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1. Opinion | The Ambush on the National Guard

2. Who Is D.C. Shooting Suspect Rahmanullah Lakanwal?

3. D.C. Shooting Suspect ‘Could Not Tolerate’ the Violence of His C.I.A.-Backed Unit in Afghanistan, a Childhood Friend Said

4. Trump Is Silent on Taiwan After Talking to Xi—and That Is Fine With Taipei

5. Japan denies report Trump told PM Takaichi not to provoke China on Taiwan

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1. Opinion | The Ambush on the National Guard

Excerpts:

But even careful vetting is imperfect, and Rahmanullah Lakanwal may have become radicalized in the U.S. This has been known to happen even with the children of refugees who grow up in America.

Some will say this means the U.S. should never admit such refugees, but the alternative is abandoning allies who assist Americans in war to the retribution of our enemies. The fate of Afghans, men and women, who worked with the U.S. has often been brutal. You can be sure Americans will fight overseas again, and our troops will need allies on the ground to succeed. How many will assist us if they believe there will be no exit for them if the U.S. leaves with the enemy triumphant?

Comment: This is a terrible tragedy and our hearts go out to the soldiers and their families. But I want to highlight the second paragraph above since everyone will focus on the vetting issue in the first paragraph: vetting.

The WSJ Editorial Board identifies a phenomenon of the American military working with indigenous forces since World War II. It is simply amazing that any indigenous force would want to work with Americans if they knew our history of how we have treated them throughout the 20th and 21st Century.

Starting with the Alamo Scouts in the Philippines in WWII. They fought under US control but were never compensated until the 2000's and only because of the efforts of CSM(RET) Tim Strong to get Congress to recognize their support to US forces.

The Korean partisans and guerilla forces fought under the UN flag during the Korean War and received no recognition by their country and no compensation until the 1980s for their contributions to the war effort. Fighting under the UN flag was a convenient excuse by both the ROK and US to ignore them.

Then there are the tribes in Indochina during the Vietnam War (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia): The Montagnard, Hmong, Nung, Khmer Krom, and others. We all know what happened to them when we abandoned Vietnam.

Then there is, I believe, a 5000 man Afghan military that had been developed by US SF early in OEF that was ordered disbanded by an American commander and folded into the conventional Afghan Army. They took a huge pay cut and many chose not to enlist at all.

And then there is the great abandonment of Afghanistan in 2021.

Unfortunately, now, because of the killer in the DC guard ambush, every Afghan (and in the words of some, every Muslim) who has come to the US will be treated as potentially hostile. Yes we tried to rescue many who fought with US forces and who faced certain torture and death if they remained or are returned to Afghanistan. Should they all suffer and be blamed because of the actions of one man? They should not suffer or be blamed any more than all Americans should have been blamed for the murder committed by former American soldier, Timothy McVeigh in 1995 in Oklahoma City. But unfortunately we know many Afghans will suffer at the hands of some Americans.

Opinion | The Ambush on the National Guard

WSJ

The Ambush on the National Guard

The alleged shooting by an Afghan ‘partner’ shouldn’t condemn all who assisted the U.S. and now live here.

Nov. 27, 2025 1:43 pm ET

National Guard personnel at the site of a shooting incident near the White House on Wednesday. Kyodonews/Zuma Press

The ambush of two West Virginia National Guard members near the White House Wednesday afternoon is horrifying on its own. But it arouses a particular anger because the alleged shooter is an Afghan man who was granted refuge in the U.S. after the Taliban takeover in 2021.

The motive of 29-year-old Rahmanullah Lakanwal isn’t known at this writing. But U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro said he drove from his home in Bellingham, Wash., with a goal of staging an attack in Washington, D.C.

Ms. Pirro said he is being charged with three counts of assault with intent to kill, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. The charges will escalate if either of the young National Guard members dies, and both were in critical condition as we write.

Officials are calling it a terror attack, yet the CIA said the man had been part of a CIA-backed Afghan “partner force” in Kandahar province, one of the most dangerous places during the war. As such he was a Taliban target and thus he and his family were candidates for evacuation after the chaotic U.S. retreat from Afghanistan in 2021.

The reason for his alleged turn from partner to terrorist, especially as a husband and father of five in the U.S., is an important question to answer. The FBI will be looking for links to a domestic terror cell or international contacts, though he might simply have been disgruntled on his own about his adopted country.

President Trump immediately linked the shooting to Joe Biden’s Afghan debacle, and officials were quick to denounce the lack of adequate vetting in the evacuation rush of 2021. When and how the shooter was approved for entry will become clearer, and no doubt an orderly withdrawal would have allowed more careful investigation. This is one more cost of the Biden Administration’s Afghan failure.

But even careful vetting is imperfect, and Rahmanullah Lakanwal may have become radicalized in the U.S. This has been known to happen even with the children of refugees who grow up in America.

Some will say this means the U.S. should never admit such refugees, but the alternative is abandoning allies who assist Americans in war to the retribution of our enemies. The fate of Afghans, men and women, who worked with the U.S. has often been brutal. You can be sure Americans will fight overseas again, and our troops will need allies on the ground to succeed. How many will assist us if they believe there will be no exit for them if the U.S. leaves with the enemy triumphant?

The Trump Administration said it has paused processing immigration applications from Afghanistan, and Mr. Trump said the attack justifies his mass deportation policy. But it would be a shame if this single act of betrayal became the excuse for deporting all Afghan refugees in the U.S.

Tens of thousands are building new lives here in peace and are contributing to their communities. They shouldn’t be blamed for the violent act of one man. Collective punishment of all Afghans in the U.S. won’t make America safer and it might embitter more against the United States.

Journal Editorial Report: Who’s winning the fight over the administration’s immigration policies?

Appeared in the November 28, 2025, print edition as 'The Ambush on the National Guard'.

WSJ

2. Who Is D.C. Shooting Suspect Rahmanullah Lakanwal?

Summary:

Rahmanullah Lakanwal, a 29-year-old Afghan who worked with a CIA-linked counterterrorism unit in Kandahar, was evacuated to the U.S. in 2021 under Operation Allies Welcome and later settled in Bellingham, Washington, where he received asylum. Authorities say he drove to Washington, D.C., and on Nov. 26 ambushed two West Virginia National Guard soldiers on patrol near the White House, killing 20-year-old Sarah Beckstrom and critically wounding 24-year-old Andrew Wolfe, using a .357 revolver. Fellow Guardsmen shot and captured him. He is expected to face first-degree murder and federal terrorism charges, sparking renewed debate over vetting of Afghan evacuees.

Comment: So many questions: Assuming he began fighting in Afghanistan at 18 years old, that means he would have begun his training around 2014. And why did he use a revolver? What was his intention? Was he, and if so, how was he radicalized? What caused him to take this action? Did he act on his own or was he recruited to take this action?

Who Is D.C. Shooting Suspect Rahmanullah Lakanwal?

WSJ

The 29-year-old Afghan national settled in Bellingham, Wash., after working with CIA in his home country

By Jack Morphet

Nov. 28, 2025 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/who-is-d-c-shooting-suspect-rahmanullah-lakanwal-c44ef1cd

Blood was washed off the sidewalk near Washington, D.C.’s metro station on Thanksgiving, the day after the deadly shooting. Andrew Leyden/Getty Images

Authorities are searching for clues to why a man shot two West Virginia National Guard members serving in Washington, D.C., on Wednesday, killing one and grievously wounding the other.

The suspect, Rahmanullah Lakanwal, will likely be charged with first-degree murder, after Jeanine Pirro, the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, said she would pursue the charges if either victim died.

Attorney General Pam Bondi told Fox News that the U.S. government also planned to level terrorism charges against Lakanwal. It wasn’t clear if he had a lawyer or had been assigned a public defender.

Here’s what to know about the suspect.

The suspect will likely be charged with first-degree murder, after Jeanine Pirro, D.C’.s U.S. attorney, said she would pursue the charges if either victim died. Photo: Andrew Leyden/Getty Images

He worked with the CIA during the war in Afghanistan.

Lakanwal, aged 29, worked with the U.S. government, including the Central Intelligence Agency, “as a member of a partner force in Kandahar,” John Ratcliffe, the spy agency’s director, said.

He was in one of Afghanistan’s elite counterterrorism units operated by the CIA, according to AfghanEvac, a nonprofit organization that resettles Afghan nationals outside the country.

Lakanwal was evacuated to the U.S. shortly after the Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Why was the suspect in the U.S.?

Lakanwal was evacuated from Afghanistan by the U.S. military and entered the country on Sept. 8, 2021, as part of a resettlement program called Operation Allies Welcome, according to Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem.

He was one of around 86,000 Afghans who assisted U.S. forces or were otherwise at-risk and brought into the country on a temporary status known as “humanitarian parole.”

Rahmanullah Lakanwal U.S. Attorney’s Office/AP

Lakanwal settled in Bellingham, Wash., where he applied for asylum, which was granted in April during President Trump’s second term, according to officials.

Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin said the U.S. government was bound by a Biden-era court settlement to expedite asylum claims of Afghans paroled into the U.S. under Operation Allies Welcome.

“Regardless if his asylum was granted or not, this monster would not have been removed because of his parole,” McLaughlin said.

On Wednesday, both Noem and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel criticized the resettlement policy as one without full vetting.

Others with knowledge of the resettlement program say the Afghan evacuees were screened thoroughly.

“Afghans who worked closely with U.S. diplomatic and intelligence personnel, including units assisting the CIA, underwent among the most intensive vetting of any foreign nationals around the world as a condition of their employment and prior to entering the United States,” said Sam Aronson, a former State Department official who vetted Afghans at the Kabul airport during the August 2021 evacuation.

What role did the suspect allegedly take in the Washington, D.C., shooting?

Officials say Lakanwal drove from his home in Bellingham, Wash., to Washington, D.C., where he shot two National Guard troops, Sarah Beckstrom, 20, and Andrew Wolfe, 24, just blocks from the White House on Nov. 26.

View the images

Witness Photos Captured the Attack on the National Guard

The National Guard members were on patrol when Lakanwal allegedly came from around a corner and opened fire with a .357 Smith & Wesson revolver, according to authorities.

“It appears to be a lone gunman that raised a firearm and ambushed these members of the National Guard,” said Metropolitan Police Executive Assistant Chief Jeffery Carroll.

Fellow Guardsmen shot Lakanwal, who is in the hospital in police custody.

The shooting of National Guard members was “targeted,” according to Pirro.

The National Guard troops were part of the contingent of troops deployed to Washington, D.C., on Trump’s orders over the summer to support law enforcement.

What is the status of the shooting victims?

Beckstrom died on Thursday, according to Trump. The second victim, Wolfe, remained in a critical condition.

This explanatory article may be periodically updated.

Write to Jack Morphet at jack.morphet@wsj.com

3. D.C. Shooting Suspect ‘Could Not Tolerate’ the Violence of His C.I.A.-Backed Unit in Afghanistan, a Childhood Friend Said

Summary:

Rahmanullah Lakanwal, 29, the Afghan refugee accused of shooting two National Guard soldiers in Washington, once served in a CIA backed “Zero Unit” in Kandahar, a force lauded by U.S. officials but branded a death squad by human rights groups. Raised in Khost, he reportedly struggled with mental health problems and told a childhood friend he could not tolerate the blood and bodies from night raids. Evacuated after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, he resettled in Washington State and gained asylum in April. His case has reignited scrutiny of Zero Units, Afghan vetting, and U.S. responsibility toward former partners.

D.C. Shooting Suspect ‘Could Not Tolerate’ the Violence of His C.I.A.-Backed Unit in Afghanistan, a Childhood Friend Said

The C.I.A. and an Afghan intelligence official said that the shooter had been part of an Afghan “partner force,” known as a Zero Unit, trained and supported by the agency in the southern province of Kandahar.

By Julian E. Barnes Hamed Aleaziz Elian Peltier and Safiullah Padshah

Elian Peltier and Safiullah Padshah reported from Kabul, Afghanistan.

Nov. 27, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/27/us/national-guard-dc-shooting-suspect-cia-afghanistan.html

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Law enforcement at the scene of the shooting. The suspect had worked with a C.I.A.-supported military unit in Afghanistan.Credit...Eric Lee for The New York Times

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The Afghan refugee accused of shooting two National Guard members in Washington, D.C., fought in the late days of the U.S. war there as part of a “Zero Unit,” a paramilitary force that worked with the C.I.A., according to a person briefed on the investigation and an Afghan intelligence officer familiar with the matter. The units were known for their brutality and labeled “death squads” by human rights groups.

The suspect, identified by federal officials as Rahmanullah Lakanwal, 29, grew up in a village in the eastern province of Khost. A childhood friend, who asked to be identified only as Muhammad because he feared Taliban reprisals, said that Mr. Lakanwal had suffered from mental health issues and was disturbed by the casualties his unit had caused.

“He would tell me and our friends that their military operations were very tough, their job was very difficult, and they were under a lot of pressure,” Muhammad said.

The suspect received asylum from the U.S. government in April, according to three people with knowledge of the case who were not authorized to speak publicly.

Members of the Zero units were among the thousands of Afghans relocated to the United States under the Biden administration after the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021, which allowed the Taliban to retake control of the country. Federal officials said Mr. Lakanwal was part of that program and had resettled with his family in Washington State.

“The Biden administration justified bringing the alleged shooter to the United States in September 2021 due to his prior work with the U.S. government, including C.I.A., as a member of a partner force in Kandahar,” the C.I.A. director, John Ratcliffe, said in a statement, adding that the accused assailant “should have never been allowed to come here.”

An Afghan intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t allowed to comment publicly on the issue, confirmed that Mr. Lakanwal had served in Kandahar in one of the Zero Units, which were formally part of the Afghan intelligence service. The units had been trained for nighttime raids targeting suspected Taliban members, and were accused by human rights groups of widespread killings of civilians.

The intelligence officer said that one of Mr. Lakanwal’s brothers was the deputy commander of the Zero Unit in Kandahar, which was known as 03.

Muhammad, Mr. Lakanwal’s childhood friend, said he has last seen him a few weeks before the Taliban takeover in 2021, when Mr. Lakanwal came to Khost to marry his second wife. He had started smoking weed, Muhammad said, and ended up divorcing his new wife a few days after the wedding. Muhammed recalled that Mr. Lakanwal told him: “When he saw blood, bodies, and the wounded, he could not tolerate it, and it put a lot of pressure on his mind.”

Taliban officials on Thursday denounced the actions of the Zero Units during the war. Sediqullah Quraishi Badloon, a provincial official in Nangarhar, in eastern Afghanistan, accused the groups of looting after the chaotic fall of the U.S.-backed government.

“After that, they fled to the United States in search of a better life,” Mr. Badloon said in a social media post. “These traitors still do not let the Afghan people live in peace.”

The C.I.A. has denied the allegations of brutality among the units, saying they were the result of Taliban propaganda. Current and former officials said the units played an important role in the American evacuation of Afghanistan. The units helped both U.S. citizens and Afghan partners flee to the airport and get on flights out of the country.

In at least one instance, however, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services used a Human Rights Watch report decrying the units as a reason to deny U.S. citizenship to an Afghan soldier who had worked alongside American forces during the war.

A correction was made on Nov. 27, 2025: An earlier version of this article misstated the action that U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services took against an Afghan soldier as a result of a Human Rights Watch report. The soldier was denied citizenship, not asylum.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews @nytimes.com.Learn more

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

Hamed Aleaziz covers the Department of Homeland Security and immigration policy for The Times.

Elian Peltier is an international correspondent for The Times, covering Afghanistan and Pakistan.

4. Trump Is Silent on Taiwan After Talking to Xi—and That Is Fine With Taipei

Summary:

POTUS maintains traditional U.S. “strategic ambiguity” on defending Taiwan after a call with Xi Jinping, saying publicly only that relations with China are strong. Taipei’s leadership publicly expresses confidence, pointing to nonstop cooperation, new U.S. arms sales, and Lai Ching-te’s plan for a 40 billion dollar special defense budget and higher defense spending toward 5 percent of GDP. Yet POTUS' silence worries some in Taiwan, who fear support could be bargained away in a great-power deal. Analysts say ambiguity preserves U.S. leverage and may frustrate Beijing, but it also risks undermining Taiwanese public confidence and resolve.

Excerpts:

Some analysts described Trump’s public silence on Taiwan as a source of leverage for the U.S. side.

“The U.S. has kept approving sizable arms packages for Taipei even as economic talks continue,” said Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank. “Xi pressing Taiwan on this call reflects frustration that Trump is not giving China the rhetorical shift it wants.”

Taiwan’s security remains a focal point of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific. Military installations in South Korea, Japan and Guam maintain a U.S. footprint intended in part to deter Beijing.

Comment: Is this the most complex geopolitical situation we face? It sure seems like it.

Trump Is Silent on Taiwan After Talking to Xi—and That Is Fine With Taipei

WSJ

Island counting on American support makes the most of U.S. policy of ambiguity

By Joyu Wang

Nov. 27, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-is-silent-on-taiwan-after-talking-to-xiand-that-is-fine-with-taipei-8a20ddcc

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said he would seek a $40 billion special budget for military spending to deter China. I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Images

President Trump maintained strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan, after a phone call with China’s Xi Jinping.
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te plans to increase military spending and says the relationship with the U.S. is strong.
The island depends on American military support, making Trump's public silence a source of concern for some.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

President Trump maintained strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan, after a phone call with China’s Xi Jinping.

TAIPEI—For years, most U.S. presidents have declined to answer the question of whether America would defend Taiwan’s democracy against a military takeover by Communist China. This “strategic ambiguity”—backed by aid for Taiwan’s self-defense and a robust military presence in the Pacific—has been key to deterring Beijing.

But with China’s military growing stronger and leader Xi Jinping on a mission to tell the world that Taiwan belongs to Beijing—a message he delivered to President Trump in a phone call Monday—the question has resurfaced: Is saying little saying enough?

The view from Taiwan’s leadership: Trump’s silence speaks volumes.

“The relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. is rock solid,” Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said Wednesday, after declaring that he would seek a $40 billion special budget for military spending to deter China.

U.S.-Taiwan cooperation during Trump’s second term has been “nonstop,” Lai said. “That’s why we’re confident about the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations.”

Taiwan conducts routine maritime patrol missions. I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Images

Taiwan’s survival depends on U.S. military support. That makes Trump’s public silence, coupled with his willingness to turn away from traditional U.S. alliances, a cause for concern for some in Taipei.

The fear is that Trump could modulate support for Taiwan to reach a trade deal with China, just as he has used U.S. support for Ukraine as leverage for a potential peace deal with Russia.

“Taiwanese people want to hear, ‘Of course America has your back,’ but America is not going to say that,” said Lev Nachman, who teaches political science at National Taiwan University. “Trump’s not going to say that.”

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When Trump and Xi met in South Korea in October, at an upbeat summit that focused on progress in trade agreements, the contentious topic of Taiwan didn’t come up. Asked during an interview with CBS TV’s “60 Minutes” after meeting with Xi if he would order U.S. forces to defend Taiwan, Trump replied: “You’ll find out if it happens. And he understands the answer to that.”

With the two leaders planning to meet again in China in April, Xi made a move on Monday to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Taiwan. The Chinese leader emphasized to Trump his view that Taiwan must “return” to China, which claims the island as its own territory.

Trump, posting on social media about the call, made no mention of Taiwan. “Our relationship with China is extremely strong!” he wrote.

Xi’s message to Trump followed two weeks of Chinese diplomatic attacks against U.S. ally Japan over Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comment that her country could be pulled into a war over Taiwan.

Following his talk with Xi, Trump set up a call with Takaichi in which, The Wall Street Journal reported, he advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Takaichi’s office denied that Trump made such a remark.

Taiwan’s president with soldiers in front of a U.S.-made Abrams tank. Ann Wang/Reuters

Some analysts described Trump’s public silence on Taiwan as a source of leverage for the U.S. side.

“The U.S. has kept approving sizable arms packages for Taipei even as economic talks continue,” said Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank. “Xi pressing Taiwan on this call reflects frustration that Trump is not giving China the rhetorical shift it wants.”

Taiwan’s security remains a focal point of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific. Military installations in South Korea, Japan and Guam maintain a U.S. footprint intended in part to deter Beijing.

The U.S. approved new arms sales to Taiwan this month, a first in the second Trump presidency. Taiwan has commissioned its new Abrams tanks purchased from the U.S. and is getting up to speed on the use of its new U.S.-made Altius-600M attack drones. Members of Taiwan’s military routinely receive U.S. training, including a unit of marines that recently trained in Guam.

Still, the Trump administration has pressed Taiwan to spend more on its own defense—making every defense dollar spent by Taipei an argument for sustained U.S. support. Lai has pledged to increase the military budget to 5% of GDP by 2030, from the 3.32% set for next year’s budget.

The question of American support also has political ramifications. Public backing for Lai’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party is built in large part on the argument that the island must prepare to battle China and deflect Beijing’s “gray zone” efforts to get Taiwan to submit without a fight.

Former President Joe Biden said, and repeated, that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. White House staff walked back his comments—all four times.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

How much and what kind of support should the U.S. provide Taiwan? Join the conversation below.

Trump has consistently adhered to the policy of strategic ambiguity, said Marvin Park, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who was director for Taiwan affairs in Biden’s National Security Council.

“Between Trump 1 and Trump 2, Trump has never willy-nilly just haphazardly or flippantly talked about Taiwan,” Park said. “You don’t want Trump to talk about Taiwan until he is ready to talk about Taiwan.”

National security officials in Taipei said that they interpret Trump’s public silence as a sign that Washington doesn’t agree with Xi’s claim to the island. Trump has previously said he received assurances from Xi that China won’t attack Taiwan as long as he is in the White House.

Even so, the worry lingers on an island whose survival ultimately depends on the U.S. military: What if China attacks and the U.S. doesn’t come to the rescue?

The question itself has a real effect on Taiwan’s security, said Nachman. While U.S. silence may deter China, it can also weaken public resolve, he suggested.

“Whether or not we believe America is coming or not has a very big effect on people’s willingness to defend Taiwan,” Nachman said.

Write to Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com

WSJ

5. Japan denies report Trump told PM Takaichi not to provoke China on Taiwan

Summary:

Japan rejected a Wall Street Journal report claiming POTUS told Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi not to provoke China over Taiwan, with top spokesman Minoru Kihara saying “there is no such fact” while refusing further comment. Takaichi’s earlier suggestion that Japan could intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict angered Beijing, which summoned Japan’s ambassador, warned Chinese travelers, and reportedly pressed POTUS about Taiwan’s “return” in a call. China has hinted at renewed seafood import bans and accused Tokyo of downplaying Takaichi’s remarks. Trump’s public silence worries some in Tokyo, who fear he may trade support for Taiwan to improve ties with Beijing.

Comment: How can we find an opportunity in this complex situation? How effectively are we coordinating words and deeds with our allies?

Japan denies report Trump told PM Takaichi not to provoke China on Taiwan

Takaichi’s suggestion earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily if Taiwan is attacked has enraged Beijing.

Al Jazeera English · News Agencies

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/27/japan-denies-report-trump-told-pm-takaichi-not-to-provoke-china-on-taiwan

Japan has denied a report that said United States President Donald Trump had advised Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi not to provoke China over Taiwan’s sovereignty.

In a news briefing on Thursday, Japan’s top government spokesperson Minoru Kihara said “there is no such fact” about an article published in The Wall Street Journal claiming that Trump had made such a remark to the Japanese leader.

Japan will pay 'painful price' if it steps out of line over Taiwan, China military says

channelnewsasia.com

27 Nov 2025 05:55PM

(Updated: 27 Nov 2025 06:20PM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/japan-china-taiwan-painful-price-steps-out-line-5493651

BEIJING: China's defence ministry said on Thursday (Nov 27) that Japan will have to pay a "painful price" if it steps out of line over Taiwan, responding to Japanese plans to deploy missiles on an island some 100km from Taiwan's coast.

The remarks come amid the countries' worst diplomatic crisis in years, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said this month a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo.

Japan's Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said on Sunday that plans were "steadily moving forward" to deploy a medium-range surface-to-air missile unit at a military base on Yonaguni, an island about 110km off Taiwan's east coast.

Asked about the deployment, which China's foreign ministry has already criticised, the country's defence ministry said how to "resolve the Taiwan question" was a Chinese matter and nothing to do with Japan, which controlled Taiwan from 1895 until the end of WWII in 1945.

"Not only has Japan failed to deeply reflect on its grave crimes of aggression and colonial rule in Taiwan, it has instead, in defiance of world opinion, entertained the delusion of military intervention in the Taiwan Strait," spokesperson Jiang Bin told a regular news briefing.

"The People's Liberation Army has powerful capabilities and reliable means to defeat any invading enemy. If the Japanese side dares to cross the line even half a step and bring trouble upon itself, it will inevitably pay a painful price," he added.

Taiwan's democratically elected government rejects Beijing's territorial claims, saying only the island's people can decide their future.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te this week unveiled plans to spend an extra US$40 billion on defence over the coming eight years, which China criticised as a waste of money that would only plunge Taiwan into disaster.

Asked about that criticism, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council spokesperson Liang Wen-chieh said on Thursday that China's defence spending was far greater than Taiwan's.

"If they could place importance on cross-strait peace, this money could also be used to improve the mainland's economy and people's livelihoods," he said.

"The two sides of the strait would not then be like this, at daggers drawn; that would be good for everyone."

China's military operates almost daily in the waters and skies around Taiwan in what the government in Taipei says is part of Beijing's harassment and pressure campaign against it.

Source: Reuters/dc

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7. The global AI race is supercharging Taiwan’s economy. But many don’t feel better off

Summary:

Taiwan’s AI-driven export boom has pushed growth above 8 percent for two straight quarters, with 2025 GDP forecast near 7.4 percent and the stock market now among the world’s largest. Chip and electronics giants such as TSMC lead a surge in exports, especially to U.S. AI data center builders. Yet prosperity is highly concentrated. Electronics generate over 15 percent of GDP but employ a small share of workers, real wages have stagnated for decades, and housing costs have soared. Many Taiwanese feel little benefit amid widening inequality, Trump’s tariff threats, and constant pressure from China, reinforcing a cautious, insecure public mood.

Excerpts:

For Wu of Academia Sinica, he remains optimistic, saying that the thriving tech industry could generate spillover effects that trickle down to other sectors.

“Taiwan’s economy wasn’t shaped by deliberate planning or an exceptionally capable government, but rather an evolutionary process,” he said.

While the size of Taiwan’s economy is dwarfed by leading global powers, Wu added, its small and medium-sized enterprises are nimble, adaptable and attuned to global trends.

“That’s how its semiconductor industry became what it is today.”

