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Quotes of the Day:
A body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by anybody.
~Thomas Paine
"Don't explain your philosophy. Embody it."
~ Epictetus
"Although ancient states were great, they inevitably perished when they were fond of war"
- Sima Rangju
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 4 (Putin's War)
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (04.11.22) CDS comments on key events
3. Iran acknowledges sending drones to Russia for first time
4. Putin endorses evacuation of parts of Ukraine's Kherson region
5. The Untold Story of ‘Russiagate’ and the Road to War in Ukraine
6. Perspectives for Influence Operations Investigators
7. A Response: The Promises and Pitfalls of Developing Pre-Crisis Clandestine Underground Resistance Organisations - Lessons of the WWII Polish Underground State
8. Russian arms and influence in Myanmar
9. Elon Musk’s Twitter faces early test in U.S. midterms: ‘Disinformation can pay off big time’
10. How Much Difference Can One Person Make?
11. Asia Matters for America: Public & Elite Opinion Poll Report
12. Should America ‘Lead from Behind’ in China Policy?
13. Taiwan Strait issues must be resolved peacefully, say G7 foreign ministers
14. Reunifying with Taiwan is only way to stop foreign invasion of island: China’s Communist Party
15. In a first, Space Force picks private university as war college
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 4 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4
Key Takeaways
- The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart its Donetsk offensive but will likely fail to achieve operationally significant gains.
- Russian forces are setting conditions for an orderly withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River to avoid a rout in Kherson Oblast.
- President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue mobilization covertly despite claims that partial mobilization produced sufficient forces.
- Russia’s costly force generation measures will likely continue to weigh on the Russian economy and generate social tensions.
- Iran is likely exploiting Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapon systems to request Russian assistance with its nuclear program.
- Russian forces may be deploying extreme measures against deserting personnel in an attempt to respond to severe morale issues.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
- Russian forces continued to prepare existing and new defensive lines in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
- Russian forces continued forced evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian and occupation officials continued to set measures for the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 4
understandingwar.org
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 4, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart the Donetsk offensive but will likely still fail to achieve operationally significant gains. Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported on November 4 that Russian forces have tripled the intensity of hostilities in certain sections of the front with up to 80 daily assaults.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are currently focusing those offensive operations in the direction of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk Oblast.[2] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of troops spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi stated on November 4 that Russian forces are likely trying to seize Bakhmut and Soledar in Donetsk Oblast so that Russia can declare some type of success by announcing the “liberation” of the Donbas (even though those gains would not give Russia control over the entire region).[3] Cherevatyi also noted the presence of mobilized men in the Bakhmut direction, an area that should not in principle see many mobilized personnel given the extensive presence in this area of Wagner Group and proxy units that should not be receiving large numbers of Russian reservists.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive pushes near Bakhmut and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast on November 3.[5] The apparent intensification of Russian assaults in Donetsk Oblast likely indicates that Russian forces are repeating that mistake throughout this section of the front. The increased quantity of personnel at frontline positions may allow Russian forces to achieve some gains in Donetsk Oblast, but poor training, logistics, and command will continue to prevent Russian forces from making operationally significant gains that would materially affect the course or outcome of the war.
Russian forces are setting conditions for a controlled withdrawal in northwestern Kherson Oblast, likely to avoid a disorderly rout from the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River. Russian forces will likely need to engage in a fighting withdrawal to prevent Ukrainian forces from chasing them onto the left (eastern) bank. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command corrected social media reports from November 3 regarding the destruction of civilian boats and piers along the Dnipro River.[6] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces are purposefully destroying civilian vessels and are restricting civilian use of watercraft and access to the shore. The corrected story likely corresponds with the reports of Russian forces preparing defensive positions on the left bank and the withdrawal of certain elements and suggests that Russian forces are eliminating ways for Ukrainian forces to chase them across the river during or after a withdrawal. Local Ukrainian sources also shared geolocated footage that reportedly showed the aftermath of the recent Russian destruction of a pedestrian bridge over the Inhulets River in Snihurivka (about 60km east of Mykolaiv City), which may also indicate Russian efforts to slow Ukrainian advances amidst a Russian withdrawal.[7]
Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue covert mobilization, which suggests that partial mobilization did not generate sufficient forces for Putin’s maximalist goals in Ukraine despite Putin’s claims to the contrary. Putin announced on November 4 that Russian forces mobilized 318,000 men of the 300,000 authorized due to the recruitment of volunteers during the mobilization period.[8] Putin added that Russia had already committed 49,000 men to combat missions. Putin’s claims of a successful and completed mobilization are inconsistent with his November 4 decree that allows Russian officials to mobilize citizens with outstanding convictions for some serious crimes.[9] Putin also signed decrees extending the status of servicemen to men serving in volunteer formations and outlining mobilization exemptions for citizens undergoing alternative service.[10] Such decrees likely indicate that Putin is preparing to continue covert mobilization in Russia by attempting to incentivize volunteer service or setting conditions to mobilize convicts—given that he has yet to sign an order terminating mobilization as of November 4.[11] Provisions authorizing the mobilization of prisoners may also indicate that Putin is trying to preempt social tensions by setting conditions to mobilize convicts instead of civilian Russian men.
Russian opposition and online outlets have reported that Russian authorities and businesses are preparing for a second mobilization wave by modernizing military recruitment centers and preparing lists of eligible men.[12] Rostov, Kursk, and Voronezh Oblast governors have also previously spoken about conducting a second wave of mobilization, and a few men reported receiving summonses for 2023.[13] While it is unclear if the Kremlin will double down on covert mobilization or initiate another mobilization wave, Putin’s decrees are indicative of the persistent force generation challenges that have plagued the Russian military campaign.
Russia’s costly force generation efforts will continue to weigh on the Russian economy and could ignite social tensions if the Kremlin does not fulfill its financial obligations to the participants of the “special military operation.” Putin signed a decree granting a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles (about $3,150) to mobilized men and individuals who had signed a contract after the declaration of partial mobilization on September 21.[14] By committing to pay mobilized men and giving the status of servicemen to volunteers the Kremlin is adding another financial burden to Russia’s economy.[15] Russian governors are already releasing statements attempting to justify delays in compensating mobilized men and their families citing budget issues and the need to finance supplies for Russian servicemen.[16] Failures to make payouts to mobilized men are already causing social tensions in Chuvash Republic, for example, where 1,800 men are demanding that the region immediately pay the promised 400 million rubles (about $6.5 million) to the mobilized population.[17]
Iran is likely already exploiting Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapons systems to request Russian assistance with its nuclear program. CNN reported on November 4 that unspecified US intelligence officials believe that Iranian officials have been asking Russia for help in acquiring additional nuclear materials and with nuclear fuel fabrication.[18] Nuclear fuel could allow Iran to shorten the breakout period to create a nuclear weapon depending on the kind of fuel and the kind of reactor for which it is being requested. CNN reported that it was unclear whether Russian officials had agreed to Iranian requests.[19] ISW has previously reported that Iranian plans to send more combat drones and possibly ballistic missile systems to Russia will likely strengthen Russia’s growing reliance on Iranian-made weapons systems.[20]
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Yusov stated on November 4 that GUR has not received information confirming that Iranian missile systems have arrived in Russia despite intelligence that confirms the contract for the transfer of those systems.[21] Yusov also stated that another shipment of 200 Iranian-made combat drones to Russia is currently underway.[22] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov reported on November 4 that Russian forces have almost completely used up the first set of 300 combat drones from Iran.[23] Reznikov reported that Russia currently has contracts to receive 1,500 to 2,400 more Iranian-made combat drones, assuming Iran can fill the orders.[24] Russia’s growing reliance on these systems allows Iran to exert greater influence on Russian officials, and Iranian officials have already likely started to exploit that influence in support of its nuclear program. The Iranian requests for Russian assistance with its nuclear program may be an indicator of an intensifying Russian Iranian security partnership in which Iran and Russia are more equal partners.
Russian forces may be deploying extreme measures against deserting personnel in an attempt to respond to severe morale issues. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 4 that Russian forces in Ukraine probably have started deploying “barrier troops” and “blocking units”, units that threaten to shoot their own retreating personnel to compel offensives.[25] The UK MoD reported that Russian generals likely want their subordinate commanders to shoot deserters, including possibly authorizing personnel to shoot to kill their own deserting servicemen.[26] Desertion in the face of the enemy is a capital offense in many militaries, including America’s.[27] The deployment of designated units or individuals behind friendly lines to shoot deserters is nevertheless indicative of just how low the morale, discipline, and cohesion of Russian military forces in parts of Ukraine have become.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart its Donetsk offensive but will likely fail to achieve operationally significant gains.
- Russian forces are setting conditions for an orderly withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River to avoid a rout in Kherson Oblast.
- President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue mobilization covertly despite claims that partial mobilization produced sufficient forces.
- Russia’s costly force generation measures will likely continue to weigh on the Russian economy and generate social tensions.
- Iran is likely exploiting Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapon systems to request Russian assistance with its nuclear program.
- Russian forces may be deploying extreme measures against deserting personnel in an attempt to respond to severe morale issues.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.
- Russian forces continued to prepare existing and new defensive lines in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
- Russian forces continued forced evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian and occupation officials continued to set measures for the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on November 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian artillery and aviation repelled Ukrainian forces that attempted to attack northwest of Svatove in the directions of Berestove, Kharkiv Oblast (21km northwest of Svatove) and Kuzemivka, Luhansk Oblast (14km northwest of Svatove).[28] Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault in the direction of Yahidne, Kharkiv Oblast (28km northwest of Svatove).[29] One of the milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces managed to enter Yahidne but that Russian forces later pushed them out of the settlement.[30] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults northwest of Kreminna in the direction of Ploschanka (17km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[31] A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are probing Russian defensive lines northeast of Terny (17km west of Kreminna).[32] ISW cannot independently verify the Russian claims about Ukrainian counteroffensives in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on November 4.
Russian forces conducted counterattacks in the Kreminna-Svatove area likely to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces on November 4. The Ukrainian General staff reported that Russian forces shelled settlements southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove); south of Kreminna near Siversk (18km southwest of Kreminna), Verkhnokamianske (19km south of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna); and near Vedmezhe.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults northwest of Kreminna near Nevske (18km west of Kreminna) and Makiivka (22km west of Kreminna).[34] Economist Defense Editor Shashank Joshi claimed on November 3 that a Western official on the Luhansk front stated that there has been a reduction in Russian fighting but that developments in Svatove have the potential to assume operational-level significance.[35]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces continued to prepare existing and new defensive lines in Kherson Oblast on November 3 and November 4. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces are leaving some checkpoints, redistributing personnel and equipment, moving equipment, and equipping new defensive positions, which would be consistent with an ongoing Russian effort to establish fallback positions on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River.[36] Geolocated footage also showed that Russian forces continued to install pillbox fortifications in Nova Kakhovka on the left bank.[37] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces are also strengthening existing lines, which may indicate that the Russians are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast likely to coordinate a controlled withdrawal. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces still hold checkpoints outside Kherson City and have units operating along the entire frontline, with one milblogger even noting that Russian forces have no military need to withdraw from the city.[38]
Ukrainian and Russian sources did not report significant changes to the situation on the northern and northwestern Kherson Oblast borders as of November 4. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces continued to use aviation to strike Ukrainian positions, and Russian artillery units continued to shell newly liberated settlements along the line of contact.[39] Ukrainian forces also published a video of a raised Ukrainian flag over Mala Seidemynukha (approximately 61km northeast of Kherson City) on November 3, but the village had likely been liberated prior to the official confirmation.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed striking Ukrainian positions and ammunition depots but did not report ground assaults from either side.[41]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian transportation nodes and logistics points as part of their ongoing interdiction campaign. Geolocated footage showed that Russian forces are still operating ferry crossings near the barge bridge under the Antonivsky Bridge.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed an earlier reported strike on an administrative building in Hola Prystan (about 13km southwest of Kherson City) that killed 18 Russian servicemen and wounded two Russians on November 3.[43] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces also struck two ammunition depots in Bashtanka and Snihurivka raions in Mykolaiv Oblast.[44] A Russian milblogger also reported the activation of Russian air defense systems and smoke in the area of the Kherson City shipyard but did not provide visual evidence.[45]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske (28km northeast of Bakhmut) and Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut).[46] Russian sources reported that Russian forces made inconsequential advances, 100 meters, against Ukrainian forces near Bakhmut between November 1 and 3.[47] Russian forces continued routine shelling in the Bakhmut area.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka and Donetsk City area on November 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults southwest of Avdiivka near Marinka (28km southwest of Avdiivka) and Novomykhailivka (37km southwest of Avdiivka).[49] Social media video footage posted on November 4 shows Ukrainian forces destroying a column of Russian vehicles and equipment in the vicinity of Opytne (15km northwest of Donetsk City).[50] The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militia posted a video on November 4 purporting to show the DNR 3rd Guards Brigade striking a Ukrainian manpower and equipment concentration in the direction of Horlivka (about 63km north of Donetsk City).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 4 that the 2nd Reconnaissance Company of the DNR Sparta Battalion cleared Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka direction near the M-4 highway a few days ago.[52] The source claimed that the Sparta Battalion, DNR Somalia Battalion, and other DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units successfully repelled Ukrainian attacks in the area.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the 11th DNR Regiment is encircling Avdiivka and will take the settlement.[54] Russian forces continued routine shelling in the Avdiivka area.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults southwest of Donetsk City near Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) and Vodyane (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[56] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces have not taken Pavlivka and that fighting there devolved into small positional battles.[57] A Russian source reported that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations near Prechystivka (55km southwest of Donetsk City) to push Ukrainian forces across the Kashlahach River.[58] The Russian source also claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground assault in the direction of Marinka (24km southwest of Donetsk City) and plans to attack Pervomaiske (20km northwest of Donetsk City) and Vodyane.[59] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in southwest Donetsk Oblast.[60]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on November 4.[61] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City, Nikopol, Mykolaiv City, and Bereznehuvate.[62] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted eight drone attacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Ukrainian air defenses shot them all down.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower and equipment concentration in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3, wounding 50 Russian servicemen.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on November 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian S-300 anti-air system in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2.[65]
Russian forces likely continued to transfer personnel to Zaporizhia Oblast despite reports of poor conditions among personnel there. The Ukrainian advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 4 that many Russian military personnel are arriving in Komyshuvate and Demianivka in Donetsk Oblast and that a significant number of newly mobilized personnel in the area are moving to deployments in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Andryushchenko reported that Russian military officials have transformed Mariupol into a military logistics hub.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 4 that Russian military personnel in Zaporizhia Oblast have a low level of morale due to poor living conditions, poor equipment, constant delays in financial payments, and contemptuous attitudes of leadership to subordinates.[68] Russian military officials are unlikely to resolve poor conditions and morale among personnel in Zapoirzhia Oblast or elsewhere in Ukraine as they continue to prioritize the quantity of personnel deployed to Ukraine.
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian officials are increasingly refusing to acknowledge deaths of mobilized men. Social media users complained that Volgograd Oblast officials are not making any public announcements to commemorate mobilized men who reportedly died on October 24 in unspecified locations.[69] Another local report noted that multiple mobilized men from Volgograd Oblast have been buried every day since October 28.[70] Russian mobilized men are also continuing to show significant morale issues, with mobilized elements of the 252nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment recording a video appeal in which they refused to fight and asked to return to Russia.[71]
Russian outlets reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin opened the new Wagner Center in St. Petersburg.[72]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation officials continued forcible evacuation measures in Kherson Oblast on November 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 4 that pontoon barges and ferries are currently transferring up to 1,200 civilian vehicles and 5,000 residents a day across the Dnipro River to the east bank in Kherson Oblast.[73] Kherson occupation deputy head Kirill Stremousov continued to urge residents on the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast to evacuate.[74] A Russian source reported that Russian officials are continuing the evacuation of the population from the right bank of the Dnipro River after previously stating that such evacuation measures had concluded.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 4 that many residents left in Kherson City are without social services as social service payments can now only be received on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[76] Administration and social services in areas heavily impacted by forcible evacuation measures are likely minimal or non-existent. Russian occupation officials will likely continue to increase forcible evacuation measures as the Ukrainian southern counteroffensive progresses.
Russian and occupation officials continued to take measures supporting the deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation as of November 4. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 4 that Russian and occupation officials plan to conduct medical examinations of Ukrainian children in occupied territories and intend to send Ukrainian children with assessed “illnesses” to medical camps in remote areas of the Russian Federation.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian officials likely intend to use the children to force their parents to relocate to the Russian Federation under the guise of picking up their children from “treatment.”[78] It is equally likely that Russian officials intend to use this medical relocation scheme to continue ongoing measures to adopt deported Ukrainian children into Russian families. Both efforts would likely be intended to erase the Ukrainian people as a distinct ethnic group. ISW has previously assessed that forced relocations of Ukrainians to the Russian Federation and forced adoptions of deported Ukrainian children likely amount to a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign and are apparent violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[79]
Russian occupation officials likely increased filtration measures and restrictions on movement in Russian-occupied territories on November 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 4 that Russian occupation officials are increasing filtration measures along the Oleshky—Nova Kakhovka highway in Kherson Oblast as well as in Pisky, Luhansk Oblast where Russian forces relocate 30 residents to an unknown location.[80] Russian sources reported that Kherson occupation administration deputy head Kirill Stremousov announced a 24-hour curfew in Kherson City on November 4.[81] Stremousov later claimed that there were no restrictions on civilian movement.[82] Russian occupation officials will likely continue to increase filtration measures and restrictions on civilian movement as Ukrainian counteroffensives progress.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[4] https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2022/11/04/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-chastyna-mobilizovanyh-armiyi-rf-vidmovlyayetsya-jty-v-ataku/
[5] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
[8] https://t.me/navideovidno/53487 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/11/04/putin-zayavil-chto-v-rossii-mobilizovany-318-tysyach-chelovek-potomu-chto-dobrovoltsy-idut
[9] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211040008?index=0&rangeSize=1; https://t.me/bazabazon/14267
[10] https://klops dot ru/news/2022-11-04/260874-dobrovolcheskie-formirovaniya-alternativnaya-sluzhba-mobilizatsiya-sudimyh-putin-podpisal-neskolko-zakonov
[14] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211030044?index=0&rangeSize=1
[16] https://t.me/e1_news/81035; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/3124; https:... readovka.news/regions-of-russia-financial-assistance; https://t.me/suverennews/229
[21] https://gur dot gov dot ua/content/pidtverdzhen-pro-nadkhodzhennia-do-rosii-iranskykh-raket-narazi-nemaie.html
[22] https://gur dot gov dot ua/content/pidtverdzhen-pro-nadkhodzhennia-do-rosii-iranskykh-raket-narazi-nemaie.html
[27] 10 U.S. Code § 885 - Art. 85. Desertion | U.S. Code | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute (cornell.edu)
[70] https://t.me/astrapress/15197; https://v1(dot)ru/text/gorod/2022/11/03/71787566/; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/3212
[71] https://t.me/parmenovosti/681; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1588455865589563393?s=20&t=im7iQM3... ; https://v1(dot)ru/text/gorod/2022/11/02/71786570/; https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1588224775964483589
[77] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/04/prykryvayuchys-likuvannyam-rosiyany-deportuyut-ditej-z-tot-na-terytoriyu-rf/
[78] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/04/prykryvayuchys-likuvannyam-rosiyany-deportuyut-ditej-z-tot-na-terytoriyu-rf/
understandingwar.org
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (04.11.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (04.11.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
The army of the Russian Federation shelled nine regions of Ukraine during the past day, according to the consolidated information of the regional military administrations about the situation in the regions of Ukraine as of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, November 4.
