​Quotes of the Day:

"Far and away the best prize that life offers is the chance to work hard at work worth doing."  

– Theodore Roosevelt

"The vocation of every man and woman is to serve other people."

– Leo Tolstoy

"You can make mistakes, but you aren't a failure until you start blaming others for those mistakes." 

– John Wooden

1. Pentagon policy shop stonewalling Congress, Republican senators say

2.  Pentagon’s policy shop is a ‘Pigpen-like mess': Sen. Cotton

3. Trump Weighs Options, and Risks, for Attacks on Venezuela

4. China is already dominating the data war in the Pacific, experts say

5. How China’s Chokehold on Drugs, Chips and More Threatens the U.S.

6. China’s Security State Sells an A.I. Dream

7. Army takes another step on path toward producing new drone-killing laser weapons

8. US Army Tests AI-Enabled Counter-Drone System on Abrams, Bradley

9. China's military build-up demands response, Australia defence minister says

10. Opinion | The War Powers Irresolution

11. Hamas Returns Last Dead American-Israeli Hostage to Israel

12. The Inside Story of How Gen Z Toppled Nepal’s Leader and Chose a New One on Discord

13. China’s Rising Influence in the Western Balkans and How the West Should Respond

14. Putin orders increased drone 'incursions' in Europe as Russia ramps up 'hybrid war'

15. Russia’s New War Grifters—The ‘Black Widows’ Duping Soldiers Into Marriage

16. The trouble with US veterans benefits isn’t ‘rampant’ fraud – it’s bureaucratic roadblocks, advocates say

17. Japan Can Keep the Indo-Pacific Open and Free: With America Stepping Back, Tokyo Should Step Up

18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former diplomat: 'What's next for multilateralism?'

19. The Case for Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy: Peace Through Strength Is Delivering Stability and Security

20. The Slow Death of Russian Oil: Why Ukraine’s Campaign Against Moscow’s Energy Sector Is Working

​21. Racing Against Time: Realizing a True Defense Industrial Enterprise

22. Drones Won’t Save Us: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine Will Cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare

23. Nominee for Pentagon strategist outlines approach for stymieing potential Chinese attacks on Taiwan

1. Pentagon policy shop stonewalling Congress, Republican senators say

​Summary:

Republican senators sharply criticized Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby for obstructing congressional oversight during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Chairman Roger Wicker and Sen. Dan Sullivan accused Colby’s policy office of withholding information and undermining President Trump’s goals, citing opaque decisions like troop withdrawals from Romania and a pause in Ukraine aid. Nominee Austin Dahmer faced bipartisan frustration for vague answers and unconsulted restructuring of the policy office. Senators claimed the Pentagon failed to brief Congress on major strategic shifts, prompting accusations of dysfunction within Colby’s shop despite generally good relations with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg.

​Excerpta:

Members and staff of this committee have struggled to receive information from the policy office and have not been able to consult in a meaningful way with the shop, either on the National Defense Strategy or” a review of the US military’s global force posture, Wicker said in opening remarks during the hearing.

...

More recently, the expected focus of the NDS on homeland defense instead of conflict in the Pacific has led to grumblings among the China hawk community he previously championed.

​Comment: Mentioned briefly in this critical article is the National Defense Strategy and the Force Posture review. Questions: when will they be released? What is the hold up? Are there divisive issues (see above) that are preventing approval and release?

Pentagon policy shop stonewalling Congress, Republican senators say - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · Michael Marrow · November 4, 2025

WASHINGTON — In a rare moment of public intraparty frustration, Republican senators today blasted a top Defense Department official for not cooperating with congressional oversight.

Throughout a confirmation hearing held by the Senate Armed Services Committee for three different Pentagon nominees, senators from both parties aired their frustrations with what they described as Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby’s opaque decision-making, asserting that lawmakers were not kept abreast of key moves like the recent announcement of withdrawing US troops from Romania. But it was comments from Republicans, especially Armed Services Chairman Roger Wicker, that stood out.

“Throughout this year, the committee has had a relatively positive relationship with the Pentagon, especially Secretary [Pete] Hegseth and Deputy Secretary [Steve] Feinberg. I’ve been disappointed to find one exception to that cordiality: Members and staff of this committee have struggled to receive information from the policy office and have not been able to consult in a meaningful way with the shop, either on the National Defense Strategy or” a review of the US military’s global force posture, Wicker said in opening remarks during the hearing.

“This does not match our experience with the first Trump administration,” said Wicker, a Mississippi Republican who has largely avoided criticizing the Trump Pentagon until now. He then added, “the situation needs to improve if we are to craft the best defense policy.”

Colby serves as the undersecretary of defense for policy, sometimes described as the third-most important job in the Pentagon. A long-time think tanker, Colby emerged in the first Trump administration as a leading China hawk voice, a role he rode into his current position, which places him in charge of crafting the National Defense Strategy among other responsibilities.

However, Colby has also emerged as a lightning rod for criticism, reportedly driving decisions to pause aid to Ukraine and launching a review of the AUKUS trilateral security pact — moves that reportedly caught members of the administration by surprise. More recently, the expected focus of the NDS on homeland defense instead of conflict in the Pacific has led to grumblings among the China hawk community he previously championed.

Senators largely directed their displeasure at Austin Dahmer, the Trump administration’s nominee to serve as the Defense Department’s assistant secretary for strategy, plans and forces — a position whose title, lawmakers revealed, was changed without their awareness. Lawmakers’ discontent also comes amid a broader crackdown by the Pentagon on communications with Congress that was previously reported by Breaking Defense.

“The guy you’re going to go work for has been really bad on this, the worst in the administration,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, a Republican from Alaska, said to Dahmer when discussing how Colby was difficult to reach. Dahmer’s current role, performing the duties of the deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and the new post he has been nominated for both fall under Colby.

“But man, I can’t even get a response, and we’re on your team!” an exasperated Sullivan added, who along with Wicker stated that it appeared the Pentagon’s policy shop was actually undermining President Donald Trump’s goals.

Throughout the hearing, Dahmer fielded questions on a range of topics, including a pause on Ukraine aid and lethal strikes on small boats the Trump administration asserts are trafficking drugs. According to Dahmer, he was “not aware” of any halt in aid to Kyiv — despite a high-profile Oval Office blowup that temporarily stopped the flow of weapons and a separate, publicly confirmed stockpile review — and Romanian officials were informed of the withdrawal of a US brigade from the country in advance. (Sen. Elissa Slotkin, a Democrat from Michigan, asserted that Bucharest was blindsided by the brigade withdrawal based on conversations with Romanian officials.)

Lawmakers were briefed three times about the Romania decision as well, Dahmer said, though senators on the committee disputed that. After publication of this report, Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson said in a statement, “The Committees were pre-notified of the decision. Briefings were offered to the Committees this week.”

“You’re clearly avoiding answers to questions that you should have been acutely aware of in your position. That does not augur very well for your role and the future of the Department of Defense,” Sen. Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island and the committee’s ranking member, said after questioning Dahmer on the decisions to pause Ukraine aid and remove troops from Romania.

Reed also asserted that the Pentagon reshuffled the portfolios of deputy assistant secretaries who would report to Dahmer, if he is confirmed to his new role, without properly consulting Congress. Inside Defense reported that the Pentagon’s policy shop is being overhauled by merging roles, dissolving positions and renaming posts — changes that Wicker said were spelled out in a letter dated Oct. 8 but only delivered Sunday night.

“I understand that media reports can be wrong, believe me, but it just seems like there’s this Pigpen-like mess coming out of the policy shop that you don’t see from” other offices, said Sen. Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas. Cotton then asked Dahmer why he thinks that is.

“Senator, I would like to understand that myself,” Dahmer replied, blaming “fake news” and “inaccurate reporting.”

UPDATED 11/4/25 at 5:47 PM ET with comment from the Pentagon on the withdrawal of US troops from Romania, as well as clarification from Sen. Tom Cotton’s office about the Peanuts character Pigpen.

breakingdefense.com · Michael Marrow · November 4, 2025

2. Pentagon’s policy shop is a ‘Pigpen-like mess': Sen. Cotton

​Summary:

Senators from both parties blasted the Pentagon’s policy office during a contentious confirmation hearing for Austin Dahmer, nominee for assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and forces. Lawmakers accused the office led by Elbridge Colby of disorganization, secrecy, and poor coordination with Congress and even the White House. Sen. Tom Cotton called it a “Pigpen-like mess,” citing confusion over troop withdrawals, AUKUS reviews, and aid to Ukraine. Chairman Roger Wicker and Sen. Jack Reed criticized Dahmer’s evasive testimony and last-minute job reorganization. Senators expressed frustration with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s restrictions on communication, suggesting widespread dysfunction in the Pentagon’s policy apparatus.

Excerpts:

Asked why the policy undersecretary’s office, led by Elbridge Colby, has been at the center of so many controversies, Dahmer blamed “fake news” and “inaccurate reporting” while claiming ignorance of details.

“This decision did not appear to reflect the policy mandate of President Trump,” Wicker said of the withdrawal of troops from Romania. “Just two weeks ago, the president had said that troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. It is unclear to me how the move fits with the commander-in-chief's direction.”

Asked why the decision hadn’t been coordinated with Congress, Dahmer claimed the committee had received three briefings on the move. During the hearing, Wicker confirmed with committee staff that no such briefings had occurred.

​Comment: There appears to be a serious problem between Congress and the Pentagon and specifically USD(P). 

Pentagon’s policy shop is a ‘Pigpen-like mess': Sen. Cotton

Senate Armed Services Committee members from both parties question DOD missteps, actions that contravened president’s foreign-policy positions.

defenseone.com · Meghann Myers

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

November 4, 2025 03:23 PM ET

Updated: 5:42 p.m.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/11/pentagons-policy-shop-pigpen-mess-sen-cotton/409297/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

Congress’s simmering discontent with the Pentagon’s recent decision-making and lack of transparency with its lawfully-mandated oversight body boiled over during a routine nomination hearing Tuesday, one of the few venues lawmakers have had to get answers from defense officials since the second Trump administration began in January.

Austin Dahmer was ostensibly before the committee to answer questions about how he would tackle the job of assistant secretary for strategy, plans, and forces—a job whose title and responsibilities have changed in ways that the committee was only told about on Sunday night, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the committee chairman, said during the hearing.

But because Dahmer has already been performing the duties of another high-level Pentagon official—and because Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has restricted communication between the department and Congress, requiring every interaction be cleared through legislative affairs—a bipartisan group of senators took the opportunity to grill him on a host of recent department moves, some of which they contend are in direct opposition to President Trump’s stated foreign-policy positions.

Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark, listed several: the pause in Ukrainian security assistance, the uncoordinated review of the AUKUS agreement, opposition to deploying more U.S. troops to the Middle East during the Iran-Israel war in June, the cancellation of a meeting among top Japanese and U.S. officials, and the recent cancellation of a rotational Army brigade deployment to Romania.

“I understand that media reports can be wrong, believe me, but it just seems like there's this Pigpen-like mess coming out of the policy shop that you don't see from, say, intel and security and acquisition and sustainment,” Cotton said.

Asked why the policy undersecretary’s office, led by Elbridge Colby, has been at the center of so many controversies, Dahmer blamed “fake news” and “inaccurate reporting” while claiming ignorance of details.

“This decision did not appear to reflect the policy mandate of President Trump,” Wicker said of the withdrawal of troops from Romania. “Just two weeks ago, the president had said that troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. It is unclear to me how the move fits with the commander-in-chief's direction.”

Asked why the decision hadn’t been coordinated with Congress, Dahmer claimed the committee had received three briefings on the move. During the hearing, Wicker confirmed with committee staff that no such briefings had occurred.

Story Continues Below Sponsor Message

Story Continues Below Sponsor Message

“Are we confusing ‘notifications’ with ‘briefing’? Check on that; will you do that?” he told Dahmer.

Dahmer claimed that both Romanian and NATO officials had been briefed on the decision, but couldn’t name any of the officials or when the discussions took place.

Wicker said there has been a distinct lack of coordination between the Pentagon and Congress, in contrast with the first Trump administration.

“Members and staff of this committee have struggled to receive information from the policy office and have not been able to consult in a meaningful way with the shop, either on the National Defense Strategy or the Global Posture Review,” he said.

The policy office is “the worst in the administration,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said, in that it is harder to get in contact with than Hegseth or the president himself.

“Man, I can’t even get a response,” Sullivan said. ”And we’re on your team!”

Sullivan admonished Dahmer and his office for not coordinating with the committee on the National Defense Strategy, a document that only exists because Congress mandated it in law.

“Where do you think the requirement for the NDS comes from? Yeah, it comes from us,” he said. “Don’t you think it would be smart to maybe preview it?”

And in some cases, Wicker pointed out, it appears the policy shop hasn’t coordinated with the White House, as shown by President Trump’s surprise upon learning that the administration had paused security assistance to Ukraine in July.

Dahmer claimed that there had been no such pause, despite a Pentagon spokesman confirming one on July 2.

“My impression today is you cloaked your testimony in a veil of ignorance. You don't know what's happened in many different cases, when in fact, you were basically the stand-in and the surrogate for Secretary Colby,” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., the committee’s ranking member, told Dahmer. “Again, as the No. 2 in policy, what were you doing?”

Reed also asked about the change to Dahmer’s own prospective job title. The job has long been called assistant secretary for “Strategy, Plans and Capabilities”; that’s what the department’s website still says, and it’s how the nominee was introduced at his confirmation hearing. But Dahmer responded to pre-hearing questions using the title of assistant secretary for “Strategy, Plans and Forces,” reflecting an Oct. 8 OSD memo ordering up that change and others.

Reed said the change was described to him as “cosmetic,” even though it directs a reorganization that moves three deputy assistant secretaries under Dahmer’s prospective office.

“Normally, when the department conducts such a reorganization, it will send to the committee a summary of those changes for our review and consideration before the committee proceeds with the nomination,” Reed said. “This is important because the Senate has a constitutional duty to advise and consent on all Senate conferred nominees. As such, having a basic understanding of a nominee's duties is imperative to our oversight role. Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case.”

Dahmer said he took responsibility for the late notification and lack of consultation with the committee. He said the Pentagon’s office of legislative affairs should have reached out, and it was his responsibility as the policy deputy to make sure that happened.

Lawmakers have stopped short of levying any threats against the department, though as Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., pointed out, they have made clear the unseriousness with which they regard the current chain of command in one regard: neither the House nor the Senate version of the draft National Defense Authorization acts include a statutory change of the Defense Department’s name to the War Department, despite the administration’s insistence on using what amounts to an official nickname without congressional approval.

“As far as I'm concerned, there's no effort for Congress to make the name change. The president did this by executive order, but acknowledged it would take a congressional authorization, and it was an alternate name,” Kaine said. “I view it as a form of political cosplay. Cosplay isn't my thing, but to each his own.”

It’s not clear whether the senators’ ire for the Pentagon’s policy shop will upend Dahmer’s chances at confirmation. A spokesman for Wicker did not respond to a query from Defense One about whether the senator intended to vote in the affirmative.

“Mr. Dahmer, you're clearly avoiding answers to questions that you should have been acutely aware of in your position,” Reed said. “That does not bode very well for your future role in the Department of Defense, since it's essential that this committee has accurate and specific knowledge, and I think you've essentially indicated to us that you won't cooperate with us.”

If he doesn’t get the votes, he would be the only the second of several controversial Trump defense nominees to face real opposition to confirmation, after Hegseth’s vote required a tie-breaker from Vice President JD Vance.

Note: A Cotton spokesperson later clarified that the senator meant a "Pigpen-like mess,” alluding to the Peanuts character, and not a "pigpen-like mess,” referring to a pen for pigs.

defenseone.com · Meghann Myers

3. Trump Weighs Options, and Risks, for Attacks on Venezuela

​Summary:

President Trump is weighing military options to oust Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, including airstrikes, special operations raids, or seizing oil fields. Advisers Marco Rubio and Stephen Miller advocate aggressive action, while Trump hesitates over risks to U.S. troops and potential failure. The administration seeks legal justification to target Maduro as a “narcoterrorist” without congressional approval, expanding previous authorities used for drone strikes. A major U.S. buildup — bombers, naval forces, and 10,000 troops in the Caribbean — signals pressure on Caracas. Trump’s motives mix counter-narcotics, regime change, and access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, despite warnings against launching another foreign intervention.

​Excerpts:

President Donald Trump has yet to make a decision about how or even whether to proceed. Officials said he was reluctant to approve operations that may place American troops at risk or could turn into an embarrassing failure.

...

While the guidance is still being drafted, some administration officials expect it will argue that Mr. Maduro and his top security officials are central figures in the Cartel de los Soles, which the administration has designated as a narcoterrorist group.

​Comment: Do the benefits outweigh the risks? What would be the end state that we sek to achieve? What is the legal justification for this action? Could the president order such an action without a declaration of war by Congress? Is narcotrafficking sufficient grounds for attacking a sovereign nation?

Trump Weighs Options, and Risks, for Attacks on Venezuela

President Trump has yet to make a decision, but his advisers are pressing a range of objectives — from attacking drug cartels to seizing oil fields — to try to justify ousting Nicolás Maduro.

NY Times · Devlin Barrett · November 4, 2025

By David E. SangerTyler PagerHelene CooperEric Schmitt and Devlin Barrett

Reporting from Washington

• Nov. 4, 2025
• Updated 7:41 p.m. ET
• 
  

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/us/politics/trump-weighs-attacks-venezuela.html

President Trump has yet to make a decision, but his advisers are pressing a range of objectives — from attacking drug cartels to seizing oil fields — to try to justify ousting Nicolás Maduro.

Asked in an interview whether Nicolás Maduro’s days as president of Venezuela were numbered, President Trump said, “I think so, yeah.”Credit...Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

President Trump has yet to make a decision, but his advisers are pressing a range of objectives — from attacking drug cartels to seizing oil fields — to try to justify ousting Nicolás Maduro.

Asked in an interview whether Nicolás Maduro’s days as president of Venezuela were numbered, President Trump said, “I think so, yeah.”Credit...Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

Listen to this article · 14:36 min Learn more

• Nov. 4, 2025Updated 7:41 p.m. ET

Leer en español

The Trump administration has developed a range of options for military action in Venezuela, including direct attacks on military units that protect President Nicolás Maduro and moves to seize control of the country’s oil fields, according to multiple U.S. officials.

President Trump has yet to make a decision about how or even whether to proceed. Officials said he was reluctant to approve operations that may place American troops at risk or could turn into an embarrassing failure. But many of his senior advisers are pressing for one of the most aggressive options: ousting Mr. Maduro from power.

Mr. Trump’s aides have asked the Justice Department for additional guidance that could provide a legal basis for any military action beyond the current campaign of striking boats that the administration says are trafficking narcotics, without providing evidence. Such guidance could include a legal rationale for targeting Mr. Maduro without creating the need for congressional authorization for the use of military force, much less a declaration of war.

While the guidance is still being drafted, some administration officials expect it will argue that Mr. Maduro and his top security officials are central figures in the Cartel de los Soles, which the administration has designated as a narcoterrorist group. The Justice Department is expected to contend that designation makes Mr. Maduro a legitimate target despite longstanding American legal prohibitions on assassinating national leaders.

The Justice Department declined to comment. But the move to justify targeting Mr. Maduro would constitute another effort by the administration to stretch its legal authorities. It has already engaged in targeted killings of suspected drug smugglers who, until September, were pursued and arrested at sea rather than killed in drone strikes. Any effort to remove Mr. Maduro would place the administration under further scrutiny over whatever legal rationale it does offer, given the hazy mix of reasons it has presented so far for confronting Mr. Maduro. Among them are drug trafficking, the need for American access to oil and Mr. Trump’s claims that the Venezuelan government released prisoners into the United States.

Mr. Trump has issued a series of contradictory public messages about his intentions, and the goals and justification for any future military action. He has said in recent weeks that the attacks on speedboats in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific — including another strike on Tuesday — that have killed at least 67 people would be expanded to land attacks. But that has not happened yet.

U.S. Marines training in Arroyo, Puerto Rico, last month. There are about 10,000 American military personnel in the Caribbean, roughly half on warships and half on bases in Puerto Rico.Credit...Ricardo Arduengo/Reuters

When asked by CBS News whether the United States is headed to war with Venezuela, Mr. Trump said on Sunday: “I doubt it. I don’t think so, but they’ve been treating us very badly, not only on drugs.” He repeated his unsupported allegation that Mr. Maduro opened his prisons and mental institutions, and sent Tren de Aragua gang members to the United States, a charge Mr. Trump has made since his campaign for the presidency last year.

Asked whether Mr. Maduro’s days as president of Venezuela were numbered, he added, “I think so, yeah.”

The support for the more aggressive options is coming from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also the acting national security adviser, and Stephen Miller, Mr. Trump’s deputy chief of staff and homeland security adviser. According to several U.S. officials, they have privately said they believe Mr. Maduro should be forced out.

Mr. Trump has repeatedly expressed reservations, aides say, in part because of a fear that the operation could fail. Mr. Trump is in no rush to make a decision, and has repeatedly asked about what the United States could get in return, with a specific focus on extracting some of the value of Venezuela’s oil for the United States.

“President Trump has been clear in his message to Maduro: Stop sending drugs and criminals to our country,” Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said in a statement. “The president has made clear that he will continue to strike narcoterrorists trafficking illicit narcotics — anything else is speculation and should be treated as such.”

Mr. Trump will most likely not be forced to decide at least until the Gerald R. Ford, the United States’ largest and newest aircraft carrier, arrives in the Caribbean sometime in the middle of this month. The Ford carries about 5,000 sailors and has more than 75 attack, surveillance and support aircraft, including F/A-18 fighters.

The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford will arrive in the Caribbean in the middle of this month.

There has been a steady buildup of U.S. troops in the region since late August. Even before the carrier arrives, there are about 10,000 American military personnel in the Caribbean, roughly half on warships and half on bases in Puerto Rico.

The Pentagon has in recent weeks also dispatched B-52 and B-1 bombers from bases in Louisiana and Texas to fly missions off the coast of Venezuela in what military officials call a show of force. B-52s can carry dozens of precision-guided bombs, and B-1s can carry up to 75,000 pounds of guided and unguided munitions, the largest nonnuclear payload of any aircraft in the Air Force arsenal.

And the Army’s elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, which conducted extensive counterterrorism helicopter operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, recently carried out what the Pentagon said were training exercises off the Venezuelan coast.

The military buildup has been so rapid, and so public, that it appears to be part of a psychological pressure campaign on Mr. Maduro. In fact, Mr. Trump has talked openly about his decision to issue a “finding” that permits the C.IA. to conduct covert operations inside Venezuela — the kind of operation presidents almost never discuss in advance.

Should Mr. Trump elect to order the action inside Venezuela, it would amount to a considerable military, legal and political risk. For all the risks Mr. Trump took in authorizing the American bombing of three nuclear-related sites in Iran in June, it did not involve an effort to overthrow or replace the Iranian government.

If Mr. Trump goes that route, there is no assurance that he would succeed or that he could guarantee that a new government would arise friendlier to the United States. Aides say that far more planning has gone into striking at the Maduro government than on what it would take to govern Venezuela should the operation succeed.

And some of Mr. Trump’s most loyal political backers have been warning against striking at Mr. Maduro, reminding the president he was elected to end “forever wars,” not incite new ones.

A Military Plan in Three Parts

American F-35 fighter jets at an airport in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, on Monday. There has been a steady U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean since late August.Credit...Alejandro Granadillo/Associated Press

Mr. Trump’s authorization for the C.I.A. to operate inside Venezuela’s borders could enable the agency to conduct a variety of activities, from information operations to building opposition to Mr. Maduro to actively sabotaging his government — and even seizing the leader himself. But national security officials say that if such operations could really pry Mr. Maduro from power, he would have been gone years ago. That is why the White House is considering military action, and the proposals on the table come in three broad varieties.

The first option would involve airstrikes against military facilities, some of which might be involved in facilitating drug trafficking, with the aim of collapsing Venezuelan military support for Mr. Maduro. If Mr. Maduro believed he was no longer protected, he might seek to flee — or, in moving around the country, make himself more vulnerable to capture, officials say. Critics of such an approach warn that it could have the opposite effect, of rallying support around the embattled leader.

A second approach envisions the United States sending Special Operations forces, such as the Army’s Delta Force or the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, to try to capture or kill Mr. Maduro. Under this option, the Trump administration would seek to sidestep prohibitions against assassinating foreign leaders by arguing that Mr. Maduro is, first and foremost, the head of a narcoterrorist gang, an extension of the arguments used to justify the U.S. airstrikes on boats the administration says are smuggling drugs.

The State Department has a $50 million reward for Mr. Maduro’s arrest or conviction — up from the $25 million offered in the last days of the Biden administration. The Trump administration may also argue that because Mr. Maduro suppressed opposition and worked to rig elections, he is not the legitimate leader of the country. The Biden administration refused to recognize him as Venezuela’s president after he declared victory last year.

A third option involves a much more complicated plan to send U.S. counterterrorism forces to seize control of airfields and at least some of Venezuela’s oil fields and infrastructure.

These last two options carry much greater risks to American commandos on the ground — not to mention civilians — especially if they were targeting Mr. Maduro in an urban setting like Caracas, the country’s capital.

Mr. Trump has been reluctant to consider attacks that could put American troops at risk. As a result, many of the plans under development employ naval drones and long-range weapons, options that may prove more viable once the Ford and other ships are in place.

For Trump, an Oil Conundrum

Seizing Venezuela’s oil fields is one option the Trump administration has developed.Credit...Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

Mr. Trump is deeply focused on Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves, the largest in the world. But how to deal with them — whether to cut off exports to the United States or keep them going in hopes of retaining a foothold should Mr. Maduro be ousted — is a problem that has vexed administration officials for the past 10 months.

Even as Mr. Trump doubled the bounty on Mr. Maduro and called him a narcoterrorist, he canceled, then renewed, a license for Chevron, an American oil company that is a pillar of Venezuela’s economy, to keep operating there.

Chevron’s existing license was killed in March under pressure from Mr. Rubio, and over the summer Venezuelan exports to the United States plummeted. But a new license — the details of which have been kept confidential — apparently prevents the company from sending hard currency into Venezuela’s banking system. Still, Chevron’s oil exports are providing Mr. Maduro’s economy with real support.

Chevron is a rare survivor; most American oil companies operating in the country had their assets seized or transferred to state-owned firms years ago. The company is one of the few that have figured out how to deal with both Mr. Trump and Mr. Maduro, who declared that “I want Chevron here for another 100 years.” It has hired as its lobbyist in Washington a top fund-raiser for Mr. Trump.

