Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If you feel pain you are alive. If you feel other people's pain, you are a human being."

– Leo Tolstoy

"Integrity without knowledge is weak and useful, and knowledge without integrity is dangerous and dreadful.

– Samuel Johnson

"There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest."

– Elie Wiesel

1. Things Worth Remembering: Whoever Loses, They Should Lose Like Nixon

2. Opinion: Why Trump Deserves a Second term (A Ukrainian- American view)

3. Why the U.S. Must Strengthen Its Commitment to Protect Allies in the South China Sea Against Chinese Aggression

4. On Eve of US Election, ‘High Alert’ and Cautious Optimism on Foreign Interference

5. Is the United States on the Verge of Civil War?

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2024

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 2, 2024

8. Russia’s Elite Spetsnaz Special Forces 'Devastated' in Ukraine War

9. Ukraine Is Getting Another 200 Stryker Vehicles Just In Time To Meet A North Korean Onslaught

10. The U.S. is in the Midst of a Perfect ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Storm

11. SOCOM adds new ‘collaborative autonomy’ capabilities to tech wish list

12. Does a ‘Warning from Kursk’ Show Reality of North Korea’s Russian Misadventure?

13. American industry must rise again: The US has squandered its Cold War victory

14. How Japan Can Strengthen the U.S. Steel Industry

15. To save our democracy, we must get rid of online anonymity

16. Seeing Rising Election Misinformation, Americans Say Social Media Platforms May Bear Responsibility for Political Violence

17. Fighting the Houthis Is a Waste. That’s the Point.

18. Americans’ top sources of political news ahead of the 2024 election

19. Why Electoral Violence Starts—and How It Can End

1. Things Worth Remembering: Whoever Loses, They Should Lose Like Nixon

Very much worth remembering and reflecting upon.

This is a civics lesson we should all heed but especially both candidates should.

Excerpts:

He started by thanking these supporters, and joking: “I thought that we had the last rally of the campaign, but here we go again.”

But he didn’t sugarcoat what he had come to say, which was the thing the crowd did not want to hear.

“One of the great features of America is that we have political contests. That they are very hard fought, as this one was hard fought, and once the decision is made, we unite behind the man who is elected,” began Nixon. “I want Senator Kennedy to know, and I want all of you to know, that certainly if this trend does continue and he does become our next president, he will have my wholehearted support and yours as well.”

At this, the audience shouted: “No.” But Nixon reminded his supporters that just because they were passionate, it did not mean they had won. “I am sure his supporters are just as enthusiastic as you are for me,” he said, “and I thank you for that.”

Stopping just short of a concession, Nixon then turned his attention away from his political opponents, and towards the United States, and what it represents.

“Having been to all of the 50 states of this nation since the nominating convention in Chicago, having seen the American people, seen them by the hundreds of thousands and perhaps the millions, in the towns and cities of America, I have great faith about the future of this country. I have great faith that our people, Republicans, Democrats alike, will unite behind our next president in seeing that America does meet the challenge which destiny has placed upon us. And that challenge is to give the leadership to the whole world which will produce a world in which all men can have what we have in the United States: freedom, independence, the right to live in peace with our neighbors.

“And so, with that, let me say again my thanks to you. Having had only two hours sleep last night, and two hours sleep the night before—I’m now going to bed, and I hope you do, too!”

Things Worth Remembering: Whoever Loses, They Should Lose Like Nixon

Grace in defeat is important for democracy. Both presidential candidates must be prepared to accept America’s choice next week.

https://www.thefp.com/p/things-worth-remembering-nixon-concession-trump-kamala?utm

By Douglas Murray

November 3, 2024

Welcome to Douglas Murray’s column, “Things Worth Remembering,” in which he presents great speeches from famous orators we should commit to heart. Scroll down to listen to Douglas reflect on the speech Richard Nixon made upon recognizing that he had lost the 1960 presidential election.

Perhaps every election feels like it is the most febrile. But this one really does. There is the name-calling, of course, and the outrageous claims made by both sides. Yet one of the more concerning features of this race is the suspicion—indeed, the certainty—that the other side intends to cheat, or not accept the result. It is a terrible thing for a democracy that trust in the system should reach such a low.

As I have said often in the last four years, democracy depends on election results being clear and agreed upon, and for that to happen requires two things. Not only that one side wins, and knows it has won, but also that another side loses, and knows it has lost. That is the only way for a losing—as well as a winning—side to move on and adapt to the realities that have produced the result.

Which brings me to Richard Nixon.

Nixon is not often cited these days as an example of best practice. But in the case of the concession speech he made the night of the 1960 presidential election, it would be fair to do so. The race that year was exceptionally close. Although in the electoral college Nixon’s Democrat rival John F. Kennedy ended up winning 303 votes to Nixon’s 219, the popular vote was virtually tied between the two candidates. Kennedy was less than half a percentage point ahead.

It had been a hard-fought campaign. In certain respects, the two candidates were similar. They were only four years apart in age. Both had served in the Navy in the Pacific during World War II. Both had served in the House and Senate. But on a deeper level, the two men were very different. The Republican candidate was someone who had pulled himself up from a humble farming background, and had fought for everything he got. The Democrat candidate, by contrast, was an American blue blood.

Then, as now, a blunder when addressing a minority could cost a man an election. Although Nixon had a strong record on civil rights, in October 1960, he refused to express support for Martin Luther King Jr., who had been arrested during a sit-in in Atlanta and sentenced to four months of hard labor. Asked about this, the Nixon campaign said: “No comment.” It wasn’t hard for the Democrats to seize that advantage. They swiftly distributed campaign materials saying: “No comment Nixon versus a candidate with a heart, Senator Kennedy.” The black votes that Nixon lost may well have been the ones that cost him the election.

Something else that makes the 1960 election seem strangely modern was that there was serious controversy over voter fraud. Nixon lost Illinois and Texas—which together represented 51 electoral college votes—by the slimmest of margins. In the former, Kennedy won by a mere 9,000 votes amid allegations that Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley had used the city’s Democrat machine to manipulate vote totals in Kennedy’s favor. In Texas, the margin was almost as small, and the accusations of fraud almost as credible. If Nixon had won Illinois and Texas, he would have won the nation.

Just before midnight on Tuesday, November 8, on the East Coast, The New York Times went to press with a front page announcing a Kennedy victory. But, at the time, the result was still too close to call. Illinois hadn’t yet been announced, and the Times managing editor later confessed that he found himself fearing the headline would be proved wrong—and hoping that “a certain Midwestern mayor would steal enough votes to pull Kennedy through.”

Meanwhile, as Nixon wrote in his memoirs: “There was tremendous pressure from reporters and commentators for me to concede.” After midnight, he decided to speak to the cameras at the now-demolished Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. Not only to the cameras, but also the crowd of adoring supporters—people who really did not want Nixon to accept the facts that were already clear. As he stepped up to the podium, with his wife Pat, the crowd shouted: “We want Nixon. Now!”

He started by thanking these supporters, and joking: “I thought that we had the last rally of the campaign, but here we go again.”

But he didn’t sugarcoat what he had come to say, which was the thing the crowd did not want to hear.

“One of the great features of America is that we have political contests. That they are very hard fought, as this one was hard fought, and once the decision is made, we unite behind the man who is elected,” began Nixon. “I want Senator Kennedy to know, and I want all of you to know, that certainly if this trend does continue and he does become our next president, he will have my wholehearted support and yours as well.”

At this, the audience shouted: “No.” But Nixon reminded his supporters that just because they were passionate, it did not mean they had won. “I am sure his supporters are just as enthusiastic as you are for me,” he said, “and I thank you for that.”

Stopping just short of a concession, Nixon then turned his attention away from his political opponents, and towards the United States, and what it represents.

“Having been to all of the 50 states of this nation since the nominating convention in Chicago, having seen the American people, seen them by the hundreds of thousands and perhaps the millions, in the towns and cities of America, I have great faith about the future of this country. I have great faith that our people, Republicans, Democrats alike, will unite behind our next president in seeing that America does meet the challenge which destiny has placed upon us. And that challenge is to give the leadership to the whole world which will produce a world in which all men can have what we have in the United States: freedom, independence, the right to live in peace with our neighbors.

“And so, with that, let me say again my thanks to you. Having had only two hours sleep last night, and two hours sleep the night before—I’m now going to bed, and I hope you do, too!”

Nixon formally conceded the next morning, at 9:47 a.m. in Los Angeles, in a telegram to Kennedy that read: “I want to repeat through this wire congratulations and best wishes I extended to you on television Tuesday night. I know you will have the united support of all Americans as you lead the nation in the cause of peace and freedom in the next four years.”

Perhaps Nixon’s gracefulness in defeat came in part from his determination that he would stand to fight another day, and win. What he chose to do with his time in office once he got there is, of course, another story. But as the United States prepares to elect its next president, this speech is a perfect reminder that unity will always be more important than victory.

Click below to listen to Douglas reflect on the speech Richard Nixon made upon recognizing that he had lost the 1960 presidential election:

Douglas Murray will be back in your inbox next Sunday. To read his last column, “T.S. Eliot Put His World Back Together Again,” click here. To learn more about Douglas and support his work, visit DouglasMurray.net.

2. Opinion: Why Trump Deserves a Second term (A Ukrainian- American view)

I have been following Roman's work in support of Ukraine's defense against Putin's War since the invasion in 2022.

Political preferences aside, his review of the history of US action and inaction is worth recalling.

Opinion: Why Trump Deserves a Second term

kyivpost.com · by Roman Golash · November 3, 2024

For the sake of balance, Kyiv Post is reprinting the view of a retired American Ukrainian military officer who supports Donal Trump in the US presidential election.

By Roman Golash

November 3, 2024, 12:17 pm

This handout photograph released by the Ukrainian presidential press service on September 27, 2024 shows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (L) and Republican presidential nominee former US President Donald Trump meeting on September 27, 2024 in New York. The meeting coincides with Zelensky's visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Handout / UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE / AFP

Articles and letters written in The Ukrainian Weekly in support of Kamala Harris were filled with emotional viewpoints, but they did not point to a realistic view of events. Some who do not like Donald Trump feel validated to make stuff up to make stuff happen.

I spent the 1990s in Ukraine with the United States Army and the United States Air Force on a variety of missions. I was in Ukraine when former U.S. President Bill Clinton managed to convince Ukraine to give up their nuclear weapons, not to the United States, but to Russia.

At meetings with Ukrainian generals, the U.S. warned Ukraine to look after their own best interests, but the Ukrainians said they trust Mr. Clinton and signed the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. This was the first step to war with Russia, as Mr. Clinton showed weakness and lacked leadership.

In 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine. This would have eliminated any invasion by Russia in 2014 and 2022. However, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel blocked the move. Mr. Bush showed poor leadership and allowed Ms. Merkel to prevail.

In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Crimea and the eastern provinces of Ukraine. At that time, Barack Obama was president of the United States and Joe Biden was the vice president. Mr. Obama abrogated the Budapest Memorandum by not adhering to its intent, and, in so doing, they bear responsibility for the integrity of Ukraine’s borders. Instead of helping the country, Messrs. Obama and Biden told Ukraine to “stand down.” Instead of offering significant aid, Mr. Obama sent blankets. Ukraine was shocked. This was another reason for war in 2022. Messrs. Obama and Biden betrayed Ukraine, and it showed Putin that America was not leading the free world.

Harris, Trump Hit Overdrive in Campaign's Final Weekend

US presidential election battle enters final tense stage.

Ukraine realized that it cannot trust the Democrats, so they began to train troops with newfound vigor. A friend of mine, who retired from the U.S. 1st Special Forces Group, was in Ukraine. He helped train the country’s Azov Brigade during the early days of the 2014 Russian invasion. The brigade continues to fight to this day.

Mr. Trump was elected president of the United States in 2016 and began to study geopolitical scenarios across the globe. He realized that NATO had become lazy and inefficient, that many countries were not close to providing the alliance with the required financial contribution of 2 percent of each country’s gross domestic product, and that military training was not taking place. These nations preferred to spend their defense allocations on social welfare programs. The warrior ethos was replaced by apathy and indifference coupled with drugs and hedonism.

After a routine conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Mr. Trump sent Ukraine more than 600 Javelins in 2017. Mr. Biden refused to help Ukraine in 2022. It was Mr. Trump who saved Ukraine in the initial weeks of the invasion.

The Democrats could not stomach Mr. Trump, though he improved the U.S. economy and told NATO members to shape up. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi decided to impeach Mr. Trump over his conversation with Mr. Zelenskyy, though Mr. Biden’s son, Hunter, sat on the board of directors of a Ukrainian company.

During Mr. Trump’s presidency, he sent the 10th Special Forces Group to help Ukraine. Poland was very helpful by sending groups of “GROM,” or Polish Special Forces soldiers, to train Ukrainian troops. Mr. Trump may have called Putin “smart,” which was a negotiation tactic, but he also took him to task.

In one conversation, Mr. Trump warned Putin not to attack Ukraine.

Months before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Mr. Zelenskyy begged Mr. Biden for military aid. Mr. Biden and Ms. Harris refused. They firmly believed that Ukraine would fall in three days, so why help? Thanks to Mr. Trump, Mr. Zelenskyy used the Javelins he received back in 2017 to save Kyiv.

How did Ukraine survive in early 2022? My friend from the 1st Special Forces Group was not surprised; he was proud of the Ukrainian military and how they used hit-and-run tactics. They morphed into a force that used fast-hitting, lethal tactics, but only when they got the supplies they needed.

Where do we stand today? Mr. Biden has been slow-walking aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. He was afraid of offending or provoking Putin. Somehow, they believed that a war of attrition would be the best option for Ukraine. Mr. Biden and Ms. Harris have blood on their hands for creating this stalemate.

Will Ms. Harris do better? Of course not. She is a carbon copy of Mr. Biden and his disastrous policies. Remember Afghanistan? The press wants you to forget, but Putin saw weakness in both of them. He will be happy to have Ms. Harris at the helm of the United States.

Americans of Ukrainian descent should all vote for Mr. Trump. He is not a perfect person, as no one is. However, he is a leader, though you may not like the structure of his sentences or his energy. His running mate, J.D. Vance, was not my first choice, but we have what we have. Mr. Trump is reaching out to Nikki Haley, and she will make a great secretary of the State Department. Ms. Haley knows international politics and she is a strong supporter of Ukraine.

Mr. Trump understands that the United States is up against an evil coalition of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. We need peace in the world, but Russia must be defeated. U.S. industries must come home from China, especially pharmaceutical companies. North Korea must suffer the consequences of sending troops to Ukraine. Iranian bomb-making factories must be destroyed, and their nuclear weapons program has to be pulverized.

When Mr. Trump was president, there were no new wars. Mr. Trump planned to leave Afghanistan with honor, and not leave weapons worth over $85 billion in that country, which could have helped Ukraine. Mr. Biden did not care. That is why everyone needs to put Mr. Trump back in the White House.

Col. Roman Golash (retired) was deputy brigade commander of the 332nd Medical Brigade of the U.S. Army in Nashville, Tenn. Before that, he was assigned to a terrorist mitigation group with the U.S. Fifth Army. During mobilization in 2005, he was part of the First United States Army, training the 34th Infantry Division for duties in Iraq. He also participated in eight missions to Ukraine in the 1990s.

This opinion piece is reprinted with permission from the US publication The Ukrainian Weekly.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

To suggest a correction or clarification, write to us here

You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter

Please leave your suggestions or corrections here

Roman Golash

kyivpost.com · by Roman Golash · November 3, 2024

3. Why the U.S. Must Strengthen Its Commitment to Protect Allies in the South China Sea Against Chinese Aggression

Excerpts:

Conclusion: A New U.S. Strategy for a Stable South China Sea

The United States faces a pivotal moment in its commitment to the security and sovereignty of its allies in the South China Sea. Chinese Coast Guard aggression has grown more audacious, testing the limits of international tolerance and the efficacy of the U.S. response. As current U.S. strategies have done little to curb this behavior, it is imperative for the U.S. to adopt a more robust, proactive approach that addresses the specific nature of Chinese aggression in the region.

The proposed measures—submersible drones, propeller-entanglement devices, high-intensity light or laser deterrents, civilian surveillance networks, and expandable foam—are examples of viable, innovative solutions that can be employed to defend US allies and enhance maritime deterrence without escalating to full-scale military conflict. These actions could strengthen allied nations’ defenses, demonstrate U.S. commitment, and create tangible consequences for China’s coercive tactics.

In implementing these strategies, the U.S. can reaffirm its role as a defender of freedom and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring that its allies do not stand alone against the challenge of Chinese aggression. By moving beyond symbolic gestures and adopting a stance that actively addresses China’s grey-zone strategies, the U.S. can effectively protect the South China Sea’s freedom and its allies’ sovereignty, sending a resounding message to all nations that aggression, in any form, will not go unchecked.

Why the U.S. Must Strengthen Its Commitment to Protect Allies in the South China Sea Against Chinese Aggression

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/why-the-u-s-must-strengthen-its-commitment-to-protect-allies-in-the-south-china-sea-against-chinese?utm

By Jeremiah Monk

Introduction

The South China Sea remains one of the world’s most critical regions for international shipping, trade, and geopolitical balance. Yet, Chinese Coast Guard aggression toward allied nations has escalated, straining the stability of the region and testing the commitments of the United States to protect its allies. Although the actions taken by Chinese forces often fall below the threshold of armed conflict, they constitute a persistent, calculated form of aggression aimed at expanding Chinese influence and undermining allied resolve. This aggression poses a direct threat to the security interests of U.S. allies and partners, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian nations. It is essential that the United States adopt a more proactive stance to protect these allies effectively, as the current U.S. posture has shown insufficient deterrent power. This article explores why the U.S. has a responsibility to intervene, provides recent examples of Chinese Coast Guard actions, and proposes three innovative measures to better deter aggression and safeguard allied interests.

The U.S. Responsibility to Protect Allied Nations in the South China Sea

The United States has long maintained strategic alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Alliances with nations like the Philippines and Japan have been instrumental in establishing a balance of power and promoting peace and security. The South China Sea is vital not only for its resources and economic significance but also as a symbol of regional freedom against coercion. When the U.S. extends its protection and strengthens its commitments, it reinforces the security structure that prevents any one nation from dominating the region.

However, Chinese actions have challenged this structure. China’s Coast Guard, operating under a strategy of “grey zone” tactics, pursues aggressive actions that fall below the threshold of military conflict, making it difficult for allied nations to justify self-defense responses. This aggression includes ramming, water-cannoning, and maneuvering dangerously close to vessels of allied nations. Despite these provocations, the U.S. response has largely been passive, relying on diplomatic statements and freedom-of-navigation operations, which have so far proven inadequate in deterring China’s actions.

Recent Examples of Chinese Coast Guard Aggression

Over the past few years, Chinese Coast Guard actions have repeatedly infringed on the sovereignty of neighboring countries and raised tensions in the South China Sea. In July 2023, for example, Chinese vessels reportedly rammed Philippine fishing boats near the Spratly Islands, causing damage to the boats and endangering the lives of Filipino fishermen. This incident was not an isolated one. A similar event occurred earlier in 2023, where a Chinese vessel blocked a Philippine supply boat in the Second Thomas Shoal, obstructing it from resupplying a military outpost. Such actions are designed to intimidate and coerce while avoiding a direct confrontation that might provoke an armed U.S. response under its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines.

Moreover, China has established a formidable presence with its “maritime militia,” an armed group of fishing vessels that supplement the Chinese Coast Guard’s patrols. These militia vessels often crowd around disputed territories and have been reported encircling islands occupied by other nations, preventing these countries from conducting routine patrols or fishing activities in their own waters. In many cases, these actions are coupled with warnings from the Chinese Coast Guard, claiming these territories as Chinese waters and forbidding other nations’ vessels from approaching.

The Failure of the Current U.S. Posture in Deterring Aggression

While the U.S. has taken steps to counter China’s assertiveness, including increasing freedom-of-navigation operations and conducting joint military exercises with allies, these measures have done little to deter Chinese Coast Guard aggression. Freedom-of-navigation operations serve as symbolic affirmations of open seas but fall short of challenging China’s day-to-day harassment of U.S. allies in the region. Similarly, joint exercises may improve allied preparedness but do not directly address the immediate needs of smaller nations facing Chinese coercion.

Without a more proactive approach, the U.S. risks signaling to its allies that it is unwilling or unable to defend their interests against Chinese aggression. This lack of action could embolden China to continue, or even escalate, its coercive tactics. To demonstrate its commitment to its allies, the U.S. must explore innovative strategies that directly respond to the unique challenges posed by Chinese Coast Guard actions.

Proposed Measures to Deter Chinese Coast Guard Aggression

The United States needs creative, assertive measures to counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea effectively. The following three options offer a proactive approach to better deter the Chinese Coast Guard while enhancing protection for allied nations.

1. Deployment of Combined Submersible Drone and Propeller-Entanglement Device Systems

To effectively patrol and defend strategic areas in the South China Sea, the U.S. could help allies deploy defensive propeller-entanglement devices in key areas. The devices, which can be as simple as a tangle or rope or an advanced high-tensile net, could be deployed by fishing vessels or by submersible drones. Ropes can ensnare and seize Chinese propellers, rendering aggressive vessels unmaneuverable. Drones, which are designed to be stealthy and maneuverable, could be stationed at key choke points or near allied waters to monitor and, if necessary, temporarily disable hostile vessels. By deploying underwater drones to patrol contested waters, the U.S. could create a persistent surveillance presence, enabling real-time monitoring and, if Chinese vessels engage in aggressive maneuvers, immediate defensive action.