Consequences of enemy shelling on the morning of November 4:
• In the morning, air defense forces shot down an Iranian kamikaze drone over Lviv Oblast. No victims or destruction were recorded.
• 8 Shaheds were shot down in the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. At the same time, the enemy shelled with "Grads" and heavy artillery Nikopolska, Myrivska, Chervonohrygorivska, and Marganets communities. No victims were reported. Residential buildings, cars, and a gas pipeline were damaged in the Chervonogryhorivska community.
• During November 3, the occupiers fired at the Kupyansk, Izyum, and Chuhuyiv districts of the Kharkiv Oblast. In Kupyansk, a residential building and the administrative building of a farm were damaged.
• On November 3, 8 civilians were killed by enemy shelling in Donetsk Oblast: 5 - in Bakhmut, 1 - in Pokrovsk, 1 - in Nelipivka, and 1 - in Krasnohorivka. Another 14 people were injured.
• At night, the enemy shelled one of Mykolaiv's neighbourhoods with S-300 missiles. The warehouse was destroyed, and the administrative building and nearby cars were damaged. In the Mykolaiv district - 2 residential buildings were damaged.
• At night, the enemy shelled the populated areas of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A gas pipe in the open area was damaged. The fire that broke out was extinguished.
• On November 3, the Russian occupiers shelled the Shalyginsk community of Sumy Oblast. A local farm was damaged. In the Seredyno-Budsk community, a Russian shell pierced the roof of a private house and got stuck in the floor.
In the liberated village of Vysokopilya, Kherson Oblast, law enforcement officers discovered the bodies of three civilians who were tortured and shot by the Russians, reported the Prosecutor General's Office.
Today, one of DTEK's energy enterprises was hit by rocket fire, the company's press service reports. No victims were reported, but the company's equipment was significantly damaged. This is already the 12th attack on DTEK power plants in the last month.
Due to the overload of the central node of the energy system of Ukraine in Kyiv, 450,000 apartments remained without electricity this morning, Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko said.
In each district of Kyiv, an average of 100 heating points will be prepared in case of critical damage to the heating system. Overall, around a thousand heating points will be formed before the
beginning of winter, said the Director of the Department of Municipal Security, Roman Tkachuk. According to the official, they will be equipped with everything necessary: heat, lighting, bathrooms, dining rooms, places to rest, and stocks of warm clothes and blankets. In the buildings of such social facilities, there are protective shelters to go to in case of an air raid alarm. In addition, the points will be equipped with emergency power generators and heat guns. If necessary, emergency medical personnel will be on duty nearby.
Occupied territories:
There are currently three ways to leave the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, said Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov in an interview with Ukrinform. "Through Crimea, then to Georgia or European countries. The road takes about 5 days, but many residents of the occupied territories use this route as the main one." Another route is through the [so-called] "DPR" (Mariupol - Novoazovsk), but it is psychologically difficult and the most dangerous and requires going through filtering. According to his calculations, Fedorov also said that less than 50% (no more than 50-60 thousand) of Melitopol residents remain in the city.
According to information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian children were taken from boarding schools in Kherson to the territory of Crimea. They were placed in one of the psychiatric hospitals in Simferopol. Prisoners of the Kherson colony were also transported to the territory of the Crimean Peninsula.
In the temporarily captured Energodar, where the Zaporizhzhya NPP is located, the Russian invaders are going around the apartments and stopping people on the street to conduct the so- called "population census", wrote Dmytro Orlov, [legally elected Ukrainian] mayor of Energodar, on his Telegram. In addition to passport data and contact numbers of people who remained in the city, they are also required to provide data on relatives who have left. It is noted that the so- called "census" ends with a search of the apartment and a meticulous study of all applications on mobile phones.
Operational situation
(please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 3) developments)
It is the 254th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories, concentrates its efforts on restraining the actions of the Defense Forces, and conducts offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novopavlivka directions.
Over the past day, units of the Defense Forces have repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Vodyane and Pavlivka of the Donetsk Oblast. The enemy is shelling units of the Defense Forces along the contact line; carrying fortification of their frontiers in certain directions and conducting aerial reconnaissance.
The Russian military continues to strike critical infrastructure, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, laws and customs of war. The enemy carried out 4 missile strikes, 28 air strikes, and more than 45 attacks from rocket launchers. These criminal actions affected about 30 towns and villages of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson and other Oblasts. Near the state border, the enemy shelled Volfyna of Sumy Oblast, Stelmakhivka, Berestove, Bilohorivka, Veterynarne, Gatyshche, Chugunivka and Uda of Kharkiv Oblast.
The threat of new strikes and the use of strike UAVs remains. In particular, from the territory of the Republic of Belarus, which continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
In the temporarily occupied territories, the Russian occupiers continued to violate the norms of international humanitarian law, laws and customs of war. In the village of Pisky, Starobilsk district of Luhansk Oblast, representatives of the so-called military commander's office conducted filtering measures against the local population. About 30 citizens were kidnapped and taken to an unknown destination. Similar events happened in towns and villages along the Oleshka - Nova Kakhovka highway of the Kherson Oblast. In addition, the traffic of trucks and cars with looted property increased on the roads of the Kherson Oblast. A lot of robberies are taking place in Beryslav and nearby villages. In particular, the property and repair base are looted from power grid maintenance enterprises. In the village of Topolivka, the Russian occupiers are using a local school and a kindergarten as a "human shield", where they located up to three hundred enemy soldiers and equipment.
The Defense Forces aircraft during the past day struck the enemy 21 times. 20 areas of concentration of enemy weapons and military equipment, as well as the position of the enemy's air defense equipment, were affected. Ukrainian air defense forces shot down 3 "Shahed-136" UAVs.
During the day, Ukraine's missile troops and artillery units of the Defense Forces hit the enemy's control post, 4 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, an ammunition warehouse, an EW station, mine-explosive barriers and other important enemy military targets.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the
RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle
regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
The operational situation is unchanged.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
The enemy fired from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery at the Defence Forces' positions in Myasozharivka, Zvanivka, Rozdolivka, Siversk, Verkhnyokamianske, Serebryanka, Novoyehorivka and Yampolivka.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
From tanks and artillery, the enemy shelled the areas of Bakhmut, Andriivka, Klishchiivka, Ozaryanivka, Kurdyumivka, Mayorsk, Ivangrad, Soledar, Opytne, Zelenopillia, Avdiivka, Oleksandropil, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Vuhledar, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske.
Zaporizhzhia direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the
42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The enemy shelled the Defence Forces' positions in Prechistivka, Vodyane, Pavlivka, Vremivka, Velyka Novosilka, Hulyaipole, Dorozhnyanka, Novoandriivka, Olhivske, Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky.
Tavriysk direction
- Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;
- Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd Army Corps of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd Army Corps of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.
Areas of more than 25 towns and villages along the contact line were damaged by fire. In addition, the enemy continued aerial reconnaissance, actively used UAVs, made up to thirty sorties.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.
The enemy has seven ships and boats at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them, for the first time in a long time, there is not a single carrier of Kalibr cruise missiles. Most likely, out of 11 such ships (3 frigates, 4 missile corvettes, and 4 patrol ships), 3 (a frigate and two corvettes) can be combat-ready at the moment. 2 ships (a frigate and a corvette) are in the Mediterranean Sea. 2 ships were damaged on October 29 during a drone attack. 4 patrol ships, despite the declared technical capability, are most likely not yet capable of firing Kalibr. Nevertheless, a rapid build-up of surface and underwater carriers of Kalibr missiles in the launch areas, with up to 40 missiles, is possible.
There are 6 patrol ships and boats in the waters of the Sea of Azov on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.
Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 warplanes from Belbek and Saka airfields were deployed.
Russia began to admit that as a result of the sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser "Moskva", more than one sailor died. Relatives of sailors managed to prove this only through a court case. In Sevastopol, the so-called "court" of the occupiers found 17 people dead. Meanwhile, the actual number of casualties per ship on April 13-14 2022, may be significantly higher.
The Russian Federation rotated the surface grouping of ships of the Pacific and Northern fleets in the Mediterranean Sea, which it deployed in February 2022 before the start of aggression against Ukraine (18 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers of project 1164). Most of those ships and vessels returned to their bases in August and October. Currently, there are 8 ships of the Russian Federation from the Black Sea, Northern and Baltic Fleets and 2 support vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, two project 20380 corvettes of the Baltic Fleet (with Kh-35 missiles) arrived to replace them. It is possible that the Russian submarine missile carrier of project 949A is also in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey does not allow these ships to enter the Black Sea based on its powers under the Montreux Convention. Their combat potential is probably equal to the previous group, and their strike capabilities are mainly focused on combating surface targets.
The head of the occupation authorities of Sevastopol, Razvozhaev, reported to Putin in Moscow about the situation in Sevastopol, in particular regarding shipbuilding. He proposed to expand the production of marine and underwater drones for various purposes in Sevastopol.
"Grain Initiative": Seven ships with 290,000 tons of Ukrainian agricultural products left the ports of Great Odesa on November 3. As reported by the press service of the Ministry of Infrastructure, they are heading to the countries of Asia and Europe. Among the ships is the tanker ESENTEPE, which will deliver 29,000 tons of sunflower seeds to Oman, and the ship KEY KNIGHT, which carries 67,000 tons of corn for China. It is emphasized that in October, export volumes could have been 30-40% higher if Russia had not artificially blocked inspections in the Bosphorus.
Despite the return to the "grain agreement", the authorities of the Russian Federation again stated that they have not yet decided their position regarding the extension of the agreement after November 16. In this way, the Russian Federation continues to blackmail and put artificial pressure on Ukraine, the UN and countries that need Ukrainian agricultural products.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 04.11
Personnel - almost 74,840 people (+840);
Tanks - 2,750 (+16)
Armored combat vehicles – 5,580 (+28);
Artillery systems – 1,772 (+17);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 391 (+1);
Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 201 (+3); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,174 (+12); Aircraft - 277 (0);
Helicopters – 258 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level – 1,450 (+8); Intercepted cruise missiles - 397 (0);
Boats / ships - 16 (0).
Ukraine, general news
Next year's state budget of Ukraine will be half financed from its own resources, and international partners will help with the rest of the financing, announced Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal during the government meeting on November 4. "We will cover the deficit of 38 billion dollars with the help of our partners. In particular, the United States, the European Union and the IMF," Shmyhal said. He noted that during recent meetings in Berlin, the government received assurances from the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, that the EU will allocate 18 billion euros to Ukraine next year in the form of macro-financial assistance. "We also have progress in negotiations with the IMF. We expect to start a new major cooperation program in 2023," Shmyhal stressed.
The IT industry in Ukraine has grown by 13% since the beginning of the year, and exports have increased by 23%, as reported by the press service of the Ministry of Economy.
Ukrainian farmers have finished harvesting grain and leguminous crops from 72% of the [agricultural] area; 32.6 million tons of grain have already been threshed, reported the press service of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.
International diplomatic aspect
G7 condemned Russia's recent escalation, including its attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure using missiles, Iranian drones, and trainers. Russia was blamed for terrorizing the civilian population. "Indiscriminate attacks against civilian population and infrastructure constitute war crimes and we reiterate our determination to ensure full accountability for these and crimes against humanity," the statement reads. In addition, G7 established a coordination mechanism aimed at helping Ukraine repair, restore and defend its critical energy and water infrastructure.
The Group called unacceptable "Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric" and warned of severe consequences should the Kremlin decides to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. In addition, the leaders rejected "Russia's false claims that Ukraine is preparing a radiological "dirty bomb."
The US will provide Ukraine with the $400 million assistance package, including 1,100 Phoenix Ghost kamikaze drones, funding to refurbish 45 tanks and an additional 40 riverine boats, and
Hawk air defense systems. The Netherlands is financing the refurbishment of another 45 Czech Т-72 tanks. Greece will send an undisclosed number of BMP-1 IFVs. The Bulgarian Parliament approved (175 – aye, 49-no) sending the country's first military aid to Ukraine.
In a message marking Russia's Day of National Unity, a former so-called liberal President Dmitriy Medvedev said the task of the Fatherland was to "stop the supreme ruler of Hell, whatever name he uses - Satan, Lucifer or Iblis." It seems he decided to pick up a notion voiced by Alexander Dugin, who supported Ramzan Kadyrov's call for jihad against Ukraine. Dugin believes Russia is fighting a "holy war against the satanic West," a "final apocalyptic, eschatological battle against the antichrist." So, "jihad" and "a holy war" are added to the long list of reasons for Russia's aggressive war and genocide of the Ukrainian people that includes, particularly, the "genocide" of Russians, intentions to "attack" Russia, development of a "dirty bomb" and "combat mosquitos."
Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin said that "we [Russians?] always have (and even now) treated Ukrainians with respect and warmth." He expressed his "bitterness" because "now we are essentially fighting with each other, in fact, the confrontation is going on within one nation. The situation has become deadly for Russia and suicidal for the Ukrainian people. We see how they are thrown into the furnace as if Ukrainians do not exist". He claimed that Ukrainians "are the main victim of the deliberate sublimation of hatred towards Russians."
The volatile mood of the Russian rulers, from denying the very existence of the Ukrainian nation to expressing "respect and warmth" in the foreground of numerous war crimes and acts of genocide, is a pretty "favorable" setting for a "negotiated" solution.
Russia, relevant news
Putin signed a law that allows the mobilization of Russians with unexpunged convictions for serious crimes, the Russian media reported. It will now be possible to send to war those who have recently served time for murder, robbery, and drug trafficking.
318,000 people have been mobilized in Russia, of which 49,000 are already in Ukraine, Putin said.
The Infinity car company has announced its exit from the Russian market. The supply was temporarily suspended back on March 9.
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3. Iran acknowledges sending drones to Russia for first time
Iran acknowledges sending drones to Russia for first time
AP · November 5, 2022
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Iran’s foreign minister on Saturday acknowledged for the first time that his country has supplied Russia with drones, insisting the transfer came before Moscow’s war on Ukraine that has seen the Iranian-made drones divebombing Kyiv.
The comments by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian come after months of confusing messaging from Iran about the weapons shipment, as Russia sends the drones slamming into Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian targets.
“We gave a limited number of drones to Russia months before the Ukraine war,” Amirabdollahian told reporters after a meeting in Tehran.
Previously, Iranian officials had denied arming Russia in its war on Ukraine. Just earlier this week, Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N. Amir Saeid Iravani called the allegations “totally unfounded” and reiterated Iran’s position of neutrality in the war. The U.S. and its Western allies on the Security Council have called on Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to investigate if Russia has used Iranian drones to attack civilians in Ukraine.
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Even so, Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard has vaguely boasted of providing drones to the world’s top powers. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has extolled the efficacy of the drones and mocked Western hand-wringing over their danger. During state-backed demonstrations to mark the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover on Friday, crowds waved placards of the triangle-shaped drones as a point of national pride.
Power blackouts across Ukraine amid Russian shelling
Iran marks 1979 US Embassy takeover amid nationwide protests
G-7 ministers back Ukraine support, are suspicious of China
Biden says 'we're gonna free Iran' as protests there go on
As he acknowledged the shipment, Amirabdollahian claimed on Saturday that Iran was oblivious to the use of its drones in Ukraine. He said Iran remained committed to stopping the conflict.
“If (Ukraine) has any documents in their possession that Russia used Iranian drones in Ukraine, they should provide them to us,” he said. “If it is proven to us that Russia used Iranian drones in the war against Ukraine, we will not be indifferent to this issue.”
AP · November 5, 2022
4. Putin endorses evacuation of parts of Ukraine's Kherson region
Excerpts:
Sullivan affirmed that Washington will continue to provide economic, humanitarian and military aid with support from both Biden's Democrats and opposition Republicans.
"We fully intend to ensure that the resources are there as necessary and that we'll get votes from both sides of the aisle to make that happen," he told reporters at the Ukrainian presidential administration.
Sullivan's remarks came days before U.S. midterm elections in which Republicans are given a good chance of taking control of Congress. This has raised concerns that close allies of former President Donald Trump, who is known for an "America First" agenda, could cut or even block Ukraine aid, which must be approved by the House of Representatives and Senate.
Sullivan's visit came a day after Democratic Senator Chris Coons and Republican Senator Rob Portman traveled to the Ukrainian capital in a bid to signal bipartisan U.S. support.
Putin endorses evacuation of parts of Ukraine's Kherson region
Reuters · by Jonathan Landay
- Summary
- Companies
- Putin says evacuation zone is dangerous
- Moscow has been moving people from Kherson
- 24-hour curfew announced for Kherson city
- U.S. sending more military aid, top official visits Kyiv
FRONTLINE WEST OF KHERSON, Ukraine/KYIV, Nov 4 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly endorsed the evacuation of civilians from parts of Ukraine's southern Kherson region on Friday, the latest sign of Russia's retreat in one of the most bitterly contested areas in Ukraine.
"Now, of course, those who live in Kherson should be removed from the zone of the most dangerous actions, because the civilian population should not suffer," Putin told pro-Kremlin activists as he marked Russia's Day of National Unity.
Moscow has already been ferrying people out of an area it controls in Kherson on the west bank of the Dnipro River, and this week announced that the evacuation zone would also include a 15 km buffer area on the east bank. But the comments appear to be the first time Putin has endorsed the evacuations personally.
Russia says it has been taking residents to safety from the path of a Ukrainian advance. Kyiv says the measures have included forced deportations of civilians, a war crime, which Russia denies.
Putin's comments came amid signs Russia could be preparing to abandon its military foothold on the west bank of the Dnipro River, including Kherson's regional capital - potentially one of the biggest Russian retreats of the war.
On Thursday, Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian-installed occupation administration in Kherson, said Russia was likely to pull its troops from the west bank. In later remarks, he was more equivocal, saying he hoped there would be no retreat but "we have to take some very difficult decisions."
Late on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the fiercest fighting over the last week had taken place around Bakhmut and Soledar, in the eastern Donetsk region about 500 km northeast of Kherson.
