Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Most ignorance is vincible ignorance. We don’t know because we don’t want to know.”

– Aldous Huxley

“Noting will ever replace the human contact between learner and teacher.”

– Wole Soyinka

“Perhaps one did not want to be loved so much as to be understood.”

– George Orwell, 1984

1. A View from the CT Foxhole: General Bryan Fenton, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

2. Trump selects longtime adviser Keith Kellogg as special envoy for Ukraine and Russia

3. Analysis: Trump’s Ukraine envoy has a plan to end the war that Putin may revel in

4. Could Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ trigger NATO retaliation?

5. The plan to set US special forces on Mexican drug cartels — and why experts say it won’t work

6. U.S. Navy SEALs, Indian Marine Commando Force, and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Train

7. US Special Forces to get NERVA-LG robots from France

8. The US Army's Vision of Soldiers in Exoskeletons Lives On

9. Project Olympus Forges Critical Digital Pathways to Enable Interoperability

10. World at most dangerous point in 40 years, MI6 chief warns

11. China’s Wagner? Beijing Establishes Private Security Company in Myanmar

12. The Myth of Peace: Imperialism and Control of Occupied Lands from Ukraine to Gaza

13. Beyond Retribution: Unveiling Al Qaeda’s Strategic Power Logic for 9/11

14. Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella

15. Aren’t they there yet? corruption, end of November edition (China)

16. Poland readies $740 million fund to jump-start ammunition production

17. Key Western Counterterrorism Ally in Africa Cuts Military Ties With France

18. Opinion: Russia Is at War With the West – What Needs to Be Done

19. China announces top military official is under investigation

20. Europe’s Most Powerful Warship Heads To India Amid China Aggression In Indo-Pacific

21. Time to Eliminate the Houthi Threat: China, Russia, and Iran Support Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea

22. Marine Corps commandant completes combat fitness test 11 months after open heart surgery

23. Ukrainian Special Forces Capture Russian Marines in Kursk Oblast

24. Taiwan’s military uses Taipei university for urban warfare training, sparking outcry

25. Considering the Marketplace of Loyalty by Matt Armstrong

26. For Soldiers at Fort Carson, Food Is Scarce

27. The U.S. Homeland Stands Unguarded

28. A nuclear fusion startup just reached a milestone in its bid to commercialize unlimited clean energy

1. A View from the CT Foxhole: General Bryan Fenton, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

A lot to unpack here. There are very important insights into the future of SOF here. SOF is more than CT but CT is still a critical mission for SOF. It is just not the only one.

I would highlight what I think is the most important paragraph here:

Excerpt:

We talk about a SOF renaissance: What’s old is new again. In other words, I don’t see that our emphasis or necessity with partnerships will change. I do see opportunities for us to expand and evolve those partnerships from bilateral to multilateral. We will need to think differently about these because the security environment is global and demands it.

Three things:

First, we need SOF operators, planners, and strategists who are renaissance men and women, lifelong learners who can apply the past to the future. This must be a fundamental characteristic of SOF: Renaissance Men and Women or Renaissance Operators, Planners, and Strategists.

Second is that the SOF reconnaissance is critically important, while we innovate and develop new technology and TTPs, and partner with Cyber and Space, we must not forget the timeless foundations of SOF (and SF, PSYOP, and CA in particular) - and that working through, with, and by indigenous and partner forces. SOF cannot forgo the focus on the human domain and the importance of trust, relationships, and influence and people to people contact.

Third is that someone in the incoming administration (Waltz and Kellog) needs to ensure the president elect does not pull the rug out from under SOF when he deemphasizes the importance of allies just because the previous administration put so much emphasis on them and improved our alliances around the world. (which he hopefully will not).

A View from the CT Foxhole: General Bryan Fenton, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

November 2024, Volume 17, Issue 10

https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-general-bryan-fenton-commander-u-s-special-operations-command?utm

Authors:

Sean Morrow, Don Rassler

Categories:

Counterterrorism

General Bryan P. Fenton is a career Special Forces (Green Beret) Officer. He currently serves as the 13th Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) where he oversees all Special Operations for the U.S. Department of Defense. Before assuming command of USSOCOM, General Fenton served as the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Prior to that, he was the Senior Military Assistant for two U.S. Secretaries of Defense.

General Fenton’s other general officer assignments include: Deputy Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; Commander of U.S. Special Operations – Pacific; and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

CTC: U.S. CT has been going through a more intense evolution over the past five years and the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ is a thing of the past. What are the top lessons you learned, and that you believe the CT community should take away, from the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ period?

Fenton: We have certainly seen an evolution in countering terrorism as we rebalance the needs of the country, but within the SOF [Special Operations Forces] enterprise, the CT mission is alive and well. As the adage goes, you may not be interested in terrorism, but terrorism is interested in you. While pressure on VEOs is crucial, we have learned that kinetic action alone is not enough to deter and defeat a radical ideology and that our actions must be informed by the root causes and needs of those who might be attracted to political violence.

Defending the homeland is still and will always remain the number-one priority for the Department; this is complementary to strategic competition and integrated deterrence. I view this as twofold: First, CT allows national attention to remain on the pacing threat without distraction, while directly supporting our teammates at DHS, FBI, and State to protect the homeland; second, CT allows us to continue valuable work with our international partners, while we protect our citizens abroad and carry the best practices forward into the future. This is especially the case with the threat of lone wolf attacks. One of the ways we couch our remit for CT and crisis response globally is that SOF helps our national leaders preserve the strategic focus for the future of the Joint Force, Department, and nation.

There has been a lot of incredible work done to protect our homeland through cooperation with partners domestically and internationally. Think about the monumental, international effort of securing a city like Paris for the Olympics this past summer; what a phenomenal effort. None of this happens magically or in isolation—there’s a reason we call it a community—because it takes all of us. SOF works in concert with conventional forces, the intelligence community, our interagency partners, and of course, our allies and partners to make these gains. Terrorists intend to surprise by nature, as demonstrated by attacks from Israel to Iran and Russia. Just as CT is the ultimate team sport, the biggest change is that we’ve shifted from an away to a home game. We must work faster, collectively—all to stay a step ahead of those who are willing to risk everything to do us harm.

Our forward deployed posture has changed and will continue shift, which can alter our ability to get after bad guys and creates opportunities for VEOs to evolve. Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen showcase what happens absent CT pressure; the Sahel offers another example. In an era of online knowledge transfer among unlikely terror groups, the need to innovate and stay ahead of VEO adaption is paramount. Our community must recognize the evolving nature of the threats, while also continuing to evolve ourselves. I firmly believe this evolution is centered on our people, and it can’t be done alone. The global SOF community must be on the cutting edge of technology and artificial intelligence. Our partners in academia are also critical to our evolution.

CTC: You previously served as the Deputy Commander of INDOPACOM and as the Senior Military Assistant for two Secretaries of Defense. After a long career conducting tactical operations with strategic impacts, did the experience at the COCOM and OSD change how you viewed the use and application of Special Operations Forces in CT or in other mission sets? How did it inform your views of SOF in strategic competition?

Fenton: I think, if anything, it reinforced that global problems require global solutions. I also learned that in pursuit of these solutions, the entire spectrum of special operations was just so critical to success. The experiences in OSD reinforced my understanding of how SOF are built for competition in a unique way. When you take a strategic view of the global security environment, it becomes quickly apparent that the threats, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy, are rapidly converging. In addition, the character of war is rapidly changing. SOF maintains unique placement and access to conduct our CT remit globally; however, this placement and access are also vital in building partnerships and relationships that underpin SOF’s DNA. I see the application of SOF in both CT and competition as complementary efforts. In other words, it’s actually okay to walk and chew gum at the same time. The fruits of the CT mission set in places like Ukraine, Colombia, the Philippines, and Central Asia have paid dividends over time in terms of tangible progress in strategic competition. Ultimately, both of these missions sets, when done right, require a whole-of-government approach, which is why our most senior national level leaders see many of these problem sets as intertwined across regions, elements of national power, and geopolitical divides. These global problems will require global solutions. SOF are postured in more than 80 countries worldwide and perfectly positioned to operate across the elements of national power.

Since you brought up my time at INDOPACOM, I also want to speak specifically about that problem set. In terms of deterrence associated with a Taiwan scenario, USSOCOM takes a conditions-based approach to our day-to-day campaigning—we call it “What Winning Looks Like”—through which we increase our relative influence vis-à-vis our adversaries, deter them in the gray zone, and build warfighting advantages should deterrence fail. By taking such an approach, we can identify the way by which SOF—often with and through our allies and partners—can contribute to creating a fait accompli where the PRC has no choice but to accept the status quo with Taiwan and operate within the rules-based international order. We are using this “What Winning Looks Like” construct to communicate how SOF contributes to the Joint Force in competition especially—and as a way to share the “best use of SOF” globally to our fellow Combatant Commands.

I know I went a bit beyond CT here, but I think it’s important to show how SOF are taking the lessons from the past 20 years and applying them to the future while staying true to our historical roots in irregular warfare. Essentially, my time in INDOPACOM demonstrated the value of SOF to the nation across CT, crisis response, and strategic competition; all at the same time, and often integrated and intertwined. The fruits of these missions not only appeared as SOF shaped the operational environment, but also demonstrated the outsized role of SOF in relationship development with allies for the United States.

CTC: Over the past several years, the U.S. CT enterprise rebalanced and evolved so that the United States can focus more resolutely on strategic competition and prepare for threats posed by very capable state adversaries. This has pushed the U.S. CT community to place greater emphasis on the prioritization of terror threats, and to figure out ways in which it can optimize or do more with less. Given the persistence of terrorism, and the diversity of today’s terrorism landscape, navigating this shift has not always been an easy thing for the U.S. CT enterprise to do. What are some challenges and opportunities you see for this period of U.S. CT? When it comes to SOCOM’s CT efforts, which areas is the Command placing optimization emphasis on?

Fenton: I already briefly touched on it, but the operational environment is changing, as are our partners and presence globally. In an increasingly complex and contested world, how we maintain I&W [indicators and warning] matters immensely. Who and how we enable our partners will similarly become the coin of the realm because we cannot be everywhere all the time. With that said, we need to ensure we have the right expertise at the right time. It calls into mind—the First SOF Truth—that people are more important than hardware, and building incredible teams inside the department and across the interagency and across the globe will help us succeed. We must hyper-enable our people to continue to deliver winning results for our nation. These teammates remain focused on the National Defense Strategy—our North Star for prioritization—and deliver SOF capacity to counter the PRC and Russia, while still keeping VEO threats at bay. How do we do this? By choosing the best people, then providing them with the best training and technology.

We have to realize that while we are ready to win now, when we talk modernization, what we really mean is, ‘What do we need to be able to win tomorrow?’ That’s what modernizing is really about: Winning in the future. Ultimately, AI will also play a significant role in helping us to understand and disrupt the terrorist threat with a small group of dedicated professionals, freeing up the bulk of the force, including SOF, for the challenges of integrated deterrence and state conflict. Data acquisition and processing is a huge challenge. We know we won’t have the same level of fidelity on the terrorist threat that we did when [we] were postured directly against those threats, but through leveraging technology, SOF can continue to be a small force that delivers outsized impacts for the DoD. To do so, we must be more creative in our data acquisition strategies and leverage what the private sector is doing in terms on data analysis. This means creating algorithms to quantify risk, prioritize targets, and coordinate between multiple departments, agencies, and foreign partners. SOF, as always, is at the forefront of technological innovation, making us the perfect community to experiment with the power of AI.

General Bryan Fenton

CTC: Part of the success of U.S. CT efforts has been sustained pressure. As resource and priorities adjust, can the U.S. CT enterprise maintain the same global pressure? How can we mitigate risk in places perhaps where groups might not have external operations capability, or where violent extremist organizations pose a threat of violence but not a threat to U.S. national security interests or those of our allies?

Fenton: Yes, we absolutely can maintain pressure on VEOs. We just have to take a different approach than we did during the height of the GWOT. To accomplish this, our SOF global posture is vital to detect and mitigate prioritized threats and keep a pulse on rising regional threats. We rigidly scrutinize our SOF posture to ensure that we influence meaningful locations at the appropriate times. Additionally, we must get better at predictive analysis, anticipate the next locus of homeland threats, and provide timely warning.

One of the greatest keys to success in the C-VEO space is our partnerships. You’ll hear me say this a lot in this interview. Our partners in the interagency, in the intelligence community, in academia, and around the world came together in an unprecedented fashion post-9/11. Those relationships are forged in sacrifice, remain strong, and continuously refine capabilities to ensure operations are more efficient, tech enabled, and almost always partnered. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP)—a U.S. interagency and multinational C-VEO initiative. Now in its 10th year, OGP has enabled international and interagency partners to share information from battlefield captures to asymmetrically disrupt 16 distinct al-Qa`ida and ISIS groups in FY 2023. Coupled with counter-threat finance authorities and analytical expertise, operations like OGP provide expanded and cost-effective ways to disrupt illicit financing and deter activities. Operations for U.S. and OGP partners contributed to more than 1,500 investigations, more than 6,000 foreign disclosure releases, and support to partners repatriating more than 60 individuals in 2023. DoD counter-threat finance analysts also supported numerous Treasury designations against VEO finances and facilitators. The OGP model could apply further to countering coercive activities and deterring aggression. We have to scale and expand this model, because terrorism is an enduring problem.

CTC: You came of age in the CT community when the joint and interagency boundaries were coming down and collaboration and sharing improved significantly. How can we continue to improve on what was built? As we reduce the forward operating bases and joint operations centers around the world, how can we avoid the tendency to go back to our corners?

Fenton: At SOCOM, we seek improvement and innovation; it’s inherent in our SOF DNA. This is how we continue to improve and help everyone across the CT community, joint force, and interagency. To improve upon the foundation that’s been laid, we have a responsibility at the highest levels of DoD to elevate these discussions related to our posture, footprint, and military agreements. We are the canary in the coalmine for all things VEO; if that means advocacy for authorities or funding for combat support agencies and having hard conversations about emerging threats, that’s part of our job as the global coordinating authority.

We held a CT Risk Conference in 2022 and 2023 with the interagency when the cumulative cuts in CT resourcing started rippling across an interdependent community. We wanted to make sure we weren’t creating too much risk in any one area. And you know what we found? The CT enterprise had become a Gordian Knot of interdependencies between departments and agencies. We couldn’t untangle it if we wanted to, and the continuation of sharing people, LNOs, interns, and others among agencies is critical to sustaining these relationships. The best we can do is be circumspect about the effects our decrements have on other agencies when the Department cuts CT programs, many of which the interagency relies on as the foundation for their own capabilities. We’ve continued the tradition of the CT Risk Conference, and we’ll have our third annual event next month. Every year, unity of effort is a key theme of the conference.

CTC: CT is an activity aimed at a specific threat, but it is also an operational design that focuses on the human element of the enemy’s capabilities. What lessons learned from CT can we take into the strategic competition and conflict space? Are there ways in which the CT operational design can play a part in irregular deterrence? If so, how do you see personality-based targeting playing into future conflicts?

Fenton: We spent years in the CT fight learning how to understand organizations and the networks of humans that comprise those organizations. This type of targeting is universal; it applies to a government, a gang, a terrorist group, a private firm, etcetera. We continue to see the relevance of personality-based networks for kinetic and non-kinetic opportunities. Who makes the decisions, who influences those decisions, how do they perceive us, how do they see themselves? We’ve also learned a great deal about how we communicate, deliver, and shape the information as part of the operational design.

Ultimately in conflict, whether it is CT or peer conflict, the fight is largely won or lost in the human domain. This is the domain of SOF. The Navy thinks in terms of ships. The Army thinks terms of maneuver. SOF, we think about humans; it’s our stock and trade. We continue to see the relevance of personality-based targets in places like Ukraine, and I suspect HVI targeting will have some role in most future conflicts. That isn’t to say this type of approach should always be kinetic. It may not be, but it’s critical that we consider our enemy’s human terrain. Our capabilities in this arena provide one of the United States’ greatest assurances to our allies. We remain the best in the world at direct action, and our forces still retain tremendous combat experience that our allies value.

After we assure our allies, we must deter our adversaries. And then when you talk about deterrence, we can deter by denial, making the enemy believe there is a small likelihood of success and also deter by punishment. All the tools for CT, both kinetic and non-kinetic, can work on any organization composed of humans, including state governments, both to cause enemy mission failure and make their actions very costly.

SOCOM is pioneering several concepts within the framework of irregular deterrence. Most of these concepts are not related to CT, but they are all done the SOF Way: irregular, asymmetric, asynchronous, and indirect.

Another great lesson from the CT fight that has tremendous applicability in the strategic competition arena is the need to dominate the information space. This goes in both directions. First, we must ensure our messages are fast, truthful, and delivered with purpose to achieve intended effects. Next, we must remain ahead of misinformation and disinformation spread by our adversaries. We protect the homeland physically, but we also protect the homeland from the threats posed by the information operations of malign actors.

CTC: When it comes to technology, and tech innovation, what types of technologies concern you the most when it comes to future terrorism threats? What types of technologies do believe will be important, or more important, for U.S. CT in the near future?

Fenton: The ability to strike and the risk to the force, even from a terrorist perspective, is concerning. With AI and aerial unmanned and uncrewed systems, the threat is evolving in creative ways. I think investment in these systems, as well as defensive capabilities against such systems, is paramount not only in the near future but today. Our unique acquisition authority at USSOCOM is enabling us to move with greater speed to meet the needs of our people.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is doing more than displaying the battlefield upon which the joint force will have to operate; it is also giving us a glimpse into the future of both terrorism and CT. The proliferation and technological leaps in one-way attack drones, first-person view drones, and long-range uncrewed systems are both available to terrorist groups and put our deployed forces and forward installations and facilities at risk.

It’s no secret that uncrewed systems are no longer limited to the large, remotely controlled, heavily armed “unmanned aerial systems” of the past. The future is all-domain, remotely controlled, and autonomous, and in mass. While the services are doing a great job investing in these systems at scale, we see SOF’s role as the mechanism to ensure these systems can get on target. In that way, we are investing in and experimenting with our command, control, and communications networks to test how best to get targeting data to this lattice of uncrewed systems.

Anti-access, area denial is another concept that is not solely in the realm of great powers and applies directly to CT. As we look globally to the places from which external operations threats may emanate, they are often in areas that require penetration of sophisticated integrated air defense and electromagnetic spectrum systems. Our research and experimentation with penetrating those networks and operating in a comms-degraded or denied environment for CT has direct applications to warfighting. If we can punch a hole in the A2/AD bubble to conduct a CT strike or raid, then we can do the same to open a window for the Air Force to get a long-range anti-ship missile off the rails and onto target.

Finally, we need to improve our digital intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to make up for the loss in posture. The role of space and cyber in this arena cannot be overstated. SOCOM has several initiatives to do just that and has made tremendous progress. However, we still have a long way to go. We are working with the private sector to improve our capabilities at the speed of innovation

CTC: How do you balance the innovation requirements for integrated deterrence with counterterrorism? Are you seeing overlap, for example, in areas such as remote operations? How do you ensure CT is equipped with the technology it needs for posture-less operations without detracting from the critical innovation for peer conflict?

Fenton: Operationally, this occurs through the TSOCs. These Theater Special Operations Commands have the best feel for the needs of a region and serve as advisors to the Combatant Commanders. In support of these commanders, SOF capabilities must span the full-spectrum range of operations, so innovation efforts will focus primarily on SOF’s role in large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary. This emphasis allows SOF to modernize to the most dangerous threat environment, mindful of further potential operations other than major conflict. Therefore, SOF will focus on creating multi-functional capabilities that address more than one mission area to cover the range of military operations. For the most part, we have seen that the changing nature of warfare affects all missions sets, and therefore, the innovations we’ve made in LSCO [large-scale combat operations] capabilities have translated well into the irregular warfare arena, including CT mission sets. The CT mission set is a key component of integrated deterrence and is an essential tool for developing partnerships and allies. There is no magic formula for balancing the innovation focus. It is both an art and a science, but we have found that innovation gains are often beneficial across the SOF mission spectrum.

CTC: USSOCOM has made important investments in liaison officers to Silicon Valley, Austin, Boston, and Washington, D.C., for acquisition, technology, and logistics. What have we learned from consistent exposure to these innovation hubs? How can our acquisition systems improve to keep up with the speed of technology?

Fenton: As SOF, we’re needy—some would say discerning—and we’re never satisfied. We are always working to do things better and faster, and we’re not afraid to fail fast and try again. The close coordination between SOCOM and industry enables movement at a pace we haven’t seen before. We are blessed to have talented officers in innovation hubs around the United States to forge partnerships and to learn from the fastest innovators in business and technology. Our connections with venture capital companies through our Defense Innovation Unit helps government learn how to move from idea to implementation in a way that’s not typical for federal entities.

Thanks to congressional foresight, one of the hallmarks I mentioned before is that we have our own acquisition system. We don’t have unique authorities in SOCOM, but we use the ones we have in a unique and more rapid fashion. A major USSOCOM acquisition advantage is our acquisition executive’s well-developed culture of risk identification and management at the appropriate level, which is also enabled by our organizational scale and structure coupled with proximity to our warfighter. The warfighter, through interaction with our components and TSOCs are included in all our acquisition and development programs. Additionally, efforts like SOFWERX and leveraging the nation’s network of service and national laboratories, FFRDCs, and UARCs are key to rapidly innovate and allow small start-ups to get their foot in the door.

CTC: Israel has demonstrated an astounding capability in its kinetic targeting over the past two months. How do you think the decapitation of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders will impact the conflict in Israel in the near term? What long term implications might it have for the larger CT fight?

Fenton: Let me start with the long view of the impact of the Israeli crisis. First off, the impact of the Hamas October 7th attack remains to be seen, as we typically expect roughly two years after an event for effects to manifest. With that said, we know VEOs are exploiting the crisis, while groups previously unaligned with Gaza have increasingly rallied against the West. Second, this event has renewed interest in jihad like we’ve not seen since the Arab Spring. The crisis in Gaza will continue to galvanize those susceptible to radicalization, creating a larger pool of recruits for local operations and inspired or enabled attacks inside Western homelands. VEOs continue to advance their anti-Western ideology in media platforms criticizing U.S. and Western support of Israel, while calling for attacks in the Middle East and beyond.

CTC: We are several years into, for lack of a better term, our ‘over the horizon’ model of CT. What is working? What is harder?

Fenton: It’s always harder when you’re not on the ground, but ‘over the horizon’ has helped us to examine the challenge differently and develop other tools to see and sense, and where necessary, strike anywhere around the globe. We’ve had to get a lot better at prioritizing targets, and we’ll have to get even better still as we continue to lose posture. SOF has long had the ability to reach out and interdict threats anywhere in the world. So, I think, with sufficient will, that we can conduct any OTH scenario. My worry is more about “OTH sensing”—do we know what targets are of sufficient national import to initiate an OTH operation, and do we have enough fidelity to target them? I think we have more work to do on the front end of OTH, but when the balloon goes up, I think we are confident in our abilities. SOF forces are executing OTH with tremendous success due to the innovation of our teammates, atypical partners, new forms of ISR, and well-earned trust with traditional partners.

CTC: When you look to the future of U.S. counterterrorism—a future that the SOCOM enterprise and other partners are working to build—what does that future look like? How, if at all, will it be different than what U.S. counterterrorism looks like today?

Fenton: The future often looks a lot like the past, in that we will still conduct relentless pursuit of those who would do us harm. How we do it and who we pursue may look different. State-sponsored terrorists and proxies, while not new, increasingly offer plausible deniability to behave outside international norms. The information environment and the role of public perception continue to prove pivotal, and the challenge to be first with the truth, while meeting democratic ideals, will continue to challenge us. Terrorists, like private military firms, will continue to adapt and complicate the operational environment. Pay close attention to the convergence of adversaries.

We should not underestimate the terrorists’ ability to innovate. From rapid knowledge transfers online to the use of satellite phones and imagery, the enemy will always capitalize on cheap, fast tech. We have benefited from valuable cyber targeting and disruption; however, we anticipate tech-savvy terrorists will reduce our advantage in the future. These innovations will also help us to dominate the information space, which will be a task for all of us from the tactical to the strategic levels.

CTC: Narrowing that question down, when you think about the future of CT through the lens of partnerships, what does that picture look like? Can you share some examples of what you think might look the same, as well what might look different?

Fenton: We talk about a SOF renaissance: What’s old is new again. In other words, I don’t see that our emphasis or necessity with partnerships will change. I do see opportunities for us to expand and evolve those partnerships from bilateral to multilateral. We will need to think differently about these because the security environment is global and demands it.

As for differences, there are several. We expect more activity to fall under multilateral partnerships. Things that may have been NOFORN in the past will become YESFORN in the future as the reliance on partners becomes more critical to every campaign. We also expect to spend more time moving back and forth between CT and integrated deterrence and in the spaces where they overlap.

CTC: When we walk into the Pentagon, the SOF wall shows incredible photographs of operators in action. While those operators continue to do amazing work around the globe, there is a new generation of warriors in the data, cyber, and information space who are bringing a lot to the fight. As capabilities evolve, how has your leadership style changed or evolved along with it?

