Quotes of the Day:

The national security policy of the United States shall be guided by the following global objectives: (replace USSR/Soviet with China?)

To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts.

To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.

To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation.

To foster, if possible, in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.

To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources.

To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.

To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World.

To promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing

and resolving differences.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, NSDD 32, May 20 1982. Copy 1 of 36, declassified from TS on 8/27/09  https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf 

“Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.” - Aristotle

“Prejudices are what fools use for reason.” - Voltaire

1. 54th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique (ROK/US)

2. ​ Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup Hold a News Conference​

3. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-Sup Visit Korean War Memorial, Tour U.S. Bomber Aircraft

4. Episode 3: Modern-day North Korea, and what a reunified peninsula might look like

5. North Korea’s missile splurge cost $70 million – more than a year of imported rice

6. 3 US soldiers praised for rescuing about 30 lives from crowd crush

7. Kinetic Korea: missile tests, war drills and Kim’s dead hand

8. S. Korea scrambles some 80 fighter jets after 180 N.K. warplane activities detected

9. N. Korea fires 3 short-range ballistic missiles toward East Sea: S. Korean military

10. U.S. offers $5 mln reward for arrest of Singaporean businessman helping N. Korea evade sanctions

11. Why Biden isn’t changing course on North Korea

12. Defense & National Security–US, South Korea issue stern warning to Kim Jong Un

13. S. Korea, U.S. codify 4 categories of 'extended deterrence' cooperation against N.K. nuke threats

14. N.Korea's Provocations Are Getting out of Hand

15. Russia and North Korea are partners in sanctions-busting crime

1. 54th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique (ROK/US)

A very comprehensive statement that hit all the key alliance points.  

Note the number of committees and working groups covering all the major issues.

Note the commitment to readiness and exercises.

It appears OPCON transition is moving forward at a good pace.

Note the reinforcing comments on the United Nations Command.

54th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

defense.gov

1. The 54th United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C. on November 3, 2022. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-Sup led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On October 19, 2022, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim Seung-Kyum presided over the 47th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).

2. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the shared vision of both nations for a global comprehensive strategic alliance as contained in the May 2022 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit in Seoul. They emphasized the commitment of both countries in promoting democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. They further shared their common understanding that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is based on the same principles and shared values including: mutual trust, freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

The Secretary and the Minister assessed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is strong and reaffirmed the two nations' mutual commitment to a combined defense posture consistent with the U.S-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to defend the ROK. The two leaders resolved to continue to strengthen the Alliance to remain postured to defend against and respond to Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) aggression and preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

The Secretary and the Minister noted that the SCM has played a pivotal role in the continued development of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and is to continue to be a cornerstone venue to discuss and affirm national commitments. Both sides pledged to continue to develop the Alliance—the linchpin of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Indo-Pacific region— into a deep and comprehensive strategic relationship.

In particular, marking the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance in 2023, the Secretary and the Minister recognized the value of the Alliance and pledged to hold various joint events to lay a foundation for the development of the Alliance in the future.

3. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the current security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula and the region and discussed cooperative measures between the two nations. The Minister expressed concern about DPRK violations of the 'Comprehensive Military Agreement,' including repetitive multiple rocket launcher firings. The Secretary and minister strongly condemned the DPRK's escalatory activities and violations of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including ballistic missile test launches, multiple rocket launches, and firing of coastal artillery and called upon the international community to hold the DPRK responsible for its actions. Both sides also expressed concern that the DPRK's ongoing efforts to develop nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, as well as its escalatory rhetoric regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and its proliferation activities. They noted that these actions present profound challenges to the international community and pose an increasingly serious threat to the security and stability of the region and the world. Secretary Austin also expressed his concern on the DPRK's attempts to develop various nuclear weapons, as well as means of delivery. Secretary Austin reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence to the ROK utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities and advanced non-nuclear capabilities. He noted that any nuclear attack against the United States or its Allies and partners, including the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime. They pledged to further strengthen the Alliance's capabilities, information sharing, and consultation process, as well as joint planning and execution, to deter and respond to DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile threats. Both leaders also reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S. to deploy United States strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula in a timely and coordinated manner as necessary, to enhance such measures, and identify new steps to reinforce deterrence in the face of the DPRK's destabilizing activities.

The two leaders assessed that bilateral mechanisms such as the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD), the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) serve to strengthen the Alliance combined deterrence posture. They pledged to continue close consultation through these mechanisms to identify means to further strengthen extended deterrence. The Secretary and the Minister applauded progress on revising the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) within the DSC, which upon completion is to provide a framework on deterrence and response in order to better prepare for the DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile threats. The two leaders encouraged the DSC to make significant progress toward completion of the TDS ahead of 55th SCM. The Secretary and the Minister further pledged to conduct the DSC Table-top-exercise (TTX) annually, which is to include a DPRK nuclear use scenario, in response to recent changes in DPRK nuclear strategy and capabilities. Going forward, the two leaders concurred on the importance of focusing efforts to deter DPRK nuclear weapon use and pledged to seek new measures to demonstrate Alliance's determination and capabilities. The Secretary and the Minister also expressed their determination to maintain close Alliance coordination, especially with regards to strategic communication, to respond effectively to any future provocation.

The Secretary and the Minister closely consulted on both nations' policies to effectively deter and respond to DPRK's nuclear and missile threats, including the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Missile Defense Review (MDR), and the reinforcement of the ROK 3K Defense System. The Secretary and the Minister noted the efforts to strengthen Alliance's missile response capabilities and posture by establishing the two subordinate groups under the DSC: the newly established Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) and the reactivated Program Analysis Working Group for the U.S.-ROK Missile Defense (PAWG) in response to advancing DPRK missile threats.

4. The two sides pledged to continue coordination and cooperation toward achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as pursuing steps to encourage the DPRK to choose a path leading to denuclearization and a brighter future. Secretary Austin welcomed the ROK's Audacious Initiative as a positive effort to encourage progress towards denuclearization. The Secretary and the Minister stressed the importance of efforts to resume diplomacy and dialogue, and called for full implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) by the entire international community, including the DPRK. The Secretary and the Minister urged the DPRK to abide by its obligations under the existing UNSCRs as well as its previous commitments and agreements. The Secretary and the Minister also concurred on the need for a concerted effort by the international community to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, while noting that next year marks the 70th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. The Secretary and the Minister concurred that the efforts by the ROK and the DPRK to faithfully abide by the Armistice Agreement and previous agreements in a mutual manner is necessary to ease military tensions and build trust on the Korean Peninsula. Minister Lee further conveyed the ROK's position that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating ROK and DPRK military forces and preventing military tension. The two leaders reaffirmed that they would continue to closely cooperate in pursuit of these objectives, expressed their support for diplomatic efforts as the most preferred path, and concurred that such diplomatic efforts must be backed by a robust and credible combined defense posture.

5. The Secretary and the Minister also reflected on the critical role that U.S. forces in the ROK have played for more than 69 years, and reaffirmed that U.S. Forces Korea USFK is to continue to play an important role in preventing armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Secretary Austin also noted that the Indo-Pacific region is the Department of Defense's priority theater, reaffirmed the ironclad commitment of the United States to the combined defense of the ROK, and reiterated the U.S. commitment to maintain current USFK force levels in order to defend the ROK. He highlighted the increased frequency and intensity of U.S. strategic asset deployments, consistent with the Presidents' commitments to enhance rotational deployments of U.S. strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula, as tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend the ROK.

Secretary Austin and Minister Lee also reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in maintaining and enforcing the Armistice Agreement and coordinating multinational contributions to security on the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders reaffirmed that the UNC has contributed to the successful maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for over 70 years, and that it will continue to carry out its mission and tasks with the utmost respect for ROK sovereignty.

The Secretary and the Minister recognized ROK efforts to establish the conditions for the stable stationing of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery at Camp Carroll. The Secretary and the Minister committed to continuing close cooperation for normalizing routine and unfettered access to the THAAD site.

6. The Secretary and the Minister received a report on the results of the U.S.-ROK MCM from the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) Commander, General Paul J. LaCamera. Based on the report, they committed to enhance combined defense capabilities against DPRK threats, strengthen nuclear and WMD deterrence and response posture of the CFC, conduct the systematic and stable transition of operational control (OPCON), and update relevant operation plans (OPLANs). The two leaders also assessed that there was significant progress in effectively responding to a variety of security challenges following changes to the strategic environment.

7. The Secretary and Minister concurred on the need to enhance combined exercises and training events to strengthen readiness against DPRK nuclear and missile threats, particularly given the security environment following the DPRK's most recent missile tests. The two leaders assessed that the Combined Command Post Training (CCPT) 22-1 and the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise contributed to maintaining combined readiness. In particular, they recognized that the UFS exercise restored a realistic theater-level combined exercise system. They also assessed that the combined field exercise intensively performed in conjunction with the UFS exercise OPLAN added strength to the U.S-ROK combined defense posture and military readiness. Both leaders pledged to closely cooperate to return to large-scale field exercises in line with combined exercises in 2023, noting that training for defensive and deterrent purposes is a critical component of maintaining Alliance readiness. The two sides assessed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance must continue to focus on combat readiness and on the combined defense posture to address dynamic changes on the Korean Peninsula.

8. The Secretary and the Minister emphasized that continuous training opportunities for USFK are critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture. Secretary Austin noted the efforts of the ROK's Ministry of National Defense (MND) for the improvement of the combined training conditions and the two leaders pledged to maintain close cooperation to achieve additional progress. Both leaders concurred on the importance of communication and cooperation between USFK and MND to coordinate the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for U.S. and ROK training to maintain effective combined readiness. The two leaders also noted that the ROK Government's plan to establish a combined joint multi-purpose live-fire training complex is a strategic approach to significantly improve the training conditions of both nations, and shared a common understanding on the need to expedite efforts to establish the complex.

9. The Secretary and the Minister recognized the Combined Forces Command (CFC) as the symbol of the Alliance and core of the combined defense system, and its central role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and defending the ROK since its establishment in 1978. The two leaders also expressed their expectation that the CFC Headquarters relocation would contribute to a stable transition of wartime OPCON in accordance with the Alliance Guiding Principles and the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP). Furthermore, the Secretary and the Minister pledged to work together to establish a strong combined defense posture based on further and enhanced Alliance spirit and operational efficiency capabilities at Pyeongtaek base (U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys), a new cradle of the Alliance.