"We are holding our positions in these and a few other areas in the Donetsk region," he said in a video address, accusing Russia of insane stubborness for sending "tens or hundreds of thousands more people to the meat grinder."
During the day Ukrainian forces had downed eight Iranian drones and two Russian missiles, Zelenskiy said.
CURFEW
Pictures have circulated on the internet showing the main administration building in Kherson city with Russia's flag no longer flying atop it. Kyiv has been wary, saying such signs could be Russian deception to lure Ukrainian troops into a trap.
A 24-hour curfew was imposed on the city on Friday, Stremousov said, adding the measure was necessary to defend Kherson from a likely Ukrainian offensive.
[1/5] Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with members of public associations, youth and volunteer organizations during a flower-laying ceremony at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky while marking Russia's Day of National Unity in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia November 4, 2022. Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Pool via REUTERS
Ukrainian soldiers in a mechanized infantry company dug in on a tree line west of Kherson city were confident the Russians would eventually retreat, but would fight as they fall back.
Vitalyi, 48, the company's deputy commander, said recent Russian efforts to beef up their defences appeared aimed at protecting a withdrawal rather than holding Kherson.
"They have large amounts of tanks and people, but I don't think they have a realistic plan to stay more than one or two weeks," he said, as his men took advantage of unusually mild weather to improve bunkers and clean weapons amid thumps of intermittent artillery fire.
Vladyslav, a 27-year-old soldier, said he expected the Russians would fight: "We will fight as well. We have nowhere else to go. This is our home. This is our land."
The regional capital, on the west bank at the mouth of the Dnipro, is the only big city Russia has captured intact since its invasion in February. Its loss for Russian forces would be one of the severest blows of the war.
MORE U.S. MILITARY AID AND OFFICIAL VISITS
The United States announced $400 million worth of additional security assistance for Ukraine, including refurbishing T-72 tanks from the Czech Republic and missiles for HAWK air defenses that could be used against Russian drones and cruise missiles.
The new assistance brought the amount of U.S. military aid sent to Kyiv to more than $18.2 billion since the invasion. As it was announced, President Joe Biden's national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, met with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, in Kyiv.
Sullivan affirmed that Washington will continue to provide economic, humanitarian and military aid with support from both Biden's Democrats and opposition Republicans.
"We fully intend to ensure that the resources are there as necessary and that we'll get votes from both sides of the aisle to make that happen," he told reporters at the Ukrainian presidential administration.
Sullivan's remarks came days before U.S. midterm elections in which Republicans are given a good chance of taking control of Congress. This has raised concerns that close allies of former President Donald Trump, who is known for an "America First" agenda, could cut or even block Ukraine aid, which must be approved by the House of Representatives and Senate.
Sullivan's visit came a day after Democratic Senator Chris Coons and Republican Senator Rob Portman traveled to the Ukrainian capital in a bid to signal bipartisan U.S. support.
Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Peter Graff, Frank Jack Daniel and Patricia Zengerled; Editing by Philippa Fletcher, Gareth Jones and Daniel Wallis
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Jonathan Landay
5. The Untold Story of ‘Russiagate’ and the Road to War in Ukraine
Long read.
Before any partisan vitriol is launched over this article I recommend taking a deep breath and assessing this article by setting aside political bias as much as possible.
This is an article worthy of study. Those on the extreme right and extreme left will have their extreme views.
I would recommend an objective read of this article with two approaches.
First, take it at face value: Is the information here factual and if so who should be held accountable?
Second, is this article written to advance a specific agenda? Is it deliberate disinformation (deliberately presented misinformation with the intent to deceive)? What will be the effects of such disinformation?
The Untold Story of ‘Russiagate’ and the Road to War in Ukraine
Russia’s meddling in Trump-era politics was more directly connected to the current war than previously understood.
By Jim Rutenberg
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html?campaign_id=190&emc=edit_ufn_20221102&instance_id=76364&nl=from-the-times®i_id=67105681&segment_id=111827&te=1&user_id=5509b3485fdf43a9395c0a4e5d3f2e9d
To hear more audio stories from publications like The New York Times, download Audm for iPhone or Android.
On the night of July 28, 2016, as Hillary Clinton was accepting the Democratic presidential nomination in Philadelphia, Donald J. Trump’s campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, received an urgent email from Moscow. The sender was a friend and business associate named Konstantin Kilimnik. A Russian citizen born in Soviet Ukraine, Kilimnik ran the Kyiv office of Manafort’s international consulting firm, known for bringing cutting-edge American campaign techniques to clients seeking to have their way with fragile democracies around the world.
Kilimnik didn’t say much, only that he needed to talk, in person, as soon as possible. Exactly what he wanted to talk about was apparently too sensitive even for the tradecraft the men so fastidiously deployed — encrypted apps, the drafts folder of a shared email account and, when necessary, dedicated “bat phones.” But he had made coded reference — “caviar” — to an important former client, the deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who had fled to Russia in 2014 after presiding over the massacre of scores of pro-democracy protesters. Manafort responded within minutes, and the plan was set for five days later.
Kilimnik cleared customs at Kennedy Airport at 7:43 p.m., only 77 minutes before the scheduled rendezvous at the Grand Havana Room, a Trump-world hangout atop 666 Fifth Avenue, the Manhattan office tower owned by the family of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Shortly after the appointed hour, Kilimnik walked onto a perfectly put-up stage set for a caricature drama of furtive figures hatching covert schemes with questionable intent — a dark-lit cigar bar with mahogany-paneled walls and floor-to-ceiling windows columned in thick velvet drapes, its leather club chairs typically filled by large men with open collars sipping Scotch and drawing on parejos and figurados. Men, that is, like Paul Manafort, with his dyed-black pompadour and penchant for pinstripes. There, with the skyline shimmering though the cigar-smoke haze, Kilimnik shared a secret plan whose significance would only become clear six years later, as Vladimir V. Putin’s invading Russian Army pushed into Ukraine.
Known loosely as the Mariupol plan, after the strategically vital port city, it called for the creation of an autonomous republic in Ukraine’s east, giving Putin effective control of the country’s industrial heartland, where Kremlin-armed, -funded and -directed “separatists” were waging a two-year-old shadow war that had left nearly 10,000 dead. The new republic’s leader would be none other than Yanukovych. The trade-off: “peace” for a broken and subservient Ukraine.
The scheme cut against decades of American policy promoting a free and united Ukraine, and a President Clinton would no doubt maintain, or perhaps even harden, that stance. But Trump was already suggesting that he would upend the diplomatic status quo; if elected, Kilimnik believed, Trump could help make the Mariupol plan a reality. First, though, he would have to win, an unlikely proposition at best. Which brought the men to the second prong of their agenda that evening — internal campaign polling data tracing a path through battleground states to victory. Manafort’s sharing of that information — the “eyes only” code guiding Trump’s strategy — would have been unremarkable if not for one important piece of Kilimnik’s biography: He was not simply a colleague; he was, U.S. officials would later assert, a Russian agent.
Their business concluded, the men left by separate routes to avoid detection, though they continued to text deep into the night, according to federal investigators. In the weeks that followed, operatives in Moscow and St. Petersburg would intensify their hacking and disinformation campaign to damage Clinton and help turn the election toward Trump, which would form the core of the scandal known as Russiagate. The Mariupol plan would become a footnote, all but forgotten. But what the plan offered on paper is essentially what Putin — on the dangerous defensive after a raft of strategic miscalculations and mounting battlefield losses — is now trying to seize through sham referendums and illegal annexation. And Mariupol is shorthand for the horrors of his war, an occupied city in ruins after months of siege, its hulking steelworks spectral and silenced, countless citizens buried in mass graves.
Putin’s assault on Ukraine and his attack on American democracy have until now been treated largely as two distinct story lines. Across the intervening years, Russia’s election meddling has been viewed essentially as a closed chapter in America’s political history — a perilous moment in which a foreign leader sought to set the United States against itself by exploiting and exacerbating its political divides.
Yet those two narratives came together that summer night at the Grand Havana Room. And the lesson of that meeting is that Putin’s American adventure might be best understood as advance payment for a geopolitical grail closer to home: a vassal Ukrainian state. Thrumming beneath the whole election saga was another story — about Ukraine’s efforts to establish a modern democracy and, as a result, its position as a hot zone of the new Cold War between Russia and the West, autocracy and democracy. To a remarkable degree, the long struggle for Ukraine was a bass note to the upheavals and scandals of the Trump years, from the earliest days of the 2016 campaign and then the presidential transition, through Trump’s first impeachment and into the final days of the 2020 election. Even now, some influential voices in American politics, mostly but not entirely on the right, are suggesting that Ukraine make concessions of sovereignty similar to those contained in Kilimnik’s plan, which the nation’s leaders categorically reject.
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This second draft of history emerges from a review of the hundreds of pages of documents produced by investigators for the special counsel, Robert S. Mueller III, and for the Republican-led Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; from impeachment-hearing transcripts and the recent crop of Russiagate memoirs; and from interviews with nearly 50 people in the United States and Ukraine, including four hourlong conversations with Manafort himself.
For Trump — who today is facing legal challenges involving the cache of classified documents at his Mar-a-Lago resort, his finances and his role in efforts to overturn his 2020 election defeat — the Russia investigation was the original sin, the first of many politically motivated “witch hunts,” since repurposed into weapons in his expansive arsenal of grievance. The Russia investigation and its offshoots never did prove coordination between the Trump campaign and Moscow, though they did document numerous connections. But to view the record left behind through the blood-filtered lens of Putin’s war, now in its ninth month, is to discover a trail of underappreciated signals telegraphing the depth of his Ukrainian obsession — and the life-or-death stakes that America’s domestic travails would have for some 45 million people nearly 5,000 miles away.
Among the episodes that emerge is the Grand Havana Room meeting, along with the persistent, surreptitious effort to bring the Mariupol plan to life. The plan was hardly the only effort to trade peace in Ukraine for concessions to Putin; many obstacles stood in its way. And its provenance remains unclear: Was it part of a Putin long game or an attempt by his ally, Yanukovych, to claw back power? Either way, the prosecutors who uncovered the plan would come to view it as potential payoff for the Russian president’s election meddling.
The examination also brings into sharper relief the tricks of Putin’s trade as he pressed his revanchist mission to cement his power by restoring the Russian empire and weakening democracy globally. He pursued that goal through the cunning co-optation of oligarchs and power brokers in the countries in his sights, while applying ever-evolving disinformation techniques to play to the fears and hatreds of their people.
No figure in the Trump era moved more adroitly through that world than Manafort, a political operative known for treating democracy as a tool as much as an idea. Though he insists that he was trying to stanch Russian influence in Ukraine, not enable it, he had achieved great riches by putting his political acumen to work for the country’s Kremlin-aligned oligarchs, helping install a government that would prove pliant in the face of Putin’s demands. Then he helped elect an American president whose open admiration of the Russian strongman muddied more than a half-century of policy promoting democracy.
In the end, Putin would not get out of a Trump presidency what he thought he had paid for, and democracy would bend but not yet break in both the United States and Ukraine. But that, as much as anything, would set the Russian leader on his march to war.
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Credit...Photo illustration by Anthony Gerace
Long before the Trump-era investigations, Manafort had established himself in Washington and abroad as a grand master of the political dark arts. Together with Roger Stone, Manafort helped develop the slashing style of conservative politics, pushing “hot buttons” to rile up base voters and tar opponents. They served in Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaigns and started their own firm, taking on international clients seeking favor in Reagan’s Washington. The firm specialized in covering over the bloody records of dictators like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines with copious coats of high-gloss spin, presenting them as freedom-loving democrats.
By 2005, Manafort had emerged as a central figure in Ukraine’s often-snakebit experiment in democracy. He was introduced to the country’s politics by one of Russia’s most powerful oligarchs, the aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska. Oligarchs don’t survive in Putin’s Russia without continually proving themselves useful to the motherland. And when Putin had an urgent problem in Ukraine, Deripaska, who had various holdings there, stepped in to help: He brought in Manafort’s firm, which he had hired earlier to assist in overcoming a block on his U.S. visa, based on allegations that he had gained his position through ties to organized crime (which he denies).
What had Putin in a lather was a pro-Western and youth-led democracy movement that had caught fire just as Ukraine’s second post-Soviet leader, the dictatorial and Kremlin-aligned Leonid Kuchma, prepared to step down. To succeed him, the reformists had lined up behind a politician named Viktor Yushchenko. Pro-American and married to a former State Department official, Yushchenko vowed to join NATO and the European Union. To the Kremlin, as one influential Russian defense analyst put it at the time, a Yushchenko victory would represent “a catastrophic loss of Russian influence throughout the former Soviet Union, leading ultimately to Russia’s geopolitical isolation.”
Putin had gone all in for Kuchma’s handpicked successor, Yanukovych, who had risen to power in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region and had the backing of the country’s leading oligarchs. But working with some of Putin’s top political operatives, the Yanukovych campaign had gone horribly awry. First, an assassination attempt had left Yushchenko permanently scarred but very much alive. (A culprit was never identified; Yushchenko suspected the Kremlin.) Then the Yanukovych team resorted to an election heist worthy of Trump’s 2020 voter-fraud fantasia, with reports of ballot stuffing, disappearing ink and bused-in voters. With thousands protesting in Kyiv’s central Maidan square, Ukraine’s high court declared Yanukovych’s “victory” marred by “systemic and massive” election violations. Yushchenko then won in a new vote, a triumph of democracy known as the Orange Revolution.
Now Deripaska asked Manafort if he could restore Yanukovych’s political organization, the Party of Regions, to power. Manafort’s prescription is contained in a June 2005 memo to Deripaska that was quoted in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report. Yanukovych and his party, he argued, should work to win elections legitimately by dressing up as democrats in a Western mold — using the tools of the West “in ways that the West believes is in concert with them,” even if they weren’t. By embracing the West, Yanukovych and his party would “restrict their options to ferment an atmosphere that gives hope to potential advocates of a different way.” In talking points that played to Putin, Manafort added, “We are now of the belief that this model can greatly benefit the Putin Government if employed at the correct levels with the appropriate commitment to success.”
Manafort insisted throughout our interviews that Putin would come to dislike him and his strategy, and that the memo was intended as a tutorial of sorts for Deripaska. “I was basically teaching him democracy,” he said. Deripaska’s office did not respond to an interview request. But in a failed libel suit against The Associated Press over a 2017 article that revealed their discussions about Ukraine, Deripaska said he hired Manafort solely for his own business interests and “never had any arrangement, whether contractual or otherwise, with Mr. Manafort to advance the interests of the Russian government.”
The State of the War
Regardless, with financing from Deripaska’s oligarch allies in Ukraine, Manafort began to put the plan into action. He brought in international elections consultants and American strategists from both sides of the partisan aisle. For local knowledge, Manafort brought in Kilimnik, who even then was trailed by suspicions that he was a Russian mole. Five feet tall with a disarmingly boyish mien, Kilimnik had last worked at the International Republican Institute, a democracy-promotion outfit affiliated with Senator John McCain of Arizona, who was a client of Manafort’s longtime partner, Rick Davis. Kilimnik had studied at a Soviet military language academy known for minting future intelligence officers and had served as a Russian Army translator. His colleagues at I.R.I. came to suspect he was passing secrets to Russian intelligence, and he was fired when the institute learned he was working for Yanukovych’s backers.
Under Manafort’s tutelage, Yanukovych took on a new look, swapping out his blocky, gray apparatchik apparel for custom suits, Manafort-style, and taming his Soviet-vintage bouffant with a tighter-cropped cut. Then, from a new office just off Maidan square, Manafort worked up a Party of Regions platform promising to make Ukraine a “bridge” between Russia and the West — by striking an economic partnership with the European Union (popular in the west) but rejecting NATO membership (popular with Russian speakers in Ukraine’s east). Skeptical American diplomats titled the Manafort project “Extreme Makeover.”
For all the talk of extending a bridge to the West, Manafort soon began plying his battle-tested and poll-driven politics of division — exploiting fissures over culture, democracy and the very notion of nationhood to excite the Party of Regions base, the Russian-speaking voters in the east and south. Speech drafts and talking points, unearthed in Manafort’s criminal cases, portrayed the Orange Revolution as a “coup” and the “orange illusion.” They attacked the Yushchenko government’s harder line toward Moscow and homed in on a simmering issue in Ukrainian politics — a regional split over whether to make Russian the second official language.
“In U.S. politics,” says Tetiana Shevchuk, a lawyer with the Anti-Corruption Action Center, a reform group based in Kyiv, “it’s called ‘culture wars,’ when they pick some issue which is not the high priority for society right now but can easily be made into something. He was pushing something like the idea that there are two types of Ukrainians — there are Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.”
Over the course of our interviews, Manafort maintained that the reformers had forced the issue by pushing the pre-eminence of Ukrainian in a country where many primarily spoke Russian. If anything, he argued, his strategy gave Yanukovych the credibility with “ethnic Russian” voters needed to unite the country while turning it westward. (He says he is “strongly” on Ukraine’s side in the war.) Still, Manafort’s line of attack coincided with a budding Russian intelligence operation that was engaging in “manipulation of issues like the status of the Russian language” to stoke a separatist rebellion in the Crimean Peninsula and “prevent Ukraine’s movement west into institutions like NATO and the E.U.,” according to a leaked U.S. Embassy cable from the time. Nearly two decades later, Putin would employ similar messaging over language and national identity as justifications for his war and illegal annexations in the east.
The Manafort strategy was a smashing success. The Party of Regions won the parliamentary elections in 2006, and four years later Yanukovych reclaimed the presidency in elections that passed international muster. The Orange revolutionaries, or at least their elected leadership, had done much of the work themselves — alienating voters through paralyzing infighting and a failure to deliver reform. But Manafort won the credit, becoming as well known in Ukrainian political circles as Karl Rove or James Carville in America. He was living the oligarch’s life, collecting jackets of python and ostrich skin, Alan Couture suits and properties in SoHo, the Hamptons, Trump Tower and brownstone Brooklyn. He was also growing closer to Yanukovych, playing grass-court tennis — always letting the client win — and soaking in the hot tub at the new president’s 350-acre Mezhyhirya Residence, with its petting zoo, golf course and grotesquerie of a mansion, whose shambolic mix of architectural influences was known locally as “Donetsk Rococo.”
It did not take long for Yanukovych to begin backsliding on his democracy pledges. He jailed his opponent, the former Orange leader Yulia Tymoshenko; ratcheted back press freedoms by criminalizing defamation and bringing trumped-up investigations of opposition media outlets; presided over the plundering of public funds; rigged the 2012 parliamentary elections; and reversed a plan to end Russia’s lease on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, where its naval fleet was viewed as a stalking horse for a Putin takeover.
