Quotes of the Day:
"The best way to make a dream come true is to wake up."
- Dame Anna Wintour
✺✵𝐿𝒶𝓎𝓁𝒶𓆡𓆉
@uv_uv50
divide with fear. unite with courage.
divide with politics. unite with facts.
divide for control. unite for freedom.
divide for power. unite for humanity.
"Scientific thought and its creation is the common and shared heritage of mankind."
- Abdus Salam
1. North Korea Can Make More Uranium for Nuclear Bombs Than Previously Thought
2. The Implications of Simultaneous Conflicts in South Korea and Taiwan
3. China, Russia ask U.N. to end sanctions so North Korea can import bolts, utensils, vacuums
4. New Report Details Experience Of Christians Detained In North Korea
5. Military plays down rift over command transfer
6. US alliance under Biden more popular with South Koreans than under Trump, poll finds
7. North Korean soldier injured picking chestnuts in leader Kim Jong Un’s name
8. Meeting between Moon and Kishida falls through
9. Moon extends nuclear help to Hungary, Poland
10. Korea's nuclear phase-out policy trapped in paradox
11. KAI aims to supply Slovakia with domestically developed FA-50 aircraft
12. N. Korean Cabinet calls on commercial sector to eradicate the "import disease"
13. N Korea in final arrangements to reopen China border to revive economy amid COVID: Report
1. North Korea Can Make More Uranium for Nuclear Bombs Than Previously Thought
Excerpts:
Uranium can be found around the world and typically gets used as the fuel for nuclear power plants. But when enriched to a weapons grade of roughly 90% purity, uranium can be used in atomic weapons to set off a chain reaction that creates a nuclear explosion.
At Pyongsan, ore gets crushed, sorted and processed, before the uranium gets extracted, purified and dried into yellowcake that gets transported elsewhere for further enrichment, according to the Stanford report. Uranium can also be used in reactors to make plutonium.
Decades-old estimates of North Korea’s annual uranium ore output were put at roughly 30,000 metric tons, the report said. But the capacity could be as much as 360,000 metric tons, according to the Stanford analysis, which factored in Pyongsan’s milling infrastructure, size and equipment. The estimate assumes optimal operations for 300 days a year.
To assess Pyongsan’s ore quality, Ms. Park, a trained geologist, collected samples from South Korea, as well as rock analysis of other places with similar geological formations.
The findings suggest the Kim regime could process enough yellowcake for up to 340 kilograms of highly enriched uranium a year—enough for more than 20 nuclear bombs annually. In a 2020 assessment, the U.S. Army said North Korea has the ability to manufacture six new bombs a year.
The Stanford report cited other research that estimates North Korea can enrich the equivalent of roughly six to 10 nuclear bombs a year. That means even if Pyongsan churned out much higher levels of yellowcake, expanding fissile-material production would likely face constraints at the North’s Yongbyon facility, where such enrichment work is believed to be done.
North Korea Can Make More Uranium for Nuclear Bombs Than Previously Thought
The Kim regime is making a fraction of potential fissile material that could be used for bomb, according to new research based on satellite-imagery analysis
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
The assertion is based on satellite-imagery analysis of the equipment and facility size of the Kim regime’s only confirmed operational uranium mining complex in Pyongsan county, about 30 miles north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. That milling capacity assessment was contrasted with North Korea’s estimated production, based on the levels of waste deposited near the mill.
Furthermore, researchers tracked deforestation levels to study mining activity from 2017 to 2020, using an algorithm to analyze satellite imagery and detect land-use changes.
The gap between potential and actual production may indicate that the Kim regime is satisfied with its current proliferation levels, doesn’t have enough ore to mine or that potential bottlenecks exist at later stages of weapons-grade fissile development, said Sulgiye Park, the report’s lead author who is a nuclear-security research fellow at Stanford.
“It’s using 1/10th or 1/20th of the capacity it has,” Ms. Park said. “The big question is why.”
North Korean leader Mr. Kim has vowed recently to keep pursuing weapons advances to face the threat from the U.S. and South Korea—accusing both countries of having adopted hostile policies.
Uranium can be found around the world and typically gets used as the fuel for nuclear power plants. But when enriched to a weapons grade of roughly 90% purity, uranium can be used in atomic weapons to set off a chain reaction that creates a nuclear explosion.
At Pyongsan, ore gets crushed, sorted and processed, before the uranium gets extracted, purified and dried into yellowcake that gets transported elsewhere for further enrichment, according to the Stanford report. Uranium can also be used in reactors to make plutonium.
Decades-old estimates of North Korea’s annual uranium ore output were put at roughly 30,000 metric tons, the report said. But the capacity could be as much as 360,000 metric tons, according to the Stanford analysis, which factored in Pyongsan’s milling infrastructure, size and equipment. The estimate assumes optimal operations for 300 days a year.
Researchers analyzed waste deposits around the Pyongsan mill to estimate North Korea's uranium output.
Photo: Orbital Insight and Airbus
To assess Pyongsan’s ore quality, Ms. Park, a trained geologist, collected samples from South Korea, as well as rock analysis of other places with similar geological formations.
The findings suggest the Kim regime could process enough yellowcake for up to 340 kilograms of highly enriched uranium a year—enough for more than 20 nuclear bombs annually. In a 2020 assessment, the U.S. Army said North Korea has the ability to manufacture six new bombs a year.
The Stanford report cited other research that estimates North Korea can enrich the equivalent of roughly six to 10 nuclear bombs a year. That means even if Pyongsan churned out much higher levels of yellowcake, expanding fissile-material production would likely face constraints at the North’s Yongbyon facility, where such enrichment work is believed to be done.
“Pyongsan is your first stop for North Korea’s nuclear program because it has the one identifiable mine that we know of,” said Dave Schmerler, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, who has done satellite-imagery analysis of Pyongsan though was uninvolved in the Stanford report.
Dismantling the Pyongsan uranium concentrate plant should be an essential component of any denuclearization talks between the U.S. and North Korea, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, which has published satellite-imagery reports about the mining facilities.
North Korea hasn’t allowed outside nuclear inspectors into the country for more than a decade. Pyongsan was one of several key sites, including Yongbyon, that International Atomic Energy Agency officials visited in the early 1990s.
The Stanford estimates had limitations by relying on satellite imagery, Ms. Park said. Collecting samples from Pyongsan itself would allow her to study rock cross sections to better determine ore quality. Spot checks could provide greater confidence that changes to Pyongsan’s topography arose from mining and not something else.