Equipped with propeller-entanglement systems, these drones could discreetly release entangling lines or nets to immobilize hostile vessels if they approach too closely to allied ships. This non-violent, defensive measure would complicate China’s use of close-contact intimidation tactics and create real consequences for any harassment of U.S. allies’ vessels. By combining surveillance and deterrence in one system, the U.S. could enhance regional security while avoiding direct military confrontation.

2. Use of High-Intensity Light or Laser Deterrents

Deploying non-lethal high-intensity lights or low-energy lasers on U.S. or allied vessels could deter Chinese ships that engage in close-harassment tactics. These tools could disorient or temporarily impair the vision of operators on aggressive vessels without causing permanent harm, making it difficult for them to engage in close-contact intimidation of allied ships. High-intensity lights or lasers could also be deployed on automated floating buoys near contested zones, creating a low-cost deterrent barrier that makes it uncomfortable and risky for Chinese vessels to continue their incursions.

Using high-intensity lights and lasers would allow smaller allied vessels to maintain a safe distance from intimidating Chinese ships, giving allied nations a form of deterrence that is reversible, humane, and legally compliant. This approach also aligns with current technological trends in non-lethal deterrence, providing a relatively low-risk means of pushing back against grey-zone tactics without engaging in open conflict.

3. Crowdsourcing Surveillance with Private Fishing Fleets and Public "Naming and Shaming"

To increase surveillance capabilities and exert diplomatic pressure, the U.S. could assist allied nations in outfitting local fishing fleets with GPS tracking, audio, and video-recording devices, creating a “civilian surveillance network.” These fishing fleets, with their daily presence in contested waters, could capture real-time evidence of Chinese Coast Guard harassment and other aggressive actions. This network would serve as a passive deterrent by vastly increasing the visibility of China’s activities in the region.

Beyond simply gathering data, this information could be publicly released in a “naming and shaming” campaign to spotlight and expose each instance of Chinese coercion. High-quality video evidence and GPS data, shared on international platforms, would show the provocations and intimidation that China uses against smaller nations in the South China Sea. Such exposure would create diplomatic consequences, drawing negative attention to China’s actions from global audiences, international media, and human rights organizations. By documenting and broadcasting these incidents, the U.S. and its allies could weaken China’s standing and raise global awareness, making it harder for China to sustain its aggression in the court of public opinion.

4. Employment of Quick-Expanding Foam Spray as a Non-Lethal Deterrent

A quick-expanding foam spray could be deployed as a non-lethal tool to temporarily disable hostile Chinese Coast Guard or militia vessels engaging in aggressive maneuvers. This type of foam, which rapidly expands and hardens on contact, could be deployed by allied or U.S. vessels to obstruct essential parts of a threatening vessel, such as its propellers or water intake valves. The foam acts as an immobilizing agent, effectively preventing the vessel from maneuvering without causing permanent damage.

This method of deterrence provides a powerful psychological and physical barrier by halting aggressive vessels in their tracks. The quick-expanding foam can be deployed through specialized canisters or launchers, requiring minimal setup. Additionally, this foam is biodegradable and non-toxic, ensuring minimal environmental impact while providing a reversible but highly visible deterrent. Using this method, allied nations and U.S. forces could respond to encroaching vessels in a measured yet assertive manner, creating an effective line of defense without escalating to direct military confrontation.

Conclusion: A New U.S. Strategy for a Stable South China Sea

The United States faces a pivotal moment in its commitment to the security and sovereignty of its allies in the South China Sea. Chinese Coast Guard aggression has grown more audacious, testing the limits of international tolerance and the efficacy of the U.S. response. As current U.S. strategies have done little to curb this behavior, it is imperative for the U.S. to adopt a more robust, proactive approach that addresses the specific nature of Chinese aggression in the region.

The proposed measures—submersible drones, propeller-entanglement devices, high-intensity light or laser deterrents, civilian surveillance networks, and expandable foam—are examples of viable, innovative solutions that can be employed to defend US allies and enhance maritime deterrence without escalating to full-scale military conflict. These actions could strengthen allied nations’ defenses, demonstrate U.S. commitment, and create tangible consequences for China’s coercive tactics.

In implementing these strategies, the U.S. can reaffirm its role as a defender of freedom and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring that its allies do not stand alone against the challenge of Chinese aggression. By moving beyond symbolic gestures and adopting a stance that actively addresses China’s grey-zone strategies, the U.S. can effectively protect the South China Sea’s freedom and its allies’ sovereignty, sending a resounding message to all nations that aggression, in any form, will not go unchecked.

4. On Eve of US Election, ‘High Alert’ and Cautious Optimism on Foreign Interference

Excerpts:

Meurmishvili: How does the U.S. balance protecting elections with ensuring free speech and expression?

Gerstell: That’s always the delicate balance—protecting democratic processes while upholding free speech. The U.S. is very cautious when it comes to limiting speech, even in the context of foreign disinformation. Unlike in some other countries, we don’t have mechanisms to simply shut down disinformation sources, because of First Amendment protections.

Meurmishvili: What role does social media play in this, especially in terms of disinformation?

Gerstell: Social media is a huge vector for disinformation. The platforms have made some strides in minimizing fake news and misinformation, but they still have a long way to go. The ability to create fake personas and spread false information remains a significant challenge, and bad actors continue to exploit this.

Meurmishvili: Given the strides made in tackling disinformation, are you satisfied with where we are, or do you think more needs to be done?

Gerstell: We’ve made great progress, especially with platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, but it’s an ongoing battle. We’ve introduced programs to minimize misinformation, but disinformation evolves rapidly. The key is that platforms need to continually adapt and build robust systems to identify and eliminate fake news.

There’s always room for improvement. Social media companies and governments are collaborating more, but the nature of disinformation is that it’s constantly evolving. We need to stay ahead of the curve and maintain vigilance.

On Eve of US Election, ‘High Alert’ and Cautious Optimism on Foreign Interference

The government and private sector are racing to mitigate election interference risks in the final runup to Election Day

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/on-eve-of-us-election-high-alert-and-cautious-optimism

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWSVoters make selections at their voting booths inside an early voting site on October 17, 2024 in Hendersonville, North Carolina. (Photo by Melissa Sue Gerrits/Getty Images)Tweet

Posted: November 2nd, 2024

By The Cipher Brief

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWS — In the final days of one of the most consequential U.S. presidential campaigns in memory, outside threats to the election remain a high risk. As The Cipher Brief has reported, there is heightened concern over foreign interference from several quarters, much of it driven by new technologies that have made it easier for adversaries to meddle in the process.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has repeatedly warned that Russia, China and Iran are using generative artificial intelligence (AI) technology to spread dis- and misinformation about the presidential candidates, and amplify political divisions. Cyber threat actors have also tried to hack into the presidential campaigns; reports suggest that Chinese hackers who broke into U.S. telecommunications networks last month targeted the phones of former President Donald Trump and several of his family members, as well as members of Vice President Kamala Harris’s campaign staff.

The election interference threat was a key subject of interest at The Cipher Brief 2024 Threat Conference. Our chief international correspondent Ia Meurmishvili spoke with Glenn Gerstell, former General Counsel at the National Security Agency, and Sandra Joyce, the head of Google Threat Intelligence, on the sidelines of the conference to discuss the risks, the role of social media, and how strong public-private partnerships help bolster our election system’s defense.

The picture in these last days before the election is “cautiously optimistic,” as Gerstell puts it. “The intelligence community is on high alert, and we’re seeing efforts across the board to safeguard the integrity of the elections,” he said. “But we need to stay vigilant and ensure that we continue adapting to the evolving threats.”

Glenn Gerstell

Gerstell practiced law for almost 40 years at the international law firm of Milbank, LLP, where he focused on the global telecommunications industry. He served on the President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council, which reports to the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security on security threats to the nation’s infrastructure, as well as on the District of Columbia Homeland Security Commission. He is a principal member of the Cyber Initiatives Group.

Sandra Joyce

Sandra is a cybersecurity leader with 26 years of intelligence experience. She leads Google Threat Intelligence and joined Google in 2022, following Google’s acquisition of Mandiant. Sandra is a U.S. Air Force Reserve offi cer, serving as a faculty member and on the Board of Visitors at the National Intelligence University. She is a member of the Aspen Institute Cybersecurity Working Group, the strategic council of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, and the Institute for Security and Technology’s Ransomware Task Force Steering Committ ee. Sandra also joined the Board of Directors at Crane NXT.

These conversations have been edited for length and clarity.

Meurmishvili: With the elections coming up, where do you see some of the external threats, particularly from foreign interference?

Gerstell: Unfortunately, we do have to worry about foreign interference in U.S. elections. We saw this back in 2016, where Russia attempted to influence the presidential elections. The pattern continues, with disinformation and attempts to interfere in political campaigns being the primary tactics. We’re not likely to see direct interference with voting machines, but the disinformation aimed at sowing discord is already happening.

Joyce: Cyber threat actors from Iran and Russia and China – we have been watching them all interfere with elections or with the information space over the last several years. We have been tracking very specific threat actors who are doing this type of activity. We recently published a report about a group we call APT42, an Iranian threat actor that has been targeting both sides of the campaign. It’s almost that they don’t necessarily have a favorite candidate. They just want to sow some discord in American elections. That’s what we’re tracking right now.

Meurmishvili: Do you anticipate the same level of interference, or do you think the threat is evolving?

Gerstell: We’re seeing similar patterns, but it’s evolving. For instance, we’ve recently seen efforts to share false information on social media platforms, and in some cases, there’s been hacking attempts aimed at campaign infrastructures. This disinformation is not limited to Russia anymore—other actors are also getting involved.

Joyce: (In the case of Iranian hacking group APT42), the threat actor actually leaked – they didn’t just hack in, but also leaked this information. That’s something that was new for this threat actor. But we’ve seen hack-and-leak quite often as a tool for some of these threat actors who have done this. The GRU, for example, from Russian intelligence, has done that hack-and-leak as well. Basically, what we’re looking at is either an intrusion or information operations or a hybrid of both.

Looking for a way to get ahead of the week in cyber and tech? Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter to quickly get up to speed on the biggest cyber and tech headlines and be ready for the week ahead. Sign up today.

Meurmishvili: What do you think about the overall readiness?

Gerstell: The intelligence community is doing a lot. We’ve seen it evolve, particularly after 2016. Agencies like the NSA and FBI have stepped up their efforts, and we’ve seen bipartisan support for measures aimed at countering these threats. The intelligence community remains vigilant, especially with Russia, but also with other foreign actors.

Joyce: The good thing is that a lot of this election interference from foreign threats doesn’t really amount to much. I’ll give you some examples involving Chinese information operations – more specifically, pro-China information operations, like a campaign called Dragon Bridge. What we have seen is attempts to create narratives that are anti-US, and pro-China. We have seen them do their narratives and push out these agendas in over 10 languages, on 30 different social media platforms.

However, when YouTube is taking them down – they took down 57,000 YouTube channels that Dragon Bridge tried to put out there, and 80% of them had zero subscribers. Similarly, 900,000 videos have been taken down from that same threat actor, and about roughly 70% had viewership of less than a hundred, and about 30% had zero. So really what we’re looking at there is that there’s not a lot of organic engagement with these information operations. So I would say that while there’s a lot of effort from the Chinese side going on, it doesn’t seem to have the impact that they probably want.

Meurmishvili: What do you ascribe that to?

Joyce: I think everyone wants to be an influencer, but not everyone understands their audience. First of all, YouTube taking them down obviously takes away the opportunity for those to get propagated further. But also, when you’re doing an information operations campaign, you really have to understand the psyche of your target audience. And maybe they just haven’t gotten that good at that yet.

Meurmishvili: How does the U.S. balance protecting elections with ensuring free speech and expression?

Gerstell: That’s always the delicate balance—protecting democratic processes while upholding free speech. The U.S. is very cautious when it comes to limiting speech, even in the context of foreign disinformation. Unlike in some other countries, we don’t have mechanisms to simply shut down disinformation sources, because of First Amendment protections.

Meurmishvili: What role does social media play in this, especially in terms of disinformation?

Gerstell: Social media is a huge vector for disinformation. The platforms have made some strides in minimizing fake news and misinformation, but they still have a long way to go. The ability to create fake personas and spread false information remains a significant challenge, and bad actors continue to exploit this.

Meurmishvili: Given the strides made in tackling disinformation, are you satisfied with where we are, or do you think more needs to be done?

Gerstell: We’ve made great progress, especially with platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, but it’s an ongoing battle. We’ve introduced programs to minimize misinformation, but disinformation evolves rapidly. The key is that platforms need to continually adapt and build robust systems to identify and eliminate fake news.

There’s always room for improvement. Social media companies and governments are collaborating more, but the nature of disinformation is that it’s constantly evolving. We need to stay ahead of the curve and maintain vigilance.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? Watch The Cipher Brief’s interview with CIA Director Bill Burns as he talks about The Middle East, Russia, China and the thing that keeps him up at night.

Meurmishvili: Let’s talk about private-public partnership in this. How important is that partnership, in terms of securing elections?

Joyce: I think that the public-private partnership is probably the single most important thing we’re talking about at this [Cipher Brief Threat] conference, because the threat landscape is so vast and everybody has a different perspective. Everybody has a different view, different authorities, different regulations, and the only way we’re going to be able to really attack the problems that are here in the world is through those relationships where we come together and solve problems. I think that’s how important it is.

From my perspective, the industry and government partnerships around cyber threats specifically have never been stronger. There are a few reasons for this. The CCC (Cybersecurity Collaboration Center) at NSA has created an opportunity for businesses to work with NSA in an unclassified setting, really highlighting threats that they see in industry that perhaps the government didn’t see before, which can protect thousands of organizations. We have things like the JCDC (Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative) with DHS and CISA, so you can see that the government is taking that public private partnership very seriously.

Meurmishvili: Are there any measures that you would like to see that would make some of these efforts even more effective?

Joyce: Mandiant Intelligence is part of the organization under Google Threat Intelligence, and so we have this very good perspective of incident responses. Mandiant responds to over 1300 incidents every year, and we get a first-row seat in seeing what threat actors are doing. When I spoke to some of these incident responders, I said, Well, what would be three controls you could do that could take care of the biggest amount of these threats?

And it was the following: One was to use multifactor authentication. To have a modern EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) solution across your entire deployment, (with) a hundred percent of endpoints, which is harder than it sounds. And then we know that from our incidence reports, we have often seen that there was an alert, an initial alert that was either ignored, misunderstood or deprioritized. So having a process around that kind of thing.

There’s never a silver bullet, and all of these have their own vulnerabilities associated with them. But if a company or an organization were to be able to do something like this, they would take care of the vast majority of the commodity threats that are out there.

Meurmishvili: Some of these actors are using technological advancements to amplify their messages. Is the U.S. government fast enough to respond?

Joyce: I think that it’s not a question about if the government is fast enough. I think with emerging technologies and the threats and opportunities that those create for us, it’s really a whole-of-society approach we need to take.

Take AI for example. What’s really, really crucial there is that it is the kind of productivity tool, the type of tool that is going to change everything — it already is changing everything. And so we want to make sure that we are ahead of threat actors who are going to eventually be using it for their purposes. And they are in some cases already doing it. We have seen them try to sell jail-breaked versions of some of these chatbots in the underground. We have seen them use it for deep fakes. We’ve seen that type of thing.

But what we haven’t seen yet is, for example, an incident response that we’ve done where AI was the tool, a game-changing tool for a threat actor. We haven’t seen that yet, which to me means they’re still experimenting. And we have the opportunity — government, industry, organizations, nonprofits, all of us — to walk forward understanding how we want AI to shape our lives together, what our standards are, what the regulation should be, and that we stay ahead in this technology so we can use it to defend ourselves.

Meurmishvili: Do you feel optimistic about the upcoming elections, given all the challenges?

Gerstell: I think we have reason to be cautiously optimistic. The intelligence community is on high alert, and we’re seeing efforts across the board to safeguard the integrity of the elections. But we need to stay vigilant and ensure that we continue adapting to the evolving threats.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

5. Is the United States on the Verge of Civil War?

Excerpts:

Notably, then, firearms provide not just a capability for those who might be inclined to violence but might even be contributing to the radicalization and mobilization of Americans against other Americans.

Such sentiments have crystallized at a moment when an already polarized nation faces another highly divisive and nail-bitingly-close presidential election.

The far-right is especially eyeing these developments with suspicion and expressing ever more effusive concern over social media. Based on manifold posts, tweets, comments, and emojis, persons of this particular political persuasion will almost certainly be provoked should Trump lose another electoral bid. They will likely assume the mantle of his ultimate guardians—and indeed avengers. This combustible scenario is only catapulted further by an insistence from both sides of the aisle that this election is set to be the last in America.

At the same time, a Trump electoral victory could well prompt violence from the far-left, inspired in no small part by a strategy of revolution called accelerationism. Although first articulated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in their seminal 1848 pamphlet, Manifesto of The Communist Party, it more recently surfaced as a concept for a white supremacist revolution in the United States via a 1980s-era newsletter, titled, Siege.

In 2015, an online message board called “Iron March” published a digital edition of a collection of past writings that had originally appeared as a hardcopy book in 2003. The actual concept of accelerationism does not appear until page 199 where, the author argues, “the country isn’t going but has gone MAD; that the final END of society is accelerating; that the entire foundation itself is thoroughly corroded . . . Now isn’t that the most encouraging thing anyone has reported to you in a long, long time?”

Let us return to the question that opened this essay: is the United States on the verge of a civil war? Although we have argued elsewhere that the answer, for geographic reasons, is likely no, the question is no longer frivolous. We stand on the precipice of an election likely to offer an unprecedented mix of ingredients for widespread violence. America was up to the test in 2020. Time will tell whether 2024 can follow suit.

Is the United States on the Verge of Civil War?

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/is-the-united-states-on-the-verge-of-civil-war

Posted: October 30th, 2024

By Bruce Hoffman

Bruce Hoffman is a professor at Georgetown University and co-author of Gods, Guns, and Sedition: Far Right Terrorism in America. He served on the Independent Commission to Review the FBI’s Post-9/11 Response to Terrorism and Radicalization, and is a Scholar-in-Residence for Counterterrorism at the CIA.

By Jacob Ware

Jacob Ware is a research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and DeSales University. He is co-author of God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America.

OPINION — Is the United States on the verge of civil war? It is a possibility that has been frequently raised in connection with the outcome of the 2024 presidential election. It is also the subject of a hit dystopian film that premiered last April.

Three decades ago, we could all laugh at the absurdity of the White House being destroyed by aliens in the hit science fiction film, “Independence Day.” Today, however, the all-out assault on the White House depicted in Alex Garland’s “Civil War” leaves audiences singularly discomforted by its plausibility.

Although an actual civil war resulting from the 2024 election remains highly unlikely, a range of sufficiently alarming scenarios cannot be prudently dismissed or discounted—as the two recent attempts on former President Donald Trump’s life have shown.

Trump’s conviction last spring on 34 counts of falsifying business records further sharpened the political frictions already embedded in American politics. Almost immediately, threats to the judiciary and the array of Trump’s perceived and actual political enemies intensified. “Our judicial system has been weaponized against the American people,” was typical of the views expressed in die-hard MAGA circles. “We are left with NO option but to take matters into our hands,” far-right media personality Stew Peters asserted on his Telegram feed. Other social media platforms lit up with similar posts, “Time to start capping some leftys,” one post on Gateway Pundit urged. “This cannot be fixed by voting.”

The threats followed a decade of heightened far-right white supremacist and anti-government violence in the United States, striking from El Paso, Texas to Buffalo, New York, and making its most dramatic stand at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

In that universe, it was axiomatic that President Joe Biden and his ‘minions’, having already stolen the 2020 presidential election from the ‘real victor’, had now enlisted the courts in a last-ditch effort to de-rail the electoral prospects of the presidential candidate who, at that time, was far ahead in the polls.

The first assassination attempt, at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania in July, was – to this demographic – proof positive of the desperate lengths Trump’s opponents would go to in order to deny him the presidency. Last month’s attempt on the former president as he golfed in Florida confirmed the acuity of this argument. Unlike the Butler plot, authorities in Florida believe the suspect there may have been directly inspired by partisan politics.

Indeed, salient as the threat from far-right extremism in the United States is, it must also be noted that the threat of violence from far-left extremists is not non-existent.

“We are Westerners fighting for the total eradication of Western civilization,” one student protest group recently proclaimed. Not to be outdone by this call to violent revolution, another student group at a different university quickly followed suit with a similar message. “We seek community and instruction from militants in the Global South, who have been on the frontlines in the fight against tyranny and domination which undergird the imperialist world order,” it boasted. “Resistance takes many forms, including armed struggle.”

The bloodied, decapitated likeness of President Joe Biden’s head displayed by a demonstrator in front of the White House last June was doubtless merely a tasteless manifestation of political street theater. But as we have seen repeatedly in recent years, words and images matter—perhaps even more so in the digital era—and have a propensity to inspire, motivate, and ultimately animate individuals “to take matters into their own hands”—as Stew Peters recently argued and the events of January 6, 2021, proved.

One of the most indelible images of the January 6, 2021, insurrection was the gallows—complete with hangman’s noose—that was erected outside the U.S. Capitol building, surrounded by a crowd calling for one of their own, a Christian, Evangelical vice president, Mike Pence, to be lynched.

Not a Subscriber+Member but need access to the national security content that the experts read? Let’s get you in.

In late August, a Virginia man was arrested for posting 4,359 threats targeting a variety of public officials, including President Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and FBI Director Christopher Wray. It was the 19 posts specifically directed at Harris and the claim that the person’s “AR-15 [assault rifle is] LOCKED AND LOADED” that finally prompted the FBI to intervene.

