Published: 11:28am, 25 Nov 2024Updated: 3:51pm, 25 Nov 2024

The Philippines’ defence chief has accused Beijing of sending military vessels disguised as fishing boats to block access to areas in the South China Sea, with observers noting that the alleged tactic would add a “new dimension” to Chinese grey-zone activities amid a long-running maritime row with Manila.

Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro made the comments during a visit on November 19 to Palawan with US counterpart Lloyd Austin, where both men condemned what they said was “dangerous and escalatory” behaviour by China in the disputed waters.

Beijing’s foreign ministry has yet to respond to the allegations.

“[Beijing has] been more aggressive in denying us access to our exclusive economic zone in the western Philippines. They have really placed a lot of these pseudo-military vessels disguised as coastguard vessels and maritime militia vessels in the areas west of the Philippine Sea,” Teodoro told a press briefing.

Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro last week visited the strategic Palawan province. Photo: EPA-EFE

In September, the Armed Forces of the Philippines tallied a record-high 251 Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea – Manila’s term for waters in the South China Sea that it considers part of its exclusive economic zone – including People’s Liberation Army Navy warships, coastguard vessels, and maritime militia boats.

5. Taiwan says Chinese balloon detected near island

Taiwan says Chinese balloon detected near island

November 25, 2024 2:29 AM

• By Agence France-Presse

voanews.com · November 25, 2024

Taipei, Taiwan —

Taiwan said Monday it had detected a Chinese balloon over waters northwest of the island, the first reported since April, as Beijing maintains pressure on Taipei to accept its claims of sovereignty.

Communist China claims democratic Taiwan as part of its territory and has refused to renounce the use of force to bring it under its control.

Beijing regularly deploys fighter jets, drones and warships around Taiwan, and occasionally balloons, as it keeps up military pressure.

The latest balloon was spotted at 6:21 p.m. on Sunday about 111 kilometers northwest of Keelung City at an altitude of 10,058 meters, said the defense ministry, which releases daily data on China's military presence around Taiwan.

It entered the island's air defense identification zone and disappeared at 8:15 pm, the ministry said.

As well as the balloon, 12 Chinese military aircraft and seven warships were detected around Taiwan in the 24 hours to 6 a.m. Monday, the ministry said.

In the run-up to Taiwan's January presidential election, balloons crossed the sensitive waters separating Taiwan and China day and night, with some floating above the island.

Taiwan has described the balloons as a form of "gray zone" harassment -- a tactic that falls short of an act of war.

China has previously brushed off allegations it sends balloons over Taiwan, accusing Taipei of trying to raise tensions with the mainland.

Balloons from China became a politically fraught topic in early 2023 when the United States shot down what it called a spy balloon.

The huge balloon, which carried a large payload of electronics, flew over sensitive US military installations and prompted concerns Beijing was scooping up vital intelligence.

Beijing has said it was a civilian airship blown off-course.

voanews.com · November 25, 2024

6. How to Counter Russia’s Hybrid Threats? First, Make Them a Priority

How to Counter Russia’s Hybrid Threats? First, Make Them a Priority

Moscow’s hybrid war on the West needs a robust and smart response, which means coordinated action from the European Union.

By Eitvydas Bajarūnas

November 25, 2024

cepa.org · by Eitvydas Bajarūnas · November 25, 2024

The hybrid threats from Vladimir Putin’s regime blend covert tactics, such as disinformation, cyber-attacks, and economic manipulation, to exploit legal and political vulnerabilities. It is extremely hard to attribute blame, and respond effectively, without escalating conflicts — and the Kremlin knows this.

Over the last decade, European Union (EU) member states have developed a clear understanding that the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare is a significant security challenge that requires coordinated countermeasures and constant vigilance. If there were any doubts at all, see the latest November 17-18 allegations of an attack on NATO critical infrastructure by a Chinese merchant ship in the Baltic Sea.

This was one of eight policy priorities set out for the new European Commission in a CEPA report published in October, amid evidence that Russia is increasingly employing such techniques to influence Western decision-making and public opinion, including on Ukraine.

Kremlin tactics have combined “classic” hybrid (or grayzone) threats with kinetic action or acts of sabotage. Influence operations are also on the rise in the EU neighborhood.

Since 2016, the EU has developed ambitious proposals through the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, and by agreeing a single position on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities, both of which are foundational documents for the bloc’s response.

They were later bolstered by the establishment of an EU hybrid toolbox, a comprehensive collection of methods for countering cross-domain threats. Reacting to increasing disinformation, the bloc proposed a broad Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) concept, while hybrid threats were also broadly addressed in the EU Security Union Strategy.

In light of such preparation, why has the West been so ineffective at preventing Russian grayzone tactics, and how can the EU improve its response?

have been tasked with addressing hybrid threats, disinformation, and resilience.

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Vice-President Henna Virkkunen will focus on digital security and disinformation, while High Representative Kaja Kallas will oversee responses to hybrid threats in foreign policy, including EU-NATO collaboration. Michael McGrath will concentrate on internal resilience and democratic processes alongside Hadja Lahbib, who will take responsibility for resilience and crisis management.

An October report by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, requested by the new Commission, recommends enhancing EU joint capabilities, improving cross-border coordination, and aligning military and civilian readiness to ensure a robust and integrated European response.

But relying on Commissioners and producing reports — however smart they are — won’t deter Putin. It is political will at the highest level and decisive action that will truly make a difference.

Strategies have been agreed, and thorough mechanisms established, but still, the EU’s drive to counter hybrid threats isn’t biting. Russia has been let off the hook.

An effective EU hybrid threats policy needs the following 10 key objectives and initiatives:

• Make countering hybrid threats a top priority on the EU agenda. The West is at hybrid war with Russia — statements are not enough.
• Introduce deterrence-by-punishment as a key element of the strategy. This must include punitive measures such as sanctions on individuals and entities, asset seizures, and legal actions.
• Establish a list of Russia’s vulnerabilities and those involved in malign activities, while also identifying key vulnerabilities and the most likely targets of Russia’s hybrid attacks.
• Support independent Russian-language media to counter disinformation. Using trusted platforms, the EU can deliver credible information to counter Kremlin propaganda.
• Accelerate the implementation of the Niinistö Report proposals.

Continue strengthening technical and intellectual systems to monitor hybrid threats, including the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and Stratcom units.

• Establish a comprehensive EU-wide doctrine for gray-zone deterrence, set response protocols for hybrid threats, and strengthen EU regulations to protect strategic sectors from foreign interference and covert ownership to exclude hostile states.
• Conduct joint EU exercises and training to enhance readiness, focusing on countries frequently targeted by hostile aggression.
• Establish clear and robust measures to protect elections from hostile propaganda and foreign interference.
• Use EU regulatory mechanisms to encourage online platforms to tackle disinformation under the Code of Practice on Disinformation.
• Enhance societal resilience by involving civic society, the media and the IT sector in national efforts to counter hybrid threats. Use creative national responses, such as Lithuania’s Debunk.eu.

Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and is currently a Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA) Visiting Fellow.

Assessments and views expressed in the article are those of the author and should not be treated as the official position of the MFA of the Republic of Lithuania.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

cepa.org · by Eitvydas Bajarūnas · November 25, 2024

7. The Rolling Middle East Earthquakes by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

While the events of 7 October, while rightly described as an earthquake in Middle East security affairs, this was just the beginning of a series of rolling earthquakes. The 14 months since that day have seen Gaza destroyed, Hezbollah significantly degraded, the Israeli Army now poised on the southern bank of the Litani River (see photo above), and the early phase of a potential larger war between Israel and Iran.

The reflections on strategic issues I have provided in this article hopefully highlight some of the key issues in the ongoing war in the Middle East. As I noted in the introduction to this article however, there are still many elements of my recent visit to Israel that I continue to ponder. There are multiple potential impacts on the future of war that the Middle East war portends.

I hope this article has illuminated some of the key ethical, political, organisational and technological issues which may have an influence on broader international security affairs in the coming decades.

The Rolling Middle East Earthquakes

Reflections on strategy and the future of warfare in the wake of my recent Israel visit.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-rolling-middle-east-earthquakes?utm

Mick Ryan

Nov 26, 2024

∙ Paid

Image: BBC

As Israel and Hezbollah agree to a ceasefire, I wanted to provide some strategic reflections based on my recent visit to the region.

Over the period 3-7 November, I was part of a small group of national security and military experts that visited Israel. Our program there included field visits to IDF headquarters in the north and south of the country, a visit to the IDF ground forces combat training centre, as short mission into Gaza, as well as to an IDF Air Force base in the south of the country.

This is the third in my series of articles about the visit. You can read the first and second parts of my reflections about the visit here and here.

As I have highlighted during the series, there is much that might be learned from Israel’s response to the awful events of 7 October 2023, when Hamas terrorists breached the border wall in southern Israel and massacred Israeli civilians and military personnel. After my first visit to Israel a couple of months after the events of that day, I wrote in an article back in December 2023:

Many of our interlocutors, particularly those from intelligence and military backgrounds, described the events of 7 October, as an earthquake in Israel’s national security affairs…It is widely accepted that the Israel of 8 October is very different to the Israel of 6 October…While some elements of this changed environment might be gaining some clarity, it is much too soon to understand the full array of political, strategic, military and societal impacts that will ‘ripple out’ from 7 October.

With the remove of over 14 months since the Hamas massacre, more of the strategic impacts of this seismic event in Middle East affairs have become apparent. And while the strategic situation continues to evolve, including today’s announcement by Israel of a ceasefire with Hezbollah, my recent visit to Israel provided me with some strategic insights that I will reflect upon in this article.

Strategic Insights and Reflections

The following insights comprise a list of reflections rather than a normal essay. In some respects, I am still pondering many of the things we saw and discussed during the visit. I am sure my thoughts on the topics discussed in the following paragraphs will continue to evolve, as will the strategic situation itself in the Middle East.

Focus on Iran. The key strategic issue, and a difference from our December 2023 visit, was the Israeli focus on Iran. This was probably the number one talking point from every Israeli interlocutor. While Hamas and Hezbollah (and the Houthis) are targets, Israel sees Iran as its primary enemy, and the one it is principally at war with. As at least one interlocutor noted, at some point once Hamas and Hezbollah have been dealt with, a war with Iran is inevitable.

Indeed, in a report in today’s Washington Post describes the new ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah, the Israeli Prime Minister cites the “Iranian threat” as one of the key drivers of the new ceasefire.

Deeper Reflections on the Failures That Led to 7 October. We had several discussions about the further analysis that has been conducted about the strategic and institutional failures that led to the Hamas Massacre of 7 October. Two key factors emerged as themes in these conversions.

The first theme was a strategic and systemic misunderstanding of Israel’s enemies. One of our interlocutors proposed that Israel missed the change in view that occurred in its enemies where they came to believe that they could defeat Israel. This was a significant and political change. Their language changed from “preventing the Israeli army from achieving its goals” to “destroy the Israeli army”.

Over time, Hezbollah’s theory of victory evolved. Founded in weakness over the period 1991-2006, it then shifted to a theory of victory based on balanced capabilities and a ‘victory by points’ approach in the period 2006-2021. Most recently, the theory of victory evolved again to one that embraced ‘decisive victory’ against Israel. This was founded on several concepts:

• The power of working together with Hamas, Iran and others.
• A decade of analysis of the trends from wars in Syria and elsewhere.
• The perceived weakness of the USA and ‘west is declining’ narrative.
• An assumed weakness of Israel, particularly given its political challenges.
• Hezbollah’s conclusion that war had changed due to precision, cyber operations and other factors but that Israel remained committed to a model of ‘classical war’.

These factors together resulted in a ‘gap in imagination’ in the Israeli national security establishment. Hamas and Hezbollah were able to imagine the actions of 7 October while Israel could not. There are important lessons here for us how our potential adversaries might see us and how they are evolving their theories of victory.

The second major theme in the analysis of the events leading up to, and on, 7 October was the ‘illusion of certainty’. Israel’s intelligence concept is that it understands that there is uncertainty but if they have enough high-quality information, it can remove uncertainty. With the information revolution and the ability to amass large quantities of high-quality information, the concept of intelligence superiority arose. This resulted in the following:

• The believe in the enemy being ‘transparent’.
• A bias towards delaying decision making until certainty war gained.
• The ability of the enemy to effectively deceive the Israelis.

Strategy. An important strategic issue was the continuing lack of a coherent strategy that ties together the various operations in the north, south and areas ‘to the east’ (Syria, Iraq and Iran) that would support an achievable, enduring political outcome. To be fair, many of our more senior interlocutors understand this, and it was a theme that was obvious last December as well. There is no plan for the Palestinian issue (other than discussions about whether a West Bank style solution might be necessary for Gaza). There is no obvious political solution for Israel to be more secure in its region beyond the multiple IDF military operations that are ongoing.

As one of our Israeli interlocutors put it, “we only talk about strategy in English”. Battles and campaigns without coherent strategy, historically and in the modern world, is rarely a recipe for enduring security and prosperity.

Israel’s military and intelligence operations over the past year have fundamentally shifted the correlation of forces in the Middle East. That said whether this has placed Israel in a position to achieve a political outcome that makes it more secure within the region is yet to be seen.

Societal Challenges. The societal divisions in Israel appear to have become more pronounced since my last visit. Because of the exemptions for military service granted to the ultra-orthodox community, other elements of Israeli society are carrying a disproportionate load in this war. It is this part of society is seeing its children killed and wounded on military operations. There is significant anger from parts of the Israeli community towards their ultra orthodox fellow citizens. This issue has also been explored in detail by my friend Eliot Cohen in a recent article for The Atlantic, where he wrote:

The national-religious disproportionately volunteer for frontline combat units. Their antipathy toward the ultra-Orthodox, who are draft-exempt and have been draining government budgets at the expense of subsidies for soldiers whose families and careers have been upended by war, is fierce. “Cowards,” spat out one mild-mannered friend

But given the political hold that ultra orthodox politicians have on the Prime Minister, this situation is unlikely to change soon. Indeed, one of the reasons that the Defence Minister was sacked by the Prime Minister was because he was about to send out another 7000 draft notifications to young people in the ultra orthodox community.

Strategic Empathy. One of the things that struck me throughout the visit was the limited empathy shown by the Israelis towards the Palestinians. Whether it was soldiers on the ground or the pilots that dropped munitions to support ground operations, the key focus was on mission success. While warnings are employed and there is a legal process in ground forces for limiting collateral damage, the IDF has a different mindset to the one developed by Western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have a ‘lesser of two evils’ approach where defence of their homeland against an existential threat trumps other considerations.

Experience v Fatigue. Israel is facing the challenge of balancing experience versus fatigue in the conduct of its military campaigns. Ukraine is too. Modern military institutions require a philosophy that understands that fatigued commanders can stop learning and sometimes don’t want to learn. Learning fatigue and initiative fatigue have been observed by the Israelis and they are actively looking at measures to combat this.

Strategic Warfare. The Israelis are pondering the concept of strategic warfare. Just as we have -observed Ukraine develop a strategic strike complex in the past three years and employ physical strike and information operations against Russia, so too the Israelis are examining what form that strategic warfare will take henceforth. The Israelis define strategic warfare as long-range, focussed on critical targets and it directly attacks political vulnerabilities.

They believe there are four important issues in this topic:

1. Age of bomber is giving way to age of drone and missile. Bombers are vulnerable and expensive.
2. Upends the dynamics of strategic warfare. It becomes more precise and therefore more politically palatable.
3. Allows many more actors to conduct their own form of warfare. Low bar for entry now.
4. Resupply of interceptors for air defence complexes is an issue. Bigger issue in the Pacific.
5. However, the central issue remains unresolved: does strategic warfare win wars?

Importantly, strategic strike complexes can be developed more quickly, adapted more quickly and shared more quickly. The Ukrainians and Houthis have shown this. This means that an adversary can develop and evolve their strategic strike capabilities and ‘get inside’ our learning loops as well as our indicators and warning constructs for strategic intelligence collection.

A Different World and Mindset. Intellectually, the Israelis appear to occupy a different world to the one that Western citizens live in. The Israeli government, its military and security establishment and many of its citizens now see themselves fighting a large-scale, protracted, societal conflict that is potentially the initial stages of a third world war. This theme came through in multiple conversations and it one that the Israelis believe the West is not blind to but is willingly avoiding.

In pursuing their objectives in their current military campaigns, the Israelis have developed what they believe are important themes in the conduct of modern war. Key themes of this ‘way of war’ are that modern war is total, societal, intelligence-led, casualty tolerant, sustained over years and features both mass and precision warfare. As a result of this, the emerging military mindset that I observed in Israel could be characterized as follows:

1. The IDF is now in an endless war.
2. Gaza and Lebanon will be the focus of ongoing ‘raiding’ campaigns rather than occupation.
3. Post war planning and civilian aid, if it happens, does not involve the military.
4. Iran is the number one enduring enemy.

