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Quotes of the Day:
"Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less."
– Marie Curie
“The sane man is neither deceived by others nor by himself.”
–Marcus Aurelius
"I will accept any rules that you feel necessary to your freedom. I am free, no matter what rules surround me. If I find them tolerable, I tolerate them; if I find them too obnoxious, I break them. I am free because I know that I alone am morally responsible for everything I do."
– Robert A. Heinlein
1. U.S. Patriot missile batteries return to S. Korea after Middle East deployment
2. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, Japan to hold 'strategic dialogue' this week
3. The New Takaichi Cabinet and South Korea-Japan Relations
4. The North Korean Conundrum: The world has changed since 2019.
5. N. Korea slams U.S. sanctions on Pyongyang, vows proper response
6. Full replacement of JCS generals ordered over martial law turmoil: sources
7. Air Force team's participation in Dubai airshow thwarted over Japan's refusal to refuel: sources
8. Seoul open to reviewing sanctions on N. Korea over cryptocurrency theft if needed: official
9. Delay in summit fact sheet signals extended US review
10. AMCHAM, FTC chair discuss Korea’s fair trade policy direction
11. Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea Policy Is Built on Outdated Assumptions
1. U.S. Patriot missile batteries return to S. Korea after Middle East deployment
Summary:
U.S. Patriot missile batteries have returned to South Korea after a temporary Middle East deployment. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment’s return enhances readiness and air defense against North Korean threats. Their overseas experience strengthens tactical planning, while upgraded Patriot systems bolster South Korea’s layered missile defense with THAAD integration.
Comment: Let's put "strategic flexibility" to bed. This is "strategic agility." This is a reality for US forces. We have "high demand low density" forces. Strategists in the Pentagon must make resource trade-offs current versus future threats, immediate requirements versus long term commitments etc. But note that our strong commitment to mutual defense in Korea remains. And our defensive capability in Korea is strengthened by the lessons these soldiers learned in missile defense combat, especially since the missiles they short down were likely either directly from north Korea or derivatives of north Korean provided systems.
(LEAD) U.S. Patriot missile batteries return to S. Korea after Middle East deployment | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · November 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251106004151315?section=national/defense
(ATTN: REMOVES erroneous quote; UPDATES throughout)
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Patriot missile defense batteries have returned to South Korea after being temporarily deployed to the Middle East earlier this year, according to the U.S. military stationed in South Korea on Thursday.
In a statement, the U.S. Eighth Army said it welcomed soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, following their deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in March.
Lt. Col. Ashley Hahn, commander of 2-1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion to South Korea, said the unit's experience overseas will directly benefit its mission on the peninsula.
"The Guardian Soldiers faced an array of threat sets while deployed, which will undoubtedly add to air defense planning, decision-making, and tactical operations in Korea," Hahn said, adding these lessons will enhance combat capability and readiness on the peninsula.
At a press conference in August, USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson indicated that the Patriot batteries, which had been relocated to the Middle East for strategic flexibility, would return to South Korea for the latest equipment upgrades.
The Patriot missile system is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at low to mid-range altitudes and serves as part of South Korea's layered missile defense network, along with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, to counter North Korean threats.
This photo, taken from the U.S. Forces Korea website, shows the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade being greeted by Eighth Army and 35th ADA leaders as they deplane at Osan Air Base, south of Seoul, on Oct. 30, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · November 6, 2025
2. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, Japan to hold 'strategic dialogue' this week
Summary:
South Korea and Japan will hold their 16th strategic dialogue in Seoul on Friday, led by Vice Foreign Ministers Park Yoon-joo and Takehiro Funakoshi. The talks will address bilateral, regional, and global issues, aiming to sustain improving relations and build on recent leadership-level cooperation following APEC and trilateral meetings with the U.S.
Comment: Sustaining ROK-Japan relations is important for trilateral cooperation and mutual defense.
Senior diplomats of S. Korea, Japan to hold 'strategic dialogue' this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · November 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251106007800315?section=national/diplomacy
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan will hold vice-ministerial diplomatic talks later this week to discuss bilateral relations, regional and global issues, Seoul's foreign ministry said Thursday.
The 16th strategic dialogue will take place in Seoul on Friday, led by First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo and his Japanese counterpart, Takehiro Funakoshi, ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing.
"There will be in-depth discussions on a broad range of issues, including the South Korea-Japan bilateral relations, regional situations and international issues," Lee said.
First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo (L) poses with Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takehiro Funakoshi during their bilateral talks in Tokyo on July 18, 2025. (Yonhap)
It marks the first strategic dialogue to be held since the leadership changes in both countries. The same talks previously took place in June last year under the preceding governments.
Friday's talks come as Seoul and Tokyo seek to maintain the positive momentum in the bilateral ties that have dramatically improved over the past two years.
At their first one-on-one talks on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Gyeongju last week, President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi shared the need to enhance cooperation in a future-oriented manner.