This environment provides fertile ground for America’s historical, foreign adversaries, too. An Afghan national was recently arrested for an election day plot. The would-be terrorist, according to the Department of Justice, had “conspired and attempted to provide material support to ISIS and obtained firearms and ammunition to conduct a violent attack on U.S. soil in the name of ISIS.” Such a plot surely would have proved greatly unsettling to the many Americans going to the polls and would have provided fruitful ammunition for conspiracy theorists questioning the integrity of the election.

To find a similarly unsettled time in American politics, one would have to go back to the 1960s, when separate assassinations were carried out against President John F. Kennedy; his brother and presidential candidate, Robert F. Kennedy, Sr.; and then civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. That spate of tragedies did not end the incidence of political assassination or attempted assassinations in America. Only a few years later, a shooting attack on third-party presidential candidate George Wallace, left him in a wheelchair for life. In 1975, President Gerald Ford was the target of two separate, though unconnected, assassination attempts; and, in 1981 President Ronald Reagan narrowly escaped death from a would-be assassin’s bullet.

Similar acts of violence accompanied America’s recovery from the Great Depression. A lone assassin could have changed the course of history on February 15th, 1933. On that day, a disgruntled naturalized Italian immigrant opened fire on President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt as he delivered a speech in Miami 17 days before his inauguration. The similarities between would-be assassin Giuseppe Zangara and 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, the would be assassin in Butler, Pennsylvania are unsettling. Both failed to kill their primary target but they did take the lives of bystanders. And both were killed in the course of their attacks.

Sadly, it is not only candidates for the highest office in the land that face serious threats of violence in America. Members of congress increasingly find themselves targeted as well. In 2017, a self-professed supporter of independent Senator Bernie Sanders attempted to murder Republican Party members of Congress at an early morning baseball practice. He managed to wound six people, before the personal security detail accompanying then-House Majority Whip, Louisiana Republican congressman Steve Scalise, who himself was seriously wounded, returned fire and killed the gunman.

And, in October 2022, a far-right Canadian conspiracy theorist broke into the San Francisco home of then-Speaker of the House and Democratic Party congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. After learning that she was away, the intruder attacked and seriously injured her husband.

Neither of these incidents against the legislative leadership of their respective parties should be seen as aberrations. In recent years, the number of threats made against members of congress have increased ten-fold. There were already 900 such incidents in 2016—a depressingly high number. But by the end of the first year of the Trump presidency in 2017, that figure had more than quadrupled. And, then it doubled during the months immediately following the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021.

Since then, nearly half of state legislators across the United States have reported receiving “direct threats” to their lives. And too often, local election officials are being threatened, doxed, and otherwise deliberately intimidated.

According to the FBI, in September, election offices in some two dozen states received threatening communications. They were sent to officials in indisputably red states like Mississippi and Utah; blue states like Massachusetts and New York; and purple ones like North Carolina and Virginia. Messages in the letters and parcels, which contained a suspicious white powder that proved to be harmless, were signed by the hitherto unknown “United States Traitor Elimination Army.”

Research conducted by Seamus Hughes and his team at the University of Nebraska’s National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education (NCITE), Center of Excellence, funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, report that 112 persons have been arrested this year for threatening public officials. This surpasses the previous record of 90 arrests recorded in 2023. Both Republicans and Democrats have been targeted, with more threats directed against Democrats.

Violence may always have been “as American as cherry pie” as the radical African-American nationalist H. Rap Brown famously averred in 1967, but support for its use by a broad spectrum of Americans against their own government and elected representatives is a more recent phenomenon—and one not seen since the years leading up to the outbreak of America’s catastrophic civil war in 1861.

A 2021 survey jointly conducted by the University of Maryland’s Center for Democracy and Civic Engagement and the Washington Post, found more than a third of persons who self-identify as Republican and only slightly fewer less of those who self-identify as Democrats, believe that the use of violence in the United States for political purposes would be “somewhat justified.” This view, we is expressed in a democracy where free-and-fair elections are supposed to be a guarantee.

More alarming still, is that when asked the same question the following year, even more self-professed Republicans—41 percent compared with 36 percent of Democrats—regarded the use of politically motivated violence as “somewhat justified.” Interestingly, the percent of self-proclaimed Democrats sanctioning political violence declined by ten points. As a Washington Post editorial nonetheless lamented, “Overall, the new survey reflects how much the partisan wars continue to rage across the country . . . [with] hopes for unity hav[ing] largely faded as doubts about democracy have grown.”

More recent polls are hardly reassuring. A 2023 survey found that nearly a quarter of Americans agreed with the statement that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.” This past April, another poll of American voters found that 28 percent of Republicans strongly agree or just simply agree that “Americans may have to resort to violence in order to get the country back on track.”

Although only a fraction of Democrats polled shared that conviction, it was a not inconsequential 12 percent. Those who have seen the film, “Civil War” will doubtless recall the haunting question posed by actor Jesse Plemons, “Okay, what kind of American are you?”

Motive without means is of course immaterial. But, in this context, the situation is even more depressing. The United States leads the world—by far—in the number of firearms in private hands. While the United States comprises only 4 percent of the world’s population, it accounts for 40 percent of the globe’s firearms ownership. To drive home this point, there are 121 firearms for every 100 people in the United States compared with 53 in Yemen, the number two country by proportion of population. Indeed, more guns were purchased in the United States during 2020 alone—17 million—than in any other year on record.

It is therefore sobering to reflect on what this means for political discourse in America and attendant opportunities for violence. A 2024 survey conducted by the University of California at Davis revealed the faith that American gunowners have in their power to effect profound political change if moved to do so.

Over 42% of owners of assault-type rifles polled, for instance, agreed that political violence could be justified in certain, exigent circumstances. The number increased to 44 percent when recent gun purchasers were asked the same question, and to a staggering 56% “of those who always or nearly always carry loaded guns in public.”

Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.

Notably, then, firearms provide not just a capability for those who might be inclined to violence but might even be contributing to the radicalization and mobilization of Americans against other Americans.

Such sentiments have crystallized at a moment when an already polarized nation faces another highly divisive and nail-bitingly-close presidential election.

The far-right is especially eyeing these developments with suspicion and expressing ever more effusive concern over social media. Based on manifold posts, tweets, comments, and emojis, persons of this particular political persuasion will almost certainly be provoked should Trump lose another electoral bid. They will likely assume the mantle of his ultimate guardians—and indeed avengers. This combustible scenario is only catapulted further by an insistence from both sides of the aisle that this election is set to be the last in America.

At the same time, a Trump electoral victory could well prompt violence from the far-left, inspired in no small part by a strategy of revolution called accelerationism. Although first articulated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in their seminal 1848 pamphlet, Manifesto of The Communist Party, it more recently surfaced as a concept for a white supremacist revolution in the United States via a 1980s-era newsletter, titled, Siege.

In 2015, an online message board called “Iron March” published a digital edition of a collection of past writings that had originally appeared as a hardcopy book in 2003. The actual concept of accelerationism does not appear until page 199 where, the author argues, “the country isn’t going but has gone MAD; that the final END of society is accelerating; that the entire foundation itself is thoroughly corroded . . . Now isn’t that the most encouraging thing anyone has reported to you in a long, long time?”

Let us return to the question that opened this essay: is the United States on the verge of a civil war? Although we have argued elsewhere that the answer, for geographic reasons, is likely no, the question is no longer frivolous. We stand on the precipice of an election likely to offer an unprecedented mix of ingredients for widespread violence. America was up to the test in 2020. Time will tell whether 2024 can follow suit.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2024

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21. A Russian Telegram user, who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of the Russian special services, claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against a Russian S-300/400 air defense system near occupied Mospyne (just southeast of Donetsk City) and that their sources are still clarifying the damage to the system. The Telegram user claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the air defense systems with six ATACMS missiles and that Russian forces downed three of the missiles. The Telegram user claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Podlet" radar station near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea with a drone on October 23 and that Russian forces have not evacuated the damaged station for repairs yet. A Ukrainian division posted footage on October 31 purportedly showing a successful Ukrainian strike against a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified frontline area, and the footage showed secondary detonations consistent with a successful strike against such a system. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the radar system of another Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23 and a Buk-M3 air defense system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified frontline area. ISW has previously observed indications that Russia has struggled to source the microelectronic components necessary to produce complex weapons and air defense systems due to Western sanctions, and Russia may not be able to produce or repair a sufficient number of air defense systems to maintain the current density of Russia's air defense coverage over occupied Ukraine if Ukraine destroys a significant number of Russian systems. Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, may impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and could limit Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.

South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul stated on November 1 that "all possible scenarios are under consideration" in response to a question about possibly sending weapons to Ukraine following the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia. Cho emphasized that South Korea will monitor North Korean troop involvement in Russia and the "benefits" that North Korea receives from Russia to determine a course of action. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces transferred 7,000 additional North Korean personnel to unspecified areas near the border with Ukraine in the last week (since about October 26). The GUR reported that Russian forces have armed North Korean soldiers with 60mm mortars, AK-12 assault rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, SVD/SVCh sniper rifles, Phoenix anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and have equipped North Korean forces with some night vision devices, thermal imagers, and other optical equipment.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21.

South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine.

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2.

Ukrainian and Russian forces marginally advanced north of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed to have rescinded an order for his Akhmat Spetsnaz soldiers to not take Ukrainian servicemembers as prisoners in the war in Ukraine.

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 2, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 2, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2024

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond. Western officials believe that the regime is debating how and whether it should respond to the strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on November 2 that Iran will give a “tooth-breaking response” to Israel and the United States. This warning comes after Khamenei issued an order on October 29 to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is Iran’s highest defense and foreign policy body, instructing the SNSC to prepare a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer and Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Esmail Kowsari claimed on November 2 that the SNSC agreed on a “military response” to Israel that will involve Iran and its Axis of Resistance. It is more likely that Kowsari would have insight into the SNSC’s decision-making due to his deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders rather than due to his position in the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. Kowsari’s claim is consistent with Western media reports that Iran’s retaliation could include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel. Unspecified Iranian sources speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based al Araby al Jadeed denied on November 2 that Iran will launch an attack from Iraq, instead insisting that Iran will respond from Iranian territory. These differing statements from Iranian officials likely reflect current debates within the regime about how the regime should respond to the Israeli strikes.

The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers to the Middle East. AP reported, citing unspecified US officials, that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the middle of November and return to its home port in San Diego. The United States will still maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Israel and the Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit in the eastern Mediterranean area despite the imminent departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln. Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated that these new deployments demonstrate the “flexible nature of US global defense posture” to deploy world-wide on short notice.

Key Takeaways:

Iranian Retaliation against Israel: The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.

US Posture in the Middle East: The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.

Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed the 900th Infantry Brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2. This brigade, which specializes in operations against “guerilla” cells in the West Bank’s urban environments, would be well-suited to operations in Jabalia’s urban environment, where Hamas has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells.

Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas.

Israeli Raids in Lebanon: Israeli naval special operations forces captured a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval forces in Batroun, central Lebanon, according to an unspecified Israeli official.

8. Russia’s Elite Spetsnaz Special Forces 'Devastated' in Ukraine War

If Russian special operations forces have not fared well in Putin's War, what makes anyone think north Korea SOF will do any better?

Russia’s Elite Spetsnaz Special Forces 'Devastated' in Ukraine War

Russia's Spetsnaz special operations forces, among the most elite military units in Russia, have been severely impacted in Ukraine. Initially tasked with high-stakes missions, including decapitation strikes on Ukrainian leadership, Spetsnaz units have faced devastating losses, especially during Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensives.

The National Interest · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 31, 2024

What You Need to Know: Russia's Spetsnaz special operations forces, among the most elite military units in Russia, have been severely impacted in Ukraine. Initially tasked with high-stakes missions, including decapitation strikes on Ukrainian leadership, Spetsnaz units have faced devastating losses, especially during Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensives.

-According to Pentagon leaks and BBC reports, several Spetsnaz brigades have been reduced to fractions of their initial strength.

-As elite forces are irreplaceable on short timelines, Moscow may need up to a decade to rebuild Spetsnaz to pre-war capacity, marking a critical setback for Russia’s strategic special operations capabilities against near-peer adversaries.

War in Ukraine: The Heavy Toll on Russia’s Spetsnaz Commandos

Since the opening hours of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s elite Spetsnaz special operations units have been on the front of the fighting. Much like the rest of the Russian military, their performance has varied. They have also suffered extremely heavy losses that undermine their strategic utility for years to come. Nonetheless, Spetsnaz units remain Moscow’s go-to force for difficult missions.

Russia’s Elite Soldiers

Spetsnaz, an abbreviation of “special purposes forces” in Russian, is a term that describes the specialized units of the Russian military, law enforcement, and intelligence services.

The term dates before World War One but it wasn’t until after World War Two that Stalin created the first official Spetsnaz units.

The original Spetsnaz units were part of the Russian Chief Intelligence Office (GRU) and Federal Security Service (FSB). Today, several Spetsnaz units provide the Russian military and law enforcement with specialized troops.

When it comes to mission sets, Spetsnaz units specialize in direct action, strategic reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare. They usually have the best weapons and equipment in the entire Russian armed forces.

In terms of training, all Spetsnaz units are airborne qualified in static-line parachuting, but only the most elite are free-fall qualified and can conduct jumps from very high altitudes.

The GRU and FSB Spetsnaz units are by far the most elite and professional. These are the tier 1 special operations units and are comparable, at least on paper, to the U.S. Army’s Delta Force and Navy’s SEAL Team 6. They specialize in direct action, human intelligence, cyber espionage, sabotage, and assassinations.

Spetsnaz in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine is the largest conflict Russia has found itself in since World War Two. As such, the Kremlin has thrown everything it has into the fight, including its elite Spetsnaz forces.

At the onset of the conflict, the Russian High Command had planned to use its Spetsnaz units to bag an easy victory for the Kremlin. While Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) paratroopers were storming the Hostomel airport next to Kyiv, Spetsnaz commandos were going after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other high-ranking Ukrainian officials.

The Kremlin wanted to decapitate the Ukrainian command and control structure at the most important point of the conflict and create chaos in its adversary. Much like of Moscow’s plans, the attempt to take out Zelensky and the Ukrainian leadership failed.

But, the Russian military was not dissuaded and continued to use its elite Spetsnaz forces in the conflict. Although conventional Russian troops spearheaded the three different invasion prongs: north toward Kyiv; south toward Kherson and Odessa; and west toward Kharkiv, the Kremlin deployed Spetsnaz commandos every time the conventional Russian forces faced significant resistance. Spetsnaz commandos have appeared in all of the important battles, including Mariupol, Kherson, Lyman, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and the Donbas.

However, the heavy attrition suffered by the Russian forces also reached the elite Spetsnaz. In April 2023, a U.S. Air National Guard airman leaked several classified documents. Some of the documents concerned the war in Ukraine and Pentagon’s assessments of the combatants and the course of the conflict. And there were documents about the Spetsnaz units and their casualties in the war.

According to the Pentagon, all but one of five Spetsnaz brigades that went to war on February 24, 2022, had suffered significant losses by late summer 2022. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s estimate, one of the separate Spetsnaz brigades in question had only, “125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.”

In military terms, a unit that has lost almost ninety percent of its combat capability is deemed no longer effective and is moved from the line.

Those numbers would only have increased as the Ukrainians launched an extremely successful counteroffensive just a few weeks later, in September 2022, liberating hundreds of square miles of territory in just a few days. During that Ukrainian counteroffensive, the GRU’s Third Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, one of Russia’s most elite units, was caught in the retreat and had to fight a defensive action in the town of Lyman.

It didn’t go well.

A subsequent report by the BBC assessed that the Spetsnaz unit lost up to seventy-five percent of its men.

The Russian military is even using Spetsnaz units to attack Ukrainian trenches, a task usually reserved for regular infantry.

Although we don’t have more up-to-date figures concerning Spetsnaz losses after the summer of 2022, the extremely heavy losses suffered by the entire Russian forces suggest that Spetsnaz special operations units have continued to take significant losses. Overall, the Russian forces have lost almost 700,000 men in the fighting thus far and casualties continue to pill up every day at an alarming speed, over the weekend, Moscow lost an average of 1,600 men each day. And although the Russian military can replenish losses in conventional units easily, that is not the case with Spetsnaz special operations units.

The Strategic Effect

One of the main differences between special operations and conventional units is the training and qualifications of their troops. For example, a U.S. Air Force Pararescueman requires around two years of advanced training before they join an operational unit. Other units have similar lengthy selection and assessment pipelines.

The level of casualties suffered by the Russian special operations units will leave a strategic capability gap. Moscow won’t be able to recreate the capability anytime soon. Indeed, in the leaked classified documents, the Pentagon estimated that it would take Russia up to ten years to reconstitute its special operations capability. And that assessment referred to casualty figures more than two years ago.

There are two pertinent adages from the U.S. special operations community that say, “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced” and “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”

Russia might try to recreate its Spetsnaz units, but it will take a lot more than just numbers to recreate a strategic special operations capability that can used against near-peer adversaries.

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

9. Ukraine Is Getting Another 200 Stryker Vehicles Just In Time To Meet A North Korean Onslaught

What if Korea provided 200 tanks, 200 infantry fighting vehicles, and 200 howitzers along with a sustained flow of ammunition for each? I would bet this would have more of an effect on the war than 10,000 or 50,000 NKPA forces.

Ukraine Is Getting Another 200 Stryker Vehicles Just In Time To Meet A North Korean Onslaught

The extra U.S.-made Strykers should be enough to equip the 95th Air Assault Brigade.

Forbes · by David Axe · November 2, 2024

David Axe

Forbes Staff

David Axe writes about ships, planes, tanks, drones and missiles.

Nov 2, 2024,01:55pm EDT

A Ukrainian Stryker.

82nd Air Assault Brigade photo

Thousands of North Korean troops are massing in Kursk Oblast in western Russia. The U.S. Defense Department expects that, any day now, these troops will march to the front line in Kursk to help Russian troops trying to roll back Ukraine’s surprise invasion of the oblast.

“Initial indications are that these troops will be employed in some type of infantry role,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon’s top spokesperson.

Ukrainian forces in their 270-square-mile salient in Kursk are getting a boost, too—potentially in the form of hundreds of American-made Stryker armored vehicles. A $425-million aid package the Pentagon announced on Friday includes bombs, missiles, artillery shells—and at least 212 of the speedy, eight-wheel Strykers.

Most of the Ukrainian military’s Strykers are already in Kursk. There’s no reason to believe the additional vehicles won’t also roll into the salient to meet the counterattacking Russians and their new North Korean allies.

It’s not apparent how quickly the new Strykers will arrive in Ukraine. It is apparent what the Ukrainians will do with the vehicles.

After subtracting the approximately two dozen Strykers the Ukrainians have lost to Russian fire, the additional vehicles will grow the Ukrainian Stryker inventory to nearly 400. Kyiv assigns the 18-ton, 11-person vehicles to air assault brigades—usually equipping three 31-vehicle battalions in each brigade.

Earlier batches of Strykers were sufficient to equip the 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades, both of which contributed battalions to the invasion of Kursk starting in early August. A third air assault brigade, the 95th, is also in Kursk—and it doesn’t yet have any Strykers.

It would make sense for the general staff in Kyiv to prioritize the 95th Air Assault Brigade for the newly consigned Stykers, in order to align the brigade with its sister units in Kursk.

The nimble Stryker with its 60-mile-per-hour top speed is suited to the mix of chaotic urban combat and swift road assaults that’s typical of the fighting in the Russian oblast—and was also a hallmark of last spring’s battle for Vovchansk in northeastern Ukraine.

In Vovchansk, the 82nd Air Assault Brigade discovered what the U.S. Army already knew about the Stryker: in addition to being fast and maneuverable, the nine-foot-tall vehicle is a good observation and firing platform for top-mounted sensors and weapons.

Ukrainian troops bracing for the coming North Korean onslaught in Kursk would surely be grateful for a couple hundred extra Strykers. They’d probably be even more grateful for a few brigades of fresh troops to match the Russians’ North Korean reinforcements soldier-for-soldier.

But as much as the Ukrainian armed forces have struggled to generate enough modern armored vehicles, they’ve struggled more to generate additional manpower. Unless and until the defense ministry in Kyiv can resolve its recruiting crisis, those new Strykers might be the only help coming to Kursk.

Follow me on Twitter. Check out my website or some of my other work here. Send me a secure tip.

Sources

1. U.S. Defense Department (and here)

2. Oryx

3. Ukraine Control Map

David Axe

Forbes · by David Axe · November 2, 2024

10. The U.S. is in the Midst of a Perfect ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Storm

Excerpts:

The quest for cognitive resilience must continue

Related to cognitive warfare, in simple terms, cognitive resilience could be described as the capability of individuals, groups, and societies to recognize and resist deliberate attempts at manipulation, disinformation, and psychological operations. Society writ large must understand critical thinking and decision-making. But it certainly isn’t simple.

It requires a well-coordinated effort which includes education and awareness, government-private sector collaboration, utilizing evolving technologies that assist in mapping out cognitive warfare activities against the U.S., and an ability to persuade Americans that an effort at cognitive resilience is not itself an effort to undermine and control what we think.

Of course, our adversaries will attack efforts that look to expose and undermine their activities. There’s also the risk that even a well-intentioned effort at cognitive resilience can simply be a small voice in a very loud storm. But the reality is that we are in the midst of a perfect storm when it comes to cognitive warfare and we need to face it head on.