The global AI race is supercharging Taiwan’s economy. But many don’t feel better off | CNN Business

CNN · John Liu · November 28, 2025

https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/28/economy/taiwan-ai-economy-intl-hnk

Night view of Taipei 101 and the Taipei skyline in the distance behind vegetation and a mountain trail from Taipei Mountains in Taipei, Taiwan, on December 14, 2021.

Jimmy Beunardeau/Hans Lucas/AFP/Getty Images

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For proof that an economy can thrive even under constant military threats from a powerful neighbor and amid US President Donald Trump’s sweeping global tariffs, look no further than Taiwan.

The self-ruled democracy has logged roughly 8% economic growth for two consecutive quarters, a rare achievement for a developed economy and one that is projected to push its 2025 GDP growth close to 7.4%, even surpassing China’s.

“Taiwan’s economy has clearly been one of the best performing economies in the world, particularly over recent quarters,” said Jason Tuvey, an economist at Capital Economics. “Many people expected Taiwan’s economy to benefit from the sort of AI boom, but maybe many underestimated to what extent it would do.”

Taiwan’s statistics bureau on Friday reported 8.21 % year-on-year growth in GDP in the third quarter, driven by a 36.5% surge in exports in the period ending September. This followed an already striking 7.7% expansion in the second quarter.

In October, exports hit a record high, climbing 49.7% from a year earlier – the largest single month increase in over 15 years.

To top it all off, Taiwan’s stock market overtook Germany’s in September as the world’s eighth largest, riding on the global frenzy for artificial intelligence.

Logo of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd (TSMC) is pictured at Hsinchu Science Park in Hsinchu, Taiwan, on April 18, 2025.

Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

But even as Taiwan’s economy flourishes, driven by the outsized influence of its high-tech sector as exemplified by the world-beating chipmaker TSMC, many citizens have been unable to share in the boom, as income gaps widen and wages remain stagnant.

Economists say a key reason is that the gains are highly concentrated. Electronics manufacturing accounts for more than 15% of GDP but employs just 6.5% of the workforce, according to Capital Economics.

This unevenness is partly reflected in sluggish consumer spending. Consumer confidence has remained subdued throughout the year, according to the index released by the Research Center of Taiwan Economic Development. Trump’s trade war has also dampened sentiment, economists say, particularly as Taiwan has yet to finalize a trade agreement with Washington.

“From my perspective as a salaried worker earning above the median income, I feel the economy isn’t actually doing that well,” said Vivian Chen, a nurse in the Southern port city of Kaohsiung.

Chen’s observations are echoed by many in the home of the global chip powerhouse. Taiwan’s GDP per capita is forecast to exceed $38,000 this year, outpacing South Korea and Japan. But its average wage lags both countries by at least 30%, according to CNN’s calculations of official data.

One of the biggest beneficiaries of AI

Taiwan’s tech prowess, built over decades in the chip and electronics industries, has positioned the island to benefit from the AI boom. As tech giants from Google and OpenAI to Microsoft rush to build data centers powered by graphics processing units designed by Nvidia and AMD, Taiwanese companies have been at the forefront, manufacturing the semiconductors and servers essential for training AI models.

In one prominent example, TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker that supplies Nvidia and is known by locals as the “protector of the nation,” has raised its full-year revenue growth forecast to the mid-30% range, driven by the explosive growth in AI, after surpassing sales expectations in previous quarters.

Visitors watch a wafer shown on screens at the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) Renovation Museum at the Hsinchu Science Park in Hsinchu, Taiwan, on July 5, 2023.

Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s outbound shipments to the US, where most of the AI data center expansions have occurred, have grown more than 63% in the first 10 months of this year, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance.

But questions have mounted about the sustainability of this export-driven boom, especially amid concerns that the AI frenzy could cool.

Taiwan’s export growth “will definitely come down next year,” said Wang Jiann-Chyuan, vice president of the semi-official thinktank Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. He expects growth to retreat from about 30% in recent quarters to single digits, as this year’s surge makes further expansion harder.

Trump’s shadow

Adding to the uncertainty is Trump, Wang said. Taiwan’s trade surplus with the US hit a record this year, raising the risk of scrutiny from a president who has made reducing trade deficits a central goal of his tariff campaign.

So far, chips and electronics, which made up more than 73% of Taiwan’s exports, have been spared from the levy. While Trump has repeatedly threatened triple-digit tariffs on semiconductors, he has exempted companies, including TSMC, that build manufacturing facilities in the United States.

Still, the heavy concentration of exports in the high-tech sector has amplified concerns about over-reliance on a single industry — or even a single company. While chips and electronics now account for nearly three-quarters of exports, up from roughly half five years ago, traditional sectors such as metals, machinery, and plastics have seen little growth or outright decline.

Shipping containers are seen at the Port of Keelung in Keelung, Taiwan, on August 7, 2025.

I-Hwa ChengAFP/Getty Images

For Wu Jieh-min, a researcher at Taiwan’s top research institute Academia Sinica, however, part of the concern about the island’s economic future are associated with many Taiwanese people’s deep-seated insecurity about its political status. China claims Taiwan as part of its territory, despite having never controlled it, and has vowed to absorb it by force, if necessary.

“I think the cautious, on-edge mindset you see across Taiwanese society is very obvious, and I actually see it as something positive,” said Wu, whose research focuses on political economy and sociology.

“We have to manage our own future very carefully, because even just surviving is already difficult for us,” he said.

Disconnect

On the ground, some Taiwanese say the rosy headline figures don’t reflect their daily lives, like Chen, the nurse, who said salaries for health professionals feel stagnant.

“That’s why you hear doctors complaining about being underpaid, and why so many nurses are leaving the country or the industry altogether,” Chen said.

“People in Taiwan keep hyping themselves up, saying things like ‘We have TSMC,’ or boasting about how high the stock market is. But for many living here, their monthly pay stayed much the same,” she added.

GT Lin, an AI engineer in Taipei, echoed that sentiment.

“That’s why I’ve come to the conclusion that the country is strong, but the people aren’t necessarily wealthy,” he said.

Taiwan’s real wage growth, adjusted for inflation, began to slow in the late 1990s and has remained stagnant since the early 2000s. Labor’s share of GDP peaked at about 50% in the 1990s and has since fallen to around 44%.

Roy Ngerng, a Singaporean labor activist based in Taipei who has written extensively about the issue of wage stagnation in Taiwan, attributed the problem to long-term wage suppression — aimed at boosting export competitiveness.

He said that while Taiwan’s economy has seen exceptional growth in recent years – and booming profits among tech businesses – average workers and employees in other sectors have been mostly left out, widening the income disparity.

Just five years ago, wages in the electronics sector were already 35% above the economy-wide average, according to Capital Economics. Now they are more than 70% higher.

Ngerng added that the current government has been steadily increasing the minimum wage.

Visitors walk around a local night market in Keelung on June 26, 2025.

I-Hwa ChengAFP/Getty Images

Wu Tsong-Min, an economist at National Taiwan University, however, notes that wage stagnation is “not unique to Taiwan,” as many advanced economies face similar issues, particularly among low-skill workers.

Wu, the author of “A 400-Year History of Taiwan’s Economy,” also pointed out that Taiwan’s GDP per capita, after adjusted for purchasing power, rises further thanks to lower domestic prices.

Still, housing remains a major burden: Taipei’s house price-to-income ratio has nearly tripled in the past two decades, surpassing London, New York and even Hong Kong, according to the Global Property Guide.

For Wu of Academia Sinica, he remains optimistic, saying that the thriving tech industry could generate spillover effects that trickle down to other sectors.

“Taiwan’s economy wasn’t shaped by deliberate planning or an exceptionally capable government, but rather an evolutionary process,” he said.

While the size of Taiwan’s economy is dwarfed by leading global powers, Wu added, its small and medium-sized enterprises are nimble, adaptable and attuned to global trends.

“That’s how its semiconductor industry became what it is today.”

CNN · John Liu · November 28, 2025

8. Taiwan sets date to prepare for WAR with China that could spiral into WW3

Summary:

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has warned that the island must be ready for all-out war with China within two years, vowing a defence boost of about £30.6 billion. His plan would lift spending above 3 percent of GDP next year and toward 5 percent by 2030, funding new US arms deals, long range missiles, counter drone and anti ballistic systems, and the “T Dome” air defence shield. Lai frames the buildup as deterrence, not linked to tariff talks with Washington. The plan faces resistance from the China friendly Kuomintang, even as Taipei expands civil defence handbooks for its population.

Comment: An interesting interpretation of the Taiwan budget announcement. Videos, photos, and graphics at the link.

Taiwan sets date to prepare for WAR with China that could spiral into WW3

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei threaten to reach boiling point

the-sun.com · Joe Mannion

Published: 12:08, 26 Nov 2025

https://www.the-sun.com/news/15552691/taiwan-prepare-for-war-with-china-ww3/

TAIWAN has fired a stark warning to Beijing, vowing to ready itself for all-out war within two years as China ramps up threats to seize the island.

President Lai Ching-te announced today that he will be accelerating defence spending by £30.6billion to have a “high level” of joint combat readiness against China by 2027.

A Taiwanese US-made M60A3 tank firing during military exercises on Taiwan’s Penghu IslandsCredit: AFPTaiwanese military personnel fire howitzer ammunition during military drillsCredit: EPATaiwanese President Lai Ching-te has hit back at China’s military threatsCredit: Getty

Lai accused Xi Jinping of “speeding up military preparations to take Taiwan by force” as tensions reach boiling point in a war of words that could spiral into WW3.

Taiwan has escalated its military spending over the past decade, but US President Donald Trump‘s administration have urged the island to do more to protect itself.

At the press conference announcing the bombshell spend increase, Lai said: “The ultimate goal is to establish defence capabilities that can permanently safeguard democratic Taiwan,

“Beijing authorities have recently intensified efforts aimed at turning democratic Taiwan into China’s Taiwan, posing a serious threat to our national security and to Taiwan’s freedom and democracy.”

Communist China has never ruled Taiwan, but Beijing has threated to annex it by force, carrying out terrifying dress rehearsal invasions in the South China Sea.

Xi even told Trump in a phone call that Taiwan’s return to China “an integral part of the post-war international order.”

China has offered Taiwan a “one country, two systems” solution, but this model has been rejected by any mainstream political party in the country.

Lai’s announcement comes amidst a vicious back-and-forth between Beijing and Tokyo, with conservative Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting Japan could intervene militarily in any attack on Taiwan.

The United States’ top envoy in Taiwan has backed the island’s huge defence splurge and urged the island’s rival political parties to “find common ground” to beef up its defences.

Lai said the extra cash will go on fresh US arms deals and boosting the island’s ability to fight a more flexible, asymmetrical war.

Horror moment pack of gun-toting 'robot WOLVES' storms battlefield as bots lead China’s mammoth Taiwan invasion force

INVASION OF THE WOLVES

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Stunning moment army of humanoid Chinese robots marches forward in ‘first mass delivery’ of futuristic machines

He insisted the military push has nothing to do with ongoing tariff talks with Washington and said the real aim is to “demonstrate Taiwan’s determination to defend” itself.

In an article in the Washington Post, Lai said: “We aim to bolster deterrence by inserting greater costs and uncertainties into Beijing’s decision-making on the use of force.”

The comments come after the US signed off on 330 million dollars worth of parts and components in the first Taiwan arms sale since Donald Trump returned to the White House.

Lai, who heads the Democratic Progressive Party, has already set out plans to lift defence spending above three percent of GDP next year and five percent by 2030.

China has expanded its reconstruction of Taiwanese government buildings at its Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia

The government has put forward a £22.7billion budget for next year, equal to 3.32 percent of GDP.

The extra eight year package unveiled on Wednesday goes beyond the 32 billion dollars previously revealed to AFP.

Lai said the money will help develop the so called “T-Dome”, an air defence shield, while boosting Taiwan’s own defence industry.

Long range precision missiles, counter-drone systems and anti ballistic weapons are all on the shopping list, according to the defence ministry.

Su Tzu-yun, a military analyst in Taipei, told AFP that Lai’s plan is what Taiwan needs, saying: “Freedom is not a free lunch.”

The government faces an uphill battle in parliament, where the China friendly Kuomintang holds the purse strings with help from the Taiwan People’s Party.

New Kuomintang boss Cheng Li-wun has attacked Lai’s plans before and claims Taiwan “doesn’t have that much money.”

Xi Jinping called Taiwan’s return to China as “integral” to world orderCredit: GettyA China-registered bulk carrier ship pictured in the South China SeaCredit: APThe Chinese navy have been carrying out mock invasions in the South China SeaCredit: AFP

Kuomintang lawmaker Ma Wen chun added that “strengthening national defence is not about simply buying more weapons” and that recruiting and retaining troops is “far more urgent and important issue.

“In the future we may face a situation where there are no personnel left to operate these weapons.”

But those personnel issues may be solved after Taiwan began distributing millions of civil defence handbooks to households last week.

In an unprecedented effort to prepare residents, Taiwan issued advice for potential emergencies – including a Chinese attack.

The handbook, unveiled in September, includes for the first time instructions on what to do if citizens encounter enemy soldiers.

Why does China want to invade Taiwan?

TAIWAN insists it is an independent nation after splitting from mainland China amid civil war in 1949.

But China claims Taiwan remains a part of its territory with which it must eventually be reunified – and has not ruled out the use of force to take the island and place it under Beijing’s control.

The island, which is roughly 100 miles from the coast of south-east China, sees itself as distinct from the Chinese mainland, with its own constitution and democratically-elected leaders.

Taiwan sits in the so-called “first island chain”, which includes a list of US-friendly territories that are crucial to Washington’s foreign policy in the region.

This also puts it in an ideal situation to slow a Chinese attack on the West.

And with tensions between the two nations high, Taiwan is likely to aid China’s enemy if it means keeping its independence.

Taiwan’s economy is another factor in China’s desperation to reclaim the land.

If China takes the island, it could be freer to project power in the western Pacific and rival the US, thanks to much of the world’s electronics being made in Taiwan.

This would allow Beijing to have control over an industry that drives the global economy.

China insists that its intentions are peaceful, but President Xi Jinping has also used threats towards the small island nation

the-sun.com · Joe Mannion

9. SpyWatch: CIA Drops Top Spy Leader Pick: Politics and U.S. National Security Concerns

Summary:

The CIA’s abrupt decision to drop veteran spymaster Ralph Goff from the top clandestine operations post, despite a confirmed start date and stellar credentials, signals heavy political interference in intelligence leadership. Observers link the reversal to his outspoken, post-retirement support for Ukraine, an unusually public stance for a former senior operator. The move suggests senior IC appointments now hinge not only on operational excellence but on political comfort and alignment with current foreign policy narratives. Morton argues this politicization chills the officer corps, risks sidelining top talent, erodes trust, and weakens U.S. clandestine capabilities at a time of intense adversary probing.

Sunday, November 23, 2025

SpyWatch: CIA Drops Top Spy Leader Pick: Politics and U.S. National Security Concerns

https://osintdaily.blogspot.com/2025/11/cia-drops-top-spy-leader-pick-politics.html

Ralph Goff was a seasoned spymaster and dropping him raises national security questionsThe decision by the CIA to drop a seasoned agency veteran, Ralph Goff, from consideration for the top clandestine operations post sends a clear signal—there’s more going on behind the scenes than meets the eye. After 35 years of service, six station chief tours and a stint as chief of operations for entire swaths of Europe and Eurasia, Goff seemed practically built for the job. Yet, despite having a confirmed start date, the appointment was abruptly reversed with no public explanation.

What makes the reversal really interesting is the speculation around Goff’s outspoken support for Ukraine. In the era where foreign policy is increasingly entwined with intelligence-community leadership, his advocacy appears to have been a factor. After retirement he didn’t fade into the background—he traveled to Ukraine, met with officials, supported humanitarian efforts—and that kind of public posture in an intelligence veteran is both rare and risky. It raises the question: when operational experience meets outspoken foreign-policy views, does that make someone indispensable—or too politically exposed for the job?

The optics are stark. An agency that deals in secrets moves openly to sideline someone who has been at the cutting edge of human intelligence, presumably because of external pressures or internal politics. It suggests that the selection for senior intelligence roles isn’t just about operational acumen—it’s increasingly about alignment with broader strategic narratives and political comfort. For those in the trenches of clandestine operations, that’s a chilling message: even the most decorated case-officer isn’t immune from being sidelined if his views, even after agency retirement, fall outside acceptable bounds.

From a national-security standpoint the implications are serious. Intelligence work isn’t just about what you know—it’s who you trust, how you deploy that knowledge, and whether you have the freedom to act without political interference. If capable leaders like Goff are being passed over because their post-service public statements or affiliations don’t fit the current strategic tone, the agency risks losing not just talent but authenticity. Opponents—state and non-state—thrive when U.S. intelligence looks uncertain or compromised.

In plain terms: when the people running clandestine operations are themselves under the microscope for their views, the risk grows that the real work gets second-guessed, delayed or altered. That feeds directly into adversary hands. A weaker or more politicized intelligence community is less credible, less nimble, and less fearsome. And in a world where adversaries are actively probing, infiltrating and influencing, we can’t afford either.

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the full-length Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

10. Drones have changed warfare. Two new weapons might be about alter its course again

Summary:

Drones dominate the Russo-Ukraine war, causing an estimated 60 to 70 percent of casualties and extending the lethal zone many miles behind the front, but new countermeasures are emerging. The UK is fielding DragonFire, a shipborne laser that can destroy small targets like drones at low cost per shot, though it needs line of sight and engages only one target at a time. Britain is also testing a radio frequency directed energy weapon that can disable multiple drones’ electronics through focused radio pulses, even in bad weather. These systems may blunt drones’ impact, challenging claims they will define future air warfare.

Comment: Not mentioned is the Leonidas system by Epirus.

Epirus’ Leonidas High-Power Microwave Defeats 49-Drone Swarm, 100% of Drones Flown at Live-Fire Demonstration

https://www.epirusinc.com/press-releases/epirus-leonidas-high-power-microwave-defeats-49-drone-swarm-100-of-drones-flown-at-live-fire-demonstration

Drones have changed warfare. Two new weapons might be about alter its course again

theconversation.com · Matthew Powell

https://theconversation.com/drones-have-changed-warfare-two-new-weapons-might-be-about-alter-its-course-again-267895

Like so many conflicts before it, the Russo-Ukraine war has forced both sides to innovate. Since they have been able to gain control of opposition air space, neither side has made wide use of traditional air assets such as fast fighter jets. which take much time and money to manufacture and so can’t be risked in active operations.

Instead, drones are now dominating the war. According to figures emerging from Ukraine, drones are causing an overwhelming percentage of all the casualties the country is suffering, amounting to between 60% to 70%.

However, history shows that this kind of technological advance in warfare is often followed by the development of counter measures. And we’re now seeing the emergence of anti-drone weapons that could reduce the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Ukraine conflict and beyond.

The use of drones has changed the character of warfare with the zone in which ground forces are vulnerable to lethal attack extending to between six and nine miles behind the front lines. This has made trenches, fortified positions and armoured vehicles much more vulnerable than they would have been previously.

It is not just in the attack role that drones have proved their value, although their use in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance role is remarkably similar to that performed by aircraft and balloons in the first world war. Drones have been used to provide real-time intelligence and situational awareness of the battlefield to aid planning and mid-level command, control and communication on the battlefield.

The ability for drones to loiter for prolonged periods of time, combined with the difficulty in successfully targeting these assets, has also seen their use in artillery spotting.

Drones are being used on the battlefield, but also against civilian populations in Ukraine and Russia.

It has been argued that drones – and uncrewed aerial vehicles more generally – represent a radical change in the way moderns wars are fought and that these assets will shape the future of aerial warfare for a significant period. But what this argument fails to take into account is that when new technologies are deployed in warfare, counter measures and innovations can often quickly emerge that reduce their effectiveness.

The first use of tanks on the western front was during the five-month Battle of the Somme in 1916. Despite the radical boost the first tanks gave the allied forces, the Germans had soon negated this effect through the use of anti-tank guns by early 1917.

Countering drones

Similar developments are being seen in Ukraine where simple countermeasures such as netting are being used to reduce drones effectiveness. While this is providing a limited degree of protection, more technologically sophisticated countermeasures are being developed elsewhere.

The UK’s navy has recently announced it will deploy a direct-energy weapon that has been named DragonFire. DragonFire is a laser-based defensive capability that has the capability to target and destroy small offensive weapons such as drones.

While there are limitations to Dragonfire, such as the requirement to be able to see the target in order to engage it, it demonstrates the continual tit-for-tat developments that widely encompass warfare.

The cost per shot of Dragonfire is as low as £10 and it can engage a target the size of a one-pound coin from a distance of one kilometre. This will mean that assets such as drones more vulnerable to defensive capabilities and calls into question the claim that drones are the future of aerial warfare. The Royal Navy plans to begin deploying DragonFire from 2027.

The UK is also experimenting with another form of direct-energy weapon that relies on radio-frequency systems. This new defensive weapon, which is currently undergoing trials, would use a pulse of directed radio waves in order to disable the internal electronics of assets such as drones.

The UK is trialling a radio frequency directed energy weapon which would take out enemy drones with a radio wave.

This system has advantages over Dragonfire. The first is that it is not a line-of-sight weapon, so it can be deployed in bad weather and in low cloud cover. DragonFire has to be able to see its target in order to be able to engage it effectively.

The second is that a radio pulse weapon can engage several targets in a specified area, whereas Dragonfire is only able to engage one target at a time.

But the major disadvantage to a radio pulse weapon is that it cannot discriminate between the targets which it engages. This means that friendly aircraft cannot fly when this target is being utilised.

The traditional tempo of technological developments and countermeasures that is a major character in warfare shows no sign of abating in 21st-century conflicts. So while drones are likely to remain important weapons, the idea that they will revolutionise warfare and make crewed warplanes obsolete is still to be seen.

theconversation.com · Matthew Powell

11. High-powered microwave technology is the 'holy grail' of drone interceptors

Summary:

High powered microwave (HPM) weapons are emerging as the “holy grail” of counter-drone systems. Instead of destroying one drone at a time with costly missiles or lasers, HPM blasts electromagnetic energy that fries the electronics of multiple drones at once, ideal against swarms of cheap UAVs. The United States, Europe, Japan, and Israel are investing heavily, with systems like Leonidas, ThunderShield, and Japan’s new HPM device under development. Israel is pairing HPM with laser systems such as Rafael’s Iron Beam, creating a layered defense where HPM handles mass attacks and lasers deliver precise, low cost intercepts against individual threats.

Comment: How are we going to generate all the power we need for AI and high powered microwaves to kill drones?

High-powered microwave technology is the 'holy grail' of drone interceptors

HPM offers rapid neutralization of swarms, while lasers and costly missiles provide precision strikes against individual drones

ByANNA AHRONHEIM

NOVEMBER 26, 2025 15:53Updated: NOVEMBER 26, 2025 22:39

https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-876287

Japan's High Powered Microwave counter-drone system(photo credit: Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency)

As drone warfare continues to evolve at a dizzying pace, countries and militaries around the globe are racing to develop technologies capable of neutralizing unmanned aerial threats. Of the various solutions being talked about are high‑powered microwave (HPM) systems, which use bursts of electromagnetic energy to disable or destroy drones by disrupting their electronic components.

HPM systems are the “holy grail” of interceptors and are the next generation of counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) technology, according to Yossi Margalit, the vice president and managing director of C-UAS & Low Altitude Air & Missile Defense Systems at Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.

HPM technologies are “the next level up” of c-UAS technology, with “capabilities never seen before” following the operational use of laser interception technology, said Margalit, who was speaking to The Jerusalem Post’s Defense & Tech on the sidelines of the UVID conference in Tel Aviv on Wednesday.

Margalit explained that there are several c-UAS technologies, from soft kill systems that use electronic warfare to hard kill solutions and energy solutions like laser or microwave technology. “We need sophisticated solutions because the threat is sophisticated, more than missiles,” he said. “With the threats becoming more complex, sometimes you have to play the game differently.”

During the 12-day war against Iran, known in Israel as Rising Lion, over a thousand drones were launched by the Islamic Republic, with the large majority intercepted. Nevertheless, the cost to intercept the drones was high: a $2,000 drone can force defenders to use a $2 million missile interceptor, a dynamic that Israeli officials have described as unsustainable.

An Iranian drone is displayed during the National Army Day parade ceremony in Tehran, Iran, April 18, 2025. (credit: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) Handout via REUTERS)This is where HPM weapons enter the picture. Unlike missiles or lasers, which target drones one by one, HPM systems emit bursts of powerful electromagnetic energy that can disable the electronics of multiple drones simultaneously, making them ideal for countering swarm tactics by offering rapid, wide-area neutralization without expending costly interceptors.

Worldwide R&D

This capability addresses one of the most pressing challenges of modern warfare: the proliferation of cheap, mass-produced drones that can overwhelm traditional aerial defenses. The United States, Europe, and Asia are investing heavily in HPM research, with systems like Epirus’s Leonidas and Thales’s ThunderShield already demonstrating operational potential.

The Pentagon has accelerated research into HPM directed-energy weapons precisely because of the Houthi drone threat in the Red Sea and Iran’s broader UAV proliferation into battlefields like Ukraine and possibly Venezuela.

Japan’s Defense Ministry has been working on HPM research for over a decade and allocated 800 million yen (some $5.2m.) this year alone to support the country’s HPM development. In January, the country’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency released a new conceptual image of its prospective HPM radiation device that is currently in the research and development stage.

Israel, long recognized as a leader in defense innovation, continues to advance directed-energy solutions. Rafael, best known for its Iron Dome missile defense system, has pioneered laser technology along with Elbit Systems to complement HPM in the fight against drones, while its “Iron Beam” laser weapon is designed to deliver precise, low-cost intercepts by burning through the structure of incoming drones, rockets, or mortars.

Unlike HPM, which disables electronics across a broad area, lasers provide pinpoint accuracy, making them ideal for neutralizing single, high-value targets. Together, HPM and laser systems represent a new, layered approach to counter-UAS defense.

HPM offers rapid neutralization of swarms, while lasers provide precision strikes against individual drones or munitions. This combination reduces reliance on expensive interceptor missiles and ensures that militaries can respond flexibly to diverse threats.

Rafael, best known for its Iron Dome missile defense system, has pioneered laser technology in the fight against drones along with Elbit Systems. Known as “Iron Beam”, the laser weapon is designed to deliver precise, low-cost intercepts by burning through the structure of incoming drones, rockets, or mortars.

For Israel, the combination of HPM and laser technology is increasingly seen as the future of counter-UAS operations, offering a layered defense against the kind of drone campaigns that Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have pioneered in their wars against the Jewish state.