The summit is seen as having dispelled worries about the new Japanese leader's approach to the neighboring country, given her widely known hawkish stance on past history issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
Park and Funakoshi last met in Tokyo in July for the trilateral talks with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · November 6, 2025
3. The New Takaichi Cabinet and South Korea-Japan Relations
The PDF can be downloaded at the website at the link below.
The New Takaichi Cabinet and South Korea-Japan Relations
Summary
The first summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, held in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Oct. 30, concluded successfully in a friendly and cordial atmosphere. South Korea emphasized continuing bilateral cooperation, a future-oriented relationship and trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan, while Japan highlighted the importance of shuttle diplomacy to build trust between the two leaders. Concerns over a meeting between South Korea’s progressive administration and Japan’s conservative administration were largely dispelled. However, Japan once again stressed that bilateral cooperation should be based on the 1965 normalization of diplomatic relations, in which Japan claimed its 1910 annexation of Korea was legal at the time. Japan also expressed hopes for South Korea’s interest in the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. In response, President Lee reaffirmed his “two-track” approach—addressing historical issues and forward-looking tasks separately. Within South Korea, public sentiment remains mixed—hopeful about Prime Minister Takaichi’s friendly gestures toward South Korea, yet uneasy about Japan’s still unchanged perception of history and territorial issues.
4. The North Korean Conundrum: The world has changed since 2019.
Summary:
North Korea, once isolated, now aligns with the emerging China-Russia-led global order, reducing incentives to reengage Washington or Seoul. Kim Jong Un’s strengthened position reflects broader shifts away from U.S. dominance since the failed 2019 Hanoi summit. Denuclearization is no longer realistic; Trump must recalibrate expectations if talks resume.
Comment: Yes it is a different world than 2019. It is an especially different Northeast Asia. A fundamental question is: How should the United States adapt its Korea strategy to address an emboldened North Korea integrated into a China-Russia-anchored “alternative world order”? To answer that, the policy makers and strategists in Seoul and Washington must have a clear understanding of the nature, objectives, and sraegy of the Kim family regime. That is a fundamental and foundational requirement.
The North Korean Conundrum
The American Conservative
Foreign Affairs
The North Korean Conundrum
The world has changed since 2019.
Rob York
Nov 4, 2025 12:05 AM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-north-korean-conundrum/
Donald Trump’s recent swing through Asia was largely harmonious, as he struck a positive tone in his dealings with everyone from South Korea’s very progressive president, Lee Jae Myung, to Japan’s very conservative prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, to Xi Jinping, who looks more and more like he will rule the People’s Republic of China for life, or at least as long as he wishes to.
One person Trump did not meet, despite rumors, was Kim Jong Un. Kim has signaled an openness to this outcome at some point, but as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit drew nearer, those rumors faded. Understanding why this has not happened—indeed, why Kim has largely ignored the U.S. since 2019—means understanding the world at large and how it has changed since the Hanoi summit.
When Trump walked away from the Hanoi summit, and from Kim Jong Un, in 2019, he sounded optimistic that there would be more opportunities. There has been an impasse, and Kim had indeed arrived expecting more than Trump was prepared to offer—keeping much of his nuclear program intact in exchange for the almost complete lifting of sanctions. The Americans arrived expecting negotiations, and Kim effectively expected capitulation.
Trump therefore seemed to assume that eventually Kim would have to moderate his position and try again, because all roads to international acceptance traveled through the U.S., and escaping its sanctions was essential for North Korea. Likewise, Trump probably thought that leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2018 would be the prelude to another deal, one more favorable to the U.S., or perhaps one that imposed more exacting standards on Tehran for its aggressive regional behavior and opaque nuclear program.
Neither outcome has come to pass so far, and for reasons far bigger than developments in either Pyongyang or Tehran. North Korea has had a more complex relationship with what we will call, for the sake of convenience, the “international community” than many realize, having championed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War and never being so firmly in the orbit of either the USSR or the PRC as it might have seemed. The Cold War’s end, along with that of the NAM’s relevance, coincided with the failing health of national founder Kim Il Sung, who died in 1994. With that, and with South Korea’s emergence as a global diplomatic player after the 1988 Olympics, North Korea retreated inside itself, focusing on deterrence and internal stability. The former of these developments culminated, starting in the mid-2000s, with a functional nuclear program; the latter with Kim Il Sung passing his leadership to his son Kim Jong Il in 1994, and Kim Jong Il passing it to Kim Jong Un upon his death in 2011.
But the developments above also took place as North Korea acceded to the United Nations in 1991, and, despite its reputation as a “rogue state” in the years that followed, North Korea has continuously declared itself to be a member in good standing of the international community, a sovereign nation worthy of governing its own affairs, and a committed opponent of foreign interference.