My two visits to Israel in the past 11 months, and my travels elsewhere in Ukraine, Taiwan and beyond cause me to ponder whether we are on the brink on a fundamental shift in war (not just warfare) where we are returning to whole of society warfare, with much larger proportions of our societies in direct contact with each other, and able to influence each other as well as the national policies of their nations.

These wars appear to also trend towards a mix of high and low intensity, high and low technologies, the large-scale mobilization of people, industry and new ideas, and will be fought over years not weeks.

Other key elements of this new environment, as discussed with the Israelis, include:

• There is no revolution in military affairs yet: more continuity than change in war.
• New technology has not replaced anything yet but has augmented old capabilities and old ideas.
• There is no such thing as air supremacy anymore, just local superiority for defined periods.
• There is a new, much lower barrier to entry for conducting long range strike.
• There has been a democratization of military power, with organisations like Hezbollah being better described as ‘terror armies’ and possessing many institutional elements like normal military organisations.
• There has been a loss of monopoly in precision among western military organisations.
• Missile defence is now non-discretionary: without it, national posture and strategy must change.

Civilian Casualties. Unfortunately, it is possible that an element of this new ‘modern’ model of war may be a much-increased tolerance for civilian casualties. Is what we have seen in Gaza and Lebanon an approach that is restricted to the Middle East or is it likely to feature more broadly in 21st century wars? The evidence from places like Ukraine indicates that this might be a more widespread phenomena in the coming decades.

The number of civilian casualties in Gaza has seen a significant political and societal backlash against Israel around the world including the rise of anti-semitism and even program-like activities such as those in Amsterdam in early November 2024. This has resulted in the Israeli Prime Minister and former Defence Minister becoming subjects of arrest warrants issued by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that Israel must halt any military offensive in Rafah that could harm civilians.

Additionally, South Africa appealed to the ICJ for an interim order to compel Israel to immediately halt hostilities in the Gaza Strip. However, within months of this, South Africa welcomed the Russian president, who is under indictment by the ICC for war crimes, to its country with open arms.

Modern wars, at least in the western tradition, have rightly embraced conventions that encouraged limiting civilian casualties and restrictions on their deliberate targeting. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11 have caused western nations to shift the paradigm further to one where civilian casualties are seen as unacceptable. This has also become a societal expectation that shapes military concepts and the execution of operations in western nations (but not in Russia and almost certainly not in China).

The Israelis have apparently concluded that in responding to an existential threat, the ‘civilian casualties are unacceptable’ approach is not viable. The tragedy of war is that those on the ‘side of right’ often don’t get to decide between right and wrong in their decisions in war, but between the lesser of two evils. We must never stop aspiring to the highest standards of conduct, but sometimes strategic realities – or national survival – might get in the way of this. Remember, it was the allies that firebombed Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo and many other cities during the Second World War because they believed in the strategic necessity of doing so (despite the unease of many who planned and conducted such operations). Any war over Taiwan is likely to result in mass civilian casualties caused by both sides.

This is a massive challenge to our current views of ethical leadership and ethical military operations. I am not advocating for wholesale changes in our approach on this topic. But we should at least consider the possibility that, like in the wars of the 20th century, democracies may again have to do terrible things as the lesser of two evils if we want to ensure we are not overwhelmed by the informational and technological aggression of authoritarian powers.

Geopolitical Challenges. Just as the theory of victory for Iran and Hezbollah has evolved over the past three decades, we might also discern this process at work at the geopolitical level. Russia and China have a strategic narrative about the west in decline. They are almost certainly re-evaluating their fundamental analyses about the capacity and will of Western nations. At some point they may decide, if they have not already, that the West can be beaten and evolve their theory of victory to embrace this. I don’t believe that western polities are prepared for this intellectually, physically or morally. That is a big problem.

The Context for Learning Lessons. Finally, it must be emphasized that context matters in learning lessons. This is particularly the case when geography and the culture of different adversaries is considered. But there remains much that might be learned from Israel’s current wars in the north, south, its aerial strike operations, air and missile defence, and operations in the information domain.

I have observed a deep arrogance in some western military organisations about learning lessons from Ukraine. It is apparent that the same applies, in certain respects, to lessons from Israel. This is unfortunate. Israel’s mistakes and successes contain seeds of information that are essential to our own modernization and transformation processes. Our inability to effectively learn from other wars – the good and the bad - is often why we get surprised at the start of every war.

Commander of the IDF Northern Command at the Litani River recently. Source: @NadavPollack at Twitter / X

The Rolling Middle East Earthquake

While the events of 7 October, while rightly described as an earthquake in Middle East security affairs, this was just the beginning of a series of rolling earthquakes. The 14 months since that day have seen Gaza destroyed, Hezbollah significantly degraded, the Israeli Army now poised on the southern bank of the Litani River (see photo above), and the early phase of a potential larger war between Israel and Iran.

The reflections on strategic issues I have provided in this article hopefully highlight some of the key issues in the ongoing war in the Middle East. As I noted in the introduction to this article however, there are still many elements of my recent visit to Israel that I continue to ponder. There are multiple potential impacts on the future of war that the Middle East war portends.

I hope this article has illuminated some of the key ethical, political, organisational and technological issues which may have an influence on broader international security affairs in the coming decades.

8.

Excerpt:

The use of tariffs as a tool beyond protecting an industry is an expansion of a non-military instrument of statecraft. Public policy is one of the most apparent instances of actions and consequences. The newly-elected president is avowing his determination to address a policy danger he views above any others. Voters commonly become disillusioned with a leader who does not carry through on promises so this should be quite interesting for all of us in wrestling under this mechanism.

tariffs

different application ahead

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/tariffs?utm

Cynthia Watson

Nov 26, 2024

The incoming U.S. president announced last night that he is imposing 25% tariffs on products on products from Mexico and Canada; these are, of course, our top two trading partners and border states. He additionally will apply a 10% tariff on the PRC which is our third most important trading partner. These go into effect as soon as he can sign Executive Orders, 20 January 2025 following his inauguration.

Tariffs normally are a tool of statecraft intended to protect domestic industry. By forcing a fee on the commodity imported from the specific country, either the importing company absorbs this specified additional cost or passes it to the consumer buying the product (usually the latter as the company does not want its profits eaten up by paying tariff costs). The intent is to push consumers to buy the products of the home nation rather than pay this de facto tax on the commodity entering the U.S. market. Tariffs usually “protect” a nascent industry such as our Electric Vehicle production against what is thought unfair foreign competition.

What is getting short shift, in the main, about the incoming president’s declaration last night was that it specified penalizing these countries for their unwillingness or inability to prevent fentanyl from entering the United States from their shores rather than protecting our industries. In the case of Mexico and Canada, he also mentioned illegal immigration in the same breath.

That is a considerably different application of tariffs. The former president is converting tariffs into broader instruments to force these countries to alter their control over exporters to prevent actions of which he strongly disapproves. It’s one thing to discourage a country’s decision to develop an industry of its own to compete with a domestic sector of our own; it’s quite different to say that we will impose 25% higher prices on importing goods to force the government of the other country to address an sweeping action we don’t like. Trump wants both shipping of fentanyl and illegal aliens crossing the borders ended as national security threats.

This move ignores the intertwining of U.S. companies’s supply chain with all three nations, raising questions about how precisely the implementation will affect automakers, for example. Many parts for cars originate in Mexico even if final assembly is done elsewhere. Similarly, food stuffs coming easily across the border from any of the three countries would inflict higher costs on the consumer. The effects of such wide-ranging duties would shock the system here and abroad. Effects would not stop with Canada, Mexico, or China. The shock waves will affect consumers and the relevant industries so pivotal between these three states.

This ultimatum, as The New York Times labels it, is a much broader, more open-ended use of tariffs. This might be previewed now to provide flexibility for Ottawa or Mexico City to figure out details on how to stop illegal immigration or the shipment of the deadly precursor chemical. Alternately, the annoucement in late November may mean that the administration gives a rather brief window through which to grade their seriousness of these states’s reactions. We haven’t seen the Executive Order with applicable metrics by which he will grade Ottawa’s, Beijing’s, and Mexico City’s steps.

Will he leave the tariffs in place until 100% of the fentanyl or movement of illegals into the United States deemed foreign in origin ends? As president, he can decide at any point that the change in behavior is adequate but one might expect metrics to illustrate that as well. President-elect Trump tends to react by gut so he is less likely to worry about that part than other leaders but in theory the question will arise.

Will these governments respond to tariffs immediately to thwart those operating in their sovereign territory? This is harder to answer as tariffs are not an on/off switch which instantaneously show success. Tariffs are a tax to deter a U.S. consumer from buying a commodity from overseas rather than a direct financial cost to Canada, China or Mexico. How quickly or slowly will it be before an effect that the exporters in those countries feel? His message indicates the applications would be an across the board on all products which would be a de facto radical shot at trade between us and our top three trading partners so the impact might be relatively quickly. Tariffs would not end the import of the goods, instead making purchases considerably more expensive from China and much more costly from Canada or Mexico than they are right now.

Using these tariffs also implies absolute power on the part of Mexico City, Beijing, and Ottawa to control these behaviors by actors within their borders. While Xi Jinping aspires to control everything in China, it’s not always clear he does that successfully. Ottawa and Mexico City are capitals of free market economies where the state’s power to curb illegal activity, especially if under the radar, may not exist as fully as either government—or Washington—would like to believe. Particularly in the Mexican case where the narcotraficante cartels operate as shadow states within the federal system makes this more delicate, if deadly as well. Trump is consistent in his belief that these governments have the power to end illegal migration which the tariffs instantly if we induce that forcefully to rid the actions once and for all.

Again, the fentanyl issue apparently applies to all three countries, although the exporter most often blamed for this deadly chemical is China. I suspect the president-elect notes links the three countries on the premise that the deadly substance is a bad thing coming into this country so it must be coming across a porous border but I am hypothesizing here.

He certainly built a reputation for charging that Mexico sends whatever it doesn’t want into this country. I suspect he is again extrapolating that the northern border must be as open to this trafficking because it comes across the southern border. I am aware that concerns spiked earlier this year about Chinese migrants coming into the country illegally from Mexico so that probably is why he is bundling these three states with this unique use of tariffs against the three.

Another question bound to arise is whether these states have anything for which they can similarly use tariffs against us? Mexicans have long argued that the vast pool of fire arms from the United States destabilizes their country where stricter legislation on fire arms ownership. I suppose President Claudia Sheinbaum could impose a tariff on the United States to demand we stop guns from flooding south but it seems unlikely for the same reasons that our use of the tool may not work immediately.

The new president may only be offering a salvo two months before taking office to warn these other states of his determination to end these scourges. Once in office, it’s possible he could rescind the tariff threat, although that seems inconsistent with steadfast dedication to preventing illegal entries of people and abusive substances above any other concerns. The use of tariffs is an instrument the president-elect referred to repeatedly in his campaign. He firm commitment to the idea of America First means he is unfazed by the existing legal agreements under the World Trade Organization (which consider tariffs out of bounds in most cases) or the North Americans Free Trade revision signed during his earlier term. His is an obvious commitment to prioritizing the problems in America here and now over the much cited liberal international order we so often accuse China of undermining. I suspect, like the deportations he has announced, this is truly a top priority for him.

Tariffs will do nothing to lower the cost of living that so many voters complained about before the election. Tariffs almost always fuel inflation because they drive up the cost of purchasing a product. If applied as announced, this would be a 10% increase in the cost of anything brought in from China and a whopping price increase by a fourth for Canadian or Mexican goods. Those expenses will hurt consumers but the president-elect believes that the dangers posed by immigrants and fentanyl will be more relevant to the consumers than the extra costs. Alternatively, he may be correct that consumers will stop buying products from those countries altogether en lieu of paying the inflated amounts. I certainly don’t know consumer spending patterns well enough to predict.

The use of tariffs as a tool beyond protecting an industry is an expansion of a non-military instrument of statecraft. Public policy is one of the most apparent instances of actions and consequences. The newly-elected president is avowing his determination to address a policy danger he views above any others. Voters commonly become disillusioned with a leader who does not carry through on promises so this should be quite interesting for all of us in wrestling under this mechanism.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Ana Swanson, Matina Stevis-Gridneff, and Simon Romero, “Trump Plans Tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China that Could Cripple Trade”, NewYorkTimes.com, 25 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/25/business/economy/trump-tariffs-canada-mexico-china.html

9. Will Musk’s ‘Algorithm’ reduce military inefficiency—or increase risk?

I recall seeing the phrase algorithmic warfare in the writings one time. Maybe that is what Musk is going to practice against DOD.

But on a serious note, I hope that the DOGE guys will begin with a deep understanding of the missions the nation requires the Department to execute and what risks the nation is willing to accept if the Department cannot have sufficient resources to accomplish them. I suppose missions equal "requirements" in Musks algorithm. 

It would be a good start to try to eliminate the missions that are not necessary to support nationals security and the defense of the nation.

Excerpt:

Previous DoD efficiency initiatives have tried, and largely failed, to trim spending. This time will be different, one could argue, because Elon Musk is involved. He has done things in industry, such as revolutionizing space launch and electric vehicles, that many thought were impossible. To achieve these unlikely feats, Musk developed a ruthless approach that he calls “The Algorithm.” As recounted in Walter Isaacson’s biography, the Algorithm consists of five sequential steps: 1) question every requirement; 2) delete any part or process you can; 3) simplify and optimize; 4) accelerate cycle time; 5) automate. As Musk tries his hand at public policy, can this approach work?

Will Musk’s ‘Algorithm’ reduce military inefficiency—or increase risk?

It's good to question Pentagon requirements. But many exist for deadly serious reasons that may not be obvious in a hasty review.

By Todd Harrison

Senior fellow, AEI

November 26, 2024 04:34 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Todd Harrison

Following through on a campaign promise, president-elect Donald Trump recently appointed Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to co-lead an effort they are calling the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE. While it is not actually a government department, the entity is likely to prove influential within the Trump administration and the Republican-led Congress—at least initially. Its mandate is to cut federal spending, and Musk and Ramaswamy have made clear that the Pentagon is in their sights. “The Pentagon recently failed its seventh consecutive audit,” the co-leaders wrote in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, “suggesting that the agency’s leadership has little idea how its annual budget of more than $800 billion is spent.”

Previous DoD efficiency initiatives have tried, and largely failed, to trim spending. This time will be different, one could argue, because Elon Musk is involved. He has done things in industry, such as revolutionizing space launch and electric vehicles, that many thought were impossible. To achieve these unlikely feats, Musk developed a ruthless approach that he calls “The Algorithm.” As recounted in Walter Isaacson’s biography, the Algorithm consists of five sequential steps: 1) question every requirement; 2) delete any part or process you can; 3) simplify and optimize; 4) accelerate cycle time; 5) automate. As Musk tries his hand at public policy, can this approach work?

Musk’s Algorithm has largely, and perhaps exclusively, been applied to high-technology and manufacturing-intensive sectors of industry. While the arm of DOD that develops and procures weapons fits this mold, acquisition consumes only about one-third of the defense budget in any given year. The other two-thirds of the budget go toward labor (military and civilian employees) and operations (training, military exercises, routine peacetime operations, housing, and military construction).

The first step of the algorithm—question every requirement—would be helpful across all parts of the military, from the weapons it acquires to the processes it uses to evaluate people for promotions. Too often, military requirements are passed from generation to generation without re-examining the assumptions behind why things are done the way they are. One of Musk’s trademark moves is to assign a name to every requirement—the specific individual behind it, not a group or department (such as “legal”). In the case of DOD, if the requirement was approved through the joint requirements oversight council, the chair of the JROC or a delegated representative should be the one who defends it. If the requirement is from a combatant command or military service, they should provide a representative to defend it. One of the challenges for DOD is that many of its requirements are external—that is, dictated by Congress or some other part of government, such as the Office of Personnel Management. For such requirements, the lawyer or other individual responsible for interpreting how the requirement applies to DOD should be the one to defend it.

The second step is to delete the parts and processes associated with unnecessary requirements. This sets up a somewhat adversarial environment that can be uncomfortable to many but ultimately productive in the end. Former Army Secretary (and later Defense Secretary) Mark Esper used something along these lines that became known within the Army as “Night Court.” This step is a massive undertaking because inefficiencies in the Defense Department are not always large programs or big pots of funding that can be easily identified and eliminated. (Sorry, there is no billion-dollar budget for diversity programs.) The real inefficiencies are spread thin and wide across a vast bureaucracy, and making the tough calls of what to delete and what to keep will require the active involvement of the next Defense Secretary. This is not something that can be delegated to lower levels if you want decisions to stick.