Fenton: First, that’s a good reminder that at every level, an appreciation for the total team is so important, and the diversity of skills and experiences only gets vaster at echelon as you move from platoon to battalion on up to joint and international operations. Relentless improvement across our formation is paramount. We are early adopters, and it starts with the knowledge and emphasis of our leaders on developing the skills and talents necessary to win today and in the future. We continue to educate ourselves and seek opportunities to gain greater experience based on new adaptations and evolutions that occur from generating new capabilities. Take cyber and information operations, for example. As leaders, we must understand the capabilities and capacity of specific skill sets within each of these communities. Much like a Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha is a conglomeration of individuals with various skills, so is a cyber mission unit or PYSOPS team. We have the institutional knowledge to understand the types of missions an ODA, SEAL platoon, or Marine Raider Detachment can perform and their capacity to do so. Our understanding of cyber, robotics, and other emerging capabilities is still nascent, and we are wrestling with how much we keep those capabilities as stand-alone teams versus integration with our traditional formations. The future of SOF leadership, from my level down to, perhaps, the O-5 or O-4 level will be both joint and multi-domain. It isn’t enough that we are experts in our service-specific SOF missions; we must evolve as leaders to the reality of the challenges we face.

CTC: SOCOM and JSOC have long held the proponency for hostage recovery. While this threat has never gone away, the post-October 7th experiences have put renewed attention on the complexities of these operations. Can you share your insight on what SOF brings to the table for policy makers when they have to consider the critical task of hostage rescue in their development of response options?

Fenton: Hostage rescue is a wicked problem with strategic convergence. It is complex, politically sensitive, but above all, it is a no-fail mission. Our crisis response force is specially assessed, selected, and trained to provide this capability to our nation. They rehearse these missions over and over until the mindset is that they can never get it wrong. I come back to what we’ve been talking about: Success requires deep trust and assistance across the interagency and with partners and allies. It’s what the American public expects from us. These mission sets, at their sharp end, provide policy makers with multiple options to solve the hardest problems.

CTC: When it comes to threats, what keeps you up at night?

Fenton: Always at the forefront of my mind is the question: What do we not know? What is the adversary doing that we have not anticipated? In short, blind spots keeps me up at night. We all have them, and they will always be out there. The risk to the homeland is increasing as reductions in CT operations, I&W, and posture have enabled VEOs space and time to regenerate disrupted leadership structures and communication networks. ISIS/AQ remain coordinated, transregional organizations capable of conducting and inspiring violent attacks against U.S./allied interests globally. I think professional anxiety is healthy because it keeps us both leaning forward, but also looking over our shoulder at the same time. Staying vigilant about the active, persistent threat is the challenge. There are plenty of strategic distractions that can take us off course. CT is not going away, and it is up to all of us, collectively, to maintain a trajectory that accepts it as a reality, but simultaneously and fundamentally, rejects it as an acceptable norm. USSOCOM works very, very hard to ensure we fill in gaps in knowledge to reduce the blind spots and to remain ahead of the threat. Our people, their talent, and their effort are what mitigate those concerns more than anything. CTC

2. Trump selects longtime adviser Keith Kellogg as special envoy for Ukraine and Russia

Another Green Beret on the National Security Team.

Trump selects longtime adviser Keith Kellogg as special envoy for Ukraine and Russia

AP · by FATIMA HUSSEIN · November 27, 2024

LOLITA C. BALDOR

FATIMA HUSSEIN

Hussein reports on the U.S. Treasury Department for The Associated Press. She covers tax policy, sanctions and any issue that relates to money.

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AP · by FATIMA HUSSEIN · November 27, 2024

3. Analysis: Trump’s Ukraine envoy has a plan to end the war that Putin may revel in

I can imagine that any Ukraine territory occupied by Russia in return for a peace agreement will experience a long and bloody insurgency for years to come as the Urkainains will resist all such occupation. The Ukrainian resistance will not go quietly into the night (or might for a short time to regroup in order to live to fight another day and night).

Excerpts:

Kellogg spends most time berating Biden’s actions - saying that his administration gave too little lethal aid too late. He says Trump’s decision to give the first lethal aid to Ukraine in 2018 conveyed the strength needed to confront Putin, and that Trump’s soft approach to the Kremlin head - not demonizing him like Biden has - will enable him to strike a deal.

Kellogg says more weapons should have been given before the Russian invasion, and immediately afterwards, to enable Ukraine to win.

But that’s when the plan – which CNN has reported that Trump’s soon-to-be national security adviser is considering - stops being to Ukraine’s liking.

Kellogg says the United States doesn’t need involvement in another conflict, and its own stocks of weaponry have suffered from aiding Ukraine, leaving the country potentially exposed in any conflict with China over Taiwan. He says Ukraine’s NATO membership - in truth a very distant prospect, tentatively offered to Kyiv in symbolic solidarity - should be put on hold indefinitely, “in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.”

Analysis: Trump’s Ukraine envoy has a plan to end the war that Putin may revel in | CNN

CNN · by Nick Paton Walsh · November 29, 2024

Keith Kellogg speaks during a Senate Armed Services Committee full committee hearing on the conflict in Ukraine in February 2023.

Mariam Zuhaib/AP

CNN —

In a single post, the president-elect told the world what the end of the Ukraine war might look like. And it is going to be a big diplomatic ask, to say the least.

“I am very pleased to nominate General Keith Kellogg to serve as Assistant to the President and Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social channel. “Together, we will secure PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, and Make America, and the World, SAFE AGAIN!”

By appointing Keith Kellogg as his special envoy to Ukraine, Donald Trump has also chosen a very specific, pre-announced plan for the thorniest foreign policy issue on his plate.

Kellogg, Trump’s 80-year-old former national security advisor, has laid out his peace plan in some detail, writing for the America First policy institute in April.

It begins calling the war “an avoidable crisis that, due to the Biden Administration’s incompetent policies… has entangled America in an endless war.”

In short, a ceasefire will freeze the frontlines and both sides will be forced to the negotiating table. But it is in the longer details where it all gets complex.

Changing the US’ involvement

Kellogg spends most time berating Biden’s actions - saying that his administration gave too little lethal aid too late. He says Trump’s decision to give the first lethal aid to Ukraine in 2018 conveyed the strength needed to confront Putin, and that Trump’s soft approach to the Kremlin head - not demonizing him like Biden has - will enable him to strike a deal.

Kellogg says more weapons should have been given before the Russian invasion, and immediately afterwards, to enable Ukraine to win.

But that’s when the plan – which CNN has reported that Trump’s soon-to-be national security adviser is considering - stops being to Ukraine’s liking.

Kellogg says the United States doesn’t need involvement in another conflict, and its own stocks of weaponry have suffered from aiding Ukraine, leaving the country potentially exposed in any conflict with China over Taiwan. He says Ukraine’s NATO membership - in truth a very distant prospect, tentatively offered to Kyiv in symbolic solidarity - should be put on hold indefinitely, “in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.”

Foremost, the plan says it should become “a formal US policy to seek a ceasefire and negotiated settlement.”

A serviceman of 24th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fires a 2s5 "Hyacinth-s" self-propelled howitzer towards Russian troops at a front line.

Ukrainian Armed Forces/Reuters

It says future US aid - likely given as a loan - will be conditioned on Ukraine negotiating with Russia, and the US will arm Ukraine to the extent it can defend itself and stop any further Russian advances before and after any peace deal. This latter suggestion is perhaps dated by the fast Moscow advance underway in eastern Ukraine and the current high US level of aid already makes Kellogg uncomfortable.

Kellogg credits partially a 2023 article by Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan for some of the next ideas.

A freeze to the frontlines

The frontlines would be frozen by a ceasefire, and a demilitarized zone imposed. For agreeing to this, Russia would get limited sanctions relief, and full relief only when a peace deal is signed that is to Ukraine’s liking. A levy on Russian energy exports would pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Ukraine would not be asked to give up on reclaiming occupied territory, but it would agree to pursue it through diplomacy alone. It accepts “this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office.”

It is fetchingly simple and swift in its approach. But it lacks an accommodation of what Moscow will demand and has used the diplomatic process for in the past: To cynically pursue military advances. The freezing of the frontlines will precipitate a very violent few months ahead as Moscow seeks to take as much ground as it can. The Kremlin has in the past ignored ceasefires and pursued its territorial objectives - often blankly denying that it is.

A demilitarized zone would likely need to be policed, possibly putting NATO troops, or soldiers from other non-aligned nations, in between the two sides. That will be hard to maintain and staff, to say the least. It would be enormous, spanning hundreds of miles of border, and a massive financial investment.

Arming Ukraine to the extent it can stop present and future Russian advances will also be tough. The plan notes the United States manufactures 14,000 155 artillery rounds a month, which Ukraine can use up in just 48 hours. Paradoxically, Kellogg wants the US to arm Ukraine more, yet also accepts they really can’t.

Ukrainian rescuers extinguish a fire in a residential building following a missile attack in Kyiv in February 2024.

Sergei Supinsky/AFP/Getty Images

A change in values

Two lines provide a wider insight into the author’s thinking. He says that national security, the American First way, was about practical necessities.

“Biden replaced the Trump approach with a liberal internationalist one that promoted Western values, human rights, and democracy,” he writes. That is a pretty grim base from which to build a compromise on European security.

He adds that some critics of continued aid to Ukraine - in which he seems to include himself - are “worried about whether America’s vital strategic interests are at stake in the Ukraine War, the potential of the involvement of US military forces and whether America is engaged in a proxy war with Russia that could escalate into a nuclear conflict.”

These two sentences provide the ultimate backdrop for the deal proposed: That Ukraine’s war is about values we don’t need to perpetuate, and we should step back from Putin’s nuclear threat. It is the opposite of the current unity in which the West prioritizes the values of its own way of life and security, based on the lesson of the Thirties that appeased dictators don’t stop.

The plan presents Ukraine with a welcome chance for an end to the violence, at a time when it is losing on all fronts, and darkly short of basic manpower - a hurdle it may never overcome, and something in which Russia will likely always outpace it.

But it begins a process in which a wily and deceitful Putin will revel. Exploiting a ceasefire and Western weakness is his forte, the moment he has been waiting nearly three years for. The plan accepts Western fatigue, that its armament production cannot keep pace, and that its values are wasteful. It also makes little accommodation for what Russia will do to upset its vision.

It is a bleak compromise for a bleak war. But it may not end it and instead open a new chapter where Western unity and support begins to crumble, and Putin edges, both at the negotiating table and at the front, closer towards his goals.

CNN · by Nick Paton Walsh · November 29, 2024

4. Could Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ trigger NATO retaliation?

Excerpts:

Hybrid warfare is the use of both conventional and unconventional means to create instability in countries without making it seem like an all-out war.

These kinds of tactics can include election interference, assassination plots and attacks on critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables, but they can be extremely difficult to prove.

So could these sorts of incidents really trigger retaliation against Russia by NATO countries?

Could Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ trigger NATO retaliation?

German intelligence chief says Russia’s hybrid war could prompt NATO allies to invoke the mutual defence Article 5.

Al Jazeera English · by Sarah Shamim

German intelligence chief Bruno Kahl said this week that Russia’s extensive use of “hybrid” warfare measures “increases the risk that NATO will eventually consider invoking its Article 5 mutual defence clause”, under which an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against them all.

Hybrid warfare is the use of both conventional and unconventional means to create instability in countries without making it seem like an all-out war.

These kinds of tactics can include election interference, assassination plots and attacks on critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables, but they can be extremely difficult to prove.

So could these sorts of incidents really trigger retaliation against Russia by NATO countries?

What sort of hybrid warfare incidents have occurred recently?

Kahl’s comments on Wednesday came just days after two cables in the Baltic Sea were cut on November 17 and 18.

The Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 – which had departed from the Ust-Luga port in Russia and was reported by some media, including The Wall Street Journal, and research units, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as having a Russian captain – appeared to pass over the cables about the same time each was severed.

The Swedish police said the Chinese ship was “of interest”, and the Danish navy immediately began shadowing it through the Kattegat strait between Denmark and Sweden.

Swedish authorities are investigating the damage, which they say may have been caused by an anchor being dragged along the floor of the sea.

Is Russia using hybrid war tactics?

Russia has long faced accusations from the West of carrying out a hybrid war.

“Russia is conducting an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry and committing violence,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said on November 4.

“We know the Russians have developed a lot of hybrid warfare under the sea to disrupt the European economy through cables, internet cables, pipelines. All of our economy under the sea is under threat,” Vice Admiral Didier Maleterre, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command said, according to a Guardian report in April.

What other incidents has Russia been accused of?

In April, the United Kingdom alleged that Russia was behind an arson attack on a Ukraine-linked business warehouse in east London.

In July, CNN reported that the United States and Germany had foiled a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, the head of a German company that supplies arms to Ukraine.

The Swedish Agency for Support for Faith Communities said in February that it was reducing support to a Russian Orthodox church built in Vasteras in central Sweden. This was after Swedish intelligence services warned that the church was being used for intelligence operations. The church is located near the Vasteras Airport, which is on standby for use in the event of a military or civil crisis.

The church is also close to water treatment and energy facilities. Defence experts have warned Sweden to take action over this church, but it is not known if Swedish authorities have done so.

“The church offers a potential foothold that can be used for information-gathering, both directed at Vasteras Airport and at industrial interests in the form of large companies involved in the energy sector,” Markus Goransson, a researcher focusing on Russia at the Swedish Defence University, told Politico in a report published this month.

“When Sweden’s defence forces undertake exercises on or near the airport, as was done in June, they do so under possible surveillance from the church,” Goransson said.

The Baltic is a particular hotspot for this sort of warfare because it is surrounded by eight NATO countries.

In September 2022, explosions occurred along two Nord Stream gas pipelines. These run from Russia to Germany and are owned by a consortium of energy companies, including Russian gas giant Gazprom. No one claimed responsibility for the explosions, but the West has pointed the finger at Moscow.

Russia has also co-opted conservative social media personalities in Western countries, especially the US, to spread disinformation and propaganda, according to the American think tank Atlantic Council.

What is the point of hybrid warfare?

The goal is to create division and unrest within other countries. “Whenever a country is focusing on domestic disputes and arguments, its foreign policy becomes much weaker,” Pekka Kallioniemi – a Finnish disinformation scholar who is the author of Vatnik Soup, a book on Russia’s “information wars” – told Politico in an interview.

The Atlantic Council’s analysis added that authorities in Moscow also tend to back populist, right-wing leaders in Europe who share Russia’s anti-NATO, anti-European Union agenda and will introduce dis- and misinformation favouring those leaders and groups.

What is NATO’s Article 5?

Article 5 of the NATO treaty commits each member to treat an attack on an alliance ally as an attack against every NATO country.

“The increasing ramp-up of the Russian military potential means a direct military confrontation with NATO becomes one possible option for the Kremlin,” Kahl said this week. He predicted that the Russian military could “become capable of attacking NATO by the end of the decade”.

Article 5 has only been invoked once since NATO was established in 1949 – shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US.

Could NATO countries invoke Article 5?

Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told Al Jazeera NATO allies are unlikely to invoke the article against Russia.

“That is the whole point of calling it ‘hybrid war’ instead of real war,” he said.

Giles added that this sort of hybrid warfare has been going on for decades. He said the hybrid war is ramping up now because Russia is secure in the belief that it will not trigger all-out war. The ramping-up of these sorts of tactics “would have been unlikely if Russia was deterred by any countermeasures even as prosaic and basic as sanctions”, he added

Furthermore, an analysis published on Tuesday by IISS said: “The West lacks a strategy and the ability to act quickly in response to Russian hybrid warfare.”

“As long as NATO and European member states disagree on how to respond more assertively to the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare, Europe will remain vulnerable,” it added.

The US-based Center for European Policy Analysis has made suggestions for an EU hybrid threats policy. These include enforcing punitive measures such as sanctions and supporting independent Russian-language media to counter disinformation.

According to Giles, while sanctions were imposed in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, they “should have been placed earlier” in response to hybrid warfare tactics.

Last year, the EU announced it would provide grants worth more than 2.2 million euros ($2.32m) to the Free Media Hub EAST project, led by the Prague Civil Society Centre, which supports independent Russian and Belarusian news outlets.

Al Jazeera English · by Sarah Shamim

5. The plan to set US special forces on Mexican drug cartels — and why experts say it won’t work

I fear this would be a forever war.

Fear those who tout any war as quick, easy, or simple.

And few Americans would have the stomach for this.

The plan to set US special forces on Mexican drug cartels — and why experts say it won’t work

Donald Trump has pledged to confront gangs head on, but they are so well-armed they could prove a match for anything

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2024/11/29/border-tsar-plan-set-special-forces-on-mexican-drug-cartels/

Joe Barnes

U.S. Navy SEALs, Indian Marine Commando Force, and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Train

navy.mil

term

29 November 2024

From Petty Officer 1st Class Alex Perlman

VISAKHAPTNAM, INDIA (Oct. 14, 2024) U.S. Naval Special Warfare (NSW), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Indian Navy Marine Commandos (MARCOS) completed a military-to-military engagement training during the special operations phase of MALABAR 24 on Oct. 14, 2024.

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The engagement reinforced and expanded combined special operations forces interoperability with partner nation militaries in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

U.S. Naval Special Warfare operators train with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Indian Marine Commando Force members during a visit, board, search and seizure exercise in Visakhapatnam, India during exercise Malabar 2024. Portions of this image have been blurred for security reasons. (Courtesy photo)

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U.S. Naval Special Warfare operators and Indian Marine Commando Force members secure a beach during over-the-beach training in Visakhapatnam, India during exercise Malabar 2024. Portions of this image have been blurred for security reasons. (Courtesy photo)

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U.S. Naval Special Warfare operators and Indian Marine Commando Force members participate in close-quarters combat training in Visakhapatnam, India during exercise Malabar 2024. Portions of this image have been blurred for security reasons. (Courtesy photo)

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A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force member observes U.S. Naval Special Warfare operators and an Indian Marine Commando Force member train on a shooting range in Visakhapatnam, India during exercise Malabar 2024. Portions of this image have been blurred for security reasons. (Courtesy photo)

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“We value the opportunity to train with our counterparts from India and Japan,” said an NSW operator. “It’s the continued collaboration like this that sharpens our tactics and strengthens our bond with our partners in the region.”

The training encompassed a variety of critical skills, including iterations on beach insertion, maritime interdiction, close-quarters combat, and tactical casualty care. Participants engaged in realistic scenarios culminating in a comprehensive capstone exercise featuring maritime interdiction operations and rehearsals for visit, board, search, and seizure techniques.

“After sharing procedures and establishing standards, our combined forces developed realistic special operations scenarios,” said another NSW operator. “This training improved our readiness and interoperability, preparing us to effectively plan and carry out modern missions.”

High-quality, realistic training is essential to maintaining and demonstrating the United States' commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Our partners in the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy Marine Commandos are incredibly capable allies, and we continue to train and exercise together to improve interoperability and strengthen our capabilities.

NSW is the nation's elite maritime special operations force, uniquely positioned to extend the Fleet's reach. Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces provide flexible responses to contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. Integral to this capability is a forward-deployed posture and continuous engagement with partner and ally forces, heightening mutual interoperability and regional expertise.

Malabar 24 is a combined field training exercise with the Royal Australian Navy, Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy participants. The exercise is designed to support achievement of strategic objectives by strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and promoting interoperability in the conduct of complex warfighting operations.

7. US Special Forces to get NERVA-LG robots from France

US Special Forces to get NERVA-LG robots from France

defence-blog.com · by Colton Jones · November 29, 2024

News Army PRESS RELEASES

Nov 29, 2024

Modified date: Nov 29, 2024

courtesy photo

KNDS France Robotics has announced that it has secured a contract to supply 10 NERVA-LG robotic systems to the United States Special Forces.

The company stated that this new order underscores the quality and reliability of their solutions, and highlights KNDS’s ability to meet the specialized requirements of some of the world’s most demanding military units.

The NERVA-LG system is described as a light, robust, and versatile platform, well-suited for a range of military operations. Designed to assist in long-distance information collection, the system is equipped with four cameras and a microphone, providing immediate operational capacity for gathering intelligence over distances of up to 1,000 meters in open areas and 300 meters in urban environments.

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KNDS highlighted that the platform’s adaptability is enhanced by over 20 available “mission kits,” which enable the NERVA-LG to perform diverse operational tasks. These include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) recognition, improvised explosive device (IED) control, victim assistance, and close combat support. The system’s versatility is further enhanced by numerous semi-autonomous assistance features, allowing personnel to concentrate on critical aspects of their missions without being bogged down by manual control of the robotic platform.

KNDS France Robotics expressed its gratitude to its teams for their commitment and to its partners for their continued confidence in the company’s solutions. “This new order demonstrates the quality and reliability of our solutions, as well as our ability to meet the specific needs of the most demanding Special Forces,” KNDS said in its announcement.

The NERVA-LG is expected to be a valuable tool for the U.S. Special Forces, providing them with advanced capabilities for reconnaissance and support in a variety of operational scenarios. The versatility of the system, coupled with its ability to carry specialized mission kits, makes it an adaptable solution for the unpredictable nature of special operations.

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About author:

Colton Jones

Colton Jones is the deputy editor of Defence Blog. He is a US-based journalist, writer and publisher who specializes in the defense industry in North America and Europe. He has written about emerging technology in military magazines and elsewhere. He is a former Air Force airmen and served at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

defence-blog.com · by Colton Jones · November 29, 2024

8. The US Army's Vision of Soldiers in Exoskeletons Lives On

Excerpts:

While the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) oversaw incremental advances in US military exoskeleton research in the early 2000s, the most recent concerted attempt at a suit of powered armor came in the last decade in the form of US Special Operations Command’s Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS). Inspired by the death of a Navy SEAL during a hostage rescue effort in Afghanistan, TALOS sought to cloak elite US special operations forces in additional layers of ballistic armor, sensors, and an exoskeleton to boost their survivability and situational awareness to near-superhuman levels. But while the TALOS program did yield several novel technologies (a lower body exoskeleton among them), the effort was canceled in 2019 after just five years of research and development, felled by “complex subsystem interdependencies” between its various elements that failed to coalesce into a unified and intuitive suit that operators could “just wear,” as Heinlein envisioned decades earlier. (SOCOM would pivot to its “hyper enabled operator” concept, which focuses on “cognitive overmatch” rather than physical augmentation to give American commandos an edge on the battlefield.)

The US Army's Vision of Soldiers in Exoskeletons Lives On

Following decades of failed attempts and dashed dreams, the US Army is once again trying out powered exoskeletons to help soldiers haul munitions and equipment in the field.

Wired · by Jared Keller · November 29, 2024

After decades of research and development, the United States Army is taking yet another run at developing a powered exoskeleton to help soldiers carry heavy loads on the battlefield—but don’t expect a futuristic suit of combat armor straight out of Starship Troopers or Iron Man anytime soon.

Soldiers assigned to the Army’s 1-78 Field Artillery Battalion training unit at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, recently completed a three-day “proof of concept” evaluation of several off-the-shelf “exoskeleton suits” in late September and early October, officials confirmed to WIRED. The evaluation was overseen by the service’s Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM), the organization responsible for developing new technology for soldiers.

Official photos from the evaluation published to social media showed Advanced Individual Training students hauling artillery shells to and from a M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer and M777-towed howitzer with telltale black exoskeleton harnesses contrasted against their camouflage uniforms, part of a field exercise undertaken “to assess the potential of human augmentation, improve soldier performance, and determine if these exoskeletons meet the demands of our warfighters,” as the service put it.

While a DEVCOM spokesperson declined to identify which commercially produced systems were evaluated by soldiers, the Army announced its intent in August to award a contract to exoskeleton maker SUITX to “give users experience of advanced soldier augmentation technologies,” according to a government notice. “This exoskeleton will serve as a critical tool for evaluating the potential benefits of robotic assistance in increasing soldier endurance, strength, and overall operational effectiveness.”

Increased strength and endurance are an alluring duo for an American fighting force used to hauling close to 140 pounds into combat, and the prospect of a sophisticated combat suit that delivers both to soldiers even more so. But DEVCOM officials strongly emphasized that, despite this recent testing, the US military has yet to even determine how to actually apply a powered exoskeleton in a military context, let alone outfit soldiers in an “Iron Man suit” the likes of which the Army has bragged about in years past. Indeed, service officials tell WIRED that an official requirement document—a formal outline of a potential program’s technical and logical preconditions—for the adoption and fielding of exoskeletons does not currently exist, despite the fact that officials previously stated back in 2020 that Army Futures Command, DEVCOM’s superior organization, was closing in on one.

“As of today, the Army has not determined what the primary purpose of a ‘military exoskeleton’ is,” says David Accetta, a DEVCOM spokesperson.

That the Army is taking another crack at a powered exoskeleton should come as no surprise. The US military has been pursuing such technology for potential tactical applications for decades, since around the same time that science fiction author Robert Heinlein introduced the world to his vision of a “mobile infantry” flitting across future battlefields clad in advanced robotic armor in his beloved 1959 military science fiction classic Starship Troopers. Where Heinlein imagined future soldiers operating a mechanized battlesuit reminiscent of “a big steel gorilla, armed with gorilla-sized weapons,” the ostensible advantage of powered armor wasn’t just its added strength and durability, but the fact that “you don’t have to control the suit; you just wear it, like your clothes, like skin.” No fancy control interface, no complicated training: Soldiers would ostensibly step into a notional apparatus and be ready to “fight tonight,” as US military planners are fond of saying.