Indeed, when one looks at the regime’s actions in the decades leading up to Hanoi, reaching deals with the outside world, only to violate their spirit (such as with the Agreed Framework of 1994 and Leap Day Deal of 2012), it seems fairly clear that the regime had a goal of breaking out of its isolation—first self-imposed for the sake of stability following Kim Il Sung’s death, then imposed from outside by U.S.-led sanctions—to restore the regime’s place of prominence in the world but without having to make major concessions regarding its weapons programs.
With Trump, Kim thought he had such an opportunity. Failure in 2019 did not change his opinion about the suitability of this goal; it only made him look for different routes to obtaining it.
Within the security communities of the U.S. and its major partners in Europe and Asia, concern has been growing in recent years about the emerging alternative “global order”, this one helmed by China but supported by Russia (and even, to an extent, India, though its vision likely differs from the other two). BRICS is in the process of expanding. Beijing has set up a series of alternative institutions to compete with those of the UN. “Non-Aligned Movement” as a term is passé, but the countries it once consisted of are still out there, still feeling underrepresented by the UN and other G7-adjacent institutions, and have more recently been rebranded as “the Global South.” When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, it laid bare the Euro-American order’s powerlessness to prevent such actions, and when G7 countries rallied to speak out for Kiev and bolster its defenses, but did not do the same for Gazan civilians who died at Israeli hands after October 7, many voices in the Global South rose with chants of hypocrisy.
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Whether Ukraine and Gaza, or Israel and Russia, are clear parallels is beside the point. Beijing’s rise and its tight relationship with Moscow is cause for alarm in many European, North American, and East Asian capitals, but in capitals across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia it is a sign that the U.S.-led order is no longer the only game in town. Kim Jong Un recognized this early, which made him comfortable supporting Putin’s Ukraine campaign and swearing off relations with South Korea. And he was not alone—hardliners in Iran were vindicated by the collapse of the JCPOA. The late President Ebrahim Raisi did not seek an amended version of it, but instead invested his diplomatic energies in growing closer to Xi and Putin.
In time, Kim may see an opportunity to serve as a voice for nations of the Global South, just as his grandfather did. For now, what we do know is that he feels comfortable with his current arrangement with China, and especially Russia, and has no need for the South Koreans. Meeting Trump during his APEC stopover, when the South Koreans were hosting, would have validated Seoul, albeit indirectly, something Kim has very little interest in doing.
Some North Korean state media announcements suggest that Kim may be willing to meet Trump eventually—the odds are certainly higher than under Joe Biden or Kamala Harris, whom he almost certainly would have seen as instruments of the old global order that despises him. But if and when they do meet, Trump should be prepared for what he is getting: an emboldened member in good standing of the alternative emerging order, and one who will not negotiate the terms of his own disarmament. Trump and his cabinet should modify their objectives accordingly and set realistic goals. Negotiating complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) was unrealistic in 2019. It’s absurd now.
The American Conservative
5. N. Korea slams U.S. sanctions on Pyongyang, vows proper response
Summary:
North Korea condemned new U.S. sanctions targeting its cyber-laundering operations as proof of Washington’s “hostile policy,” vowing a “proper response with patience.” Despite Trump’s outreach for renewed talks, Pyongyang dismissed pressure tactics as ineffective. Seoul’s unification ministry noted the restrained tone, while intelligence hinted at possible future U.S.–North Korea summit preparations.
Comment: Admit nothing, deny everything, Make counter accusations (and threats). The proper response is to end its malign activities including its cyber warfare. And we should note that the ROK and US do not have a hostel policy. It is the Kim family regime that is the hostile and malign actor.
(2nd LD) N. Korea slams U.S. sanctions on Pyongyang, vows proper response | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · November 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251106000452315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with KCNA's English-language report, details; RECASTS headline, lead para)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday denounced the latest U.S. sanctions on Pyongyang as a demonstration of Washington's hostile policy, vowing to take proper measures to counter it with patience.
The North's reaction came as the U.S. announced Tuesday that it had imposed sanctions on eight North Korean individuals and two entities for their involvement in laundering money stolen through illicit cyber activities.
The sanctions came even as U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed his wish to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to resume stalled diplomacy with Pyongyang.
This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 1, 2019, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) and U.S. President Donald Trump meeting at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Kim Un-chol, North Korea's vice foreign minister in charge of U.S. affairs, said in a statement that by imposing fresh sanctions, the U.S. has showed its "invariable hostile" intents toward North Korea in an "accustomed and traditional way," according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"Now that the present U.S. administration has clarified its stand to be hostile towards the DPRK to the last, we will also take proper measures to counter it with patience for any length of time," the statement showed.
Denouncing the U.S. for revealing its "wicked nature," the North's official warned Washington should not expect its tactics of pressure, appeasement, threat and blackmail against North Korea will work.
"The U.S. sanctions will have no effect on the DPRK's thinking and viewpoint on it in the future, too, as in the past," Kim said, using the acronym of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In regard to North Korea's statement, South Korea's unification ministry assessed the North appears to have responded to the imposition of U.S. sanctions in a "restrained" manner.