10. The Secretary and the Minister assessed that significant progress had been made in meeting the conditions for wartime OPCON transition. After reviewing the progress on directed tasks from the COTP, the two leaders discussed the way forward for wartime OPCON transition to the Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC). The Secretary and the Minister also reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is fully transitioned to the F-CFC.

The two leaders applauded the progress made in completing all eight COTP Annexes and approved the completed set of the COTP annexes with appendices and tabs recommended by the 22-2 COTP Permanent Military Committee. The Secretary and the Minister also noted that all assessment tasks met the criteria after the successful Full Operational Capability (FOC) assessment of the F-CFC and committed to complete the bilateral evaluation of Conditions #1 and #2 capabilities and systems and to review the overall status of acquiring bilateral approved-upon levels of capabilities and systems, before discussing FOC certification. They also confirmed the progress of the joint assessment of the ROK's critical military capabilities and the Alliance's comprehensive response capabilities against DPRK nuclear and missile threats and assessed that significant progress had been made in meeting the conditions for the transition. The Minister reiterated that the ROK military is to continue to acquire defense capabilities necessary to lead the future combined defense and to pursue efforts to meet the conditions in a systematic as well as stable manner. The Minister and Secretary concurred that further management of Bridging and Enduring Capabilities is to be accomplished within the OPLAN planning process. The Secretary and the Minister also committed to cooperate closely to ensure the development of comprehensive and interoperable Alliance capabilities. The two sides pledged to engage in regular evaluation and review of the progress in wartime OPCON transition implementation through annual SCM and MCM to maintain a steadfast combined defense system.

11. The Secretary and the Minister decided to continue strengthening cooperation in various areas, including space and cyber, in order to ensure an effective joint response against newly emerging threats and to bolster comprehensive Alliance response capabilities. The Secretary and the Minister acknowledged the efforts of the respective defense authorities working to promote the security of critical infrastructure, including information and space systems. The two leaders applauded the work of the Space Cooperation Working Group and pledged to explore measures to strengthen space cooperation given the signing of the U.S.-ROK Space Policy Joint Study. The two sides pledged to explore further cooperative measures to strengthen space capabilities as an Alliance, such as space situational awareness information sharing systems, and to expand bilateral and multilateral exercises and training events including the Space Cooperation TTX. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen Alliance cyber cooperation in light of the increasing scope of cyber security threats. They highlighted the work of the May 2022 Cyber Cooperation Working Group and committed to enhance close communication and coordination in the cyber domain including increasing U.S.-ROK combined response cooperation, the establishment of a bilateral cyber exercises and training, and information security requirements.

12. The Minister and the Secretary concurred on the need to strengthen the national defense capabilities of the Alliance, and to establish more efficient and effective collaboration in the development, acquisition, and employment of these capabilities. The two sides noted the importance of expanding and deepening cooperation in the areas of defense research and development, industrial cooperation, capability acquisition, and logistics and sustainment, with a focus on strengthening the national defense capabilities of the Alliance as well as interoperability.

13. The Secretary and the Minister pledged to continue exchange activities between U.S-ROK consultative bodies that address defense research and development, as well as industrial cooperation, capability acquisition, lifecycle logistics, and technology security, and concurred on the necessity to advance Alliance priorities in the areas of capability development, interoperability, acquisition, and sustainment.

14. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to evaluate and evolve bilateral consultative bodies to strengthen efficacy and timeliness of cooperation in areas of defense industries and research and development. The two leaders reaffirmed that U.S.-ROK science and technology cooperation has expanded in various domains such as space, quantum, sensor/electronic warfare, cyber defense, artificial intelligence, automation, and directed energy. They also pledged to seek cooperative measures in the area of 5G and next-generation mobile communications (6G). The two sides assessed that such cooperation is continuing to develop in a way that furthers ROK-U.S. mutual interests. Going forward, the two sides pledged to continue to devise and deepen cooperative efforts through the regular consultative bodies that support these domains, and to work together on continued reform of those consultative bodies to strengthen their alignment with Alliance policy and strategy.

15. The Secretary and the Minister shared a common understanding that the U.S.-ROK Alliance plays a critical role in the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. As such, in consideration of the complex regional and global security situation, the Secretary and the Minister pledged to continue promoting defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the world, in order to better respond to regional and global security challenges. In this context, the two leaders committed to seeking cooperation between the ROK's Indo-Pacific strategy framework and the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the sea, lawful unimpeded commerce, and respect for international law including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful use of the seas, including the South China Sea and beyond. They further expressed their intent to work together for that purpose. The Secretary and the Minister also acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as reflected in the May 2022 Joint Statement between President Biden and President Yoon. They reaffirmed support for Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture.

The two leaders concurred on the need to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law both at home and abroad, and also reiterated their commitment to ongoing efforts to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the region including counter-piracy operations, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, regional security cooperation initiatives, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

16. The two leaders also committed to seek synergies in U.S. and ROK regional strategies to maintain the peace and security of the Northeast Asian region through trilateral and multilateral cooperation. They committed to continue U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation such as information sharing, high-level policy consultation, trilateral exercises, and personnel exchanges. In particular, the two leaders committed to continue missile warning and anti-submarine warfare exercises, which help strengthen the response posture of the three countries to the DPRK nuclear and missile threat. The Secretary and the Minister also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing to promote and expand trilateral security cooperation through regular defense consultations, such as the defense trilateral talks (DTT).

17. Amidst the DPRK's continued development of nuclear and missile programs, the Secretary and the Minister recognized the necessity of continued sanctions monitoring missions in the region and welcomed continued multinational contributions to counter-proliferation activities in the region. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the ROK's contribution to various global security efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and both leaders concurred on the importance of upholding and fully implementing all relevant UNSCRs. They reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing cooperation to address existing DPRK sanctions evasion tactics and illicit cyber activities, and committed to seek additional opportunities for responding to WMD threats from the DPRK. Additionally, the two leaders resolved to continue strengthening cooperation to enhance CWMD capabilities through measures including U.S.-ROK Counter WMD Committee (CWMDC) and U.S. DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which have enhanced Alliance CWMD capabilities. The Secretary and the Minister applauded the work done over the last year in the CWMDC to enhance the Alliance's combined response capabilities to prevent the acquisition and use of DPRK's WMD, and to respond to mitigate WMD threats.

Secretary Austin expressed his gratitude that the ROK is contributing towards ensuring a stable stationing environment for U.S. Forces Korea. The Secretary and Minister also assessed that the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) has greatly contributed to the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture.

18. Secretary Austin and Minister Lee expressed appreciation for the courtesy, hospitality, and work by both sides that contributed to the success of this year's SCM. Both leaders affirmed that the discussions during the 54th SCM and the 47th MCM contributed to substantively strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and further developing the bilateral defense relationship into the U.S.-ROK global comprehensive strategic Alliance. Both sides expect to hold the 55th SCM and 48th MCM in Seoul at a mutually convenient time in 2023.

defense.gov

2.  ​ Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup Hold a News Conference​

The Secretary received questions about the "failure" of deterrence. The press was making the argument that the north's behavior, (missile launches, et el) must illustrate a failure. The press and pundits do not get it. We cannot deter provocations, missile and nuclear tests.

What we do is deter war. We deter an attack on the ROK and our allies in the region, And we deter a nuclear attack against the ROK, Japan, and the US.

But we cannot deter provocations, especially those based on tests. But that does not mean deterrence has failed. The strategic guidance of the Military Committee (made up of representatives of both countries, National Command and Military Authors) is for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command to deter war and attack on the ROK. And if deterrence fails the ROK/US CFC will defend the ROK and defeat the nKPA

Excerpts:

SEC. AUSTIN: To answer your question, yes, I believe our activities are effective in deterring. You know, one of the things that sends a strong deterrent message is our ability to work together and to be interoperable, and our ability to train our troops to a high level of capability, and also maintain a combat-credible force in the region. And most recently, you've seen us focus on that in a major way. Again, I point to the major exercise that we have ongoing. I -- you know, you mentioned the carrier. That is a serious demonstration of commitment and combat capability. Again, we are focused on making sure that nobody attacks South Korea, and we're committed to that. Our commitment is ironclad. And we're also committed to deterring anyone from using a nuclear device. And yes, I do believe we've been effective in that, and we'll continue to work to make sure that we're working together building increasing capability and increasing our ability to work together, so --

Q: (inaudible) said a criticism that North Korea's artillery and nuclear missile firings are a deterrence failure. You don't accept that?

SEC. AUSTIN: Criticism of --

Q: That North Korea's continued provocations can be seen as a failure in terms of deterrence.

SEC. AUSTIN: I don't. It -- you know, I believe that they are deterred from attacking North Korea -- South Korea -- excuse me. And I also believe they are deterred from employing a nuclear device, either against the -- in the peninsula or against our homeland here in the U.S. Yes, I do believe that.

We cannot deter provocations but we must deter war and the employment of nuclear weapons against the ROK, other US allies, and the US homeland. We have successfully deterred north Korea since 1953.

We really need to help the press understand what we are deterring and why.

But there is the key point from MInister Lee:

Secretary Austin and I affirmed that any nuclear attack by the DPRK, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, is unacceptable and result in the end of Kim Jong-un regime by the overwhelming and decisive response of the alliance. This is a strong warning against the DPRK.

​ Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup Hold a News Conference​

defense.gov

PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY BRIG. GEN. PAT RYDER: Thank you, everyone, for being here today.

It is my pleasure to introduce Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup. The Secretary and the Minister will deliver opening remarks and then we'll have time to take a few questions. I will moderate and call on the journalists. And with that, Secretary Austin, over to you, sir.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III: Thanks, Pat.

Good afternoon, everyone. And let me again warmly welcome Minister Lee and his team to the Pentagon for the 54th security consultative meeting.

Minister Lee, it's great to have you here. And before I begin, I'd like to express my deepest condolences for the terrible tragedy that occurred in Seoul this past weekend. Our hearts go out to the families of all the victims from across South Korea and around the world, including two young Americans. And we stand together with the people of South Korea during this time of national mourning.

Now, it's highly unfortunate that the DPRK has chosen to interrupt this solemn period with the illegal and destabilizing launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile last night, as well as additional missile launches today. I've consulted with Minister Lee, and we've decided to extend Vigilant Storm, which is our long schedule combined training exercise to further bolster our readiness and interoperability. And we'll continue to work closely together to develop options to protect the United States and our allies in the region.