With an eye to future conflicts on an atomic battlefield, the Cold War-era US Defense Department clearly drew at least some inspiration from Starship Troopers. One year after Heinlein’s novel published, the Army went on the hunt for a “power-operated mechanical suit or skeleton that would transform the ordinary GI into a Superman,” according to a 1960 issue of the service’s Army Research & Development magazine, with future “servo-soldiers” hauling munitions and other heavy equipment “beyond the strength of a dozen men.” The servo-soldier “will wear a special suit which will have its own engine, enabling him to run faster, stop quicker, and lift bigger loads than ordinary mortals,” as Armor magazine put it in 1961 when the Pentagon officially solicited the defense industry for potential exoskeleton solutions. “What is more, he will be immune to germ warfare, poison gas, and the heat and radiation from nuclear blasts.”

In the following decades, the Pentagon took several stabs at making the servo-soldier a reality. In the 1960s, Cornell University engineer Neil Mizen’s “Man Amplifier,” funded by an Office of Naval Research grant, offered service members a patchwork of robotic components intended “to help sailors manhandle torpedoes, bombs, and machinery in the cramped quarters aboard ships and submarines,” as Popular Science described it in a November 1965 issue. In the later part of the decade, General Electric debuted its “Hardiman” exoskeleton, developed under a dual Army-Navy effort, a colossal, bulky apparatus that more closely resembled the P-5000 Powered Work Loader from the 1986 movie Aliens than a sleek battlesuit like Iron Man’s armor. In the 1980s, Los Alamos National Laboratory Advanced Weapons Technology Group engineer Jeffery Moore offered the Pentagon its most futuristic vision of a powered exoskeleton yet with his proposed “Pitman” combat suit, a vision of robot armor so advanced it remained a mere concept without ever producing a prototype. Every decade, the Pentagon appears to stand up and quickly wind down an exoskeleton project without ever producing a feasible prototype.

While the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) oversaw incremental advances in US military exoskeleton research in the early 2000s, the most recent concerted attempt at a suit of powered armor came in the last decade in the form of US Special Operations Command’s Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS). Inspired by the death of a Navy SEAL during a hostage rescue effort in Afghanistan, TALOS sought to cloak elite US special operations forces in additional layers of ballistic armor, sensors, and an exoskeleton to boost their survivability and situational awareness to near-superhuman levels. But while the TALOS program did yield several novel technologies (a lower body exoskeleton among them), the effort was canceled in 2019 after just five years of research and development, felled by “complex subsystem interdependencies” between its various elements that failed to coalesce into a unified and intuitive suit that operators could “just wear,” as Heinlein envisioned decades earlier. (SOCOM would pivot to its “hyper enabled operator” concept, which focuses on “cognitive overmatch” rather than physical augmentation to give American commandos an edge on the battlefield.)

Wary of the technological complexity required to develop mechanized armor for infantry troops, the Pentagon has spent the better part of the last two decades, with the exception of SOCOM’s TALOS effort, scaling back its exoskeleton ambitions to better match the original duties of the servo-soldier: hauling munitions and other heavy equipment. The Army’s Robotics and Autonomous Systems strategy released in March 2017, for example, stated that the service would pursue exoskeleton research primarily “to lighten the soldier load in the future” as a near-term priority as the Pentagon began its pivot from counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East to “great power competition” with technologically-advanced “near-peer” adversaries like Russia and China. The following October, in a letter to senior officials laying out the Army’s core modernization priorities for the coming decades, General Mark Milley, then the Army chief of staff and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that the service would eventually field “load-bearing exoskeletons” as part of a renewed emphasis on “soldier lethality” (the next year, Milley directed DEVCOM to undertake “a detailed engineering analysis of existing and emerging exoskeleton products” for their potential military applications).

This newfound push appears to have yielded several fresh experiments with exoskeleton technology in recent years. In 2018, Lockheed Martin was awarded a $6.9 million contract to “enhance” its ONYX exosuit for future Army demonstrations (Accetta, the DEVCOM spokesman, tells WIRED that initiative was ended due to a “number of technical issues” and lack of funding). Similarly, the service has been testing the Dephy ExoBoot for at least the last several years. In August 2022, the Army unveiled an (unpowered) exoskeleton dubbed the Soldier Assistive Bionic Exosuit for Resupply (SABER) to reduce lower back pain and physical stress among service members in the field; according to a 2023 study, 90 percent of soldiers who used the exosuit during field artillery training exercises reported an increased ability to perform their assigned tasks. And the Army isn’t the only branch exploring exoskeletons: Later in 2022, the Air Force announced that the service was testing its own pneumatically powered exosuit developed by ROAM Robotics to help aerial porters load up cargo aircraft like the C-17 Globemaster III.

The Fort Sill exoskeleton trial isn’t just the latest installment in a seven-decade push to meld man and machine; it’s also representative of the service’s cautious, restrained approach to the technology. Although US military planners may have long aspired to build an army of those so-called servo soldiers to dominate the future battlefield, current exoskeleton research efforts appear laser focused on more modest and potentially attainable applications like logistics and resupply rather than combat engagements. Slowly but surely, the Pentagon is carefully examining whether a robotic assist will help service members carry more for longer downrange.

But the Pentagon doesn’t appear to have totally given up on its dream of a powered exoskeleton as the basis for an armored battlesuit just yet. The 2017 Army RAS strategy, despite its emphasis on lightening soldier loads, also posited the long-term goal of building a “warrior suit” with “integrated displays that aggregates a common operating picture, provides intelligence updates, and integrates indirect and direct fire weapons systems”—capabilities not unlike those imagined with a notional Starship Troopers mobile infantry or Iron Man suit-clad operator and explored with the TALOS initiative. As of a few years ago, at least one Army official was still talking about such a suit as a long-term effort that could potentially become a reality sometime in the 2040s.

Today, however, that idea appears to be in hibernation, if not fully dead. When asked about the “warrior suit” effort, DEVCOM officials threw cold water on the entire concept as “the professional vision of one person” and “not to be considered (even at the time) as an official Army position,” despite its explicit mention in the 2017 RAS document.

“The ‘warrior suit’ never existed as such, it was never considered a ‘warrior suit’—at least not by the Army—but a proof of concept, meaning, ‘Would something like this help manage load while on the move?’’ Accetta says. “The number of technical, integration, design, power, ergonomic, and so on concerns were not trivial.”

“The project is not abandoned, it’s simply inactive,” he adds. “And if it ever were to become active, we doubt highly it would be called a ‘warrior suit.’”

Wired · by Jared Keller · November 29, 2024

9. Project Olympus Forges Critical Digital Pathways to Enable Interoperability

Project Olympus Forges Critical Digital Pathways to Enable Interoperability

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark and Army Maj. Wes Shinego

The Defense Department is moving rapidly toward the future of warfare in which decision advantage will reign as the decisive factor in deterring conflict, and when needed, defeating adversaries.

Military leaders have long recognized the imperative to maintain the information edge in an increasingly complex and distributed global security landscape.

Bold Quest

Army Lt. Gen. David Isaacson and other distinguished visitors with the J-6 Staff observe a drone flying during Bold Quest '24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C., Nov. 5, 2024.

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Credit: Marine Corps Cpl. Marc Imprevert

VIRIN: 241105-M-IC428-1139

Earlier this year, DOD announced it had reached a minimum viable capability of Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control, the department's approach to providing material and nonmaterial solutions to arm front line commanders with rapid access to actionable battlefield information across all warfighting domains and throughout the globe.

The capability represents not only a force multiplier for the Joint Force but will also provide the foundation for ever increasing interoperability between the U.S. and global network of allies and partners.

That ability to work seamlessly across warfighting domains and theaters with a range of partners is key to maintaining the United States' enduring strength around the globe. It remains a prime focus among military leaders that shape how the U.S. plans, trains and fights.

But achieving the reality of seamless integration for CJADC2 between the U.S. and its broad range of partners is not without its challenges.

Disparate technologies among forces along with policy hurdles have presented a perennial challenge for integrating partner nations onto a single network.

Project Olympus, a Joint Staff J-6-led initiative, is working to solve these challenges through digital transformation initiatives that synchronize current warfighting capabilities and enhanced security frameworks that manage access to data at the end-user level.

"Project Olympus is a concept that was formed in the Joint Staff based on lessons learned from previous events that we've done with capabilities employing new technology, such as zero trust and data centric security which is really focused on access control to data based on specific attributes to somebody's identity," said Fred Stanley, the Coalition Interoperability Division Chief within the Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4)/ Cyber Integration.

Members of Project Olympus work alongside international partners to test, develop and integrate capabilities critical to CJADC2 through iterative experiments and demonstrations.

Joseph Chacon

Joseph Chacon, Bold Quest operations director with U.S. Joint Staff J6, speaks to distinguished visitors during Bold Quest '24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C., Oct. 31, 2024.

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Credit: Marine Corps Cpl. Cpl. Jacquilyn Davis

VIRIN: 241031-M-KV124-1142

Over the past couple of years, Project Olympus participated in a series of demonstrations and events involving a range of participants including U.S. Central Command, U.S. Transportation Command Joint Communications Support Element and partner forces from the U.K., among others.

This year, Project Olympus is focused on implementing its first-ever mission partner environment architecture on a live network that will support a U.K.-led maritime mission spanning multiple U.S. combatant commands and involving 16 international partners.

The new security frameworks being demonstrated as part of Project Olympus move the U.S. and partner forces beyond traditional network security methods, allowing for agile and targeted access to critical information on an integrated network.

"We've historically looked at security as the antithesis for information sharing," said Jim Knight, the U.K. lead for Project Olympus during a demonstration last month. "The security folks come in and want to sort of clamp down. With zero trust and data centric security, they are security mechanisms, but they are enabling information sharing."

"I think that's a key focus point," he said. "For the first time, we're getting that balance right in terms of applying more security. And by applying more security, we're getting greater information sharing."

Knight said what Project Olympus is demonstrating goes beyond technology.

"It's a paradigm shift," he said. "We're moving from not only securing our networks at the boundary, having high castle walls... but we're also applying security and information sharing to individual data objects."

Project Olympus' success is forged through consistent test and evaluation of capabilities in complex scenarios involving a dynamic array of capabilities and partner forces.

Bold Quest

Marine Corps Sgt. Logan Schell, a joint tactical air controller assigned to 2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, monitors aircraft camera footage during a digitally aided close air support event as part of Bold Quest ‘24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C., Oct. 31, 2024.

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Credit: Marine Corps Cpl. Maurion Moore

VIRIN: 241031-M-HC655-1052

In October, members of Project Olympus took part in the latest iteration of Bold Quest — a Joint Staff-sponsored multinational demonstration and assessment that provides a proving ground for new technology and warfighting concepts.

During the demonstration, hosted at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, military participants and observers from allied and partner nations gathered to evaluate technical and procedural means of working together across strategic, operational and tactical levels in all domains.

This approach expedites learning and adaptation. By regularly collaborating, coalition partners can identify and address gaps in technology and policy before they create critical risk in real-world crises.

"Interoperability is crucial long before a crisis takes place. Waiting for a crisis to bring partners together is unacceptable," Stanley said, adding that "we need to be able to bring our partners in at the ground floor."

Demonstrations like Bold Quest underscore the importance of iterative demonstrations and assessments to push boundaries and foster a culture of true interoperability.

"We have to keep doing exercises or events, not once a year but multiple times, to continue pushing the boundary," said Army Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Cavanagh, a Project Olympus representative from U.S. Transcom's Joint Communications Support Element.

That same sense of a need to continually innovate resonates throughout the department.

Last year, in a keynote address titled "The Urgency to Innovate," Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks spoke to cloud computing's necessity in implementing CJADC2.

She said digital foundations, like those being developed by Project Olympus, are helping realize Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control.

"This is not a platform or single system that we're buying," Hicks said. "It's a whole set of concepts, technologies, policies, and talent that's advancing … command and control."

Spotlight: DOD Innovates

Spotlight: Science and Technology

Spotlight: Engineering in DOD

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark and Army Maj. Wes Shinego

10. World at most dangerous point in 40 years, MI6 chief warns

Excerpts:

While Mr Trump’s stance on Ukraine has raised concerns among some UK officials, Sir Richard – whose has been mentioned as a possible choice for the UK’s ambassador to Washington – said he was confident the transatlantic bond remained strong.

“For decades the US-UK intelligence alliance has made our societies safer,” he said. “I worked successfully with the first Trump administration to advance our shared security and look forward to doing so again.”

Sir Richard also directly addressed defence spending, with Mr Trump having called on Nato nations to spend more during his first term in the White House. “We know that we all need to do more,” he said. “That’s why the British government has committed to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence.”

However, the MI6 chief said Europe and North America already “have many times Russia’s GDP and defence budget”, adding: “We should never doubt that our alliance has strength in numbers, both economic and military, and our unity of purpose makes that count.”

World at most dangerous point in 40 years, MI6 chief warns

Vladimir Putin will not stop if he destroys Ukraine, Richard Moore says

https://www.the-independent.com/news/uk/home-news/mi6-russia-sabotage-ukraine-europe-b2655960.html

Andy Gregory

Friday 29 November 2024 15:23 EST

Sir Richard Moore issued a warning to Ukraine’s allies as he spoke at an event in Paris on Friday (AP)

The world is at its most dangerous point for 40 years, the head of MI6 has warned, accusing Russia of waging a “staggeringly reckless campaign” of sabotage in Europe to undermine support for Ukraine.

Sir Richard Moore also said the West could face a “reckoning” as potential terrorists are radicalised over war in the Middle East.

“In 37 years in the intelligence profession I’ve never seen the world in a more dangerous state. And the impact on Europe, our shared European home, could hardly be more serious,” Sir Richard said, adding that if “Putin is allowed to succeed in reducing Ukraine to a vassal state he will not stop there”.

Sir Richard said MI6 “cherishes our heritage of covert action, which we keep alive today” – with British spies working to stop the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He warned that a victory for Mr Putin in Ukraine would jeapordise both European and transatlantic security, in what appeared a message to preseident-elect Donald Trump, with the incoming US president having repeatedly complained about the amount of money and military aid Washington is sending to help Kyiv.

“We have recently uncovered a staggeringly reckless campaign of Russian sabotage in Europe, even as Putin and his acolytes resort to nuclear sabre-rattling to sow fear about the consequences of aiding Ukraine,” he said. “The cost of supporting Ukraine is well known but the cost of not doing so would be infinitely higher. If Putin succeeds China would weigh the implications, North Korea would be emboldened and Iran would become still more dangerous,” he added.

“Our security - British, French, European and transatlantic - will be jeopardised,” Sir Richard said during an event with his French counterpart to mark 120 years since the Entente Cordiale, the Anglo-French diplomatic agreement, was first signed.

The spymaster said his agency and its French counterpart, run by Nicolas Lerner, were working together to prevent a dangerous escalation by “calibrating the risk and informing the decisions of our respective governments” in response to President Putin’s “mix of bluster and aggression”.

Vladimir Putin is waging a ‘staggeringly reckless’ sabotage campaign, Sir Richard Moore warned (Ramil Sitdikov/Sputnik/Kremlin Pool Photo/AP)

Western officials have linked Moscow to several planned attacks in Europe in recent months, including an alleged plot to burn down Ukrainian-owned businesses in London, and to incendiary devices in packages on cargo planes. In July, one caught fire at a courier hub in Germany and another ignited in a warehouse in England.

Moscow has denied responsibility for all such incidents. Sir Richard’s remarks come after Ken McCallum, the head of the UK’s domestic intelligence service MI5, warned last month that Russian spies were on “a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets” – including “arson, sabotage and more dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness”.

Describing British intelligence officials as facing a “hell of a job”, Mr McCallum said both Russia and Iran had turned to employing private intelligence officers and criminals from both the UK and third countries.

Speaking on Friday, Mr Lerner, head of France's foreign spy agency DGSE, said that Britain’s experience in the wake of recent attacks like the Salisbury novichok poisoning in 2018 was invaluable to French intelligence officers seeking to defuse Russian actions.

Britain and France have been among Ukrainian allies most willing to allow Kyiv to use weapons they supply to hit certain targets inside Russia, after US president Joe Biden this month eased its long-held opposition to US-made ATACMS missiles being used to do so.

Since then, Russia has bombarded Ukraine’s energy infrastructure with hundreds of missiles and drones, fired and threatened the West with a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, and altered Russia’s nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold for using such weapons.

A production hall is seen destroyed though the roof after a recent Russian missile attack at DTEK's power plant in Ukraine (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)

While Mr Trump’s stance on Ukraine has raised concerns among some UK officials, Sir Richard – whose has been mentioned as a possible choice for the UK’s ambassador to Washington – said he was confident the transatlantic bond remained strong.

“For decades the US-UK intelligence alliance has made our societies safer,” he said. “I worked successfully with the first Trump administration to advance our shared security and look forward to doing so again.”

Sir Richard also directly addressed defence spending, with Mr Trump having called on Nato nations to spend more during his first term in the White House. “We know that we all need to do more,” he said. “That’s why the British government has committed to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence.”

However, the MI6 chief said Europe and North America already “have many times Russia’s GDP and defence budget”, adding: “We should never doubt that our alliance has strength in numbers, both economic and military, and our unity of purpose makes that count.”

(AFP via Getty Images)

Turning his attention to the war in Gaza, Sir Richard said: “We have yet to have a full reckoning with the radicalising impact of the fighting and terrible loss of innocent life in the Middle East after the horrors of 7 October.”

The war in Gaza – along with cross-border fire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon – was triggered on 7 October last year, when Hamas launched an attack inside Israel. The militant group killed around 1,200 people and took some 250 hostages into Gaza.

In response, Israel launched a devastating air and ground offensive against Hamas, and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to keep fighting until all of the hostages are freed. Some 100 hostages remain, although about a third of those are believed to be dead. More than 44,000 Palestinians have been killed in the largely devastated Gaza Strip, according to local health officials, while around 90 per cent of the population of around 2.3 million have been forced from their homes.

The former head of MI6, Sir John Sawers, warned last month that police and intelligence agencies in Britain should be “on their toes” as the assassination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders by Israel could trigger attacks on British soil.

Additional reporting by agencies

11. China’s Wagner? Beijing Establishes Private Security Company in Myanmar

I fear what this organization could do to the Free Burma Rangers and other US citizens who are supporting the resistance efforts in Burma/Myanmar.

Excerpts:

As a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CMEC comprises highways, railways, pipelines, and economic zones connecting China’s Kunming province to the deep-sea Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The economic corridor is vital to Beijing, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean and bypassing the strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait, a chokepoint critical to China’s energy and trade supply lines, particularly in the event of a conflict with the United States. Yet unfortunately for Beijing, many CMEC projects pass through some of Myanmar’s most volatile conflict zones.

Since pro-democracy opposition armies declared a “people’s defensive war” in 2021, Chinese projects, including oil and gas pipelines, have come under increasing threat. Notably, in January 2022, a local People’s Defense Force attacked the $800 million Tagaung Taung nickel processing plant. More recently, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack last month. While no group has claimed responsibility, both the People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government (NUG) have condemned the incident.

The announcement of a joint security company has sparked controversy in Myanmar, with many arguing that it could be perceived as a breach of the country’s sovereignty. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on its soil, and the framing of this initiative as a Chinese “company” in a joint venture appears to be a strategic move to deflect accusations of a foreign military intervention. By structuring the company as private and partially Burmese, Beijing can claim arm’s-length deniability, distancing itself from direct involvement while potentially directing the security force to carry out state-derived foreign policy objectives.

China’s Wagner? Beijing Establishes Private Security Company in Myanmar

Situation Reports - November 28, 2024

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/chinas-wagner-beijing-establishes-private-security-company-in-myanmar/

By Antonio Graceffo

China is collaborating with the Myanmar military junta to establish a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar. On October 22, 2024, the junta formed a working committee to draft a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the initiative, reflecting China’s growing concerns over the security of its projects, particularly those under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

As a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CMEC comprises highways, railways, pipelines, and economic zones connecting China’s Kunming province to the deep-sea Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The economic corridor is vital to Beijing, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean and bypassing the strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait, a chokepoint critical to China’s energy and trade supply lines, particularly in the event of a conflict with the United States. Yet unfortunately for Beijing, many CMEC projects pass through some of Myanmar’s most volatile conflict zones.

Since pro-democracy opposition armies declared a “people’s defensive war” in 2021, Chinese projects, including oil and gas pipelines, have come under increasing threat. Notably, in January 2022, a local People’s Defense Force attacked the $800 million Tagaung Taung nickel processing plant. More recently, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack last month. While no group has claimed responsibility, both the People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government (NUG) have condemned the incident.

The announcement of a joint security company has sparked controversy in Myanmar, with many arguing that it could be perceived as a breach of the country’s sovereignty. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on its soil, and the framing of this initiative as a Chinese “company” in a joint venture appears to be a strategic move to deflect accusations of a foreign military intervention. By structuring the company as private and partially Burmese, Beijing can claim arm’s-length deniability, distancing itself from direct involvement while potentially directing the security force to carry out state-derived foreign policy objectives.

The deployment of a Chinese private security company (PSC) comes at a critical moment in the Myanmar civil war, and amid sustained financial and military support for the junta, including shipments of weapons and aircrafts. But above all Beijing’s motivation for establishing the joint venture signals waning confidence in the junta’s ability to protect Chinese investments and personnel. Such concerns are underscored by the junta’s overstretched military forces, which have lost significant ground and numerous bases and outposts to pro-democracy rebels, further eroding the junta’s presence across Myanmar.

In late October 2024, Chinese authorities reportedly placed Peng Daxun, commander of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), under house arrest in Kunming, Yunnan Province, to pressure the group to withdraw from Lashio. The MNDAA’s capture of Lashio in August 2024 dealt a major blow to Myanmar’s junta.

Lashio, a strategic hub in northern Shan State, serves as a gateway to China’s Yunnan Province and central Myanmar along the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Its control is vital for ensuring the flow of Chinese investments and trade. China frequently claims to adhere to its official stance of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of other nations, yet developments in the Myanmar civil war suggest an active involvement. By detaining Peng Daxun, Beijing seems to be stepping in where it perceives the junta has failed, underscoring its wider rationale for establishing a private security company in Myanmar.

Beijing already has numerous private security companies operating globally, including four in Myanmar, in areas where China has significant strategic and economic interests. The largest Chinese security companies include De Wei Security Group Ltd, Hua Xin China Security, Guan An Security Technology, China Overseas Security Group, and Frontier Services Group.

The idea of a Chinese security company is reminiscent of Russia’s Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) that has been heavily involved in conflicts across Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine. Wagner functions as an unofficial extension of Russian state power, providing military training, combat support, and securing strategic assets, often under the guise of protecting Russian interests abroad. Its operations frequently involve direct combat roles, covert military activities, and securing resource-rich areas, making it an instrument of geopolitical influence for Moscow.

In contrast, Chinese private security companies primarily focus on safeguarding infrastructure projects, personnel, and investments linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unlike Wagner, these companies avoid direct combat roles, instead specializing in site security, risk management, and logistical support.

However, the proposed firm in Myanmar will be a joint venture with the junta, introducing a new dynamic. It is already known that this company will facilitate arms shipments and deliveries to the junta. As a junta-aligned company, it may operate with fewer restrictions and potentially involve heavily armed personnel, diverging from the usual limitations imposed on Chinese PSCs. The joint arrangement could also mean the company is not bound to adhere strictly to Chinese regulations, raising concerns that it might take on a more militarized role than typical Chinese security firms. In an extreme case, there is speculation that Chinese security firms could take an active role in the junta’s fight against pro-democracy forces, similar to the role that Russia’s Wagner Group has played in its engagements in Africa and the Middle East.

Incidentally, the joint private security company approach is also being attempted in Pakistan, where a string of recent attacks against Chinese citizens and economic interests have shaken faith in Islamabad’s ability to protect the CPEC corridor.

In response to the announcement, Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) asserted that collaborating with the NUG and revolutionary forces is the only viable way to effectively protect Chinese investments and operations in Myanmar. The NUG further emphasized its commitment to safeguarding lawful investments and fostering friendly relations with neighboring countries. The messaging serves to reassure Beijing that, even if Myanmar transitions to democracy, it will continue to maintain trade relations with China.

Yet it seems for now that Beijing is not ready to abandon the junta, and amid a fraught outlook on the battlefield, the deployment of a Chinese private security company is the only way to ensure the junta’s survival. For its part, the NUG remains isolated, lacking in both recognition from Western powers and a direct line of communication with Beijing.

12. The Myth of Peace: Imperialism and Control of Occupied Lands from Ukraine to Gaza

Excerpts:

Conclusions

By breaking down the war/peace binary and critiquing state-centric models, we open up space to consider war as a continuous, structural condition rather than an aberration. It allows us to rethink the relationship between force and politics, blurring the lines between distinct periods of war and peace. In imperial settings, war is ongoing—imperialism is inherently a form of war. This rethinking has far-reaching consequences for how we approach international law, humanitarian interventions, and conflict resolution. Rather than focusing on “endings” to war, these fields must evolve to recognize the ongoing nature of violence, particularly in settler-state, postcolonial, and imperial contexts.