The U.S. move came as North Korea has not responded to Trump's proposal to meet with the North's leader during his latest trip to South Korea on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering.
Earlier this week the U.S. State Department also raised the need to seek U.N. sanctions on seven ships accused of illegally exporting North Korean coal and iron ore to China in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions over the North's nuclear and missile programs.
South Korea's spy agency said this week there were signs that North Korea had been preparing for a possible meeting with the U.S. in time for last week's APEC gathering.
The National Intelligence Service said there is a high possibility that the North and the U.S. would hold a summit some time after an annual joint military exercise between South Korea and the U.S. in March next year.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · November 6, 2025
6. Full replacement of JCS generals ordered over martial law turmoil: sources
Summary:
JCS Chairman Gen. Jin Yong-sung ordered a complete replacement of top Joint Chiefs of Staff generals and senior officers as part of post-martial-law reforms. About 40 generals will be reassigned to other branches or the defense ministry, following September’s dismissal of seven four-star generals linked to Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed martial law.
Comment: A purge? Probably not seen on this scale since the election of Kim Young Sam in 1993 and the ouster of the Hanahoe society (IYKYK)
Full replacement of JCS generals ordered over martial law turmoil: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251106011700320
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jin Yong-sung has ordered a full replacement of generals at the top military leadership as part of personnel reform following last year's martial law turmoil, sources said Thursday.
According to the sources, Jin has ordered the replacement of all generals at the JCS, as well as lieutenant colonels and colonels who have served at the organization for two years or longer.
"The measure is part of personnel reform in the aftermath of the martial law (attempt)," a military official said.
Under the order, around 40 generals currently affiliated with the JCS are expected to be reassigned to respective military branches or the defense ministry.
In September, all seven four-star generals who were in office at the time of ousted former President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived martial law imposition in December last year were discharged.
This undated file image provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shows its logo. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
7. Air Force team's participation in Dubai airshow thwarted over Japan's refusal to refuel: sources
Summary:
South Korea’s Black Eagles aerobatic team canceled plans to join the Dubai Airshow after Japan denied a refueling stop in Okinawa, citing recent T-50B training near the disputed Dokdo islets. The refusal, tied to ongoing territorial tensions, left insufficient time to secure alternatives, forcing the team to withdraw.
Comment: One step forward two steps back.
Air Force team's participation in Dubai airshow thwarted over Japan's refusal to refuel: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251106011600320
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- An Air Force aerobatic team's plan to participate in an airshow in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) this month has effectively been thwarted after Japan refused an intermediate refueling request over a diplomatic issue, sources said Thursday.
Seoul and Tokyo had been discussing allowing the Black Eagles to refuel in Japan's Okinawa as part of the flight display team's plan to participate in the Dubai Airshow 2025, set for later this month, according to diplomatic sources,
Japan, however, recently rejected the proposal, citing training conducted by the team's T-50B aircraft near Dokdo late last month.
Dokdo, South Korea's easternmost islets, lie closer to South Korea in waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, which claims sovereignty over them.
The Black Eagles previously refueled in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, to participate in overseas airshows between 2022 and 2024, but had opted for Japan this year due to the shorter time and lower expenses involved.
The decision left little time for the Air Force to arrange refueling with other countries, ultimately leaving the flight team to skip the Dubai event, according to the sources.
Japan's territorial claim to Dokdo has long been a key source of diplomatic friction in relations with South Korea.
The Air Force's Black Eagles aerobatic team performs above the Han River in Seoul in this file photo taken July 12, 2025, to commemorate K-Defense Day. (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
8. Seoul open to reviewing sanctions on N. Korea over cryptocurrency theft if needed: official
Summary:
Seoul signaled openness to reviewing sanctions on North Korea over cryptocurrency thefts, emphasizing close coordination with the U.S. to prevent illicit funds from supporting Pyongyang’s weapons programs. Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na noted ongoing joint efforts and U.S. review of a summit fact sheet between Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Trump.
Comment: We should be thinking about how we can strengthen joint enforcement against North Korea’s cyber-enabled financial networks and exerting pressure on KJU through strategic (resource and financial) strangulation. And we need to fight and defeat KJU's all purpose sword of cyber.
Seoul open to reviewing sanctions on N. Korea over cryptocurrency theft if needed: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na said Thursday that South Korea is open to reviewing sanctions against North Korea when necessary, following the announcement of fresh U.S. sanctions on North Korean individuals and entities over illicit cyber activities.
"In cases of cryptocurrency theft by Pyongyang, coordination between South Korea and the U.S. is important, as it can be used to fund North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and pose a threat to our digital ecosystem," Kim said during an interview with Yonhap News TV.
"South Korea has been making joint efforts to curb illegal activities, and in that context, we can consider reviewing sanctions as a measure if they are really needed," Kim added.
Her remarks came after Washington said Tuesday (U.S. time) that it has imposed sanctions on eight North Korean individuals and two entities for their involvement in laundering money stolen through illicit cyber activities.