Mr. Maduro made a last-ditch effort over the past few months to offer Mr. Trump oil concessions, including a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil and other mineral wealth. He dangled the possibility of opening up existing and future oil and gold projects to American companies, which would receive preferential contracts. And he said he would redirect exports that are now headed to China, and limit mining contracts with Chinese, Iranian and Russian firms.

But Mr. Trump rejected the offer in early October, and the U.S. military buildup accelerated.

Should Mr. Maduro’s government fall and be replaced by a stable leadership open to improved relations with the United States, Chevron would be best positioned for what the Trump administration believes would be a boom in investment in the country’s huge oil reserves. It is a topic that fascinates Mr. Trump, much as it did when he urged the seizing of oil fields in Syria, whose reserves are a tiny fraction of Venezuela’s.

The company is keeping its head down.

“We believe our presence continues to be a stabilizing force for the local economy, the region and U.S. energy security,” said Bill Turenne, a Chevron spokesman.

Seeking a Legal Rationale

A Reaper drone armed with missiles in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, last month. Credit...Ricardo Arduengo/Reuters

As Mr. Trump’s aides push for the most aggressive military option, lawyers at the Justice Department are working to develop a legal analysis to justify the full range of military options that are being developed.

White House officials have said they want an updated legal analysis before taking any additional steps, and administration lawyers told Congress last week that the president did not need congressional approval for his lethal military strikes on boats.

T. Elliot Gaiser, who leads the department’s Office of Legal Counsel, told Congress that the administration did not think the boat-strike operation rose to the kind of “hostilities” covered by a 1973 law called the War Powers Resolution, which limits the president from conducting military operations for longer than 60 days without congressional approval. But lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have raised concerns about the strikes and have demanded more information from the administration.

Perhaps the closest recent parallel to a legal justification for killing a head of state would be a legal opinion produced by the Office of Legal Counsel during Mr. Trump’s first term. It concluded that the president had authority to conduct a missile strike to kill Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani.

General Suleimani was Iran’s top intelligence and security commander when he was killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2020, and Mr. Trump has long viewed that killing as one of the signature successes of his first term.

In that instance, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the drone strike could be carried out because General Suleimani was “actively developing plans for further attacks against U.S. military personnel and diplomats,” according to a heavily redacted memo released after the strike.

“Military leaders who organize and oversee attacks against U.S. persons and interests may be legitimate military targets,” the memo said, adding that the strike was intended “to avoid civilian casualties or substantial collateral damage” and was not aimed “at imposing through military means a change in the character of a political regime.”

The memo concluded that “given the targeted scope of the mission, the available intelligence and the efforts to avoid escalation,” a drone strike against him “would not rise to the level of a war for constitutional purposes.”

Julian E. Barnes and Charlie Savage contributed reporting.

David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges.

Tyler Pager is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent for The Times. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent.

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times. He has reported on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism for more than three decades.

Devlin Barrett covers the Justice Department and the F.B.I. for The Times.

A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 5, 2025, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: TRUMP CONSIDERS MILITARY OPTIONS TO HIT VENEZUELA

NY Times · Devlin Barrett · November 4, 2025

4. China is already dominating the data war in the Pacific, experts say

​Summary:

At the AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific conference, former Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller and other experts warned that China is already winning the “data war” in the Pacific. Experts noted Beijing’s control of digital infrastructure, massive data collection, and potential future advantage through quantum decryption. U.S. forces are still organized to “refight World War II.” Panelists called for new doctrine, funding, and innovation to counter China’s data dominance.

​

Excerpts:

Right now, all we’re trying to do is fight World War II in the Pacific

… 

We’re still fundamentally organized to refight the Cold War, which really was refighting World War II in the Pacific.

...

Miller’s advice to commanders: “Stop saying you don't have any money. That's complete bull,” he said. “I do believe operational commanders should have a lot more money to work through their things, but…please, I'm begging commanders to stop saying that.” And, he said, meet with companies that may have solutions to their problems.

“Right now, all we’re trying to do is fight World War II in the Pacific. That’s exactly our operational concept,” Miller said. “There are pockets of brilliance, kids that get it, but you know, we’re still fundamentally organized to refight the Cold War, which really was refighting World War II in the Pacific. So…we’re fighting an uphill battle on that.”

​Comment: Another serious charge leveled at the Pentagon. The question is what kind of new doctrine, funding, and innovation will counter China's data dominance?

China is already dominating the data war in the Pacific, experts say

'Lack of focus' is slowing needed change at the Pentagon, a former acting SecDef says.

defenseone.com · Jennifer Hlad

By Jennifer Hlad

Managing Editor, Defense One

November 4, 2025 05:05 PM ET

Indo-Pacific

Cyber

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/11/china-already-dominating-data-war-pacific-experts-say/409310/?oref=defenseone_today_nl&utm

HONOLULU—Nine months into the second Trump administration, an acting defense secretary from President Trump’s first term said he thought “we’d be a lot further along” toward a nimbler military.

“I’m seeing a lot of marketing coming out of the department, and not a lot of outcomes,” Chris Miller said during a panel at the AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific conference last week.

Miller, who served as acting defense secretary from November 2020 to January 2021, said today’s Pentagon leaders are taking “an approach where if you have experience inside the Beltway, somehow you’re suspect and not worthy. And what I’m seeing are a bunch of like, quote-unquote brilliant business people that do not understand the plumbing of the most bureaucratic, Byzantine organization, probably since [the] Byzantine [Empire], and we’re losing opportunities because there’s a lack of focus.”

Amid a shift in national security strategies from the Indo-Pacific to the southern border, the former Special Forces colonel also criticized the push to focus on one adversary or challenge at a time. “Where’s the leadership? We spend a trillion dollars a year on national security. We can do more than one thing.”

Miller offered his comments during a discussion on ubiquitous digital surveillance in the region, where Sean Berg, a former deputy commander of Special Operations Command Pacific, said China “is already in phase three of that war: dominate” while “we still think of ourselves in phase zero: shaping.”

But when quantum decryption becomes practical, Berg said, China will be able to read untold oceans of once-secure messages that it has intercepted and filed away, then use them to gain unprecedented understanding of the patterns of U.S. forces.

“Whoever gets quantum first and is able to use that metadata to go back and figure out and predict every single move that the U.S. is about to make, whether it's an air crew landing and going to the same hotel, whether it is the fleet gearing up, and all the Copenhagen being bought out from 7-Eleven from a Ranger battalion,” he said.

The challenge of open data and ubiquitous surveillance is particularly relevant in the Pacific, where Rob Christian, the former command chief warrant officer for 311th Signal Command, pointed out that China “is the largest technically advanced enemy we’ve ever seen and could imagine, and they also own the majority of the infrastructure.”

Twenty years ago, operators could use burner phones, get local SIM cards, or even turn phones off to “hide in the noise.” But “hiding in the noise now is much more difficult when you think about the layer of AI and analytics on top of things that are out there and all the stuff we’ve dumped out there through our travels,” Christian said. “I think the challenge is slowly kind of morphing into, ‘OK, you’ve got to project, but you’ve also got to protect’.”

Panel moderator Mike Stokes, vice president of strategic engagements and marketing for Ridgeline, called the issue one of “digital signature warfare.”

“It’s almost its own domain, where we need to think about the adversary’s capabilities to collect on us and our ability to counter those threats as its own doctrine and policy,” Stokes said.

Berg said that one problem is that success looks like nothing is happening. Even if the U.S. government funded an identity-management campaign “that had all of the both offensive and defensive capabilities that would be integral in the technical surveillance to both protect and then understand how we’re being surveilled, the metric that would come out of that is nothing. Nothing would happen. Adversaries would not violate people’s sovereignty. There would be no crossing the border. There would be no economic coercion that would happen. There would be no bilateral manipulation of currency happening. And when you are fighting for dollars, telling the HASC or the SASC or the Appropriations Committee, ‘Yes, for the $1.3 billion, how much nothing would you like, Madam Senator?’ It’s a terrible argument to make.”

Additionally, the “bread and butter” of special operations is working with partner nations, and in every exercise, “you go into the [Joint Operations Center], you throw up your slides, and the first thing all the partners do is this,” he said, holding his phone up high above his head and pretending to take photos of the listening audience. “They start taking pictures of the slides and then sending them over Line or WhatsApp. That’s the end-to-end encryption on a Huawei backbone… The entire digital infrastructure and economic backbone of this entire theater is owned by the PRC.”

So what can commanders do? Christian suggested they “train and try…and then let yourself be exposed and fail forward, because that’s the only way your troops are gonna learn.”

Miller’s advice to commanders: “Stop saying you don't have any money. That's complete bull,” he said. “I do believe operational commanders should have a lot more money to work through their things, but…please, I'm begging commanders to stop saying that.” And, he said, meet with companies that may have solutions to their problems.

“Right now, all we’re trying to do is fight World War II in the Pacific. That’s exactly our operational concept,” Miller said. “There are pockets of brilliance, kids that get it, but you know, we’re still fundamentally organized to refight the Cold War, which really was refighting World War II in the Pacific. So…we’re fighting an uphill battle on that.”

defenseone.com · Jennifer Hlad

5. How China’s Chokehold on Drugs, Chips and More Threatens the U.S.

​Summary:

China wields supply-chain dominance as strategic leverage, controlling key sectors like lithium-ion batteries, mature semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. Through subsidies, market flooding, and export controls, Beijing can pressure rivals economically and politically. Xi Jinping has openly urged tightening global dependence on China to deter foreign actions against its interests.

Excerpts:

Once Chinese companies have come to dominate a wide stretch of the supply chain, flooding global markets with lower-priced products in the process, Beijing brings in export controls that allow it to leverage its advantage and impose pain or threaten rival economies.

...

In a 2020 essay, Xi said supply-chain control shouldn’t be weaponized, yet he also said China must “tighten the dependence of international industrial chains on our country” to deter others from hurting China.

Comment: I have only two words: unrestricted warfare.

We must recognize China's strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack China's strategy with a superior strategy.

How China’s Chokehold on Drugs, Chips and More Threatens the U.S.

WSJ

By Yoko Kubota

Nov. 4, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/how-chinas-chokehold-on-drugs-chips-and-more-threatens-the-u-s-8b3f6b2e

It isn’t just rare earths. Three products show how Beijing built supply-chain dominance that can impose pain on trading partners.

Nov. 4, 2025 11:00 pm ET

A lithium mine in Jiangxi province, China. The nation has a significant hold on the supply of lithium-ion batteries. Gilles Sabrie/Bloomberg News

• China can weaponize its control over global supply chains, notably in rare-earth minerals, lithium-ion batteries, mature chips, and pharmaceutical ingredients.
• Chinese suppliers produce 79% of battery cathodes, 92% of anodes, 63% of refined lithium, 80% of refined cobalt, and 98% of refined graphite.
• China accounts for about one-third of global mature semiconductor production capacity and 99% of global gallium production in 2024.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• China can weaponize its control over global supply chains, notably in rare-earth minerals, lithium-ion batteries, mature chips, and pharmaceutical ingredients.

BEIJING—China has demonstrated it can weaponize its control over global supply chains by constricting the flow of critical rare-earth minerals. President Trump went to the negotiating table when the lack of Chinese materials threatened American production, and he reached a truce last week with Chinese leader Xi Jinping that both sides say will ease the flow of rare earths.

But Beijing’s tools go beyond these critical minerals. Three other industries where China has a chokehold—lithium-ion batteries, mature chips and pharmaceutical ingredients—give an idea of what the U.S. would need to do to free itself fully from vulnerability.

Behind China’s supply-chain dominance lie decadeslong industrial policies.

Once Chinese companies have come to dominate a wide stretch of the supply chain, flooding global markets with lower-priced products in the process, Beijing brings in export controls that allow it to leverage its advantage and impose pain or threaten rival economies. Sometimes countries can procure alternatives at higher cost, but in other cases it is hard—or nearly impossible—to find suppliers outside China.

In a 2020 essay, Xi said supply-chain control shouldn’t be weaponized, yet he also said China must “tighten the dependence of international industrial chains on our country” to deter others from hurting China.

Here is a guide to China’s playbook for flexing its export muscle.

Lithium-ion batteries

Lithium-ion batteries are used in electric vehicles, energy storage and consumer electronics. Whoever controls them has an edge in automotive technology and green energy.

The top two global battery producers are Chinese: CATL and BYD. Even when a battery is made elsewhere, its innards include a significant Chinese contribution. Chinese suppliers produce 79% of the cathodes inside batteries and 92% of the anodes, according to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. The batteries also use materials such as lithium, where Chinese producers have a 63% market share for the refined chemical version. China also controls 80% of the supply of refined cobalt and 98% of refined graphite.

In 2015, Beijing declared a goal of expanding its homegrown EV industry, which opened the floodgates for hundreds of local carmakers and battery makers. Between 2015 and 2019, Beijing encouraged Chinese EV makers to use approved locally made batteries.

This year, China has taken steps to keep its chokehold by ensuring its technology doesn’t leak to rivals. In July, Beijing said it would require licenses to transfer certain technologies linked to lithium-ion battery manufacturing overseas, and in October it started requiring export licenses for certain manufacturing equipment and cathode materials.

Semiconductors

China now accounts for about one-third of the globe’s mature semiconductor production capacity. These chips are still critical for industries including cars, consumer electronics and defense, even though they are easier to produce than cutting-edge chips.

Meanwhile, minerals such as gallium and germanium are widely used in chips—both advanced and mature—and other semiconductor products such as photovoltaic cells. China accounted for 99% of global gallium production in 2024, data from the U.S. Geological Survey showed. China is the world’s leading producer of germanium, USGS said, without giving exact numbers.

China has spent billions of dollars to build semiconductor manufacturing capability with a view toward self-sufficiency. That has triggered concerns globally about Chinese overcapacity in mature chips, which could push down the profitability of other producers and ultimately drive them out of the market.

China in 2023 announced export restrictions on gallium and germanium, requiring licenses for foreign shipments.

Recently, China blocked the export of mature chips made by a Dutch company called Nexperia that are used in car lights and electronics. The chips are largely manufactured in Europe but ultimately get exported to the world from China, where processing and packaging take place.

China said it blocked those exports as retaliation after the Dutch government seized control of Nexperia from its former Chinese parent, which is on a U.S. trade blacklist.

Following the Trump-Xi talks last week, China said it would let the Nexperia chips flow to global customers again. Still, the case showed the consequences that result when a single relatively modest-size mature chip maker can’t sell its products. Global automakers such as Honda had to shut down factories within weeks of China’s move.

Pharmaceuticals

While drugs sold in U.S. pharmacies or over the counter typically don’t say “made in China,” the country often supplies active pharmaceutical ingredients in the drugs or precursor chemicals used to make those active ingredients.

Most of the acetaminophen and ibuprofen imported into the U.S. comes from China. Those are the active ingredients in Tylenol and Advil, respectively. China is also a significant producer of antibiotic ingredients.

The U.S. imports many branded drugs from Europe, while for generics, it relies heavily on India. Still, a significant amount of the active ingredients used in India-made generics originates in China.

In 2015, China made production of medicines and medical devices an industrial priority. More recently, China said it plans to support development of innovative medicine and medical devices in the next five years.

Perhaps aware of the sensitivity of turning medicine into a political tool, China hasn’t often threatened to cut off drug supplies to the U.S. Still, it signaled awareness of its leverage early in the Covid-19 pandemic, when the world faced shortages of masks and personal protection equipment owing to supply disruptions from China. In March 2020, the official Xinhua News Agency said that if China were to restrict exports of medical goods, the “U.S. will be plunged into the vast ocean of coronavirus.”

Write to Yoko Kubota at yoko.kubota@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 5, 2025, print edition as 'China’s Chokehold on Goods Imperils U.S.'.

WSJ

6. China’s Security State Sells an A.I. Dream

​Summary:

China’s “A.I.+ Action Plan” is integrating artificial intelligence into every facet of governance and society, expanding the state’s surveillance and control. At a Beijing security conference, companies showcased A.I. tools that monitor speech, behavior, and emotions, supported by vast state data access. Experts warned that China’s all-seeing security state combining advanced A.I., ubiquitous sensors, and centralized data, creates powerful deterrence through perceived omnipresence, even without perfect accuracy.

​Excerpts:

It was hard to tell how many of the systems advertised at the conference, which was hosted by an industry group, actually worked, and how many were being hyped up with the aim of winning contracts from the many high-ranking police officials in attendance.

But it was clear that the companies and the officials shared a common goal: a Chinese state that is ever more capable of knowing, predicting and controlling its citizens.

​...

Now the authorities are looking to make it even more powerful, after the central Chinese government recently rolled out the “A.I.+ Action Plan,” a sweeping project to put the technology at the center of education, health care, entertainment — basically, every aspect of Chinese life.

Comment: As I have written many times: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly​. And when they sell these surveillance systems to other countries who has access to them and the data they produce? 

China’s Security State Sells an A.I. Dream

NY Times · Vivian Wang · November 4, 2025

By Vivian Wang

Vivian Wang attended a conference in Beijing where companies advertised how artificial intelligence could enhance policing capabilities.

Nov. 4, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/world/asia/china-police-ai-surveillance.html

China’s new national drive to embrace artificial intelligence is also giving the authorities new ways to monitor and control its citizens.

Listen to this article · 7:26 min Learn more

Security cameras in Shanghai last month.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

By

Vivian Wang attended a conference in Beijing where companies advertised how artificial intelligence could enhance policing capabilities.

Nov. 4, 2025

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

The police officers walked past the display of robot dogs and into the ornate Beijing hotel ballroom, as a welcome video showed animated androids conducting warfare in outer space.

For the next few hours, the officers, who had come from all across China, sat and listened as tech executives and government researchers took the stage to describe how they could use artificial intelligence to perfect their surveillance of Chinese society.

One executive said his company was partnering with the police in ethnic-minority regions to deploy its speech recognition software, which he said could decipher more than 200 Chinese dialects and minority languages, in the name of national security.

A researcher for the Ministry of Public Security said that robots could reduce the need for police officers to conduct street patrols, by being trained to look out for things like protest banners.

The chief executive of another company, which describes itself as using big data to make cities safer, suggested its software could help the police understand a person’s habits, connections and even state of mind, based on that person’s medical history, online shopping habits, interactions with neighbors and use of smart home appliances.

It was hard to tell how many of the systems advertised at the conference, which was hosted by an industry group, actually worked, and how many were being hyped up with the aim of winning contracts from the many high-ranking police officials in attendance.

But it was clear that the companies and the officials shared a common goal: a Chinese state that is ever more capable of knowing, predicting and controlling its citizens.

Sign up for the Race/Related Newsletter Join a deep and provocative exploration of race, identity and society with New York Times journalists.

That vision of an all-seeing state has unnerved Washington, which has cited China’s use of advanced computing to enable surveillance and repression as one reason for restricting the export of chips and semiconductors to China.

A number of the Chinese companies that attended the conference are on American export control lists, including the tech giants Huawei and Hikvision, a maker of surveillance camera systems. Several presenters acknowledged the challenges that the U.S. restrictions had created for their ambitions, but they pledged to overcome them with homegrown alternatives.

Huawei phones on display in Shanghai. The tech giant also produces surveillance camera systems for government use.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

China is not alone in using advances in A.I. to heighten surveillance. The New York Police Department, for example, has drawn criticism from civil rights advocates for its widespread and often undisclosed use of tracking technology.

But the scale and sophistication of China’s surveillance apparatus are unparalleled. The state tracks its 1.4 billion people through a vast network of cameras, internet controls and requirements that people use their national IDs to buy everything from SIM cards to stand-up comedy tickets.

Now the authorities are looking to make it even more powerful, after the central Chinese government recently rolled out the “A.I.+ Action Plan,” a sweeping project to put the technology at the center of education, health care, entertainment — basically, every aspect of Chinese life.

The new political mandate was palpable at the security conference, where several speakers referred to it by name.

“Our country’s security industry has already become one of the most successful sectors in implementing A.I.+,” Gu Jianguo, a former high-ranking official at the Ministry of Public Security, said at the conference. “We don’t need to be modest.”

The conference highlighted one key advantage that Chinese companies that work with the police hold over competitors, at home and abroad, in developing cutting-edge A.I. technology: access to huge amounts of data.

The companies’ close cooperation with the government gives them an unmatched supply of information that can be used to train and refine artificial intelligence systems. An analysis published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, in the United States, found that Chinese facial recognition companies that won public security-related government contracts later went on to develop more new commercial products afterward, compared with companies that did not work with the police.

Police officers staging a patrol drill with robots in Beijing in May, in a photo released by Chinese state media. Chinese companies developing A.I. technology for police have one major advantage: access to huge amounts of data.

Fang Ce, a representative of iFlytek, a leading Chinese speech recognition company, said that police reports were a particularly valuable source of input for the company, because “the data volume is extremely large.” Mr. Fang, the director of iFlytek’s police affairs department, said the company’s software could help police officers log and analyze emergency calls, as well as infer whether someone was talking about a crime in a roundabout way, rather than using specific keywords.

He also said that iFlytek had developed a large-scale speech model that recognized 74 foreign languages and “for our national security, supports 202 dialects” of Chinese.

The company has been “collaborating in limited ways with local ethnic minority public security agencies” to protect ethnic languages, he added.

Human rights groups have long accused iFlytek of helping the Chinese government use voice patterns for surveillance and repression, especially of minorities in regions like Xinjiang and Tibet. The company has said that it protects users’ privacy and is interested in the preservation of dialects and languages.

Indeed, many of the presenters described the use cases for their products as benign: helping to track down missing children, for example, or combat identity fraud. Mr. Fang suggested that iFlytek’s software could be used to monitor police officers, too, for missteps or misconduct.

But companies pitched their ability to target certain types of individuals who have long been identified as potential troublemakers, including migrant workers and people who complain to the government.

A booth for iFlytek’s A.I. models in Shanghai in July. Human rights groups have accused iFlytek of helping the Chinese government use voice patterns to repress parts of the population.

One presenter from the company Quan Min Ren Zheng — which translates loosely as All-People Authentication, and makes tools to help governments and companies verify people’s identities — described how his company could help the authorities detect suspicious behavior in rental homes. His company makes products like smart door locks that could determine if people who were not authorized to live in a place had entered the premises, and electricity meters that could flag abnormal electricity usage.

Some of the technology is most likely already being used. One state-owned company at the conference, SDIC Intelligence, won a $2 million contract last year to provide a county government in southwestern China with a platform that could analyze people’s “frequented areas, activity patterns and locations,” according to public procurement documents. It won a similar amount to help Dongguan, a city in southern China, build profiles of mobile phone users based on their movements, deliveries and contact book entries.

For all the excitement that advances in A.I. have created in the security industry, though, the technical prowess of the surveillance technology is less important than its sheer pervasiveness, said Alison Sile Chen-Zhao, a researcher studying the effect of A.I. on surveillance at the University of California San Diego. As long as people believe that they are being watched, they will think twice about doing anything the government might disapprove of.

“The surveillance actually doesn’t need to achieve a very high accuracy or effectiveness to have the desired effect,” she said.

Siyi Zhao contributed research.

Vivian Wang is a China correspondent based in Beijing, where she writes about how the country’s global rise and ambitions are shaping the daily lives of its people.

NY Times · Vivian Wang · November 4, 2025

7. Army takes another step on path toward producing new drone-killing laser weapons

​Summary:

The U.S. Army is advancing its Enduring High Energy Laser (E-HEL) program to counter small drones. A new request for information aims to guide production of up to 20 systems by FY2026. The modular, vehicle-mounted lasers promise rapid, low-cost engagements, though challenges include power, thermal management, and weather-related beam degradation.

Comment: Are drones the threat of the century (along with AI, cyber warfare, etc)?

Army takes another step on path toward producing new drone-killing laser weapons

The service issued a request for information on Oct. 30 to inform an Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) production effort.

By

Jon Harper

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

https://defensescoop.com/2025/11/03/army-enduring-high-energy-laser-ehel-rfi-counter-uas/

The Army has taken another step forward in its pursuit of new directed energy weapons that can zap small drones.

The service issued a request for information on Oct. 30 to inform an Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) production effort, with an eye toward holding a competitive source selection as early as the second quarter of fiscal 2026.

Officials are also planning to host a technology demonstration at Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah in December and January to offer vendors an opportunity to participate in a test range event, according to the RFI.

The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office has prototyped laser weapon systems for other projects such as Directed Energy Maneuver-Short-Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD). However, the E-HEL initiative is expected to be the service’s first program of record for this type of technology, according to an Army news release.

High-energy lasers could offer significant advantages over traditional air defense weapons, including faster engagement, lower cost per shot and deeper magazines, experts say.

“These characteristics could in turn produce a favorable cost-exchange ratio for a defender, whose marginal costs would be significantly lower than those of an aggressor,” according to a Congressional Research Service report released last year.

However, there are technical challenges involved, such as beam control, thermal management, and size, weight and power issues.

“These weapons could … face limitations not faced by their kinetic counterparts. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., rain, fog, obscurants) could potentially limit the range and beam quality of DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness,” per the CRS report.

According to the new RFI, the Army is looking to produce up to 20 E-HEL platforms using a modular open system approach and “leveraging range proven laser and beam control technologies.”

While directed energy weapons have applications against a variety of threats, the E-HEL effort is geared toward defeating small unmanned aerial systems — which are seen as a growing menace on the battlefield — including kamikaze drones or “one-way attack” UAS that are designed to crash into their targets.

Boosting the U.S. military’s ability to counter small drones has been a top priority of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who directed the secretary of the Army to establish a new joint interagency task force for developing capabilities to defeat these types of platforms.

“E-HEL is expected to produce a hard kill (inability for the UAS to maintain flight) of Group 1 and 2 UAS and one-way attack (OWA) Group 3 UAS,” officials wrote in the RFI, referring to categories of unmanned aerial systems on the smaller end of the spectrum.

The new laser capability is intended to support both semi-fixed and maneuver operations in a “palletized” configuration or via integration onto a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, they noted.

Notably, the platform could be networked with other sensors.

“E-HEL is intended to track Group 1-3 UASs in both ‘blue sky’ and cluttered conditions based upon accepting external Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) cues to the UAS,” officials wrote.

Responses to the RFI are due Nov. 21.