Incorporating the histories, cultural narratives, and sociologies of small wars into the study of warfare forces us to confront the fact that war is not simply a clash between equal or unequal opponents but a product of deeper power dynamics. Just as war itself cannot be understood globally through a Eurocentric framework, peace too must be redefined. Effective peacebuilding must address the imperial and settler-state legacies that continue to drive conflict.

By expanding our frameworks beyond the limited concepts of war and peace developed in the West, we can better understand the full scope of global conflict and, perhaps, craft more meaningful paths to resolution.

The Myth of Peace: Imperialism and Control of Occupied Lands from Ukraine to Gaza

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/29/the-myth-of-peace-and-imperialism/

by Siamak Naficy

11.29.2024 at 06:01am

Warfare is often viewed through a Eurocentric lens, framing conflicts as binary events—war or peace—that oversimplify global realities. Rooted in European concepts (e.g., Westphalian sovereignty, nation-states, formal declarations of war), this view assumes war is a temporary rupture in an otherwise peaceful status quo, followed by negotiations and treaties. However, conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza demonstrate that traditional notions of war fail to capture the continuous, structural violence experienced in regions where force is a routine tool of dominance.

The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and Israel’s internationally recognized illegal occupation of Palestinian territories challenge traditional notions of war. These regions remain in perpetual insecurity, blurring the lines between war and peace. By studying such “irregular wars” on the global periphery, we can move beyond this binary framework and see war as a permanent condition, tied to imperial legacies.

Imperialism shapes not only borders and governments but also leaves behind structures of exploitation and inequality that fuel ongoing violence. Rethinking conflict this way allows for more meaningful peacebuilding, addressing the root causes of violence in both historical and modern contexts.

Consider, for instance, Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Many Western analyses viewed this as the start of a new phase of conflict, marking a deviation from the prior “peace” in the region. However, this perspective overlooks the long-standing historical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which have roots in imperial control, cultural suppression, and Soviet-era policies that destabilized Ukrainian sovereignty. The annexation itself was presented by Russia as a “reunification” rather than an act of war, reflecting a different understanding of conflict that sees war and peace as more fluid concepts. This continuous assertion of Russian dominance over Ukraine, not just through overt military aggression but through economic coercion, political subversion, and disinformation campaigns, blurs the traditional boundaries between war and peace.

Moreover, the situation in the Donbas region underscores the inadequacy of the war/peace binary. The Donbas (short for Donetsk River Basin) is an industrial and mining hub in eastern Ukraine, historically populated by both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. Its strategic importance increased in the Soviet era due to its coal and steel production, making it a key economic zone. Following Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the region maintained strong ties to Russia, and this connection became a flashpoint after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which ousted the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014), pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, with Moscow’s support, declared the independence of two self-proclaimed republics, Donetsk and Luhansk. This sparked a war between Ukrainian forces and these separatist groups, leading to thousands of casualties and mass displacement. Although often described as a “frozen conflict” since the Minsk agreements in 2015, low-intensity fighting, covert operations, and proxy warfare have persisted, creating an environment of sustained violence and instability. For the local population, this is not a period of peace but a condition of perpetual insecurity. Elements of insurgency—territorial defense units, protests, and popular uprisings—complicate the narrative. Civilians have been turning into fighters overnight, with localized forces disrupting Russian logistics and infrastructure. This blending of conventional war with asymmetric, insurgent tactics challenges not just the binary of war/peace but a simplistic division of war into “small” and “big” conflicts.

This nonbinary nature of war and peace is also seen in how Western powers have responded to the Russo-Ukraine conflict, offering sanctions, arms, and training rather than engaging in full-scale war. These actions reflect a strategic engagement that operates in the gray zone between war and peace—another reminder that modern conflicts rarely adhere to the binary model.

Elsewhere, similar dynamics can be seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where outside powers –like Iran on one side and the United States on the other—offer arms and training but are restrained when it comes to engaging in a full-scale war. Moreover, in the internationally recognized illegally occupied territories, settler expansion and systemic violence exist in a state of neither full peace nor full war. It extends into everyday life, shaped by systemic violence, economic exploitation, displacement, and racialized oppression. In places like Gaza or the West Bank, occupation and structural violence blur the boundaries between what is conventionally understood as “war” and “peace.” Here, peace does not mean the absence of violence but is instead a continuation of different forms of domination. The binary model fails to capture the lived experience of continuous violence in these regions, challenging the notion of war as an exceptional event.

So, what happens if we use the history, cultural narratives, and sociologies of so-called ‘irregular wars’ to rethink the very category of war? That is, what if we make the periphery the center? By rethinking the definition of war through the lens of imperial and settler-state conflicts, we reveal new insights into the nature of warfare.

First, the binary between war and peace begins to break down. In the occupied territories of a settler-state and on the frontier of empires alike, there is no clear distinction between wartime and peacetime—war is a permanent condition, with force being an ordinary part of politics. As historian Isabel Hull notes, imperialism is war.

Second, the notion of the sovereign nation-state as the primary unit of war and world politics dissolves. Eurocentric war studies typically assume two main types of war: interstate wars and civil wars. This framework cannot apply to imperial and settler-state contexts, where conflicts do not fit neatly into these categories. For example, the conflict in Gaza cannot be recognized as either—Palestinians there in the territories occupied by Israel do not have their own state nor are they citizens of Israel.

Third, war is not a horizontal relation between so-called “peer competitors” or even “near peers” but is embedded in transnational contexts and international hierarchies. This shifts the focus from state-on-state conflict to a broader analysis of power dynamics, which include imperial and settler-state settings.

Each of these points offers not only a new perspective on imperial and settler-state war but also forces us to reconsider warfare in the West. In examining imperial and settler-state conflicts, we gain new insights into the fundamental nature of war itself. In other words, don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater—don’t throw out Carl von Clausewitz. Instead wage anthropology; that is, enrich Clausewitz by incorporating particular histories, cultural narratives, and local politics into your general theorizing. There’s perhaps no more clear example of this than the use of the Peace of Westphalia to theorize about world politics. A little event somewhere on the continent of Europe in 1648 pervasively used today to make sense of world politics as a whole.

From Empire to Nation-State and Sorting

The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza also invoke memories of the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, where national and ethnic identities were violently contested after the collapse of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans, the dissolution of a multi-ethnic state led to brutal ethnic cleansing and population sorting—Serbs, Croats, Bosnians—through forced migrations and mass violence. The same process of sorting is evident in Ukraine, where the Russian invasion is redrawing lines between Ukrainians and Russians, a forced sorting of populations in the post-Soviet imperial space. Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty against Russian imperialism echoes the Balkans’ dissolution, while Gaza represents an unresolved settler-state question. The sorting of people—whether through territorial lines, ethnic cleansing, or forced migration— echoes other events in history, like the 1830 U.S. Indian Removal Act—and binds these conflicts across different geographies and moments in history.

What further unites these conflicts is the racialized dimension of global responses. The international reaction to the Ukraine war has been unprecedented, partly because it disrupts an imagined “civilizational” hierarchy. The shock of war in Europe—”How could this happen in Europe?”—is framed in racial terms (ignoring the series of crises in the Balkans), as if Europe is somehow immune to such violence. Media coverage has emphasized how Ukrainian victims resemble Western Europeans, with references to “blue eyes and blonde hair” surfacing in reporting. This contrasts sharply with the global response to conflicts in places like Syria, Iraq, and Gaza, where the victims, typically coded as non-white, elicit far less concern from Western powers. The prolonged suffering in Gaza, with repeated cycles of conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups, has not inspired the same outcry despite the devastation and human toll.

The Balkan wars, too, exposed this disparity. Although the conflict occurred in Europe, the region’s portrayal as a “volatile” and “backward” part of the continent relegated it to a lesser category in the Western imagination. This, like the restrained responses to conflicts in Gaza or the Middle East more broadly, highlights how Western reactions to war are often shaped not just by the geopolitical interests of the state, but by presumed racial and cultural proximity.

Conclusions

By breaking down the war/peace binary and critiquing state-centric models, we open up space to consider war as a continuous, structural condition rather than an aberration. It allows us to rethink the relationship between force and politics, blurring the lines between distinct periods of war and peace. In imperial settings, war is ongoing—imperialism is inherently a form of war. This rethinking has far-reaching consequences for how we approach international law, humanitarian interventions, and conflict resolution. Rather than focusing on “endings” to war, these fields must evolve to recognize the ongoing nature of violence, particularly in settler-state, postcolonial, and imperial contexts.

Incorporating the histories, cultural narratives, and sociologies of small wars into the study of warfare forces us to confront the fact that war is not simply a clash between equal or unequal opponents but a product of deeper power dynamics. Just as war itself cannot be understood globally through a Eurocentric framework, peace too must be redefined. Effective peacebuilding must address the imperial and settler-state legacies that continue to drive conflict.

By expanding our frameworks beyond the limited concepts of war and peace developed in the West, we can better understand the full scope of global conflict and, perhaps, craft more meaningful paths to resolution.

Tags: imperialism, Israel-Hamas Conflict, Russo-Ukrainian War, Sovereignty, war

About The Author

Siamak Naficy
Siamak Tundra Naficy is a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis. An anthropologist with an interdisciplinary approach to social, biological, psychological, and cultural issues, his interests range from the anthropological approach to conflict theory to wicked problems, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

13. Beyond Retribution: Unveiling Al Qaeda’s Strategic Power Logic for 9/11

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The concept of power focuses on an actor’s ability to achieve its desired outcomes. As noted by Nye, power is more than merely resources such as military force and economic strength. He argues that “power conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable.” Hence, it is critical that actors develop compelling power conversion logic to maximize their resources in pursuit of their objectives. Nye contends that power conversion strategies can employ hard power and soft power. Hard power utilizes coercion through threats or rewards to change an actor’s behavior, whereas soft power engages with co-optive means like framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attractions to obtain preferred outcomes.

Although Al Qaeda has frequently been portrayed as an irrational actor, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the terrorist organization operated with clear strategic intent. Contrary to popular belief that the terrorist organization sought only revenge for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Al Qaeda engaged in a movement to unite Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate with Sharia Law. To achieve this objective, the terrorist organization employed both hard power and soft power strategies to mobilize its movement. In terms of hard power, Al Qaeda coerced the United States by compelling it to respond to the terrorist organization’s attack on U.S. soil in 2001. As for soft power, the terrorist group attempted to win the hearts and minds of members of Islam in the Arab world by highlighting the costs of American intervention and the benefits of supporting its movement.

Evaluating Al Qaeda’s strategic power logic and execution in hindsight, it is clear that it failed to establish an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law in the Middle East. Al Qaeda’s plan effectively expanded its following as a result of the United States invading Afghanistan and Iraq, but it failed to unite the Islamic Sects of Sunni and Sharia Islam. Al Qaeda’s strategic logic failed in large part because it underestimated the United States’ commitment to a prolonged intervention and overestimated its own resilience against U.S. military might. Moreover, the organization’s execution faltered due to its inability to maintain a coherent and compelling message to Muslims across the region.

We must therefore never assume an actor is irrational, as many US leaders did after the 9/11 attacks. We must remember the importance of understanding adversaries’ strategic motivations and intentions, even in the face of incomprehensible actions. Moreover, we must value doing our best to think like the enemy. One practical approach to doing so is utilizing Nye’s strategic power logic. By evaluating an actor’s resources and potential courses of action to achieve its desired objectives, we can better anticipate and respond to security threats, ultimately contributing to more effective national security strategies and safeguarding the interests of the United States and its allies.

Beyond Retribution: Unveiling Al Qaeda’s Strategic Power Logic for 9/11

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/28/beyond-retribution/

by Noah Jager

11.28.2024 at 06:01am

Introduction

On September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States (US) was rocked to its core by an unfathomable act of terror. Nineteen terrorists associated with Al Qaeda, an Islamist extremist group, hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and another in Pennsylvania. New York City’s iconic Twin Towers, symbols of American prosperity and power, burst into flames and collapsed, following horrific airliner attacks. The 9/11 attack killed nearly 3,000 people and injured more than 6,000 others, making it the deadliest terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil.

Given the horror and revulsion of the event, many American leaders and citizens declared Al Qaeda’s attack as sheer irrational hatred instead of strategic behavior. President George W. Bush claimed Al Qaeda “hates progress, and freedom, and choice,” while Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted that Al Qaeda’s followers are “fanatics who seek to extinguish freedom, enslave women, corrupt education and to kill Americans wherever and whenever they can.” Although such sentiments and perceptions resonated throughout the US, Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack was more deeply rooted in strategic logic than most Americans imagined. Al Qaeda conducted the 9/11 attacks not solely as a retribution against US involvement in the Middle East, but rather as a calculated effort to unite followers of Islam under the jihadist ideology of Salafi and to mobilize Muslim leaders to enact Sharia Law across the Arab World.

The purpose of this paper is to provide valuable insights into how power operates in the realm of international relations. The concept of power is often referenced in scholarly works, but authors frequently interpret the term differently. This essay helps conceptualize power by highlighting that the concept is more than merely an abundance of resources, economic strength, and military supremacy. This paper reveals that power revolves around an actor’s ability to convert their resources to desired outcomes.

The first section explores the foundational context surrounding the events of 9/11. It discusses how Al Qaeda formed, what the terrorist organization believes, and why it committed the attack against the United States. In the subsequent section, this paper evaluates the notion of power within the literature of international relations. In particular, it examines Joseph Nye’s strategic power framework, a pivotal tool that aids scholars in dissecting how actors attempt to translate their resources into desired outcomes. Next, the essay applies Nye’s framework to Al Qaeda’s actions against the United States and evaluates the effectiveness of the terrorist organization’s strategic logic. Finally, this paper offers an explanation for why Al Qaeda’s plan failed to achieve its aims. By analyzing Al Qaeda’s strategy through the lens of Nye’s power framework, readers will better understand that power revolves around an intricate interplay between resources, strategic logic, execution, and desired outcomes.

Background

The development of Al Qaeda can be traced back to the Soviet-Afghan War (1978-1989). During the war, an Afghan resistance group known as the Mujahideen successfully defended their state from Soviet invasion. The success of this effort cannot be separated from the US’s assistance to the Mujahideen. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen split into factions, one of which became Al Qaeda in 1988. The Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist organization, provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, in Afghanistan in the years leading up to 9/11. Moreover, Al Qaeda funded military camps and trained around 10,000 to 20,000 fighters between 1996 and 2001. The United States officially designated Al Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1999 after it bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Members of Al Qaeda, along with other extremist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, adhere to an ideology known as Salafi jihadism. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) claims the ideology aims “to raise awareness among Muslims that their religion has been on the wane” because leaders and followers in the Arab World are idolizing Western powers and not adhering to Sharia Law. Salafi jihadism emphasizes the obligation of practicing Sharia Law as their prophet Mohammed intended in 570 CE. Sharia means “the correct path” in Arabic, and the law refers to the Quran’s religious and moral guidance. Among the sects of Islam, scholars suggest Salafism projects the most literal interpretation of the Quran. Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar claim that “Salafis, often described as ultraconservatives, believe not just in the spirit, but in the letter of the law, which is what sets them apart from their mainstream counterparts.”

In an attempt to characterize the demise of Shariah Law in the Arab World, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda referenced Islamic stories and doctrine. In particular, Al Qaeda created a parallel between the prophet Muhammad’s battle in Mecca and their modern fight against individuals and leaders incorrectly practicing Islam. Bin Laden likened the United States to the Hubal of the age, referring to a stone idol that Muslims praised and invoked to push Mohammed out of Mecca. As scholar Michael Scott Doran claims, bin Laden used imagery to suggest that “the leaders of the Arab and Islamic worlds today are hypocrites, idol worshippers cowering behind America.” In his 1996 fatwa, entitled “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans,” bin Laden accused Saudi Arabia of such hypocrisy. He claimed, “the regime has desecrated its legitimacy through many of its own actions, the most important being: 1) Its suspension of the rulings of the Islamic law and 2) Its inability to protect the land and its allowing the enemies of God to occupy it for years in the form of the American Crusaders.”

Just as Mohammed destroyed followers of Kabul in Mecca, bin Laden declared that Muslims must remove Islamic leaders who were partnering with the US or those Muslims not practicing Sharia law, like the leaders in Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda initially collaborated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the late 1980s to remove lax Muslim leaders from power in the Arab World, which resulted in the death of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. However, beyond states like Sudan and Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was unable to mobilize their movement throughout the Arab World. As noted in his Declaration of War, bin Laden claimed the “Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to contain and abort any “corrective movement” appearing in Islamic countries.” The “Zionist-Crusader alliance” refers to the partnership between Israel (the Zionist entity) and Western powers (the Crusaders) to control Muslim lands and ideology, especially in the Middle East. Bin Laden responded to Al Qaeda’s failures and a growing alliance between Israel and Western powers, by proclaiming “different means and methods” must be utilized to institute Salafi Islamic doctrine.

After Al Qaeda’s ineffectiveness in mobilizing its aims, Bin Laden developed a parallel between the United States and the Mongol invasion of Islamic lands in the 1300s to justify and promote a new strategy for furthering Salafi jihadism. In particular, Al Qaeda referenced Ibn Taymyr, an Islamic legal philosopher, during the Mongol invasion. Taymyr produced a renowned fatwah calling upon Muslims to unite despite their differences to repel the threat of the Mongols. J.M. Porter claims bin Laden regularly quoted Tamiya, who argued that “when Muslims face a serious threat, they must ignore minor differences and collaborate to get the enemy out of the [Islam].” Rather than attacking other Islamic sects, bin Laden began to unite Muslims by engaging in violent rhetoric toward the United States. He embraced the classic idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

In a 1998 Fatwa, bin Laden united Muslims under a common struggle, stating that for over seven years, the United States had been “occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.” In his Letter to America, he further cited the morality of his stance against the United States to encourage participation in Al Qaeda’s movement: “We do not fight for mere killing but to stop the killing of our people. It is a sin to kill a person without proper, justifiable cause, but terminating his killer is a right.” Leveraging a common struggle against the United States, bin Laden claimed it is an “individual duty for every Muslim” to “kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military.”

Although Al Qaeda and bin Laden incited Islamic unification in their rhetoric against the United States, their main objective remained to promote Salafi jihadism. Doran argues that “war [against the United States] was not a goal in of itself but rather an instrument designed to help its brand of extremist Islam survive and flourish among believers.” While the group did hold hatred against the United States, as many Americans thought, it ultimately longed to create the conditions for the founding of an Islamic Caliphate with Sharia Law. An Islamic Caliphate is an “Islamic form of government in which political and religious leadership is united, and the head of state (the caliph) is a successor to the Prophet Muhammad.” As bin Laden frequently emphasized before the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda aspired to overthrow regimes and leaders incorrectly practicing Islam, specifically in Saudi Arabia, and to return Islam to its original teachings as outlined by the prophet Muhammad.

Power Conversion: Nye’s Framework

Power is a highly contested concept in the realm of International Relations because it encompasses varying definitions and interpretations. For instance, some scholars define the term as “the ability to make or resist change,” whereas others claim it is “the ability to get what we want.” Within the array of interpretations, Joseph Nye provides a power framework that offers scholars a foundational resource for examining the complexities of power dynamics in international relations. Beyond distinguishing between types of power, Nye’s framework also provides a power conversion model that assists scholars in analyzing how actors attempt to convert their resources to desired outcomes. Nye’s framework helps explicitly delineate why Al Qaeda committed the attacks against the United States on 9/11.

The scholar defines power as “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers.” He argues there are three faces of power. In the first face of power, known as “hard power,” Nye suggests actors focus on “the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies.” He contends that Actor A uses coercion through threats or rewards to change Actor B’s behavior. Coercion, in this face, serves as a tool to “deter” an actor from committing an action or to “compel” them to act in a specific manner. As for the second face of power, Nye contends it exists when Actor A “controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B’s choices of strategy.” In other words, Actor A ensures that the “less powerful are never invited to the table, or if they get there, the rules of the game have already been set.” Finally, in the third face power, which is often declared as “soft power,” Nye claims Actor A “helps create and shape B’s basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences.” Rather than coercing an actor like hard power, soft power affects others through co-optivar means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.

Along with distinguishing between types of power, Nye develops a power conversion model to analyze how an actor attempts to achieve its desired outcomes.

The model consists of an actor’s resources, power conversion logic, power conversion execution, and desired outcomes. Nye claims that an actor’s “power is conveyed through resources, whether tangible or intangible.” Hard power resources can include factors such as military force and economic strength, whereas soft power resources comprise intangibles such as ideas, values, culture, and legitimacy. Powerful actors often possess large populations, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. However, as Nye cites, actors are not always successful in employing their resources to reach their desired outcomes. For instance, despite the United States being far more powerful than the Vietcong in the 1970s, it was unable to achieve its goals in Vietnam. Nye argues that “power conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable.”

Power conversion strategies relate to how an actor intends to use its resources to obtain its objectives. This involves analyzing the actor’s usage of hard power tactics, soft power strategies, or a combination of the two. For example, an actor may employ a blend of military force, economic incentives, and diplomatic pressure to coerce or persuade other actors to comply

with its preferences. Nye contends that “converting resources into realized power” requires “well-designed strategies and skillful leadership,” which he describes as “smart power.” Nevertheless, plans are only as effective as the execution of such a strategy. Nye states that “strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudged.” For this reason, the scholar independently analyzes the execution of an actor’s strategy to determine why the actor may have failed or succeeded in achieving his desired outcomes.

Nye’s power conversion model provides an excellent framework to understand why Al Qaeda committed attacks against the United States on 9/11. By examining the terrorist organization’s resources, power conversion logic, execution strategies, and desired outcomes, this paper provides insights into the motivations and objectives behind Al Qaeda’s actions. Although Americans often contend Al Qaeda is an irrational actor who “hates progress, and freedom, and choice,” as President Bush stated, a deeper analysis through Nye’s framework reveals a rational and more strategic logic than many Americans realize.

Al Qaeda’s Power Conversion

As mentioned previously, the concept of power is about influencing others to achieve desired outcomes. In the early 2000s, Al Qaeda held the following desired outcome: establish an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law in the Middle East. To achieve this objective, Al Qaeda focused on mobilizing Muslims to practice Salafi Jihadism in the region. Although individuals often believe Al Qaeda’s goal was to commit retribution against the United States, the terrorist organization utilized the United States as a “means” to unite Muslim sects. Hence, as mentioned before, Al Qaeda ultimately was attempting to affect the behavior of Muslims in Arab Lands to establish an Islamic caliphate and abolish regimes not practicing Sharia Law.

Al Qaeda employed a combination of the first and third faces of power to achieve its objective: hard power and soft power. Al Qaeda implemented Nye’s idea of hard power by utilizing coercion in the form of corpulence. The act of compelling is, as Nye describes, forcing an actor to take a specific action or change its behavior. Al Qaeda leveraged its ability to ignite fear in the U.S. population to force American leaders to respond with an invasion of Islamic countries. In addition to its initial attack on September 11th, Al Qaeda continued to employ the first face of power by resisting the United States invasion and occupation of Afghanistan with guerrilla warfare and asymmetric tactics, including ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Al Qaeda utilized hard power to inflict pain on the United States and to raise the costs of military intervention in the Middle East. This form of power was employed to assist Al Qaeda in mobilizing the Muslim population.

As for Al Qaeda’s usage of soft power, the terrorist group attempted to win the hearts and minds of members of Islam in the Arab world. Daniel Byman argues that Al Qaeda desired to “create affiliates and forge alliances with existing groups” in order to expand its influence in the Middle East. Al Qaeda attempted to attract Muslims to its movement by demonstrating the terrorist group’s legitimacy and highlighting the United States’ brutality. By engaging in such an ambitious and elaborate attack on 9/11, Al Qaeda and bin Laden attempted to display their competency and commitment to implementing Sharia Law in the Middle East. The terrorist group also invoked soft power by strategically targeting symbolic American buildings, such as the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Al Qaeda believed that destroying symbols of American power would display American weakness and rally Muslims to fight against a major power, just as members of Islam did during the Mongol invasion in the 1300s. Furthermore, Al Qaeda attempted to employ soft power by displaying U.S. immorality in its invasion of Arab lands and the killing of civilians. Through these channels of soft power, the terrorist organization highlighted the benefits of joining its movement and the costs of inaction to co-opt members of Islam in the Middle East.

Beyond the faces of power, more specifically Al Qaeda’s strategic power logic can be broken down into two phases:

As mentioned before, the first step in Al Qaeda’s plan was to provoke the United States to invade Afghanistan. Americans at the time of the attack may have suggested Al Qaeda’s strategy was irrational, but 9/11 expert Lawrence Wright suggests the terrorist organization believed it could “replicate the experience of the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan and engaged in a very bloody and failed effort there, and then shortly after that it dissolved.” Upon an invasion of the United States, Al Qaeda sought to exploit the atrocities caused by American destruction. Michael Doran exemplifies this idea: the “script was obvious: America, cast as the villain, was supposed to use its military might like a cartoon character trying to kill a fly with a shotgun.”