Soon several of Manafort’s democracy consultants dropped out in disappointment. For his part, Manafort expanded his role with Yanukovych, becoming something of a shadow foreign-policy adviser and emissary to the West. He was also, prosecutors later charged, working as an unregistered foreign agent, running secret lobbying campaigns in Washington and Brussels to stave off sanctions over the Tymoshenko jailing while insisting that Yanukovych was still pursuing his economic deal with Europe.
But that tenuous bridge to the West could not hold. Under pressure from Putin, Yanukovych abruptly reversed course in late 2013, breaking off talks with Europe and deepening his economic commitment to Russia. By the tens of thousands, protesters again streamed into Maidan square. Weeks of standoff, punctuated by violence, came to a deadly denouement over three days in February 2014, when a government crackdown left dozens dead, mere yards from Manafort’s office.
In the backlash, with his political coalition in pieces, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Within weeks, claiming Yanukovych had been ousted not in a homegrown swell of democracy but in a Western-backed coup, Putin moved on Crimea and the east. To this day, Manafort, too, maintains that Maidan was essentially a coup against a duly elected president. It was also a personal financial disaster — he had lost his cash cow. Still, he managed to find work, helping former Party of Regions members start a new party called Opposition Bloc and consulting on mayoral races.
The last one came in late 2015, in Mariupol. The port city, in Ukraine’s southeast, was part of a potential land bridge for arms between occupied Crimea and the war-torn Donbas and would be a commercial hub for a Potemkin republic beholden to Moscow. It was also a fief of Ukraine’s richest citizen, the metals and mining magnate Rinat Akhmetov, for whom both Russia and Europe were important markets. An early political godfather to Yanukovych, Akhmetov was also an original financier of Manafort’s work for the Party of Regions.
With a concentration of industrial holdings in the Donbas, Akhmetov kept a tight hold over the region’s politics, governance and media. Even as Putin’s proxies advanced on Mariupol and held a sham independence referendum in 2014, Akhmetov struck a neutral-seeming posture that gave the “separatists” an opening to claim they had his support. “Rinat,” read graffiti in Kyiv’s Independence Square, “are you with Ukraine or the Kremlin?” Akhmetov ultimately came out harshly against the “separatist” violence, dispatching workers to patrol the streets and help repel Russia’s proxies. But even then, his mixed messages continued to feed suspicion that he was hedging his bets. After “separatists” shelled a civilian area in early 2015, killing 30 people — the attack, it later became clear, was directed by Russian military officials — his largest news outlet, Segodnya, stood out for articles that avoided ascribing blame. “The impression was, ‘It’s not man-made shelling but some kind of earthquake; it just happened,’” Eugenia Kuznetsova, a Ukrainian media analyst who studied the coverage of the attack, told me.
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Jock Mendoza-Wilson, a spokesman for Akhmetov, said the oligarch had never been neutral and had always supported a united Ukraine. (Akhmetov is now suing Russia for destroying his largest steelworks in Mariupol, the site of Ukrainian soldiers’ desperate 80-day holdout this year.) But to hold the country together, he said, Akhmetov believed at the time that “it would not be constructive to come out guns blazing” against Russia.
With the 2015 mayoral and City Council elections approaching, several insurgent candidates stepped forward, pledging to turn Mariupol more decisively against Russia and its proxies. Akhmetov’s chosen mayoral candidate, a former executive with his steel company, Vadym Boychenko, was a clear advocate for the neutral status quo.
Manafort’s hand in the campaign, revealed in an email unearthed by Senate investigators, was largely hidden; in interviews, he described his role as minor. One reformist candidate, Oleksandr Yaroshenko, was surprised to learn that Manafort had been involved, though, in retrospect, he did see hints of his presence. “The Americans came with little counts,” he told me during a video interview in May that was occasionally interrupted by his efforts to coordinate evacuations from the besieged city. “They had technology: how many people we need to bring from each street, which percent.” He saw it as so much window-dressing, given that Akhmetov’s control of the city extended to the contract to print the ballots.
After Boychenko won, Yaroshenko organized a City Council campaign to force him to renew a proclamation declaring Russia an “aggressor country.” The mayor shelved the measure.
Manafort’s move to the Trump campaign, in March 2016, was a boon for the candidate, giving him one of the Republicans’ savviest intramural strategists just as Senator Ted Cruz was beginning to cut into his delegate lead, spurring talk of a contested convention.
It was also a boon for Manafort, who was poor in cash if rich in luxury goods. He had wired a large portion of his Ukraine earnings — a total take of some $60 million, investigators found — into his real estate, automobile and suit purchases from shell companies in Cyprus, part of what prosecutors said was a money-laundering scheme. A $2.4 million bill to Akhmetov and another client remained unpaid. Financial threats loomed. He was being sued by Deripaska, who claimed that Manafort and his deputy, Rick Gates, had lost nearly $20 million in a joint business venture gone bad.
Manafort went to great lengths to get the job with the Trump campaign, according to the Senate intelligence report. He lobbied Roger Stone and the fund-raiser Tom Barrack and clinched the deal, Barrack told prosecutors, by saying “the magic words” — he would work without pay. After all, Manafort reasoned, the job could be a way to get his back pay from Akhmetov and patch things up with Deripaska, who would no doubt see value in Manafort’s association with a potential president. “How do we use to get whole,” Manafort wrote to Kilimnik. Manafort told me he believed he would have greater influence with Trump as a supportive volunteer than as a member of his staff.
Manafort’s new job also held promise for Putin. The inner circle of the leading Republican candidate for the American presidency now included an adviser who was the mastermind behind Ukraine’s most successful Russia-friendly party and was close to a man, Kilimnik, whom American officials have identified as a Russian agent.
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The day after the Trump campaign announced his appointment as chief convention strategist, Manafort worked with Gates and Kilimnik to send copies of the announcement to his main patrons in Ukraine, along with personal letters promising to keep them in the loop throughout the campaign. The recipients included Deripaska, Akhmetov and another wealthy Ukrainian, a former Yanukovych chief of staff named Sergiy Lyovochkin. A conduit for oligarchs’ money to Manafort during the Party of Regions years, Lyovochkin also had a close working relationship with Kilimnik, according to Senate investigators.
As Manafort rose to become Trump’s campaign chairman — and as Russian operatives were hacking Democratic Party servers — the candidate took stances on the region that were advantageous to Putin’s ambitions for Ukraine. Ahead of the Republican National Convention in Cleveland in July, Trump shocked the American foreign-policy establishment by voicing only tepid support for NATO. He also told aides that he didn’t believe it was worth risking “World War III” to defend Ukraine against Russia, according to the Senate intelligence report released in the summer of 2020.
That would be followed by the only platform fight of the convention. After a Texas delegate added a plank pledging “lethal defensive weapons” for Ukraine, a Trump national security adviser, J.D. Gordon, swept in to block it; it would be downgraded to a softer pledge of “appropriate assistance.” The Texas delegate would tell the Senate Intelligence Committee that Gordon had told her he was acting in consultation with “New York,” specifically with Trump. Gordon denied that, saying he acted on his own initiative because the “lethal aid” pledge appeared to contradict Trump’s position on Ukraine. Two other very invested players were on hand at the convention — the Ukrainian and Russian ambassadors to the United States; the Russian spoke with Gordon days after the plank was softened. In the end, investigators did not conclude that Russia was involved in the platform wrangling. Nor did they find any evidence to contradict Manafort’s insistence that he had been wholly removed from the process, though one campaign official later told investigators that Manafort had to “mollify” the “upset” Ukrainian ambassador.
The Ukrainians would have reason to be upset, and the Russians pleased, all over again a few days later, on July 27, when Trump, at a news conference, said he would consider recognizing Crimea as Russian territory, effectively ending Obama-administration sanctions and normalizing relations that had been strained since the illegal annexation. He also, famously, invited Russia to hack Hillary Clinton’s emails.
The following day, Kilimnik flew to Moscow, travel records obtained by Mueller’s office show. In his email to Manafort that night, he wrote that he had met with “the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago” — the guy being Yanukovych, who once gave Manafort $30,000 worth of fine caviar. Kilimnik needed to meet in person. He had “a long caviar story to tell.”
At the Grand Havana Room, Kilimnik delivered Yanukovych’s urgent message: A “peace” plan for Ukraine was coming together that he hoped Manafort would help effect.
As described by Kilimnik in messages and memos over the next several months, the envisioned autonomous republic in the east would nominally remain part of Ukraine; with Yanukovych as its leader, it would then negotiate a settlement. But what became known as the Mariupol plan was, as Manafort later acknowledged to prosecutors, a “backdoor” route to Russian control of eastern Ukraine — remarkably similar to what Putin has now declared accomplished through his gun-barrel annexations.
The plan was based on Putin’s maximalist interpretation of accords, signed in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, in late 2014 and early 2015, that tied a cease-fire in the east to a new Ukrainian constitutional provision granting “special status” to the two main territories there. Russia interpreted that fuzzy term as giving the territories autonomy — under its proxies — with veto power over Ukraine’s foreign policy. Ukraine viewed it as a more limited expansion of local governance. Even then, a majority of Ukrainians saw the provision as capitulation, polls showed, and it struggled to gain acceptance in Parliament.
For the United States, which was not a party to the Minsk talks, any plan that gave the east outsize autonomy and influence ran counter to longstanding support for what William Taylor, a former American ambassador to Ukraine, described as “an independent, sovereign Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” “We’ve said that over and over and over,” he told me. Now, though, Trump’s rhetoric on Russia was suggesting a break from that policy.
In the Russia investigation, the meeting at the Grand Havana Room would become better known for the other piece of business conducted that night: the discussion of polling data that traced how Trump might achieve the position of power to make that momentous diplomatic break. Manafort and Gates had been passing that data to Kilimnik since the spring; produced by Manafort’s go-to pollster, Tony Fabrizio, it was among the campaign’s more closely held assets, according to the Senate intelligence report. Manafort and Gates have insisted that the data was only of the most basic sort, some of it publicly available. But it also showed exactly what the campaign was looking at as it formed its strategy and spread its message in new ways across social media. And as Manafort told Kilimnik at the club, according to testimony from Gates and another witness briefed on the meeting, the polling was picking up something that Clinton pollsters and mainstream prognosticators were not — a path to the White House through traditionally blue states like Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Of course, Manafort explained, that would require a relentless assault on Clinton’s public image.
By the end of summer, vicious anti-Clinton social-media operations were intensifying, not only by the Trump campaign and its American allies but also by Russian trolls posing as Americans, who spread a raft of conspiracy theories about Clinton’s health and alleged criminality. The operations included the states that Manafort had identified as key, investigators found.
The polling data would become a major focus of the Mueller team and Senate investigators. Neither could directly link the Russian operations to the data; they reported only that Gates believed that Kilimnik was sharing it with Deripaska and his Ukrainian counterparts — an apparent fulfillment of Manafort’s pledge to keep his patrons in the loop. But last year a Treasury Department communiqué concluded that Kilimnik had passed the data directly to Russian military intelligence, calling him a “known Russian agent.”
The document provided no underlying evidence, and Manafort and Gates have used that to question the assessment and all that flows from it. As Gates told me, “If Kilimnik is a G.R.U. agent, show us the proof, and I’ll be the first to say that’s accurate.” Kilimnik declined to speak with me, but in a text message, he dismissed his work on the Mariupol plan as “informal discussions” regarding “one of 10,000 various options of peace solution.” (It was “not the right time to discuss these matters,” he told me, given the “struggle of Ukrainians for their life and freedom.”) Last year, Kilimnik told an interviewer with RealClearInvestigations that the assessment was “senseless and false,” noting that he was a regular source of information for U.S. Embassy officials in Kyiv, which documents and former officials confirmed.
Of course, building trust inside a rival nation’s embassy is what spies are supposed to do. One very plugged-in Westerner, a fixer who interacted with Kilimnik regularly in Kyiv, told me that while he harbored doubts about the intelligence assessment, he considered the question academic: As a Russian citizen with family in Russia and a history with the military, Kilimnik would have been under pressure to do Putin’s bidding, and often seemed to. For that matter, emails obtained by Mueller showed Kilimnik referring to his interactions with high-level players in Moscow, including some with clear intelligence ties. Among them was a top Deripaska aide, Viktor Boyarkin, whom the U.S. Treasury Department has described as a former ranking official with the G.R.U., which took the lead in Putin’s meddling operation.
Kilimnik’s best connection to the Trump campaign would not be around as that operation came into full flower. Less than three weeks after the Grand Havana Room meeting, Manafort was out of a job. In mid-August, The New York Times had reported that a new Ukrainian anti-corruption agency had obtained a Party of Regions “black ledger,” listing earmarked, off-the-books payments to Ukrainian officials — and to Manafort. A few days later, at a news conference in Kyiv, a former journalist turned reformist parliamentarian, Serhiy Leshchenko, highlighted 22 handwritten ledger entries listing $12.7 million in payments designated for Manafort. With Clinton’s campaign calling the ledger evidence of ties between the Trump campaign and Russia, Manafort resigned.
The discovery of the ledger seemed to have been lifted straight from the plot of a hit sitcom, “Servant of the People.” A Ukrainian riff on “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,” it starred the comedic actor Volodymyr Zelensky as a humble and idealistic history teacher who is unexpectedly thrust into the presidency, constantly fighting off a Manafort-esque agent of the oligarchs trying to package and manage him. In the 2015 season finale, he finds a black ledger of secret payments kept by his predecessor and vows to cleanse the “off-the-book company called ‘Ukraine’” of its endemic corruption.
Speaking with reporters, Leshchenko used similar rhetoric when discussing why he helped publicize the real-world ledger. He had another reason too. “The more exposure there is of Trump and Trump’s circle,” he told Tablet magazine several months later, “the more difficult it will be for Trump to conclude a separate deal with Putin, thereby selling out both Ukraine and the whole of Europe.”
From the start of his presidential transition, Trump did appear to give Russia every indication that its political bet had paid off. He nominated as national security adviser a retired lieutenant general, Michael J. Flynn, who had accepted $33,750 to speak at a 2015 Moscow celebration of Russia’s state-financed propaganda outlet, RT. Even before taking office, Flynn was speaking with Putin’s ambassador in Washington, in apparent violation of federal law, about lifting sanctions over election meddling. (Flynn twice pleaded guilty to charges of lying to the F.B.I. about those discussions but was pardoned by Trump.) The new secretary of state would be Rex W. Tillerson, who as Exxon Mobil’s chief executive had criticized the Obama administration’s decision to sanction Russia over Crimea and the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines flight.
And in the days around the inauguration, promising signals came from across the Potomac in Virginia, where Manafort met with Kilimnik and Lyovochkin at the Westin Alexandria Old Town hotel. (The two men obtained inauguration tickets through a Manafort associate who would later plead guilty to failing to register as a foreign agent and illegally buying the tickets — a violation of rules against foreign political donations.) As most of their communications took place over encrypted messaging apps, investigators had little visibility into the agenda, but Manafort acknowledged one item to prosecutors: the Ukraine “peace” plan.
With no official position, Manafort continued to advise the Trump camp, according to the Senate report. At the same time, Kilimnik was shuttling between Moscow and Kyiv, working out the “peace” plan’s details. Communicating through a draft email in a shared account before the Virginia meeting, Kilimnik told Manafort that he and Yanukovych — code named BG for Big Guy — had met in Russia and discussed the plan. “Russians at the very top level are in principle not against this plan,” Kilimnik wrote, “and will work with the BG to start the process.” A public endorsement by Trump, he added, would overcome resistance in Kyiv. “All that is required to start the process is a very minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from DT saying, ‘he wants peace in Ukraine and Donbass back in Ukraine’ and a decision to be a ‘special representative’ and manage this process,” Kilimnik wrote. Trump’s representative would apparently be Manafort, who, Yanukovych could guarantee, would have entree at “the very top level” in the Kremlin.
Manafort was hardly the only figure in the Trump orbit engaging with people who knew people in Moscow. The early months of the administration brought a head-spinning procession of disclosures. Flynn, the national security adviser, was fired over his back-channel conversations with the Russian ambassador. There was the revelation that a foreign-policy adviser to the campaign named George Papadopoulos, at a bar in London, had told an Australian diplomat that Russia had dirt on Clinton, weeks before Russia’s hacking of Clinton’s emails was publicly known. His loose talk sparked the first meddling investigation, which evolved into the Mueller inquiry. There was the news that Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner and Manafort met at Trump Tower in June 2016 with a well-connected Russian lawyer who, they were told, wanted to pass along incriminating information about Clinton as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” By all accounts, the lawyer, more interested in the lifting of sanctions, failed to deliver. And there was the Mueller team’s disclosure in court papers in the fall of 2017 that Kilimnik was “assessed to have ties to a Russian intelligence service.”
By then, though, Manafort had emerged as a primary target of the investigation, his interactions with Kilimnik, Deripaska and pro-Russian Ukrainians viewed as a potential link between the Kremlin and the Trump campaign. Yet even after his indictment in late October 2017, prosecutors reported, he and Kilimnik continued to seek the Trump administration’s “wink” for the Ukraine “peace” plan. To that end, as late as March 2018, he and Kilimnik were working on a survey of Ukrainians. A draft of the poll asked whether Donbas should stay under the governance of Kyiv in one of two alternative arrangements; break off as an autonomous region; or join Russia outright. Devised with input from the pollster Fabrizio, it also asked if Yanukovych could be accepted as a leader in the east.
But as Manafort and Kilimnik worked to refine the poll, prosecutors brought new criminal charges against Manafort. He was now facing two trials, one in Virginia and one in Washington. Then came news of a new star witness — Manafort’s deputy, Gates, who laid out in detail how Manafort used shell companies to hide millions of dollars in earnings from the tax collectors.
In August 2018, a Virginia jury found Manafort guilty of eight of 18 counts, including tax and bank fraud. With his second trial, for money laundering, looming in Washington, Manafort struck a deal to plead guilty and cooperate with the government, in hopes of receiving leniency at sentencing. (Manafort now says he did not believe his sworn admission of guilt, and entered it only because he did not think he would face a fair jury and wanted to protect family financial assets.) But at the last minute, the lead prosecutor, Andrew Weissmann, scuttled the deal. Manafort, he learned, had consistently lied “about one issue in particular: his interactions with Kilimnik, the Russian intelligence officer,” as the Senate report put it. Among those interactions: the maneuverings for the Mariupol plan.
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Credit...Photo illustration by Anthony Gerace
Weissmann discovered the plan only after the Virginia trial, when the F.B.I. obtained a batch of Kilimnik’s emails. Confronted with that new information, Manafort told the prosecutors that he had dismissed the plan out of hand when it first came up, at the Grand Havana Room in August 2016. He stuck to that insistence even after Weissmann disclosed he was in possession of the December 2016 correspondence discussing “the BG” and the desired “wink” of support from Trump — and again when presented with the emails about the poll in March 2018.