Kim added that the U.S. is currently undergoing internal coordination regarding a joint fact sheet on the outcome of last week's summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump.
"We are waiting as the U.S. side is currently working on adjusting and reviewing the wording," Kim said.
This undated file photo shows Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na. (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · November 6, 2025
9. Delay in summit fact sheet signals extended US review
Summary:
The joint U.S.–South Korea fact sheet from the Trump–Lee summit remains delayed amid extended U.S. interagency review. The document is expected to detail Seoul’s $350 billion investment pledge, tariff reductions, and nuclear-powered submarine cooperation. Officials attribute the holdup to sensitive coordination among U.S. agencies, particularly over nuclear and defense-related language.
Comment: One the one hand not a good sign for the alliance. On the other, there are complex interagency issues involved. I think this indicates that there was not sufficient (or any) preparation prior to POTUS' announcements on the nuclear sub issue.
Delay in summit fact sheet signals extended US review - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20251106/delay-in-summit-fact-sheet-signals-extended-us-review
South Korea and the United States have yet to release their joint fact sheet on the outcome of last week's summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump, raising speculation about what has caused the extended delay.
Seoul officials said earlier the two sides plan to release the fact sheet outlining the details of what was agreed upon between the two leaders within "two or three days" of their summit, held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, on Oct. 29.
The joint fact sheet is expected to outline the specifics of South Korea's $350 billion investment pledge, made in return for the United States reducing its tariff rate on South Korean goods to 15 percent from 25 percent.
The fact sheet is also expected to provide details on security commitments, including plans for supporting Seoul's efforts to secure fuel supplies for nuclear-powered submarines, as Trump has signaled willingness to do so after the summit with Lee.
As the release of the joint document appears to be delayed, speculation has grown that prolonged interagency coordination within the U.S. government may be behind the hold-up.
Seoul has reportedly handed over its draft version of the fact sheet to Washington and is awaiting a response, according to sources with knowledge of the matter, suggesting that the delay is not due to an unfinished negotiation but has more to do with the fine-tuning among relevant U.S. government agencies.
Speaking before lawmakers Thursday, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said the State Department had asked him to "wait a little longer."
"It is not that we are dragging our feet, but the delay is largely due to the coordination process with the United States," Cho said during a National Assembly session.
"I have heard that the U.S. side is getting the final confirmation from relevant government agencies," he said.
As for the issue of nuclear-powered submarines, it would require coordination at least between the State Department and the Department of Energy, as well as other relevant national security agencies. Such a sensitive matter would also require time to deliberate over the wording and phrasing of the document.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back gave a similar view during a parliamentary session Wednesday, saying issues like the nuclear-powered submarines would need such interagency-level coordination in Washington.
The release of the joint fact sheet could be further delayed, as South Korea will need to review the U.S. draft once Washington sends it back to Seoul.
There also remains a possibility that the two sides have yet to fully reach common ground on key security issues, particularly on how to allow Seoul to produce its own fuel for nuclear submarines.
That would require either a revision of their nuclear energy pact or the signing of a separate agreement. Washington holds the power to grant Seoul consent to enrich uranium for use in nuclear-powered submarines.
The delay in releasing the fact sheet has also held up the allies' announcement of the outcome of their annual security talks, held earlier this week between Ahn and U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
The two defense chiefs discussed key alliance issues, including South Korea's bid to retake wartime operational control from the U.S. and its plans to increase defense spending — details that must align with what will be stated in the joint fact sheet.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
10. AMCHAM, FTC chair discuss Korea’s fair trade policy direction
Summary:
AMCHAM leaders met new Fair Trade Commission Chair Ju Biung-ghi to discuss Korea’s fair trade direction and foreign business challenges. Both sides emphasized transparency, predictable regulation, and ongoing dialogue to enhance competitiveness. Discussions covered platform regulation, AI policy, anti-competitive conduct, and strengthening international cooperation to foster innovation and investor confidence.
AMCHAM, FTC chair discuss Korea’s fair trade policy direction - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Kang Seung-woo
Published Nov 6, 2025 2:43 pm KST
Updated Nov 6, 2025 3:05 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20251106/amcham-ftc-chair-discuss-koreas-fair-trade-policy-direction
The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) met with Ju Biung-ghi, the newly appointed chairperson of Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (FTC), in Seoul Thursday to exchange views on the new administration’s fair trade policy direction and key issues faced by global companies operating in the Korean market.
As part of Ju’s ongoing series of industry outreach efforts following his appointment, the meeting served as a platform to discuss the administration’s fair trade policy priorities and to hear directly from foreign companies about their on-the-ground challenges in Korea.
In his remarks, AMCHAM Chairman and CEO James Kim emphasized the importance of open communication between the government and the business community, noting that a transparent and predictable regulatory environment is essential to enhancing Korea’s competitiveness and attractiveness as an investment destination.
