Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If a political party does not have its foundation in the determination to advance a cause that is right, and that is moral, then it is not a political party; it is merely a conspiracy to seize power."

– Dwight D Eisenhower

"Ideal conversation must be an exchange of thought, and not, as many of those who worry most about their shortcomings believe, an eloquent exhibition of wit or oratory."

– Emily Post

"Perhaps our national ambition to standardize ourselves has behind it the notion that democracy means standardization. But standardization is the surest way to destroy the initiative, to benumb the creative impulse above all else essential to the vitality and growth of democratic ideals."

– Ida M. Tarbell

1. Opinion | Trump’s New World Order

2. Trump Proclaims “Everlasting Peace” With China as Skeptics Wince

3. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is booming

4. Communist China's Transnational Repression

5. Hegseth Vows Stronger Ties With a Vietnam Skeptical of U.S. Commitment

6. Rare-Earth Magnet Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal With Trump Administration

7. Opinion | Taking Hostages Turned Out to Be Hamas’s Undoing

8. Exclusive | Trump Officials Torpedoed Nvidia’s Push to Export AI Chips to China

9. China Started Separating Its Economy From the West Years Ago

10. President Trump Deserves Better Advice

11. Why Is Trump Suddenly Talking About Invading Nigeria?

12. With Military Buildup Against Venezuela, the U.S. Eyes Cuba as Well

13. Making Multipolarity Work: How America Should Navigate a New Global Order

14. Hegseth Revisits Vietnam and Korea, Sites of America’s Two Bloodiest Wars Since World War II

15. Choices of a Higher Caliber: NATO, the US Army’s New Service Rifle, and Visions of Future Warfare

16. One + One = Zero? The Challenge of Battle Networks and Parallel Command Structures in a Bilateral Fight

17. Palantir Revenue Climbs to Another Record as Defense Work Booms

18. The Coming Wave: Chinese Doctrine on the Tabletop?

19. Proxy Armies and Principal–Agent Problems: A Review of Militias in Eastern Ukraine

20. Guerrilla Information War: McLuhan Was Right About World War III

21. Laura Loomer is now credentialed to cover the Pentagon

22. How “War” Becomes War: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Ours of Us

1. Opinion | Trump’s New World Order

Is POTUS' technique otherwise known as unconventional diplomacy?

Excerpt from Mead's OpEd:

Those who still think of Mr. Trump as a restrainer or isolationist should watch his “60 Minutes” interview. This president isn’t retreating from the world. He aims to reshape it.

Read the full transcript of Norah O'Donnell's interview with President Trump here.

November 2, 2025 / 7:32 PM EST / CBS News

Editor's note: On October 31, 2025, correspondent Norah O'Donnell spoke with President Donald J. Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, FL, and this is a transcript of that conversation. They started by discussing the president's recent meeting with China's President Xi Jinping.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/read-full-transcript-norah-odonnell-60-minutes-interview-with-president-trump/

Summary:

Walter Russell Mead argues President Trump is no isolationist but a global reshaper. His assertive actions from Venezuela to Asia, reflect a strategy to counter China, Russia, and Iran while restoring U.S. power. Trump’s activism mixes chaos with purpose: rebuilding trust at home, projecting dominance abroad, and redefining America’s world order on his terms.

Opinion | Trump’s New World Order

WSJ

If you think he’s an isolationist, you’re wrong. He aims to reshape the globe.

By Walter Russell Mead

Nov. 3, 2025 4:59 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trumps-new-world-order-8c258bb7

President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Oct. 30. Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

“On Venezuela in particular,” CBS News’s Norah O’Donnell asked President Trump on “60 Minutes” Sunday, “are Maduro’s days as president numbered?”

“I would say yeah. I think so, yeah,” he replied.

“And this issue of potential land strikes in Venezuela, is that true?”

“I don’t tell you that. . . . You know, you’re a wonderful reporter, you’re very talented, but I’m not gonna tell you what I’m gonna do with Venezuela, if I was gonna do it or if I wasn’t going to do it.”

And that’s where matters stand. With a carrier strike group joining eight warships already in the region, a squadron of F-35s in Puerto Rico, and assorted elite military units in the area, the Trump administration has ramped up its standoff with Venezuela. Regime change is clearly the goal; the timetable and means are unspecified.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

An Election Preview and the Emerging Antisemitism on the Right

New Wall Street Journal columnist Matt Continetti joins Paul Gigot to discuss what to look for in Tuesday's elections. Plus, what the fight over antisemitism reveals about the future of the MAGA movement and the GOP presidential race in 2028.Read Transcript

In normal times, a crisis of this magnitude would dominate world news, but in our era it struggles to stay on the front page. The Venezuela crisis escalated to the brink of war the same week Mr. Trump’s lightning Asia tour concluded with a summit with Xi Jinping. While senators such as Kentucky’s Rand Paul denounced what they called illegal American strikes against alleged drug-running boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, lawyers on both sides were prepping oral arguments for the historic Supreme Court showdown over the legality of Mr. Trump’s tariffs, which have upended world trade. Russian troops ground out more gains in Ukraine even as the air war between Kyiv and its nuclear-armed neighbor raged. Scenes of horror unfolded in Darfur as Sudan descended deeper into civil war. The fragile cease-fire in Gaza hung by a thread.

Meanwhile, on Truth Social, Mr. Trump threatened to attack Nigeria if that country doesn’t do a better job of protecting Christians.

Not since Franklin D. Roosevelt has an American president been this powerful or this busy. In his hyperactive second term, Mr. Trump doesn’t merely walk and chew gum at the same time. He dances on tightropes while juggling chainsaws. This blizzard of activity keeps him at the center of the world stage, throws his opponents off balance, makes it relatively easy to drown out failures in the flood of events, distracts attention from any conflicts of interest, and provides enough successes (real or apparent) to burnish his image.

But while the storm Mr. Trump unleashes is chaotic, there is a certain logic to his path. He really does believe that the U.S. is in trouble. From his perspective, stupid Democratic and Republican policies since the end of the Cold War have left the country divided and exposed to dangers overseas. A poorly designed globalization strategy hollowed out the middle class, gutted the defense industrial base, and fueled China’s rise. Clueless elites alienated Americans in pursuit of nonsensical utopian goals. An incompetent American foreign-policy cadre failed to win wars, advance democracy or build peace.

That leaves Mr. Trump with a difficult task. On the one hand, decades of failure, foolishness and shortsighted elite greed have eroded the trust between Americans and the political and administrative mandarins. On the other, the immense efforts required to address the internal challenges and the external threats to the U.S. can be mobilized only on the basis of renewed trust between the national government and the public at large.

Setting the domestic agenda aside, to build that trust and public support for the global struggle, Mr. Trump needs to educate his base without directly challenging some of their core beliefs. Venezuela is a godsend from this point of view. As a leading source of both drugs and illegal migrants, it represents the kind of threat that the Trump base most worries about. And even most isolationists applaud strong American action in the Western Hemisphere.

But Venezuela is also part of the global contest. During World War II and the Cold War, America focused on foreign rivals’ efforts to challenge Washington’s power in the hemisphere. Today, Russia, China and Iran are all active in Venezuela and seek to use the country as a base to undermine America’s regional position.

And there’s more. Venezuela’s proven oil reserves are larger than Saudi Arabia’s. Flipping Venezuela from the Axis of Revisionists to Team America would have lasting consequences on the global balance of power—and would reduce the ability of countries like Russia and Iran to use energy as a weapon against the U.S.

Those who still think of Mr. Trump as a restrainer or isolationist should watch his “60 Minutes” interview. This president isn’t retreating from the world. He aims to reshape it.

Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews WSJ Columnist Mary Anastasia O’Grady.

WSJ

2. Trump Proclaims “Everlasting Peace” With China as Skeptics Wince

So are we trying for a G2 (again)?

But I have to call out the error in the information below. James Jay Carafano was never a senior counselor to President Obama. I think the author's mistake is in reading the Heritage article and Dr. Carafano's bio - I believe the correct interpretation of this was that in 2014 he was senior counselor to the President of the Heritage Foundation, not POTUS.

Senior Counselor to the President and E.W. Richardson Fellow

James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges.

Excerpts:

Cyrus Janssen, a US business consultant, tweeted on November 2, “All the China Hawks are absolutely shocked by what’s happened the past week in US-China relations. Trump was so happy to meet with Xi, literally declaring the end of the unipolar world by stating it was a ‘G2 Meeting’ which means Trump now believes China is on the same level as the USA in terms of being a world superpower.”

In an article for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative US think tank, on January 6, 2014, James Jay Carafano, a senior counsellor to US President Barack Obama, argued G2 won’t work.

“The idea quickly died a natural death. And no wonder: there was a huge divide between the notion that the US and China could agree on how to solve the world’s problems,” Carafano wrote. “China is a mercantilist power in a globalized world. That inconsistency creates friction that can’t be greased over.”

Summary:

President Trump proclaimed “everlasting peace” with China after his Busan “G2” summit with Xi Jinping, calling it historic. Analysts dismissed it as a fragile truce restoring pre-September trade terms. Despite warm rhetoric and resumed defense talks, structural U.S.–China rivalries, tariffs, and Taiwan tensions remain unresolved beneath the temporary calm.

Trump Proclaims “Everlasting Peace” With China as Skeptics Wince

President ‘creates’ co-equal superpower by touting US-China “G2”

asiasentinel.com · Nov 03, 2025∙ Paid

By: Toh Han Shih

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/trump-proclaims-everlasting-peace-china-skeptics-wince?publication_id=23934&utm

White House photo

US President Donald Trump has spread uncertainty among diplomats and analysts in a November 1 tweet in which he referred to his October 30 APEC meeting with President Xi Jinping of China as a “G2” event, thus conferring great-power status on Beijing in the face of years of attempts by Washington to downplay the country’s rising standing.

“Even if nobody believes that the G2 order is emerging by agreement, Beijing must be pleased to be seen as an equal peer,” tweeted Sari Arho Havren, a China analyst, on October 31.

The fact that Trump and his War Secretary repeatedly mentioned G2 suggests Trump is taking seriously this concept of grouping the world’s two most powerful countries, a notion first mooted by US economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005. G2 talk occurred during the 2008 financial crisis, when US and European policymakers called on Beijing to shoulder greater responsibility for rescuing the global economy, according to an article in The Diplomat on October 31. The concept of G2 has been shelved since then, as relations between the US and China deteriorated.

Trump’s hyperbole over the summit meeting with President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, which he rated as “12 out of 10” in importance, also led him to describe it as likely to “lead to everlasting peace and success.”

Others greeted with skepticism the proclamation of “everlasting peace” with the superpower he called a “strategic competitor” during his first presidency. The accord seems more of a “temporary truce” between the world’s two largest economies, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong told Singapore media on November 1.

Wong said it was a “relief” that the meeting between Xi and Trump went well, providing some stability for the global economy, but said the fundamental rivalry and the structural issues between the two superpowers remain unresolved.

Nonetheless, after the abbreviated meeting, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth tweeted, “I just spoke to President Trump, and we agree – the relationship between the United States and China has never been better. Following President Trump’s historic meeting with Chairman Xi in South Korea, I had an equally positive meeting with my counterpart, China’s Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun, in Malaysia. And we spoke again last night. The Admiral and I agree that peace, stability, and good relations are the best path for our two great and strong countries.

“As President Trump said, his historic ‘G2 meeting’ set the tone for everlasting peace and success for the US and China. The Department of War will do the same – peace through strength, mutual respect, and positive relations. Admiral Dong and I also agreed that we should set up military-to-military channels to deconflict and de-escalate any problems that arise. We have more meetings on that coming soon.”

Lye Morris, a senior fellow of the Asia Society Policy Institute, tweeted on November 2 that it was “very rare” for the US War Secretary to speak with the Chinese Defense Minister twice in three days. “Sounds like US-China defense dialogues are back on track, with DPCTs (Defense Policy Coordination Talks between China and US) likely coming up soon,” Morris said

A former World Bank official told Asia Sentinel the event produced not “everlasting peace” between China and the US, but “peace until next year’s negotiations.” Trump’s tweets of “everlasting peace” between the two superpowers were “only meant to calm markets and avoid Cold War rhetoric,” he said, “and to paint recent events as successful. Successful negotiation is buying time to improve leverage.”

Oh Ei Sun, principal adviser of Pacific Research Centre of Malaysia, told Asia Sentinel, “At best, it represents Trump’s latest sentiments vis-à-vis China at this moment. It may change at any moment depending on the respective acts and words evinced by either side.”

On November 2, US Treasury Scott Bessent told Fox News that the Trump administration is prepared to raise tariffs on Chinese goods if Beijing continues blocking China’s rare earth exports to the US, a threat that came one day after the White House announced the deal which Trump struck with Xi in Busan. The terms include the US suspending for one year US fees on Chinese ships calling on US ports and tariffs on certain Chinese goods.

The US will also lower tariffs on Chinese imports imposed to curb fentanyl flows into the US by 10 percentage points starting November 10. In return, China agreed not to impose retaliatory trade measures against the US.

“A few modest agreements were reached that roll back the tit-for-tat measures that both sides have taken in the past two months. The result returns the two countries to the pre-September status quo ante on trade and marks a fragile truce in their trade war,” said a report by GMF Indo-Pacific, a US think tank, authored by its managing director Bonnie Glaser on October 30.

Trump said Xi had assured him that China would not unify Taiwan with the mainland for the remainder of his presidency, which ends in January 2029, the US leader said in an interview with CBS on November 2. When asked if he would order US forces to defend Taiwan if China invaded the island, Trump replied, “You’ll find out if it happens, and he (Xi) understands the answer to that.”

Trump and Hegseth’s tweets on G2, dated November 1 and November 2 respectively, came days after October 30 when Trump tweeted, “The G2 will be convening shortly!” At a press conference of China’s Foreign Ministry in Beijing on October 31, when asked by a reporter about Trump’s mention of G2, the ministry’s spokesman Guo Jiakun replied that China and the US could “jointly shoulder their responsibility as major countries” and work together to accomplish “more great and concrete things for the good of our two countries and the whole world.”

However, Guo qualified, “China follows an independent foreign policy of peace… China will forever stand together with fellow developing countries. China will continue to practice true multilateralism and work with other countries to uphold the multilateral trading system.”

Neil Thomas, a fellow of the Asia Society, tweeted on October 30, “Xi is finally getting the ‘new type of great power relations’ that he sought between China and the United States when he first took office in 2012. Trump deals with China as a fellow superpower and respects Xi’s status as a powerful leader on the world stage.”

“But the two sides have not resolved the fundamental economic and technological conflicts that underpin US-China strategic competition. I don’t think it’s all plain sailing ahead,” Thomas warned.

Tom Wright, a senior Brookings Institution fellow of the US think tank, commented in a tweet on October 30, “For years, US allies and partners in the Indo Pacific have worried about a US-China G2. Here, the president is embracing it.”

Cyrus Janssen, a US business consultant, tweeted on November 2, “All the China Hawks are absolutely shocked by what’s happened the past week in US-China relations. Trump was so happy to meet with Xi, literally declaring the end of the unipolar world by stating it was a ‘G2 Meeting’ which means Trump now believes China is on the same level as the USA in terms of being a world superpower.”

In an article for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative US think tank, on January 6, 2014, James Jay Carafano, a senior counsellor to US President Barack Obama, argued G2 won’t work.

“The idea quickly died a natural death. And no wonder: there was a huge divide between the notion that the US and China could agree on how to solve the world’s problems,” Carafano wrote. “China is a mercantilist power in a globalized world. That inconsistency creates friction that can’t be greased over.”

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong and a regulator contributor to Asia Sentinel

asiasentinel.com · Nov 03, 2025∙ Paid

3. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is booming

What is the best way to compete with One Belt One Road?

•What is the resistance potential against OBOR?

•Is it supportable and exploitable?

•Adapted resistance concepts – resist PRC/CCP malign influence, wolf and debt trap diplomacy? – Chinese PMCs?

•How to develop a supporting campaign plan to support the new US Strategic Approach to China;

•Promoting American Prosperity

•Advancing American Influence

•Preserving Peace Through Strength.

•US Strategic Approach to China: (New NSS and NDS?)

•How to Support the GEC? (If we still had it)

•Information and Influence Activities

•How to Support State?

•Blue Dot Network

•Economic Prosperity Network

Excerpts:

There are also risks for China. Just as rich countries worry about the harm to their industries caused by a flood of cheap goods from China, so members of the global south have misgivings too. Many BRI countries are seeing their trade deficits with China widen. Protectionist mutterings are growing louder in both Africa and South-East Asia. Reckless Chinese lending in earlier years leaves a sting, too. A report in May by the Lowy Institute, a think-tank in Sydney, said China had “transitioned from capital provider to net financial drain” on developing-country budgets, as debt-servicing costs on belt-and-road projects in the 2010s now “far outstrip new loan disbursements”. The institute warned that these repayments could mean rising vulnerability to debt in many countries, especially in Africa. Key spending priorities like health, education, reducing poverty and adapting to climate change all risk being crowded out.

Yet China knows that with these countries it has a captive audience. Some may quietly grumble about trade imbalances or debt, but the technology and construction skills offered by China are often hard to find elsewhere. China hopes such countries see little choice other than to support it in its desire to be the architect of an alternative world order. As a Communist Party journal recently put it, the BRI will help create “a new paradigm of global governance”. In a Trump-troubled world, Mr Xi sees opportunities still.

Summary:

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is booming again, surging to record investment levels exceeding $120 billion in 2024–25. Amid Trump’s renewed tariffs, Xi Jinping uses the BRI to expand trade with the global south and secure geopolitical influence, despite rising debt, protectionist backlash, and doubts about China’s economic sustainability.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is booming

The Economist · Nov 2nd 2025

https://www.economist.com/china/2025/11/02/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-booming

In a Trump-troubled world, China’s leader still sees opportunities in poor countries

CHINA’S LEADER, Xi Jinping, sees difficult times ahead. At a conclave of the Communist Party’s most senior officials that ended on October 23rd he warned that over the next five years the task of ensuring China’s development while maintaining its security would become “much harder” amid a “notable rise in uncertainties and unforeseen factors”. Mr Xi’s meeting a week later in South Korea with President Donald Trump produced an uneasy truce in the two countries’ fight over trade. But it will not have eased Mr Xi’s biggest headache: America. The cure for Trumpian instability, as he sees it, is an alternative order that draws the rest of the world closer into China’s orbit.

Enter the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Not so long ago, some analysts wondered whether China might wind down this colossal infrastructure-building scheme, to which most of the 130 or so poor or developing countries collectively known as the global south have signed up. Mr Xi launched the scheme in 2013, aiming to boost growth and trade by building ports, railways, power plants and so on (and to land big deals for Chinese state firms, which got many of the contracts). The BRI was soon beset by claims that it was crippling countries with debt and damaging the environment. China began scaling back its loans. Yet though BRI activity ebbed during the pandemic, it has picked up sharply since 2023, reaching record levels. It is also helping to stimulate trade between China and the global south, expanding markets for Chinese goods that Mr Trump’s tariffs are pricing out of America.

First, look at the trade numbers. America is still the single biggest destination for Chinese exports of goods. Yet its share of China’s shipments has fallen sharply since trade tensions soared during Mr Trump’s first term as president, from nearly 20% in the first nine months of 2018 to less than 12% in the same period this year. The global south is taking up the slack. Year-on-year exports to ten members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) grew by 15% in September, as they did to countries in Latin America. China’s exports to Africa jumped by nearly 57%. According to S&P Global, the global south took 44% of China’s exports in 2024, up from 35% in 2015. The financial-data firm reckons this group of countries also accounts for more than half of China’s global trade surplus. (America’s share of the surplus is 36%.)

Then consider BRI activities. These often involve projects that encourage trade. A Chinese factory built in a foreign country, for example, may rely on components or machinery shipped from China. It can thrive in local markets, or sometimes even in America’s by making goods appear to originate from a country other than China and thus evading China-related tariffs. In 2023, the first full year after China abandoned its long “zero-covid” policy, the total value of BRI investments and construction contracts was $92.4bn, according to a report by Christoph Nedopil of Griffith University in Australia in collaboration with the Green Finance and Development Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai (the report counts any Chinese state or private investment, as well as construction contracts, in countries that have joined the scheme as BRI “engagement”—China does not publish an official list of BRI projects). This was still below pre-covid levels, but a big rebound from the pandemic era (up from $74.5bn in 2022). In 2024 and 2025, BRI engagement surged. The rise of 30% in 2024, to nearly $122bn, was the largest increase in a single year in the history of the scheme. In the first half of this year the record was broken again, with more than $123bn of engagement, nearly double the same period in 2024, Mr Nedopil calculated.

In 2021, responding to widespread misgivings about the BRI, Mr Xi declared that it would shift to a new “small but beautiful” approach: less splurging on concrete-consuming infrastructure, and more spending on projects relating to health care, green energy, telecommunications and more; there would be no new Chinese investment abroad in coal-fired power. Yet in the past couple of years some BRI deals have been anything but small or beautiful. Of $39bn of BRI money directed to Africa in the first half of this year, a single deal accounted for nearly half: a $20bn contract awarded to a Chinese state firm for building oil and gas facilities in Nigeria. By value, fossil fuels now dominate in BRI-related energy projects. Another large slice has involved construction deals in Kazakhstan worth nearly $20bn involving copper and aluminium production.