The U.S. is in the Midst of a Perfect ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Storm

The Dangerous Convergence of Cognitive Warfare, AI, and the Chaotic Information Environment

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-u-s-is-in-the-midst-of-a-perfect-cognitive-warfare-storm

EXPERT PERSPECTIVETweet

Posted: October 31st, 2024

By Dave Pitts

Pitts is a senior national security executive with over four decades of experience ranging from counterterrorism and special operations to regional and global affairs. Pitts served as the Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia and was responsible for all CIA activities and engagement across South and Central Asia and for policy coordination in Washington.

By J.D. Maddox

J.D. Maddox is a political warfare expert. He’s the CEO of Inventive Insights, consulting on strategic communications, and he’s an adjunct professor at Tulane University and George Mason University. He served as a CIA branch chief, deputy coordinator of the U.S. Global Engagement Center, advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and as a U.S. Army Psychological Operations team leader.

During the 2024 Cipher Brief Threat Conference, Dave Pitts joined Brad Christian, Mike Vickers, and Ralph Goff in a discussion about Gray Zone Operations; a term they recognized was lacking in strategic clarity. One topic discussed was the growing threat of “cognitive warfare.”

The authors are focusing here on cognitive warfare as an important strategic element in great power competition, particularly as superpowers increasingly engage in operations just below the level of war.

Their observation is that U.S. adversaries may have a clearer view of the role of cognitive warfare in great power competition than the U.S. does. They argue exclusively in The Cipher Brief that the U.S. is fully capable of successfully engaging in cognitive warfare against Russia, China, and other aspiring adversaries, but they think there is more essential work to be done in this space.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — We are in an era of renewed great power competition, and the global order for decades to come is hanging in the balance. Great powers, having learned costly lessons from history, are increasingly wary of direct military confrontation against each other. In this complex environment, operations in the “Gray Zone”—the space between peace and open conflict—have become increasingly prevalent.

Activities such as covert action, surrogate warfare, cyber-attacks, penetration of critical infrastructure, use of ambiguous forces (e.g. Russia’s ‘little green men’), and technology theft are examples of Gray Zone activities. These operations allow nations to pursue strategic objectives, at times aggressively, against their adversaries, overtly and covertly, while minimizing the risk of war.

An increasingly prominent Gray Zone activity to gain a strategic advantage over adversaries is cognitive warfare. These are activities conducted across a broad spectrum to achieve specific strategic objectives by influencing individuals, groups, and societies at the cognitive level—through information activities, but also through a wide range of actions and pressures that can influence cognition. Our perceptions and beliefs, what and how we think, how we make decisions, the decisions we make, and even our will and resolve are under unprecedented assault.

The Evolving State of Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare, rooted in ancient strategies like Sun Tzu’s emphasis on winning without fighting, has evolved significantly through history. It evolved through Cold War psychological operations, and further developed in the twentieth century with Russian concepts of Active Measures and Reflexive Control. The post-Cold War era saw the emergence of political warfare, while China contributed its Three Warfares strategy. Most recently, advancements in AI and neuroscience have revolutionized cognitive warfare, enabling more precise targeting of human cognition and decision-making processes. In contrast to traditional information operations, cognitive warfare focuses on people, not systems, and ultimately seeks to control cognition, not media. Today’s cognitive warfare is a comprehensive assault on human cognition that extends well beyond just the spread of false information.

The Primary Actors

China is waging cognitive warfare to weaken U.S. global power and influence while advancing its own global leadership role. Beijing aims to subtly impose its will on the United States and its allies—without resorting to military conflict.

One of China’s primary goals is to reverse U.S. support for Taiwan, but it also seeks to expand its regional and global influence, assert itself as the global technology leader, and strengthen its economy—and it believes the U.S. is in the way. It is China’s belief that cognitive warfare will advance their objectives.

Russia is keeping pace. Moscow is working nonstop to persuade U.S. citizens and policy makers to make decisions on issues like the war in Ukraine that benefit Russia. On September 4, 2024, the U.S. Justice Department disrupted a covert Russian disinformation campaign to undermine international support for Ukraine, bolster Russia’s interests, and influence U.S voters.

These operations are part of Russia’s” Reflexive Control”, an element in Russia’s long-standing military strategy to make adversaries voluntarily make decisions that favor Russia.

Vladimir Putin is the face of Russia’s Reflexive Control strategy and a practitioner of cognitive warfare. It is our assessment that he personally advances false narratives, forceful denials, and conspiracies; issues threats; courts – as well as taunts – world leaders; engages in bad-faith negotiations and diplomatic deception; and seeks to create social and political division within the United States and NATO.

One challenging aspect of Putin’s Reflexive Control is that it is undeterred by discovery. Moscow tends to double down on a false narrative if that narrative is outed as an obvious lie. For months, Moscow denied that the troops it was amassing along Ukraine’s border, were staging for an unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has proven that pushing a false narrative will eventually persuade some people to believe it’s lies. Putin also knows that if he offers an obviously false narrative, some will willingly spread it. The Russian leader is likely more effective with internal audiences, but we should not underestimate his ability to use a wide array of cognitive tactics to sow chaos and uncertainty that then influences beliefs and actions.

Iran is working diligently to influence the 2024 elections, employing a multi-layered information warfare apparatus with branches across the globe. Iran’s goals are similar to Russia’s and China’s in that it wants to weaken the power and influence of the U.S., and punish the U.S. for past actions, manipulating U.S citizens in the process.

What is clear today, is that things have changed. The current U.S. focus on disinformation needs to evolve. Cognitive warfare represents an evolution in conflict, targeting human cognition as its primary battlefield, potentially altering the geopolitical landscape without conventional military engagement. Disinformation is still an effective tool for our adversaries, but it is increasingly a part of a broader and more dangerous cognitive warfare approach.

AI has Changed Everything

Of course, we already know that AI is making all this more challenging, but we’re still only at the beginning of how AI will shape cognitive warfare. Deep fakes, voice cloning, and AI-enabled information is created and then disseminated quickly and widely; often well ahead of the facts.

AI can also be used to automate content creation that can outpace the truth, by making subtle changes in content, working quickly in multiple languages, subtly tailoring information for selected audiences, helping to weave powerful narratives, and persuasively misattributing information.

AI enhances the ability to influence the human cognition and decision-making processes, and the speed and scale of AI-driven operations can overwhelm human cognitive defenses. AI is becoming ubiquitous.

There were close to 250 million users of AI tools globally in 2023. That number is expected to reach 700 million by the end of the decade, according to Statista. This makes it far easier for even more individuals to create and post persuasive disinformation and narratives online. AI is the perfect companion to Cognitive Warfare.

Impact of a Chaotic Information Environment

The chaotic state of the information environment makes it conducive to the creation and dissemination of false and deceptive information. According to the data company Statista, there are over 5 billion internet users today and over 200 million content providers who produce billions of articles and posts and who produce over 4 million podcasts. There are over 10,000 websites created every hour. Any individual or any group, with good or malicious intent, can now easily reach global audiences with minimal costs.

A stand-out example is COVID-related disinformation, whose 12 core originators generated thousands of postings that were then multiplied in repostings and comments, dominating online discussions. User-generated and AI-enabled content can rival established media in accessibility and influence, and fake news sites now outnumber legitimate new sites.

The information environment also provides camouflage, infrastructure, and resources for nefarious work by our adversaries. There are thousands of internet sites, fake users, bots, and willing surrogates managed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea that disseminate disinformation in a calculated manner with the U.S as a primary target.

To make this worse, shadowy Disinformation as a Service (DaaS) providers (private firms that will spread disinformation online for a fee) are on the rise. It’s no wonder that the World Economic Forum identified misinformation and disinformation as the biggest short-term risk in its 2024 Global Risks Report.

What are our Adversaries Strategic Objectives?

Considering the evolving state of cognitive warfare, the enabling capabilities of AI, and the resources and infrastructure offered by the chaotic information environment, what are our adversaries’ interrelated strategic objectives when it comes to cognitive warfare?

The answer: to manipulate the perception of facts and reality. A key goal of cognitive warfare is to replace what we believe and know with new perceptions and realities. Persuasive disinformation, deep fakes, and other AI-manipulated information can shape those perceptions and realities over time.

Persuasive narratives that redefine how we perceive major issues or even one nation versus another can influence our beliefs and decisions. False realities that weave in enough truthful information to sound authentic and that are delivered repetitively can potentially reshape how we see the world. Those narratives can be emphasized in different ways based on the target audiences; internal, the near-abroad, the Global South, Europe, or the United States, for example.

In China’s global messaging strategy, Beijing presents itself as a peaceful rising power, advocating for a “Community of Common Destiny” that emphasizes mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. It projects its ascent as legitimate and beneficial for the region and the world. China often uses educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges for individuals and groups along with the promise to countries of economic investments and infrastructure and security assistance to support this image.

China contrasts this with the narrative that the U.S. is a declining hegemon clinging to global power and attempting to contain China’s rightful rise through aggression, coercion of other nations, and unfair trade practices.

Through this narrative, China seeks to undermine U.S. influence and shape a more China-centric international order while positioning itself as a responsible global actor. Simultaneously, China seeks to obscure criticisms of its own aggressive actions in regions like the South China Sea, its coercive economic practices, and its domestic human rights record.

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that provides the best way to unwind while staying up to speed on national security. Sign up today.

Russia portrays itself as seeking peace and as a defender against Western aggression and imperialism. It is important to Russia that it projects power and its global diplomatic expertise and influence. Russia frames the conflict in Ukraine as an ideological battle against Western hegemony. Putin maintains that Russia is the victim and Ukraine is the aggressor, falsely claiming that Ukraine harbors neo-Nazis and has secret weapons programs.

The Kremlin justifies its actions as protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, while delegitimizing Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty; Russia has claimed that Ukraine is part of Russia. Moscow presents the conflict as a necessary response to NATO expansion and Western meddling, positioning itself as a necessary global counterbalance to U.S. dominance and a champion for a multipolar world order.

Undermining the credibility of leaders, institutions, and policies

Our adversaries are working to undermine the trust we have in our own leaders, institutions, and policies. Both China and Russia have conducted disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks to manipulate stock prices and currency exchange rates. China’s deception and disinformation on COVID is well established. Beijing has even accused the U.S. of using cognitive warfare against China.

Both China and Russia have used cyber-attacks to target a wide range of high-ranking U.S. government officials and their advisors across a spectrum that includes the White House; the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, State Department; and members of Congress. Access to those personal networks allow a wide variety of operations to influence, discredit, or exploit in other ways.

Beyond domestic considerations, there is disagreement in the U.S. on future support for Ukraine and there have been previous delays in funding approvals; developments which ultimately favor Russia and which are consistent with Russia efforts to influence U.S citizens and policymakers. We know from the 2024 Annual U.S. Threat Assessment that China is intensifying efforts to mold U.S. public discourse on Taiwan and to advance its broader narrative. China rightly sees the role that both citizens and policymakers play in future policy decisions on Taiwan, and we should expect China to seek to manipulate this internal dialogue in its favor.

Sowing political and social discontent and creating fractures with our allies

Democratic societies discuss their agreements and disagreements in public. This strength of free societies allows Russia and China to find ways to interfere in public discourse. Moscow is particularly active on this. Undermining confidence in our democratic processes that results in contentious and contested election results— is a win for our adversaries.

Russia and China utilize online personas to pose as Americans and they use the statements of influential Americans to enflame already contentious issues.

Both Chinese and Russian-based accounts were involved in stoking tensions following the George Floyd tragedy. Russia has been particularly active in creating fake religious, political, white supremacist, and both left- and right-wing groups online to sow division and marginalize groups. China trails Russia in these approaches but it is gaining ground and combining its efforts with Russia in some cases.

The social fabric of America is clearly a cognitive warfare target of China and Russia.

Creating apprehension and fear that narrows decision options

Cognitive warfare is not just about information. Intimidation—threatening statements or actions— is a persuasive element of cognitive warfare that can create apprehension about possible outcomes of our decisions and potentially persuade us to make decisions we don’t want to make.

Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has drawn multiple red lines and has issued multiple threats related to the use of nuclear weapons and a state of war with the U.S. and NATO.

Russia threatened the UK that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with UK-supplied weapons could draw retaliatory strikes against British military facilities. In 2022, Russia severely reduced the flow of gas to Europe resulting in price spikes and supply concerns and Moscow cut off the flow of natural gas to Bulgaria and Poland when those countries refused to pay in rubles.

But intimidation can be challenged. Ukraine has publicly exposed Russia’s redlines as intimidation and has brought the West along to see it, even if slowly. Ukraine has used drones against military targets inside of Russia and has boldly called Russia’s bluff on red lines by invading and occupying the Russian territory of Kursk, all while the West exercises an abundance of caution over Russia’s red lines.

Moscow miscalculated that Bulgaria and Poland would cave to its intimidation and be an example for Europe. Both countries refused to accept Moscow’s demands and were aided by support from the U.S. and Europe, and Poland responded with sanctions against companies with connections to Russia. Moscow’s failed intimidation revealed that Putin was not the energy and economic expert some pundits thought him to be and that his actions were damaging the Russian economy.

But intimidation and threats do have cognitive impact. Putin’s threats and concerns shared by the U.S. and NATO over potential escalation—an element in Russia’s cognitive warfare strategy—likely led the U.S. placing limits on the use of weapons that Ukraine could to launch deep strikes into Russia against military targets; limitations that ultimately favor Putin.

Long range missiles for Ukraine are now on the table once again but concerns in the West over the possibility of escalation and Putin’s unpredictability linger. Is this a result of Russia’s cognitive warfare?

China’s Red Lines

China continues to use redlines, intimidation, and not-so-veiled threats of possible conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan as part of its broader cognitive warfare strategy. China has said that a declaration of independence of Taiwan means war, a clear redline. Beijing has increased military pressure through large-scale drills around Taiwan, while simultaneously conducting disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks aimed at both Taiwanese and American targets.

China is also using intimidation to attempt to establish a “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing asserted “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait,” contesting the U.S. Navy’s presence in the area. If China could enforce this bold claim, it would strengthen its position against Taiwan, but the U.S. Navy has continually denied Beijing and has sent U.S. ships through the Taiwan Strait. China has taken a similar approach in the South China Sea, which it claims almost in its entirety, while the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan disagree.

The South China Sea is a Gray Zone

Intelligence analysts have assessed that China is responsible for multiple ramming incidents against Philippine vessels in disputed waters between the two countries. The Philippine Navy is clearly outgunned by the Chinese Navy, but it still continues to occupy its territorial waters in spite of Chinese aggression.

The United States and the European Union have criticized China’s aggressive actions against the Philippines to strengthen the Philippines’ position. But these actions by Beijing against the Philippines are just not random acts of aggression; they have a cognitive purpose. They are meant to create apprehension and a fear of escalation with a powerful adversary, as part of a broader cognitive warfare campaign to persuade the Philippines to submit to China’s demands.

Inducing a steady state of impaired judgment: uncertainty, fatigue, decision paralysis, passive responses, and acceptance of false choices

One aim of cognitive warfare is to influence specific strategic perceptions and decisions, and to impair the judgment and decision-making by the target over the longer term.

Russia, China, and Iran flood the U.S. with false and manipulated information that exploits cognitive biases and overwhelms information processing capabilities. If China and Russia can use an array of cognitive warfare approaches to induce a steady state of impaired judgment, then they gain a decided advantage.

Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security.

For all of us, but particularly for policy makers who have to make so many consequential decisions, the pressure from continuous attacks on leaders and institutions, political and social division, election threats, threats of critical infrastructure attacks, vilification around the world of U.S. positions and policies, recurring global confrontations, surrogate warfare, and recurring intimidation and veiled threats create a challenging cognitive environment.

The Threat to Corporate America

This is not just government-to-government cognitive warfare. U.S. companies are increasingly the intentional targets of malicious information and for cognitive warfare. In an era in which Big Tech and Big Business already have challenges with trust, creating false, fake, and nefarious information can have an outsized impact.

Attacks on the private sector have broader consequences. The private sector owns and operates an estimated 85% of infrastructure and resources that are critical to our nation’s physical and economic security. U.S. economic strength and global competitiveness is based in great part on the success or failure of large and small U.S. corporations and the continuous churn of innovative start-ups.

With supply chain security for critical industries; data collection and storage; the financial system, critical research and development and leadership on critical technologies; such as AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology, just to name a few, all relying on a viable and secure U.S private sector, it’s easy to see why the private sector is a prime target for cognitive warfare.

Private citizens are also primary targets

We all increasingly rely on the internet and social media for news and information, which makes all of us more vulnerable. Private citizens are prime targets for cognitive warfare because we elect our leaders, we drive the economy, we support or oppose U.S. foreign and domestic policy and we can be drawn into contentious political and social issues that can undermine confidence in our government institutions and polarize society.

The issues we face are complicated, and most of us are in a constant search for accurate information. That search for accurate information keeps us informed on many complex issues, but it also makes us vulnerable.

What we buy, who we trust, how we vote, how we invest, which policies we support, and what and who we believe on important local, national, and global issues –are all targeted using cognitive warfare.

We Have Options

There are some things we can do to counter cognitive warfare as our knowledge and capabilities evolve. We won’t try to lay out a detailed plan that many excellent professionals are already working on (and that many others should join) but there are some key considerations.

Higher Priority

Cognitive Warfare should become a higher national priority. Of the many national security challenges in the Gray Zone between peace and actual war, this may be the most important.

We should also recognize that cognitive warfare today is broader than we may have thought in the past and is a suitable overarching concept for how we view offensive and defensive information and influence activities.

That overarching concept should also include those more coercive actions and pressures that affect cognition and work in concert with the full spectrum of cognitive warfare activities.

Collaboration

Cognitive warfare is an excellent area for government-private sector collaboration to expand on work that is already underway.

National security professionals and organizations within the private sector working in this space should begin shifting the conversation and to this more complex challenge. Cognitive warfare is evolving, and we should get ahead of that evolution; that requires partnership.

Play Offense and Defense

Advancing a strong U.S. narrative and exposing the deception, disinformation, and intimidation of our allies should be used in parallel to counter cognitive warfare directed at the U.S.

Advance the U.S. Narrative

In a perfect world, the U.S. would have a strong global narrative that fully confronts and counters global adversaries, one that resonates persuasively with diverse global audiences.

That narrative would offer a stark and persuasive difference between the U.S. and our authoritarian adversaries. Therein lies the challenge.

The U.S. does not have the broad global influence it once did and there is a decline in the trust that some nations have in us. The reasons for this probably deserve a separate review but there are a few things to consider.

A strong global narrative which lays out America’s vision for its global leadership requires a foundation of domestic support. Many Americans are uncertain about U.S. global engagement broadly and about issues such as Ukraine and support for Taiwan, specifically. Our domestic politics do influence our global credibility.

Some U.S. foreign policy decisions, perceived as inconsistent or contradictory, have strained relationships with allies and have eroded trust among developing nations. Further, Russia and China are clearly working nonstop to undermine U.S. influence and standing around the world using broad cognitive approaches. Some global audiences are listening.

We have advantages, but we have work to do to coordinate and project a global U.S narrative that confronts and counters Russia and China and that resonates persuasively with diverse global audiences.

Expose our Adversaries’ activities

The U.S. should continue to regularly expose and unmask the cognitive warfare activities of our adversaries, particular those that are hidden; employ fake institutions, websites, and personas; and those that we ordinarily don’t see as a threat—even if they are not illegal or particularly effective.

We should specifically continue to expose and dismantle Beijing and Moscow’s global narrative, and in a manner that resonates with global audiences.

“Pre-bunking” requires timely action but can be effective in undermining new disinformation narratives before they become entrenched. This is not just during election seasons. Cognitive warfare and threats to our national security will continue. This is a great area for expanded public-private sector collaboration.

Artificial Intelligence

Many in the public and private sectors are developing AI tools to counter disinformation and to identify deep fakes. If we are to fully counter increasingly sophisticated AI-enabled cognitive warfare capabilities, we will need to expand our own AI capabilities across the broad spectrum of cognitive warfare.

The Need for Consequences

Cognitive warfare directed at the United States is an intentional violation of our sovereignty with the intent to do harm, and there should be consequences.

The work to date by the Justice Department and the FBI using legal actions, cyber counter-operations, public awareness campaigns, and partnerships with both private-sector entities and international allies, has been impressive.

Despite this diligent work though, the legal system in the U.S. is struggling to keep pace with the evolving nature of cognitive warfare, particularly when it comes to disinformation.

Outdated frameworks, essential First Amendment protections, inadequate regulation of social media, and gaps in cyber law create critical vulnerabilities.

Foreign adversaries are exploiting these legal loopholes to conduct sophisticated and harmful influence campaigns. Addressing these gaps will require a careful balancing of free speech protections with the need to protect national security in an increasingly digital and information-driven age.

Our terminology should evolve and mature. The cognitive warfare space is awash with a myriad of terms that reflect our efforts over the years to characterize the complexity of what we are facing. That’s both good and bad.

For example, influence operations, psychological operations, propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, malign foreign influence, covert influence, information dominance, active measures, information warfare, cognitive warfare, hybrid warfare, narrative warfare, memetic warfare, irregular warfare, cultural warfare, narrative shaping, astroturfing, strategic communications, information disorder, soft power, reflexive control, computational propaganda, discourse power, discourse dominance, coordinated inauthentic behavior, digital authoritarianism, techno-authoritarianism, information environment shaping, perception management, social engineering, cognitive hacking, cognitive defense, cognitive security, cognitive resilience, and other terms are all used frequently and often interchangeably. It’s time to change that.

It is very easy to have a conversation on this complex issue while talking past the very people the U.S. needs to reach based on the many terms and definitions in play. Our approach to terminology should be to enable consistency and clarity but also to allow our conversations evolve as we learn more.