The main risk with step two is that the effects of deleting a requirement can be complex, opaque (especially for old requirements), and non-linear. A requirement that seems outdated or wasteful may have enormous consequences under certain circumstances. The practitioners of the Musk Algorithm should understand that some inefficiencies in the military are by design: they are strategic choices that maintain options in unlikely but highly consequential scenarios. Musk admits that he errs on the side of deleting too many requirements, arguing that “if you do not end up adding back at least 10 percent of them, then you didn’t delete enough.” How do you know what needs to be added back when failure is not an option? In the military, every deletion could put lives at risk.

The third step is to simplify and optimize, which is where the algorithm starts to break down as it applies to the military. To optimize, one needs an objective function: a metric by which the relative value of different alternatives can be compared. In industry, the objective function could be the time it takes to build each item on a production line, the unit cost of an item, total profit, total revenue, or some other quantifiable outcome that the optimization is intended to improve. Importantly, the validity of an optimum solution is subject to testing—you can try it out and see if it works before committing. The military is different because its ultimate purpose—to protect the nation—is based on value judgements about threats, risks, and sufficiency. How secure does the nation want to be and against what types of threats depends on who you ask and what they value. And while the military can test some changes in operations and processes on a small scale, it has little ability to test major initiatives, such as an alternative strategy, without causing irreversible change. For example, one cannot “test” what pulling back from NATO means for national security without undermining our credibility with allies, which may take years or decades to restore. Even decisions like delaying a weapon system or temporarily reducing peacetime presence missions can have irreversible effects because they create a window of opportunity an adversary can exploit.

Practitioners of Musk’s Algorithm should again be mindful that many inefficiencies in DOD—especially the ones that are government waste at its finest—are often there by design because it creates something else people value. Inefficiencies maintain jobs in someone’s congressional district, which is why they persist and are so difficult to eliminate. Even if a solution can be negotiated among stakeholders to reduce the most egregious inefficiencies, the system does not stay optimized for long because the military operates as a dynamic open system subject to innumerate external factors, including the actions of adversaries and allies and the whims of domestic politics.

Steps four and five of the Algorithm—accelerate cycle time and automate—are highly relevant to the military, but they depend on having simplified and optimized in step three. Otherwise, you will be accelerating and automating processes that remain inefficient. While this may still be a marginal efficiency improvement over the status quo, it could further entrench and legitimize unnecessary processes, making them even more difficult to reform in the future.

Where step three can be accomplished using value judgments negotiated across competing political interests, steps four and five can create important military advantages. The military desperately needs to accelerate the pace of innovation in its weapons programs and the time it takes to make policy, administrative, operational, and tactical decisions. Moreover, the ability to automate processes in the back-office functions of the Pentagon (e.g., filing and reviewing expense reports) and at the tactical edge (e.g., sorting through terabytes of sensor data in real time) frees up people to focus on the cognitive and value judgement elements of warfighting and planning—areas where humans are most valuable. Automation is not a replacement for humans or human judgement; it is an enabling tool that allows humans to be more effective and efficient.

Nearly everyone in Washington recognizes that the Pentagon is in dire need of reform, including many of the people that lead or have led the Pentagon. Defense reform is not and should not be a partisan issue, but it cannot help being a political issue because politics is about the allocation of resources within society: who gets what. The budget is a key tool for reforming defense, but reformers should remember that the budget is ultimately an expression of political values. How much security and what kind of security the nation wants is a value judgement made by elected and appointed leaders that represent the people. If the people elect politicians who talk about peace through strength and eliminating waste and inefficiency but then act in ways that are contrary to these ideas, one can only conclude that the people must not really value these things. In a democracy, the people get the government they deserve, as ineffective and wasteful as that may be.

defenseone.com · by Todd Harrison

10. New US drones tested on Ukraine front line hailed as 'game changer'

"Game changer." Isn't that what they all say?

New US drones tested on Ukraine front line hailed as 'game changer'

Newsweek · by Billal Rahman · November 26, 2024

New advanced U.S. drone systems have been hailed as "game changers" after being successfully tested on the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Developed by two leading American tech companies, the revolutionary counter-drone technology has shown impressive potential to take down drone threats in real-life combat situations and boost battlefield intelligence.

Russia and Ukraine have both relied on drones to track enemy movements, guide weapons, and execute strikes since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022.

Ukrainian servicemen of the 22nd Brigade launch a Leleka reconnaissance UAV drone near Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, on April 27, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. New advanced U.S. drone systems have been hailed... Ukrainian servicemen of the 22nd Brigade launch a Leleka reconnaissance UAV drone near Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, on April 27, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. New advanced U.S. drone systems have been hailed as a "game changer" after being successfully tested on the front lines of the war in Ukraine. Photo by Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images

IronNet, the AI-based collective defense cybersecurity company, and Asterion Systems, a leader in counter-unmanned air system (UAS) technology, have collaborated to create a defense system capable of protecting entire countries.

The defensive network is formed by combining IronNet's Iron Dome cybersecurity system, which provides real-time detection of cyber threats, with Asterion's Hitchhiker counter-drone technology. The system is designed to neutralize hostile drones."

This integrated defense solution offers robust protection against digital and physical threats, ensuring enhanced security for critical systems on the battlefield.

The Hitchhiker is a high-speed, electric-powered interceptor drone designed to destroy enemy drones, such as the Iranian Shahid, more cost-effectively than traditional defense systems like the expensive Patriot missile.

Cyberattacks aimed at disabling defense systems often precede large-scale drone assaults, putting critical infrastructure at risk.

However, the partnership between IronNet and Asterion ensures that defenses are protected from cyber threats even before enemy drones are launched. IronNet's advanced cybersecurity capabilities safeguard systems from potential breaches, while Asterion's counter-drone technology can then be deployed to track, target, and destroy incoming enemy drones, providing a layered and proactive defense against both cyber and aerial threats.

It has been described as a "game changer" by Admiral Mike Hewitt, a cybersecurity investor and a director of the US-based IronNet, who said the two companies would transform the way countries are protected from a joint cyber and drone attack.

He told National Security News: "Asterion is a counter-unmanned Air System (UAS) company that can basically provide complete coverage of a country from threats by drones. It can see drones, classify them, track and then it can destroy them with their own drone that they launched from multiple locations."

"So it's really going to be twofold," Hewitt said. "One, IronNet will provide a cyber, resilient cybersecurity collective defense system for the Asterion network, which is critically important because the way to disrupt the counter-UAS network is via a cyberattack of some kind. Additionally, what we are developing is the ability for IronNet to actually deliver cyber payloads against the adversary drones using this network."

He added: "IronNet has their Iron Dome capability, which would then be applied to the Asterion counter-UAS ecosystem to give it cyber protection, which is critically important for them to be able to operate in what we would call a 'denied environment' because I can promise you that one of the attacks that would happen to disrupt the counter-UAS system would be a cyberattack in advance, perhaps, of the drone launch.

"We have shared this capability of both IronNet and Asterion with different leaders in Ukraine that are on the front line. And I will tell you the feedback we got is how fast can you get this capability here? And that came from people that are actually executing in the front lines at a very high level.

"So we took that with a great deal of confidence that this would be a game changer in Ukraine. Our intention is to bring this collaborative partnership to Ukraine."

This new military technology could redefine modern warfare dynamics.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is deploying numerous domestically produced drones equipped with AI-enhanced systems, according to Reuters.

Speaking on the benefits of using AI in military operations, Tyler Saltsman, CEO of EdgeRunner AI, told Newsweek: "Imagine you're a soldier on a critical mission, with a general issuing instructions from a distant command center while you're on the ground.

"An expert AI assistant has access to extensive data from similar missions and can recommend the optimal course of action, significantly enhancing your chances of success. The officer can then integrate real-time observations with the AI's insights to swiftly make informed decisions.

"The AI can help mitigate errors by facilitating immediate corrective actions or suggesting a more adaptable approach, ensuring flexibility."

Newsweek · by Billal Rahman · November 26, 2024

11. The U.S. Is Losing the Ability to Deter War With China

A question: Are we trying to deter the right war? Is the war we are trying to deter the one that China wants to fight? That it is preparing to fight?  Is the war only a math problem?

The U.S. Is Losing the Ability to Deter War With China

A war game simulation shows we will run out of long-range missiles in a week.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-is-losing-the-ability-to-deter-war-with-china-defense-industrial-base-2da8b83a?st=Fkj4oA&utm

By Seth G. Jones

Nov. 26, 2024 2:55 pm ET

Navy personnel signalling with flags during a performance at the People's Liberation Army Navy Submarine Academy in Qingdao, China, April 21. Photo: wang zhao/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

America is rapidly losing the ability to deter China in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere due to a weak defense industrial base. The Trump administration can revitalize this base by increasing procurement funds, making defense systems critical for warfighting and deterrence in Asia a priority, and cutting excessive contracting regulations.

This month, my colleagues and I led members of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party in a simulation of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The goal was to understand how the U.S. defense industrial base would perform in a protracted war with China and to assess the implications for deterrence. The results weren’t reassuring.

The simulation began with a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the U.S. defense industrial base was severely stressed. The U.S. military spent its entire inventory of Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles by the end of the first week and ran out of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range missiles after a month. Taiwan used up its entire inventory of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles after a week. It would be very difficult to sustain a fight without these weapons.

We also found that the U.S. faces significant supply-chain, workforce and contracting challenges. It has too few solid rocket motors, processor assemblies, castings, ball bearings and forgings. These shortages would drastically limit replacement of weapons systems used or destroyed in a conflict. The U.S. also relies on China for advanced battery parts and key raw materials, which could be cut off in a war.

A shortage of engineers, electricians, pipefitters, shipfitters and metalworkers at U.S. factories and shipyards would also cripple the country’s ability to win a protracted war. These challenges are already delaying the construction of frigates, submarines, destroyers and other ships.

Reversing these trends will take time. It takes roughly two years to produce critical munitions like the missile systems necessary to support Taiwan in a conflict with China. It could take several years for U.S defense companies to build new factories, since it takes time to buy property and insurance, obtain permits and build infrastructure.

It also won’t be cheap. The U.S. spends roughly 3% of its gross domestic product on defense. This won’t cut it in today’s landscape where both China and Russia are on a wartime footing and collaborating with Iran, North Korea and other countries.

The Pentagon needs more funding, which should be directed toward nuclear-powered submarines, ships, unmanned vehicles, long-range missiles and other equipment key to deterrence and warfighting in the Indo-Pacific. During the Reagan administration, the U.S. defense budget hovered around 6% of GDP to deal with the Soviet threat. Given how competitive the international landscape is today, the U.S. should aim for a defense budget somewhere between 4% and 6% of GDP.

The U.S. also needs to cut defense-contracting regulations to make it easier for commercial firms, including start-ups, to work with the Pentagon. The U.S. has some of the most innovative companies in unmanned systems, sensors and artificial intelligence. But many of their products never make it from prototype to contract because Defense Department acquisition processes are often prohibitively long and burdensome.

Fortunately, there is a growing bipartisan consensus that the U.S. needs to revitalize its defense industrial base. At our simulation, both Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi agreed that the country needs to make changes quickly or risk a disastrous war.

The clock is ticking. Xi Jinping has indicated that he would like his military to be prepared for a war with the U.S. in 2027, halfway through the Trump administration. Will America be ready?

Mr. Jones is president of the defense and security department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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Free Expression: Donald Trump’s re-election has exposed aesthetic and substantive divisions within the U.S.-Europe alliance. Photo: Image: Francois Lenoir/Reuters

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 27, 2024, print edition as 'The Defense Industrial Base Won’t Deter China'.

12. Making sense of Trump’s national security team

Waltz and Rubio are the foundation of the national security team and should be strong and dominant.

Making sense of Trump’s national security team

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/11/26/making-sense-of-trumps-national-security-team-00183727?utm

By ERIC BAZAIL-EIMIL and PHELIM KINE  11/26/2024 04:01 PM EST

President-elect Donald Trump’s picks for top roles aren’t particularly hostile to Ukraine. | Alex Brandon/AP

With help from Paul McLeary, Joe Gould and Connor O’Brien

Subscribe here | Email Robbie | Email Eric

The formation of President-elect DONALD TRUMP’s senior national security team is nearing completion and analysts and allies are already beginning to speculate over what the specific combination of personalities and ideologies could mean for the direction of U.S. foreign policy going forward.

At the Halifax International Security Forum this past weekend, JIM TOWNSEND from the Center for a New American Security compared the tracking of the ups and downs of those in Trump’s orbit to the “Kremlinology” that dominated analysis of the Soviet Union’s inner politicking during the Cold War.

While it’s too soon for your NatSec Daily hosts to suggest who might stand next to Trump at bill signings and who could be listed as traveling with the president on pool reports, there are some early takeaways we can derive from Trump’s first round of picks.

Potential disagreements over China loom: The selection of ALEX WONG, a seasoned Asia policy hand, as deputy national security adviser, was greeted with largely bipartisan praise.

RUSH DOSHI, former deputy senior director at the National Security Council for China and Taiwan, told NatSec Daily there is a “high degree of variance” in Trump’s China policy. Still, he said that the selection of Wong could ensure Trump’s “transactional” approach to foreign policy could be somewhat more muted.

“A strong NSC, including a [principal deputy national security adviser] who takes the China challenge seriously, wasn’t a given for the Trump administration. So this suggests competitive approaches could win out over transactional ones in the interagency process,” Doshi said.

But a focus on competition doesn’t mean a desire for confrontation, cautioned JAKE WERNER, who leads East Asia policy at the Quincy Institute think tank in Washington. That could cause tensions with incoming national security adviser Rep. MICHAEL WALTZ (R-Fla.) and Trump’s pick for secretary of State, Sen. MARCO RUBIO (R-Fla.), who Werner described as having “more unilateral neo-conservative impulses” towards Beijing.

“We’re likely to see intensifying tension,” Werner said. “This could lead to kind of an incoherent U.S.[-China] policy and because all the tensions might break out into the open and there may be a lot of infighting and inconclusive debates.”

The dearth of Ukraine skeptics (for now): Trump’s picks for top roles aren’t particularly hostile to Ukraine, either.

Rubio and Waltz have previously backed tough sanctions on Russia and voiced support for giving Kyiv more weapons to repel Russia’s invasion. So too has Trump’s pick to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Rep. ELISE STEFANIK (R-N.Y.). And other picks, like Trump’s choice for U.S. ambassador to NATO, MATTHEW WHITAKER, don’t have marked records opposing Ukraine (Whitaker even voiced early support for Kyiv).

That could change. It is still unclear if former Ambassador to Germany RIC GRENELL will occupy a role in Trump’s administration. Two people familiar told Eric that Grenell is being considered for the position of Ukraine peace envoy. Grenell has expressed less sympathy for Ukraine than Rubio and Waltz. In that role, Grenell could have enough influence to overrule the more amenable attitudes others may have in the administration.

And of course, figures like TULSI GABBARD, Trump’s pick to be director of national intelligence, have spoken about the war in Ukraine in ways that mirror the Kremlin’s talking points — in particular, Gabbard’s comments early on blaming NATO for instigating the conflict.

The absence of prize fighters (for now): With the exception of Stefanik, none of Trump’s current picks for high-level diplomatic roles are known for their tendencies to lash their foes in the geopolitical arena.

Though Rubio and Waltz have certainly never minced words about the flaws they perceive in the Biden administration’s foreign policy, neither has a reputation for being especially combative or caustic. And even Stefanik, who gained prominence for her grilling of university presidents over the handling of antisemitism on their campuses, is known to be a skilled and savvy political operator whose rapid rise to House leadership can be attributed as much to her support for Trump as her ability to build relationships within the fractious House Republican Caucus.

But of course, the return of the “dragon of Budapest” SEBASTIAN GORKA as National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism could see the firebrand Trump ally thrust more into the diplomatic area, or moved into a higher-profile role if heads roll down the line. Grenell, known for his pugilistic approach to diplomacy, could also hold allies’ feet to the fire in a senior diplomatic role.

13. Ukraine’s Armed Forces Recall Thousands of Dud Mortars

Supply chain issues.

Ukraine’s Armed Forces Recall Thousands of Dud Mortars

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · November 26, 2024

Ukraine’s news media is irate that one of the Ukrainian army’s key munitions to stop Russian infantry attacks, is often proving more dangerous to the troops that fire it than it is to the enemy.

by Stefan Korshak | November 26, 2024, 5:29 pm

Ukraine-manufactured mortar rounds. Image published on X by @ColbyBadhwar on Nov. 1

Domestically manufactured mortar rounds are substandard and sometimes cannot be relied on to hit what they’re aimed at. On Tuesday the Ukrainian military issued a recall of tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition in the hands of at least seven combat brigades, news reports and official statements said.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) announcement said Ukraine-manufactured 120mm mortar rounds issued to troops had been recalled because of quality issues, without specifying the numbers of munitions or the units affected.