Now, let me turn to the work of the security consultative meeting. As you know, it's the annual capstone event for the U.S.-ROK alliance. And it brings our defense leaders together to discuss our challenges and opportunities and to deepen our cooperation and friendship. Next year will mark the 70th anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty and the establishment of our alliance.

For nearly seven decades this alliance has been an anchor of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and across the broader Indo-Pacific. And today the ROK is a tremendously capable ally and a provider of security in the region, and a defender of the rules-based international order that keeps us all secure.

Now, Minister Lee and I had an outstanding discussion today. We talked about the DPRK's continued provocations and destabilizing actions. And at this time of heightened tension, our alliance is ironclad. The United States remains fully committed to the defense of the ROK. And our extended deterrence commitment is firm. And it includes a full range of our nuclear and conventional and missile defense capabilities.

Minister Lee and I also talked about the tremendous progress that we've made in recent months to deepen our cooperation and bolster our shared security. Just within the past year we have conducted a very successful summit between our Presidents that charted a shared vision for our alliance's future.

In July, we deployed fifth-generation fighters to the Republic of Korea, and in late September, the USS Ronald Reagan conducted its first port call to the ROK in five years. On the Peninsula, we're returning to large-scale exercises to strengthen our combined readiness and our ability to fight tonight, if necessary.

We're committed to building on these efforts to strengthen integrated deterrence and to ensure that this alliance continues to bolster security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the Indo-Pacific.

You know, for decades, U.S. and ROK service members have fought side-by-side to defend the ideals of freedom. This alliance is founded on that shared sacrifice. So we will confront the challenges of the future the same way that we have for nearly 70 years: by standing shoulder-to-shoulder as proud allies.

I'm enormously proud of what we've accomplished together, and I'm very grateful for the Republic of Korea's partnership.

So thank you, and let me turn it over to Minister Lee for his comments.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE LEE JONG-SUP (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): Hello. I'm ROK Minister of Defense. First of all, thank you very much for your sincere condolences to the tragedy (that) happened in Korea. Also, thank you for your effort for the peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and development of ROK-U.S. alliance and your support. Thank you very much for that.

Today, through the 54th security consultative meeting, hosted for the first time since the inauguration of the Yoon administration, we once again affirmed the robustness of the ROK-U.S. military alliance and the steadfastness of the combined defense posture. Furthermore, we reaffirmed that ROK-U.S. alliance is developing its global comprehensive strategic alliance based on shared values, such as liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Secretary Austin and I held two ministerial meetings this year to work on the details of the agreement on defense areas, as agreed upon during the May ROK-U.S. presidential summit. Today was my third time to meet Secretary Austin and we made a lot of achievements during this 54th SCM.

First, Secretary Austin and I assessed the daily advances of DPRK nuclear and missile threats as a grave security challenge to the peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia but for the international community. And in order to practically deter and respond to such threats, we agreed to further strengthen the alliance capabilities and posture.

Secretary Austin committed to the provision of extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea, leveraging the full range of military capabilities, including not only nuclear and conventional forces, but missile defense capabilities, but also advanced non-nuclear capabilities, such as space, cyber, and electromagnetic capabilities.

Secretary Austin and I affirmed that any nuclear attack by the DPRK, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, is unacceptable and result in the end of Kim Jong-un regime by the overwhelming and decisive response of the alliance. This is a strong warning against the DPRK.

Also, Secretary Austin and I pledged to further strengthen alliance capability and posture in respective areas, including information sharing, consultation process, joint planning and execution to effectively deter and respond to the DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile threats.

In particular, Secretary and I will work on response options towards all possible nuclear use scenarios by the DPRK. To this end, Secretary and I noted that progress in revising the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, or TDS, and pledged to put efforts to complete the revision of the TDS by the 2023 SCM, and prepare response options by annually conducting Deterrence Strategy Committee tabletop exercise, or DSC TTX, under the scenario of DPRK nuclear use.

In addition, Secretary Austin pledged to effectively respond to any DPRK provocation by employing U.S. strategic assets to the level equivalent to constant deployment through increasing the frequency and intensity of strategic asset deployment in and around the Korean Peninsula.

Along with the efforts of the alliance to deter and respond to DPRK nuclear threats, Secretary Austin and I pledged to encourage DPRK to choose denuclearization and the path for a brighter future. We also pledged to continue our cooperation to achieve a complete denuclearization of North Korea.

In this context, Secretary Austin assessed that the ROK government's audacious initiative is a practical approach and expresses his support for it. ROK government's audacious initiative is along the same line as the U.S. approach to the DPRK, an approach of deterring DPRK threats based on overwhelming combined defense capability and posture while, in parallel, seeking for a diplomatic solution by keeping the window of dialogue open.

As stated, both countries will adhere to the principal DPRK policies through close cooperation until the day DPRK decides to denuclearize, and the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense will backstop the efforts with strength.

During the meeting, there were earnest discussions and cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. and our partners for the promotion of regional security and all measures of bolstering multilateral cooperation.

In order to respond to DPRK nuclear and missile threats, Secretary and I affirmed to continuously advance the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, for which we agreed to activate trilateral senior level policy consultation, information sharing, training, and personnel exchanges.

And Secretary and I also pledged to resume early next year the ASD level policy consultation body called Defense Trilateral Talks, or DTT, which has been suspended for the past years.

Secretary and I also shared a strong sentiment on the importance of the rules-based international order and pledged to closely cooperate for the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, Secretary Austin expressed much interest in the Indo-Pacific Strategy framework, which the ROK government is currently developing.

The Republic of Korea, as a responsible, global, pivotal state of the international community, will more closely cooperate with the United States, the only ally of our nation, in order to overcome global security challenges.

Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance while pursuing the goal of global comprehensive strategic alliance. Secretary Austin and I concurred to plan and hold various joint events in celebration of the 70th anniversary for future advancement of the alliance.

The events will serve as an opportunity for us to commemorate the noble sacrifices made in the battlefield by ROK and U.S. service members, and to consult on the challenges which alliance faces today and to envision the path forward for ROK-U.S. alliance.

By reaffirming the unwavering U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of Korea, efforts to strengthen the capabilities to implement the extended deterrence, as well as the robust combined defense posture based on the capability and resolve of our two nations through the 54th SCM, Secretary Austin and I assessed that we have demonstrated values and trust of the ROK-U.S. alliance to the people of both nations and a grave message of warning to the DPRK and the robustness of the alliance to the international community.

Lastly, I once again extend my sincere gratitude to Secretary Austin and the staff at the Department of Defense for their warm hospitality towards myself and the ROK delegation. Thank you very much.

BRIG. GEN. RYDER: Secretary Austin, Minister Lee, thank you gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, we'll be switching to consecutive translation for the question-and-answer portion, so would ask you to kindly remove your headsets.

First question will come from Reuters, Phil Stewart.

Q: Thank you. Secretary Austin, do repeated and increasingly regular North Korean missile tests show the U.S.-ROK alliance needs to adjust its deterrence strategy? And on Russia, is it your assessment that Ukrainian forces will be able to retake Kherson City and that the Russian forces are preparing to leave?

And to Minister Lee, you've called for a shift in strategy away from trying to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons but what would a shift from the denuclearization look like? And do you believe the U.S. needs to consider reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula? Thank you.

SEC. AUSTIN: Thanks, Phil. On the first question, in terms of whether or not we need to adjust our strategy, I'll just say first that -- and you've heard me say this a number of times -- that we -- you know, our commitment to defending the ROK is ironclad.

We strongly condemn the DPRK's irresponsible and reckless activities. As we said before, these kinds of activities are destabilizing to the region potentially. So we call on them to cease that type of activity and to begin to engage in serious dialogue.

On the issue of whether or not the Ukrainians can take the remaining territory on the west side of the Dnieper River in Kherson, I certainly believe that they have the capability to do that. Most importantly, the Ukrainians believe that they have the capability to do that.

We've seen them engage in a very methodical but effective effort to take back their sovereign territory. I think you'll see them continue to press until they secure the territory on the west side of the river. So to answer your question, I do think they have the capability.

MIN. LEE (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): As for the question that was asked of me, I believe the question was regarding the redeployment of tactical nukes of the United States. To state our government's stance of denuclearization policy on the Korean Peninsula, I'd like to say that there's no change in our denuclearization policy and that, for now, we do not have a -- we are currently not thinking to redeploy tactical nukes on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you.

BRIG. GEN. RYDER: Thank you, gentlemen. All right, next, we'll go to Korea Herald, Da-gyum Ji.

Da-gyum Ji from The Korea Herald. I have two questions for Secretary Austin. My first question is on the effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrence. North Korea has so far launched more than 40 missiles of different types since late September and North Korea has threatened to start targeting South Korean territory with tactical nuclear weapons. Clearly, North Korea has continued saber rattling and provocations but do you still think that the current extended deterrence arrangement has been effective in deterring North Korea? And what kind of North Korean behavior should the U.S. and South Korea seek to deter?

And my second question is on the inter-Korean military agreement. North Korea has repeatedly violated the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement. It has fired around 1,000 artillery shells toward the inter-Korean maritime buffer zone. Do you think the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement is still effective in reducing tensions between the two Koreas? Do you still support the -- do you support inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement or should we abandon the deal?

SEC. AUSTIN: On the second question, I certainly -- yes, I do think it's effective and I certainly would invite comment from my colleague here, Minister Lee, as well.

In terms of the effectiveness of the -- our deterrence, yes, I do think we've been effective. I would point out to you that we have recently gone back to conducting a number of exercises that are focused on increasing our readiness and our ability to be able to fight tonight.

As a matter of fact, right now, we have one of the largest exercises that we've seen in the -- in recent history. There's some -- over 240 aircraft that are part of that exercise and they're doing, you know, a number of high end types of training events -- conducting a number of high end types of training events, and all of that is designed to ensure that we have the ability to defend the peninsula when -- if called to do so.

And so I think this increased focus on readiness, this -- you know, our ability to redeploy or deploy strategic assets to the peninsula, as you've seen us do here with the fifth generation fighters recently -- you've also seen us move a carrier into port there recently, and I think that's -- that sends a pretty strong signal as well.

But it could be that -- you know -- our neighbors in the north there may be concerned about our increased focus on readiness. So yes, I do think we've been effective and we will continue to look at this and ensure that we remain effective.