The U.N.’s atomic agency, in a report submitted in August, said North Korea had appeared to have resumed operation of its plutonium-producing reactor at its Yongbyon facility. The reactor had been inactive since December 2018 until the beginning of July 2021. A nearby laboratory that separates plutonium from spent fuel had also shown signs of being operational around that time.
North Korea's uranium mine is located about 30 miles north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
Photo: Orbital Insight and Airbus
The mining activities continued at Pyongsan, even last year when North Korea became one of the first countries in the world to seal off its borders as neighboring China began reporting widespread Covid-19 infections.
The Stanford analysis, in contrast with prior reports that focused more on bursts of activity than geological science, tracked deforestation and land-use developments by using algorithms developed by Orbital Insight Inc., whose software can automatically detect such changes. Normally such analysis can take hours to fully characterize what is in a single image, though the algorithms reduced that process to just seconds, said Olivia Koski, an Orbital Insight employee involved in the Stanford research.
In future research using Orbital’s imagery detection tools, an analysis of railcar activity from Pyongsan to North Korea’s Yongbyon facility could offer even more precise measurements on how much yellowcake the country is producing, Ms. Park said. Railway and milling activity was detected as recently as late last month at Pyongsan, she added.
“The activity at this site never really slowed down during Covid,” she said.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
2. The Implications of Simultaneous Conflicts in South Korea and Taiwan
Can there be a "win-hold-win?" Or can the US and its allies conduct two major theater wars (MTW) simultaneously? We must keep in mind that north Korea has the potential to be a spoiler in Great Power Competition (or strategic competition).
Recall our first action in 1950 when northK Korea attacked the South was to send 7th Fleet ships to the Taiwan Straits. If there was a conflict over Taiwan what would/could we do to deter conflict on the Korean peninsula assuming the Kim family regime would exploit a war over Taiwan?
Excerpts:
How can the United States best prepare for two simultaneous major conflicts in East Asia? The answers are numerous and range from posturing additional forces in the region to securing commitments from other allies and partners to deter aggression from North Korea and China. Another key mechanism that must not be overlooked is incentivizing South Korea and Taiwan to acquire the appropriate capabilities required to specifically defeat North Korean and Chinese invasion forces, respectively. For South Korea, that might include anti-missile systems, platforms to counter maritime special operations forces insertion, and advanced weaponry and equipment for its ground forces. For Taiwan, acquisition of anti-ship and -air missiles and hardening of critical infrastructure may be the wisest investments. Taiwan has previously been criticized for both with questionable operational value in the face of the growing Chinese threat, but relevant defense investments become dire when accounting for the potential division in U.S. attention and resources towards multiple contingencies.
The purpose of this article is not to specify which equipment South Korea and Taiwan must acquire; rather, it is to emphasize that the military equipment they do acquire must be based on North Korea and China’s current and future military capabilities that are expected to be employed for an attack on South Korea and Taiwan. By acquiring appropriate capabilities, the two countries will significantly raise the risk of attack by their adversaries, perhaps to the degree that they reassess the likelihood of a successful invasion. At a minimum, by developing the ability for a self-sufficient defense, South Korea and Taiwan will be helping themselves by enabling the United States to employ its limited resources efficiently to support the defense of the two countries, especially if anticipating simultaneous conflicts.
The acquisition of “flashy” capabilities may be tempting in general and more so if they are perceived to signify an advanced military; however, all military equipment has a limited scope, and acquiring a specific capability creates an opportunity cost that prevents a country from acquiring another, more-justified capability. This is an especially important point to consider for South Korea and Taiwan, which have an aggressive neighbor whose stated policy is to unify with each country.
The Implications of Simultaneous Conflicts in South Korea and Taiwan
By Ki Suh Jung
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, sparking the Korean War. The following day, President Harry Truman ordered U.S. air and naval forces to support South Korea’s defense, which the United States would soon thereafter bolster with ground forces. On the same day, President Truman directed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent any conflict between the Republic of China (henceforth Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (henceforth China), each of which had been vying to unify with the other under its leadership. Had China taken advantage of the U.S. focus on the Korean peninsula by launching a large-scale invasion of Taiwan (for which it had been preparing), U.S. leadership would have faced the difficult decision between leaving Taiwan to fend for itself or diverting resources from the Korean War to support Taiwan. Although the United States was able to deter China from invading Taiwan in 1950 despite its concurrent commitment of forces to defend South Korea against North Korean aggression, it may not be so successful today or in the near future given the current trend in the balance of military power. Therefore, South Korea and Taiwan must develop credible self-defense capabilities with an eye toward future North Korean and Chinese threats to better support the joint response effort with the United States, which may find itself engaging in a two-front conflict.
Today, both the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait remain as flashpoints. South Korea and North Korea are still in a state of war with each other, and the risk of a forcible unification with Taiwan by China has been increasing in conjunction with China’s growing assertiveness in both rhetoric and action. If South Korea is attacked again, the United States has already committed to “mutually meet the common danger,” as stated in the two countries’ mutual defense treaty. While the United States does not make a similar commitment to Taiwan – the U.S.-unilateral Taiwan Relations Act only states that the United States will “maintain the capacity…to resist any resort to force…on Taiwan” – President Joe Biden has thus far for Taiwan. Also, a recent survey showed that the majority of Americans would favor defending Taiwan with U.S. forces if China were to invade the island. Certainly, neither Biden’s statements nor the survey results equate to a shift in the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity,” but they do indicate that in a Taiwan Strait contingency, U.S. leadership will seriously consider the level of support for Taiwan, as it did during the mid-20th century.
If the challenges facing the United States in those flashpoint areas have largely remained unchanged, so have the opportunities for China. A future Korean peninsula conflict would consume much of the focus and resources of the U.S. military in the region, which China can exploit to attempt to solve the Taiwan question. However, a scenario in the reverse sequence is also plausible. If China’s leaders determine that a peaceful unification with Taiwan will not be possible by 2049 – the date by which the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is to be achieved – they may decide to resort to force. If the United States commits forces in defense of Taiwan, North Korea may sense a weakness in the U.S.-South Korea alliance and also launch an attack on its southern neighbor. As China and North Korea are treaty allies, they may discuss, plan, and execute such a two-pronged attack specifically designed to split US forces. After all, in 1950, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung sought and received approval from China’s (and the Soviet Union’s) leaders prior to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea.