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The official statement cited poor-quality propelling charges and improper storage as problems already identified by state investigators, with examination of the issues continuing. Troops will be issued with “imported” mortar rounds and the State Bureau of Investigation has initiated criminal proceedings, the statement added.

Since early November Ukraine’s news media has reported, with increasing anger, production-quality issues affecting Ukraine-produced 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds. Errors included faulty fuses, low-quality firing pins, weak propellant, low-grade explosives and cheap packing materials that let in the damp.

Ukrainian military journalist Yury Butusov, the reporter that first broke the news, on Nov. 6 posting a video that he said had been recorded by a front-line Ukrainian mortar operator complaining of low-quality ammunition that was endangering the user at times.

Other Topics of Interest

Who Murdered Ukraine’s First Oligarch and Why - His Son Speaks Out

Yevhen Shcherban’s son discusses new details of his father’s murder, the world view of Ukraine’s foremost entrepreneur at the time, Russia’s role, and why his assassination was a game changer

Images showed a mortar tube with a live round stuck halfway out the muzzle because, the mortarman said, the propellent had failed to ignite. He said that in some ammunition batches nine out of ten rounds that he managed to fire don’t detonate because of faulty fuses.

Propelling charges are factory-packed in thin cellophane sleeves permeable to water, making the charges too damp to ignite properly. Partial ignition of firing charges can result in a mortar round dropping to ground only several meters in front of the firing crew and if it detonates then they, rather than the Russians, could be hit by shrapnel, the soldier said.

Ukrainian mainstream media and military analysts also said Ukrainian mortar rounds sent to the field often did not work. Two drone operators contacted by Kyiv Post said that in dry conditions fire correction observers considered if one mortar round out of four actually detonated on target as an excellent performance.

Some front-line gunners were attempting to work around the damp propellent problem by removing it from cellophane packing and laying it out on a warm surface. The hack is difficult in Ukraine’s often water-logged front-line trench conditions, and propellent charges that do dry out become an explosive hazard to troops nearby, news reports said.

A relatively cheap munition fired from an easy to operate light tube mortars are used by both sides to hit dismounted attacking infantry. Since late 2023 the Russian army has relied on attacks on foot to avoid heavy losses of tanks and other armored vehicles to Ukrainian drone swarms, and to take advantage of Ukraine’s mortar shortages.

A news piece filed by TSN television special correspondent Yuliya Kiriyenko on Nov. 23 showed video of a recently fired 120mm mortar, still smoking, with a round stuck halfway out of the barrel in the Kurakhive sector, the focal point of Russia’s ground offensive in Ukraine’s east.

“This is a video from Kurakhiv Oblast. It's hot there. And it's bullsh*t. Because it's nothing but sabotage against the Armed Forces. From our manufacturers and the Ministry of Defense. Many people have seen the video with the burning mortar. And I have a few more of them. From every area of the front. From Pokrovsk sector, from the Kurakhiv sector. These are just batches of low-quality 120 mm mortar rounds,” Kiriyenko reported.

Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kochetkov in Nov. 23 Facebook comments said that the state agency responsible for most war production, the Ministry of Strategic Industry, has to date only delivered 18 percent of 120mm mortar rounds it has already been fully paid for, and that 10 percent of those that were delivered were rejected by the military as too poor quality to attempt to use in combat.

“Some do not explode after firing, or, even worse, can explode in the barrel of the mortar. And the media writes about this. Let me remind you that the vast majority of the enemy's manpower on the front line is destroyed precisely by artillery and mortar fire,” Kochetkov said.

According to Kochetkov, unreliable mortar bombs manufactured in country are undermining troop morale and wasting scarce logistics resources which transport bad mortar round lots to troops and then having to return them to the manufacturing facilities.

“What is this, if not negligence, which is tantamount to sabotage?” he said.

Kochetkov and other news reports pointed the finger of blame at the state-run company Ukroboronprom, the government institution responsible for overseeing manufacturing and ensuring quality of military materials produced domestically for the armed forces. The company had not responded to a Kyiv Post request for comment by the time this article was published.

Screenshot from Yury Butusov’s video showing a 120mm mortar round misfiring, catching fire and about to land a few meters from the mortar tube and the crew that fired it.

Butusov in a Nov. 25 update said that AFU leadership had “finally” acknowledged the quality problems and ordered the recall of 100,000 rounds that were issued to seven combat brigades. It was not clear whether those recalled lots were the total of the faulty rounds of the hundreds of thousands of munitions issued to troops. In total, Ukrainian manufacturers received taxpayer funding equivalent to $600 million for the delivery of around 1.9 million mortar rounds in 2024, he said.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal claimed in early October that national ammunition manufacturing had been a great success and claimed that since Russia’s February 2022 invasion domestic producers had gone from manufacturing a tiny fraction of all mortar rounds and artillery shells fired on the front, to the production of every second munition fired at the enemy. An October 2024 UNIAN report put the total number of domestically produced artillery shells and mortar rounds contracted for by the government for 2024 at around 2.5 million individual munitions.

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Stefan Korshak

Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas and is a Yalie. He has worked in journalism in the former Soviet space for more than twenty years, and from 2015-2019 he led patrols in the Mariupol sector for the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbass. He has filed field reports from five wars and enjoys reporting on nature, wildlife and the outdoors. You can read his blog about the Russo-Ukraine war on Facebook, or on Substack at https://stefankorshak.substack.com, or on Medium at https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · November 26, 2024

14. Washington May Permit US Defense Contractors to Assist Ukraine

Washington May Permit US Defense Contractors to Assist Ukraine

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 26, 2024

Defense Industries White House Weapons

The Biden administration has reportedly lifted existing restrictions on US defense contractors sending employees to help maintain US-built weaponry in Ukraine.

The White House has reportedly greenlit plans for US defense contractors to send their civilian employees to Ukraine to help maintain US-provided weaponry, according to unnamed Pentagon officials.

As the New York Times (NYT) reported on Thursday, the restrictions were lifted sometime this month. The contractors would work far from the front to help maintain and repair weapons such as F-16 fighters and Patriot air defense systems. They will not be engaged in combat.

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The NYT, citing an unnamed Pentagon official, said the Pentagon “is soliciting bids for a small number of contractors.” It added that the Biden administration aims to award the contract before Donald Trump returns to the White House in January.

The publication said it is unclear if the goal can be achieved as awarding contracts normally takes four to nine months.

It added that some US defense firms already have contractors in Ukraine to help fulfill contracts directly for the Ukrainian government.

The decision marked a significant shift in Washington’s policies.

In June, an unnamed official told CNN that talks to deploy US contractors were in place but no proposals were submitted to or agreed on by President Biden.

An official from within the administration told CNN at the time: “We have not made any decisions and any discussion of this is premature.” The executive also said at the time that Biden remained firmly against any suggestion of sending US troops to Ukraine.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine’s Defense Minister Heads to South Korea With Weapons Wish List

The delegation plans to meet South Korean officials “as early as Wednesday” with a request for anti-air missiles and artillery systems.

The US withdrew all its personnel involved in training or other support to Ukraine’s forces before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. Since then, Washington has taken great pains to make it clear that the US military and other official representatives, and US defense industry companies have no direct involvement in combat operations.

The result of US reticence is that if any of the military equipment that it provided sustains damage, it must be transported to Poland, Romania, or another NATO country for repair.

While US troops can help with routine maintenance procedures online that also comes with inherent limitations. The process in both circumstances takes time and resources and keeps vital weapons systems out of service for longer periods than if the work could be done by US defense industry experts onsite in Ukraine.

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 26, 2024

15. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024

Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin claimed on November 26 that Russia is open to negotiations but stated that Russia "categorically rejects" any "freezing" of the current frontline or the creation of a demilitarized zone. Naryshkin alleged that the "elimination" of the reasons that "caused" Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is the only way to ensure peace — demonstrating that Russia continues to uncompromisingly demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Kremlin has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine relinquish areas of the four Ukrainian oblasts that the Kremlin has illegally annexed and that Russian forces do not currently occupy. ISW also recently forecasted that the Russian military command is likely planning how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — notably not one of the four illegally annexed oblasts — in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.

The Russian military's rate of advance since Fall 2024 has notably increased recently compared to its rate of advance in 2023 and the rest of 2024, but recent Western media reports comparing recent Russian gains to those at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion continue to mischaracterize the gradual and tactical nature of Russia's recent advances. ISW assesses that Russian forces have gained 574 square kilometers since November 1, 2024 — an average rate of 22 square kilometers per day. This is remarkably less than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining in March 2022. Reuter's November 26 report that Russian forces "control" over 80 percent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is also misleading. ISW assesses that while Russian forces occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, Russian forces only occupy about 66 percent of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have occupied almost the entirety of Luhansk Oblast since Fall 2022 but have occupied significantly less territory in Donetsk Oblast throughout the war. ISW recently assessed that Russian forces still need to seize over 8,000 square kilometers of territory to achieve the Kremlin's self-defined objective of seizing the territory of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in roughly one year should Russian forces continue their recent relatively quicker rate of advance — which is not a given. Russian forces notably have been bypassing Ukrainian strongpoints, and Ukraine still has several well-defended cities in Donetsk Oblast, such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, that Russian forces likely cannot seize as rapidly as they have with the rural fields near Pokrovsk. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not been able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield to make deep penetrations into Ukrainian positions, as seen in the initial months of the full-scale invasion. Russian forces have instead been exploiting identified vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses to make gradual advances.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed Ukraine's usage of US-provided ATACMS against Russia amid official Russian confirmation of recent Ukrainian ATACMS strikes. Kirby stated on November 25 that the Ukrainian forces are "able to use" ATACMS to "defend themselves" and that Ukrainian forces are already using them in and around Kursk Oblast. Kirby's statement is the first official confirmation that the US authorized Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to strike military objects in Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on November 26 that Ukrainian forces recently struck military objects in Kursk Oblast. The MoD stated that Ukrainian forces launched five ATACMS on November 23, damaging an S-400 air defense radar system in Lotarevka (northwest of Kursk City), and eight ATACMS on November 25, damaging infrastructure facilities and injuring military personnel in the Khalino Airfield. The Russian MoD published photos purportedly showing parts of the ATACMS from both strikes. Geolocated footage published on November 25 shows the moment of the ATACMS strike that damaged the Khalino Airfield. A former Ukrainian officer stated on November 25 that while Russian air activity from the Khalino Airfield has decreased in recent days — likely due to recent Ukrainian strikes, Ukraine's ability to inflict damage during long-range missile strikes is limited by the number of such missiles available to Ukrainian forces. ISW assesses that Ukrainian long-range strikes against military objects within Russia’s rear are crucial for Ukraine's ability to degrade Russian military capabilities throughout the theater.

Russian forces launched a record number of drones against Ukraine on the night of November 25 to 26 as Russia continued to increase their use of decoy drones in long-range strike packages targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 188 Shahed and other unspecified drones — likely referring to decoy drones — from Voronezh, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all four Iskander-M missiles and 76 drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Rivne, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts as of 0900 local time on November 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 95 Russian drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that five drones flew into Belarusian air space. Kyiv Oblast officials stated that Russian forces launched more than 10 drones at Kyiv City from different directions in several waves and that Ukrainian forces shot down all of the drones. Ternopil Oblast officials stated that Russian strike drones destroyed energy infrastructure in Ternopil Oblast, causing power outages. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M missiles at civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast during the day on November 25 and that Ukrainian forces intercepted one of the Iskander-M missiles. Sumy Oblast officials stated that a Russian missile of an unspecified type struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City during the day on November 26. Ukrainian reports that roughly half of the Russian drones became "lost" suggest that Russian forces likely used a large number of decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. ISW recently observed reports that Russia is increasing its use of decoy drones that resemble Shahed drones during combined long-range strikes and assesses that Russia will likely continue to use decoy drones and experiment with varying strike packages to increase the effectiveness of long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks.

• The Russian military's rate of advance since Fall 2024 has notably increased recently compared to its rate of advance in 2023 and the rest of 2024, but recent Western media reports comparing recent Russian gains to those at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion continue to mischaracterize the gradual and tactical nature of Russia's recent advances.

• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed Ukraine's usage of US-provided ATACMS against Russia amid official Russian confirmation of recent Ukrainian ATACMS strikes.

• Russian forces launched a record number of drones against Ukraine on the night of November 25 to 26 as Russia continue to increase their use of decoy drones in long-range strike packages targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.

• Russian state media reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) and Southern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Gennady Anashkin with Eastern Military District (EMD) acting commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik.

• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a surge of recent Russian war crimes.

• The Russian State Duma is preparing the legal mechanisms to remove the Taliban from the Russian government’s official list of banned terrorist organizations.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• A Russian milblogger complained on November 25 that Russian forces often operate artillery without coordinating between different Russian elements, highlighting significant communications issues between armored vehicle and infantry units.

• Russian authorities continue to incentivize service in Ukraine through one-time payment offers, likely in order to avoid conducting another partial involuntary reserve call-up.

16. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 26, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 26, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-26-2024

Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. The ceasefire is set to come into effect on November 27 at 2:00 am GMT. The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas. The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there. The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed. US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.

This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims. Hezbollah initiated its attack campaign targeting Israel in October 2023 to support Hamas, and Hezbollah’s leaders have said repeatedly that it would not end its attacks without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. This ceasefire does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Current Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has also previously expressed opposition to any stipulations giving Israel freedom of action inside Lebanon.

Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel. Israel began its ground campaign in Lebanon to create safe conditions to return Israelis to their homes in northern Israel. IDF operations in Lebanese border towns have eliminated the threat of an October 7-style offensive attack by Hezbollah into northern Israel, and the Israeli air campaign has killed many commanders and destroyed much of Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles. Destroying Hezbollah’s military organization—which is the only military objective that would prevent all attacks into Israel permanently—was never the stated objective of Israeli military operations. A ceasefire deal, however, will prevent attacks into Israel through diplomatic means.

The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement. The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. Neither the LAF nor the UN proved willing or able to prevent Hezbollah from reoccupying southern Lebanon and building new infrastructure. Some LAF sources, for example, have expressed a lack of will to enforce this ceasefire because they believe that any fighting with Hezbollah would risk triggering ”civil war.” Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon, however. LAF units have been in southern Lebanon since 2006, but have failed to prevent Hezbollah from using the area to attack Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire in Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon on November 26. This ceasefire and its terms are tantamount to a Hezbollah defeat. Hezbollah has abandoned several previously-held ceasefire negotiation positions, reflecting the degree to which IDF military operations have forced Hezbollah to abandon its war aims. Israel has accomplished its war aim through two months of military operations in Lebanon and this ceasefire. Hezbollah claimed incorrectly that it defeated Israel.

• Shortcomings of the Ceasefire: The ceasefire contains several elements that will prove difficult to implement. The decision to rely on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UN observers in Lebanon to respectively secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement makes no serious changes to the same system outlined by UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The difficulties in implementing this deal mean that Hezbollah and Iran can recover from this setback if the United States and Israel fail to prevent Hezbollah and Iran from doing so.

• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF struck approximately 180 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 25 marking its most intense day of airstrikes on Beirut since September 2024.

• Iranian Use of Pharmaceutical-based Agents: Iran is actively violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to advance its ability to develop and deploy its chemical weapons capabilities both inside and outside of Iran.

• Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: Israeli light infantry advanced to the Litani River near Deir Mimas and Arnoun, southeastern Lebanon, on November 26. The IDF elements also operated about 10km from Israeli territory in Wadi Saluki, making this advance the deepest penetration into Lebanon since Israeli forces began operations in early October 2024.

17. Focus: Why the US Green Berets are the World’s Most Unique Special Forces Unit.

I have never seen this website before.

They say nice things:

Their ability to blend military expertise with diplomatic finesse is unmatched. This duality makes them indispensable tools in gray-zone conflicts—situations that fall between war and peace, where influence and persuasion are as important as firepower. As the nature of global conflict evolves, with state and non-state actors competing for influence, the Green Berets’ ability to shape environments rather than merely react to them ensures their continued relevance.

In a world where brute force often creates more problems than it solves, the Green Berets’ unique approach to warfare makes them a model for modern conflict resolution. By empowering allies, building trust, and focusing on long-term stability, they accomplish missions that no other special forces unit could achieve. This combination of adaptability, cultural intelligence, and strategic impact cements the Green Berets as one of the world's most unique and effective special forces units.

Focus: Why the US Green Berets are the World’s Most Unique Special Forces Unit.

https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/armies-in-the-world/focus-why-the-us-green-berets-are-the-worlds-most-unique-special-forces-unit?utm

26 Nov, 2024 - 19:30Armies in the world

The United States Army Special Forces, better known as the Green Berets, are one of the world's most formidable and distinctive special operations forces. While they share elite training and combat skills with their international counterparts, such as the British SAS, Russian Spetsnaz, and French Commandos Marine, the Green Berets are set apart by their mastery of unconventional warfare, emphasis on cultural adaptability, and their ability to act as "force multipliers." These qualities make them a crucial tool in modern conflict where direct military engagement is often less effective than strategic influence.

