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Quotes of the Day:
“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.”
– Abraham Lincoln
“The power under the Constitution will always be in the people. It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to representatives of their own choosing.”
– George Washington
“The future of this republic is in the hands of the American voter.”
– Dwight D. Eisenhower
“The health of a democratic society may be measured by the quality of functions performed by private citizens.”
– Alexis de Tocqueville
“We do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate.”
– Thomas Jefferson
“Nobody will ever deprive the American people of the right to vote except the American people themselves, and the only way they could do this is by not voting.”
– Franklin D. Roosevelt
“The ignorance of one voter in a democracy impairs the security of all.”
– John F. Kennedy
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1. Kim Jong Un’s Risky Embrace of Russia Is About His Regime’s Survival
2. PacNet #77 – Trump or Harris: The ROK-US alliance must meet challenges together
3. The Next World War Starts Here (Northeast Asia)
4. Ukraine says it has attacked North Korean troops in Kursk
5. Inexperienced, poorly trained and underfed: the North Korean troops heading to Ukraine
6. North Korea succession speculation swirls as Kim Ju-ae steps into the spotlight
7. From the bookshelf: ‘Engaging North Korea’
8. South Korea and EU worry about Russia's technology transfer in return for North Korea troops
9. North Korean soldiers reportedly face Ukrainian fire for first time since training in Russia
10. North Korea receiving cash, food, space technology from Russia in return for soldiers, South Korean lawmaker says
11. North Korea issues ominous "nuclear war" warning
12. N. Korea fires multiple short-range ballistic missiles just ahead of U.S. election
13. Seoul-Washington nuclear MOU to help boost ties, avoid future conflict: industry official
14. S. Korea vows continued close cooperation with new U.S. administration
15. ROK, U.S. top officials meeting marks shift from 'unification dismissiveness'
16. A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
1. Kim Jong Un’s Risky Embrace of Russia Is About His Regime’s Survival
If Kim is rehashing his strategy for survival we have to wonder if he thinks his survival is being significantly threatened at this time., I think his recent actions could be the proverbial inflection point and possibly even a tipping point. I believe he is doing this because he fears the internal throat. What he has done in the past year with removing peaceful unification and designating the South as the enemy in a two state construct on the peninsula is part of the long standing strategy of "externalizing" the threat to deal with internal stress. KIm has always needed the external enemy to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north.
At the same time we have to see how the nKPA deployment to support Putin's War plays out. According to reports he has already isolated the families of the soldiers. Is he anticipating heavy casualties which he will have to "hide?" Is he concerned with possible defections of soldiers? We have seen a report that allegedly 18 soldiers defected (but apparently retired to Russian control).
My concern is twofold. Will the internal stress lead to a breakdown of the ability of the party to govern all of the north from Pyongyang? And will failed operations in Ukraine lead to a breakdown of the military and ultimately cause the military to turn away from support to the regime. These conditions lead to how we dine regime instability and collapse. When there is a loss of central government effectiveness and the loss of coherency and support of the military, regime collapse is likely to occur.
If we see the conditions of regime collapse what are we going to do? And if collapse does occur are we prepared for what comes next? Are we prepared to deal with the conflict that is likely to occur and execute the full range of contingency plans that will range from internal civil war, loss of control of WMD to refugees and humanitarian assistance? And then what is the ultimate end state following collapse or conflict? (hint: it has to do with freedom in the north and one Korea).
The bottom line is that this could be a critical time and of course we are distracted with many other important crises around the world. But if something breaks on the peninsula it will distract us from all the other crises.
- World
Kim Jong Un’s Risky Embrace of Russia Is About His Regime’s Survival
Pyongyang’s pact with Moscow comes after disappointment with old methods and the emergence of new military partnerships by Washington, allies
https://www.wsj.com/world/kim-jong-un-is-embracing-russia-for-his-regimes-survival-d3268cc0?utm_medium=social
By Timothy W. Martin
Follow and Dasl Yoon
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Nov. 4, 2024 7:50 am ET
Many of Kim Jong Un’s ambitions hinge on his country’s burgeoning military symbiosis with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Photo: alexander zemlianichenko/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
SEOUL—Kim Jong Un tried peace talks and refrained from testing new weapons to shed North Korea’s status as a pariah state. Now he is doubling down on rogue behavior to get what he wants.
By recently sending thousands of troops to the Russian front lines, Kim has opened a new chapter for his cash-strapped regime. The move thrusts the “Hermit Kingdom” into global affairs in a way that it has shunned since the 1950-53 Korean War.
By going all-in on Russia, Kim is forging an unproven—and even more brazen—path to achieve regime security, advance his country’s nuclear program and win economic relief. Seemingly eroded, for now, are the traditional levers of detente with South Korea, nuclear talks with the U.S. and widespread diplomatic support from Europe.
Now, much of Kim’s ambitions hinge on the burgeoning military symbiosis with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In return for the troops, munitions and missiles, Kim has already pocketed Moscow’s protection at the United Nations and an uptick in cross-border trade. Officials from the U.S., South Korea and elsewhere also believe Kim has asked Russia for help to improve North Korea’s top weaponry—much of which is based on Soviet-era systems.
“It’s North Korea 2.0 that Kim is pursuing,” said Paik Woo-yeal, a political science and diplomacy professor at South Korea’s Yonsei University. “Kim is reshaping his strategy of regime survival.”
Kim’s gambit could backfire. North Korean soldiers might fail on the battlefield or defect, causing him problems with Putin or back at home. Russia’s all-encompassing commitment could fade should fighting with Ukraine end. Pyongyang’s standing across Europe, an important bridge partner with the U.S., is now damaged.
But North Korea, in many ways, couldn’t keep repeating the same old approach—and not just because it had failed to yield results. The U.S., Western Europe and its Indo-Pacific allies swung behind combating Chinese aggression, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the weaponization of global supply chains. Those new partnerships could coalesce around the Kim regime’s nuclear threat, too.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang in June. Photo: Vladimir Smirnov/Associated Press
Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s traditional foes in Seoul, Washington and Tokyo increased joint military exercises and started sharing missile-tracking data. The U.S. provided deeper input to South Korea on potential American nuclear use in the event of a North Korean attack.
“Kim Jong Un understands that his strategic environment is changing rapidly,” said Evans Revere, a former senior State Department official who focused on Asia. “For Kim, the risks are worth the reward of getting the tools, technologies and the support he will need to survive in the hostile environment he anticipates.”
Kim’s Emboldened Era
Kim’s closer alignment with Putin—which included the signing of a mutual defense pact in June—puts new pressures on Washington-Seoul relations at a sensitive time, security experts say. As many as 8,000 North Korean troops near the Russian front lines could soon enter combat, U.S. officials say.
The dispatch of North Korean soldiers to Russia increases the odds of reciprocal support should fighting break out on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul officials worry that Moscow could help Pyongyang realize breakthroughs in nuclear-powered submarines, long-range missiles and reconnaissance satellites.
Inter-Korean ties sit at their lowest level in years. North Korea declared its southern neighbors the country’s new No. 1 enemy in January. It has showered South Korea with trash-filled balloons this year and recently blew up roads and railroads that had linked the two countries.
North Korea carried out an intercontinental ballistic missile test on Thursday, its first such long-range launch in nearly a year. That led to a combined air drill over the weekend from the U.S., South Korea and Japan south of the Korean Peninsula, including at least one B-1B bomber, Seoul’s military said.
“Kim feels emboldened to behave in this way knowing he has support from Russia,” said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance.
South Koreans remain convinced that Kim will never surrender his nuclear weapons, polls show. That has sparked calls for South Korea to pursue a nuclear program of its own—an idea that a growing number of conservative lawmakers have entertained.
North Korea can use its newfound closeness with Russia to create conflict that tests the trilateral alliance of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. by exposing a weakness in their communication or unity, said Jean H. Lee, a visiting fellow at the East-West Center, a Honolulu-based think tank.
“In Kim’s eyes, all tension is good tension at a time when he is seeking to create anxiety around the Korean Peninsula,” Lee said.
North Korea recently sent thousands of troops to Russia’s front lines with Ukraine. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
‘Crossing the Rubicon’
Kim was 27 when he started his reign atop North Korea. He often promised to revitalize the economy. His best shot to shed sanctions dissipated after talks broke down abruptly in Hanoi at the 2019 nuclear summit with then-President Donald Trump.
That triggered a profound shift from Pyongyang. In January 2020, Kim implored North Koreans to brace for life under sanctions—de-emphasizing the importance of dealmaking with Washington. The pandemic then further isolated the cash-strapped regime, which sealed off its borders over virus fears.
Kim found a willing partner in Putin after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. North Korea was one of just five countries to support the Russian war at the U.N.
The embrace of Russia brings geostrategic value to Kim beyond money, energy and technology by diversifying itself away from Chinese support, said Daniel Russel, a former top State Department official for Asia during the Obama administration. Now Beijing runs the risk of driving Kim further into Putin’s arms, should it seek to shape Pyongyang’s behavior or demand restraint, he said.
“Kim has put himself in the driver’s seat and can run something of a bidding war for his favor,” said Russel, now a vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
The Ukraine war is now not only existential for Putin but also Kim, who has bet North Korea’s future on a tighter alliance with Russia, said Victor D. Cha, the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a recent analysis called “Crossing the Rubicon.”
North Korea’s potential combat role could spur more aid to Ukraine from South Korea, Cha wrote, and lead to long-term consequences for Pyongyang’s relationships in Europe. “North Korea’s decision to send troops to kill Europeans will not easily be forgotten in European capitals,” he wrote.
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
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Appeared in the November 5, 2024, print edition as 'Kim Pins Regime’s Future on Russia Ties'.
2. PacNet #77 – Trump or Harris: The ROK-US alliance must meet challenges together
Excerpts:
Conclusion
The inauguration of a new government through elections is a great blessing of democracy. Citizens reflect their will through elections, and in turn, formulate, implement, and evaluate new policies. While allied countries do not have voting rights, they still have expectations. South Korea seeks to safeguard its national security against common external threats and achieve prosperity together with the new US government. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin emphasized in the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, “We are living in a decisive decade…business as usual at the Department is not acceptable.” The ROK-US alliance is indeed at a turning point. It can no longer deter and respond to threats by continuing as it has.
I believe that time will favor those who are integrated by shared values and mutual trust, rather than those divided by conflict and distrust.
PacNet #77 – Trump or Harris: The ROK-US alliance must meet challenges together
https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-77-trump-or-harris-the-rok-us-alliance-must-meet-challenges-together/
The following is the fourth in a series on the challenges facing the next US presidential administration in managing the most crucial Indo-Pacific relationships. See part one in the series here, see part two here, and part three here.