The government “anticipates a potential future competitive source selection, initiated in FY26, Q2 or later,” according to officials.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Editor-in-Chief of DefenseScoop. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X: @Jon_Harper_

In This Story

• Army
• directed energy
• E-HEL
• laser

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

8. US Army Tests AI-Enabled Counter-Drone System on Abrams, Bradley

​Summary:

The U.S. Army is evaluating the AI-enabled Bullfrog counter-drone weapon on Abrams and Bradley vehicles. Mounted with an M240, the 400-lb system uses computer vision and autonomy to detect and engage Class 1–3 UAS out to 1,500 meters, addressing drone threats that existing active protection and jamming struggle to stop.

Comment: It is amazing that the Bradley and Abrams are still going strong. I recall going through Bradley transition at Vilseck, Graf, and Hohenfels in 1983-1984.

US Army Tests AI-Enabled Counter-Drone System on Abrams, Bradley

thedefensepost.com

Inder Singh Bisht

November 3, 2025

https://thedefensepost.com/2025/11/03/counter-drone-abrams-bradley/

The US Army is testing an autonomous, machine-gun-based counter-drone system on Abrams main battle tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).

A photo shared by Allen Control Systems’ President Steven Simoni shows the company’s Bullfrog weapon station mounted on a Bradley during the trial.

“Mechanized infantry & armor platforms from troop transports to fighting vehicles like this Bradley are vulnerable to cheap, fast, lethal drones acting as aerial IEDs,” Simoni said on X.

“The Allen Control Systems Bullfrog will reverse that, giving back control to US and allied ground forces.”

The system features a 400-pound (181-kilogram) mount that can carry an M240 machine gun chambered in 7.62×51mm, with a rate of fire of about 600 rounds per minute.

The Bullfrog integrates artificial intelligence, computer vision, and proprietary control software to adapt both legacy and modern weapon systems for precision engagement.

It is built to defeat Class 1–3 drones weighing up to 600 kilograms (1,320 pounds) and can engage aerial targets at ranges of up to 1,500 meters (4,921 feet).

The lightweight system fits NATO-standard vehicles and features passive detection with a reported false-negative rate below 2 percent.

It is unclear if the effort is an evaluation or rapid prototyping project, as no official contract has been announced.

The Texas-based startup was previously contracted by ManTech to integrate the Bullfrog into maritime platforms for the US Special Operations Forces.

Growing Threat

The effort acknowledges the growing threat that cheap, widely available unmanned aerial systems — particularly first-person view drones — pose to modern armored vehicles, even those equipped with advanced protection.

While Trophy- and Iron Fist-equipped Abrams and Bradleys are well protected against anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades, their active protection system designs are ill-suited to engage slow, erratic, low-signature quadcopters.

Options such as the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station or locally mounted M2 and M240 machine guns can engage such threats but remain entirely dependent on the gunner’s situational awareness.

With the advent of fiber-optic drones, even electronic warfare and jamming measures lose effectiveness, as control signals are maintained through long, thin cables.

A solution like Bullfrog aims to bridge this capability gap in vehicle defense by providing an automated hard-kill means to counter small drones.

thedefensepost.com

9. China's military build-up demands response, Australia defence minister says

​Summary:

Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles warned that South China Sea trade-route operations are increasingly risky as China embarks on the “biggest military build-up in the world today,” done without strategic transparency.

 He stressed that open sea lanes are core to Australia’s national interest and said a response is now required, prompting Canberra to accelerate naval spending and capability upgrades.

​Comment: We must understand our ally's perspective. 

China's military build-up demands response, Australia defence minister says

channelnewsasia.com

04 Nov 2025 11:06AM

(Updated: 04 Nov 2025 11:09AM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/china-biggest-military-build-up-world-australia-response-5443301

SYDNEY: Australia's defence force operations to protect its sea trade routes, including through the South China Sea, are becoming more risky as Beijing undertakes the "biggest military build-up in the world today", Australia's defence minister said on Tuesday (Nov 4).

Open sea lanes, including trade routes that go through the South China Sea and East China Sea, are at the core of Australia's national interest, Richard Marles said in an opening speech at a navy conference in Sydney.

"That work is challenging and in truth it is becoming increasingly risky. The biggest military build-up in the world today is China," he told the Indo-Pacific conference.

"That it is happening without strategic reassurance means that for Australia and so many countries, a response is demanded."

About 100 protesters, including pro-Palestinian groups, gathered outside the conference centre in Darling Harbour in Sydney. New South Wales state police said 10 people were arrested and pepper spray was used after clashes with officers.

Several Israeli companies are exhibiting at the defence conference.

Marles said Australia was increasing its military spending to build a "more capable, lethal, long-range navy".

This included acquiring frigates from Japan, developing submarine drones with United States company Anduril, and expanding its naval shipyards facing the Indian Ocean.

Australia raised concerns with Beijing last month after a Chinese fighter jet dropped flares near an Australian maritime patrol plane carrying out surveillance in the South China Sea, the latest in a series of such incidents that Australia has labelled "unsafe and unprofessional".

Dozens of navy and coast guard chiefs, including from the US, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Pacific Islands, are attending the conference in Sydney, which comes as Australia prepares to build a nuclear-powered submarine fleet with the US and Britain through the AUKUS partnership.

Source: Reuters/rl

Newsletter

channelnewsasia.com

10. Opinion | The War Powers Irresolution

​Summary:

​The WSJ editorial board argues a Senate resolution to block U.S. military action in Venezuela is unconstitutional, as war powers rest with the President under Article II. Congress can cut funding or impeach, but cannot direct troop withdrawals. The editorial defends executive authority, citing historical precedents from Jefferson to Reagan.

Comment: How will this play out in Congress and the Court? But wouldn't an attack on Venezuela require a declaration of war? Surely it will be considered a war of choice. What about Congress' "war powers" under Article I?

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution:

“The Congress shall have Power To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”

Opinion | The War Powers Irresolution

WSJ

A Senate measure would let Congress block military action in Venezuela. It’s unconstitutional.

By​ The Editorial Board

Nov. 4, 2025 5:57 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-war-powers-senate-congress-venezuela-e801f43a

U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer USS Sampson DDG-102 docks near the Panama Canal, Aug. 31. enea lebrun/Reuters

Here we go again. Senators who oppose the American use of military force are trying again to hamstring presidential military action. No matter what you think about President Trump as Commander in Chief, putting Congress in charge of the military is an even worse idea.

That’s essentially what the war powers resolution offered by Sens. Tim Kaine, Adam Schiff and Rand Paul would do. The resolution states that “Congress hereby directs the President to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces for hostilities within or against Venezuela, unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military force.”

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Donald Trump’s 'Emergency' Tariffs Reach the Supreme Court

The Justices could end President Trump's sweeping global tariffs, if they find he lacks the power to impose them using a 1977 statute called IEEPA. What does that law say, how has it previously been used, and where's the limiting principle? Plus, what to make of the White House's warnings of economic calamity if it loses?Read Transcript

The constitutional problem here is that Congress lacks the power to order a President to terminate military action. The authority as Commander in Chief lies with the President under Article II. Congress has the power to declare war, but the last time it did so was 1942. Presidents have used military force countless times since, including long wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East.

If Congress opposes a military action, it can use its power of the purse to cut off funding for the conflict. Democrats in Congress reduced aid for South Vietnam in 1975, and the result not long afterward was a North Vietnamese invasion that conquered the South and sent tens of thousands of “boat people” adrift in the ocean. Congress can also impeach a President, but Democrats lack the votes.

That’s why the Senators are relying on the 1973 War Powers Act, which says the President must consult with Congress before committing troops to fight, and he must withdraw troops from a conflict after 60 days without authorization from Congress. The law in effect creates 535 Commanders in Chief.

The resolution passed over the veto of Richard Nixon, who thought it was unconstitutional and so have nearly all Presidents since. “We think it’s illegal,” said Ronald Reagan when Democrats tried to invoke it to block his deployment of the Navy to escort oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987. Barack Obama claimed to be following the War Powers Act in Libya, though he didn’t wait for Congress’s permission to intervene in that conflict.

Numerous Presidents have used force without Congressional approval going back to Thomas Jefferson against the Barbary pirates. John F. Kennedy didn’t ask Congress before he decided to blockade Cuba, risking nuclear war. Ditto for Reagan’s invasion of Grenada. In the nearest analogy to Mr. Trump and Venezuela, George H.W. Bush sent troops in 1989 to depose and arrest the president of Panama, Manuel Noriega.

Mr. Trump is assembling a Navy flotilla in the Caribbean near Venezuela. Its purpose isn’t clear, though Mr. Trump said Sunday on CBS’s “60 Minutes” that dictator Nicolás Maduro’s days in power are numbered. The U.S. has blown up boats and a submarine it says were carrying drugs to the U.S. But it’s hard to believe Mr. Trump has assembled a fleet of this size merely to attack drug boats.

Venezuela’s democrats won the 2024 election, and helping them oust Mr. Maduro would be a service to the Americas and U.S. security. It would turn a regime allied with Cuba, China, Russia and Iran into an American ally. It would also allow the Venezuelan diaspora that has fled the regime’s poverty and cruelty to return home and rebuild. Once a wealthy nation, Venezuela could be again.

If Senators are opposed to the U.S. deposing Mr. Maduro, they ought to say so. But the Senators don’t want to do that because it might be unpopular to side with a dictator. It’s so much easier, politically, to charge that Mr. Trump is acting unlawfully than address the merits of U.S. policy.

***

None of this means Mr. Trump shouldn’t inform and cooperate with Congress on Venezuela. If he brings Congress with him at the start of hostilities, he will have more allies if events go awry, as they often do in war. Mr. Trump would also be wise to explain to the public what he is doing and why he thinks it’s in America’s interest to depose Mr. Maduro.

If Mr. Trump does pursue regime change in Venezuela, he will have to stay with it until the end. That means supporting a new democratic government against Maduro diehards allied with Cuban intelligence. Mr. Trump doesn’t want his version of JFK’s Bay of Pigs.

The Constitution gives the Commander in Chief enormous power to use the military without Congressional micromanagement, but it also means taking responsibility for failure.

Appeared in the November 5, 2025, print edition as 'The War Powers Irresolution'.

WSJ

11. Hamas Returns Last Dead American-Israeli Hostage to Israel

​Summary:

Hamas returned the body of 19-year-old Israeli-American soldier Itay Chen, the last American hostage from Gaza. The transfer leaves seven deceased hostages in Gaza. Retrieval of remaining bodies is ongoing amid devastation, with Egypt assisting; further cease-fire phases face issues.

Hamas Returns Last Dead American-Israeli Hostage to Israel

WSJ

A total of seven dead hostages remain in Gaza after the return of the body of Israeli-American soldier Itay Chen

By Anat Peled

Follow

Nov. 5, 2025 4:31 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-returns-last-dead-american-israeli-hostage-to-israel-b7f71fff

Itay Chen was killed during the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel. Bring Them Home Now

• Hamas returned the body of Itay Chen, a 19-year-old Israeli-American soldier, marking the return of the last dead American hostage from Gaza.
• Chen was among approximately 250 hostages taken during the Oct. 7, 2023, attack, which included about a dozen U.S. nationals.
• The return of hostages has been central to President Trump’s diplomatic efforts, culminating in a U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Hamas returned the body of Itay Chen, a 19-year-old Israeli-American soldier, marking the return of the last dead American hostage from Gaza.

TEL AVIV—The body of the last dead American hostage in Gaza was returned by Hamas after more than two years, marking the close of a painful chapter for U.S. families whose relatives were taken by the militant group.

Itay Chen, 19, an Israeli-American soldier who also holds German citizenship, was killed during the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack while fighting off militants with his tank crew in southern Israel. Chen was one of around 250 hostages taken during the attack, including around a dozen U.S. nationals, according to the Hostages Families Forum, an advocacy group.

The return of the hostages taken by the U.S.-designated terrorist group, especially those with American citizenship, has been central to President Trump’s diplomatic efforts on Gaza. Throughout the war, Trump and top U.S. officials frequently met with hostage families, and he has often spoken about the importance of bringing them home as part of a deal.

As part of the U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement last month between Israel and Hamas, the militant group has returned all the remaining living hostages in Gaza and 21 dead bodies, including Chen’s body late Tuesday, in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Seven deceased hostages now remain in the enclave, including one Israeli soldier, Hadar Goldin, who was captured by Hamas in 2014 and is included in Israel’s official tally. The remaining six dead hostages taken on Oct. 7 include two foreigners, from Tanzania and Thailand, and four Israeli men.

The parents of Itay Chen took part in a protest in Tel Aviv in July. Associated Press

Israeli hostage families, and especially American families, frequently flew to Washington to lobby the Trump administration throughout the war. Chen’s father, Ruby Chen, traveled around the world from Doha to Washington to lobby world leaders for his son’s release. He frequently met with Trump and top U.S. officials, most recently during Trump’s trip to Israel last month.

“On the one hand you have the anticipation of getting the worst phone call you will ever get in your lifetime, and you feel disappointed at the end of the day that you didn’t get that phone call,” Ruby Chen said in October.

Israel and Hamas are currently completing the first phase of the cease-fire agreement, which includes a prisoner-for-hostage exchange and partial Israeli withdrawal from the enclave. The next phase of the agreement is expected to be much more complicated over the implementation of thorny issues, including Hamas’s disarmament and the entry of an international stabilization force that is supposed to help secure the enclave.

The text of the cease-fire agreement acknowledges the return of all the hostage bodies is complicated and will take time. Israeli officials believe that returning all the remaining dead hostages in Gaza might prove difficult as the location of some is unknown.

Searches for the remaining hostage bodies are under way in Gaza’s ruins and include an Egyptian team that is assisting in the efforts, according to Arab mediators. Gaza has suffered a severe level of destruction from Israeli airstrikes and demolitions, further complicating the search.

Several previous cease-fire deals mediated by the U.S., Egypt and Qatar led to the release of hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons.

Write to Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com

12. The Inside Story of How Gen Z Toppled Nepal’s Leader and Chose a New One on Discord

​Summary:

In September 2025, Nepal’s Gen Z activists used Discord, TikTok, and VPNs to organize massive anti-corruption protests that toppled Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli. Sparked by viral “Nepo Kid” videos, the movement erupted after a child’s death in a government vehicle incident. Despite deadly clashes, protesters coordinated digitally to select former chief justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister who is the world’s first leader chosen through an online poll. The uprising exposed deep inequality and political decay, revealing both the power and peril of digital democracy as Nepal’s youth now struggle to turn their online revolution into lasting reform.

​Comments: Worthy of study by those who focus on revolution, resistance, and insurgency. A cautionary tale? The way of the future? Coming to a wired but unstable country near you?

The Inside Story of How Gen Z Toppled Nepal’s Leader and Chose a New One on Discord

The revolution started on social media. It ended with protests, violence, and an online poll to pick the new prime minister.

Wired · Tulsi Rauniyar · November 4, 2025

https://www.wired.com/story/nepal-discord-gen-z-protests-vote-prime-minister-election/

At 11:30 pm on Tuesday, September 9, Rakshya Bam stepped down from an army jeep outside military headquarters in a pitch-dark, locked-down Kathmandu. The 26-year-old hadn’t slept in more than a day. Her eyes were red-rimmed and glassy, the whites threaded with thin lines of fatigue.

A wave of youth-led protests had rocked Nepal, born on Discord servers, TikTok feeds, and encrypted messaging apps. In just a few days, Bam had seen friends gunned down, watched parliament buildings smolder, and witnessed the collapse of the Nepalese government. Prime minister K. P. Sharma Oli had resigned, and the army had stepped in to try to restore order. Now, Bam was one of 10 young activists who had been summoned to an unprecedented meeting.

As she walked through the gates of Nepali Army headquarters, flanked by soldiers in full combat gear, Bam could feel her phone buzzing in her pocket. Online, misinformation was spreading fast. Bam’s phone barely stopped buzzing. “The king is here.” “The army has staged a coup.” Discord was alive with chatter. Diplomats were calling, urging, “Save democracy!”

Inside a sterile meeting room—no phones allowed—the 10 Gen Z activists were greeted by Army General Ashok Raj Sigdel, a stern-looking man in a crisp dark green uniform, medals gleaming on his chest. For three hours, Sigdel questioned the protesters on their motives and their backgrounds. Finally, he presented them with an ultimatum. It had been their youth-led movement that had sparked the protests, he said, so they were the ones responsible for shaping the interim government. Just days earlier, these activists had been ordinary young people, lost in the grind of their daily lives. Now they were being asked to help choose Nepal’s next prime minister.

Activist Rakshya Bam became a central figure in Nepal's Gen Z protests after clips of her giving speeches to the crowd went viral.

Photograph: Tulsi Rauniyar

Rakshya Bam grew up in Kailali, a lowland district in Nepal’s far west, where the subtropical plains stretch toward the Indian border. The region is known for its dense sal forests and fertile fields, but after years of neglect it’s one of the country’s poorest areas.

Nepal is one of the youngest countries in South Asia, with a median age of 25.3 years (the US median age is 39.1). High fertility rates in previous decades have created a “youth bulge”—the largest in the region’s history. But many young people like Bam see no future in their homeland. The country has effectively outsourced its labor market to Malaysia, South Korea, and the Gulf states, exporting its youth instead of creating opportunities at home. Minimum wages are not enough to sustain a life within Nepal’s borders, leaving young Nepalis with a stark choice: Leave to study abroad, or leave to work abroad.

Those who stay are forced to contend with a political system that doesn’t work for them. Even with steep taxes, essential services are in disarray. In the 1950s, the first democratic movement brought free elections, before the monarchy reasserted control. In the 1990s, citizens rose again and reclaimed democracy, but poor governance, civil war, and the 2005 royal coup, when King Gyanendra dismissed parliament, arrested political leaders, and imposed a media blackout, snuffed out that hope. Even after the fall of the monarchy and the end of the war, the structural problems that had driven Nepal’s unrest persisted. The Maoists, who had launched a decade-long “People’s War” in 1996 demanding the creation of a republic that would address deep inequalities, especially in rural Nepal, were subsumed into mainstream politics. Their movement, once rooted in the frustrations of marginalized groups like Dalits, Indigenous communities, and poor farmers shut out of Kathmandu’s elite, helped establish Nepal as a federal democratic republic. But over time, the Maoists became part of the same establishment they had once fought to dismantle. Power continued to circulate among a familiar set of parties and leaders.

For Bam and her peers, the online world offered a place to express outrage, build solidarity, and speak freely. She started posting about corruption and inequality on social media, sharing photos of herself at small rallies, holding a megaphone or a hand-drawn pamphlet. Then, in early September 2025, a new trend started to sweep across Nepali social media.

Nimesh Shrestha’s TikTok feed was supposed to make him laugh. He grew up in Kathmandu and had developed a niche as a video editor and content creator, known for slapstick comedy and quirky skits. Usually, the algorithm fed him similar content. But in early September, he started to notice different kinds of videos filling his phone.

They showed luxury cars glinting in the sun and the children of Nepali government ministers stepping out of them wearing designer clothes and expensive watches. There were reels showcasing opulent weddings, intercut with images of Nepal’s impoverished communities. The “Nepo Kid” trend had started in the Philippines and Indonesia, but now it was erupting in Nepal too. As it spread, the tone of the videos seemed to shift. They became more raw, chaotic, and emotionally charged, turning corruption and inequality into something tangible, instantly recognizable, and shareable.

As the videos began to rack up millions of views and spill into mainstream news coverage, the government responded with panic. On September 4, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology ordered internet service providers to block access to 26 social-media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, X, and YouTube, ostensibly because the companies had failed to register with the government as required by a Supreme Court directive. Users opened their apps to find frozen feeds, posts failing to load, and connection errors flashing across their screens.

Coming just as the Nepo Kid videos were flooding social feeds, the government’s explanation felt hollow. To Nepal’s young citizens, the ban wasn’t about compliance or procedure—it was about fear. The system, they believed, was terrified of transparency.

VPN downloads surged. Within hours, Nepalis were trading links and workarounds in private chats and Discord servers, tunneling back online through encrypted connections. The government crackdown only amplified the sense of defiance.

On September 6, outrage turned to fury. An 11-year-old girl, Usha Magar Sunuwar, was struck by a black SUV carrying a provincial minister from the ruling party. The vehicle sped away without stopping, but the incident was captured on CCTV. The clip went viral within hours.

Later that day, Shrestha and Bam were added to a Discord server called Youths Against Corruption, which had just been set up by Hami Nepal, a nonprofit founded by activist Sudan Gurung in 2015, after he lost his son in a deadly earthquake that flattened neighborhoods across central Nepal and killed nearly 9,000 people. Hami Nepal had only about 20 active volunteers but had built up a large online following through its disaster-relief work after the earthquake and during the Covid pandemic. When the government blocked social media platforms, the same networks that once coordinated oxygen deliveries and flood relief pivoted to activism.

Discord was one of the banned platforms but needed less bandwidth than mainstream social media, which made it easier to access through VPNs. Youths Against Corruption quickly became the largest of several servers that emerged in the chaos that followed the internet shutdown, with more than 150,000 members.

Late on September 6, according to Shrestha, after hours of frantic coordination on Discord, the group began preparing for their move to the streets. On Shrestha’s TikTok and Instagram, he’d post stories every few minutes with safety tips, including what to do if tear gas was deployed, emergency contact numbers, and which routes to avoid. His follower count tripled. Thousands messaged him, asking how to take part. Protest guides were readily shared online, telling viewers how to remain safe and peaceful. The Discord servers enabled participants to coordinate flash protests, promote hashtags such as #OliResign, #GenZProtest, and #WakeUpNepal, and warn each other about police movements.

Rakshya Bam helped coordinate the protests on September 8, but was horrified when they turned violent.

Photograph: Courtesy of Rakshya Bam

On September 8, Bam was standing in the back of a pickup truck, microphone in hand, helping to coordinate as dozens of youth groups converged for a protest in central Kathmandu. She called out to the growing crowd, reading from a list: “We won’t break trees or vandalize property. We won’t shout, set fires, or create chaos. No violence, no conflict. We won’t threaten or use foul language. We will stay peaceful. We will be civil and responsible. We haven’t come carrying any political party’s agenda.” The crowd cheered, and she waved the Nepali flag, hoping her voice would be enough to keep things calm. But the crowd was swelling faster than anyone had anticipated. Groups she didn’t recognize began pushing toward restricted government zones, ignoring the curfew, ignoring her pleas. Barricades near the parliament began to topple. Vehicles were set on fire. Stones flew through the air. She saw tear gas canisters arcing through the afternoon sky like birds. The gunfire started moments later.

Panicked police commanders, fearing a breach of the parliament compound, had opened fire on the crowd. Bam saw young people collapse, shot in the head. The protests would ultimately leave at least 72 people dead and over 1,000 injured nationwide, making it the deadliest unrest in Nepal’s recent history. The next day, despite the massacre and a strict curfew, thousands of young protesters returned to the streets, still trying to demonstrate peacefully. But alongside them, mobs emerged. Bam watched as groups vandalized government buildings, set private properties ablaze, and attacked homes. Smoke rose over Kathmandu. As protests spiraled and government buildings smoldered, Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli resigned. Within hours, the army was on the streets, enforcing a 6 pm to 6 am curfew and promising to restore stability.

Social media let the world watch the government crackdown in real time. Nepal’s internet was filled with cell phone footage of police opening fire on young people, bodies collapsing in clouds of tear gas. A British travel YouTuber went viral after getting caught in the maelstrom. Shrestha describes the experience of following the protests online as “organized chaos.” “It was wild. Hundreds of people talking at once, memes flying around, live updates from the streets. You felt the chaos of the city through the screen,” he says.

One voice cut through the noise. Known as “Jalebi” on Discord, he requested anonymity, but his username and voice were among the most recognizable on the Youths Against Corruption server. With experience running Discord channels and a background in tech, he had volunteered to moderate the server when it was first created.

Now, as violence erupted on the streets, Jalebi found himself cast in the role of emergency responder. He clicked on a username, opened a direct message. “What’s your phone number?” A voice confirmed the address and described the injuries. Jalebi posted the information in the rescue channel, and nearby users responded. He got them on a call, coordinating the pickup. That night, he and a team of volunteers drove out to evacuate a family from a burning house. The request had come through Discord, and Jalebi had verified it by phone before they went.

What had started as a platform to facilitate protests and communication quickly evolved. Moderators now verified calls for help, coordinated rescues, and organized blood donations for people trapped by the curfew. As the server swelled beyond 100,000 members, Jalebi scrambled to recruit 15 to 20 more volunteer moderators to keep up with the demand.

The server had been open; anyone could invite anyone. International YouTube channels discovered the feed and began livestreaming it. Foreigners flooded in. Some were curious observers; others spread propaganda, incited violence, or sent fake emergency calls designed to waste moderators’ time or expose their networks. One cybersecurity firm estimates that a third of the social media accounts driving the protests were fake.

Jalebi soon locked down invitations. He and his team created separate groups: verified rescue requests in one, general discussion in another, and coordination in a third. His role became triage, deciding whose turn it was to speak in voice channels, which messages to pin, and which users to silence or ban. Hate messages accumulated in his inbox.

By the next day, the violence had reversed its direction. Cell phone videos showed smoke rising over the capital, government buildings in flames, and mobs storming police stations. Guns, batons, and uniforms lay scattered on the ground as the city burned.

A few hours after their meeting with the army general on September 9, Bam, Shrestha, and a small group of protesters huddled in their safe space—a small room somewhere in Kathmandu that had become their usual meeting place during the uprising. It was the middle of the night, and their faces were lit by the glow of phones and laptops. Thousands logged in to Discord that night, as the protesters tried to wrestle with the task ahead of them.

It was a new kind of democracy—brokered not by men in suits but by anonymous users with names like meme_lord, rebel_rana, momo4justice, TheLostGhost, nepali_anon18, and 2pac, and avatars of cats in sunglasses and anime faces. There were streams of text in English and Nepali, punctuated by voice notes: someone shouting updates from Maitighar, a central square in Kathmandu near key government offices. Another played a protest song through their mic. A third laughed nervously. At times, the messages scrolled by too fast to read.

But this chaotic form of direct democracy was far from perfect. One participant, who requested anonymity, experienced this firsthand. In the frenzy of polls and speculation, they became the target of coordinated attacks after unverified claims about them began circulating on Reddit and Discord. The harassment was relentless enough to drive them offline entirely. “One moment you’re part of a movement, and another you’re receiving death threats through the same channels,” they said. “Someone can post a half-made-up story about your family’s connections to corruption, and you’re done. No verification, no due process. Just mob justice.”