While there are presently no indications that a major conflict in the Korean peninsula is imminent or even brewing, the two Koreas have come close to war before, perhaps most recently in 2010 following the sinking of South Korean navy ship Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Even as South Korea’s president Moon Jae-in pushes for a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations in his final months in office, however, the two countries are seemingly engaged in an arms race, with North Korea recently having tested a hypersonic missile and South Korea a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
On the other hand, cross-strait relations have deteriorated in recent years and Taiwan has come to dominate the discussion surrounding the U.S.-China strategic competition. Amid revelations of U.S. forces training the Taiwanese military, Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen has expressed “faith” that the United States would support the defense of the island. China has reinforced its vows for unification with Taiwan with its military aircraft’s incursions into Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone at an unprecedented frequency and numbers as well as military exercises in the vicinity of the island. And unlike in 1950, when the U.S. military was undeniably superior to China’s, China has embarked on an impressive modernization streak and has “achieved parity with – or even exceeded – the United States in several military modernization areas.” If China is determined to unify with Taiwan by force, it will most likely be undeterred by a U.S. show of force.
How can the United States best prepare for two simultaneous major conflicts in East Asia? The answers are numerous and range from posturing additional forces in the region to securing commitments from other allies and partners to deter aggression from North Korea and China. Another key mechanism that must not be overlooked is incentivizing South Korea and Taiwan to acquire the appropriate capabilities required to specifically defeat North Korean and Chinese invasion forces, respectively. For South Korea, that might include anti-missile systems, platforms to counter maritime special operations forces insertion, and advanced weaponry and equipment for its ground forces. For Taiwan, acquisition of anti-ship and -air missiles and hardening of critical infrastructure may be the wisest investments. Taiwan has previously been criticized for both with questionable operational value in the face of the growing Chinese threat, but relevant defense investments become dire when accounting for the potential division in U.S. attention and resources towards multiple contingencies.
The purpose of this article is not to specify which equipment South Korea and Taiwan must acquire; rather, it is to emphasize that the military equipment they do acquire must be based on North Korea and China’s current and future military capabilities that are expected to be employed for an attack on South Korea and Taiwan. By acquiring appropriate capabilities, the two countries will significantly raise the risk of attack by their adversaries, perhaps to the degree that they reassess the likelihood of a successful invasion. At a minimum, by developing the ability for a self-sufficient defense, South Korea and Taiwan will be helping themselves by enabling the United States to employ its limited resources efficiently to support the defense of the two countries, especially if anticipating simultaneous conflicts.
The acquisition of “flashy” capabilities may be tempting in general and more so if they are perceived to signify an advanced military; however, all military equipment has a limited scope, and acquiring a specific capability creates an opportunity cost that prevents a country from acquiring another, more-justified capability. This is an especially important point to consider for South Korea and Taiwan, which have an aggressive neighbor whose stated policy is to unify with each country.
In both the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense treaty and Taiwan Relations Act, the United States effectively declared that peace and security in the Western Pacific is of national interest and it will strive to maintain them; but the United States cannot go alone, and it needs allies and partners. South Korea and Taiwan can support this common endeavor by investing in the appropriate capabilities vis-à-vis their adversaries’. Such deliberate choices are not for the primary benefit of the United States, but for South Korea and Taiwan themselves. History hints that in the future, the fate of the two countries might be more-closely-linked than currently realized. For the United States to support the continued security and stability of the two countries and the greater region, South Korea and Taiwan must themselves make wise decisions to bolster their security.
Ki Suh Jung is a U.S. Navy foreign area officer with experience in the Asia-Pacific. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Featured image: U.S.-made CM-11 tanks are fired in front of two 8-inch self-propelled artillery guns during military drills in southern Taiwan on May 30, 2019. (Photo via Sam Yeh/AFP/Getty Images)
3. China, Russia ask U.N. to end sanctions so North Korea can import bolts, utensils, vacuums
Chinese, Russian, and north Korea political warfare to attack the US and blame the US for not allowing sanctions to be lifted.
China, Russia ask U.N. to end sanctions so North Korea can import bolts, utensils, vacuums
Newsweek · by Erin Brady · November 3, 2021
China and Russia are asking the U.N. to end key sanctions against North Korea, according to the Associated Press, which obtained a draft resolution given to Security Council members.
The resolution says that the sanctions should be lifted "with the intent of enhancing the livelihood of the civilian population" of North Korea. It also encourages North Korea and the U.S. to revive diplomatic discussions. The sanctions have been in place since 2006 and have become steadily tougher over the years.
The draft resolution expands on another resolution proposed by China and Russia in 2019, but it was never fully introduced for a vote because of Western opposition. Diplomats who spoke anonymously to the AP said this one could face a similar fate.
The new resolution calls on U.N. member nations to provide "goods, materials, technology, and financial services needed by North Korea to combat COVID-19, improve livelihoods, and develop the economy," according to the AP.
The resolution also wants exemptions from sanctions to include air conditioners, bolts, iron, kitchen utensils, agricultural equipment, vacuum cleaners, radiators and fire extinguishers.
For more reporting from the Associated Press, see below.
China and Russia are urging the U.N. Security Council to end a host of sanctions against North Korea. Above, a Yokjon Department Store employee waits for customers in order to measure their body temperature and disinfect their hands in Pyongyang on October 20. Photo by Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images
China and Russia are also urging the Security Council to end sanctions that include a ban on exports of seafood and textiles, a cap on imports of refined petroleum products, and a prohibition on North Korean citizens working overseas and sending home their earnings.
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said in 2018 that the sanctions had cut off all North Korean exports and 90 percent of its trade and disbanded the pool of workers that North Korea sent abroad to earn hard currency.
The U.S. Mission to the United Nations said North Korea has failed to comply with sanctions on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The Biden administration "remains committed to the sanctions regime" and calls on all member states to enforce the measures.
On October 19, North Korea fired a newly developed ballistic missile from a submarine in its fifth round of weapons tests in recent weeks, all of which violated U.N. sanctions. It was the North's first underwater-launched test since October 2019 and the highest-profile test since President Joe Biden took office in January.
The China-Russia draft resolution makes no mention of the missile tests. Instead, it notes that North Korea has refrained from conducting nuclear tests since September 2017; has kept to a moratorium on further nuclear tests and test launches of intermediate-range and intercontinental missiles from April 21, 2018; and has taken additional denuclearization measures since.