The US presidential election is just around the corner. In South Korea, there are concerns about the potential re-election of President Trump. Trump previously mentioned the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, but he was not the only one: There have been numerous historical examples where the ROK-US alliance faced drastic changes depending on who became US president. After the end of the Vietnam War, President Nixon reduced US forces in Korea to just above 40,000. President George W. Bush revisited this issue during the Iraq War.
However, let’s look externally. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear missile capabilities and has amended its constitution, declaring a shift in policy toward South Korea. China launched an ICBM for the first time in 40 years and exchanged sharp warnings with Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Russia, after dragging out the war in Ukraine for over two and a half years, imposing enormous sacrifices, is also threatening nuclear use and has restored its close Cold War ties with North Korea.
It is not only South Korea but also the US that faces a critical period for the alliance. It is an environment where neither country can defend its security alone. The US and its allies have shared situational awareness through the announcement of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and are building a robust defense network with the US’ “Integrated Deterrence” concept. While conflicts and politics within the alliance are inevitable, they must be conducted with a purpose aligned with the alliance’s goals.
South Korea’s strategy
I believe the US government fully understands the difficulties the alliance is facing. However, shared threat perceptions do not automatically strengthen the alliance, nor can the US unconditionally understand South Korea’s national interest. An alliance is managed through dialogue, where differences in threat perception and national interests are adjusted. The South Korean government must not simply be concerned about the uncertainties in US policy orientation.
South Korea, as part of the alliance, not as two separate nations, must establish a clear direction to maximize its interests. First, South Korea should establish a priority list of national interests it seeks to push forward within the alliance. Second, it should strategize to expand South Korea’s parameters in US policy on the Korean Peninsula. Third, attention should be paid to events that could change the perceptions of key figures after the US election. Lastly, there must be a sophisticated approach to key topics and issues.
South Korea’s top priority should be to strategically differentiate the issues to be emphasized and those to be minimized for the new US administration. This must be done with careful consideration of the new president’s tendencies, the transition team’s inclinations, and the events that could influence their perceptions. For instance, promoting the defense budget ratio (2.7% of GDP), the strategic value of Camp Humphreys, a value-based strategic alliance, and the defense industry foundation (shipbuilding, low-grade fighter jets, artillery/missiles) should be at the forefront. On the other hand, seemingly complex and confusing ROK-US defense consultation bodies or multilateral consultation systems, as well as previous commitments or policy directions that could burden the new administration, should be cautiously addressed.
Key issues
We remember the concerns surrounding President Trump’s unprecedented policies, which materialized shortly after his inauguration. His North Korea-related promises were challenged before they even materialized, with a series of North Korean missile tests that reshaped Trump’s perception of the Korean Peninsula and led to a near-war crisis. However, it also opened an unprecedented opportunity for North Korea and the US to sit at the negotiation table.
The next US administration, whether it continues the legacy of Trump’s first term, or should Harris follow Biden’s policy direction, will not represent an entirely new path for South Korea. Although election promises are gradually becoming more concrete, uncertainty remains regarding which Korean Peninsula policies or defense issues will surface. Key topics for South Korea around the 2024 election include:
*KOPEN = The Korean Peninsula
None of these are insignificant, but a few issues stand out:
-
Sustaining the Indo-Pacific Strategy: The US will seek to maintain its influence in the Indo-Pacific region while shifting the costs and responsibilities to its allies. As a result, there will be increasing demands on countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia to contribute more financially and take on leading roles. South Korea should pledge strong efforts on regional issues while emphasizing its clear responsibility for the security of the Korean Peninsula. This does not mean ignoring regional matters but rather actively managing Korea’s role in regional security, where the Korean Peninsula is a central pillar.
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Ukraine War: The stark difference in stance between Republicans and Democrats regarding support for Ukraine will lead to significant changes depending on the election outcome. However, as European nations’ threat perceptions evolve and they accelerate their military buildup, efforts by NATO and the US to strengthen military cooperation and defense trade with their Indo-Pacific partners will likely increase. South Korea will actively engage in connecting the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.
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North Korean Nuclear Issue: This is one of the most critical issues for South Korea but also one fraught with uncertainty. In the short term, it is unlikely to be a top priority for the new US administration. However, the current international system, with its unstable balance of power and increasing fragmentation, gives North Korea significant maneuvering room and opportunities. Expected North Korean actions may include the 7th nuclear test to deploy tactical nuclear warheads (Hwasan–31), a standard-angle ICBM test to demonstrate the capability to strike the US mainland, and tests of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs to demonstrate the ability to penetrate US missile defense systems. South Korea and the US must prepare joint responses to these provocations in advance.
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Extended Deterrence: Considering Russia’s nuclear threats against Ukraine, North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities, and its potential for preemptive strikes, the US will continue to provide its nuclear umbrella to its allies to maintain the international non-proliferation regime. The bipartisan “Strategic Posture Commission (SPC)” of the US Congress also emphasized the need to optimize overseas military postures. South Korea, for its part, must institutionalize the successes of the newly established NCG system to ensure that the US’s extended deterrence and assurance commitment remain strong.
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Trilateral ROK-Japan-US Cooperation and US Military Redeployments: There is a stark difference between the two presidential candidates regarding multilateralism. The trilateral cooperation established at Camp David must continue gaining momentum and institutionalization. If the US Department of Defense reviews the Global Posture Review and considers redeployments of US troops overseas, including in South Korea, careful consideration of related complex issues like the transition of wartime operational control will be necessary. South Korea will actively participate in strengthening regional security architecture.
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Defense and Military Technology Cooperation: As global supply chains are restructured, South Korea’s role in defense and military technology cooperation will become increasingly important. The vulnerabilities in the US’s defense industry have been highlighted, and the concept of “friendshoring” with reliable allies in the Indo-Pacific region is being emphasized on a bipartisan basis. The ROK-US alliance, although currently limited by US domestic laws and focused on functional cooperation through committees, provides an opportunity for South Korea to enhance its capabilities and expand the alliance’s overall strength.
Conclusion
The inauguration of a new government through elections is a great blessing of democracy. Citizens reflect their will through elections, and in turn, formulate, implement, and evaluate new policies. While allied countries do not have voting rights, they still have expectations. South Korea seeks to safeguard its national security against common external threats and achieve prosperity together with the new US government. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin emphasized in the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, “We are living in a decisive decade…business as usual at the Department is not acceptable.” The ROK-US alliance is indeed at a turning point. It can no longer deter and respond to threats by continuing as it has.
I believe that time will favor those who are integrated by shared values and mutual trust, rather than those divided by conflict and distrust.
Dr. Hanbyeol Sohn (han.b.sohn@gmail.com) is a professor at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and also serves concurrently as the Director of Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA).
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
Photo: The flags of South Korea and the U.S. || Credit: Council on Foreign Relations
3. The Next World War Starts Here (Northeast Asia)
Ominous.
Excerpts:
As strange as it might seem in this moment, the next U.S. administration’s strategy is hamstrung by some old history. Japan and South Korea — which have powerful militaries, and in Japan’s case one that’s recently embarked on a major buildup — are haunted by long-running disputes from the previous century that make their entente feel fragile. It’s an open question whether it can last, even as the threats that are pulling them together grow more serious.
Over the hills that ring Seoul lies the most heavily militarized region in the world. The DMZ separates this vibrant capital from a nuclear-armed hermit state ruled by an unpredictable autocrat that weighs heavily on Korean minds.
The view from Tokyo, a quick flight across the Sea of Japan, is as unreassuring these days.
...
The wartime history in East Asia feels far more alive and relevant to the future than in Europe. Beijing, naturally, exploits it. The Chinese government has managed to transfer animosity toward Japan to the next generation. A 10-year-old Japanese boy was stabbed to death in September while walking to school in Shanghai on the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China, the latest in a string of attacks on Japanese in the country.
Beijing has another card to play against both South Korea and Japan. Both countries are deeply integrated with China economically, which Beijing has used to pressure them.
As much as the U.S. wants their friendship to build, Japan and South Korea will look primarily to Washington for reassurances about American power and its commitment to them individually.
“Beijing wants to send a signal that the U.S. is unable to support treaty allies in the region, and to send a signal to Taiwan, to portray us as hollow allies,” Pottinger said. “Xi has led himself into believing that America is in irrevocable decline and that China and its allies will paper the world in chaos.”
The Next World War Starts Here
Politico
An aggressive China and Russia’s war on Ukraine brought South Korea and Japan closer — with lots of American help. Keeping them together to deter Beijing will be one of the most important foreign policy tasks for Harris or Trump.
Japan and South Korea are haunted by long-running disputes from the previous century that make their entente feel fragile. | Photo by Kazuhiro Nogi/AFP via Getty Images
11/04/2024 10:04 AM EST
Matthew Kaminski is editor-at-large, writing regularly for POLITICO Magazine on American and global affairs. He’s the founding editor of POLITICO Europe, which launched in 2015, and former editor-in-chief of POLITICO. He previously worked for the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal, based in Kyiv, Brussels, Paris and New York.
SEOUL — East Asia is the most serious threat to world peace. An eruption here is hotter and bigger than anything the Middle East or Europe would conceivably produce.
The Biden administration leaves behind a strong diplomatic legacy in Asia, in contrast to its failure in Afghanistan and mixed record in Ukraine and the Middle East. It built webs of security alliances across the region to deter China and forged what has proved elusive for decades — a rapprochement, if not warm friendship, between historical foes and America’s closest Asian allies, South Korea and Japan.
Huge challenges loom for Joe Biden’s successor here. The scale of the forces lining up against each other in the northern Pacific is terrifying. China is forging a deeper alliance of American adversaries in North Korea and Russia, making threats against Taiwan and staking stronger claims on territory in the South China Sea. America’s actions in other geopolitical theaters — above all Ukraine — will reverberate in East Asia.
As strange as it might seem in this moment, the next U.S. administration’s strategy is hamstrung by some old history. Japan and South Korea — which have powerful militaries, and in Japan’s case one that’s recently embarked on a major buildup — are haunted by long-running disputes from the previous century that make their entente feel fragile. It’s an open question whether it can last, even as the threats that are pulling them together grow more serious.
Over the hills that ring Seoul lies the most heavily militarized region in the world. The DMZ separates this vibrant capital from a nuclear-armed hermit state ruled by an unpredictable autocrat that weighs heavily on Korean minds.
The view from Tokyo, a quick flight across the Sea of Japan, is as unreassuring these days.