As night turned to morning, the activists deliberated on who could lead, how to build consensus, and how to fill the power vacuum as soon as possible. They weighed risks and figured out a way to formalize their recommendations. By the time the sun rose over Kathmandu’s skyline, they had settled on a handful of candidates. But they needed one name to take to the army general.

“Please decide on a representative right now. We do not have time,” moderator Jalebi urged. Then he created the poll, pulling from a range of public figures and influencers. The question: Who should be the interim prime minister? Names: Sushila Karki, the former chief justice; Balendra Shah, a rapper, engineer and Kathmandu’s first independent mayor; a YouTuber and lawyer known as “Random Nepali.” Others. Votes accumulated over hours of chaotic discussion.

“It was about showing a consensus,” Jalebi explains. “The poll was our evidence, the only way to measure what Gen Z was thinking. We ran it on Discord but also reached out to civil society members and other stakeholders to make sure it reflected more than just online chatter.”

After hours of voting across different polls, former chief justice Sushila Karki, who had a long history of activism on women’s rights, anti-corruption, social justice, and other matters of interest to younger generations, and who had become one of the movement’s most recognizable figures after footage of her joining protesters went viral, finally emerged as the lead candidate.

Three days later, Rakshya Bam was standing beneath the marble arches of the presidential residence as Parliament was dissolved and Karki prepared to take the oath as Nepal’s first female prime minister. As interim PM, Karki would lead a transitional government tasked with tackling corruption, ensuring transparency, and steering the country toward fresh elections. Watching her, Bam was struck by the sense that she and her peers had cracked history open.

Some of these events may seem familiar. Analysts have drawn parallels between Nepal’s Gen Z uprising and the 2011 Arab Spring, where social media became a force for mass mobilization, calling this moment a kind of “South Asian Spring.” In recent months, similar youth-led protests have erupted in Madagascar and Morocco.

But choosing a leader through a digital platform like Discord is messy, transparent, and unprecedented, says Sudhamsu Dahal, a researcher on the social impact of communication technologies. The current movement is spontaneous, leaderless, and emotionally charged—united more by a rejection of corruption and repression than by a shared vision of what comes next.

That means the same digital infrastructure that allowed young activists to mobilize could just as easily be weaponized against them. As the Youths Against Corruption server swelled to more than 150,000 users in the days after the protests, paranoia seeped in. Organizers warned about infiltrators, government agents, provocateurs, or trolls lurking behind anonymous accounts. Facebook users discovered that a page now calling itself Gen-Z Youth Nepal, one of the amplifiers of protest content, had previously been affiliated with a major political party before quietly rebranding just days before the uprising. Screenshots of the group’s history ricocheted across chats and servers, a digital flare warning of political infiltration.

Dahal says what Nepal witnessed was “the death of the old political class and the birth of a new one.” Whether this emerging generation can withstand entrenched forces remains uncertain. “The challenge now is turning digital momentum into lasting governance without sacrificing the moral clarity that gave the movement its power,” he says. He also warns that moving forward, digital surveillance will touch everyone, citizens and politicians alike, making every online action both a tool and a potential risk.

These movements have been hailed as a demonstration of social media’s ability to orchestrate decentralized, digitally coordinated activism, yet their reach remains uneven. Less than half of Nepalis had internet access in early 2023, and only 17 percent in rural areas. In many remote regions, the infrastructure and digital skills needed to participate are lacking. This gap suggests that the uprising, while gaining momentum online, may struggle to include those most marginalized, raising questions about how representative and sustainable the movement can ultimately be.

For now, the Discord servers remain active—political news, blood donation calls, and suggestions for former politicians who should be arrested still pop up regularly. Nepal is in a state of messy, unpredictable flux. The interim government has formed a cabinet to keep the country running, while protesters scramble to forge a coalition. On November 1, Bam was named coordinator of the Nepal Gen-Z Front, a new organization that will bring together the youth groups associated with the protests and try to unify their demands before the elections scheduled for March 2026. The media headlines have focused on the spectacle of September 9, while September 8, when police fired on young protesters, has received little attention.

“Maybe we didn’t change everything,” says Rakshya Bam. “But we changed how people imagine what’s possible.” Then she returns to that same question every Gen Z activist I spoke to is asking, one that can’t be answered with a Discord poll. What comes next?

Have your say

Does the use of social media platforms like Discord help make democracy more representative? Let us know what you think in the comments below. Alternatively, you can submit a letter to the editor at

Wired · Tulsi Rauniyar · November 4, 2025

13. China’s Rising Influence in the Western Balkans and How the West Should Respond

​Summary:

China is expanding influence in the Western Balkans, and especially in Serbia, through arms sales, technology transfers, infrastructure investment, and surveillance networks, creating dependencies that threaten NATO cohesion. To counter this “sharp power,” the U.S. and allies should fund transparent, NATO-compliant defense, cyber, and infrastructure projects, adopt open contracting data standards, and strengthen regional interoperability, governance, and resilience.

Conclusion:

China’s campaign in the Western Balkans is entrenching its influence with security and defense partnerships, technological penetration, and information and media manipulation. This is different from Russia’s more active measures in the region, as China cultivates dependencies in multiple domains. Serbia is central to this campaign since China seeks to weaken European and American cohesion and undermine NATO and EU standards. The risk is that China’s defense transfers, monitoring and surveillance tools, and infrastructure projects create vulnerabilities that could undercut NATO interoperability. With open contracting data standards, American and European institutions can outpace China on governance, sustainable systems, and quality. An approach that combines defense and security with information resilience will deter the Western Balkans from the Chinese influence model and anchor the region on American and European initiatives.

Comment: We cannot think about China only in Asia. It is acting globally in its interests. Is it correct for us to withdraw from other regions (and cede influence to China) to only focus on the homeland and the Asia-Indo-Pacific?

China’s Rising Influence in the Western Balkans and How the West Should Respond

by Dr. Chris J. Dolan

|

11.05.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/05/chinas-rising-influence-in-the-western-balkans/

In the Western Balkans, China blends several operational domains to sway the region toward Beijing and expand itself in Europe. Unlike Russia, which employs disruptive active measures like cyberattacks and disinformation through proxies and intermediaries, China embraces “sharp power” tools centered on defense transfers, selective investments in critical infrastructure, and technological dependencies in surveillance and monitoring. In many ways, Serbia welcomes Chinese influence and serves as a so-called “ironclad strategic partner”. To counter China’s rising influence, the US and NATO allies must adopt proven methods that strengthen security and adapt to the challenges of hybrid war.

Military and Defense

China’s military engagements in the region include arms and weapons sales, technology transfers, and dual-use telecommunications infrastructure, especially in Serbia. Chinese military sales to Serbia outpace other regional arms relationships. While the Western Balkans constitute a small share of this percentage, Serbia is now China’s primary military client in Europe. To complement its recent purchase of French Rafale fighter jets, Mistral air defense systems, and Airbus C-295 transport aircraft, China is supplying Serbia with FK-3 medium-range air defense missile systems, CH-92A and CH-95 combat drones, and 18 FT-8C laser-guided missiles. Moreover, in July 2025, Serbia and China held Peace Defenders joint military exercises in Hebei, China, including special operations forces to strengthen interoperability.

In addition, technology transfers from China assist Serbia in completing sophisticated military projects. One project is ‘Pegaz’ (Pegasus), which is facilitated by China’s state-owned Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. The project will reconstitute Serbia’s 353rd Intelligence Surveillance squadron to specialize in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drone operations. China-Serbia defense exchanges include military training sessions for Serbia’s 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade on Chinese air defense systems.

Serbia embraces China for several reasons. First, Belgrade views it as a dependable security partner that does not interfere in its domestic politics. Second, China-led defense and security cooperation resonates in Serbia as China opposes Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence and objected to NATO military intervention in Serbia in 1999, including the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Third, the growing bilateral military relationship reflects Serbia’s attempt to diversify suppliers and strategic partnerships beyond traditional Western and Russian sources. For China, the relationship extends technological dependencies in ways that could undercut NATO and position it as an alternative security partner beyond Serbia.

Serbian defense cooperation also involves engaging with NATO, reflecting its tradition of balancing both East and West. Since 2006, Serbia has been a Partnership for Peace (PfP) member, and in 2015, it joined the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). These programs allow Serbia to improve interoperability with NATO and participate in, for example, the multinational “Platinum Wolf” exercises, which are focused on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. In addition, Serbia participates in the Defense Education Enhancement Program and the NATO-recognized Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Training Center. While these security partnerships promote defense reforms consistent with Euro-Atlantic integration, Serbia’s commitments are pragmatic and non-binding.

Information, Technology, and Surveillance

China’s messaging emphasizes Beijing as a reliable and benign non-interventionist partner. Huawei is playing a significant role in the digital transformation of the Western Balkans. This is especially the case in Serbia, where Huawei is a key player in several telecommunications projects. The scope of Chinese surveillance deployments is quite far-reaching. For example, in Serbia, at least 40 municipalities have installed video cameras and pedestrian and traffic monitoring systems using $32 million in equipment from Chinese firms Hikvision and Dahua. In 2019, both companies were among 28 Chinese entities blacklisted by the Trump Administration due to security and technology risks and their roles in human-rights abuses.

Moreover, as part of Belgrade’s Safe City project, Serbian police installed thousands of Huawei “smart” cameras that feed into law enforcement database systems for automated public monitoring. Procurement and installation in Serbia are facilitated by Macchina Security, a discreet company that imports Chinese surveillance. In addition, in 2020, Serbia launched a Huawei Digitalization and Innovation Center in Belgrade to develop digital skills, search for cyber talent, and support Serb tech companies using Chinese technologies. Huawei operates a “One Thousand Dreams” initiative to attract young people and promote academic exchanges with schools in China.

Telekom Srbija has a $150 million contract with Huawei to expand broadband, landlines, and fiber optic networks. Huawei is an equipment donor and commercial contractor for Serbia’s National Data Science in Kragujevac, where China supplied a $2 million grant to access the city’s second data center. Huawei has also signed contracts to develop and expand the center’s artificial intelligence platform and cloud storage for state utilization.

There were reports of Serb police sending Chinese surveillance tools and technologies into the north of Kosovo, where Serb municipalities and parallel structures use blacklisted Chinese Dahua cameras and digital recorders to monitor public institutions. A 2021 contract worth €39,000 installed 200 cameras and several digital video recorders for installation in public spaces and schools in at least eleven municipalities in the north of Kosovo. These surveillance operations circumvent the Kosovo Police since they are purchased and installed by Serbian-affiliated businesses not registered in Kosovo. However, in 2023 and 2024, Kosovo Police removed more than 50 surveillance cameras from Zubin Potok and North Mitrovica

In contrast to Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia joined the US-led Clean Network Initiative, banning Chinese companies from involvement in their e-government systems. Although Serbia has welcomed Chinese surveillance, NATO member Montenegro and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain open to integration with China’s systems. Chinese media content is filtered through pro-Russia outlets to promote preferred economic and political themes and downplay transparency and human rights. Confucius Institutes and other academic exchanges reinforce and promote Chinese state authoritarianism.

Recent studies confirm expanding China’s efforts to embed China-friendly narratives through media and digital infrastructure cooperation, as local governments remain receptive and Chinese funding in digital and telecommunications increases over time. Chinese state media outlets China Global Television Network, China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency, and China Radio International distribute preferred content throughout the Western Balkans. China-supported content is also distributed via regional cable operators and online portals in Serbian, Albanian, and Croatian.

Furthermore, China facilitates media-content sharing agreements between Xinhua News Agency and outlets in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, promotes “journalist” visits to China, distributes pro-Beijing “documentaries,” and disseminates media items reinforcing China’s official positions. An International Republican Institute survey reported public views of China were primarily positive in the region compared to select EU member states.

How the West Should Respond

To counter Chinese influence, the US should work with European allies to provide funding alternatives for commercial and military/cybersecurity projects to dissuade Western Balkans countries from falling for Chinese infrastructure financing schemes and defense transfers. Proposed reforms require a strategic mix of security-sector modernization and financing initiatives. The US and partners should build on Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI/PGII) financing models to strengthen military and defense infrastructure resilience with a focus on secure communications, NATO interoperability, cyber threat intelligence and information sharing, regional military and security cooperation training centers, and IT and data storage.

Foreign military financing must be connected to reforms in defense procurement transparency, export control compliance in artificial intelligence and machine learning systems, and adoption of NATO cybersecurity protocols. Corridor-based financing models can be adapted to defense logistics corridors across the Western Balkans; for example, rail lines, ports, and airbases that are dual-use in commercial and military applications. This would ensure that US and EU-backed projects enhance NATO operational mobility, interoperability, and readiness in Southeastern Europe.

To insulate procurement and financing against corruption and elite capture, Western Balkans governments should look to Ukraine’s ProZorro/DoZorro open-contracting data standards (OCDS). OCDS provides globally recognized standards that digitize tenders, public machine-readable data, and empower watchdogs to identify irregularities. OCDS-compliant procurement measures with multilingual interfaces and API-level transparency make it harder for China’s state-led deals to circumvent scrutiny and easier for US CFD/EIB-backed bids to compete on quality as opposed to political access and influence.  Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that Ukraine has shown material savings, higher competition, and civic oversight across legal systems.

OCDS would improve transparency in the acquisition of surveillance systems, drones, and counter-drone operations, and dual-use technologies in a region susceptible to corrupt contracting practices and political meddling. Also, transparent tendering limits the ability of localized political elites to privilege Chinese and Russian defense suppliers while enhancing NATO interoperability by making procurement data and information visible and benchmarked against transatlantic alliance standards and guidelines. OCDS-oversight would build the resilience of Western Balkans defense ministries and security forces against Chinese and Russian influence operations seeking to exploit vulnerabilities and insert dependencies into defense industrial sectors and critical military infrastructure.

OCDS creates a more level and competitive playing field. Technical merit and compliance with NATO standards should be benchmarks for evaluating bids as opposed to informal political access and influence. US, UK, and EU counter-unmanned aerial systems, communications networks, and platforms would be preferred by quality and design. At the operational level, implementing OCDS would strengthen military force readiness by mitigating delivery delays and cost inflation while also providing legislatures, government auditors, and non-governmental organizations with a vantage point into whether promised defense capabilities are being procured. This approach would boost the credibility and legitimacy of Western Balkan states within NATO and strengthen the case for future alliance membership, as they would be much less vulnerable to malign influence by Chinese and Russian defense providers.

Furthermore, extending the scope of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program to provide advanced drone and ISR training would offer viable substitutes to the Chinese CH-92A and CH-95 systems in Serbia. SPS is funding the Ai4CUAV project to enable the detection, classification, and tracking of killer drones. Export controls modeled on the US Entity List could be jointly applied by the EU to Chinese defense contractors, limiting their ability to transfer sensitive dual-use technologies.

And where Serbia hedges via Chinese defense purchases and technology transfers, NATO/EU should offer modular interoperability packages—humanitarian/CBRN, ISR, cyber defense—that give immediate capability gains in exchange for verifiable vendor-risk mitigation and transparency benchmarks. Specifically, NATO’s Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) provides advisory and practical assistance to partner countries that include CBRN, ISR, and cyber training. Also, the JCBRN Defense Center of Excellence offers training courses for NATO members and partners in CBRN/humanitarian modules. For governments already restricting untrusted vendors (e.g., MOU 5G security in Kosovo and Albania), preferential access to Global Gateway/PGI pipelines and Millennium Challenge Corporation-style compacts can be fast-tracked to reward reforms and crowd in private capital.

Another consideration would be to adopt the corridor-based consortium financing model in the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI/PGII) on Africa’s Lobito Corridor. The project is a large-scale infrastructure and logistics initiative with a rail linkage system connecting the port of Lobito in Angola with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to export critical minerals, expand regional market access, modernize trade and transport logistics, and develop and finance digital access and energy initiatives. This approach, which blends development banks with commercial lenders and private operators under transparent standards, can be applied to priority projects in the Western Balkans (Corridor VIII; Belgrade–Niš upgrades). This offers the Western Balkans a practical template for connecting critical minerals and transport value chains with a rules-based and transparent financing model.

In cybersecurity, the region needs incentives for alternatives to Huawei-enabled surveillance and monitoring systems and Chinese-built and supported AI and data centers. Western digital projects should fund NATO-compliant data facilities and regional cyber and threat intelligence training centers. The Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Center in Podgorica offers trainings in cybersecurity, cybercrime, and cyber diplomacy for civil servants, CERT members, police, prosecutors, and critical infrastructure operators. While it would be a significant effort to mitigate the risk of Chinese technology penetration, the Adriatic Charter and the Regional Cooperation Council could be expanded to include cyber threat intelligence and information sharing. The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats training programs should include Balkan security officials to equip them with skills to detect and dismantle Chinese-aligned cyber surveillance in law enforcement operations.

Conclusion

China’s campaign in the Western Balkans is entrenching its influence with security and defense partnerships, technological penetration, and information and media manipulation. This is different from Russia’s more active measures in the region, as China cultivates dependencies in multiple domains. Serbia is central to this campaign since China seeks to weaken European and American cohesion and undermine NATO and EU standards. The risk is that China’s defense transfers, monitoring and surveillance tools, and infrastructure projects create vulnerabilities that could undercut NATO interoperability. With open contracting data standards, American and European institutions can outpace China on governance, sustainable systems, and quality. An approach that combines defense and security with information resilience will deter the Western Balkans from the Chinese influence model and anchor the region on American and European initiatives.

Tags: Balkans, China, China strategic influence, EU, NATO

About The Author

• 
  
• Dr. Chris J. Dolan
• Dr. Chris J. Dolan is an Assistant Teaching Professor in the School of Public Affairs at Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg where he specializes in defense and security cooperation, critical infrastructure and cyber defense, hybrid warfare, and advanced defense technologies. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Kosovo and North Macedonia, a Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Specialist at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, and an Open-Source Intelligence Specialist with the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. He blends academic knowledge with practical experience in assessing hybrid war threats. He is the author of two books on NATO and four on U.S. foreign policy as well as numerous articles.

14. Putin orders increased drone 'incursions' in Europe as Russia ramps up 'hybrid war'

​Summary:

Putin has intensified drone incursions across Europe as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy to sow division and test NATO’s defences. Drones have disrupted airports and violated airspace in Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, and others. European leaders call it deliberate destabilization, prompting heightened radar surveillance, joint NATO monitoring, and potential escalation responses.

​Comment: What actions can NATO take to make Putin stop? What is his objective? As stated, is it to "sow division inside Europe?"

Putin orders increased drone 'incursions' in Europe as Russia ramps up 'hybrid war' - with Belgium's biggest airport forced to close overnight

By KEVIN ADJEI-DARKO, SENIOR FOREIGN NEWS REPORTER

Published: 04:39 EST, 5 November 2025 | Updated: 07:23 EST, 5 November 2025

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15260179/Putin-orders-increased-drone-incursions-Europe-Russia-ramps-hybrid-war-Belgiums-biggest-airport-forced-close-overnight.html

Vladimir Putin has increasingly ordered drone incursions in Europe over the last few months as Russia ramps up what officials say is its hybrid war with countries on the continent.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the pattern as 'hybrid warfare'. She said Russia's goal is to 'sow division' inside Europe.

She did not accuse Moscow of being behind every flight, but said the aim was clearly to unsettle European countries and weaken unity.

Yesterday, Brussels Airport, the busiest in Belgium, was forced to shut after drone sightings. Operations in a smaller airport in Liege also came to a halt after drones were spotted.

The country's defence minister, Theo Francken, was adamant that professionals caused the disruptions and said they were carried out to destabilise the country.

It led the interior minister, Bernard Quintin, to ask prime minister Bart De Wever to convene the National Security Council. He also stated that the incident necessitated a 'coordinated, national response'.

Although the airport reopened this morning, there are still major delays with thousands of passengers left stranded.

On Sunday, Francken said experts were probing drone sightings over the Kleine Brognel air base in north-east Belgium. Last week, there were two sightings over a military air base in the south-east.

The country also reported drones over a military base near the German border.

Since September, several countries have reported suspicious drone activities and illegal incursions into airspace.

Yesterday, Brussels airport, Belgium's busiest was forced to shut after drones were spotted, leaving passengers stranded

Russian MIG-31 fighter jets above Estonia's airpace on September 19. Vladimir Putin has been accused of ordering several incursions into Europe

Vladimir Putin has been accused of attempting to unsettles European countries with his 'hybrid war'

At the end of last month, Polish MiG-29 fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea. Days before that, the army had reported a similar incident.

During an attack on overnight attack on Ukraine on September 9, over 20 Russian drones crossed into Poland.

NATO responded by sending F-35 and F-16 jets, helicopters and a Patriot missile battery to reinforce the area. Warsaw also requested consultations under NATO's Article 4, which permits allies to discuss threats to their security.

On 19 September, Estonia reported that three powerful Russian MIG-31 fighter jets had violated its airspace and stayed there for a total of 12 minutes.

The incident sparked World War Three concerns when one of the falling drones that were shot down hit an elderly couple's home, destroying the roof.

Experts have acknowledged that war could have broken out between Russia and NATO had they been killed.

On September 10, the Czech army also reported a spike in unidentified drones over sensitive military facilities.

In Denmark, drone activity disrupted six airports that month, including Copenhagen Airport, the busiest travel hub in the Nordic region. It left around 20,000 passengers stranded.

Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called it a hybrid attack on her country. He also said it was 'the worst attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date.'

The roof of an elderly couple's home was completely destroyed after falling Russian drones struck it

Copenhagen Airport was forced to close, leaving 20,000 passengers uncertain about their journeys

Lithuania was forced to close Vilnius Airport and nearby border checkpoints with Belarus on October 28, after strange aerial objects, including helium balloons, entered its skies. The country said this was one of four similar incidents in a single week.

The country also accused Russia of flying two military aircraft, a Su-30 fighter jet and an II-78 refuelling tanker, into its airspace for around 18 seconds in October.

Its president, Gitanas Nauseda, said: 'I strongly condemn the violation of Lithuanian airspace by the fighter jet and transport plane of the Russian Federation from a Kaliningrad region site.' He also called it a 'blatant breach'. Moscow has denied the report.

Germany has faced repeated reports of drones this autumn.

Airports in Berlin and Bremen briefly shut down after sightings, while Munich also saw suspicious activity.

A confidential police report mentioned multiple incidents at military sites, raising concerns about espionage or sabotage.

Officials in the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein confirmed drones had appeared overnight in late September and said the purpose was under investigation.

Elsewhere in northern Europe, Oslo Airport in Norway briefly paused landings after a drone was seen near the runway.

Last month, the country's army reported that two NATO F-35s were scrambled to intercept a Russian spy plane. The jets, from NATO's Quick Reaction Alert, identified an IL-20 COOT-A flying in international airspace above Finnmark.

Two NATO F-35s were scrambled to intercepted a Russian spy plane that had flown into Norway's airspace

In mid-September, Romania scrambled aircraft when a drone crossed into its airspace during Russian strikes on Ukrainian border towns.

Spanish authorities also halted flights at Palma de Mallorca Airport on October 20 after drone sightings.

European leaders and NATO analysts believe the activity is part of a wider effort by Russia to test air defences and intimidate European countries while the war in Ukraine continues.

Several nations have increased radar surveillance, put military units on standby and launched joint monitoring operations with NATO allies.

Officials across the continent have urged NATO leaders to do more in response to Russia's continued provocations.

Latvia's president has said it is time for a shift in approach from 'air policing' to full 'air defence'.

In September, a NATO commander also said the organisation could soon make it easier for member countries to shoot down Russian aircraft.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone said: '[Air defence] could be an option, depending on what will be the final assessment on what is being investigated right now. I would say that this could be one of the options but not the [only] option.'

Countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have warned Russia that it would not hesitate to shoot down aircraft that violate its airspace.

Russian officials, however, have warned that the shooting down of any of its aircraft could amount to war.

Daily Mail · KEVIN ADJEI-DARKO, SENIOR FOREIGN NEWS REPORTER · November 5, 2025

15. Russia’s New War Grifters—The ‘Black Widows’ Duping Soldiers Into Marriage

​Summary:

Russian courts are uncovering “black widow” schemes in which women allegedly trick soldiers into hasty marriages to collect death payouts, often $180,000 to $200,000, after the men are killed in Ukraine. Lawmakers propose harsher penalties and limits on benefits; prosecutors describe organized gangs arranging sham unions. Social media groups on VK connect women with servicemen, easing exploitation. Cases feature annulments, appeals, and bitter fights among relatives over compensation. Authorities say large wartime incentives have flooded poor regions with cash, fueling fraud and disputes. While the scale is uncertain, officials warn the practice undermines support for troops and invites tighter controls on benefits.

​Comment: War brings out the worst in some people in every country.  

Russia’s New War Grifters—The ‘Black Widows’ Duping Soldiers Into Marriage

WSJ

Authorities say women are marrying servicemen in an attempt to get the death payouts that go to their families

By

Matthew Luxmoore

and Milàn Czerny

Nov. 4, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russias-new-war-griftersthe-black-widows-duping-soldiers-into-marriage-2d02c6a5

An army billboard in Moscow by Russia’s Foreign Ministry reads, ‘Our Defenders! Thanks Native Ones!’ ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP/Getty Images

• Russian courts have identified several cases of women allegedly tricking soldiers into marriage to claim death payouts, which can exceed $180,000.
• Lawmakers are proposing new legislation to deter ‘black widows,’ women who marry soldiers for financial gain, including harsher penalties and limiting benefits.
• The phenomenon is fueled by substantial financial incentives offered to soldiers, including high salaries and large death benefits for their families.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Russian courts have identified several cases of women allegedly tricking soldiers into marriage to claim death payouts, which can exceed $180,000.

When Russian soldier Sergey Khandozhko got married the day after enlisting in October 2023, his family and friends were confused. The 40-year-old had never mentioned the bride. Nor had he spoken of marriage.

More puzzling was the 20-minute wedding ceremony without photos or exchange of rings, and only one guest. Afterward, Khandozhko’s new wife even carried on living with her ex-husband and their children, according to testimony and a court ruling reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

But alarm bells began to ring after Khandozhko died of injuries inflicted on the battlefield in Ukraine and his bride received the lump sum paid to every fallen soldier’s next of kin, the soldier’s sister-in-law said in an interview. The payout, totaling $200,000, is almost 20 times the average annual salary in Russia.

Khandozhko died in war.