While highlighting the costs of American intervention in the Middle East, the terrorist organization desired to expand the following of Salafi jihadism. Gabriel Weiman states that the 9/11 attacks gave Al Qaeda a platform to spread its message in Arab Lands. In agreement, Daniel Byman contends that Al Qaeda thrives by issuing a “swarm of propaganda to convince Muslims that jihad is their obligation and to convince jihadists to adopt Al Qaeda’s goals over their local ones.” Then, in Phase 2, Al Qaeda sought to mobilize its followers to support an Islamic Caliphate while opposing U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Weiman states that the 9/11 attacks gave Al Qaeda a platform to combine “multimedia propaganda and advanced communication technologies to create a very sophisticated form of psychological warfare.” Not only was the psychological warfare intended to impact Americans, but it was even more so meant to mobilize Muslims to take up arms against the United States.

Finally, with an expanded following, Al Qaeda sought to expel Western influence in the region and set the conditions for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law. Just as Afghanistan repelled a Soviet invasion in the 1980s, Al Qaeda believed Afghans could do this once again with the terrorist organization leading the movement. While opposing American intervention in the region, Al Qaeda aimed to consolidate its power and spread its extremist ideology to ultimately destabilize governments seen as partners of Western powers such as Saudi Arabia. In their strategic logic, Al Qaeda attempted to leverage conflict with the United States, exploit Muslim grievances, and spread their extremist ideology across Arab Lands.

To execute this plan, Al Qaeda employed a combination of hard power and soft power resources. In terms of the resources invoking hard power, Al Qaeda utilized its military power to provoke a U.S. response and resist its invasion. In particular, Al Qaeda hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and another in Pennsylvania. Additionally, as the invasion commenced, Al Qaeda actively engaged the United States, leveraging its members initially and garnering additional support from insurgents who joined their movement throughout the conflict. As for soft power resources, Al Qaeda leveraged the Salafi jihad ideology along with its perceived legitimacy and commitment to establishing an Islamic caliphate. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda often invoked religious texts to justify their actions and attract members of Islam to their movement. Additionally, the organization appealed to its past success as a resource to enhance its public perception among Muslims in the Arab World.

Outcome

In what today is known as the Global War on Trade (GWOT), the United States toppled the Taliban regime and decimated Al Qaeda in the state. In 2003, the United States pushed its invasion into Iraq and eventually displaced Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well. American forces remained in Afghanistan, conducting state-building efforts until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2020. As a consequence of the war in the Middle East, over 900,000 people lost their lives directly, with an additional 3.6 million fatalities indirectly attributed to the conflict.

Scholar David Baldwin suggests that “before criticizing foreign policy failures, one should ponder the meaning of success and failure.” In this context, Al Qaeda’s ultimate objective was to establish an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law. Therefore, their plan should be deemed successful if Al Qaeda completed this goal. Conversely, a failure would entail a scenario such as a decline in the practice of Sharia Law or a further divide in the Muslim population. However, it is difficult to fairly evaluate Al Qaeda’s attacks with such a distinct valuation. Hence, a success-to-failure continuum is necessary, like the one depicted in the figure below.

Evaluating Al Qaeda’s plan in hindsight, the terrorist organization did not succeed in achieving its desired outcomes. Al Qaeda’s aspiration to establish an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law remains unfulfilled in 2024. However, Al Qaeda’s execution should not be labeled as a complete failure because its actions did expand Salafi Jihadism and mobilize a large population of Muslims. Additionally, the United States was unable to successfully implement regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and eventually withdrew from the countries as Al Qaeda predicted.

Because this stark divide prevails, it is clear that Al Qaeda was unable to unite the Islamic World under Sharia Law with its Salafi Ideology. Some scholars even argue that the divide between sects of Islam has increased and become more contentious since Al Qaeda committed the attacks on 9/11. Muslims are increasingly opposing their counterpart sect and referring to violence against one another in some cases in the Arab World today. Mohammed Aly Sergie suggests that “Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and security.” In particular, Saudi Arabia (Sunni Majority) and Iran (Shia Majority) have deployed considerable resources in the Syrian Civil War, which scholars have called a “Sunni-Shia conflict.”

Along with its inability to unite sects of Islam, Al Qaeda failed to minimize Western influence and implement Sharia Law throughout the region. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests that U.S. foreign policy has grown to incorporate countering terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the region since 9/11. It also argues that the U.S. has expanded its reach by establishing “military bases in more than half a dozen countries, an offshore naval presence in the Gulf, and military assistance and arms sales to its partners, notably Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.” As for Sharia Law in the region, Kali Robinson argues it is not often interpreted literally or practiced fundamentally as Al Qaeda intends in the Middle East. She suggests that “European-style law also influences legal systems in Muslim countries, even in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which claim to only follow Islamic law.”

Although Al Qaeda failed in these regards, Al Qaeda seized upon the U.S. invasions as opportunities to expand its following and recruit new members. In 2007, Daniel Byman wrote that Al Qaeda, a branch of the original Al Qaeda in Iraq, found itself with “the best recruiting tool it could wish for.” He mentions that “with over 100,000 U.S. troops occupying the country for a long period of time, Iraq has become the focus of the media throughout the world and especially the Middle East.” A 2006 National Intelligence Estimate found that the conflict created a “cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” Furthermore, in a study conducted in 2006, Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank found that “the Iraq War generated a stunning sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks.”

Along with expanding its following, Al Qaeda played a crucial role in compelling the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq in defeat. After nearly 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the cost of the Global War on terror stands at $8 trillion and over 7,000 service members deaths for the United States, according to a report from the Costs of War project at Brown University. Scholar William Galston writes that the “United States is weaker, more divided, and less respected than it was two decades ago, and we have surrendered the unchallenged preeminence we then enjoyed.”

However, Al Qaeda’s inability to unite the Islamic World, implement Sharia Law, and expel Western influence in the region far outweighs the gains of its Salafi expansion. Because the Muslim world remained divided and the United States conducted state-building operations for nearly 20 years, Al Qaeda failed to set the conditions for establishing an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law in the Middle East.

The Challenge of Projecting Power: Al Qaeda’s Flaws

Joseph Nye highlights that actors often face challenges in converting their resources to desired outcomes. He argues that “strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudged.” In this case, Al Qaeda failed in three key regards:

Al Qaeda underestimated the United States’ commitment to a prolonged intervention in the Middle East. The terrorist organization believed that it could repel American forces as Afghans did to the Soviets in 1989. The Soviet Union remained in Afghanistan for nine years compared to the nineteen years the U.S. intervened in the state. The U.S. was also backed by a coalition that included the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, among others. This multinational support distinguished the American intervention from that of the Soviet Union.
Al Qaeda overestimated its own strength and ability to resist U.S. military power. Despite having an estimated 70,000 members in over 60 countries by 2001, as indicated by a study conducted by Johns Hopkins University, this figure pales in comparison to the Afghan resistance during the Soviet-Afghan War, which numbered around 200,000 insurgents. While Al Qaeda anticipated garnering support from fellow Muslims to bolster its ranks, it miscalculated the extent of its influence. Consequently, the United States swiftly invaded Afghanistan and established an interim government by early December 2001, a mere three months after the 9/11 attacks.
Al Qaeda failed to project a consistent message to Muslims in the region. Although the terrorist organization succeeded in expanding its following as American forces entered Iraq, its efforts were complicated by the diverse factions within the movement. The insurgency in Iraq encompassed a spectrum of groups with varying motivations and ideologies. As highlighted by Daniel Byman in 2007, Al Qaeda was “at the forefront of efforts to foment a sectarian war between Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni populations.” He noted that the “jihadists have attacked Shiite shrines, pilgrims, political leaders, and other civilian targets.” Al Qaeda deviated from its initial message of Islamic unity, opting instead for violence and division. This departure from their stated goals further obscured their message and undermined their credibility among potential supporters.

Conclusion

The concept of power focuses on an actor’s ability to achieve its desired outcomes. As noted by Nye, power is more than merely resources such as military force and economic strength. He argues that “power conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable.” Hence, it is critical that actors develop compelling power conversion logic to maximize their resources in pursuit of their objectives. Nye contends that power conversion strategies can employ hard power and soft power. Hard power utilizes coercion through threats or rewards to change an actor’s behavior, whereas soft power engages with co-optive means like framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attractions to obtain preferred outcomes.

Although Al Qaeda has frequently been portrayed as an irrational actor, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the terrorist organization operated with clear strategic intent. Contrary to popular belief that the terrorist organization sought only revenge for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Al Qaeda engaged in a movement to unite Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate with Sharia Law. To achieve this objective, the terrorist organization employed both hard power and soft power strategies to mobilize its movement. In terms of hard power, Al Qaeda coerced the United States by compelling it to respond to the terrorist organization’s attack on U.S. soil in 2001. As for soft power, the terrorist group attempted to win the hearts and minds of members of Islam in the Arab world by highlighting the costs of American intervention and the benefits of supporting its movement.

Evaluating Al Qaeda’s strategic power logic and execution in hindsight, it is clear that it failed to establish an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law in the Middle East. Al Qaeda’s plan effectively expanded its following as a result of the United States invading Afghanistan and Iraq, but it failed to unite the Islamic Sects of Sunni and Sharia Islam. Al Qaeda’s strategic logic failed in large part because it underestimated the United States’ commitment to a prolonged intervention and overestimated its own resilience against U.S. military might. Moreover, the organization’s execution faltered due to its inability to maintain a coherent and compelling message to Muslims across the region.

We must therefore never assume an actor is irrational, as many US leaders did after the 9/11 attacks. We must remember the importance of understanding adversaries’ strategic motivations and intentions, even in the face of incomprehensible actions. Moreover, we must value doing our best to think like the enemy. One practical approach to doing so is utilizing Nye’s strategic power logic. By evaluating an actor’s resources and potential courses of action to achieve its desired objectives, we can better anticipate and respond to security threats, ultimately contributing to more effective national security strategies and safeguarding the interests of the United States and its allies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Tags: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, GWOT, insurgency, terrorism

About The Author

Noah Jager
Noah Jager is a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army and a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is currently pursuing a Master of Arts in War Studies at King’s College London.

14. Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella

Excerpts:

If the United States expects its deterrence to continue to be effective, and the nuclear umbrella to continue functioning as designed, the proposed paradigm should be effectively incorporated in doctrine. The alternative has operated effectively to deter past conflicts, but there is little guarantee that future conflicts will resemble the past. Vital efforts must be made to ensure that American deterrence policy is continually adapted to the situation at hand. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that deterrence policy is as complete as possible. By neglecting half of the soft/hard power dichotomy, the US accepts a level of risk that may become intolerable in future conflicts. Prevention of this outcome should be nonnegotiable to policymakers.

The proposed rendering of deterrence is, however, just one method to conceptualize the place of military soft power in exerting deterrence on potential aggressors. Due to the significant lack of research on military soft power, there is yet much to unpack on the concept. Further exploration of this idea is unfortunately inappropriate for this forum, but the author hopes that this article will stimulate conversation and further the study of this concept as US military doctrine continues to evolve.

Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/27/soft-power-and-the-us-nuclear-umbrella/

by Daniel O'Connor

11.27.2024 at 06:01am

Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella

As China increases its nuclear capacity and Russia continues to maintain ambiguity in relation to the possible employment of their nuclear arsenal, it becomes difficult to view nuclear weapons as tools of diplomacy rather than those of war. Nuclear weapons can rightly be viewed as the hardest element of hard power for any nation, but holding this view to the exclusion of all others is shortsighted. For sure, nuclear threats can hold populations, infrastructure, and even entire governments at risk – a fact long recognized by nuclear theorists. Those same nuclear theorists, from Brodie to Kahn, have tended to think in primarily realist terms. This view is not necessarily false, but it is incomplete. The world today is intertwined by worldwide information and economic networks. This makes nuclear weapons far from simply a bilateral issue. They are rather a complex network of relationships, competing goals, and sought outcomes.

But while the preceding makes a strong case for the superiority of hard power, this view completely ignores the important role of soft power and the various benefits it bestows on a nation seeking to convince others to emulate their example. This article seeks to make the argument that while nuclear weapons are a frightening specter and certainly an instrument of hard power, the way they are used by the United States currently forms the foundation of a strong source of soft power that works in concert with other American soft power sources. This soft power is a powerful tool that aids in the attainment of US strategic goals; most notably, deterring adversaries from aggression. This article further takes aim at the current theoretical paradigm for deterrence and culminates by proposing a more complete method for considering deterrence.

To fully understand this article’s argument the ideas of soft power and deterrence must be firmly understood. A more detailed unpacking of the ideas as they will be applied is warranted. At its most basic, soft power encompasses all the intangibles that make a foreign audience want to get closer to the US. Outside of the West, recent efforts by some nations have yielded strong results, despite a rather different interpretation of what constitutes and builds soft power. The strongest examples come from America’s current great power competitors. Chinese soft power tends to emphasize the cultural and commercial appeal of China. However, Chinese soft power efforts have not seen results that were expected in some venues, with China even seeing decreases in evident soft power in some partner countries. Russia, for its part, has focused its soft appeal on a conservative interpretation of the world. Advocacy for the legitimization of these values has found fertile ground in some countries. However, its dismissal of other modes of interpretation has proved ineffective in a large part of the world. Western soft power, on the other hand, involves the fact that democratic beliefs make the US an attractive partner for those seeking to chart a similar course.

Despite the disparities in interpretations of soft power, certain universal soft power constants exist. The original and enduring definition of soft power was laid down by the famous political scientist Joseph Nye in the eponymous book Soft Power:

“The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture… it’s political values… and its foreign policy.”

The civilian implications of Nye’s interpretation of soft power were and are perfectly valid and applicable in a wide range of societies. It follows that traditionally soft power is associated with those aspects of a country that are farthest from the military realm. For America, this includes things like Hollywood movies, American clothing brands, popular music, and American advocacy for Western ideals. It is, however, the third aspect of Nye’s soft power equation – foreign policy – that this article primarily seeks to explore in more depth and utilize with application to the nuclear umbrella.

Nye’s exposition of soft power in the government arena is primarily focused on traditional American support for good governance, rule of law, and democratization. But Nye mostly neglects the closely related topic of soft power generated by the wise exercise of military power as a tool of foreign policy. This article terms this concept as “military soft power.” There is a litany of sources on this aspect of soft power, with many of the most important efforts coming from the security cooperation field. The most visible of these methods include military exchange programs, foreign military financing, and multinational training exercises. Though Nye mostly neglects the idea, he does note that “the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power.” All these tools of military policy are specifically aimed at the major goal of pursuing, “mutually beneficial objectives and/or interoperability with the US.” Variations of this terminology are found strewn about other strategic documents and high-level military commanders’ statements and priorities, usually preaching that American strategic goals can most efficiently be pursued through mutually beneficial outcomes. The variety of sources notwithstanding, it is sufficient to say that military soft power is a powerful force; one that wise practitioners of international relations seek to wield.

One of the key strategic goals of US nuclear policy is to deter strategic attacks by adversaries. The US, in its unravelling of what deterrence is, focuses on the “prevention of action” by an adversary through the “credible threat of unacceptable counteraction” by the United States. The realist will consider this credible threat in the arena of hard power: an overwhelming response utilizing the ample American nuclear arsenal. And certainly, the existence of overwhelming nuclear capability by the US is a credible deterrent. The US possesses a nuclear deterrent that significantly outpaces all but the most powerful global powers. But the very same threat of counteraction that makes deterrence work can rest in the guise of other areas, such as economic sanctions or actions short of open warfare. This threat can include a loss of prestige and a loss of partners and allies. At its extreme, this threat includes disparate groups banding together to jointly confront an aggressor.

Nuclear weapons pose the most powerful threat from a hard-power perspective. The massive level of death and destruction wrought by such weapons is a truly powerful deterrent. However, since the beginning of the nuclear era, many theories have been proposed for the proper place for nuclear weapons as a tool of security. That fact notwithstanding, there have been certain aspects of US nuclear policy that have long been ingrained in policy. One of these constants is the rejection of “preventative war” as a viable policy for the United States. The loss of a policy of massive retaliation gave way, “completely and inevitably to the policy and strategy of deterrence.” This seemed the best option to avoid the new reality of certain and symmetric exchanged total destruction. Current US methods to achieve deterrence and avoid massive, exchanged destruction include imposing costs on the adversary, denying the adversary benefits, and encouraging the adversary to choose restraint or alternative methods for engagement.

However, this deterrence, in its current practice goes beyond American territory. It is this “extended deterrence,” meant to “assure allies and partners,” that is the real notable piece of US nuclear policy. Extended deterrence and allied assurance work together to ensure a robust defense of the US and its allies, but only if allies have confidence that “the United States is willing and able to deter the range of strategic threats they face.” Put another way, allies must have faith that the US will accept grave consequences in the name of protecting them. A major issue with this concept arises when considering the possible actions of the US if nuclear escalation occurs. US allies naturally have doubts that the US would sacrifice a major American city to a nuclear strike in order to protect an allied city. This is a perfectly natural challenge to extended deterrence and is a constant with regard to the nuclear umbrella. However, as noted by the foreign policy expert Lawrence Freedman, allied assurance and a nuclear umbrella, even with a considerable dose of doubt mixed in, remains an extremely powerful tool of deterrence, even outside of the nuclear realm.

With a long-established goal of deterrence and the knowledge that the use of the nuclear umbrella is the US method of achieving extended deterrence, it remains to demonstrate how this policy builds military soft power over time. There are three main reasons that soft power is built through extended deterrence. First, the nuclear umbrella promotes and supports mutually beneficial outcomes for allies and partners. Second, continued restraint and nonuse of nuclear weapons is a clear display of Western democratic values. And third, through years of being steadfast and predictable the US builds increased trust with its allies and partners. When the results of these three efforts are brought together, the US realizes the benefits of a significant source of soft power, which creates a desire to emulate the American example and gives adversaries pause to reconsider their actions. This soft power, in concert with traditional hard power, presents a formidable challenge indeed.

Mutually Beneficial Outcomes

Extended deterrence represents the world’s most wide-ranging example of mutually beneficial outcomes; a goal that the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is clear about. By providing protection under the nuclear umbrella the US supports internal policy documents, like the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation to “strengthen the international order.” The nuclear umbrella precludes the need for allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons. This benefits the US in that the level of complexity and risk of accidental escalation is kept at a minimal level. Simply put, the fewer nations with nuclear weapons, the less likely that misunderstanding or violent desire will lead to nuclear use. The US also protects its nuclear advantage by preventing new nuclear powers from emerging. While this realist view may seem harsh, the intermingling of realist views with idealist beliefs has long been a key aspect of American strategic thinking. However, from an idealist view, the prevention of emerging nuclear powers is in line with American support of several international agreements, like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. These actions are also in line with the general ideals of arms control agreements like the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Thus, the United States derives a positive outcome from both a realist and idealist viewpoint, by pursuing mutually beneficial outcomes in its exercise of extended deterrence.

Partner nations, under the nuclear umbrella, receive a significant level of security in return for declining to develop their own nuclear weapons. The United States, through clear declarations, maintains a level or responsibility for its allies. This is most familiar in the guise of NATO’s Article Five, which claims that an attack on one NATO partner will be considered an attack on all NATO partners. However, similar protections and actions are laid out in Article Three of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea as well as the nearly identical Article Five of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America.

US partners not only receive the ultimate security that goes along with nuclear deterrence but also benefit by avoiding the massive financial outlays that would be required to develop a nuclear weapons program domestically, a burden that few economies in the world could handle. It is important to note, however, that nuclear weapons are considered by some nations to be “international normative symbols, which can be a powerful attraction.” This is true even of the closest US allies, as displayed by comments voiced by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Turkish President Recep Erdogan. It is even true of the one state to suffer from the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue in Japan has become increasingly controversial in recent years, due to a perceived need to join the nuclear club in order to avoid attacks on its territory. However, due to America’s constant partnership and a painful past with regard to nuclear weapons, there is no consensus on the issue. The main reason for Japan’s continued avoidance of nuclear weapons lies mainly in the credibility of US extended deterrence. Thus, despite the occasionally voiced consternation by protected allies that they lack their own domestic capability, extended deterrence and non-proliferation efforts have thus far been mostly successful in preventing the emergence of new nuclear-armed powers. It is therefore vital for the US to retain adequate, flexible, and resilient nuclear deterrence, because if allies and friends suddenly feel less secure, they may “reconsider their own need for nuclear weapons.” Consternation aside, to date the sovereignty of NATO, Japan, and South Korea all remain intact. The nuclear umbrella is a clear tradeoff that forms the basis of a balanced, mutually beneficial outcome. The US supports international agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while retaining its nuclear advantage. In return, partners get security and the reduced economic strain that goes along with a nuclear weapons program. This win-win situation forms a strong core of American military soft power with regard to extended deterrence.

Values Display

In his writing on soft power, Joseph Nye spends considerable time discussing the power of the overtly displayed values of a country. However, for Nye’s purposes, these values tend to rest in areas like good governance, rule of law, and democratization. In the end, nuclear deterrence “…is not strictly about making threats – it is also about offering assurances.” When this is applied to the United States’ consistent nonuse of nuclear weapons and assurance of responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons, the US taps into a strong source of soft power. By its careful and ardent adherence to policy, the US displays its values and can be seen as a steadfast nuclear power in the middle of a world where consistency is severally lacking in many areas.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a clear example of the opposite. Putin has made a habit of playing fast and loose with threatening nuclear use, especially since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence makes clear that the use of nuclear weapons is only acceptable when “the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” On its face, this is not particularly different than American nuclear policy, which retains a certain level of nuclear ambiguity by eschewing a no-first-use policy. Where this becomes problematic is in Putin’s frequent statements that the risk of nuclear use is increasing. Putin’s irresponsible attitude towards nuclear weapons poses a risk to any potential Russian enemy and leaves experts to puzzle over Russia’s intent. Nuclear deterrence is after all, only feasible if the United States and their allies understand the Russian strategy on a rather deep level.

One such puzzling policy is what some analysts call the Russian Federation’s policy of “escalate to de-escalate.” This policy espouses a belief that by a tailored, preemptive strike on an enemy, Russia can bring its adversary to the negotiating table and preclude further nuclear use. While the Western interpretation of this policy is debated, the basic idea is simple: the tailored use of violence can prevent more violence. The belief in deterring conflict by igniting conflict is one that is at once intentionally ambiguous and extremely dangerous. It does, however, indicate that Russia perceives the rightful place of soft and hard power to be nearly diametrically opposed to the West, and shows a fundamental disregard for Western values.

While Russia waffles in its adherence to policy and its own stated values, the United States continues to pursue values that are consistent with its actions. In 2009, then-President Obama made his famous Prague speech, where he advocated for a world without nuclear weapons. He tempered this idealism with a dose of realism in acknowledging that this goal was not likely in his lifetime. Obama was not the first to pursue this goal. President Raegan, in his meeting with Gorbachev at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, nearly accomplished this very goal by dealing with a likeminded Russian personality and holding to the dream of making nuclear weapons obsolete. While many have dismissed Raegan’s goals in subsequent years, those actions – the direct application of American values – can be directly connected with the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The main point of the proceeding examples is a focus on the constant efforts to live up to and espouse American values.

The early nuclear theorist Bernard Brodie noted that total nuclear disarmament may not be a reasonable objective due to the enormous risk involved. Stopping violators of disarmament would be almost impossible, and the risks to non-violators would be immense. It is just those quizzical actions and words by Russia in recent days that make total disarmament appear as a foolish course of action. However, at its most basic, the nuclear umbrella is in itself a powerful display of constant American application of its values. It is this steadfast nonuse of the ultimate weapon that continues to add to the reservoir of American military soft power. This is brought into particularly clear focus when one considers the current state of affairs. Russia has recently ceased its participation in the final piece of nuclear arms control with the US – the New Strategic Arms Control Treaty (New START). China continues to build up its nuclear arsenal at an alarming rate. All the while, the US is making overtures to the Chinese on new arms control and attempting through diplomatic channels to coax Russia to return to existing arms control regimes.

Trust Building

The long-lasting nature of nuclear deterrence relationships and their relative stability over three quarters of a century is another powerful source of soft power. When the strategic goals of the United States – specifically, aggression deterrence – align with strategic goals of partners and allies, the source of soft power finds a foundation. But when these same goals align for decades, this source is strengthened and built upon. It becomes about more than just common defense. It then becomes about forging common identities and extending trust. The alignment under international norms, multilateral agreements, and formal treaties only further strengthens the bond of commitment. This builds even more soft power, not only between allies, but internationally. Mark Suchman notes that this repeated compliance with international expectations of behavior is a strong source of building trust. Unaligned nations and neutral parties see the strong relationship between allies like the NATO partners and naturally feel attracted to this stability. This trust is what separates the United States in its exercise of policy from competitors, partners, and unaligned nations. But often the validity of this aspect of international relations goes unrecognized.