12. Ukraine's Long-Distance Drones Take Toll On Russia's Oil Business -- And War Chest

Summary:

Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign has hit at least half of Russia’s major oil and gas facilities, knocking out about 10 percent of its refining capacity and forcing processing down from 5.4 to 5 million barrels per day. New systems like the 2,000-kilometer-range Lyutiy and swarms of cheaper FPV drones let Kyiv strike refineries almost daily and re-hit key sites as Moscow scrambles to repair them. The damage fuels domestic fuel shortages, export bans, and a shift from high-value refined products to lower-margin crude, eroding revenues that fund the war, though Russia’s vast surplus refining capacity blunts immediate battlefield effects.

Comment: Buried lede? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are still producing quality news despite the best efforts to take US information warfare capabilities off the battlefield of human terrain.

Ukraine's Long-Distance Drones Take Toll On Russia's Oil Business -- And War Chest

rferl.org · RFE/RL ·

Ukraine

By RFE/RL

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-targets-russian-oil-gas-infrastructure-analysis/33606305.html

A fire rages at the Kuibyshev oil refinery in Russia's Samara Oblast after a strike by Ukrainian drones in August.

Ukraine's deep-strike drone campaign targeting Russia's oil and gas production facilities has already cost its enemy 10 percent of its refining capacity, according to industry experts -- and Kyiv is committed to stepping things up.

"Ten percent, it's not an astonishing number," says Tatiana Mitrova of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. "But it is still something that starts to be felt with the Russian domestic fuel crisis, with reduced oil refined products exports, and general tension inside the Russian oil sector."

Ukraine has invested heavily in new long-distance drone technology, putting out weapons such as the Lyutiy drone, which is capable of delivering explosives up to 2,000 kilometers from its secret launch site.

But Ukrainian drone units have also gained expertise at swarming targets with dozens of cheaper first-person-view (FPV) drones.

The technology advances are currently allowing Kyiv to hit key Russian oil and gas resources on an almost daily basis.

It has also committed to hitting the same refineries repeatedly, an essential strategy, says Mitrova, as Russia scrambles to rebuild and repair damage.

Kyiv has also struck at least half of Russia's 38 major production complexes and has forced Russia to reduce oil processing from 5.4 million barrels per day in July to just 5 million two months later.

Still, Mitrova points out, Russia operates the world's third-largest refining system and has substantial built in surplus capacity.

"It might take years before the result becomes really visible," she says, "so we are not talking about Russian refining collapsing anytime soon -- but exhausting its potential, it really started already."

Irregular Warfare Club

by Jeremiah "Lumpy" Lumbaca

11.28.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/28/irregular-warfare-club/

As anyone who has a niche hobby knows, there are entire communities of people who share a common passion for their favorite pastime, often known only to those who share that common interest. They meet in and out of work, join social media groups, create chatrooms to collaborate, and take to the skies to fly around the world for a chance to experience the magic of being with others who share similar interests. Those with a passion for Irregular Warfare (IW) are no different. There is an entire community, a club if you will, comprised mostly of Americans, Europeans, and Australians, that thinks, teaches, debates, writes doctrine, shares experiences with others, advocates for policy, publishes articles, puts ideas into practice on the ground, and dreams about Irregular Warfare when they go to sleep at night. Their objective is to find new and creative ways to advance national, regional, and global security initiatives through non-traditional means. Welcome to a glimpse into the Irregular Warfare Club.

What happens in Irregular Warfare Club unfortunately stays in Irregular Warfare Club.

While there is no secret handshake yet, club members are familiar with most of the other members. Some key institutional members of the American chapter of the club include US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its subordinate organizations (such as Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and service component special operations elements), Joint Special Operations University (JSOU – which is actually part of USSOCOM), Fort Bragg (numerous organizations), Arizona State University, the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASW SO/LIC), a small part of National Defense University’s (NDU) College of International Security Affairs (CISA), the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI), and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community more broadly. As for individuals in the IW Club, those who are unusually passionate about it, those who live and breathe it, those who think of IW not just as a means to a paycheck, those who wake up at 2 am with a new idea about it, day after day, year after year, decade after decade in some cases – there aren’t many of them. The total is about 150, give or take some number, according to the author’s opinion and a non-scientific best guess.

While there are hundreds of discussion topics involving IW, there are a few enduring themes. The list below is not exhaustive, but it’s a good start:

What is the definition of IW? Also, related definitional debates involving Unconventional Warfare (UW), hybrid conflict, asymmetric conflict, 4th generation warfare, guerrilla warfare, and political warfare, among others.
What supporting activities should be included under the big umbrella concept of “Irregular Warfare?”
Models that attempt to capture IW with easy-to-understand graphics.
Who should be “in charge” of IW? Proposed task organizations (and re-organizations) for effectively “doing” IW.
The idea that an actor doesn’t “do” Irregular Warfare. IW is instead a condition or state.
Who should execute IW? IW is often perceived as a “SOF thing.” How do we get organizations, particularly those in the military that fall outside of the SOF community, to embrace it?
IW is bigger than just the military. The military should be in a supporting role.
IW should be about more than just taking action, but about gaining a true understanding of the environment before taking action (this argument, of course, applies to all forms of warfare, not just IW).
How can we deter our adversaries’ malign use of IW (or gray zone tactics, hybrid warfare, etc.)?
What does IW look like when we collaborate with foreign partners and allies? While the term is used quite freely, many of our friends around the world understand it to mean Counterterrorism (CT) and/or Counterinsurgency (COIN).

The IW Clubhouse is, unfortunately, somewhat of an echo chamber. Most club members read what other club members write about, with few outsiders taking notice. Members go to find literature on IW in a very small number of places that routinely publish work on the subject (this article is no exception). Members see other members at conferences and symposiums, with few non-members showing up or knowing the events exist. For practitioners of IW—the club members operating “where the rubber meets the road,” in the field, in embassies around the world, alongside partners and allies—there are few non-members who know what is happening there.

The exception to the members-only theme is when an IW Club member gets an opportunity to try and influence a key leader, maybe an important military Flag Officer or member of Congress. The club member hopes to get them to appreciate how unappreciated Irregular Warfare is, why it’s relevant, or how it contributes to current, conventional national security objectives. These efforts take place during targets of opportunity when members are given a chance to share thoughts with non-members. For the members in the club, however, we know the unfortunate truth: despite our best efforts to inform others about the opportunities and advantages that Irregular Warfare brings to the geopolitical landscape, few non-members are interested.

Irregular Warfare can yield big payoffs but requires a slow, steady burn. Competing priorities, big tech programs, and more traditional security initiatives tend to push IW to the background because it doesn’t generate a fast jackpot. As a result, what happens in Irregular Warfare Club unfortunately stays in Irregular Warfare Club. So, for those reading this article who don’t consider themselves card-carrying members, or perhaps didn’t even know that the club exists, welcome to a peek inside the clubhouse. We hope you stay.

Tags: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, gray-zone conflict, irregular warfare, SOF Community, Special Operations

About The Author

Jeremiah "Lumpy" Lumbaca
Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD is a retired US Army Green Beret and current professor of irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and special operations at the Department of Defense’s Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He can be found on X/Twitter @LumpyAsia.

14. Thinking the Thinkable on an AI Market Correction

Summary:

Talk of an AI “bubble” is growing, but the author argues the real danger is how a sharp market correction could warp U.S. strategy. Sprinters, marathoners, and skeptics all see different futures, yet any downturn or “J curve” slump would fuel pressure to relax AI chip export controls and “make a deal” with Beijing, even using Taiwan as a bargaining chip. He warns this would supercharge China’s AI and military power while undermining U.S. security. He urges Congress to prioritize U.S. access to advanced chips, legislate a floor on China controls, expand enforcement, and deepen concrete support for Taiwan.

Excerpts:

In the event of a market correction, the U.S. response would prove critical. Powerful forces and interest groups will seek to relax U.S. export controls, weaken support for Taiwan, or both. Adopting either measure could cede technological leadership and geopolitical supremacy to the Chinese Communist Party.

There are bipartisan measures that Congress can take now to reduce national security dangers in an AI market correction. Passing the bipartisan Guaranteeing Access and Innovation for National Artificial Intelligence Act will ensure that U.S. companies are first in line for advanced semiconductors. While export controls enjoy bipartisan support, codifying them via legislation of a statutory floor could greatly enhance their durability. Furthermore, substantially expanding the budget of the Bureau of Industry and Security would slow Chinese military and technological progress. Additionally, individual legislators could further signal bipartisan support for Taiwan by signing on to the already-large Senate and House Taiwan Caucuses. Legislators should prefer substantive support for Taiwan over showy displays and emphasize the one China policy, but they should also not shy away from upsetting Beijing.

Resisting calls for loosening export controls or Taiwan-related concessions will be an all-hands-on-deck moment for the U.S. national security community. But if the United States and its allies and friends can overcome whatever complex dangers emerge from an AI market correction, a better world may emerge.

Comment: We had a meeting with an expert in this area this week (and particularly an expert on the power generation and connectivity requirements for AI) and I understand that this is a huge concern. But AI is so important to everything we do now and will do in the future that I wonder if this is the new "industry" that is too big to fail?"

Thinking the Thinkable on an AI Market Correction

warontherocks.com · November 28, 2025

Joseph Webster

November 28, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/thinking-the-thinkable-on-an-ai-market-correction/?utm

You’re not hallucinating: AI “bubble” discourse is everywhere. Whether you’re looking at Google Trends, reading the paper of record, listening to subject matter experts, or braving the Washington cocktail circuit, there’s a growing belief that AI will face some sort of market correction. Given AI’s strategic capabilities and the stakes of the technological competition with China, a potential market correction and its implications deserve scrutiny.

While a “bubble” is not inevitable — or perhaps even likely — it is a real possibility. In the event of a market correction, powerful interests will intensify their calls for loosening key technology export controls and even offering concessions on Taiwan to Beijing. These measures would provide only ephemeral benefits at the cost of severely damaging long-term U.S. strategic and commercial interests. Bipartisan members of Congress must guard against short-sighted actions. The first priority should be to pass the Guaranteeing Access and Innovation for National Artificial Intelligence Act, which would prioritize American access to cutting-edge AI chips. Additionally, members of both parties should establish a statutory floor for export controls on China-bound AI chips, so that any substantial loosening requires explicit congressional approval. Finally, Congress should further institutionalize support for Taiwan.

BECOME A MEMBER

Uncertainties, Camps, and the J-Curve

Anything is possible when it comes to AI development. Anyone who claims certainty is lying to you or deluding themselves. One useful way to think about the range of outcomes is to divide today’s AI debate into three schools of thought — sprinters, marathoners, and skeptics — and use that frame to assess how a market correction might unfold.

Sprinters are the most optimistic of the three AI camps. In their view, AI capabilities (and financial market valuations) will continue their seemingly inexorable rise and potentially go exponential. Sprinters think a bubble is not imminent: In their view, the stock market is undervaluing AI-related stocks. Still, many sprinters have become less confident in recent months, with OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman edging away from prior artificial general intelligence projections. Other technology leaders have also grown more circumspect. While some AI companies may be hiding proprietary capabilities or even subtly encouraging bubble discourse (to muscle out weaker or less liquid competitors and consolidate the market), the sprinter camp seems much less self-assured than before.

The skeptic camp, meanwhile, is having a moment. Skeptics like Gary Marcus point to OpenAI’s $1.4 trillion in spending commitments but only $13 billion (some say it’ll be closer to $20 billion) in annual revenue, or cite a Massachusetts Institute of Technology study finding that 95 percent of organizations have received zero measurable return from their generative AI projects so far. Mainstream outlets are increasingly reporting about a potential correction and identifying some AI companies increasingly engaging in creative financial engineering reminiscent of the Great Recession and circular investments. Many political figures from across the political spectrum, such as Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, are not necessarily skeptics but seem to be positioning themselves for the 2028 presidential election by expressing selective opposition to AI. Perhaps most concerningly, the bond market is increasingly showing wariness about repayment prospects.

With U.S. total federal public debt-to-GDP ratios at roughly double pre-financial crisis levels, a correction could trigger significant near-term economic and financial pain even if AI holds substantial long-term value. Gita Gopinath, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, estimates that a correction would be disproportionately concentrated in the United States and eliminate $20 trillion in wealth for American households.

Marathoners, meanwhile, acknowledge that a near-term market correction — perhaps even a deeply painful one — may be in the offing, but hold that AI will deliver significant or even transformative long-term benefits. As evidence, marathoners can point to studies from the St. Louis Federal Reserve finding significant productivity savings from generative AI or note that costs for inference (that is, model application) for a model at ChatGPT-3.5 capabilities fell 280-fold between November 2022 and October 2024.

Marathoners hold that AI model capabilities could very well continue to “plateau” — delivering fewer marginal performance gains despite huge investment of incremental compute — but nevertheless improve productivity on a sector-by-sector basis. This scenario, similar to the “AI as normal technology” construct favored by AI experts Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, would likely see long-term productivity gains from AI but with potential short-term growing pains.

Indeed, Jason Furman, the former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, warns that a “bubble” might be an imprecise way to describe a correction. Instead, Furman holds that an AI correction might resemble a “J-curve,” where AI adoption reduces productivity in the near-term but increases long-term output. Of course, if the downward slope of the J-curve proves steep, the consequences could be deeply painful.

AI is already a powerful technology and holds transformative long-term potential. The United States should prepare for a long-term competition with Beijing and avoid making technological or geopolitical concessions to China even in the event of a painful J-curve market correction.

The Aftermath of a Market Correction

The shape of a potential market correction — whether a bubble, J-curve, or something else entirely — is difficult to predict but may strengthen Beijing’s leverage vis-à-vis Washington. In the event of a recession, U.S. policymakers will likely feel intense political pressures from higher unemployment levels and potential financial market contagion. Attention will turn to bolstering economic and financial linkages with China, the world’s second-largest economy. In such a scenario, Beijing will likely seek fewer export restrictions on advanced semiconductors and technological products.

If a chip glut emerges, calls to soften export controls and “make a deal” will only grow louder. Analysts are split on a potential glut under current trends: some hold that oversupply is likely, while others are much more bullish. If a market correction significantly impacts demand, however, a chip glut becomes highly likely and would pressure manufacturers’ earnings. Indeed, in August 2025, and in an unprecedented arrangement that raised legal eyebrows, the Trump administration approved export licenses for Nvidia’s H20 and AMD’s MI308 inference-focused chips on the condition that the companies pay 15 percent of their China revenues to the U.S. government. Chip makers continue to openly advocate for softer restrictions — one hosted a major conference in Washington timed to immediately precede the Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping-U.S. President Donald Trump Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting.

In the event of a market correction, many in the U.S. business community will argue for further relaxing controls on inference chips, contending that selling less-advanced semiconductors will support an important domestic industry, pose little risk for America’s innovative edge, or even foster dependencies on the U.S. technology stack. Sales of inference or (especially) training chips to China will damage U.S. national security interests, however, perhaps severely.

While inference chips are admittedly less sensitive than semiconductors used for training AI models, sales to China still pose major risks. Even less-advanced inference chips, such as the H20, could be repurposed to fine-tune training of powerful AI models. Figures in the administration have also floated potential sales of the significantly more powerful H200 chip, which could be used for either inference or training. As Chris McGuire of the Council on Foreign Relations notes, the H200 chip has over nine times more performance than current U.S. export control thresholds. Crucially, inference-capable chips would bolster China’s growing military edge in “physical artificial intelligence” across robotics and unmanned systems like quadrupeds or extra-large uncrewed underwater vessels. Selling inference chips to America’s most formidable military rival, even in the event of an economic crisis, is still deeply unwise.

Selling more advanced chips used for training models would be even more dangerous, but cannot be ruled out. In the run-up to his autumn summit with Xi, Trump publicly floated allowing downgraded versions of Nvidia’s cutting-edge Blackwell training chips to be exported to China, before ultimately backing away under opposition from advisers and congressional China hawks.

Industry holds that such sales would foster Chinese dependency on the U.S. technology stack, but this seems highly unlikely given Beijing’s track record, authoritative statements, and ambitions. In other technologies and industries — automobiles, batteries, solar panels, and even critical minerals — Beijing has run its industrial policy playbook of securing technology transfer, using scale to lower costs, and driving foreign competitors out of business. Moreover, AI and technology are central to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 plan and its 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan — which explicitly aims to make China the global AI leader by 2030. Xi contended in a recent commentary that “Artificial intelligence is a strategic technology that is leading a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation.” The Chinese leadership identifies AI as a strategic technology, in their own words. Consequently, they will seek to replace the U.S. technology stack rather than maintain dependency on it.

Regardless of whatever it indicates publicly, Beijing seeks to acquire advanced chips currently subject to U.S. export controls. Of the main cost drivers over the model development process (research staff, accelerator chips, other server components, cluster-level interconnects, and energy), AI accelerator chips are China’s key bottleneck.

If China can obtain enough advanced chips, however, its approach to AI development may change. Chinese AI industrial policy has emphasized sectoral adoption over developing bleeding-edge models. While there are several reasons for this approach, it has partly been necessitated by chip constraints. If U.S. chip controls are relaxed, then Beijing would be increasingly capable of sprinting to artificial general intelligence and might attempt to do so.

Even if Beijing does not go all-in on developing artificial general intelligence, or if model capabilities plateau around current levels, China would likely use advanced training chips to develop the most powerful AI model that would outperform any American competitor. Chinese intelligence services would gain another useful tool for collection and influence, especially since Article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires all organizations and citizens to “support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.”

If AI is truly a transformative technology, however, and artificial general intelligence is attainable, then China’s sectoral domination would all but ensure it would become the world’s preeminent and permanent power. Given the Communist Party’s devil-may-care safety record across COVID-19, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak, and more, the consequences of its AI leadership could be profound.

Taiwan as a “Bargaining Chip”?

An AI correction will challenge Taiwan, as U.S. foreign policy is increasingly transactional and unmoored from traditional bipartisan calculations of long-term national interests. An AI market correction and resulting chip glut will simultaneously reduce Taipei’s leverage while increasing Beijing’s.

An American AI recession — or worse — would not only refocus attention on U.S. ties with China, the world’s second-largest economy. It would also reduce Taiwan’s leverage by degrading the strategic and commercial value of its chip exports.

If a glut of chips emerges, Taiwan will be hit hard. The semiconductor industry accounted for 13–15 percent of Taiwan’s GDP in 2023 (before the boom). About 317,000 individuals directly work in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, or about 3 percent of its labor force. An AI market correction would therefore hold significant implications for Taiwan’s domestic political economy.

While any recession would be wrenching, it is not the greatest danger facing Taipei. If the U.S. economy falls into a recession, would Taiwan be used as a bargaining chip? This is not an idle fear: U.S. policymaking is increasingly transactional, some U.S. policymakers hold little sentimental attachment to Taiwan’s hard-won democracy, and the Chinese economy is more than 20 times the size of Taiwan’s. For these reasons, an AI market correction may hold unprecedented dangers for Taiwan for two reasons. If the United States loosens chip controls, then China may develop global technological leadership. On the other hand, Washington could also conceivably and shortsightedly respond to a recession by using Taiwan as a bargaining chip with Beijing.

To avoid either outcome, Taiwan and its friends should underscore that it is valuable to the United States for more than just chips. It is a strategically placed island and an advanced economy with deep technological expertise. Even leaving aside any sentimental notions of shared values, Taiwan’s absorption by China would alter the balance of power across the Indo-Pacific in Beijing’s favor. Many U.S. allies would hedge in the wake of a retreating leader and an emerging hegemon, leaving the United States increasingly alone to deal with a powerful rival that could summon all the resources and technological strength of mainland China and Taiwan.

What Taipei Can Do Now

Any camp — sprinters, marathoners, skeptics — could ultimately hold the correct long-term approach to AI. Still, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific should consider how they would respond to the very real possibility of a near-term market correction. Additionally, Taiwanese policymakers will have to navigate a complex U.S. policymaking process, cross-strait dangers, and their own fractious domestic politics.

Taiwan can fundamentally bolster its resiliency by taking certain steps regardless of any AI market correction. Taiwan’s Public Debt Act, which caps the central government debt-to-GDP ratio at 40.6 percent, is inappropriate given manifest defense and energy security challenges. Taiwan’s domestic politics are admittedly highly polarized, constraining its ability to pursue needed reforms, but elites should understand they will fare much better in a constitutional democracy than under the Chinese Communist Party.

Taiwan has already taken key steps to strengthen its resiliency, but more is needed. While defense spending will rise from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2021 to 5 percent of GDP by 2030, additional strategic investments in a “large number of small things” are necessary.

Similarly, Taiwan can strengthen its energy security by pursuing an all-of-the-above approach to energy, using nuclear, liquefied natural gas, renewables, oil for generation and transportation, and even coal where appropriate.

Getting Ahead of a Market Correction

In the event of a market correction, the U.S. response would prove critical. Powerful forces and interest groups will seek to relax U.S. export controls, weaken support for Taiwan, or both. Adopting either measure could cede technological leadership and geopolitical supremacy to the Chinese Communist Party.

There are bipartisan measures that Congress can take now to reduce national security dangers in an AI market correction. Passing the bipartisan Guaranteeing Access and Innovation for National Artificial Intelligence Act will ensure that U.S. companies are first in line for advanced semiconductors. While export controls enjoy bipartisan support, codifying them via legislation of a statutory floor could greatly enhance their durability. Furthermore, substantially expanding the budget of the Bureau of Industry and Security would slow Chinese military and technological progress. Additionally, individual legislators could further signal bipartisan support for Taiwan by signing on to the already-large Senate and House Taiwan Caucuses. Legislators should prefer substantive support for Taiwan over showy displays and emphasize the one China policy, but they should also not shy away from upsetting Beijing.

Resisting calls for loosening export controls or Taiwan-related concessions will be an all-hands-on-deck moment for the U.S. national security community. But if the United States and its allies and friends can overcome whatever complex dangers emerge from an AI market correction, a better world may emerge.

BECOME A MEMBER

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

Image: Gemini

warontherocks.com · November 28, 2025

15. The 2025 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

Comment: War on the Rocks can always be counted on to offer some of the best book recommendations (I am biased since I am a contributor). But I think my entire reading list from now until Chistrmas could consist of the list below.

However, after reviewing this list there are two books I am going to order now. But I know I will order so many more from this list (and I will have to add more bookshelves to my office).

Rick Landgraf

The Airborne Mafia: The Paratroopers Who Shaped America’s Cold War, Robert F. Williams (2025). This book traces the origins and the eventual reach of a powerful subculture in the U.S. Army: the airborne. Williams demonstrates how a small group of World War II paratroopers made a lasting impression on how the Army trained and fought in the Cold War.

...

Walker Mills

How the United States Would Fight China, Franz-Stefan Gady (2025). Backed by years of research and conversations from inside the U.S. national security establishment, Gady succinctly outlines how the United States would fight a war against the People’s Republic of China (as the title suggests) as well as why current approaches may fail, and could trigger nuclear escalation. His work is a sobering assessment that should trigger self-reflection among practitioners and policymakers in the U.S. national security establishment.

The 2025 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

warontherocks.com · November 28, 2025

WOTR Staff

November 28, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-2025-war-on-the-rocks-holiday-reading-list/?utm

It wouldn’t be the holidays without our annual War on the Rocks book roundup. Check off your gift list or pick a book to enjoy by the fire. Happy reading.

Kerry Anderson

The Warrior Queens: The Legends and the Lives of the Women Who Have Led Their Nations in War, Antonia Fraser (1990). I’ll happily read any history book by Antonia Fraser, but this might be my favorite. The book offers multiple mini biographies of warrior queens throughout history, such as Boadicea, Zenobia, the Rani of Jhansi, and several more. Fraser weaves fascinating themes about women, power, and warfare throughout the various women’s stories.

The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Story of the Caribbean Pirates and the Man Who Brought Them Down, Colin Woodward (2008). This wonderfully engaging history book tells the story of the peak period of Caribbean piracy. While I wouldn’t want to be a pirate back then (or now), the story left me much more sympathetic to those who chose or were forced into the pirate life. Woodard wrote another one of my favorite nonfiction books (American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America) and is skilled at highlighting crucial themes in history that have relevance to today.

Benjamin Armstrong

Annapolis Goes to War: The Naval Academy Class of 1940 and its Trial by Fire in World War II, Craig Symonds (2025). This book is a micro-history, examining World War II through the experiences of one class from the U.S. Naval Academy. The book includes their time in Annapolis, in addition to their service during the war. It offers not only great stories told by a masterful historian, but also great insights about military education and the preparation of officers who may face the ultimate challenge.

The Pacific’s New Navies: An Ocean, Its Wars, and the Making of US Sea Power, Thomas Jamison (2024). This book examines the rise of the U.S. Navy at the end of the 19th century in an entirely new way: from the vantage point of the Pacific. Using original research in the archives of multiple Pacific nations, in multiple languages, Jamison demonstrates how the Navy was shaped by the wars and maritime developments of the Pacific. Not only does this book offer a deep understanding of the Pacific world that is vital to today, it also demonstrates the complex history of the U.S. security interests west of the California coast.

David Barno

The Mysterious Case of Rudolf Diesel: Genius, Power and Deception on the Eve of World War I, Douglas Brunt (2023). The disappearance of the Diesel engine’s famed inventor in late 1913 sparked enduring speculation about his apparent demise for more than a century. Brunt unravels this mystery in a fast-paced narrative that ends in a shocking speculative conclusion. A compelling account that provided me with fascinating new insights upon the dangerous final years leading to the First World War.

From Strength to Strength: Finding Success, Happiness and Deep Purpose in the Second Half of Life, Arthur C. Brooks (2023). In recent months, I have recommended this book to over a dozen friends and family members facing the painful transition from high-flying careers to “the second half” of life. Brooks, an academic, best-selling author, and former think tank president, lays out the inevitable decline and surprising opportunities to be seized in later life as we find new meaning in our skills, experiences, and evolving types of intelligence. An absolute must-read for all those facing the transition from the all-consuming careers that so many of us have loved.

Mike Benitez

The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. (2023). A compelling study of how disruptive innovations reshape warfare, this book demonstrates that technology alone is insufficient — it’s the ability to integrate it through new doctrine, organization, and mindset that ultimately wins. Krepinevich highlights recurring barriers of institutional inertia, service rivalry, and cultural pride that have slowed technical adoption in every era, offering critical lessons that are especially relevant today.

Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, Robin Higham and Stephen Harris (2006). This book analyzes 13 different failures of various air forces spanning World War I to the Falklands War. The historical insights are well-researched, even for obscure failures that most airpower disciples have never heard of, and the lessons are applicable now more than ever.

Ian Brown

The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians, Brian Garfield (1982). This sat on my bookshelf for years until I finally cracked it open this summer. I quickly regretted waiting so long to read it — it’s a deeply immersive narrative of American and Japanese forces grappling with each other in the High North under astonishingly brutal weather conditions. Just as impressive as the stories of human endurance was the incredible effort of a handful of U.S. commanders to create, out of nothing, the operating bases and supply chains that supported hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the most austere environment imaginable. Garfield’s book is worth a reread today as global competition in the High North warms up.

Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War, Stephen Platt (2013). I’d never heard of the Taiping Rebellion until a colleague recommended this book to me to better understand the events that shaped Chinese history over the last two centuries. Reading it filled in a vital gap in my knowledge — a conflict both bloody and surreal, the rebellion was led by a man who believed himself to be the son of God and a brother of Jesus Christ, had a death toll that equaled the World War I, and offered a tantalizing alternative path for China’s development until Western intervention snuffed that path out. The tribulations that wracked China in the 20th century cannot be understood without understanding the Taiping Rebellion.

Brad Carson

The Origins of Efficiency, Brian Potter (2025). Potter is the author of the great Substack Construction Physics, from which I’ve learned more about the world than from any other recent source. This book continues his inquiry into the secret origins of the modern world. If you like writers such as Vaclav Smil, you’ll love Potter.

Capitalism and Its Critics: A History from the Industrial Revolution to AI, John Cassidy (2025). Cassidy is a long-time economics writer for The New Yorker. In this book, he profiles the major schools of recent economic thought through a close look at the thinkers themselves. The biographical information is always interesting, there are many interesting juxtapositions, and it is nice to see heterodox views get consideration.

Ryan Evans

Homeland: The War on Terror in American Life, Richard Beck (2024). Beck is good at showing how a formally overseas war reshaped life at home. He traces how the Global War on Terror helped normalize a permanent emergency, eroded citizenship, and hollowed out democratic accountability. And as he points out, this all unfolded as the conflict “militarized America’s relationship with the rest of the world.” Beck moves from law and politics to culture and daily life, showing how security thinking and crisis logic seeped into everything. Truly everything. Even where I part ways with him, especially in his tendency toward totalizing explanations, our different political beliefs, and his reluctance to consider any ideology but America’s, the book forces a reckoning, or at least it should.

The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949, Sarah C. M. Paine (2012). This is one of the clearest guides to overlapping wars that are usually treated as a tangle of only loosely related conflicts. Paine shows how Chinese, Japanese, Soviet, and Western aims collided, how domestic politics shaped strategy, and how a series of regional contests bled into one another. I am so impressed by her ability to pull disciplined narratives from a chaotic era.

Madeline Field

On All Fronts: The Education of a Journalist, Clarissa Ward (2021). CNN’s chief international correspondent reflects on her life and career as a female reporter assigned to some of the most brutal conflicts in the last two decades. It’s a short, and oftentimes funny, memoir full of fascinating stories from Russia to Bangladesh and Syria. Yet, it’s also a sharp examination of what conflict reporting should be, and the toll violence takes on all involved. It’s one of my favorite reads this year.

The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq, Steve Coll (2025). I picked up this excellent book after reading a War on the Rocks book review and follow-up article from last year. This book offers a detailed look at Saddam Hussein’s psyche throughout his reign, and the nearly unbelievable series of intelligence failures and miscommunications that occurred in the leadup to the Iraq War. Coll weaves a highly convincing narrative that has quite a lot to offer to international relations students, intelligence officials, and practitioners alike.

Richard Fontaine

Sea People: The Puzzle of Polynesia, Christina Thompson (2019). This is the fascinating account of how the Polynesians settled remote islands across thousands of miles of ocean, all without maps, metal tools, or navigational instruments. Beautifully written, it tells the history of these remarkable people, their incredible feats of navigation, and the culture they built in the process.

Shifting Sands: A Human History of the Sahara, Judith Scheele (2024). The Sahara is often thought of as empty desert, with more sand dunes than people. Yet two million make their home there, and this anthropological tale tells their stories. Totally fascinating.

Amos Fox

Ground Combat: Puncturing Myths of Modern War, Ben Connable (2025). This book addresses many of the recurring lines of contemporary defense and security studies, to include the revolution in military affairs, that technological means can (and should) replace manpower, and that complete (or near-complete) battlefield awareness is just around the corner. Connable’s refreshing analysis takes a holistic and historical approach to the subject, and finds that in most cases these recurring ideas perpetually fail to come remotely close to achieving a fraction of what their advocates suggest is possible. In the end, Connable finds that fighting and winning in war still requires rugged military forces that are capable of iteratively persevering against seemingly insurmountable odds until the other side of a conflict is exhausted. Well worth your time.

AI, Automation, and War: The Rise of a Military Tech Complex, Anthony King (2025). King examines the intersection of AI, human involvement, and the future of war to examine if autonomous warfare is practical. King uses case studies from recent wars in Ukraine and Gaza, among others, to find that although AI can help manage increased loads of data and make simple recommendations, it currently lacks the judgment that humans possess to make policy and command decisions in war. Thus, King argues that despite the move towards a more technocratic approach to war and warfare, humanity — for the sake of humanity — ought to cautiously approach the handover of decision-making in war to AI and autonomous systems and only do so when it doesn’t jeopardize international law and the law of armed conflict. King’s AI, Automation, and War is a truly thought-provoking tour de force.

Ulrike Franke

The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs, Tim Benbow (2004). It may seem odd to recommend — in 2025 — a “topical” book published over twenty years ago. But I recommend making it a habit to reread old analyses from time to time. It can help to put current debates into perspective. This is the case here. Tim Benbow takes on the “revolution in military affairs,” a concept which remains influential today, despite Benbow already noting 20 years ago that it had “transcended the status of buzzword and entered the ‘done to death’ category.” His historical analysis of past revolutions in military affairs stays as topical today as it was then. Rereading what experts thought about the then-current revolution in military affairs can help remind us how difficult it is to predict things, how important it is not to believe in the hype — but also how quickly things can indeed change.

Nicholas Hanson

Red Roulette: An Insider’s Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today’s China, Desmond Shum (2021). This memoir pulls back the curtain on the world of China’s politically connected elite, showing how wealth, power, and access rise and fall at the whim of the Chinese Communist Party. Shum traces his own climb through Beijing’s business circles, the deals that made it possible, and the sudden disappearance of his ex-wife, Whitney Duan, after she fell out of political favor. It is an unvarnished look at how influence really works in China and how quickly it can all be taken away.

Five Past Midnight in Bhopal: The Epic Story of the World’s Deadliest Industrial Disaster, Dominique Lapierre and Javier Moro (1997). This book gives a gripping, on-the-ground account of the 1984 Bhopal disaster and how a mix of corporate shortcuts, poor oversight, and bad luck led to one of the worst industrial accidents in history. Lapierre and Moro bring you into the lives of the families and workers who lived next to the Union Carbide plant and show how larger political and economic pressures shaped what happened. It is a sobering look at how easily systems can fail and how ordinary people often pay the highest price when they do.

Frank Hoffman

How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations, Carl Benedikt Frey (2025). The author explores economic history and the optimal path to managing innovation. Frey studies the role of the state in free markets and how industrial policy impacts economic growth. His biggest conclusion is that the binary distinction between centralized versus decentralized approaches is limited. Frey contends that nations need decentralized exploration of new technologies to stimulate invention as well as competent managers to efficiently produce innovative products at scale. The fate of nations hangs in finding the right balance. The alternative is the prospect of stagnation.

War and Power: Who Wins Wars―and Why, Phillipps Payson O’Brien (2025). The central theme in War and Power is that God and fortune are not necessarily on the side of the biggest battalions. The war against Ukraine is just the latest example that there is more to success in war than having the most troops or ships. Wars are clashes of complex systems and institutions, as well as trials of both social and industrial mobilization. Forecasting the interaction of these interactions is difficult and humbling. An excellent blend of history that illuminates the enduring continuities of war.

Rick Landgraf

Watching the Jackals: Prague’s Covert Liaisons with Cold War Terrorists and Revolutionaries, Daniela Richterova (2025). In the middle of the Cold War, Prague was a hotbed of espionage. Drawing on interviews and archival research, Richterova takes us behind the curtain to see how states liaison with non-state actors through clandestine networks to advance their interests.

The Airborne Mafia: The Paratroopers Who Shaped America’s Cold War, Robert F. Williams (2025). This book traces the origins and the eventual reach of a powerful subculture in the U.S. Army: the airborne. Williams demonstrates how a small group of World War II paratroopers made a lasting impression on how the Army trained and fought in the Cold War.

David Maxwell

Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis, Robert D. Kaplan (2025). One of my favorite Kaplan books yet. He argues that the post-Cold War global order is unraveling much like the Weimar Republic because liberal institutions, hierarchies, and norms are collapsing. Kaplan traces how interconnected crises (war, climate change, technology, migration) threaten systemic stability and contends that order must come before freedom. He warns that without renewed emphasis on governance and tradition, the world risks sliding into autocracy or chaos.

Churchill and Orwell: The Fight for Freedom, Thomas Ricks (2017). Ricks shows how Winston Churchill and George Orwell, from opposite backgrounds, became twin defenders of liberty. Churchill fought fascism through action. Orwell battled totalitarianism through truth and words. Both upheld individual freedom and moral courage against authoritarianism, shaping democracy’s survival in the 20th century.

Mike Mazarr

A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy, Joel Mokyr (2016). Mokyr won the Nobel Prize in economics this year, and for good reason. At a time when great powers will be contending for power amid growing headwinds and multiple crises, understanding the true domestic foundations of dynamism is essential to choose public policies that feed national competitiveness rather than sap it. Mokyr’s brilliant analysis describes the sort of intellectual and institutional environment we need.

The Future of Decline: Anglo-American Culture At Its Limits, Jed Esty (2022). One doesn’t have to agree that the United States is destined to become a “second-place nation” to get striking value from Esty’s long essay. He challenges Americans to think about the kind of nation they want to be in the post-primacy era, when the dominant impulse is still to hit the reset button.

Walker Mills

How the United States Would Fight China, Franz-Stefan Gady (2025). Backed by years of research and conversations from inside the U.S. national security establishment, Gady succinctly outlines how the United States would fight a war against the People’s Republic of China (as the title suggests) as well as why current approaches may fail, and could trigger nuclear escalation. His work is a sobering assessment that should trigger self-reflection among practitioners and policymakers in the U.S. national security establishment.

Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, Toshi Yoshihara (2022). Dr. Yoshihara explains an understudied and often overlooked, but critical chapter in the military history of the People’s Republic of China — the early amphibious campaigns against Nationalist forces. Using fresh primary sources, he explains how the People’s Liberation Army rapidly built a coastal navy and amphibious force and began a campaign that only stalled with the outbreak of the Korean War, and in the process gained critical experience and a founding narrative that the People’s Liberation Army Navy hold onto through the present day.

Grace Parcover

American Kleptocracy: How the U.S. Created the World’s Greatest Money Laundering Scheme in History, Casey Michel (2024). The book brilliantly traces how the United States built a financial and legal system that attracts and protects hidden wealth, ultimately becoming what Michel calls “the greatest kleptocratic haven in the world.” Through the case studies of “Teodorin” Obiang and Ihor Kolomoisky, Michel illustrates how individual kleptocrats have exploited longstanding loopholes to launder billions of illicit funds. It’s a revealing and highly readable exploration of a system whose consequences touch far beyond America’s borders.

The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds, Michael Lewis (2017). This book brings to life the brilliant, complicated partnership of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose groundbreaking research reshaped our understanding of how humans think and make decisions. Lewis turns their scientific partnership, and its eventual unraveling, into a compelling narrative, showing how their insights into heuristics, bias, and risk gave rise to behavioral economics and changed the way we see the world.

Iskander Rehman

Strategy and Grand Strategy, Joshua Rovner (2025). How should one distinguish between strategy (a theory of victory) and grand strategy (a theory of security)? And perhaps even more importantly, in what instances might they fail to coincide? In this elegantly argued Adelphi book, Rovner employs this deceptively simple framework to engage in a lively and sophisticated examination of the oft-hidden long-term costs, or ramifications, of certain courses of action in foreign policy. Deeply grounded in history, this is destined to become a classic in the field of strategic studies. The chapter on the effects and costs of France’s game changing involvement in the American Revolution — a case of catastrophic success if ever there was one — is particularly worthwhile, and almost worth the price of admission alone.

The Arsenal of Democracy: Technology, Industry and Deterrence in an Age of Hard Choices, Ecyk Freymann and Harry Halem (2025). An excellent, historically informed and readily accessible primer to some of the major challenges currently facing the U.S. military and defense industrial base. The authors offer a brisk, bracing diagnosis, and the chapter on logistics — a crucial but often neglected topic — is especially useful. The book is also freely available for download.

Joseph Wehmeyer

Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, David Barno and Nora Bensahel (2020). Recommended to me by someone on this list, this book illustrates that not all things — conflicts included — unfold as we might expect (or after years of planning and investment, hope) they will. Through their case studies, Barno and Bensahel make a decisive argument that in the face of unpredictability that the battlefield presents, militaries must adapt rapidly, and that the costs of not doing so could very well be the difference between victory and defeat. Many of the same lessons apply off the battlefield as well.

Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel, Tom Wainwright (2016). Chock-full of firsthand anecdotes from around the world, Wainwright’s investigative journalism offers key insights into how cartels — and the methods used to combat them — are often misunderstood. This is a thought-provoking book, and the business principles it outlines are as relevant today as they were almost a decade ago.

Nicole Wiley

Hiroshima, John Hersey (1946). In the business we’re in, it can be easy to talk about weapons as numbers, capabilities, or dollar signs — but Hersey’s journalistic account of the human beings affected by the bomb dropped on Hiroshima reminds us that weapons (and how they’re used) mean more than numbers. This remarkable book is a much needed “go touch some grass” reminder for those of us in the national security space.

The Sisterhood: The Secret History of Women at the CIA, Liza Mundy (2023). Women’s contributions in the intelligence community are more recognized now than ever before, thanks to films like “Zero Dark Thirty” that highlighted the role of women in discovering Osama bin Laden’s compound hideout. If you’re looking for the lesser known stories of women in intelligence (and the history of how they got into the field in the first place), this book will do the trick.

John Allen Williams

Grant, Ron Chernow (2017) and Robert E. Lee: A Life, Allen C. Guelzo (2005). Most readers of War on the Rocks are familiar with these books and already know a lot about Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, but they are still a fascinating and informative read. Grant’s reputation for his generalship and his presidency was greatly enhanced by Chernow’s book. Lee remains a divisive figure, and rightly so. Guelzo doesn’t try to whitewash the fact that Lee betrayed his oath to defend the U.S. Constitution and led the military battle to preserve slavery, and I’m happy the statues are going down. Nevertheless, Lee remains an important historical figure and perhaps a cautionary tale. Those interested in Lee’s postwar life should consult Charles Bracelen Flood’s Lee: The Last Years.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · November 28, 2025

16. Interview with Greg Grant

Summary:

Greg Grant explains that Bob Work’s Third Offset Strategy was a competitive, technology-driven response to China and Russia achieving parity in guided-munitions warfare, which made the traditional U.S. way of war based on assured air supremacy obsolete. The Third Offset sought renewed overmatch through new operational concepts, multi-domain battle networks, and AI-enabled autonomy, not just shiny gadgets. Ukraine’s drone war validates this shift, revealing a transparent, precision-swept battlefield where massing forces means destruction and dispersed units rely on rapid, AI-accelerated targeting and cheap autonomous systems. Future winners will be those who adapt fastest in concept, organization, and kill-chain speed.

Comment: Long, but worthwhile read.

Interview with Greg Grant

by Octavian Manea

11.28.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/28/interview-with-greg-grant/

SMALL WARS JOURNAL STRATEGY DEBRIEFS

Interview with Greg Grant

This interview is Small Wars Journal exclusive.

Greg Grant, is Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work helping him develop the Department’s “Third Offset Strategy.” His DoD experience includes serving as Director of the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP), an effort to identify new technologies and concepts to sustain and advance U.S. military advantages against potential adversaries. He also served as a speechwriter for Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel.

Octavian Manea: As someone who was an insider of the whole process – how would you define an offset strategy, which were the individual/particular traits of the 3OS?

Greg Grant: So you have to go back to 2014, when Bob Work became Deputy Secretary. At that time, the DoD was strategically adrift: at least 12 years into the long wars, with an almost singular focus on the fight at hand – the Global War on Terror. There was little consideration being given to great power competition or great power adversaries. Work believed DoD had lost the competitive strategic muscles it had built over many decades of intense Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. The Third Offset was an effort to push DoD to regain the competitive culture that existed during the Cold War when staying ahead of the Soviet Union motivated nearly every action of the Department.

Proposals for wringing more innovation out of DoD are legion, coming with some velocity from government funded research centers, think tanks, academia. Most are outright ignored, unless they’re mandated by Congress of course. Even then, the result is a realignment of organizational charts and tinkering at the margins of real change. The same is true for senior leaders in the Pentagon who often come in with the intention of making things work faster and cheaper and fail to leave any lasting impact. Work was pressing for much more than incremental change or innovation for innovation sake. Work was trying to shake the Department out of a period of lethargy and get it to make big moves. The Third Offset was an effort to generate a deliberate institutional response to a changed strategic environment. The strategic competitive landscape had dramatically changed with the return of great power competition and the maturing of the precision strike regime had fundamentally changed the operational environment.

I always looked at the Third Offset Strategy as Bob Work’s effort to focus the department. What was the DoD’s biggest problem at the time? A lack of focus and a lack of prioritization. The Third Offset Strategy was designed to concentrate the building’s attention on great power rivalries – primarily the China challenge, but also Russia. Every conversation about new military capabilities, technologies, and sources of military advantage began with the Third Offset Strategy. It framed the discussion. In this way, the Third Offset Strategy served as a forcing function, bringing senior leadership to the table and focusing them on a specific problem set, the challenge posed by a rising China and an increasingly antagonistic Russia.

Work focused his efforts on that aspect of great power competition that he, as Deputy Secretary, could most actively shape – the ugly trends emerging in the military-technical balance between the United States and China. Various analytical offices within the DoD were raising alarms about an eroding military balance with China – particularly that China was driving the military-technical competition while DoD was doing very little to create new sources of military advantage. In fact, the United States hadn’t created any real new military advantages in terms of weapons systems since the development and fielding of precision guided munitions and stealth technology in the 1980s. For its part, China was in the midst of a massive military buildup and was producing advanced capabilities that in a number of areas were superior to comparable systems in the U.S. inventory, hypersonics of course being the most commonly cited example. It was this failure on the part of DoD to respond to an eroding military balance that prompted Work to push the Department to pursue the Third Offset.

When Work began advocating for DoD to pursue a Third Offset Strategy, he was wary of assigning a “brand” to the effort. Work appropriated the offset strategy construct for a specific reason, because offset strategies are deliberate Departmental technical competitive strategies in response to changes in the relative military balance. The Third Offset was an effort to organize the Department for a long-term military-technical competition with China. Work was trying to shift DoD’s mindset, to shake it out of its complacency as regards China’s advances in weaponry and to think in competitive terms. I’ve heard people criticize the Third Offset for not being a real military strategy. It never was intended to be. It was a competitive strategy, not a military strategy.

Associating that effort with a previous Cold War effort was by design, because it was the last time the Department had rallied to compete against a specific adversary. Of course the question was whether that period of dynamic innovation in DoD that generated the Second Offset Strategy could be replicated? The Third Offset Strategy was an effort to push the Department into thinking big, to imagine the art of the possible in solving for major operational challenges posed by China and Russia.

The Consequences of Parity

Octavian Manea: Surveying the key speeches that shaped the Third Offset Strategy, one notion recurs again and again: parity – more precisely, parity in the regime of guided-munitions warfare. Yet the Third Offset was simultaneously about restoring overmatch. Why, then, is parity seen as a danger zone – something to be avoided at all costs and a central driver behind efforts to regain decisive advantage over competitors?

Greg Grant: Let me address the issue of the parity question because that’s a really important one. For a long time, mainly because of the costs involved, the US was the only nation that was able to put together a guided munitions battle network, which includes satellites, stealth aircraft, highly precise GPS guided munitions, the aircraft carriers to get your strike packages across trans-oceanic distances. The US was and remains the only military in the world that can carry out a sustained global strike campaign due to the fact that we have a large strategic bomber force. And the key enabler for that is the refueling capability – the hundreds of tankers to support that bomber force.

Bob Work’s thesis was that the guided munitions contest had matured to the point where other great powers – particularly China – were achieving parity. We had dominated that contest for so long. But China, in particular, began investing heavily in the capabilities needed to wage guided munitions battle network warfare. The result? The PLA has always emphasized and heavily resourced its rocket forces. China now possesses the world’s leading missile force and the sensing and targeting networks, including space based, to generate robust battle networks – the A2/AD challenge.

Both China and Russia saw what we did in Desert Storm in 1991 and recognized that guided munitions, battle network warfare had become the dominant warfighting paradigm. They both spent decades developing the ability to launch sustained guided weapons’ salvos as dense, as far, and as precisely as U.S. battle networks. Making things worse, you have to remember that any conflict with either China or Russia is very much ‘an away game’ for the United States. In either a Taiwan contingency or a Baltic contingency, both are a long, long way from the United States.

In the Taiwan case, which of course sits adjacent to the Chinese mainland, the Chinese can mass all their military capability, whereas we have to drag ours all the way across the Pacific Ocean – a massive undertaking – stage it on the limited number of airfields and ports we have in the Pacific, and then try to wage war. If we no longer have an overwhelming advantage – if they’ve achieved parity in guided munitions warfare – then the question becomes: what advantage do we actually have at that point?

Because if you’re going to go into a fight with someone, you’ve got to have some kind of military edge/advantage, especially if you’re going to be vastly outnumbered. If you’re losing the ability to achieve air superiority, if you’re losing the ability to blind them – take out their AWACS and over the horizon radars – it becomes painfully obvious that if we end up in a fight with China, the situation would be dire. Are we really going to drive straight into the teeth of this A2/AD buzzsaw they’ve built and try to fight it out on their doorstep – without any real advantage to speak of?

They enjoy the advantage of proximity and the resulting numbers that come from having proximity. So, if you’re going to try to fight in that scenario where you’re vastly outnumbered, you absolutely need some kind of advantage. And it’s never going to be numbers. So, what’s it going to be? It has to be technology leading to qualitative superiority. It’s the same conclusion the US Army came to in the 1970s facing a vastly larger Soviet Army on Europe’s Central Front. Fight outnumbered and win was the mantra the Army adopted to give a sense of urgency to achieving technology driven qualitative superiority.

That’s where I think a lot of people misunderstood. They’d say, “Well, the Third Offset Strategy is purely technology-focused”. And my response was always: “Well, what military advantage do you think you’re going to have?” If you don’t have some kind of technological edge, and you’re not going to win the numbers game the relative military balance begins to look really bad. At that point, what advantage are you going to rely on? Your fighting spirit? That’s a fine notion – but a shaky one to stake your strategy on. So yes – the focus was primarily technological, in the sense that we needed to restore some kind of decisive edge – parity wasn’t going to do it.

To conclude… parity is a danger zone. If you get into a military conflict with an adversary that has a numbers advantage, that has overmatch over you – how do you expect to win? In many ways, it’s a numbers game. If you’re going up against an adversary that can mass its forces, and you don’t have a significant technological edge, you’re in real trouble. That’s when battlefield exchange rates begin to look really ugly.

Unpacking the Legacy American Way in Warfare

Octavian Manea: Most recent US National Defense Strategies are, in one way or another, statements about the obsolescence of the post–Cold War American Way of Warfare, with its characteristic legacy expeditionary approach. This is a theme you have explored extensively in your work. From your perspective, what were the core traits of that legacy American Way of Warfare, and what rendered them obsolete? Why, in short, is the traditional post–Cold War model no longer fit for purpose?

Greg Grant: The American way of war was predicated on the centrality of air power, on achieving air supremacy, which has been the case since World War II. If you look at the campaigns of World War II, the outcome was decided largely through air power, be it the war in Europe or in the Pacific – because we achieved air superiority over our adversaries. The same was certainly true in Desert Storm. I think it’s safe to say that the U.S. would never send ground forces into a major conflict until it had secured air supremacy. The principle around which the American way of war hinged was straightforward: achieve air superiority over the adversary – first. Of course that idea is not lost on our adversaries that the American way of war is entirely dependent on achieving air superiority over the battlespace.

But say you can’t – then what are your options? Your ground forces become extremely vulnerable. Your surface fleet becomes extremely vulnerable. In a mature precision-strike regime, it’s not exactly a pleasant idea to send your battle fleet steaming into range of an adversary equipped with mass A2/AD capabilities. This reality called into question the entire notion, because our adversaries – both the Russians and Chinese were structured to fight without first establishing air superiority – both have developed increasingly advanced integrated air defense systems. So how do you fight that? What are your options when you’re operating without air superiority – when the primary way we’ve traditionally delivered fires is suddenly no longer guaranteed/feasible?

We can get very reductive and think about high-end warfare as simply delivering high explosives on a target set – on a high-value or priority target. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, close air support is a battle winning capability – the amount of explosive that can be delivered by air is so much larger than anything on the ground. The primary way the U.S. military was configured to deliver those fires, to deliver those high explosives, was through air power. We didn’t develop a large ground-based missile force like China and Russia developed, because we began with the assumption that we would wage war only after achieving air supremacy.

Russia and China, on the other hand, assumed they might not have air superiority, so they built up extensive ground-based air defenses and relied heavily on rockets and missiles to deliver fires. We, of course, went purely with aircraft. Hinging your entire warfighting approach on dominating a single domain is destined to fail because any thinking adversary will always develop a counter. Case in point, China accurately identified weaknesses in our approach – specifically, a reliance on achieving dominance in the air domain. They recognized our vulnerability and set about developing the capabilities to take away both our fixed airfields through missile bombardment and our mobile airfields – our carriers – through long-range missile strikes.

Then what are we left with? We’ve got the strategic bomber force, and that’s about it. That reality called the entire notion of the American way of war into question. How do you get fires onto the adversary’s doorstep if they can take away every air base within range and push you all the way back to Australia – or even force you to stage out of the continental United States? At that point, you’re in real trouble. So Work was trying to convince the Department that it needed to change the game entirely and come up with a new American way of war.

Octavian Manea: What was the Overmatch brief and what picture did it paint? I think it is highly indicative in terms of the structural trends that produced 3OS.

Greg Grant: The Overmatch Brief was purely an ONA project. It really had nothing to do with the Third Offset. The interesting thing about the Overmatch Brief is that it didn’t contain anything fundamentally new – it was all in the presentation. It was very much a “military tech advantage erosion 101” kind of thing; or, put another way, “how to lose a great power war for dummies.”