Such megadeals involving state-owned companies mask another, more welcome trend, however: a surge in BRI activity, often involving non-state firms, in just the kinds of business that Mr Xi promised to encourage. Last year their overseas investments in solar, wind and waste-fuelled power amounted to $11.8bn. This 24% rise made it the greenest year in the BRI’s history, according to Mr Nedopil. Chinese firms poured in another $9.7bn in the first half of this year.

All this is not just a fillip for Chinese firms facing turbulence from Mr Trump’s tariffs. As Mr Xi sees it, the BRI pays geopolitical dividends too. Since 2013 it has involved more than $1.3trn of Chinese investments and contracts in 150 countries. China hopes that this money will encourage countries to back it in multinational forums, starting with the UN. For instance, 70-odd countries have already adopted language promoted by China that declares that “all efforts” should be made to achieve unification with Taiwan—implying that military force is acceptable. Most of these countries are signed up to the BRI.

There are also risks for China. Just as rich countries worry about the harm to their industries caused by a flood of cheap goods from China, so members of the global south have misgivings too. Many BRI countries are seeing their trade deficits with China widen. Protectionist mutterings are growing louder in both Africa and South-East Asia. Reckless Chinese lending in earlier years leaves a sting, too. A report in May by the Lowy Institute, a think-tank in Sydney, said China had “transitioned from capital provider to net financial drain” on developing-country budgets, as debt-servicing costs on belt-and-road projects in the 2010s now “far outstrip new loan disbursements”. The institute warned that these repayments could mean rising vulnerability to debt in many countries, especially in Africa. Key spending priorities like health, education, reducing poverty and adapting to climate change all risk being crowded out.

Yet China knows that with these countries it has a captive audience. Some may quietly grumble about trade imbalances or debt, but the technology and construction skills offered by China are often hard to find elsewhere. China hopes such countries see little choice other than to support it in its desire to be the architect of an alternative world order. As a Communist Party journal recently put it, the BRI will help create “a new paradigm of global governance”. In a Trump-troubled world, Mr Xi sees opportunities still. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

The Economist · Nov 2nd 2025

4. Communist China's Transnational Repression

I hate to keep beating this dead horse: My assessment is that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

Conclusion:

It is bad enough that the Chinese Communist Party actively violates the rights of its people every single day. While we are more limited in changing the situation in China, there is far more we can do to prevent CCP authoritarianism from coming to our own countries. Nations across the West and elsewhere need to be aware of the dangers of transnational repression and work to counter it.

Summary:

Matt Cookson warns that Nathan Law’s denied entry to Singapore shows China’s growing transnational repression—pressuring foreign states to silence dissidents abroad. The CCP uses secret police stations, surveillance, and diplomatic influence in countries like the UK and U.S. Cookson urges stronger Western resolve, legal safeguards, and coordinated international action to counter it.

Communist China's Transnational Repression

realclearworld.com · Matt Cookson

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2025/11/03/communist_chinas_transnational_repression_1144827.html

At the end of September, Hong Kong democracy activist Nathan Law was denied entry into Singapore. While no reason was given, Law’s denial, in all likelihood, was due to pressure from the Chinese communist party. Law’s denial is an example of the CCP’s transnational repression that the West needs to counter.

Nathan Law is from Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. After Britain returned Hong Kong to China, the city was promised a high degree of autonomy, including free markets, independent courts, and rights like freedom of speech. Unfortunately, Beijing has spent the past few decades eroding Hong Kong’s freedoms. This culminated in the National Security Law (NSL) in 2020, a law that criminalized all dissent as sedition. Hundreds of democracy advocates have been arrested under it, including Joshua Wong, Jimmy Lai, and many others.

Law was once elected to the Hong Kong Legislative Council but was disqualified due to issues with his loyalty oath. Since then, Law has been active in the Hong Kong democracy movement and eventually fled the city. Exile is not enough for the Hong Kong government, which has issued a bounty of $1,000,000 HK ($128,000 US) on Law. In response to the news of Law’s visa denial, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee demanded that Law return to Hong Kong to face justice for his alleged crimes.

Lee’s silence on the question of whether or not Hong Kong pressured Singapore to deny entry to Law is quite telling. While Singapore traditionally follows a policy of neutrality, it did approve Law’s visa to visit the country. The fact that it was then denied Law entry speaks to external pressure from either Hong Kong or mainland China.

CCP pressure isn’t limited to places like Singapore; they are also active in silencing dissidents in the West in what is known as transnational repression (TNR). In the United Kingdom, Chinese agents have been harassing and stalking members of the Chinese diaspora, including Hong Kong dissidents. The presence of Chinese police stations in the UK has raised questions about the ‘super embassy’ China is building in London. Activists fear the super embassy will be used to heighten the repression of Chinese dissidents in the UK.

These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that China submitted blueprints for the building with parts of the plans redacted. The fear is that the redacted sections will be used for espionage purposes, if not as a holding facility for dissidents. If China’s plans for the super embassy are innocuous, why not submit blueprints without redactions?

TNR isn’t just something our friends across the pond have to worry about; it’s happening in the US, too. Secret Chinese police stations are operating in US cities in an effort to silence dissidents. Numerous individuals have been arrested on charges of spying on critics of the Chinese government. Freedom of speech is at the core of our national identity, so allowing these censorship efforts is completely unacceptable.

What can be done to prevent China from exporting its authoritarianism to our shores? First, our leaders and policymakers need to make a fuss about this. China is counting on Western cowardice and desperation for trade to get away with TNR. If our leaders put principle first, we can take a stand against TNR and protect our freedom.

Second, intelligence agencies need to continue working with local law enforcement to prevent Chinese agents from silencing dissidents. The arrests made so far are a good start, but more needs to be done to make a difference. Increased awareness at the Department of Justice, updated legal protections, and more scrutiny for visa applicants are some of the reforms that are needed.

Finally, the State Department needs to be active in calling out other nations that succumb to Chinese pressure to silence dissent. Singapore is an independent nation, but that doesn’t mean the US can’t express its displeasure. If other countries are aware that the US is concerned about TNR, they will be more likely to counter it on their own. International cooperation via the Five Eyes and other alliances can help counter China’s transnational repression.

It is bad enough that the Chinese Communist Party actively violates the rights of its people every single day. While we are more limited in changing the situation in China, there is far more we can do to prevent CCP authoritarianism from coming to our own countries. Nations across the West and elsewhere need to be aware of the dangers of transnational repression and work to counter it.

Matt Cookson is an alumnus of the Young Voices Contributor Program and was a Middle East History and Policy Fellow with Young Voices. He also works in the supply chain for a U.S. Defense Contractor. X @MattCookson95 and Substack @thewaythecookiecrumbles.

realclearworld.com · Matt Cookson

5.Hegseth Vows Stronger Ties With a Vietnam Skeptical of U.S. Commitment

Summary:

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pledged $130 million to help Vietnam clean up Agent Orange toxins and locate missing soldiers, reassuring Hanoi of U.S. commitment despite earlier aid doubts. Emphasizing reconciliation and partnership, Hegseth lauded Vietnam’s modernization, accepted its multilateral defense ties, and vowed regional cooperation to deter China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Hegseth Vows Stronger Ties With a Vietnam Skeptical of U.S. Commitment

NY Times · Tung Ngo · November 4, 2025

By Damien Cave and Tung Ngo

Damien Cave reported from Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and Tung Ngo from Hanoi, Vietnam.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/03/world/asia/vietnam-war-hegseth-trip.html

LIVE See more updates from this story

Nov. 3, 2025, 8:35 p.m. ET33m ago

After months of uncertainty over U.S. aid, the defense secretary pledged that Washington would keep funding programs that help address the wounds of the Vietnam War.

Listen to this article · 4:18 min Learn more

The U.S. defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, on Sunday presenting Vietnam’s defense minister, Phan Van Giang, with a knife, belt and leather box taken by U.S. soldiers from a bunker outside Da Nang, Vietnam, during the war there, in 1968.Credit...Hau Dinh/Associated Press

By Damien Cave and

Damien Cave reported from Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and Tung Ngo from Hanoi, Vietnam.

Nov. 3, 2025, 6:51 a.m. ET

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth completed a two-day trip to Vietnam on Monday, seeking to reassure a wary partner with American promises to double down on joint efforts to address the wounds of the Vietnam War.

Mr. Hegseth said the United States would commit another round of funding, worth $130 million, to clean up leftover toxins from herbicides like Agent Orange, which are still causing birth defects decades after the American military used them to strip the jungle of foliage.

The United States also agreed to provide additional support for Vietnam’s efforts to find its own missing soldiers from the war with advanced DNA technology.

The future of both programs had been in doubt earlier this year. The Trump administration’s elimination of United States Agency for International Development spurred a long pause and layoffs. Even after some U.S. funding resumed, Vietnamese officials questioned America’s commitment. When the president’s tariff wars followed (Hanoi is still negotiating a final trade deal) skepticism about American reliability intensified.

Mr. Hegseth, during his visit, seemed eager to allay such concerns. He stressed that jointly tackling war legacy issues was a top priority and the foundation of a strong relationship.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Vietnam? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

To emphasize the point, at the end of his talks with Vietnam’s defense minister, Phan Van Giang, Mr. Hegseth handed over a knife, belt and a leather box that had been taken by U.S. soldiers from a Vietnamese bunker outside Da Nang in 1968.

Appealing to shared pain and healing, he highlighted how far the countries had come after re-establishing formal relations in 1995.

“In three decades, the U.S. and Vietnam have gone from enemies to partners — comprehensive strategic partners,” Mr. Hegseth said. “Our military relationship demonstrates our friendship and our cooperation.”

The defense secretary’s Vietnam stop — following meetings with other regional officials and before a trip to South Korea — did not include an expected announcement about new major military purchases.

Mr. Hegseth instead highlighted the recent delivery of three training aircraft from the U.S. Air Force and said, “The United States is committed to continuing this project and more.”

Vietnamese-made S-125-VT antiaircraft missile systems on parade in September during the celebration of Vietnam’s 80th National Day in Hanoi.Credit...Linh Pham for The New York Times

His visit came as Hanoi has reinvigorated its defense ties with Russia, buying planes and mobile air-defense systems, while exploring defense cooperation with partners as varied as Finland, Turkey, Israel and North Korea.

Mr. Hegseth seemed to signal an acceptance of that approach. The official U.S. summary of his visit said he “applauded Vietnam’s rapid military modernization and commended Vietnam’s commitment to defend its sovereignty and regional security.”

Washington is increasingly eager to see more countries become involved with security in the region, especially in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims nearly all of the area’s islands and commercial sea routes. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia are a few of the countries that reject China’s assertions and maintain their own claims.

On Friday, at a regional summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Mr. Hegseth announced a new task force with the Philippines to deepen military cooperation and safeguard the seas from sudden disruptions caused by conflict or contests for dominance.

“We will work relentlessly to re-establish deterrence in the South China Sea and advance our alliance,” he said in a statement.

Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, said that these regional security concerns are a major reason — more than the legacy of war — that the United States and Vietnam are trying to connect. The question is whether shared security interests will outweigh discontent on trade.

“The U.S. values its closer ties with Vietnam because of its strategic competition with China,” Mr. Vuving said. “Vietnam hopes its closer ties with the U.S. will greatly help its quest for security and prosperity.”

Zunaira Saieed contributed reporting from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Damien Cave leads The Times’s new bureau in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, covering shifts in power across Asia and the wider world.

Tung Ngo is a Times reporter and researcher based in Hanoi, Vietnam.

NY Times · Tung Ngo · November 4, 2025

6. Rare-Earth Magnet Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal With Trump Administration

A question: Who is controlling the means of production?

Summary:

Vulcan Elements and ReElement secured $1.4 billion to build a U.S. rare-earth magnet supply chain, reducing reliance on China. Vulcan gets a $620 million DoD loan, $50 million Commerce equity, plus private funds to reach 10,000 tons/year; ReElement receives $160 million for recycling. Government takes warrants. Supports defense, EVs, AI.

Rare-Earth Magnet Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal With Trump Administration

WSJ

By Heather Somerville

Updated Nov. 3, 2025 2:32 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/rare-earth-magnet-startups-seal-1-4-billion-deal-with-trump-administration-8184b9ae

The agreement with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies is a strong sign the Pentagon is intent on building a supply chain to reduce China’s control

Updated Nov. 3, 2025 2:32 pm ET

Rare-earth magnet flakes in a U.S. factory operated by MP Materials. Trevor Paulhus for WSJ

Two startups, Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies, secured $1.4 billion from the U.S. government and private investors to establish a domestic rare-earth magnet supply chain.
Vulcan Elements received a $620 million loan from the Defense Department and $50 million from the Commerce Department to build a magnet facility producing 10,000 metric tons annually.
The deal aims to reduce U.S. reliance on China for rare-earth magnets, essential for defense systems, electric vehicles, and AI data centers, with the government taking equity stakes.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Two startups, Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies, secured $1.4 billion from the U.S. government and private investors to establish a domestic rare-earth magnet supply chain.

Two startups aiming to produce an American supply of rare-earth magnets have sealed a $1.4 billion deal with the U.S. government and private investors. It is the latest sign that the Trump administration is moving to build out a domestic rare-earths supply chain and thwart China’s sector dominance—and willing to pay large sums for it.

Led by Vulcan Elements, the deal involves a $620 million loan from the Defense Department’s Office of Strategic Capital to build and operate a U.S. magnet facility capable of producing 10,000 metric tons of magnets each year, the company said Monday. The Commerce Department is chipping in $50 million and private investors are putting in another $550 million.

Rare-earth magnets are essential for the construction of motors needed in AI data centers, electric vehicles and consumer electronics as well as missiles, drones, satellites, ships, jet fighters and other defense systems. China has long dominated the supply chain, from mining to processing.

Also involved in the deal is ReElement Technologies, a company that works to purify and recycle rare-earth materials, which will help in the recycling of old magnets to boost domestic production. ReElement secured $160 million from the Office of Strategic Capital and private investors.

In return for the funding, the Raleigh, N.C.-based Vulcan said the Commerce Department will receive $50 million of its equity. The Defense Department will receive warrants in both Vulcan and ReElement; warrants offer the ability to buy stock at a preset price.

President Trump rated his highly anticipated sit down with Chinese leader Xi Jinping a 12 out of 10. WSJ’s Alexander Ward explains why. Photo: Yonhap/EPA/Shutterstock

It is a fresh move by the administration to take equity in private companies building technology that President Trump has given priority to. In July, MP Materials, the U.S.’s largest rare-earths miner, announced the Defense Department had taken a 15% stake. In August, the administration acquired a 10% stake in Intel. That followed a deal with AI chip makers Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices to take a 15% cut of their sales to China.

The deal marks a major boost for the newly formed Vulcan Elements, led by former Navy officer John Maslin, which in March unveiled its first commercial manufacturing facility. It announced a $65 million venture-capital raise this summer. The startup’s magnet production has received huge demand since China first implemented export curbs on rare earths and critical minerals essential to U.S. manufacturing and defense—and which are difficult or impossible to source elsewhere.

ReElements’s involvement in the deal shows the important role that rare-earth magnet recycling, rather than just mining, is going to play in supplying new factories in the U.S.

The Defense Department will get warrants, which let stock be bought at a preset price, in both Vulcan and ReElement. Joshua Roberts/Reuters

U.S. manufacturers and defense contractors have been scrambling for alternatives and the shortage has amplified the vulnerabilities of dependence on China for critical minerals since Beijing put strict export restrictions on them late last year, and followed with curbs on rare-earth magnet exports in April. American companies subsequently had to seek permission from Beijing and prove their products weren’t used in defense.

In recent days, China rolled back some of the curbs on rare-earth exports. After trade talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week, Trump said that the hostilities over rare earths “has been settled.”

Write to Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 4, 2025, print edition as 'Rare-Earth Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal'.

WSJ

7. Opinion | Taking Hostages Turned Out to Be Hamas’s Undoing

Excerpts:

Senior Hamas terrorist Mousa Abu Marzouk recently admitted that freeing the hostages would “remove Israel’s justification to continue the war.” In a recent interview to “60 Minutes,” U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said that the aim in negotiations was to show Hamas that the hostages were no longer assets to them but a liability.

By shattering the cycle that had shielded Hamas for two decades, the hostage-taking ironically gave Israel the time and space it needed to degrade the terrorist organization drastically and strike a deal that dictates Hamas’s dismantlement.

The job isn’t finished, but Israel stands stronger than ever, having risen from one of its darkest hours to one of its brightest. The lesson for genocidal organizations should be clear: Hostage-taking can backfire, leading to terrorists’ destruction.

Summary:

Ophir Falk argues Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 hostage-taking backfired, breaking its long-used strategy of provoking Israeli restraint. Holding civilians made global calls for a cease-fire untenable and unified support for Israel’s campaign. Trump’s peace plan and Netanyahu’s resolve exposed Hamas’s moral and strategic collapse, turning its psychological weapon into its undoing.

Opinion | Taking Hostages Turned Out to Be Hamas’s Undoing

WSJ

While the terror group was torturing Israeli civilians, its defenders in the West simply looked ridiculous.

Ophir Falk

Nov. 3, 2025 3:57 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/taking-hostages-turned-out-to-be-hamass-undoing-919eabcc

Hamas militants in Gaza City, Nov. 2. omar al-qattaa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

After slaughtering some 1,200 people on Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas dragged 251 hostages into Gaza. The terrorists apparently believed that the taking of hostages and accompanying psychological warfare would force Israel to capitulate and end the war, leaving Hamas victorious. Instead, the hostage crisis sealed Hamas’s fate.

For two decades following the folly of Israel’s ill-advised 2005 unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas perfected a cynical script: Launch rockets at Israeli civilians, provoke retaliation, use Gazan civilians as human shields, and wait for international pressure to force a cease-fire before Israel can achieve its military objectives. This pattern recurred in 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense and 2014’s Operation Protective Edge. Each time, initial global outrage against Hamas gave way to demands that Israel halt its operations. Each time, Hamas survived to fight again, emerging stronger and stronger.

Oct. 7 shattered this cycle. The hostage-taking transformed the moral landscape in ways Hamas failed to anticipate. While hostages remained in Gaza, it was no longer reasonable for international leaders to demand that Israel stop military operations. How could the world ask a nation to abandon its citizens to captivity while letting Hamas militants—the hostage-takers and torturers—continue to hold hostages and terrorize Israel?

True, a politicized battery of United Nations organizations engineered a massive disinformation campaign, demonizing Israel as it waged a just war by just means. And true, weak leaders in the U.K., France, Australia and Canada succumbed to local and international propaganda, demanding that Israel stop defending itself and rewarding Palestinian terrorism by recognizing a Palestinian state. That appeasement prevented an earlier hostage release deal and prolonged the war. It also exposed those leaders’ moral weakness, and it ultimately failed.

Instead, President Trump’s 20-point peace plan prevailed. It demanded the immediate release of the hostages and the dismantlement of Hamas—which will either be dismantled diplomatically or destroyed militarily.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted Mr. Trump’s plan, and many world leaders endorsed or welcomed it. Moral clarity, backed by soldiers’ bravery, overcame moral bankruptcy. Mr. Netanyahu was right when he said in a July 2024 speech before the U.S. Congress that “the war in Gaza could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders, disarms and returns all the hostages.” It took 15 months for many to realize that this was true. In the same speech, the prime minister warned that if Hamas didn’t lay down its arms and return the hostages, “Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and its rule in Gaza.”

Hamas’s refusal to take these actions exposed fatal contradictions in the group’s propaganda. Why not release the hostages and lay down arms to stop the war? The cognitive dissonance was difficult to explain.

During Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s state visit to Turkey last week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized Germany for supporting Israel. Mr. Merz unapologetically replied that his government has stood by Israel since the Oct. 7 atrocities. “Israel exercised its right to self-defense,” he said, “and it would have taken only one decision to avoid the countless unnecessary casualties: Hamas should have released the hostages earlier and laid down its arms.”

The hostage-taking prevented the conflict from dissolving into the traditional false narratives about “occupation,” “resistance” and “apartheid.” Despite strenuous efforts to turn reality on its head, including through bogus international lawfare, many saw the truth—innocent people being held hostage by a genocidal terrorist organization committed to murdering Jews.

Even Israel’s harshest critics struggled to argue that a nation should abandon its captive citizens. The hostage-taking provided what decades of legitimate Israeli grievances couldn’t: a broadly recognized imperative that eventually overcame the propaganda. The Palestinians’ greatest weapon—the ability to manipulate international sympathy—turned against them.

Senior Hamas terrorist Mousa Abu Marzouk recently admitted that freeing the hostages would “remove Israel’s justification to continue the war.” In a recent interview to “60 Minutes,” U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said that the aim in negotiations was to show Hamas that the hostages were no longer assets to them but a liability.

By shattering the cycle that had shielded Hamas for two decades, the hostage-taking ironically gave Israel the time and space it needed to degrade the terrorist organization drastically and strike a deal that dictates Hamas’s dismantlement.