Q: So what kind of North Korean behavior should U.S. and South Korea specifically seek to deter?

SEC. AUSTIN: What kind of behaviors would we --

Q: Behaviors the U.S. and South Korea seek to deter?

SEC. AUSTIN: Expect to deter?

Q: Yes, I mean, like, what is the desired behavior that the U.S. and South Korea are trying to bring about?

SEC. AUSTIN: Well, certainly we don't want to see, you know, anyone make a decision to employ a nuclear device. And lately, as you've seen, North Koreans have engaged in activity such as an inter -- testing an intercontinental ballistic missile, a number of short-range ballistic missiles, firing artillery into the ocean. And so all of this activity is potentially destabilizing.

And so you know, again, you know, I think it's possible that they could continue to do that kind of thing, but certainly, we are focused on making sure that they don't choose to employ a nuclear weapon or choose to attack South Korea, so --

BRIG. GEN. RYDER: Our next question will go to CNN, Oren Liebermann.

Q: A question for each of you: Secretary, sir, the Minister said just a moment ago that you'd pledge to effectively respond to any DPRK provocation by employing U.S. strategic assets equivalent to a constant deployment through increased frequency and (inaudible) of strategic asset deployment. What strategic assets do you intend to deploy to the Korean Peninsula? And is this a change in U.S. posture in the region?

And Minister, sir, do you believe a North Korean nuclear test is imminent? And is China playing a constructive role in preventing them from carrying out such a test?

SEC. AUSTIN: Well, you've seen us recently redeploy fifth-generation fighter aircraft. You've seen us exercise our strategic assets from time to time. And again, we -- to answer your question, we don't have a plan to change permanent positioning or stationing of assets on the peninsula currently. But you know, what we're doing together not only to -- on a bilateral basis, but also with our allies in Japan. In each and every case, we'll assess what -- you know, what's going on, and we'll work together to ensure that we provide the right kind of deterrent message. So to answer your question, no new deployment of strategic assets on a permanent basis, but you'll see assets move in and out on a routine basis.

MIN. LEE (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): So to respond to the answer asking whether North Korea is ready for a nuclear test, I can state a statement that as for a third underground facility in North Korea, they are ready to conduct the nuclear test at that area. But when they will carry out the nuclear test is currently still a curiosity, as North Korea will have to take into account the political purpose and to exactly estimate when they will carry out the nuclear test, is a difficulty for us, as well.

And to answer the question about Chinese effect and influence on North Korea, if you traditionally look at the influence that China had in North Korea in the past, there's been a time when despite Chinese opposition to North Korea carrying out a nuclear test, North Korea still carried out the test anyway. So it's difficult to say that China has a decisive effect in North -- in choosing North Korea, as well.

Q: Thank you.

BRIG. GEN. RYDER: And for our final question, we'll go to Yonhap, Sangho Song.

Q: Yes, I have two questions, one to both Secretary Austin and Minister Lee, and the other question is for -- only for Minister Lee. And I think my question is similar to Reuters -- I mean, CNN and my colleague. But even when South Korea and the United States are talking about extended deterrence at the SCM at this point, North Korea fired missiles and artillery shells into the ocean. So -- and when the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier was in South Korea, still, North Korea fired missiles. So the question is if the deterrence works when it comes to North Korea's conventional forms of provocation or low-intensity attacks, you know, so there's still concern of whether or not the terms of the alliance really working fine. So did you actually discuss that issue at the SCM today? And did you come up with any effective measures beyond rhetorical excoriations?

And (UNTRANSLATED)

SEC. AUSTIN: To answer your question, yes, I believe our activities are effective in deterring. You know, one of the things that sends a strong deterrent message is our ability to work together and to be interoperable, and our ability to train our troops to a high level of capability, and also maintain a combat-credible force in the region. And most recently, you've seen us focus on that in a major way. Again, I point to the major exercise that we have ongoing. I -- you know, you mentioned the carrier. That is a serious demonstration of commitment and combat capability. Again, we are focused on making sure that nobody attacks South Korea, and we're committed to that. Our commitment is ironclad. And we're also committed to deterring anyone from using a nuclear device. And yes, I do believe we've been effective in that, and we'll continue to work to make sure that we're working together building increasing capability and increasing our ability to work together, so --

Q: (inaudible) said a criticism that North Korea's artillery and nuclear missile firings are a deterrence failure. You don't accept that?

SEC. AUSTIN: Criticism of --

Q: That North Korea's continued provocations can be seen as a failure in terms of deterrence.

SEC. AUSTIN: I don't. It -- you know, I believe that they are deterred from attacking North Korea -- South Korea -- excuse me. And I also believe they are deterred from employing a nuclear device, either against the -- in the peninsula or against our homeland here in the U.S. Yes, I do believe that.

MIN. LEE (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): So the question was regarding the development of OPLAN and how the endorsed SPD and SPG from security consultative meeting last year and how the OPLAN is developing on top of those agreements that were made in SCM. The question was about how the process was going and when the OPLAN was going to be completed. And as for OPLAN to provide my answer, when you're developing the OPLAN, it's not a one and done deal. It's something that you continue to develop, given the -- take into account the environment of the situation. So it is difficult to say when it will exactly complete. However what I can say is that we will -- in the process of developing the OPLAN we are seeking to expedite the upgrade. However as for the specifics of the information that I can divulge, there is a limitation due to military confidentiality. So I will keep my answer to this.

SEC. AUSTIN: And one final note here, again, in terms of our deterrent efforts and at the types of things that we're deterring. I would point out that we're committed to deterring that type of activity against any of our allies and partners in the region. We remain committed to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region. So thank you very much.

BRIG. GEN. RYDER: Secretary Austin, Minister Lee, thank you, gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, that is all the time we have available today. This concludes our press briefing. Thank you for joining us.

29:41

defense.gov

3. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-Sup Visit Korean War Memorial, Tour U.S. Bomber Aircraft

Note that the US Korean War Memorial has some 7000+ names of KATUSAs who fought and died side by side American soldiers.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-Sup Visit Korean War Memorial, Tour U.S. Bomber Aircraft​

defense.gov

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Immediate Release

Nov. 3, 2022 |×

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Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jung-Sup to the Pentagon for the 54th United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting.

In addition to their meeting at the Pentagon, Secretary Austin and Minister Lee visited the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. to view the new Wall of Remembrance, unveiled in July 2022, and to pay honors to the service and sacrifice of those who fought and died in defense of the Republic of Korea during the Korean War.

Secretary Austin and Minister Lee also visited Joint Base Andrews in Maryland for a briefing and tour of two U.S. Air Force bomber aircraft -- a B-52 Stratofortress and a B-1 Lancer. U.S. airpower capabilities routinely contribute to the security and stability of the Korean peninsula, and participate in combined air exercises and training with the ROK Air Force. In addition to U.S. land, naval and space forces, U.S. military aircraft and other airpower assets are a vital component of extended deterrence and the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Secretary Austin and Minister Lee reaffirmed that they will closely coordinate to strengthen all U.S. and ROK military capabilities to implement U.S. extended deterrence to effectively and appropriately respond to DPRK nuclear and missile threats. This commitment is built on a 70-year alliance relationship and based on common values and people-to-people ties.

South Korea Austin Defense Secretary Indo-Pacific Air Force korean war

defense.gov

4. Episode 3: Modern-day North Korea, and what a reunified peninsula might look like

​Part 2 of my latest interview with Stars and Stripes for its Military Matters podcast. 

Here is the link to the actual podcast https://stripesmilitarymatterspod.libsyn.com/future-war-north-korea-part-2

Episode 3: Modern-day North Korea, and what a reunified peninsula might look like

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney · November 3, 2022

(Stars and Stripes)

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In last week’s episode of Military Matters, North Korea expert and retired Army Special Forces Col. David Maxwell discussed how North and South Korea and their rocky relationship have evolved since World War II.

Co-host Jack Murphy and Maxwell continue their discussion in this week’s episode with a look at modern-day North Korea, what a theoretical unified Korean peninsula might look like — and who will pay for reunification.

“You know, if you ask Koreans, do they want unification? Many will say in their heart, they do,” Maxwell said. “But … the others will say, if you ask, do you want to pay for it? They'll say, hell no. And of course, that's one of the things that drives the fear of the costs of unification. I like to joke that there are probably more Ph.D.s, Ph.D. dissertations written in South Korea about East and West German unification than any other subject. And they look at those costs and they compare them to the stark differences — the greater differences between North and South than were between East and West Germany. And they're afraid of those costs.”

The South Korean entertainment industry — in particular South Korean drama TV shows — could help prepare North Koreans for eventual reunification. Maxwell brought up the Netflix show “Crash Landing on You,” a South Korean romantic comedy about a South Korean woman who ends up in the North after a paragliding accident and is rescued by North Korean soldiers.

“Before COVID, I met with a number of North Korean soldiers,” Maxwell said. “I asked them what they thought about this drama, this ‘Crash Landing on You.’ And I said, ‘What do soldiers who are seeing that on the North side think?’ [One of the soldiers] said it makes them want to come to the South even more than they already do. But what really impressed them was that the drama portrayed not only the Korean people in the North, but Korean soldiers in the North as human beings.”

You can find Military Matters on Twitter @stripesmmpod.

Follow Jack Murphy on Twitter @jackmurphyrgr and Rod Rodriguez @rodpodrod.

A transcript of the episode can be found here.

Go to www.stripes.com use promo code PODCAST and save 50% on your digital subscription.

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney · November 3, 2022

5. North Korea’s missile splurge cost $70 million – more than a year of imported rice

See the links below to understand the power and influence of RFA (and the same for VOA.

Below this article is a series of links that draw from Jaehoon Shim. This is an indication of the power and influence of Radio Free Asia (and VOA). Korean news organizations are paying attention to the open source analysis provided by excellent RFA/VOA journalists.

North Korea’s missile splurge cost $70 million – more than a year of imported rice

Kim Jong Un’s prioritizing weapons over the welfare of his people amounts to crimes against humanity, experts say

By Jaehoon Shim for RFA Korean

2022.11.03

rfa.org

North Korea’s record breaking single-day barrage of more than 20 missiles cost the impoverished country more than U.S. $70 million, or as much as it spent importing rice from China in 2019 to try to cover grain shortages that year, experts told Radio Free Asia.