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U.S. Green Berets from the 5th Special Forces Group secure the area during a training exercise on March 27, 2024, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. U.S. Special Operations Forces engage in realistic training to sustain readiness for potential real-world missions. (Picture source: U.S. DoD)

From their inception, the Green Berets were envisioned as elite soldiers and operators capable of altering the tide of conflict through non-traditional methods. While many special forces focus heavily on combat operations, the Green Berets prioritize building alliances, training local forces, and executing long-term missions that destabilize adversaries from within. This ability to win wars without fighting large-scale battles makes them unique among special forces.

The missions undertaken by the Green Berets reflect their adaptability and wide range of capabilities. Their expertise in unconventional warfare means they often operate behind enemy lines, training and equipping local resistance groups to wage insurgencies against hostile regimes. For example, during the Vietnam War, Green Berets worked extensively with the Montagnards, a minority group in South Vietnam, to resist the Viet Cong. More recently, they trained and led Afghan forces in the fight against the Taliban and assisted Kurdish forces in combating ISIS. This emphasis on training and empowering local allies is unparalleled in the global special forces community.

Another defining feature of the Green Berets is their extensive cultural and linguistic training. Operators are expected to gain fluency in at least one foreign language, an ability that allows them to build trust and operate effectively within local communities. This cultural awareness is not just an asset but often a necessity, as Green Berets must embed themselves in diverse regions—from the jungles of Southeast Asia to the deserts of the Middle East and the highlands of Latin America.

Compared to other elite forces, the Green Berets stand out because of their specialized focus. The British SAS, for example, is renowned for its counterterrorism and direct action operations. While the SAS excels in surgical strikes and hostage rescues, its missions are often shorter-term and less focused on embedding with local populations. The Green Berets, by contrast, engage in long-term operations that build enduring relationships and strengthen allied nations. This distinction reflects the Green Berets’ strategic emphasis on achieving stability and influence through partnership rather than force alone.

Similarly, the French Commandos Marine specializes in maritime operations and direct combat. While they are highly skilled in amphibious warfare, their operational focus is narrower than the Green Berets, who must be equally adept in deserts, jungles, mountains, and urban environments. Their versatility allows them to respond to a wider array of missions, often in regions where traditional military operations are untenable.

Russian Spetsnaz forces represent another contrast. Known for their brutal training and emphasis on high-intensity combat and sabotage, Spetsnaz units are often used for rapid, aggressive operations that achieve immediate tactical goals. However, their approach lacks the Green Berets’ strategic depth. Where the Spetsnaz might eliminate a high-value target, the Green Berets would focus on creating conditions to prevent the target's rise in the first place, often by strengthening local governance and security forces.

U.S. Green Berets assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), along with a Swedish special operations forces soldier, use fallen tree trunks to cross a creek during a foot march through dense forest following a military free fall (MFF) jump while participating in a cyber infiltration operation as part of Swift Response 24 near Skillingaryd, Sweden, May 1, 2024. (Picture source: U.S. doD)

Special forces in China, such as the People’s Liberation Army’s Snow Leopard and Falcon units, increasingly focus on counterterrorism and urban warfare as China seeks to expand its global influence. However, their operations are heavily centralized and lack the autonomy afforded to Green Berets. While Chinese units emphasize precision and rapid deployment, they do not operate with the same cultural integration or unconventional warfare expertise that defines the Green Berets.

The Green Berets’ uniqueness also lies in their operational structure. Organized into small teams called Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), each consisting of 12 members, the Green Berets can deploy independently and achieve outsized results. Each team member has a specific role, such as weapons expert, medic, or engineer, but all are cross-trained to ensure maximum flexibility. This structure allows ODAs to operate autonomously in austere and politically sensitive environments, making them highly effective even in regions where traditional military forces cannot function.

Over the years, the Green Berets have participated in some of the most significant and challenging missions in modern military history. In Afghanistan, they spearheaded Operation Enduring Freedom, where they worked with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban within weeks. In Iraq, they played a pivotal role in training and advising local forces to counter insurgencies. In Africa, Green Berets have been quietly involved in combating terrorism, training local troops, and stabilizing fragile governments.

Their ability to blend military expertise with diplomatic finesse is unmatched. This duality makes them indispensable tools in gray-zone conflicts—situations that fall between war and peace, where influence and persuasion are as important as firepower. As the nature of global conflict evolves, with state and non-state actors competing for influence, the Green Berets’ ability to shape environments rather than merely react to them ensures their continued relevance.

In a world where brute force often creates more problems than it solves, the Green Berets’ unique approach to warfare makes them a model for modern conflict resolution. By empowering allies, building trust, and focusing on long-term stability, they accomplish missions that no other special forces unit could achieve. This combination of adaptability, cultural intelligence, and strategic impact cements the Green Berets as one of the world's most unique and effective special forces units.

18. GT investigates: How will American special operations team intervene in S.China Sea?

And here is how the CCP's mouthpiece, the Global Times, assess US special operations forces.

GT investigates: How will American special operations team intervene in S.China Sea?

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1323820.shtml?utm

By Hu Yuwei and Fan Wei

Published: Nov 26, 2024 09:49 PM

Soldiers in rubber boats take part in the US-Philippines Balikatan joint military exercise in Palawan on April 30, 2024. Photo: VCG

The US military has recently announced its support for Philippine operations in the South China Sea through task force Ayungin, named after the Philippine term for China's Ren'ai Jiao (also known as Ren'ai Reef). This initiative, according to Manila, will involve collaboration in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. What additional, lesser-known details exist about this task force? Why was its launch timed during such a sensitive period? To what extent can it bolster the Philippines' provocations in the South China Sea? The Global Times conducted interviews with a Chinese expert who has engaged with high-level sources in the Philippines, as well as a former deputy national security advisor of the Philippines, to uncover deeper insights on the task force. 

The announcement represents the latest example of the US "fanning the flames" in the South China Sea. It also underscores the current Philippine government's dedication to strengthening its strategic partnership with the US, according to Ding Duo, a deputy director at the Institute of Maritime Law and Policy at the China Institute for South China Sea Studies, who recently concluded a visit to the Philippines, where he engaged with local sources familiar with the matter.

"The US task force will only hinder the peaceful resolution of disputes that require direct dialogue, consultations, and negotiations between the Philippines and China," stated Rommel C. Banlaoi, Chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, in an interview with the Global Times on Monday.

As the former director of the Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies in the Philippines, Banlaoi previously told the Global Times that he is dismayed by the current government's decision to increase American military presence, which he believes undermines the balance in the Philippines' relationship with China and promotes a markedly pro-Americanism in foreign policy. 

He pointed out that the Marcos administration is complicating efforts to improve Philippines-China relations and that these unilateral actions are counterproductive to peacefully resolving disputes with China.

Demonstrators hold banners during a protest against the visit of US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in Manila, the Philippines, on February 2, 2023. Photo: VCG

What is the US task force?

According to Ding, local sources revealed the concept of the US task force began to take shape in July 2024. 

The idea for forming the US task force emerged after the direct serious clash between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea on June 17 when a Philippine supply boat ignored warnings from the Chinese side and charged into waters off China's Ren'ai Jiao.

The US brought out the idea of founding a task force to the Philippines following the incident, which was then accepted by the Philippine side.

Ding deems that the formation of the US task force likely stemmed from concerns over the July 21 agreement between China and the Philippines regarding maritime disputes following the clash. The temporary agreement established arrangements for humanitarian supplies of essential goods for the Philippine warship stranded at the Ren'ai Jiao. Both parties agree to jointly manage maritime disputes and promote the easing of tensions in the South China Sea.

The US task force was established around the same time as the temporary agreement, suggesting that the US is concerned the agreement may hinder its strategic goals in the South China Sea, according to the expert.

The task force comprises approximately 15 US military personnel stationed on Palawan Island in the Philippines, who regularly engage in training exercises with the Western Command (WesCom) under the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). These exercises primarily focus on providing personnel rotation and logistical support to the Philippine military vessel that is illegally stranded at China's Renai Jiao, Ding revealed to the Global Times.

Following US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's high-profile introduction of the US task force, both military and political officials from the US and the Philippines released statements. US embassy spokesperson Kanishka Gangopadhyay stated, "Task Force Ayungin enhances US-Philippine alliance coordination and interoperability, enabling US forces to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the South China Sea," according to Reuters. 

Philippines National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano, however, stressed that the US task force Ayungin "will not directly participate in missions in the West Philippine Sea [South China Sea]," as reported by Filipino GMA.

Ding revealed that specific tasks provided by the US task force include improving the coordination capabilities of both manned and unmanned military equipment and providing personnel training to the Philippines. The instructors for the so-called "small vessel defensive tactics course," conducted by the US military for the Philippines in October of this year, were selected from this task force, Ding said. 

The Philippine media Inquirer reported that Philippine coast guardsmen (PCG) trained with US special forces over nearly three weeks in Palawan on how to respond to "noncompliant vessels" as part of the course.

Banlaoi said that the US established the US task force to support Philippine forces not only in rotation and reprovisioning missions, but also in protecting Philippine presence in Ayungin Shoal (Ren'ai Jiao). "The US provides operational training, intelligence information sharing and threat assessment of situation around the shoal, almost the same kind of support that the US has provided the Philippines during the siege of Marawi in 2017 and the Global War on Terrorism from 2001-2010 through the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines."

Ding further noted that the unmanned equipment currently provided by the US task force to the Philippines includes at least four unmanned surface vessels MANTAS T-12 and at least one T-38 Devil Ray, both of which are from Australian company Maritime Tactical Systems (MARTAC) USA Division.

According to a piece on an online news platform Straight Arrow News, Devil Rays can be used as a mother ship of sorts to help relay signals to the T-12s. They can also be used as a weapons platform.

How much can it support Manila?

The maritime situational awareness capabilities of the Philippines remain relatively underdeveloped, a longstanding concern held by the Philippine military. An article from the US think tank Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative in December 2023 pointed out that "the Philippines faces substantial maritime governance capacity gaps, with shortfalls in maritime domain awareness standing out as a primary concern."

The US has provided substantial support to the Philippines in areas such as information sharing, situational awareness, and engagement tactics to bolster its capabilities.

Since 2021, the Philippines has been utilizing the SeaVision program, a maritime situational awareness tool, led by the US Department of Transportation, at no cost. Currently, this system is being employed by the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine Navy, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and the National Coast Watch Center, as observed by Beijing-based think tank South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI).

In May, the US and the Philippines issued a joint statement on space dialogue, announcing an enhancement of cooperation in leveraging space for both maritime and space situational awareness. Moreover, within the framework of the US-Japan-India-Australia "Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Partnership," the US is coordinating resource support from Japan, India, and Australia for the Philippines, according to SCSPI.

Many Filipino scholars contend that the security cooperation between the Philippines and the US is designed to strengthen the asymmetric advantage over China, enabling the execution of surveillance missions focused on China's maritime activities, Ding noted.

The Ayunjin task force has been interpreted by Philippine media as a direct indication of US military assistance to the Philippines.

Banlaoi believes that the US task will benefit the Philippine military for operational support, intelligence gathering and tactical capacity building, but it politically hinders peaceful dispute resolution between the Philippines and China.

By establishing the task force, the US has sought to gain direct insights into the operational patterns of China Coast Guard vessels, thereby enhancing its situational awareness and battlefield readiness. This move can be interpreted as a concealed intention of the US, Ding noted.

"It remains unclear whether the US task force will expand in personnel and scope. The US may also use this opportunity to encourage the Philippines to provoke incidents at sea, such as conducting 'freedom of navigation operations' against China or providing 'escort' services for Philippine supply ships in contested areas. US military personnel might observe aboard these vessels under the guise of journalists or offer guidance for Philippine maritime operations," he told the Global Times.

If the Philippines continues to provoke incidents through its strengthened alliance and external support, engaging in "gray zone" tactics and challenging China's South China Sea policies with misleading narratives, it risks undermining constructive resolutions and managing differences, Ding stressed. 

19. Trump Returns to ‘Maximum Pressure’ as Era of Biden Alliances Ends

Just because Biden supported alliances does not mean it is wrong to do so or it is wrong to continue to do so. I hope the Trump administration does not throw away one of the most important national security assets of America: its allies. 

But if he wants to put maximum pressure on north Korea and Kim Jong Un the way to do it is conjunction with South Korea (and Japan) through human rights, a comprehensive information campaign and support to the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea resting on a foundation of combined deterrence and defense and a strategic strangulation campaign thought highly enforced sanctions. And one way to put pressure on China is through trilateral corporations because Xi has publicly stated that hedpes not want to see a trilateral alliance.  

Alliances contribute to the US winning in strategic competition, to deterrence and to US victory in war.  I hope the Trump administration can recognize that.

"America First – Alliances Always"

Trump Returns to ‘Maximum Pressure’ as Era of Biden Alliances Ends

The president-elect is taking a page from the playbook he used in his first term when he sought to restrain Iran and North Korea

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-foreign-policy-diplomatic-pressure-a27830cc?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Alexander Ward

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Nov. 26, 2024 9:00 pm ET

President-elect Donald Trump has long taken strong positions with the goal of cowing negotiating partners. Photo: Brandon Bell/Press Pool

WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump’s brandishing of tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico and China marks the passage from one era to another: Partnerships are out, and coercion is in.  

Trump is showing his second term will be much like his first, defined by the economic and diplomatic fights he picked with friends as well as foes. His punitive use of tariffs to bend others to his will is a far cry from the pains the Biden administration took to forge agreements and build consensus on policy in Europe and Asia.

The president-elect has long taken strong positions with the goal of cowing negotiating partners. It is part of the playbook he used during his first term to confront Iran’s aggression and North Korea’s nuclear program. In the end, his “maximum pressure” strategy produced mixed results: Iran was strangled financially but continued supporting proxies in the Middle East, and North Korea grew and advanced its nuclear arsenal.

Then-President Donald Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019 in the demilitarized zone that divides the two Koreas. Photo: Associated Press

“His whole worldview is maximum pressure, it’s that simple,” said a Trump adviser under consideration for a senior foreign-policy position. “Scare your negotiating partner into thinking you will do what most think is unthinkable.”

Trump on Monday night announced his plans to compel countries to stop the flow of migrants crossing the border illegally and fentanyl entering the U.S., by placing 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods, and increasing existing duties on Chinese products by 10%. The three governments could “easily solve this long simmering problem,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “Until such time they do, it is time for them to pay a very big price.” 

The moves, if implemented as planned in an Inauguration Day executive order, could upend global trade and raise prices for American consumers, but Trump’s allies say his goal is to gain leverage in negotiations—whether with allies or foes.

“Tariffs on allies are a more benign option than sanctions on adversaries, but both are designed to achieve the same end, which is to increase American negotiating leverage in order to find an agreement that advances American interests,” said Mark Dubowitz, chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, who speaks frequently to senior incoming Trump administration officials. “It’s maximum pressure gone global.”

Trump will re-enter the Oval Office with the world far more dangerous than when he was first president. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of North Korean troops complicates efforts to negotiate an end to the war. In the Middle East, Israel’s retaliation for the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas has seen tens of thousands of Palestinians killed and most of Gaza’s more than two million people have been displaced. Iran, which has been engaged in a cycle of escalating attacks with Israel, has moved closer to obtaining the weapons-grade fuel needed for a nuclear weapon.

Demonstrators in New York City turned out in January 2017 to protest an executive order to ban citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entry into the U.S. for 90 days. Photo: Stephanie Keith/Getty Images

Members of Trump’s team are saying his strength is already having global effects, with incoming national security adviser Mike Waltz giving his boss credit for the Biden administration-brokered cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah.

“Everyone is coming to the table because of President Trump,” he posted to X. “His resounding victory sent a clear message to the rest of the world that chaos won’t be tolerated.” 

Under most administrations, major foreign-policy decisions out of the White House usually emerge after reviews featuring senior aides, counselors, lawmakers and even allies. Trump turned the process on its head in his first term. He often announced policies before formal considerations had taken place, in some cases sidestepping Congress and leading to a scramble within his team to implement the directive.

A week into his first term, Trump signed an executive order to ban citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entry into the U.S. for 90 days, even though senior officials knew the document hadn’t been reviewed by government lawyers. 

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Tariffs are at the center of former President Donald Trump’s economic plan. It would be a dramatic shift in trade policy, but how would they work? WSJ explains what the proposals would look like and how they’d affect consumers. Photo illustration: Madeline Marshall

In this case, Trump is still weeks from taking office, and his transition team has yet to complete the executive order he would use to impose the tariffs. 