It is impossible to prove a negative. So, the consistent nonuse of nuclear weapons by the United States cannot necessarily be claimed to be the driving factor in US competitors absconding. This is further complicated by the doubts raised by some on whether the United States is willing to sacrifice its own population to protect foreign capitals. Former British Defense Minister Denis Healey famously noted that it only takes “a 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter an attack, but it takes a 95 percent credibility to reassure the allies.” But, doubt or not, it makes sense that a weaker nation would want to join a “balancing alliance with a nuclear power… as a means of extended deterrence.” Alliances are, after all, generally preventative in nature, and prevention of conflict and mutual support inherently reside in the realm of soft power. With proving a negative quite impossible, anecdotal evidence must be used to show the power of extended deterrence in an effort to ensure allied assurance.

A powerful example rests in the Iraqi experience during the Gulf War. Many reasons for Saddam Hussein’s nonuse of chemical weapons have been cited. However, the fear of a nuclear response for chemical escalation is a particularly powerful possibility. It very well may be that the existence of the American nuclear deterrent changed Hussein’s mental calculus to a degree where he decided not to escalate the conflict. In other words, it can be claimed that nuclear deterrence operated as designed and prevented an escalation of aggression on the part of Iraq. Even if the nuclear deterrent was only a proximal cause of Husseins decision against chemical weapon use, the effect on US partners was a view that American nuclear capability and extended deterrence saved lives and prevented a potential escalation of conflict. Such examples of deterrence work continue to build trust and military soft power between the US and its allies.

Recent years have seen a return of great power competition, prioritizing hard power over soft power. Treating nuclear weapons exclusively in this way is shortsighted. Nuclear weapons are anything but a traditional weapon and need to be treated in a way that recognizes this fact. President Truman was on to something in this vein when he noted, “[y]ou have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So, we have got to treat this thing differently from rifles and cannons and ordinary things like that.” Treating nuclear weapons differently begins with an adjustment to how we consider their effects. Nuclear power can be a foundation for soft power, which works well in conjunction with traditional hard power. They all work towards deterrence.

With an increase in military soft power and substantial hard power to back it up, both the US and its allies effectively deter foreign aggression. This military soft power is primarily built through the exercise of mutually beneficial outcomes, overt and consistent display of American values, and long-term building of trust between allies. This cumulative soft power has the effect of reassuring allies of their security. This also has the second-order effect of dissuading third parties from aligning themselves with American adversaries. A strong soft power deterrent may well shift the mental calculus of potential adversaries, which can actively dissuade them from attempting aggression against those who are under the protection of US extended deterrence. The addition of a strong alliance of many nations further presents adversaries with an insurmountable risk of using aggression. All three of these fortunate outcomes are in line with American deterrence policy. In this age of renewed great power competition, new threats, and potential adversaries, US nuclear policy brings together the US and its allies in closer cooperation to jointly confront the threat. It is essential that the most complete picture of deterrence is gathered, so all possible resources of deterrence are leveraged. It would be a shame indeed to fall into the trap noted by Herman Kahn 60 years ago and simply be a Western government, engaging in “wishful thinking.” That is exactly why the recognition of military soft power’s place in nuclear policy is so valuable and important.

Postscript: A More Complete Rendering of Deterrence

It has been pointed out that the traditional American method of considering strategy as the sum of ends, ways, and means has shortcomings. The ends, ways, and means paradigm may be somewhat simplistic and miss important nuance. That truth notwithstanding, the paradigm’s inherent simplicity allows it to convey complicated ideas with relative ease. As such, this article utilizes this method to suggest a more complete rendering of American deterrence policy that takes military soft power into account. The US Department of Defense’s Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence contains several graphics that show how deterrence functions, including this article’s use of selected graphics (see figure 2). However, the joint operating concept model completely ignores the presence of military soft power, which this article has shown functions in conjunction with hard power. Thus, it is imperative for American doctrine to incorporate this concept. Figure 3 shows how hard and soft power inputs (i.e., the means) combine with deterrence methods (i.e., the ways), and the preferred outcomes of deterrence (i.e., the ends). The figure below clearly shows the place for military soft power and its indispensable nature in contributing to a complete method of deterrence.[1]

[1] Graphic created by the author. Clipart is used with permission of the Defense Security Cooperation University.

If the United States expects its deterrence to continue to be effective, and the nuclear umbrella to continue functioning as designed, the proposed paradigm should be effectively incorporated in doctrine. The alternative has operated effectively to deter past conflicts, but there is little guarantee that future conflicts will resemble the past. Vital efforts must be made to ensure that American deterrence policy is continually adapted to the situation at hand. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that deterrence policy is as complete as possible. By neglecting half of the soft/hard power dichotomy, the US accepts a level of risk that may become intolerable in future conflicts. Prevention of this outcome should be nonnegotiable to policymakers.

The proposed rendering of deterrence is, however, just one method to conceptualize the place of military soft power in exerting deterrence on potential aggressors. Due to the significant lack of research on military soft power, there is yet much to unpack on the concept. Further exploration of this idea is unfortunately inappropriate for this forum, but the author hopes that this article will stimulate conversation and further the study of this concept as US military doctrine continues to evolve.

Tags: Deterrence, nuclear umbrella, soft power

About The Author

Daniel O'Connor
LTC Daniel J. O’Connor, U.S. Army, is a foreign area officer currently serving as the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Belgrade, Serbia. He previously served as a nuclear weapons inspector under the New START Treaty. O’Connor holds a BA in classics and ancient Mediterranean studies from the University of Connecticut, an MBA from the College of William and Mary, and an MA in Eurasian, Russian, and East European studies from Georgetown University. He has served in the Army as a logistics officer and has deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

15. Aren’t they there yet? corruption, end of November edition (China)

Wise words.

Excerpts:

What is Xi actually doing about corruption for the future? Does he genuinely think he can impose accountability without transparency? Is this part of his apparent determination to remain in power?

Perhaps this is all a trick to allow us to relax under the premise that the PLA and China have corruption problems, undermining their operational capability That seems far-fetched but again, the lack of accountability and public understanding makes everything speculative from our perspective.

Or, is Xi simply gearing up as he claims to assure he roots out the problem he thus far failed to solve? That would be a possibility as well. But a system where image and projection of strength against any views to the contrary are so important strikes me as unlikely to allow questions about Xi’s judgement. If Xi can’t stand people calling him Winnie the Pooh with his gut, would he really tolerate reporting on this bad judgement about leaders defying his signature crusade?

And there are other ideas you may well have as to what we are witnessing. Will any of these explanations matter for PLA effectiveness or CCP aspirations?

My husband and I were discussed the topic as I put the finishing touches on this piece. He offered the most salient point of all: we need focus on what is best for our national interests rather than fixating on what is going on in the Middle Kingdom. Wise words so often ignored in practice.

Aren’t they there yet?

corruption, end of November edition

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/arent-they-there-yet?utm

Cynthia Watson

Nov 29, 2024

Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party twelve years ago this month. Known for his Belt and Road Initiative expanding China’s engagements across the globe, his signature emphasis within the Middle Kingdom has been actually anti-corruption.

Upon assuming his position, Xi recognized what countless cynical citizens understood about their nation: corruption was endemic. In this case, corruption doesn’t just mean storing gold bars in the freezer as a U.S. politician did about a generation ago. In China corruption is manipulating the relationships—guanxi—at the heart of society for personal gain. Foreign analysts commonly opine that what Americans—a rather puritanical crowd in thought, if not deed—see as corruption is simply how relationships unfold in China. Perhaps but evidence is that the average Wen or Lu on the street of any city still understand fully that mounting disparities in a society under CCP rule for three quarters of century mean generalized doubt, regardless of the improved standard of living.

Xi launched an anti-corruption program of immense proportions to include appearances of exaggerated wealth. The initial years of his rule saw strict limits, actually quotas, on how often Chinese officials could travel abroad. State banquets became far less lavish to show the public that the Party officials (remember the Party itself is fewer than a hundred million members out of a population of 1.4 billion) were not squandering resources. People were to be accountable in every sense as Xi promoted a view of probity.

The leadership of the Party and of the People’s Liberation Army received special scrutiny—and often lost their lofty positions. The inquiries unmasked those who had become fabulously wealthy in conjunction with the overall improvement in China’s economy. Officials declared so many guilty following secretive inspections by special party units acting under the Party’s veil of secrecy. These opaque moves culminated either had public trials for embarrassment or simple disappearances, assumably into prisons. The accountability in this case was within the Party on behalf of the society—at least in principle.

The Party discipliners removed hundreds from their posts, although a recent South China Morning Post story suggests, unsurprisingly, that the reasons may be less straightforward than simply corruption. The danger of this process introducing personal competition, retribution for past decisions, and other circumstances has always been real. In a system without transparency or independent accountability, the legitimacy of rules applying equally to all is dubious.

People’s Liberation Army flag and general officers were major targets for corruption—and for exemplifying them as failed leaders. Dozens of officers, many at the apex of the PLA, fell because of this scrutiny. if nothing else, Xi clearly intended to empower those he trusted to carry out his vision for a more powerful, agile Chinese armed force. His anti-corruption campaign, in conjunction with the 2015 organizational reforms, would create a world class institution replete with Chinese characteristics.

Yet earlier this week, the third Defense Minister in a row came under investigation for “serious discipline violations”, the common verbiage for corruption. Let me repeat that: the third one running. The Defense Minister is more of a political slot than an operational commander but it’s still a high viz position within a Party sensitive to image. Many analysts see this as an escalation in Xi’s determination to root out the problem. Perhaps but it also raises other questions about the jockeying for positions within PLA and China.

Xi has now been General Secretary, often described as the most powerful individual in that position since Mao Zedong, for more than a decade. One would expect that his choices by this point, almost a full generation of leaders, would reflect his vision (and their reliance on him)for the country. If eradicating corruption in the People’s Republic is his keen determination, several questions arise for me.

Have we misjudged the completeness of his power? The General Secretary is the top position within the CCP but it’s also a highly compartmentalized organization. Did he lack power over some of these people? Are those under him in the Party thwarting his goals? Not the way we generally look at China from abroad but a definite possibility.

Does he really care about corruption or is this a façade for putting his preferred network in place as he ages? The problem with this one is that the bloke under investigation this week, Admiral Miao Hua, was his preferred guy. This is not a system where someone reaches the pinnacle of power because the supreme leader doled out responsibility to underlinings to facilitate his time looking at something else. The Chinese system, Leninist in nature, is an exceptionally tightly controlled, hierarchical political mechanism. The PLA is an arm of the Party, not a state military. Xi farming out the responsibility ofchoosing leaders? I strong doubt it.

An alternate explanation is that Xi perhaps isn’t really as interested in corruption as he is assuring loyalty from those he empowers below him. Yet the longer leaders remain in power can allow them to become isolated, listening to an ever decreasing circle of voices, many of whom have their own axes to grind. Could that have happened here? We certainly have indications Xi’s buddy Vlad the Impaler is pretty isolated within the Kremlin walls but perhaps that speculation is fanciful regarding Xi. In non-transparent systems, we simply do not know. It’s possible Miao originally got the nod as Defense Secretary because someone other than Xi argued for him but this against seems unlikely to match what we know—or think we know.

Or is it simply that the amount of money sloshing around under the CCP and PLA is so vast that the temptation is too high? Could it be that a decade ago Miao or his two predecessors were not corruption but became lured into the sense of entitlement so common at higher levels? Did they think no one would catch them? Clearly corruption is indeed part of China’s culture in senior levels.

What is Xi actually doing about corruption for the future? Does he genuinely think he can impose accountability without transparency? Is this part of his apparent determination to remain in power?

Perhaps this is all a trick to allow us to relax under the premise that the PLA and China have corruption problems, undermining their operational capability That seems far-fetched but again, the lack of accountability and public understanding makes everything speculative from our perspective.

Or, is Xi simply gearing up as he claims to assure he roots out the problem he thus far failed to solve? That would be a possibility as well. But a system where image and projection of strength against any views to the contrary are so important strikes me as unlikely to allow questions about Xi’s judgement. If Xi can’t stand people calling him Winnie the Pooh with his gut, would he really tolerate reporting on this bad judgement about leaders defying his signature crusade?

And there are other ideas you may well have as to what we are witnessing. Will any of these explanations matter for PLA effectiveness or CCP aspirations?

My husband and I were discussed the topic as I put the finishing touches on this piece. He offered the most salient point of all: we need focus on what is best for our national interests rather than fixating on what is going on in the Middle Kingdom. Wise words so often ignored in practice.

What are your thoughts on this? What additional or alternate explanations are relevant or plausible? One doesn’t have to have any exposure to China to develop hypotheses for us to test so chime in, please.

Thank you for reading Actions today or any other day. I neglected to remind you yesterday how much I appreciate each and every one of you: thank you for being part of this dialogue. I especially thank the subscribers who support this column.

I hope you had a satisfying day of thanks yesterday. Be well and be safe. FIN

Chun Hang Wong, “China Targets Senior Admiral in New Round of Defense Purges”, WallStreetJournal.org, 28 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-targets-senior-admiral-in-new-round-of-defense-purges-9f6d3c9e?mod=china_news_article_pos3

Xinlu Liang, “China confronts false accusations that plague Communist Party’s anti-corruption crusade”, SouthChinaMorningPost.com, 23 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3287787/china-confronts-false-accusations-plague-communist-partys-anti-corruption-crusade?module=latest&pgtype=homepage

16. Poland readies $740 million fund to jump-start ammunition production

Poland readies $740 million fund to jump-start ammunition production

Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · November 29, 2024

WARSAW, Poland — Polish lawmakers have voted to allocate some 3 billion złoty ($740 million) for investments in ramping up the country’s ammunition production capacities, with a particular focus on much-needed 155mm artillery shells.

The decision to approve the bill was made by the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish parliament, on Nov. 27 by a majority of 424 votes, with no lawmakers voting against the measure. Following this, the legislation needs to be approved by the senate, the upper chamber, and signed by the president to enter into force.

The allocated funds “will be used to capitalize companies responsible for producing ammunition, in particular artillery ammunition of caliber 155mm,” Polish Deputy State Assets Minister Marcin Kulasek said in a social media post.

The funds will be made available for investments by companies that seek the state’s backing for their projects to ramp up ammunition manufacturing capabilities. The program will be financed by the Ministry of National Defence and government securities.

The latest development comes as Warsaw is exploring various means of drastically increasing industry capacity for making artillery shells. As the predominantly state-owned sector relies on imported components to manufacture 155mm ammunition, officials are looking at ways to secure the necessary manufacturing technology from foreign partners.

Polish Deputy Prime Minister and National Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz recently stated that Poland aims to cooperate with Slovakia to secure the necessary technology that will allow the country to boost production. Kosiniak-Kamysz declared willingness to bolster Warsaw’s partnership with Bratislava during the minister’s Nov. 22 meeting with his Slovak counterpart, Robert Kaliňák.

“I’m greatly impressed by Slovakia’s production capacities in the field of ammunition, in particular the 155mm one, but also other types,” Kosiniak-Kamysz told his counterpart. “We want to develop our defense industry together with you.”

The Polish military requires increasing 155mm ammunition deliveries for its growing fleet of K9 Thunder and Krab self-propelled howitzers, manufactured by South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace and Poland’s state-run defense group PGZ, respectively.

About Jaroslaw Adamowski

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

17. Key Western Counterterrorism Ally in Africa Cuts Military Ties With France

Key Western Counterterrorism Ally in Africa Cuts Military Ties With France

Chad’s surprise announcement will likely result in exit of some 1,000 French troops

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/key-western-counterterrorism-ally-in-africa-cuts-military-ties-with-france-0677448d?mod=hp_listb_pos2

By Gabriele Steinhauser

and Benoit Faucon

Nov. 29, 2024 9:20 am ET

Chad’s President Mahamat Déby, in white, met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris in October. Photo: ludovic marin/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Chad, a longtime Western counterterrorism ally in central Africa, said it is ending military ties with France, the latest country in the troubled Sahel region to break with its former colonial power amid rising anti-French sentiment.

The surprise announcement came in the final hours of Chad’s Republic Day celebrations on Thursday, and just a day after France’s foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, met his Chadian counterpart in the capital N’Djamena. It will likely result in the exit of some 1,000 French troops currently stationed in the country, who have been supporting the Chadian military with training, logistics, aerial surveillance and intelligence in its fight against jihadists and various rebel groups.

“This decision, which followed an in-depth analysis, marks a historic turning point,” Chad’s foreign minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, said in a statement posted on his ministry’s Facebook account just after 11 p.m. local time Thursday. “Indeed, 66 years after the proclamation of the Republic of Chad, it is time for Chad to affirm its total and complete sovereignty and redefine its strategic partnerships in line with national priorities.”

France’s foreign ministry didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Chad, like other former French colonies in the region, has seen protests against France’s continued presence. In May, hundreds of demonstrators marched through N’Djamena and other towns, accusing Paris of supporting the regime of President Mahamat Déby. Protesters vandalized gas stations operated by TotalEnergies, a French energy company, and burned French flags before being dispersed by Chadian police.

French President Emmanuel Macron earlier this year announced an overhaul of France’s military posture in Africa. That plan foresaw a drawdown of troops in Senegal, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Chad and the possible transfer of some military bases to local authorities, according to French defense officials.

But France aimed to maintain a lower-profile military presence across the region, including its base near N’Djamena to keep direct access to the airport, the officials said.

Over the past two years, military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have kicked out French troops and instead forged alliances with Moscow, including by hiring Russian mercenaries to train or, in the case of Mali, support their own soldiers in combat.

Chadian troops have been more successful than other countries in the Sahel—the semiarid region south of the Sahara—at keeping at bay a sprawling jihadist insurgency. But in recent weeks they have suffered several deadly attacks by suspected fighters from Boko Haram, an Islamist group.

France has reduced its troop numbers in West Africa but had aimed to maintain a low-profile presence in Chad. Photo: aurelie bazzara-kibangula/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Déby came to power in April 2021, after his father, Idriss Déby Itno who had ruled the country with an iron fist for 30 years, was killed in a battle with a rebel group. The transition violated the line of succession laid out in the Chadian constitution and the regime was criticized by international rights groups for the violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in October 2022.

Still, both France and the U.S. had been treading carefully in their relations with Chad, hoping to stop Déby from also moving closer into Russia’s orbit. In recent months, the Pentagon’s Africa Command had been in talks with Chadian officials over the return of a small contingent of American troops who had been ordered out of the country by a Chadian air-force general earlier this year.

Before the rupture in U.S.-Chadian military relations earlier this year, Chad’s 11,000-man counterterrorism force trained with U.S. Green Berets and, previously, received American pickup trucks and body armor.

A senior Chadian military officer said Friday that he was still hoping for U.S. support on training and logistics. “However, it is up to the diplomats of the two countries to determine to what extent to put in place this cooperation to help us confront terrorists,” he said.

Talks are still under way over the possible return of U.S. Special Forces, “which could take place in the near future,” said a second Chadian officer.

Chad has been sending mixed messages about its relationship with Russia. Déby met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in January and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited N’Djamena in June. However, Chadian authorities in September detained Maxim Shugaley, a Russian political operator with ties to the Wagner Group, and expelled him from the country earlier this month, according to Russian state media.

Déby has also forged a close relationship with the United Arab Emirates, and allowed the Gulf monarchy to ship military supplies to the paramilitary-turned-rebel Rapid Support Forces in Sudan via Chadian territory, The Wall Street Journal has previously reported.

Chadian officials told their French counterparts Friday that they had been surprised by the foreign minister’s announcement, a European official said. France over the years had used its forces to support the regime of Déby Itno, including helping Chadian troops expel rebels who had entered N’Djamena in 2008. In 2019, French jet fighters bombed a heavily armed column of rebels who had entered northern Chad from Libya.

Remadji Hoinathy, a N’Djamena-based analyst with the Institute for Security Studies, said Déby’s government might have decided that a reduced French presence in Chad no longer fitted its needs and used the surprise rupture to gain public support.

“Chad may have accelerated this process [of ending military ties], using this very symbolic date of Nov. 28, to break the agreement and present it to the Chadian public as an act of sovereignty that we know will be very popular at this moment with young people in francophone Africa,” he said.

Michael M. Phillips and Noemie Bisserbe contributed to this article.

Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

18. Opinion: Russia Is at War With the West – What Needs to Be Done

Opinion: Russia Is at War With the West – What Needs to Be Done

kyivpost.com · by Jason Jay Smart · November 29, 2024

Russia War in Ukraine Top News

Russia’s war on Ukraine is in reality a war against the West by other means that needs to be ended by resolution and firmness.

By Jason Jay Smart

November 29, 2024, 4:57 pm

A photograph shows The Kremlin’s Spasskaya tower and St. Basil’s cathedral in downtown Moscow, on July 13, 2023. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP)

In recent years, there has been a recurring narrative in the West about the potential for a “war breaking out” with Russia that indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of Moscow’s strategy. While Russia undeniably seeks to weaken the Western order, it is keenly aware that it cannot win a conventional war against the United States and its allies. Instead, Russia has waged what it considers to be World War IV – a war fought on terrain that allows it to benefit from its strengths without entering a conventional war with NATO.

As chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov has argued, Moscow does not view itself to be at war with Ukraine, a country that Moscow considers to be merely a puppet of America, rather Putin believes that he is waging war against the puppet’s master – NATO – whom it blames for having lost World War III, the Cold War.

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Recognizing that it cannot compete with the US military-industrial complex in conventional arms, Russia has adapted: Instead of trying to out-produce America in weapons systems, it has shifted its focus to sowing global chaos – an arena where tanks and artillery cannot provide a defense.

Openly allied with Iran, North Korea, and China, Moscow is focused on new forms of conflict: Hacking not for espionage alone, but to inflict damage as was recently seen in the attack on the Texas water treatment facilities; Creating regime change by training guerillas in Moscow who then return home to topple the Western-leaning governments there, as was seen in the overthrow of Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, or to prop-up authoritarian allies, as occurred in Venezuela; Seeking to divide Americans from within by using psychological operations aimed at inciting post-election violence – thus allowing Russia to divide and conquer.

Russia Waging ‘Reckless’ Sabotage Campaign in Europe: UK Spy Chief

Richard Moore, the head of the UK’s MI6, warned that Russia’s sabotage campaign was “dangerous and beyond irresponsible.”

In the grand scheme of this new world war, Putin sees any need for conventional conflict as a failure. Lacking the advanced military technology of the West, Moscow relies on attrition, the classic Russian tactic of overwhelming an opponent with vast numbers of soldiers, should a traditional war break out.

The ongoing invasion of Ukraine, initially planned as a ten day show of force, has now dragged on for nearly three years – an unwelcome quagmire that has left Moscow scrambling to rely on outdated military hardware from the Second World War to counter modern American and European military systems. Yet, despite these shortcomings, Russia’s “meat assaults” continue to prove effective.

As Russia wages this unconventional war, it skillfully avoids triggering NATO’s collective defense mechanism, Article 5. Its actions – ranging from assassinations to espionage to arson and sabotage – have taken place across Europe and the United States, frequently below the threshold of a direct military confrontation. This gives Moscow the confidence to continue its attacks without fear of reprisal. For now, Putin likely feels secure in his regime’s stability, interpreting the Biden Administration’s fears about “escalation“ as a signal that America will not respond forcefully to his provocations.

The West, and particularly the United States, must maintain a formidable military presence to project power and safeguard global security. But if the US continues to fail in confronting Putin’s strategic maneuvering, Russia will only expand its influence, which now extends far beyond Ukraine.

The Biden legacy will be defined by indecision and a failure to counter Moscow’s growing global footprint. But the next occupant of the White House will have an opportunity to reset America’s role as the global hegemon – one capable of not only putting adversaries in their place but also willing to do so.

In the coming months, Putin will undoubtedly test the resolve of Washington’s decision-makers. It is time for the United States to send a clear message to Moscow: there is a new sheriff in town, and any further provocation will be met with swift and unforgiving consequences. The stakes have never been higher.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

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Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at www.JasonJaySmart.com / www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart

kyivpost.com · by Jason Jay Smart · November 29, 2024

19. China announces top military official is under investigation

I think Dennis Wilder's tweet about this is very instructive and informative.

Dennis Wilder偉德寧

@dennisw5

https://x.com/dennisw5/status/1862120628544843902

What is extraordinary about this is that Miao Hua was handpicked by Xi a decade ago to be a PLA leader. He helicoptered him to the top having known him ever since Fujian Province days. To publicly humiliate the man, rather than retire him quietly, shows Xi must be extremely angry with the PLA.

China’s senior PLA ideology official Miao Hua under corruption investigation https://sc.mp/waf3t?utm_sour ce=twitter&utm_campaign=3288499&utm_medium=share_widget … via @scmpnews

China announces top military official is under investigation

The suspension of Miao Hua, one of China's highest-ranking military officials, marks an escalation in leader Xi Jinping's campaign to tackle corruption.

3 min

Miao Hua, head of the powerful political work department of China's Central Military Commission since 2017, arrives in North Korea in 2019. (Cha Song Ho/AP)

By Christian Shepherd and Katrina Northrop

Updated November 28, 2024 at 6:01 a.m. EST|Published November 28, 2024 at 3:40 a.m. EST

One of China’s highest-ranking military officials is under investigation for “serious discipline violations,” Beijing announced Thursday, using a common euphemism for corruption.

The announcement marks a notable escalation in Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s campaign to tackle the long-standing graft that has reached the top rungs of the Chinese army.