What made it powerful was the way it was presented visually – the idea of show don’t tell – it drove the message home. David Ochmanek was always the one presenting the brief, and he’s both a brilliant thinker and a brilliant briefer. I remember going up to brief Senator McCain and company on the SASC on Capitol Hill, and you could literally see the light bulbs going on above their heads as they flipped through the pages. Visually, they could see – clear as day – “Oh my God, we’re really in trouble.” Whether it was the PLA’s missile rings around Taiwan or just how vastly outranged we were by Russian artillery, ground fires, and ground-based air defense systems, the graphics made the threat understandable and unmistakable.

It was the visual impact that drove the point home more than specific data points. Anyone who had been following the military competition already knew how bad things had gotten. But it was very effective. It changed minds on Capitol Hill. It woke a lot of people up to the problems we were facing. The Overmatch brief confirmed many of the ugly trendlines in the relative military balance that spurred the Third Offset. That we can’t achieve air superiority over key geographic areas of interest and those areas are increasing. That we’re losing the ability to achieve maritime superiority across more of the world’s oceans. That we have no effective defenses against hypersonics. That our space constellations are at risk. The list goes on.

Influences & Influencers

Octavian Manea: What were the intellectual roots of the Third Offset Strategy? When reading Bob Work’s speeches, one repeatedly encounters an emphasis on a triad of new organizational constructs, new operational concepts, and new ways of doing things. This resonates strongly with Andy Marshall and the wider 1990s debate on the Revolution in Military Affairs. To what extent was the Andy Marshall/ONA intellectual universe a distant – or perhaps not so distant – influence on the Third Offset?

Greg Grant: A lot of what became the Third Offset Strategy – much of the underlying thinking – was certainly spurred by the old Andrew Marshall clan, if you will. Many of the war games coming out of ONA, like the 20XX war-game series, were looking specifically at the China problem. These had been long-running and served as something of an intellectual foundation for Work’s thinking and the Third Offset Strategy.

In many ways we faced a very similar operational problem that Bill Perry and Harold Brown confronted in the Second Offset. Back then it was how to penetrate the Soviet’s highly effective air defenses and kill massive numbers of Soviet tanks. Their answer was combining various emerging technologies – new sensors, advanced command and control, stealth, embedded computers, and precision guidance – all of which would allow the US to overcome Soviet defenses and destroy lots of Soviet tanks. Today, the operational challenge in the Pacific is how to defeat highly effective Chinese counter-air and counter-surface systems and sink the PLA’s amphibious fleet. In Europe, it’s how to crack the Kaliningrad A2/AD nut and stop Russian tank columns from overrunning the Baltics.

Before he actually became Deputy SECDEF, Bob went and talked to the “godfathers” of the Second Offset – figures like William Perry, Paul Kaminski – who had been around the Pentagon at that time. He asked them how they had gone about achieving the Second Offset Strategy. Essentially, the Second Offset was driven by the same kind of realization: back in the late 1970s and into the early ’80s, there was a growing recognition that the Soviets were achieving parity in many weapon systems. It was that same sort of “oh my gosh, we’ve got to do something now” moment. And nothing concentrates the mind quite like being on the losing side of a potential military competition – or worse, a military fight. Much of that intellectual energy came first from ONA and then from the Second Offset veterans who were still around to share their lessons.

Legacy & Brain Trust

Octavian Manea: How do you see the broader strategic legacy of the 3OS? There’s a tendency to equate the Third Offset purely with a technology-driven focus. And yes, technology played a central role – but, as with its predecessors, an offset strategy is also about developing new operational concepts. In fact, I think the ripple effects – the fruits – are what we’re harvesting now. The services began that work back then, and we can see it today in the multi-domain focus, in the U.S. Marine Corps’ transformation to prepare for a First Island Chain contingency, and in other evolving approaches. Fast-forward to today – where are we, from your perspective, in terms of progress toward truly developing effective operational concepts and new ways of fighting?

Greg Grant: Back then, we faced obstacles from the Services who were set in their way of fighting and their approaches to the problem set, a Navy and Air Force that couldn’t get away from the Pacific A2/AD meat-grinder because it perpetuated the capability and capacity combinations they love. The Navy always wants larger numbers of ships – but they’re finding that more and more of their volume is taken up by self-defense capability and living on the surface of the ocean is getting more hazardous, not less. The Air Force is about fighter jets – lots of money spent on being able to drive into the denied zone and shoot down the other guy’s aircraft or drop bombs on mainland China. The competing vision we were after aimed to render an adversary’s A2/AD architecture irrelevant, not to drive across the ocean to try and bludgeon it to death.

I do think the 3OS was definitely the intellectual foundation – the genesis if you will – for much of the subsequent thinking on new operational concepts. In one of his speeches, Bob charged the Army with coming up with a new “AirLand Battle 2.0” and tasked the Marines to continue developing new operational concepts. It was all about pushing them to extend their boundaries and think more creatively. Work’s effort to push the Department to pursue a Third Offset Strategy led directly to discussions about acquiring new capabilities in a time of constrained resources. It was the organizing idea that began all discussions on the subject. It focused the senior leadership on a specific problem set and prioritized developing response options.

We had a meeting in Norfolk with the concept developers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps – under the umbrella of the Joint Forces Association – to talk about new concept development. It was interesting because General McMaster was there representing the Army; he was leading their concept development at the time. And I distinctly recall him saying, “You know, we’ve never actually had all the concept developers from all the services sitting in the same room together until now.” And Work’s response was, “Exactly. We need to bring the Services together to generate future concepts that employ the entire Joint Force, not just a part of it.”

Work emphasized the importance of confronting China with multiple dilemmas. You don’t want them to focus solely on taking out your Navy or your Air Force. You want to hit them with multiple dilemmas from the ground, from the air, from the sea, from under the sea, from space – to overwhelm the adversary’s ability to react and present them with as many dilemmas as you can possibly devise. It goes back to this idea that you need a new American way of war.

That’s why Work tried so hard to re-energize wargaming in the Department. He realized that progress towards a Third Offset would only happen when the Services began to incorporate new ideas and new capabilities into their own operational concepts. Work knew that it’s inherently difficult to get military officers who have spent their careers thinking about fighting in a specific, doctrinally proscribed way to begin to think in terms of fighting in new ways. He viewed wargaming as a tool for bringing the Services along in embracing a vision of future warfare and as a means for discussing possible solutions to an eroding military balance that includes new capabilities. Work was also determined to spark an effort to expand the degree to which defense professionals think Red. It was part of rebuilding the competitive culture that had existed during the Cold War.

I do think this period and the Third Offset was the genesis of some of the thinking on new concepts – in the Marine Corps and in the Army as well. Multi-domain battle was, in many ways, born out of this. The Third Offset kicked off a wave of thinking about new ways of warfighting and concept development. A lot of the people who were in those meetings with us back in the 2016–2017 timeframe were the ones who stayed in the building – or stayed in the services – after we left. General Smith, for example, was one of Work’s senior military assistants. There was this core group of people – O6’s from the Services, a few folks from ONA, some from J5, and a strong wargaming cadre. It was a brain trust that developed in that period, and then dispersed into key positions across the force.

This was one of the real impacts of the ACDP – the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel. It brought everyone together. The Breakfast Club, which became the “Deputy’s Action Group” if you will, met every other week in the conference room adjoining the Deputy’s office. It really pulled together a kind of brain trust inside the building. The goal was twofold: go out and sell/proselytize about the Third Offset, and at the same time, scout the building to find the good ideas. And meeting in the conference room adjoining Work’s office sent the signal that this was a priority. And he would stick his head in the room during breakfast club meetings and ask: “What have you come up with to screw China today?” He’s a former Marine so he’d use more colorful language of course.

This goes to one of the key lessons from William Perry and the Second Offset folks was that there are a lot of good ideas floating around the Pentagon. There’s a ton of smart people there. But unless those ideas are brought to the attention of senior leadership – and unless you have a senior leader willing to champion that program, capability, technology, or concept – it’s not going anywhere. That was the function of the ACDP: to identify those good ideas, elevate them to the Deputy, and present them for consideration. If he said, “Yeah, you’re right – this is a good idea, this merits further funding,” then it could actually move forward. Project Maven is probably the best example of that.

We’re seeing today a strong trend of land forces embracing a sea-denial role. I actually have a story about how that began. It was around 2014 or 2015. At the time, I was working closely with the Secretary’s speechwriter, and Secretary Hagel was preparing to address the Army. In Bob Work’s office, we were trying to get the Army to embrace the idea of using land-based anti-ship missiles. So, we slipped a line into the speech about how the Army, back in the 1800s, had been responsible for coastal defense artillery. That line sparked a conversation inside the Army about striking ships from land and gave cover to those inside the Army who were supportive of getting in the ship killing business.

This speaks to a broader point: progress depends on senior leadership committing their time, energy, and resources to good ideas – and then relentlessly pushing them forward. Look, driving change in any large organization is difficult. Doing so in the hidebound DoD is incredibly challenging. The resistance and inertia inside the building are so strong that, without that kind of leadership focus, even the best concepts will go nowhere. Looking back, I feel we were fortunate to be working for Bob at that time, when he was driving the Third Offset Strategy. It was a period of real intellectual ferment within the Department – and it was exciting to witness. I believe a direct line can be drawn from Work’s efforts to spur a Third Offset Strategy and the strategic direction contained in the 2018 NDS. Much of what was in that document resulted from conversations between Work and then Secretary James Mattis on the major ideas and challenges the NDS should address.

Work shifted the strategic focus of the building toward great power competition – particularly the military-technical competition. – emphasizing the centrality of guided munitions battle network warfare and the imperative for devising new concepts within that framework. He also highlighted the importance of new capabilities, such as AI and increasingly autonomous systems. In doing so, he effectively kick-started the momentum behind all of it. Work was determined to advance a vision of future warfare, even if it was incomplete, to spur the Services to explore new ways of warfighting in an age where AI and autonomy began to make significant impacts.

Octavian Manea: Back in the 3OS days, Bob Work was calling for the creation of a multi-domain operational fires network to deter great power rivals in both theaters. A similar concept has been debated over the past few years in the Indo-Pacific context – the need to build a joint fires network. To what extent can the 3OS vision of a multi-domain operational fires network be linked to the ideas we see playing out today?

Greg Grant: He was certainly pushing things in that direction. It goes back to the notion of how do you gain advantage in a mature precision strike regime? He believed that, ultimately, it would come down to a contest of battle networks – where whoever can see first can hit first. And we see that playing out in Ukraine right now. The notion of a transparent battlefield is very real: if you can see the enemy, you can hit the enemy, because there are so many capabilities you can bring to bear. For him, the contest of battle networks was the decisive arena – and one in which we had to achieve an advantage. Within that battle network, there are core components: the sensor grid, the command-and-control (C4I) grid, the effects grid, and a sustainment or logistics grid.

Much of this thinking was influenced by the Defense Science Board. In 2015, the Board’s summer study argued that we were on the cusp of AI delivering real advantages in autonomous systems and urged the Department to lean into the latest advances in AI and autonomy. That became a central hypothesis of the Third Offset Strategy: the more AI and autonomy you could inject into the battle network, the greater the potential to achieve an advantage.

We can see echoes of that today. Take the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. Early on, DARPA was experimenting with concepts like quarterbacking and picket lines in the air – using autonomy not only to extend range and increase striking power, but also to absorb hits from the adversary. And now, DoD is actually building out those capabilities. The war in Ukraine, in many ways, has validated what he foresaw about autonomy. Work used to say, ‘If the first one through the door is a soldier, we’re stupid. It should be a robot.’ Increasingly, that’s exactly what we’re seeing. Some Ukrainian units no longer even run resupply missions with people – they rely on ground robots, because the battlefield has become so lethal. He was early, and insistent, in pushing autonomy deeper into the force, even if the U.S. military – especially the Army – has been slow to fully embrace it.

Octavian Manea: So the Third Offset Strategy (3OS) is about both autonomy and AI – it’s not an either/or proposition. Yet at times, AI was perceived as the primary dimension of 3OS.

Greg Grant: We began the Third Offset effort with two realizations in mind. First, that our competitors and adversaries were catching up, and in some cases, passing us in terms of advanced weaponry – particularly in the Mature Precision Strike Regime – which was the motivating force behind the Third Offset. And second, the realization that new technology – particularly in the fields of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and robotics – would dramatically impact the way wars were fought in the future. AI and autonomy are closely intertwined in what he called algorithmic warfare.

Take, for example, the situation in Ukraine. A major focus there is achieving what they call ‘last-mile targeting’ or terminal guidance. So how does terminal guidance work? Essentially, it involves running an algorithm on the drone itself – on its onboard computer – to detect, identify and lock onto a specific target. Here’s how it typically plays out: a drone pilot operates a first-person view (FPV) drone, watching the live feed. When the pilot spots a target, all they have to do is tap the screen – on a tablet or similar device – and the system locks on, creating what’s known as a ‘bounding box’ around the target. From that point on, the algorithm takes control and completes the targeting process and autonomously guides the drone into the target. These operators are collecting combat footage daily and using it to train their machine learning models every night. So, AI and autonomy are very much interdependent – you really can’t achieve meaningful autonomous systems without AI.

Back during the Third Offset era, one of the big challenges was that people struggled to contextualize what AI could actually deliver in terms of improved capability. It was difficult to grasp the real advantages it could provide. Work was determined to demonstrate the impact of integrating AI into military operations and needed something impactful that the warfighter could understand. Along came Project Maven. Maven was all about getting AI to the warfighter. DoD AI projects at the time were mostly “hobby projects” with no real outcome. It was important to get something concrete forward with the troops to see how it could impact operations.

At the same time, one of Bob’s big pushes within the Department was to embrace autonomy and drones. His view was: while hypersonic missiles are impressive weapons, they’re far too expensive. You can’t build or field enough of them to generate rapid, large-scale effects. The only way to achieve massed precision is through low-cost systems. Without that, you simply won’t have the numbers you need. That’s why he was advocating for a new generation of lower-cost autonomous systems. In a mature precision-strike environment, where you’re dealing with a high volume of missiles and targets, AI becomes essential. It’s what enables you to close the kill chain faster than your adversary as AI does very well at identifying targets.

That push was harder to get DoD to focus on, but I think they’re starting to come around – especially in light of the lessons from Ukraine. If you want precision at scale, you can only get it with affordable systems. Interestingly, the Europeans are actually leading in this regard. The British appear to have embraced the concept of attritable mass, and Poland along with the Baltic states are exploring what they’re calling a ‘Baltic line’ of drones as a deterrence concept stretching along the northern flank into Finland.

Reflecting on the Lessons of Ukraine

Octavian Manea: An argument can be made that the development of the AirLand Battle concept in the 1970s was, in part, kickstarted by lessons drawn from the dynamics of the Yom Kippur War. So, what should we be learning from Ukraine today as we think about the next wave of defense transformation? What are the key lessons from Ukraine that highlight the changing character of conflict and inform how we must adapt to future war?

Greg Grant: Bob Work often referenced the 1973 war as a defining battle – one of those moments that fundamentally shapes warfighting, doctrine, and training. In 1973, it was the battlefield evidence of precision air defense systems and massed use of wire-guided Sagger anti-tank missiles along with RPGs that served as real eye-openers to the implications of precision systems deployed at scale. I believe that this war it will be drones and autonomy deployed at scale that will drive the realization that we are in fact witnessing a revolution in warfare. As much as people hate the whole revolution in warfare concept.

I’ve been spending the past two years traveling to Ukraine and working with Ukrainian frontline units. There is a real transformation in warfare happening there. I’m 100% convinced that Ukraine is going to be a defining battle. It’s going to entirely change the way militaries fight. In force design terms, there is a before Ukraine war military and an after Ukraine war military…and they will look very different from each other. And if militaries don’t adapt and adjust their organizations and their concepts and their capabilities to the way the Ukrainian military has they’re just going to flat out lose. Because the Russians have had three years of fighting this way whereas NATO nations do not. It doesn’t matter if you’re reluctant to fight that way, because the Russians are going to fight that way and they will have an experiential advantage. They’ve created drone centric units, Rubicon is the most well known, that are very good and are expanding those across their force.

I firmly believe that autonomy, drones, and increasingly AI have dramatically changed the battlefield. The idea of a ‘transparent battlefield’ is very real. When you’ve sat with Ukrainian drone pilots or inside a brigade command post, surrounded by 60 monitors tracking their entire sector 24/7, where nothing moves without being seen, you realize just how radically different this is – the concept of a reverse slope no longer exists as a defense. The saturation of drone surveillance has made nearly all troop movement visible and therefore vulnerable. Any grouping of forces, anything that moves near the frontline will be hit in minutes. The familiar maxim: “What can be seen can be hit” is truer on today’s battlefield than at any point in history. It’s a new world, and it’s going to reshape the way wars are fought. There’s no doubt in my mind. Autonomous systems – both aerial and ground-based – will be central to that transformation.

The fight for information advantage, the ability to form and maintain resilient recce-strike complexes over the battlefield is the operational center of gravity for both Ukraine and Russia. The frontline has become a battle of recce-strike complexes, the fight to maintain your own and simultaneously take down your enemy’s. Six months or so ago Ukrainian drone units listed Russian air defenses as their most high value target. That has shifted to targeting Russian drone pilots. Early in the war Ukrainian brigades used NATO’s ISTAR approach for targeting but quickly realized that the ISTAR targeting process that was far too slow for the scale of the fighting. They’ve put together a system that directly connects the reconnaissance and strike pieces in much faster kill chains.

And it’s in Ukraine where we see AI deployment accelerate. The incredibly complex EW environment along the frontline served as a forcing function. It’s a radio operators’ nightmare, it’s such a dirty battlespace. Skilled pilots can sense the EW jamming as they get closer to the source and the best of them can often find a way to get inside the jamming either by flying low enough to get under it or coming in around from uncovered directions. But most can’t and thousands of drones are lost to jamming. That’s why terminal guidance is the focus of so much work right now, it’s the AI enabled autonomous piece that restores effectiveness to drones in EW saturated environments. Autonomy will continue to increase the capability of drones, there is a big shift currently underway and increasingly software will supersede the skills of a pilot.

The adaptation piece is absolutely central. Ukraine is proving that innovation and speed of iteration are just as vital as traditional metrics of combat strength on the modern battlefield. The key is their lightning-fast feedback loop from operator to engineer. The most effective Ukrainian drone operators are both tactician and technician able to make modifications and improvements on the fly. Drone operators are supported by R&D labs and manufacturing facilities with the brigades located just behind the frontlines. Drone producers integrate frontline feedback within hours. Pilots report issues via secure chat. Engineers adjust software or hardware in real time. Software to counter jamming is routinely patched within 48 hours of field use. It’s something else to watch how fast the whole process operates.

Octavian Manea: Many observers are pointing out that we are on the precipice of a defense dominant world to some extent.

Greg Grant: FPV drones provide operators with an incredibly precise and mobile anti-tank weapon that can immediately respond to any armored assault within tens of kilometers, unhindered by terrain. It’s the mobility piece that makes them such a game changer – FPVs move orders of magnitude faster than anything on the ground to an enemy’s point of attack whereas anti-tank guns and ATGMs would have to be sited along the avenue of approach to be effective. Both NATO and Russian military plans for mobile anti-tank defense placed a heavy reliance on ATGM armed helicopters. Because of the sheer numbers of air defense systems on both sides helicopters are not survivable over the FLOT. Low cost FPVs and bomber drones dropping anti-tank mines have replaced missile armed helicopters. Ukrainian soldiers say it’s senseless to use tanks on this battlefield as they don’t survive very long – 90% of vehicles are destroyed by FPVs and drone dropped remote mining.

Western militaries haven’t reconciled this yet, the challenge of operating on a drone swept battlefield. It fundamentally challenges the traditional notion of massing. Concepts like AirLand Battle, maneuver warfare, and other legacy doctrines are all based on the idea of concentrating forces – massing at the point of effect. But today, that very act of massing gives off an enormous signature and turns you into a target. It really calls into question the whole blitzkrieg concept, whether an attacker massing forces to breakthrough a defenders positions is even viable anymore. In Ukraine it has become nearly impossible for either side to mass and maneuver along the frontline, since any attempt to concentrate forces is quickly detected and targeted.

The incredible lethality on the Ukrainian battlefield is due to the intersection of two dynamics, the proliferation of precision and the transparent battlefield. This combination violates the main foundation of classic military thought: the concentration of effort and mass at a decisive point. On the modern drone swept battlefield any massing of forces is met with precision strike by waves of drones within minutes, well before reaching the FLOT. The primary guiding principle of the western way of war has been concentration of combat power at the decisive point. In Ukraine, concentration equals destruction. To survive on a drone swept battlefield units must be dispersed, which in AirLand Battle doctrine is a dilution of lethality. Offense is now based on the concentration of fires as the means of defeat rather than on the concentration of forces and maneuver. Proficiency in targeting is now the principal determinant of success on the battlefield not proficiency in maneuver.

Tags: Department of Defense, drone warfare, drones, Russia-Ukraine War, strategy, third offset strategy

About The Author

Octavian Manea
Octavian Manea is a PhD Researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) that he joined in October 2021. He is interested in the changing character of conflict and the implications of such alterations for the US-led alliance system. Octavian is also broadly interested in strategic studies, transatlantic relations and security issues. He worked for many years as a journalist, and is currently a contributor at the Romanian weekly 22 and the Small Wars Journal. In addition, Octavian was the managing editor of the Eastern Focus Quarterly in Bucharest and was affiliated with the Romania Energy Center (ROEC). Octavian was a Fulbright Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, where he received an MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies. He also holds a BA and an MA in political science and international relations from the University of Bucharest.

17. The Witkoff File: Three Decades of russian Cash, One Kremlin “Peace Plan.”

Summary:

Steve Witkoff’s role as Trump’s “special envoy” on Russia and Ukraine is the culmination of three decades immersed in Russian money and networks, especially in New York real estate after the Soviet collapse. It links him to the same post-Soviet capital pipelines, criminally tainted ecosystems, and Kremlin narratives that shaped Trump and Paul Manafort’s earlier “peace plans” for Ukraine. Witkoff is portrayed not as a naïve businessman but as a long-conditioned actor whose proposed plan mirrors Moscow’s aims: freezing lines, halting aid, legitimizing Russian gains, and easing sanctions, turning U.S. policy into a vehicle for Kremlin objectives.

Comment: A sensational read. Truth or fiction? Hit job or accurate expose? Or where there is smoke, is there fire? Is the Kremlin this good at developing and running assets? Or is this just another conspiracy theory?

Photos and graphics at the link.

Background on the author:

Ine Back Iversen is a prominent journalist and media personality known for her insightful reporting and charismatic presence. With a career spanning over two decades, Iversen has established herself as a significant voice in the media landscape, renowned for her dedication to uncovering the truth and presenting complex issues in an accessible manner.

Born and raised in Norway, Iversen developed an early interest in storytelling and journalism. She pursued her passion by studying media at NTNU in Trondheim Norway and continued her education in acting and entertainment at NISS inOslo where she graduated with honors. Her career began at a local radio station, and quickly became a voice within the world of news and entertainment spanning across borders in Scandinavia.

The Witkoff File: Three Decades of russian Cash, One Kremlin “Peace Plan.”

ineukraine.com · Ine Iversen

https://ineukraine.com/2025/11/27/the-witkoff-file-three-decades-of-russian-cash-one-kremlin-peace-plan/

Steve Witkoff: The Continuity of a System Built on russian Money

When Bloomberg broke the news this week about a phone call made on October 14th between Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s “special envoy,” and Yuri Ushakov, Vladimir Putin’s top foreign-policy adviser, I, unfortunately was not surprised.

About 20 minutes before the leaked transcript, of the call was made public, where Witkoff—the man representing the United States—was advising the Kremlin on how to persuade Donald Trump, I had published a long deep dive thread on X I’d been working on for a while.

It was about who Steve Witkoff really is— about his background and many russian connections.

Witkoff has spent three decades swimming in russian money, russian mob circles, and the russian real-estate pipeline.

In fact; it’s what his career is built on. It’s not through politics & diplomatic relations, it’s through a business that has been Russias main way of exploiting their connections and creating a network in the U.S.

And his background has never been a secret, it’s all well documented, through archived articles, interviews, business reports and partnerships, it’s all there, and when put together is gives us a very clear image of exactly who Steve Witkoff is, and how his position as a “special envoy” to Russia is incredibly concerning.

It’s not accidental, it’s intent.

The narrative that Steve Witkoff is simply a “useful idiot” is not only wrong — it’s dangerously convenient.

It gives him an excuse. It frames his choices as accidental.

But nothing about his behavior and his approach of this new role, is accidental.

Witkoff’s worldview was shaped inside a network built on russian capital, russian mob pipelines, and post-Soviet financial structures that flooded New York real estate in the 1990s. His actions today are not a departure from that world.

They are a continuation of it.

A Man Formed in a System of Post-Soviet Money

Witkoff is not just “a MAGA guy” brought in to shape Trump’s Russia–Ukraine policy.

He is:

• Of Russian descent,

• A beneficiary of the post-Soviet real-estate gold rush,

• A businessman who thrived in an industry the FBI warned for decades was infiltrated by russian criminal networks

..and now, he is the architect of a “peace plan” that mirrors the Kremlin’s foreign-policy demands point by point.

This is not coincidence.

It is continuity.

The 1990s: When Manhattan Became the Kremlin’s Laundromat

When the Soviet Union collapsed, billions of dollars from russian criminal networks and oligarchs fled the country — and Manhattan’s luxury real-estate market became the primary laundromat.

The FBI testified to Congress about this era. Investigations, financial records, and open testimony all confirm it.

And who rose to prominence in that exact industry at that exact moment?

Donald Trump and Steve Witkoff.

This isn’t speculation. It’s documented history.

Trump built his empire by selling condos — often in cash — to shell companies, mobsters, arms dealers, and businessmen tied to russian organized crime, including networks linked to Semion Mogilevich.

Witkoff, meanwhile, became a major player in the commercial side of the same ecosystem.

While Trump moved apartments bought with suitcases of cash, Witkoff acquired office buildings through opaque partnerships and distressed deals that mirrored the structures used by post-Soviet capital seeking anonymity.

Two men, two branches of the same pipeline, gaining wealth and influence from the same influx of russian money.

Fast-Forward to 2024–25: The Pipeline Reappears in U.S. Foreign Policy

Today, Witkoff is Trump’s point man on Russia–Ukraine — a role for which he has:

• no diplomatic experience,

• no Ukraine expertise,

• no background in international negotiations,

but what he do have is;

• A very large network of russian partners, financiers, and ideological allies.

He is also a man who has, for years, publicly echoed Kremlin narratives.

So the sudden emergence of a U.S. “peace plan” that looks identical to Moscow’s wish list is not surprising.

History didn’t repeat — it simply continued.

Déjà Vu: This All Happened Before

In 2016, Trump’s campaign chairman Paul Manafort met with Konstantin Kilimnik, a known russian intelligence asset, to discuss a “peace plan” for Ukraine that:

• legitimized russia’s invasion,

• installed a Moscow-approved leader,

• lifted sanctions, and

• forced Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness.