Pyongyang on Wednesday launched 23 missiles, one of which crossed a disputed maritime border, ratcheting up tensions on the peninsula. On Thursday, it launched six more, including an ICBM, and observers anticipate that North Korea’s seventh nuclear test could happen soon.

The short-range missiles fired on Wednesday likely cost between $2 million to $3 million each, Bruce Bennet, an adjunct international defense researcher at the California-based RAND Corporation, told RFA’s Korean Service.

“You're talking about something between $50 and $75 million,” he said, adding that Pyongyang likely chose to use surface-to-air missiles in the Wednesday barrage because they cost less than medium or long-range missiles.

That’s about as much as North Korea spent on all its imports from China for the month of August this year, or the total cost of rice imported from China in 2019, data from China’s General Administration of Customs showed.

The $70 million splurge in a single day showed that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un prioritizes missile and nuclear weapons development over the welfare of the people, said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“Kim Jong Un is expending resources and money, to test missiles and build his advanced military capabilities and this is, of course, responsible for the great amount of suffering among the Korean people living in the North,” he said.

Choosing weapons over people was one of many ways authorities in the country were committing human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, he said.

“So every missile that he launches,” Maxwell said, “takes food from the mouth of the Korean people in the North.”

Translated by Leejin. J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

rfa.org

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/cost-11032022170409.html

https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2022/11/03/AAYSYUNSHVFIBCLWE4DPKVKDGU/?utm_source=naver&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=naver-news

https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25114576

https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20221103/116293695/2

https://news.jtbc.co.kr/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB12090491

https://www.fnnews.com/news/202211031036264094

https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20221103_0002071785&cID=10101&pID=10100

http://news.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20221103000032

http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2022110301070209012001

https://biz.chosun.com/international/international_general/2022/11/03/SUQEV7Q3FBE3ZAY4UA4T3C22IA/?utm_source=naver&utm_medium=original&utm_campaign=biz

https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2022110316245955338

https://www.etoday.co.kr/news/view/2188980

https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20221103000707

https://www.wikitree.co.kr/articles/803239

6. 3 US soldiers praised for rescuing about 30 lives from crowd crush

Excerpts:

He said he is convinced the heroic Americans are Jarmil Taylor, 40, Jerome Augusta, 34, and Dane Beathard, 32, after belatedly learning of their interviews with French news agency AFP published Sunday.

He said he went to Itaewon on Saturday to enjoy the Halloween festivities with his friends but fell down in the crowd in the narrow alleyway before being crushed for about 15 minutes.

3 US soldiers praised for rescuing about 30 lives from crowd crush

The Korea Times · November 3, 2022

Loyd Brown, commander of U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan-Casey, pays tribute at a joint memorial altar for the victims of a crowd crush in Seoul's Itaewon district at a square in front of a subway station near the scene of the accident, Oct. 31. Yonhap

A trio of foreign heroes praised for saving more than 30 lives from last Saturday's tragic crowd crush in Seoul turned out to be American soldiers stationed in Korea, some survivors said Thursday.

One of the survivors, known only as a twentysomething man living in Cheongju, central Korea, told Yonhap News Agency he believes the three foreign heroes are U.S. soldiers serving in Camp Casey in Dongducheon, about 50 km north of Seoul.

The man told local media earlier he was pulled out of the chaos in a narrow alleyway in Itaewon before fainting and being carried to safety.

He said he is convinced the heroic Americans are Jarmil Taylor, 40, Jerome Augusta, 34, and Dane Beathard, 32, after belatedly learning of their interviews with French news agency AFP published Sunday.

He said he went to Itaewon on Saturday to enjoy the Halloween festivities with his friends but fell down in the crowd in the narrow alleyway before being crushed for about 15 minutes.

The Cheongju man, who is 182 cm tall and weighs 96 kg, said a strong black man rescued him from the crowd as if pulling radishes from a field.

"The circumstances of the Itaewon disaster and rescue activities that the three U.S. soldiers revealed in their interviews are exactly identical to what I experienced," he said.

He said he truly wants to meet with the Americans to say thanks to them, noting the number of casualties decreased thanks to their active rescue efforts.

The soldiers told AFP they pulled people out of the "crushed tangles of limbs" in the narrow alleyway for hours and carried them to safety so that emergency responders could perform CPR. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · November 3, 2022

7.  Kinetic Korea: missile tests, war drills and Kim’s dead hand

Please stop with the Arms REduction talks. The State Department Spokesman nipped that in the bud the other day.

If we offer arms control negotiations it will be game, set, and match for Kim Jong Un as he will judge his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies a success and double down.

Kinetic Korea: missile tests, war drills and Kim’s dead hand

Red lines crossed at supersonic speeds as reciprocal blasts drown out preliminary US mention of arms reduction talks

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · November 3, 2022

SEOUL – Life continued as normal in central Seoul today (November 3), but in the corridors of power and in command bunkers across this flashpoint peninsula, nerves are being tested as rarely before.

South Korea said today that massed aerial drills taking place this week with US aircraft – the first such exercises in five years – are to be extended. North Korea, meanwhile, is continuing its barrage of projectile launches, which have made 2022 its most active year ever for missile tests.

Red lines are being crossed at supersonic speeds.

This morning, North Korea fired three ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. One missile on course to fly through space over Japan – presumed by South Korea to be an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)– disappeared from radars, possibly as the result of a crash, Japanese media reported.

Yesterday, Pyongyang test-launched 25 ballistic and surface-to-air missiles from 13 separate bases off both its east and west coasts. Among them, one North Korean projectile – possibly errant – veered southward, crossing the inter-Korean maritime frontier and setting off alarms in northeastern South Korea.

It was the first time since the Korean War such an incident had occurred. South Korea responded with air-to-surface missile tests.

This is all taking place in the aftermath of a massive nuclear doctrinal shift in Pyongyang that gravely concerns military pundits. In September, North Korea announced the activation of a Soviet-style “dead-hand” nuclear system, under which subordinate units would “automatically” launch if their leadership was killed or incommunicado.

“Holy god, it’s a nightmare,” Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general told Asia Times. “Now it is not just one guy, but two – or 20 – that have their fingers on the missile triggers.”

In this heated situation, ex-general Chun is not the only old hand biting his nails.

“This is very, very dangerous,” a South Korean expert who has advised previous Seoul administrations on North Korea told Asia Times. “Wars can take place by accident, rather than by design or plan. I am worried.”

Adding to concerns: Pyongyang is focused but leaders in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington are all distracted by domestic political issues. And with widespread expectations of an imminent nuclear test by Pyongyang, no de-escalation pathway is apparent.

Amid these seismic jitters, a remarkable – albeit, underreported – piece of news offers a faint ray of hope.

A US official last week raised the possibility of arms reduction talks with North Korea. If Washington removes denuclearization – which experts insist is an impossibility – from its agenda, realistic negotiations with Pyongyang could, at last, get underway.

US F35 stealth jets, such as these, are currently training in South Korean skies. Image: US Air Force

War drills or war preparations?

Experts are divided over whether or not Kim sees a real threat from US-South Korea military exercises, or if he merely leverages them to unite his nation against external enemies.

Regardless, the drills this year are the most active since 2017. In 2018, Kim’s diplomatic dalliance with Seoul and Washington compelled both capitals to draw-down drills, a trend that continued during the Covid pandemic.

This year, with the conservative administration of Yoon Suk-yeol taking power from the progressive government of Moon Jae-in in Seoul in May, the drills are back on with a vengeance.

In recent days, South Korean TV news has featured dramatic film of massed formations of jet fighters zooming through Korean skies. The footage is of “Vigilant Storm,” a joint air exercise featuring 240 aircraft, including F35 stealth jets operated by both nations, as well as Australian refueling aircraft.

The air units are running 1,600 sorties of “close air support, defensive counter air, and emergency air operations 24 hours a day during the training period,”

The drills, scheduled to run five days from Monday, are now to be extended, it was announced today, in what is almost certainly a response to the North’s launches.

Kim’s small, fuel-starved air force cannot compete with this – but his missiles have heft. 2022 has been North Korea’s most active year, ever, for missile tests. The tests were well underway before joint South Korea-US exercises re-started this spring.

Even so, Kim is now “mechanically reacting” to ongoing exercises, the expert who advised previous Seoul governments told Asia Times.

Pyongyang media alleged this week that the flight drills are named after “Desert Storm” – the operation that ended Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. And yesterday, North Korea issued a thunderous warning.

Making a reference to “current circumstances,” the Korean Central News Agency said, “Should the US and South Korea attempt to use force against us…[North Korea’s] military’s special forces will immediately carry out the strategic mission they have been given, and the US and South Korea will face a terrifying event and pay a terrible price.”

Are the South Korean-US war games a legitimate threat? Given that Russia used winter exercises as cover to amass the force that invaded Ukraine in February – and given Pyongyang’s familiarity with Russian doctrine – those concerns look valid.

And one pundit reached further back into history to support the regime’s view.

“I believe the North Koreans have learnt strategic doctrines from World War I,” the expert said. He spoke on condition of anonymity, alleging that pressure is being quietly applied by Seoul against those who offer critical analyses.

Citing the German Army’s exercises before conducting the “Schlieffen Plan” – the German offensive through Belgium upon France – he said: “North Koreans have learnt from European experiences and accept that training can be used to invade North Korea.”

Chun, the former general, differed over the drills’ threat to Pyongyang. “Absolutely not!” he said. “These are declared, defensive routine exercises.”

Still, Chun criticized one aspect of the current drills.

“This administration is doing what should be done for military readiness, but at the same time, is publishing them a bit too much and exaggerating routine exercises,” he said. “I think this has the unintended effect of antagonizing the North Koreans. This is tit for tat and the North Koreans are not afraid to up the scale.”

Chun also slammed the inflammatory rhetoric being aired in South Korean media. Some commentators have argued that the North Korean missile that crossed to the south yesterday was a failed attempt to strike the South Korean coastal city of Sokcho.

Kim Jong Un’s new ‘dead hand’ doctine has raised the nuclear stakes on the Korean Peninsula. Image: Twitter

Kim’s ‘dead hand’

Internally, Kim has multiple reasons to conduct tests.

The first concerns military engineering. He has to physically test his constantly expanding and modernizing arsenal of missile technologies to ensure that they work. Technicians need to assess range and guidance capabilities.