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The Chinese Communist Party decided to suspend Admiral Miao Hua — who has headed the powerful political work department of its Central Military Commission since 2017 — pending an investigation, Wu Qian, a Defense Ministry spokesman, said at a news briefing Thursday.

Xi has promised to stamp out bribery and disloyalty among the military’s top brass, warning of a “seriously polluted political environment” that has damaged its image.

A clear-out has been going on for more than a year and has netted dozens of generals and other high-ranking officials, including the last two defense ministers — Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe — who were expelled from the Communist Party in June.

Many of those who have disappeared or been dismissed were connected to procurement of weapons or to the Rocket Force, which oversees China’s expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

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Following

Miao’s downfall indicates that Xi is far from finished with his efforts to bring the People’s Liberation Army in line.

Daniel Mattingly, associate professor of political science at Yale University, described the move as “remarkable.”

“Xi Jinping is clearly laser-focused on making the PLA less corrupt and more capable and professional, and he has the institutional power and personal prestige to keep sacking these top generals without meeting real blowback,” Mattingly said.

Thursday’s announcement follows a report in the Financial Times this week that Defense Minister Dong Jun, who has been in the role for less than a year, was also under investigation.

On Thursday, China’s Defense Ministry dismissed the Financial Times article, which cited anonymous U.S. officials, as “pure fabrication.”

Asked who is currently defense minister, spokesman Wu called the question “nonsensical” and added, “I just said ‘Minister Dong Jun’ many times.”

Dong was at a regional defense meeting last week in Laos, where he declined to meet with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin. The Pentagon called the snub “unfortunate” at a time when military tensions remain high in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, the island democracy Beijing claims as its own.

The pair first met in May, which was also the first top-level meeting of American and Chinese military officials in the past two years.

Before their most recent promotions, Miao and Dong held senior positions in the navy, a branch of the military that had been mostly spared in the crackdown until now.

Miao was widely seen by experts on Chinese politics as having backed Dong’s ascension.

Drew Thompson, an expert on the Chinese military at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said Miao’s position as head of political work on the Central Military Commission made him more powerful than Dong or his two predecessors.

Under the Chinese system, defense ministers act primarily as a point of contact with other countries’ militaries and do not control budgets or command forces.

Because the Chinese military is the armed wing of the Communist Party, the removal of its most senior political officer is very serious, Thompson said.

Comments

By Christian Shepherd

Christian Shepherd is China correspondent for The Washington Post. He previously covered the country for the Financial Times and Reuters from Beijing.follow on X @cdcshepherd

By Katrina Northrop

Katrina Northrop is a China correspondent for The Washington Post. Previously, she covered China's global impact on business and technology for The Wire China. Her work has also been published in The New York Times, The Atlantic, and The Providence Journal. follow on X @NorthropKatrina

20. Europe’s Most Powerful Warship Heads To India Amid China Aggression In Indo-Pacific

Are geographic combatant command boundaries still relevant and useful?

Europe’s Most Powerful Warship Heads To India Amid China Aggression In Indo-Pacific

The arrival of the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and an Italian defence minister to India marks a significant step in the West's growing focus on the Indo-Pacific. This visit highlights strengthening defence ties between India, France, and Italy amid rising concerns over China's aggressive policies in the region.

https://www.timesnownews.com/india/europes-most-powerful-warship-heads-to-india-amid-china-aggression-in-indo-pacific-article-115795277?utm

Reported by:

Srinjoy Chowdhury

Updated Nov 29, 2024, 12:10 IST

US Allies Step Up Vigil In Indo-Pacific Amid Chinese Aggression

The imminent arrival in India of the most powerful European warship and also, an Italian junior minister of defence are signs of the West continuing its "pivot" to the Indo-Pacific that began with the United States of America several years ago.

The Charles de Gaulle, a 42,500 ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will be in India towards the middle of next month along with three other French warships for 3-4 days. The ‘CDG,’ the only nuclear-powered carrier in the world apart from the American super-carriers has been in India before and during the time the French battle-fleet is here, an exercise with Indian warships including one of the Indian aircraft carriers (INS Vikrant or INS Vikramaditya) and other warships is likely. The 'CDG' carries the naval variant of the Rafale, which the Indian Air Force has. The Indian Navy has also ordered the naval version of the Rafale and also, much-needed additional French-made Scorpene submarines.

The presence of the 'CDG' in the Indian waters is a sign that despite the continuing Russia-Ukraine war that has lasted over a thousand days with no end in sight, the concerns about the Indo-Pacific, particularly the increase in Chinese aggressive policies in the South and East China Seas, are there. The Americans are, of course, present in strength as they have important allies in the region, particularly Japan, South Korea and Australia. The concerns about Taiwan are also there.

The presence of an Italian junior minister of defence and an admiral along with the Amerigo Vespucci, a 'tall' ship (a sailing ship) that is used for training is more evidence of the pivot and also, growing defence ties between the two countries. India has, very pointedly lifted the ban on Leonardo, the huge defence conglomerate that is linked to Westland (there is an investigation regarding allegations of payoffs for the purchase of helicopters). It is a sign that both countries want to work closely in areas involving national security. A clear direction comes from the regular bilaterals between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni.

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21. Time to Eliminate the Houthi Threat: China, Russia, and Iran Support Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea

Excerpts:

The crisis in the Red Sea is symptomatic of broader geopolitical shifts, wherein emerging alliances among anti-Western powers threaten to destabilize global norms and economic stability. The Houthis' attacks on international shipping, supported by Iran and indirectly by both Russia and China, represent a direct assault on freedom of navigation and a clear threat to the global economy. To counter this, the United States and its allies must move beyond defensive operations and adopt a comprehensive offensive strategy aimed at dismantling the Houthis as a proxy force.

The United States and Israel have not publicly announced any joint military operations against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, both countries have carried out independent military actions due to concerns over Houthi threats to regional stability and international shipping. While these actions demonstrate shared concerns, it may be time to consider joint operations to address this issue. Despite a decade of air and missile strikes from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain, and Israel, the Houthis have proven resilient. They effectively conceal their positions and control key areas along the Red Sea. Nonetheless, they can be weakened through coordinated joint special operations utilizing intelligence and special forces. European forces should play a role to demonstrate the resolve of the broader international rejection of this form of economic terrorism.

The Trump administration has a real opportunity to resolve this problem. Only by directly destroying Houthi capabilities and denying resupply by the sources of Houthi support—namely Iranian finances, logistical infrastructure, and the indirect support provided by Russia and China—can the international community hope to restore stability to the Red Sea. Failure to do so will not only perpetuate the current crisis but also embolden other actors to challenge the rules-based international order on which global trade depends. The gains in deterrence will be well worth the price.

Time to Eliminate the Houthi Threat

China, Russia, and Iran Support Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/time-to-eliminate-the-houthi-threat?cid=cf4e7cdb-5e07-40ac-9844-5c1e82161ff3&postId=7c858eaf-a6dc-4bf0-89fb-947b24aec0c4&utm

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - November 29, 2024

Introduction

The Red Sea is one of the world's most vital maritime trade routes, connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, and providing a crucial artery for global commerce. It accounts for approximately 15 percent of the world's trade, a staggering statistic that underscores its geopolitical significance. Unfortunately, the security of the Red Sea is increasingly at risk due to the escalation of attacks by Yemen's Houthi rebels, a group heavily backed by Iran and supported indirectly by both Russia and China. This alarming nexus of interests and alliances demands an urgent response from the international community if the stability of the Red Sea and the global economy is to be preserved.

Iran, China, and Russia: An Unholy Alliance with the Houthis

The Houthis, an Iranian-backed faction that controls large swathes of Yemen, have evolved into an increasingly potent threat to international shipping in the Red Sea. Their operations are supported by Iran, which provides military equipment, training, and strategic guidance. The Houthis have become more sophisticated over time, utilizing advanced drones, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, some of which are supplied by Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Quds Force. Intelligence sources have revealed that Iran has facilitated talks between the Houthis and Russia, resulting in a deal to supply Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis—a game-changing acquisition that significantly elevates the Houthis' capacity to threaten vessels in the region.

Russia and China, although not directly involved in the conflict, have played roles that exacerbate the situation. Russia has been an enthusiastic supplier of advanced missile technology, partly in response to its growing anti-Western alliance with Iran and China. Moscow's increasing involvement with the Houthis represents a strategic attempt to challenge the West, further complicating the crisis in the Red Sea.

China, on the other hand, represents a paradox in this equation. While China has significant economic interests in the stability of the Red Sea due to its critical position along the Maritime Silk Road, it has, ironically, ended up indirectly financing the Houthi attacks through its massive purchases of Iranian oil. Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports are purchased by China, providing Iran with the financial resources it needs to fund its proxies in the region, including the Houthis. Despite its need for stable trade routes, China has demonstrated a policy of calculated inaction, choosing instead to criticize U.S.-led attempts to secure the region and avoiding direct involvement. In March 2024, China entered a pact with both Russia and the Houthis to ensure the safety of Chinese vessels, illustrating the complex dynamics that allow Chinese ships a form of immunity from attacks that continue to cripple other nations' shipping.

Impact on Global Trade and Shipping

The Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea have already had a significant impact on global shipping. Since November 2023, shipping companies have increasingly opted to reroute vessels around the southern tip of Africa—a move that adds 1-2 weeks to travel times and drives up fuel costs by approximately $1 million per trip. This has been an economic blow not only to the companies involved but also to global supply chains, exacerbating an already fragile economic situation. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, container traffic through the Red Sea has plummeted by over 60 percent due to these persistent attacks. Not only have global fuel costs risen, but the additional time taken to bypass the Red Sea has disrupted supply chains that many countries, particularly China, rely upon for their export-driven economies.

The United States and some European countries have deployed naval forces in the Red Sea, but the attacks have continued unabated. Houthi tactics, which have included the use of drones and missiles, have proven extremely challenging to counter. These weapons, supplied by Iran and partially funded through illicit Chinese oil purchases, have enabled the Houthis to maintain pressure on international shipping lanes despite Western military efforts to deter them.

Offensive Strategy to Counter the Houthi Threat

The current U.S. approach, Operation Prosperity Guardian, has largely focused on defending commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. This strategy has proven costly and relatively ineffective, given the disparity between the expensive missile defense systems employed by the U.S. and the cheap drones used by the Houthis. The Biden administration has requested an additional $1 billion over the next two years to develop new counter-drone technologies, but such measures alone are unlikely to be effective without addressing the root cause of the crisis.

Instead, a shift towards an offensive posture is warranted. According to Kevin Zhang, a researcher at the Yorktown Institute, the United States should focus on dismantling the Houthi's command and control infrastructure, their logistical networks, and arms supply routes. Targeting key facilities such as drone production centers, arms depots, and the Iranian supply chain would deal a significant blow to the Houthi's operational capabilities. Additionally, offensive cyber operations could be utilized to disrupt the financial networks that underpin Iranian and Houthi activities, including hawala systems and cryptocurrency channels that have been used to evade international sanctions.

The recent deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group to the Red Sea, including several guided missile destroyers and a guided missile submarine, presents an opportunity to implement this offensive strategy. By targeting Houthi assets directly and employing cyber warfare against their financial backers, the U.S. and its allies could significantly degrade the Houthi's capabilities and reassert freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Targeting high value targets in the Houthi leadership should also be on the table.

Why International Action Is Imperative

The Houthi threat in the Red Sea is not an isolated issue but a key component of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at expanding its influence across the Middle East while undermining Western interests. By maintaining the capability to strike international shipping at will, the Houthis pose a direct threat to one of the most crucial arteries of global commerce. Left unchecked, this problem could serve as a model for other state and non-state actors seeking to disrupt vital maritime trade routes, threatening international stability.

The involvement of Russia and China adds an additional layer of complexity to the crisis. Both countries, for reasons tied to their broader geopolitical competition with the United States, have effectively shielded the Houthis from the full weight of international response. Russia's provision of advanced weaponry, coupled with China's economic support through oil purchases, has emboldened the Houthis while giving Moscow and Beijing leverage in their dealings with the West.

The United States and its allies must recognize that a merely defensive approach against Houthi attacks alone is not a sustainable strategy. The continued economic and security costs are too high, and the current defensive approach has demonstrated its limitations. A more aggressive strategy, targeting the sources of Houthi power—including Iranian financial support and logistical infrastructure—is essential. This approach should include applying secondary sanctions on entities that facilitate Iranian oil sales, expanding the scope of targeted sanctions on Iran’s financial institutions and the IRGC, and enhancing oversight through the United Nations' Verification and Inspection Mechanism to ensure that sanctioned goods do not reach Yemen.

The Houthis represent a distinct target when compared to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which U.S. forces have been battling in Yemen for nearly two decades. Unlike AQAP, which can evade capture and relocate, the Houthis have established a solid governance structure in northern Yemen. They rely on a combination of tribal alliances and Zaidi religious authority, led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi. Their governance model integrates political administration with religious oversight, securing loyalty from tribal leaders to create institutions like schools and courts that reflect Zaidi ideology. Militarily, the Houthis are capable of defeating Saudi and UAE forces. They are equipped with ballistic missiles, drones, and advanced air defense systems, employing both guerrilla tactics and conventional military strategies, with additional support from Iran.

In contrast, the primary adversary of the United States in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operates as a decentralized network driven by jihadist ideology. This group lacks formal governance and relies on loosely organized cells committed to the pursuit of global jihad. Unlike the Houthis, they do not govern territory; instead, they favor asymmetric warfare tactics, often targeting civilians to achieve their international terror objectives.

The Houthis control and govern significant territory, presenting an opportunity for the U.S. to take action. By targeting their leadership and assets and denying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) access to the Houthis, the U.S. can effectively disrupt Houthi operations and reduce their attacks.

Mr. Zhang from the Yorktown is correct in stating that the Houthis must be denied support and degraded as a fighting force. To effectively counter the Houthis' maritime attacks, a ground offensive must be launched. This should involve a combined joint operation with special operations, intelligence, and support units focusing on key operational nodes, supply routes, storage facilities, communications, and high-value targets. The goal is to weaken the Houthis' ability to plan and execute attacks on maritime traffic in the Bab Al Mandeb, without attempting to hold territory or improve governance in Yemen.

The aim is to achieve this and then withdraw—no nation-building. Distinct operations should also be conducted against IRGC supply routes and capabilities. If the Houthis are sufficiently weakened, local tribes may take the initiative to eliminate them. Targeting all Iranian shipping to Yemen must remain a priority to cut off any further material support. Furthermore, Iran's last maneuverable elements should be neutralized.

The Broader Geopolitical Implications

Freedom of navigation is a cornerstone of international stability. Allowing the Houthis to continue their attacks unchecked threatens not only the Red Sea but other strategic waterways around the world, such as the Suez Canal, the Taiwan Strait, and the Strait of Gibraltar. This principle, if compromised, opens the door for other state and non-state actors to challenge maritime security, leading to further global instability. The Biden administration, therefore, must prioritize the elimination of the Houthi threat to prevent further erosion of this critical aspect of international law.

The international community, particularly European and Asian stakeholders who rely on the stability of global trade routes, must also play a role. Europe, which benefits greatly from goods transiting the Red Sea, has an economic incentive to support a more assertive policy in the region. Asian nations, especially China, which has benefited from the relative stability of global shipping, should reconsider their current course of inaction and take more responsibility in ensuring the security of this crucial maritime corridor.

Conclusion

The crisis in the Red Sea is symptomatic of broader geopolitical shifts, wherein emerging alliances among anti-Western powers threaten to destabilize global norms and economic stability. The Houthis' attacks on international shipping, supported by Iran and indirectly by both Russia and China, represent a direct assault on freedom of navigation and a clear threat to the global economy. To counter this, the United States and its allies must move beyond defensive operations and adopt a comprehensive offensive strategy aimed at dismantling the Houthis as a proxy force.

The United States and Israel have not publicly announced any joint military operations against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, both countries have carried out independent military actions due to concerns over Houthi threats to regional stability and international shipping. While these actions demonstrate shared concerns, it may be time to consider joint operations to address this issue. Despite a decade of air and missile strikes from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain, and Israel, the Houthis have proven resilient. They effectively conceal their positions and control key areas along the Red Sea. Nonetheless, they can be weakened through coordinated joint special operations utilizing intelligence and special forces. European forces should play a role to demonstrate the resolve of the broader international rejection of this form of economic terrorism.

The Trump administration has a real opportunity to resolve this problem. Only by directly destroying Houthi capabilities and denying resupply by the sources of Houthi support—namely Iranian finances, logistical infrastructure, and the indirect support provided by Russia and China—can the international community hope to restore stability to the Red Sea. Failure to do so will not only perpetuate the current crisis but also embolden other actors to challenge the rules-based international order on which global trade depends. The gains in deterrence will be well worth the price.

Bibliography

Kevin Zhang, "An Offensive Strategy Against the Houthi Threat," RealClearDefense, November 22, 2024.
David Scott, "China's Calculated Inaction in the Red Sea Crisis," Center for International Maritime Security, May 6, 2024.
Matthew Karnitschnig, "How China Ended Up Financing the Houthis' Red Sea Attacks," POLITICO, March 28, 2024.

22. Marine Corps commandant completes combat fitness test 11 months after open heart surgery

Marine Corps commandant completes combat fitness test 11 months after open heart surgery

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith suffered a cardiac arrest last year during a run. He just completed the USMC's grueling combat fitness test.

Matt White

Posted Yesterday

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

As you’re dishing up your big Thanksgiving meal, be sure to save room for this big ol’ helping of motivation.

Gen. Eric M. Smith, the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps, dropped a quick video on Thanksgiving eve with clips of him completing his annual Combat Fitness Test, a grueling series of physical events that every Marine — from privates to four-star generals — must complete every year.

I ran my CFT today. If you haven’t completed yours yet, be sure to do so soon. Have a good Thanksgiving. Semper Fidelis. pic.twitter.com/QAwFe410BA

— Commandant of the @USMC (@CMC_MarineCorps) November 27, 2024

Not mentioned in the video is that Smith completed the intensive fitness test 324 days after open heart surgery, which he underwent after suffering near-fatal cardiac arrest while on a run.

Smith had the surgery on Jan. 8 to “repair a bicuspid aortic valve in his heart, which was the cause of his cardiac arrest,” the Marine Corps said at the time.

But he was fit to fight on Nov. 27, knocking out a CFT and delivering a Thanksgiving message.

“Hey Marines, it’s Gen. Smith, the Commandant,” Smith says in the short video. “I just got done running my Marine Combat Fitness Test and I hope you’ve run yours. It’s getting late in the year and everybody owes a CFT by the end of the year. Good luck to you when you’re running yours and Happy Thanksgiving.’

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On Oct. 29, 2023, Smith was just completing a three-mile run and was nearing his home at Marine Barracks Washington, when he collapsed. Bystanders found him and called 911, and performed CPR while they waited for firefighters to arrive, according to reporting by the Washington Post.

Smith had suffered cardiac arrest, but the quick actions of the bystanders and quick delivery to an emergency room saved his life. After recovering, he underwent open heart surgery to repair a valve in his heart in January and was back at work March 5.

Still, getting back to a job at the Pentagon is one thing. The eight-event Marine CFT is definitely something else.

Though regular monitored exercise is recommended as part of recovery from cardiac arrest, the CFT is a grueling series of events meant to simulate movements and physical challenges Marines might encounter in combat.

Gen. Eric M. Smith posted a video of himself doing this year’s CFT on X. Screenshots via X.

Marines do the test in a full Combat Utility Uniform including boots, beginning with an 880-yard sprint, usually on a track.

Second is the “ammunition lift,” in which troops like a 30-pound ammo can overhead, locking out their elbows on each rep, as many times as possible in a set time.

Finally, is the “maneuver under fire” event, a 300-yard course that includes crawling, ammunition resupply, throwing a grenade, agility running, and finally dragging and then fireman’s-carrying a fellow Marine as a “casualty.”

Smith’s ascension to the role of Commandant was at the center of a political fight in the Senate in 2023. Smith was confirmed in late September of that year when Senate leaders brought his name, along with two other pending service chiefs, to the floor of the body for confirmation, a move that skipped over an administrative hold on general officers put in place by Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.).

The latest on Task & Purpose

We showed the new Marine Corps recruiting ad to some teenagers. Here’s what they thought of it.
Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, who commanded 82nd Airborne in Kabul, caught by Senate hold for fourth star
The Army built a giant concrete pyramid in North Dakota and only used it for six months
Navy fires commander of E-2 Hawkeye squadron for “loss of confidence”
Bears got into a food locker at an Alaska Army base and left a huge mess

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

23. Ukrainian Special Forces Capture Russian Marines in Kursk Oblast

Ukrainian Special Forces Capture Russian Marines in Kursk Oblast

mil.in.ua · by Контужений Безпілотник

27 November, 2024 Russian prisoners from the 810th Marine Brigade. November 2024. Ukraine. Frame from the video of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Special Operations Command

POW Russia SOF Ukraine War with Russia

In the Kursk oblast, Special Operations Forces (SOF) managed to capture Russian soldiers from a marine brigade.

The Command of the Special Operations Forces stated that several dozen Russians from the 810th Marine Brigade were captured.

“Soldiers of the Special Operations Forces inflicted significant losses in manpower on the enemy during special operations in the Kursk sector,” the Command of the Special Operations Forces added.

This Russian brigade has been involved in the war against Ukrainians since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

This brigade also took an active part in the occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014.

During this time, the Russian 810th Marine Brigade suffered significant losses in combat and from missile strikes.

810th Marine Brigade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, 2020. Source: ru.krymr.com

In early November, the Russian army resumed attempts at mechanized attacks in the Kursk oblast.

The offensive is carried out, in particular, by the forces of the 810th Marine Brigade of the Russian Navy.

On November 7, fighting continued in the main Ukrainian advance in the Kursk oblast southeast of Korenevo, near Novoivanivka, as well as near Daryno and south of Sudzha, near Plekhovo.

M113 armored personnel carriers of the Ukrainian military participating in the Kursk operation. Ukraine, Sumy region. August 2024. Photo credits: Reuters

However, the front line has not changed significantly. In turn, the Russian so-called “military reporters” call the front line in the Kursk oblast “inactive.”

Meanwhile, the commander of one of the Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades said that the Russian military has much less armored vehicles and artillery in the Kursk oblast than elsewhere on the front line. Especially in the Donetsk region.

The situation in the Kursk oblast on the Deepstate map as of November 26, 2024

Recently, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine operating as part of the Siversk Joint Task Force successfully repelled a mechanized assault by Russian troops in the Kursk oblast.

24. Taiwan’s military uses Taipei university for urban warfare training, sparking outcry

Not a good sign. There needs to be a stronger national commitment to the defense of Taiwan byt the people.

We cannot want to defend Taiwan more than the people of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s military uses Taipei university for urban warfare training, sparking outcry

Critics say it disrupts academic life and could make National Chengchi University a PLA target if ammunition is regularly stored on campus

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3288239/taiwans-military-uses-taipei-university-urban-warfare-training-sparking-outcry?utm

Lawrence Chungin Taipei

Published: 10:00am, 27 Nov 2024

In a rare move, Taiwan’s military is using a Taipei university campus to train reservists to prepare for the possibility of urban warfare against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), prompting concerns and criticism.

Taiwan’s defence minister, however, defended the decision, emphasising the need to consider frontline conditions to deter PLA attacks.

National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei announced last week that it would provide part of its campus to train 100 reservists from November 23 to 29.

The notice drew attention as it marks the first time the university – one of Taiwan’s best – has cooperated with the military for such purposes.

While universities elsewhere on the island have been used for military training, it has typically happened during holiday breaks while students are away from campus.

It is also the first time a university in Taipei has hosted military training. The NCCU training is meant to prepare for urban warfare, whereas the focus of past training has been on preventing the PLA from reaching cities.

25. Considering the Marketplace of Loyalty by Matt Armstrong

Another important discussion of our challenges in the information and influence domain.

Excerpts:

It’s interesting, at least to me, that many academics argue US government efforts to mitigate the effects of disinformation and misinformation and fill in the information gaps is “propaganda” that should, by definition, be limited. (I’m referring mostly, but not exclusively, to those claiming the Smith-Mundt Act was intended to prevent the US government from “propagandizing” the public at home.) These analyses always—I cannot recall an exception in my nearly two decades in this area—fail to separate factual news and public statements, such as from Presidents and Secretaries of State, from what the authors perceive as less-than-factual manipulative content and also never provide an alternative for dealing with disinformation, misinformation, and gaps in information beyond imagining there is a perfect, undistorted marketplace where self-evident truths rise to the top.5

The marketplace of loyalty isn’t a separate marketplace; it’s part of the ideas market. Think of the marketplace of loyalty as focusing the mind on the impact of ideas that raise questions about, for example, national identity, physical security, government secrets, policies, and, well, loyalty to the overall concept of the nation.