The plan was a geopolitical Trojan horse.

Manafort was later charged and convicted — until Trump pardoned him.

And it’s when we look at the details of this plan that we also see how the role Witkoff now play, was already planned out and established by russia, during Trumps first time around.

The role that failed in 2016, has now successfully taken the main stage; by Steve Witkoff.

Trump today claims the war “would never have started if he were president,” ignoring the fact that russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, while he loudly entertained the same Kremlin talking points.

He has heard iterations of a russian “peace plan” for nearly a decade.

The 2024–25 “Peace Plan” — Same Script, New Messenger

Today we have a new version of that same plan, delivered by Witkoff:

same demands, same distortions, same goals for Moscow.

And now, thanks to the leaked transcript, we know Witkoff spoke directly with Putin’s adviser about how to coordinate on this plan and how Putin could pitch it to Trump.

That is not diplomacy.

That is alignment.

Witkoff’s Policy Positions Are Not Neutral — They Are the Kremlin’s

Witkoff has repeatedly advocated for policies that overwhelmingly benefit russia:

• “Stop aid to Ukraine.”

• “Freeze the lines.”

• “Let russia keep what it stole.”

• “Force Ukraine to negotiate.”

• “Appease Putin to end the war.”

These are not independent ideas.

These are the explicit foreign-policy objectives of the Kremlin.

And his public statements back it up.

In 2018, Witkoff criticized sanctions imposed after russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea:

“I never understood the Russian sanctions, candidly, because all it did was stop Russian investment into this country.”

To him, the crime was not the invasion of Crimea —but the interruption of russian money flowing into Manhattan real estate.

The Pattern of Omission

Witkoff never mentions:

• russian war crimes,

• the mass deportations of Ukrainian children,

• the missile strikes on civilians,

• nuclear threats,

• or russia’s documented genocidal intent.

His silence is not accidental.

It serves a purpose: To whitewash russia’s crimes and shift blame onto Ukraine.

Business, Politics, and the Kremlin’s Leverage

And many say; “Witkoff & Trump are business men” it’s how they work. And “they want a deal.”

And that’s of course partially true.

Except, it ignores that their main deals with Russia was done long ago, many times, and now, Witkoff and Trump are doing their part of those deals:

Appease Moscow.
Pressure Ukraine.
Undermine sanctions.
Force a deal.
Declare it “peace.”

This is the same world Manafort monetized, Trump depended on, and russian intelligence used as cover for access and influence.

Neither Trump, nor Witkoff left that world.

He brought it into the White House.

And now the “Special envoy” operate without scrutiny because he’s framed as a “businessman” instead of what he actually is:

A geopolitical actor with active ties to the aggressor state.

Why Are These Worlds Allowed to Mix?

Steve Witkoff — a man whose money, partners, and network are heavily linked to russia — now influences:

• U.S. posture toward russia,

• U.S. response to war crimes,

• the direction of NATO policy,

• and Ukraine’s, as well as Europes, future security.

That should never be allowed.

But it’s happening — off the books, behind closed doors, without neither Ukraine nor Europe present.

The Pattern That Refuses to Go Away

Look at the historical continuum:

1990s: russian capital floods NYC real estate → Trump & Witkoff thrive.

2016: Manafort & Kilimnik → first Kremlin “peace plan.”

2017–2019: Trump & Putin private meetings → concessions unknown.

2024: Witkoff reemerges as Trump’s link to Moscow.

2025: A new Kremlin-designed “peace plan” appears.

This is not coincidence.

It is repetition — an operational pattern.

Agents vs Assets

The so-called “russia hoax” was never a hoax.

It was misunderstood.

It was presented as “election fraud” and interference.

When in reality what it shows, is truly worse than that.

It’s about influence, access, and networks built over decades.

Are they russian agents?

Probably not.

Are they russian assets?

Most certainly.

They are men whose worldview, finances, and professional ascent were shaped inside a system russia deliberately penetrated.

The Real Question

The question isn’t:

“Is Steve Witkoff compromised?”

The question is:

Why is U.S. policy toward russia being shaped by a man whose entire career was built inside the one American industry russia spent decades infiltrating?

And why is there so much effort — from media, from political actors, from Trump’s circle — to ignore, downplay, or dismiss these connections?

Because once you see the pattern clearly, it becomes impossible to unsee.

Hunting bin Laden on 'the roof of the world'

How an encounter in a remote Pakistani bazaar prompted a search for the al-Qaida leader

Jack Murphy and Sean D. Naylor

Nov 28, 2025

∙ Paid

https://thehighside .substack.com/p/hunting-bin-laden-on-the-roof-of?r=1mgtb &utm

The village of Drosh with the Hindu Kush mountains in the background. (Credit: Zahijee, via Wikimedia Commons)

In September 2005, in a remote valley in Pakistan, a CIA contractor locked eyes with a man he was sure was Osama bin Laden and caught the moment on camera.

The images of that encounter (see below) caused the small Joint Special Operations Command task force in Afghanistan to prepare for a possible cross-border mission, according to the contractor, before Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, which the CIA’s Islamabad station chief had controversially informed about the sighting, persuaded the agency that it was a case of mistaken identity.

The episode, almost six years before a JSOC raid killed bin Laden in Pakistan, underscored the divide in the CIA over how much their Pakistani counterparts could be trusted and the febrile nature of the hunt for bin Laden after the trail of the al-Qaida leader had gone cold following the December 2001 battle of Tora Bora.

In early July 2005, according to an account written by the former contractor and obtained by The High Side, the U.S. consul general in Peshawar, a bustling city in what was then Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (since renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), was invited to meet with the head of the Kalash people, a community of about 3,000 centered in a few remote valleys in Chitral, the most northwesterly region of Pakistan.

Pakistan, with Chitral highlighted in red. (Credit: Green Giant via Wikimedia Commons)

In addition to a handful of staff, the consul general invited an undercover CIA case officer, the CIA contractor and a National Security Agency technician to accompany him. The group from the consulate flew up to Chitral, rendezvoused with the Pakistani drivers who had driven up the day before, met with the Kalash people and then spent the night at the luxurious Hindukush Heights hotel.

The next day the group drove about 66 miles northeast to Mastuj, a small settlement on the banks of the Chitral River, where they stayed in cottages located in the grounds of an 18^th century fort. The following day, the cohort from the consulate headed about 28 miles south to the Shandur Pass, which connects Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and where the annual Shandur Polo Festival was being held. (Often referred to as “the roof of the world,” Shandur boasts the world’s highest polo ground.)

The Shandur Pass, known as “the roof of the world.” (Credit: Imtiaz39, via Wikimedia Commons)

After watching the polo, the group from the consulate returned to Chitral, from where the diplomats flew back to Peshawar. The intelligence officers remained overnight and made the 11-hour drive back the next day, a highlight of which was traversing the narrow switchback road of the 10,230-foot high Lowari Pass that marked their departure from the Chitral Valley.

The Lowari Pass road, notorious for its hairpin switchbacks. (Credit: ZoroAshfaq123 via Wikimedia Commons)

As they traveled south, the intelligence officers reflected upon what the region they were departing. They noted that the steep-sided valley has but one main road that parallels the Chitral River (which becomes the Kunar River as it enters Afghanistan), and they had seen little evidence of any law enforcement presence, according to the CIA contractor’s account. The clean air, fresh water supply, and limited electricity afforded Chitral residents a healthy, modest lifestyle. “If I were UBL,” the contractor remarked to his colleagues, using the U.S. government’s acronym for Osama (or Usama) bin Laden, “this would be a great place to hide.”

The Chitral Valley, south of Drosh. (Credit: Imran Shah, via Wikimedia Commons)

‘There’s bin Laden!’

After hearing the accounts of his colleagues, “Dan,” the senior CIA case officer in Peshawar, who had not made the trip with the consul general, decided he wanted to explore Chitral himself. On Sept. 22, he, the contractor and “Iqbal,” one of the consulate’s Pakistani drivers, climbed into a Toyota Land Cruiser with a standard transmission and headed north, the former contractor told The High Side in an interview. Their cover story, if required, was that they were just scouting out potential tourism spots for the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, he said.

The CIA pair’s goal was to search the valleys that ran west into Afghanistan from the Chitral River, “looking for access routes in and out of Pakistan,” states the former contractor’s written account. They were surprised to find good research material in their hotel, which was again the Hindukush Heights.

“Rolled up in a big conference room,” the contractor told The High Side, were “original hand-drawn maps” dating to the days of the British Raj that showed “hiking trails in and out of Afghanistan, Pakistan and China.” The hotel owner had inherited them and was only too happy to show them to his American guests. Later, as the contractor and Dan drove closer to the Afghan border, they noticed “how little any movement [along those routes] was monitored,” the contractor writes.

The two Americans’ original plan was to return to Peshawar on Sunday Sept. 25. Entranced by the beautiful surroundings and fine weather, however, they decided to stay an extra day and instead left at about 8 a.m. on Monday.

Iqbal had been staying with relatives who lived in the area. “He reported that the Taliban had been trying to influence local mosques,” writes the contractor. “I decided that I would run my video camera as we drove through each village to see [if] I could locate any person or persons of interest, especially as the streets were narrow [and] lots of men stand by the side of the road watching traffic.”

Another view of Drosh. (Credit: Jawad Ullah, via Wikimedia Commons)

A couple of hours into their journey home, they approached the village of Drosh, about 28 miles south of Chitral town. Pakistan drives on the left side of the road, so the contractor was in the front left passenger seat, with Iqbal in the driver’s seat on the right, and Dan the case officer in the rear right seat. The Americans had stowed their Glock handguns in the glove compartment and their AR-15 rifles in a duffle bag in the trunk. Dressed in jeans and a shirt, the contractor held the camera to his chest, pointing toward the road.

Up ahead, a small, overloaded truck on the right was blocking oncoming traffic. Immediately behind the truck was a green jeep-style vehicle. Two children were standing in the vehicle’s open bed, but it wasn’t the kids who caught the contractor’s attention. It was the tall, bearded figure seated beside the driver.

“He was clean and neat,” writes the contractor. “He seemed like a somebody.” And not just any somebody, but the most wanted man in the world.

A still frame from the video taken by a CIA contractor in Drosh with the man he took to be Osama bin Laden to the right. (Credit: courtesy photo)

In a surreal moment, the contractor caught the stranger’s gaze. “Look! There’s bin Laden sitting in the passenger seat!” he whispered to Dan, who was peering down at his laptop. Looking up, Dan got a full view, according to the contractor, who said Dan’s reply was audible on the video: “I swear to God. I swear to God.”

The contractor glanced around to see if there was any security detail or other entourage around the man he was now convinced was bin Laden. Then, as soon as they were out of town, he quickly rewound the video “and verified I had ID quality video on bin Laden.”

Reaching Peshawar at about 9 p.m., they stopped at the home of another U.S. intelligence contractor, a retired Army officer who had been hired to conduct psychological operations in Pakistan, according to the contractor who had just returned from Chitral. “I showed him the video and he jumped up yelling, ‘Do you know who that is?’” according to the contractor’s written account. (The High Side was unable to locate the psy ops contractor to confirm this anecdote.)

‘Holy crap, bin Laden’s in Chitral!’

The next day, the contractor turned the relevant section of the video into 26 still frames that Dan sent to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The contractor sent a copy to his office, “the surveillance group” in the agency’s Counterterrorism Center.

The CIA’s photo analysts responded quickly via email, according to the contractor, who writes that he read the email at the desk of Dan the case officer. The email said that the analysts “identified nine (9) positive points on his face and head” that matched with bin Laden, and that “this was the [most] positive information on bin Laden in a long time,” writes the contractor. “They concluded it was bin Laden.”

Osama bin Laden in November 2001. (Credit: Hamid Mir, via Wikimedia Commons)

The initial CIA reaction was one of, “Holy crap, bin Laden’s in Chitral!” confirmed a former CIA officer who was in Afghanistan at the time.

“There probably were people who wanted the lead to be pursued,” said a former senior CIA official, adding that with bin Laden’s trail having gone cold, there was “a desperation for leads” on the al-Qaida leader’s whereabouts. That meant the agency felt obligated to check out every tip.

“So much of the war was hunting down every report, every lead, no matter how absurd they sounded,” said the former CIA officer who was in Afghanistan in late 2005. “Back at that point in the war, if somebody said, ‘I found bin Laden – he’s working at Wawa in Poughkeepsie, New Jersey,’ somebody had to go check it out.”

The former CIA officer said that the challenges he and his colleagues faced were down to bin Laden’s “tradecraft.” He quoted Mike D’Andrea, the legendary head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, who, according to George Stephanopoulos’ “The Situation Room,” told National Counterterrorism Center director Michael Leiter after a May 2009 White House Situation Room meeting on the bin Laden hunt, “Mike, would you please tell these guys: You know why it’s so hard to find him? Because he’s hiding.”

“That’s the reality of it,” said the former CIA officer. “He learned, he adapted, he stayed off the phones, he stayed off all the technology that would have gotten him killed a lot faster. He was a pro … He had solid tradecraft and we couldn’t fucking find him, so we ran down every darn lead that we could.”

The apparent lack of a security detail surrounding the individual sighted in Drosh caught the CIA’s attention. “The agency was surprised by this,” the contractor told The High Side. “[They] expected a bigger footprint.” Traveling without bodyguards was assumed to be “a way to hide in plain sight,” he said.

What seemed a near confirmation that they had spotted bin Laden put the Peshawar base in high spirits. The contractor found himself sitting in Dan’s office as the case officer held a speaker phone conversation over classified lines with the head of Alec Station, the Langley-based CIA unit that had been hunting bin Laden since 1996 (and which the CIA was about to shut down). “They were joking about their promotions” they expected receive after finding bin Laden, the contractor writes.

Telling the ISI

Back in the United States, however, matters were about to take a strange turn. Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the director general of Pakistan’s all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency, was receiving treatment for an unknown ailment at Bethesda Naval Hospital in Washington, D.C.’s Maryland suburbs.

(It was not unusual for Kayani and other senior Pakistani figures to be treated at the U.S. military’s flagship hospital, according to a former U.S. Embassy Islamabad official. “Anybody who it was thought it would be beneficial” to the CIA or the U.S. military to have treated there, “it was a done deal,” they said.)

Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (right), then-Pakistan’s chief of Army Staff, chats with U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 2010. As director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency in 2005, Kayani was told by the CIA’s Islamabad chief of station about the possible Osama bin Laden sighting in Drosh. (Credit: U.S. Defense Department)

Kayani’s visit had caused the CIA’s Islamabad station chief to also return to Washington. For reasons that are unclear, the station chief, whom The High Side was unable to contact, chose to visit Kayani and divulge the secret of the possible bin Laden sighting, according to the CIA contractor’s written account.

“He went into his hospital room and announced that the CIA had positive video on bin Laden in Pakistan,” writes the contractor, who adds that the station chief’s decision infuriated others at the agency: “Everyone on the conference calls later were calling for the chief of station to be tried as a traitor for giving out the information without permission.”

The CIA’s relationship with ISI has waxed and waned in the years after 9/11. But according to a former senior CIA official, this episode occurred during one of the more fruitful periods. The former senior CIA official acknowledged, however, that “some people were upset” at the station chief’s action, which the former senior CIA official said the station chief took “on his own.”

The CIA did not respond to a request for comment.

SEAL Team 6 spins up

About a week later, according to the CIA contractor, “four of us returned to the Chitral … looking for possible landing zones for U.S. forces [and] scanning neighborhoods.” At the time, the contractor didn’t know why they had been directed to locate potential HLZs. Only later, he told The High Side, did a friend in SEAL Team 6 tell him that “they had been put on alert about going into Pakistan for bin Laden.”

At the time, according to the book “Relentless Strike,” by Sean Naylor (one of the authors of this article), SEAL Team 6 kept a troop -- about 15 to 20 operators -- on a short alert in Afghanistan ready to conduct a mission into Pakistan in case bin Laden were located. If he were found within about 30 miles of the border -- and Drosh is only about 10 miles from inside Pakistan -- the SEALs were prepared to conduct a high-altitude, high-opening military freefall mission, jumping from an MC-130 Combat Talon on the Afghan side of the border and then steering themselves on the wind to the target.

Otherwise, the SEALs would fly in on the handful of MH-47 Chinook helicopters the 160^th Special Operations Aviation Regiment kept in Afghanistan. It was not uncommon for the JSOC units like SEAL Team 6 and the 160^th to receive warning orders for missions into Pakistan targeting bin Laden.

In the 2004-2005 period, “we were always getting spun up for cross-border missions into Pakistan because we fervently believed that’s where he was hiding,” said a former commander of the 160^th. “That was our mission: finding bin Laden.”

“The idea of SEAL Team 6 spinning up on it is plausible,” acknowledged the former senior CIA official.

The four Americans were back at the Hindukush Heights hotel on the morning of Oct. 8 when a catastrophic earthquake struck the region, killing scores of thousands and leveling buildings. The U.S. intelligence officers left two days later, following a satellite phone call from Washington “telling us to get the fuck out of the area,” according to the CIA contractor, who said he soon returned to the United States.

But the CIA sent more personnel up to Chitral later that autumn. A May 2006 New York Times story, headlined “Mystery Americans on the trail of bin Laden,” reported that “four Americans from the U.S. Embassy rented a house” in Chitral in autumn 2005 but that the house remained unoccupied until early May, “when an American arrived with two carloads of furniture and equipment.”

The agency indeed sent “someone” back to Chitral “but they had no cover for action and it just fell apart,” said the former CIA contractor, adding that the tight-knit nature of the Chitral community doomed the attempt to establish a safe house. “Everyone there knows everything,” he said (a point underlined by The New York Times article, which quotes a series of local sources about the Americans’ presence). “To run a house up there made no sense whatsoever.”

Another proposal was to utilize a CIA officer who in real life was an adventure racer who “could use that as a cover to go up there [to Chitral] to prepare an adventure race, which would have made sense,” the former contractor said. “But they never used that plan and rented a house instead, putting four people there who [didn’t] do anything.”

The New York Times article does not mention the incident in which the CIA filmed the man they thought was bin Laden, but it quotes a local politician who gave a garbled version of the facts behind the Americans’ arrival in the valley: “They came on the basis of a very fabricated report that some Arabs came down from the mountains in a Jeep and visited the bazaar.”

The contractor never heard what further steps the United States took based on his sighting and speculated that the Bush administration chose not to launch a mission “out of concern that [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf would be overthrown if we acted on it.” But two former CIA officers provided “the rest of the story” to The High Side.

Southern Chitral District, with Chitral town and Drosh clearly marked. (Credit: Kafiristani, via Wikimedia Commons)

The man in the jeep

It did not take the ISI long to track the tall, bearded individual down after the Islamabad station chief’s conversation with Kayani, according to the former senior CIA official. “They were very helpful,” the former CIA official said. “They found the guy.” (The ISI’s task was probably made easier by the fact that the vehicle’s license plate was clearly visible in the still images.)

The bearded figure in the jeep, the former senior CIA official said, turned out to be “a fucking lumber dude” – in other words, a local businessman in the lumber trade, a major, albeit often illegal, industry in northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and across the border in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces. The lumber trader was “one of many leads [that] people kind of got exercised about and ran to ground and it was nothing,” said the former official, who was keen to downplay the episode. “It never should have been reported in the first place.”

Another still frame of the bin Laden lookalike from the video taken by a CIA contractor in Drosh, Pakistan. (Credit: courtesy photo)

It is unclear why the CIA chose to trust the ISI’s word on such a sensitive topic. “The ISI were just renowned liars and playing both ends,” said the former 160^th commander.

But, according to the former senior CIA official, this was an example of the agency’s liaison relationship with the ISI proving its worth. “There was a time when they were actually very cooperative,” the former CIA official said.

However, the former U.S. Embassy Islamabad official was less flattering about their Pakistani counterparts. “They had thrown some bones the U.S.’s way” by capturing foreign al-Qaida fighters, but there were limits to the Pakistanis’ cooperation, the former embassy official said.

For example, the ISI, which was widely assumed to be supporting the Taliban, didn’t turn over Afghan Taliban figures to the United States. And “they’d give up other foreign actors, but rarely would they give up a Saudi,” the former U.S. Embassy Islamabad official said, noting that Saudi Arabia poured a lot of money into Pakistan.

As for the purported sighting of bin Laden in Drosh, the former U.S. Embassy Islamabad official said that although in their opinion, which they said was based on open-source information, the ISI had “a small group of people … managing bin Laden” while the terrorist chief was in Pakistan, the account of the al-Qaida leader driving through Chitral in the open did not ring true.

“If he was in that area, the Pakistanis would have never let him be on the street,” the former embassy official said. “They were playing both ends, but they weren’t foolish.”

The Pakistani government’s attitude toward the al-Qaida leader was simple, according to the former U.S. Embassy Islamabad official: “Bin Laden’s our cash cow.”

The Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not respond to a request for comment.

‘Sure as shit, he looks like bin Laden’

The United States finally got eyes on the mysterious bin Laden lookalike in early December, according to the former CIA officer who spent a lot of time in Afghanistan. That was when two CIA officers, “a platoon’s worth” of Afghan Counterterrorism Pursuit Team members (i.e., militiamen who worked for the CIA), “four or five” SEAL Team 6 operators and a Navy corpsman flew on 160^th Chinooks from a base in Asadabad about 56 miles north to Barg-e Matal, a village and district in Nuristan less than 10 miles from the Pakistan border.

The lumber merchant that the ISI had fingered as the bin Laden doppelganger was apparently an Afghan from Barg-e Metal who made frequent visits to Pakistan. So, under the guise of conducting a MEDCAP, or medical civic action program, a sort of mobile clinic in which the corpsman would treat local villagers, the CIA personnel were there to “find this guy who looks like bin Laden and get a photo of him,” as well as to figure out whether it was worth establishing a presence there, the former CIA officer said.

Barg-e Matal Valley, as seen from an Afghan Air Force Mi-17 helicopter. (Credit: U.S. Air Force)

The landscape in which the Chinooks landed was awe inspiring, according to the former CIA officer. “The floor of the valley is … 7,500, 8,000 feet and the mountains around … are like 14,000 feet.” But it was the middle of the night and the start of the Afghan winter, so the CIA officer, who was ex-military, was glad of the multilayered cold weather clothing system he had brought along. “I literally had to wear every fucking layer, because it was that cold,” he said.

While the MEDCAP was underway, the former CIA officer contacted the local chief of police as well as the local representative of the National Directorate of Security, the intelligence service created, funded and mentored by the CIA, and explained who he was looking for.

“I said, ‘Do you know of a guy who looks like bin Laden who has this name.’” The police chief responded immediately. “He was like, ‘Oh yeah, I know who you’re talking about,’ and he went and got him.” The lumber trader was soon standing in front of the CIA officer.

“Sure as shit, he looks like bin Laden,” said the former CIA officer. “He’s super tall, the whole kit and kaboodle.”

The CIA officer got the picture he was tasked to obtain. “I used to have a photograph of the two of us, me and this guy, standing together smiling,” he said, adding that he had recently looked for the photo but was unable to find it.

The CIA officer was also able to confirm what the ISI had told the agency. “He was a trader,” he said. “He was just like a merchant guy who went across the border periodically to do business … He was just a businessman.”

Bin Laden’s escape

The case of the lumber trader from Barg-e Matal might have been a case of mistaken identity, but it threw up several parallels with the real bin Laden.

According to “The Exile” by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, an authoritative account of the al-Qaida leader’s life after 9/11, following his escape from Tora Bora bin Laden took up residence for several months in an isolated compound in the Kunar valley. Barg-e Matal, although in Nuristan (the province directly north of Kunar), was about 21 miles from the Kunar border, and just over 200 miles from Jalalabad.

From Kunar, bin Laden traveled to the Pakistani coastal metropolis of Karachi, before moving into a property owned by the family of one of his wives in Shangla in the Swat valley in northern Pakistan, about 65 miles southeast of Drosh, according to “The Exile.” That bin Laden had escaped to the Kunar valley was also the CIA’s assessment, according to the former agency officer who was in Afghanistan.

While “The Exile” does not detail how bin Laden got from Kunar to Karachi, the CIA’s conclusion, according to the former CIA officer, was that he probably crossed into Pakistan at a border village called Barikot (not to be confused with the larger Pakistani town of the same name), “and then he just fucking disappears.”

In other words, the CIA was looking for bin Laden in roughly the right part of the world, albeit somewhat belatedly. Because by the time the CIA was looking in Chitral and Nuristan for him, bin Laden, according to “The Exile,” had just moved into a new home: the compound in the Pakistani garrison town of Abbottabad where the CIA found him in 2010 and JSOC killed him in May 2011.

In the wake of the successful U.S. mission to kill bin Laden on May 2, 2011, Pakistan’s government established a commission to examine the circumstances surrounding bin Laden’s death. The commission’s 336-page classified report, submitted in January 2013 and obtained by Al Jazeera six months later, contained a one-sentence reference to events in Chitral eight years previously.

According to the ISI director general, the report states, in “October-November 2005” the CIA had divulged to the ISI that “a person supposedly resembling [bin Laden] was sighted in Darosh [sic], Chitral.” The director general told the commission that this had been “the last time the CIA shared any information” about bin Laden with the ISI.

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19. How does the Hong Kong tower fire compare to other recent building blazes?

Summary:

The Hong Kong tower blaze that killed at least 94 people is among the deadliest recent building fires, surpassing London’s 2017 Grenfell Tower disaster, which left 72 dead. Recent tragedies include Hanoi’s 2023 apartment fire that killed 56 after an electrical fault, and Shanghai’s 2010 high rise fire that killed 58. Nightclub fires have been even worse: Bucharest’s 2015 Colectiv blaze killed 65, while Brazil’s 2013 Kiss nightclub fire claimed 242 lives. Earlier nightclub fires in Argentina and Rhode Island together killed around 300, exposing recurring patterns of lax fire safety, flammable materials, overcrowding, and official negligence.

Comment: Note that most recent report I have seen is 128 killed (so far). See the photo at the link. Here is a comment I received from a friend and former intelligence officer based on the photo:

What caught our eye about this blaze was how every tower in the complex went up in smoke. Apparently the scaffolding and materials to collect debris from a renovation was the culprit.

But in the mafia-crony-captialist state that Xi runs, one wonders whether the complex’s owner had run afoul of the regime—or whether the regime simply wanted the land…

How does the Hong Kong tower fire compare to other recent building blazes?

Reuters

HONG KONG, Nov 28 (Reuters) - A blaze that ripped through a massive apartment block in Hong Kong has claimed at least 94 lives, surpassing the toll of a similar incident at London's Grenfell Tower in 2017.