“Building on the successful momentum from the APEC CEO Summit, AMCHAM looks forward to working closely with the Korean government, especially the FTC, to drive innovation, transparency and stronger public-private partnerships,” he said. “By expanding pro-innovation regulatory frameworks and promoting open, evidence-based dialogue, we can foster a more predictable and globally competitive business environment in Korea.”
Ju reaffirmed the FTC’s commitment to strengthening international cooperation with competition authorities worldwide, while recognizing that differences in systems and enforcement approaches can sometimes lead to misunderstandings. He emphasized that continuous dialogue is key to building trust and enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of fair trade policies.
During the closed-door roundtable session, participants shared their perspectives on a wide range of topics, including the FTC’s approach to platform regulation, improvements to anti-competitive conduct regulations, policy directions in response to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, and the importance of strengthening communication with multinational companies.
Kim expressed his appreciation to Ju for his leadership in promoting fair and free competition, protecting consumers and ensuring balanced economic development. He added that AMCHAM looks forward to continued collaboration with the FTC to advance Korea’s fair trade objectives and further strengthen the country’s position as a leading global investment hub.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
11. Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea Policy Is Built on Outdated Assumptions
Summary:
President Lee Jae-myung’s “Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization (END)” initiative rests on outdated liberal assumptions that North Korea is isolated, desires unification, and may denuclearize. In today’s China- and Russia-backed environment, Pyongyang rejects unification, embraces a “two-state theory,” and leverages nuclear status for power. Without a strategic overhaul, Lee’s policy lacks realistic traction or leverage.
Excerpts:
“The first assumption is that North Korea is isolated.”
...
“The second one is that North Korea desires unification.”
...
“The last is that North Korea will eventually give up its nuclear weapons.”
Comment: I cannot get Jim Morrison and the Doors out of my head when I see "this is the END." I would like to see the end of the KFR which is the solution to all problems on the peninsula. But change must come from within the north.
On a serious note, assumptions are critical to strategy and policy. We have to get the assumptions right regarding the nature, objectives, anf strategy of the Kim family regime. My assumption (among many) is that the north does not desire unification. It desires domination under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure regime survival. That assumption drives my strategic thinking: Unficiaiton first, then decurarization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.
Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea Policy Is Built on Outdated Assumptions
thediplomat.com · Khang Vu
Every South Korean liberal president, including Lee, has built their North Korea policy on three assumptions. None of them still holds true.
By
November 06, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/lee-jae-myungs-north-korea-policy-is-built-on-outdated-assumptions/
Five months into his term, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has articulated a concrete foreign policy vision and is determined to put it into practice. Lee maintains amicable relations with Japan despite anti-Japan sentiment from the South Korean left. He continues anchoring South Korea’s foreign policy, including its North Korea policy, on the alliance with the United States. However, the South Korean president is ready to say no to the United States’ demands that South Korea contribute in a Taiwan contingency. Lee does not want to antagonize China as he also needs both Beijing’s help with re-engaging North Korea and access to the Chinese market.
The most ambitious of all is Lee’s policy toward Pyongyang. He envisions an era of peaceful coexistence built on his “Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization” initiative, or END.
Lee thought he would get his first major diplomatic victory when there were rumors of a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un during Trump’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit. In the end, Trump did not meet Kim due to a “timing” problem. North Korea made its voice heard in Moscow instead. In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui pledged continued support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The main issue with Lee’s END vision is not a lack of effort but the lack of new initiatives to get North Korea back to the table amid the new geopolitical configuration.
Every South Korean liberal president, including Lee, has built their North Korea policy on three assumptions. The first assumption is that North Korea is isolated. The second one is that North Korea desires unification. The last is that North Korea will eventually give up its nuclear weapons. The action plan is simple – with more engagement (“Exchange”), inter-Korean relations will be normalized by a peace treaty (“Normalization”), and North Korea will feel secure enough to give up its nuclear weapons (“Denuclearization”). After this long process of reconciliation and coexistence, the two Koreas will eventually unify.
The three assumptions originated from the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea. At that time North Korea was isolated by the demise of the socialist bloc, impoverished due to a decrease in foreign aid, and perceived to be on the verge of collapsing like its Eastern European peers.
South Korean liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) leveraged North Korea’s dire situation to push for political dialogue and the opening of inter-Korean economic and tourism projects in Kaesong and Kumgang. Later, Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) also capitalized on North Korea’s isolation and lack of cash due to sanctions and advocated for a re-opening of these projects.
Although these liberal initiatives ultimately failed, North Korea at least played along. It is not guaranteed that it will do so with Lee’s END.
First, North Korea is not isolated and penniless like it was in the 1990s. The country has revived Cold War ties with China, Russia, Vietnam, and Laos. Importantly, now North Korea is betting on a rising China instead of a declining Soviet Union. Russia’s and China’s growing trade with Pyongyang and their withdrawal of support for international sanctions mean North Korea no longer relies on just South Korea’s investment to substitute for foreign aid. North Korea’s $20 billion arms trade with Russia alone outweighs any economic benefits Seoul can give. This weakens the economic leverage of South Korea’s engagement. Apparently, Pyongyang is in no rush to secure Seoul’s money this time.