The proposed resolution underscores "the necessity to respect the legitimate security concerns of the DPRK and ensure the welfare, inherent dignity and rights of people in the DPRK," using the initials of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It reaffirms that U.N. resolutions "are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences" and notes "the serious impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic" within the country.
North Korea is struggling to deal with soaring prices of goods and shortages of medicine and other essential supplies that have accelerated the spread of waterborne diseases such as typhoid fever. The country has yet to report any cases of the coronavirus, though experts have questioned its claim of a perfect record.
The draft resolution would lift a ban on North Korea importing some industrial machinery and transport vehicles used to build infrastructure that can't be diverted to the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The draft would end a ban on North Korean government representatives or groups engaging in "scientific and technical cooperation." It would also allow a resumption of exports of giant statues produced in the North.
On the political front, the China-Russia draft welcomed "the positive outcomes" of talks between North and South Korea and between former President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. At Kim's second summit with Trump in Hanoi in February 2019, negotiations faltered after the U.S. rejected North Korean demands for broad sanctions relief in exchange for a partial surrender of the North's nuclear capabilities.
South Korea, which has expressed a desire for engagement with North Korea within the boundaries of the U.N. sanctions, did not immediately react to China and Russia's proposals for lifting sanctions on the North.
During a period of diplomacy in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in met three times with North Korea's leader and vowed to resume inter-Korean economic cooperation when possible, expressing optimism that the sanctions would end and allow such projects.
But North Korea cut off cooperation with South Korea as its diplomacy with the Trump administration derailed in 2019.
Workers carry boxes of seafood on November 8, 2013, as they load a Chinese transport truck at the Suchae Bong Corp. seafood factory in Rajin, North Korea. AP Photo/David Guttenfelder, File
Newsweek · by Erin Brady · November 3, 2021
4. New Report Details Experience Of Christians Detained In North Korea
The evil brutality of the Kim family regime.
New Report Details Experience Of Christians Detained In North Korea
By Courtney Mares
A prisoner held in a cell in North Korea for two months noticed a distinctive pattern of behavior among some of the fellow detainees who called themselves Christians.
They “would pray in the corner of the cell that was hidden from the CCTV camera … They would escape a beating if their prayers went undetected by the correctional officers, but they would be beaten if they were caught,” the former prisoner testified.
“On one occasion when they were caught praying, they were beaten every morning for 20 consecutive days,” the witness said.
This is one of many eyewitness accounts of Christian practice and persecution in the “hermit kingdom” of North Korea documented in a new report published on Oct. 27.
The report by Korea Future is the result of interviews with North Korean defectors conducted between November 2019 and August 2021.
It offers details on the detention and torture of North Korean Christians in the past decade, including documented human rights violations that occurred as recently as 2019.
The NGO found multiple cases where a person was arrested for being in possession of a Bible.
In one case, a young woman arrested for having a Bible was “beaten with a wooden stick until a superior intervened after hearing the victim screaming,” while in the custody of the North Korean Ministry of State Security Central Command.
Another victim, a woman in her 50s who was a member of an underground church, was beaten so severely in 2019 while in detention that she later died from her injuries, according to the report.
North Korea has long been identified as the worst country in the world for Christian persecution, yet the closed-off nature of the country has made it difficult to get concrete data on the existence of underground Christian practice.
The Korea Future report, and accompanying database, documents 167 serious human rights violations perpetrated against 91 Christians between 1997 and 2019.
In particular, it details 34 people detained in North Korea for possessing religious items, 23 held for having practiced religious activities in China, and 21 people seized for religious practice in North Korea itself.
“Where it could be established that detainees had been associated with Christianity, their crime was considered to be ‘political,’ and they were transferred from city or county-level detention centers to provincial or national-level detention centers or internment camps run by the Ministry of State Security,” it said.
The researchers found that multiple North Koreans were first exposed to Christianity while in China.
This was the case with Kim Gap-ji, a North Korean who was arrested in China along with a Christian pastor. China repatriated Kim to North Korea, where he was investigated for nearly five months and experienced forms of torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
Kim was eventually sentenced to three years in Chongori re-education camp. After his release, Kim said that he secretly preached the Gospel in North Korea until 2017, when he escaped after learning that a person he had preached to was an informant for the Ministry of State Security.
The human rights report accused the Chinese government of violating the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the repatriation of an individual when there are grounds for believing that they would be at risk of harm upon their return.
The researchers also documented cases of Chinese public officials stamping the files of North Koreans detained in China as having associated with Christianity before deporting them to North Korea.
In total, the report documents 456 human rights violations against religious adherents of North Korean Shamanism and Christianity from 1987 to 2019.
It contains testimonies from Christians who were detained in North Korea, as well as accounts from eyewitness detainees and prison guards.
“In 28 cases, we documented forms of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment being perpetrated by agents of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of People’s Security against Christian adherents,” it said.
“Evidence demonstrates that victims were subjected to physical beatings with objects, fists, and feet; to the ingestion of polluted food; to positional torture; to sleep deprivation; and to forced squat jumps.”
“Furthermore, the broader experience of detention was one where cruel and inhuman treatment was enabled by poor conditions of detention that incited further harm, including overcrowded cells.”
North Korea is believed to have one of the world’s worst human rights records. A United Nations investigation in 2014 produced a 372-page report documenting crimes against humanity, including execution, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, forced abortions, and knowingly causing prolonged starvation.
Pope Francis recently received an invitation to visit North Korea when South Korean President Moon Jae-In visited the Vatican on Oct. 29.
In July, the director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service said that he had been working with Church leaders to make a papal trip to North Korea possible, although a South Korean archbishop has said that “in reality, there are many steps to take” before this could feasibly happen.
According to Park Kyung-mee, the South Korean president’s spokesperson, the pope responded that he would be willing to go if he received an official invitation from North Korea.
President Moon also gave Pope Francis a cross made from barbed wire from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that divides North Korea and South Korea.
It is one of 136 crosses created from melted-down barbed wire from the DMZ to represent the 68 years that the Korean peninsula has been divided.
In contrast with North Korea, Christianity in South Korea has experienced rapid growth in recent decades, according to Pew Research Center. In particular, the Catholic population in South Korea has increased by nearly 50% in the past 20 years.
5. Military plays down rift over command transfer
I listened to a number of former Korean military leaders last night say Korea is committed to conditions based OPCON transition. It is the political aspects of this that cause some friction. The only way to overcome this is through a comprehensive information campaign to educate the press, the punducts, the political leaders, and the public in both Korea and the US about the nature of the OPCON transition and how it will benefit both countries and the strategic situation when the conditions are met.