Russian military planes are breaching the country’s northwestern coastal airspace repeatedly, a reminder that Tokyo and Moscow have an unresolved, nearly 80-year-old territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands that leaves them technically in a state of war. China disputes Japan’s claim over the Senkaku Islands in the south. In the first ever known incursion, Chinese military aircraft flew through Japanese airspace in August. Chinese and Russian military ships together passed near Japanese waters in September during a joint exercise. North Korea openly considers Japan a foe and occasionally sends a missile over the country.
“Japan is now facing off against North Korea, Russia and China and that makes for a severe security environment,” Minoru Kihara, Japan’s defense minister until the government changed last month, told me in an interview in Tokyo. “We feel a strong sense of crisis considering that such incidents took place in a short period of time.”
The war in Ukraine shifted plates in Asia. After Vladimir Putin launched the invasion, Xi Jinping backed him strongly against a unified NATO — making that European conflict a test of China’s superpower ambitions. Japan is “paying close attention to China’s alliance with Russia,” Kihara added. Ukraine also brought Moscow and North Korea closer. Kim Jong Un sent thousands of his soldiers to fight there last month in return, presumably, for military technology and other goodies.
‘Drinking buddies’
The answer to this robust authoritarian axis à trois is the trilateral relationship with Seoul and Tokyo that Washington spent years trying to bring to life.
While both countries are protected by the U.S. through treaties going back over 70 years — and while both share common enemies — South Korea and Japan have long been estranged. During World War II, Japan occupied South Korea, enslaving Koreans to work in their factories and sexually service their soldiers. Japan has apologized and paid reparations to Koreans. But this remains an open nerve — and badly strained political and military ties.
During his time as the commodore of a squadron of guided missiles destroyers in the 1990s, retired Adm. Jim Stavridis recalled that during joint exercises the U.S. had to keep Japanese and South Korean vessels far away from each other — or “you’d get the on-the-sea version of ‘road rage’.” It is as if France and Germany had remained frosty after World War II. Under that scenario, Europe wouldn’t have NATO or the EU.
The Xi era in China changed Japanese attitudes about security. Ukraine is the more recent accelerant.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who stepped down this autumn, elaborated a line used by his foreign minister — “First Ukraine, then Taiwan” — to suggest the war could come here: “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Russia’s biggest supporter China is the one power today openly challenging the U.S.-led order, and the only one with the ability potentially to do so.
Japan responded by unveiling plans to double defense spending — from 1 percent of its GDP to 2 percent by 2027. The budget has already gone up more than 40 percent since 2022. Under its constitution, Japan can only defend itself and had neglected the military. A previous Japanese leader, Shinzo Abe, started to change things in the 2010s. Japan built out a formidable navy and added modern weaponry. By the time the current expansion plans are in place, Japan is expected to be the world’s third-largest spender on defense, after the U.S. and China. Germany, by contrast, is reversing plans to boost defense spending.
Even for all that spending, “China is outpacing Japan’s increase of defense budget and they have four times more than we do,” said Kihara, the former defense minister. “It is difficult for us to face China on our own.”
South Korea is an obvious ally for Japan. Kishida was open to closer relations, believing Japan needed friends to resist China. What made that possible was the presidential election in March of 2022, a month after the invasion of Ukraine, that brought Yoon Suk Yeol to the presidential palace in Seoul.
The left and right swap power every five or 10 years here. The left tends to seek reconciliation with North Korea and dislike Japan. A man of the right, Yoon brought more hawkish views and something else: a genuine affection for Japan going back to his father’s time studying and teaching there.
He had his first chance to meet Kishida at the Madrid NATO summit in July of that year. “Yoon hugged him,” recalled a former Korean official who was there. Kishida was taken aback. Yoon is outgoing, Kishida circumspect. “Asian leaders don’t do hugs, unless they are communists.”
From that awkward beginning came a relationship that this former official described as “drinking buddies.”
The U.S. had been looking for an opening like this for years. Kurt Campbell, the deputy secretary of State, pushed a rapprochement strategy from Washington. Dozens of trilateral meetings followed where the U.S. did “the thing that’s unusual for America — step back and let everyone else talk,” said Rahm Emanuel, America’s ambassador in Tokyo.
Little was straightforward. Korean and Japanese ministers rarely meet each other one-on-one. Korea’s defense minister hadn’t come to Tokyo for 15 years before this July. If the Japanese defense chief goes to Seoul next year, as planned, that would be the first time in nine years. The U.S. has to play mediator and counselor to both sides.
“History is history, brother,” Emanuel said. “It has a pull on emotions and it has a pull on psychology.
“The U.S. plays an important role in keeping the plates spinning,” he added.
When Japan was hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May of 2023, Washington pressed to have Korea invited. During the meeting, Yoon and Kishida went together with their spouses to pay respects at a memorial to the Korean victims of the 1945 atomic bombing of the city. It was a first of sorts and created a lasting image.
The culmination of the courtship was the Camp David summit in August last year. Yoon, Kishida and Biden hailed a new era and announced various agreements, including on sharing data about missiles and a major exercise. “This is an all hands on deck moment in the region,” said a senior administration official in Washington, who asked for anonymity.
“When you have trust in us and in the president, you don’t do the bare minimum,” Emanuel said. “They went beyond their comfort zone. In a world consumed by war and grievance, history can catch up to the present and shape it. Camp David showed dialogue and diplomacy shaped the future.
“Now,” Emanuel continued, “the goal is to institutionalize it in the DNA of governments.”
‘Not allies’
The fact is this rapprochement is far from a done deal. Leaders in Seoul and Tokyo sound at best cautionary notes.
“I’m very pessimistic,” said a senior Japanese official who was granted anonymity to discuss the matter. The Koreans “swing from one extreme to the other.” Yoon’s opponents have called him a sellout to Japan, riding him hard on the rapprochement.
Another foreign ministry official in Tokyo recalled working visits to Seoul during the lead-up to the Camp David summit. “They would yell at us during negotiations over what happened in the war and when the meeting’s over, they say, ‘no hard feelings, let’s go out for drinks’,” this official said. “The next day they yell at us some more. It’s due to the domestic political pressure they’re under.”
In Korea, this issue isn’t purely a matter of partisan politics. Distrust crosses generations and goes deep.
While Korea has agreed to joint naval and aerial exercises, Japanese forces aren’t welcome on Korean soil. “We prefer to have them somewhere else,” deadpanned a senior Korean official.
Asked whether Japan was now an ally, this official paused and said, “Don’t think so. Partner is enough.”
The recurring pain points involve Korean demands for reparations and more apologies. The Japanese reply that these demands were settled already — and want to stay away from Korea’s messy internal politics.
Yes and no. Korea’s enthusiasm for the rapprochement may pass with President’s Yoon’s departure from office. Yet Japan’s own politics are tortured by history as well, which hinders its ability to build deeper relationships with Korea and other nations across Asia that fear China’s rise.
Japan’s 21st century awakening on defense contrasts with its former wartime ally in Germany. There is another contrast with Germany that is less complimentary. “The curious thing,” Ian Buruma wrote in his book Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, “much of what attracted [the] Japanese to Germany before the war — Prussian authoritarianism, romantic nationalism, pseudo-scientific racialism — had lingered in Japan while becoming distinctly unfashionable in Germany.”
No Japanese politician, Buruma continued, has “ever gone down on his knees, as Willy Brandt did in the old Warsaw ghetto, to apologize for historical crimes.”
The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for all but four years since 1955 and will almost certainly continue to despite losing its majority in the past weekend’s elections, has a vocal nationalist right wing. Many mornings outside LDP headquarters, trucks with loudspeakers and flags blare nationalist speeches.
These historical issues might have been settled long ago. The U.S. can share some blame, deciding, in order to get a peace deal done, to let the Japanese emperor stay as head of state but give up his divine right to rule. Japan’s military kept its flags and symbols. Germany was wiped clean of the Nazi regime and its vestiges.
“We didn’t really grow up,” said one foreign ministry official that I spoke to in Tokyo.
Yasukuni Shrine is a large complex in central Tokyo near the imperial palace. The shrine honors Japan’s war dead, among whom are 14 war criminals who committed atrocities in World War II. A large museum on the site treats Japan’s wartime histories with reverence. Models of a kamikaze plane and submarine are displayed. Exhibits for the last war suggest the Japanese were fighting Western imperialism in Asia. It’s as if a museum in Berlin displayed Nazi flags and honored Nazi leaders.
Whenever an LDP politician visits Yasukuni, Koreans and Chinese have an excuse to complain. Kihara, the defense minister, went on Aug. 15, the 79th anniversary of Japan’s surrender. He was unapologetic, saying that “those who had sacrificed should be given tribute” and that his own relatives worship there. “It is unfortunate that this has been politicized,” he said.
Just don’t call it Asian NATO
These two awkward neighbors need each other and America needs them to get along to marshal a credible response to the China-led threesome.
The security anxieties in the region are bound to grow. If Beijing acts on its threats and succeeds, the fall of Taiwan would be a huge economic and political blow to the U.S. It would also put the rest of Asia in play, so to speak. Add to that the reemergence of Russia in the region and the heightening of the North Korean threat. The war in Ukraine is sputtering along, and the outcome there might hang on what happens in the U.S. Tuesday.
The Biden diplomatic push of the past couple years in East Asia is intended to build out enough military muscle and overlapping alliances to create a kind of NATO for the region — with China in the role of the old Soviet Union. You just can’t call it NATO. The South Koreans and others don’t want to be formally allied with Japan. To be more like Germany, Japan would also become an equal partner to America and others.
The U.S. isn’t ready to reopen the postwar security deal that keeps Japan in a kind of arrested development. The current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba used to muse about an Asian NATO and reopening the status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Japan. He had to disavow the idea minutes after winning power in late September.
Those political issues are a distraction, U.S. officials say. In practical terms, however, a lot has already changed. The region is arming up, passing Europe in terms of defense expenditures a decade ago. As they spend more, Japan’s terrible demographics limit their ability to add manpower. The money is going to buy hundreds of American long-range Tomahawk missiles, integrated antimissile systems and unmanned defenses. Japan’s navy could be “the swing vote on effective deterrence” over Taiwan, said Matt Pottinger, deputy national security adviser in the Trump White House. Japan wants to develop weapons with the U.S. and train its troops there.
Earlier this year, the U.S. upgraded the commander of forces in Japan from a two-star to a three-star general officer and pledged to build a new command and control center — which Emanuel called “the largest change in our force structure” and “the most important thing we have done here in 60 years.”
Other baby steps are planned. The trio is talking about putting in place some institutional roots. Perhaps a secretariat for the trilateral relationship — that’s not exactly a second coming of NATO.
The wartime history in East Asia feels far more alive and relevant to the future than in Europe. Beijing, naturally, exploits it. The Chinese government has managed to transfer animosity toward Japan to the next generation. A 10-year-old Japanese boy was stabbed to death in September while walking to school in Shanghai on the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China, the latest in a string of attacks on Japanese in the country.