Tirades against U.S. trade practices were a common theme of Trump’s 2016 campaign. He said he would renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, a free-trade pact among the U.S., Canada and Mexico, threatening to walk away from it. He eventually signed onto a new deal, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which went into force in 2020 and saw improvements for American workers as well as expanded trade, according to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office.

In 2018, Trump slammed the European Union with 25% and 10% penalties on steel and aluminum, respectively, prompting the bloc to hit back, imposing import taxes on Kentucky bourbon—a key industry for then Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.). Trump also had threatened to impose 20% tariffs and cars and car parts from Europe, but the U.S. and EU reached an accord to avoid further escalation.

In his first term, Trump imposed higher levies on steel and aluminum from Europe, Canada and Mexico; rolls of steel in Germany in 2018. Photo: Alex Kraus/Bloomberg News

Trump’s biggest trade target, however, was China. He blamed Beijing for stealing U.S. intellectual property and dumping cheap goods into the American market. In 2018, Trump placed a 10% tariff on Chinese aluminum, 30% taxes on solar panels and washing machines, and 25% duties on all other products from the country. It was a major shot in a trade war that would dominate Trump’s first term, and which the Biden administration largely continued.

A 2020 analysis by the Brookings Institution found that Trump’s steel tariffs “appear to have helped create several thousand jobs in the steel industry,” while duties on washing-machine duties “associated” with 1,800 jobs across three factories in the U.S. But the analysis cautioned that any employment gains created by Trump’s tariffs by reducing imports were offset by losses in the drop in U.S. exports. 

A 2019 Federal Reserve Board paper also found that “tariff increases enacted in 2018 are associated with relative reductions in manufacturing employment and relative increases in producer prices.”

Trump’s desire to continue a tariff-heavy approach during his second presidency has already sparked a backlash from Mexico.

“For every tariff, there will be a response in kind, until we put at risk our shared enterprises,” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum wrote in a letter to Trump that she read aloud Tuesday.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum pushed back against Trump’s proposed tariffs on goods from Mexico. Photo: isaac esquivel/Shutterstock

Sheinbaum is facing a similar predicament as her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Trump threatened tariffs of 25% on imports of all goods from Mexico unless it stopped illegal migration into the U.S., prompting López Obrador to send Mexico’s national guard to the U.S.-Mexico border. Trump later dropped his tariff threat.

“U.S. leadership works best when we find ways to push countries to do what’s in our interest that are also in theirs,” said Heather Hurlburt, chief of staff in the U.S. Trade Representative’s office during the Biden administration. The proposed tariffs “on a major trading partner are in no one’s interest—not consumers, not workers, and not the Mexicans who we want to work in legitimate industries and find their futures in Mexico.” 

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said Tuesday that he had held a “good call” Monday night with Trump about the tariffs. “We obviously talked about laying out the facts, talking about how the intense and effective connections between our two countries flow back and forth,” he said, a reference to the roughly $400 billion of Canadian exports to the U.S. a year.

Meanwhile Liu Pengyu of China’s embassy in Washington warned this week that neither side “will win a trade war or a tariff war.”

European allies, already nervous about Trump’s promises of tariffs on their goods, took his latest move as a sign that they soon could be locked in a trade war with the U.S. The EU already has discussed countermeasures, including targeting products made in Trump-friendly districts to cause him political distress.

The warnings and signals from abroad might not persuade Trump and his team to back down, however, especially on an issue so central to the president-elect’s political career. 

Vivian Salama and Santiago Perez contributed to this article.

Appeared in the November 27, 2024, print edition as 'Friends, Foes in Trump’s Sights'.

20. When Maritime and Continental Powers Collide: A Historical Framework for US Asymmetric Competition with China

Conclusion:

The ongoing competition between the United States and China will shape or alter the global system of power whether the United States or China emerges successful. By learning from historical competitions and utilizing the asymmetries afforded to a maritime power, the United States could chart a course that avoids a deeply destructive conflict and reinvigorate a world order that has brought about unparalleled peace, stability, and prosperity.

When Maritime and Continental Powers Collide: A Historical Framework for US Asymmetric Competition with China - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Matthew Sansone · November 26, 2024

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Alternate visions grappling for supremacy over the structures and norms of global politics and power is at the very center of strategic competition. In this struggle, comprehensive national power across all dimensions of diplomacy, information, military, and economic might, often below the threshold of armed conflict, are means to the broader end of national prestige and supremacy on the world stage. From Athens and Sparta to the United States and the Soviet Union, history is replete with competitions over the balance of power and the assertion of the dominant state’s values, norms, and power.

History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, and modern competition has similar rhythmic tones to the past. Competition has historically played out most dramatically between maritime and continental powers, each party wielding strengths and mitigating vulnerabilities as it seeks to impose an international order that serves its interests. The dynamic interplay of maritime and continental powers occurs because of a fundamental difference in national statecraft and prioritization.

Continental powers emphasize territorial control, overland trade routes, and maintaining security through land-based military capabilities. They prefer to focus on immediate border threats and influencing the affairs of neighboring states to maintain border or territorial security. Continental powers traditionally utilize territorial conquest or overland trade to address national resource constraints. Historical continental powers include states such as Sparta, Rome, dynastic China, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg monarchy, Napoleonic France, and Imperial Russia and Germany. Although these states would acquire and often utilize naval forces, their primary imperative was territorial expansion for state security, creating a centralized economy, and a unified national culture. These priorities would often lead continental powers to govern through centralized governance to maintain territorial security and political rule.

Modern continental powers like the Soviet Union and now China that have built naval capabilities have largely done so not to challenge Western sea control, but to defend their own littoral territories and claims. These states built naval forces that complement their objectives as continental powers—namely, that of maintaining territorial integrity. China currently has the largest navy in the world in terms of total number of vessels and shipbuilding capacity, but it is designed for littoral control not power projection or oceanic trade protection. While continental powers do not fear the strategic impacts of naval power, they do tend to act in a way that reflects an apparent concern over seapower as the enabler of ideas that could undermine the political stability of the state.

Maritime powers have unique strategic attributes making them distinctive from their continental counterparts. Where continental powers see territory to be taken, maritime powers see markets to facilitate cumulative economic growth. The development of maritime power in part originates out of the necessity of trade. Early Mediterranean trade networks supplied the land empires of the Near East with commodities such as timber, tin, and copper. These early Mediterranean trading states laid the foundation of maritime power identity, which is characterized by control of trade and trade routes, an emphasis on commerce, and more inclusive forms of government such as republics or constitutional monarchies. Historical examples of maritime powers include Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, and the British Empire. Maritime power states evolved out of the periphery of early civilization, not at the center as great continental powers did, and thus had to rely on more open societies to enable trade and commerce to meet their resource needs.

While the United States does not strictly meet the criteria of a seapower state as laid out by Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1890, the Western liberal order is largely shaped by the political, cultural, and intellectual history of seapower states and protected by the United States security umbrella. The United States was born out of a maritime power, the British Empire, and its early identity was shaped by its reliance on Atlantic trade, but the acquisition by conquest and purchase of a continent morphed its identity. Modern American views of seapower are strategic rather than cultural, but naval power continues to be a defining feature of American military might. The United States inherited the mantle of international hegemon from the British after World War II, placing it at the center of the contest between maritime and continental powers that continues today.

Modern Competition

Modern-day strategic competition between the United States and China follows along the historical trend lines defining the relationships between maritime and continental powers. The United States and China’s competition spans across five areas of interstate contention: different political systems, contrasting ideologies, competing economic visions, informational misalignment, and military tension. Current strategic competition between the United States and China features all five facets of competition and encompasses competing visions for global order.

The current system of the liberal rules-based international order is championed by the United States. Both the United States and its Western allies and partners reap benefits from it. Built by the victors of World War II, the order is defined by the primacy of law. It is characterized by a set of norms and principles seeking to promote peace and prosperity by expanding free trade, collective defense, and the spread of democratic governance. These core principles built into the liberal international order are in accordance with maritime power identity, mirroring maritime states’ reliance on commerce and open governance. The United States inherited its own maritime power identity from the British and built a system of open governance with naval and air forces that have the capabilities to protect global commerce and project power abroad. This rules-based order, however, is under strain, as the reemergence of continental powers such as China challenge the United States in all aspects of national power, threatening to subvert or supplant the Western liberal order.

China, which prioritizes state territorial and political security, has been deeply skeptical of Western liberal democracies and is looking to change the international order into a system that, historically, China had successfully implemented and greatly benefitted from, known as Tianxia. At its core, Tianxia, meaning “all under heaven,” is a unique Chinese concept, deeply rooted in classical Chinese philosophy and thought. In implementation, it allowed dynastic China to control its immediate neighbors as tributaries and maintain control and influence over East Asian nations for millennia. With philosophical roots as deep as the Zhou Dynasty (1046–221 BCE), the concept of Tianxia is that of a hierarchical, orderly world, with China at the center and satellite, or tributary, states on the periphery. The model represents that of a hub and spoke and is organized so that the edges revolve around the center like planets orbiting a star. Structured to be able to maintain territorial and political control of neighbors and borders, a Tianxia system is similar to previous continental systems, but with an additional cultural hierarchy. It includes an incentive structure under which the greater the cultural, political, and economic compliance to the Chinese Communist Party, the greater the legitimacy endowed on the nation. The greater the submission, or tribute, to the party, the greater the rewards. A China-led system stands in stark contrast to the liberal rules-based international order and represents the gravest challenge to United States hegemony.

Maritime Advantages

The United States must leverage its maritime power advantages to successfully compete with China or be destined to repeat the failures of past competitions. Historically, naval forces struggle to engage resilient, well-protected land defenses—as Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson succinctly put it, “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” Mainland China functions as a continental fort from which it can advance its objectives, undermine the US-led order, and when Beijing so chooses, force the capitulation and reintegration of Taiwan. Efforts by the United States to assault the fort of mainland China using political, informational, or economic means have not been successful, so upholding the rules-based order means competing in the periphery and holding China’s global interests and influence at risk in places such as Africa and South America. The United States must utilize the asymmetric advantages of a maritime power to create the dilemma: Does China continue to seek confrontation and risk losing assets and influence abroad, or does is instead seek cooperation with the United States within the rules-based order? The United States must flex its maritime power advantages more effectively and learn from previous maritime power examples of how to use that might to maintain distance from the fort and weaken it from afar.

A prime example from which the United States can learn is the competition between the British Empire and Napoleonic France. Throughout the Napoleonic period, the British were able to wear down the French forces from afar utilizing their maritime advantages by maintaining control of the seas, implementing trade blockades, and employing diplomatic and economic leverages to keep allies in the fight against Napoleon. These advantages enabled the British to effectively chip away at French power over time. Learning from this example, the United States should emphasize its own similar advantages of naval superiority, alliance networks, and economic power to effectively compete with China and emplace capabilities to prevail in conflict if it were to occur.

A course of action available to the United States is to set conditions for a multidimensional blockade. This would entail not just a naval or trade blockade, but extend to diplomacy, information and influence, and cyber, to ensure that a hostile China can be comprehensively isolated. The United States needs to ensure it has the necessary capabilities to isolate the continental fort to disturb the enemy plans and strengthen the hand of the United States and its allies. By setting the necessary conditions, the United States can also use its leverage to remove any constraints on a friendly or cooperative China. In previous warfare in the modern period, the state, or states, that controlled the flow of trade on the seas has been able to wear down the adversary over time. Besides the example of the British against Napoleonic France, similar dynamics played out with the British against Imperial Germany and the United States against Imperial Japan.

Setting the conditions militarily would mean investing in the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military tools—such as naval, cyber, space, special operations, and irregular warfare capabilities—to hold Chinese assets and interests at risk outside of mainland China. These capabilities give the United States the flexibility to engage, or not, on its own terms at times and places of its choosing. These also enable the United States to address hybrid threats below the threshold of war while being able to prepare any operational environment in the event of conflict. Modernizing naval capabilities, diplomatic relationships, and economic resilience over time can yield powerful advantages if conflict occurs, but diplomacy is required to ensure these capabilities can be wielded to the greatest effect.

To be successful the United States needs to reinvest in diplomacy and cultivate its greatest assets, its allies and partners, to leverage the unique strengths they can wield, while also developing new partnerships that can offset its own vulnerabilities. Greater investment in diplomatic muscle can enable the United States to rely on the strengths of our allies for collective defense and enable access, basing, and overflight for military assets. Through diplomatic efforts, the United States must reinvigorate the rules-based international order, as well. This can be done by negotiating positions of influence in multilateral and minilateral institutions, forging more beneficial trade relationships with new partners, and streamlining development and infrastructure deals with potential partners. These actions targeting potential partners in Africa and South America, for instance, would strengthen an enforcement of a comprehensive, multidimensional blockade by ensuring the United States has the partners necessary to isolate any malign actors.

The ongoing competition between the United States and China will shape or alter the global system of power whether the United States or China emerges successful. By learning from historical competitions and utilizing the asymmetries afforded to a maritime power, the United States could chart a course that avoids a deeply destructive conflict and reinvigorate a world order that has brought about unparalleled peace, stability, and prosperity.

Matthew Sansone currently works on a competition and irregular warfare portfolio for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition. Previously, he handled a strategic competition portfolio at State Department and is a former US Navy SEAL. Matthew has his master’s degree in international relations from American University’s School of International Service and has previously written about ongoing US-China strategic competition within Africa.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Tyler Wheaton, US Navy

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Matthew Sansone · November 26, 2024

21. How to Fix a Broken Defense Department to Beat China and Russia

And do not forget Iran and north Korea and violent extremist organizations.

Excerpt:

The stakes have never been higher, and the path ahead demands the audacity of visionaries who can break free from the inertia of the status quo. Just as Vannevar Bush once harnessed the ingenuity of America’s best minds to outpace the enemies of his time, we now face a moment of similar urgency and promise. If the United States can empower its boldest innovators to lead, not as bureaucrats but as pioneers of rapid technological dominance, we can secure not just victory in the wars of tomorrow but the preservation of the values that make our nation worth defending. The future hinges on our ability to act decisively, to embrace radical change, and to once again make history — not by clinging to the comforts of tradition but by seizing the opportunities of transformation. This is not merely a call to action; it is a rallying cry for a nation that must once again trust its greatest minds to deliver when it matters most.

How to Fix a Broken Defense Department to Beat China and Russia - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Steve Blank · November 27, 2024

“The coming war is going to be a technology war. The country’s top innovators feel that there is a huge disconnect between what the U.S. military ecosystem can produce and what’s possible if we engaged civilians to develop weapon systems for critical technologies…The only solution is to outsource advanced weapons systems development outside of the traditional services and government ecosystem and hand the development to civilians.”

-Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt in 1940

So said one of our country’s greatest innovators to the president of the United States. And the president agreed, making a series of decisions that, without which, the Allies may have lost World War II.

The story of how Roosevelt outsourced advanced weapons systems development and acquisition is fascinating and also critical to the present moment. The incoming Trump administration has a historic, once-in-a-century opportunity to do something similar today and give the United States a stream of advanced capabilities and weapons that will allow the United States to deter Russia and China or — failing that — defeat them in a war.

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From MIT to the White House

In June 1940, Vannevar Bush, ex-MIT dean of engineering, along with the country’s top science and research administrators, believed the United States was woefully unprepared and ill-equipped for a war driven by technology. They felt the U.S. military had little idea of what science could provide in the event of war, and scientists were wholly in the dark as to what the military needed. In their view, advanced weapons could be created faster if they could be designed by civilian scientists and engineers in universities and companies.

The scientists drafted a one-page plan for an organization that would look for new technologies that military labs weren’t working on such as radar, proximity fuses, anti-submarine warfare, and nuclear weapons. This organization, the National Defense Research Committee, was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

A year later, Roosevelt gave the group permission to go past research and development to acquire weapons systems. The group was renamed the Office of Scientific Research and Development. They rapidly built prototypes of weapons (e.g., radar, electronic warfare, and rockets) and used existing contractors to mass produce them. Roosevelt’s decision gave the United States a head start for employing science in the war effort.

Radical Change, Now

It’s abundantly clear that the U.S. defense ecosystem is being challenged by the proliferation of commercial technology, hobbled by its legacy systems and prime contractors, and sabotaged by its own acquisition system, rendering it unable to keep pace with threats to the nation.

Simultaneously, the rise of defense-oriented startups and venture capital firms have proven that a commercial ecosystem is more than capable of rapid delivery of most of the advanced weapons needed to deter or win a war. Companies like SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir, Saronic, and Vannevar Labs have proven they can deliver at speeds unmatched by existing contractors. Defense- and dual-use-oriented venture capital firms have stepped up to fund this ecosystem, collectively investing tens of billions in new defense technologies.