Here's how the tragedy compares to some other major building fire incidents around the world in recent years.

Hanoi apartment block fire, Vietnam, 2023 - 56 dead

A fire at a nine-storey apartment block in Vietnam's capital Hanoi in September 2023 killed 56 people, among them 10 children. Many others were injured after leaping from windows or on to roofs of neighbouring buildings to escape.

Authorities said the fire was sparked by an electrical fault in a motorbike on the ground floor and the building's landlord was later sentenced to 12 years in prison for fire safety violations and illegal construction.

Vietnam's deadliest blaze in two decades prompted stricter fire safety enforcement nationwide.

Grenfell Tower fire, UK, 2017 – 72 deaths

The fire that ripped through a 23-storey social housing block in one of London's richest areas in June 2017 was Britain's deadliest blaze in a residential building since World War Two

The tragedy claimed 72 lives and led to revelations that high-rise public housing buildings across Britain were wrapped in flammable cladding.

A public inquiry concluded last year blamed the disaster on failings by the government, construction industry and, most of all, the firms involved in fitting the exterior with flammable cladding.

Colectiv nightclub fire, Romania, 2015 - 65 deaths

A blaze sparked by pyrotechnics at a Bucharest nightclub in October 2015 killed 65 people in what became a symbol of corruption in Romania.

The fire broke out when fireworks used by rock band ignited non-fireproofed insulation foam, triggering a stampede towards the single-door exit.

The nightclub owners and a mayor were jailed after a court found the room was overcrowded and safety inspectors allowed it to open despite knowing it did not have a fire safety permit.

Kiss nightclub fire, Brazil, 2013 - 242 deaths

More than 200 people were killed in a similar incident in a nightclub in southern Brazil in 2013 when pyrotechnics appeared to set the ceiling on fire.

Many of the estimated 500 people inside were unable to find exits as dark smoke filled the room, police said. Two owners of the nightclub and two band members were given lengthy prison sentences.

Other fires at nightclubs in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 2004 and Rhode Island in the United States in 2003 claimed around 300 lives between them.

Shanghai high-rise fire, China, 2010 - 58 deaths

A fire blamed on unlicensed welding work during renovations gutted a 28-storey high-rise in Shanghai in November 2010, killing 58 people.

Sparks from the welding work ignited scaffolding around the structure, a preliminary investigation found.

The tragedy prompted public anger at lax enforcement of safety standards in a city that prides itself on being a modern financial hub. A year later, four former city officials were jailed for corruption and abuse of power.

Reporting by John Geddie; Editing by Stephen Coates

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

Suggested Topics:
China

Purchase Licensing Rights

Reuters

20. China Using Brazil to Reshape Power in the Americas

Summary:

China is moving from commodity buyer to embedded industrial power in Brazil, using EV maker BYD, apps, and fast-rising investment to shape jobs, markets, and supply chains. Local production plus Mercosur rules let “Made in Brazil” Chinese goods penetrate the region, undercutting Taiwan’s leverage in Paraguay. Lula’s “active non-alignment,” de-dollarization push, and openness to Chinese capital deepen Beijing’s role in energy, oil, and autos, with indirect implications for Itaipu and Paraguay’s energy sovereignty. The result is a structural shift in hemispheric power that erodes U.S. influence and constricts Taiwan’s diplomatic space unless Washington and Taipei step up engagement.

Excerpts:

To counter this trend, Washington and Taipei must cooperate more closely with Latin America. A recently introduced bill, the United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act, represents a step in that direction, but its implementation should extend beyond Taiwan’s current diplomatic allies. Engaging with major economies like Brazil (albeit informally on Taipei’s part) through technological cooperation, market diversification, and investment would improve regional autonomy and reduce dependency on Chinese capital.

China’s growing presence in Brazil represents a structural shift in hemispheric power. As Beijing leverages Brazil’s industrial and market capacity to expand its clout across Latin America, Washington risks losing influence in its own neighborhood, while Taipei risks losing diplomatic standing in one of its remaining supportive spheres of influence. If Washington and its partners fail to act, Beijing’s involvement in Brazil may evolve into a strong foothold for reshaping economic and political alignments across the Americas.

China Using Brazil to Reshape Power in the Americas

China entrenching in Brazilian industrial base with implications for influence across the continent

Nov 28, 2025

∙ Paid

By: Patrick Ko, The Diplomat

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/china-using-brazil-reshape-power-americas?utm

Xi and Lula in Beijing. Photo from @LulaOfficial

China’s increasing economic footprint in Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy, is redefining the region’s balance of power. Once primarily a trading partner, China is now entrenching itself in the Brazilian industrial base and consumer economy, turning the South American colossus into a gateway for Chinese influence across the continent.

This shift challenges Washington’s traditional sphere of influence while carrying indirect consequences for Taiwan, whose diplomatic survival relies on a shrinking circle of allies in Latin America that have been progressively drawn into Beijing’s orbit.

China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009, but its economic presence was primarily confined to commodity trade. Now that boundary has disintegrated. Today, China’s economic presence is readily visible in everyday life. BYD’s electric vehicles (EV) dominate Brazilian roads and hold more than 80 percent of sales in the domestic EV market, while Chinese-backed apps such as Didi’s “99” and Meituan’s “Keeta” are competing for dominance in Brazil’s urban mobility and food delivery industries. Chinese companies have expanded from their past role as exporters to now be responsible for job creation and market shaping within Brazil’s economy.

Although China is not yet Brazil’s largest foreign investor – the U.S. still holds that title, accounting for 17.05 percent of the total – Beijing’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is escalating significantly. From 2023 to 2024, Beijing increased FDI to Brazil by 113 percent, while U.S. investment increased by only 0.057 percent. While the Trump 2.0 administration has placed Latin America at the core of its foreign policy, Washington’s economic engagement remains limited, leaving space for Beijing to expand unchallenged.

Although the gap in total investment volume remains wide, the pace of China’s FDI increase should prompt attention from Washington and Brasília. If these trends continue, Brazil will become increasingly reliant on Chinese capital, consequently increasing China’s economic leverage over Brazil and pushing it closer to China’s foreign policy stances.

As China’s investment grows, Brazil’s domestic market has become a platform for regional expansion by Chinese companies like BYD. The automotive company chose Camaçari in Brazil’s Bahia state as the location for BYD’s first and largest complete-vehicle manufacturing base overseas. The factory will serve as a regional strategic hub handling exports to the entire South American market, including distribution to neighboring Argentina and Uruguay. The first vehicles have already rolled off the production line.

In 2024, BYD registered a 327.7 percent increase in sales to Brazil compared with 2023, indicating growing Brazilian consumer interest in its products. Companies like BYD are capturing significant market shares due to their marketing strategies, localized production, affordability, and improvements in quality and reliability. While in the past, Chinese products were considered low-cost and low-quality, strong sales have gradually repositioned them as reliable, competitive, and aspirational in the eyes of Brazilian and Latin American consumers.

China’s rising economic presence in Brazil has also granted it access to trade benefits in the region through Mercosur. According to Mercosur rules, a product manufactured in Brazil can contain up to 45 percent of non-Mercosur inputs and still qualify as a Brazilian-origin good. Through local manufacturing – for example, BYD’s electric vehicle factory in Brazil – Chinese firms are allowed to label their products as “Made in Brazil,” which qualifies them as Mercosur-origin goods.

This trade workaround allows Chinese brands to enter Paraguay, a market that otherwise engages with Taipei, at a lower cost. As Brazil and Paraguay are members of Mercosur, intra-bloc trade privileges, such as simplified customs procedures and tariff exemptions, allow Chinese-made-in-Brazil products to enter not only Paraguay but other regional markets with minimal barriers. As a result, China’s economic expansion in Brazil is indirectly eroding Taiwan’s economic leverage with Paraguay, one of its few remaining diplomacy allies.

China’s increasing economic presence in the region is not an accident. Brazil has identified Beijing as a reliable and strategic partner to achieve its foreign and domestic policy goals. Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Worker’s Party (PT), Brazil has embraced an “active non-alignment” foreign policy, emphasizing sovereignty, multilateralism, and South-South cooperation. This approach strengthened Brazil’s partnership with China, creating new opportunities in favor of Beijing.

During Lula’s 2023 visit to Beijing, he advocated for settling trade in local currencies instead of the U.S. dollar, demonstrating Brazil’s eagerness to strengthen financial coordination with China and push for de-dollarization. Lula’s administration is expanding ties with China to increase Brazil’s international influence, while China is leveraging Brazil as a diplomatic and logistical gateway into Latin America’s institutions and markets, particularly the Mercosur bloc, which influences regional trade norms.

While economic cooperation promises advantages for both sides, this growing partnership risks subordinating Brazil’s strategic autonomy to Chinese capital and supply chains and may even compromise the sovereignty of neighboring countries such as Paraguay. China’s involvement in Brazil’s energy and industrial sectors poses particularly significant regional implications. According to a study by the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC), of the $4.8 billion in Chinese investment in Brazil in 2024, 34 percent was directed to the electricity sector, 25 percent to the oil industry, and 14 percent to automobile manufacturing.

Recent technical cooperation and equipment supply between Brazil’s State Grid and China Three Gorges has integrated Chinese technology, capital and supply chains within Brazil’s energy infrastructure. But with Brazil and Paraguay holding joint ownership over the Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Station, which supplies 90 percent of Paraguay’s electric needs, these infrastructural changes have far-reaching consequences. Although China does not own stakes in Itaipu and does not have direct influence over Paraguay’s energy sector, Brazil’s growing partnership with Chinese companies opens it to Chinese influence could indirectly undermine Paraguay’s energy sovereignty.

China’s economic consolidation in Brazil is a long-term plan that could grant it leverage over key industries including energy, rare earth minerals, and agriculture. This economic expansion in Latin America also carries indirect but critical consequences for Taiwan. As Chinese companies scale their footprint in Brazil and gain access to Mercosur, they expand their capacity to influence regional trade and political networks, such as those in Paraguay, Taiwan’s last diplomatic ally in South America. If China strengthens its hold on Brazil’s domestic economy, Taiwan’s position in Latin America could weaken, narrowing its already limited international space.

To counter this trend, Washington and Taipei must cooperate more closely with Latin America. A recently introduced bill, the United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act, represents a step in that direction, but its implementation should extend beyond Taiwan’s current diplomatic allies. Engaging with major economies like Brazil (albeit informally on Taipei’s part) through technological cooperation, market diversification, and investment would improve regional autonomy and reduce dependency on Chinese capital.

China’s growing presence in Brazil represents a structural shift in hemispheric power. As Beijing leverages Brazil’s industrial and market capacity to expand its clout across Latin America, Washington risks losing influence in its own neighborhood, while Taipei risks losing diplomatic standing in one of its remaining supportive spheres of influence. If Washington and its partners fail to act, Beijing’s involvement in Brazil may evolve into a strong foothold for reshaping economic and political alignments across the Americas.

Patrick Ko is a policy analyst at Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington, D.C. This article is the result of a cooperative sharing agreement with The Diplomat, a Tokyo-based current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region.

21. The US Navy Can't Find Workers To Build Warships, And It's Pretty Clear Why

Summary:

The US Navy faces a critical shipbuilding manpower shortage, driven largely by uncompetitive wages. Navy Secretary John Phelan warns that private shipyards cannot attract welders and other skilled trades when Amazon warehouses and Buc-ee’s stores pay similar or better hourly rates for safer, easier work. Average shipyard welder pay ranges roughly $19 to $29 an hour, comparable to retail and logistics jobs that also offer strong benefits. The gap matters strategically. China’s vast, heavily subsidized shipbuilding sector can outbuild the United States by orders of magnitude, rapidly expanding a modern fleet. Without higher pay, training, and better conditions, America’s naval industrial base will continue to erode.

Comment. Depressing news. How can we fix this?

The US Navy Can't Find Workers To Build Warships, And It's Pretty Clear Why

slashgear.com · Bob Sharp · November 27, 2025

https://www.slashgear.com/2034405/us-navy-warship-building-worker-shortage/

Reed Kaestner/Getty Images

The United States operates one of the world's most powerful navies, yet the industry responsible for building America's warships is struggling to attract workers. It's a significant enough concern that US Navy Secretary John Phelan has raised it publicly — and one that carries real implications for maintaining America's fleet strength as China continues to expand its naval power.

Currently, China is the only navy with more ships than the US Navy — at least in terms of modern warships of over 1,000 tons. However, for the full picture, we need to consider the capabilities of the fleets. Generally, the more advanced capabilities of American destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers (including the USS Gerald R. Ford — the Navy's most lethal warship) all help to negate the numerical deficit. That being said, China continues to add to its fleet, and history is not always on the side of even technologically advanced but smaller navies. A point corroborated in a recent study published by the US Naval Institute website, which concluded that 25 out of 28 naval wars were won by the fleets with the greatest numbers of ships.

Against this backdrop, the recent statement by the US Navy Secretary that it's hard to attract shipyard workers is even more worrying. The main problem identified by Phelan is that of pay. Speaking at a defense summit in Fort Wayne, Indiana, he said, "I think this is an issue of wages to be honest." He went on to say that shipbuilders struggle to attract workers when they can make the same money working for Amazon or Buc-ee's.

Just how big is the wage problem in US Naval shipbuilding?

Carmen K Sisson/Getty Images

Doing a side-by-side comparison of wages across industries isn't straightforward; wages are almost always dependent on the role's responsibilities. However, we can get an idea of the concerns by comparing the salary of a shipyard welder against an "average" Buc-ee's or Amazon worker. According to ZipRecruiter, shipyard welder salaries vary by state, with the lowest being in Florida with an hourly rate of $19.34, the highest wages are in Washington, where the average hourly wage for the same job is $29.31.

For comparison, Buc-ee's wages begin at $18 to $21 per hour for "associate" level employees, with team leads getting between $21 and $24, with department managers between $31 and $33 per hour. For Amazon, we can look at "fulfillment and transportation workers" wages. The company recently announced that US-workers in this sector would see their pay increased to $23 per hour. Amazon also notes that when benefits and incentives are included, the "average total compensation" exceeds $30 per hour.

While these figures all remain roughly in the same ballpark, there is also another consideration. Shipyard roles demand far more than a typical retail or warehouse shift. A typical shift can involve welding in confined spaces, working at height, and handling heavy steel in hot, noisy, and often hazardous conditions. It's a physically demanding job that requires technical training and long apprenticeships. When compared with jobs offering similar wages for safer, cleaner, and less-demanding roles, it's easier to understand why the top manufacturers of US Navy ships are struggling to attract and retain staff.

China's overwhelming shipbuilding capacity advantage

Kate Scott/Shutterstock

The drought of workers in US Naval shipyards is all the more worrying when considering the size of China's Navy and its current shipbuilding output. According to an analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China's shipbuilding industry is now so large that it's estimated it can outbuild the US by a factor of 230. This is primarily why the Chinese Navy now outnumbers America's, but also why it's more modern. A massive 70% of Chinese navy ships were built after 2010, the figure drops to 25% for US Navy ships.

More importantly, China's shipyards have the capacity to keep expanding at a pace the US can't currently match. In fact, in 2024, China was responsible for over 50% of the world's shipbuilding output, with the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Company producing more tonnage in one year than the entire US shipbuilding output since the end of World War two. Although this figure is for commercial vessels, it still ably demonstrates the point.

Bearing this in mind, it's easy to see why the Navy secretary is worried. He argues that the first step is to raise wages so that they genuinely compete with the likes of Amazon and Buc-ee's. This alone won't solve the issue, but it's essential for attracting and retaining a skilled workforce. Other steps that have been proposed to ease the crisis include better training, improved working conditions, affordable housing, and increased benefits. Such measures will be essential if America hopes to reverse its shipbuilding decline.

slashgear.com · Bob Sharp · November 27, 2025

22. Holiday Reading and Charitable Giving Guide from the IWI Maritime Program

Comment: An interesting list to complement WOTR's list with an added twist on charitable giving recommendations.

Holiday Reading and Charitable Giving Guide from the IWI Maritime Program

irregularwarfare.org · Christopher Booth, Walker Mills · November 28, 2025

https://irregularwarfare .org/articles/iwis-maritime-programs-holiday-gift-list/

For the upcoming Holiday Season – and just in time for Black Friday – the staff of IWI’s Maritime Program, along with select authors and experts – are providing the following reading recommendations as gift ideas. Our team is highlighting texts that they find to hold valuable insights on maritime themes, irregular warfare, or economic, cultural, or technological developments that impact the global commons and may impact future conflict. In our section, “Santa’s List,” we provide a list of some of our favorite charities for our readers’ consideration as alternative gifts.

Co-Director Maritime Program: Christopher Booth – Book Recommendations:

David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Global Guerilla, (Oxford University Press, 2013).

Despite being more than a decade old, Kilcullen’s thesis that conflict will increasingly focus on “crowded, coastal, and connected cities,” helps crystalize a frame of reference for many of the megatrends he identifies as shaping modern global society: population growth, urbanization, coastal settlement, and connectedness. In particular, he demonstrates the dangers posed by urban “feral” megacities that have grown through state failure. The recently concluded war in Gaza, continued threat posed by the Houthis to maritime trade in the Red Sea, disintegration of state power in Nigeria particularly in the Niger Delta, and festering problem of Somalia, all illustrate this book’s powerful argument.

Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations, (Random House Publishing Group, 2018).

Ronen Bergman is an Israeli author with exceptional connections to those in Israel’s military and intelligence communities. The thousands of interviews he conducted on and off the record, and access he had to classified documents help ensure that this doorstop of a book (784 pages) will serve as the definitive work on the successes and failures of Israel’s efforts to kill their way out of a political problem since before the nation’s founding. The very repetitiveness of the operations (and the military/intelligence failure of October 7th), help demonstrate that “mowing the grass” by periodically assassinating terrorists and other adversaries is no substitute for a coherent political solution, and that even successes may result in unanticipated blowback that may take decades to manifest.

In the same vein, the Israeli documentary “The Gatekeepers” (2012), by Droh Moreh, in which he interviews the then six living directors of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) (known as Shin Bet, or Shabak in Hebrew) remains a master-class and must viewing for not only understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the degree to which counter-terrorism efforts are not by themselves a panacea.

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, (Basic Books, 2010).

Over 500 pages Snyder immerses readers in horrific accounts of the mass death of more than 14 million non-combatants between 1933-1945 as state policy of the Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, throughout the killing fields of the region he categorizes as Europe’s “bloodlands” made up by a region that encompasses Poland, Ukraine, the Baltics, Belarus, and portions of Romania and Western Russia. The multilingual author had access to the archives thorough-out the region where he worked with primary sources in their original languages, and synthesized his research in a groundbreaking work. Absent an understanding of the tangled histories of the people of the region who were frequently both victims and willing perpetrators of pogroms, ethnic cleansings, forced migration and other horrors one is unprepared to fully understand the histories and viewpoints that influence Eastern Europeans, Balts, and especially Ukrainians as they fight yet again their historic enemy.

Santa List:

St. Javelin – What started as a meme has now raised millions of dollars for a variety of Ukrainian charities and NGOs. Its impact has ranged from a multi-story painting of the ubiquitous Orthodox Madona holding a javelin anti-tank rocket; to supporting a Ukrainian clothing industry; and donating fleece tops to children who have lost parents in the war, socks and other gear to the Ukrainian troops along the FLOT. Buy their ever-popular Ukrainian war themed ugly Christmas sweaters, or something for anyone on your list knowing that not only are you able to demonstrate your support through stickers or clothing, but you are helping contribute directly to troops and programs in Ukraine.

United24 – The Initiative of the President of Ukraine, is the official fundraising platform of Ukraine. The largest charity for Ukraine has charitable ambassadors ranging from Luke Skywalker himself – Mark Hamill, and Oscar-winner Hillary Swank, to the band Imagine Dragons, and country star Brad Paisley. Bear Grylls and Scott Kelly – the astronaut, offer support from the adventure set, and Oleksandr Usyk – the world unified heavyweight champion is one of many athletes supporting their wide-ranging work. One of the most immediately impactful opportunities is provided by downloading the U24 app, which allows you to contribute to specific Ukrainian drone units directly.

NOR DOG Frontline Animal Rescue in Ukraine. On the microlevel Norwegian entrepreneur Frederik Guttormsen and his small team rescue dogs whose owners have had to abandon them as the flee advancing Russian troops – primarily in Kharkiv – and reunite them with their families. Leveraging Guttormsen’s business background they also produce dog-food and distribute 20-40,000kg of food per month. They actively post on Instagram with updates on their rescues. Their work was featured in the New York Times.

Galgos del Sol helps rescue Spanish greyhounds. In the words of the charity, “Galgos are widely used by hunters in the rural areas of Spain for both hunting and hare coursing with betting. They are considered disposable and when the short hunting season ends each year, tens of thousands are abandoned or brutally killed by their owners to whom they are no longer of use.” On an almost daily basis GDS rescues galgos and podencos abandoned on the streets, many of which have been abused, abandoned, hit by cars, or horrifically tortured. I’ve personally volunteered at the rescue, and it is amazing the work they do caring for 200+ dogs and seeking out new homes. They also post daily on Instagram with updates.

Surfaced at the North Pole, August 1970. Chief Quartermaster Jack Patterson, dressed as Santa Claus, greets Commander Alfred S. McLaren, USN, Commanding Officer of the submarine. Image courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command.

Co-Director Maritime Program: Walker Mills – Book Recommendations:

Toshi Yoshihara, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2023)

Dr. Yoshihara has done a great service to practitioners, policy makers and academics alike in his relatively brief, and accessible account of the People’s Liberation Army’s amphibious campaigns The history draws on new primary sources, and is a must-read for anyone interested in how to build professional amphibious forces from scratch, but the history is most interesting when the readers remembers that these campaigns form the core of experience and narrative of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. As I wrote in a review for Naval History, the only drawback is that Dr. Yoshihara “leaves the reader wanting more.”

Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice, (New York: Routledge, 2019)

US Naval War College professor Milan Vego is a national treasure, and continues to publish books that should be required reading for anyone interested in naval strategy or operations (his latest is (Exercising Control of the Sea: Theory and Practice, 2022). I have referenced and reread his 2003, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas more times than I can count. I have come back to revisit Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial, because it explicitly focuses on weaker powers at sea – outlining a strategic framework for that perspective, and in his typical style Vego draws on hundreds of years of maritime history to make his points – much of which readers may be learning for the first time.

Joshua Tallis, The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers and Maritime Insecurity, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019)

I have also been revisiting The War for Muddy Waters, by Dr. Joshua Tallis, from the Center for Naval Analyses. This heavily researched book outlines a framework for understanding the Navy’s role in the littoral – and breaks out the overlapping circles of national security, human security and economic development in the term “maritime security.” Now, the second part, “Cocaine and Context in the Caribbean” is particularly relevant as the US Navy is taking a larger counter-narcotics and counter-trafficking role in the Caribbean.

Santa List:

Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society

The Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS) is one of the best organizations that directly aids active-duty Marines and sailors in need. Anyone who has served in the sea services has a chest full of stories about service members and families who have been helped by the NMCRS.

Founder and Director Emeritus IWI Maritime Program: Lisa Munde – Book Recommendations:

Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean: Journeys Across the Last Untamed Frontier, (Vintage, 2020).

Urbina blends storytelling and investigative journalism to expose the challenges of governance and enforcement across the world’s ungoverned oceans. A former New York Times reporter and Pulitzer prize-winning journalist, he documents how overlapping jurisdictions, weak governance, and flag-of-convenience loopholes enable forced labor, trafficking, illegal resource extraction and environmental crimes. The book vividly illustrates the dichotomies that define the maritime domain—where global commerce, human exploitation, and environmental degradation coexist in the same unregulated space. What stands out in this book are both the compelling topics covered in the book and Urbina’s excellent writing that make it a page-turner and a joy to read. (

Edward Fishman, Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, (Portfolio, 2025).

Chokepoints offers a timely and authoritative framework for understanding how economic statecraft and maritime geography intersect. Fishman, a former U.S. State Department sanctions architect, examines how the United States wields influence through control of strategic chokepoints—ranging from physical chokepoints like shipping lanes and maritime straits to global financial networks such as SWIFT. The book also contextualizes the historical role of naval forces in underpinning a nation’s ability to enforce sanctions through blockade and embargo.

Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans, (Penguin Books, 2017).

This is the quintessential primer on the role of sea power in history and geopolitics. Stavridis provides a comprehensive tour of the world’s oceans, explaining how each body of water—the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and Mediterranean—has shaped global trade, security, and influence. Drawing on both scholarly historical analysis and firsthand practitioner experience, he shows how maritime geography underpins strategy, coalition building, commerce and the global order.

Rose George, Ninety Percent of Everything: Inside Shipping, the Invisible Industry That Puts Clothes on Your Back, Gas in Your Car, and Food on Your Plate, (Metropolitan Books, 2013)

In a brilliantly written account, George embeds aboard Maersk Kendal on a voyage from Europe to Asia to examine the global shipping industry that transports nearly 90 percent of world trade. The book confronts “sea blindness” by revealing how a system essential to global commerce operates mostly out of sight and beyond public understanding. She documents challenges of modern container logistics including the long and isolating contracts endured by seafarers, the operational and legal complexities of flag states, and security challenges like piracy and stowaways offering a clear account of how disruptions in this largely invisible system can reverberate across global supply chains and economies.

Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019).

Immerwahr reinterprets U.S. history and success in the 20th century through the geography of its territories, bases, and maritime logistics networks. While not a specifically maritime-themed book, it provides a unique angle in tracing how American influence expanded through overseas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply chains rather than formal colonial annexation. By connecting the geography of U.S. power projection—from Guam to Guantánamo—he reveals how the United States built a global presence embedded in maritime systems and why maritime superiority remains important in the modern era.

Maritime Program Fellow: Brian Kerg – Book Recommendations:

Hsiao-ting Lin, Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia: Divided Allies, (New York: Routledge, 2022)

While this book is largely focused on the challenges faced by the alliance between the United States and Taiwan during the Cold War, it uses a host of recently unclassified Taiwanese and American sources to depart from previous scholarship in many important ways. Irregular warfare abounds, including clandestine cross-strait operations conducted by Taiwanese forces against the People’s Liberation Army, secret military support of the Nationalists for guerrilla movements in Asia aimed at disrupting Chinese Communist Party expansion, and Taiwan’s significant role as a base for U.S. operations in Vietnam. This newly uncovered history will cause many readers to reevaluate their assessment of the strategic value of Taiwan to any ally, in both the past and the future.

John Curatola, Armies Afloat: How the Development of Amphibious Operations in Europe Helped Win World War II, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2025).