A judge in a Russian civil court ruled earlier this year that Khandozhko’s bride, Elena Sokolova, had tricked him into marrying her so that she could collect his inheritance. The marriage was annulled and Sokolova had to pay a 3,000 ruble fine, equivalent to $37. Sokolova, who has appealed the court’s ruling, didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Targeting Russian soldiers for financial gain has become so widespread in wartime Russia that people have begun to label the women who do so “black widows.” Courts tackling the problem are trying to determine whether the marriages were genuine or entered into by the woman purely for financial gain upon their husband’s death.

Russian lawmakers have proposed laws that would levy harsher penalties for those behind such acts or limit the benefits they can accrue from having married a soldier.

The phenomenon stems in part from the large payments Russia has had to offer to entice men to risk their lives on the front lines of its brutal war with Ukraine. That includes high salaries and bonuses for joining and large payouts to the families of those who die on the front lines.

Payouts to families of deceased soldiers often exceed 14.5 million rubles, or $180,000, depending on rank and circumstances. The money has flooded poor Russian regions that many front-line soldiers hail from, provoking feuds between relatives over the proceeds, and attracting those looking for a share.

Estranged fathers have reappeared laying claim to part of the proceeds, according to court statements reviewed by the Journal. Grandparents have demanded money as recompense for having spent years caring for a grandson taken in battle.

But Russian lawmakers and officials say schemes in which women alone or as part of a group persuade soldiers into marriages before they go to war—in the hope of benefiting from their deaths in battle—are particularly pernicious.

“These monsters have chosen to disgrace the most sacred thing—care for the families of fallen heroes!” lawmaker Leonid Slutsky said this summer. He compared the women involved to looters during the Siege of Leningrad in World War II.

Russian legal experts say the true scale of the problem is hard to ascertain. The Journal identified half a dozen Russian court cases in which it was alleged or concluded that a Russian soldier or their relatives had been cheated of money earned in the trenches through a sham marriage.

Social media makes it easy for potential scammers to find soldiers. On Russia’s VK platform, there are dozens of groups specifically for women seeking potential husbands serving in Ukraine—with names such as “Dates with Soldiers” and “Dates with Shoulder Marks,” a euphemism for someone in uniform.

Russia’s VK platform features groups tailored to women seeking potential husbands serving in Ukraine. Uncredited

Russian authorities say criminal gangs are involved in some of the scams—sometimes seeking to ensnare multiple soldiers at once.

One gang operating in the central Russian region of Khanty-Mansiysk sought out single men and convinced them to sign military service contracts, according to the Investigative Committee in the region. The group then arranged sham marriages for the men and convinced them to hand over control of their finances, the Investigative Committee said.

The number of soldiers taken in by the scam, which netted around 30 million rubles, or $370,000, and which was prosecuted under organized crime laws, hasn’t been made public.

In February, a Russian prosecutor in the country’s far east alleged that a married couple had duped a 46-year-old man without relatives into marrying their 63-year-old female accomplice, before convincing him to sign a military contract.

“The goal was to steal the money in an event giving rise to a payment for relatives since they understood that the man had no other heirs,” the prosecutor’s office said.

When the man died, the group opened a bank account in the name of his widow, applied for the funds owed to his next of kin and shared eight million rubles, equivalent to almost $100,000, between them, according to the prosecutor’s office. The marriage was declared invalid and the case, in which neither the soldier nor the suspects have been named, is ongoing.

Some lawmakers have called for criminal liability against individuals who enter a sham marriage with a soldier to receive state benefits.

Two other lawmakers have proposed legislation designed to deny divorcing wives the right to a share in their ex-husband’s service payments if the couple married after the start of the conflict.

In April, a Siberian court found a real-estate agent guilty of inciting hatred and enmity by urging women to marry soldiers for “self-interested reasons.” The agent, Marina Orlova, had spoken on a podcast about meeting women who were trying to purchase homes with large sums of money they had obtained by inheriting it from soldiers.

“It’s very easy. Find a guy serving on the front, and when he dies you get eight million,” Orlova said in the podcast. “It’s a business plan.” Orlova didn’t respond to a request for comment.

In a video posted online by the local police, Orlova apologized for her statement on the podcast, which also aired as an interview on YouTube. “I want to offer my deepest apologies for the video that was posted online—to the participants of the Special Military Operation, to the widows, to the mothers and to the wives,” she said, using the Kremlin’s euphemism for its war in Ukraine.

Some of the cases reviewed by the Journal involved messy family disputes over payments from fallen soldiers.

In August last year, Angelina Varyukhina married soldier Georgy Kostyrko, 27, in a town southeast of Moscow. The couple, who met on social media, lived together for 11 days, according to court documents containing the court’s decision about the couple’s relationship, before Kostyrko returned to war.

Kostyrko filed for divorce several months later, and in February, a Russian judge annulled the marriage, allowing one month for the decision to be appealed. Two weeks later, Kostyrko was killed on the front line in Russia’s Kursk region, and a day after that, Varyukhina appealed the annulment of her marriage, Kostyrko’s mother Olga Kostyrko told Russia’s NTV television channel.

That left Varyukhina as the beneficiary of Kostyrko’s death payout, according to Andranik Grigoryan, the lawyer representing the Kostyrko family. The soldier’s mother then sued Varyukhina, alleging that she had been unfaithful to Kostyrko throughout their brief marriage and was now seeking to profit from her son’s death, according to court documents published online by Grigoryan.

During the case, Varyukhina posted clips on Instagram of the couple goofing around in an apartment and dressing up in funny outfits. “Does anyone still doubt that we are right for each other?” she wrote in an April post, a month after Kostyrko’s death. She told NTV in April that she needed the payouts to cover debts Kostyrko had saddled her family with.

Varyukhina, 22, didn’t respond to a request for comment and wasn’t represented by a lawyer in court. She lost the case in June and had her rights to the payouts revoked.

Grigoryan, the lawyer representing Kostyrko’s family, said the case was a lesson for Russian society and the growing number of combat veterans it has placed on a pedestal. “Her attempt to profit from her deceased husband’s blood is not just immoral, it is pure betrayal,” he said.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 5, 2025, print edition as 'Russian ‘Black Widows’ Cash In on War Deaths'.

WSJ

16. The trouble with US veterans benefits isn’t ‘rampant’ fraud – it’s bureaucratic roadblocks, advocates say

​Summary:

Veterans groups and experts rejected The Washington Post’s claim of “rampant” disability fraud, arguing the real crisis is a burdensome VA system that delays rightful benefits. They note fraud cases are extremely rare, some 0.005% of payouts,while millions suffer lasting injuries from Iraq and Afghanistan. Critics say the Post misrepresented data and ignored complex, service-connected conditions like PTSD, tinnitus, and toxic exposure. Advocates warn such reporting could justify cuts to veterans’ benefits under Project 2025. Former VA Secretary David Shulkin said veterans face needless bureaucracy, not corruption, and that the system’s flaws unfairly punish those it was designed to protect.

​Comment: After the government shutdown ends I may test the system and submit my claim for benefits.

The trouble with US veterans benefits isn’t ‘rampant’ fraud – it’s bureaucratic roadblocks, advocates say

Veterans groups say recent Washington Post stories on VA disability payments paint a misleading picture. The paper stands by its reporting

The Guardian · Aaron Glantz · November 4, 2025

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/04/washington-post-report-veterans-benefits

In October, the Washington Post reported that it had uncovered “rampant exaggeration and fraud” in the US Department of Veterans Affairs’ disability benefits system.

“Military veterans are swamping the US government with dubious disability claims … exploiting the country’s sacred commitment to compensate those harmed in the line of duty,” the newspaper reported.

But the Post’s claims about American veterans committing disability fraud are fundamentally flawed, according to government documents, legal experts, current and former VA officials, members of Congress, advocates, and veterans themselves.

They say that the Post’s reporting fails to account for the physical and mental toll of sustained military conflict on service members – and improperly casts the actions of several dozen veterans convicted of lying about their disabilities as representative of widespread fraud.

Rather than providing evidence of a pervasive problem, experts say, the convictions show that the system for combating fraud is working.

The American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America and Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America have condemned the Post’s series of stories as misleading and insulting to veterans who have sacrificed for their country.

Others worry the Post’s stories will be used as a pretext to reduce benefits for former members of the US military. Project 2025, which has served as an intellectual guide for Trump’s second term, proposes that the VA “target significant cost savings” by “revising disability rating awards for future claimants”.

Dr David Shulkin: ‘Veterans are forced to navigate a benefits system that places the burden on them to gather extensive documentation.’ Photograph: The Washington Post/Getty Images

Dr David Shulkin, who served as the VA’s undersecretary for health under President Barack Obama and secretary of veterans affairs in the first Trump administration, said the Post mischaracterized his comments about the benefits system.

Shulkin was quoted as saying “my belief is that this is a flawed system. Many of these conditions are hard to measure.” He told the Guardian he said those words, but that they were used to “mean the opposite” of what he intended – which was that the system is flawed because it prevents or delays many veterans from getting their rightful benefits that they have earned.

“Veterans are forced to navigate a benefits system that places the burden on them to gather extensive documentation,” Shulkin wrote in a social media post describing the Post’s first story. “The sheer complexity of the process leads to unnecessary delays and denials – not because of veterans’ shortcomings, but because of how the system is designed. Blaming veterans reflects a misunderstanding of how the system actually works.”

In response to questions from the Guardian, the Post defended the accuracy of its reporting. “We stand by this year-long, data-driven investigative series conducted by Washington Post reporters known for their thoroughness and factual, accountability journalism,” the statement said. “Its findings are based on public records and more than 100 on-the-record interviews, including from veterans and current and former VA officials.”

The newspaper said it represented Shulkin’s comments fairly, saying: “Former VA Secretary Shulkin confirmed the accuracy of his quotations with a Post reporter before and after publication.”

The Post said “reporting on fraud is essential to safeguarding benefits programs funded by taxpayers and ensuring resources reach the veterans who need them most”.

Politicians from both parties have attacked the series. At a hearing last week of the Senate committee on veterans affairs, Republican Tim Sheehy of Montana, a combat veteran and former Navy Seal, called it “poisonous and disgusting”. Senator Tammy Duckworth, a Democrat from Illinois who lost her legs in Iraq, called it an effort to “falsely depict our nation’s veterans as a group of dishonest fraudsters and cheaters”.

“Nobody is denying the unfortunate reality that a small number of veterans exist who will dishonor their service and their fellow veterans by defrauding the VA,” Duckworth said, saying she supports robust enforcement. “The mistake we must avoid is allowing a minority of criminals to dictate the redesign of the disability benefits system into a bureaucratic black box that is more frustrating and less fair and will leave more veterans waiting and dying waiting to get their benefits they earned.”

The committee chairman, Republican Jerry Moran of Kansas, acknowledged “concerns and frustrations” about the articles, but added that the Post series “provides us an opportunity to have an important discussion about whether the system we have built is serving the needs of veterans today, and how we can reform it to better serve those it was designed to help”.

The VA has condemned the Post’s reporting as “garbage”, but declined to provide specifics.

Here are some of the key points that the Post’s story highlights – and what experts, veterans and the public record say:

The Post reported “taxpayers will spend roughly $193bn this year for the VA to compensate about 6.9 million disabled veterans on the presumption that their ability to work is impaired”. It notes this is a sixfold increase since 2001, adjusted for inflation.

Experts say that this increase represents a predictable outcome of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the longest in American history.

More than 4 million Americans have served in the global “war on terror”, with 77% deployed to a war theater and 58% serving in a combat zone. The absence of a draft meant a higher share of veterans of these wars served multiple deployments than previous wars, leading to higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and physical injuries from bomb blasts.

Linda Bilmes, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, who co-authored the 2008 book The Three Trillion Dollar War, noted that the heavy use of military contractors to fill support rolls such as cooks and mechanics also meant that a greater proportion of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans were exposed to violence.

Bilmes estimated that the cost of disability benefits for the Iraq and Afghanistan generation would reach between $1.3tn and $1.5tn by 2050.

A man identifying himself as a Vietnam war veteran visits the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, in May 2023, in Washington DC. Photograph: The Washington Post/Getty Images

“I see no evidence of fraud greater than in any other government program,” she said. Instead, Bilmes said, the sticker shock came from a lack of planning. When Congress authorizes a war and the Pentagon fights it, no one plans for the long-term cost, which grows as veterans age, injuries sustained in service become more debilitating and diseases from toxic exposure develop.

The cost of veterans’ benefits from the first world war and the second world war crested about 50 years after the end of those conflicts, she said, while benefits costs to Vietnam veterans were hitting their apex now.

The Post told the Guardian: “It is important to note that injuries or illnesses from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the only driver of the increase in claims since 2001” and that “the VA does not track how many disabilities were incurred from combat or war compared to regular or peacetime military service.”

The VA does track disabilities by the era in which the veteran served. According to the agency’s most recent benefits report, 1.6 million “compensation recipients” served in the global “war on terror”. The most prevalent disabilities among these veterans are tinnitus, knee injuries and PTSD.

Experts say the VA’s primary interest in tracking claims was not whether the disability was caused by combat, but whether it was connected to military service – for example, not whether the cause of a back injury was a bomb blast or a training accident.

The Post reported that the number of disabilities claimed by veterans is growing – noting that last year “each disabled veteran received, on average, benefits for a combination of about seven injuries and illnesses, up from 2.5 per person in 2001”.

Experts say this is not an indication of dubious claims but rather the nature of injuries sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For example, the Pentagon reported that 518,000 military members experienced at least one brain injury between 2000 and 2025. A body of scientific research has found that “even mild cases can involve serious long-term effects on areas such as thinking ability, memory, mood and focus” as well as “headaches, vision and hearing problems”.

In the VA disability claims process, each of these symptoms – tinnitus, migraines and mental health conditions – are evaluated separately, as are, for example, back injuries sustained from a Humvee rollover or other event that caused a concussion.

VA researchers have also found “chronic multisymptom illness” to be common among Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, likely from toxic exposure. The ailment presents a combination of chronic symptoms “such as fatigue, joint pain, indigestion, insomnia, dizziness, breathing problems and memory problems”. Veterans of the 1990-1991 Gulf war, who number 700,000, face similar problems.

A Post headline said the “VA’s disability program is an ‘honor system.’”

The Post cited a 2021 court filing by federal prosecutors who brought charges against an Army veteran who defrauded the VA of more than $200,000. “One inherent problem [VA] must contend with, is that it operates on an honor system with its veterans,” the prosecutors wrote. “The result is that some veterans can, and unfortunately some veterans do take advantage.”

Veterans and legal experts say calling the disability benefits program an “honor system” misrepresents the process. To get a disability claim approved, a veteran must have a current condition, an event in service and a medical opinion linking the current condition to the event in service. All of this must be documented as part of the claim.

If the veteran’s claim advances past a paper review, an independent physician – either a VA doctor or a federal contractor – must evaluate the veteran’s condition, confirm its connection to military service and establish the severity of its impact on their ability to work using a rating schedule published in the federal code.

This process often takes years to complete and results in many wrongful denials, VA data shows.

The Post’s reporting “is grossly misleading and one-sided and misrepresents the facts”, said Rose Carmen Goldberg, director of the Veterans Legal Services Clinic at Yale Law School. “For many veterans, seeking benefits represents a second battle, a painful and retraumatizing experience where they are forced to open up old wounds to share with strangers and the most difficult experiences of their lives.”

When Joseph Castellanos returned home from Afghanistan, he ended up homeless, sleeping on the streets and beaches of his hometown, Long Beach, California.

Joseph Castellanos. Photograph: Courtesy of Joseph Castellanos

A VA doctor diagnosed him with PTSD, which the former senior airman said was tied to his experience being mortared while stationed at Bagram air force base in Afghanistan. Castellanos, who is gay and joined the military when it was illegal for LGBTQ+ individuals to serve openly, also said he was raped twice during his four years in the service.

Like many veterans who say they experienced sexual assault in uniform (the VA estimates 41% of women and 4% of men in the service experience military sexual trauma), Castellanos did not file a report, so there was no paper trail.

In 2014, a VA compensation examiner conceded that Castellanos had most likely been “raped at some point in his life” but concluded that he had not been sexually assaulted while in the military. The examiner also rejected Castellanos’s statements that he was traumatized by mortar fire in Afghanistan, noting he continued to be a top performer throughout his deployment.

It would take Castellanos four years to get his disability claim approved. During most of that time, he was homeless. The disability payments he finally received have stabilized Castellanos’s life. He is currently pursuing a doctorate in cultural studies and a law degree, which he plans to use to help other veterans with disability benefit appeals.

In its statement to the Guardian, the Post said it “reported in great detail how the disability claims process works and how, under the law, medical conditions must be documented as ‘service-connected’ to qualify for compensation”.

The newspaper also said that “while some ailments can be verified with X-rays or blood samples, many of the most common claims filed with VA – including depression, back pain, erectile dysfunction and migraine headaches – are difficult to confirm with objective medical tests”.

The Post reported that it examined “how some veterans have conned the government” by obtaining records from 30 disability fraud cases that have led to criminal convictions since 2017. The Post said it uncovered “cases of brazen fraud totaling tens of millions of dollars”.

Many of those cases led to lengthy prison sentences. Barry Hoover, for example, a Navy veteran who faked blindness, was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to pay $400,000 in restitution.

No examples of veterans who perpetrated fraud but went unpunished were revealed by the Post.

The VA disability compensation system provided nearly 7 million veterans an estimated $193bn in benefits in 2024. The tens of millions of dollars in fraud cited by the Post represents less than one-one-hundredth of a percent (0.005%) of that total.

In its statement, the Post said it “repeatedly reported in its articles that VA officials, veterans groups and independent analysts say most disability claims are legitimate. At the same time, current and former VA officials say fraud investigations are relatively rare because of a lack of resources and because VA does not place a high priority on policing fraud.”

It said that while the amount of fraud within the system “is inherently unquantifiable, no one seriously doubts that it far exceeds the amount from the tiny fraction of cases that have resulted in prosecution”.

The Post reported that “the number of veterans receiving benefits for disabilities such as tinnitus and post-traumatic stress disorder has grown exponentially since 2001”.

More than 1 million veterans of the global “war on terror” have received disability ratings for tinnitus, according to the most recent annual VA benefits report. And more than 700,000 have received disability ratings for PTSD, according to the VA. These numbers are in line with scientific estimates of their prevalence among Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans.

Tinnitus, a persistent ringing in the ears, is associated with concussions and exposure to loud noises, including bomb blasts and the persistent hum of diesel engines. One study found 34% of service members and 44% of veterans experience “constant tinnitus”.

Of the 5.8 million veterans treated by VA clinicians in fiscal year 2024, about 14 out of every 100 men and 24 out of every 100 women were diagnosed with PTSD, according to the National Center for PTSD. The center estimates that 15% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans experienced PTSD last year, with nearly 30% experiencing it during their lifetime.

The Post reported that “556,000 veterans receive disability benefits for eczema”.

Eczema, a chronic skin condition characterized by itchy, inflamed and scaly skin, is highly associated with deployments to desert environments and toxic exposure during the Gulf war and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

The vast majority of veterans with service-connected skin conditions receive no financial compensation for that disability. According to the VA’s annual benefits report, 77% of disability ratings for skin conditions are determined to be “zero percent” – meaning that veterans are allowed to receive free healthcare for the injury or disease but not money.

“A zero percent service connection means VA will treat that condition,” said Iraq war veteran Ryan Gallucci, assistant adjutant general of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). “That’s why people file. A majority of veterans want the disabilities to go away if they can be treated.”

The VA healthcare system rations care through the use of eight priority groups. Except for the most disabled or indigent veterans, care is typically only provided for conditions connected to military service.

For payment to be provided for eczema, claims examiners must find lesions covering at least 5% of the body or that require regular treatment.

For veterans to receive the maximum rating for eczema – which entitles them to approximately $1,500 a month – the lesions must cover at least 40% of the veterans’ body or require “near-constant systemic care”. According to the VA’s annual benefits report, only 1% of veterans with a service-connected skin condition receive this amount of money for it.

“We’re not talking about a little rash that you put some over-the-counter cream on,” said Kayla Williams, an Iraq war veteran and former director of the VA’s Center for Women Veterans. “If you’re getting compensation, you have a serious skin condition.”

Kayla Williams. Photograph: Courtesy of Kayla Williams

Williams told the Guardian she was service-connected for eczema but received no compensation for the condition. She said she wanted it in her record in case the condition got worse later so she would not have to prove it was linked to her military service. By that time, the records she would need to rely on might have disappeared.

The Post reported veterans have received disability compensation for “toenail fungus”.

Very few veterans actually receive compensation for this malady. Money is only provided if an examiner finds the fungus covers more than 5% of the veterans’ entire body or 20% of their foot, according to the federal regulations.

“Foot health is a serious issue in the military,” said the VFW’s Gallucci, who said he went two months without a shower in Iraq. Amid the pressure of war, fungal growth can go unattended and become a chronic condition, he said. “We’re not talking about simple athlete’s foot here. If you can’t get rid of it, then it becomes a service-connected condition.”

The Post did not report how many people had received compensation for toe-nail fungus in its stories. In response to questions from the Guardian, the paper said 179,000 veterans had a service-connection for dermatophytosis (or fungal infections) in fiscal year 2023.

According to the VA ratings schedule, that figure includes permanent fungal infections covering any part of the body including feet, face, beard, back, groin and thighs. The Post did not indicate how many veterans receive monetary compensation for this malady. The Guardian queried the VA, which declined to provide data on compensation citing the government shutdown.

The Post said: “We consider it newsworthy that VA grants disability benefits for toenail fungus and other minor afflictions.”

The Post reported that the “VA generally considers combat veterans who had their legs amputated below the knee to be 40% disabled. At that rate, they receive $774 per month, more with dependents.”

This is technically correct; however, veterans and legal experts say it would be uncommon to find an amputee who was rated less than 100% disabled. The veteran who lost their leg in the war would most certainly also have suffered nerve damage and musculoskeletal injuries in other parts of their body.

In response to questions from the Guardian, the Post said this did not contradict their reporting, stating that “as the Post has reported, most veterans who receive disability benefits are being compensated for multiple conditions”.

The Post reported sleep apnea “is now one of VA’s most frequently claimed disabilities. Last year, 659,335 vets received compensation for it. That’s about 11 times the number who did in 2009, VA figures show.”

Veteran advocates and former VA officials acknowledge that this was an issue and that the rating schedule for sleep apnea – developed decades ago – was prone to abuse.

In 2022, the Biden administration proposed new standards that reduced the amount of potential compensation for the condition, providing payments only to veterans who could prove their ability to work was affected. The proposed rules also asked examiners to query veterans about whether they had first tried less intensive therapies, such as weight loss, before trying a sleep mask.

A VA spokesperson said the agency “is on a pace” to complete modernization of the entire disability ratings schedule “during the second Trump administration”.

An official with the federal general accountability office told Congress last week that the federal code remains antiquated in four areas – respiratory conditions, ear and auditory conditions, neurology and mental health – but has been updated for other parts of the body.

The Guardian · Aaron Glantz · November 4, 2025

17. Japan Can Keep the Indo-Pacific Open and Free: With America Stepping Back, Tokyo Should Step Up

​Summary:

Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, seeks to revive Shinzo Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision as U.S. commitment wanes and Chinese influence grows. Japan aims to sustain rules-based order through trade, development partnerships, and regional security cooperation. By leveraging goodwill, bolstering defense spending, and supporting nations from Southeast Asia to the Pacific Islands, Tokyo can strengthen autonomy and deter Chinese coercion. Takaichi’s challenge lies in balancing coalition politics, domestic constraints, and defense costs while reaffirming Japan’s leadership in sustaining an open, stable Indo-Pacific. Her results-driven diplomacy could keep the region free, prosperous, and aligned with democratic norms.

Excerpts:

Yet a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is an area in which Takaichi can build support across the political spectrum. Conservatives embrace the strategy because it shows Japan’s leadership in the region and projects an image of a strong Japan. Moderates see it as a way to promote a Japanese style of diplomacy that emphasizes a collective approach. There is wide support in Tokyo for the government’s commitment to double national defense spending, which Takaichi has declared she will achieve by March 2026, rather than the initial plan to do so by 2027. Takaichi has also repeatedly called for strengthening ties with allies to ensure freedom of navigation and for improving coordination with major regional partners, including Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea.

...

By tapping seasoned trade negotiators for two key positions—foreign minister and minister of economy, trade, and industry—Takaichi has signaled that she values experience in foreign and economic policy. But in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, the new prime minister cannot merely offer a redux of what Abe created. She will need to effectively reestablish Japan as a central pillar of stability in the volatile Indo-Pacific. A realistic vision of support and cooperation will show the region that a deeper commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific is the best strategy to address the economic and security challenges of the current moment.

Comment: Are we really "stepping back?

Japan Can Keep the Indo-Pacific Open and Free

Foreign Affairs · More by Shihoko Goto

With America Stepping Back, Tokyo Should Step Up

Shihoko Goto

November 4, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/japan/japan-can-keep-indo-pacific-open-and-free

Containers on a cargo ship in Tokyo, April 2025 Kim Kyung-Hoon / Reuters

SHIHOKO GOTO is Director of the Asia Program and Vice President of Programs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

As the United States rethinks its role in the international order it has championed since the end of World War II, Japan is on the frontlines of the challenge to rules-based commerce and diplomacy. For the past decade, Tokyo has promoted the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which seeks to ensure that countries from the western shores of the Indian Ocean to the northern reaches of the East China Sea can pursue economic growth without compromising their autonomy by relying too heavily on China. The policies associated with this idea, which include ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, peacefully resolving geopolitical conflicts, and establishing common rules to govern trade, have made Japan a stabilizing force in the region. The framework of a free and open Indo-Pacific has also encouraged advanced economies, including the United States, to maintain their military and economic engagement with the region.

But Japan’s ability to promote a viable alternative to a regional order centered on Beijing has been faltering. Japan is on its fifth prime minister in as many years and, in the most recent elections, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority in both houses of parliament. Pursuing a foreign policy vision has taken a back seat to navigating domestic politics. Meanwhile, the allure of the development programs that China can offer is growing as countries throughout the region struggle to find new sources of economic growth.

Japan is now in a unique position to reenergize its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Its newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, is the self-proclaimed successor to Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister who proposed the free and open Indo-Pacific idea in 2016. In her first weeks in office, Takaichi has made clear that embracing this vision will be part of her commitment to carrying on Abe’s legacy. Takaichi, like Abe, has sought to position Japan as the United States’ trusted guide to the region and convince U.S. leaders that it is in their interest to have the United States remain an Indo-Pacific power and support Japan’s strategic vision.