The second is the need to make a show of force. To deter his enemies, Kim needs to display credible assets that could, feasibly, rain hellfire upon South Korea, Japan, US bases in the region and the US mainland itself.

The third reason is political. Kim’s public – the poorest in Northeast Asia – is suffering their third year of tightly closed borders, which have cut trade with China, the source of many of the goods traded in North Korean markets. A military defiance against external threats distracts from internal woes, providing a basis for Kim’s rule and solidifying national unity.

The fourth reason is aimed at external eyes and ears. Missile tests seize internatinal attention, granting Pyongyang relevence in international society. This is why tests have, in the past, been conducted on US independence day – and why more could take place on the upcoming November 8 mid-term elections.

A worriesome new motivation has been added this year. In September, Pyongyang announced a new doctrine under which unit commanders will independently fire nuclear weapons at enemy targets if Kim himself, or his command net, is disabled. This means new procedures, systems and communications must be stress tested.

So-called “dead hand” capability was developed by the former USSR and inherited by Russia. Though shadowy, its code name, “Operation Perimeter,” is known. An automated system, it guaranteed a retaliatory nuclear strike if Moscow’s command was decapitated.

Given the extreme nature of the North Korean state – where power is ultra-centralized around Kim – some wonder whether Pyongyang is truly willing to delegate powers down the command chain.

“I have big questions,” Chad O’Carroll, CEO of Korea Risk Group, said. “The word they used when they released that doctrine was an ‘automatic system’ should KJU [Kim Jong Un] lose control of his nuke system.”

Experts ponder whether the North Korean system could be AI-based. O’Carroll, for one, is skeptical.

“To me, that would suggest a risk of things going wrong so I don’t believe it is truly automatic,” he told Asia Times. “It must be a multi-human, layered decision-making process, I would imagine.”

Chun is more concerned. “If more than one person has the ability, but maybe not the authority, that is a nightmare,” he said. “No responsible country does that.”

Speedy apocalypse

O’Carroll warns that if North Korea came under attack, it would not hesitate to escalate at apocalyptic speed.

“I don’t doubt that they would go full pelt if push came to shove – if nukes were used, or if their leader was assassinated,” he said. “We would see loads of missiles going off and some would have nuclear warheads.”

Yesterday’s multiplicity of rockets, launched from 13 different sites, would – if fired for real – present huge challenges to Seoul’s early-warning net.

Politically, the escalation advantage lies with North Korea.

Kim may lack the mighty resources of those nations arrayed against him, but is highly risk-tolerant. He is also a master of his own destiny, untrammeled by any of the alliance coordination or domestic political issues troubling his opposite numbers in Seoul, Tokyo or Washington.

South Korean President Yoon is being forced to crisis-manage the aftermath of the October 29 Halloween tragedy in which 156 young revelers died in a Seoul crowd crush. Many angry voices insist this was preventable, putting his government under pressure.

President Yoon Suk-yeol is under fire. Photo: AFP

Japanese Premier Fumio Kishida is similarly distracted by the aftermath of ex-prime minister Shinzo Abe’s assassination. The killing cast a harsh light on the ties between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Unification Church, which many consider a cult.

And in Washington, the Joe Biden administration, neck deep in Ukraine, is glued to domestic politics as mid-term elections loom.

If – as pundits have been predicting for months – North Korea tests a nuclear device, potentially its seventh – tensions will rise yet further.

“It’s hard to see de-escalation,” O’Carroll fretted.

Hopes vs reality

Perhaps. But on October 28 a US official made a remarkable, if underpublicized, statement. Given that Seoul’s Halloween disaster followed the next day, her statement was drowned out in breaking news.

Speaking at the 2022 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins said Washington would not refuse talks with Kim if he asked for arms reduction negotiations.

If that view is held by the Biden administration – which is not clear – it signals a significant change.

Unwavering US prioritization of North Korean denuclearization has long been a stumbling block in talks. Among the North Korean punditry, it is difficult to find anyone who believes Pyongyang will ever give up its nuclear “sacred sword.” Optimists believe that only if the US ditches denuclearization and pivots to arms control can progress be made.

That makes Jenkins’ statment noteworthy. But even if US thinking and policy are shifting, it is questionable whether either Pyongyang or Washington could enter related negotiations in good faith.

“North Korea pushes arms control talks, as they would acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state,” said Go Myong-hyun, a fellow at the Asan Institute think tank in Seoul. “The problem is, this approach would eliminate the US as an external enemy – and a pillar of the regime’s justification for its existence is enmity against the US.”

South Korean and American flags fly next to each other at Yongin, South Korea, August 23, 2016. Photo: Ken Scar / US Army / Handout

Across the Pacific, not only would ditching denuclearization be a tough sell to the general public, a law exists that may make it politically impossible.

“We have a history of the US and North Korea trying out different negotiating tracks, but there are political constraints in the US that are registered in law,” Go told Asia Times, citing the 2016 North Korean Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act.

Before sanctions are lifted, the Act demands that North Korea show progress in areas including dismantling its WMD and releasing political prisoners – demands it is highly unlikely the regime would countenance.

Follow this writer on Twitter @ASalmonSeoul

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · November 3, 2022

8. S. Korea scrambles some 80 fighter jets after 180 N.K. warplane activities detected

Probably overkill on the part of South Korea. If the north Korean aircraft were to cross into South Korean airspace there would be a lot of South Korean Air Force fighter pilots who would quickly become aces. The nNKPAF is no match for South Korean or allied air power.

(LEAD) S. Korea scrambles some 80 fighter jets after 180 N.K. warplane activities detected | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · November 4, 2022

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with details throughout)

SEOUL, Nov. 4 (Yonhap) -- South Korea scrambled dozens of stealth fighter jets and other warplanes Friday after detecting more than 180 North Korean military aircraft activities in various locations via radar, Seoul's defense authorities said.

The North's planes, including fighters and bombers, were spotted flying between around 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. over its inland areas as well as off the western and eastern coasts without approaching close to the inter-Korean border, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The bombers conducted air-to-ground firing.

In response, the South's Air Force mobilized some 80 fighter jets, including F-35As, in line with full response posture, added the JCS. It is trying to confirm the exact number of North Korean aircraft mobilized.

The North has been fiercely protesting the ongoing combined air drills of South Korea and the United States, called Vigilant Storm.

South Korea and the U.S. were scheduled to end the five-day Vigilant Storm practice on Friday, with around 240 aircraft, including F-35 stealth fighter jets, mobilized around the Korean Peninsula. But they decided to extend it in response to North Korea's firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Thursday.

The North accused the allies of pushing the regional security to an "uncontrollable" stage by extending the practice.

"Our military is maintaining a firm readiness posture for further provocations while closely monitoring the North Korean military's related movements under close cooperation between South Korea and the United States," the JCS said.

Last month, a group of 12 North Korean military aircraft were spotted flying south of a special reconnaissance line set by South Korea. Seoul then scrambled military aircraft, including F-35A fighter jets, in response.

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · November 4, 2022

9. N. Korea fires 3 short-range ballistic missiles toward East Sea: S. Korean military

Everyone take a deep breath.  Keep calm and carry on - which means continue to conduct alliance readiness exercises to ensure readiness and demonstrate strength and resolve.

But we are seeing no reports of any kind of mobilization or preparations for war by the nKPA.  The regime's activities are in support of its political warfare and backlamil diplomacy strategies while developing advanced warfighting capabilities to support military operations in the future. But we are seeing no reports of any preparation for war. We must not play into Kim's hands by showing fear of his activities or backing down and giving into his attempts to exhort concessions and sanctions relief. This will never end if we appease Kim in any way.

(2nd LD) N. Korea fires 3 short-range ballistic missiles toward East Sea: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 4, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with additional information in paras 3-4; CHANGES dateline)

SEOUL, Nov. 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired three more short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea Thursday night, the South Korean military said, about an hour after Pyongyang slammed Seoul and Washington's decision to extend joint air drills as a "very dangerous and wrong choice."

The missiles were launched from Koksan County in North Hwanghae Province at around 9:35 p.m., according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The JCS later said the North Korean missiles flew some 490 kilometers at apogees of some 130 kilometer at a top speech of Mach 6.

North Korea also fired some 80 artillery shells from around 11:30 p.m. Thursday into the military buffer zone in the East Sea, violating the 2018 agreement with South Korea designed to reduce military tension, according to the JCS.

Earlier in the day, the North fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and two short-range ballistic missiles.

The late night missile launch came less than an hour after Pak Jong-chon, secretary of the Central Committee of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, released a statement denouncing South Korea and the U.S.'s earlier decision to extend the Vigilant Storm air drills that commenced on Monday.

"The irresponsible decision of the U.S. and South Korea is shoving the present situation caused by provocative military acts of the allied forces to an uncontrollable phase," he said in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency. "It is a very dangerous and false choice."

The missile launches are the North's apparent protest against Vigilant Storm, the allies' massive joint air drills involving more than 240 aircraft, including stealth jets, over the skies of the peninsula amid growing speculation that Pyongyang may conduct a nuclear test soon.

After the ICBM firing, South Korea's military announced that the air exercise will be extended, but did not provide details on the extension of the drills.

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 4, 2022​

10. U.S. offers $5 mln reward for arrest of Singaporean businessman helping N. Korea evade sanctions

Much more still needs to be done.

Excerpts:

"As alleged, Kwek and his co-conspirators sought to obscure their activities by conducting financial transactions through a series of shell companies based in Panama, Singapore and other locations," Houston told a press briefing organized by the Washington Foreign Press Center.

...

"North Korea employs a wide range of proliferation networks ... to collect revenue from overseas operations to support the WMD program, including a ballistic missile program," Suarez told the press briefing.

U.S. offers $5 mln reward for arrest of Singaporean businessman helping N. Korea evade sanctions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 4, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 3 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Thursday announced a reward of up to US$5 million for information that leads to the arrest of a Singaporean national who is suspected of engaging in illegal transfers of oil and luxury goods to North Korea.

The Singaporean, identified as Kwek Kee Seng, is the director of a Singapore-based shipping agency who is suspected of being engaged in an "extensive scheme" to evade U.S. and U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, according to Paul Houston, deputy assistant secretary and assistant director of the Diplomatic Security Service for Threat Investigation and Analysis.

"As alleged, Kwek and his co-conspirators sought to obscure their activities by conducting financial transactions through a series of shell companies based in Panama, Singapore and other locations," Houston told a press briefing organized by the Washington Foreign Press Center.