One of the problems is language. The Koreans use the same word for transfer and transition. The problem is there is NO transfer of control of the US government to the ROK government. There is a transition of commanders from the US to the ROK. But whether the commander is US or ROK, he or she will still answer to the Military Committee and the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, which is the HQ charged with deterrence and defense and is the warfighting HQ, will continue be "co-owned" by both nations.
Military plays down rift over command transfer
Published : Nov 4, 2021 - 14:55 Updated : Nov 4, 2021 - 18:14
Gen. LaCamera, commander of United States Forces Korea, speaks during a change of command ceremony on July 2, 2021 at Barker Field. (USFK/Disclaimer: The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement)
South Korea and the US are still working for Seoul to take over wartime operational control of the joint military forces from Washington by the time they had agreed, the Ministry of National Defense said Thursday in response to the top US general who hinted at a delay.
“We will have to look at what exactly the US commander said, but the bottom line is that the transfer is taking place as scheduled, as agreed by both our commanders-in-chief,” ministry spokesperson Boo Seung-chan said.
Earlier in the day, Gen. Paul LaCamera, the US military chief overseeing the 28,500 American troops here, said the allies could make changes to South Korea’s plan to retake the wartime role by May next year or set a transfer deadline.
President Moon Jae-in, who leaves office in May next year, pledged to complete the handover within his term, but for the last two years the allies have had to cut back on full-scale drills to test Seoul’s readiness because of the coronavirus pandemic.
Washington is wary of a rushed decision, saying test drills as well as stable regional security befitting for a command change are crucial. The US is seen as reversing its earlier position to facilitate the transfer as it expands efforts to contain Chinese and North Korean military buildups.
“So as we move forward with our plan, we will adjust,” LaCamera added without elaborating at a webinar hosted by the Korea Defense Veterans Association and Korea-US Alliance Foundation.
It was the first time a sitting US commander openly backed what many here understood as pushing back the handover until conditions are met. Gen. Robert Abrams, who preceded LaCamera and did initial work on the transfer, said he had never been informed as to when it should come to an end.
In December, Defense Minister Suh Wook is expected to “press hard” on fixing a deadline when he meets his counterpart at their annual security meeting in Seoul.
Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry said it would look at how trial runs turn out before expanding cellphone access to conscripts and trainees at boot camps. Conscripts can use their cellphones only after working hours, usually past 6 p.m., and trainees at boot camps are banned from using theirs.
A civilian-led panel has recently advised the military to grant them unrestricted cellphone access as part of efforts to better respect soldiers’ rights. In October, the panel ended its five-month work on recommending ways to do away with rights violations and abuse taking place within the military.
“There are pros and cons to the change and we will go over the results from our trial runs, which aren’t finished yet. We will look at them from every angle before making a final decision,” the ministry said.
6. US alliance under Biden more popular with South Koreans than under Trump, poll finds
Comparisons are not always useful but positive views of the alliance are important.
US alliance under Biden more popular with South Koreans than under Trump, poll finds
A South Korean sailor welcomes the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Busan, South Korea, in 2017. (Jermaine Ralliford/U.S. Navy)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — Most South Koreans see the alliance with the United States as stable, a dramatic increase over last year, according to an annual poll from a government-funded think tank.
The Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analysis polled 1,000 South Koreans, 67% of whom view the alliance favorably. The figure represents a “substantial” increase from last year’s 47%, and the two years prior to 2020.
“The relatively low level of stability perceived by the public during these past few years implies that they were concerned about the disharmony between [South Korean President Moon Jae-in] and the Trump administration over North Korea policies,” Hong Sukji, an institute fellow, wrote in her analysis published Tuesday.
Foreign policy analysts questioned the relationship between the two allies during President Donald Trump’s tenure. Trump, who railed against North Korea with threats of “fire and fury” before holding summits with its leader, also criticized the U.S. trade relationship with South Korea and demanded Seoul foot more of the bill for stationing roughly 28,500 American troops on the peninsula.
“In contrast, the sharp improvement in the sense of stability within the alliance suggests that anxiety regarding the [South Korea]-U.S. Alliance is being alleviated due to consistent signaling by the Moon and Biden administration reaffirming their firm relations since the inauguration of the Biden administration in January 2021,” Hong wrote.
Other evidence from the poll suggests more South Koreans believe the U.S. would come to their aid than in previous years. Asked if the U.S. will be “fully committed to the defense of South Korea if there is a military provocation by North Korea,” 77% of respondents said they agreed, compared to 62% last year.
Most respondents also viewed the alliance as a positive force on the peninsula: Nearly 94% said they agreed it is “contributing to the peace and stability of South Korea.”
However, the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea in the event of a peace treaty with the North may create mixed feelings, the poll suggests. President Moon, who must step down next year because of term limits, has prioritized a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War to normalize relations with Pyongyang.
About 35% respondents said U.S. Forces Korea ought to remain in the country, while another 40% said “it should be decided based on the circumstances after the signing of a peace treaty.”
Another 21% said USFK troops “should withdraw.”
The results demonstrate that South Korea’s view of a USFK withdrawal is incumbent “on the circumstances and conditions” of the political climate, rather than merely the passage of a peace treaty, Hong said in her analysis.
Critics have scrutinized Moon’s push to end the Korean War and remain doubtful of substantial changes by North Korea. The communist regime has long lambasted the joint military exercises conducted by the two allies and has called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South.
The defense policy institute’s poll was conducted between Sept. 10 and Oct. 14 and has a 3.1% margin of error.
David Choi
7. North Korean soldier injured picking chestnuts in leader Kim Jong Un’s name
Just another indicator of the dire conditions as well as the nature of the Kim family regime and its lack of concern for soldiers and the Korean people in the north .
North Korean soldier injured picking chestnuts in leader Kim Jong Un’s name
The underfed soldiers will never eat any of the 3,000 chestnuts they must harvest each day.
A North Korean soldier fell from a tree and broke his arm after authorities mobilized his unit to harvest chestnuts to be sold below cost in Pyongyang to demonstrate leader Kim Jong Un’s love for the privileged citizens of the capital, his father told RFA.
Forcing soldiers and civilians to provide free construction or farm labor is common practice in North Korea, but usually they eat some of the food they grow and use the buildings they construct.
However, units stationed near Pyongyang are being mobilized to collect 30 kg (66 lbs) of chestnuts daily, or roughly 2,500 to 3,000 nuts, and are not allowed to eat even a single chestnut.