In our interviews and in his book, “Political Prisoner,” published this August, Manafort calls the idea that he supported the plan “crazy” and maintains that the poll was designed to help a Ukrainian presidential candidate he would not name. Though he does not deny that Kilimnik pushed the plan — at the behest of Yanukovych, not Putin, he says — he accuses Weissmann of crafting a “made-up narrative” from unconnected facts.
For Weissmann, the revelations made for an aha! moment. The partition plan, he realized, was the “quo” Putin wanted for the “quid” of helping Trump’s campaign. “On August 2, if not earlier,” he wrote in his 2020 memoir, “Russia had clearly revealed to Manafort — and, by extension, to the Trump campaign — what it wanted out of the United States: ‘a wink,’ a nod of approval from a President Donald Trump, as it took over Ukraine’s richest region.”
Putin has sought to justify his war in Ukraine with a barrage of propaganda — that Ukraine, with a Jewish president, is ruled by Nazis; that Russian atrocities, amply captured in photographs, videos and witness accounts, are Ukrainian false-flag attacks, staged to smear Russia; that Ukraine is preparing to detonate a “dirty bomb,” even as Moscow stokes global fears of a Russian nuclear attack. Putin’s propaganda forces, in fact, had been employing such fictions for years to sow division and confusion in Crimea and Donbas, as he road-tested a new doctrine of hybrid warfare, a mix of weapons and words.
That through-the-looking-glass messaging echoes in the fashioning and evolution of a counternarrative to the Russia investigation that took root in Trump’s campaign and ultimately bled into his first impeachment: Ukraine, not Russia, had meddled in 2016.
According to the Mueller report, Kilimnik and Manafort began spinning the theory after news broke in June 2016 that a private cybersecurity firm called CrowdStrike had determined that Russian hackers had been responsible for breaching the Democratic National Committee’s computer systems. Gates later told investigators that Manafort had told people inside the campaign that Ukraine was actually behind the hack. In doing so, Gates reported, Manafort had “parroted a narrative Kilimnik often supported,” according to F.B.I. notes quoted in the Senate report. Manafort denies Gates’s account.
After the disclosure of Manafort’s name in the black ledger, Kilimnik mounted a reputational defense of his boss by surfacing a new iteration of the counternarrative — that Clinton’s Ukrainian allies had fabricated the ledger to tar Manafort and undermine Trump. Like all effective disinformation, it had some thread-thin ties to reality — the view within the Ukrainian government that a Trump presidency would be potentially ruinous, and the admission that the ledger had not been fully authenticated and did not prove actual payments made to Manafort. An F.B.I. agent who viewed the ledger told me that its hundreds of pages of handwritten entries would have been prohibitively difficult to forge and were a worthwhile investigative tool if not court-ready evidence. (Manafort has denied receiving off-the-books payments and was never a subject of criminal inquiry by Ukrainian prosecutors, who were focused on investigating whether payments to Manafort and others had been improperly drawn from public funds.)
Kilimnik’s initial foray was subtle, involving an August 2016 Financial Times article about prominent Ukrainians’ picking sides in the American election, breaking with traditional neutrality to oppose the “pro-Putin Trump.” Kilimnik had exchanged several emails with the reporter before publication, prosecutors learned, and the article included a quote from a “former Yanukovych loyalist” suggesting not only that the ledger had been leaked to harm Trump but also that journalists covering the leak had been “working in the interests of Hillary Clinton.” Kilimnik sent the article to Gates with the hope that “DT sees it.” Then, after three phone calls with Manafort, Roger Stone posted a link to the piece on Twitter. “The only interference in the US election is from Hillary’s friends in Ukraine,” he added as punctuation.
Several months later, Kilimnik helped make the case more plainly in an op-ed in U.S. News & World Report that he helped ghostwrite for his old associate, the Manafort patron Lyovochkin, now serving in Ukraine’s Parliament as a member of the Party of Regions’ successor, Opposition Bloc. Accusing anti-corruption officials of “manufacturing a case” against Manafort, the op-ed defended those proposing “painful concessions” in return for peace with Russia.
The counternarrative found a prominent amplifier at the Kremlin, which wasted no time using it to stoke Trump’s ire against its foe. Noting how vital American sponsorship was to Ukraine’s future, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, told reporters in Moscow during the transition, “It appears that keeping this sponsorship is a big challenge for the Kyiv authorities,” who had been “uncivilized and rude towards President-elect Donald Trump” and had planted information about Manafort. Putin joined the chorus in February, asserting that the Ukrainian government had “adopted a unilateral position in favor of one candidate” — Clinton. “More than that,” he added, without evidence, “certain oligarchs, certainly with the approval of the political leadership, funded this candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.”
Russia’s online assets in Ukraine and America joined in. That July, CyberBerkut, a hacker group associated with Russian military intelligence — and active in Russia’s earlier Ukraine propaganda efforts — elaborated on Putin’s theory that Ukrainian oligarchs had secretly financed Clinton. The next day, a pro-Trump Twitter account based in St. Petersburg that was later identified as an asset in the 2016 meddling, @USA_Gunslinger, posted, “Where’s the outrage over Clinton and her campaign team’s collusion with Ukraine to interfere in the US election?”
In the months that followed, Trump’s view of the Ukrainians seemed to grow only darker, as a more outlandish version of the theory flourished in the pro-Trump corners of the internet. Its proponents claimed that the cybersecurity company CrowdStrike was owned by a Ukrainian (it wasn’t), and that the physical servers were hidden somewhere in the country (they weren’t). In other words, much like the Russia investigation “hoax,” it was all a Ukrainian campaign to frame Trump and Russia. Trump nodded at the idea in his news conference with Putin in Helsinki in July 2018, when he said he accepted Putin’s word that Russia had not been involved in the hacking. “Where are those servers?” he asked. “They’re missing.”
Trump’s distrust was threatening to have deadly consequences for the Ukrainians. According to the memoir of his former national security adviser, John R. Bolton, when Russian sailors seized three Ukrainian naval vessels that November in a potentially escalatory move, Trump’s first instinct was to suspect that Ukraine had provoked Russia.
That same month, prosecutors reported to a federal judge that Manafort had breached his plea deal by lying. The judge later sentenced him to a prison term of seven and a half years, to be served at the Federal Correctional Institution Loretto, in Pennsylvania, as Inmate No. 35207-016. What might have been Putin’s best hope for a Trump-approved plan for a weakened and divided Ukraine seemed to have gone away with him. But in ways that played to the Russian leader’s designs, Trump’s festering grievance toward Ukraine would shape the next major scandal of his presidency.
Manafort might have been in prison, but, in search of a pardon, he still had something of value for the transactional president — his unparalleled knowledge of Ukrainian politics and government. He would effectively pass the baton to Trump’s personal lawyer, the former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, who in the fall of 2018 was preparing an offensive to definitively cast the special-counsel investigation as a political hit job after its final report failed to prove “collusion.”
Central to Giuliani’s mission was an effort to build out the “Ukraine did it” counternarrative. Giuliani and Manafort did not speak directly but through Manafort’s lawyers. When I asked Manafort exactly what he had passed along, he was vague, but he noted that Giuliani was “talking to some of the people in Ukraine who were my friends” and said his lawyers would have briefed Giuliani on the details of what he calls a plot to frame him. Giuliani declined to speak with me about their discussions, but he told The Washington Post in 2019 that his question for Manafort was, “Was there really a black book?” and the answer came back, “There wasn’t a black book.”
What happened from there is already exhaustively litigated Trump history, as Giuliani adventured across Europe spinning that original counternarrative into an ornate conspiracy theory that roped in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, its ambassador, Marie Yovanovitch, and Joe and Hunter Biden. In its simplest version, the impeachment case that followed was about presidential abuse of power — a scheme to condition essential military aid on a Ukrainian investigation into CrowdStrike, the “hidden servers” and the Bidens’ purportedly corrupt dealings with the Ukrainian energy company Burisma. What was lost on the American audience, though, was the way Trump’s pressure campaign and Giuliani’s freelance diplomacy were buffeting a country that, whether it knew it or not, was careening toward war. Their machinations were playing directly into a soft-power contest over whether Ukraine would lay the true foundations of an independent Western-style democracy or remain in thrall to Moscow and its proxies.
That contest was hard to see through the fog of Ukrainian politics. Everyone I spoke with who had any experience in Kyiv — no matter their political persuasion — warned against seeing anything in black and white, good guys and bad. There was no telling how many seemingly contradictory agendas a major player in Ukraine might be juggling — the only reliable through-lines being the pursuit of money and power. It is in that spirit that the oligarchs most often characterized in the Western press as being “pro-Russian” reject the label. “I was never pro-Russian,” the billionaire energy broker Dmitry Firtash told NBC News this year, “but you have to understand that I’m a businessman.” In prewar Kyiv, pursuing money and power and serving Putin’s interests could often mean the same thing.
“Americans were playing a basic game — ‘Trump wants dirt on Biden,’” says Suriya Jayanti, chief of energy policy at the American Embassy in Kyiv at the time. “What was actually going on in Ukraine was this crazy web of shifting alliances and oligarch pockets and horse trading and back-stabbing, and in our American myopia we had limited understanding that if a tree falls in the forest and America is not there to hear it, it still falls.”
If any place provided a relatively clear view of this seething panorama, it was the embassy, through the events that led to the firing of the ambassador, Yovanovitch. Something of a supporting character in Trump’s first impeachment, Yovanovitch was central to the geopolitical competition playing out in Kyiv. In bottom-line terms, she represented American diplomatic resistance to everything Putin and his Ukrainian proxies wanted from Trump.
A strait-laced and driven career diplomat dispatched to Kyiv by Obama just months before Election Day, Yovanovitch was the daughter of émigrés whose families had fled the Soviets and the Nazis. She arrived in Ukraine at a precarious time. In the wake of the 2014 Maidan uprising, the popular will for democracy was proving irrepressible yet again. Billions of dollars flooded in from the West. But the efforts to nurture Ukraine’s democracy were foundering as the new administration, like the post-Orange Revolution government, was failing to keep its promises of reform. The new president, Petro O. Poroshenko, left little doubt about the seriousness of his anti-Russian rhetoric as he pressed the Obama administration, unsuccessfully, for defensive weapons. But as an oligarch politician in the classic Ukrainian mold — he had made his fortune in the chocolate trade — he was also part of the system he was being asked to blow up.
Yovanovitch immediately set out to shore up the two pillars of the American democracy agenda: freeing Ukraine’s economy from the grip of the oligarchs and its justice system from the corrupting imperatives of politics. That inexorably brought her into conflict with two powerful men.
One was the energy broker Firtash, the embodiment of the oligarchic system that had proved so beneficial to Putin. He had built extraordinary wealth through a partnership with Gazprom, Russia’s leading energy concern: Gazprom sold deeply discounted gas to a middleman company that it owned with Firtash, which then resold it, at a considerable profit, to Ukraine and throughout Europe. Firtash, in turn, used some of those profits to support Russia-aligned politicians. He had been a major sponsor of the Party of Regions and, prosecutors believed, an important paymaster for Manafort. The men were also would-be business partners; a decade earlier, they discussed a deal to buy a hotel in Manhattan. (Firtash did not respond to questions sent to a representative.)
By the time Trump took office, Ukraine had cut Firtash’s middleman out of the gas deal. Firtash himself was in Austria, fighting extradition to the United States on unrelated bribery charges that he denies. But he maintained lucrative ties to Ukraine’s energy industry through ownership of regional distribution companies associated with the national gas concern, Naftogaz. Now, despite what she suspected was pressure from Firtash, Yovanovitch persuaded Poroshenko to hold to his vow to enact new rules that would disrupt “the Firtash business model,” as the ambassador put it in her memoir.
Yovanovitch at first had hopes for Ukraine’s chief law-enforcement official, the prosecutor general, Yuriy Lutsenko. But she almost immediately got crosswise with him as well. Lutsenko had been appointed in the spring of 2016, after Western allies pressed for the ouster of his predecessor, Viktor Shokin, for failing to prosecute corruption cases. One of the more egregious examples, cited frequently by the Americans, involved the energy company Burisma. It had escaped prosecution despite allegations, which it denied, that it embezzled public funds. As State Department officials called for an investigation into the handling of the case by the prosecutor general’s office, Joe Biden, as vice president, delivered a forceful ultimatum: $1 billion in loan guarantees would be contingent on the prosecutor general’s firing. Biden was an imperfect messenger. The year before, Burisma had given a lucrative board seat to his son Hunter, who had a famous last name but no energy-industry experience. Even State Department officials worried, presciently, that his board position would pose the appearance of a conflict.
On paper, Lutsenko seemed the man to professionalize the justice system. Though he had no formal legal training, he had been a leader of the Orange Revolution, was then imprisoned by Yanukovych and emerged to join the 2014 Maidan protests. The black ledger would be one test of whether he would succeed where Shokin had failed, and he promised to support the investigations into its contents, which extended beyond Manafort to apparent bribes to judges and elections officials. Within months, though, reformers were complaining that Lutsenko’s office appeared to be slow-walking the ledger-related investigations. One lead lawyer in the office publicly complained that the prosecutor general was prohibiting him from interviewing witnesses or issuing subpoenas in four cases relating to Manafort’s work.
At the embassy, Yovanovitch was clashing with Lutsenko over his apparent lack of zeal for a range of corruption cases. She was furious, too, that he was working to undercut, if not disempower, a corps of independent anti-corruption prosecutors and investigators that the West had pushed Ukraine to create. As she lectured him about the need for a depoliticized justice system, they soon ceased regular communication. “We thought he would be different,” she told me. “He wasn’t.”
When Trump won the presidency in 2016, the Ukrainians and the Russians believed that the American-led push for change in Kyiv would subside. But Trump, convinced that Ukraine was behind the Russia “hoax,” showed little interest in the country, leaving Yovanovitch free to stay the course.
That changed drastically as Giuliani entered the picture in late 2018. Firtash would provide a vital building block of Giuliani’s case against the Bidens — a sworn affidavit from Shokin in September 2019 asserting that Biden had forced his firing as part of a corrupt scheme to protect Burisma, with his son on the board, from scrutiny. Despite ample evidence that the case against Burisma lay dormant under his watch, Shokin maintained that he had, in fact, been pursuing a “wide-ranging” inquiry. Firtash had secured the affidavit as part of his own legal fight — in it, Shokin suggested that Firtash’s bribery case was politically motivated — and it apparently found its way to Giuliani through mutual associates. Firtash has said he never met Giuliani and did not authorize the affidavit’s use in his operation.
But that operation would not have been possible without Lutsenko, who carried it forward with an added twist implicating Yovanovitch in the supposed plot to help Clinton and hurt Trump.
Though Lutsenko had his own political ambitions, he owed his current position to Poroshenko, who wanted one thing above all else from Trump: more antitank missiles. People inside and outside Kyiv already suspected that was at play as the ledger investigations remained stalled and the United States delivered a first batch of missiles. As one Ukrainian official told The Times in 2018, the Poroshenko government had put the ledger inquiries in a “long-term box,” because “we shouldn’t spoil relations with the administration.” And in March 2019, after meeting with Giuliani at his Park Avenue office, Lutsenko appeared to give Trump at least some of what he wanted. He told the political publication The Hill that he was opening a new ledger investigation — into the allegations that anti-corruption activists and investigators had released it to help Clinton. He would then indicate that he had evidence of possible wrongdoing by the Bidens.
Yet for all that intrigue, there was one force that even the most cynical Kyiv hands never doubt — the sincerity of Ukrainian protesters’ calls for democracy, independent and uncorrupted. And on April 21, Poroshenko was voted out of office in favor of Zelensky, a political neophyte who fashioned himself in the reformist mold of the character he had played on television.
Suddenly Lutsenko was reversing course, announcing that he saw no evidence of wrongdoing by the Bidens. (He did not respond to attempts to reach him for comment.) The scheme was at a dead end. As Trump and Giuliani worked to get it back on track under the new administration in Kyiv, Trump finally forced out Yovanovitch, casting her as a central actor in the fantasy plot to defeat him in 2016. Now the president and his lawyer were trying to force a result that embodied everything the fallen ambassador had sought to vanquish in Ukraine: the rank politicization of the justice system, openly articulated in Trump’s “perfect phone call” asking Zelensky to trade a sham investigation for arms, which led to impeachment, only the third in American history.
In March 2021, U.S. intelligence services declassified a report detailing their consensus view that Kilimnik and others associated with Russian intelligence had used various Americans — among them, it strongly suggested, Giuliani — to promote the idea of the Bidens’ corruption in Ukraine to influence the 2020 campaign. The report assessed that Russian leaders viewed Biden’s potential election as “disadvantageous to Russian interests” — especially as it pertained to Ukraine.
Early in his presidency, Zelensky showed a willingness to compromise with Russia on autonomy in the east — the question at the center of the Mariupol plan. But after thousands of protesters streamed back into Maidan in late 2019, he refused Putin’s demands for concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty. Zelensky was already prioritizing efforts to join NATO and would sign legislation constraining the oligarchs.
Trump pardoned Manafort before leaving the White House. Had he remained in office, the former president said in a statement earlier this year, “the Ukraine desecration would not be happening.” But with Biden’s inauguration in January 2021, Putin was now facing a new American president who promised a tough line against his imperial designs on Ukraine — and with no obvious back channels through which to manipulate him or his policy.
Thirteen months later, Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian frontier.
First illustration, source photographs: Ira L. Black/Corbis, via Getty Images (Trump); Eric Thayer for The New York Times (Manafort); Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images (Putin).
Second illustration, source photographs: Mikhail Metzel/Getty Images (Putin); Brandon Bell/Getty Images (Trump); Damon Winter/The New York Times (Manafort); Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call Inc., via Getty Images (Giuliani); Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times (Yanukovych).
Third illustration, source photographs: Eva Hambach/AFP, via Getty Images (documents); Rick Friedman/Corbis, via Getty Images (Clinton); Yevgeny Biyatov/Sputnik/AFP, via Getty Images (Putin); Brandon Bell/Getty Images (Trump); David Everett Strickler/Unsplash (White House).
Fourth illustration, source photographs: Doug Mills/The New York Times (handshake); Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press (stretcher and explosion); Interim Archives/Getty Images (map); James Hill for The New York Times (protesters); Carlos Barria/Reuters (tanks); Carlo Allegri/Reuters (Manafort).
Jim Rutenberg is a writer at large for The Times and the Sunday magazine. He was previously the media columnist, a White House reporter and a national political correspondent. He was part of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2018 for exposing sexual harassment and abuse. @jimrutenberg
A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 6, 2022, Page 30 of the Sunday Magazine with the headline: The Road to War. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
6. Perspectives for Influence Operations Investigators
All professionals in the field of influence operations (e.g., PSYOP, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy, etc. ) should read and use this report.