He added that Kwek is alleged to be involved in illicit ship-to-ship and direct transfers of refined petroleum products to North Korea, noting the North has violated the 500,000 barrels-per-year limit under U.N. Security Council resolutions each year.

The deputy assistant secretary of state also noted the District Court of the Southern District of New York issued a warrant for Kwek's arrest in April 2021, but that he remains at large.

Gonzalo Suarez, deputy assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, highlighted the need to disrupt North Korea's illicit activities that help fund its illegal weapons programs.

"North Korea employs a wide range of proliferation networks ... to collect revenue from overseas operations to support the WMD program, including a ballistic missile program," Suarez told the press briefing.

The announcement of the reward program follows a record number of missile launches by North Korea this year.

Pyongyang fired a number of ballistic missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile, on Thursday (Seoul time).

Suarez said the latest missile launches brought the total number of ballistic missiles fired by the North this year to "over 50."

"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a country of major concern when it comes to proliferation," he said, referring to North Korea by its official name. " As many of you are likely aware, the DPRK is continuing its unprecedented pace, scale and scope of ballistic missile launches this year."

"Addressing the DPRK's unlawful weapons program is necessary to uphold the global nonproliferation regime," added Suarez.

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby earlier said the North is trying to covertly deliver "a significant number" of artillery shells to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine.

"We must let proliferators know that they will be held accountable for their actions and that we will do everything we can to impede their efforts," Suarez said.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 4, 2022

11. Why Biden isn’t changing course on North Korea

No one offers any substantive policy and strategy changes. If you want to pressure the regime you must do more than be a one trick pony with sanctions and you must not appease the regime (not ever). You need a massive information and influence program and a human rights upfront approach to really exert pressure and affect change.

But you must also look beyond the symptoms of the problem (e.g., nuclear weapons and missiles) and get to the source - you must solve the "Korea question" - the unnatural division of the peninsula.

The Bidena and Yoon administrations are laying a great foundation of military readiness and strength and resolve. Now is the time to overlay a longer term and broaders strategy that consists of three lines of effort: a human right upfront approach, an information and influence activities campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

Why Biden isn’t changing course on North Korea

Politico · by Alexander Ward · November 3, 2022

With help from Nahal Toosi, Lee Hudson and Daniel Lippman

President JOE BIDEN’s strategy for North Korea isn’t getting traction in Pyongyang. But it’s unclear any other approach would prove more successful.

U.S. officials have said they would meet with their North Korean counterparts anywhere, including in Pyongyang — and without preconditions — to talk through a slew of nuclear and non-nuclear issues. At the same time, Washington has improved relations with its regional allies in Seoul and Tokyo and resumed joint military drills that were downsized during the Trump years.

It’s an approach that borrows both from BARACK OBAMA’s “strategic patience” and DONALD TRUMP’s summit-level diplomacy with North Korean leader KIM JONG UN.

The problem is North Korea hasn’t responded positively to Biden’s play. Instead, Pyongyang broke the yearly and daily records for missile tests and is expected to conduct a seventh nuclear detonation in the coming weeks. In the most recent barrage Wednesday, Kim ordered an intercontinental ballistic missile launch that drew condemnations from the U.S. and its allies.

A senior administration official, granted anonymity to speak about sensitive internal discussions, told NatSec Daily on Thursday that “we’re looking at potential additional measures to hold the DPRK accountable.” The official used the acronym for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Hours later, during a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Defense Secretary LLOYD AUSTIN said any nuclear attack by North Korea on the U.S. or its allies “will result in the end of the Kim regime.”

The question is if those punishments and threats will stop North Korea from firing off more projectiles. “Kim Jong Un isn’t ready to talk. He has a checklist of weapons he wants to perfect first,” said Wilson Center Fellow JEAN LEE, the former Pyongyang bureau chief for the Associated Press.

For now, Biden administration officials say there’s no need to change course, a different senior administration official told NatSec Daily on Tuesday. North Korea “is a profoundly difficult policy challenge,” the official said. “We are not in any kind of place that we'd like to be on it. But the alternatives are far worse for the United States and for our allies and partners and for global norms.”

That hasn’t stopped former officials and experts from offering ideas of how to shake up the strategy.

ANTHONY RUGGIERO, who worked on North Korea in Trump’s National Security Council, said Biden’s team should rekindle the sanctions regime that has atrophied since 2018. That would both help the long-term goal of denuclearization while in the short term starve Kim of finances for his arsenal.

“The main issue is North Korea is constantly adapting to the sanctions. If the U.S. does not respond then the sanctions are not as powerful,” Ruggiero said.

North Korea, however, is the fourth-most sanctioned country on Earth, and still built a dangerous nuclear program amid the pressure.

Ruggiero, though, is confident North Korea can be brought to heel if put under even more economic strain. “U.S. sanctions are stronger than U.N. sanctions which were whatever China would accept. The best the U.S. will get in the U.N. Security Council now is the designation of North Korean companies, banks, vessels and individuals. The Biden team should use that diplomatic capital to implement U.S. sanctions,” he said.

Others suggest isolation and deterrence don’t work. Washington and Seoul could ramp down their exercises again, said the U.S. Institute of Peace’s FRANK AUM. And then, once tensions have lowered, move toward “a more full-throated peace offensive that offers unilateral conciliatory gestures to get North Korea to reciprocate.”

Per Aum, that could include a moratorium on strategic-asset deployments, declaring an official end to the Korean War, reciprocal sanctions relief for denuclearization measures and ending a ban on U.S. citizens traveling to North Korea.

But previous diplomatic agreements with North Korea ultimately failed. And Trump’s efforts to deal with Kim directly also didn’t work as three face-to-face meetings never produced a true pathway to denuclearization.

This is why some experts say the only thing left to do is recognize North Korea as a nuclear state and improve relations where possible. The Biden administration and most experts reject that proposal, though, because they say it would incentivize other nations to get the bomb and allies would reject such a policy shift. It’s also unclear if North Korea would quit its provocations; it could just as easily decide it has the green light to do whatever it wants.

12. Defense & National Security–US, South Korea issue stern warning to Kim Jong Un

Key points that need to be transmitted to Kim:

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking to reporters following a meeting with South Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup at the Pentagon, said the nations decided to extend Vigilant Storm “to further bolster our readiness and interoperability.” He added that the two will “continue to work closely together to develop options to protect the United States and our allies in the region.”

An extreme warning: And Lee threatened that should Kim use any use nuclear weapons against the South or other allies in the region such as Japan, it would “result in the end of Kim Jong Un regime by the overwhelming and decisive response of the Alliance.”

Defense & National Security–US, South Korea issue stern warning to Kim Jong Un

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/overnights/3718960-defense-national-security-us-south-korea-issue-stern-warning-to-kim-jong-un/

BY ELLEN MITCHELL - 11/03/22 10:30 PM ET

AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

A South Korean army soldier passes by a TV screen showing a file image of North Korea’s missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2022.

The United States and South Korea have decided to extend military exercises in response to a recent spate of missile launches from North Korea, offering stern warnings for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un should he hold a nuclear test.

We’ll chat Washington and Seoul’s message to Pyongyang and defense steps the two counties are taking, plus fears of a Russian trap in Kherson and lawmakers make a trip to Ukraine to show broad Congressional support.

This is Defense & National Security, your nightly guide to the latest developments at the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill and beyond. For The Hill, I’m Ellen Mitchell. A friend forward this newsletter to you? Subscribe here.

US, South Korea extend response to North’s missiles

The United States and South Korea have decided to extend Vigilant Storm joint military air drills after North Korea late Wednesday launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with additional missile launches early Thursday.

The U.S.-South Korea war games, which began on Monday, had been scheduled to end on Friday and include some 240 fighter jets and other aircraft holding more than 1,600 flights. Officials did not say how long the drills would be extended.

In development: Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking to reporters following a meeting with South Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-sup at the Pentagon, said the nations decided to extend Vigilant Storm “to further bolster our readiness and interoperability.” He added that the two will “continue to work closely together to develop options to protect the United States and our allies in the region.”

An extreme warning: And Lee threatened that should Kim use any use nuclear weapons against the South or other allies in the region such as Japan, it would “result in the end of Kim Jong Un regime by the overwhelming and decisive response of the Alliance.”

Earlier: The North Korean missile launches are the latest in a string of similar actions, including the firing of 23 missiles on Wednesday, including one that landed off the coast of South Korea for the first time, after testing several throughout the month of October.

Washington and Seoul have condemned the launches, with the Biden administration pressing countries to enforce sanctions on Pyongyang for violating United Nations Security Council resolutions that ban the isolated nation from holding missile and nuclear tests.

A strategy change?: Asked whether the U.S. needs to adjust its strategy in response to an increasingly bellicose North Korea, Austin would only say that Washington will implement a larger U.S. military rotational presence in South Korea.

“We don’t have a plan to change our permanent positioning or staging of assets on the [peninsula] currently,” he said. “But you’ll see assets move in and out on a routine basis.”

Read the rest here

13. S. Korea, U.S. codify 4 categories of 'extended deterrence' cooperation against N.K. nuke threats

Excerpts:

Extended deterrence means America's stated commitment to mobilizing a full range of its military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, to defend its ally under attack.

Public angst over the North's nuclear threats has deepened as the recalcitrant regime has been pushing to develop tactical nuclear weapons and secure diverse, survivable launch platforms under an aggressive nuclear policy that leaves open the possibility of preemptive strikes.

Concerns also lingered that Pyongyang's push to develop long-range missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland could make Washington dither on whether to come to the aid of South Korea should it be attacked.

Against this backdrop, Seoul has been pushing to have a say in the process of the U.S. planning and executing Washington's deterrence procedures, including the potential employment of nuclear arms.

Apparently mindful of security concerns in the South, Austin highlighted the U.S.' security commitment.

"At this time of heightened tensions, our alliance is ironclad," he said. "The U.S. remains fully committed to the defense of the ROK and our extended deterrence commitment is firm, which includes a full range of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.

(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. codify 4 categories of 'extended deterrence' cooperation against N.K. nuke threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 4, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 4, 10-18)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Nov. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed Thursday on specific categories of "extended deterrence" cooperation against North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats, in a move to fortify the credibility of America's security commitment to its Asian ally.

Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, reached the agreement at their annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at the Pentagon amid worries that Pyongyang is ready for a fresh nuclear test that will further compound security challenges facing the allies.