But the Defense Department is organized for a world that no longer exists. While there have been innovative experiments in innovation such as the Defense Innovation Unit, Replicator, and the Office of Strategic Capital — all of which should continue — the overall glacial pace of acquisition and the capture of the status quo by the few prime contractors threatens our nation. In a perfect world, a bipartisan Congress would reorganize the Defense Department to integrate with this new wave of private companies and capital. But that isn’t politically feasible in the time America has left to prepare for the possibility of major war, which may be as little as 18 months. That’s where Vannevar Bush’s insights are critical for the present day.

The United States needs to outsource advanced weapons systems development to private industry in areas that startups and scale-ups already lead or could move faster in: AI, drones, space, biotech, networking, and cyber.

A New Office of Scientific Research and Development

The Trump administration should establish an organization modeled after the World War II–era Office of Scientific Research and Development. It would focus on developing systems that are inexpensive and software-based, and with relatively shorter lifecycles of three to ten years. Its approach would rely on outsourcing projects to private industry, concentrating on solving specific problems with speed and innovation.

This office would have the authority to define and issue prototype requirements on behalf of the geographic combatant commands, enabling those commands to purchase solutions directly. To stay ahead of emerging needs, the office would embed representatives with these commands to observe their operations, investigate challenges, and prioritize critical problems. It would also be empowered to select solutions based not on the lowest cost but on their ability to deliver the best and fastest deployment. Winning solutions would be supported with guaranteed production contracts to ensure swift delivery.

In addition, the office would take responsibility for integration and overall system strategy, managing how these systems are deployed, fielded, and supported. Major defense contractors would be incentivized to collaborate with the office as providers of advanced subsystems, integrators of new technologies, or even acquirers of innovative systems. Tax incentives could be offered to encourage the deployment and fielding of these solutions, creating opportunities for partnerships between traditional industry leaders and emerging technology companies. For example, a collaboration between a traditional defense prime contractor like Lockheed Martin and a newer technology company like Anduril could generate significant synergies.

Meanwhile, the traditional military services would retain responsibility for long-term acquisition programs requiring formal budgeting processes, extended supply chains, and decades of support. Established defense contractors would remain the primary suppliers for these complex and enduring systems that require sophisticated integration and long-term maintenance.

Finally, the office would rigorously evaluate the portfolios of military research labs and federally funded research centers, eliminating projects that the private sector can already handle effectively. These institutions would then be free to concentrate on tasks the private sector cannot address, such as fundamental research, advanced weapon systems, and programs requiring timelines of 10 years or more. This approach would ensure that both public and private efforts are focused on their respective strengths, maximizing efficiency and innovation.

The Path to Success

The success of the proposed “Office of Rapid Development and Deployment” will depend on a combination of clear goals, strong collaboration, dedicated resources, and effective integration of the commercial sector to address practical military challenges with speed and precision.

A central element of this success will be establishing clear goals. The immediate threats posed by adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea provide a unifying purpose: to rapidly develop and deliver cutting-edge technologies, advanced weapon systems, and innovative operating concepts that deter aggression and secure victory in conflict. This clarity of mission will ensure the office remains focused on addressing the most pressing challenges.

Rapid deployment of solutions is another key priority. The office will concentrate on identifying and resolving specific, actionable problems such as developing and deploying autonomous vehicles, creating AI-enabled systems, and leveraging commercial access to space. These solutions must be deployable in the near term to maximize their impact.

Interdisciplinary collaboration will play a vital role in the office’s operations. Teams will include founders, private investors, scientists, engineers, and military innovators from diverse fields such as AI, autonomy, quantum computing, cybersecurity, physics, and engineering. Financial experts, contracting specialists, and acquisition professionals will also contribute, ensuring seamless project execution and alignment with military needs.

The office will prioritize rapid prototyping and testing to address challenges efficiently. By working closely with combatant commands to deeply understand operational problems, the office will iterate designs based on field performance and immediate requirements. Agile development methods will be employed to accelerate the design, testing, and refinement process, ensuring solutions can be delivered promptly to areas of responsibility.

Collaboration with the private sector is essential. Startups, venture capital, private equity, and established defense companies will be mobilized to support the office’s initiatives. Major defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, Northrop Grumman, and Huntington Ingalls, will work alongside these newer players to combine expertise and drive innovation.

Finally, the office will leverage existing Department of Defense innovation efforts, such as those led by the Defense Innovation Unit and initiatives like Replicator. By embedding personnel to anticipate emerging combatant command needs, the office can build on these foundations, creating a seamless network of innovation and rapid problem-solving. This integration will enable the office to stay ahead of evolving threats and deliver timely, effective solutions.

Who Should Run It?

The leader of the Office of Rapid Development and Deployment should be carefully chosen to meet a range of critical qualifications. This individual must be a trusted advisor to President Donald Trump, possess a deep understanding of technology, demonstrate the ability to assess venture capital portfolios and select top domain experts, and bring both a problem-solving mindset and charismatic leadership to the role.

As a trusted advisor, the head of the office must have a close relationship with the president to influence policy effectively. This connection will be essential to ensuring that startups and private capital are positioned as central players in the office’s efforts. Their ability to navigate high-level decision-making will give the office the authority and credibility needed to drive its ambitious agenda.

The leader must also be a visionary who can articulate a compelling strategy for how startups and private capital can be mobilized to close technological gaps with adversaries. Their ability to inspire confidence and respect among diverse stakeholders — ranging from startup founders and venture capitalists to military leaders and policymakers — will be essential to building momentum and fostering collaboration.

Additionally, the leader must secure congressional support to obtain substantial federal funding for the office. This requires a combination of strategic insight and political acumen to demonstrate the importance of the office’s mission and gain bipartisan backing.

The focus on practical outcomes will be paramount. The leader must emphasize solutions that can be rapidly deployed to military commands, prioritizing projects with the greatest potential impact. By ensuring that funding and resources are directed toward high-priority initiatives, they will drive tangible results and strengthen the office’s credibility.

Ultimately, this role requires someone who can seamlessly bridge the worlds of technology, defense, and government while maintaining a sharp focus on delivering innovative, effective, and timely solutions to the challenges facing the nation.

Who fits this description? Not many. The only candidates I can think of are Elon Musk, Trae Stephens, Stephen Feinberg, Raj Shah, and Mike Brown.

A Once-in-a-Century Opportunity

The stakes have never been higher, and the path ahead demands the audacity of visionaries who can break free from the inertia of the status quo. Just as Vannevar Bush once harnessed the ingenuity of America’s best minds to outpace the enemies of his time, we now face a moment of similar urgency and promise. If the United States can empower its boldest innovators to lead, not as bureaucrats but as pioneers of rapid technological dominance, we can secure not just victory in the wars of tomorrow but the preservation of the values that make our nation worth defending. The future hinges on our ability to act decisively, to embrace radical change, and to once again make history — not by clinging to the comforts of tradition but by seizing the opportunities of transformation. This is not merely a call to action; it is a rallying cry for a nation that must once again trust its greatest minds to deliver when it matters most.

Become a Member

Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford and a founding member at Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.

Image: Truman Presidential Library via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Steve Blank · November 27, 2024

22. This is Not the Status Quo You’re Looking For

Conclusion:

For the incoming Trump administration, the combination of China’s continued aggression and the natural maturation of U.S.–Taiwan relations presents a unique opportunity to update and more fully leverage the flexibilities inherently contained in the current policy framework. Only through a deliberate and interagency policy review process will Washington be able to evolve its approach, not only to ensure alignment on the strategic importance of whole-of-government actions on China and Taiwan, but also to scope further how the interagency process can more actively pursue these critical actions within the boundaries of the current policy framework.

This is Not the Status Quo You’re Looking For - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Lauren Dickey · November 27, 2024

The United States has long declared its goal to maintain a “status quo” that avoids an official position on Taiwan’s sovereignty, discourages Taiwan from declaring independence, and as a result, effectively equates to there being no outbreak in hostilities. Washington’s ad nauseam recitation of U.S. support for the “status quo” — defined as the existing state of affairs — is, however, increasingly disconnected from both the reality of China as the “most powerful adversary the United States has faced in living memory” and Taiwan’s maturation as a vibrant democracy. The “status quo” concept accurately represents language in U.S. policy, but it does not address the gray zone tactics used by Beijing toward Taiwan that could allow Beijing to accomplish its political objectives toward Taipei without crossing perceived U.S. redlines. It is time to realign U.S. policy toward something that better reflects this challenge. And while Washington’s policy framework has been and — by all indications will remain — a popular and bipartisan one, the framework itself was conceived over four decades ago in a dramatically different geostrategic environment. With only 25 years to go until China’s 2049 target of national rejuvenation — and five U.S. presidential elections in the interim — Washington cannot afford to wait in adjusting its approach and sharpening current policy rhetoric.

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U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan in Context

The origins of the current U.S. approach to Taiwan policy can be traced to several historical inflection points, one of which was enunciated by Richard Nixon in a 1967 Foreign Affairs article, “Asia After Vietnam,” immediately prior to his second run for the presidency. Recognizing the deepening U.S. involvement in Asia after three wars, Nixon understood the need for a strategic recalibration. He realized that an exit from Vietnam was necessary, as was an approach that would prevent the U.S. from entanglement in future Asian conflicts while still enabling Washington to compete with the Soviet Union. In this context, his proposed approach to China was an especially clear-eyed one: He recognized China as an adversary and a nuclear-armed, revisionist power that posed a “present and potential danger” and required “measures designed to meet that danger.” But he also realized that America’s near-term challenge was less likely to come from China, but rather from the Soviet Union.

Nixon outlined in his article the strategy he would go on to pursue as president: a strategic shift in the overall U.S. approach to Asia driven by rapprochement with China that avoided a nuclear war, defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War, prevented the spread of communism and fostered economic prosperity in Asia, and maintained U.S. dominance across the region. A new era began when Nixon stepped into office and found partners willing to engage the United States in both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. As the troves of official historical records from the time make clear, both sides came to the table willing to negotiate on common interests. Ultimately, this was a trade-off that aligned with what Nixon had defined as U.S. interests: Good relations with Beijing were key to preventing future regional entanglement, managing competition with the Soviet Union, and supporting an exit strategy out of Vietnam. It was only on the issue of Taiwan that both sides agreed to disagree, instead, as the United States described it, “acknowledging” the position of the other government but not definitively taking a stance toward resolution. This nuance ultimately helped to pave the path for Washington to diplomatically recognize Beijing under President Jimmy Carter in 1979.

The U.S. policy approach to Taiwan began to crystallize as rapprochement transitioned to formal recognition of Beijing. Today, what’s known as America’s “one China” policy is usually described by U.S. officials as derived from a series of defining legal and policy documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (1979); the three U.S.–China joint communiques (1972, 1979, and 1982); and the Six Assurances (1982). Occasionally, officials will go on to emphasize a few additional principles, including an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of differences, opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo, non-support for Taiwan independence, and a preference for continuing dialogue between all sides. As Brookings scholar Richard Bush has noted, some of these policy documents are more important for Beijing than Taipei (and vice versa) — but, in our view, all of them matter for how the U.S. competes with China and evolves its support for Taiwan’s self-defense in a manner commensurate with the threat environment.

Cementing the “Status Quo”

Fast forward to present-day, and U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains one of the few truly consistent and bipartisan issues in Washington. While such policy continuity may offer external assurances of stability, whether to Chinese policymakers watching every word and tweet from Zhongnanhai or to like-minded American allies and partners, there is a growing risk that the United States is allowing historic formulations rather than updated geostrategic realities to drive Washington’s approach to Taiwan. In other words, there are risks in continuing to employ the policy framework first defined by Nixon — who sought to manage the realities of a very different China — as the ruler against which U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the rest of Asia is measured.

What we believe to be especially detrimental for advancing long-term U.S. strategic interests in the region is a seemingly laser-focus by U.S. officials in publicly affirming to “uphold the status quo.” Whereas much of the U.S. policy framework for Taiwan can be defined or interpreted from Washington’s “one China” policy documents, any clarity on what the “status quo” entails — or, better still, whose “status quo” is the version to define all others — is left for interpretation. In the absence of an explicit or legally binding definition, the concept has instead evolved largely in the eye of the beholder. While the “status quo” may be more colloquially defined as “the existing state of affairs” when it comes to the Taiwan Strait, the term has become a catch-all phrase for encouraging all sides to avoid war.

None of these conceptualizations come near to the “status quo” that Nixon sought to preserve when fleshing out his Asia strategy. The “status quo” he defined for Washington was one that, at the time, consisted of far more military parity between China and Taiwan, no “new normal” of the Chinese military operating around Taiwan, and an implicit optimism that China would be dissuaded by the costs of conflict from pursuing further coercive behaviors toward Taipei.

We’ve seen in the intervening decades the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise and global ambitions of China, and Taiwan’s transformation into a flourishing democracy and crucial hub for global trade and innovation. Today’s “status quo” is likely one that the drafters of the foundational “one China” policy documents would not recognize. It is characterized by an increasingly heavy-handed Beijing — demonstrating repeatedly within its neighborhood and beyond a high tolerance for criticism in pursuit of its political objectives and territorial claims. This “status quo” is also taking a toll on Taiwan, with Beijing leveraging military and socioeconomic coercion to gradually chip away at the political psyche and preparedness of Taiwan in an attempt to co-opt the long-sought goal of unification.

Today’s “status quo” simply no longer serves U.S. interests in applying an archaic framing of China to ambiguity in how Washington describes the steps it is taking to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Washington’s persistent defense of the “status quo” may mean the United States is able to avoid the outbreak of hostilities, but in doing so this rhetoric renders the U.S. posture a defensive one. The United States is perpetually left to respond to challenges from China — such as record-breaking air incursions and the “Joint Sword” exercises — in an effort to preserve a “status quo” that avoids escalation into war and preserves the agreements upon which formal bilateral ties were once negotiated. For Taiwan, advocacy of the “status quo” risks obscuring the urgency of the threat the island faces; it translates into the absence of war, but in doing so normalizes China’s gray zone coercive actions toward the island.

Washington is Overdue for a Policy Review

While some may argue for the United States clarifying its position for Taiwan and against China in a conflict, we’re not arguing for “strategic clarity.” Indeed, absent a formal defense treaty, any decision to take sides in a conflict will most certainly be ambiguous. Nor are we advocating that the foundational “one China” policy documents should be thrown out the window; the “one China” policy documents were masterfully written and the language was left purposefully ambiguous to allow current and future policymakers the room to make adjustments that reflected geostrategic realities. Interpretations of the foundational policy documents by officials must necessarily be reviewed — both formally and informally — whenever a major change in conditions occurs. In this case, we believe that Washington is overdue for a comprehensive, formal policy review of its approach to Taiwan that accurately reflects updated threat assessments, China’s political goals, the evolution of Taiwan’s democracy, and the full spectrum of U.S. government actions — alongside those of Washington’s regional allies and partners — to advance U.S. interests across the Indo-Pacific. This process need not be public; indeed, we believe it will likely be more effective and avoid any reaction from China if carried out behind closed doors.

There have been informal and ad hoc reviews of U.S. policy toward Taiwan across administrations, but the only formal and publicly documented review dates to the Clinton era. (Congressional calls for another review as recently as 2014 do not appear to have yielded fruit.) The Clinton-era review was led by the Department of State and sought to reconcile how the U.S. government implemented the Taiwan Relations Act (1979); by accounts conveyed to the authors from those witting of the process at the time, it’s understood that the policy review ran in parallel to the development of Executive Order 13014 to delegate the authorities of the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) from the president to the secretary of state. While businesspeople and Congress were involved in the review, strikingly absent from any public documentation of the effort was the inclusion of the departments with whom Taiwan policy today has matured significantly: the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Trade Representative. Both agencies today represent critical pillars of the U.S.–Taiwan relationship, whether through the sustained provision of defensive arms and services or in the expanding volume of trade on both sides of the Pacific.

For the incoming Trump administration, the combination of China’s continued aggression and the natural maturation of U.S.–Taiwan relations presents a unique opportunity to update and more fully leverage the flexibilities inherently contained in the current policy framework. Only through a deliberate and interagency policy review process will Washington be able to evolve its approach, not only to ensure alignment on the strategic importance of whole-of-government actions on China and Taiwan, but also to scope further how the interagency process can more actively pursue these critical actions within the boundaries of the current policy framework.

Become a Member

Lauren Dickey, PhD is a non-resident senior associate for the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From January 2020 to March 2024, she served as senior advisor and acting director for Taiwan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Matthew Kent is a U.S. Army officer currently serving as associate dean in the College of Security Studies at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He joined the College of Security Studies faculty in September 2022 following a three-year tour as chief of the Liaison Affairs Section at the American Institute in Taiwan-Taipei.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Scott Taylor via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Lauren Dickey · November 27, 2024

23. Trump Ally Holds Up Promotion of Army General Involved in Afghanistan Evacuation

From what I have heard from multiple sources is that he is one of our very best generals on active duty today.