Full report the the link. The table of contents is below.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/25/perspectives-for-influence-operations-investigators-pub-88208?utm
Perspectives for Influence Operations Investigators
VICTORIA SMITH, JON BATEMAN, DEAN JACKSON
OCTOBER 25, 2022
The field of influence operations investigations is growing rapidly, and researchers need a better grasp of best practices and standards. Here, experienced researchers offer insights ranging from methods to data collection to team development.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Excellence
- Introduction: What It Takes to Investigate Influence Operations
- DEAN JACKSON AND VICTORIA SMITH
- Methodological Considerations and Guidance
- ENEKEN TIKK AND MIKA KERTTUNEN
Accuracy
- Managing a Complex Investigative Process
- JACOB WALLIS
- Investigating Influence Operations by Twitter Integrity
- PATRICK CONLON, WILLIAM NULAND, KANISHK KARAN
- How to Investigate Influence Operations as an Independent Analyst
- ELISE THOMAS
- Investigating Cross-Country, Cross-Platform Spread of Information
- HARPRE KE
- Assessing Social Networks Beyond Quantification and Across Platforms
- JOÃO GUILHERME BASTOS DOS SANTOS
- Assessing the Impact of Influence Operations Through the Breakout Scale
- BEN NIMMO
Collection
- Acquiring Data
- DHIRAJ MURTHY
- Data Visualizations
- CARLOTTA DOTTO
Attribution
- Media Coverage of Influence Operations
- OLGA ROBINSON AND SHAYAN SARDARIZADEH
Diversity
- Encouraging Diversity of Staff
- CAMILLE STEWART GLOSTER
- The Risk of Gender Bias in Conducting and Reporting on Influence Operations
- KRISTINA WILFORE AND ALCY STIEPOCK MACKAY
7. A Response: The Promises and Pitfalls of Developing Pre-Crisis Clandestine Underground Resistance Organisations - Lessons of the WWII Polish Underground State
The article below is co-authored by a Special Forces brother. I read this as I am traveling to Poland at the end of this month for a conference so I wanted to learn some Polish history.
A friend flagged this edition of the Journal of baltic security. It is filled with articles on resistance. I will try to send out an article each day as I read them. Or you can go to the link to the journal here and read them: https://journalonbalticsecurity.com/journal/JOBS/current
Here is the table of contents for all those who study resistance. Many of the authors are very experienced practitioners and scholars.
Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), August 2022
Order by:
Title
First page
Publication date
Type
Select: All None Download: Citation PDF XML
Introduction. Special Issue on the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)
Asta Maskaliūnaitė Kevin D. Stringer
Pub. online: 8 Aug 2022 Type: Editorial Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 3–7
Citation PDF XML
A Response: The Promises and Pitfalls of Developing Pre-Crisis Clandestine Underground Resistance Organisations - Lessons of the WWII Polish Underground State
Derek Jones Monika Lipert-Sowa
Pub. online: 6 Sep 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 10–28
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Bear Trap: Building a Pre-Conflict Underground Force to Resist the Future Enemy
James Stejskal
Pub. online: 3 Oct 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 29–43
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Modern Resistance – Learning From Non-Western Examples
Sandor Fabian
Pub. online: 3 Oct 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 44–66
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Special Operations Forces (SOF): The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance
Kevin, D. Stringer
Pub. online: 3 Oct 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 67–76
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Resistance Operations : Challenges and Opportunities for Special Operations Forces
Hans Ilis-Alm Ulrica Pettersson
Pub. online: 9 Aug 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 77–94
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Integrating Territorial Defence Forces into National Resistance Efforts: Lessons of the Polish Home Army's role within the World War II Polish Underground State and the Post-War Polish Independence Underground
Brian Mehan Maciej Klisz
Pub. online: 2 Sep 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 95–119
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
The Backbone: The Role of the Armed Forces in the Resistance Movement
Mareks Runts
Pub. online: 13 Jun 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 120–130
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Finding Order in Chaos: Conceptualizing Resistance Command and Control Approaches
Brian S. Petit
Pub. online: 4 Aug 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 131–149
Citation PDF XML
Abstract
Legitimizing the Resistance
Otto C. Fiala
Pub. online: 5 Aug 2022 Type: Research Article Open Access
Journal: Journal on Baltic Security Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 150–169
A Response: The Promises and Pitfalls of Developing Pre-Crisis Clandestine Underground Resistance Organisations - Lessons of the WWII Polish Underground State | Journal on Baltic Security | Baltic Defence College
journalonbalticsecurity.com
A Response: The Promises and Pitfalls of Developing Pre-Crisis Clandestine Underground Resistance Organisations - Lessons of the WWII Polish Underground State
Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022), pp. 10–28
Derek Jones Monika Lipert-Sowa
Authors
Placeholder
Pub. online: 6 September 2022 Type: Research ArticleOpen Access
Received
10 March 2022
Accepted
18 May 2022
Published
6 September 2022
Abstract
Dr. Asta Maskaliūnaitė identified five concerns related to the promises and pitfalls of developing underground resistance organisations (URO) before a crisis in her excellent and timely 2021 Journal on Baltic Security article, ‘Exploring Resistance Operating Concept. Promises and pitfalls of (violent) underground resistance’. These pitfalls or areas of concern are: (1) Command and Control (C2), (2) Legitimacy, (3) Recruitment, (4) Potential Long-Term Problems, and (5) Strategic Communications. This study will address these five concerns from a non-military perspective, focusing on civilian control, political conditions, capabilities of the state, and legislated safeguards for each concern to accentuate promises and minimize risks. The study is based on a case study analysis of the Polish Underground State and highlights its legitimacy, enjoyed due to the legally organized, civilian-led URO and its shadow government leading the resistance in Poland and the Polish Government-in-Exile providing the legitimacy and organizing external support.
Introduction
In her 2021 Journal on Baltic Security article, ‘Exploring Resistance Operating Concept. Promises and pitfalls of (violent) underground resistance’, Dr. Asta Maskaliūnaitė rightly challenged the rigor of emerging doctrines and efforts to develop underground resistance organisations (URO) before a conflict in peacetime. She noted the two primary doctrinal references for these efforts: Special Operations Command Europe’s (SOCEUR) Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), developed with the support of several countries, and the NATO Special Headquarters’ (NSHQ) Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH), both published in 2020. While agreeing with the overall premise for pre-crisis, peacetime development of UROs, her article correctly pointed out the lack of rigour of analysis of the ROC and CDH, especially the ‘what could go wrong?’ issues—the unintended consequences. She focused on five areas of concern:
• The question of [command and control] of (violent) resistance organisation and operations;• The issue of legitimacy and its role in organising the [URO] • The question of recruitment criteria; • The aspect of time and its impact on the development of the organisation; • The question of messaging and its implications. .
In 2021, these concepts were untested. Today, they are less theoretical due to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. While tragic, this event displayed the effectiveness of a hastily organised resistance to invasion (RTI) which successfully combined crowd-sourced intelligence, social media, overt guerrilla tactics, and modern man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to counterbalance the initial large Russian advantage in conventional military capabilities. While not a clandestine resistance to occupation (RTO), the overt RTI proved the general ROC and CDH doctrinal concepts. At the time of this writing, the overall success of RTI is unclear or whether RTO will be necessary. Ukraine’s special operations forces (SOF) were designated lead for RTO in the 2021 Ukrainian Law ‘On the Foundations of National Resistance’. It is uncertain whether they had the requisite expertise and time to develop the RTO at scale before or since the start of the 2022 invasion.
Despite the Ukrainian RTI successes, there is a danger of countries learning the wrong lessons, specifically that RTI is easier and quicker to organise and should be the principal method of resistance over the more difficult RTO. However, this is a false dichotomy. They are two different options with different purposes, organisational models, operating concepts, and signatures. RTI is an overt resistance effort that relies on small teams conducting guerrilla warfare using physical terrain to mask their manoeuvres to disrupt an invasion. RTO, on the other hand, uses clandestine tradecraft to mask the organisation among the human terrain while it conducts armed and non-violent resistance at the time and place of its choosing to maximize its ambiguity and stay viable throughout the occupation . Its goal is to disrupt, coerce, and defeat the occupier alone or in support of outside intervention. Using both options is best. However, trying to use the same personnel and organisations for both, such as having members move between RTI and RTO or vice versa, will lead to the exposure of the URO. The URO is the centre of gravity for protracted RTO if the RTI fails. URO takes the most time and effort to organize and develop securely to ensure its long-term viability . Therefore, Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s concerns are still valid, and countries developing URO for RTO need to address these concerns.
This article adds to the discourse by providing options to mitigate the pitfalls and issues identified by Dr. Maskaliūnaitė. This work differs from previous and heavily military-influenced studies by focusing on civilian control, political considerations, capabilities of the state, and legislated safeguards to mitigate risks and pitfalls. Given that URO developed prior to a crisis is still untested, this article uses the case study method based on lessons learned from the largest URO in the modern era—the Polish Underground State—and its resistance to German and Soviet occupation in World War II (WWII). Although not developed before the crisis, it is the closest exemplar of the concept and successfully resisted brutal occupations.
1. The WWII Polish Underground State
The Polish Underground State [Polskie Państwo Podziemne or PPP]…had been built in complete secrecy during the joint occupation of Poland by Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany….Nowhere in occupied Europe was there an equally complex and well-working organisation, that came complete with its own administration, judiciary system, educational facilities and, most importantly, a well organised army. The most important task...was, alongside the organisation of underground activity, to provide the flawless functionality of the Polish state – the maintenance of the pre-occupation national institutions as well as making all necessary preparation for the power takeover after the end of war.The 1939 invasion and occupation of Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union lit a fire in the Polish population that led to the establishment of the Polskie Państwo Podziemne or Polish Underground State (PPP). This URO included the in-country shadow government (SG) leading the day-to-day resistance in Poland under control and legitimized by the Rząd na Uchodźstwie or Polish Government-in-exile (GIE). The GIE focused on garnering international support and maintaining the Polish sovereign government in hopes of returning to Poland at the war’s end. The large-scale PPP consisted of hundreds of thousands of members, clandestine underground civilian and military wings, a representative committee that included every political party ensuring the continuation of democratic principles, and every government and societal institution—media, education, art, and industry. This article focuses on the civilian wing of the organisation, which began with only the structure of the political parties . The lack of pre-crisis development of the civilian wing was opposite that of the military wing—Armia Krajowa (A.K.) or the Home Army—which quickly reached capacity due to its pre-crisis military organisation . Additionally, the case shows the incredible resilience of the population under brutal occupation. As Werner Ring observed, ‘Under these circumstances, organized resistance seemed the sole alternative to national extinction’ .
The case study proves the potential of large-scale URO legitimized in law and under complete government control. The success of the PPP is unquestionable — it resisted long-term occupation to execute a coordinated and large-scale uprising. The one thing they lacked that would have assured their ultimate victory and freedom was external support from the Western Allies. Instead, Poland became a pawn in a geopolitical game focused solely on the defeat of Germany, where the West allowed Poland to fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. It would take Poland five more decades to become a free and open democracy.
2. Addressing the Promises and Pitfalls
This preparation, however, brings forth a great number of challenges, which have to be seriously considered when discussing further development of the [URO] concept. Indeed, the developers have to be conscious of the potential unintended consequences of this approach and think very seriously whether the potential benefits truly outweigh the potential negative effects of this approach. .
The following sections address Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s concerns directly to substantively add to the discourse and provide policymakers with a better understanding of the promises and pitfalls of these programs and inform their national security and domestic policies. This study refers to Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s five concerns using the following terms: Command and Control (C2), Legitimacy, Recruitment, Potential Long-Term Problems, and Strategic Communications.
2.1 Command and Control (C2)
Despite the constant threat, the Poles had quickly undertaken actions aimed at fighting the occupational forces. These were not random and uncoordinated actions, but instead were planned and run by the [PPP]…. The PPP always acted with consent and in direct contact between itself and the legitimate Polish Government, that due to the Soviet and Nazi aggression was forced into exile and operated alongside Polish allies in the West…. It was from there…[the] Polish [GOI] was able to control both the civil and military administration on the Polish territory.
Dr. Maskaliūnaitė focuses on three C2 sub-concerns: risks due to loss of control and unethical behaviors of resistance members, how the resistance members will be held accountable for their actions, and the potential negative impact of these actions on civilians. Dr. Maskaliūnaitė is correct that effective ‘leadership and government oversight’ is vital to reduce the chances of the resistance organisation losing control and the likelihood of members behaving unethically . However, to be effective, leadership and oversight must be supported by legislation to provide the legal foundations for what actions are permissible and what are not, and the punishments for violations. The legal frameworks or classified addendums should address continuity of governance, mission, organisation, manning, resourcing, and authorities. Effective leadership, oversight, and legislation establish conditions that dissuade resistance members from conducting negative actions and allow for rapid prosecution if members violate the laws. The legal framework becomes the foundation for the code of conduct for the resistance and the oath taken by every resistance member ; . Codes of conduct, ethics, and laws of armed conflict (LOAC) should be part of every resistance members’ training as well as a public education campaign. This includes what the population should expect of their government’s URO efforts and what will be expected of the population. Together, these efforts build an understanding of and confidence in these irregular institutions before and during a conflict. Are these efforts guaranteed to stop all issues? No, there are no perfect solutions when dealing with human nature, but the above, plus effective recruiting practices discussed below, will go a long way to mitigate and provide a legal means of responding to these issues.
Dr. Maskaliūnaitė also highlights historical examples that demonstrate insurgent organisations’ propensity for targeting populations to force compliance or delegitimise the government and security forces and rightly worries about similar happenings with URO . However, the idea that a URO sponsored by a democratic government, shadow or in exile, would intentionally target their citizens to delegitimize the occupier is unlikely since this would be self-defeating. This concern highlights the confusion between insurgency and resistance — insurgency against a constituted government and resistance against an occupier. Terrorism — the indiscriminate or politically-motivated extrajudicial targeting of civilians to achieve a political end — is a tactic of insurgency. The legal foundations established prior to a conflict, plus leadership and civilian oversight, provide the checks and balances against the use of terrorism.
Actions against collaborators could be misinterpreted as terrorism. The PPP effectively carried out justice under occupation against collaborators, criminals, and illegal activities that hurt the population, not the occupier, and minimized misperceptions by using a sanctioned justice system, public punishment, and media outlets to inform the public of these actions . The underground courts conducted trials of accused collaborators or criminals in absentia, but they were represented by an appointed defence attorney. If the individual was found guilty, the court would determine the appropriate sentence, and then a specialized unit would carry out the sentence as publicly as possible — execution or humiliation . Such operations were fully sanctioned and legally based on the legislative foundations outlining the expected conduct of the resistance and the general population under occupation. To ensure the actions against the guilty were not misinterpreted as terrorism against the citizenry, the Polish Underground announced the legal justifications and sentences via underground papers and radio . This system provided not only legitimacy but also dissuaded others.
Additionally, a shadow government-controlled justice system against collaborators also protects perceived collaborators who conduct underground-sanctioned collaboration for intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, or assassination. The casual observer would be inclined to act out against the individual without legal constraints which could have catastrophic repercussions. This only works if the resistance is organized, legal frameworks are understood, and the population is informed of the underground justice system and dissuaded from vigilantism and extrajudicial actions. At the same time, a clandestine reporting mechanism is needed to allow the population to report violations of conduct by any member of the society, not to the occupier, but to the underground, like the population capturing and reporting unethical behaviors and war crimes of the occupier . The process for reporting is more complicated in a clandestine environment where a tip line or 911 is not practical, but clandestine reporting systems can be set up that protect the underground and still provide a means for the population to report, such as whisper campaigns — tell enough people, and it will get back to the underground. This reporting concept serves three purposes — it gives the population the ability to report suspected violators without exposing underground members, helps to find potential unsanctioned resistance organisations or individuals, and allows the underground to investigate and serve justice as a message to the population that they take any negative actions of their members or unsanctioned organisation seriously which also helps to maintain the underground’s legitimacy.
In peacetime, the concern is mission creep and the misuse of the URO for political purposes per Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s Operation Gladio example . First, and where we disagree with the ROC and CDH, the peacetime-developed URO should not be used operationally to counter adversary grey-zone operations, unless they result in occupation, due to the risks of exposing the URO. This would negatively impact deterrence and operational effectiveness. Second, legislative frameworks would define any URO missions in peacetime, just as in war, mitigating misuse and mission creep. Short of occupation, the only exception would likely be passive intelligence collection and early warning of threats, such as adversary grey-zone operations, using the nationwide clandestine intelligence network. In this case, the networks would remain undetected but would report their observations via their established clandestine reporting procedures. Additionally, misuse or misappropriation would be exposed quickly due to the constant counterintelligence monitoring of URO members.
Dr. Maskaliūnaitė also exposes the fundamental issue of the cadre concept where vetting and recruitment is the cell leader’s responsibility, which is a challenge in the best conditions, and extremely difficult under occupation . For countries using the cadre concept, she is correct in her assertion that leaders and their recruited cell members should be held responsible if the recruited cell member’s actions result in ethical or legal issues. However, without clear legal frameworks, the accountability of individuals and their leaders is difficult. However, the cadre model would be better than starting from scratch like the PPP, which took years of clandestine growth to reach its final scale in 1944. Alternatively, these issues are negated when the URO is organized before a conflict and all the resources of the state can be used to assess, select, and monitor personnel. Additionally, the same URO can provide counterintelligence support to recruiting under occupation to replace losses due to attrition.
Lastly, without the support of the state, including vetting systems, legal frameworks, and clandestine justice systems to enforce the laws, the cell leader is on their own. If they inadvertently recruit an unethical or criminal cell member, the leader has no suitable options. If the problematic member is fired, they could turn on the cell or commit other illegal activities against the population. If they stay, they are a risk. Thus, the leader could be forced to be the judge and executioner, both figuratively and literally.
2.2 Legitimacy
The Polish [GIE] was widely recognised by the international community and was established in full accordance with the Polish pre-war Constitution – thus guaranteeing the continuity of all state institutions. This was important as it was these institutions that had the major impact on the legal functioning of the PPP, giving it the full, lawful legitimacy – something unheard of amongst other European resistance movements.
The earlier section began to lay out the critical aspect of legitimacy, and the legal frameworks for the URO. As Dr. Maskaliūnaitė explains, the nation’s government must be the URO sponsor because ‘only its authorization by the established authority can lend credibility and distinguish it from other unruly elements’ . She named three specific concerns with legitimacy: wartime mission creep to target collaborators over the occupier, violence by the occupier in retaliation for armed resistance, and the potential peacetime activities against the nation’s democratic processes or institutions .