The job isn’t finished, but Israel stands stronger than ever, having risen from one of its darkest hours to one of its brightest. The lesson for genocidal organizations should be clear: Hostage-taking can backfire, leading to terrorists’ destruction.

Mr. Falk is the foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and was a member of Israel’s hostage negotiation delegation.

Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Foundation for Defense of Democracies CEO Mark Dubowitz.

Appeared in the November 4, 2025, print edition as 'Taking Hostages Turned Out to Be Hamas’s Undoing'.

WSJ

8. Exclusive | Trump Officials Torpedoed Nvidia’s Push to Export AI Chips to China

Summary:

Before meeting Xi, President Trump, heeding aides including Marco Rubio, rejected Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang’s push to sell Blackwell AI chips to China and declined to raise it. Officials argued exports risked U.S. security. While exploring tariff concessions for rare-earths, the administration may allow a downgraded chip; Nvidia’s lobbying continues.

Exclusive | Trump Officials Torpedoed Nvidia’s Push to Export AI Chips to China

WSJ

By Lingling Wei, Amrith Ramkumar and Robbie Whelan

Updated Nov. 3, 2025 2:27 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-nvidia-china-chip-exports-51e00415?mod=hp_lead_pos1

President decided not to discuss matter with Xi after aides opposed company’s request

Updated Nov. 3, 2025 2:27 pm ET

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang speaks with President Trump often. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

President Trump decided against discussing the export of advanced Nvidia AI chips to China during his meeting with Xi Jinping.
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has lobbied to maintain access to the Chinese market for AI chips, estimating China has half of the world’s AI researchers.
The U.S. was preparing other concessions for China, including lowering some tariffs, in exchange for rare-earth magnet exports.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

President Trump decided against discussing the export of advanced Nvidia AI chips to China during his meeting with Xi Jinping.

Shortly before President Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in South Korea, an urgent issue emerged. Trump wanted to discuss a request by Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang to allow sales of a new generation of artificial-intelligence chips to China, current and former administration officials said.

Greenlighting the export of Nvidia’s Blackwell chips would be a seismic policy shift potentially giving China, the U.S.’s biggest geopolitical competitor, a technological accelerant. Huang—who speaks to Trump often—has lobbied relentlessly to maintain access to the Chinese market.

As they prepared to meet Xi, top officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Trump the sales would threaten national security, saying they would boost China’s AI data-center capabilities and backfire on the U.S., the officials said.

The U.S. was already preparing to make other concessions in the meeting with Xi, in exchange for Beijing allowing exports of rare-earth magnets. Others against the approval, the officials said, included U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who helped lead trade talks.

Faced with nearly unified opposition from his top advisers, Trump decided not to discuss the advanced Nvidia chips during his Oct. 30 meeting with Xi in Busan, South Korea, the officials said.

Trump’s ultimate decision marked a victory for Rubio and other Trump advisers over Huang, leader of the world’s most valuable public company. Exports of Blackwell chips to China are potentially worth tens of billions of dollars in sales and could help Nvidia keep Chinese AI companies hooked on Nvidia’s technology.

President Trump rated his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in South Korea a 12 out of 10. WSJ’s Alexander Ward explains why. Photo: Yonhap/EPA/Shutterstock

Nvidia is awaiting approval from the Trump administration to move ahead with a less powerful version of its Blackwell chip for the Chinese market. Blackwell is the company’s latest generation of AI processors.

“President Trump listens to a variety of insights on policy matters, including from top business leaders,” White House spokesman Kush Desai said. “President Trump’s historic meeting with President Xi proves, however, that the only factor guiding his decision-making is the best interest of the American people.”

Speaking at an Nvidia event in Washington before the Trump-Xi meeting, Huang emphasized the importance of the world’s second-largest economy, which he estimates is home to about half of the world’s AI researchers.

The CEO said he worried about the U.S. permanently ceding the market to China. “I really hope President Trump will help us find a solution,” Huang said. “Right now we’re in an awkward place.”

Trump’s trip to Asia was a crucial moment for the future of Nvidia’s business in China, with the summit with Xi setting the tone for trade policy and the AI race. For months leading up to the Xi meeting, Trump indicated he would consider approving exports of a lower-performance Blackwell chip.

He has reversed course since his Asia trip. In an interview with “60 Minutes” that CBS aired on Sunday, Trump said the U.S. would let China deal with Nvidia but not on the most advanced chips. Talking to reporters on Sunday, Trump said of the Blackwell, “we don’t give that chip to other people,” without specifying if he meant the top-performing version or a less powerful Blackwell designed for China.

The Trump-Xi summit ended without a major deal, though the two sides de-escalated tensions, with the U.S. lowering some tariffs on China and Beijing agreeing to resume some purchases of American soybeans. It gives both sides time to build up self-sufficiency in crucial industries such as semiconductors and rare-earth minerals vulnerable to the other’s sanctions.

For Xi, the summit ended without achieving a key near-term objective: a concession on the U.S. chip ban. While Beijing’s long-term strategy is to achieve self-sufficiency and dominance in high technology, securing access to advanced processors now is critical. It would give China valuable time to build up its own domestic capabilities. Not getting such a concession slows the timetable for Beijing’s technological ambitions.

Nvidia needs the administration’s permission to sell its most advanced chips to China under export controls first imposed in 2022. The Trump administration has shown a willingness to allow exports and negotiate over restrictions on China’s tech sector, fueling uncertainty in the industry.

Huang’s efforts to sell the Blackwell in China are expected to continue, especially in the lead-up to Trump’s planned visit to China in April. In Washington last week, Huang said that Trump frequently calls him late at night. He has become one of the president’s favorite executives.

The Blackwell generation of graphics processing units, or GPUs, represents the most powerful AI chips Nvidia has designed. Nvidia has said servers made with the B200 GPU are about three times as powerful as those using the predecessor H100 chip for training AI models and about 15 times as powerful when used for inference processes, or the computations that allow AI models to run.

The specifications for the Blackwell chip Nvidia is developing for China haven’t been released. In August, Trump said he would be willing to approve a Blackwell chip with capabilities reduced by 30% to 50%. Once given the signal to move forward, it would take Nvidia two or three months to engineer such a chip, according to people familiar with the matter.

Even if a Blackwell chip is approved for China, questions remain about its viability. In August, the White House reversed an export ban on an older Nvidia chip if the company shared 15% of China revenue with the U.S. government, an arrangement that some lawyers say represents an unconstitutional export tax.

Shortly afterward, Chinese authorities told companies not to buy it. Nvidia hasn’t sold any of those older H20 chips in China since April, the company has said, missing out on billions of dollars in sales.

Nvidia opponents in Congress and at think tanks have countered the company’s lobbying with their own campaign. Before the Trump-Xi meeting, some circulated a video to administration officials showing Huang saying in a July CNN interview that he didn’t think it mattered who wins the AI race, the people said.

The House Select Committee on China called Huang’s words “dangerously naive” and compared the AI race to the Cold War. “This is like arguing that it would not have mattered if the Soviets beat the U.S. to a nuclear weapon,” the committee wrote on X.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com, Amrith Ramkumar at amrith.ramkumar@wsj.com and Robbie Whelan at robbie.whelan@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 4, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Aides Sank Nvidia Push To Export AI Chips to China'.

WSJ

9. China Started Separating Its Economy From the West Years Ago

I was surprised to read this analysis.

Summary:

For two decades, China has built economic self-reliance—replacing imports, dominating key supply chains, and reducing Western leverage. Xi Jinping’s policies in advanced manufacturing, rare-earths, and technology have fortified China’s economy against U.S. pressure. Despite inefficiencies, Beijing’s strategy now lets it constrain Washington’s options while expanding its industrial and geopolitical resilience.

China Started Separating Its Economy From the West Years Ago

NY Times · Keith Bradsher · November 3, 2025

By Keith Bradsher

Reporting from Beijing

Nov. 3, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/03/business/china-five-year-plan.html

China is able to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

news analysis

Two decades of sustained effort to build national self-reliance and minimize imports have antagonized trade partners but fortified what a senior adviser called Beijing’s “bulwark” against conflicts.

China is able to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

Listen to this article · 6:39 min Learn more

Reporting from Beijing

Nov. 3, 2025Updated 2:43 p.m. ET

President Trump has used tariffs to try to reduce American reliance on Chinese exports and prevent China’s factory overcapacity from swamping the U.S. economy. But his effort has hit an obstacle: Beijing was already well on its way to weaning its economy from the United States.

For two decades, China has systematically pursued economic self-reliance. China has been able to establish choke points to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.

Self-reliance has been a cornerstone of Chinese policymaking not just under Xi Jinping, the country’s top leader since 2012, but also under his predecessor, Hu Jintao.

Their program of replacing imported manufactured goods with domestic production has been costly and often inefficient. But it has left the West with dwindling leverage it can deploy during disputes.

China’s leaders have become increasingly public about emphasizing the self-reliance drive. It took a prominent place at an annual gathering of the Communist Party’s Central Committee last month, when the country’s top officials laid out a sketch of China’s next five-year plan.

“We must first and foremost intensify efforts toward achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology,” Mr. Xi said in a speech.

This year, China has wielded one of its most powerful choke points — its almost complete control over the world’s supply of rare-earth metals and rare-earth magnets.

Faced with restrictions on China’s supply of rare earths, Mr. Trump last week accepted a compromise with Mr. Xi.

President Trump with China’s president, Xi Jinping, in South Korea last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Their agreement left this year’s new U.S. tariffs for China similar to those for countries in Southeast Asia and lower than the tariffs for countries like India and Brazil, with which the United States has traditionally maintained closer relations.

China’s threat to put extremely tight controls on its rare-earth exports also helped persuade the Trump administration to suspend a policy it adopted in September to expand the number of military-related Chinese companies that Americans are not allowed to do business with.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

China has gained other choke points through its policies of manufacturing self-reliance. It is the world’s dominant producer of the ingredients needed to make antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals. It is also the main producer of a lot of electrical equipment, low-end computer chips and much more.

The United States has been left with fewer options when it needs to fight back. When Washington wanted to pressure Beijing to back down on rare-earth export controls, the Trump administration threatened to restrict some of the last categories of crucial American exports that China still needs, like aircraft parts.

Chinese officials are now calling for their country to become even more self-reliant.

“A comprehensive industrial system benefits the enhanced resilience of supply chains,” Tian Peiyan, one of Mr. Xi’s senior policy advisers, wrote in a journal over the weekend. He added that a very broad industrial base could create “a bulwark of economic security.”

When China joined the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001, it depended on imports for a wide range of goods. The cars, telecommunications gear, power generation equipment and other manufactured goods that China made then were inferior to imports, prompting many Chinese companies and consumers to prefer imports.

Since then, China has made enormous strides in the quality and quantity of these and many other goods.

“Among 500 major industrial products, my country ranks first globally in the production of over 220,” Jin Zhuanglong, a prominent Chinese engineer, said last year when he was minister of industry and information technology.

China’s state-run banks have lent heavily to electric car and solar panel makers, helping Beijing become the world’s largest exporter of both.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Last month’s Central Committee gathering, or plenum, ordered that China would, starting next year, double down on its emphasis on advanced manufacturing. The plenum document ordered government and business to “work faster to boost China’s strength in manufacturing, product quality, aerospace, transportation and cyberspace.”

Beijing has combined the vast scale of its manufacturing operations with considerable state direction. Only a handful of business sectors are left in which American and European industries still lead the world, notably commercial aircraft and a few of the most advanced semiconductors.

“President Xi has been quite good at finding ways to engineer American imports out of China’s supply chains over time, apart from the most advanced semiconductors designed but not made by U.S. firms,” said Brad Setser, a China specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Despite more than a decade of heavy public investment, China lags in making the fastest semiconductors, needed for artificial intelligence and the latest military technologies. But Chinese companies have proved adept at buying and smuggling Nvidia microchips.

China’s policies to replace imports with domestic products have included the Indigenous Innovation campaign adopted soon after China joined the W.T.O., Made in China 2025 starting in 2015 and the effort called “high quality productive forces” in the past two years.

The state-controlled banking system has lent heavily at low interest rates to manufacturers of electric cars and solar panels, and China has become the largest exporter of these goods.

For some products, China has achieved self-reliance with protectionist trade policies. Since 2008, China has used tariffs and fees that more than double the sticker prices of imported cars and sport utility vehicles with large gasoline engines.

Electric and hybrid cars now make up more than half of China’s auto market.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

That has not only discouraged imports but meant that Chinese consumers never became accustomed to powerful and bulky vehicles. This is one reason they have been quick to switch over to electric cars and hybrid gasoline-electric cars, which together now make up more than half the Chinese market.

Since early in Mr. Trump’s first term, American officials tended to dismiss concerns that China might use the choke points it was developing. To do so would damage China’s credibility as a destination for foreign investment, they argued, and would prompt multinationals to shift their purchases elsewhere.

That could yet happen. But China’s leaders, as shown last month, seemed determined to pursue even greater self-reliance.

The plenum’s closing statement said, “We must consolidate and expand our advantages, break through bottlenecks and constraints and strengthen our shortcomings and weaknesses.”

Chris Buckley contributed reporting. Li You contributed research.

Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic.

See more on: Donald Trump, Xi Jinping

NY Times · Keith Bradsher · November 3, 2025

10. President Trump Deserves Better Advice

Summary:

Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller argue President Trump is receiving poor nuclear policy advice. His claim that the U.S. leads in nuclear arms and will resume testing is factually wrong—Russia holds more weapons, no new U.S. systems were deployed, and testing authority lies with the Energy Department. They urge informed, responsible nuclear counsel.

President Trump Deserves Better Advice

realcleardefense.com · Eric S. Edelman & Franklin C. Miller November 03, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/11/03/president_trump_deserves_better_advice_1144884.html

Story Stream

He is not being well-informed on Nuclear Issues

Despite his well know aversion to using the other “N” word and discussing the issues connected with nuclear deterrence and nuclear sabre rattling by America’s adversaries the President, during his trip to Asia this week, dropped a bit of a bombshell of his own. On October 29, President Trump posted a brief statement on Truth Social about nuclear weapons testing, which contained the following key points:

“The United States has more nuclear weapons than any other country”
“In my first term in office” the U.S. “accomplished a complete update and renovation of existing [U.S. nuclear] weapons.
“because of other countries testing programs I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our nuclear weapons on an equal basis”
The process of testing our nuclear weapons “will begin immediately.”

Sadly, whoever provided the President with the background information for each of his statements is manifestly unaware of the easily ascertainable facts, and so the President is being extremely poorly served by his own staff.

First, the Russian Federation has more nuclear weapons than any other nation. Its stockpile of nuclear weapons available to the Russian military is about 5200 while its overall stockpile is about 5600. The numbers for the U.S. are about 3700 and 4400. This information is easily available in public sources like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook or the annual assessments published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Second, during the President’s first term progress was made on the “Strategic Modernization Program” initiated in 2010, but no new platforms (submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers or land-based missiles) were deployed between 2017 and 2021; we rely today instead on aging systems which are decades old. Very importantly a small number of modified low yield submarine launched warheads were produced and placed in service, and development work began on other new air force nuclear warheads, but none were deployed.

Third, the President’s staff has a profound misunderstanding about the difference between the test of a nuclear “system’s” delivery vehicles (i.e., a ballistic or cruise missile) and the test of a nuclear “warhead.” In the days before the President’s text Russia conducted a test of a new cruise missile and a new trans-oceanic torpedo (both of which, incidentally, are not constrained by the new START treaty). Tests of missile systems are commonly conducted by all the nuclear powers, including the United States. Today, with the sole exception of North Korea in 2017, neither Russia nor China nor any other nuclear weapons state has conducted a nuclear warhead test in this century. To be clear, the U.S. Intelligence Community has raised concerns that both Russia and China may be covertly carrying out extremely low yield tests of experimental nuclear designs, but those do not appear to be the “tests” to which the President’s Truth Social post was referring.

Finally, the President appears to have been informed that the Department of War/Defense is responsible for nuclear weapons testing. It is not: that responsibility belongs to Department of Energy. Based on over 30 years of neglect, that Department would be unable today to conduct a nuclear weapon test in the near future. Rather, based on estimates provided to the Congress by DOE, it would take 24-36 months to do so, at a cost of several billion dollars – dollars which have not been authorized or appropriated by Congress.

Parenthetically, the President appears to have been advised that extending the New START treaty (which expires next February) a proposal raised by Russian President Vladimir Putin, might be a good idea; it is not, the treaty today is very much in Russia’s interest and very harmful to our own.

When asked, on his return flight from Asia, why he had delivered himself of this signal of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons muscle-flexing, the President said he believed that if others were testing then the U.S. should test as well. Depending on the state of our own nuclear weapons (currently assessed by the military as being reliable), and if he had been properly informed on the facts that others had resumed testing of nuclear weapons there would be something to this argument. But as things stand, the President owes it to himself and to America’s national security to improve the quality of advice he is being provided on the vital issue of nuclear deterrence and our ability to sustain it – and quickly.

Mr. Edelman was undersecretary of defense for policy, 2005-09, and is counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Miller served as special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council staff, 2001-05, and is a principal of the Scowcroft Group.

realcleardefense.com · Eric S. Edelman & Franklin C. Miller November 03, 2025

11. Why Is Trump Suddenly Talking About Invading Nigeria?

Excerpts:

A U.S. military intervention will be disastrous. It would sow distrust, exacerbate divisions, fuel conspiracy theories, and would not end the insurgency in the northeast, which seems to thrive on the poverty in the area, illiteracy, access to illegal mining opportunities, a distrust of a central government, and links to larger jihadi networks.

...

If the Trump administration really cares, it could place sanctions on leaders fostering religious divisions, impound corrupt funds stashed abroad, and provide military cooperation with Nigeria’s leaders in a way that helps remove insurgency without victimizing citizens.

Nigeria’s government itself has much to do to regain the trust of its citizens. The alienation that so many groups feel as a result of years of neglect, corruption, and sometimes outright victimization is real and deep, and citizens have lost trust in the country’s military to keep them safe, especially in the north. Allowing violence to fester can only lead to more fragmentation. When the country’s own foundations of trust and unity are collapsing, the offers of even foreign demagogues to fill the gap may be tempting.

Summary:

President Trump’s threat to “invade” Nigeria follows right-wing media claims that Abuja fails to protect Christians. Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún argues U.S. intervention would worsen Nigeria’s complex mix of religious, ethnic, economic, and climate-driven conflicts. He warns it would fuel conspiracy theories, destabilize West Africa, and reflect America’s misunderstanding of Nigeria’s realities.T

Why Is Trump Suddenly Talking About Invading Nigeria?

Foreign Policy · Kọ́lá Túbọ̀súnext

A U.S. military intervention would be a disaster in an already divided country.

By Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún He, a Nigerian linguist and writer.

November 3, 2025, 3:23 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/03/trump-nigeria-war-invasion-christians/

Over the past year, a talking point about Nigeria has gradually gained a foothold in U.S. right-wing media. It spread even to relatively liberal spaces such as Real Time With Bill Maher, and has now become an official government policy. On Oct. 31, U.S. President Donald Trump instructed his cabinet to put the country in the category of “country of particular concern” and, if necessary, make plans for going in “guns-a-blazing.”

The ostensible reason: the Nigerian government’s terrible job in protecting “Christians” in its fight against bandits, terrorists, and other purveyors of insecurity.

It’s true that there has been violence against Christians in Nigeria—but they are not the only victims, nor would U.S. military intervention help. Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy, is a multiethnic, multireligious country, with the northern part of the country mostly inhabited by Muslims and the southern part of the country mostly inhabited by Christians. But the delineation is not black and white. The middle belt, often characterized as part of the north, has a number of non-Muslim residents. In the south, Christians, Muslims, and traditional animist believers live side by side.

While the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims live peacefully with their neighbors, the country has battled a militant Muslim insurgency, Boko Haram, for at least a decade. The global #BringBackOurGirls campaign arose after the kidnapping of about 276 schoolgirls age 16-18 in April 2014 by Boko Haram militants in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram has been operating across Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Mali since around 2002, but it has also carried out a number of insurgent attacks in northern Nigeria.

There are tensions between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in Nigeria, but these issues blur with the usual political divisions that that have bedeviled the country since independence. The mostly Muslim north enjoyed greater federal government power through the military for decades. (This issue stemmed from the north’s fear of elimination after the country’s first military coup, which mostly targeted northern politicians. Young northern men enlisted and eventually took over the military. This original sin is also part of Nigerian politics’ villain origin story.)

But in a country of nearly 240 million people originally pressed together by colonialism and often kept together by military force, painful tensions are inevitable—and religion is far from the only dividing line. Other violent groups in recent years have included the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group that operated mainly in the southern part of the country; the Oodua People’s Congress (and lately Àmọ̀tẹ́kùn re, its militant arm); and the Eastern Security Network, a militant group created to implement and enforce the aspirations of Nnamdi Kanu, the founder of the Indigenous People of Biafra, a separatist group whose aim is to cleave the eastern part of the country away from Nigeria.