Takaichi’s government does not need to craft a fundamentally new vision of regional order. Instead, Tokyo can update and reinvigorate the basic tenets of Abe’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy through tangible, results-oriented policies, including more trade agreements, developmental partnerships in Southeast Asia, contingency planning for a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, and investment in human capital and technical knowledge among Pacific islands. Buoyed by high public support in the early days of her administration, Takaichi can use her political leverage to promote this slate of policies as the core of her foreign policy agenda. By building on the goodwill and trust it has established over decades, Japan can ensure that the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific further takes root despite Chinese expansion and U.S. retreat.

BUILDING ON SUCCESS

Promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific over the past decade has made Japan a diplomatic powerhouse in Asia. As early as 2007, when Abe floated the idea during his first stint as prime minister, Japan was already concerned that China’s rise challenged Japan’s economic and security interests. When Abe launched the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy in 2016, during his second administration, Beijing had inaugurated a series of comprehensive programs to extend its regional influence. It created the Belt and Road Initiative, which outlined a global framework to support much-needed development projects, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which supplemented and competed with the U.S.-dominated World Bank and the multilateral Asian Development Bank. Domestically, the Made in China 2025 plan provided a blueprint for Beijing to invest in key technology sectors and boost its competitive edge. The United States has failed to provide similar far-sighted plans to spur growth in the region; only Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific framework has provided an even partial alternative.

Tokyo’s vision has never been about decoupling from China, nor has it been about restoring Japan’s former status as the region’s largest economy. Instead, Tokyo is concerned about China’s destabilizing influence on the norms and rules that support a fragile peace in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s aggressive territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas, for instance, challenge established international law. And China’s weaponization of its economic leverage for political gain and its strategy of exporting excess industrial capacity have weakened the ability of other economies to compete with Beijing. Countries across the Indo-Pacific may not agree on everything, but they share a wariness of China’s methods of wielding power. Japan, meanwhile, has built significant goodwill through its partnerships. According to a 2025 ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute survey, for instance, nearly 67 percent of respondents from ten Southeast Asian countries express trust in Japan, many more than express trust in China, the European Union, or the United States.

But in the decade since Abe proposed the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, sources of instability in the region have grown. China has strengthened its command over numerous advanced technologies and its monopoly in key sectors including critical minerals. When Beijing restricted the export of rare-earth minerals in the run-up to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in South Korea last week, a move ostensibly targeting the United States, it drove home to all Indo-Pacific countries the susceptibility of their own supply chains to China. Beijing and Moscow have become closer, converging on an alternative vision of regional order in which strength takes precedence over the rule of law. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, meanwhile, have shaken confidence in the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Washington seems more focused on resolving immediate conflicts than on promoting a long term strategic vision for managing relations with China.

RESULTS FIRST

Japan’s foreign policy elites have tried to expand on the success of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy to keep pace with geopolitical changes. At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, for instance, Japan’s defense minister proposed the One Cooperative Effort Among Nations security concept, also known as OCEAN, which sought to boost defense cooperation and capacity building among region allies. But such a grand strategic vision failed to gain traction: Japan could not convince the loose coalition of Southeast Asian countries that they would reap clear benefits from another comprehensive program aiming to unite them around shared interests.

A better way to adapt to the new geopolitical landscape would be to solidify the individual parts of the free and open Indo-Pacific framework that have brought tangible successes. To win support, Japan needs to prioritize a results-oriented approach that promises tangible improvements to living standards. Such efforts can build on the areas in which Japan has effectively established itself as a credible source of pragmatic, growth-oriented policies that benefit the region.

Trade is where Japan has emerged as an economic leader in the Indo-Pacific. Without Tokyo’s commitment, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 2016 trade agreement to harmonize regulations, lower tariffs, and establish regional trading rules among a group of countries with interests in the Pacific, would not have survived when the United States pulled its support in 2017, during the first Trump administration. But far from collapsing, the agreement that replaced it—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—has been effective in establishing a rules-based trade framework.

Development assistance has been another bedrock of Japan’s success in building regional trust. Japan started providing aid to countries in South and Southeast Asia in 1954 to atone for its actions in World War II. But by the late 1950s, it adopted a more pragmatic approach to reparations by providing favorable loans rather than aid packages. Japan’s overall global development assistance continued to grow throughout the twentieth century, peaking at nearly $10 billion in 1997 at the height of Japan’s economic might. Although Japan’s development assistance budget has effectively been halved in the intervening years, the cutbacks have forced Tokyo to be far more strategic in providing aid, including by focusing on infrastructure projects that align with its broader Indo-Pacific goals.

Promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific has made Japan a diplomatic powerhouse.

Japanese investments in infrastructure, workforce development, and technical knowledge have helped countries such as Thailand climb the economic ladder so that they are too wealthy to qualify for development assistance. The Philippines is likely to reach a similar threshold soon. Japan’s new challenge will be to leverage the goodwill it has generated through its contributions to Southeast Asian economies to move beyond a transactional relationship between donor and recipient. Even if Japan is no longer providing assistance to countries such as Thailand or the Philippines, Japan can engage with former aid recipients as partners to secure supply chains and invest in strategic industries with an eye toward longer-term growth. For instance, Japan can support countries by investing in their capability to process critical minerals, rather than only export them, which will offer new economic opportunities and reduce regional dependence on China.

Japan can also pursue a practical approach to aiding Taiwan. Leaders in Tokyo have made clear that a crisis over Taiwan would be a crisis for Japan and for regional order at large. Since 2021, when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joe Biden issued a joint statement highlighting the need for stability in the Taiwan Strait, Japan’s willingness to risk backlash from China because of its support for Taiwan has set the standard for other advanced economies. Tokyo has continued to support Taipei with concrete action, including an August 2025 agreement to share information about non-Japanese nationals evacuating from Taiwan in the event of a military conflict. A revamped free and open Indo-Pacific strategy with Japan at the helm could further support Taiwan by helping the island’s leaders prepare for other potential coercive actions, such as a blockade, and encouraging the island to diversify its energy supply.

Japan’s ability to promote a rules-based order faces its most acute challenge among small island nations in the Pacific. Since 2019, Kiribati, Nauru, and the Solomon Islands, under pressure from China, have withdrawn their diplomatic recognition of Taipei and formally recognized Beijing. In return, China has offered them security pacts, strategic partnerships, and financial assistance. Japan, for its part, has stepped up its diplomatic engagement with and economic support for island nations. Tokyo opened new embassies in Kiribati and New Caledonia in 2023 and offered nearly $56 million in aid to enhance resilience in island nations including Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Japanese-sponsored development projects have included building wind turbines, providing equipment for disaster preparedness and road construction, and training local authorities in emergency preparedness and international law. By instructing local leaders on how to assess the consequences of contracts they sign with China, for instance, Japan can help island governments retain their sovereignty and empower them to decide what investments would benefit them the most in the longer term.

BUILDING A COALITION

Japan’s biggest obstacle to revitalizing a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is its own political reality. Although public support for the newly formed Takaichi government is high, because the Liberal Democratic Party is not in the majority it will have to deal with a fragile coalition in which it cannot call all the shots. Takaichi will also have to address numerous domestic challenges, including how to manage a continually aging population, a shrinking workforce, and one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world, as well as how to implement social and financial changes—including updating tax structures to reward innovation and attract talent—that Japan needs to remain competitive in a borderless digital economy.

Yet a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is an area in which Takaichi can build support across the political spectrum. Conservatives embrace the strategy because it shows Japan’s leadership in the region and projects an image of a strong Japan. Moderates see it as a way to promote a Japanese style of diplomacy that emphasizes a collective approach. There is wide support in Tokyo for the government’s commitment to double national defense spending, which Takaichi has declared she will achieve by March 2026, rather than the initial plan to do so by 2027. Takaichi has also repeatedly called for strengthening ties with allies to ensure freedom of navigation and for improving coordination with major regional partners, including Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea.

Where Takaichi will face pushback is on the scope of Japanese commitment, how to pay for it, and where the line between deterring China and provoking further conflict lies. Increasing defense spending will require cutbacks in other areas, such as pensions and health care, or increases in taxes. Either of these will be unpopular with voters, and cutbacks could decrease support for development assistance and other international spending programs. There are also lingering historical tensions that Tokyo will have to navigate. Although Takaichi has a reputation as a conservative, on the campaign trail she carefully skirted sensitive issues such as political memory and Japan’s actions in World War II. Takaichi must continue to ensure that she has support not only from within Japan but also from allies and partners as far away as Europe and the United States.

By tapping seasoned trade negotiators for two key positions—foreign minister and minister of economy, trade, and industry—Takaichi has signaled that she values experience in foreign and economic policy. But in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, the new prime minister cannot merely offer a redux of what Abe created. She will need to effectively reestablish Japan as a central pillar of stability in the volatile Indo-Pacific. A realistic vision of support and cooperation will show the region that a deeper commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific is the best strategy to address the economic and security challenges of the current moment.

Foreign Affairs · More by Shihoko Goto

18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former diplomat: 'What's next for multilateralism?'

​Summary:

Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that U.S. disengagement and UN paralysis demand new multilateral forms. Middle powers and coalitions of states and non-state actors should lead flexible, overlapping arrangements to address global crises. She urges convening alternative UN assemblies and revitalizing diplomacy beyond Washington’s control to preserve collective, rules-based governance.

​Conclusion:

As recently noted on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "the world that America made will end." Multilateral governance, however, will continue. Whether, how and under whose leadership all these actors can produce clear decisions and effective global action remains to be seen. But the game is on.

​Comment: What will be America's role in the future? What is our vision for how we fit in the world?

Anne-Marie Slaughter, former diplomat: 'What's next for multilateralism?'

Op-Ed

Anne-Marie Slaughter

former US director of policy planning

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/11/04/anne-marie-slaughter-former-diplomat-what-s-next-for-multilateralism_6747082_23.html

In an op-ed, the American political scientist discusses the different paths that could preserve strong and effective international governance in the face of current challenges, despite disagreements between major powers and Donald Trump's sharp criticism of the United Nations.

Published yesterday at 11:00 am (Paris) 4 min read Lire en français

Subscribers only

In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23, US President Donald Trump claimed to have "ended seven unendable wars" – a definite exaggeration, though his administration has helped make peace in several regional conflicts. Trump then excoriated the UN for its inaction. "All they seem to do is write a really strongly worded letter, and then never follow that letter up," he said. "It's empty words – and empty words don't solve war."

It pains me to admit that he is largely right about the UN's current role in peace and security. As the war in Ukraine and the destruction of Gaza and the Gazans illustrate, the UN is impotent when the five permanent members of the Security Council are at odds. Russia and China veto any attempt to hold Russia accountable for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while the United States blocks collective global action to protect the Palestinians and create lasting security for Israel and a nascent Palestine.

Trump did talk about the UN's "tremendous potential." But no one should be fooled: His foreign policy blatantly contravenes the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. He is an old-school realist who, like Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, values national sovereignty and self-interest above all else.

Disorderly activity

If he wants to invade or economically coerce other countries, or destroy boats in international waters for allegedly transporting illicit drugs, he will. Amazingly, during Trump's speech, many world leaders laughed in the right places and applauded at the appropriate times, flattering the US president in public to improve their chances of making deals with him in private.

Read our series 'The Transatlantic Divorce' Subscribers only How the US divided Europe to invade Iraq at any cost in 2003

To be sure, the US has ignored the UN Charter before, engaging in proxy wars around the world throughout the Cold War and, most notably, invading Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, an international security and economic order, with rules, institutions and processes, existed to address global crises, and often did so successfully. For all the UN's defects, a return to 19^th-century balance-of-power politics, with no restraints on the use of force, would be far worse.

So, what comes next? On the sidelines of the UNGA, many business leaders and representatives of religious groups, think tanks, educational and scientific institutions and philanthropies met to discuss versions of this question. Scores of meetings across town discussed ideas about what a new international order could look like.

One way to think of this messy, decentralized activity is to compare it to the various meetings that took place during World War II in the run-up to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, which established the UN. Today's world is far more complex: The number of UN member countries has almost quadrupled, and the field of non-state actors capable of effective global action has expanded dramatically. Still, the ferment remains important.

Long-time proponents of UN reform see two broad possibilities for change. One is an international order organized and led by middle powers – for now, essentially any country that is neither a great power nor a small state. The second option, which could coexist with a middle-power order, is a flexible, informal arrangement created by intersecting coalitions of states and non-state actors focused on countering threats and delivering positive change at the sub-regional, regional and global level. Think of it as an armadillo's overlapping scales.

In the immediate term, as diplomats initiate follow-up action in the wake of the UNGA, I propose two sets of meetings among key countries to determine how the world can conduct the business of diplomacy without, or perhaps in parallel with, the US.

Contempt for 'globalism'

The first meetings should be between China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and South Korea, which together provide nearly 50% of the UN's general budget. The US has long been the UN's biggest funder; its share of the 2025 general budget is assessed at 22%, or around $820 million. But the organization will likely receive only a fraction of that amount, given Trump's executive order mandating a review of US funding and involvement in the UN.

Read more Subscribers only UN: World leaders respond to Trump and show their commitment to the climate struggle

These eight countries should thus consider convening the UNGA elsewhere for the next few years, which would reduce US diplomatic leverage and ensure that all delegates can attend the annual session. It would also underscore that, unlike Trump, who has made clear his disdain for "globalism," most of the world's governments still believe in rules that limit national sovereignty in the service of mounting a collective response to existential threats.

As the UN's second-largest funder, China could try to organize the UNGA in Beijing. But a more likely outcome would be to rotate the meeting among cities that host various UN and regional organizations: Geneva (the UN's European headquarters), Brussels (the European Union), Jakarta (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Addis Ababa (the African Union), Riyadh (the Gulf Cooperation Council) and Montevideo (Mercosur).

The leaders of the G20, minus China, Russia and the US, should also meet. This group of middle powers – the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the EU and the AU – could take steps to make the G20 more representative. The roughly 170 countries that are not G20 members may be disinclined to approve expanding its scope, but the group can increase its accountability to the global community.

As recently noted on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "the world that America made will end." Multilateral governance, however, will continue. Whether, how and under whose leadership all these actors can produce clear decisions and effective global action remains to be seen. But the game is on.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is CEO of the think tank New America; professor emerita of politics and international affairs at Princeton University; and the author of Renewal: From Crisis to Transformation in Our Lives, Work, and Politics (Princeton University Press, 2021).

© Project Syndicate, 2025. www.project-syndicate.org

Anne-Marie Slaughter (former US director of policy planning )

Translation of an original article published in French on lemonde.fr; the publisher may only be liable for the French version.

19. The Case for Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy: Peace Through Strength Is Delivering Stability and Security

​Summary:

Former U.S. National Security Adviser Robert C. O’Brien argues that Trump’s second-term “peace through strength” strategy is restoring stability through renewed deterrence, defense spending, and allied burden-sharing. NATO members now target 5% of GDP for defense, Europe funds Ukraine’s war effort, and the U.S. is expanding military modernization. Trump’s firm stances—maximum pressure on Iran, full backing for Israel, border enforcement, and assertive diplomacy—have, O’Brien claims, strengthened alliances, curbed adversaries, and advanced global peace. He credits Trump’s use of economic leverage, military readiness, and decisive leadership for reviving deterrence worldwide and ensuring American security through strength rather than concession.

​Conclusion:

There is no doubt that Trump can build on these successes to make a chaotic world more peaceful. A strong United States, backed by partners that want to share the burden of the defense of freedom, will prevail against the autocrats, tyrants, communists, and terrorists wishing to do Americans and their friends harm. A stronger country will allow Americans to find opportunities to bring an end to conflicts around the world that were otherwise thought to be unresolvable. And with a U.S. government that understands the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere, the American homeland will be safe and protected. On all these fronts, Trump is leading the way with a policy of peace through strength.

Comment: note the phrase: "backed by partners". If we are going to have America First, it must be paired with Allies Always.

The Case for Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy

Foreign Affairs · More by Robert C. O’Brien · November 5, 2025

Peace Through Strength Is Delivering Stability and Security

Robert C. O’Brien

November 5, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/case-trumps-second-term-foreign-policy

U.S. President Donald Trump speaking to reporters in West Palm Beach, Florida, October 2025 Elizabeth Frantz / Reuters

ROBERT C. O’BRIEN is Chairman of American Global Strategies, a geopolitical advisory firm. He served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2019 to 2021.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

Close Share

Last year in Foreign Affairs, I outlined a framework for a second Trump administration foreign policy that would restore the “peace through strength” posture that prevailed during Donald Trump’s first term as president. This vision of “America first” stood in stark contrast to the foreign policies pursued by the Obama and Biden administrations and the approaches advocated by influential Democratic strategists during the 2024 presidential campaign. Broadly speaking, they believe that the United States is in decline, and that this process must be skillfully managed through a variety of steps: unilateral disarmament (via gradual but significant cuts to military spending that harm readiness); apologizing for putative American excesses and misdeeds (as when, in 2022, Ben Rhodes, who had served as a deputy national security adviser in the Obama administration, wrote that “historians will debate how much America might have instigated” Russian President Vladmir Putin’s aggressive acts, asking whether the United States had been “too triumphalist” in its foreign policy); appeasement (including ransom payments to Iran thinly disguised as humanitarian sanctions relief); and the partial accommodation of the desires of U.S. adversaries (as when, in January 2022, President Joe Biden suggested that Russia would face less significant consequences if it launched only a “minor incursion” into Ukraine instead of a full-scale invasion).

In 2024, having experienced 12 years of foreign policies predicated on these views, in contrast to four years of Trump’s “America first” foreign policy, the American people overwhelmingly chose strength over managed decline and went with Trump. Ever since, Trump has been using U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military power to deliver on every aspect of his foreign policy agenda. He has demonstrated that strength begets peace and security.

Since Trump took office for the second time in January, the U.S. military has begun a generational rebuilding of its capabilities, turbocharged by an additional $150 billion in spending on top of its regular budget request for fiscal year 2026. Trump persuaded American allies and partners to commit to boosting their defense spending to five percent of GDP and to take on more of the free world’s security burdens. The president has ended the chaos at the southern border. He has been unwavering in his support for Israel without conceding to Hamas and has revived maximum pressure on Iran, including by striking its nuclear enrichment sites. The war in Ukraine is also on the path to resolution, although admittedly at a much slower pace than Trump hoped, owing to Putin’s intransigence. These measures have restored American deterrence and could usher in a new era of stability.

GETTING UP TO SPEED

Many critics argue that Trump has weakened the United States’ alliances, but the facts instead show that he has strengthened Washington’s collective security arrangements by generating the urgency needed to get allies to make tangible investments for their own defense. Rather than withdraw from or weaken NATO, as critics warned he would, Trump is leading the biggest European rearmament of the postwar era. And he wasted no time getting this process started. During his first meeting with NATO’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte, in March, Trump reiterated his position that allies must spend more on defense or risk having the United States reassess its commitments to the alliance. The response was swift and substantial. In June, NATO allies agreed to raise the group’s defense spending target to five percent of GDP, with 3.5 percent going to core defense capabilities and 1.5 percent to other security and industrial base needs. Germany, long a laggard, now plans to double its defense spending within the next five years.

Last year, I argued that in a second term, Trump would “push NATO to rotate ground and air forces to Poland to augment its capabilities closer to Russia’s border” and emphasized that “Washington should make sure that its European allies understand that the continued American defense of Europe is contingent on Europe doing its part—including in Ukraine.” In September of this year, Trump suggested that the United States could deploy additional rotational forces to Poland, signaling ironclad resolve against Russian revanchism. Soon after, Warsaw surged 40,000 additional troops to its borders, and France committed to joint air patrols over Poland.

European contributions to Ukraine’s defense have ballooned. According to data collected by the Kiel Institute, which includes the months between January 2022 and August 2025, Europe’s total allocations of aid to Ukraine averaged about $12.2 billion per quarter during the Biden administration and have averaged around $18.8 billion per quarter under Trump. In March and April of this year, Europe allocated about $23.2 billion in military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine—the highest combined total for any two-month period since the start of the war. A key component of Europe doing its part has been Trump’s decision to continue providing lethal U.S. arms to Ukraine but only if that support is financed by European countries. Trump’s vision of burden-sharing has proven not only feasible but also invigorating, strengthening the alliance without costing American taxpayers. Critics who decried Trump’s “bullying” tactics have been silenced by the results: a fairer, more capable NATO that deters aggression from the outset. These steps are not mere European compliance with Washington’s demands; they are driving a renaissance of the alliance.

For the next fiscal year, the Trump administration and Congress are aiming for a historic $1 trillion investment in our military. Together, the more than $150 billion for defense funding included in the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” and the Pentagon’s request for more than $848 billion could represent as much as a 13 percent spending increase over the 2025 fiscal year budget and will prioritize vital capabilities such as drones, AI-driven cyberdefenses, naval shipbuilding to counter China, and defenses against hypersonic missiles. This surge will align U.S. defense priorities with U.S. interests after years of underinvestment, ensuring that the American military remains the world’s preeminent force.

Critics who decried Trump’s “bullying” tactics have been silenced by the results.

Under the Trump administration, the Pentagon has likewise urged U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to match NATO’s new commitments and spend five percent or more of GDP on defense to develop their own capabilities. Under pressure from the United States, Taiwan has significantly increased its defense budget for next year and announced its intent to reach the five percent target by 2030, and it is now seeking to purchase billions of dollars of equipment from the United States, including HIMARS rockets and coastal defense missiles. According to spring reporting by the defense news site 19FortyFive, Vietnam has reached an agreement to buy F-16s from the United States, a stunning development for a country with long-standing procurement ties to Russia.

At the strategic level, Trump is not waiting for Congress to lead. Through an executive order, he launched the Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisages a layered shield incorporating ground-based interceptors and space-based sensors that echoes the proposed scale of U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s. The Pentagon is already moving out on development and planning for the deployment of the program.

Trump knows that deterrence requires more than a good defense. Last year, in these pages, I noted that in a second Trump term, the United States could restart nuclear testing for the first time since 1992 to address Russia’s and China’s growing and modernizing nuclear arsenals. This September, China showcased its nuclear forces, including a new intercontinental ballistic missile, during a military parade that Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watched from VIP seats. In late October, Putin said that Russia had tested a Poseidon nuclear torpedo, which is designed to survive a possible U.S. attack and could possibly wipe out U.S. port cities. It should come as no surprise that Trump is not letting this nuclear saber rattling by Russia and China go unanswered. In a post on Truth Social in late October, he wrote that the United States would immediately resume nuclear testing on an “equal basis” with the programs of its adversaries. A tested and proven U.S. nuclear force will cause American adversaries to think twice about threatening or using the ultimate weapon.

PATHS TO PEACE

In the Middle East, Trump’s record shines brightest in its support for Washington’s historic ally Israel as it seeks to eliminate Hamas in Gaza, and in the restoration of U.S. maximum pressure on Iran. Trump understands that instability throughout the region is a direct consequence of Iran’s support for its terrorist proxies. U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow this summer crippled Tehran’s enrichment capabilities without escalating to full scale war. Maximum pressure is strangling Tehran financially, starving the regime’s proxies of the money and weapons they rely on to sow chaos. Iran’s leaders are isolated, Hezbollah and Hamas are weakened, and the region is tilting toward stability. Strength, rather than the Biden administration’s paralyzing obsession with “de-escalation,” has compelled adversaries to come to the table.

Trump has also positioned himself as the indispensable global statesman by driving efforts to bring peace to other, often far flung and long-standing disputes. The president’s biggest tool has been his willingness to impose high tariffs or punitive sanctions on the recalcitrant parties, showing that the United States’ vast economic power can be as useful as its military might in ending sticky conflicts. Last month, the Trump administration orchestrated a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, initiating a plan for peace and rebuilding in Gaza, after repeated failures by the prior administration to secure the release of all the hostages and provide a postwar vision for the region. Earlier this year, Trump urged a cease-fire between India and Pakistan after hostilities broke out over Kashmir; brokered a peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; forced Iran to accept a cease-fire after 12 days of Israeli strikes; helped Cambodia and Thailand reach an unconditional cease-fire at their disputed border; and mediated a landmark agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that aims to end more than 30 years of conflict. Hopefully, Trump will be able to add another peacemaking success, this time in Ukraine, where Russia—emboldened by Biden’s hesitancy—has not yet recalibrated to Trump’s resolve.

CLOSE TO HOME

In the Western Hemisphere, the most critical geopolitical space for defense of the United States, Trump has overseen a surge in law enforcement and troops to secure the previously open U.S. southern border and threatened massive tariffs on Mexico and Canada to incentivize them to crack down on drug smugglers on their side of the line. Trump’s strikes on suspected drug trafficking ships in the Caribbean are literally sinking the drug trade rooted in Venezuela, which is plagued by cartel violence. The president’s interest in acquiring Greenland has driven Denmark to deploy the largest number of ground, air, and naval assets there since the Cold War, boosting the allied presence in previously unpatrolled territory and putting Russia and China on notice that the United States and its allies do not intend to lose the race for the Arctic. And in reaction to Trump’s ire over Chinese meddling in the Panama Canal, Panama is reasserting its sovereignty and letting the Chinese know that it is time for their port management companies to go home. All of these steps have meant less fentanyl killing young Americans, less human trafficking, less Russian dominance in the Arctic, less Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and a safer American homeland.

There is no doubt that Trump can build on these successes to make a chaotic world more peaceful. A strong United States, backed by partners that want to share the burden of the defense of freedom, will prevail against the autocrats, tyrants, communists, and terrorists wishing to do Americans and their friends harm. A stronger country will allow Americans to find opportunities to bring an end to conflicts around the world that were otherwise thought to be unresolvable. And with a U.S. government that understands the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere, the American homeland will be safe and protected. On all these fronts, Trump is leading the way with a policy of peace through strength.

Foreign Affairs · More by Robert C. O’Brien · November 5, 2025

​20. The Slow Death of Russian Oil: Why Ukraine’s Campaign Against Moscow’s Energy Sector Is Working

​Summary:

Ukraine’s sustained drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have reduced refining output by 10%, causing regional fuel shortages and forcing Moscow into heavy-handed market controls. Though Russia retains repair capacity and redundancy, repeated attacks are eroding efficiency, straining resources, and accelerating long-term decline. Kyiv’s campaign exposes Russia’s deeper vulnerability of its aging infrastructure, sanctions-constrained repairs, and increasing state control turning its once-dominant energy sector into a rigid war economy. The strikes inflict cumulative institutional damage rather than immediate collapse, compelling Russia to choose between defending refineries, sustaining exports, or funding its war. Ukraine’s attritional strategy is quietly degrading the core of Moscow’s petrostate power.