Beijing has another card to play against both South Korea and Japan. Both countries are deeply integrated with China economically, which Beijing has used to pressure them.
As much as the U.S. wants their friendship to build, Japan and South Korea will look primarily to Washington for reassurances about American power and its commitment to them individually.
“Beijing wants to send a signal that the U.S. is unable to support treaty allies in the region, and to send a signal to Taiwan, to portray us as hollow allies,” Pottinger said. “Xi has led himself into believing that America is in irrevocable decline and that China and its allies will paper the world in chaos.”
Politico
4. Ukraine says it has attacked North Korean troops in Kursk
I think it will still be some time before we can accurately assess the effectiveness of the nKPA forces and whether they will achieve effects that the Russians can effectively exploit.
The question is if they suffer high casualties and are not effective in support of Russian objectives will Kim continue to send troops. Will he weaken the nKPA to such a point that it begins to lose whatever effectiveness it might have to fight a war on the Korean peninsula? At what point will the nKPA reach a breaking point because Kim Jong Un is misusing them
Ukraine says it has attacked North Korean troops in Kursk
Financial Times · by Christopher Miller · November 4, 2024
Ukrainian officials said on Monday that their forces had fired at North Korean soldiers in combat for the first time since their deployment by Russia to its western Kursk region.
The clashes mark the first direct intervention by a foreign army since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, as well as an expansion of what was already the largest land war in Europe since the second world war.
“The first military units of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] have already come under fire in Kursk,” Andriy Kovalenko, Ukraine’s top counter-disinformation official within the national security council, said on Telegram. A senior Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed the military engagement to the Financial Times but declined to provide further details.
In Kyiv, foreign minister Andrii Sybiha said he had discussed with his visiting German counterpart Annalena Baerbock the “need for decisive action” in response to North Korea’s deepening involvement in the war.
“We urge Europe to realise that the DPRK troops are now carrying [out] an aggressive war in Europe against a sovereign European state,” Sybiha said in a news conference.
The US on Monday called out Russia and China at the UN Security Council for “shamelessly protecting” and emboldening North Korea. South Korea and the EU also condemned the deployment and expressed concern that Russia could reward North Korea with transfers of nuclear and ballistic technology.
Another senior Ukrainian official told the FT that Moscow was already providing military technologies to Pyongyang to help with its missile programmes, as well as “money”.
In Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin met North Korea’s foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, in the Kremlin on Monday.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korean foreign minister Choe Son-hui meet at the Kremlin on Monday © Mikhael Tereshchenko/ Sputnik/ Kremlin/ EPA/Shutterstock
Choe passed on a greeting from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who has backed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and signed a treaty with Putin in June that includes a mutual security assistance clause.
The foreign minister last week said that North Korea had “no doubt whatsoever that under the wise leadership of the honourable Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian army and people will surely achieve a great victory in their sacred struggle to defend the sovereign rights and security of their state”.
Putin has not confirmed the North Korean deployment but he hinted at it last month, indicating it fell under the security provisions in the treaty.
US and South Korean officials last week confirmed Ukraine’s assessment that around 8,000 North Korean troops were sent to Kursk last month to help Russia’s army push Ukrainian forces out of territory they have occupied since August. Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials told the FT that the forces were in barracks about 50km from the Ukrainian border and preparing to enter the fight within “days”.
Kyiv, Washington and Seoul said that Pyongyang had sent roughly 12,000 troops in all to Russia for its ongoing war effort, including 500 officers and three generals. The remaining forces are located in Russia’s far east, where they are undergoing training.
The White House has said that the North Koreans would become “legitimate military targets” if they entered the fight against Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his evening address on Monday that his military and foreign intelligence services had informed him that 11,000 North Korean troops were now stationed in the Kursk region. “We see an increase in North Korean forces, but, unfortunately, we do not see an increase in response from our partners,” he said.
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The senior Ukrainian intelligence official declined to provide specifics about the first military engagement between his country’s forces and the North Koreans. But he said that it occurred within Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukraine controls some 600 sq km of territory, or a little more than half of what it previously held following the summer incursion that took Moscow by surprise.
Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, the GUR, said over the weekend that Russia had armed the North Korean troops in Kursk with 60mm mortars, assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, anti-tank guided missiles and shoulder-launched anti-tank rocket launchers. The GUR said that some were also provided with night-vision devices and thermal imagers. A few hundred troops from North Korea’s special forces have also been deployed in Kursk.
Ukrainian officials and military analysts have raised questions about the quality and combat effectiveness of the North Korean troops, with most being described as inexperienced, low-ranking soldiers.
“We will know soon” how well they can fight, said one of the officials on Monday.
Financial Times · by Christopher Miller · November 4, 2024
5. Inexperienced, poorly trained and underfed: the North Korean troops heading to Ukraine
It is dangerous to both overestimate and underestimate the nKPA forces. We need to be patient and see how well they do over time. We must not make assessment based on our preferred Charactertures of the nKPA (and in particular their SOF - are they 10 feet tall supermen or are the 4 feet 8 inch starving kids – they fact is they are neither and somewhere in between). Also we must consider that Ukraine has been conducting very effective psychological operations so their reporting will be based on supporting their messages to achieve the effects they believe they need to achieve in the information space. This is one reason why South Korea (and the US) need to to provide observers (and advisors) to be able to assess the ground truth and to determine how best to support Ukraine's defense.
Inexperienced, poorly trained and underfed: the North Korean troops heading to Ukraine
Justin McCurry
in Tokyo
Kim Jong-un has called his army the ‘strongest in the world’ but they are vulnerable to malnutrition, and none have seen combat or know the terrain in Russia’s war
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · November 5, 2024
Depending on whom you ask, they are the boost that Russian forces need to make a significant breakthrough in Ukraine, or they are simple cannon fodder, destined for repatriation in body bags.
After weeks of speculation, Nato and the Pentagon have confirmed that around 10,000 North Korean troops are in Russia, with most massing near Ukraine’s border in Kursk, where the Kremlin’s forces have struggled to repel a Ukrainian incursion.
US officials believe the North Koreans could enter the conflict within days, as the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, pleads with his country’s allies to “stop watching” while his troops prepare to confront a new and untested enemy.
It is too early to say how the Russian-North Korean “blood alliance” will change the dynamics of the conflict. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, said Russia had been training them to use artillery, drones and “basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, indicating that they fully intend to use these forces in frontline operations”.
‘Blood alliance’: why South Korea fears North’s involvement in Ukraine war
Read more
But not one of the young men drafted from Kim Jong-un’s regular army of around 1 million – the “strongest in the world”, according to Kim – have seen combat. And they will be fighting on unfamiliar territory, with new weapons and in uniforms bearing the flag of a country – Russia – they know little about.
While their arrival relieves pressure on Russia to draft more of its own citizens, with the US estimating that more than 500,000 Russians have been killed or wounded since the war started in February 2022 – experts believe the military dividends for the Kremlin will be limited.
North Korean pilots flew during the Vietnam war, and the country provided military advisers and air force personnel to Egypt during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, as well as military aid to Syria.
But North Korea has not fought in a major war since the early 1950s, when a three-year conflict between North and South ended in an uncomfortable truce but not a peace treaty.
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un inspects a guard of honour during a military parade in February 2023. His troops have been trained in mountainous regions, far from the flat battlefields of Ukraine. Photograph: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP/Getty Images
The soldiers, thought to be mostly in their teens or early 20s, have been trained in mountainous North Korea and have no experience of the large, flat battlefields of Ukraine, according to experts.
Russia appears to have armed more than 7,000 North Korean soldiers positioned near the border with Ukraine with 60mm mortars, AK-12 rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank grenade launchers, as well as night vision equipment, the Yonhap news agency said, citing Ukraine’s intelligence agency.
“This deployment is historic for North Korea, which has previously sent advisory or specialist groups abroad but never a large ground force,” the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US thinktank, said in an online post.
The North Korean forces in Russia are thought to include about 500 officers and a small number of generals, as well as members of the Storm Corps, elite troops who are better trained – and fed – than most of their comrades, who are poorly equipped and vulnerable to illness and malnutrition.
In 2017, a North Korean soldier who made a frantic escape across the border – barely surviving multiple gunshot wounds from his own side – was found by the South Korean doctors who saved him to have a 27cm intestinal worm and a host of other parasites in his system. His stomach contents reflected a poor diet – cheaper corn instead of rice – and this for a staff sergeant said to be from the relatively elite border guard. South Korean researchers in 2015 cited elevated rates of chronic hepatitis B and C, tuberculosis and parasites among North Korean defectors.
‘Most of them are unlikely to come back home alive’
Provided they survive, the transplanted troops could benefit from their time on the Ukrainian front, according to former North Korean soldiers who say many will see their tour as a source of pride. It will also an opportunity to earn extra money and, perhaps, secure better treatment for their families who, according to South Korean military intelligence, have been moved en masse to unknown locations to keep the deployment secret.
“They are too young and won’t understand exactly what it means,” said Lee Woong-gil, a former member of the Storm Corps who defected to the South in 2007. “They will just consider it an honour to be selected as the ones to go to Russia among the many North Korean soldiers. But I think most of them are unlikely to come back home alive.”
Most of their wages will go directly to the regime – potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign currency that is rumoured to form part of a deal Kim reached with Vladimir Putin this summer. Depending on how long the conflict lasts and the number of North Korean troops involved, their mutual defence agreement could include the transfer of sophisticated Russian weapons technology in return for North Korean ammunition, missiles and personnel.
Reports of dead and wounded soldiers would have little impact on the North Korean army – state media claimed last month that 1.4 million people had applied to join or return to the army in the space of a week. But significant losses would deal a blow to Kim should the news ever get past the country’s tightly controlled propaganda machine.
“Kim Jong-un is taking a big gamble,” said Ahn Chan-il, a former North Korean army first lieutenant who is now head of the World Institute for North Korean Studies, a thinktank in Seoul. “If there are no large casualty numbers, he will get what he wants to some extent. But things will change a lot if many of his soldiers die in battle.”
The coming weeks will tell if the North Korean troops are more than poorly prepared, unwitting mercenaries Kim has offered up to enrich and strengthen his regime.
Choi Jung-hoon, a former first lieutenant in North Korea’s army who now leads an activist group in Seoul, said his “heart ached” when he saw a Ukraine-released video purporting to show young North Korean soldiers lining up to collect their Russian military fatigues and equipment last month.
“None would think they are going to Russia to die,” Choi said. “But I think they’re cannon fodder because they will be sent to the most dangerous sites. I’m sure they will be killed.”