This is a shame.

Trump Ally Holds Up Promotion of Army General Involved in Afghanistan Evacuation

Pentagon fears the delay could foreshadow other moves against officers under Trump

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-ally-holds-up-promotion-of-army-general-involved-in-afghanistan-evacuation-91c82cf9?mod=latest_headlines

By Michael R. Gordon

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 and Nancy A. Youssef

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Nov. 26, 2024 7:11 pm ET

Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue, right, met with tank crewmen in Georgia in February. Photo: Santiago Lepper/U.S. Army

WASHINGTON—The last U.S. soldier to leave Afghanistan is the target of the first battle over whether generals involved in the chaotic withdrawal and other officers will face retribution under the Trump administration.

Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue’s departure from Kabul airport in August 2021 was captured in grainy footage as he marched up the ramp of a C-17 cargo plane, the last pair of American boots on the ground in a two-decade-old war. 

But his promotion to a fourth star has been paused by Sen. Markwayne Mullin, an Oklahoma Republican and a strong Trump supporter. Mullin last week put a hold on Donahue’s nomination to serve as the top U.S. Army commander in Europe.

Pentagon officials say they are hopeful Mullin will withdraw his hold in the coming days. But his move has reinforced fears among officers that they could face retaliation for carrying out orders by the Biden administration. 

The incoming Trump administration has been considering a draft executive order that would establish a “warrior board” of retired senior military personnel with the power to review three- and four-star officers and to recommend removals of any deemed unfit for leadership, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

During the presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly criticized the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, calling it a “humiliation” and “collapse of American credibility and respect all around the world.” He also vowed to establish a task force to monitor the “woke generals” and get rid of diversity training in the military. 

“What things like that do is create uncertainty,” said a defense official of Trump’s comments. “The bigger worry is the march toward the politicization of the military. Generals are human as well. The more this happens, the more likely they are to react to it. At some point, they are going to conclude that they have to pick sides to keep advancing.”

In this image provided by the U.S. Army and made with a night-vision scope, Chris Donahue prepares to board a C-17 cargo plane in Kabul in August 2021. Photo: Alexander Burnett/U.S. Army/Associated Press

Neither Mullin, who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, nor the Trump transition team responded to requests for comment. 

To some experts on the Afghanistan conflict, Donahue seems an unlikely Republican target. As the commander of the 82nd Airborne, Donahue worked to restore security at the Kabul airport and keep the cargo flights going in the final days of the U.S. military presence in the country. But the U.S. military operation in Kabul was commanded by Navy Rear Adm. Pete Vasely.

Nor was Donahue in charge of securing Abbey Gate, a key entry point to the airport where an Aug. 26, 2021, attack by a suicide bomber killed 13 service members and about 170 Afghan civilians. That responsibility fell to Marines under Brig. Gen. Farrell Sullivan.

“Policymakers on both sides of the aisle share the burden for the outcome in Afghanistan,” said Carter Malkasian, a former U.S. adviser in the country and author of “The American War in Afghanistan. “Over the course of the 20 year war, some generals also share that burden. But Donahue protected U.S. lives under difficult conditions and under immense time pressure.”

It was the Trump administration that signed a 2020 agreement with the Taliban that set a timeline for a withdrawal. By January 2021 when President Biden took office, just 2,500 U.S. troops remained and 5,000 Taliban prisoners had been released, adding to the security challenges.  

Biden ordered a full troop departure in April 2021 while keeping the American embassy in operation, rebuffing the recommendations of senior U.S. military officers that the 2,500 troops be retained.

After watching security unravel as American forces drew down, Biden later sent thousands of Marines and 82nd Airborne soldiers to Kabul to facilitate an evacuation of U.S. citizens, allied personnel, Afghans eligible for special visas and other vulnerable individuals. 

Senate approval of military promotions recommended by the president is usually routine. Democrats have criticized Mullin’s move to delay Donahue’s promotion without a hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Much of Donahue’s earlier career was spent in special operations. After Islamic State militants seized Mosul in Iraq in 2014, Donahue led Delta Force commandos in Iraq and Syria, where he forged a partnership with Syrian Kurds to fight ISIS. 

He also commanded a June 2014 raid in Libya that captured Ahmed Abu Khatallah, who was sentenced in the U.S. to 22 years in prison for his role in the 2012 attack that led to the death of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other American personnel in Benghazi. 

A month later, he commanded an operation in Syria that sought to rescue a number of ISIS hostages, including journalist James Foley and aid worker Kayla Mueller. U.S. commandos arrived only to discover the hostages had recently been moved to another site. 

Now a three-star general, Donahue took command of the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps in March 2022 during its eight-month deployment to Germany. The corps, which has served as the Army’s response force in international crises, was deployed to bolster the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank and facilitate the equipping of Ukrainian forces after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

When Donahue and his 82nd Airborne soldiers were sent to reinforce security on Aug. 18, 2021, they arrived to find a chaotic situation in which some Taliban were within the perimeter of the airfield and had to be pushed out.

Three days after the Abbey Gate attack, a U.S. task force outside Afghanistan misidentified a civilian vehicle as another suicide bomber. Donahue gave the go-ahead for a U.S. drone to strike it with a Hellfire missile, military officials said.

Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie, the head of the U.S. Central Command, which was responsible for operations in Afghanistan, later took responsibility for the drone strike that killed 10 civilians, which he called a “tragic mistake.”

On Aug. 28, Vasely left for Qatar, leaving Donahue as the senior officer on the ground. The Marines also left. The security perimeter shrank, and the soldiers destroyed and disabled abandoned equipment.

After evacuating 124,000 people in a matter of weeks, the final U.S. C-17s were loaded with the 82nd soldiers, the U.S. ambassador and other embassy officials. Donahue’s plane and four other C-17s departed around midnight on Aug. 31. Following military procedure, Donahue was the last soldier to walk up the ramp.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

24. A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/a-modern-national-security-decision-directive/

by David Maxwell

|

11.26.2024 at 11:00pm

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In today’s complex security environment, America faces a new era of strategic competition from authoritarian adversaries that wield power unconventionally. The rise of what we term the “Dark Quad” – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – necessitates a recalibration of our approach to global stability and national security. A National Irregular Warfare Strategy is no longer merely an option; it is a critical imperative to counteract the broad and multi-faceted threats posed by these actors and achieve a level of overmatch beyond simple hard power measures. The U.S. must embrace irregular warfare as a central pillar of its strategy to safeguard democracy, deter aggression, and promote freedom globally. It must achieve overmatch, not just in traditional hard power, but in its global influence and legitimacy.

Unlike traditional warfare, irregular warfare leverages indirect, asymmetric methods to achieve strategic outcomes. Our adversaries have become adept at waging campaigns that exploit vulnerabilities within the United States and our allies – deploying cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, lawfare, and proxy warfare to achieve their objectives. This approach seeks not only to erode our influence but to reshape the global order in their favor without triggering full-scale military conflicts. The U.S. must respond with equal adaptability and precision, using irregular warfare as an agile tool to counter these threats. This strategy enables us to confront adversaries without the risks associated with direct military engagement, ensuring that we maintain the initiative while avoiding escalation.

The proposed strategy outlined in this directive is based on Ronald Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 32 (National Security Strategy) (NDSS 32) from 1982. It will provide the U.S. with a cohesive and proactive framework to counter irregular threats. It integrates political, economic, and technological measures designed to undermine adversarial influence while strengthening our allies and partners. By focusing on information warfare, cyber capabilities, economic pressure, and the support of non-state actors, the U.S. can operate in the “gray zone” where our adversaries thrive. This approach not only defends our interests but also upholds the global norms that our adversaries seek to dismantle because they have worked so well for America and like-minded countries.

Implementing a National Irregular Warfare Strategy acknowledges the lessons of history while adapting them to present-day realities. Just as the Cold War strategy of containment combined economic, diplomatic, and irregular measures to counter the Soviet threat, so too must today’s strategy employ a wide array of non-conventional tactics to counter the ambitions of authoritarian regimes. The irregular domain is where the U.S. must be prepared to compete and win, and a national strategy will provide the vision and structure necessary to operationalize these efforts.

Ultimately, a National Irregular Warfare Strategy is about resilience and readiness. It will ensure that we are equipped to counter threats that are evolving and complex, leveraging our strengths and partnerships to maintain a world order that favors freedom and security over coercion and control. It will focus on our own resilience and readiness while challenging our allies and partners to invest more in theirs.

The following is a recommendation for a modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare.

Definition of Terms

Joint Definition:

 Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfighting, August 2023)

 Army Definition: 

Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (Army Publication FM 3-0, Operations, October 2022)

Congressional Description:

Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” (National Defense Authorization Act of 2017)

National Guidance

1. Counter the Department of Defense designated “pacing threat:” China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve Chinese Communist Party objectives.
2. Apply irregular warfare in support of strategic competition in the gray zone versus the “Dark Quad” (China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea) and violent extremist organizations.

NSDD XX for Irregular Warfare

1. Strategic Objectives:

• Undermine Adversaries’ Influence: Use political, economic, and military measures to weaken the influence of adversarial states, e.g., the axis of tyranny or totalitarians or the “Dark Quad” (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) and violent extremist organizations (VEO) in key regions, especially where they challenge U.S. interests.
• Support Proxy and Partner Forces: Bolster U.S. allies and non-state actors through financial, military, and intelligence support to enable them to fight against adversaries.
• Limit Adversaries’ Strategic Expansion: Use hybrid warfare (a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics) to delay or disrupt the ability of adversarial states to project power in regions of U.S. interest.

1. Political and Diplomatic Warfare:

• Information and Influence Activities (IIA): Conduct global information campaigns aimed at discrediting the legitimacy and policies of adversarial regimes, or “Dark Quad” and VEOs, using media, social media platforms, and influence through cultural, political, and economic channels.
• Exploitation of Internal Divisions: Identify and exploit ethnic, political, or social tensions within adversarial states to foment dissent and civil unrest. Focus on leveraging non-state actors and dissidents to undermine political cohesion.
• Cyber Warfare: Develop and execute cyber disruption campaigns to disable critical infrastructure, financial systems, and communication networks within adversarial nations.
• Reinforce Internal Unity: Assist friendly states and state-like entities to build their national unity and domestic resilience through arms sales, military assistance, public information. Do the same at home by emphasizing the things that make us Americans and de-emphasizing the things that divided us domestically.

1. Support for Proxy Forces and Non-State Actors:

• Covert Action Programs: Expand the U.S. capability to conduct covert actions in partnership with local resistance or insurgent groups who oppose authoritarian or adversarial regimes. These include support for anti-Russian or anti-Chinese or Anti-Iran or anti-North Korea resistance in key regions.
• Arms Transfers and Training: Provide weapons, funding, and training to insurgent groups or nations that challenge adversarial powers. This includes anti-aircraft (counter drone) weapons, cyber capabilities, and irregular warfare training for partner forces. Request Congress revise Title 10 and Title 22 authorities to allow support at the “speed of strategy.”
• Special Operations Forces (SOF): Deploy U.S. SOF to train, advise, and assist local forces in unconventional warfare tactics, such as resistance, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, and psychological operations where appropriate.

1. Cyber and Technological Warfare:

• Offensive Cyber Operations: Use cyberattacks to degrade the ability of adversarial nations to coordinate military and political operations, sow confusion, and undermine the regime’s domestic control.
• Cyber Exploitation: Infiltrate adversarial networks to collect sensitive intelligence, disrupt critical infrastructure, and undermine military command and control systems.
• Disinformation Campaigns: Deploy cyber capabilities to spread disinformation, sow internal dissent, and create political and social unrest within adversarial states.

1. Economic Warfare:

• Economic Sabotage and Sanctions: Expand the use of economic sanctions and sabotage efforts to undermine adversarial economies, focusing on key sectors like energy, technology, and finance.
• Energy Disruptions: Support covert actions to disrupt energy supplies critical to adversarial nations, particularly in regions where energy dependency is high, such as Russia’s gas supply to Europe.
• Trade Disruption: Use economic leverage to disrupt key trade relationships that benefit adversaries while bolstering the economic ties of U.S. allies.
• Strengthen the Dollar: Take active measures to strengthen the dollar as the global currency and prevent adversary promotion of trade in other currencies.

1. Military Support and Deterrence:

• Conventional and Unconventional Force Mix: Leverage U.S. military superiority by integrating conventional force projection with unconventional warfare capabilities to deter adversarial actions.
• Forward Presence of SOF Units: Increase the permanent presence of designated SOF units in strategic regions to enable irregular warfare missions. These units should be tasked with unconventional warfare, foreign international defense, psychological operations, and civil military operations, and support to intelligence collection.
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Intensify PSYOP campaigns to shape perceptions, undermine adversarial military morale, and influence global public opinion against adversarial powers.

1. Psychological and Information Warfare:

• Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications: Develop an extensive public diplomacy apparatus that communicates the values and benefits of the U.S.-led international order while countering adversary narratives. This includes direct messaging aimed at foreign populations.
• Cultural Influence: Increase U.S. cultural and ideological influence in regions at risk of falling under adversarial influence by promoting pro-democratic ideas and values through media, education, and public diplomacy efforts.
• Exposing Corruption and Human Rights Abuses: Highlight corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses in adversarial states to diminish their domestic and international legitimacy.

1. Coalition Building:

• Regional Alliances: Strengthen regional alliances and partnerships (e.g., NATO, QUAD, AUKUS) and create new coalitions to counter adversarial influence. These coalitions should provide both conventional and unconventional support for countering adversaries.
• Support to Multinational Resistance Movements: Build networks of resistance groups and sympathetic states to mount coordinated political and military pressure on adversaries.

1. Planning and Flexibility:

• Develop and implement a national level interagency campaign capability. Establish a national level standing joint interagency command responsible for irregular warfare training, education, and force development (less the counterterrorism mission). Employ Joint Interagency Task Forces responsible to the NSC for irregular warfare operations. Employ a continuous assessment and evaluation process to support NSC oversight of campaign plan execution.
• Dynamic Response Teams: Establish rapidly deployable, interdisciplinary teams (including intelligence, cyber, and special operations forces) capable of responding to irregular warfare crises or opportunities.
• Escalation Control: Ensure that all irregular warfare actions are coordinated with broader U.S. strategic goals and are designed to avoid uncontrollable escalation into full-scale conventional conflicts.
• Lead with our values rather than retreating behind them: Remove or loosen restrictions on military and security engagement with countries and forces accused of human rights violations and coup d’etat. These post-cold war relics only serve to cede influence to our adversaries. Instead continue to engage and lead with our values to privately criticize and teach the values of democratic security and civilian leadership models.

1. Implementation:

• Institutionalize Irregular Warfare:
• Doctrine and Training: Develop and integrate irregular warfare doctrine into military training programs across all branches.
• Dedicated Units: Establish dedicated irregular warfare units within the military to specialize in unconventional operations.
• Operationalize Irregular Warfare:
• Interagency Coordination: Enhance coordination between the Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, and other government entities to streamline irregular warfare efforts by establishing interagency task forces to campaign to achieve strategic objectives.
• Rapid Deployment: Maintain rapid deployment capabilities for irregular warfare units to respond swiftly to emerging threats.
• Long Term Deployment and Force Stationing: Provide designated forces for long duration presence and operations in specified operational areas to be prepared to and when directed conduct irregular warfare operations.
• Sustainment:
• Resource Allocation: Ensure adequate funding and resources are allocated to sustain irregular warfare operations.
• Continuous Assessment: Regularly assess and adapt strategies based on the evolving threat landscape, assessment of assumptions, and operational feedback.

1. Integration with NSDD-32’s Principles:

• Prevention of Strategic Nuclear Escalation: Irregular warfare should be conducted below the threshold of direct military confrontation with nuclear-armed states, relying on deniable, covert operations and asymmetric/gray zone conflicts.
• Reinforcing Deterrence: While engaging in irregular warfare, maintain and enhance the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from escalating to the nuclear level in response to unconventional challenges.
• Global Force Projection: Use irregular warfare to project U.S. influence globally, especially in regions where direct military intervention would be too costly or politically sensitive.

1. NSC Tasking:

• Using Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56 – the Management of Complex Contingency Operations) as a guide develop one comprehensive campaign plan to conduct irregular warfare in support of the US National Security Strategy. Include one annex for each member of the “Dark Quad”: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as well as for violent extremist organizations).

Conclusion:

This irregular warfare strategy, grounded in the principles of NSDD-32, offers a blend of political, economic, and military actions designed to counter modern adversaries. By integrating both traditional and contemporary elements of irregular warfare, the U.S. can maintain strategic superiority while mitigating the risks of full-scale conflict.

Tags: irregular forces, irregular warfare, proxy war, proxy warfare, strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• David Maxwell
• David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com