Her first concern is the delegitimisation of the URO if it follows historical trends and spends ‘more energy trying to intimidate ‘collaborators’ than…fighting…the occupier’ . While historically accurate, the PPP is illustrative as an example where legal process and precision actions ‘to pass sentences on oppressors [occupiers], traitors [collaborators], spies and agents provocateurs [emphasis in original]’ were just one PPP line of effort and not the primary . Second, armed resistance actions against the occupier can cause occupier reprisal against the population which may negatively affect the URO’s legitimacy. While this is always a risk of armed resistance, giving up this means may not stop actions against civilians. Stopping armed actions may cause the population to question the legitimacy of the resistance. From the occupier’s perspective, the URO ending armed resistance for fear of reprisals is a win. If the occupier achieves this success, this positive reinforcement may lead to more reprisals against civilians. The PPP learned the occupier would be brutal regardless of the activities of the resistance . However, large-scale military activities by the Polish resistance army were discouraged due to equally l arge-scale retributions . While non-violent resistance can be effective, the capacity for armed resistance should never be given up. The URO modulates the employment of both based on desired goals, means and methods available, and on the occupier’s actions and responses.
The last concern is that political leanings lead the URO to attempt to counter the nation’s democratic processes in peacetime. For example, Dr. Maskaliūnaitė posits that the URO could react negatively to a political party taking power that shows policy deference to Russia or decides to disband the URO for political reasons . For legitimacy’s sake, the same laws that regulated the establishment of the organisation should supply the legal pathway to adapt or disband the URO due to changes in policy to mitigate these concerns . Legal frameworks provide similar safeguards if a political party tries extrajudicial efforts to use the organisation for political purposes or disband it. In either case, if policy changes and decisions are legal, URO members as government professionals follow the law, resign, or face legal repercussions individually or collectively. Further, the legal framework provides the means for prosecuting violations. Ultimately, well-thought-out legislation is the best safeguard and ensures legitimacy.
2.3 Recruitment
We discussed the structure of the [underground] organization to be set up, and…agreed on the personalities who were to be invited to join…the only criterion…applied was their suitability for underground activities.
Concerning recruiting, Dr. Maskaliūnaitė identifies three issues with the ROC and CDH: who is ‘undesirable’ and how to protect against recruiting them, the implications for recruiting from established defence-related social networks, and how not to recruit ‘the loudest ‘patriots’ but the dedicated adherents to the civil society’ . The obvious undesirables include fringe members of society, radicals, criminals, and those with behavioral health issues. Although easy to categorise, it is much harder to identify these individuals as part of standard recruiting efforts if they conceal these aspects of their lives. However, the added benefit of developing and recruiting for a highly-secret organisation is the ability for the government to do enhanced vetting of all aspects of a recruit’s life, lifestyle, and associations to expose these issues. Despite the example of the involvement of former service members in the US events of 6 January, there are currently no known cases involving individuals from US Government organisations that use enhanced vetting and monitoring protocols — a potential indicator of their efficacy. Additionally, as an added safeguard for UROs, recruits can be required to sign documents stating the individual cannot be part of groups deemed undesirable. While not a prevention measure, a false statement provides the legal basis for removal.
Undesirables in URO are more expansive than those mentioned above, such as those not cut out for a clandestine lifestyle. Life as an underground member constantly under the pressure of being detected, hunted, and killed or captured requires individuals with extraordinary strength and endurance. The secondary and tertiary risk of the potential death or capture of close associates and even family members increases the stress for these individuals. Therefore, the underground members must be mentally and physically prepared for the hardships of the clandestine lifestyle. Additionally, undesirables for recruitment would include anyone considered a known threat to an occupier resulting in them being hunted from the outset and putting the URO at risk. These include current and former military and national security-related government personnel, politicians, scientists, technical professionals, and members of their social networks. This is a common tactic of occupiers and was used against Poland by both the Germans and Soviets. Based on recent reports, Russia is using similar tactics in Ukraine in 2022 , although it should be noted that western counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations use similar target lists, such as the ‘deck of cards’ used in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Countries relying on former military members for the URO to inadvertently induce risk into their clandestine structure since they will be one of the first groups to be sought by the occupier trying to minimize armed resistance. This risk also runs counter to Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s assertion that ‘recruitment into clandestine functions tends to be concentrated in social networks that are already linked to the defence effort’ . Recruiting individuals with no national security or military-related experience and then training them in specialized skills for armed and non-violent resistance, or other underground functions would deny the occupier the ability to identify individuals of interest prior to a conflict, keeping the organisation safer. For example, the Polish Home Army had a wide variety of members without military backgrounds. As Fuegner notes, ‘People from all walks of life took part. Clerks, railway workers, artisans, factory workers, and students all took up arms against the Germans’ . However, if an individual has the specific background, expertise, or standing required by the underground, the government can provide them with a new identity, a common practice in the PPP, although complicated today by technology and ‘big data’ .
Finally, individuals chosen for clandestine roles will inherently want to maintain low profiles for their safety, and the safety of their family, organisation, and nation. Their inherent ascetic makes choosing patriots dedicated to ‘civil society’ and not merely the ‘loudest patriots’ easy to achieve. These are ‘quiet professionals’ that serve in every secretive government organisation. They do not want public recognition or need social affirmation, and they are content being part of an exceptional team. Individuals seeking recognition and social networks do poorly in clandestine organisations. Studies of both the WWII British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services assessments and selection efforts found this undesired trait . These assessment and selection concepts are still used today by their successor organisations. Each organisation modified its assessment and selection courses based on its unique requirements. For example, today special operations place more emphasis on the ability of individuals to work in teams while intelligence officers are likely to be assessed more on their individual capabilities due to the clandestine nature of their work. It is this mindset, the quiet professionals who shy away from recognition and social affirmation that separates the world’s best-in-class special operations and intelligence organisations from others. The same concept would apply to clandestine underground resistance organisations. Thus, the concept of patriotism in URO takes on a whole new meaning—one of unrecognized, selfless service to the nation.
2.4 Potential Problems in the Long-Term
The most important task of the [PPP] was, alongside the organisation of underground activity, to provide the flawless functionality of the Polish state – the maintenance of the pre-occupation national institutions as well as making all necessary preparation for the power takeover after the end of war.
As Dr. Maskaliūnaitė notes, the ROC and CDH do not detail how a URO ends in peacetime or after occupation. Disbanding the URO in peacetime was discussed in paragraph 2.2. This section focuses on URO’s disposition after an occupation. As the quote above notes, the goal of the resistance is to defeat the occupier and re-establish the government. After the occupation, the URO is either demobilized or reconstituted. Disbanding can be in total if no national security threats exist in the future. Alternatively, only portions of the URO can be disbanded based on future threats, lessons from the occupation, or policy changes. Reconstitution would focus on applying lessons learned to make the ‘next generation’ URO more capable. The biggest obstacle to reconstitution is how long and complex the RTO lasted—months, years, or decades, and the trauma of the events faced under occupation. Thus, reconstitution could mean replacing a few members if the RTO lasted a few months or all members for long-term resistance efforts. Lastly, the scale of reconstitution depends on the availability of resources to rebuild and reset the organisation. From a legal perspective, prosecuting members of the resistance or population for unethical or illegal actions based upon national resistance frameworks should happen immediately after the occupation, creating an opportunity for closure and national reconciliation.
2.5 Strategic Communications
The Polish people had their eyes fixed on the [GIE]; they gave their unstinted obedience to the [PPP], of whose existence the Germans were well aware; and they would have rejected any suggestion of compromise.
Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s final area of concern is strategic communications related to three issues — unintended consequences of messaging the intent to develop URO in peacetime; use of these announcements by the adversary for misinformation or disinformation to discredit the URO or justify pre-emptive action; and consequences on the population in a conflict.
When messaging the URO establishment, three target audiences should be taken into account — domestic, international, and potential adversaries. For domestic audiences, legitimacy requires clear messaging of political intent and legal frameworks to establish a URO in peacetime and mitigate all issues discussed above to set the stage for domestic acceptance. Holistic messaging also informs the international community, including partners and allies, of the decision of the nation to resist, providing these partners with the legal foundations to build external support, both in peacetime and in conflict. Lastly, announcing the establishment of the URO plays an important deterrence role for potential adversaries. While governments should carefully consider the timing and scope of their strategic communication about establishing the URO, they should not shy away from public messaging about the URO in fear of a possible pre-emptive invasion by their adversary given its defensive nature. However, if this was a concern, nations could develop URO in secret and only publicly announce its existence after it was established, although this would impact the legitimacy of the URO with the domestic audience. Given the importance of legitimacy, the optimal approach is to establish the URO's legal foundations openly and focusing the messaging on its defensive deterrence nature, while developing the organisation secretly to protect its classified details such as the structure, personnel, doctrine, locations, scale, capabilities, plans, and resourcing. Choosing this strategy can also diminish adversary efforts using URO for misinformation or disinformation, including labeling the URO a terrorist organisation or using it to justify pre-emptive actions.
Lastly, the potential impact of these pre-crisis efforts on the population must be acknowledged. First, legislation and national security documents must reflect URO's established purpose, roles, and structure and the expectations of the non-participating population to frame LOAC protections for URO armed members, non-violent participants, and the population. Additionally, strategic messaging must articulate that URO will follow the LOAC, and the success of this communication depends on the occupier following LOAC in tandem. If they do, these efforts will help minimise indiscriminate targeting of the population. If they do not, then the messaging and URO’s adherence to the LOAC sets the stage for international condemnation and legal challenges. Lastly, messaging and legal foundations allow friendly nations to determine their support for the URO. Legal foundations are critical to legitimizing the effort in the eyes of domestic audiences and international stakeholders while ideally dissuading the adversary.
Conclusions
For us…the road to freedom leads through the torture chambers of the [German] Gestapo…through prisons and concentration camps, through mass deportations and mass executions…. The hour of decision will arrive for Poland when the Polish people themselves grapple with the invader. With stubborn patience we must wait for that hour to come…. Arms must be amassed and our fighters made ready….In this period of dire oppression, without precedent…arouse your spirit of combat and perseverance. .
The PPP, the Polish GIE, and the Polish people resisted with honour against not one, but two occupiers in WWII. Although the resistance effort ultimately failed, it provides many lessons for countries developing a large-scale URO to resist occupation prior to a crisis. While still largely theoretical in a modern context, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has again demonstrated the applicability of RTO, with the URO as its center of gravity, and the importance of Dr. Maskaliūnaitė’s five concerns. This study complements and builds upon the five concerns: (1) Command and Control, (2) Legitimacy, (3) Recruitment, (4) Potential Long-Term Problems, and (5) Strategic Communications using the Polish underground case study to explore modern solutions, Additionally, it adds to the discourse on the topic and provides policymakers and civilian leaders in countries developing these capabilities with a greater understanding of the possibilities and risk-mitigating measures to consider for success.
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8. Russian arms and influence in Myanmar
Russian malign influence and activities.
Russian arms and influence in Myanmar
eastasiaforum.org · by Narayanan Ganesan · November 5, 2022
Author: Narayanan Ganesan, Hiroshima City University
Myanmar’s coup leader and de facto head of state, General Min Aung Hlaing, has paid two visits to Russia in 2022. Such visits are the culmination of bilateral ties that have grown since 2014.
Relations between Myanmar and Russia are military-focussed. Myanmar has long relied on Russia for the postgraduate training of its military officers, especially those in the air force. While China has proved to be a great power ally at times when Myanmar was subject to widespread international sanctions, which have been imposed intermittently and to varying degrees since 1962, better ties with Russia afford the military junta the opportunity to interact with international leaders and gain international recognition.
Ties with Moscow also allow the military to diversify weapon procurements away from China, its traditional provider of developmental aid and weaponry. The military is suspicious of China’s support for the Wa, Kokang and Kachin ethnic armed groups, which control large swathes of territory along the lengthy China–Myanmar border.
Myanmar has come to rely on Russian fighter aircraft, helicopters and air defence systems to engage ethnic armed groups that have intensified attacks against the military. The Kachin, Karen and Karenni ethnic armed groups have similarly trained and fought alongside the Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDF) — the armed wing of the National Unity Government. Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters, regarded as superior to Chinese alternatives, have been regularly used in unfavourable fighting conditions.
It is not uncommon for sanctioned regimes to help each other advance their common development and security interests. North Korea and Iran, subject to a range of sanctions, have done this historically. Russia and China, Myanmar’s security and economic patrons, are threatened by Washington and Western countries. Despite their rivalry from 1970–1990, they enjoy a more productive bilateral relationship. Russia maintains cordial relations with India and Vietnam, its partners during the Cold War.
Sanctioned regimes with convergent interests can bypass the deleterious effects of sanctions by sourcing developmental and other needs from isolated regimes. But forming a coalition of sanction-abiding states to enhance the enforcement of sanctions risks alienating countries unaligned with the United States and the European Union. That limits the type of economic responses available to the international community.
Sanctions against Myanmar are complicated by China’s good relationship with Russia, Myanmar and North Korea. The attempted isolation of China by the United States and Europe would be difficult since many Asian countries have strong trade relations and shared development interests with Beijing.
ASEAN has been very critical of the military coup in Myanmar and has isolated the military regime by excluding its officials from ministerial meetings. ASEAN’s collective position against the Myanmar coup has strong support from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Member countries have also reduced trade and investment in Myanmar. But the Indonesia-inspired Five Point Consensus plan, crafted in April 2021 to contain political violence and return Myanmar to a modicum of normalcy, was rebuffed by the military junta.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s attempts to engage the Myanmar regime as ASEAN Chair have come to nought and Indonesia looks set to support the status quo when it assumes the ASEAN Chair. The United Nations Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Noeleen Heyzer, has been equally unsuccessful in her attempts to engage all parties, including former state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
Malaysia is the most strident critic of Myanmar, openly dealing with the parallel National Unity Government. But ASEAN has little leverage over Myanmar’s policies towards Russia. Singapore was labelled unfriendly by Russia when it openly criticised its war in Ukraine, Indonesia continues to maintain cordial ties with Moscow and Malaysia purchased a Russian aircraft in August 2022.
China and Russia can collectively assist Myanmar with continued developmental, infrastructural and military aid to help offset the effects of international sanctions. That means ASEAN can do little to stop Myanmar–Russia ties from growing, even if their relationship bodes ill for Southeast Asia.
Narayanan Ganesan is a Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University.
eastasiaforum.org · by Narayanan Ganesan · November 5, 2022
9. Elon Musk’s Twitter faces early test in U.S. midterms: ‘Disinformation can pay off big time’
Misinformation or disinformation? We need to understand the difference.
Elon Musk’s Twitter faces early test in U.S. midterms: ‘Disinformation can pay off big time’
BYDAVID KLEPPER AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Fortune
Voters in both nations have already faced a torrent of misleading claims about candidates, issues and voting. That torrent could become a deluge if Musk makes good on his vows to roll back Twitter’s rules just as millions of voters prepare to cast a ballot.
“This is the most critical time for this work, right before an election,” said Alejandra Caraballo, an instructor at Harvard Law School’s Cyberlaw Clinic who has been monitoring the online response to Musk’s purchase. “We’re going to see a test run with the election in Brazil this Sunday, when we’ll see how bad things get.”
Even if Musk waits until after the elections to make changes, his decision to fire the executive in charge of content moderation raises questions about the company’s ability to combat misinformation and extremist content linked to deepening distrust in democracy.
Musk, the world’s richest man, hasn’t detailed his plans for Twitter, which he purchased this week for $44 billion. But he has called himself a “free speech absolutist” and has said the platform should tolerate any content that is legally permissible.
That’s a threshold that varies widely among countries. In the U.S., it would cover misleading content about vaccines or elections as well as Holocaust denialism and hate speech.
He’s also said he disagreed with Twitter’s decision to banish Donald Trump after the ex-president’s lies about the 2020 election helped spur the deadly Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Yet Musk has also signaled that he’d consider some level of moderation, as he did this week when he said he didn’t want Twitter to become a “ free-for-all hellscape.”
On Friday, Musk announced the creation of a committee to review Twitter’s policies on content moderation and the reinstatement of suspended accounts. “No major content decisions or account reinstatements will happen before that council convenes,” Musk tweeted.
One of Musk’s first moves as Twitter’s owner was to fire top leaders at the platform, including chief legal counsel Vijaya Gadde, who had overseen Twitter’s content moderation and safety efforts.
Gadde’s departure is not only a blow to Twitter’s current election efforts, but a sign of where Musk may take Twitter, Caraballo said. Musk is also reportedly considering deep layoffs at the company.
Misinformation right before an election
Twitter began preparing for the elections in Brazil and the United States months ago. Over the summer, the platform rolled out a series of policies designed to stop the spread of election-related misinformation while also making it easier for users to find trustworthy sources.
Despite sometimes inconsistent enforcement, Twitter at least had rules in place prohibiting hate speech and the most harmful kinds of misinformation. Those “guardrails” have been shown to be necessary, according to Suzanne Nossel, CEO of PEN America, a New York-based literary and human rights group.
“Our politicians have learned that trafficking in disinformation can pay off big time,” Nossel told the AP. “Hopefully he (Musk) takes this seriously. Hopefully he’s listening and asking questions. If he makes good on some of his more outlandish promises we could be in trouble.”
Misinformation can have an even greater impact when delivered right before an election, when officials and independent journalists have little time to push back. Sometimes misleading claims about voting can be part of an intentional campaign to confuse or frighten people into staying home. Other times, it can mislead voters about results.
Brazilians have been bombarded by false political claims ahead of this weekend’s presidential election between Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and incumbent Jair Bolsonaro. Similarly, there’s been a significant increase in misleading and deceptive content about the election in the U.S. next month, which will decide control of Congress.
Long-time critics of social media moderation cheered Musk’s purchase of Twitter and said it heralded a new day for unfettered online communication.
“He has stated he intends to do away with content moderation … that more speech, not censorship, is the best way to arrive at the truth,” said Jenin Younes, litigation counsel at the New Civil Liberties Alliance.
Eager to test the rules under Twitter’s new owner, some conservative and far-right Twitter users on Friday posted conspiracy theories about COVID-19 or the 2020 election. In many cases, however, the content was already permitted even under Twitter’s old rules.
“I can finally speak the truth on Twitter. Joe Biden did not win the 2020 Election,” comedian and far-right commentator Terrence K. Williams tweeted. Yet on Jan. 6, 2021, Williams posted that the election was rigged and blamed liberals for staging the Jan. 6 insurrection. That post remains up.
Musk will have to weigh many factors before deciding how to moderate content on his new platform, said A.J. Nash, vice president for intelligence at ZeroFox, a cybersecurity firm that tracks misinformation. Advertisers, for example, could become reluctant to place ads on the platform if it becomes too extreme, he said.
Musk may also learn that running a platform with 240 million daily users in dozens of nations is harder than criticizing it from the sidelines, Nash said.
“It’s easy to do that from the stands,” Nash said. “Let’s see what happens now.”
Fortune
10. How Much Difference Can One Person Make?
A fitting tribute to a good man who will be sorely missed for his many great contributions to the Army and to the national security community.
What the authors overlooked is the effect Dave had on so many graduate students who Dave taught at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program.