The Department of Defense is smart to integrate influence operations into its evolving concept of irregular warfare, which broadens the conceptual framework – away from stove-piped counter-disinformation activities and toward integrated influence activities that take advantage of the whole spectrum of concepts. This is a broad government-private sector conversation, and we have more work to do when it comes to using the same language.

The quest for cognitive resilience must continue

Related to cognitive warfare, in simple terms, cognitive resilience could be described as the capability of individuals, groups, and societies to recognize and resist deliberate attempts at manipulation, disinformation, and psychological operations. Society writ large must understand critical thinking and decision-making. But it certainly isn’t simple.

It requires a well-coordinated effort which includes education and awareness, government-private sector collaboration, utilizing evolving technologies that assist in mapping out cognitive warfare activities against the U.S., and an ability to persuade Americans that an effort at cognitive resilience is not itself an effort to undermine and control what we think.

Of course, our adversaries will attack efforts that look to expose and undermine their activities. There’s also the risk that even a well-intentioned effort at cognitive resilience can simply be a small voice in a very loud storm. But the reality is that we are in the midst of a perfect storm when it comes to cognitive warfare and we need to face it head on.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

11. SOCOM adds new ‘collaborative autonomy’ capabilities to tech wish list

Excerpts:

They noted that data collection assets should include modular and open systems approach (MOSA) software as well as modular hardware designs allowing payloads to be quickly installed and removed, giving commandos more flexibility to tailor them for various missions.

Officials are eyeing a slew of cutting-edge, autonomy‐enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tools to help collect audio, visual (day and night) and radio frequency data “across all domains, from seabed to low‐earth orbit,” according to the BAA.

SOCOM adds new ‘collaborative autonomy’ capabilities to tech wish list

U.S. Special Operations Command just amended a previously issued BAA.

Jon Harper

October 31, 2024

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 31, 2024

U.S. Special Operations Command updated its technical areas of interest in a broad agency announcement to include additional autonomous capabilities that could aid commandos with their missions.

The changes to the BAA came in an amendment posted Thursday on Sam.gov.

A new subsection, dubbed “collaborative autonomy,” is part of the document’s list of disruptive technologies that officials are eyeing.

“SOF is interested in improving Battlespace Awareness by leveraging systems where multiple Autonomous or Remote‐controlled Systems (ARCS) share data in real time, allowing them to work together without constant human intervention,” officials wrote. “Battlespace data collected by individual ARCS elements and collaboratively shared through data transport services should inform ARCS automated tasking, positioning, and execution activities to meet overall SOF mission intent. Data collection systems integrated with ARCS, without degradation of ARCS range and endurance, and able to seamlessly operate with crewed systems to reduce operator burden, reliance on full‐time high‐speed communications link, and decision loop cycle time are especially of interest to SOF.”

They noted that data collection assets should include modular and open systems approach (MOSA) software as well as modular hardware designs allowing payloads to be quickly installed and removed, giving commandos more flexibility to tailor them for various missions.

Officials are eyeing a slew of cutting-edge, autonomy‐enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tools to help collect audio, visual (day and night) and radio frequency data “across all domains, from seabed to low‐earth orbit,” according to the BAA.

SOCOM is looking to equip small autonomous and remotely operated platforms — including drones, ground robots and uncrewed surface and underwater vessels — with ISR and edge computing capabilities that can operate in environments where access to traditional networks and IT capabilities is limited.

Tech that allows for the fusion of sensor data collected by small robotic platforms using multiple intel disciplines and recognition of patterns and anomalies are “especially interesting,” officials wrote.

“Furthermore, SOF desires data collection systems enabling augmented reality (AR) capabilities to provide warfighters with visual cues to identify and discern targets, foes, and friendly forces,” they added.

Another subsection in the amended BAA focuses on autonomy‐enabled data processing and exploitation, noting an interest in systems that can provide commandos “response recommendations” and predictive analytics based on real-time data updates.

“Candidate processing and exploitation systems should provide battlespace geographic orientation and use easily understood language and audio/visual symbology. These processing and exploitation systems should use standard software interfaces allowing the cybersecurity testing necessary for integration onto SOF Information networks and must be able to connect to secure data transport services. Data storage and management techniques enhancing the predictive reliability, speed, and maintenance of processing and exploiting systems are also interesting to SOF,” officials wrote.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 31, 2024

12. Does a ‘Warning from Kursk’ Show Reality of North Korea’s Russian Misadventure?

Ukrainian psychological operations/warfare?

We have to take this with a grain of salt but if these kinds of battle outcomes are confirmed and continue this could be a boon for psychological operations/warfare both in Ukraine and on the Korean peninsula.

Does a ‘Warning from Kursk’ Show Reality of North Korea’s Russian Misadventure?

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 2, 2024

A video said to be of a badly wounded North Korean soldier, the sole survivor of a 40-man unit that was obliterated in Kursk has appeared in social and mainstream media.

by Kyiv Post | November 2, 2024, 12:13 pm

Screenshot from the video that purports to show the only survivor of a North Korean unit that was massacred in Kursk

On Thursday, the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel 'ExileNova' released a two-minute video titled “Warning from Kursk.” The video shows what is said to be an unnamed, badly wounded North Korean soldier who says he was the only survivor of a 40-man unit that was decimated by a Ukrainian artillery and drone attack in the Kursk region of Russia.

The footage shows the man, lying in a hospital bed his head and face wrapped in bandages that appear to be soaked soaked with blood and pus and a nasal catheter held in place with another dressing.

JOIN US ON TELEGRAM

Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.

Needless to say, the video was rapidly picked up by other social media who were split between those pro-Ukrainian sites who said it was genuine and those pro-Kremlin bloggers who said it was faked propaganda.

While Kyiv Post is unable to confirm the veracity of the video it is interesting that the South Korean media outlets News Naver and JongAng say that although it was difficult to make out everything the man said, both agreed that he was speaking with a definite North Korean accent.

In the video he claims that he and his comrades had been lied to by the commander of the Russian unit they were attached to, vented his frustrations with President Putin, and urged his compatriots to stay home.”

He said that they had been assigned to guard a defensive position somewhere in Kursk where they were told they would be “safe from attack as long as we were in the defensive position… that we would not be needed to participate on the front line.”

An Open Letter to the Ukrainian American Community

As the election heads into its final days, the stakes for the future of Ukraine and European security couldn’t be higher.

He said that once their position came under attack by Ukrainian forces, “the Russian military forced us to participate in the [counter] offensive,” which he called the Battle of Kursk. He said that there was no plan claiming, “The Russians did not conduct any reconnaissance before the attack and left us without weapons to defend ourselves.”

The man also said, “When Ukraine started attacking all 40 of our unit were launched into the attack, they were all killed including my friends Hyuk-cheol and Gyeong-hwan – who had their heads blown off by shrapnel.”

He went on, “I was only able to survive by hiding under their corpses. My grandfather told me stories about the Fatherland Liberation War [Korean War 1950-53], but I didn’t know it would be like this. In reality my comrades were simply sacrificed, used as mere fodder… historical material.”

The soldier continued, “The Ukrainian soldiers were well-armed with the latest weapons and are highly motivated… but the Russian army has lost too many weapons and equipment, so it just sends waves of soldiers like us recklessly into the offensive.”

He adds, “I saw mountains of Russian soldiers’ bodies with my own eyes, as well as destroyed defensive positions,” before concluding, “This is truly the evil of this world -

Putin will lose this war.”

Jonas Ohman, head of the Lithuanian non-profit organization (NGO) Blue-Yellow which is providing support to Ukrainian forces in the area said they had seen North Korean military in Kursk as far back as Oct. 25. He is also quoted by the JonAng news site as saying the North Korean soldier was carrying documents that identified him as being from the Buryat region, which lends weight to previously suggestions Russia was disguising the identity of Pyongyang’s troops.

In an interview on Thursday Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said, “So far, North Korean troops have not participated in the battle. They are preparing to engage [in Kursk],” but said there had been no confirmation of any exchange of fire between Ukrainian and North Korean troops or reports of any North Korean casualties. However, he said that the fighting would soon become a reality “in a matter of days, not weeks or months.”

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 2, 2024

13. American industry must rise again: The US has squandered its Cold War victory

Excerpts:

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a critical ingredient present in the canonical East Asian industrial policy success stories is absent in the United States. Namely, the “Asian Tigers” each used global export markets, particularly the US market, as a competition check: companies that increased export share received more industrial policy support; those that did not were cut off. Without the export-market check, there is an increased temptation to subsidise “zombies”, rather than orient industrial policy investments toward improving productivity and competitiveness. US industrial strategy, therefore, may need to place greater emphasis on stimulating domestic competition. Another option involves using government procurement and investment to create milestone-based contests. In Operation Warp Speed, for example, the government offered contracts only to vaccine developers who met certain thresholds, such as Moderna and Pfizer. Unfortunately, such contracting models remain more the exception than the rule in US policy.

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, it is clear that the United States squandered its unipolar moment, not only via quixotic foreign policy interventions but also through imprudent economic policy. Deluded by abstract and idealistic theories, American leaders offshored the country’s industrial base to what is now its greatest rival, in order to support debt-funded consumption and financial asset bubbles. The result is a new era of great power competition, massive public and private debt loads, and an economy dominated by software monopolies that have done little to improve productivity. In the next few decades, America will have to commit more resources to addressing these problems. If it fails to do so, an even more drastic austerity will eventually be imposed upon it, as an already strained empire collapses completely.

American industry must rise again

The US has squandered its Cold War victory

unherd.com · by Julius Krein · November 2, 2024

The US needs an industrial policy. Jeff Swensen/Getty Images

America Austerity Economy Neoliberalism reindustrialisation Society US

Julius Krein

November 2, 2024 13 mins

Austerity is rarely popular during election season, and already this campaign has featured a variety of budget-straining proposals. Donald Trump has called for exempting tips from taxation, which Kamala Harris subsequently endorsed. J.D. Vance has suggested increasing the child tax credit to $5,000; Harris later upped her bid to $6,000. The current vice president has also proposed $25,000 in down payment assistance for first-time homebuyers, while Trump has promised to make Social Security benefits and overtime pay tax free. The list will probably continue to grow.

But despite these promises, Americans are likely in for a period of consumer austerity no matter who wins the election. The only question is what form this austerity will take.

In somewhat simplified terms, the fundamental policy choice is between conventional or “neoliberal” austerity, progressive-environmental austerity, and what might be called “catch-up reindustrialisation” — a policy shift in favour of investment over consumption to rebuild the US industrial base and shore up America’s long-term security and economic prospects, particularly vis-à-vis China. In my view, the third option is both the necessary and most desirable choice, yet all three present their own difficulties and complications. The fact that all these choices involve some level of austerity doubtless contributes to the increasing bitterness of American politics.

Let’s start by considering neoliberal austerity. Conventional budgetary concerns have resurfaced with the inflation spikes of recent years and interest rates still near their highest levels since 2008. In the past, deficits significantly above 3% of GDP were only experienced during major economic downturns or in wartime. In 2023, however, the United States ran a roughly 6% deficit with a relatively low unemployment rate of around 4%. While paranoia about the US national debt has always proved baseless in the modern era, the limits of the present trajectory are becoming more visible, as interest payments take up greater and greater percentages of government spending.

The question for deficit hawks — today and in the past — is whether they are in fact primarily concerned with reducing the deficit. In America, this pose is often, if not typically, disingenuous — rhetorical cover for an ideological project of shrinking the state rather than responsibly balancing revenues with expenditures. Hence the most strident deficit hawks are almost invariably the most eager tax cutters. Or, perhaps more accurately, the most aggressive tax cutters often masquerade as deficit hawks but have little real interest in responsible fiscal policy.

Today, with federal tax rates at low levels, any serious deficit reduction programme would have to consider tax increases. The rates themselves may not even be the key issue: taxing corporate profits in the country where they are earned, or closing various personal loopholes, may have a greater impact at this point. But these items are largely excluded from the “deficit” agenda, especially among Republicans, who continue to indulge in fantasies that tax cuts will “pay for themselves”, despite the manifest failure of the Bush and Trump tax cuts to generate meaningful growth.

Instead, the conservative focus remains entirely on cutting spending. The problem here is that, within the realm of political plausibility, there is not all that much to cut. According to the most recent numbers from the Congressional Budget Office, “mandatory spending” (mostly Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) accounted for $3.8 trillion of the $6.1 trillion 2023 federal budget. Defence spending added another $800 billion, constituting almost half of “discretionary spending”. Interest costs were an additional $700 billion, contributing to a total deficit of $1.7 trillion. The bottom line is that, even if all $900 billion of non-defence discretionary spending were miraculously cut — zeroing out transportation, education, veterans’ benefits, the justice system, and scientific research — that would only reduce the deficit by about half. Significant deficit reduction must therefore involve cuts to the most politically sensitive areas: defence and entitlements.

Given China’s emergence as a peer competitor — and one with a massive industrial-base advantage — cutting defence appears to be off the table. On the contrary, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, has proposed increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP, up from the current level of 3%. The reasons are clear: China built 21 submarines last year, while the United States struggled to build one; it will take up to seven years to replenish certain munitions stocks used in Ukraine, and analysts estimate that the United States would be out of some critical weapons within a week in any active conflict over Taiwan. One reason the US Navy has not been able to better protect Middle Eastern shipping lanes from recent Houthi attacks is a concern that the increased use of certain munitions there would compromise readiness for other potential conflicts.

“China built 21 submarines last year, while the United States struggled to build one.”

Simply throwing more money at the Pentagon and incumbent defence contractors will not solve these problems: serious procurement reforms and broader industrial policy measures are necessary. And yet there is little doubt that America’s security situation is more perilous than it has been for generations. Legacy ideological commitments further complicate these issues. The most aggressive “deficit hawks” — such as Nikki Haley in the Republican Party or various centrist Democrats — also tend to be the most fervent supporters of interventions in Ukraine and elsewhere to uphold a “US-led liberal international order”. Although Haley and others typically prefer to imagine that foreign policy and economic policy are distinct domains, their interventionist commitments nevertheless preclude any significant cuts to defence spending.

That leaves Social Security and Medicare. Cutting Social Security is so politically toxic that Trump has completely distanced himself from the proposals of George W. Bush and Paul Ryan, once hallmarks of conservative economic policy. Republican congressional leadership also notably refused to endorse entitlement cuts in the last midterm elections. Even if Social Security cuts were politically viable, however, there has been little serious effort to think through the effects.

Significant cuts would mean workers would have to defer their own consumption, either to save more for their own retirement or to keep their elderly parents out of poverty, creating a drag on growth and complicating deficit reduction efforts. Although Social Security is structured as social insurance rather than welfare, the benefit formulas are somewhat redistributive, so major cuts would probably result in a further shift of wealth from lower-income people, with a high propensity to spend, to affluent savers, with a lower propensity to spend.

In the past, advocates of “privatising” Social Security sometimes argued that allowing individuals to manage their own retirement savings would enable higher returns and boost growth. But the Social Security programme functions less as a professionally managed pool of capital, like the public pension funds common in many other countries or in US states, and more like debt-funded consumption stimulus. Eliminating Social Security, therefore, is not simply a matter of distributing a pool of assets to individual accounts. Furthermore, if the goal were simply to maximise returns, the Social Security “trust funds” could be authorised to make public and private investments beyond US Treasury securities. But the same small-government ideology that calls for cutting Social Security also resists giving the government the authority to make such investments, which could distort “market signals”. Devolving all responsibility to individuals, on the other hand, would magnify the impact of market volatility for each household and likely require further increasing savings. At the same time, the government would probably still be called upon to bail out retirees — whether they saved prudently or not — during major stock market crashes.

A more practical approach might aim to maximise the value derived from the existing programme rather than cutting it. Senator Vance was roundly criticised for saying that more should be done to enlist grandparents to assist with childcare. Yet there are a number of serious proposals to use Social Security to incentivise childcare or otherwise better support the sharing of resources within extended families.

The other major area perpetually on the chopping block is health care. This would appear to be more fertile ground: the United States spends 17–18% of GDP on health care, by far the most in the world, to achieve overall public health outcomes that are decidedly mediocre. Spending on health care programmes composes about a quarter of the federal budget. Surely, the system could be more efficient?

The problem, once again, is that ideological motivations are at odds with practical solutions. Those most eager to cut health care spending tend to be those most committed to “market fundamentalist” ideology, who tend to ignore the possibility that increasing state intervention might be necessary to control costs. But marketisation, in practice, has generally failed to control costs and, in theory, there is little reason to expect that it should. As the economist Kenneth Arrow demonstrated back in 1963, normal market dynamics do not apply to critical aspects of health care. Ordinary competitive and pricing dynamics are often absent, and the sector is characterised by deep information asymmetries and network effects.

The irony is that even practical incremental steps to reduce health care costs, such as government negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies or hospital monopolies, or better regulating parasitic middlemen such as “pharmacy benefit managers” (PBMs), are generally resisted by the same people who claim to be most concerned about reining in spending. As a result, “marketisation” in the US context has simply meant a refusal to employ the state to control costs, contributing to a cycle of expanding subsidisation.

In sum, the concerns of deficit hawks are real enough when it comes to health care, Social Security and defence, but the politics around these concerns remain insincere and ineffective.

“The concerns of deficit hawks are real enough, but the politics around these concerns remain insincere and ineffective.”

A similar pattern prevails in progressive environmentalism, another sphere in which legitimate concerns have been pressed into the service of a counterproductive politics. In the United States, unlike in Europe, true “de-growth” austerity has become so discredited that most politicians have run away from it, though the impulse still exists among many NGOs and activists. Yet even if American progressives, for the most part, are not looking to shut down modern agriculture, discourage having children, or revert to hand-washing their laundry to stop climate change, they are eager to restrict consumer choices and divert public resources to promote renewable energy and electric vehicles. The Inflation Reduction Act, which includes most of the climate-related subsidies passed during the Biden administration, is estimated to cost somewhere between $800 billion to $1.2 trillion over 10 years. The actual cost is unknown, because some of the IRA’s tax credits are uncapped and theoretically unlimited — but the “energy transition” is certainly expensive.

The necessity of such costly carbon reduction efforts is often presented as beyond ordinary politics — only pathologically greedy science-deniers would oppose taking action to avert a global climate emergency! Yet while environmental concerns are seemingly universal, the environmental movement remains deeply partisan. There is no getting around the fact that climate activists frequently demand sacrifices from ordinary people while ignoring the behaviours of ultra-wealthy donors and displaying clear sectoral biases. The farmer, the coal miner, the exurbanite, and so on are all called upon to make difficult adjustments to meet various arbitrary emissions targets. But the billionaires who shuttle between multiple estates on private jets are never expected to change their lifestyles to save the planet, except perhaps to donate to the climate NGO complex. Wind and solar fields are supposedly essential — but not within sight of Nantucket. Fossil fuel companies are demonised, but tech giants whose server farms consume more and more energy are largely exempt from such criticism, as long as they make the right noises on ESG. Likewise, the environmental movement has fought to impose more and more regulatory burdens on manufacturing and heavy industry, all while turning a blind eye toward pollution offshoring to China and elsewhere.

“Climate activists frequently demand sacrifices from ordinary people while ignoring the behaviours of ultra-wealthy donors.”

In fact, the history of the American environmental movement and its political alliances is rather sordid. In its earliest days, environmentalism was associated with population control and even eugenics. After rebranding as an emissions control movement in the second half of the 20th century, environmental groups first teamed up with coal and utility deregulators against nuclear power. Then they took money from natural gas and Enron for campaigns against coal. Recent years have seen a turn against all fossil fuels, though nuclear has once again been grudgingly readmitted to the decarbonisation push. Ironically, the most significant opponents to new renewable energy construction are often legacy environmental groups, who helped construct a legal regime in which it is relatively easy for third parties to challenge any new energy installations on environmental grounds. This is one reason why far more solar fields have been built in red states like Texas compared to ultra-progressive states like California.

Beneath all the moral preening, then, the green movement is fundamentally just another interest group pursuing a relatively narrow, partisan agenda. It is, and always has been, primarily composed of affluent and professional-class individuals in “asset-light” corporate sectors, as well as opportunistic energy players. In many ways, it is the ultimate neoliberal coalition: a global, post-political orientation, overseen by technocrats operating through nondemocratic transnational organisations and financial markets.

To be sure, the fact that the environmental movement is a self-interested lobby does not necessarily mean that its core claims are false, even if some activists have engaged in alarmism and exaggeration in the past. Indeed, the absence of effective environmental policy is already imposing its own form of austerity, as seen in rising home insurance prices across the United States, to which climate change is almost certainly a contributor. Yet being right about some things does not make the environmental movement any less of a lobby.

Oddly, the green movement would probably have more success in the United States if it simply accepted its corporate-lobby character. Certainly, a movement that focused less on moral preening and NGO fundraising probably would not have made the mistake of trying to pursue decarbonisation while demonising nuclear energy for decades. It also might be more practical about encouraging the transition to clean energy and electric vehicles.

The current push into EVs, based on a combination of tax subsidies and state-level mandates, is already sputtering. Sales growth has slowed dramatically, and auto companies have shelved plans for new models. A more serious approach would recognise that the United States — unlike, say, Norway — is a large country with a weak rail network; people regularly drive long distances; and combustion vehicles’ rapid refuelling remains a significant advantage. At the same time, the United States — unlike, say, China — has little capacity to enforce top-down changes in consumer preferences and infrastructure construction. Two years after Congress appropriated billions for charging stations, not a single one has been built. A more practical agenda would have emphasised vehicles such as plug-in hybrids, which could have a major impact on emissions and would create incentives for the private sector to add more charging stations, while also appealing to consumers who desire flexibility. Such thinking, however, would require the green movement to abandon the pretence of moral purity and accept the compromises and coalitional balancing of any industry lobby.