Agencies contributed reporting.
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · November 5, 2024
6. North Korea succession speculation swirls as Kim Ju-ae steps into the spotlight
I sometimes wonder if Kim Jong Un is giving us these views of his daughter just to play with us, knowing how obsessed we are with succession. I wonder if he sits in Pyongyang and reads our comments about Kim Ju Ae being groomed for succession and just laughs at us?
On the other hand, we have to consider if he really is grooming here and why. Is this a sign that he recognizes his possible ill health and he may not have long in this world? Does he just want to ensure his dynastic legacy? Is this part of an internal game of thrones to fend off rivals from within the regime?
Is this another indicator that Kim faces increasingly dangerous internal stress that could result from a combination of factors?
North Korea
This Week in AsiaPolitics
North Korea succession speculation swirls as Kim Ju-ae steps into the spotlight
Kim Jong-un’s daughter is emerging in the public eye, but her future leadership role in North Korea remains a mystery
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 8:00am, 5 Nov 2024Updated: 9:18am, 5 Nov 2024
Recent intelligence from South Korea suggests that Kim Jong-un’s preteen daughter is stepping into the limelight, raising speculation about her potential role in North Korea’s future leadership. Analysts remain divided on the regime’s succession strategy, however, given its secretive nature and the complexities of leadership transitions.
Questions about Ju-ae’s potential as a successor resurfaced last week when Seoul’s intelligence agency reported increasing sightings of her at official events.
Ju-ae, believed to be around 10 or 11 years old, first appeared in public in November 2022 at an intercontinental ballistic missile inspection with her parents.
North Korean state media, which has not officially revealed her name, initially referred to her as the “beloved” child of the leader. Over time, her titles have been upgraded to “respected” child, “Morning Star of the nation”, and in March, “Hyangdo”, a title meaning “great person of guidance”.
This latest title, historically reserved for her ancestors, has fuelled speculation that she may be groomed to follow in her father’s footsteps.
A picture released by the North Korean state media in September last year shows Kim Jong-un and his daughter at a parade. Photo: KCNA/dpa
Despite its nominal status as a socialist state, North Korea operates as a de facto dynasty, with power firmly entrenched in the Kim family lineage, beginning with Kim Il-sung and continuing through his son and grandson.
The secretive regime has kept much about Kim Jong-un’s other children, if any exist, under wraps.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service noted last week that Kim Ju-ae’s public appearances were on the rise, expanding from military events to include party and government functions.
She has been spotted alongside her influential aunt, Kim Yo-jong, as well as foreign minister Choe Son-hui. At a recent gathering, she was even seen chatting with Russian ambassador Alexander Matsegora, further solidifying her presence in the political landscape.
Photographs from state media frequently feature Ju-ae next to her father, including a striking image of them together during a missile launch.
“Her status seems firmly established,” the National Intelligence Service reported to South Korea’s National Assembly.
Kim and his daughter Ju-ae (middle) watch a test-launch of a nuclear-capable Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile at an undisclosed location in December last year. Photo: KCNA/KNS/dpa
Just a symbol?
However, analysts like Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, suggest that Ju-ae’s visibility may serve more as a symbolic gesture.
“She seems to represent Kim Jong-un’s commitment to safeguarding future generations through nuclear deterrence in the face of perceived threats from the United States,” he said.
As North Korea’s propaganda chief, Kim Yo-jong is leveraging her niece’s public appearances to project an image of normalcy and underscore her brother’s efforts to secure the regime’s longevity, observers say. Yet, opinions diverge on whether Ju-ae is being groomed as a successor in a society that is often resistant to women being in charge.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, expressed scepticism about Ju-ae’s potential for leadership, citing her youth and lack of military experience.
Will North Korea’s next leader be a woman with Kim Jong-un’s daughter on the rise?
“I have consistently argued that Ju-ae is not the heir,” he told This Week in Asia, pointing to her “gender limits” in a society isolated from external influence.
Conversely, Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University, believes that while Ju-ae’s ceremonial status may rise, it does not necessarily indicate she will inherit her father’s position.
“As she grows older, she will likely be held in higher regard, not as a successor but simply as the leader’s beloved daughter,” Lim said, suggesting she may be stepping into a public role once filled by her mother, Ri Sol-ju, who was last seen celebrating the New Year with Kim and Ju-ae.
The uncertainty surrounding Ju-ae’s possible succession also raises questions about her father’s health.
While she hasn’t been officially declared the successor, Ju-ae is receiving intensive preparation for leadership
Cho Han-bum, analyst
Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute think tank, said that concerns over Kim’s health had prompted early “successor training” for Ju-ae, arguing that the likelihood of Kim having a son is “close to zero.”
This view was echoed by Cho Han-bum, another senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
“While she hasn’t been officially declared the successor, Ju-ae is receiving intensive preparation for leadership, with her aunt Yo-jong gradually transitioning into a subordinate role,” Cho said.
He also dismissed speculation that Kim might have a son studying abroad, noting North Korea’s recent international condemnation for its support of Russia in Ukraine.
“It’s absurd to think a potential heir is studying abroad while North Korea faces scrutiny for dispatching troops [to Ukraine],” Cho added.
Kim and his daughter attend a missile test at an undisclosed location in North Korea last November. Photo: KCNA/dpa
Park Jie-won, a former South Korean intelligence chief, dismissed the notion of Ju-ae being trained for succession, noting that she has an older brother and a younger sibling, whose gender remains unreported.
“If Kim Jong-un truly has no legitimate son, he would likely have found a way to produce a male heir,” Park said, emphasising North Korean society’s deeply entrenched male preference.
He suggested that Ju-ae’s rising public profile might be a strategy to divert attention from the existence of a son, speculating that, like Kim and Kim Yo-jong who went to Switzerland as teenagers, her siblings could be studying abroad under similar arrangements.
Park Chan-kyong
FOLLOW
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied
7. From the bookshelf: ‘Engaging North Korea’
I may have to check this book out of the library as the $180 price tag ($49.49 for the eBook) is a bit steep. I have pasted the table of contents of the book below the article.
I would support the effective engagement of north Korea if it is based on a realistic understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and in support of a superior political warfare strategy that seeks to solve the "Korea question.
From the bookshelf: ‘Engaging North Korea’ | The Strategist
aspistrategist.org.au · by Robert Wihtol · November 4, 2024
North Korea is again in the global spotlight. By providing first munitions and now troops to support Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has expanded the scope of the Ukraine conflict while driving its relations with the West to a new low. And, by aligning with Russia, sidelining long-time patron China and abandoning its goal of unification with South Korea, North Korea has escalated tensions in Northeast Asia.
The last time the hermit kingdom was this visible was in June 2018, when its leader, Kim Jong Un, met US president Donald Trump at a summit held in Singapore amid cautious optimism that North Korea might gradually open up to the West. But in a follow-up summit in Hanoi in 2019, the gaping differences between the two parties became clear and negotiations collapsed.
The Biden administration adopted a wait-and-see policy, paying little attention to North Korea. Most foreign missions in Pyongyang closed during the Covid-19 pandemic and have not reopened.
In 2022, however, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine dealt the North Korea a fresh hand. With rapidly depleting military resources, Moscow turned to Pyongyang, which in 2023 began exporting artillery shells and weapons to Russia, in return receiving much-needed food, raw materials and weapons parts.
In January this year, Pyongyang relinquished its constitutional commitment to Korean unification and said it would consider the South to be its principal enemy. To underline the shift, in October North Korea blew up parts of two roads connecting it to the South. Munitions exports to Russia have accelerated, and now Pyongyang has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
In Engaging North Korea, 12 international experts put their heads together to review experience in relations with North Korea and provide pointers on how to deal with it in the future. The contributors include leading Korea experts from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the US and Vietnam, a director of humanitarian aid and a Swedish diplomatic envoy. The two last-mentioned have hands-on experience working inside North Korea.
The authors start from the widely divergent interests behind the six-party talks, which sought to address North Korea’s nuclear program and broke down in 2009. The United States, Japan and South Korea want denuclearization, North Korea wants to keep its nuclear capabilities and have economic sanctions lifted, while China and North Korea have a special relationship based on inter-party cooperation. Japan must also deal with the domestically sensitive issue of citizens abducted by North Korean agents. The sixth party in the talks was Russia.
Singaporean and Vietnamese viewpoints are also discussed in the book, as either country may be called on to facilitate future negotiations. Should the North Korea ever consider opening its economy, Vietnam might serve as a model. With the world focusing on geopolitics, the authors remind us of North Korea’s deep humanitarian crisis. Given the range of interlinked issues, the book highlights the need to deal with North Kora comprehensively rather than piecemeal.
A fascinating chapter reviews the special role played by Sweden in keeping the door to North Korea ajar, though sometimes only minimally. It was the first Western country to recognise North Korea, in 1973. In 1975 it set up an embassy that it has kept open, although since the Covid-19 outbreak staffed entirely with North Korean nationals.
In the early 1990s, after a change of government, Stockholm was about to shut its embassy when the US asked it to represent it as a diplomatic protecting power—a representative. Washington lacked official relations with Pyongyang and wanted Sweden to serve as a neutral go-between. Sweden kept the embassy open and now serves as the protecting power for Australia, Canada, Germany and the US. It also represents several other countries in consular matters.
Engaging with North Korea is a daunting task but one that is essential for world peace. The authors liken it to the Sisyphean challenge of repeatedly pushing a boulder up a hill only to have it roll down again, but they consider the chances of success greater if countries work ‘collectively, patiently and purposefully’. They propose doing this through informal working groups rather than showy summits. However, North Korea’s recent policy shifts make even this unlikely, at least in the short term.
Its playbook consists of bluster, threats and unpredictability, which its leaders have used ruthlessly to gain strategic advantage. However, behind the enigmatic facade there is a method, usually opportunistic, to North Korea’s unpredictability.
Frustrated at being ignored by the Biden administration, North Korea predictably undertook missile launches in September and October in the run-up to the US presidential elections. We should remember that its warming relations with Russia are transactional and do not change the reality that China is North Korea’s closest neighbour and only major trading partner.
With North Korea sending soldiers to support Russia and with tensions on the Korean Peninsula at a new high, the search is on for fresh ways to deal with the hermit kingdom. Engaging North Korea is essential reading for diplomats and security specialists, especially those handling Northeast Asia and Russia’s war on Ukraine.
aspistrategist.org.au · by Robert Wihtol · November 4, 2024
Engaging North Korea
Edited By Lam Peng Er
https://www.routledge.com/Engaging-North-Korea/Er/p/book/9781032819167
Copyright 2025
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ISBN 9781032819167
296 Pages 7 B/W Illustrations
Published September 16, 2024 by Routledge
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Description
This book presents a comprehensive overview of international attempts to engage North Korea diplomatically with the aim of avoiding a nuclear war.