The presence of oil in the Niger Delta, which forms the bulk of Nigeria’s foreign revenue, is a factor in many of these issues. Another driver is the hunger and political corruption that have been a hallmark of much of Nigeria’s public life. The “End SARS” protests of 2020—led by young Nigerians who sought to end police brutality, through which agencies of state typically oppressed and extorted young citizens—ended with a military attack on unarmed protesters that killed dozens. Even the election that brought President Bola Tinubu into power was not devoid of ethnic and other types of violence.

Another powerful driver of conflict is climate change —a topic, of course, that the Trump administration refuses to admit exists. For many years, the biggest causes of clashes between nomadic (and often armed) Fulani cattle herders and (usually unarmed) local farmers in the country’s middle belt have been the loss of grazing land due to the effects of climate change in the arid north and the incursion of these cattle into private farmland, which leads to violent clashes.

Religion, money, regional divisions, and volatile politics have produced a combustible situation—one that could turn into a roaring fire. U.S. action would add fuel to this conflagration, not quench it. There have been many instances of violence against Christian communities recently and through history—but also against moderate Muslims, who are as much of a threat to religious fanatics as Christian residents are. Understandably, some have cried out for help from abroad.

In Plateau state in the middle belt, for instance, the Rev. Ezekiel Dachomo has spoken out about many of the issues affecting his community, including a recent attack on Oct. 14 in Barkin Ladi area, where at least 13 people were killed, all Christians. He has appealed for international intervention, having failed to get the federal government to take the long-running security problems in the state seriously. (I served in the National Youth Service program in Plateau state back in 2005 and 2006 and personally witnessed clashes between local farmers and Fulani settlers.)

Followers of traditional religions haven’t been spared, either. In October, a notable case in Kwara state involved a female practitioner of Yorùbá traditional beliefs being harassed by Islamic clerics.

So yes, intolerance and extremism run deep in the country and often obscure other significant issues. And yes, self-inflicted PR wounds such as Nigerian soldiers

taking photos

in November 2023 with Zakir Naik (an Indian preacher banned from several countries for hate speech and alleged links to terrorism), and a national TV interview with a Hamas spokesperson in February 2024 where he defended the October 2023 attack on Israel, may give the impression of a country that doesn’t have its act together.

Still, none of it calls for an invasion.

What unites everyone today is a desire for good governance, better cost of living, and security. Two years ago, Tinubu, a former governor of Lagos state and an acclaimed economic reformer, was voted into office with a northerner as vice president. Although both were Muslims, many Christians voted for them, and a bitterly divided opposition split the vote.

Since that time, the president has given public assurances of economic transformation; commissioned massive public projects; and mostly stabilized the country’s currency, the naira. A new private oil refinery—controlled by Nigerians— has begun operating, and at the end of October, a tariff on foreign imports was instituted to keep local production viable. The citizens continue to await tangible returns from his mandate.

Nigerians are also wondering whether these changes, and Nigeria’s new assertions of economic independence, have anything to do with the United States’ fresh interest. Conspiracy theories abound, especially given Nigeria’s mineral reserves and China’s leveraging of rare earths against the United States.

The revocation—a week ago—of the visa of Wole Ṣóyínká, Africa’s first Nobel Prize winner in literature, has put many Nigerians on edge against U.S. policies, which seem increasingly driven by impulsiveness and, sometimes,

racism

. (Only South Africa’s white farmers seem free from Trump’s sweeping new

immigration policies around the continent.)

Domestically, the political mood was already tense. About a week ago, the Nigerian president fired and replaced all the army chiefs on suspicion of a failed coup attempt, which took the country by surprise. There has been no coup in the country since the end of military rule in 1999.

There’s so much in the air for one to make an informed conclusion of what is going on. But the U.S. president is apparently confident that he understands this volatile and complex situation. He is being egged on by those already disgruntled by historical grievances, including his own defense secretary—or “secretary of war”—who is eager to prove himself in at least one winnable theater.

Some of these claims made it to the right-wing media sphere through social media, celebrity attentionto Trump circles, the evangelical ecosphere, Nigerians with an axe to grind with the Nigerian state, and a seeming desire in Washington for some distraction from the public’s upset about the U.S. role in the war in Gaza. (Maher repeated a common theme, blaming young Americans for protesting Gaza but not attacks on Nigerian Christians.).

The voices of Nigerian Christians and Muslims who have been victims of Boko Haram as well as other victims of violence (including illegal miners of mineral resources in the country) are being drowned by this intervention cloud for fear of adding to an already incendiary environment. And the conspiracy theories about the United States’ own interest in Nigeria’s instability continue to abound.

A U.S. military intervention will be disastrous. It would sow distrust, exacerbate divisions, fuel conspiracy theories, and would not end the insurgency in the northeast, which seems to thrive on the poverty in the area, illiteracy, access to illegal mining opportunities, a distrust of a central government, and links to larger jihadi networks.

Many prominent Nigerians have called for a type of national constitutional conference to properly negotiate the definition of the state, outside of the parameters foisted on it by the departing military in 1999. This would seem to solve a number of problems, including the call for self-determination of component parts. Washington’s own military adventures, from the Bay of Pigs to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, have been largely disastrous. A protracted U.S. action would only lead to refugees, waste, loss of lives, and a destabilization of the West African subregion.

If the Trump administration really cares, it could place sanctions on leaders fostering religious divisions, impound corrupt funds stashed abroad, and provide military cooperation with Nigeria’s leaders in a way that helps remove insurgency without victimizing citizens.

Nigeria’s government itself has much to do to regain the trust of its citizens. The alienation that so many groups feel as a result of years of neglect, corruption, and sometimes outright victimization is real and deep, and citizens have lost trust in the country’s military to keep them safe, especially in the north. Allowing violence to fester can only lead to more fragmentation. When the country’s own foundations of trust and unity are collapsing, the offers of even foreign demagogues to fill the gap may be tempting.

Foreign Policy · Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún

12. With Military Buildup Against Venezuela, the U.S. Eyes Cuba as Well

Venezuela and Cuba (and Nigeria as well)?

Where is the restraint and isolation?

Summary:

Trump’s massive Caribbean buildup of 10 ships, 10,000 troops, and the USS Gerald R. Ford, signals imminent strikes on Venezuela under the pretext of the drug war. Analysts say the real goal is regime change in Caracas to cut off Venezuelan oil to Cuba, collapsing Havana’s regime. Critics warn intervention risks regional instability, backlash, and failure.

With Military Buildup Against Venezuela, the U.S. Eyes Cuba as Well

flip.it · William M. LeoGrande, Peter Kornbluh

Analysis

Washington hopes cutting off Venezuelan oil to Havana would collapse the Cuban regime.

By William M. LeoGrande, a professor of government at American University in Washington, D.C., and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute. , and Peter Kornbluh, director of the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and co-author of The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/03/military-buildup-venezuela-u-s-eyes-cuba-trump-maduro/?utm

A massive aircraft carrier cuts across open ocean toward the camera, with dozens of warplanes clustered together on the surface of its flight deck. In the background, in the ship's triangular wake, smaller gray naval ships follow.

The world’s largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, transiting the Strait of Gibraltar on Oct. 1. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Alyssa Joy

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South America

November 3, 2025, 5:30 PM

Trump’s Second Term

Ongoing reports and analysis

With 10 naval vessels and 10,000 troops already deployed to the Caribbean—the largest military buildup there since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—and a carrier strike group led by the USS Gerald R. Ford taking up position, some sort of military attack on Venezuela appears imminent. U.S. President Donald Trump’s rationale for this aggressive military action is that Venezuela is a hub of drug trafficking and that supplying drugs to U.S. consumers is the equivalent of an armed attack on the United States, justifying a military response.

But the real aim is to overthrow Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s government and then, by cutting off the flow of Venezuelan oil to Cuba, fulfill the Republican right’s decades-long dream of collapsing the Cuban government. It’s a strategy that John Bolton, national security advisor in the first Trump administration, tried without success in 2019, but Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio now intends to try again. It’s unlikely to work this time, either, though the cost of a military conflict will be higher for U.S. regional interests and much higher for Venezuelans.

U.S. armed forces have already obliterated more than a dozen alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific, killing more than 60 people—so far. Trump has designated traffickers as foreign terrorists and declared war on them.

“We are going to kill people that are bringing drugs into our country, OK? We are going to kill them,” Trump told reporters in late October. “The land is going to be next,” he added, presumably referring to Venezuelan national territory. The Miami Herald reports that Venezuelan military installations will be the targets.

Trump has also authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela and named Maduro as the alleged leader of the Cartel de los Soles, a Venezuelan criminal organization that Trump designated a foreign terrorist organization in February. The Justice Department has offered a $50 million reward to anyone who provides information leading to Maduro’s arrest. Among the U.S. military units now deployed off the coast of Venezuela is the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment—the “Night Stalkers”—which supported the special forces operation that killed Osama bin Laden.

Although Venezuela is Cuba’s closest ally in Latin America and a vital source of low-cost oil, Havana has no way of countering a U.S. attack—any more than it was able to defend Grenada from a U.S. invasion in 1983. To try would invite a U.S. attack on Cuba itself. Cuban diplomats have said as much publicly and repeated it to Venezuelan officials privately.

Since the rise of the late Gen. Hugo Chávez and his Chavista movement more than 25 years ago, Caracas has been Cuba’s ally and patron, albeit with diminishing returns as Chavez’s authoritarian successor, Maduro, has presided over the self-destruction of his nation’s economy. The alliance is one of the reasons that a U.S. attack on Venezuela has potentially serious implications for Cuba. There are still thousands of Cuban medical personnel serving there, along with an unknown number of military and intelligence advisors. If the United States strikes Venezuelan government installations, especially military ones, Cuban lives would be at risk. Even so, there’s little that Cuba could do other than protest and ramp up its own military preparedness as it has in the past during moments of heightened tension.

If Washington manages to unseat Maduro, then his successor would very likely cut off oil shipments to Havana, striking another blow to an already reeling Cuban economy. U.S. success in Venezuela could also threaten Cuba’s national security if the Trump administration, intoxicated with the win, decided to expand its aggressive military interventionism.

But Havana is no longer as dependent on Venezuela as it was a decade ago.

The alliance between Havana and Caracas was formed in 1998, when Chávez was first elected as Venezuela’s president, advocating “21st century socialism.” Chávez and Fidel Castro developed a strong personal bond even before the election. Chávez saw Castro as his mentor; Castro saw Chávez as his protégé.

In 2000 and 2003, the two countries signed cooperation agreements for Venezuela to provide Cuba with petroleum at subsidized prices in exchange for the services of Cuban medical personnel deployed to Chávez’s working-class constituencies. At the peak of this trade, from 2008 to 2015, Cuba received more than 100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) while nearly 30,000 Cuban doctors and technicians served in Venezuela

But beginning in 2016, Venezuelan oil production began to decline due to mismanagement and poor maintenance. By the middle of 2018, it had fallen by half. Over roughly the same few years, the global price of oil also fell by about half, drastically cutting Venezuela’s revenue. Oil shipments to Cuba declined as Venezuela sold more production for its own benefit. By 2024, shipments had fallen to 32,000 bpd and have been even lower this year.

The shrinking supply of Venezuelan oil has exacerbated its perennial shortage of foreign exchange currency. Power blackouts have become routine and domestic production is suffering from lack of fuel. But there’s a silver lining for Cuba in these dark clouds: Havana is less dependent on Venezuelan oil now than it was a decade ago.

In 2014, Cuban economist Pedro Vidal estimated that the sudden, complete loss of Venezuelan oil would knock 7.7 percent off of Cuba’s GDP. But since Venezuela’s largesse has already fallen by almost three-quarters and the price of oil is now roughly half of what it was then, Cuba has already absorbed most of the shock that Vidal predicted. Moreover, as Cuba’s energy crisis has worsened, Mexico and Russia have been willing to increase their oil shipments at concessionary prices to fill at least part of the deficit.

The Trump administration has made it clear that its goal is to overthrow the Maduro government. What remains unclear is how. Will the CIA try to turn the armed forces against him to foment a coup? Will the Night Stalkers drop SEAL Team Six into Caracas in the dead of night to snatch Maduro from Miraflores Palace, rendition him to the United States, and put him on trial for narcotics trafficking? Will the U.S. forces amassing in the Caribbean launch airstrikes to pressure the military to overthrow him for their own survival? Or will it be enough to make the Venezuelan armed forces an offer they can’t refuse: remove Maduro or face destruction?

The least likely option is a full-scale invasion and occupation of Venezuela, given Trump’s pledge to stay out of foreign wars and abstain from nation-building. Moreover, the Venezuelan military has taken Cuba’s advice on how to resist an invasion—not by trying to defend strategic targets but by melting into the population to wage an asymmetric “war of all the people.”

Add to that several thousand veteran guerrillas of the Colombian National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN) operating in Venezuela, and pacifying Caracas could prove far more complicated than anticipated.

Rubio has his eye on a bigger prize. During the first Trump administration, Bolton imagined that overthrowing Maduro would lead inexorably to the collapse the other two governments in the socialist “troika of tyranny,” Cuba and Nicaragua. Bolton, it turned out, underestimated Maduro’s staying power and the loyalty of the Venezuelan armed forces.

Yet his reverse domino theory survives. U.S. Sen. Rick Scott, who originally introduced his former Senate colleague Rubio to Trump, recently told 60 Minutes that if the United States could remove Maduro and cut off the flow of oil to Havana, “It’ll be the end of Cuba.”

Orchestrating the “end of Cuba” has been Rubio’s ultimate foreign-policy goal since he was elected senator from Florida in 2010. In the Senate, he became the leading hawk on Cuba policy and led the Republican opposition to then-President Barack Obama’s 2014 effort to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations.

Trump himself has shown no real interest in Cuba since his pre-presidential plans to open a Trump hotel there fell flat. Indeed, during his first term, he told White House aides, “Make Rubio happy,” so they let Rubio and Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart craft Trump’s Cuba policy. Now, doubling as both secretary of state and national security adviser, Rubio’s hands are on the levers of power to advance his goal of rolling back the Cuban Revolution.

“Rubio’s legacy project is regime change in Cuba,” said a Senate staffer who is monitoring the military buildup in the Caribbean, speaking to the authors privately. “This is Rubio’s chance to do what he has always wanted to do.”

But regime change is easier said than done. U.S. officials have been underestimating the staying power of the Cuban government ever since 1959. A little more pressure, so the argument goes, one more twist of the screw, and the “Castro regime” will crumble. Next year will be the 10th anniversary of Castro’s death, and the regime he built is still standing.

Despite the desperate state of the Cuban economy and widespread popular discontent, there is no organized opposition of any consequence. Activists who have tried to build one are either in exile or in jail. Cuban State Security has proven adept at containing U.S. “democracy promotion” programs aimed at fomenting opposition, as can be attested by Alan Gross, the American subcontractor who spent five years in a Cuban prison for his part in one of them.

The idea that cutting off Venezuelan oil will be the straw that breaks the back of the Cuban government is a pipe dream. To be sure, the further loss of Venezuelan oil would be a serious blow to the Cuban economy, and it would deepen people’s misery. But misery doesn’t automatically translate into rebellion. Misery can just as easily produce a deeper siege mentality among elites, or political disengagement by people preoccupied with simple survival. In the worst case, it can precipitate a failed state.

“Within the Western Hemisphere,” wrote Ben Rhodes, a former deputy national security advisor under Obama, “Mr. Trump is beginning to act like Mr. Netanyahu in the Middle East or Mr. Putin within the former Soviet Union — a right-wing leader claiming a sphere of influence where he is free to act as he chooses.”

Trump’s brutish return to the use of “gunboat diplomacy” to assert U.S. dominion will prove costly for real U.S. interests in the Latin American region, reinforcing the historic image of the United States as the hegemonic bully.

U.S. strikes on boats off the Venezuelan and Colombian coasts have already been condemned as violations of international law by the United Nations high commissioner for human rights and three other U.N. officials as well as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Similar criticism has come from members of Congress, including a few Republicans, a raft of international lawyers, and even from some voices inside the Defense Department. The White House has dismissed all criticism out of hand.

Not so easily dismissed are the protests by Presidents Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico and Gustavo Petro of Colombia, because Washington needs their cooperation to reduce the production and transport of drugs destined for the United States. Those are largely the countries—not Venezuela—that the drugs come from. Most Latin American leaders have remained silent so far, but more will speak out if the United States attacks Venezuela, not because they have any sympathy for Maduro—they don’t—but because they know that next time, it could be them.

The more profound consequence will be an acceleration of the gradual shift in South America away from the United States and toward China. Trump’s tariffs have already shown that the United States is no longer a reliable economic partner. If it is now becoming a military threat as well, then it’s time to look for partners—and security alliances—elsewhere.

“If you break it, you own it,” former Secretary of State Colin Powell famously warned President George W. Bush as the United States prepared to invade Iraq. Trump, take heed. Sustained military conflict with Venezuela will further destabilize the region, spurring another wave of migration, shocking global oil markets, and creating more ungoverned spaces in Venezuela for traffickers to occupy. How many more Venezuelan lives stand to be lost? Hundreds? Thousands? And for what?

Airstrikes on Venezuela will not halt the flow of drugs into the United States. Where there are hefty profits to be made, demand always calls forth supply. Military action and the threat of escalation may lead to Maduro’s departure, but the Venezuelan armed forces profit from the status quo. If they remain intact, then not much will change in Caracas short of U.S. military occupation. Nor is a cutoff of Venezuelan oil likely to unseat the Cuban government, which has survived far worse economic blows.

The watchword of Trump’s foreign policy is to speak loudly and carry a big stick. No one can stop him from bashing Venezuela with it, and once he does, he will undoubtedly claim victory, no matter how meager the results. But the wreckage left behind, to U.S. regional interests and to Venezuela, will not soon be repaired, nor soon forgotten.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

United States
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William M. LeoGrande is a professor of government at American University in Washington, D.C., and a nonresident Fellow at the Quincy Institute. He is the co-author, with Peter Kornbluh, of Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana. X: @WMLeoGrande

Peter Kornbluh directs the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive at George Washington University. He is co-author with William M. Leogrande of Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana. X: @peterkornbluh

Read More On South America | United States | Venezuela | War

13. Making Multipolarity Work: How America Should Navigate a New Global Order

Excerpt:

This confused approach leaves the United States in limbo: partly able to navigate a multipolar world, yet risking alienation and—more important—undermining the open global economic order that has served Washington so well for so long. Even as the Trump administration makes positive moves to rebalance its security commitments, it is undermining the United States’ economic and diplomatic standing. From imposing draconian tariffs and sanctions to conducting seemingly random military strikes in Iran and off the coast of Venezuela, the administration has approached friends and foes alike with self-serving aggression—even though successfully navigating a more multipolar world will require strong, lean global partnerships. Ultimately, this half-baked strategy for multipolarity may be just as bad as no strategy at all.

Summary:

Emma Ashford argues the U.S. must adapt to a multipolar world where power is dispersed among several great and regional powers. Rejecting bipolar “Cold War” thinking, Washington should pursue flexible, transactional partnerships and shared defense burdens, but Trump’s unilateralism and economic coercion risk undermining America’s influence, stability, and global order.

Making Multipolarity Work

Foreign Affairs · More by Emma Ashford · November 4, 2025

How America Should Navigate a New Global Order

Emma Ashford

November 4, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/making-multipolarity-work

Chinese and U.S. flags on a screen in Beijing, October 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters

Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center. She is the author of First Among Equals: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World.

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The “unipolar moment” of American predominance is over. Long-term economic, demographic, and military trends have undeniably shifted global politics, and the United States now needs a strategy to manage this emerging world in a way that preserves at least some of its unipolar advantages without leaving it overstretched. Which strategy Washington should pursue, however, largely depends on the kind of world it believes is emerging.

The Biden administration envisioned a bipolar world, with the United States and China locked in a fierce competition. As a result, it assiduously built a strategy around a new cold war, and it sought to stitch together discrete U.S. alliances and reframe Washington’s adversaries as an “axis of authoritarians.” But a coherent democratic axis failed to emerge, and states chafed against a unified democratic policy: consider India, which is still an active participant in BRICs, a bloc it founded with Brazil, Russia, and China in 2009, or the tensions between the United States and the Netherlands over the latter’s export of critical chip-making technology to China.

This is because the Biden administration was wrong about bipolarity. With increasing economic interconnectedness; the rise of militarily capable regional powers such as Turkey, India, and South Korea; and economic and technological power less concentrated in the hands of the United States and China, it seems more likely that a fragmented and complex multipolar world will follow the unipolar moment.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, multipolarity is not a death sentence for the United States. In an era of declining relative U.S. power, it benefits Americans to let other capable countries handle some of the load of global leadership. If Washington embraces this fact, it can pursue a more flexible strategy—one that allows the United States to operate more efficiently and effectively in a rapidly changing world.

The good news is that the Trump administration appears much more comfortable with the idea of multipolarity than the Biden administration was. Instead of trying to force the world into a false us-versus-them dichotomy, it has taken some early, positive steps toward embracing a more multipolar strategy. In particular, the push for U.S. allies in Asia and Europe to bear more of the defense burden is a significant shift from traditional U.S. foreign policy.