The more likely outcome is the continuation of the status quo, in which lavishly funded NGOs persist in their attempts to push badly designed policy on a reluctant populace. Whereas neoliberal austerity is essentially an ideological movement trying to appropriate the rhetoric of economic interest, progressive environmentalism is a class- and sector-based lobby seeking to brand itself as a moral-ideological cause. Both will remain ineffective as long as they continue to labour under these self-delusions.

The third option is, for lack of a better name, catch-up reindustrialisation. As with environmental “austerity”, this does not involve conventional budgetary austerity — it may in fact require more public spending — but it does entail a shift away from maximising consumption and towards increasing investment in productive capacity. Trade measures such as tariffs intentionally raise prices, at least in the immediate term, while funding for industrial policies may come at the expense of other budget priorities.

The need for a serious industrial policy programme has become more pressing for various reasons. The first is national security. As discussed above, America’s defence industrial base has eroded considerably. By contrast, China’s manufacturing advantage is overwhelming, which has created supply-chain dependencies in a number of critical commercial areas as well. Surrendering sectors to foreign competitors often entails losing more than “commodity manufacturing”; it also means losing technological prowess and workforce skills. The United States need not look to dominate every manufacturing sector, but it will be impossible to fix the defence industrial base without improving the broader industrial base.

In addition, it is slowly dawning on American politicians that it is impossible to avoid having an industrial policy; the only question is whether to pursue one’s own, or to accept the imposition of someone else’s. China, in particular, by massively subsidising capital investment and export industries, has disadvantaged and discouraged investment in manufacturing and capital-intensive sectors in the United States. And by refusing to intervene, the United States has simply allowed Beijing to pick winners and losers.

Moreover, the fact is that, even without a self-conscious industrial policy, the US government has had to subsidise fallen national champions such as Boeing in recent decades. What has been missing is a serious plan to maximise the effectiveness of these investments, in large part because the post–Cold War neoliberal consensus precluded any open consideration of industrial policy.

According to this conventional economic theory, industrial policy will always be inefficient, value-destructive, and a drag on growth because it interferes with market-driven capital allocation. If private-sector actors require government support or prodding to make an investment, the theory goes, then it must be a poor investment, even if necessary for non-economic reasons such as defence. These models assume, however, a form of economic rationality in which firms operate to maximise profits. In reality, firms operate to maximise shareholder value. The two may occasionally overlap, but they are not the same. As a result, firms often maintain hurdle rates well in excess of their cost of capital, and pursue financial engineering strategies instead of investment. This behaviour may be irrational in the sense of forgoing profits, but it is often eminently rational in the sense of maximising equity valuation. The net result, from a national perspective, is chronic underinvestment, particularly in capital-intensive sectors where foreign industrial policies drive down returns. This is one reason why the relationship between financial returns and productivity breakthroughs has always been more tenuous than standard models would predict, and why industrial policy can spur economic development by dislodging financial rentierism.

Government investment promotion, therefore, is not necessarily value-destructive. It may in fact enable investments whose returns, while below private sector hurdle rates, are still positive. These investments, in turn, can form the basis of new companies, technologies, and industries, as the many historical examples of successful industrial policies attest, from Korean autos to Taiwanese semiconductors to early Silicon Valley.

From this perspective, successful industrial policy is perhaps best thought of not simply as consumer austerity but rather as “deferred gratification”, or investment in the future. Notably, the Chinese government has actively suppressed domestic consumption in favour of industrial investment throughout the last several decades, and yet, contra Western economic orthodoxy, has presided over a miraculous rise in living standards, in addition to its growing geo-economic power.

That is not to say, however, that the path forward for the United States will be easy. On the contrary, American industrial policy faces a number of obstacles and complications. First, US government agencies have relatively little expertise in designing and executing industrial strategy, certainly when compared to their Asian counterparts. The US government itself is poorly structured for this end, with limited institutional capacity to integrate foreign policy and economic policy.

Second, advocates of US industrial policy often have diverging goals in mind. Some focus on the defence industrial base, others on the “energy transition”, others on “creating jobs”. In a Venn diagram, these circles would intersect, but they are not identical. Such diffuse ambitions may impede both the passage and implementation of successful industrial strategy, as previous criticisms of “everything bagel” industrial policy have shown.

Third, the largest corporate and financial actors in the US are at best ambivalent about industrial strategy. They are deeply dependent on China, and are also prime beneficiaries of the “fissured economy” model in which intellectual property rents are separated from capital investment and labour. Furthermore, policies like the Chips Act passed in large part due to the support of incumbent industry lobbies, though policy design suffered in various ways as a result. It remains to be seen whether the United States can pursue industrial policy in critical areas that, unlike semiconductors, do not have powerful incumbent lobbies.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a critical ingredient present in the canonical East Asian industrial policy success stories is absent in the United States. Namely, the “Asian Tigers” each used global export markets, particularly the US market, as a competition check: companies that increased export share received more industrial policy support; those that did not were cut off. Without the export-market check, there is an increased temptation to subsidise “zombies”, rather than orient industrial policy investments toward improving productivity and competitiveness. US industrial strategy, therefore, may need to place greater emphasis on stimulating domestic competition. Another option involves using government procurement and investment to create milestone-based contests. In Operation Warp Speed, for example, the government offered contracts only to vaccine developers who met certain thresholds, such as Moderna and Pfizer. Unfortunately, such contracting models remain more the exception than the rule in US policy.

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, it is clear that the United States squandered its unipolar moment, not only via quixotic foreign policy interventions but also through imprudent economic policy. Deluded by abstract and idealistic theories, American leaders offshored the country’s industrial base to what is now its greatest rival, in order to support debt-funded consumption and financial asset bubbles. The result is a new era of great power competition, massive public and private debt loads, and an economy dominated by software monopolies that have done little to improve productivity. In the next few decades, America will have to commit more resources to addressing these problems. If it fails to do so, an even more drastic austerity will eventually be imposed upon it, as an already strained empire collapses completely.

Julius Krein is the editor of American Affairs

JuliusKrein

unherd.com · by Julius Krein · November 2, 2024

14. How Japan Can Strengthen the U.S. Steel Industry

Conclusion:

Blocking Nippon Steel’s investment would leave the U.S. steel industry more consolidated and less competitive against the Chinese behemoths that produce over half of the world’s steel. Conversely, simply allowing this commercial transaction to proceed would bring significant economic benefits to many and help strengthen the American steel industry for decades to come. It is important to make this case now so that the best decision for most Americans can be made as soon as possible. This should include encouraging more direct dialogue between USW and Nippon Steel in Tokyo. Even as U.S. Steel remains an American company, a positive USW-Tokyo relationship can help underpin a long-term alliance.

How Japan Can Strengthen the U.S. Steel Industry

Blocking Nippon Steel’s investment would leave the U.S. steel industry more consolidated and less competitive against its Chinese rivals.

The National Interest · by James L. Schoff · November 1, 2024

Election politics might have postponed a U.S. government decision about whether the Nippon Steel company’s planned acquisition of U.S. Steel creates a national security concern. However, this politically charged transaction will be in the spotlight again by December. Now is the time to think dispassionately about this nearly $15 billion mega-deal so that the interests of multiple stakeholders are protected. They include shareholders, workers, customers, suppliers, and local communities. Fortunately, aside from some political sensitivities, there are many potential benefits from this acquisition, and the national security risk is negligible. Lest this opportunity be lost, policymakers and community leaders must step up to make this case in the face of a skeptical and vocal United Steelworkers Union (USW).

U.S. Steel shareholders will clearly benefit from this sale to a Japanese firm, and over 98 percent of voting shareholders approved it in April. Nippon Steel’s all-cash offer was nearly double that of a rival bid by Cleveland-Cliffs, another major American steel manufacturer. Nippon Steel does not spend money recklessly, as it is by far the most profitable conventional steelmaker in the world for volume produced, so this generous offer is a sign of how much the company values U.S. Steel. And when a company values something, it invests to make it the best that it can be in terms of plant and workforce productivity.

In fact, Nippon Steel announced plans in August to invest $1 billion into U.S. Steel’s Mon Valley Works in Pennsylvania, in addition to $300 million at the Gary Works plant in Indiana. This is on top of a March pledge for $1.4 billion in U.S. Steel facility upgrades combined with promises for no plant closures, no layoffs, and cooperation with United Steelworkers (USW) labor union. All of this will benefit American steelworkers and the many workers at businesses that supply U.S. Steel. USW can say that Nippon Steel’s pledges are not sufficiently guaranteed, but an arbitration board with members selected, in part, by the union itself was apparently satisfied by Nippon Steel’s commitments and ruled in September that the acquisition could proceed.

It is worth reflecting on the legacy of Japanese auto investment in the United States since the 1990s. Investment from this corner proved a significant catalyst for American industrial revival in states like Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Texas, and others. Japanese brand automakers in the United States are still growing, with direct, intermediate, and spin-off employment topping 1 million American workers in 2022. This growth did not come at the expense of U.S. firms but was part of an overall recovery of U.S. auto manufacturing that resulted in historic gains for unionized auto workers in 2023. More steel production in the United States from multiple competitors will similarly stimulate innovation and benefit suppliers and customers alike.

But what about potential risks to national security? As someone who has spent thirty-five years working with the U.S. and Japanese governments and businesses at the nexus of commerce and national security, I can say that there is more risk to the United States from stopping this deal than from allowing it to proceed. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has indicated concerns about Nippon Steel’s commitment to maintain sufficient U.S. domestic production or that it might not support U.S. trade actions against foreign competitors in India or Brazil. However, Nippon Steel has agreed that U.S. citizens will make up the majority of the Board of Directors and the core of management for U.S. Steel. U.S. Steel will remain an American company owned by Nippon Steel North America, which has operated here for over fifty years and supported U.S. trade actions, most recently in September on imports of corrosion-resistant steel from ten countries.

Japanese firms are not corporate raiders, and they focus on long-term relationships. Nippon Steel is investing a lot of money in U.S. Steel to expand its capacity to produce steel in the United States, which is the expressed goal of past protectionist or industrial policies. Nippon Steel’s investment is the fruit of these efforts and should be welcomed as a win. If the deal is turned aside instead on dubious national security worries or USW’s bad experiences with U.S. Steel management in the past, it would be a self-inflicted wound that could discourage future foreign investment and damage one of America’s most trusted alliances and valuable economic relationships.

Blocking Nippon Steel’s investment would leave the U.S. steel industry more consolidated and less competitive against the Chinese behemoths that produce over half of the world’s steel. Conversely, simply allowing this commercial transaction to proceed would bring significant economic benefits to many and help strengthen the American steel industry for decades to come. It is important to make this case now so that the best decision for most Americans can be made as soon as possible. This should include encouraging more direct dialogue between USW and Nippon Steel in Tokyo. Even as U.S. Steel remains an American company, a positive USW-Tokyo relationship can help underpin a long-term alliance.

James L. Schoff is senior director of the “U.S.-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative” at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (based in Washington, DC). Previously, Schoff was a senior fellow and director of the Japan Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for nine years, following two years as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. His publications include “Allied on AI Assurance: Technology to Enhance AI Security & Safety” (Sasakawa USA, October 2024), “Modernizing U.S.-Japan Command & Control Relationships for New Challenges” (Sasakawa USA, May 2023), “China and the New Role for Economic Security in the US-Japan Alliance” (Sasakawa Peace Foundation, April 2022), and “Uncommon Alliance for the Common Good: The United States and Japan after the Cold War” (Carnegie, 2017).

Image: Gorodenkoff / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by James L. Schoff · November 1, 2024

15. To save our democracy, we must get rid of online anonymity

No one was anonymous when they were on the soapbox in the public square.

This sounds good in a strong democracy. Transparency is a good thing. Let the sun shine on ideas. You should have the right to debate in public with your opponent (or face the "accuser" who criticizes your political beliefs).

But what about being able to protect online anonymity in authoritarian regimes who seek to suppress freedom of speech to remain in power? We want to develop technology and techniques that hide identities of those who are resisting oppression.

To save our democracy, we must get rid of online anonymity

by Mark Weinstein, opinion contributor - 11/02/24 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/technology/4959447-social-media-id-verification/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=TheHill/magazine/The+Hill+Technology

As the presidential election approaches, a Pew Research survey this year found that “about two-thirds of Americans say they think social media is bad for democracy.” A similar Pew survey reports that about 70 percent of Americans believe social media makes people “less civil in how they talk about politics.”

Baked into our continuous scrolls and clicks, social media has inadvertently fostered the rise of anonymous human bad actors along with “bot farms” — that is, networks of fake accounts. These bot brigades are frequently operated by foreign governments, including Russia, Iran and China, in order to impersonate Americans and interfere in elections. They deliberately spread misinformation, sow discord and poison the well of civil discourse. Russian operatives recently bragged that social media companies detect only 1 percent of their fake accounts.

How do we balance protecting a user’s privacy while holding them accountable for actions violating the law or a site’s Terms of Service? How do we eliminate anonymously boosted content from all originators and the manipulation of our opinions? How do we protect the rights of free speech by nurturing civil discourse among real people? That’s the backbone of democracy.

There certainly are many circumstances where anonymity must be protected, as for whistleblowers, journalistic sources, political dissidents and others speaking truth to power. But when it comes to social networking, anonymity creates far more problems than it solves.

Online platforms that market themselves as anonymous, such as 8kun (formerly 8chan), have enabled their users to engage in violent and sometimes illegal activities without fear of consequences. Similar dynamics play out on the larger mainstream networks like Facebook and X, where countless anonymous accounts routinely wreak havoc.

How do we solve this puzzle? It’s time for a non-tracking user ID verification system, requiring social media platforms to verify the true identities of their users.

Previously, I have been outspoken against verification systems. A decade ago, as a steering committee member of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace and the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, I fought against the proposed “national identity system.” It was, I believed at the time, a violation of the individual right to privacy.

Fast-forward to today, however, and user ID verification has become a necessity. True verification is the only viable way for a social media platform to avoid the onslaught of bots, trolls and manipulative human forces hiding behind the curtain of anonymity. The present and future of democracy is at stake.

It’s also the only way to protect kids. According to the U.S. Surgeon General’s national advisory in 2023, “nearly 40 percent of children ages 8–12 use social media.” At the same time, adults can pretend to be kids to deceitfully interact with them.

Here’s the reality check: Our personally identifiable data is already out there. It’s in the hands of marketing companies, data brokers, the dark web and governments worldwide. It’s time to end the charade and acknowledge that our human and digital identities are known. We should leverage this data constructively, while vigorously protecting our privacy as much as possible.

The ideal user ID system has the sole purpose of verifying legitimate users. It won’t track or monitor, and won’t collect user data beyond the minimum necessary for verification. The system needs to work not just for users on our shores but for users worldwide. It can be supported by exceptional AI tools.

The movement toward user ID verification is gaining legislative traction. Last year, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Protecting Kids on Social Media Act. If passed, this federal bill would require social media platforms to verify the age of account holders. In September, California Gov. Gavin Newsome signed a bill requiring social media companies verify users’ ages. Several states have introduced similar laws, although many face challenges in court.

Momentum is also building abroad. Australia announced plans in September to implement mandatory user ID verification to prevent young children from joining social media.

Social media companies aren’t going to do this voluntarily; federal legislation is required. Instead of relying exclusively on government-controlled verification processes, an alternative is for social media companies to partner with a vendor or create their own verification systems. Of note, a handful of independent companies already provide user verification for financial services and other industries.

No solution is perfect, but in weighing the benefits versus the risks, user ID verification is the best option we have. It will give social media platforms the upper hand in the battle against bad actors creating fake accounts online to disrupt the genuine communication of real human beings.

Kids win, democracy wins, and anonymity is the loser — RIP.

Mark Weinstein is a world-renowned tech thought leader, privacy expert and the founder of the social network MeWe. His book, “Restoring Our Sanity Online: A Revolutionary Social Framework” published in September 2024.

16. Seeing Rising Election Misinformation, Americans Say Social Media Platforms May Bear Responsibility for Political Violence

Graphics and charts are at the link: https://www.techpolicy.press/seeing-rising-election-misinformation-americans-say-social-media-platforms-may-bear-responsibility-for-political-violence/?utm

Excerpt:

A possible consensus around election misinformation?

These results suggest the potential for public consensus that social media platforms should not be passive observers in electoral disputes, with majorities supporting proactive content moderation and accepting some potential limitations on expression to prevent the spread of false claims. Of course, how to apply such limitations and in what circumstances remains divisive. If there is substantial political violence following the 2024 election, public support for platforms to take a more aggressive posture on protecting election integrity may increase.

Seeing Rising Election Misinformation, Americans Say Social Media Platforms May Bear Responsibility for Political Violence | TechPolicy.Press

techpolicy.press · by Justin Hendrix, Ben Lennett · November 1, 2024

Shutterstock

With the 2024 election just days away, Americans express growing concern about election-related misinformation on social media, with 65% believing the problem has worsened since 2020, according to a Tech Policy Press/YouGov survey of 1,089 voters fielded from October 24 to October 25, 2024. The results reveal broad, bipartisan support for social media companies taking a more active role in content moderation, with 71% of respondents favoring platforms prioritizing the prevention of false claims over unrestricted expression and 72% believing political figures should be held to higher standards than regular users due to their outsized influence.

“Heading into the post-election period, clear majorities of Americans on both sides of the aisle want social media companies to do more to protect democracy,” noted Daniel Kreiss, a professor in the Hussman School of Journalism and Media and a principal researcher of the Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life at UNC Chapel Hill, who reviewed a copy of the poll results provided by Tech Policy Press.

Regarding specific interventions, voters show the strongest support for warning labels on potentially false content (56%), though views on more aggressive measures like account suspensions and permanent bans vary significantly by party affiliation. Notably, while Democrats and Republicans may differ on the appropriate extent of content moderation, the Congressional certification of election results emerges as one natural point for platforms to begin to more aggressively moderate election fraud claims and to take action on groups, pages, and accounts that propagate such claims.

The survey also reveals that 70% of Americans would likely cast some of the blame on social media platforms if political violence follows a contested election, though this sentiment is significantly stronger among Democrats (83%) than Republicans (57%).

“These findings demonstrate that, despite what some of the loudest voices might be saying, most Americans actually do believe social media companies have a civic responsibility to protect democratic processes, including ensuring they are not helping fuel potential political violence,” said Yaёl Eisenstat, a Senior Policy Fellow at NYU Cybersecurity for Democracy.

Below are the results in more detail.

Respondents believe the problem of election misinformation is worse than in 2020

When asked whether the problem of election mis- and disinformation on social media has improved or worsened since the 2020 election, a strong majority of Americans (65% in total) believe the problem has worsened either slightly or significantly, while only 12% believe it has improved.

Respondents want platforms to prioritize addressing the spread of false claims

When asked, “If you had to choose, should social media companies prioritize ensuring expression or preventing the spread of false claims and misinformation in the event of a contested election?” a clear majority of voters – 71% – say companies should prioritize preventing false claims and misinformation, even if it means limiting some speech.

29% say companies should prioritize expression, even if it means allowing false claims and misinformation. While all groups favor preventing false claims over unrestricted expression, the strength of this preference varies significantly by party, with Democrats showing the strongest support for content moderation and Republicans being more evenly split on the issue.

Respondents want social media companies to hold political figures to a higher standard

When asked, “Should social media companies hold elected officials, candidates, and other political leaders, influencers, and media figures to a higher standard than regular users when it comes to making false claims about election fraud or irregularities because of their outsized influence?” 72% say yes, these figures should be held to a higher standard, while 28% say no, they should not be held to a higher standard. Democrats show the strongest support for a higher standard (83% support), while a strong majority of Republicans also support a higher standard (61% support).

Warning labels are the most favored intervention to address false claims

When asked about support for different types of actions social media companies might take against public figures who spread false claims about elections, 56% support adding content warning labels. 36% support temporary account suspension, 34% support reducing content visibility (deranking), 30% support permanent account bans, and 15% say no action should be taken. Democrats generally show stronger support for all enforcement actions, while Republicans show lower support for interventions overall, with about a quarter saying no action should be taken.

Respondents believe fact-checking political figures should be prioritized over regular users

Asked about whether social media companies should prioritize fact-checking posts from political figures over ordinary users, 61% say yes, political elites should be fact-checked more rigorously due to their influence. 26% say no, all users should be fact-checked equally for fairness. Only 13% say no, fact-checking political elites could interfere with free expression. Democrats show the strongest support (75%), while Republicans show more divided views, though still with plurality support (47%).

Congressional certification appears to be a natural point by which platforms should more aggressively moderate claims of election fraud

Voters were asked “Now, imagine if the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election is contested – that is, a significant number of people argue the ‘official’ result has been falsified. When is it most appropriate for social media companies to begin to aggressively moderate claims that it was ‘rigged’ or “stolen” and to take action on groups, pages, and accounts that propagate such claims?” In response, 28% say such claims should always be labeled/moderated. 9% say they should be moderated after major media outlets call the election, 12% say after court challenges are decided, and 22% say when Congress certifies the results. 12% say never take action, but they don't believe the 2024 election is at risk, and 18% say never take action and believe the 2024 election is at risk.

Here, there are significant partisan differences, with Democrats most likely to support immediate moderation (40%). Republicans are more likely to oppose any moderation, with 31% believing that the platform should never take against election misinformation and that the election is at risk of being stolen. Congressional certification emerges as a consistently supported point for more aggressive moderation to commence, finding support among 22% of Democrats and 24% of Independents and Republicans.

Respondents believe social media platforms will bear blame for political violence following a contested election

Asked whether social media platforms should bear some blame for any violence following a contested election, 40% say "very likely" to blame platforms, viewing misinformation as a major driver of violence, while 30% say they are "likely" to blame platforms but see social media as playing only a small role. Only 30% are unlikely or very unlikely to blame the platforms. Democrats show a stronger conviction about platforms' responsibility (83% responding very likely or likely) compared to Republicans (57% responding very likely or likely).