It highlights the difficulty of this task, concluding that the containment of North Korea currently depends more on military deterrence than on diplomatic restraint. It considers the various multilateral attempts at diplomatic engagement over recent decades and explores the different approaches of different countries, examining the domestic factors and the strategic interests which drive different countries’ different approaches. It includes an account of China’s growing estrangement, Russia’s increasing closeness, and the surprising relationship between North Korea and Sweden which has been effective in providing the North Korean people with humanitarian aid.
Revealing the story of diplomatic frustrations and failures when engaging North Korea, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Korean studies, Asian politics, and international relations.
Table of Contents
Part 1: Introduction
1. Engaging North Korea: A Task for Sisyphus?
Lam Peng Er
Part 2: Superpowers and the DPRK
2. The United States’ Diplomacy towards a Nuclearizing DPRK: Agreed Framework, Six-Party Talks, and Summits
Jihwan HWANG
3. A Basic Framework for Understanding China-North Korea Relations
Jaewoo CHOO
Part 3: Regional Great Powers and the DPRK
4. Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the 21st Century
Vitaly KOZYREV
5. Japan and North Korea: Reminders of Forgotten Realities
Haruko SATOH
Part 4: Korean Middle Powers
6. Containment versus Engagement: South Korea’s Polarized Politics and Different Approaches to the North Korean Conundrum
Hahnkyu PARK
7. North Korea’s Relentless Nuclear Path: Advances in Nuclear Capability and Doctrine
Sung Chull KIM
Part 5: ASEAN Middle Powers
8. Singapore-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Relations: Diplomacy and Humanitarian Assistance
Gordon KANG
9. The Vietnam-DPRK Experience: Sharing and Engagement for Peace and Prosperity
NGUYEN Thi Tham and HA Anh Tuan
Part 6: Discreet Roles of the European Union, and Sweden
10. Sweden’s Enduring Relations with North Korea: Establishing Trust for Peace
Kent HÄRSTEDT
11. The European Union’s Humanitarian Assistance Program in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Saroj DASH
Editor(s)
Biography
Lam Peng Er is Head of the Korea Centre and Principal Research Fellow of the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore, Singapore.
8. South Korea and EU worry about Russia's technology transfer in return for North Korea troops
I think we should all be concerned with technology transfer from Russia to north Korea.
South Korea and EU worry about Russia's technology transfer in return for North Korea troops
By HYUNG-JIN KIM and KIM TONG-HYUNG
Updated 2:18 PM EST, November 4, 2024
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AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · November 4, 2024
1 of 8 |South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, left and European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, arrive for their meeting at the Foreign Ministry, in Seoul, South Korea, Monday, Nov. 4, 2024. ( Chung Sung-Jun/Pool Photo via AP)
KIM TONG-HYUNG
Kim has been covering the Koreas for the AP since 2014. He has published widely read stories on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the dark side of South Korea’s economic rise and international adoptions of Korean children.
twittermailto
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · November 4, 2024
9. North Korean soldiers reportedly face Ukrainian fire for first time since training in Russia
Again, we need to gather more data over time than we are reading in these initial reports.
North Korean soldiers reportedly face Ukrainian fire for first time since training in Russia
Mark MacKinnonSenior International Correspondent
Kyiv
Published Yesterday
Updated 6 hours ago
The Globe and Mail · by Mark MacKinnon · November 4, 2024
A family in Kyiv watches TV news reports that North Korea is sending soldiers to fight in Ukraine on the side of Russia, on Nov. 4.Olga Ivashchenko/The Globe and Mail
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For more than two years, a Ukrainian military program has been letting Russian soldiers know they can surrender if they don’t want to fight in a war that has already taken tens of thousands of lives.
But the message broadcast by the bluntly named “I Want To Live” project has sounded very different in recent days, broadcasting a Korean-language video on Ukrainian television and social media that’s aimed at the more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers now training in Russia and positioned close to at least one part of the front line.
On Monday, Ukraine said North Korean troops had come under Ukrainian fire for the first time, though few details were given about the clash. It reportedly took place in the Kursk region of Russia, which has been under partial Ukrainian occupation since a surprise cross-border offensive this summer.
North Korean troops sent to Russia may be pleased to be there, even as they face intense battle
If the North Koreans have indeed joined the fighting, it marks the further internationalization of a conflict that has already seen Russia turn to its allies North Korea and Iran for fresh supplies of ammunition, ballistic missiles and explosive drones. Meanwhile, Ukraine is reliant on massive amounts of military aid from the United States and NATO.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed frustration in recent days that Russia’s allies are escalating their involvement in the war while Ukraine’s backers have been slower in recent months to deliver promised supplies and continue to place restrictions on how Ukraine uses the weapons it has received.
Among those restrictions is a ban on using Western-supplied long-range missile systems to strike at targets deep inside Russia. Mr. Zelensky said that has prevented Ukraine from hitting the camps where the North Koreans are training. “America is watching, Britain is watching, Germany is watching. Everyone is just waiting for the North Korean military to start attacking Ukrainians as well.”
While Ukraine still holds part of the Kursk region, Russian troops have continued to press ahead on the war’s main battlefield in the southeastern Donbas region of Ukraine, gaining more than 400 square kilometres in October alone. Even without the North Koreans, the Russians hold a manpower and equipment advantage of seven or eight to one along some parts of the front.
“This is a war of two countries against one,” Mr. Zelensky said in a series of social-media posts late last week. He said Russia and North Korea were watching to see how the West and South Korea react to the first deployment – and that more North Korean troops would follow “if the response is weak.”
A residential building in the centre of Kyiv, which was attacked by Russia using a Hwasong-11 (KN-23/24) ballistic missile manufactured in North Korea, on Jan. 4.Olga Ivashchenko/The Globe and Mail
Video message aimed at soldiers
Despite Mr. Zelensky’s frustration, the “I Want To Live” video conveyed confidence that the North Koreans would face certain death if they fought in Ukraine.
“Soldiers of the Korean People’s Army who were sent to help the Putin regime: You should not die senselessly on someone else’s land! There is no need to repeat the fate of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers who will never return home. Surrender into captivity! Ukraine will shelter, feed and warm you!” a voice says over scenes of a prisoner-of-war facility that looks more like a summer camp. There are images of a leafy yard with picnic tables, plates of meat and pasta, as well as clean beds – two to a room – with kittens sleeping on them.
North Korea will back Russia until victory in Ukraine, foreign minister says
When The Globe and Mail visited a Ukrainian military prison in September, it looked little like the facility shown in the Korean-language video. Some Russian prisoners of war were living 10 to a small cell.
Among the many unknowns is whether the North Korean troops will arrive at the front line looking to avoid battle – and perhaps escape their repressive homeland – or whether they will feel honoured to have been selected for the mission and highly motivated to serve North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s hermetic regime.
“No one knows about the effectiveness of these soldiers. We only have stereotypes. We will understand, unfortunately, only from the fight,” said Nataliya Butyrska, an East Asia expert at the New Europe Centre, a Kyiv-based think tank. Ms. Butyrska said the North Korean soldiers likely had little idea about where they were going or what the war in Ukraine was about.
“The North Koreans live in real isolation from the rest of the world. I think Kim Jong-un and his generals told them, ‘You have to go to Russia,’ and they go.”
The Korea Herald, a newspaper headquartered in Seoul, reported Sunday that South Korean intelligence has assessed that Russia is paying US$2,000 a month for each soldier to Mr. Kim’s regime, with only a fraction of that likely to reach the soldiers and their families. Moscow is also believed to be sending Pyongyang 700,000 tons of rice and providing assistance to its military satellite program as part of the deal.
Ukraine calls for sanctions over alleged North Korean involvement in war with Russia
China’s position so far
One troubling question for Ukrainian officials is whether China – the Kim regime’s main economic and political backer – supports North Korea’s growing involvement in the war. China has claimed it had no foreknowledge of the deployment, and Washington has been pressing Beijing to use its influence to prevent Pyongyang from sending more troops.
Few in Kyiv believe China was caught off guard. Oleksandr Merezhko, the chair of Ukraine’s parliamentary committee on foreign policy and international relations, said he met with Chinese representatives at last month’s ASEAN summit in Laos and asked them to use their influence to curb the shipments of ammunition from North Korea to Russia. He was rebuffed.
“I’m sure that if China really wanted to prevent North Korean ammunition and troops and soldiers from North Korea going to Russia, they could do it,” Mr. Merezhko said.
Dmytro Kuleba, a former Ukrainian foreign affairs minister, told The Globe that the arrival of the North Korean troops revealed that Moscow’s allies were willing to go further than Ukraine’s to make sure their side won.
“The truth is that Russia has friends who are ready to send not only weapons but also their soldiers,” Mr. Kuleba said. “This should be a wake-up call to everyone in the world.”
The Globe and Mail · by Mark MacKinnon · November 4, 2024
10. North Korea receiving cash, food, space technology from Russia in return for soldiers, South Korean lawmaker says
Kim is renting out mercenary services to Putin.
North Korea receiving cash, food, space technology from Russia in return for soldiers, South Korean lawmaker says
kyivindependent.com · by Boldizsar Gyori · November 4, 2024
North Korea is believed to receive cash, food, and space technology from Russia as compensation for entering the war on its side, The Korea Herald newspaper reported on Nov. 3, citing a lawmaker familiar with the matter.
North Korea has reportedly dispatched 10,000-12,000 troops to Russia, with the first soldiers allegedly already coming under fire in Kursk Oblast.
North Korean soldiers are believed to receive $2,000 per month for their service from Russia, adding up to a total of at least $200 million annually if calculated by 10,000 soldiers, Wi Sung-lac, a member of the South Korean parliamentary intelligence committee, told The Korea Herald.
Moscow is also believed to have helped ease North Korea’s food shortage, the lawmaker said, citing intelligence briefings.
"The 4 million tons of grains that North Korea says it produces per year are actually about 1 million tons short of what it needs to feed the country. If Russia is offering 600,000 to 700,000 tons of rice, that is enough to cover more than half of what North Korea would need to meet the year's demand," the lawmaker was quoted as saying by the Herald.
According to The Korea Herald, South Korean intelligence believes that Russia is also helping North Korea with advanced space technology, enabling Pyongyang to launch another military reconnaissance satellite.
Moscow plans to form at least five 2,000-3,000-strong units manned by North Korean troops, the Ukrainian ambassador to the U.N., Sergiy Kyslytsya, said on Oct. 30. They would be equipped with Russian uniforms and arms and integrated into formations with ethnic minorities from Russia's Far East regions to conceal their presence.