​Excerpts:

Kyiv cannot break Russia’s oil industry overnight. But by forcing Moscow into constant firefighting—whether putting out actual refinery fires or preventing a second-order economic conflagration—these attacks ensure that Russia will have to pay an ever higher cost to maintain stability. For now, the refineries will keep operating, the pumps will keep running, and exports will continue—but with rising costs, shrinking margins, and a reduced capacity to recover from attack.

What Ukraine’s campaign has exposed about Russia is really a deeper vulnerability: an energy superpower whose strength lies in infrastructure built decades ago, maintained through improvisation, and preserved by command rather than innovation. In the end, Russia’s refineries are most likely to wear out under the weight of repeated shocks and institutional sclerosis—a quiet but telling metaphor for Russia’s war economy itself.

Comment: Russia's achilles heel? Can Russia rebuild its infrastructure? Could Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil infrastructure actually produce better infrastructure in the future if Russia can rebuild it - build back better? Or will Russia have to give up on Putin's war before it can do that?

The Slow Death of Russian Oil

Foreign Affairs · More by Tatiana Mitrova · November 5, 2025

Why Ukraine’s Campaign Against Moscow’s Energy Sector Is Working

November 5, 2025

Rosneft office building, Moscow, October 2025 Ramil Sitdikov / Reuters

TATIANA MITROVA is a Global Fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.

SERGEY VAKULENKO is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

• More by Sergey Vakulenko

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

In considering the many effects of the war in Ukraine on the Russian economy, few suspected that fuel shortages would be one of them. After all, Russia is an oil-rich country whose energy infrastructure is far from the frontlines; for most of the war, it has been Ukraine, not Russia, whose energy grid has been in the line of fire. Yet since August, when Ukraine began a concerted campaign to strike oil refineries deep inside Russia, fuel shortages have come to preoccupy Russians. By late October, Ukrainian drones had hit more than half of Russia’s 38 major refineries at least once. As a result, Russia went from processing about 5.4 million barrels of oil per day in July to processing roughly 5 million barrels per day in September. Production outages spread across multiple regions, and some Russian gas stations began rationing fuel. By late October, additional strikes, including at refineries in Ryazan and Saratov, further underscored the reach of Ukraine’s campaign.

With such results, it may be tempting to conclude that Ukraine is on the verge of breaking Russia’s oil industry. But that is not the case. Despite the serious damage they are causing, the attacks are unlikely to change Moscow’s resolve in the near term. For the time being, the Russian refining sector still has enough resilience, because of both its substantial surplus capacity as the world’s third-largest refining system and its ability to repair damaged units quickly. The Russian government also has a variety of tools it can use to maintain a relative equilibrium. Moreover, for Ukraine, there is also the risk that the campaign will cause Moscow to step up its own attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and energy systems as the country enters the fourth winter of the war.

But the attacks on refineries could—if they can be sustained at the current pace—have far-reaching effects over the longer term. As Russian resilience is relentlessly tested, it is gradually being worn out. Although the units used to distill crude oil can be repaired relatively easily after every attack, they erode after the repeated cycles of heating and cooling caused by strikes. And as Russia’s oil industry grows more reliant on government interventions for crisis management, the energy sector will become state-managed and less efficient. In truth, the real damage caused by Ukraine’s campaign is cumulative and institutional, not physical. Even as it strives to preserve short-term stability, Russia is presiding over the acceleration of long-term decline.

OIL RICH, FUEL POOR

Part of the challenge of assessing the effects of Ukraine’s strikes comes from the sheer size and complexity of Russia’s downstream oil sector. Russia currently has roughly 6.5 million barrels per day of refining capacity spread across about 40 refineries, with the biggest clusters in the Volga region, the Urals, and around Moscow. Russia also exports on average two million barrels per day of oil products. Under ordinary circumstances the system has a fairly large cushion built in, even though fuel supplies can be constrained occasionally during periods of peak seasonal demand.

The current fuel shortages, which are the most notable since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, are not the result of only Ukrainian attacks on refineries. For one thing, the Russian fuel market gets stretched every summer by a combination of high agricultural demand, high rates of driving, and refineries shutting down for annual maintenance. This summer, demand was heightened further because more Russians traveled by car to avoid flight cancellations and train delays that were caused by Ukrainian drone attacks on transport infrastructure.

Another factor is that the Russian government has increasingly intervened in the country’s fuel market in the name of price stability and inflation control. Its main mechanism, known as the “price-damper,” is a subsidy that compensates refiners when domestic fuel prices fall below export parity. But as the government has become pressed for funds, it has increasingly shifted the burden of subsidies to manufacturers and retailers, using threats to keep the market supplied, as often happens under rigid price controls. Trying to keep fuel prices stable has removed important price signals for both consumers and producers and disturbed the balance of supply and demand. At times of low profitability, the biggest oil companies keep their own gas stations supplied with fuel but sell as little as possible to independent retailers. Independent stations and small retail networks make up almost 70 percent of the Russian retail fuel market, but move less than a quarter of the fuel supply. They nevertheless play an important role by bringing fuel to motorists in less affluent and sparsely populated areas. When the big oil companies cut their supplies to independents, people in the countryside suffer disproportionately.

SWARMING MENACE

Nonetheless, the most salient cause of the shortages has been the dramatic shift in Ukraine’s long-range drone strike capabilities. In 2023 and 2024, Ukraine rarely attempted to target energy infrastructure deep inside Russia, and when it did, it did not target the same refinery repeatedly. Throughout this period, only a few refineries within 250 miles of Ukrainian-controlled territory were hit regularly. Now, Ukrainian strikes can reach as far as Tyumen in Siberia—1,360 miles away—and Ukraine has been targeting many refineries across western Russia on a recurring basis.

Take the Volgograd refinery, a large plant with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day. It has been hit no fewer than five times in two months, with the latest attack coming just days after Russian repairs brought it back on line. Although these repeated attacks cannot destroy a refinery, they can keep it constantly in need of repair, stretching spare-parts supply chains that are already constrained by sanctions. Since August, especially, Ukrainian drone attacks have become more successful, thanks, in part, to U.S. intelligence. Ukraine now has both the capacity and the confidence to regularly launch large-scale drone swarms at multiple targets across Russia—successfully overwhelming Russian air defenses.

The effects of the attacks have also been amplified by the way the Russian refinery system is organized. Soviet-era planning created regional duopolist refineries. One or two refineries are responsible for serving a large area (usually made up of several oblasts and millions of people); when one is down, shortages ripple quickly across adjacent areas. This means that a successful Ukrainian attack can create a shortage for a large territory that Russia will have to then supply by rail from hundreds of miles away. And if neighboring refineries get hit simultaneously, these problems invariably snowball.

DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

The real impact of Ukraine’s attacks, however, is likely to come over the longer term. As with other aspects of the war, the battle over energy infrastructure can be won only by a carefully calculated war of attrition. No single strike will kill the system, but a sustained, up-tempo campaign increases the likelihood of cascading failures, longer repairs, and compounding losses of capacity. Unless Moscow makes a breakthrough in anti-drone defenses, something neither side has achieved since the full-scale war began, Ukraine’s efforts will continue to inflict damage.

In this sense, the overall outcome will depend on a series of shifting variables. These include how quickly Russia can repair refineries; how many times a unit can be repaired before it must be replaced; the number of drones needed to overwhelm air defenses; and how many drones Ukraine can deploy and for how long. Drone warfare is a numbers game. In any given operation, most attacking drones will be shot down. Their purpose is to saturate the air defense system; for a single attack to be effective, dozens, if not hundreds, of drones must be launched, each carrying at least 110 pounds of payload. The most effective attacks involve strikes on multiple refinery units at the same plant, and the same plants must be repeatedly struck as the damage from the previous raids gets fixed. Keeping up a successful campaign against refineries requires thousands of drones a week sustained over several months.

This is a game where the attacker has the advantage. Just as Ukraine has been forced to do in protecting its cities and infrastructure from Russian bombardment, Russia cannot provide enough cover for all refinery targets and must choose which to protect. Shifting air cover from site to site over vast distances takes time. Meanwhile the attacker can switch targets at will.

Although its defenses have proven unable to hinder the attacks, Russia has begun to make other adaptations. Refineries are adding improvised overhead netting and shielding, for instance. Such measures may look rudimentary, but even small deviations in a drone’s trajectory can be the difference between a dent and a catastrophic fire.

THE GREAT ENERGY DUEL

Paradoxically, Ukraine’s campaign against Russian oil installations draws on the lessons of Russia’s own campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure. Since the early phases of the war, Russia has targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure, aiming to disrupt the Ukrainian economy and crush morale. In 2023 and 2024, Ukraine could barely keep pace repairing the damage as Russia inflicted it. Now, as Russia’s offensive capacities have only grown, this has become an unwinnable race.

In March, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tried to persuade Russia to agree to a moratorium on air strikes against energy infrastructure—to no avail. In this sense, Kyiv’s refinery campaign is partly a form of deterrence, partly a form of retaliation. It seeks to impose the kinds of costs on Russia that Russia has long imposed on Ukraine. In theory, this could force an informal mutual moratorium on energy strikes, since they come at high cost to both sides. But so far, the result has only been escalation.

For Ukraine, attacking refineries is also a particularly effective way to target Russia. Attacks on pipelines, fuel storage facilities, and railroads have had more transient effects: they generally can be returned to operation within days. But refineries, with their big and complex equipment, remain the more vulnerable and symbolically potent targets.

The resilience of Russia’s energy sector is gradually being worn out.

In recent weeks, Ukraine has augmented its campaign with a more multipronged effort to hamper Russian oil exports. Ukraine now routinely attacks pumping stations on pipelines that lead to export outlets. It has also expanded the scope of its attacks to third parties involved in Russia’s energy trade. On November 2, for example, Ukrainian drones attacked Russia’s Black Sea port of Tuapse, damaging a Turkish tanker.

There have also been several sabotage incidents against non-Russian ships carrying Russian crude, likely caused by limpet mines, although Kyiv has not claimed responsibility for these. Ukraine has even hit the pumping stations, terminal, and Novorossiysk offices of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium—which helps export oil produced in Kazakhstan through the Black Sea—with air and water drones. Such operations have a dual purpose. Militarily, they aim to impose costs and uncertainty on Russia’s export logistics. Strategically, they are meant to dissuade third parties—ship owners, insurers, and traders—from doing business with Russia.

But for its part, Russia has also found additional targets. Until 2025, Ukraine transited Russian gas to European buyers, and as an informal part of the deal, Russia refrained from attacking Ukrainian gas production and pipelines. Now this arrangement is off, and in October, Russia launched a series of massive drone and missile strikes that knocked out 60 percent of Ukraine’s domestic gas production during a crucial period ahead of the winter.

STABILITY AT ANY COST

By late September this year, Ukrainian strikes had reduced Russia’s refining production by roughly 10 percent. Yet so far, despite the intensity of the campaign, Russia has been able to keep the impact mostly local and temporary. Fuel shortages and retail price spikes have largely been confined to particular regions—mainly southern Russia, the far east of the country, and Crimea. The Kremlin responded by imposing temporary gasoline export bans and partial diesel restrictions. It also redirected supplies and tapped reserves.

These measures come at a price. Each new layer of government intervention or control tightens the state’s grip over the sector. Already, fixed margins, quota systems, and emergency decrees now define the operating environment for the oil industry. The Kremlin, for example, responded to the September fuel shortages by issuing several ad hoc executive decrees and Energy Ministry orders that prioritized deliveries of gasoline and diesel for agriculture, public transport, and defense needs; capped wholesale and retail fuel prices in several regions; and temporarily suspended exports of gasoline and some diesel blends to stabilize the domestic market. The more the government intervenes, the less incentive companies have to increase supplies to the domestic market. Although they may prevent immediate chaos, these moves are undermining the oil sector’s long-term adaptability.

One of the most counterintuitive effects of Russia’s refinery outages is their impact on exports. When Russia loses its refining capacity, it must reduce its exports of oil products. Yet it can recover much of the lost revenue by simply exporting the crude that would have been otherwise refined in Russia. For the government, this matters little, since it collects petroleum taxes at the wellhead. For companies, however, the losses from selling low-priced crude instead of refined oil products can reach $10 per barrel or more. Moreover, on October 23, the United States announced new sanctions aimed against key oil companies, including Lukoil and Rosneft; these measures are likely to put temporary pressure on Russian crude exports, compounding the strain on the country’s oil sector.

Russia must decide whether to defend its refineries or its armaments plants.

Moscow faces a dilemma. On the one hand, high gasoline prices cool demand and bring the market into balance. On the other hand, the government has pledged to keep fuel prices stable, intervening to do so if necessary. Such interventions are costly and keep demand artificially high, but not doing them risks lower approval ratings and eroding public trust in Russia’s stability.

For now, Russia retains enough redundancy and repair capacity to keep the system afloat. Yet the accumulation of damages and the effects of heavy-handed state management are eroding efficiency and resilience. Even if Ukraine cannot destroy the oil industry, it can force Moscow into making costly tradeoffs. Russia must decide whether to defend its refineries or its armaments plants; whether to prioritize exports or domestic supply; whether to divert resources to repair refineries as fast as possible or use those resources elsewhere. Each dilemma narrows policy options.

Thus far, Moscow’s response to the supply crunch has been remarkably consistent: contain, control, and compensate. The Kremlin is determined to prevent visible shortages that could undermine public confidence, but the tools it relies on—export bans, fixed margins, subsidies—are locking the sector into stagnation. Russian refiners must now operate with little market autonomy; many are postponing investment decisions “until after the war.” Refineries are still running, but with deferred maintenance, rushed emergency repairs, and a mounting backlog of safety and efficiency issues. The result is not collapse, but quiet degradation.

PETRIFICATION OF THE PETROSTATE

Three variables will make a difference in the long-term fate of Russia’s oil industry. The first is Ukraine’s strike tempo—whether Kyiv can maintain or increase the number, payload, and frequency of drone attacks. Equally important is Russia’s repair capacity, or how quickly damaged units can be restored and whether spare-parts shortages become binding. Finally, the third variable is oil prices and OPEC+ policy: a drop in prices, for example, would test Russia’s ability to sustain both subsidies and military spending simultaneously.

If its refining capacity is further constrained, Russia can also fall back on lower fuel-quality standards, increasing the supply of naptha-derived gasoline and high-sulfur diesel. Such moves could help alleviate shortages at the expense of air quality and engine longevity. The government is also counting on Belarus to help, potentially supplying up to 30 percent of Russia’s gasoline needs. But these fixes can only mitigate rather than eliminate the long-term effects of the impending oil crunch.

Kyiv cannot break Russia’s oil industry overnight. But by forcing Moscow into constant firefighting—whether putting out actual refinery fires or preventing a second-order economic conflagration—these attacks ensure that Russia will have to pay an ever higher cost to maintain stability. For now, the refineries will keep operating, the pumps will keep running, and exports will continue—but with rising costs, shrinking margins, and a reduced capacity to recover from attack.

What Ukraine’s campaign has exposed about Russia is really a deeper vulnerability: an energy superpower whose strength lies in infrastructure built decades ago, maintained through improvisation, and preserved by command rather than innovation. In the end, Russia’s refineries are most likely to wear out under the weight of repeated shocks and institutional sclerosis—a quiet but telling metaphor for Russia’s war economy itself.

Foreign Affairs · More by Tatiana Mitrova · November 5, 2025

21. Racing Against Time: Realizing a True Defense Industrial Enterprise

​Summary:

Gen. CQ Brown argues the U.S. must urgently build a true defense industrial enterprise to outpace adversaries. Persistent munitions shortfalls and bureaucratic friction demand flexible budgeting and portfolio management, not thousands of rigid line items. Provide steady demand signals, on-time appropriations, and multi-year procurement to stabilize suppliers and cut costs. Streamline acquisition by rewriting FAR guidance, using underused authorities, incentives, data/AI tools, and implementing FoRGED/SPEED Act provisions. Treat DoD, Congress, and industry as one team with transparent dashboards and shared accountability. Prove the model in priority portfolios (e.g., integrated air and missile defense/Patriot) and execute relentlessly while measuring progress in months, not years.

​Excerpts:

If any leg of the stool isn’t there — if inaction or reticence by any one actor stifles progress — that will ultimately worsen our country’s strategic position and fail our warfighters.

Acceleration depends upon collaboration and must become muscle memory. The nation needs a shared roadmap that sets priorities, aligns incentives, and measures progress in months, not years. Selecting one or two major mission areas to serve as proof points — such as integrated air and missile defense — can demonstrate how portfolio management, multi-year procurement, and streamlined oversight work together in practice. The Patriot system, which already relies on multiple primes and sub-vendors across radar, interceptors, and rocket motors, provides a clear opportunity to prove that synchronization across program offices and industry partners can translate directly into faster capability delivery.

From my decades of service, I realize this is all easier said than done. But any steps taken to increase flexibility, consistency, and streamlining will be a plus for warfighters. This is not about recreating the “arsenal of democracy” of the 1940s. That world no longer exists. It is about forging a modern arsenal of agility, one that harnesses private-sector dynamism, transparent governance, and the clarity of a unified mission. The commissions have given us the playbook. The next step is to execute it ruthlessly and relentlessly. Risk will always accompany action, but the far greater danger lies in complacency. The time for more studies has passed. The time to build, together and at speed, is now.

Comment: What does the new 21st Century 'arsenal of democracies look like? (with emphasis on the plural).

Racing Against Time: Realizing a True Defense Industrial Enterprise

warontherocks.com · November 5, 2025

Gen. (ret.) CQ Brown, Jr.

November 5, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/racing-against-time-realizing-a-true-defense-industrial-enterprise/

In November 2015, I was five months into commanding the air campaign against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Operation Inherent Resolve was in full swing. Coalition airpower was blocking enemy reinforcements, severing supply lines, choking off illicit oil revenue, and enabling friendly forces to retake key ground. We were taking it to the enemy: The week before Thanksgiving 2015, U.S. Central Command registered the highest seven-day total weapons expenditure since the beginning of the campaign.

The group would be defeated, but I could foresee a major strategic challenge: The United States, its allies, and partners did not have deep inventories of precision weapons on the shelf. The coalition of the willing was short on firepower. Something had to change quickly.

At the Dubai Air Show also in November 2015, I and then-Secretary of the Air Force Deborah James sat down with industry partners to discuss the need for increased weapons production. Yet nearly a decade later, despite countless high level meetings and study after study, not enough has changed. The United States still faces the same munitions constraints, now with the added pressure of conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Warfighting was at the center of my military career. From the Middle East to Europe to the Indo-Pacific, I saw how transformation determines whether America can deter wars and, if necessary, win them. But back in the Pentagon, I also saw how slowly that transformation can unfold at the highest level, limiting the flow of capabilities to warfighters. That tension between the pace of battle and the pace of bureaucracy shaped my Accelerate Change or Lose approach as chief of staff of the Air Force that I continued as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In both roles, I sought to trim bureaucracy, modernize faster, and enable the development of servicemembers for the future fight.

As chairman, I reviewed with the Joint Staff the recommendations of four bipartisan commissions: the 2018 Section 809 Panel on acquisition reform; the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission; the 2024 Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform; and the 2024 National Defense Strategy Commission. Across nearly 200 worthy recommendations, the message was remarkably consistent: The Defense Department, Congress, and the defense industrial base need to move together with greater urgency, flexibility, and unity of purpose if they are to deliver capability to warfighters at speed and scale.

More reports and memos are continuing to pile up, offering the same recommendations — things most of us understand need to happen. And yet, we have not seen the implementation our country demands. As one senior leader once said, “Anything we don’t want to do, we continue to study.”

America is far past the era when it had the luxury of time. Xi Jinping has tied China’s ambitions to three years: 2027, 2035, and 2049. The first to be ready to conduct an invasion of Taiwan, the second to transform to an intelligentized force on the path to the third, to have a “world-class military.”

That’s only one adversary’s timeline and future crises around the world can’t be predicted. So time is of the essence. What matters now is urgent execution: building flexibility into budgets and acquisitions, giving industry consistent demand signals it can trust, and cutting through the bureaucracy that slows everything down. Most of all, the Pentagon, Congress, and industry should act as one team focused on execution and capability delivery.

BECOME A MEMBER

Flexibility in Processes, Contracts, and Funding Is Key

Delivering combat capabilities at the pace of modern warfare requires flexibility. But the defense budget is currently spread across thousands of budget line items and organized into rigid appropriation categories known as “colors of money.” This structure was designed for control, not speed or flexibility. It creates hurdles that make it difficult to shift resources when opportunities or crises arise. To achieve speed and flexibility, Congress and the executive branch need to work together to consolidate programs and line items into portfolios.

Both the Section 809 Panel and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Commission reports reached the same conclusion: Instead of managing programs individually, they should be combined under portfolios led by executives with the authority to reward high performing programs with additional resources at the expense of the poorer performing ones. Competition within portfolios can motivate companies to go faster rather than just tick boxes. With this approach, the best available capabilities within a portfolio could be delivered to warfighters in weeks or months instead of years.

Since earlier this year, the Army has been taking some promising initial steps in this direction by establishing portfolios for drones, counter-unmanned aerial systems, and electronic warfare. Additional portfolio opportunities are in discussion and a draft memo from the secretary of defense reportedly seeks to institutionalize portfolios and other initiatives across the department The services should move forward with urgency to identify a handful of portfolios and their supporting budget lines to be consolidated and managed by portfolio acquisition executives. And they should empower these executives with clear fiscal guidance to maximize flexibility, allowing the movement of money within a portfolio to programs that are making promising progress on delivering capability at the speed and scale required. Thus far, only the Army has openly discussed moving over to this model.

Not all areas of defense acquisition lend themselves to this approach, but many do. Prime candidates include munition components, cyber and information technology capabilities, autonomous systems, and space launch and services being produced in the private sector or through public-private partnerships where technology moves faster than budget cycles.

Flexibility would have to be matched by transparency. Congress and the Pentagon would share responsibility for maintaining trust through modern data systems, accessible dashboards, and sustained dialogue. With clear visibility into how and why funds are moved, oversight can become an enabler of speed rather than a barrier to it.

Consistency of Effort Across Stakeholders and Investments Needed

Without consistency, it is difficult to have speed in a large bureaucracy like the Department of Defense. At that scale, predictable demand signals and resourcing are the necessary — but on their own, insufficient — conditions for systemic speed. That consistency cannot come from the Pentagon alone. Congress and industry are also critical participants.

The Pentagon demand signals shift too often as the services develop their budgets year by year. For example, between Fiscal Years 2023 and 2025, Joint Direct Attack Munitions procurement decreased by 65 percent in one year and by another 5 percent the next year. During the same time frame, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range purchases dropped by 30 percent in one year and doubled the following year. Many other munitions show the same pattern: fluctuating Pentagon budget requests and fluctuating orders appropriated from year to year. The fluctuating numbers may not seem like a big deal among all the moving parts associated with delivering a defense budget. However, in my engagement with industry as service chief and chairman, I was often told that inconsistency made it difficult to control costs and maintain a quality workforce.

Even when efforts are authorized and funds are approved, continuing resolutions delay their release. In the 15 years I served as a general officer, only one defense budget arrived on time from Congress. Within those 15 years, a total of five years’ time was under continuing resolutions, which meant the Department of Defense could not start new programs, increase production rates, or sign long-lead contracts. Funding was frozen at the prior year’s levels, even when priorities had shifted. In effect, continuing resolutions — which the Defense Department has been funded under since March of this year until the recent shutdown — put the military into neutral, spending money only to sustain last year’s plans while waiting for permission to move forward on this year’s needs.

The results? Slower modernization and disrupted training and maintenance schedules for the military, as well as difficulties among industry partners that are poised to start new programs, forecast production, manage and maintain supply chains, and keep people employed on existing programs. This is part of the reason why delays and cost overruns have become the norm. An on-time budget from Congress and a steady demand signal from the Pentagon are key steps to achieving consistency.

As I discussed in Congressional testimony, multi-year procurement remains one of the most proven ways to create consistency, allowing the country to buy down risk to national security, in addition to producing some savings. Of note, three of the four commissions mentioned earlier recommended multi-year purchases when possible.

The Fiscal Year 2024 defense appropriation made progress by enabling multi-year procurement for six critical munitions: the Naval Strike Missile, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. But this was after the armed services committees had tried to prod appropriators into multi-year procurement for a broader selection of munitions.

While there is, for good reason, much focus on expanding the usage of multi-year procurement for munitions programs, it can also be applied to programs with long lead-time components, stable requirements, and high annual demand, such as munition components, aircraft propulsion, solid rocket motors, and submarine and nuclear reactor components. These are shared bottlenecks where multi-year block buys could stabilize fragile suppliers, and reduce risk across and strengthen the industrial base.

The Defense Department’s Munitions Acceleration Council, aimed at doubling production across 12 key weapons, is a good start on coordinating the resources required, processes needed, and supply chains that need strengthening.

Consistency builds trust, drives down costs, and improves delivery timelines. This, in turn, secures supply chains, allowing for surge capacity when crises come. By contrast, inconsistent demand and resourcing discourages suppliers, especially sub-vendors, from taking risks to build out the supply chain, hire workers, and construct facilities ahead of a resourced program or contract.

Simplifying the Pentagon’s Purchasing Processes

Acquisition reform is a continuous subject of effort without enough tangible change in the field. While there are plenty of existing authorities available to go faster, they are buried under onerous guidance. This perpetuates a risk-averse culture that does not act with urgency but instead values compliance over accelerated timelines.

The Federal and Defense Acquisition Regulations are over 2,000 pages. Piling on top of these regulations are the nearly 7,400 pages of the department’s Financial Management Regulation. The growth of these regulations in the 1970s nearly doubled acquisition timelines. Navigating through and complying with this amount of guidance has extended acquisition timelines and been barriers to true reform. Both the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Commission and the Section 809 Panel provide ready-made recommendations to streamline by using data tools and workforce training to build trust and change culture. The government-wide initiative to rewrite the Federal Acquisition Regulation in plain language and remove elements not required by statute is sure to provide the opportunity to accelerate capability delivery.