Instead the nuts are used for a propaganda scheme in Pyongyang, sold below market value to the capital’s citizens, who are vetted for political reliability and enjoy privileges and a lifestyle unobtainable by rural North Koreans.
Sources said making the underfed soldiers collect food for more privileged citizens was unfair.
“Last week I went to the hospital after receiving a call that my son, who is serving in the military in Songchon county, South Pyongan province, was hospitalized with an arm injury,” a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA’s Korean Service Monday.
“My son was in a cast with a broken arm. His entire military unit was picking chestnuts to be sent to Pyongyang when he fell from a chestnut tree,” said the soldier’s father, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
According to the soldier’s father, the mobilization orders from the military’s General Staff Department specify that each soldier is responsible for collecting 30 kg of chestnuts daily to be sent to Pyongyang in the name of Kim Jong Un. Other units near Pyongyang were also mobilized, he said.
“When I went on a business trip to Pyongyang, I bought roasted chestnuts from a stand. A bag of roasted chestnuts with their shells still on, weighing about 200 grams, was sold for 2,000 North Korean won (U.S. $0.39) about half the price of the local marketplace.”
“I didn’t feel comfortable knowing that the chestnuts were picked by young soldiers like my son… How hard it must have been for them to climb up and down trees every day to pick 30 kg of chestnuts,” the soldier’s father said.
North Koreans gather under a sign that advertises cooked chestnuts and sweet potatoes in Pyongyang, in this file photo taken by Kyodo. Credit: Reuters
Soldiers on chestnut detail were often injured from falls in the unit of a former soldier stationed in Pyongyang’s Samsok district, who is now a refugee living in South Korea, he told RFA.
“Until I was discharged in 2016, the whole unit was mobilized to pick chestnuts every autumn. Chestnut trees are weaker than other kinds of trees, so every year there were many soldiers who fell off the trees and got hurt,” said the refugee, who declined to be named.
“There is an orchard that specializes in supplying chestnuts to the Pyongyang vegetable wholesale center, which manages the chestnut stands, but it does not produce enough. So, every fall, military units around Pyongyang are mobilized to supplement the orchard,” the source said.
The mountains near Samsok district are rich with wild chestnut trees, and the former soldier and his unit hiked far from the military base for harvesting, he said.
“Sometimes, our daily task was to stop children from leaving the village to prevent them from going out to get ‘our’ chestnuts. I still feel sorry for them,” the refugee said.
“We picked so many chestnuts every year, but during my 10 years of military service in Pyongyang, I was never able to buy chestnuts from chestnut stand,” he said.
“They are all over TV and in the newspaper saying that the roasted chestnut stands, which can only be found in Pyongyang, are examples of the party’s love for the people. To be honest though, it’s not the party’s love at all, it’s the sweat and sacrifice of so many soldiers.”
Still technically at war with wealthier South Korea, North Korea makes every male serve about eight years in the armed forces according to South Korean intelligence. North Korean refugees in South Korea told RFA that the basic service period for non-technical and non-special forces units was seven years. From 1993 until this year, service time was 10 years.
According to the CIA’s World Factbook there are approximately 1.1 to 1.2 million active troops in the North Korean military, more than about 80 percent of whom serve in the army.
Reported by Chang Gyu Ahn for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
8. Meeting between Moon and Kishida falls through
Another missed opportunity to put the relationship on a positive path forward.
Meeting between Moon and Kishida falls through
Posted November. 04, 2021 07:25,
Updated November. 04, 2021 07:25
Meeting between Moon and Kishida falls through. November. 04, 2021 07:25. tree624@donga.com.
The first meeting scheduled between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) fell through. As the South Korean and Japanese governments have not closed a gap regarding the resolution of the issues of sex slaves and forced labor victims during the Japanese colonial era, it is predicted that President Moon is unlikely to find momentum in the bilateral relations in the last several months of his term.
President Moon attended an event to launch the Global Methane Pledge led by U.S. President Joe Biden as the final program of COP26 held in Glasgow on Tuesday (local time). As it was predicted that Prime Minister Kishida would also attend the event and meet with President Moon, South Korean presidential office Cheong Wa Dae prepared for a short meeting or a brief talk between the two national leaders. However, the Japanese prime minister delivered a keynote speech and had meetings with U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, instead of attending the event. Prime Minister Kishida also had a short conversation with U.S. President Joe Biden. The two national leaders agreed to hold a U.S.-Japan summit with the Japanese Prime Minister visiting the U.S. soon in the future, possibly this year, according to the Nikkei Keizai Shimbun.
The reason why Prime Minister Kishida’s meeting with President Moon fell through while he met with several national leaders, including the U.S.’s, at COP 26, which marked his debut on the international diplomatic stage, seemed to be cool relations between South Korea and Japan due to historical issues. Prime Minister Kishida maintained the existing stance by requesting the South Korean government to resolve the historical issues in a phone conversation with President Moon on October 15, forecasting a rough road ahead for bilateral relations.
9. Moon extends nuclear help to Hungary, Poland
South Korea is a nuclear (energy) power. But its nuclear capabilities and expertise are far superior than north Korea.
Thursday
November 4, 2021
Moon extends nuclear help to Hungary, Poland
President Moon Jae-in, second from right, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, right, attend a Korea-Visegrad Group business forum at Budapest, Hungary, on Wednesday. [YONHAP]
President Moon Jae-in agreed to help Hungary and Poland with nuclear power ambitions, despite his own phasing-out of nuclear power at home, through agreements signed on a visit to Hungary on Wednesday.
Moon attended a business forum in Budapest on Wednesday joined by representatives of the Visegrad Group (V4), and signed seven agreements on electric vehicles, batteries and renewables with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Moon's delegation included the minister of trade, industry and energy and representatives of the Korea Chamber of Commerce, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, LG Energy Solution, Kia and Posco.
Two of the agreements concern Korea’s assistance with building nuclear power plants in Hungary and Poland.
Moon did not comment on the nuclear partnership in an address at the forum, other than saying he looks forward to working with the V4 on hydrogen power and other renewable energy sources.
One of his aides traveling in the presidential delegation, when asked about the two nuclear energy agreements, said that despite the phase-out policy at home, “Korea will also be generating electricity from nuclear energy for a while,” adding that cooperation on nuclear plants abroad is a “win-win strategy” for Korea and its partners.
The partnership on nuclear energy was also discussed between Moon and Hungarian President Janos Ader during a summit meeting on Wednesday morning.