Some 8,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia's Kursk Oblast to participate in the war against Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a press conference on Oct. 31.
China was well aware of North Korean troop deployment ahead of time, expert says
Beijing was fast at claiming that it had no knowledge of Russia’s deepening partnership with North Korea. The U.S. had jumped on the opportunity, hoping to pressure China to dissuade North Korea from taking an active part in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Observers, however, are skeptical about Chi…
The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek
kyivindependent.com · by Boldizsar Gyori · November 4, 2024
11. North Korea issues ominous "nuclear war" warning
Blackmail diplomacy and political warfare.
North Korea issues ominous "nuclear war" warning
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · November 4, 2024
A new North Korean research organization has issued a scathing report targeting South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, writing that his leadership has put the U.S. ally at greater risk of nuclear war.
The North's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Sunday that the "white paper disclosing the criminal colors and miserable plight of Yoon" had been published the previous day by a never-before-mentioned research organization known as the Institute of Enemy State Studies.
"'Yoon's disastrous policy' has exposed the Republic of Korea to the danger of a nuclear war," the KCNA cited the authors as saying.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur region on September 13, 2023. A North Korean institute has released a paper detailing the Kim regime's grievances against South Korean President... North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur region on September 13, 2023. A North Korean institute has released a paper detailing the Kim regime's grievances against South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. Artem Geodakyan/AFP via Getty Images
They referenced hard-line statements by Yoon, who belongs to the conservative People Power Party and is known as a hawk on North Korea, as evidence of escalating hostility on the Korean Peninsula.
Examples included Yoon's 2022 remark that the South must make "overwhelmingly superior war preparations" to achieve peace and warning that a nuclear attack would lead to the "end of the [Kim Jong Un] regime."
The North Korean institute also criticized Yoon for approving the suspension in June of a 2018 military agreement that had been reached during a short period of warming ties between the two Koreas. The pact had both sides agreeing to reduce border tensions, establish a no-fly zone along the Demilitarized Zone and cease live-fire artillery drills.
After North Korea successfully launched its first spy satellite into orbit in November 2023, the South partially suspended the agreement by resuming surveillance flights. In response, Pyongyang declared it was "no longer bound by" the document and discarded its confidence-building measures.
The North Korean institute further condemned South Korea's alliance with the United States and its growing military cooperation with Japan.
The paper highlighted commitments made by President Joe Biden and Yoon in April 2023 to step up dialogue and information sharing on nuclear threats. It also referenced the establishment of the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group, formed during that summit to coordinate on the North Korean threat and align U.S. nuclear planning with South Korean conventional forces.
The KCNA cited the researchers' comparing South Korea to a "bridgehead" for foreign forces carrying out a 21st-century crusade.
Newsweek reached out by email to the South Korean Embassy in the U.S. with a request for comment.
South Korean Unification Ministry spokesperson Koo Byoungsam told reporters on Monday that the Institute of Enemy State Studies is presumed to be a rebranded version of the National Reunification Institute.
That entity operated under the ruling Workers' Party's United Front Department and was responsible for analyzing South Korea's policies and promoting North Korea's vision of unification on terms favorable to the Kim regime.
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · November 4, 2024
12. N. Korea fires multiple short-range ballistic missiles just ahead of U.S. election
And Kim thinks this will affect the election how? Is Kim trying to cast his vote here? Note the American people are yawning (if they noticed this at all).
(3rd LD) N. Korea fires multiple short-range ballistic missiles just ahead of U.S. election | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 5, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Nov. 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea on Tuesday, South Korea's military said, in the latest saber-rattling just hours ahead of the U.S. presidential election.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launches at about 7:30 a.m. from the Sariwon area in the western province of North Hwanghae, and they flew about 400 kilometers before splashing into the sea.
A JCS official told reporters that the latest launches apparently involved the North's KN-25 super-large 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers. The weapon system is believed to be capable of striking anywhere in South Korea when fired from Sariwon.
The official declined to specify the number of missiles fired, noting a detailed analysis is under way.
The barrage of missiles came just hours before Americans headed to the polls for the presidential race between Democratic candidate Kamala Harris and her Republican rival, Donald Trump.
South Korean officials have warned the North could stage weapons tests around the U.S. presidential vote to assert its presence and attract outside attention by boasting of its nuclear capabilities.
This file photo, captured from video footage aired on North Korea's official Korean Central Television on April 23, 2024, shows the North staging a firing drill involving 600 mm multiple rocket launchers the previous day, guided by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The launches came five days after the North launched the new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) -- theoretically capable of reaching the U.S. mainland -- into the East Sea on Thursday.
Calling the Hwasong-19 the "ultimate version" of its ICBM series, North Korea claimed it renewed the records of its strategic missile capability and that it secured an "irreversible hegemonic position" in developing delivery means of nuclear weapons.
Experts said with the ICBM launch, North Korea appeared to aim to flaunt its nuclear capabilities ahead of the U.S. election and divert attention away from the North's troop dispatch to Russia.
In response to last week's launch, South Korea, the United States and Japan staged combined air drills, involving a U.S. B-1B bomber, over waters east of the southern island of Jeju on Sunday, according to the JCS.
Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North's leader, blasted the air exercise just before the latest launch, describing it as demonstrating the "most hostile and dangerous aggressive nature" of the enemy.
North Korea has bristled against the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to and near the Korean Peninsula, accusing Washington of heightening tensions.
Considering the timing of the latest launches, the JCS official said they were assessed to be a show of force against the combined air drills.
The official said they also appeared to be threats against the South, considering the location of the launch and the North's claim of the 600 mm multiple rocket launcher being nuclear capable.
"It is not a location where it usually fires missiles," the official said, noting they appeared to demonstrate North's capabilities to launch a surprise missile attack against the South.
Citing the recent security situation, the official said the North could stage more provocative acts, such as launching a hypersonic missile, a spy satellite, or submarine-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as conducting a nuclear test.
South Korean officials have said the North remains ready to carry out what would be its seventh nuclear test at any time.
If North Korea does press ahead with a nuclear test, the JCS official said it will likely test its Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead that it unveiled in March last year as it seeks to miniaturize warheads to mount on various missiles.
"A nuclear test remains prepared at all times," the official said. "Activities for nuclear material production have been ongoing for the entire year, and there appear to be more (nuclear materials) than expected at the start of the year."
The JCS vowed to never "sit idle" to North Korea's provocative acts, warning that the North would bear full responsibility for any consequences.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 5, 2024
13. Seoul-Washington nuclear MOU to help boost ties, avoid future conflict: industry official
Seoul-Washington nuclear MOU to help boost ties, avoid future conflict: industry official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · November 5, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's envisioned memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Washington on nuclear export cooperation is expected to help the two countries boost ties and avoid potential disputes in the future, a senior industry official said Tuesday.
The remark came after Seoul and Washington said they have initialed the MOU that reaffirms their mutual commitment to promoting the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy while upholding the "highest standards of nonproliferation, safety, safeguards and security."
The agreement also came amid an ongoing dispute between South Korea's Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and Westinghouse Electric Co., a U.S. nuclear energy firm, over a nuclear reactor export issue.
"Technically, the agreement is not directly related (to the dispute)," a senior ministry official told reporters.
"I believe there has been progress in preventing the occurrence of similar situations, as we have established procedures for cooperation without engaging in disputes in terms of export control," the official added.
The official also noted that the agreement is expected to be signed in the near future, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.
"Following the war between Russia and Ukraine, the nuclear energy market has been showing signs of recovery. There has been a sense of urgency that (the two countries) could miss the opportunity due to the corporate conflict," the official said.
"I believe that businesses can also pursue partnerships under a shared understanding over coordinated efforts between South Korea and the U.S.," he added.
President Yoon Suk Yeol gives a congratulatory speech during a ceremony marking the completion of the Shin Hanul No. 1 and 2 reactors, and the resumption of construction of the same nuclear power plant's reactors No. 3 and 4 in Uljin, 330 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on Oct. 30, 2024. (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · November 5, 2024
14. S. Korea vows continued close cooperation with new U.S. administration
The alliance weathers changes in leadership in both countries.
(US election) S. Korea vows continued close cooperation with new U.S. administration | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 5, 2024
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will continue to maintain close cooperation with the new U.S. administration following this week's election, the foreign ministry said Tuesday, noting the strong "bipartisan" support for the bilateral alliance in Washington.
The ministry made the comment as U.S. voters began casting their ballots Tuesday (local time) to pick a successor to President Joe Biden.
"We have closely monitored the election developments, working hand in hand with relevant departments, embassies and experts from academic and business circles, as we've been thoroughly preparing for the days beyond the election," ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing.
Lee said the government has used high-level visits to and from the U.S. to "extensively engage with key figures from both parties."
"Through these efforts, we have confirmed that the support in the United States for our bilateral alliance and the trilateral cooperation with Japan is bipartisan and strong," he said.
"Our ministry will make every diplomatic effort to maintain this close cooperation with the new U.S. administration," Lee added.
This composite photo shows U.S. Vice President and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris (L) and former U.S. President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 5, 2024
15. ROK, U.S. top officials meeting marks shift from 'unification dismissiveness'
My second essay from this weekend.
Voices Nov. 4, 2024 / 3:23 PM
ROK, U.S. top officials meeting marks shift from 'unification dismissiveness'
By David Maxwell
upi.com
Messages of peace written by vistors hang from a tree in the exhibition center of Aegibong Peace Ecopark in Gimpo, South Korea, in February. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo
Nov. 4 (UPI) -- The recent 56th South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the 2024 U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") have underscored the resilient alliance between the United States and South Korea. These meetings, which convene high-level foreign and defense officials from both nations, reflect an evolving commitment not only to regional stability but also to the long-standing vision of a free, unified Korea.
In an era when North Korea's provocations are met with skepticism, both in the United States and globally, these bilateral efforts emphasize that the dream of a unified Korean Peninsula should not be written off as a relic of the past. Instead, it is a realistic, achievable goal -- albeit one that requires a renewed approach to policy, diplomacy, and public sentiment on both sides of the Pacific.
The robust agenda of the 56th SCM covered defense strategies, alliance coordination, and joint responses to North Korean threats. The reaffirmed support for denuclearization and the advancement of Korea-U.S. military cooperation signals a clear, unified stance against the risks posed by Pyongyang's growing missile and nuclear capabilities. In the the light of recent missile tests and cyber-attacks attributed to North Korea, South Korean and U.S. officials are doubling down on their deterrence posture, reassuring allies and adversaries alike that they stand ready to defend peace and stability on the Peninsula.