Most users say they have not visited election resources provided by social media platforms

Asked whether they had visited election-related resources provided by social media platforms like Facebook, 57% said no, they have not, while only 33% said yes, they have visited these resources, and 10% are not aware of such resources. This result marks a general decline in both awareness and claimed usage of social media election resources across all party affiliations from a June poll that posed the same question.

A possible consensus around election misinformation?

These results suggest the potential for public consensus that social media platforms should not be passive observers in electoral disputes, with majorities supporting proactive content moderation and accepting some potential limitations on expression to prevent the spread of false claims. Of course, how to apply such limitations and in what circumstances remains divisive. If there is substantial political violence following the 2024 election, public support for platforms to take a more aggressive posture on protecting election integrity may increase.

techpolicy.press · by Justin Hendrix, Ben Lennett · November 1, 2024

17. Fighting the Houthis Is a Waste. That’s the Point.

Political and irregular warfare or as the author notes, guerrilla warfare (or as the Chinese might say Unrestricted Warfare). Bleed the US dry.

Whatever name we give it, it is effective and we fail to acknowledge the Houthi strategy at our peril because it is certainly in support of Iran and possibly in support of all members of the "Dark Quad" (if you are a conspiracy theorist and believe they are all colluding and coordinating).

Excerpts:

Houthi drones cost as little as $2,000, whereas each B-2 bomber costs about $2 billion. Since B-2s also cost $163,000 per flight hour to operate, a 30-hour roundtrip mission to Yemen from Missouri where all U.S. B-2s are based would cost nearly $5 million per sortie, and that is before accounting for the cost of the bombs themselves. (Citing operational security, the Pentagon declined to specify how many B-2s were used or where they flew from.)

That lopsided cost-exchange ratio is the essence of guerilla warfare and the source of its occasional success. Weak actors like the Houthis cannot hope to defeat stronger foes like the United States in a conventional war. So they pursue irregular warfare to sap their opponent’s will, ambushing supply lines and other vulnerable spots instead of hardened military targets. Guerillas function like “innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant in both front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him,” as Mao Zedong aptly wrote. The gnats trick the giant into self-defeating behavior—pointless flailing that only wears itself out.

Guerilla strategy is clever, but in this particular case, its practitioners are not. In reality, the Houthis are more like bees than gnats because their attacks are so bumbling. That incompetence makes U.S. overkill all the more frustrating.

Few episodes illustrate Houthi ineffectiveness better than the MV Delta Sounion saga that played out in the Red Sea this summer.

Fighting the Houthis Is a Waste. That’s the Point.

By Rosemary A. Kelanic

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2024/11/02/fighting_the_houthis_is_a_waste_thats_the_point_1069528.html?utm

In a major escalation, the United States hit Houthi targets in Yemen this month with B-2 stealth bombers, perhaps the most sophisticated and expensive platform in the U.S. arsenal. The Air Force only has 19 such bombers and hasn’t used them in combat since 2017. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said the raid demonstrated Washington’s ability to “take action against these targets when necessary, anytime, anywhere.”

It also demonstrated, once again, that the U.S. response to the Houthi threat is far costlier than any damage the Houthis could have hoped to achieve.

Houthi attacks on maritime shipping have cost the industry $2.1 billion since October 2023. But the U.S. has spent more than twice that sum—at least $4.86 billion—on its military campaign against the Houthis, according to the Costs of War Project at Brown University.

Throwing nearly $5 billon at a $2 billion problem makes no sense. In principle, the U.S. government could save $3 billion simply by reimbursing the shippers instead of fighting the Houthis. Not that it should, because the costs are tiny and the industry can easily absorb them.

Container ships that divert around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Red Sea pay roughly $1 million in extra fuel and transit expenses. But considering that the average container ship carries about $300 million of cargo, the additional cost is just 0.33 percent of the value of the goods. Overall, the estimated $2.1 billion in higher costs represents less than one-tenth of 1 percent of a global maritime shipping industry valued at $2.2 trillion in 2021.

Meanwhile, fears that Houthi violence would cause global prices to soar have proven completely unfounded. To the contrary, inflation has cooled so much that the U.S. Federal Reserve cut interest rates by half a percent in September, with more cuts likely by the end of 2024.

Why do the Houthis bother to attack Red Sea shipping if their strikes cause so little damage? Because the attacks are cheap to mount but expensive to defend against. In other words, the cost-exchange ratio of the campaign favors the Houthis, even though the conventional balance of power strongly favors the United States.

Houthi drones cost as little as $2,000, whereas each B-2 bomber costs about $2 billion. Since B-2s also cost $163,000 per flight hour to operate, a 30-hour roundtrip mission to Yemen from Missouri where all U.S. B-2s are based would cost nearly $5 million per sortie, and that is before accounting for the cost of the bombs themselves. (Citing operational security, the Pentagon declined to specify how many B-2s were used or where they flew from.)

That lopsided cost-exchange ratio is the essence of guerilla warfare and the source of its occasional success. Weak actors like the Houthis cannot hope to defeat stronger foes like the United States in a conventional war. So they pursue irregular warfare to sap their opponent’s will, ambushing supply lines and other vulnerable spots instead of hardened military targets. Guerillas function like “innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant in both front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him,” as Mao Zedong aptly wrote. The gnats trick the giant into self-defeating behavior—pointless flailing that only wears itself out.

Guerilla strategy is clever, but in this particular case, its practitioners are not. In reality, the Houthis are more like bees than gnats because their attacks are so bumbling. That incompetence makes U.S. overkill all the more frustrating.

Few episodes illustrate Houthi ineffectiveness better than the MV Delta Sounion saga that played out in the Red Sea this summer.

In late August, the Houthis foolishly tried—and failed—three times to sink the Greek oil tanker Sounion, which was carrying some one million barrels of crude petroleum. About 15 Houthi fighters initially assaulted the vessel with gunfire from small boats, to no effect. Two hours later, they knocked out the engine with a few unidentified projectiles, but the Sounion stayed afloat and the crew evacuated unharmed. Finally, the Houthis boarded the undefended tanker and rigged it with explosives, but the ensuing blast produced nothing more than theater. The Sounion remained intact.

At that point, it apparently dawned on the Houthis that engineering an environmental disaster four times worse than the Exxon Valdez off the coast of their own territory wasn’t the brightest idea. They encouraged EU naval forces to tow the ship to safety.

Real masterminds, those guys.

Clearly, the Houthi threat to maritime commerce is exaggerated. Yet somehow Washington can’t resist swatting at a nuisance whose greatest achievement is tricking the U.S. into wasting its own resources.

Rosemary A. Kelanic is Director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities.

18. Americans’ top sources of political news ahead of the 2024 election

I think I am in the 17% who do not have a main source of election news since I read all of those mentioned below (I am listening to NPR right now while I flip between CNN and Fox on TV on my iPad and turn up the volume whenever I see something interesting being reported) while reading the NY Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal online (and myriad other websites) (And every night I watch ABC news with my wife because she likes to watch David Muir and get the daily news in less than 30 minutes).

Graphics and charts at the link:

https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/10/31/americans-top-sources-of-political-news-ahead-of-the-2024-election/?utm

The key stats:

The most common single outlet that Americans name as their main source for political news is Fox News (13%). Older adults are much more likely than younger adults to name Fox News: 22% of those ages 65 and older say this is their main source for this news, compared with just 5% of adults under 30.

One-in-ten Americans cite CNN as their top source of political news. This represents a slight decline since the last time we asked this question in 2021, when 14% of respondents said CNN was their main political news source.

Beyond Fox News and CNN, at least 2% of Americans name eight other sources:

A specific local TV station or local TV in general
Other national TV news channels (ABC News, NBC News, MSNBC or CBS News)
NPR, the only radio organization among these top sources
The New York Times, the only traditional newspaper on the list
X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. A previous Pew Research Center study found that X is more of a destination for news than other social media sites.

About a third of Americans (32%) name a source other than these top 10. Another 17% say they don’t have a main source of election news or decline to answer the question.

Short Reads

October 31, 2024

Americans’ top sources of political news ahead of the 2024 election

Christopher St. Aubin

TV network booths are set up in Chicago’s United Center on Aug. 17, 2024, ahead of the Democratic National Convention. (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

Americans have a wide variety of news sources available to them this election season.

In September, we asked U.S. adults to name the source they turn to most often for political and election news. People mentioned hundreds of unique sources across more than 8,000 open-ended responses, demonstrating the fragmented nature of the modern news environment.

How we did this

The most common single outlet that Americans name as their main source for political news is Fox News (13%). Older adults are much more likely than younger adults to name Fox News: 22% of those ages 65 and older say this is their main source for this news, compared with just 5% of adults under 30.

One-in-ten Americans cite CNN as their top source of political news. This represents a slight decline since the last time we asked this question in 2021, when 14% of respondents said CNN was their main political news source.

Beyond Fox News and CNN, at least 2% of Americans name eight other sources:

A specific local TV station or local TV in general
Other national TV news channels (ABC News, NBC News, MSNBC or CBS News)
NPR, the only radio organization among these top sources
The New York Times, the only traditional newspaper on the list
X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. A previous Pew Research Center study found that X is more of a destination for news than other social media sites.

About a third of Americans (32%) name a source other than these top 10. Another 17% say they don’t have a main source of election news or decline to answer the question.

Our September survey also asked respondents what platform they most often use for election news (e.g., TV, news websites, etc.) and whether they use several specific news outlets (including many of the most common sources mentioned above) as a major or minor source of political news.

Do Americans view their main source of political news as part of the mainstream media?

The September survey also asked Americans whether they think their main source for political news is part of the “mainstream media.”

Across many of the most common sources, large majorities of those who use each source say it is part of the mainstream media. For example, 84% of those who say CNN is their top source of election news say it’s part of the mainstream media, compared with just 5% who say it is not.

A majority of people who list Fox News as their main source say it is part of the mainstream media (61%). But this cable news network has a larger share of users who say that it is not mainstream (28%) than other top news outlets. About one-in-five Americans who name NPR as their main source of political news (19%) also say it is not mainstream media.

A relatively slim majority of Americans who say local TV is their main source of political news (57%) see it as mainstream media, but just 8% say this is not the case. Another 34% of these local TV news consumers say they aren’t sure whether their station is part of the mainstream media.

Partisanship and mainstream media

Overall, among those who listed a main source of political news, six-in-ten say that their source is part of the mainstream media. About a quarter (24%) say it is not mainstream and 16% aren’t sure.

Among those who named a main source of political news, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and GOP leaners to say that their main source of political news is part of the mainstream media (72% vs. 48%).

Meanwhile, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say their main source of political news is not part of the mainstream media (36% vs. 13%).

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Topics

19. Why Electoral Violence Starts—and How It Can End

A long read.

Excerpts:

Countries experiencing political violence tend to have two factors in common, Barbara F. Walter, a scholar of civil war at the University of California, San Diego, told FP’s Ravi Agrawal recently. The first is anocracy—“just a fancy political science term for a partial democracy” with elements of autocracy, Walter said. The second factor that Walter outlined is whether those partial democracies are “mainly organized around race, religion, or ethnicity and not around ideology.”

The stories from countries featured in this package are drawn from four continents, but you will recognize both of these descriptions—or elements of them—throughout. Before getting to the solutions for the specter of electoral violence that these countries can offer, we also wanted to assess whether widespread fears of violence around the Nov. 5 election are well founded. Robert Pape, a professor at the University of Chicago who studies Americans’ attitudes toward democracy, thinks that the country is indeed living through an “extraordinary era of political violence.”

Read on to find out why Pape thinks that support for political violence has grown sharply over the last few years, and keep scrolling to hear from regional experts about how Brazil, Ethiopia, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka managed to find a path out of polarization.—Amelia Lester, deputy editor

Why Electoral Violence Starts—and How It Can End

As Americans prepare to vote in a tense presidential contest, these countries show a way out of political polarization.

November 1, 2024, 6:00 AM

By Robert A. Pape, Dushni Weerakoon, Oliver Stuenkel, Adem Kassie Abebe, and Daniel Finn

Foreign Policy

United States

Election-harris-trump-2024-functional-tag-2

Stay informed with FP’s news and analysis as the United States votes.

Though experts have pointed out the pervasiveness of violence in U.S. political history, this particular election—held in the shadow of the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection and marked by multiple assassination attempts on Republican nominee and former President Donald Trump—doesn’t feel normal. Americans can no longer take a peaceful transition of power for granted.

With even pollsters declaring the contest too close to call, Foreign Policy wanted to do something useful in the waning days of the presidential campaign. We decided to see if other countries might have lessons for the United States on how to navigate through such a charged moment.

Countries experiencing political violence tend to have two factors in common, Barbara F. Walter, a scholar of civil war at the University of California, San Diego, told FP’s Ravi Agrawal recently. The first is anocracy—“just a fancy political science term for a partial democracy” with elements of autocracy, Walter said. The second factor that Walter outlined is whether those partial democracies are “mainly organized around race, religion, or ethnicity and not around ideology.”

The stories from countries featured in this package are drawn from four continents, but you will recognize both of these descriptions—or elements of them—throughout. Before getting to the solutions for the specter of electoral violence that these countries can offer, we also wanted to assess whether widespread fears of violence around the Nov. 5 election are well founded. Robert Pape, a professor at the University of Chicago who studies Americans’ attitudes toward democracy, thinks that the country is indeed living through an “extraordinary era of political violence.”

Read on to find out why Pape thinks that support for political violence has grown sharply over the last few years, and keep scrolling to hear from regional experts about how Brazil, Ethiopia, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka managed to find a path out of polarization.—Amelia Lester, deputy editor

JUMP TO COUNTRY

How Many Americans Support Political Violence?

By Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the University of Chicago and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats

Donald Trump, surrounded by security, is rushed offstage after being shot.

Republican presidential candidate and former President Donald Trump is rushed offstage after being shot during a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

Americans are living through an extraordinary era of political violence. For years, political violence has been on the rise across the political spectrum—not just according to anecdotal examples but also based on rigorous long-term studies of a representative sample of U.S. citizens. Indeed, support for political violence has now become “normal,” at least when people are asked about the use of violence to achieve political goals that they also endorse.

Violent populism, meaning the violent mass support for a political leader, party, political ideology, or mass movement, on both the right and left pose a grave threat to modern democracy in the United States.

To understand public attitudes, the University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) has conducted quarterly nationally representative surveys of support for political violence and confidence in democracy since June 2021, fielded by NORC, previously known as the National Opinion Research Center. These surveys show that political violence is supported by determined minorities on both the right and the left and at disturbingly high and stable levels.

They also show that large fractions of Americans see the nation’s politics as broken and are deeply distrustful of the value of elections to solve problems. They see the leading political candidates for the presidency as dangers to democracy and believe political conspiracy theories about the malicious and corrupt behavior of the federal government. In other words, support for political violence is now squarely in the mainstream of Americans’ thinking and a normalized tool to achieve political goals when peaceful means fail.

The most distressing development in the past year has been a spate of assassination attempts and politically motivated mass shootings. In July, a gunman tried to shoot former U.S. President Donald Trump at a campaign rally and ended up killing a civilian and wounding three others, including Trump himself; the gunman was killed by a Secret Service counter-sniper. In September, another man was arrested for attempting to assassinate Trump in West Palm Beach, Florida.

The United States has also seen multiple attempts to assassinate or severely harm leaders across the political spectrum. In October 2022, a man broke into U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s home with the intention of interrogating and harming her; she was not home, and the home invader later attacked her husband. In June 2023, an individual was arrested while surveilling the Washington, D.C., home of former president Barack Obama with weapons in his van. In June 2022, an individual was arrested for plotting to kill conservative Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh.

By any count, the number of these events has grown since 2018 and appears to be higher than at any time since the rash of high-level political assassinations and attempts in the 1960s and early 1980s. Indeed, the last nearly fatal attempt to assassinate a sitting U.S. president was against Ronald Reagan in 1981, more than 40 years ago.

And it is not only political leaders and their families being targeted. Over the past six years, the United States has witnessed a number of mass shootings targeted at ethnic groups, such as Jews at the Tree of Life synagogue in October 2018; Hispanics at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, in August 2019; and African Americans at Tops Friendly Markets in Buffalo, New York, in May 2022. All three aforementioned attacks were motivated by the right-wing “great replacement theory,” which originated in France but has influenced white supremacists around the world. The theory’s core idea is that elites are conspiring to deliberately replace the white population with nonwhite people—and the attacks were meant to punish and deter this outcome, as all three shooters explained in their manifestos.

The United States has also witnessed multiple instances of violent protests from both the right and the left.

During the summer of 2020, the George Floyd protests were overwhelmingly peaceful, but there were some instances of violence, including looting and attacks on police stations and vehicles, for the purpose of compelling local political leaders to “defund the police,” a goal associated with the left. These instances of political violence occurred in over 100 major cities, including Minneapolis, Portland, New York City, and Chicago.

On Jan. 6, 2021, around 2,000 Trump supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol—breaking through barricades, fighting Capitol and Washington, D.C., police, and ultimately hunting U.S. lawmakers inside the building—all in an effort to prevent the peaceful transfer of power to Joe Biden, who was president-elect at the time.

In the wake of the escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after Oct. 7, 2023, hundreds of pro-Palestine and pro-Israel protests occurred in many U.S. cities and on college campuses in the fall and again in the spring of 2024. And almost immediately, anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim incidents of violence and intimidation rose.

There is also the threat of domestic terrorism. According to statistics collected by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security, incidents of groups and individuals carrying out attacks of domestic terrorism increased by 357 percent between 2013 and 2021. This includes violence for ideologies across the political spectrum. While anti-government militias, white supremacists, and likeminded extremists conducted about 49 percent of all attacks and plots in 2021, violent incidents by anarchists, anti-fascists, and likeminded extremists rose from 23 percent in 2020 to 40 percent in 2021, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

There has also been a rise in threats prosecuted by the Justice Department to members of Congress—targeting both Republicans and Democrats—for years. To understand more clearly whether the recent rise of political violence incidents is a real phenomenon rather than a product of a human tendency to exaggerate a handful of salient events, CPOST studied every threat prosecuted by the Justice Department to members of Congress from 2001 to 2023. It found that the annual number of threats increased fivefold starting in 2017—the first year of Trump’s presidency—and stayed consistently at that annual high every year through 2023. Targets were roughly half Republicans and half Democrats, as the graphic below shows for the most recent years.

What’s going on in the United States? The first step in understanding major upswings in political violence is knowing what the public thinks. As scholars have long demonstrated, well-functioning democracies and peaceful resolution of political disputes turns on more than the mechanics of electoral politics. They also hinge critically on public support for norms of restraint in the use of force and confidence in the ability of elections to settle disputes fairly. Historically, the more public support for violence, the more common and dangerous actual violence becomes—even in countries considered to be mature democracies.

The news on this front is not comforting. Scholars have long known that public commitment to democratic norms—particularly, confidence in the legitimacy of elections and restraint in the use of violence to settle political disputes beyond the ballot box—are crucial foundations for a constitutional government and to constrain elites who might seek to weaponize institutions for their private concerns. But CPOST’s surveys show that public support of democratic norms is not as high as we would like to imagine and support for the use of force to achieve political goals is at worrying levels—moving well beyond a tiny fringe, with significant minorities supporting violence for causes on both the right and left. Hence, it is no wonder that would-be lone wolves and flash mobs think that their acts of political violence enjoy a mantel of legitimacy.

The good news is that 75 percent of Americans surveyed still abhor political violence. Political leaders at all levels of government, community leaders, scholars, and the media all need to lean into the 75 percent, empowering them to speak up against political violence wherever it comes from. The United States’ political leaders and media figures have an especially powerful role to play. The goal should not be to dampen political enthusiasm, which is so critical for political campaigns. Rather, the goal should be to redirect political anger away from violence and toward voting. Americans should absolutely “fight” for their political future. However, that must mean electoral competition as the venue for nonviolent confrontation and not letting that competition transform into physical violence.

In the United States, the next national election is always only two years away—and all political leaders and media figures have a responsibility to stand up vigorously for these norms that truly safeguard our democracy.

Economic Devastation to Peaceful Transition in Sri Lanka

By Dushni Weerakoon, executive director of the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka

A crowd of people carrying colorful umbrellas make their way through clouds of tear gas.

Police use water cannons and tear gas to disperse teachers and principals protesting against salary anomalies during an anti-government demonstration in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on June 26.Ishara S. Kodikara/AFP via Getty Images

The conventional wisdom is that a growing economy helps the incumbent, and a weakening one helps their opponents. But the effects of economics on election outcomes are never straightforward. Sri Lanka’s presidential election, held in September, came in the middle of a steady recovery from a debilitating economic crisis two years ago. Despite this, the election results saw a political transition, from a seasoned politician who has previously held the post of prime minister on five different occasions to an untested candidate from a political party out of the mainstream.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the leader of the Marxist-oriented Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party, obtained 42 percent of the popular vote—up from just 3 percent of votes in the last presidential election in 2019. It is the first national electoral success for the JVP, and to capitalize on this turnabout, the new president swiftly called for a parliamentary election for this November.

What seems certain is that, in the presence of widespread economic disruptions, changes in voter alignments and other unpredictable behavior can be expected. At the peak of Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis and sovereign default, food and fuel shortages were accompanied by spiraling inflation and a tumbling currency—at unprecedented magnitudes of 70 and 80 percent, respectively. The economy has come a long way since. Annual inflation is at a low 2 percent, the exchange rate is stable having regained some of its lost value, and output growth is strengthening. Sri Lanka will likely end 2024 with a GDP growth rate of around 4 percent, double the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2 percent projection. On these fundamentals, a reasonably speedy debt restructuring deal with bilateral creditors and bondholders has also been concluded.