“The two countries agreed that carbon neutrality would not be possible without the use of nuclear energy,” Ader said during a joint press conference that followed the meeting.
Moon did not comment on the topic during his address to the press, other saying he looks forward to working with Hungary on “digital transformation and green transformation.”
At home, the Moon administration’s policy is to phase out nuclear power.
In 2017, Moon announced that the country would halt plans to build new nuclear plants and would not extend the lifespans of existing ones in a bid to phase out nuclear power. By 2079, the country will have no operating nuclear plant, the government has said.
Moon has been anti-nuclear energy since the accident in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which had a big environmental impact on Korean air and water. His first nuclear phase-out pledge was made in 2012 when he unsuccessfully ran for the presidency, and he renewed the pledge again in 2017.
The administration also intends to be carbon neutral by 2050 and reduce its carbon emissions by 40 percent compared to its 2018 level by 2030.
Moon’s spokesperson Park Kyumg-mee in a statement later on Wednesday said that Korea remains “committed to phasing out of nuclear power as planned.”
“Instead of building new nuclear power plants, Korea intends to invest in new renewable energy sources and hydrogen energy, and intends to reach carbon neutrality through increased reliance on these,” Park said.
In their meeting, Moon and Ader also agreed to elevate bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. Hungary was the first country in the Eastern bloc to establish diplomatic ties with Korea in February 1989 during the Roh Tae-woo administration. Moon also met with Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban later on Wednesday.
Moon is in Hungary through Friday for a three-day state visit, the first from a Korean leader in 20 years. He was scheduled to meet with heads of the V4 states, altogether in one meeting and separately after that with each head of state.
First Lady Kim Jung-sook, who accompanied Moon on his Europe tour starting with the G20 summit in Italy and COP26 in Scotland, visited the national archive of Hungary on Wednesday.
She was accompanied by members of the National Archives of Korea, who examined records and maps showcasing long-standing people-to-people ties between the two countries that date back to early 20th century, including a diary by Hungarian priest Vay Peter.
“Father Peter wrote, ‘I have always been certain that this people and country have a very important role to play in the future,’” she said. “He couldn’t have known then, but his writings read almost like a letter he had intended to be read out loud 100 years later to the peoples of both nation. […] I hope that our two nations’ exchanges today will also be remembered fondly by our next generations.”
BY KANG TAE-HWA, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
10. Korea's nuclear phase-out policy trapped in paradox
I have never understood Moon's decision to phase out nuclear power in South Korea when it is the best energy source to defend against climate change.
Korea's nuclear phase-out policy trapped in paradox
President Moon Jae-in shakes hands with his Hungarian counterpart Janos Ader after a joint press conference at the latter's residence in Budapest, Wednesday (local time).
Yonhap
President Moon faces self-contradiction during nuclear tech sales to European countries
By Nam Hyun-woo
President Moon Jae-in's policy to phase out nuclear power from Korea's energy mix is facing a self-contradiction, as he apparently recognizes the necessity of nuclear power during his sales pitch to export domestic reactors to central European countries.
During a joint press conference with President Janos Ader after a summit, Wednesday (local time), the Hungarian head of state said the two had reaffirmed each other's promise to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, adding "it is the shared intention of the two countries that carbon neutrality cannot be achieved without nuclear energy."
Ader's remark contrasted with Moon's policy to phase out nuclear energy in Korea. The government has been pursuing a plan of replacing domestic nuclear power plants with renewable energy and some remaining coal-fired power plants by 2079, despite experts' concerns on potential power shortages and the necessity of nuclear power for cutting emissions.
According to the plan, the country's nuclear reactors will be decommissioned when they reach the end of their respective design life, so the number will decline from the current 24 to 18 in 2031 and 9 in 2050.
So far, the Moon administration has been dismissing concerns that the country's nuclear power industry may collapse due to the policy, saying the industry can sustain itself by exporting technologies and developing a reactor decommissioning business. This, however, also raises doubts as it faces the paradox of Korea selling its nuclear technology to other countries while it exits the sector.
A computer rendering of a power plant using Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power's (KHNP) APR 1400 nuclear reactor. Courtesy of KHNPThe Hungarian president's comments are seen as an example of such doubts being realized.
A senior official at Cheong Wa Dae said, "Moon told Ader that Korea's nuclear power plants will play their role until carbon neutrality in 2050, but the country will not build any new reactors. But it seemed that Ader placed his focus on the role of the nuclear reactors."
The official noted that Korea's nuclear power industry has technological prowess despite the phase-out policy, adding, "we are seeking a win-win situation."
"Countries including Poland and the Czech Republic want nuclear reactors. Since we have the technologies and experience, we may be able to find ways for mutual benefit."
Despite the explanation, questions remain about whether Moon can be free from such a paradox during his remaining efforts to promote Korea's nuclear technologies to partners.
According to the presidential office, Moon will meet the leaders of the Visegrad Group, an organization of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, late Thursday (KST). During the meeting, Moon will discuss improving the countries' ties with Korea in the fields of nuclear power plant, airport and defense industries.
Poland plans to build six nuclear reactors by 2040, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power plans to tender an offer of six APR1400 reactors with a total capacity of 8.4 gigawatts. Korea is also staking out its claims on the Czech Republic's project of building an additional reactor in the southern region of Dukovany.
"The Hungarian president's comment shows that the Moon administration's nuclear energy policy is in a paradox," said Prof. Seong Poong-hyun of the Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. "The paradox leaves a burden for the next administration, because it has to find consistency in Korea's stance on nuclear energy and explain it properly to partner countries."
11. KAI aims to supply Slovakia with domestically developed FA-50 aircraft
South Korea is an increasingly important player in international arms sales.
Thursday
November 4, 2021
KAI aims to supply Slovakia with domestically developed FA-50 aircraft
President Moon Jae-in arrives in an FA-50 light fighter jet at the Seoul Aerospace and Defense Exhibition in Seongnam, Gyeonggi, on Oct. 20. [NEWS1]
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is aiming to supply Slovakia with 10 domestically developed FA-50 light fighter aircraft as part of the central European country's push to replace its ageing fleet of trainer jets, according to the state arms procurement agency on Thursday.
The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said that the agency's chief Kang Eun-ho attended a signing ceremony Wednesday in Budapest, Hungary, where President Moon Jae-in will meet his counterparts from the Visegrad Group (V4) of four central European states — Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia — on Thursday.