In the joint SCM communique, the two sides spelled out the four linear categories -- information sharing, consultation process, joint planning and execution -- in a decision that would pave the way for Seoul's involvement in those areas, where its role has largely been limited or absent.

In his opening remarks, Lee said that he and Austin agreed to reinforce the alliance's capabilities and posture in each category so as to "effectively deter ad respond to advancing North Korean nuclear and missile threats."

The SCM document sets the tone for the allies' defense collaboration amid calls in South Korea for Seoul to pursue a nuclear sharing arrangement akin to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other measures to ensure the U.S. adheres to its extended deterrence pledge.

Extended deterrence means America's stated commitment to mobilizing a full range of its military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, to defend its ally under attack.

Public angst over the North's nuclear threats has deepened as the recalcitrant regime has been pushing to develop tactical nuclear weapons and secure diverse, survivable launch platforms under an aggressive nuclear policy that leaves open the possibility of preemptive strikes.

Concerns also lingered that Pyongyang's push to develop long-range missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland could make Washington dither on whether to come to the aid of South Korea should it be attacked.

Against this backdrop, Seoul has been pushing to have a say in the process of the U.S. planning and executing Washington's deterrence procedures, including the potential employment of nuclear arms.

Apparently mindful of security concerns in the South, Austin highlighted the U.S.' security commitment.

"At this time of heightened tensions, our alliance is ironclad," he said. "The U.S. remains fully committed to the defense of the ROK and our extended deterrence commitment is firm, which includes a full range of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.

ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea."

Austin also said that "any nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies and partners, including the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim Jong-un regime," according to the communique.

Touching on the deployment of U.S. strategic military assets, Lee said that Austin agreed on increasing the frequency and intensity of the deployment of such assets to and around the peninsula to create the effect similar to that of permanently stationing them in Korea.

The SCM document also includes the defense chiefs' agreement to work together to complete ongoing work to revise the allies' "tailored deterrence strategy (TDS)" ahead of next year's SCM.

Adopted in 2013, the allies' tailored deterrence strategy (TDS) is designed to cope with growing threats from the North's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, Lee and Austin pledged to conduct annual table top exercises based on a North Korean nuclear use scenario.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 4, 2022

14. N.Korea's Provocations Are Getting out of Hand

The conclusion brings up the key dilemma. The paradox is that the only way to disprove the notion that the US will not respond to an attack may be for an actual attack to take place so the US can respond. We are using all the right words and taking all the appropriate actions up to and including show of force but if Kim thinks he can attack without fear of a response we are ceding the initiative to him and providing him with freedom of action.

Conclusion:

The South Korean military fired three air-to-surface missiles north of the NLL in response, but North Korea will not cease its provocations and the situation may well get worse. South Korea must not be caught off guard again as it was by the torpedo attack on the Navy corvette Cheonan in 2010. North Korea's belligerence is now backed by confidence in its nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang seems to believe that the U.S. would hesitate to launch an attack, so the government must think hard how to eliminate this fatal weakness in national security.

N.Korea's Provocations Are Getting out of Hand

english.chosun.com

November 03, 2022 12:37

North Korea fired 25 missiles into the East and West seas on Wednesday and another three ballistic missiles into the East Sea on Thursday. One of Wednesday's missiles flew toward Ulleung Island and landed 26 km south of the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border with South Korea. It was the first time since the 1950-53 Korean War that the North targeted an area south of the border. What is worrisome is that there are no anti-missile batteries on Ulleung Island, where locals scurried for shelter when the air-raid warning sounded.

Shortly before Wednesday's provocation, the North’s top military officer lambasted South Korea and the U.S. for conducting massive aerial drills and warned that the allies would "pay a horrible price." North Korea also fired around 100 artillery shells into a buffer zone in the East Sea that was created under a cross-border military agreement in 2018 to ease tensions.

North Korea's provocations are growing increasingly threatening and belligerent. In September it fired a missile that flew exactly the same distance a U.S. aircraft carrier sailed before it docked in Busan at the time. The North also startled observers by launching a ballistic missile from under a reservoir. Last month it fired a ballistic missile over Japan, scrambled 150 fighter jets and lobbed hundreds of artillery rounds into buffer zones in the East and West seas, and a North Korean vessel crossed over the NLL near Baeknyeong Island and fired around a dozen artillery shells.

North Korea is attempting to rattle the South by resorting to unexpected provocations. It could even fire a mid-range ballistic missile over South Korean airspace, triggering a nationwide air-raid warning, or any missile over Baeknyeong or Yeonpyeong islands off its southwestern coast. North Korea leader Kim Jong-un is constantly looking for new ways to spark fear, confusion and chaos in South Korea. He is widely expected to conduct a seventh nuclear test.

The South Korean military fired three air-to-surface missiles north of the NLL in response, but North Korea will not cease its provocations and the situation may well get worse. South Korea must not be caught off guard again as it was by the torpedo attack on the Navy corvette Cheonan in 2010. North Korea's belligerence is now backed by confidence in its nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang seems to believe that the U.S. would hesitate to launch an attack, so the government must think hard how to eliminate this fatal weakness in national security.

Read this article in Korean

• Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com

15. Russia and North Korea are partners in sanctions-busting crime

Excerpts:

Although unilateral sanctions against Moscow have negatively affected North Korea’s ability to earn hard currency through Russia, Chinese actions have already caused problems for countries attempting to curb Russian aggression in Ukraine through sanctions. In light of this, China, North Korea and Russia could view sanctions-busting as an area for trilateral cooperation.

In the short term, the UN will continue to have a central role in questions over Korean security. This is largely because both Moscow and Pyongyang have used the cover of the UN to justify recent moves toward solidifying their relationship in contrast to international norms.

It is time to prepare for the greater use of unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang while bracing for the veritable collapse of multilateral punitive economic measures against the DPRK. However much North Korea and Russia may attempt to couch recent developments in their bilateral relationship in the legitimacy of the UN, Moscow has shown its hand. It can no longer be trusted to enforce punitive economic measures against North Korea in any meaningful sense.

Russia and North Korea are partners in sanctions-busting crime | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Anthony Rinna · November 4, 2022

Author: Anthony V Rinna, Sino-NK

The dissonance between the two conflict-ridden ends of Russia’s periphery continues to shrink as the situation in Ukraine exerts an increasing influence on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The development of North Korea–Russia relations since the beginning of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine suggests multilateralism aimed at curbing the security threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will come under increasing strain.

The strengthening of DPRK–Russia ties since the beginning of 2022 indicates that Russia may be shifting away from asserting compliance with the UN-based international sanctions regime against Pyongyang. Russia now seems in favour of explicitly violating UN sanctions as a matter of public policy.

The DPRK–Russia relationship had in recent years been amicable if somewhat distant before it ground to a halt due to North Korea’s stringent border closure in 2020. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brought an outpouring of support from Pyongyang for everything from the invasion itself to the annexation of Ukrainian territory. While UN member states overwhelmingly condemned Russia’s actions, North Korea has supported them. The Kremlin has since shown an increased willingness to violate UN sanctions against the DPRK.

Since North Korea and Russia vowed to strengthen ties in August 2022, members of the Russian government’s executive and legislative branches have engaged in open discussions over hiring large numbers of North Koreans to work in Russia. That would be a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2270.

The degree to which policymakers in Moscow have begun engaging openly in these conversations is notable. Well into its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government was still asserting that it abides by UN resolutions regarding sanctions against North Korea.

Prior to the annexation of additional Ukrainian land in September 2022, the Russian government argued that North Korean workers had the right to take employment in Donetsk and Luhansk due to those areas being, in Moscow’s view, independent, non-UN member states.

Such an assertion implies that Moscow still officially maintained the position that allowing them to work in Russia proper would be a violation of international law. The claim that Donetsk and Luhansk were independent states appears to have been a way for Moscow to sidestep the issue of allowing North Korean citizens to work in a Russian-occupied territory.

Still, none of this suggests Russia has made a sudden shift from sanctions compliance to malfeasance. Since the UN laid the latest round of sanctions against the DPRK five years ago, Russia has faced accusations that it has been sidestepping UN regulations governing fuel trade with the DPRK and hiring North Koreans for work purposes. The March 2022 report from the UN Panel of Experts for North Korea details an accredited North Korean diplomat in Moscow helping the DPRK acquire dual-use materials for its missile program.

The Kremlin has consistently responded to official accusations of sanctions violations — over issues ranging from energy sales to North Korean labourers — by denying such misdeeds. But current discourse in the upper rungs of the Russian government shows a willingness to drop any pretence of maintaining compliance over sanctions. So policymakers will need to prepare for the potential of sanctions violations on a larger and much more explicit scale than ever before.

North Korea and Russia are already under heavy economic sanctions from the United States, the European Union and some US allies in Asia. The most feasible response to North Korea’s security threats is to maintain and expand existing unilateral sanctions to cover all nodes of DPRK–Russia economic cooperation, as well as sanctions circumvention that may be fulfilled with Chinese assistance.

Attempts to counteract Russian moves to upend the multilateral sanctions regime against the DPRK will need to consider China’s role in that regard.

Washington may hold out hope that it can induce China to pull back in its relationship with Russia. After all, China has demonstrated greater willingness than Russia in the past to support UN sanctions against the DPRK. But China and Russia currently appear to be largely aligned in a common desire to upend sanctions against the DPRK, with Moscow taking the lead.

Although unilateral sanctions against Moscow have negatively affected North Korea’s ability to earn hard currency through Russia, Chinese actions have already caused problems for countries attempting to curb Russian aggression in Ukraine through sanctions. In light of this, China, North Korea and Russia could view sanctions-busting as an area for trilateral cooperation.

In the short term, the UN will continue to have a central role in questions over Korean security. This is largely because both Moscow and Pyongyang have used the cover of the UN to justify recent moves toward solidifying their relationship in contrast to international norms.

It is time to prepare for the greater use of unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang while bracing for the veritable collapse of multilateral punitive economic measures against the DPRK. However much North Korea and Russia may attempt to couch recent developments in their bilateral relationship in the legitimacy of the UN, Moscow has shown its hand. It can no longer be trusted to enforce punitive economic measures against North Korea in any meaningful sense.

Anthony V Rinna is Senior Editor at the Sino-NK research group.

eastasiaforum.org · by Anthony Rinna · November 4, 2022

16.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com