Yet, while these security-focused dialogues remain paramount, the path to a unified Korea -- a notion historically dismissed as utopian or strategically impractical -- was also reaffirmed in subtle, meaningful ways. At the heart of these discussions was a shared commitment to human rights and freedom, a commitment that implicitly advances the aspiration for a reunified Korea.
From Washington's perspective, however, overcoming the dismissiveness surrounding Korean unification requires a shift in public opinion as much as it does in policy circles. Most importantly, now is the time to embrace South Korea's new 8.15 Unification Doctrine and find ways to support it.
The evolution of the U.S.-South Korea alliance: Security and beyond
At the core of the U.S.-South Korea relationship has been a strong military alliance, evolving from a defense arrangement during the Cold War to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Security Consultative Meeting has become a cornerstone of this alliance, providing a forum where both nations can update, refine, and coordinate their defense strategies in response to North Korea's nuclear program. The recent 2+2 ministerial meeting allowed diplomats to explore non-military avenues of cooperation that reinforce mutual interests in human rights, economic resilience, and regional stability.
The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their South Korean counterparts clearly outlined the consequences of North Korea's nuclear threats. The joint communique emphasized a shared stance on "extended deterrence," a term referring to the United States' commitment to using its full range of military capabilities to defend South Korea. The expansion of joint military exercises, cybersecurity collaboration, and intelligence-sharing demonstrate that the alliance is prepared to meet contemporary challenges. This unity, however, extends beyond the battlefield, as both nations seek not only to manage threats but to ultimately create conditions that could lead to a unified Korea.
While the leaders of both countries rightly seek peaceful unification, strategists recognize that the planning for such unification must be given priority. Although peaceful unification planning is extremely complex, the work to prepare for it can be applied in all other contingencies that might lead to unification, including war and regime collapse. Importantly, peaceful unification planning gives South Korea the moral high ground and provides the foundation for a coordinated information strategy to defeat Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
Public dismissiveness and policy inertia in the United States
Unification, as a goal, suffers from an identity crisis in Washington. While successive U.S. administrations have paid lip service to it, the prospect often fades in the face of complex geopolitical realities. North Korea is viewed as an intractable adversary, and the prospect of unification appears daunting. However, the assumption that North Korea will always remain a hermit kingdom with a nuclear arsenal shackles American policymakers to a status quo approach that neither challenges Pyongyang nor inspires real solutions for the North Korean people.
Among the American public, dismissiveness toward unification can be attributed to a lack of understanding about the conditions faced by those in North Korea. Often portrayed in stark terms, North Korea is less frequently seen through a human lens that recognizes the aspiration of its people to one day live in freedom. South Korean and American leaders face the task of shifting the narrative to envision unification as an achievable outcome of diplomacy, resilience, and active policy engagement.
Overcoming skepticism through leadership
Recent developments, such as the 2024 U.S.-ROK Ministerial Meeting, building on the statements from the 2023 Camp David Trilateral Summit, mark a promising shift in discourse. By framing the alliance as a moral as well as a military partnership, both governments signal that Korean unification is a goal tied to universal values of freedom and justice. The challenge now is to convert these symbolic gestures into action, transforming unification from a passive ideal to an active policy objective.
To make unification viable, the United States must demonstrate not only resolve but creativity. Rather than viewing North Korea solely as a security threat, U.S. policymakers should work with South Korea to craft a long-term strategy that integrates diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic tools. Public awareness campaigns, policy dialogues, and intergovernmental initiatives can galvanize American support for unification in parallel with South Korean efforts to galvanize support among the Korean people in both the North and South, helping dispel the notion that Korea's division is permanent.
A vision for the future
The 56th SCM and 2+2 meetings highlight that unification is not merely a Korean aspiration but a shared vision between allies. As the United States and South Korea reaffirm their commitments, they confront a broader truth: a unified Korea is not just a geopolitical aim; it is a quest for human dignity. Through sustained engagement, policy innovation, and a focus on the human dimension, South Korean and American leaders can overcome unification dismissiveness, shaping a future in which a free, unified Korea becomes a reality.
The only way to end the Kim regime's nuclear program and military threats, as well as its human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, is through unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, and economically vibrant. It should have a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people.
Someday, in the not too distant future, there can be a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.
The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.
upi.com
16. A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
My latest essay.
A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · November 4, 2024
Influencing Minds and Will: A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine – In the shadow of Putin’s war in Ukraine, a new paradigm for psychological operations (PSYOP) is emerging – one that could reshape the security landscape on the Korean peninsula. As North Korea’s provocations escalate and its nuclear ambitions grow unchecked, it’s time for the ROK-U.S. alliance’s military forces to adopt a proactive PSYOP strategy specifically targeting the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). This is military to military competition for ideas.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine can serve as a real-world laboratory, demonstrating the power of well-executed psychological warfare. Ukrainian forces have successfully eroded Russian morale, encouraged defections, and sowed doubt among enemy ranks. These tactics offer valuable lessons for dealing with the NKPA.
Ukrainian PSYOP Targeting the North Korean People’s Army in Russia and Ukraine
Ukraine has already initiated a PSYOP program against North Korean soldiers. The “I Want to Live” program offers food, shelter, and warmth to North Korean soldiers who surrender. Many escapees from the north Korea are volunteering to support Ukraine with communications and content to support developing themes and message to target North Korean soldiers.
Former North Korean soldiers have provided recommendations to Ukraine for tailored PSYOP programs targeting the NPKA. Hyun Seung Lee who served in the NKPA Special Forces has written an open letter to the President of Ukraine and outlined a detailed concept to allow Ukraine to “break their psychological chains, that will not only neutralize a new threat but also save the lives of young men and women Form Ukraine and North Korea. He correctly assesses that what is need is not just a military strategy, but a moral victory. Listen to Hyun Seung’s pleas to North Korean soldiers here.
ROK/US Alliance PSYOP Targeting the North Korean People’s Army on the Korean Peninsula
Two fundamental primary objectives should drive this PSYOP campaign during the Armistice:
- Deter KPA soldiers from following orders to attack South Korea
- Encourage KPA forces to refuse orders suppressing domestic political resistance
To achieve these goals, the mindset of North Korean soldiers must be understood. As Hyun Seung Lee explains, many are disillusioned with the regime but trapped by fear and indoctrination. South Korea and the U.S. must offer them hope, safety, and a path to a better future.
This is a specific proposal focused solely on targeting the NKPA by South Korea and U.S. PSYOP forces by exploiting the opportunities being presented in Ukraine. Comprehensive and complementary public diplomacy and information and influence campaign targeting the regime and the Korean people are necessary but beyond the scope of this proposal.
Key themes for the PSYOP campaign should include:
Truth and Transparency: Expose the lies of the Kim regime. Show NKPA soldiers the reality of life in South Korea and the wider world. Highlight the corruption and hypocrisy of their leaders.
Shared Korean Identity: Emphasize that South Koreans view them as brothers and sisters, not enemies. Promote the vision of a unified, prosperous Korea.
Amnesty and Opportunity: Guarantee safety and fair treatment for defectors. Showcase success stories of North Korean escapees thriving in the South.
Futility of Aggression: Demonstrate the overwhelming military superiority of the ROK/U.S. alliance. Make it clear that any attack on South Korea is doomed to fail.
Moral Imperative: Appeal to soldiers’ sense of duty to protect the Korean people, not the regime. Frame refusing unjust orders as an act of patriotism.
Question the legitimacy of offensive actions against South Korea: Emphasize the potential futility and high casualties of an offensive, stressing that South Korea and its allies are prepared to defend themselves decisively.
Highlight the regime’s failure to provide basic needs: Underscore how Kim Jong Un’s regime prioritizes nuclear weapons over the welfare of soldiers and their families.
Present narratives of safety and honor in defection: Provide clear instructions and safe routes for soldiers who wish to defect or escape, assuring humane treatment by the South Korean military and international organizations.
All the above must be developed with the advice and assistance of escapees from North Korea, especially including former soldiers. Putin’s War in Ukraine offers the opportunity to test and refine these messages and based on what is assessed as most effective can then be applied to the NKPA on the Korean peninsula.
To effectively deliver these messages, the alliance must employ a multi-faceted approach. Many of these techniques are already being effectively employed by non-government organizations consisting of escapees from North Korea and supported by such organizations as the Defense Forum Foundation. Punching well above their weight, these organizations have really made a niche contribution. It is time for a whole of government and alliance investment in PSYOP using the following concepts:
Digital Infiltration: Despite North Korea’s tight information controls, USB drives, SD cards, and other digital media continue to penetrate the country. The alliance should flood these channels with carefully crafted content.
Radio and television Broadcasts: Expand and enhance existing radio and television programs from Radio Free Asia and Voice of America targeting North Korea. Include testimonials from escapees and messages tailored to military personnel.
Leaflet Campaigns: While controversial, targeted leaflet drops remain an effective way to reach KPA soldiers directly.
Loudspeaker Broadcasts: Reactivate and modernize DMZ loudspeaker systems to deliver timely messages to frontline troops.
Covert Networks: Leverage existing smuggling networks and potential sympathizers within the NKPA to spread information internally.
Leveraging Escapee Networks: Utilize testimonies and messaging from North Korean escapees, who can share authentic stories that resonate deeply with NKPA soldiers, emphasizing the possibility of a better life after defection.
Strategic Considerations for the ROK/U.S. Alliance
For the PSYOP campaign to be successful, the ROK/U.S. alliance must take a long-term view, recognizing that changing deeply entrenched beliefs and behaviors will take time. The following strategic considerations should guide the campaign:
Deep Intelligence Integration: Gather actionable intelligence on NKPA troop locations, morale levels, and the effectiveness of initial messaging efforts to refine tactics continuously.
Collaboration with International Allies: Engage allies who have successfully conducted PSYOP in similar environments, such as Ukraine, to share insights and coordinate efforts.
Legal and Ethical Standards: Ensure that PSYOP activities adhere to international laws and ethical standards, maintaining legitimacy and reducing potential backlash.
Conclusion: A Call to Action
The lessons from Ukraine’s PSYOP campaign against Russian forces highlight the potential effectiveness of strategic influence in modern warfare. Ukraine PSYOP against NKPA forces will provide relevant and valuable lessons that the ROK/U.S. alliance can exploit. For South Korea and the U.S., the stakes are clear: a successful PSYOP campaign targeting the NKPA can prevent conflict escalation, encourage defection, and lay the groundwork for a peaceful Korean unification. It is time for South Korean and U.S. leaders to commit to a comprehensive PSYOP plan aimed at influencing the NKPA—one that begins now and continues until reunification is achieved resulting a new country known as the Untied Republic of Korea (UROK).
About the Author: David Maxwell
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.
nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · November 4, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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