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Considering the Marketplace of Loyalty

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/considering-the-marketplace-of-loyalty?r=7i07&utm

In the marketplace of ideas versus loyalty, focus is easily narrowed on munitions rather than outcomes

Matt Armstrong

Nov 28, 2024

Evolutions in modern communications for nearly a century and a half allowed information to reach farther faster. Barriers to information flows, such as time, distance, platform, and language, lessened with each evolution as the ability to transmit information and the cost of doing so plummeted, now to nearly zero. From the transoceanic telegraph to shortwave radio and social media, these evolutions fueled hopes of global integration and understanding. These platforms were catalysts for rapid, sometimes turbulent change as made it easier to access audiences and for audiences to access information. These changes were profound, even if see the telegraph and twice-daily papers of the early 1900s as slow and quaint by today’s standards. It is all relative, however. Questions and concerns came with the changes: how will—not merely might—these information flows reshape politics and society, especially as the information affects perceptions and beliefs, meaning ideas? The phrase marketplace of ideas emerged in the early period in a court case directly related the new mobility of information. In terms of national security and foreign affairs, should we narrow our focus to something more specific: the marketplace of loyalty?

For a terrific and timely discussion, and background, on the marketplace of ideas, read

Asha Rangappa’s excellent post:The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa

FREE BONUS: Class 38. The Distorted "Marketplace of Ideas" in the Digital Age

If you are just joining The Freedom Academy, welcome! As a reminder, this post is a standalone “lesson” and you do not need to be caught up to follow along! I’ll reference any previous posts that offer relevant background, and you can always visit the syllabus…

8 days ago · 67 likes · 20 comments · Asha Rangappa

Let’s be clear, though: the marketplace has always been distorted. Despite the comments of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who gave us this term in 1919, the “best” ideas will not and cannot consistently beat out the competition. The scales are always tilted, and what is self-evident may not be known, and it may be subject to intentional disinformation or accidental misinformation. In recent history, in the United States, perhaps the heaviest “thumb” on the marketplace scale (which isn’t a mixed metaphor) is probably Citizens United. For an older example, another distortion was Moscow’s jamming the Voice of America’s new Russian language broadcasts in 1949.1

The difference between the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace of loyalty is the latter focuses attention on the subset of ideas that gain traction and affect behavior in specific ways.

That description can be refined significantly, and you, dear reader, have likely already formulated a better definition. I haven’t really delved into this topic since 2017, when a colleague and I put together a book proposal (co-edited) that found an interested publisher but could not find enough US and non-US contributors at the end of several years of delving into this subject.2 At the heart of my earlier effort was the idea that modern communications allowed people to test-drive identities in the privacy of their home or phone. They could adopt or discard whatever they wanted, whether reconnecting with the family’s heritage or exploring a new identity, which may affect the person’s loyalty, as was the case with “Jihad Jane,” the blonde, blue-eyed woman from Colorado years ago.3 The marketplace for loyalty is where specific ideas cause certain actions that concern national security, potentially the concept of nationalism and loyalty. Whether factors that facilitate manipulation, including debt or grievances, should fall within this marketplace is worth further discussion.

One of my favorite references to the marketplace of loyalty comes from 1947. Though it’s not necessary, some background is helpful before sharing the quote. In February 1947, President Truman described the need to supply aid to Greece and Turkey in the face of Russian aggression in clear terms:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations… We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States… The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

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The core of Truman’s speech was the severe distortion of the marketplace of ideas and how those translated to loyalty to the state. A few months later, in June, Secretary of State George Marshall described the need to provide aid to Europe for not just humanitarian reasons but also our national security and the broader marketplace of loyalty, which was affected not just by post-war conditions but actively manipulated by Russian political warfare, and not just grassroots resentment. .

…it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy… It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

The sheer destruction, loss of life, and substantial economic, societal, and political upheavals were made worse by international politics and the environment. The peace treaty with Germany and Austria had yet to be finalized, interfering with the rebuilding of the nations. The weather did not help, as a severe drought damaged and decimated agriculture across Europe, with farms, equipment, transportation, labor, and everything else associated with food production and distribution ravaged from years of war.

The following month, in the insulated safety of a Top Secret memo, George Kennan, who had become the Director of a new Policy Planning Staff under Marshall just a few months earlier, frankly described the “Marshall Plan”:4

[A]ny set of events which would substantially restore to people in Western Europe a sense of political security, and of confidence in a future marked by close association with the Western Powers, would itself release extensive recuperative forces in Europe which are today inhibited or paralyzed by political uncertainty. In this sense, we must recognize that much of the value of a European recovery program will lie not so much in its direct economic effects, which are difficult to calculate with any degree of accuracy, as in its psychological political by-products.

To state this publicly, however, would be a self defeating act. For the Europeans themselves, the restoration of confidence must be an unconscious – not a conscious — process. They must come to believe seriously in the real value of such an economic program. Obviously, we cannot say to them that the value of such a program lies largely in their subjective attitude toward it. This would only confuse them and undermine in advance precisely the psychological reaction which we aim to produce.

The marketplace was not neutral; many actors actively distorted it. Russia, its agents, and various aspirants, sought to tip the scales through subversion, disinformation, exploiting misinformation, and fancifully filling gaps in information. Even before this realization of active adverse efforts, the US realized the nation had to at least participate in the marketplace. An internal State Department report completed in July 1945 declared “modern international relations lie between peoples and not merely governments.” This report’s core concepts and recommendations were used to structure and provide further arguements for a post-war international information program.

In 1947, the situation continued to get worse as the severe drought was followed by a harsh winter that threatened access to the already limited food and heating supplies. In November 1947, Sir John Orr, head of the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization, publicly explained in an article in the New York Times Magazine how non-ideological issues would affect and be affected by the marketplace of loyalty:

Apart from the humanitarian aspect of the problem there is real danger that the food shortage will prevent a return to stable, peaceful conditions. People will not support a Government which cannot provide food. Widespread and continued hunger, with the resulting social and political unrest, will undermine the foundation of governments.

This brings us to the quote I teased at the start. In an article titled “We Are Losing the War of Words in Europe,” which appeared alongside Sir Orr’s article, Representative Karl E. Mundt reminds us what happens when we ignore marketplace of loyalty.

We may help avert starvation in Europe and aid in producing a generation of healthy, physically fit individuals whose bodies are strong but whose minds are poisoned against America and whose loyalties are attached to the red star of Russia. If we permit this to eventuate it will be clear that the generosity of America is excelled only by our own stupidity.

Mundt reminded the reader that the “marketplace of ideas” does not adequately prioritize the “So what?” aspect. Marshall, Kennan, and Orr referred to the same ultimate point. Mundt, who had been a school teacher, a school superintendent, and a college instructor, was the co-founder of the National Forensic League (now the National Speech and Debate Association), a prolific writer, and, along with his wife, active in the South Dakota Poetry Society, hammered this point home. Policies, statements, and actions are not self-evident or always known. Timelines, limitations, problems, and intentions can be manipulated to influence the marketplace, especially the perception of these. The distortion can go either way, but typically, it’s the hostile actor, not the positive one, who has the heavy thumb.

It’s interesting, at least to me, that many academics argue US government efforts to mitigate the effects of disinformation and misinformation and fill in the information gaps is “propaganda” that should, by definition, be limited. (I’m referring mostly, but not exclusively, to those claiming the Smith-Mundt Act was intended to prevent the US government from “propagandizing” the public at home.) These analyses always—I cannot recall an exception in my nearly two decades in this area—fail to separate factual news and public statements, such as from Presidents and Secretaries of State, from what the authors perceive as less-than-factual manipulative content and also never provide an alternative for dealing with disinformation, misinformation, and gaps in information beyond imagining there is a perfect, undistorted marketplace where self-evident truths rise to the top.5

The marketplace of loyalty isn’t a separate marketplace; it’s part of the ideas market. Think of the marketplace of loyalty as focusing the mind on the impact of ideas that raise questions about, for example, national identity, physical security, government secrets, policies, and, well, loyalty to the overall concept of the nation.

Parting shot

We adopted our dog Paisley, a rescue from a Romanian animal shelter, over eight years ago when we lived in Switzerland. We always wondered about his breed, and of course we were constantly asked what he was (and is, he’s still with us, thankfully).

Paisley at Albishorn 5mi into a ten miler with Zürich in the far background, and Paisley taking a drink from a forest fountain.

This week we received the results of his DNA test. He’s… 100%… East European Village Dog. That’s apparently a thing.

Village dogs, like the Eastern European Village Dog, descend from distinct lineages that are separate from modern breeds, like the Labrador or the Poodle. Genetically, village dogs are different from breed dogs. So, his actual breed is Eastern European Village Dog. His ancestors were likely also from the same population of village dogs.

Indeed, based on his DNA, his family tree is straight forward.

Thanks for reading.

I’ll keep my comments on framing the cold war as a “war of ideology” brief. I can argue the Soviet Union acknowledged they accepted their inability to compete when they strictly limited US Information Service materials and libraries immediately after the war, jammed VOA soon after that (after the initial broadcast was delayed when the transmitters were damaged, possibly from sabotage), shut down their borders and those of their satellites, and later led the only military alliance whose only military action was to invade one of its members. Furthermore, every political contest, from mayoral contests to presidents or prime ministers, is a contest over idealogy. Describing World War II as a war of ideology is accurate and useless. Framing the cold war (pre-detente, before the era was a proper noun) as a “war of ideology,” as many historians do, creates false equivalencies between the different parties. Lastly, these same historians almost always (inadvertently?) make statements that dismiss entirely the rote labeling of the period as a war of idealogy. Asserting the war of ideology in the context of the cold war as some kind of level marketplace is absurdly disconnected from the facts of the period.

Our tentative title: “Shifting Identities: How the Marketplace of Loyalties Impacts National Security.” Related to this was an earlier joint effort with a different colleague that resulted in a book chapter: Powers, Shawn, and Matt Armstrong. “Conceptualizing Radicalization in a Market for Loyalties.” In Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment, edited by Carol Winkler, and Cori Elizabeth Dauber. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014.

Part of my modeling then relied on the idea of hyphens to commas. This reconsidered the hyphenated model (German-American, for example) into commas. This change permits the person to be both German and American, plus a member of other identity groups marketers (specifically adverse or friendly influencers) would seek to tap into and ultimately leverage, like a fan of cricket or a (not US) football club. This comma model permits the permanent or temporary inclusion of identities of someone connecting with an identity group they have an existing link to (like familial or friends) or are interested in.

Kennan’s point here is a core piece of the Marshall Plan that is invariably ignored by perhaps every utterance of the phrase “we need a Marshall Plan” for this or that situation. Missing the fundamental point of Kennan has people thinking they can buy their way to a solution.

These authors also tend, if not always, pin their arguments only on the radio broadcast operations and not the larger information program.

26. For Soldiers at Fort Carson, Food Is Scarce

Oh no. I cannot believe this is true. We are better than this and this is not a "fumble."

Excerpts:

Senior officials have often pointed to difficult logistics in mapping out how much food to supply soldiers and getting them quality nutrition. However, it's unclear why those challenges have persisted in the force for years.

"Are we gonna fumble? Yes, but we're learning," Renee Mosher, deputy chief of staff, G4 HQ Army Materiel Command, which oversees logistics for the force, said when asked about food issues at Fort Carson in October at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C.

For Soldiers at Fort Carson, Food Is Scarce

military.com · by Steve Beynon · November 27, 2024

As Americans gather for Thanksgiving feasts, soldiers at Fort Carson, Colorado, are contending with a far less festive reality -- months of insufficient meals, confusing schedules, and limited food options at the base's dining facilities that have ignited widespread frustration among the rank and file.

Dining facilities -- critical for sustaining the health and readiness of troops -- are reportedly offering fewer options, with some meals falling short of basic nutritional standards. Earlier this month, the issue was exemplified by a meal in which soldiers were served a single piece of toast and a handful of lima beans for dinner, according to one soldier stationed there who shared imagery of the meal. Even getting access to those limited rations can be hard, given confusing dining hall schedules and seemingly random closures that make it difficult for many to access hot meals.

Military.com's interviews with eight soldiers and review of photos from Fort Carson facilities found recurring problems. Food runs out quickly, and portions often fall short of the macronutrient requirements needed to sustain soldiers' demanding physical regimens, likely running afoul of service regulations on feeding requirements for troops. Some soldiers reported and shared photos of food that was undercooked or stored at dangerous temperatures.

"This has been a division-wide issue with the [dining facilities] on workdays and kiosks on the weekend," said one soldier stationed at the base, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the press. "The people who deal with it the worst are the soldiers who live in the barracks and don't have a car."

The issue is twofold. Troops reported being served food that was either improperly prepared or unavailable by the time they reached the end of the line. Kiosks, intended to replace dining facilities in some circumstances with grab-and-go options, are frequently empty, particularly during peak times when soldiers finish their shifts.

When kiosk shelves are stocked, they're often filled with chips, sugary snacks and other items that soldiers say fall short of the nutritional standards required to maintain physical fitness as demanded by their jobs. Frustration over food issues has prompted some unit leaders to instruct troops to document the issue, capturing photos of the low-quality food or barren shelves to escalate concerns to higher-level leadership, though it's unclear what official complaints have been filed.

"We recognize that we've had some challenges with consistency in the quality of our soldiers' dining experiences at our warrior restaurants and kiosks," Lt. Col. Joseph Payton, a base spokesperson, said in a statement to Military.com. "We're committed to ensuring our soldiers receive quality and healthy meals and can take full advantage of their meal benefit they are entitled to receive."

Payton added that the issue has been brought to brigade-level leadership, which is investigating methods to boost the quality of food options for soldiers.

Fort Carson has 4,600 meal card holders, mostly junior enlisted soldiers who would normally rely on the dining facilities for meals. In most cases, barracks do not have cooking appliances, and soldiers are generally forbidden to have kitchen tools such as hot plates. Other food options, which soldiers would have to pay for, are mostly less healthy fast food restaurants such as Pizza Hut, Dunkin' Donuts and Arby's.

In 2024, the base served food to 591 soldiers on average each day, according to data provided by the service. That number also includes meals purchased and consumed by non-meal card holding troops -- meaning the raw percentage of junior soldiers living on base who use the dining facilities may be in the single digits some days.

Compounding the frustration is the financial strain hunting for alternative food options can cause for troops. Soldiers contribute an average of $460 per month from their Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), a mandatory deduction that collectively totals approximately $22 million annually at Fort Carson. However, the base's food budget this year was just $5 million. How the remaining funds are allocated remains unclear. A 2022 report from the Government Accountability Office found that the Army does not adequately track how often its food services are used by service members.

Some Army officials have pointed to soldiers using dining facilities less and less in recent years as driving decisions to cut spending. It has produced something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, with less investment in quality food and infrastructure pushing even fewer soldiers to see those food options as viable -- despite automatically paying for that food out of their paychecks.

Soldiers have reported waiting in line for up to 30 minutes at Fort Carson dining facilities, only to be served small portions that fall far short of a full meal. In one instance, a soldier recounted being handed just a small bowl of soup and an apple.

On Hots & Cots, a Yelp-style platform where soldiers review barracks and dining options, complaints about food quality and availability at Fort Carson are significantly higher than at other installations, according to the app's internal data.

However, the issue is not isolated to Fort Carson. Last year, Military.com reported on similar struggles at Fort Cavazos, Texas -- in which junior enlisted soldiers had few options for food as the garrison struggled to juggle a severe shortage of food service workers. Soldiers also frequently report issues with undercooked food or inconsistent dining facility schedules on Reddit and other social media.

Senior officials have often pointed to difficult logistics in mapping out how much food to supply soldiers and getting them quality nutrition. However, it's unclear why those challenges have persisted in the force for years.

"Are we gonna fumble? Yes, but we're learning," Renee Mosher, deputy chief of staff, G4 HQ Army Materiel Command, which oversees logistics for the force, said when asked about food issues at Fort Carson in October at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · November 27, 2024

27. The U.S. Homeland Stands Unguarded

The U.S. Homeland Stands Unguarded

The Pentagon needs to modernize its plans to defend against new threats from Russia and China.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-homeland-stands-unguarded-military-defense-d3f16845?mod=Searchresults_pos5&page=1

By Glen VanHerck and Pete Fesler

Nov. 28, 2024 4:34 pm ET

Illustration: Robert Neubecker

In the early 20th century, as air power advocates worked to understand the emerging role of aircraft in conflict, Brigadier Gen. William Mitchell conducted a series of tests. The purpose was to demonstrate the airplane’s superior capabilities for coastal defense, at that time a Navy mission. Mitchell believed the airplane—and the Army Air Corps—were better suited to the task.

In July 1921, Mitchell led the First Provisional Air Brigade from Virginia’s Langley Field in bombing tests against captured German ships and submarines. Mitchell’s tests culminated in the sinking of the battleship Ostfriesland, which the Navy had believed invulnerable to air attack. Despite this demonstration of air power’s efficacy, a fight between the services for primacy against attack from the sea continued for decades. The Navy and Army Air Corps conducted competing exercises to prove it could better defend the nation.

A hundred years later, the U.S. faces greater threats than those the 1920s War Department could have imagined. They contemplated attacks only from the sea and sea-based aircraft. Today the U.S. faces threats from all domains. Russia and China can target American cities and infrastructure with nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as ultra long-range, conventionally armed, land, air, sea and submarine-launched stealthy cruise missiles.

Beijing and Moscow have deployed weapons that can circumvent current threat warning and defensive systems. In a move some call a “sputnik moment,” China recently tested a hypersonic missile that nearly orbited the globe before returning to hit a target. An additional menace are the cyber attacks that state and non-state actors regularly conduct against government and commercial infrastructure. Drones of unknown origin fly over critical infrastructure, including military bases.

The Defense Department hasn’t adequately addressed these new threats. The Army, by law responsible for ground-based air defense, has a limited ability to defend the District of Columbia and the immediate surrounding area. Most of its Patriot air defense systems are deployed or will likely be deployed in overseas operations, and the Army-led, multiservice counter-drone effort is fielding systems that aren’t as well suited for domestic use.

The Navy dedicates only a few on-call vessels to maritime defense and since 9/11 has offered its support to homeland defense on a handful of occasions, instead focusing on forward deployment. Even the Missile Defense Agency hasn’t stepped up, focusing more on defending Guam and against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea.

Mitchell’s Army Air Corps, which became the Air Force, was the front line of homeland defense during the Cold War. Today it commits only a handful of predominantly Air National Guard fighters to the air defense mission for the entire North American continent. That is barely one-tenth of the aircraft that Mitchell had on a single base for his tests in 1921. Ground-based radars, fielded in the 1980s to watch over North America, are obsolete. The effort to replace them has been locked in an analysis of alternatives for more than a decade.

The Air Force was on a path to acquire over-the-horizon radars capable of detecting approaching aircraft, ships and cruise missiles at a range of more than 1,000 miles. That project now appears stalled while the Air Force does more studies. At the recent annual Air and Space Symposium, only one official—the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command—addressed protecting the homeland.

The services are investing heavily in modernizing the nation’s nuclear deterrent. Replacing the Air Force’s aging Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is estimated to cost $96 billion over the next decade. These systems were designed to deter a nuclear attack by promising devastating retaliation. They were never intended to deter more limited non-nuclear strikes, cyberattacks or attacks by small, unmanned drones on infrastructure. Adversaries are unlikely to believe the U.S. will respond with nukes to a non-nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence isn’t enough to defend against new weapons.

Despite the National Defense Strategy’s declaration that homeland defense is the Pentagon’s top priority, almost no additional resources have been allocated, and none are forthcoming. The focus is on offense and the fight around the world. Today the nation is defended by a small number of professionals equipped with systems largely designed and bought in the 1970s and ’80s, with no defined path to modernization.

Today, as Russian ultraquiet submarines prowl off American shores and Chinese and Russian bombers and warships conduct joint operations near Alaska, our military is focused elsewhere. Fortress America stands largely unguarded. Billy Mitchell would be disappointed.

Mr. VanHerck, a retired U.S. Air Force general, served as commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense command. Mr. Fesler, a retired Air Force major general, served as deputy director of operations for the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

A nuclear fusion startup just reached a milestone in its bid to commercialize unlimited clean energy | CNN

CNN · by Laura Paddison · November 29, 2024

CNN —

In a commercial warehouse overlooking the ocean in New Zealand’s capital Wellington, a startup is trying to recreate the power of a star on Earth using an unconventional “inside out” reactor with a powerful levitating magnet at its core.

Its aim is to produce nuclear fusion, a near-limitless form of clean energy generated by the exact opposite reaction the world’s current nuclear energy is based on — instead of splitting atoms, nuclear fusion sets out to fuse them together, resulting in a powerful burst of energy that can be achieved using the most abundant element in the universe: hydrogen.

Earlier this month, OpenStar Technologies announced it had managed to create superheated plasma at temperatures of around 300,000 degrees Celsius, or 540,000 degrees Fahrenheit — one necessary step on a long path toward producing fusion energy.

The company hailed it as a breakthrough. “First plasma is a really important moment,” said Ratu Mataira, OpenStar’s founder and CEO, it’s “the moment that you know that everything works effectively.”

It took the company two years and around $10 million to get here, he told CNN, making it cheap and fast compared to many of the decades-long, government-led efforts that have dominated the fusion energy space.

OpenStar is one of a number of startups pushing the world toward the nuclear fusion finish line by seeking ways to commercialize the futuristic power source, even before it’s even been proved viable.

They come with big promises and wads of investment — fusion companies have attracted more than $7.1 billion in funding, according to the Fusion Industry Association. But experts warn there’s still a long, complex road ahead of them.

An animation of the inside of OpenStar's reactor.

OpenStar Technologies

Fusion — the same process that makes the sun and other stars shine — is often called the holy grail of clean energy: it’s near limitless, produces no planet-heating pollution and doesn’t have the long-term radioactive waste problem that plagues fission, the nuclear technology the world currently uses.

It’s a moonshot for tackling the escalating climate crisis. A baseload power able to use existing grid infrastructure, it offers what people want: a climate solution that involves little change to the world as it is now.

But recreating it on Earth has proved fiendishly tricky.

The most popular technology involves a donut-shaped machine called a tokamak, which is fed with two forms of hydrogen gas — deuterium, found in seawater, and tritium extracted from lithium.

The temperature inside the tokamak reaches 150 million degrees, 10 times hotter than the sun’s core. Under this extraordinary heat, the hydrogen isotopes smash together within a plasma, causing them to fuse in a process creating enormous amounts of energy.

Strong magnetic coils in the tokamak confine the plasma, a task scientists describe as like holding Jell-O together using rubber bands.

OpenStar’s technology flips this on its head, essentially turning the tokamak inside out. Instead of having plasma inside magnets, it has a magnet inside the plasma.

Its reactor features a single, extremely powerful magnet levitating inside a vacuum chamber about 16 feet wide, which looks like a steel donut on legs. The design is modeled after the plasma in planetary magnetic fields, including Earth’s.

An illustration of the inside of Openstar Technologies' "levitated dipole" nuclear fusion reactor.

Openstar Technologies

The physicist Akira Hasegawa came up with the concept in the 1980s, based on his study of plasma around Jupiter. The first machine using these principles was built at MIT, in collaboration with Columbia University, and turned on in 2004. But it closed in 2011.

“It wasn’t going to scale with the technology that they had,” Mataira said. By swapping out some of this technology and using newer types of magnets, OpenStar says they have cracked the problem.

The advantage of this reactor is it’s easier and faster to engineer than a tokamak, Mataira said. This “allows you to rapidly iterate and improve performance very, very quickly.” It’s also less complex than a tokamak — which he compares to “building a ship in a bottle” — meaning it’s much faster to fix if something goes wrong.

OpenStar, which has already raised $12 million and is now embarking on a much bigger funding round, plans to build two further prototypes over the two to four years, to work out how to scale it and make it viable.

The fusion reactor looks like a steel donut on legs and is housed in a warehouse in Wellington, New Zealand.

Openstar Technologies

OpenStar is one of a constellation of fusion companies has sprung up over the past five years, pursuing diverse technologies, said Gerald Navratil, a professor of fusion energy and plasma physics at Columbia University.

“The maturity of the field is such that now private venture capitalists are willing to put up money to try to see if they can get to fusion a little faster,” he told CNN.

One of the largest commercial ventures, Commonwealth Fusion Systems, which uses high-temperature superconducting magnets within a tokamak, has raised more than $2 billion.

Others, like OpenStar, are exploring more unusual tech. Seattle-based Zap Energy is trying to build a compact, scalable reactor that doesn’t use magnets at all, but instead fires pulses of power into a stream of plasma.

The billion dollar question is still: when will fusion power be ready? OpenStar says six years. Commonwealth Fusion says it can deliver fusion power to the grid in the early 2030s. Zap Energy foresees a similar timeframe.

Other players are more cautious. The UK Atomic Energy Authority, a government body developing fusion, said fusion isn’t likely to become a commercial reality until the latter half of this century due to the significant scientific and engineering challenges.

Sometimes startups “tend to be a little aggressive in what they’re promising,” Navratil said. There’s a big difference between producing energy from fusion and having a practical system that puts power on the grid and is safe, licensed and operating, he added.

Mataira remains buoyant and confident in the ability of agile startups to push the world further and faster toward a tantalizing clean power, which for decades has seemed just out of reach.

“Not all of the fusion companies will be successful, OpenStar might be one of those,” he said, “but we as a society will learn faster.”

CNN · by Laura Paddison · November 29, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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