Often lost in the grand telling of World War II’s amphibious operations is the story of how the Allies learned to conduct them. Using the warfighting framework called for in U.S. amphibious doctrine of the time, this book explores the development and capabilities of Allied amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and European theaters of operation. It introduces readers to a cast of unsung heroes who were essential to the development of U.S. amphibious capabilities, and highlights the many developmental contributions of commanders better known for their leadership in combat.

Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem: Machine Learning and Human Values, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2020).

The constant hype surrounding the promise of artificial intelligence often overshadows its risks, and what risk is presented can often be dismissed as irrational fear inspired by dystopian science fiction. Here, the author clearly and convincingly describes the very real challenges of aligning artificial intelligence with human values. IWI readers will immediately make connections between these risks and the implications for conflict, information warfare, and psychological operations conducted both abroad and domestically.

Santa List:

Sea Shepherd is an international, non-profit marine conservation organization that engages in direct action campaigns to defend wildlife, and conserve and protect the world’s ocean from illegal exploitation and environmental destruction.

Maritime Program Fellow: Pieter Zhao – Book Recommendations:

Benjamin Armstrong, Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy, (University of Oklahoma Press, 2019).

This book explores the largely overlooked role of irregular maritime operations in the early American Navy, focusing on coastal raiding, small unit tactics, and operations outside the traditional line-of-battle or commerce-raiding frameworks. While the concept of “maritime irregular warfare” is often viewed as a modern development, Armstrong illustrates that such practices have deep historical roots. His work, therefore, invites a reconsideration of naval history not just as a story of fleets and decisive engagements, but as one equally shaped by asymmetry, improvisation, and contested littorals. A useful starting point for thinking historically about contemporary irregular maritime challenges.

Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira, The Sea and International Relations, (Manchester University Press, 2022).

This book makes a compelling case for placing the maritime domain at the center of international relations theory and analysis. Despite the sea’s central role in shaping trade, power projection, and global order, it remains curiously underexplored in much of mainstream IR scholarship, a gap often described as sea-blindness. De Carvalho and Leira bring together a range of interdisciplinary perspectives to challenge this neglect, offering new ways of thinking about maritime space, mobility, and the global commons. While not focused on irregular warfare specifically, the volume is useful for understanding the broader context in which future maritime conflict may unfold. As non-traditional threats increasingly play out at sea, through competition over resources, infrastructure, and influence, this book provides a valuable framework for recognizing how the maritime domain continues to shape strategic behavior and global politics.

Erik de Lange, Menacing Tides: Security, Piracy and Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean, (Cambridge University Press, 2024).

This book offers an insightful look at how irregular maritime threats like piracy shaped security and power dynamics in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean. De Lange explores how Barbary piracy (or privateering, if you will) influenced imperial strategies and contributed to the formation of global order during a critical period of transition. While focused on a historical context, the book bridges important themes from the earlier volumes by showing how non-traditional maritime threats have long affected states’ approaches to security, governance, and control of the global commons. The subject remains relevant today, not least because the United States’ own history with Barbary piracy reflects enduring challenges in managing irregular maritime threats. This is a thought-provoking read for anyone interested in how maritime irregular warfare has historically intersected with broader questions of power and global order.

IWI alum, Commander 3rd Marine Raider Battalion – LTC Paul Bailey – Book Recommendations:

As in the past, the United States faces strategic competition and potential conflict with other global powers, namely Russian and China. This competition and looming conflict have caused the United States and its military to refocus on regenerating maritime capabilities to fight both irregular and conventional wars. Against China in the Western Pacific, the United States faces immense challenges given vast time and space challenges within China’s inner sphere of influence and control especially inside the South China Sea. As the U.S. military develops maritime options, the past offers useful lessons to prepare for the future. The oft-overlooked irregular wars with the Barbary Pirates in the early 1800’s offers potentially useful lessons to the United States for both conventional and irregular warfare when faced with relative disadvantages. Especially for U.S special operations forces, early audacious raids on the captured U.S.S. Philadelphia and the unconventional warfare operation against Derna offer two of the nation’s earliest success overseas to consider for modern application against daunting challenges and odds. Here are two accounts of this noteworthy period of history to consider over this holiday season.

Josph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror, 1801-1805,(Public Affairs, 2003).

Two centuries ago, without congressional or public debate, a president who is thought of today as peaceable, Thomas Jefferson, launched America’s first war on foreign soil, a war against terror. The enemy was Muslim; the war was waged unconventionally, with commandos, native troops, and encrypted intelligence, and launched from foreign bases. For nearly 200 years, the Barbary pirates had haunted the Mediterranean, enslaving tens of thousands of Europeans and extorting millions of dollars from their countries in a mercenary holy war against Christendom. Sailing in sleek corsairs built for speed and plunder, the Barbary pirates attacked European and American merchant shipping with impunity, triumphing as much by terror as force of arms.

Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger, Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates: The Forgotten War That Changed American History, (Sentinel, 2015).

When Thomas Jefferson became president in 1801, America was deeply in debt, with its economy and dignity under attack. Pirates from North Africa’s Barbary Coast routinely captured American merchant ships and held the sailors as slaves, demanding ransom and tribute payments far beyond what the new country could afford. For fifteen years, America had tried to work with the four Muslim powers (Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco) driving the piracy, but negotiation proved impossible. Realizing it was time to stand up to the intimidation, Jefferson decided to move beyond diplomacy. He sent the U.S. Navy and Marines to blockade Tripoli—launching the Barbary Wars and beginning America’s journey toward future superpower status.

Santa List:

Marine Raider Foundation: The Marine Raider Foundation is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization that provides benevolent support to active duty and medically retired MARSOC Raiders and their families, as well as to the families of Raiders who have lost their lives in service to our Nation. Since standing up in May of 2012, the Marine Raider Foundation has provided over $7 million in support to MARSOC Marines, Sailors and their families. The Foundation aims to meet needs unmet by the government with an emphasis on building personal and family resiliency and supporting the full reintegration of MARSOC personnel following wounds, injuries and extended deployments.

Fisher House Foundation: Fisher House Foundation builds comfort homes where military & veteran families can stay free of charge, while a loved one is in the hospital. Since inception, the program has saved military and veterans’ families an estimated $650 million in out-of-pocket costs for lodging and transportation.

IWI author: Dr. Ian Ralby – Book Recommendations:

James Clavell, Tai-Pan: The Epic Novel of the Founding of Hong Kong, (Atheneum, 1966).

This historical fiction (with a lot of historical accuracy) tells the story of the founding of Hong Kong by the British and American opium traders following the British victory in the First Opium War. This era of Chinese history is both fascinating and vitally important to understanding some of the drivers behind China’s behavior today.

Max Hardberger, Seized! A Sea Captain’s Adventures Battling Pirates and Recovering Stolen Ships in the World’s Most Troubled Waters, (Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2010).

The maritime industry is out of sight and out of mind for most people, even, sometimes, for navy sailors. The various commercial oddities of an inherently international industry with centuries of rules and traditions can even be hard to believe. This true story of the work of a maritime repo man is beyond compelling and opens anyone’s eyes to a world that few even know exists.

David Grann, The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder, (Doubleday, 2023)

This true story of a British vessel sent on a secret mission to pursue a Spanish prize vessel in 1740 involves murder, mutiny, a shipwreck and a court martial. The story is absolutely riveting, and made all the more so knowing that one of the key characters in the story – a young midshipman – is the future Admiral John Byron, grandfather of the poet Lord George Gordon Byron. Indeed, the Admiral’s account of the scandalous voyage provided the inspiration for Lord Byron’s epic poem, Don Juan.

IWI author: Ben Connable – Book Recommendations:

Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of the United States Marines, 1800-1934, (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 1974).

In a sometimes-frustrating old-school style, Ellsworth sets the context for lots of amphibious landings most Marines are not even vaguely aware of. His definition of “amphibious landing” is far too loose; it should not include going ashore to render burial honors in France, etc. But this volume includes lots of examples of young lieutenants, captains, and NCOs being thrust ship-to-shore into complex and uncertain situations including urban rioting, riverine search, seizure, and fighting, naval combat with coastal fortifications, civil war, and full-scale combat against defending forces. Readers will get a good sense of the range of things Marines have done and can do from the sea. Think routine embassy reinforcements and noncombatant evacuation operations with some gunfighting. Who has ever heard of the Battle of Barranca? How about BG John Russell, USMC, being appointed temporary Ambassador Extraordinary to Haiti? Marine Guard raiding parties into Nicaragua to blow up rebel supplies? Read on, skim as needed.

Nicholas J. Schlosser, U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare Training and Education, 2000-2010, (Quantico, Vir.: United States Marine Corps History Division, 2015).

To paraphrase George Santayana, only the dead have seen the end of irregular war. We’re fighting several irregular wars now in Iraq, Syria, the Philippines, and elsewhere, and we will almost assuredly be dragged into another larger-scale conflict in the coming years. Keep in mind that nobody in the United States expected our nation would be sending troops into Nicaragua, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic in the first part of the 20th Century, or Vietnam, Lebanon, or the Balkans in the last half of the century. Nobody predicted a counterinsurgency fight in Iraq, a long-running counterterror-COIN fight in Syria, or the 20-year irregular war in Afghanistan. “By the pricking of my thumbs, something wicked this way comes,” and we are not ready for it. What can you do as a professional? Start reading about IW now and think about how we are going to stand back up, yet again, the infrastructure we need to succeed or at least not allow our government to punt another war into the f***ing stands.

Gary D. Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989).

This may seem like an unusual pick, but I think it may be more relevant than any other recommendation in this list. What is a war crime? What constitutes legal behavior in war? Why is it important to the United States that our servicepeople behave honorably and legally, and particularly so when living in other cultures in the context of an irregular war? This monograph covers regular crimes, criminal justice, and war crimes in an irregular context. As any veteran of Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq will tell you, irregular war requires extraordinary adaptability, intellectual focus, and integrity. Take a look at the repercussions from the Abu Ghraib incident. I met many insurgents who stated clearly that they chose to kill Americans because of the way Iraqi prisoners were abused at Abu Ghraib. Yes, we have to be lethal, but we have to be legal as well, both for our own moral virtues and for the sake of military success.

Santa List:

Patrol Base Abbate (PBA) was established by Marine LtCol Tom Schueman in honor of Sergeant Matt Abbate. With events restricted by cost and availability, the PBA team brings any honorably discharged veteran from any service out to Montana to engage with other servicepeople in an exhilarating fresh-air environment, to lead and participate in lots of activities like fishing, hiking, and golf, and to reconnect and reset. This program is specifically intended to help address the epidemic of suicide amongst Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, but there are no age limits and no combat experience is needed to be included in what PBA refers to as a “Return to Base,” or RtB. SOF bros welcome but have no head-of-line privileges.

Main Image: Christmas lighting aboard ship while at Key West Naval Station Annex, Key West, Florida. The winner for Destroyer Division 601, 25 December 1961. Courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command.

Please note that this list is for informational purposes only. We do not endorse the specific work, warrant the current 501(c)(3) status, or accept any liability for the actions or financial performance of these independent third-party organizations, and we strongly encourage all donors to conduct their own due diligence.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

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irregularwarfare.org · Christopher Booth, Walker Mills · November 28, 2025

23. Exclusive | ‘We Do Fail … a Lot’: Defense Startup Anduril Hits Setbacks With Weapons Tech

Summary:

Defense startup Anduril, valued above $30 billion, is pitching fast, software-driven autonomous weapons but its rapid approach has produced notable setbacks. In Navy trials, drone boats using its Lattice autonomy software went “dead in the water,” triggering safety concerns. In Ukraine, some Altius loitering munitions reportedly crashed or missed under Russian jamming. A Fury unmanned jet test suffered engine damage, delaying its first flight, and an Anvil counter-drone intercept test sparked a 22-acre fire in Oregon. Anduril says such failures are expected in aggressive testing, claim no fundamental flaws, and argue that iterative fixes are improving performance.

Exclusive | ‘We Do Fail … a Lot’: Defense Startup Anduril Hits Setbacks With Weapons Tech

WSJ

The company’s products have had breakdowns and safety issues, documents show

By Shelby Holliday

Follow, Heather Somerville

Follow, Alistair MacDonald

Follow and Emily Glazer

Updated Nov. 27, 2025 3:11 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/anduril-industries-defense-tech-problems-52b90cae

An Anduril autonomous air vehicle on display. Hollie Adams/Reuters

Defense startup Anduril is promising to deliver hardware and software that will usher in a new era of autonomous warfare with the speed that only a startup can offer.
Anduril’s fast-moving approach comes with its share of setbacks—during closed military exercises, at private drone ranges and on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Anduril has said that none of the incidents suggest fundamental problems with its products and that the point of testing is to challenge the software, find the bugs and fix them.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Defense startup Anduril is promising to deliver hardware and software that will usher in a new era of autonomous warfare with the speed that only a startup can offer.

The Navy was attempting to launch and recover more than 30 drone boats from a combat ship off the coast of California in May when more than a dozen of the uncrewed vessels failed to carry out their missions. The boats had rejected their inputs and automatically idled as a fail-safe, making them “dead” in the water.

The botched experiment quickly became a potential hazard to other vessels in the exercise. Military personnel scrambled overnight to clean up the mess, towing the boats to shore until 9 a.m. the next day.

The drone boats were relying on autonomy software called Lattice, made by California-based Anduril Industries. The Navy said the exercise was handled safely, but the incident alarmed Navy personnel, who said in a routine follow-up report that company representatives had misguided the military. In comments that were unusual for such a report, which was viewed by The Wall Street Journal, four sailors warned of “continuous operational security violations, safety violations, and contracting performer misguidances (Anduril Industries).” If the software configuration wasn’t immediately corrected and vetted, they wrote, there would be “extreme risk to force and potential for loss of life.”

Palmer Luckey is the founder of Anduril Industries. Philip Cheung for WSJ

Since its founding in 2017, Anduril Industries has become one of the hottest companies in a crowded field of defense-tech startups, promising to deliver hardware and software that will usher in a new era of autonomous warfare and equip the U.S. military with the speed that only a startup can offer. The privately held company was valued at more than $30 billion in its last funding round and has scored an impressive number of military contracts to build prototypes of everything from unmanned jet fighters to mixed-reality headsets to battlefield-management systems.

The company’s founder, tech billionaire Palmer Luckey, has made his convictions clear. “We spend our own money building defense products that work, rather than asking taxpayers to foot the bill. The result is that we move much faster and at lower cost than most traditional [large defense companies],” Luckey said in a TED Talk published in April. “Unlike traditional contractors, we build, test and deploy our products in months, not years.”

The startup’s fast-moving approach comes with its share of setbacks—during closed military exercises, at private drone ranges and even on the battlefield in Ukraine.

In California, a mechanical issue damaged the engine in Anduril’s unmanned jet fighter Fury in a ground test over the summer ahead of a critical first flight for the Air Force. In August, a test involving its Anvil counterdrone system caused a 22-acre fire in Oregon. And in the exercises with unmanned boats over the summer off the coast of California, Anduril’s Lattice software struggled to command and control vessels.

Anduril’s only real battlefield experience—in Ukraine—has been marred by problems as well, including vulnerability to enemy jamming, according to former employees and others familiar with the systems in Ukraine. Some front-line soldiers of Ukraine’s SBU security service, for instance, found that their Altius loitering drones crashed and failed to hit their targets. The drones were so problematic that they stopped using them in 2024 and haven’t fielded them since, according to people familiar with the matter.

Specialists testing different kinds of drones in Ukraine before sending them to the front line. Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

“The challenge will be, can they deliver? They have minimum viable products in a bunch of different areas,” said Bryan Clark, a former Navy strategist who is now at the Hudson Institute.

After the Journal inquired about the incidents, the company said that its methods can lead to testing failures. “We recognize that our highly iterative model of technology development—moving fast, testing constantly, failing often, refining our work, and doing it all over again—can make the job of our critics easier,” the company said in a statement. “That is a risk we accept. We do fail … a lot.”

Representatives from Anduril and those who defend the company say that it is encountering the same sorts of issues that occur in any weapons development program and that the company’s roster of engineers is making impressive strides. They say that none of the incidents suggest fundamental problems with its products and that the point of testing is to challenge the software, find the bugs and fix them.

The company said it has maintained a “near continuous” presence in Ukraine to update its software and weapons, and that its drones have proven effective against a large number of Russian assets.

Software setbacks

Anduril’s software platform, called Lattice, aims to connect various weapons systems to enable a single servicemember to control a range of drones. On its website, the company says Lattice can orchestrate “machine-to-machine tasks at scales and speeds beyond human capacity.”

The platform “lets us deploy millions of weapons without risking millions of lives. It also allows us to make updates to those weapons at the speed of code,” Luckey said in April.

But in some Navy exercises, Lattice has fallen far short of servicemembers’ expectations, according to documents, defense officials and people familiar with the matter. In some cases, operators have had to manually send commands to boats or control them remotely with a device due to the software’s shortfalls, the people said.

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft operating in San Diego Bay. MC1 Claire M. DuBois/U.S. Navy

During the May exercise with drone boats in California, unmanned boats made by BlackSea Technologies were relying on Lattice when they began to idle in the water. The boats were rejecting commands and were unable to reliably maneuver away from other traffic, prompting a safety stand-down, according to people familiar with the exercise.

Anduril said the failure wasn’t Lattice’s fault, but rather a bug in the software on the boats, made by BlackSea Technologies. Anduril said it identified the root cause, fixed the problem and returned to the exercise a few days later to successfully complete autonomous mission plans.

BlackSea Technologies referred questions about the exercise to the Navy since its boat, the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft, is an official Navy program. BlackSea also said that its boat is designed to work with a range of software and that it has successfully operated with a half-dozen other software stacks.

A Navy spokesperson didn’t comment on the companies involved, but said the exercise had multiple mitigation measures in place and didn’t create risk to force or potential for loss of life. He said the boats went “dead in the water” as an automatic fail-safe, which prevented them from causing damage or injury.

Three people familiar with the exercise said the problem was Anduril’s because it was the company’s responsibility to implement its software correctly. The authors of the preliminary report, who said Anduril had misguided the military, couldn’t be reached to comment.

An unmanned aircraft system at the Anduril showroom in Costa Mesa, Calif. Philip Cheung for WSJ

Jet fighter lags

Anduril’s most high-profile, and potentially most lucrative, military project has also faced challenges.

When Anduril won a multimillion-dollar Air Force contract last year to develop and test a prototype of an unmanned jet fighter, known as a “Collaborative Combat Aircraft,” it signaled the company’s biggest shot yet at building a major weapon system for the Pentagon. The company, which has never manufactured weapons at a large scale, is building a plant in Ohio to produce the unmanned jet.

Air Force leaders initially set expectations for the aircraft to fly before the end of summer. But during a test in August, a mechanical issue caused a nail to be sucked into the aircraft’s intake, damaging the engine, according to people familiar with the matter.

Anduril didn’t publicly disclose the engine issue, and when asked about the timing of the flight during a call with reporters in September, Luckey said the delay was due to the rigors of Air Force ground testing because the Air Force had only one Anduril plane to work with at the time.

“If it was up to my engineers, we’d push the throttle and shoot into the air months ago,” Luckey said during the call.

Executives also told reporters that the company was taking time to get the software right, which they said would allow them to “leapfrog” the test plan by flying semiautonomously.

By the time the drone jet Fury took to the skies over Southern California on Oct. 31, the test flight came two months after the first flight of Anduril’s main competitor in the Air Force program, General Atomics.

Anduril said the nail that caused the engine damage was the result of a temporarily installed test instrument and had nothing to do with the structural design of the aircraft. The Air Force said Anduril and General Atomics were ahead of the program’s schedule, which required the companies to conduct a test flight of their aircraft by the end of the year.

“Both Anduril and General Atomics are in the very early developmental stages of what promises great opportunity, but there’s a long way to go to realize that opportunity,” said David Deptula, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who is now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, an aerospace think tank.

Trial by fire

During an August drone intercept test in Oregon, Anduril’s Anvil counterdrone system crashed and caused a 22-acre fire near the Pendleton Airport, according to an incident report obtained by the Journal through a Freedom of Information Act request.

The report said Anduril had tried to put out the flames with its own vehicle, but three trucks from the local fire department had to be brought in to extinguish the fire. Anduril said it has since developed a mitigation plan for impact and intercept testing at the range to mitigate or avoid any fires in the future.

The aftermath of an Anvil counterdrone system's crash, which caused a 22-acre fire in Oregon near Pendleton Airport. FOIA

Photographs show a scorched and mangled drone, and satellite images reveal the extent of the damage to the terrain.

Major defense companies that have been testing for decades typically understand their boundaries and have adequate mitigation measures on site, analysts say. “Anduril is less prepared institutionally to do this, so they are finding their way around,” said Jonathan Wong, a senior policy researcher at Rand, referring to the fire.

The drone range declined to comment. Anduril said that the test was conducted in accordance with all range safety procedures. It said the fire was a possible known outcome and not a system failure.

“We test five days a week nearly 52 weeks out of the year at several of our test sites across the US,” the company said. “We expect things like this to occur once in a while due to the volume of tests.”

Write to Shelby Holliday at shelby.holliday@wsj.com, Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com, Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com and Emily Glazer at Emily.Glazer@wsj.com

WSJ

24. Denmark sets up ‘night watch’ to monitor Trump since Greenland row

Summary:

Denmark’s foreign ministry has created a “night watch” shift to track POTUS' statements and movements, producing a morning report for officials. The system emerged after the Greenland sovereignty row and reflects how Copenhagen now views Washington as unpredictable, with Danish analysts questioning whether the US remains a reliable ally.

Denmark sets up ‘night watch’ to monitor Trump since Greenland row

US president’s threat to seize territory prompts intelligence briefings reminiscent of Game of Thrones patrol

The Guardian · Miranda Bryant · November 27, 2025

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/27/denmark-sets-up-night-watch-to-monitor-trump-since-greenland-row

The Danish government has set up a “night watch” in the foreign ministry, not to keep out the wildlings and White Walkers like the Night’s Watch of Game of Thrones, but rather to monitor Donald Trump’s pronouncements and movements while Copenhagen sleeps.

The night watch starts at 5pm each day and at 7am a report is produced and distributed around the Danish government and relevant departments about what was said and took place, the Politiken newspaper reported.

The position is understood to have to been introduced in the aftermath of the diplomatic row between Copenhagen and Washington over Greenland this spring, when the US president threatened to take control of the Arctic island.

Politiken said the initiative was one of several examples of how Danish diplomacy and the country’s civil service have had to adapt to the new reality of the second Trump administration.

A source close to the foreign office told the Guardian: “It is fair to say that the situation in Greenland and the time difference between Denmark and the United States was quite an important factor introducing this arrangement during the spring.”

Rather than everybody having to reach immediately for their phones to catch up on news from the US, the foreign office had instead made a “collective effort” to stay updated on Trump, the foreign office said.

Jacob Kaarsbo, a former chief analyst at the Danish defence intelligence agency, said the development showed, “as we have always known”, that the idea that the US was Denmark’s largest and most important ally was dead. “Alliances are built on common values and a common threat perception,” Kaarsbo said. “Trump shares nether of those with us and I would argue he doesn’t share it with most Europeans.”

The Guardian · Miranda Bryant · November 27, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Opinion | The Ambush on the National Guard

The Ambush on the National Guard

The alleged shooting by an Afghan ‘partner’ shouldn’t condemn all who assisted the U.S. and now live here.

Who Is D.C. Shooting Suspect Rahmanullah Lakanwal?

The 29-year-old Afghan national settled in Bellingham, Wash., after working with CIA in his home country

He worked with the CIA during the war in Afghanistan.

Why was the suspect in the U.S.?

What role did the suspect allegedly take in the Washington, D.C., shooting?

What is the status of the shooting victims?

D.C. Shooting Suspect ‘Could Not Tolerate’ the Violence of His C.I.A.-Backed Unit in Afghanistan, a Childhood Friend Said

Trump Is Silent on Taiwan After Talking to Xi—and That Is Fine With Taipei

Island counting on American support makes the most of U.S. policy of ambiguity

Japan denies report Trump told PM Takaichi not to provoke China on Taiwan

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Taiwan sets date to prepare for WAR with China that could spiral into WW3

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Why does China want to invade Taiwan?

Sunday, November 23, 2025

SpyWatch: CIA Drops Top Spy Leader Pick: Politics and U.S. National Security Concerns

Drones have changed warfare. Two new weapons might be about alter its course again

Countering drones

High-powered microwave technology is the 'holy grail' of drone interceptors

HPM offers rapid neutralization of swarms, while lasers and costly missiles provide precision strikes against individual drones

Worldwide R&D

Ukraine's Long-Distance Drones Take Toll On Russia's Oil Business -- And War Chest

Irregular Warfare Club

About The Author

Thinking the Thinkable on an AI Market Correction

The 2025 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

Interview with Greg Grant

SMALL WARS JOURNAL STRATEGY DEBRIEFS

The Consequences of Parity

Unpacking the Legacy American Way in Warfare

Influences & Influencers

Legacy & Brain Trust

Reflecting on the Lessons of Ukraine

About The Author

The Witkoff File: Three Decades of russian Cash, One Kremlin “Peace Plan.”

It’s not accidental, it’s intent.

A Man Formed in a System of Post-Soviet Money

The 1990s: When Manhattan Became the Kremlin’s Laundromat

Fast-Forward to 2024–25: The Pipeline Reappears in U.S. Foreign Policy

Déjà Vu: This All Happened Before

The 2024–25 “Peace Plan” — Same Script, New Messenger

Witkoff’s Policy Positions Are Not Neutral — They Are the Kremlin’s

The Pattern of Omission

Business, Politics, and the Kremlin’s Leverage

Why Are These Worlds Allowed to Mix?

The Pattern That Refuses to Go Away

Agents vs Assets

The Real Question

Further reading/findings:

Hunting bin Laden on 'the roof of the world'

How an encounter in a remote Pakistani bazaar prompted a search for the al-Qaida leader

‘There’s bin Laden!’

‘Holy crap, bin Laden’s in Chitral!’

Telling the ISI

SEAL Team 6 spins up

The man in the jeep

‘Sure as shit, he looks like bin Laden’

Bin Laden’s escape

How does the Hong Kong tower fire compare to other recent building blazes?

China Using Brazil to Reshape Power in the Americas

China entrenching in Brazilian industrial base with implications for influence across the continent

The US Navy Can't Find Workers To Build Warships, And It's Pretty Clear Why

Just how big is the wage problem in US Naval shipbuilding?

China's overwhelming shipbuilding capacity advantage

Holiday Reading and Charitable Giving Guide from the IWI Maritime Program

Related Posts

Exclusive | ‘We Do Fail … a Lot’: Defense Startup Anduril Hits Setbacks With Weapons Tech

The company’s products have had breakdowns and safety issues, documents show

Software setbacks

Jet fighter lags

Trial by fire

Denmark sets up ‘night watch’ to monitor Trump since Greenland row