But the Trump administration is still bungling the opportunity to make multipolarity work for U.S. interests. By destroying the international economic system and alienating other countries with its aggressive unilateralism, the administration’s mixed-bag strategy for multipolarity will raise more risks and reap fewer rewards.

AGREE TO DISAGREE

Scholars still fiercely debate whether the unipolar moment is giving way to a bipolar, multipolar, or even nonpolar world. The answer boils down to power—which countries have it, how they exercise it, and how others perceive it. But power is a notoriously slippery concept, consisting of some combination of wealth, military might, population size, natural resource endowments, and political will. Varying definitions of power lead to starkly different conclusions about which world order is emerging.

If power is defined only by military prowess, for example, then a bipolar order seems plausible, pitting China and the United States against each other. Add economic data, however, and East Asia, Europe, and the Gulf states enter the mix, which suggests a markedly more multipolar world. And if it turns out that China is falsifying its own economic data and is closer to internal chaos than its military parades suggest, then unipolarity once again becomes likely.

If power is defined more broadly, it seems plausible that the world is shifting toward what scholars have labeled “unbalanced multipolarity.” In such a system, there are a few great powers—the United States and China in this case—and a larger number of second-tier powers, including Australia, France, Germany, India, Japan, and Russia, among others. These second-tier powers are weaker than the superpowers but still more than capable of shaping regional dynamics.

Multipolarity is not a death sentence for the United States.

Many second-tier powers have already started to jockey for position within this emerging system. French President Emmanuel Macron, for instance, shocked European leaders in 2023 when he declared that Europe should seek to become a “third pole” in the new world order. Meanwhile, Fernando Haddad, Brazil’s finance minister, told journalists that São Paulo will not lean toward either Beijing or Washington and is “too big to be choosing partners.”

Clearly, these states do not want to get shoehorned into some new American-led anti-Chinese coalition. They remain unconvinced about a new Cold War–style bipolarity. Indeed, this was a key problem with the Biden administration’s grand strategy, which tried to rerun the Cold War playbook and engineer bipolar competition with China, networking U.S. alliances and lumping Russia and China into an “axis of autocracies.”

What the Biden administration found was that many countries were no longer willing to concede to this black-and-white view of world politics. Washington’s closest allies welcome trade and investment with China, even if they do not agree with its ideology or repressive governance model. States such as India are eager to buy American weapons and engage in military cooperation but at the same time join Chinese military exercises and buy Russian hydrocarbons. Middle powers act, in other words, in ways that suggest they see a multipolar world in the near future.

REALITY CHECK

Underneath this seemingly esoteric debate over polarity and the new world order is an often unstated but high-stakes assumption: that a multipolar world will be worse for the United States than a bipolar one. The general thinking is that multipolarity will increase the likelihood of instability around the world, strain alliances, and leave Washington vulnerable.

But recency bias plays a role here. Because the Cold War ended peacefully and the interwar period preceding it did not, bipolarity is often associated with stability and multipolarity with danger. But some multipolar systems have been stable and long lasting, such as the Congress of Vienna in 1815, an entente between Europe’s great powers that held for nearly a century. The idea that the United States is better off in a bipolar world, rather than a multipolar one, is theoretical at best.

In practice, both world orders have advantages and disadvantages. A multipolar system, for example, may heighten certain risks, such as the potential for low-level conflicts between small states, but a bipolar system could heighten others, including arms races that could escalate to great-power war. Likewise, both systems offer benefits. Under bipolarity or unipolarity, a great power may be able to prevent conflicts through increased leverage on client states. Under multipolarity, free-riding and passing the buck on collective security commitments become more difficult, which in turn lowers the costs of defense and the risks of forward deterrence for the great power.

Other states do not want to get shoehorned into an American-led anti-Chinese coalition.

This is not a purely academic debate: polarity is a description of the distribution of power in the international system rather than something states get to choose. But administrations can lean in to either the bipolar or the multipolar aspects of the system in their strategy. The Biden administration tried to emphasize bipolarity by elevating U.S.-Chinese competition, promoting strategies of “allied scale,” and creating a new Western coalition against an “axis of upheaval.” These strategies identified a unitary bloc of opponents in China, Iran, Russia, and others and then sought to assemble a new “free world” coalition to combat it. But this approach failed because it did not match reality—other countries remain skeptical about a bifurcated world and refuse to take a side.

Instead of artificially cleaving the world in two, the United States should choose to embrace multipolarity and craft strategy accordingly. The benefits would be significant. By leaning in to the more multipolar characteristics of the international system, such as open trade and cooperation, for instance, the United States could retain many of the economic and political perks it has enjoyed for the last 70 years. By pushing allies to take on more of the defense burden, meanwhile, and redirecting U.S. military and economic resources toward pressing security concerns, it could reduce some of the risks of a more confrontational approach to the world and avoid overextension and exhaustion. And by emphasizing flexible, transactional partnerships with states on specific issues and portfolios, a multipolar strategy would enable Washington to hedge against rising competitors such as India. In the end, this approach to security would be far cheaper than the trillions of dollars required to sustain U.S. military primacy against all potential challengers.

THE TRUMP PROBLEM

To successfully compete in a multipolar world, the United States will need to shift its strategy. The Trump administration has taken some initial steps in this regard. It has, for instance, encouraged its allies, especially in Europe, to share more of the burden of collective defense and turn their latent economic power into stronger military capabilities. The administration has pulled back from funding further weapons shipments to Ukraine, effectively transferring that responsibility to European states. As a result, Washington can shrink its current global military posture and concentrate its resources where they are most needed—the Indo-Pacific and the United States’ own backyard in Latin America. Both Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance have suggested the U.S. military will likely draw down troops in Europe and the Middle East to better prioritize its resources for the Indo-Pacific.

The administration is also trying to maintain flexibility in the United States’ bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Rather than building formal, closed alliance structures as it did during the Cold War, the United States needs to form flexible, issue-specific partnerships with a variety of states. President Donald Trump has been willing to criticize allies, often gleefully, when dealing with them and to emphasize U.S. interests over shared values. He has also engaged with adversaries such as Iran and Russia, whereas prior administrations might have balked at the prospect, fearing political blowback. Although these conversations have produced limited results, this diplomatic openness—and rejection of a black-and-white worldview—is exactly the kind of flexibility needed in a more multipolar world.

Unfortunately, other U.S. policies seem to directly contradict that worldview in favor of an aggressive unilateralism that increases some of the worst risks of multipolarity, leaving allies unsure of whether the United States is friend or foe, and even making China appear a more reliable and consistent partner. Just as President Joe Biden’s attempt to divide the world into “us” and “them” risked alienating many potential partners, so, too, does Trump’s willingness to come out swinging as a hostile lone actor in a changing world.

Aggressive unilateralism leaves allies unsure of whether the United States is friend or foe.

In a multipolar world, Washington should attempt to preserve global economic openness by resisting the use of coercive economic statecraft and instead bolster the resilience and diversity of global markets. But Trump has relied heavily on economic and political coercion, using tariffs, sanctions, and other forms of U.S. leverage to wrest concessions from friendly and unfriendly states alike. The unipolar moment after the Cold War allowed the United States to build a substantial arsenal of coercive tools to weaponize interdependence. Trump has shown himself willing to pull the trigger on those weapons for even the most minor reasons. As Michael Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, recently put it in Foreign Affairs, “If Washington continues on its current course—defined by unilateralism, transactionalism, and mercantilism—the consequences will be grim.”

A final problem with the Trump administration’s approach has been the voluntary destruction of American tools of soft power and open hostility to the multilateral structures that act as a safety net against the worst outcomes of an anarchic world. It’s undoubtedly true that American aid and diplomatic institutions need reform; the same is true of the United Nations and other multilateral forums. But a United States that cannot engage diplomatically is a fundamentally less competitive and less capable global actor. And a world in which basic lifesaving services such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance do not exist is a world in which everyone is worse off.

IN LIMBO

This confused approach leaves the United States in limbo: partly able to navigate a multipolar world, yet risking alienation and—more important—undermining the open global economic order that has served Washington so well for so long. Even as the Trump administration makes positive moves to rebalance its security commitments, it is undermining the United States’ economic and diplomatic standing. From imposing draconian tariffs and sanctions to conducting seemingly random military strikes in Iran and off the coast of Venezuela, the administration has approached friends and foes alike with self-serving aggression—even though successfully navigating a more multipolar world will require strong, lean global partnerships. Ultimately, this half-baked strategy for multipolarity may be just as bad as no strategy at all.

Foreign Affairs · More by Emma Ashford · November 4, 2025

14. Hegseth Revisits Vietnam and Korea, Sites of America’s Two Bloodiest Wars Since World War II

Summary:

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Vietnam and South Korea – sites of America’s bloodiest post-WWII wars – to reinforce alliances. In Korea, he focused on the sensitive transfer of wartime operational control and urged higher South Korean defense spending. In Vietnam, he discussed arms sales, environmental cleanup, and U.S. missing-soldier issues.

Hegseth Revisits Vietnam and Korea, Sites of America’s Two Bloodiest Wars Since World War II

Negotiators in South Korea focus on transferring control to the top Korean commander in time of war from the American general of American forces on the peninsula.

nysun.com

DONALD KIRK

Published: Nov. 3, 2025 06:15 PM ETUpdated: Nov. 4, 2025 04:24 AM ET

Secretary Pete Hegseth is revisiting some of the scenes of America’s two bloodiest wars since World War II, buttressing defenses against the same enemies, the Chinese and the Russians, with whom Americans fought and died in Vietnam and Korea.

In South Korea, Mr. Hegseth is focusing on a highly sensitive topic, transferring operational control to the top Korean commander in time of war from the American general who commands U.S. Forces Korea as well as the Combined Forces Command and the UN Command.

American and Korean negotiators are touching on the trickier aspects of this transfer while the Americans press the South to increase defense spending and contribute more to the costs of keeping 28,500 American troops on bases there, as President Trump demanded in his first term.

Mr. Hegseth got a first-hand taste of the standoff on the Korean peninsula after spending two days in Vietnam talking about shipping heavy arms for the Vietnamese Communists who had fought the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies with Chinese and Soviet weapons between 1965 and the American withdrawal in 1973.

Just after flying to Osan Air Base south of Seoul from Hanoi, Mr. Hegseth headed to the Demilitarized Zone that has divided North from South Korea since the end of the war in Korea. There he was greeted by South Korea’s defense minister, Ahn Gyu-back, who escorted him to the Joint Security Area where the war truce was signed in July 1953. Mr. Ahn said Mr. Hegseth had called the JSA “the frontline of division and a place of dialogue.”

That carefully constructed remark acknowledged the importance of the JSA as the scene of negotiations when Mr. Trump met the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, for the third time, in June 2019. It was also at the JSA that Mr. Kim met the former South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, in 2018 while hopes were high for North-South rapprochement.

For Mr. Hegseth, the visit to the DMZ was typical of visits made by thousands of sightseers, but it also symbolized the American-Korean alliance in a time of deepening North-South confrontation. Now, Mr. Kim refuses to see anyone from the South, which he has declared as the “enemy” while tightening his alliance with Russia’s president, for whom he has sent thousands of troops and steady shipments of arms for Russian forces in Ukraine.

Mr. Hegseth is pressing South Korea to invest more in its own defense while possibly increasing its share of the costs of American troops and bases, set at $1.1 billion a year under President Biden. Mr. Trump during his first term demanded $5 billion a year, but has not repeated that figure during his second term — and he did not mention defense while at Pusan seeing President Xi Jinping before last weekend’s conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group at nearby Gyeongju.

Mr. Hegseth, after meeting other defense ministers at Kuala Lumpur on the sidelines of another regional grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, flew to Hanoi, where he talked about selling warplanes and other arms in a meeting with Vietnam’s leader, To Lam, general secretary of the ruling Communist Party, and also with Vietnam’s president, Luong Cuong, and the defense minister, General Phan Van Giang.

Mr. Hegseth was believed to have discussed the sale of aircraft, including transport planes and helicopters, for a regime that has been moving much closer to America in the 30 years since Hanoi formed diplomatic relations with Washington 20 years after the Vietnam War ended in 1975. Russia during the Vietnam War provided Hanoi with heavy ammunition, including short-range missiles responsible for shooting down a number of American warplanes, while China supplied rifles and machine guns.

The legacy of Vietnam hung heavy over Mr. Hegseth’s visit. As a symbol of regretful remembrance, he “returned” to Vietnam some souvenirs from a dead Communist soldier, including a belt, a knife and a leather box. Mr. Pham gave Mr. Hegseth the identification cards of two American soldiers. More significantly, they talked about measures to combat Agent Orange that was sprayed over stretches of jungle, as well as the search for missing American soldiers.

nysun.com

15. Choices of a Higher Caliber: NATO, the US Army’s New Service Rifle, and Visions of Future Warfare

The author is not talking about political conservatism here.

Conclusion:

In the end, the point of the matter is to try to clearly assess the battlefield challenges of the future and address them. If there are reasons to dismiss the M7 rifle and the general concept of a truly intermediate cartridge in order to tackle the expected conflicts of the future, these reasons should be sound and logically argued. Looking exclusively at the recent past will not cut it, nor will pretending that the current equipment is “just fine.” Unwillingness to sort out the issues that arise while pursuing technical innovation is likewise not acceptable: the risks that derive from unpreparedness are too high to allow it. Analysts and commanders must realize that continuous refusal to leave the known comfort zone of utilizing current equipment can be as much a recipe for disaster as jumping on the newest, coolest gear. In fact, while the attractiveness of new tech can also be risky, excessive conservativism can bring about the same dangers. Historically speaking, conservatism has damaged militaries – the US armed forces in particular – more than attempts at reform, especially in the field of firearms, as in the case of the .30-06 M-1 and the 7.62 M-14. This endless wait for revolutionary rather than simply evolutionary technology has stoked progress time and again, while adversaries have seized the advantage. Military leaders at all levels must strike a balance between innovation and caution, even when dealing with issues that may only seemingly be of a technical nature, because in fact service members’ lives often depend on it and because their implications can be far-reaching.

Summary:

Guido Rossi argues the U.S. Army’s adoption of the M7 rifle and 6.8x51mm cartridge reflects deeper questions about future warfare and NATO interoperability. While offering greater lethality for peer conflicts, it risks logistical strain and overreach. Balancing innovation with realism is vital—procurement choices today will shape tomorrow’s battlefield effectiveness.

Essay| The Latest

Choices of a Higher Caliber: NATO, the US Army’s New Service Rifle, and Visions of Future Warfare

by Guido Rossi

11.04.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/04/choices-of-a-higher-caliber/

Photo credit: US Army National Guard / Spc. Turner Horton

Beyond the Tactical Realm

While it is generally true that amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics, ammunition calibers is a point where the two levels of conversation meet. The adoption of a new service rifle by a branch of the US military can appear to be a topic just for grunts and gun enthusiasts. However, even minute technical aspects can suddenly acquire great importance when they concern the largest branch of the world’s most powerful military. From a deeper analytical point of view, the adoption of a new individual service weapon that utilizes a new cartridge can have profound consequences at the tactical and even operational levels. In fact, an effective weapon can make the difference between life and death for the individual soldier on the battlefield and determine success or failure for small-level units to achieve their objectives. In a snowballing fashion, tactical units’ ineffectiveness can compound to make larger units also less effective, gradually making their effects heard at the operational and even strategic levels. Logistics directly impact strategy, and the switch to a different round by the US Army affects the interoperability among the branches for combined operations and among NATO partners for joint operations. Moreover, the adoption of the M7 rifle and its unique cartridge is also a window into the procurement system of the US Military and invites reflection on how conservatism and innovation – often at odds in military culture – need to balance each other out. Most importantly, conversations over battle rifle designs and calibers are actually debates over what warfare might look like in the future and how to tackle new challenges.

In May 2025, the US Army dropped the experimental “X” designator for its newly adopted service rifle in 6.8x51mm. This signaled one more step toward its adoption for the entire branch after its selection in April 2022 during the Next Generation Squad Weapons Program (NGSW). Started in 2017, the NGSW program represented yet another attempt by the US Army to replace the 5.56 NATO caliber M4A1 carbine – the individual rifle currently in widespread service with most units. This program, in turn, was part of the never-ending quest by the US Army to find the “best” armament capable of ensuring firepower, lethality, and allowing for the optimal organization of its units from fire-teams to armies. This constant pursuit of the perfect weaponry is the same impulse that led to the adoption of the M-1 rifle in 1936, the decision to retain a large-caliber rifle in 1957 with the M-14, and, in 1965, the selection of the smaller-caliber M16 rifle, of which the currently serving M4A1 carbine is a descendant. Some of these choices proved wise moves that made the US military a more lethal force. Others proved blunders that cost money and lives. The US Army and potentially the entire US military may make another similar decision that could have momentous consequences well beyond the tactical realm.

Future warfare seems to place less and less emphasis on ground infantry combat and more on long-distance power projection; confrontation in the air and sea domains; and drone and artillery warfare in the terrestrial domain. As a result, aerial, naval, air defense, armored, artillery, and cyber defense systems should obviously be on top of the list of priorities for governments and policy-makers. Nevertheless, individual ground combat will likely continue to retain its place in the foreseeable future, as evidenced in Ukraine. Therefore, quality equipment for ground troops should not be foregone, and alongside more advanced jets, drones, and ships, the US government and military have a responsibility to shape an effective procurement system to source it.

Capricious Choices

The adoption of a new service rifle and of an entirely new ammunition is relevant also from practical and operational standpoints. In fact, no other country within NATO uses the 6.8x51mm cartridge, making shared logistics potentially difficult in case of a common conflict. The whole point of the adoption of the 5.56x45mm as standard ammunition by NATO in 1969 and, before that, the 7.62x51mm in 1954, was precisely to ensure shared logistics among its partners. The move occurred despite British (as well as American) studies showing the greater effectiveness of “intermediate” cartridges between 6.5 and 7mm caliber. Moreover, NATO’s adoption of these rounds as a common cartridge was a consequence of the US’s unequal weight among nominally equal partners. To this day, the direction that the United States takes on military matters can drive those of all the other members of the alliance.

Ideas of what warfare would be like and realities of what it actually proved to be have long driven US military procurement. The adoption of the M-14 and its powerful 7.62 cartridge by the US military in 1957 occurred due to its unshakable faith in the continued importance of marksmanship at longer ranges over firepower rates in combat. However, new realities of combat at shorter ranges against high-capacity automatic weapons in intermediate caliber in Vietnam hit the United States when faced by guerrillas armed with the AK-47 family of rifles. Therefore, in 1964, the US military quickly replaced the M-14 in Vietnam with the M-16 rifle chambered in the small-caliber .223 Remington – much smaller than the intermediate 6.5-7mm caliber rounds. The adoption of the .223 round as the new standard US cartridge in 1963 was an admission that the 7.62 had not been the appropriate choice after all. Therefore, American procurement of small arms needs to be based on realistic appraisals of future combat and account for its impact on the rest of the NATO alliance.

A Deja Vu All Over Again

Since firearms can seldom be rechambered and adapted to new caliber cartridges, the adoption of a new round typically equals the need for a new weapon specifically designed to fire it. Therefore, evaluation, design, and production (sometimes in-country) of a new individual service weapon before its adoption and issuance can consume a significant portion of a country’s military budget. It is for this reason that the switch to a smaller round in 1963 by the United States received a great deal of criticism from several NATO partners that had just adopted battle rifles in 7.62, with the 5.56 ultimately being officially adopted only in 1980.

Today, in a replay of the events of the 1960s, the adoption of the 6.8x51mm as the cartridge for the primary service rifle happens just a handful of years after some of NATO partners have adopted new or updated rifles based on the AR-15 platform in 5.56 – most notably Germany, France, and, soon, the United Kingdom. The M7 rifle and its unique caliber raised eyebrows not only from international partners but also from within the American military, since no one other than the US Army employs them. While the issue may be less relevant for branches less involved in ground combat, like the Navy and the Air Force, it greatly affects the Marine Corps, which selected the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) in 5.56 to equip most of its infantry in 2017. While interoperability and logistical issues between international partners may be detrimental, they can be extremely problematic among branches of the same military in the context of joint operations.

What Kind of Future Warfare?

At their core, ammunition choices relate to the type of warfare that a military plans on fighting. In turn, such discussions are tightly connected to historical trends of warfare. Even before World War I, some countries – including Italy and Japan – realized that the round of the standard infantry rifles was unnecessarily oversized and saw the potential in smaller cartridges to provide more ammunition and firepower with the same lethality. In the interwar era, many militaries saw the potential of repeating and semi-automatic rifles, and just prior to World War II, the US military adopted the M-1 rifle, which went on to be one of the most successful rifle designs in history. The experience of World War I showed even more clearly that soldiers on the battlefield required firepower and mobility and that intermediate caliber rounds could ensure both. It was during the interwar years that the smaller .276 (7x51mm) Pedersen cartridge gained favor in the United States. The United States, however, retained the powerful .30-06 in part due to financial considerations and in part to ensure ammunition interoperability between rifles and machine guns at the small unit level. Behind this choice, however, was most of all the continued importance placed by traditional doctrine on marksmanship for an idealized open warfare. In other words, in the mid-1930s, the M-1 rifle seemed to provide exactly the greater firepower the US military needed, while the .30-06 was the powerful cartridge it thought was necessary.