How Much Difference Can One Person Make? - Modern War Institute
John Spencer and John Amble | 11.04.22
mwi.usma.edu · by John Spencer · November 4, 2022
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More than 1.3 million active duty service members. A million more in the reserve components. Eight hundred thousand civilians working for the Department of Defense. Well over a million Americans with top secret security clearances. The US national security enterprise is massive. Add in the research organizations, think tanks, and academic departments at universities around the country, and the number of people professionally invested in advancing US national security and strategic objectives is practically uncountable. So how much of an impact can one individual have?
For a very rare few, the answer is a lot. Last weekend, the defense and national security community lost one of those few when Dave Johnson passed away. Many of those reading this will have known him personally. Many more—perhaps even most—will be familiar with his work. The very fortunate among us, quite a few given Dave’s leadership and strong commitment to helping others, will have had the privilege of benefiting from his personal mentorship.
Dave served for twenty-four years as an Army officer, retiring as a colonel in 1997. During that time, he earned his PhD from Duke University, and his last position as a professor at the National Defense University would foreshadow a post-retirement career as a highly esteemed scholar. He worked for both the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He wrote for leading publications. He was invited to appear on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal and other outlets specifically aimed at policy insiders, specialists, and experts because his own expertise was held in such high regard. He was selected to serve as the founding director of the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group. As an organization, we’re especially proud of his affiliation with MWI as an adjunct scholar since our founding year.
Perhaps the most significant contributor to his impact, though, was his knack for being in the right place at the right time intellectually. When discourse in the defense enterprise began to fixate on a new challenge or a shift in the strategic environment, it seemed almost inevitable that Dave had already been talking about, researching, and writing about the subject, sometimes years ahead of the rest of us. His list of publications—scholarly articles, op-eds, books, chapters, monographs—reads like a scan of the United States’ strategic challenges. A look at the dates when they were published shows his foresight and well-honed intuition.
In 2010, for example, when RAND published Dave’s paper, “Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza,” he joined a small group of soothsayers that recognized the significance of the concept of hybrid warfare, a term introduced and described by Frank Hoffman in 2007. When Dave wrote his paper, the US defense establishment’s collective focus was still very much oriented on the stability and counterinsurgency operations of America’s post-9/11 wars—combating terrorism, conducting irregular warfare, seeking a reasonable exit from Iraq, and generally struggling to make progress toward objectives in Afghanistan.
As a result, little attention was being paid to large-scale conflicts with state adversaries—and less still to the unique challenges posed by opponents that combined conventional and unconventional approaches, regular and irregular forms of warfare. As a series of signals emerged that US foes would increasingly leverage hybrid approaches—the so-called little green men in eastern Ukraine, Russian efforts to meddle in other states’ elections, Chinese island building in disputed areas of the South China Sea—and policymakers, practitioners, and analysts shifted their attention to such actions and how to counter them, they were fortunate. Dave and the cohort of others who foresaw the emergence of hybrid warfare and its significance had been doing the hard work of establishing the knowledge base from which to advance our understanding of the challenges and opportunities associated with it.
The story is similar with other important subjects. When we launched the Urban Warfare Project at MWI in 2017, it was in response to an appetite we detected among defense and military professionals for work that explored the unique characteristics of cities as battlefields. Since then, discussions on the topic have advanced our collective understanding, and the Army has given it increased and more focused attention. Here, too, we were following a path that Dave had begun to trace years before. The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat, which he coauthored with M. Wade Markel and Brian Shannon, was published in 2013. It is a remarkably nuanced study of one of the most significant and complex urban battles in recent US military history. Its analysis and the lessons it identified form part of the foundation on which the subsequent study of urban warfare—in which the Urban Warfare Project is proud to participate—has been built. Dave continued his work in this area when he was named by General Ray Odierno as the first director of the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group, where he established and oversaw the work of a dedicated megacities concept team.
Perhaps Dave’s most widely known work is Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945. An examination of the US Army’s interwar innovation, particularly in the development of armor and aircraft, it epitomizes Dave’s unique talent for identifying those lessons from particular historical cases that have enduring utility even as the character of warfare changes. The importance of learning from history is axiomatic, and yet doing so in a focused, accurate, and impactful way is challenging. It’s something we all aspire to do, but few achieve this aspiration as well as Dave did.
Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is first and foremost about military innovation, and the lessons it yields on that subject are enough to make it worth reading. But its relevance extends well beyond innovation and has arguably only grown since it was first published nearly twenty-five years ago. “The U.S. Army was ill-prepared for World War II,” the book’s dust jacket says. Dave’s search for the factors underpinning this reality—of an armed service unready for the challenges that would appear rapidly—is extraordinarily valuable today, as we continue to seek to uncover the details of a shifting strategic environment and develop the forces, equipment, and doctrine optimized for it. His appreciation of the lessons of history, particularly surrounding conventional conflict, give a richness to discussions about large-scale combat operations at a time when those discussions are begging for such richness.
Dave wrote about an almost shockingly large number of subjects—not just hybrid warfare, urban warfare, innovation, and history, but also military strategy, landpower, civil-military relations, NATO, doctrine, leader development, irregular warfare, and more. But he was no dilettante, dabbling in the flavor of the month. He wrote well on all of these subjects. He researched extensively. He thought deeply. He discovered and highlighted linkages between these topics, a coherent thread that weaved together much of his work. He understood context.
So how much impact can one individual have? How much influence can the ideas of one among the literal millions of stakeholders in the US defense and national security enterprise have? If that person has the right work ethic, intellectual curiosity, dedication, and sense of purpose—if that person is Dave Johnson—a lot.
John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute.
John Amble is the editorial director at the Modern War Institute.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
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mwi.usma.edu · by John Spencer · November 4, 2022
11. Asia Matters for America: Public & Elite Opinion Poll Report
The 23 page report can be downloaded here: https://asiamattersforamerica.org/uploads/publications/2022-Asia-Matters-for-America-Public-and-Elite-Opinion.pdf?utm_source=pocket_mylist
Asia Matters for America: Public & Elite Opinion Poll Report
NEW RELEASE
https://asiamattersforamerica.org/
The Asia Matters for America Public & Elite Opinion Poll Report compares US public and elite opinion at the state and local levels regarding America’s interactions with the Indo-Pacific region. Questions addressed in this survey include issues pertaining to economy, security, politics, people-to-people connections as well as to what extent Americans believe Asia matters to the United States.
12. Should America ‘Lead from Behind’ in China Policy?
Excerpts:
It took a while for the incoming Trump administration in 2017 to end engagement and formulate a more confrontational approach to China. There was a struggle within Trump’s early national security team over the best approach to China, pitting “superhawks” and hardliners like Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka, Peter Navarro, and Matthew Pottinger against the engagers like Gary Cohen and Steve Mnuchin, with a group of centrists favoring a more nuanced policy led by Vice President Mike Pence, Chief of Staff John Kelly, and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster. This policy struggle is detailed in Josh Rogin’s excellent book Chaos Under Heaven. In Trump’s last two years, the hardliners, led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, and his top deputy, Pottinger, reshaped China policy in a more confrontational direction.
And Trump established very good relations with the leaders of our two most important allies in the Indo-Pacific — the late Shinzo Abe of Japan and Narendra Modi of India.
One would never know that by reading Green’s Foreign Affairs piece. And when it came to China policy, Trump did not lead from behind. Instead, his administration formulated a whole of government approach to isolate and contain China.
Green’s preferred approach to China is a combination of “constructive engagement,” “meaningful economic initiatives for the region,” and deterrence, which sounds like the failed policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. And while praising the Biden administration’s alliance management in the region, Green neglects to mention that the recent Biden National Security Strategy identified climate change, not China, as the greatest existential threat to American security.
Should America ‘Lead from Behind’ in China Policy?
The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics
spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · November 5, 2022
The last American president who did so was Barack Obama.
November 4, 2022, 10:26 PM
Zbitnev/Shutterstock
Michael J. Green is what was once called a “China hand” who served in the George W. Bush administration as director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. He is also the author of a very good book about the history of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia-Pacific Since 1783.
Now, he has taken to the pages of Foreign Affairs, where he criticizes former President Donald Trump (which appears to be a requirement for getting published in that august journal), mostly praises the Biden administration’s approach to China, and implies that perhaps the best American strategy in the Asia-Pacific is to lead from behind.
Green’s criticism of Trump relates to what he calls Trump’s “torrent of abuse” of our Asian allies, whereas Biden, he claims, has “promoted key alliance builders to the top Asia posts” in his administration. Green urges the Biden administration to “take its cues from Australia, Japan, and South Korea” when it comes to China policy. In other words, America should lead from behind.
The last American president who led from behind in foreign policy was Barack Obama. How did that work out? Libya fell apart. The so-called “Arab Spring” took an anti-American detour even after Obama profusely apologized for America’s past sins. The “reset” with Russia ended with Russia seizing Crimea and engaging in a nuclear build-up. ISIS achieved gains in Iraq and Syria. And most important, China’s rise accelerated, unimpeded by the United States and its allies as they continued their impotent policy of engagement.
Green correctly notes that opposition to Chinese aggression began in Asia, and he highlights the work of the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in trying to awaken the region and the world to China’s geopolitical threat. “No other world leader did more in the face of Chinese revisionism to align the major powers and invest in countries’ durability against it” than Abe, Green writes. But Abe knew that neither Japan nor any other Asian power was in a position to lead that effort. Only the United States could lead that effort, but Obama was still leading from behind.
It took a while for the incoming Trump administration in 2017 to end engagement and formulate a more confrontational approach to China. There was a struggle within Trump’s early national security team over the best approach to China, pitting “superhawks” and hardliners like Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka, Peter Navarro, and Matthew Pottinger against the engagers like Gary Cohen and Steve Mnuchin, with a group of centrists favoring a more nuanced policy led by Vice President Mike Pence, Chief of Staff John Kelly, and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster. This policy struggle is detailed in Josh Rogin’s excellent book Chaos Under Heaven. In Trump’s last two years, the hardliners, led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, and his top deputy, Pottinger, reshaped China policy in a more confrontational direction.
And Trump established very good relations with the leaders of our two most important allies in the Indo-Pacific — the late Shinzo Abe of Japan and Narendra Modi of India.
One would never know that by reading Green’s Foreign Affairs piece. And when it came to China policy, Trump did not lead from behind. Instead, his administration formulated a whole of government approach to isolate and contain China.
Green’s preferred approach to China is a combination of “constructive engagement,” “meaningful economic initiatives for the region,” and deterrence, which sounds like the failed policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. And while praising the Biden administration’s alliance management in the region, Green neglects to mention that the recent Biden National Security Strategy identified climate change, not China, as the greatest existential threat to American security.
If the United States leads from behind, the nations of the Indo-Pacific will accommodate China’s regional preeminence. Green notes that “from Canberra to Tokyo, there is a deep consensus that beyond the immediate task of defending against China’s coercion, the long game is achieving a productive relationship with Beijing.” That is the kind of consensus you get when America leads from behind.
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spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · November 5, 2022
13. Taiwan Strait issues must be resolved peacefully, say G7 foreign ministers
I wouldn't expect them to say they should be resolved by war.
Taiwan Strait issues must be resolved peacefully, say G7 foreign ministers
Reuters · by Reuters
BERLIN, Nov 4 (Reuters) - Top diplomats from the Group of Seven (G7) countries reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and said they would continue to aim for constructive cooperation with China in a joint statement released on Friday.
In the statement, the foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and said there was no change in the basic positions of G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one-China policies.
Writing by Miranda Murray Editing by Paul Carrel
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
14. Reunifying with Taiwan is only way to stop foreign invasion of island: China’s Communist Party
Reunifying with Taiwan is only way to stop foreign invasion of island: China’s Communist Party
- New book presents party’s rationale for adding ‘opposing and containing Taiwan independence’ to constitution last month
- It says some forces in US ‘try their hardest to contain and suppress China, using Taiwan to subdue China’
Phoebe Zhang
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Published: 9:00am, 5 Nov, 2022
By Phoebe Zhang South China Morning Post3 min
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Top Communist Party ideologues write in a new book that unification is the only way to eliminate the hidden danger of Taiwan independence forces “separating China”. Photo: Zuma Press Wire/DPA
Bringing Taiwan back into the fold is the only way Beijing can achieve permanent peace with the island and avoid seeing Taiwan invaded by a foreign power, according to a new book written by top Communist Party ideologues.
“Only through complete reunification of the motherland can compatriots on both sides be completely freed from the shadow of civil war and jointly create and share permanent peace across the Taiwan Strait,” an article included in the book said.
The publication is the party’s official explanation for an amendment to its constitution last month.
Only by unifying with Taiwan, the piece went on, “can Taiwan avoid being occupied by foreign countries again, and can we defeat the attempts of external forces to contain China and safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests”.
23:13
‘China knows it’s getting stronger’: George Yeo on US-China tensions|Talking Post with Yonden Lhatoo
It added that unification was the only way to eliminate the hidden danger of Taiwan independence forces “separating China”.
The article was an explanation for the party’s decision to add “opposing and containing Taiwan independence” to its constitution last month, the first time such an explicit reference has been included in the document to address tensions around the island.
The book, Questions and Answers of the 20th Party Congress Constitution Amendments, was written by about two dozen top party ideologues, led by three current members of the seven-strong Politburo Standing Committee: the party’s former ideology chief Wang Huning, its former anti-corruption chief Zhao Leji and President Xi Jinping’s chief of staff Ding Xuexiang.
The book was published on October 28 by Party Building Books Publishing House, which is affiliated with the Central Organisation Department, the party’s main body for personnel appointment and training.
Despite rising tensions and loud rhetoric from Beijing over the Taiwan situation following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August, it is rare for the Communist Party to spell out its arguments related to the Taiwan issue so clearly.
The book did not discuss how Beijing would achieve unification with Taiwan, however in his work report delivered at the 20th party congress last month, Xi said Beijing would do its utmost towards peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but would never promise to renounce the use of force.
The most recent article explicitly names the United States, saying some forces in the US saw mainland China as a main strategic opponent and long-term challenge “out of a hegemonic and cold war mentality”.
“These forces try their hardest to contain and suppress China, using Taiwan to subdue China,” it said.
“The US claims that it supports the one-China policy, not Taiwan independence, but some forces in the country have been acting the opposite … they strengthen official connections with Taiwan, plan military sales and strengthen military ties between the US and Taiwan.”
03:28
US Senator calls Taiwan an ‘independent nation’ in latest congressional visit to self-ruled island
The article said these forces encouraged Taiwan independence forces to create tension across the strait while accusing the mainland of “exerting pressure”, “threatening” and “unilaterally changing the status quo”. The authors said these actions were doomed to fail.
“Unification is a historical trend and the right way, while ‘Taiwan independence’ is going against the current of history, and a dead end,” the article said.
US-China relations fell to their lowest point in half a century in August when Pelosi visited Taiwan, which Beijing saw as a violation of its sovereignty.
Beijing, which repeatedly warned against Pelosi making the visit, responded with severe condemnation and days of live-fire drills around Taiwan, including dozens of incursions over the median line in the Taiwan Strait, a de facto boundary it had honoured up to that point.
Beijing considers Taiwan part of its territory that must be brought back under its control, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. Washington, however, opposes any attempt to take the island by force.
The party’s constitution has been amended at every national congress since it was established in 1921. It now includes the political theories of all the party’s paramount leaders, from Mao Zedong to Xi, and a revision in 1982 prohibiting personality cults.
Phoebe Zhang
Phoebe Zhang is a society reporter with the Post. She has a master's degree in journalism.
15. In a first, Space Force picks private university as war college
An interesting initiative that bears watching.
In a first, Space Force picks private university as war college
airforcetimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · November 4, 2022
The Space Force has chosen Johns Hopkins University as its graduate and postgraduate military school for officers, becoming the first branch of the U.S. armed forces to leverage a private university rather than create a new war college.
Starting next July, Johns Hopkins will offer a 10-month, accredited professional military education program that draws on its world-renowned courses in international studies and engineering, the Space Force’s Space Training and Readiness Command told Air Force Times on Thursday.
Those who graduate will earn a master’s degree in international public policy from the university’s School of Advanced International Studies.
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Gen. Chance Saltzman, who took the reins from Gen. Jay Raymond, is just the second official to assume leadership of the service.
It’s the Space Force’s latest attempt to think outside the box as it creates a culture distinct from the Air Force. The service resides under the Department of the Air Force and manages most of the Pentagon’s space-focused personnel and programs.
“We are shaping the future of our service to develop joint space warfighters in world-class teams,” the Space Force’s training branch said.
Maryland-based Johns Hopkins is the oldest research university in the United States and among the world’s most prestigious institutions of higher education.
Its satellite campus in downtown Washington will host the Space Force’s intermediate and senior service school programs, which are typically run at military colleges like the Air Force’s graduate-level Air Command and Staff College and its postgraduate Air War College.
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Space Force seeks a bigger voice in military operations
The Space Force is vying for influence after the space enterprise has been in the background for several decades.
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, who retired Wednesday as the service’s chief of space operations, considered standing up the Space Force’s own service university as well. But they ultimately opted to work with a civilian school, at an estimated annual cost of $6 million.
The first cohort is expected to include about 60 students across five seminars, the Space Force said. They’ll graduate in May 2024.
The program is slated to grow to as many as 85 students across six groups in subsequent years. In comparison, about 750 students attend the Air Force’s graduate and postgraduate PME courses each year.
“Guardians, sister service members, and civilians will apply as part of their respective developmental education process,” the Space Force said. “Students selected will be required to provide recommendation letters, transcripts and complete the JHU admissions process.”
Some space-focused faculty at Air University, the Air Force’s service school at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, will join Johns Hopkins as well.
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Plan to revamp enlisted airmen’s development unveiled
The 28-point proposal lists goals the service hopes to achieve by the end of 2023.
Professional military education is a key step in an officer’s ascent up the career ladder.
Graduate, or intermediate, programs largely cater to majors (O-4), while postgraduate, or senior, courses are tailored to lieutenant colonels (O-5) as they prepare to take on greater responsibilities and leadership roles.
Students in the program can tailor their studies to fit career goals, from electives in technology, policy and security to technical courses in spacecraft engineering. And Johns Hopkins can work with the military to ensure the coursework remains relevant in a quickly changing field.
RELATED
Space Force and USAFA adapting Naval Academy’s ‘Leatherneck’ program for future guardians
The fledgling service is creating a program to determine which candidates are the best fit to join the Space Force after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy
Officials argue that studying in downtown Washington will allow guardians to build stronger relationships with key players in the national security space, and to be involved on long-term projects beyond graduation.
The decision can also make life easier for students and their families by keeping them in the D.C. area, a hub of military space jobs, instead of sending them to a school far from their potential next step.
“Our talent development processes must be uniquely designed to allow our guardians to thrive and reach their full potential,” Katharine Kelley, the service’s human capital chief, said in a release. “We must deliberately grow our guardians to think, act and fight strategically with an understanding of how they fit into the larger ecosystem of the space community.”
About Rachel S. Cohen
Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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