But it will take more than just a rewrite to accelerate procurement. Identifying and highlighting existing and under-utilized authorities not governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation that could facilitate acceleration can complement the rewrite. In parallel, training programs will need to be developed that support both the existing non-Federal Acquisition Regulation authorities and the rewritten Federal Acquisition Regulation authorities. It will be important to identify an initial cadre of personnel to be trained, ensuring they have the appropriate mindset, expertise, and desire to implement change. At the same time, incentive structures need to be put in place to solidify the Federal Acquisition Regulation overhaul processes and procedures. These incentives could include performance-based bonuses, professional development opportunities, awards, recognition, and accelerated career advancement. In addition, AI could play an outsized role in increasing speed and scale while providing the desired oversight and reducing bureaucratic red tape. Properly done, AI could support acquisition and contracting professionals in the execution of their duties and support Pentagon and Congressional leaders with oversight responsibilities as all work through the updated guidance.

Congress is acting with agency on two critical pieces of legislation that will deliver capability to the field faster. The Senate’s FoRGED Act and the House’s SPEED Act shaped elements of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Both focus on streamlining, but with different approaches. The FoRGED Act provisions included in the NDAA focused on expanding participation of non-traditional defense contractors, easing regulatory burdens, removing outdated laws and regulations, and introducing portfolio management. The SPEED Act provisions address the Pentagon’s requirement process to reduce timelines through a more agile Joint Requirements Council and by testing technologies under operationally relevant conditions. The NDAA provisions driven by the FoRGED and SPEED Acts are definitely a step in the right direction. The real measure of success will be their implementation and results for warfighters. In short, simplifying processes enables a change in culture from one of risk-averse bureaucracy to one of transparency and collaboration.

Execute as a Team

In my final months as chairman, I directed the National Defense University to host a solarium about strengthening the defense industrial base. The intent was to build upon the various commission recommendations and increase collaboration between the Pentagon, Congress, and industry setting the stage for continued work of accelerating capability to the warfighter. The solarium was one of many ways I was seeking to realize progress. It took place a few weeks after my tenure ended and was led by the vice chairman, Adm. Chris Grady. And I know that efforts continue to move forward under Gen. Dan Caine and the current leadership of the Defense Department as evidenced by the draft secretary of defense memo referenced earlier.

There is an opportunity for the Pentagon to work in concert with Congress and industry. And it does have to be in concert. It is more appropriate to think of the Defense Department, Congress, and industry (traditional and non-traditional defense companies) as a single defense industrial enterprise. This conceptualization allows us to focus on the interdependence and need for collaboration among and between each.

Each element brings essential strengths. The Defense Department holds the insight on operational problems that require solutions, Congress wields the authority and funding, and industry commands the innovation and productive power. When any leg of that stool hesitates, the entire enterprise falters. Bureaucratic delay, partisan paralysis, or commercial caution each carry the same cost: lost time. And time is the one commodity America’s adversaries are working hardest to take from us.

If any leg of the stool isn’t there — if inaction or reticence by any one actor stifles progress — that will ultimately worsen our country’s strategic position and fail our warfighters.

Acceleration depends upon collaboration and must become muscle memory. The nation needs a shared roadmap that sets priorities, aligns incentives, and measures progress in months, not years. Selecting one or two major mission areas to serve as proof points — such as integrated air and missile defense — can demonstrate how portfolio management, multi-year procurement, and streamlined oversight work together in practice. The Patriot system, which already relies on multiple primes and sub-vendors across radar, interceptors, and rocket motors, provides a clear opportunity to prove that synchronization across program offices and industry partners can translate directly into faster capability delivery.

From my decades of service, I realize this is all easier said than done. But any steps taken to increase flexibility, consistency, and streamlining will be a plus for warfighters. This is not about recreating the “arsenal of democracy” of the 1940s. That world no longer exists. It is about forging a modern arsenal of agility, one that harnesses private-sector dynamism, transparent governance, and the clarity of a unified mission. The commissions have given us the playbook. The next step is to execute it ruthlessly and relentlessly. Risk will always accompany action, but the far greater danger lies in complacency. The time for more studies has passed. The time to build, together and at speed, is now.

BECOME A MEMBER

Gen. (ret.) CQ Brown, Jr. served as the 21st chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Capt. Frank Spatt via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · November 5, 2025

22. Drones Won’t Save Us: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine Will Cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare

​Summary:

The authors warn the Army against mirroring Ukraine/Russia’s drone-heavy tactics. Using adoption-capacity theory, they argue U.S. organizational culture favors airpower-enabled armored maneuver—not attritional, artillery-centric warfare modernized by small drones. Chasing drone parity risks undermining America’s asymmetric edge: tempo and maneuver. Instead, pursue counter-innovation such as ntegrated counter-UAS air defenses, electronic warfare, deception, and SHORAD embedded at echelon to dominate the “air littoral,” protect formations, and restore operational mobility. Develop concepts for EMCON/comm-degraded operations guided by commander’s intent. Prioritize solutions that leverage the U.S. industrial base and raise adversaries’ costs, making drone saturation less effective while preserving the American way of war.

Conclusion:

The diffusion of drone technology today is not a revolution in warfare but reaffirms its enduring truths. Nations and military forces will innovate within the boundaries of their strategic and organizational cultures. Not every new drone emerging from Ukraine or Russia aligns with the United States’ strategic logic. The US way of war, preserving maneuver through tempo, initiative, and integration, must guide the Army’s approach as to which lessons to draw from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Rather than chasing mere parity, the US Army should pursue counterinnovations: systems and concepts that render Russia’s embrace of drones irrelevant and obsolete. The task ahead is to learn from Russia’s adaptations and innovations, without mirroring them, and restore the Army’s ability to maneuver on the future battlefield.

Comment: There are no silver bullets. How do we innovate within the "boundaries of our strategic and operations culture?" Do we recognize those boundaries? Do we understand our own strategic and operational culture?

Drones Won’t Save Us: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine Will Cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Matthew Revels · November 5, 2025

Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe | 11.05.25

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/drones-wont-save-us-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-ukraine-will-cost-the-us-army-its-edge-in-maneuver-warfare/

The US Army remains anchored to an era when its technological and qualitative superiority ensured dominance on the battlefield. Yet battlefield losses and grinding attrition in the Russo-Ukrainian War reveal the growing vulnerability of platforms such as the Big Five, which have long defined the Army’s approach to land warfare. The Department of War’s recent drone dominance initiative reflects the growing sense that small drones have reached a critical demonstration point—one capable of transforming the character of land warfare and challenging the conceptual foundations of the Army’s preferred way of fighting. As potential challengers for land dominance integrate small drones into their arsenals, the Army must determine whether to adopt or counter the ongoing innovation to help it maintain its asymmetric advantage in maneuver warfare.

As the world’s leading military power and defense spender, the US armed services are actively working to adopt drone innovations diffusing from Russia and Ukraine, driven by their technophile military culture. But the quest to rapidly adopt small drones and make the attendant organizational changes to optimally employ them ignores the capital required to do so and fails to recognize that Russian and Ukrainian employment methods are misaligned with the US Army’s preferred way of war. Unfortunately, the assumption that the United States must adopt the innovation misses the alternative—one far more aligned with the American way of war—of countering the drone revolution to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Reestablishing the Army’s land dominance and tilting the balance of power in America’s favor will require pursuing counterinnovations in the form of counterdrone integrated air defense systems that restore tactical and operational maneuver. Succeeding on the future battlefield does not necessitate the blind acceptance of new technologies and concepts, but rather a consideration of which innovation response leverages the state’s advantages and mitigates its strategic limitations. Seeking to counter recent drone innovations will provide the US Army with the capabilities to restore its asymmetric advantage on the battlefield—rapid maneuver, sustained by a high operational tempo and massed armored penetration forces.

The Drivers of Diffusion: Assessing the Impact of Critical Task Focus on Organizational Capital

Assessing the potential diffusion of Russian and Ukrainian drone innovation to the United States requires examining Michael Horowitz’s adoption-capacity theory. This theory consists of two key factors that determine the strategic innovation a given power will pursue: the financial intensity and the organizational capital required to adopt. The questions of financial intensity is important—not least because although the Army possesses the monetary resources to acquire small drones in large quantities, there are questions about its ability to sustain implementation in a large-scale combat operation. But examining this factor must be done after determining whether the innovation aligns with the organization’s more complicated and entrenched cultural preferences. To do so, we turn to Horowitz’s second factor: organizational capital.

Organizational capital includes critical task focus, organizational age, and experimentation. The latter factors are not the subject of this article because they are easier to measure and require less of a nuanced understanding of the organization’s culture and preferences. An organization’s age is unalterable unless it undergoes a catastrophic military defeat or broader societal changes lead to radical transformation, as occurred during the French Revolution. There are also relatively straightforward methods for determining a military’s willingness to experiment, measured by investments in innovation and suborganizations focused on developing novel technologies or concepts. This leaves us with the Army’s critical task focus, an ill-understood concept that is often overlooked by leaders when attempting to adopt new ideas and doctrine.

In simple terms, an organization’s critical task focus is its primary goal—what it seeks to achieve—which in turn limits the means (innovations) it will adopt to achieve that goal. Organizations that can broadly define their critical tasks and disentangle the ends they seek from the means they are willing to pursue are more likely to adopt innovations. In his work, Horowitz explains that the Army possesses a narrow focus and defines it as relying on “massing firepower to win conventional wars.” In effect, this is the way the Army seeks to fight. So by examining a military force’s critical task focus, we are essentially identifying the state’s way of war, because it will dictate the means and methods that state uses to pursue its military objectives.

Antulio Echevarria offers the most succinct definition of a state’s way of war, describing it as “general trends in the conduct of, and preferred modes of thinking about, war.” Though each nation has specific nuances that define its approach to war, there are often blocs of states that seek to emulate a particular military example, forming larger groupings of countries with relatively similar characteristics. For instance, former Soviet Bloc countries emulate a Russian way of war, and Western states follow traditions initiated by Napoleon Bonaparte and Helmuth von Moltke. Other analysts further clarify that the way of war refers to the mental frameworks or paradigms through which we aim to plan, prepare, and fight future conflicts. A state’s way of war will manifest itself at each level of war, from strategic documents to operational planning concepts to tactical-level doctrine. Ultimately, this way of war corresponds with how an organization—a military service like the US Army—believes it should pursue its primary objective, or critical task focus.

The Russian Way of War: Modernizing Attrition

In 2023, Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George emphasized that strengthening the Army profession requires turning “lessons observed into lessons learned.” The challenge for the US Army is to draw insight from the Russo-Ukrainian War in ways that enhance the American way of war, without internalizing the adaptations of a fundamentally different force. As Krisztián Jójárt noted in the Journal of Strategic Studies, the lessons Russia draws from this conflict, particularly regarding drones, will not align with Western interpretations, nor should they. Understanding how Russia interprets these lessons, within its organizational DNA, is key to avoiding misapplied imitation.

The Russian Armed Forces are adapting within the boundaries of their institutional DNA, which remains distinctly “artillery-centric.” Russian ground forces conduct maneuver-by-fire and massed strikes to impose attrition on adversaries. This identity has long defined how Russia wages war, stretching from the Great Patriotic War’s concept of deep battle to the preeminence of fires for operational and strategic tasks within active defense, and even to its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although the current conflict’s positional nature initially reduced Russian fires to unsynchronized volleys, the proliferation of drones has revived and deepened, rather than diminished, Russia’s reliance on attrition over maneuver, reaffirming artillery and fires as the “God of War.”

Russia’s preferences stand in stark contrast with those of the United States, whose way of war centers on maneuver enabled by airpower and precision. For example, in Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces function as an extension of fires, conducting standoff artillery bombardments with unguided rockets or glide-bomb strikes that mirror ground artillery rather than supporting or enabling ground maneuver. Russia’s airpower divergence does not reflect an inherent lack of capability, but a deliberate doctrinal preference for massed fires as the core of tactical and operational lethality. Consequently, one of Russia’s most notable innovations lies in its use of small, cheap first-person-view drones, reconnaissance drones, and loitering munitions to expand the effects of artillery. These systems saturate the battlefield, provide real-time targeting, and deliver precision effects that amplify fires at minimal cost. For Moscow, drones are not substitutes for airpower but economical instruments for perfecting its fires-based way of war.

Western analysts and military observers alike recognize this shift in restoring the coherence of Russian fires with drone innovations. Dara Massicot of the Carnegie Endowment recently observed that the Russian military institutionalized over 450 updates to combat manuals, many focused on artillery tactics and drone-enabled targeting, to reestablish fires as the decisive warfighting function. Likewise, the US Army’s ATP 7-100.1, Russian Tactics explains that while Soviet-era forces relied on sheer mass, modern Russian units integrate drone reconnaissance, extended-range fires, and automated command and control to achieve similar effects. These reforms demonstrate the logic of Russian lessons learned: Drones have modernized attrition, not maneuver.

Yet, even as Russia adapts and innovates, its armed forces have suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine, widening the military power gap with the United States and NATO. To offset those losses, Moscow is accelerating development of aerial drones and other uncrewed systems to supplement combat power and sustain an attrition-based approach against numerically superior NATO forces. The Army must resist simply mirroring these adaptations. Replicating tactics born of a stagnant, attritonal war risks diluting our own asymmetric advantage of maneuver. The Russian military seeks to paralyze movement through drone-enabled fires; the US Army’s task is to preserve it.

The American Way of War: Enabling Armored Maneuver through Close Air Support and Direct Fires

Standing in sharp contrast to Russian military preferences, where strategic and organizational tendencies remain consistent with a land-based power that projects force over shorter distances and with shorter lines of communication, the American way of war emphasizes the necessity of rapidly shaping the operational environment through airpower. As a result, the US Army relies on airpower to attrit enemy forces and set the conditions for offensive operations at its chosen time and place. This reliance on airpower to enable maneuver and the priority placed on qualitatively superior armored forces to outflank an adversary combine to produce an organizational culture that leaves the US Army ill-prepared to adopt the current innovations diffusing from the conflict in Ukraine, as it runs counter to its preferred way of war.

As a long-distance force projector, the United States disproportionately relies on its Air Force to deliver precision-guided munitions, attrit enemy forces, and set the conditions for ground maneuver. Unlike the Russian military, which primarily fights along its continental periphery, the US military must deploy expeditionary forces over vast distances, meaning that it is unable to rely on indirect fires assets to set conditions. Key to the US military’s theory of victory is establishing air dominance over its adversary and heavily attriting enemy forces. Examples include the lengthy air campaign before the Gulf War in 1991, the bombing campaign in Afghanistan, and the US military’s operations in the Middle East since 2001. Additionally, the US Army has long neglected its indirect fire capabilities, as evidenced by glaring disparities when compared to the Russians, in favor of employing exquisite airpower to achieve rapid results. Though the service is advancing its long-range fires capabilities, the Army and the American way of war still rely on airpower to set the conditions for operational maneuver. As the Army seeks to deepen its integration of small drones into its planning and doctrine, it risks undermining the air-ground integration it has placed at the center of its way of war. Overcoming entrenched beliefs about airpower may require more organizational capital than the Army can provide amid ongoing transformation.

The second key characteristic is the emphasis on maintaining a qualitatively superior armored force capable of massing and striking the enemy’s flanks. The US Army’s reliance on armored forces to sustain maneuver operations began in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, with the development of the Army’s Active Defense doctrine. At the time, the Army quickly developed operational concepts that enabled it to fight a numerically superior foe in the Warsaw Pact. Active Defense’s emphasis on defensive operations and firepower over maneuver drew significant criticism for its misalignment with the preferred way of war. Doctrinal rejection led to the development of AirLand Battle in 1982, a concept that still looms large over American operational planning. AirLand Battle restored the centrality of gaining the initiative through initial disruption, then maneuvering armored formations on the enemy’s flanks to engage follow-on echelons and disrupt enemy forces in depth. In 1991, the Army executed this doctrine against a woefully outclassed Iraqi military by fixing Saddam’s forces in Kuwait and implementing the “Left Hook” on Iraq’s flanks. The Army also utilized modified versions of AirLand Battle during its invasion of Iraq in 2003, with the caveat that Iraqi forces mostly withdrew into urban areas. It makes sense then that the Army would return to a doctrine that enabled such lopsided victories as it shifted back to an emphasis on large-scale combat operations. Unfortunately, the Russo-Ukrainian War highlights the vulnerabilities of armored formations and the risks of massing one’s forces to achieve the operational objectives of America’s preferred way of war.

In the case of AirLand Battle, catastrophic success led to the development of cultural norms and an American way of war that relied on rapid armored maneuver to overwhelm adversary ground forces. The Army’s fixation on this norm helps to explain the litany of articles that attempted to draw early conclusions about the role of armored forces on the future battlefield after Russia invaded Ukraine. Recognition that the Army may be unable to mass armored forces has created a sense of doctrinal paralysis because the Army is unable to overcome the capability gap that exists within its current way of war. Adoption-capacity theory would thus demonstrate the futility of pursuing innovations misaligned with a military organization’s way of war, and yet, the US Armed forces are aggressively pursuing innovations that prioritize firepower over maneuver. Army leaders should recognize the misalignment between their service’s organizational culture and the lessons from Ukraine, which should in turn lead them to consider the alternative: countering the innovation.

Preserving Maneuver in the Drone Age

Preserving the American way of war in a drone-saturated environment requires a framework at the strategic and operational levels to begin understanding how counterinnovations can provide asymmetric advantages on the future battlefield. Strategically, the United States should pursue counterinnovations that leverage the technical expertise of the defense industrial base and develop sophisticated single-use military solutions that will not easily diffuse. To this end, prioritization must be given to a counterdrone integrated air defense system, electronic warfare, and deception capabilities designed to neutralize an adversary’s drones. Prioritizing and investing in these systems, along with the organizational restructuring that will follow, will raise the financial and technological barrier to entry for state and nonstate actors alike to employ drones in the manner we have seen in the Russo-Ukrainian War, while restoring tactical and operational maneuver, the US Army’s asymmetric advantage. Restoring land dominance requires a strategic reallocation of resources to ensure the United States can reverse the trend toward the democratization of military capabilities.

Operationally, the US Army must begin developing concepts and doctrine that protect maneuver in an environment dominated by persistent drone presence. The framework for these concepts can include integrating the prioritized technology above—such as drone air defenses, short-range air defense, and electronic warfare—into maneuver units to enable the domination of the air littoral while preserving maneuver. Concepts may even extend to how units operate within electronic warfare–protected environments, cut off from incoming or outgoing transmissions, and operating off the commander’s intent with no radio communication after the start of operations.

The diffusion of drone technology today is not a revolution in warfare but reaffirms its enduring truths. Nations and military forces will innovate within the boundaries of their strategic and organizational cultures. Not every new drone emerging from Ukraine or Russia aligns with the United States’ strategic logic. The US way of war, preserving maneuver through tempo, initiative, and integration, must guide the Army’s approach as to which lessons to draw from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Rather than chasing mere parity, the US Army should pursue counterinnovations: systems and concepts that render Russia’s embrace of drones irrelevant and obsolete. The task ahead is to learn from Russia’s adaptations and innovations, without mirroring them, and restore the Army’s ability to maneuver on the future battlefield.

Matthew Revels is an Army strategist who serves as the Modern War Institute’s plans officer and as a senior instructor at the United States Military Academy. He currently teaches courses on military innovation and forecasting and gaming in decision-making.

Eric Uribe is a major in the US Army and a foreign area officer with an area concentration in Europe. He holds a master of arts in security studies from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service with a concentration in international security.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Capt. Stephanie Snyder, US Army

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · Matthew Revels · November 5, 2025

​23. Nominee for Pentagon strategist outlines approach for stymieing potential Chinese attacks on Taiwan

​Summary:

Nominee Austin Dahmer outlined a broad strategy for deterring or defeating a potential Taiwan invasion by China during his confirmation hearing. Key elements include layered defenses through manned submarines, underwater drones, long-range fires, bombers, space control and integrating allies around the First Island Chain, especially the Philippines. Dahmer emphasized aligning U.S. force posture with Taiwan’s defense, increasing Taiwan’s military spending, and leveraging special operations forces early in potential conflicts. He stressed burden-sharing and simultaneous global threats, positioning “peace through strength” and alliance coordination as central to future deterrence.

​Excerpt:

“I think this underscores really the central problem that our nation and the department and the joint force face — the scope and scale of the threats … [such as] China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Islamic terrorists, narco-terrorists, etc. And we only have so many military and other resources with which to address them. I think the overall approach, I think, as the president and [Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth] have enumerated, is one, obviously, to defend our own homeland above all else and to number two, deter China in the Indo-Pacific as in many ways an unprecedented threat, and to significantly increase our efforts at burden sharing with our allies and partners, precisely to address that very real threat of simultaneity,” Dahmer said.

​Comment: There is more than Taiwan. Deterring China on Taiwan does us no good if north Korea attacks and we lose South Korea. And vice versa - if we protect South Korea and lose Taiwan that will do us no good as well. We have to see how these threats are interrelated and how our interests are intertwined with the silk web of our friends, partners, and allies.

Nominee for Pentagon strategist outlines approach for stymieing potential Chinese attacks on Taiwan

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper · November 4, 2025

https://defensescoop.com/2025/11/04/austin-dahmer-dod-dow-us-military-china-taiwan-invasion-deterrence/?utm

Austin Dahmer, President Donald Trump’s nominee for a top job at the Defense Department, outlined for lawmakers a multi-pronged approach for deterring or — if necessary — defeating a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Trump nominated Dahmer in June to be the next assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, and serve as the principal advisor to Pentagon leadership on the capabilities, forces and contingency plans necessary to implement the national defense strategy, among other responsibilities.

The Trump administration subsequently rebranded the Department of Defense as the Department of War, and referred to that position as assistant secretary of war for strategy, plans and capabilities.

During his confirmation hearing Tuesday with the Senate Armed Services Committee, lawmakers revealed that the Trump administration recently rebranded the position as ASW for strategy, plans and forces.

Dahmer told lawmakers that it was his understanding that the duties and responsibilities of the position are the same as before, despite the title change that was directed via an Oct. 8 memo.

“Assistant Secretary of War for Strategy, Plans and Forces more accurately describes the position,” a Defense Department official told DefenseScoop Tuesday when asked about the recent name change.

In written responses to senators’ advance policy questions ahead of his confirmation hearing, Dahmer noted that it will take “a variety of types of forces, concepts, and posture to effectively deter and, if necessary, defeat a Chinese assault in the First Island Chain” in the Asia-Pacific region.

“The U.S. strategy of denial complements Taiwan’s plans for layered defense by providing combat-capable forces on operationally relevant timelines, to provide a strong local defense that is difficult and painful to dislodge while bolstering allied confidence in our resolve. That said, Taiwan needs to do more and faster, first and foremost by significantly increasing its defense spending and rapidly acquiring the appropriate weapons and systems needed to deter aggression from China,” he wrote.

The United States is a top arms provider for Taiwan, offering the self-governing island a variety of military capabilities — such as anti-ship missiles — that could be useful in defending against a Chinese invasion. However, some observers have expressed concerns that Taipei isn’t optimizing its weapons purchases for such a scenario or doing enough to prepare.

The Chinese government has long asserted that Taiwan is part of China and should be brought under its control. Beijing is also involved in other territorial disputes with several of its neighbors, including American allies.

“The most important thing the United States and its regional allies can do is ensure they have sufficient military forces to deter China. If we do this, then Beijing’s attempts to expand its influence and dominate its neighbors can be resisted,” Dahmer, who has recently been performing the duties of deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, told lawmakers.

The U.S. military needs to further mature and field manned submarines and underwater drones; mobile, ground-based long-range fires; bombers and other long-range air assets; “space control” tools; and other “enabling capabilities,” he wrote.

Special operations forces also offer “very unique capabilities” that can be leveraged, Dahmer noted during Tuesday’s hearing.

“And that’s true in great power competition, great power deterrence and potential conflict, as well as their enduring role in ensuring that the homeland is defended through counterterrorism, etc.,” he said, noting that SOF can be deployed to gain “unique placement and access” — including prior to the outbreak of a high-end conflict.

“If confirmed, I would be sure that special operations forces … would be integrated not only in our overall strategy, but in all the aspects of our plans and posture,” Dahmer said.

Strengthening ties with allies would also be on his agenda.

“The United States has a very important geographic position as well along the First Island Chain. I think the advances that the department has made in our force posture and presence in the Philippines is absolutely critical to our overall deterrence posture and our strategy in the Western Pacific. And I think continuing to advance that, if confirmed, with the posture angle would be a central focus for me, and also ensuring that our plans appropriately incorporate the abilities our allies and partners, especially our critical ones,” he told senators.

The threat of “simultaneity” — or the emergence of multiple crises at the same time — highlights the need for more “burden sharing” with allies and partners around the world, he suggested.

“I think this underscores really the central problem that our nation and the department and the joint force face — the scope and scale of the threats … [such as] China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Islamic terrorists, narco-terrorists, etc. And we only have so many military and other resources with which to address them. I think the overall approach, I think, as the president and [Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth] have enumerated, is one, obviously, to defend our own homeland above all else and to number two, deter China in the Indo-Pacific as in many ways an unprecedented threat, and to significantly increase our efforts at burden sharing with our allies and partners, precisely to address that very real threat of simultaneity,” Dahmer said.

He noted that Trump and Hegseth recently traveled to Asia, where they met with allies and partners. Trump also held talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

“While we’re centrally focused on the military aspect of peace through strength at the department and ensuring that our defense strategy and our military forces are able to deter China in the Western Pacific, the president’s diplomatic efforts, to include with Xi himself, are making clear that we can have a modus vivendi with China. We can have peace for our two countries, but that’s peace through strength from the American side to ensure that American interests are always advanced,” Dahmer told lawmakers.

During an interview with CBS that aired on the “60 Minutes” program on Sunday, Trump declined to say whether he would order American military forces to defend Taiwan if China tried to invade the island.

“You’ll find out if it happens,” Trump said, according to a CBS transcript of the interview. “I can’t give away my secrets. I don’t want to be one of these guys that tells you exactly what’s gonna happen if something happens.”

The subject didn’t come up during the recent meeting with Xi, according to Trump.

“Taiwan is a very interesting case. It’s 69 miles away from China. We’re 9,500 miles away. But that doesn’t matter. He [Xi] understands what will happen. He and I have spoken about it. But it was never even brought up during a … two-and-a-half-hour meeting we had yesterday,” Trump said. “He has openly said, and his people have openly said at meetings, ‘We would never do anything while President Trump is president,’ because they know the consequences.”

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Editor-in-Chief of DefenseScoop. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X: @Jon_Harper_

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper · November 4, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com