Second, North Korea no longer desires unification and has adopted a “hostile two-state theory.” Pyongyang now considers its relationship with Seoul to be one between two states, while Seoul continues perceiving such a relationship as a special situation in the process of unification. North Korea’s new theory has sowed confusion among South Korean policymakers, with Lee’s top aides quarreling over what the “two-state theory” means and whether Seoul can constitutionally treat Pyongyang as a separate state in pursuit of and after normalization.
Since the 1990s, South Korean liberals have justified engagement with North Korea by arguing that economic and political rewards can help it avoid a catastrophic collapse. A North Korea that is no longer on the verge of collapse shatters the expectation that unification is in the offing and contests the South Korean left’s case for engagement. North Korea’s new “two-state theory” makes dialogue challenging because Pyongyang and Seoul do not agree on the ends, ways, and means of political engagement.
Third, besides rejecting unification, Pyongyang no longer pretends that it regards denuclearization as the goal of engagement. Different from the past, when China opposed North Korea’s nuclear program, this time Beijing has turned a blind eye to the issue of denuclearization. Kim was thus willing to turn down Trump’s open call for a summit during his APEC trip because the U.S. president has not explicitly committed to recognizing Pyongyang as a nuclear state.
North Korea’s newfound leverage in nuclear talks plus its elevated international profile means Kim will not rely on Lee’s self-proclaimed role as a “pacemaker” for any North Korea-U.S. talks, a far cry from the days of Moon’s shuttle diplomacy. And without denuclearization as an end goal, Lee cannot justify offering economic and political rewards to North Korea.
Lee tried to distinguish his North Korea policy from those of his liberal predecessors by highlighting that END is not a sequence of priorities meant to disentangle nuclear talks from peace talks. This is a smart move to avoid repeating the pitfall of Moon’s North Korea policy. The former president could not make substantial progress in the peace talks, as Moon was hand-tied by the deadlock in nuclear talks.
However, Lee’s North Korea policy is still built on outdated assumptions, and it is unclear how he could in substance disentangle economic and political engagement from denuclearization. He cannot shun such engagement, like his conservative predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol did, because doing so only justifies North Korea’s hostile attitude.
Lee has circumvented some of these problems by using the word “stop” instead of “freeze” to describe his vision of denuclearization. He also does not give a clear timeline of when denuclearization can be achieved in service of reviving inter-Korean ties in the short term. Lee, however, cannot reject denuclearization altogether. To Pyongyang, this is now a nonstarter.
Seoul also cannot accept North Korea’s “two-state theory” just for the sake of engagement, because treating Pyongyang as a separate entity without any mention of unification is unconstitutional. Seoul is unable to justify normalizing relations with North Korea via a peace treaty if normalization means the permanent division of the peninsula.
The prospect of external help with engagement is not promising. Washington’s and Beijing’s support for Lee’s engagement with North Korea are contingent on contradictory gestures. The United States will only support Lee’s North Korea policy if he commits to an expanded role in a Taiwan contingency. On the contrary, China will demand that South Korea curb its involvement in the U.S. regional military plan. Russia has abandoned its equidistant approach toward the two Koreas, and it likely wants North Korea to strengthen ties with Moscow instead of with Seoul. Lee certainly does not want to upset South Korea’s delicate balance between the superpowers for the sake of progress with his North Korea policy.
Lee’s North Korea policy is a little different, but much the same as his liberal predecessors’. Without a major overhaul of the key assumptions, Lee’s END vision will end before it even begins.
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Five months into his term, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has articulated a concrete foreign policy vision and is determined to put it into practice. Lee maintains amicable relations with Japan despite anti-Japan sentiment from the South Korean left. He continues anchoring South Korea’s foreign policy, including its North Korea policy, on the alliance with the United States. However, the South Korean president is ready to say no to the United States’ demands that South Korea contribute in a Taiwan contingency. Lee does not want to antagonize China as he also needs both Beijing’s help with re-engaging North Korea and access to the Chinese market.
The most ambitious of all is Lee’s policy toward Pyongyang. He envisions an era of peaceful coexistence built on his “Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization” initiative, or END.
Lee thought he would get his first major diplomatic victory when there were rumors of a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un during Trump’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit. In the end, Trump did not meet Kim due to a “timing” problem. North Korea made its voice heard in Moscow instead. In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui pledged continued support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The main issue with Lee’s END vision is not a lack of effort but the lack of new initiatives to get North Korea back to the table amid the new geopolitical configuration.
Every South Korean liberal president, including Lee, has built their North Korea policy on three assumptions. The first assumption is that North Korea is isolated. The second one is that North Korea desires unification. The last is that North Korea will eventually give up its nuclear weapons. The action plan is simple – with more engagement (“Exchange”), inter-Korean relations will be normalized by a peace treaty (“Normalization”), and North Korea will feel secure enough to give up its nuclear weapons (“Denuclearization”). After this long process of reconciliation and coexistence, the two Koreas will eventually unify.