In part, the adoption of the new 6.8x51mm round today comes as the answer to complaints by US military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan that the 5.56 NATO of their AR-15 platforms lacked stopping power. Recent studies confirmed previous findings that intermediate cartridges between 6.5 and 7mm and larger than 5.56 NATO provide optimal performance for lethality. Other complaints – although not widely shared by veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq – were also that the 5.56 NATO rounds lacked the range sometimes required in medium and long-range engagements there. It is notable that the 6.8x51mm cartridge resembles the Italian and Japanese cartridges of the World War II era and before, long identified as the ideal caliber to ensure performance and lethality at both close- and mid-ranges. In any case, post-WWII studies evidenced that the ranges at which most soldiers could see enemy combatants standing up were less than 300 yards for seventy percent of the time, and less than 700 yards for ninety percent of the time, meaning that only in ten percent of cases could soldiers see standing human bodies at distances greater than 700 yards. In other words, soldiers typically would be unable to even spot enemy soldiers beyond 700 yards, let alone successfully shoot at them.

Nevertheless, the implementation of an optical sight – an NGSW requirement from the start – can greatly correct the limitations of human eyesight and extend the ranges of feasible engagements. Matthew Ford, associate professor at the Swedish Defence University, points out in a recent article that this comes at a significant cost and weight gain for the individual load carried by a soldier, something very problematic when combined with a larger army of draftees needed in case of a peer-to-peer conflict – exactly what the 6.8x51mm round is designed for. Additionally, Ford highlights that its higher penetrative power of the new round might not be useful in fighting enemy insurgents not equipped with ballistic protection. However, the assumption that future conflicts will continue to be low-intensity wars and insurgencies may not prove true. Surely, Ford accurately highlights the stress under which the British Ministry of Defence, for one, is for other procurement and supply issues. The selection of a new caliber that would demand the rehauling of the entire ammunition production and supply line (not to mention the adoption or design of an entirely new weapon system) would be enormously problematic for it, as well as for other NATO militaries. This is, however, a self-inflicted wound as a result of historically inadequate defense budgets and neglect of the defense industry by many NATO countries. In fact, small arms and ammunition production do not seem to be points of concern for the United States as they are for the UK and other allies.

International security expert Alan Orr has forcefully argued that the Army’s shift to the 6.8x51mm round represents a move to the other end of the spectrum from the 5.56 NATO and the scenario of counterinsurgency. Considering that the 6.8x51mm is precisely the type of intermediate cartridge that American, British, and European militaries and firearms experts have been asking for since the 1930s as the most appropriate for most types of engagements, Orr surely must have been thinking of the full-size 7.62 NATO round that was adopted instead. Writing in 2022, he observed that Russia has not issued standard body armor to its soldiers in Ukraine, which is only a partial truth that tells us nothing about the kits issued to the Chinese military.

A Circuitous Procurement Process

The development and adoption of the M7 after several previous attempts with promising prototypes (the XM8 and the SCAR) that eventually did not replace the AR-15 platform in US Army service occurred during years of almost frenetic adoption of other equipment, including the SIG Sauer M-17 service pistol in 2017, the Barrett MK 22 Precision Sniper Rifle in 2021, and, very recently, the M250 Squad Automatic Weapon (also by SIG) in 2025. This flurry of adoptions comes after decades of sluggish research, development, and evaluation programs characterized by red-tape-induced cost-overruns and timelines so stretched out that the technologies being developed were outdated before they could be adopted. This occurred precisely because simplified acquisition programs and streamlined research processes were activated to avoid these overly complicated and lengthy routes. So far – as in the case of the new sidearm, sniper rifle, and, it seems, the freshly adopted SAW – this approach has paid off with weapons that are an improvement over their predecessor. Nevertheless, the checks and mandated waiting periods that mark research, development, and evaluation programs are intended to prevent the rushed adoption of equipment liable to cost tremendous amounts of money for little advantage, at best, or negative consequences, at worst.

The jury is still out on the M7 rifle. However, the concerns that several analysts and firearms experts have expressed over the months have recently been revived just last May with the publication of a scathing report on the M7 rifle by Braden Trent, a US Army infantry officer currently attending the Marine Corps University’s Expeditionary Warfare School. More than the rifle’s technical issues, evidenced in Trent’s report – typical of any weapon still under development – disturbing is the Army Captain’s criticism that the combat philosophy behind the rifle and its cartridge is outdated. Trent maintains that expectations that US personnel will be facing enemy combatants wearing ballistic protection have been disproven in Ukraine, and that experiences there did not show the need for a more powerful round for engagements at longer range. He also suggested that simple measures like the adoption of armor-piercing 5.56 NATO rounds could simply solve the difficulty of penetrating enemy ballistic protections if they showed up, although they would not increase the range. Additionally, the round proposed, specifically, called M955 Armor Piercing, is several tens, if not hundreds, of times more expensive than the standard 5.56 M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round because it contains a tungsten carbide core, the supply of which could be problematic, considering that China is its largest supplier in the world. Interviews with US Army personnel currently testing the rifle in Trent’s report also indicated that the heavier weight of the rifle, moreover, negatively impacts shooters’ performance at both shorter and closer ranges. Although Sig Sauer seems to have addressed the weight issue by reducing the weight of the rifle by nearly a pound in October 2025, this does not increase the number of 6.8x51mm ammo soldiers will be able to carry. Soldiers in Trent’s report felt limited in the firepower they were able to provide with an ammunition combat load of just 140 rounds compared to the 210 5.56 NATO rounds they could carry if armed with the current M4A1 carbine. It cannot be denied that a more limited ammunition can negatively impact small-unit effectiveness by making it difficult to provide suppressive fire, the pillar of modern fire & maneuver small unit tactics.

Reading the Tea Leaves of Future Warfare

Like in 1936, 1957, and 1965, the US Army is at a crossroads with a question that is perhaps technical in nature but reflective of wider considerations of the type of warfare it expects to fight. The answers to this question will affect the other service branches, as well as America’s allies. Much like when the US adopted the M-1 and the M-16, the choice it will make may prove to be the right one. However, it may also turn out to be the wrong choice, as it was in the case of the M-14.

No matter what, it is absolutely crucial to ensure that the research, development, and evaluation process for the M-7 rifle, while not being hampered by red tape, is also as careful and transparent as it could possibly be. In terms of what kind of weapon will be needed, as with any armament, obtaining the perfect rifle and cartridge for all types of combat is not possible. The search for a weapon that could somewhat perform in any situation could lead to producing a weapon that is truly satisfactory in none. As a result, the best bet is to prepare for the worst-case battle scenario and select weapons that can best deal with it, as well as, if needed, with less likely different ones. Sticking with the AR-15 platform and the 5.56 NATO cartridge would mean continuing to embrace a specific end of the spectrum of warfare of low-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency. There is something to be said about gearing up for the conflicts one expects to fight rather than the ones just fought, even if the process is sometimes more akin to reading tea leaves than making surely accurate predictions. According to most analysts, the tea leaves are pointing at conflicts with near-peers – most likely Russia and China – whose soldiers could be wearing ballistic protection in the worst-case scenario, regardless of whether they currently are or not. Additionally, engagements occurring at medium ranges between 300 and 500 yards, already frequent in the years of counter-insurgency, are, if anything, more likely to take place in the case of peer-to-peer conflict. The M7 rifle (paired with the M250 SAW chambered in the same cartridge), equipped with fire control optical systems that extend the limitations of the human eye and assist in aim and firing an intermediate 6.8x51mm round capable of reaching and defeating ballistic protection at mid-ranges, seems the best bet for such near-peer wars. The American All-Volunteer Force is not a conscript force but rather a professional fighting force that the American public must be willing to equip with top-of-the-line gear to increase their effectiveness, including expensive optical systems for their rifles. While a draft and the recruitment of a conscript force might be necessary in an all-out fight against an enemy superpower, the current force – if necessary, through additional training – is capable of handling more complicated, expensive, delicate weapons as long as the advantages are unmistakably there.

In the end, the point of the matter is to try to clearly assess the battlefield challenges of the future and address them. If there are reasons to dismiss the M7 rifle and the general concept of a truly intermediate cartridge in order to tackle the expected conflicts of the future, these reasons should be sound and logically argued. Looking exclusively at the recent past will not cut it, nor will pretending that the current equipment is “just fine.” Unwillingness to sort out the issues that arise while pursuing technical innovation is likewise not acceptable: the risks that derive from unpreparedness are too high to allow it. Analysts and commanders must realize that continuous refusal to leave the known comfort zone of utilizing current equipment can be as much a recipe for disaster as jumping on the newest, coolest gear. In fact, while the attractiveness of new tech can also be risky, excessive conservativism can bring about the same dangers. Historically speaking, conservatism has damaged militaries – the US armed forces in particular – more than attempts at reform, especially in the field of firearms, as in the case of the .30-06 M-1 and the 7.62 M-14. This endless wait for revolutionary rather than simply evolutionary technology has stoked progress time and again, while adversaries have seized the advantage. Military leaders at all levels must strike a balance between innovation and caution, even when dealing with issues that may only seemingly be of a technical nature, because in fact service members’ lives often depend on it and because their implications can be far-reaching.

Tags: Future warfare, M7 Rifle, NATO, US Army

About The Author

Guido Rossi
Guido Rossi (B.A. University of Milan, 2014; M.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 2017; Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 2023) is currently a Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute, University of South Florida. A trained military historian with an interest in modern US military history, particularly in its intersection with social and cultural history, he researches Civil-Military Relations, personnel policy, procurement and technological innovation in the US military.

16. One + One = Zero? The Challenge of Battle Networks and Parallel Command Structures in a Bilateral Fight

Graphic at the link.

Excerpt:

A Way Forward

Bilateral forces can work through these identified problems through robust field training exercises, command post exercises, and wargames. In the right environment, the partnered commanders and staffs learn, understand, and execute. Target priority lists may differ between each nation’s JTF but exercises identified those differences and enable each command to know how to work with those differences. The bilateral force shares a common intelligence picture with reciprocity rights for subordinate units to edit tracks and populate those tracks on it. Further, the bilateral force shares and accepts an understanding of the prosecution of targets according to national priorities. Within the communications element a redundant and resilient plan is built and rehearsed allowing data to flow through primary, alternate, and contingency modes. Policy barriers to data exchange were identified during field training exercises and the right authorities requested at the onset of the crisis. The process elements conducting tracking and targeting are geographically separated but the previous rehearsals identified exchange requirements for liaison officers and subject matter experts. Each targeting team understands the strengths and weaknesses of the bilateral force effects elements. The right type of weapon is allocated to the target to minimize excess munition expenditure. A common logistics operating picture informs the target cell and the commander where the critical munitions are and when the next resupply can arrive. The current operational picture and risk to future missions inform the current fire mission. This leaves the commander with a very different end state than the opening vignette.

Summary:

Parallel command structures in U.S.-ally bilateral fights impede kill chains: misaligned priorities, incompatible ISR, split communications, separate targeting lists, and mismatched battlespace divisions cause redundant strikes and missed opportunities. Logistics opacity increases risk. Remedy: rigorous practical exercises, shared intelligence picture, resilient comms, and a common logistics picture to synchronize effects.

One + One = Zero? The Challenge of Battle Networks and Parallel Command Structures in a Bilateral Fight - Modern War Institute

Scott Blyleven, Benjamin Van Horrick, Jennifer Adams, Jill Dugan and Ricardo Bitanga | 11.04.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · Scott Blyleven · November 4, 2025

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/one-one-zero-the-challenge-of-battle-networks-and-parallel-command-structures-in-a-bilateral-fight/

A week ago, the crisis became an armed conflict. The United States formed a joint task force and led a coalition of allies and partners, with the JTF establishing a joint operating area and assigned battlespace and authorities to subordinate task forces. However, due to national policy some of the battlespace was designated a bilateral operating area, in which the partner forces operated within a parallel command structure. Coordination centers were established to generate unity of effort, in the absence of unity of command. However, kill chains were not being closed. Bilateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets remained misunderstood, preventing integration. With no common intelligence picture, forces could not pass target custody. Several engagements were successful but came at a high cost in munition expenditure due to redundant targeting.

Individually, each nation had a plan to deliver lethal and nonlethal effects. But the bilateral efforts remained asynchronous.

The result: friendly losses and missed opportunities to defeat the adversary.

The vignette is not speculative fiction; it is the operational reality in the Pacific. A potential fight in that region will hinge on America and its allies’ ability to construct a bilateral battle network. The opening and closing of kill chains are complicated by parallel command structures, where countries retain command and control of their forces. These considerations, coupled with the decades-long work of building battle networks, can now move planning concepts to realized capabilities in the Pacific. In 2021, Todd Harrison, then a director and senior fellow at CSIS, identified five functional elements that comprise a battle network. The elements included sensor, communications, processing, decision, and effects. This battle network is another way to describe kill chains or a reconnaissance-strike network. While the crux of Harrison’s article was an examination of a unilateral US battle network, when we place the discussion in the context of bilateral (or multilateral) combat operations, we discover that battle networks organized in a parallel command structure will face substantial barriers hindering the completion of a dynamic targeting cycle. Against the backdrop of looming threats in the region and a significant shift in the United States’ expectations of its regional allies, building bilateral battle networks is now imperative.

The current under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, has outlined a pivot to the Indo-Pacific through an increase in resources as part of a vision to bolster partnerships and counter China’s influence. At the same time, there have been calls for partners and allies in the region to increase their defense spending, making security relationships more equitable. Amid these shifts, it is important to account for existing command structures. During Colby’s confirmation hearings in March, he “expressed [skepticism] of a ‘NATO-like alliance’ in the Indo-Pacific, preferring more tailored bilateral relationships.” This opens the possibility that each tailored bilateral relationship will operate under a different multinational command structure. In multiple conflicts, US forces have operated in an integrated or a lead-nation command. However, Joint Publication 3-16 identifies the parallel command structure as a third option. In a parallel command, the bilateral force does not reside under a single commander; each nation retains command authority and the two nations synchronize actions through coordination centers. In this arrangement, the battlespace may be a bilateral operating area without neat lines or clear delineations of responsibilities between commanders. But how do the five elements of a battle network operate in a parallel command structure?

Sensor Element

The sensor element includes the assets that conduct the first two steps of the targeting cycle, find and fix. Assuming the bilateral sensors can detect, characterize, and confirm potential targets, the parallel command structure will still degrade the bilateral force’s ability to complete the kill chain, for two main reasons. First, the asset in the sensor element needs to be tasked and positioned, but priorities may not be aligned between the bilateral force. In a lead-nation or integrated command structure, the single commander can task the assets, which is not necessarily the case in a parallel command structure. This can lead to a mismatch of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the battlespace, redundancy, or gaps—even if there are sufficient means. Bilateral priority intelligence requirements could help to solve the problem of what to prioritize, and these should be drawn from existing unilateral priorities and not generated independently.

Second, there is the question of whether the transmission of data can create a common intelligence picture. This question appears to blend into the processing element and the ability to fuse the data, but it directly affects the number and types of sensors that need to be applied to a target. If the bilateral force cannot share track data, will two sensors be required to provide target-quality data to the effects element? The requirement of passing digital tracks may not be unique to a parallel command structure, but having two separate intelligence pictures in different intelligence operations centers is.

Communications Element

There is no dedicated step in the dynamic targeting process associated with the communications element. However, the communications element underpins every step. With US systems, there are issues with data sharing across different systems. However, the parallel command structure exacerbates this condition. Is the bilateral force sharing transmission methods within the communications element or are efforts duplicated? Is the data passed from the sensor to the processing element shared instantaneously or is there a gap caused by hardware, software, or policy? If the shared communications element cannot create a single mesh network, then the communications from sensors to processing elements will also double—not in a redundant or self-healing fashion, but rather with each communications element passing its own data in unilateral chains. The two unilateral chains then rely on coordination centers at echelon that exchange the information with written notes in a swivel chair fashion.

Activity in the communications element also creates targeting data for the adversary. The parallel commands increase the number of command-and-control nodes that are passing and receiving data while also generating an additional information exchange requirement for the partner commands to synchronize actions. Further, the two commands operating within the same battlespace may not be operating under the same signature management conditions to limit emissions.

Processing and Decision Elements

The processing element comprises the cells and centers necessary to conduct the tracking and targeting functions. Here, too, the challenge arises from a lack of unity of command. It is possible for there now to be two priority target lists, one for each commander. Within the targeting step, multiple assets may need to be coordinated to maintain the continuity of the track and custody of the target. In a contested environment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will be at a premium and those assets must be prioritized. However, there is not a single commander that can prioritize those assets.

During the targeting phase of a dynamic targeting cycle, options for weapons are selected, the battlespace is deconflicted, and risk is assessed. Except, under a parallel command structure, the centers need to manage this fight bilaterally. Based on the weapons available, how are targets matched to the available weapons with a coordinated time on target? A conflict exists if the target is a high-payoff target for one commander but not the other. The maximum benefit may be achieved with a bilateral and joint strike capability to strike the adversary from multiple directions with different types of munitions and effects. However, the joint and bilateral strike may come at the cost of time—a distinct disadvantage when the ability to maintain the target track is fleeting.

In an ideal situation, the respective targeting centers are geographically colocated. The cost to coordinate tracking and targeting is measured in time and work at additional boards, bureaus, and working groups. However, if the centers are not geographically located then there will be an increased burden on the communications element. Additionally, if we trace back to the sensor element, what if the sensor data cannot be shared and there is no common intelligence picture? Liaisons can be in place to pass information but at best this challenge will slow down the system. At worst, some tracks may be redundantly targeted while others have no weapons allocated against them.

In a simplified sense, the decision element is the commander. In a unilateral command, the commander approves the plan developed by the processing element and the orders are transmitted to firing agencies generating lethal and nonlethal effects. However, within the parallel command structure, the two commanders may or may not agree on the plan.

The Battlespace Conundrum

In addition to the complications posed by parallel command structures to the various elements of a battle network, there is an additional challenge that arises by battlespace division. Consider figure 1 below. The battlespace is arranged so that the partners at echelon share the same area of operations. Target one is in JTF battlespace for both countries. The JTF elements conduct the targeting cycle, coordinate at echelon with one another, and engage the target. Similarly, the two corps headquarters complete the cycle for target two.

Now consider figure 2. The partner assigns battlespace based on the maximum effective range of its fires, resulting in an arc, while the United States assigns it linearly. The battlespace is no longer neat and areas of operation no longer match each other. The process for targets one and two remains as it did in figure 1 but now targets three and four have emerged as new combinations, with a JTF headquarters prosecuting targets with a partner’s subordinate headquarters. While not an impossible problem to solve, the new possibilities increase layers and slow the kill chain.

Figure 1

Figure 2

And Then There’s Logistics

Harrison’s model is a powerful means of envisioning various elements of battle networks, but it gave little attention to the role of logistics and sustainment. Logistics is not only an enabler but connects all operational functions. In a bilateral context, mutual support and reliance upon partners not only extend capabilities and accelerate the targeting cycle but also build trust. The high demand for munitions coupled with complex movement requirements impose constraints on the availability and accessibility of shared ammunition stocks. In the parallel structure, additional risk is added to the commanders due to a lack of a common logistics operating picture. Logisticians must be able to clearly articulate the resource demands and limitations associated with each function of the bilateral battle network. Only with this understanding can commanders accurately assess operational feasibility to support the bilateral force.

A Way Forward

Bilateral forces can work through these identified problems through robust field training exercises, command post exercises, and wargames. In the right environment, the partnered commanders and staffs learn, understand, and execute. Target priority lists may differ between each nation’s JTF but exercises identified those differences and enable each command to know how to work with those differences. The bilateral force shares a common intelligence picture with reciprocity rights for subordinate units to edit tracks and populate those tracks on it. Further, the bilateral force shares and accepts an understanding of the prosecution of targets according to national priorities. Within the communications element a redundant and resilient plan is built and rehearsed allowing data to flow through primary, alternate, and contingency modes. Policy barriers to data exchange were identified during field training exercises and the right authorities requested at the onset of the crisis. The process elements conducting tracking and targeting are geographically separated but the previous rehearsals identified exchange requirements for liaison officers and subject matter experts. Each targeting team understands the strengths and weaknesses of the bilateral force effects elements. The right type of weapon is allocated to the target to minimize excess munition expenditure. A common logistics operating picture informs the target cell and the commander where the critical munitions are and when the next resupply can arrive. The current operational picture and risk to future missions inform the current fire mission. This leaves the commander with a very different end state than the opening vignette.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Blyleven is the III Marine Expeditionary Force director of deliberate plans. He previously served as the 3D Marine Expeditionary Brigade Japan plans officer, during which time the brigade executed five major exercises with elements from the Japan Ground Self Defense Force and rehearsed bilateral operations in a parallel command structure.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick currently serves at the Department of Defense Inspector General. During the 3D Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s bilateral exercises with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, he was the brigade’s current logistics officer.