But the message of a recovering economy was insufficient to convince large swaths of disillusioned voters. The crisis itself saw a doubling of Sri Lanka’s poverty rate. While the most disadvantaged people did receive some support, stringent austerity measures demanded by an IMF program signed in March 2023 hit hard. Public sector wage freezes, tax increases, and spending cuts ate into living standards already eroded by high inflation. Voters most likely asked themselves whether they were better off today than they were two years ago.

Whatever the proximate cause, harsh economic conditions sow the seeds of discontent. They also heighten legitimate fears of violence. In fact, Sri Lanka experienced a burst of violence at the worst moment of the 2022 downturn. Simmering tensions can crystalize more particularly in a volatile election environment—especially if politicians are inclined to lend a helping hand with divisive campaigns.

Despite the traumatic legacy of the economic crisis, Sri Lanka’s polls have since proved to be free of violence during or in the aftermath of the elections. In fact, the peaceful political transition was even more significant given that the presidential race was won on a minority vote for the first time in the country’s history. There are many explanations for this outcome. The first of these relate to the remaking of the JVP itself. Associated with two violent antigovernment uprisings in the 1970s and the 1980s, the party was keen to reassure voters and largely avoided acrimonious electioneering. The focus was on a unifying theme of anticorruption rather than the more divisive issues of economic policy or local government power-sharing arrangements. At the same time, the JVP candidate also diluted the party’s more traditional hard-left positions, especially on economic matters, to broaden the voter base.

The second set of reasons relate to the voters themselves. The economic shock focused the public’s attention more intently on who should be held responsible. This resulted in the political collapse, for now, of the Mahinda Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party, which was in power at the height of the crisis. Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party (UNP), stepped in when the Rajapaksas were forced out. Despite being the candidate responsible for rescuing the economy he, too, suffered an electoral bruising, belying the tenet of a stronger economy helping an incumbent. In addition, the widespread nature of the economic shock—across population and income groups—meant larger numbers who were ready to switch party allegiances. Those groups’ disgruntlement with mainstream parties, held responsible for corruption and missteps leading to decades of economic mismanagement, led them to an outsider candidate.

But while Sri Lanka successfully navigated out of a danger zone, an outbreak of social unrest need not be necessarily confined to the devastation from a sudden crisis. Unrest can arise from slow-burning issues tied into perceptions of relative economic decline—blamed on migration or free trade, for instance. Discontent finds fertile ground at election campaigns as seen in recent U.S. elections, where such issues couched around identity, culture, and security have proven to be deeply polarizing. In Sri Lanka, the challenging party was vigilant about avoiding inflammatory rhetoric. Such a concerted effort needs to be adopted by both parties in the United States in order to minimize the chance of disruption.

For now, Sri Lankans are relieved that this very consequential election and power transfer went smoothly. Peaceful elections, though, have not solved the country’s economic problems. The road to a durable recovery from an economic crisis and sovereign default is a long and hard one. The new president and his party will have to deliver on promises to improve standards of living, a fairer society, and a cleaner government if it is to retain the large numbers of swing voters.

On the campaign trail, all candidates held out populist promises ranging from wage increases to tax reductions. The JVP is likely to be more interventionist on economics, but the stranglehold of the IMF program means that promises can be delivered only at the margin by tweaking taxes and spending. A more thorough overhaul risks disrupting the program’s targets and timelines. If that were to occur, even the very limited foreign finance available to Sri Lanka will begin to dry up and perhaps turn out to be the precursor to another foreign exchange crisis. While the JVP has won a remarkable victory, Sri Lanka’s search for economic, political, and social stability continues.

Brazil’s Civil Society Deterred a Coup and Calmed Tensions

By Oliver Stuenkel, associate professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Supporters of Brazilian former President Jair

Supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro invade the National Congress in Brasília, Brazil, on Jan. 8, 2023.Evaristo SA/AFP via Getty Images

A look back at Brazil’s general election in October 2022 reveals just how precariously the world’s fifth-largest democracy stood on the brink of political turmoil. Throughout the race, then-President Jair Bolsonaro spread unfounded claims of election fraud and disseminated disinformation aimed at galvanizing his most extreme supporters. But while Bolsonaro’s rhetoric echoed that of former U.S. President Donald Trump, his strong support among the armed forces and the military police—who harbor antidemocratic sympathies—presented a unique threat. Several generals embraced Bolsonaro’s conspiracy theories and promoted the idea that they should play a role in signing off on the election result—a proposal that was clearly unconstitutional.

After Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva narrowly defeated Bolsonaro, highway blockades by Bolsonaro supporters were erected in several parts of the country as the defeated president refused to concede. Numerous analysts warned of impending political violence akin to the Jan. 6, 2021, riots in the United States, as thousands of Bolsonaro’s followers gathered outside military barracks in Brasília and other cities calling for a military coup. On Jan. 8, 2023, a week after Lula’s inauguration, rioters stormed the presidential palace, Congress, and the Supreme Court in a striking parallel to the Jan. 6 riots at the U.S. Capitol. Evidence suggests the Brazilian military played a dubious role in the Jan. 8 riots, with several high-ranking officials accused of either tacitly supporting or directly facilitating the attack. U.S. diplomatic pressure—involving the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department—is believed to have been crucial in deterring Brazil’s armed forces from supporting a coup.

Remarkably, however, Brazil’s national political environment appeared to have returned to normal less than six months later. Although polarization remains entrenched and political violence during recent municipal elections was high, the overall political climate has improved considerably, with the political debates on social media and leaders’ rhetoric decidedly less frenzied than back in 2022. How did Brazil pull back from the brink?

1. Rapid and transparent election results

A crucial factor in containing unrest was the swift and transparent reporting of election results. Ballots are electronic, and Brazil’s electoral justice system ensured that the final results were announced within a few hours after voting booths closed on election night, massively reducing the window for misinformation to take hold. While fake news continued to spread, Bolsonaro party officials were invited to inspect the electronic voting system ahead of the elections, so accusations of electoral fraud rang hollow.

2. Accountability and decisive legal action

Brazil’s electoral court acted swiftly to hold Bolsonaro accountable for his role in undermining public trust in the electoral system, barring him from running for public office until 2030. The case focused on a July 18, 2022, meeting where the president used public resources to tell a large group of foreign ambassadors that Brazil’s electronic voting system was rigged. This punishment not only removed the country’s most polarizing figure from the political landscape but also deprived the far-right movement of clear leadership, as Bolsonaro failed to groom a successor.

3. Combating disinformation with aggressive measures

Brazilian authorities, led by Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, adopted a proactive stance against disinformation, temporarily blocking social media accounts that spread false claims about the election. Even influential figures faced censorship if they undermined public trust in democratic institutions. Social media companies were ordered to remove thousands of posts, sometimes with limited opportunity for appeal. Moraes’s aggressive tactics sparked controversy, with critics—particularly Bolsonaro supporters—accusing him of authoritarianism and undermining free speech. While the jury is still out regarding the long-term consequences of this unusual approach, these measures did prove effective in preventing coordinated disinformation campaigns from eroding trust in the election outcome.

4. Personal leadership to overcome extreme polarization

Leading political figures seem to have sensed, after the Jan. 8 riots, that voters were getting tired of extreme polarization. That is perhaps best symbolized by the cordial relationship between Brazil’s two most powerful men—President Lula and São Paulo Gov. Tarcísio de Freitas, a right-wing former military officer and Bolsonaro protégé, who might challenge Lula in the 2026 election. Lula and Tarcísio, how the governor is publicly known, have appeared together onstage on several occasions, and both have signaled their desire to overcome the toxicity that had become the hallmark of Brazilian politics for the past decade.

5. A political system that favors finding a common denominator—but at a cost

Brazil’s political system—known as coalitional presidentialism—requires all presidents, even those elected by a wide margin, to construct broad and often unwieldy coalitions in Congress. These coalitions frequently include ideologically diverse and even antagonistic parties, making it nearly impossible for any single political agenda to dominate unilaterally. While maintaining these coalitions often involves complex negotiations, patronage, pork-barrel spending, and incentivizes corruption, this system has the potential to temper polarization.

One key factor is the relatively low level of party discipline within Brazilian politics: members of Congress are not strictly bound by party lines, which allows for pragmatic alliances across ideological divides. A striking example of this flexibility can be seen in the fact that numerous Congress members elected under Bolsonaro’s party frequently support Lula’s coalition. By forcing competing interests to negotiate and cooperate, Brazil’s political system serves as a moderating force, limiting the emergence of extreme polarization that is often seen in more rigid, two-party systems.

Truth be told, the return to normalcy on the federal and state level is contrasted by a recent spike in political violence. In the first half of 2024 alone, Brazil recorded 187 episodes of political violence, including 43 murders of politicians and their family members. The recent municipal elections saw at least 88 physical attacks on candidates or politicians. Yet these generally have little to do with polarization on the national level, and they rarely involve high-profile politicians.

6. Civil society and the media actively sought to reduce the risk of political violence

In the run-up to the 2022 general election, various actors from civil society and the media played a critical role in reducing the risk of political violence by actively promoting nonviolence, dialogue, and respect for democratic institutions. Civic organizations, religious leaders, business associations, and prominent nongovernmental organizations launched campaigns urging peaceful political engagement and rejecting any form of violence or intimidation. One notable example was the Coalizão pela Democracia (Coalition for Democracy), a broad alliance of civil society groups that publicly emphasized the importance of respecting the electoral process and peacefully accepting its outcomes. Religious figures across denominations, from Catholic bishops to evangelical leaders, also issued calls for calm and moderation, urging their followers to avoid divisive rhetoric and refrain from participating in confrontational actions.

The media, particularly major outlets such as O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo, and O Estado de S. Paulo, contributed by closely monitoring and debunking disinformation that could incite unrest. Through investigative journalism, they highlighted attempts to discredit the electronic voting system and revealed plots that sought to undermine public trust in the electoral process. Fact-checking initiatives like Agência Lupa and Aos Fatos partnered with social media platforms to counter viral falsehoods, ensuring voters had access to accurate information.

Business leaders and industry associations also issued statements advocating for stability and reinforcing that political differences should be resolved through dialogue rather than violence. Public figures, including artists and intellectuals, organized events and campaigns under the banner of democracy, urging voters to respect the results regardless of personal preferences. These efforts culminated in high-profile initiatives such as a letter in defense of democracy that was signed by more than a million citizens, including prominent figures from academia, culture, and the judiciary.

Together, these actors—through advocacy, information campaigns, and public appeals—helped create a social climate where violence became less acceptable as a political tool. Their efforts not only promoted respect for the electoral process but also fostered a sense of collective responsibility for maintaining peace, reducing the likelihood of large-scale unrest despite the tense political atmosphere. Quick and transparent results, holding political actors accountable, curbing disinformation, and fostering cross-party collaboration are tools that any democracy can use to defuse tensions.

Winning and Losing Well in Divided African Democracies

By Adem Kassie Abebe, vice president of the African Network of Constitutional Lawyers

A police officer sits next to electoral officials as they guard unopened ballot boxes

A police officer sits next to electoral officials as they guard unopened ballot boxes at a polling station in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, on June 22, 2021. Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

For many parts of the world, elections are not unadulterated celebrations of democracy. In much of Africa, elections can be an anxious, and even violent, ritual. In 2007, then-Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo quipped that elections are “do-or-die affairs.”

Whether or not elections will turn violent primarily depends on the consent of the losers.

The losers’ consent, in turn, depends on their belief in democracy, as well as trust in the credibility and fairness of the democratic system. The losers must believe that the victor won fair and square, and, crucially, that the winner will not seek to take undue advantage of the victory to reward loyalists and punish detractors.

As the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol shows, election violence is not simply the exclusive preserve of what Donald Trump derisively called “shithole countries.” Indeed, as a polarized U.S. electorate enters a knife-edge election, Americans could stand to learn a lot from Africa.

Ethiopia offers one cautionary tale. In the run-up to its 2020 general election (which was ultimately postponed to 2021), the ruling party was accused of using the security apparatus and other state institutions to dismantle the opposition in key regions where it could potentially lose, including Tigray and Oromia, where Prime MinisterAhmed is from.

Some of the opposition candidates were murdered by unknown assailants. Opposition parties therefore lost not only confidence in the fairness of the election, but also in the commitment of the ruling party to govern fairly. This forced key opposition parties to boycott the election. A loss of confidence in peaceful electoral processes then led to a surge for support for groups that resorted to armed struggle to advance their causes.

Ethiopia also offers some lessons in how the broader political framework can undermine electoral credibility and increase the chances of violence. Ethnic identity is the foundation of the country’s constitutional and political framework, and there has long been a rivalry between the largest groups: Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigrayan. This has led to intense competition both within and between ethnic groups. To outbid competing parties within the same ethnic group, ethnic factions tend to take extreme positions, often defined in reference to other (enemy) groups. In particular, politics in Oromia has been defined by strong anti-Amhara sentiment.

The pivot toward identity politics, formally or informally, heightens electoral rhetoric and the possibilities for violent struggle to advance political objectives. Ethiopia’s government postponed the 2020 elections, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, but the postponement was contested by some groups. Because there is no effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism, what should have been a difficult but ultimately technical issue of constitutional interpretation turned out to be a prelude to Africa’s biggest war in recent memory, pitting the federal government and its allies against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The electoral postponement proved to be the last stroke of intense rivalry between Abiy, Ethiopia’s new strongman, and the TPLF, the deposed party that dominated the previous regime.

In Gambia, the fracturing of an opposition coalition, which came together to unseat President Yahya Jammeh in the 2016 presidential election, increased tensions and threats of violence in the run-up to the 2021 election. In light of this, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance facilitated the development of a code of conduct for all presidential candidates, including a commitment to publicly denounce violence and intimidation. This contributed to a relatively calm political environment. The presence of eminent national guarantors and a strong partnership with civil society organizations to monitor compliance with the code of conduct strengthened its effectiveness.

The role of guarantors and civil society is critical, as a similar approach in the 2023 Nigerian presidential election—which lacked guarantors and a civil society partnership—had limited impact on enhancing trust in the electoral process and in reducing violence and intimidation.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous democracy, has witnessed repeated alternations of parties and presidential power. But elections continue to be precarious and violent experiences, with electoral costs rising while the quality of the elections seems to be diminishing, leading to a crisis of confidence in the electoral process and low voter turnout. In Nigeria’s 2023 election, only 27 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot.

Local community-based initiatives can also enhance confidence in the election process and management, as well as improve relations between the public and local election and security actors, reducing the chances of violence—even when national elites resort to divisive and violent rhetoric.

In addition, to reduce people’s susceptibility to violence, it is crucial to promote the electoral system to ensure that the rules, institutions, and systems are known and clearly understood.

Ultimately, the prevention of electoral violence in an age of social media and populist rhetoric depends on the perception of fairness of not only the elections, but also the broad political framework. If the sense of satisfaction with the political system is high, the possibilities for violence are likely to be low. This requires designing legitimate electoral and political systems (starting from the primaries that incentivize moderation) and constant vigilance to nurture and reinforce a civic-minded citizenry, which is the foundation of an improved infrastructure of peace and democracy.

Elections are not good ways of resolving fundamental differences and can be destabilizing in contexts where the rules of the game and historical narratives are contested. Therefore, it is crucial to first resolve foundational disputes, such as autonomy of distinct groups and the federal structure of the state through broad dialogue in a manner that avoids winner-takes-all politics, and rely on elections to resolve second-order policy differences like tax rates and immigration policy.

The dilemma is that constitutional features that reduce winner-takes-all politics, such as proportional electoral systems, checks and balances, power-sharing mechanisms, and relatively autonomous and apolitical bureaucracy, are often attacked by populist leaders on the grounds that such measures stand in the way of the majority’s will and that only they can genuinely represent the people’s will. Violent rhetoric may therefore become a deliberate populist strategy.

And violence cascades down from the top. The narrative of violence often starts with elite attacks on the credibility of the elections and even the broader democratic system. To reduce the chances of violence, it can help to push political leaders (and major media institutions) to abide by a set of agreements (codes of conduct) regarding inflammatory rhetoric and fair media coverage. Identifying risks, along with preventing and mitigating political violence, must be a fundamental and continuous endeavor.

It is not simply what happens on the day of an election that matters for electoral violence. The broader system determines the tolerance of losing political groups and candidates; it determines the level of protection that losers will receive, including rewards for the political minority that increase the chances of acceptance of electoral outcomes. In fact, if the system does not enjoy broad buy-in, elections may be seen as legitimizing and reinforcing an unfair system.

In places where the electoral stakes are so high and the strength of democratic institutions is low because of the winner-takes-all nature of the political framework, political competition is not merely to set policy, but to capture the state apparatus. In such contexts, the incentives to resort to overpromising, vote-buying, voter suppression, intimidation, and violence are high, both for ruling and opposition parties. Such winner-take-all systems are incompatible with free, fair, and credible elections. Accordingly, all committed democracies need to shun such systems and instead seek to enhance the protection of minorities, transparency, and inclusiveness in their electoral systems.

A Cautionary Tale From Northern Ireland About Public Safety

By Daniel Finn, features editor for Jacobin and author of One Man’s Terrorist: A Political History of the IRA

Soldiers in riot gear point guns down a Belfast street toward a civilian car.

British soldiers attempt to dispel rioters during unrest in Belfast in 1970. Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images

If the United States was to experience a descent into political violence comparable to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the results would be catastrophic. Between the late 1960s and the late 1990s, the conflict claimed 3,500 lives in a region with a population of about 1.5 million. Adjusted for population size, this would be the equivalent of more than 700,000 deaths in the present-day United States. But even political violence on a smaller scale raises an important question about the state security forces tasked with upholding the law. Can they be relied upon to do so without taking sides in a bitterly polarized environment?

Northern Ireland offers an important and disturbing case study in how far those who are supposed to protect ordinary citizens from harm can themselves become a threat to public safety. The British security forces during the Troubles were divided into several parts. Members of the regular police force, known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), routinely bore arms while on duty, unlike their counterparts in Britain. They were supported by soldiers from the British Army and by a part-time militia, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). Members of the RUC and the UDR were overwhelmingly recruited from within Northern Ireland, with the vast majority coming from the Protestant-unionist community.

These forces had to deal with paramilitary groups that challenged the authority of the state. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried out attacks on the security forces, killing hundreds of soldiers and police officers as part of its campaign for a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. The loyalist paramilitaries of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), on the other hand, accused the security forces of not doing enough to combat the IRA and took the law unapologetically into their own hands. Although the IRA was their declared adversary, in practice, the loyalist groups generally targeted civilians from the Catholic-nationalist community. About 85 percent of those killed by loyalists were civilians; the equivalent figure for republicans was 35 percent.

The security forces and their political masters in London always insisted that they were upholding the rule of law in Northern Ireland against all those who sought to undermine it. But there was clear evidence of double standards in their approach to republican and loyalist paramilitaries. To begin with, the British authorities allowed the UDA to remain a legal organization for two decades until it was finally banned in 1992. In the 1970s, it was official policy to permit members of the UDA to join the UDR. A memo from the British Army’s headquarters in Northern Ireland circulated in 1972 stated that the UDA was “a large organization not all of whose members can be regarded as dangerous extremists,” and that it would be “counter-productive to discharge a UDR member on the grounds that he is a member of the UDA.”

During the ’70s, serving members of the RUC and the UDR formed part of the so-called Glenanne gang, a loyalist militia responsible for some of the most notorious atrocities of the time, including the bombings that killed 33 people in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974. Some of the killings by the Glenanne gang were investigated by the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) of the RUC’s successor force, the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The HET report noted a widespread belief among relatives of the gang’s victims that the RUC did not investigate its activities properly at the time, “in a deliberate effort to conceal security forces’ involvement and perpetuate a campaign of terror by loyalist paramilitaries.” The HET declared itself to be “unable to rebut or allay these suspicions,” having identified “disturbing omissions and the lack of any structured investigative strategy,” not to mention “indisputable evidence” of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and members of the security forces that should have “rung alarm bells all the way to the top of Government.”

At this point, only people who are willing to ignore the vast amount of evidence from official sources in the public domain can still deny the existence of large-scale collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the state forces in Northern Ireland. This story unfolded in a West European state renowned for its long, unbroken tradition of constitutional government, in contrast with neighbors such as France, Spain, and Germany. It should stand as a permanent warning of how far those responsible for enforcing the law can deviate from their stated mission in the face of a political crisis.

The reports produced by various official bodies since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, including the HET and the Police Ombudsman, have greatly added to our knowledge of collusion during the Troubles. However, these revelations did not come out of nowhere: Members of the nationalist community and their political representatives repeatedly leveled charges of collusion against the security forces while it was taking place, only to have those charges dismissed as slanderous conspiracy theories by successive British governments.

This was when, as the HET later pointed out, there was “indisputable evidence” of what was happening available to the politicians and civil servants responsible for governing Northern Ireland. Government officials kept that evidence hidden from the public at a time when it was most important for it to be widely known and discussed. The institutions capable of investigating collusion and other abuses were only created after the conflict was over (and even then, they have faced many forms of obstruction from the highest levels of the British state).

Northern Ireland’s experience drives home a lesson that should be familiar from many other countries and conflicts: Those in positions of power simply cannot be trusted to scrutinize themselves, least of all in the middle of a full-blown conflict. Only the existence of genuinely independent bodies can hold those in power accountable and serve as a check on abuses like the kind we saw during the Troubles.

Foreign Policy

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website