At the ceremony, KAI signed an agreement with Letecke opravovne Trencin (LOTN), Slovakia's state-run defense company, to ensure smooth bilateral cooperation in the Korean company's efforts to export FA-50 aircraft.
Slovakia plans to replace its ageing fleet of L-39 trainer aircraft and is expected to issue a call for proposals from aircraft manufacturers in the first half of next year, a DAPA official said. The project is expected to be worth $500 million.
The FA-50, developed jointly by KAI and U.S. defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin, is a combat variant of the T-50 supersonic trainer jet. The FA-50 can be used for both training and operational purposes.
The FA-50 gained media attention last month after Moon rode one to make his entrance at the Seoul Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX) — the first time for a Korean president to fly over domestic territory in a fighter jet — in a symbolic move to highlight his confidence in the fighter jet.
While in Hungary, Kang also plans to meet Hungarian military officials to discuss bilateral cooperation in the defense industry, officials said.
As part of a wider export push earlier on Wednesday, President Moon Jae-in held a summit with Hungarian President Janos Ader and agreed to a strategic partnership with the country.
"Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, bilateral trade reached a new high last year," Moon said during a joint press briefing after the summit, adding that he hopes Korea and Hungary will step up their cooperation in electric vehicles and batteries and cleaner energy development.
Moon's state visit to Budapest marks the first to the country by a South Korean president in 20 years.
According to Korean government data, bilateral trade between South Korea and Hungary stood at $3.6 billion in 2020, compared with $2.97 billion in 2019.
South Korea's exports to Hungary rose 18.1 percent to $2.92 billion in 2020. Imports from Hungary jumped 36.6 percent to $678 million last year.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
12. N. Korean Cabinet calls on commercial sector to eradicate the "import disease"
Not a good sign for the people or the markets. We are reading conflicting reports about the border reopening for trade.
"Kimjongunism" appears to be focused on further isolation.
N. Korean Cabinet calls on commercial sector to eradicate the "import disease" - Daily NK
Officials also reportedly stated that the border blockade will not be lifted, even partially, this year
The party committee of North Hamgyong Province recently called in commercial officials to convey a Cabinet order calling on the commercial sector to “thoroughly” eradicate the “import disease,” i.e., a dependence on imports.
In a telephone conversation with Daily NK on Wednesday, a source in the province said the provincial party committee gathered officials in the commercial sector at 10 AM on Oct. 27 to issue a Cabinet order calling on them to “thoroughly eradicate the import disease” and develop the commercial sector by commoditizing domestically produced products since “nobody knows when the border will reopen.”
The source said North Korea declared a “war on the import disease” with the Cabinet order, calling for a “mass movement” to prevent the malady.
In fact, the provincial party called on the commercial sector to take the lead in efforts to stop the “import disease.” It strongly urged officials in the commercial sector to “come to their senses and do their job,” warning them against “hopes or illusions” that things will return to what they were before the border closure with active markets thanks to trade and smuggling.
North Korean trucks can be seen heading to the Chinese side of the border on the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge. / Image: Daily NK
In particular, the provincial party said the border closure was not just a measure to protect the people from COVID-19, but also to awaken government organizations, enterprises and people “full of illusions about imported goods” from their delusions. They stressed the need to satisfy the people’s demand for consumer goods with “products produced in our country (North Korea).”
The source added that the party said the goal of the light industry and commercial sectors was to produce “uniquely North Korean light industrial goods” independent of imports by substituting foreign materials for domestic ones, and to supply those goods to the people.
The provincial party also decided to promote domestically produced commercial goods, basic foodstuffs and groceries as good for one’s health as they are eco-friendly, and equal to those of any other country.
The source added that the party said the state would “thoroughly control” the import of raw materials for consumer goods or basic foodstuffs “that we could easily produce and use in our country (North Korea).” He also said the party said that controls could be placed on imports “unapproved by provincial, city or county commercial departments” at local markets “even if the border were reopened.”
Meanwhile, the source said the provincial party told officials that they should understand that the border closure “will never be lifted, even partially” this year and that they should supervise matters well.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. N Korea in final arrangements to reopen China border to revive economy amid COVID: Report
will they or won't they?
N Korea in final arrangements to reopen China border to revive economy amid COVID: Report
Last Updated: 4th November, 2021 14:04 IST
N Korea In Final Arrangements To Reopen China Border To Revive Economy Amid COVID: Report
North Korea is in the final stage of preparations to reopen its train routes with China following a prolonged border control, reported Korean Herald.
Written By
Image: AP
North Korea, which has recently reopened its sea routes in order to revive its crawling economy, the Seoul government is working on the final stage to reopen its train routes with China. According to a report by The Korea Herald, a unification mministry official said that Supreme leader Kim Jong-un has recently ordered its people to organise all the systems as per the COVID-19 guidelines in order to start trade with Beijing. Notably, North Korea had closed its international borders about two years ago in order to secure the country from the strain of the deadly pandemic.
North Korea had also shut the China border and other major borders that left the country's economy in crawling condition. However, the latest development came after the Supreme leader failed to revive the country with domestic products. Citing the officials, the Korean media outlet also said that Seoul is expecting the resumption of cargo transportation via land routes. However, he has not revealed any details about the exact dates for the opening of land routes but stressed surety about the resumption within the next month.
"Our assessment is that various preparations for the resumption of goods exchange through train routes are at the final stage," the official told The Korean Herald.
China, Russia urge UNSC to end key sanctions on North Korea
The officials said Seoul has constructed quarantine facilities at the border area in order to check the people with symptoms of the COVID-19 virus. According to the Korean media outlet, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) told legislators the North is in talks with Beijing and Moscow to reopen railroad operations across the border and those connecting Sinuiju and Dandong. It is to mention, on November 2, China and Russia urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to lift a slew of sanctions against Seoul. A draft resolution was also sent to council members, emphasising Korea's economic hardships and urging to lift sanctions "with the goal of strengthening the civilian population's livelihood," reported The Associated Press.
WHO started delivering medical aid after two years
Earlier in October, the World Health Organisation also started shipping COVID-19 medical supplies to North Korea after two years of ignorance of international medical supplies. Notably, the Supreme leader maintained a tough stand while announcing any COVID updates. Kim Jong-Un on several occasions bolstered the country's strict measures in dealing with the COVID virus. According to him, he has managed to weed out the deadly pandemic from the country, but, experts widely doubt his claims.
(Image: AP)
First Published: 4th November, 2021 14:04 IST
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