Major Jennifer Adams is the 3D Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s communications planner.

Captain Jill Dugan is the 3D Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s collections officer.

Major Ricardo Bitanga is the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s fires planner for Japan operations.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Marcos A. Alvarado, US Marine Corps

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Scott Blyleven · November 4, 2025

17. Palantir Revenue Climbs to Another Record as Defense Work Booms

Summary:

Palantir posted record Q3 revenue of $1.18B, up 63%, with $475.6M profit. U.S. government sales rose 52% to $486M; U.S. commercial revenue hit $397M. It raised 2025 guidance to ~$4.4B and touted deals with IRS, State, and Nvidia. Shares hit records despite valuation skepticism; 530 U.S. commercial clients and overseas.

Palantir Revenue Climbs to Another Record as Defense Work Booms

WSJ

Data-analytics company says its third-quarter sales totaled $1.18 billion, up 63% year over year

Updated Nov. 3, 2025 6:58 pm ET

Palantir sells software to manage and analyze large amounts of data. arnd wiegmann/Reuters

Palantir Technologies PLTR 3.35%increase; green up pointing triangle reported another quarter of record revenue on Monday, propelled by a surge in new customers flocking to buy artificial-intelligence technology from one of the hottest names on Wall Street.

The data-analytics company said it had $1.18 billion in sales for the third quarter, a year-over-year gain of 63%, and a net profit of $475.6 million. Both came in ahead of analyst expectations.

Palantir PLTR 3.35%increase; green up pointing triangle stock rose to another record high Monday after notching successive new gains for about the past two weeks. Shares have more than doubled this year.

“It is worth remembering that the business is now producing more profit in a single quarter than it did in revenue not long ago,” Chief Executive Alex Karp wrote in a letter accompanying the earnings release.

Palantir CEO Alex Karp andrew caballero-reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

Revenue from U.S. government contracts was $486 million, popping 52% from the same quarter the prior year and beating analyst expectations. Sales to U.S. commercial customers were $397 million, more than double a year earlier.

Palantir raised its revenue guidance to between $4.396 to $4.400 billion for the full year, up from $4.14 billion to $4.15 billion. The company provided guidance that its U.S. commercial business would more than double, to $1.433 billion.

The Denver-based company, which sells software to centralize, manage and analyze large amounts of data, has been riding artificial-intelligence-driven momentum that has pushed its share price ever higher. The company’s newfound cachet in Washington has helped it gain more government contracts, including in recent weeks a $100 million contract with the Internal Revenue Service and a $400 million award from the State Department.

The company last week announced a partnership with Nvidia that would involve using state-of-the-art AI chips to enable Palantir’s software to run faster. It is the latest in a string of corporate partnerships Palantir has announced as it aims to expand its commercial and defense offerings, and propel the growth needed to begin to justify its $491 billion market capitalization.

Many analysts still balk at Palantir’s valuation. In a note to clients last week, RBC Capital Markets wrote: “We cannot rationalize why Palantir is the most expensive name in our software coverage.”

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

What is your outlook for Palantir? Join the conversation below.

In a call with investors Monday, Karp blasted Palantir skeptics as out-of-touch elites. “We were right, you were wrong and we are going to go very, very deep on our rightness,” he said.

Palantir has doubled down on signing more commercial customers to provide growth and balance the lumpiness of government contracts. On Monday, the company said it had 530 U.S. commercial clients.

Although the U.S. provides the majority of its business, Palantir is also seeking growth overseas, with new business in the U.K., Poland, Saudi Arabia and Ecuador. Europe’s push to rearm in the face of Russia’s aggression has been a boon for Palantir’s defense business in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries.

Write to Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 4, 2025, print edition as 'Revenue Hits a Record at Palantir As Government Contracts Boom'.

WSJ

18. The Coming Wave: Chinese Doctrine on the Tabletop?

Okay, sounds good. For big battles in the air and on land and on (and under and over) the sea that is.

Wargaming is complex and this is very much needed.

But I don't see anything about unrestricted warfare and the three warfare which certainly will be setting the conditions for these big battles (if not trying to win by subversion to avoid those big battles).

Excerpt:

The Chinese wargaming community is closely connected with the Chinese military, with events like national wargaming competitions including teams from state military schools and serving as a test bed for doctrine. The Coming Wave is unique in that it is the first domestically designed Chinese wargame produced for a domestic audience that addresses modern conflict, including scenarios of an invasion of Taiwan and war on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, The Coming Wave provides an interactive interpretation of how China might apply multi-domain precision warfare in a future conflict

Summary:

The Coming Wave, a Chinese wargame modeling “multi-domain precision warfare,” reveals how Beijing envisions AI-driven, system-of-systems conflict integrating all domains. Yet it exposes China’s weakness, igid, top-down command slows decisions. U.S. and allied forces employing decentralized mission command can outpace Chinese reactions, exploiting this doctrinal vulnerability in future Taiwan or regional conflicts.

The Coming Wave: Chinese Doctrine on the Tabletop?

Cornell Fuka

November 4, 2025

warontherocks.com · November 4, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-coming-wave-chinese-doctrine-on-the-tabletop/

As China modernizes its military for a forceful reunification with Taiwan, U.S. planners continue to seek insight into how the People’s Liberation Army will implement its core operational concept. While exercises and translated academic writings provide some understanding, The Coming Wave (明日浪潮), a commercial wargame by Kilovolt Studios, provides a unique opportunity to experience multi-domain precision warfare from a Chinese perspective. In providing this perspective, it exposes a weakness inherent in Chinese doctrine: Planners and units facing China who reduce the level of decision-making authority and embrace the principles of mission command will react and generate effects faster than Chinese planners anticipate.

BECOME A MEMBER

China’s Vision for War on the Tabletop

“Multi-domain precision warfare” (多域精确战) is the core operational concept for China’s military. Originating in 2021, it intends to “leverage a [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] network” to “rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.” In addition to its widespread adoption in China’s military, multi-domain precision warfare has begun to affect the peripheral cultures outside but closely related to the military, including the small but growing community of wargamers.

The Chinese wargaming community is closely connected with the Chinese military, with events like national wargaming competitions including teams from state military schools and serving as a test bed for doctrine. The Coming Wave is unique in that it is the first domestically designed Chinese wargame produced for a domestic audience that addresses modern conflict, including scenarios of an invasion of Taiwan and war on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, The Coming Wave provides an interactive interpretation of how China might apply multi-domain precision warfare in a future conflict

The professional framework of multi-domain precision warfare permeates The Coming Wave’s commercial design (which I review in more detail in Paxsims) including explicit references in the design notes, indicating that this core concept has been widely adopted outside of the academic circles of the People’s Liberation Army. However, as The Coming Wave is a commercial product, it is best utilized as an insight into how some Chinese planners and academics understand multi-domain precision warfare, rather than proof of specific doctrinal assumptions and applications. Included in this insight is the role of platforms within a system of systems, the utilization of joint fires, the importance placed on the level of a unit’s technology integration, and how units that have a technological disadvantage but take initiative may disrupt the plans of Chinese forces. The Coming Wave seeks to model the evolution of conflict from the Cold War doctrine of massed battles into the multi-domain operations of modern war. When elaborating his design philosophy, the designer of the game Zhou Tianze describes how current Western-designed wargames, such as Next War or Asian Fleet, fail to model modern conflict accurately. He states that current modern wargames are stuck in a “Western mentality,” meaning that they focus primarily on land-based maneuver warfare, with other domains serving supporting roles, if they are represented at all. Zhou then posits, similarly to the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army when designing multi-domain precision warfare, that a fundamental shift in design is needed, one that emphasizes the electromagnetic environment and the importance of “the two dimensions of detection and strike.” This design commentary reinforces that The Coming Wave is intended to be a wargame that illustrates and embodies the principles of multi-domain precision warfare, providing the players the opportunity to test the framework for themselves.

A central component of China’s multi-domain precision warfare is the concept of system on system confrontation, which involves multiple networked systems working together to achieve information dominance. The goal of this networking is to achieve coherent joint operations so that the combined forces are “greater than the sum of its subsystem parts,” or put simply, “1+1>2.” The Coming Wave illustrates how some in China may perceive this through its representation of the units themselves in the context of its “detection-strike” mechanics. In The Coming Wave, great emphasis is placed on the fact that every unit is a sensor first and can share data with other units to coordinate joint firepower strikes. The best example of this emphasis is in the depiction of naval units and task forces. All naval units have the same number of strikes they can launch against air and ground targets, regardless of the tonnage or specific weaponry of the combatant represented. This means that a Chinese Type 055 destroyer may conduct as many attacks as a U.S. Constellation-class frigate, even though in real life these combatants vary greatly in their weaponry and magazine depths. The Coming Wave instead models their differences in their detection capabilities, with the Type 055 able to detect naval units farther out. In the greater context, this portrayal reveals a stark contrast in how assets are utilized by the U.S. and Chinese militaries.

To U.S. planners, a Type 055 destroyer is considered a capital ship and a target to be prioritized due to its wide range of capabilities. Some Chinese planners, as portrayed in The Coming Wave, view the Type 055 as a node and sensor first, with strike capabilities as a secondary, yet important, function. This indicates to planners that information synthesis nodes, such as command and communication centers, should take higher priority than leading-edge assets traditionally classified as high value, such as the Type 055.

The sensor-shooter dynamic is further reinforced by the importance of joint firepower strikes, both in multi-domain precision warfare and The Coming Wave. Chinese writing has described joint strike operations as central to a conflict over Taiwan, and joint strikes feature prominently in military exercises. This nests with the doctrine of system on system confrontation, as these strikes seek to rapidly destroy an enemy’s will and ability to fight via simultaneous air-, sea-, and land-based attacks. Within The Coming Wave, players may experience the importance of these strikes themselves, as they cause outsized amounts of damage on enemy forces with minimal use of command power. Furthermore, these strikes capitalize on the use of tactical aircraft and ships as distributed sensors to find enemy centers of gravity, as they can use assets from every domain — such as strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, tactical aircraft and ships — to mass fires. This portrayal of the system on system confrontation aspect of multi-domain precision warfare helps to illustrate the greater doctrine as a whole and provides the opportunity for players to experiment with its implementation. Specifically, planners may wish to experiment with how far down joint firepower assets may be allocated, so that an appropriate level of firepower may be used by commanders closer to the leading edge of the fight. For instance, should a commander of a forward-positioned brigade be delegated authority over joint strike assets, rather than a component headquarters? This shift would require significant advanced planning but would result in a shortened Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop, or the ability of a unit or leader to react to new circumstances, that would provide an advantage as both sides race to collect, synthesize, and act on information. At the very least, the joint forces commander should ensure that their critical and time-sensitive targets are cleared down to the lowest possible level and allow lower level commanders broader authority in assigning forces to targets or missions, so that they gain the advantage in the reaction competition.

Informatization features prominently in Chinese doctrine and is given great deference in The Coming Wave. Within Chinese doctrine, they distinguish between “informatization,” which is the proliferation of technology to operational units that creates a system of systems, and “intelligentization,” or the use of AI and other cutting-edge technology to enable decision-making at every level. Chinese doctrine states that informatization has become “a dominant essential factor that commands material and energy.” Furthermore, the Chinese military believes that success in future conflicts depends “on the acquisition and dissemination of vast quantities of high-fidelity information using advanced information technology and automated command systems.” To achieve this goal, the Chinese military is currently adopting AI in support roles and is developing new technologies and doctrines for military use. This drive towards informatization serves the greater goal of achieving joint operations, so that multiple domains may be brought to bear and achieve an effect on another. In The Coming Wave, the designers implement this concept thoroughly. All units are rated based on informatization, and the impact is most stark on the ground units. Ground units with minimal informatization, regardless of size or weaponry, are inflexible and unable to maneuver effectively, whereas units with high informatization are extremely valuable, able to maneuver freely, and are more effective at detection. In practice, this raises an interesting dynamic: While large, heavily armed ground forces can cause great damage when they engage enemy forces, it is difficult for them to reach an engagement and are often degraded before they arrive. Smaller, more modern units better serve as a node for sensing and coordinating fires. This portrayal highlights how some Chinese planners account for less modern forces: While their firepower may be formidable on paper, the lack of modernization makes them irrelevant when fighting a smaller but more integrated force. In turn, this leaves their plans vulnerable to less-informatized units that enact the principles of mission command and utilize initiative to act in the absence of direction from higher headquarters.

Multi-domain precision warfare seeks to minimize the slower OODA loop resulting from the doctrine of top-down control in the People’s Liberation Army. While multi-domain precision warfare and the broader goal of informatization may expedite the flow of information up and down the chain of command, those with command authority remain at higher echelons, and subordinates are rarely empowered or encouraged to take initiative. While the People’s Liberation Army has discussed and experimented with allowing some autonomy, there is no evidence of it being widespread, and it directly conflicts with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s vision for the military. This contrasts heavily with the U.S. military, where subordinates are encouraged to make their own decisions to achieve the commander’s intent in a decentralized command structure as outlined in Army, Navy, and Air Force doctrine. The U.S. Army’s doctrine on mission command explicitly states the following: “Subordinates do not wait for a breakdown in communications or a crisis to learn how to act within the commander’s intent. Subordinates look for every opportunity to demonstrate and exercise initiative.” This level of authority delegated to junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and junior enlisted soldiers is unheard of in most units of the Chinese military. This absence is felt in The Coming Wave as well, as the less informatized Taiwanese units have little ability to act or react, even though current trends in the Taiwanese army indicate that units are moving towards greater decentralization of command and control. While these units may not be able to react as effectively as a heavily “informatized” unit, they would still be able to carry out orders with a commander’s intent, increasing their mobility and initiative in response to an invasion. Expediting the implementation of these principles in the Taiwanese military and continuing to reinforce their importance in the U.S. military will provide an edge in future conflicts with top-down directed militaries like the Chinese.

The omission of any formal reference to mission command in multi-domain precision warfare and Chinese doctrine is especially interesting when considering large-scale joint operations like a contested amphibious landing. Mission command proved essential to success during the amphibious landings at Normandy, one of the only operations of comparable size to a potential invasion of Taiwan. On Omaha Beach, small groups of disorganized soldiers formed assault groups that breached the defenses, often without explicit orders from officers higher than company-grade. At Utah Beach, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt decided to advance inland even though he landed 2,000 yards south of the landing zone. These decisions, made in the absence of higher headquarters, enabled the success of the greater operation. By refusing to incorporate this approach, the People’s Liberation Army limits how much they can reduce their OODA loop, as they can only expedite the flow of information up to the decision maker. By reducing the level at which decisions are made and reinforcing the culture of mission command, the United States and its allies may shorten the loop in two stages: reducing how far the information must flow and reducing the time it takes to synthesize and transmit guidance up and down the chain of command.

To experience how this change in doctrine would affect the battle, strategists may modify the rules in The Coming Wave to account for a more mission command-oriented force and compare the results of the games they play with the modified rules to the rules that exemplify multi-domain precision warfare. In doing so, they may gain firsthand insight into how doctrinal changes affect the greater battle and find further weaknesses in Chinese doctrine. It would therefore be worthwhile for military organizations that focus on red teaming, such as the Air University’s Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute, or professional military educational facilities, such as the Naval War College, to obtain, translate, and use The Coming Wave. This would provide them the capability to both gain a greater understanding of the Chinese doctrine of multi-domain precision warfare and to experiment with implementing plans to counter Chinese doctrine. In doing so, these institutions will gain an experiential learning tool to augment their capabilities and understanding, in turn providing a greater understanding of the forces they seek to represent and plan against.

As planners prepare for future conflict against the People’s Liberation Army, they should gain an in-depth understanding of how China will fight future conflicts to find and exploit its weaknesses. The Coming Wave provides a unique and interactive approach to understanding and experimenting with the Chinese core operational concept, as its design is based on the principles that define multi-domain precision warfare. Through the emphasis of system on system confrontation, informatization, and joint strikes, The Coming Wave demonstrates how crucial these principles are to Chinese planners. However, The Coming Wave also exposes an inherent weakness of Chinese doctrine to the Western principles of mission command. Units which take initiative and allow leaders to assume risk act and react faster than Chinese planners expect, causing significant disruption to Chinese planning. In turn, this requires high-level Chinese leadership to intervene and lengthens the Chinese OODA loop, providing an advantage to those fighting against them. Planners preparing for future conflict and those seeking a better understanding of Chinese doctrine, including professional military educational institutions, should obtain and translate a copy so that students and strategists can experiment using their plans in The Coming Wave. By doing so, they will gain a greater understanding of how to win a future conflict with China, without having to rely solely on the traditional analysis from exercises and translated doctrine.

BECOME A MEMBER

Louis “Cornell” Fuka is the lead wargame designer and analyst at SURVICE Engineering, specializing in developing educational and digital wargames. Previously, he served as an artillery officer in the U.S. Army. The views expressed here are his own and not those of SURVICE Engineering or any of its clients.

The author thanks Kevin Malmquist of the U.S. Army, Jennifer Thurman of the U.S. Air Force, Philip Bolger-Cortez, Mike Bradley, Thomas Barnaby, and Benjamin Scheppke for their insights, expertise, and editorial assistance.

Image: China News Service via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · November 4, 2025

19. Proxy Armies and Principal–Agent Problems: A Review of Militias in Eastern Ukraine

The human domain.

Excerpts:

Describing the shaky trajectory of rebel groups in the Donbas from disorganized, chaotic militias into fragmented rebel groups and finally into proxy agents under the control of principals delegated by the Kremlin, Laryš brings his book to a close with an ominous warning: this analysis is likely to have lasting insights due to Putin’s designs on other countries in the region. It is plausible to expect similar involvement in the region, especially in other countries that Russia has invaded, influenced, or controlled in the past, or is presently coercing. The author leaves us with this: “By leveraging ethnic, political, or social fault lines, Moscow can fuel discontent and create conditions conducive to rebellion” (p. 180).

Laryš’ work reminds us that in the complex interplay between principals and proxies, the consequences of disorganization, opportunism, and manipulation are not confined to one war—they echo across borders, shaping the future of conflict in ways the world cannot afford to ignore.

Summary:

Martin Laryš’s Rebel Militias in Eastern Ukraine analyzes how Russia used local militias as proxies during the Donbas War through a principal–agent framework. He shows that weak organization, criminal opportunism, and poor local legitimacy fragmented these forces, forcing Moscow’s deeper control—an enduring model for future Russian proxy conflicts.

Proxy Armies and Principal–Agent Problems: A Review of Militias in Eastern Ukraine

irregularwarfare.org · Maya Camargo-Vemuri

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/proxy-armies-and-principal-agent-problems-a-review-of-militias-in-eastern-ukraine/

In his newest book, Rebel Militias in Eastern Ukraine: From Leaderless Rebellion to Proxy Army, political scientist Martin Laryš explores the nexus between political extremism, violent rebellion, and proxy wars, using the Donbas War as an exemplary case. The book is an important contribution to literature on irregular warfare through its discussion of diverse methods of coercion, delegation chains, and a variety of principal-agent problems including decentralization, competition, and structural weakness. While the theoretical underpinnings are important, the specific case study and conclusions are what make this book of particular interest to scholars of warfare and Eastern Europe today.

The Principal–Agent Model in Practice

Rebel Militias in Eastern Ukraine proves to be a timely and insightful contribution for understanding the early phases of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-present) that helps to understand specific dynamics of the Donbas War as well as other strategies and developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War writ large. Laryš primarily accomplishes this through the lens of the principal-agent model, to explain how a powerful actor (the principal, Russia) may coerce or incentivize another actor (the agent, local militias in the Donbas) to act on its behalf, or in accordance with the principal’s objectives.

Laryš argues that there are several reasons an actor like Russia might choose this method in warfare. First, the strategy provides avenues for deniability of involvement, augmented further when delegation chains are used. Second, agents managed from afar can be directed through access to resources that the principal controls. Third, this strategic method can allow external actors to gain a local foothold where they might not be able to establish one easily, given their position as foreigners. In addition to Laryš’ arguments, it is worth considering the reduced costs—for the principal—that such a model would entail. This can be considered in terms of financial costs or human lives, both of which are likely to be more tolerable and easy to cover, or accept, for a principal who chooses not to employ their own forces.

Despite these theoretical benefits, there can be some serious risks to relying on proxies, which Laryš highlights. Distance and decentralization can create unanticipated costs for principals when agents are not internally organized, disciplined, or experienced. Another issue related to decentralization is the trade-off between agent autonomy and effectiveness. If agents are not closely managed or directed, they are more likely to pursue actions that cease to align with the principal’s plan, otherwise known as moral hazards. However, steering agents too closely toward desired outcomes can increase the principal’s resource costs and undermine plausible deniability. Principals must therefore strike a delicate balance between the risks of distance and the costs of direct management in the course of navigating a conflict operated by their agents.

Weak Social Ties and Fragmented Rebel Forces

Laryš explains that when the principal-agent model is put into practice, local actors face an additional challenge to establish themselves among the local population who may or may not consider them legitimate political actors or representatives.