The three assumptions originated from the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea. At that time North Korea was isolated by the demise of the socialist bloc, impoverished due to a decrease in foreign aid, and perceived to be on the verge of collapsing like its Eastern European peers.
South Korean liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) leveraged North Korea’s dire situation to push for political dialogue and the opening of inter-Korean economic and tourism projects in Kaesong and Kumgang. Later, Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) also capitalized on North Korea’s isolation and lack of cash due to sanctions and advocated for a re-opening of these projects.
Although these liberal initiatives ultimately failed, North Korea at least played along. It is not guaranteed that it will do so with Lee’s END.
First, North Korea is not isolated and penniless like it was in the 1990s. The country has revived Cold War ties with China, Russia, Vietnam, and Laos. Importantly, now North Korea is betting on a rising China instead of a declining Soviet Union. Russia’s and China’s growing trade with Pyongyang and their withdrawal of support for international sanctions mean North Korea no longer relies on just South Korea’s investment to substitute for foreign aid. North Korea’s $20 billion arms trade with Russia alone outweighs any economic benefits Seoul can give. This weakens the economic leverage of South Korea’s engagement. Apparently, Pyongyang is in no rush to secure Seoul’s money this time.
Second, North Korea no longer desires unification and has adopted a “hostile two-state theory.” Pyongyang now considers its relationship with Seoul to be one between two states, while Seoul continues perceiving such a relationship as a special situation in the process of unification. North Korea’s new theory has sowed confusion among South Korean policymakers, with Lee’s top aides quarreling over what the “two-state theory” means and whether Seoul can constitutionally treat Pyongyang as a separate state in pursuit of and after normalization.
Since the 1990s, South Korean liberals have justified engagement with North Korea by arguing that economic and political rewards can help it avoid a catastrophic collapse. A North Korea that is no longer on the verge of collapse shatters the expectation that unification is in the offing and contests the South Korean left’s case for engagement. North Korea’s new “two-state theory” makes dialogue challenging because Pyongyang and Seoul do not agree on the ends, ways, and means of political engagement.
Third, besides rejecting unification, Pyongyang no longer pretends that it regards denuclearization as the goal of engagement. Different from the past, when China opposed North Korea’s nuclear program, this time Beijing has turned a blind eye to the issue of denuclearization. Kim was thus willing to turn down Trump’s open call for a summit during his APEC trip because the U.S. president has not explicitly committed to recognizing Pyongyang as a nuclear state.
North Korea’s newfound leverage in nuclear talks plus its elevated international profile means Kim will not rely on Lee’s self-proclaimed role as a “pacemaker” for any North Korea-U.S. talks, a far cry from the days of Moon’s shuttle diplomacy. And without denuclearization as an end goal, Lee cannot justify offering economic and political rewards to North Korea.
Lee tried to distinguish his North Korea policy from those of his liberal predecessors by highlighting that END is not a sequence of priorities meant to disentangle nuclear talks from peace talks. This is a smart move to avoid repeating the pitfall of Moon’s North Korea policy. The former president could not make substantial progress in the peace talks, as Moon was hand-tied by the deadlock in nuclear talks.
However, Lee’s North Korea policy is still built on outdated assumptions, and it is unclear how he could in substance disentangle economic and political engagement from denuclearization. He cannot shun such engagement, like his conservative predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol did, because doing so only justifies North Korea’s hostile attitude.
Lee has circumvented some of these problems by using the word “stop” instead of “freeze” to describe his vision of denuclearization. He also does not give a clear timeline of when denuclearization can be achieved in service of reviving inter-Korean ties in the short term. Lee, however, cannot reject denuclearization altogether. To Pyongyang, this is now a nonstarter.
Seoul also cannot accept North Korea’s “two-state theory” just for the sake of engagement, because treating Pyongyang as a separate entity without any mention of unification is unconstitutional. Seoul is unable to justify normalizing relations with North Korea via a peace treaty if normalization means the permanent division of the peninsula.
The prospect of external help with engagement is not promising. Washington’s and Beijing’s support for Lee’s engagement with North Korea are contingent on contradictory gestures. The United States will only support Lee’s North Korea policy if he commits to an expanded role in a Taiwan contingency. On the contrary, China will demand that South Korea curb its involvement in the U.S. regional military plan. Russia has abandoned its equidistant approach toward the two Koreas, and it likely wants North Korea to strengthen ties with Moscow instead of with Seoul. Lee certainly does not want to upset South Korea’s delicate balance between the superpowers for the sake of progress with his North Korea policy.
Lee’s North Korea policy is a little different, but much the same as his liberal predecessors’. Without a major overhaul of the key assumptions, Lee’s END vision will end before it even begins.
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Khang Vu
Khang Vu is a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College.
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