As a case-in-point, pro-Russian secessionists were a minority in the Donestk and Luhansk Oblasts, and an unpopular one at that, limiting their sway with the public. This argument is a key part of Laryš’s analysis, as he identifies low social embeddedness of rebel militias in the Donbas as a central reason that such groups were not able to gain more local support, attract more experienced or qualified individuals, and be taken seriously, either by locals or the government in Kyiv.

According to Laryš, weak ties between secessionists, rebels, pro-Russian groups, and Ukrainian society contributed to difficulty organizing a cohesive rebel movement from the earliest stages. This is evident in the chasm between the weakly-organized and under-developed ideology of rebels and the majority opinion of Ukrainians at the time of the Donbas War. The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan—Ukraine’s pro-democracy movements rejecting Kremlin influence and calling for closer ties with Europe—preceded the war in Eastern Ukraine and signaled a majority preference for a democratic, more ‘European’ Ukraine. This stood in stark contrast to the rebels, who embraced the Kremlin’s portrayal of these events as products of undesirable Western influence and propaganda. The Kremlin was able to use this to spin its own brand of propaganda, touting an existential crisis targeting ethnic Russians, in order to influence fringe Pro-Russian Ukrainian groups who mobilized due to such fears. As a result, the existing ideological split grew even wider.

However, it was not only an ideological disconnect that contributed to the weak ties between rebels and local civilians in Eastern Ukraine. Besides embracing fringe political beliefs that were not shared by either their neighbors or Ukrainians at large, militia members were not well-integrated into—nor representative of—the population of the Luhansk or Donetsk regions. Laryš paints a picture of rebel commanders in the Donbas region as inexperienced, colorful opportunists—many with ties to organized crime, or with criminal backgrounds of their own. Many of the other actors who joined the movement also lacked sufficient experience, qualifications, or knowledge. Low barriers-to-entry allowed anyone to join, opening the door to the inexperienced as well. This, in turn, chipped away at the feeble ties between rebels and local communities, contributing to the chaos, disorganization, and low popularity of rebel militias in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

Although Laryš identifies weak social ties as a central cause of the Donbas rebel movement’s poor coordination, it was not the only one. To begin with, the small and underdeveloped structure of rebel militias provided a shaky foundation. Moreover, a highly decentralized organization proved to be a practical problem, especially when combined with opportunistic actors vying for control and power. Combined, these issues led to chronic fragmentation within groups, which weakened the movement and worsened existing issues related to inter- and intra-group coordination. Furthermore, the inability of actors, whether agents or principals, to develop significant support for the rebel movement outside of the Donbas caused the movement to remain geographically small, complicating recruitment and organizational expansion.

The meso- and micro-level analysis of rebel commanders and their units (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) proves to be the richest part of Laryš’ analysis. Laryš makes the depth of rebel fragmentation evident, allowing readers to understand why the movement was unable to develop further and demonstrating why it was so volatile. Local disputes and competition between militias, coupled with continued Russian interest in advancing the conflict, resulted in increased Russian involvement and a more complex, coercive, and intractable international conflict.

Russian Involvement and Lasting Implications

By May 2014, the Russian rebel movement was fragmented—both in terms of commanders and their units’ actions—and heading for near-certain defeat. At this stage, the Kremlin dropped its pretense of staying out and tightened control of the rebels, relying initially on religious institutions, Cossack groups (semi-military communities that originated in the borderlands of what is now Russia and Ukraine), criminal networks, military intelligence, and retired officers to enforce its authority. The Kremlin did this in an attempt to instill organization and coordination where there was little before.

During this discussion of Russia’s control of its agents and secondary principals, Laryš confronts alternative theories regarding the timing and nature of Russia’s participation in the conflict. Specifically, he refutes Arel and Driscoll’s claim that the conflict was primarily driven by local politics, with Russia playing only a limited and reactionary role that began in August 2014. But Laryš’ in-depth focus on Arel and Driscoll comes at a cost. He misses an opportunity to engage other literature and diverse analyses by other scholars on the conflict over the past decade.

Although the timeline and involved actors discussed in prior chapters helps set the groundwork for Laryš’ refutation of Arel and Driscoll’s argument, he returns to these arguments to solidify his claim: that Russia had substantial, varied involvement, which began as early as April 6, 2014, when the “takeover of administrative buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk, […] along with the subsequent proclamation of secessionist republics, was directed and coordinated from Russia” (Laryš 152). Laryš argues that by August, when Arel and Driscoll claim that Russian involvement began, Russia had adopted a “new approach,” allowing it “increased control over the rebel movement through a direct military invasion” and paving the way for the “forced merger of rebel militias in October-November 2014” (p. 164).

If Laryš’ refutation of Arel and Driscoll feels compelling, it is due to the clarity of his argumentation as well as the strength of the evidence for his claims throughout the book. Well before Laryš discusses alternative theories, he introduces a variety of empirical evidence, including “information from the media, investigative journalists, and associations,” published reports, leaked conversations, and his own semi-structured interviews with topical experts (32-33). These varied forms of evidence support Laryš’ assertions from several angles, giving strength to his arguments and providing proof for events that Arel and Driscoll appear to be unable to address. While Laryš’ analysis could have been enriched by including and confronting additional alternative theories, his strong dismissal of Arel and Driscoll’s claims provides a refreshing and novel contribution to discourse on the subject.

Laryš admits some of his assertions (and assumptions) cannot be tested or supported due to a lack of available Russian data. This is not Laryš’ fault. Instead, we may attribute this to a number of factors, including the obfuscation of information by the Kremlin, the covert nature of its operations, and the many complications of collecting data during developing conflicts. Given these challenges, it is remarkable that the author was able to reconstruct details of social networks, sociopolitical processes, transnational military networks, and military strategy as comprehensively as he did.

Conclusion

Describing the shaky trajectory of rebel groups in the Donbas from disorganized, chaotic militias into fragmented rebel groups and finally into proxy agents under the control of principals delegated by the Kremlin, Laryš brings his book to a close with an ominous warning: this analysis is likely to have lasting insights due to Putin’s designs on other countries in the region. It is plausible to expect similar involvement in the region, especially in other countries that Russia has invaded, influenced, or controlled in the past, or is presently coercing. The author leaves us with this: “By leveraging ethnic, political, or social fault lines, Moscow can fuel discontent and create conditions conducive to rebellion” (p. 180).

Laryš’ work reminds us that in the complex interplay between principals and proxies, the consequences of disorganization, opportunism, and manipulation are not confined to one war—they echo across borders, shaping the future of conflict in ways the world cannot afford to ignore.

Maya Camargo-Vemuri is a PhD student at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Her research interests include political violence, mass atrocity, civilian victimization, and repression in totalitarian and autocratic regimes, with a regional focus on Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Latin America. Her dissertation research focuses on the dynamics of violence in genocide and mass atrocity and has been supported by the United States Holocaust Museum, the American Political Science Association (APSA), and the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs. She has also worked at the Agora Institute in Baltimore, MD, researching nonviolence and democracy, and contributed to ongoing investigations into government corruption and human rights violations at the Institute for Democracy and Human rights in Lima, Peru.

Main Image: A Russia-backed rebel armored fighting vehicles convoy near Donetsk, Eastern Ukraine, May 30, 2015. A stencil on the front armor panel reads “С нами Бог” – “God is with us.” Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

20. Guerrilla Information War: McLuhan Was Right About World War III

A provocative little essay. Perhaps a handy little tool or checklist to help ask the right questions about what we read in our news feeds

Summary:

Marshall McLuhan’s warning proves true: World War III is a guerrilla information war fought in our feeds, with no line between civilian and soldier. The battlefield is attention and language. Victory comes by seizing control of inputs, questioning frames, reclaiming words, and treating every digital encounter as contact, not consumption.

Guerrilla Information War: McLuhan Was Right About World War III

It lives in your feed. Win back attention, language, and judgment.

Mark McGrath | OODA Strategist

Nov 04, 2025

https://thewhirl.substack.com/p/guerrilla-information-war-mcluhan?r=7i07&utm_medium=ios&triedRedirect=true

WWIII Is, Not “Will Be.”

Marshall McLuhan called the shot. He wasn’t being clever. He was warning you where the fight already was. He was not predicting the future. He was describing the present.

“World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation.”

Marshall McLuhan

Read that again. No division. No safe seats. The front line is a glowing rectangle in your hand. The supply lines are your habits. The targets are your attention, your words, and your judgment. You’re not scrolling content. You’re moving through contact. The terrain isn’t over there. It’s in your hands, in your head, and in the words you borrow without noticing. The fight is for orientation. If you control your inputs, you recover judgment. If you don’t, your thinking gets outsourced, and you thank the thief for saving you time.

We lead, we do not manage. Leaders own the intake, the language, and the questions. Managers count what is already captured.

Below is the operating picture.

Read it like a field brief.

Then reorient.

You didn’t know the Guerrilla Information War was already in your feed.

It doesn’t wear uniforms. It shows up as memes, headlines, and “just sharing.” Your feed is both ground and weapon. The channel shapes you before the content even arrives. Algorithms scout your habits, map your triggers, and deliver packets that feel personal. The goal is simple: occupy your attention long enough to adjust how you see, then let you finish the job yourself.

You didn’t see the frame that hit your orientation.

The payload isn’t the claim. It’s the frame that tells you what the claim means. Frames decide salience, scale, and stakes. They compress time, inflate outrage, and anchor comparison points so your judgments snap to the wrong reference. Swap the frame and you swap reality. If you aren’t checking the lens, you’re not observing. You’re being piloted.

You didn’t know victory was there if you seized your inputs and sources.

Control the intake and you recover judgment. Set rules for what gets in, when it gets in, and how it’s tested. Build firebreaks around your attention. Triangulate across hostile and indifferent sources. Favor first-hand material over commentary. Ask better questions than the prompt on the screen. Short, regular audits beat long, heroic detoxes. Own the perimeter and the interior starts to clear.

You didn’t know you’d lost when your words started sounding like theirs.

Language is custody. Once you borrow their labels, you also borrow their

categories, and those categories quietly steer decisions. Watch for slogans that replace thinking. Notice when you start defending positions you didn’t choose to take. Swap loaded terms for plain descriptions. Name what you see in your words, not theirs. If the vocabulary changes, the vector changed.

You still don’t believe it, which is why it works.

Denial is the perfect cloak. If there is “no war,” there is no need for discipline, and no bill to pay for sloppy intake. That disbelief keeps the door unlocked and the lights off. Treat your mind like a command post, not a food court. Assume contact until proven otherwise. The moment you accept the fight, the ambush ends and the hunt begins.

Your move

What one input will you cut for seven days, and what changes when you do?

Which frame are you testing today, and how will you test it without asking the frame for permission?

What two loaded terms will you retire, and what plain words will you use instead?

Where has your language drifted to match a crowd you don’t respect, and what will you say in your own words?

If you accepted that you’re in contact, what rule would you set on your attention before you open an app?

Post your rules, swaps, and tests in the comments. Share an example of a frame you caught and how you broke it. We’re not chasing agreement. We’re building judgment.

Close where we opened: “no division.” Take that as a standard, not a slogan. If there is no division between the military and the civilian, there is no division between the author and the audience either. The public we need will not appear on its own. It shows up when we act like owners, not spectators, and when we treat every session as contact, not entertainment. Accept the terms, seize the intake, and turn the feed from ambush to patrol.

Spread Signal, Not Noise.

21. Laura Loomer is now credentialed to cover the Pentagon

Summary:

Far-right activist Laura Loomer, a close Trump ally known for attacking officials she deems disloyal, has been credentialed to cover the Pentagon under its new restrictive media policy. Mainstream outlets boycotted the rules, leaving far-right networks dominant. Loomer’s presence underscores Trump-era politicization of defense reporting and press access.

Laura Loomer is now credentialed to cover the Pentagon

Washington Post · Scott Nover

By Scott Nover and Drew Harwell

The far-right activist and former congressional candidate has repeatedly criticized defense officials on her website and social media accounts while boasting of her close ties to President Donald Trump.

November 3, 2025 at 6:51 p.m. ESTYesterday at 6:51 p.m. EST

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/11/03/laura-loomer-pentagon-credentials/

Laura Loomer, the far-right political activist and former congressional candidate in Florida, has been credentialed to cover the Defense Department, according to one person familiar with the matter, joining a new cohort of right-wing media that have agreed to the Pentagon’s new press policy.

Loomer, 32, has forged a close alliance with President Donald Trump, routinely meeting with the president in the Oval Office during his second term. She has frustrated some in the administration with her proximity to Trump and public criticisms of high-ranking defense and national security officials who she argues are disloyal to Trump — some of whom have been dismissed soon after her rebukes.

Loomer’s addition to the Pentagon’s press corps comes as the department has overhauled its media policies. Journalists covering the Pentagon walked out of the building en masse last month, in response to a new department press policy that prohibited them from soliciting any information not made available by the government.

Dozens of news outlets, including The Washington Post, the New York Times, CNN and Fox News, refused to sign the policy that many called a threat to press freedom. Out of the outlets that made up the day-to-day Pentagon press corps, only One America News, a right-wing cable network, agreed to sign.

The Pentagon unveiled a new press corps last month, consisting largely of far-right media publications, including the Gateway Pundit, the Post Millennial, and LindellTV — MyPillow founder Mike Lindell’s streaming service — along with independent journalists and online influencers. These publications, which have signed or signaled they will sign the agreement, have not previously covered the Pentagon in person on a regular basis.

Loomer and the Defense Department did not immediately respond to request for comment. The White House declined to comment.

Loomer’s social media posts have presaged the firings of several Trump officials, and she has often bragged that she “Loomered” them, using her slang term for such conquests. But some in the administration have suggested Loomer overplays her influence by only offering a preview of actions that were already imminent.

Gen. Timothy Haugh was ousted as director of the National Security Agency and head of U.S. Cyber Command in April, shortly after Loomer said she had advocated his dismissal in an Oval Office meeting. “NSA Director Tim Haugh and his deputy Wendy Noble have been disloyal to President Trump,” Loomer said in a post on X. “That is why they have been fired.”

Loomer attributed Trump’s firing of national security adviser Michael Waltz and multiple members of his staff in April to a “swift response to [her] report.” In September, Waltz was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Loomer hasn’t spared the Pentagon from her vitriol.

Loomer has railed against Col. Earl G. Matthews, then nominated to serve as the Defense Department’s general counsel, and more recently Army Secretary Dan Driscoll.

She criticized Matthews in April, posting on X that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was at risk of being “subverted and obstructed” by Matthews.

Loomer called Groberg an “anti-Trump leftist.”

“I’ve served under presidents from both parties and will always honor my oath to this country,” Groberg told The Post at the time. “Yes, I spoke for 60 seconds at the DNC when asked about service and sacrifice, not politics.”

Driscoll, the Army Secretary, revoked the appointment of Jen Easterly, President Joe Biden’s director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, to the faculty of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point following Loomer’s criticism.

Loomer, who once handcuffed herself to the door of Twitter’s New York City office after the company banned her from the platform, maintains a personal website called Loomered and dubs herself an “investigative journalist, activist, and truth-teller” who has made enemies in Silicon Valley and in the media.

Loomer has built her semi-celebrity status online largely through feats of viral attention. Since 2017, when she was banned from Uber and Lyft for an online rant about “Islamic immigrant” drivers, she has styled herself as a free-speech warrior whom online platforms have unfairly mistreated and undermined.

She’s called herself “anti-Islam” and has referred to immigrants of all kinds as “invaders.” She has been thwarted for jobs in Trump’s orbit — on the campaign trail and in the White House — on “four separate occasions,” she previously said in an interview with The Post, saying that various Trump White House staffers and advisers have “contempt” for her.

Still, she’s managed to remain a close unofficial adviser to the president.

“I know she’s known as a ‘radical right,’ but I think Laura Loomer is a very nice person,” Trump told reporters in August. “… I think she’s a patriot, and she gets excited because of the fact she’s a patriot, and she doesn’t like things going on that she thinks are bad for the country. I like her.”

Loomer has criticized Trump sparingly, including around his acceptance of a jet from the Qatari royal family. Though she said he had accepted a “‘gift’ from jihadists in suits,” she later apologized to Trump for the comment.

But she told The Post earlier this year that her application for White House credentials had been stalled, despite her repeated requests for approval and the fact that other right-wing influencers with smaller audiences had already been granted access.

Loomer, who previously contributed to the conservative sting-operation group Project Veritas, also compiles and sells opposition research as part of Loomered Strategies, a consulting firm she has promoted as “your opponent’s worst nightmare.”

But Loomer’s presence could also frustrate Pentagon officials, some of whom scrambled to contain the fallout from viral comments she made attacking Hegseth last month.

After Hegseth said that the U.S. would host a Qatari air force training facility at a base in Idaho, Loomer said the decision was so disturbing that she would not be voting in next year’s midterm elections. In an X post viewed more than 2 million times, she said Republicans had given “terror financing Muslims from Qatar a MILITARY BASE on US soil so they can murder Americans.”

Washington Post · Scott Nover

22. How “War” Becomes War: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Ours of Us

Summary:

Historian Timothy Snyder compares Russia’s false justification for invading Ukraine to Trump’s rhetoric portraying U.S. cities as “war zones.” He warns that such propaganda fosters internal conflict, urging Americans to reject “big lies” and prevent soldiers from being turned against their own people in a self-inflicted war.

How “War” Becomes War

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Ours of Us

Timothy Snyder

Nov 04, 2025

https://snyder.substack.com/p/how-war-becomes-war

One of my colleagues, serving in the Ukrainian armed forces, spent two and half years in captivity as a prisoner of war of the Russians. Amidst the physical torture came repeated interrogations.

One of his interrogators kept returning to the beginning of the war, seeking to blame Ukraine.

My friend would then ask: “Which country’s army crossed which country’s border?” To which the interrogator would reply something along the lines of: “At a deeper level…” or “But what was really going on was…” or “There was a Ukrainian plan to…”

Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russian army crossed the borders of Ukraine, unprovoked. But the unambiguous act of aggression was and is surrounded by a constant flow of conspiratorial nonsense, designed to create a sense that Russia was somehow the victim.

I was thinking about all this last Tuesday, October 28th, in Portland. That city, along with others, has been categorized by Trump and his close advisors as a threat, as a reason for attack, as a site of “war.”

My friend’s interrogator kept saying that Ukraine was about to invade Russia. This was absurd. There was no such plan, no such force in array, nothing at all. But, once Russia had done the invading, the invaders themselves clung to such ideas.

In the United States – I found myself reflecting as I walked and drove around Portland – we find ourselves in a similar place. Lies are being told, big ones, gigantic ones, to generate some sense that the country is under attack — not by another country, but by its own cities.

Portland is no threat to the Republic. There is nothing at all like the burning of buildings and the closing of businesses that Trump talks about. The first sight upon leaving my hotel was a flourishing haberdashery. Portland was the site of very large No Kings protests. And they were constructive and peaceful and very much in the spirit of the rights proclaimed by the Constitution.

Flourishing haberdashery, Portland

In Trumpish propaganda, the building that ICE leases in Portland is supposed to be ground zero of the urban war. When I visited last Wednesday, there was creative, quiet, legal protest. A pair, dressed as a frog and as a fox, were playing hacky sack. Meanwhile masked and armed men in incongruous desert fatigues and body armor loitered on the building’s roof, looking down and taking photographs. A pickup truck driven by what I guess I must call a counter-protestor circled the block, mounted flags proclaiming his support of Trump, ICE, and the goal of deporting “all of them.”

But of course the details are not really the point. Had there been huge protests going on downtown when I visited, or had there been two hundred people in animal suits instead of two, there still would have been no “war” and no “war zone.” There is nothing, in Portland, or any other city, or anywhere else in our country, that justifies the use of the word “war.”

“At a deeper level…” or “But what was really going on was…” or “There was a plan to…” This is the sort of language that now comes from the White House, that we find for example in Stephen Miller’s terror memo. No contact is sought with reality. Innuendo clings to paranoia, generating a sense that the strong side, the people giving the orders, planning the killing, are the true victims.

Big lies are meant to start wars — including self-invasions, including wars against ourselves. But they need not work. They have to be seen for what they are. Speaking the small truths about the cities and mocking the big lie about “war” is a start.

But we also have to recognize that the big lie serves a social function: Trump and Miller and the others are telling American soldiers that they will be seen as heroes after they kill their fellow Americans.

It is important to be clear and vocal about this element of the lie. We live in a country where the armed services enjoy unusual prestige. Military service is treated with ritualized respect by essentially everyone in the public sphere.

Actual respect for the men and women who serve would include telling the truth. The Trump people will not. And so others must:

From the moment the armed services violently engage their first civilians, their prestige will be gone forever, and service members will be destroying the Republic they are sworn to serve.

We don’t want American soldiers fighting a war against their own people, we don’t want them echoing lies as they interrogate and torture their fellow citizens. We don’t want them mumbling about “what was really going on…” as they attach the electrodes.

That is, sadly, what the Trump administration seems to wish for them. And that is what we must all work together to stop, by telling the truths, the ones that are easy, and the ones that are a little harder.

For all the lessons, see On Tyranny

On freedom and security, see On Freedom

PS Please vote today!

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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