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Quotes of the Day:
“Courage is resistance to fear, mastery of fear – not absence of fear. “
– Mark Twain
“All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only crime is pride.”
– Sophocles
“When someone tries to trigger you by insulting you or by doing something that irritates you, take a deep breath and switch off your ego. Remember that if you are easily offended, you are easily manipulated.”
– Bruce Lee
1. NORTH KOREA: RUMORS OF WAR-FIGHTING: (interview with John Batchrlor and Gordon Chang)
2. S. Korea sends its top envoy to U.S. to Trump's Mar-a-Lago home
3. N. Korea silent on Trump's presidential victory
4. 'America First' Trumponomics feared to dent S. Korean exports, heighten market uncertainties
5. N Korea-Russia in suspected missile tech for troops quid pro quo
6. Allies Fret Over Trump Presidency as Authoritarian Axis Challenges U.S.-Led Order
7. Ex-USFK commanders visit Hanwha
8. S. Korea eyes Yoon, Trump's meeting before Trump's inauguration: official
9. Taekwondo body chief says Trump promised to address Congress in taekwondo uniform
10.Unification ministry pledges efforts to improve N.K. human rights under 2nd Trump term
11. FM Cho vows close communication with Trump's side for deeper ties with U.S.
12. Seoul shares close tad higher amid Trump policy uncertainties
13. What does Trump's win mean for the world? by Sir Lawrence Freedman
14. What Donald Trump's victory means for North Korea
15. Trump voices concern about North Korean ‘provocations’ in phone call with Yoon
16. Editorial: What Trump's return means for South Korea
17. Criticism of Kim's sister leads to arrests, disappearances in Haeju
18. N. Korea's anti-socialist watchdog faces internal probe over currency control failures
19. What Trump’s Win Means for U.S. Foreign Policy
20. South Korean facilities attacked by Russian hackers over plan to track North’s troops
21. How Ukraine Became a World War
1. NORTH KOREA: RUMORS OF WAR-FIGHTING: (interview with John Batchrlor and Gordon Chang)
My latest interview with John Batcehlor and Gordon Chang on north Korea in Ukrinae.
https://audioboom.com/posts/8604248-north-korea-rumors-of-war-fighting-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-pacif
The John Batchelor Show
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NORTH KOREA: RUMORS OF WAR-FIGHTING:
David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL
https://apnews.com/article/north-south-korea-drones-c923535e6f414674593d74ff935adf41
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-north-koreans-fighting-with-russians-ukraine-2024-10-13/
1955 Kim in China
2. S. Korea sends its top envoy to U.S. to Trump's Mar-a-Lago home
Ambassador Cho did not waste any time.
S. Korea sends its top envoy to U.S. to Trump's Mar-a-Lago home | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has sent its top envoy to the United States to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago home in Florida, according to officials Thursday.
Ambassador Cho Hyun-dong's visit to Trump's home in Palm Beach follows Trump's election win Wednesday. Cho plans to meet with people from Trump's camp as well as his aides in security affairs, officials said.
Cho, a former foreign vice minister, is considered one of the South Korean officials who have built close personal networks with Trump's side.
In meetings with Trump officials, Cho is expected to explain South Korea's contributions to the bilateral alliance and highlight the need for thorough coordination on North Korean issues.
Trump's return to the Oval Office has stoked concerns in South Korea that there may be a dramatic policy shift in the U.S., including a potential demand from Washington for a renegotiation of the defense cost-sharing deal for maintaining American troops here.
South Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong (R) poses with former White House National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien at an event in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on July 16, 2024. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
3. N. Korea silent on Trump's presidential victory
(US election) N. Korea silent on Trump's presidential victory | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 7, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media on Thursday remained silent about former U.S. President Donald Trump's election victory to secure a second presidential term.
The Republican flag-bearer won Tuesday's presidential election, becoming the second U.S. president ever to serve two nonconsecutive terms, after winning major battleground states, including Pennsylvania, Georgia and North Carolina.
Major North Korean news outlets, such as the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the Rodong Sinmun daily newspaper and the Korean Central Television had not reported on Trump's election victory as of 7 a.m. Thursday.
North Korea previously covered U.S. presidential election results indirectly, typically sometime after the outcome is announced.
For both of Barack Obama's presidential victories, the Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper targeting the domestic audience, published the results four days after the official announcement.
When Trump first won the presidency in 2016, North Korea indirectly reported the result 11 days after Election Day through a Rodong Sinmun commentary that criticized then South Korean President Park Geun-hye's congratulatory message to Trump.
When Joe Biden won the presidency in 2000, North Korea remained silent for over two months, only indirectly mentioning it through the propaganda outlet DPRK Today after his official inauguration.
Analysts speculate North Korea may go out of its way this time to send a personal letter or congratulatory message directly to Trump, given that the two leaders exchanged messages in the past.
In any case, North Korea may choose not to raise public expectations for improved relations with the U.S.
Following Trump's nomination acceptance speech in July, in which he highlighted his friendship with the North Korean leader, the KCNA reported North Korea does not care about who wins, saying, "Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate ... does not change."
Trump and Kim held summit talks in Singapore in 2018 and Vietnam in 2019. The Hanoi summit ended without a deal due to a failure to narrow differences over the scope of the North's denuclearization and sanctions relief by Washington.
U.S. President Donald Trump (R) talks to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their meeting in the truce village of Panmunjom, in this file photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on July 1, 2019. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 7, 2024
4. 'America First' Trumponomics feared to dent S. Korean exports, heighten market uncertainties
(US election) (News Focus) 'America First' Trumponomics feared to dent S. Korean exports, heighten market uncertainties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · November 7, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- Donald Trump's return to the White House is expected to have a significant impact on the export-driven South Korean economy and increase market volatility as he has warned of protectionist policies, decoupling from China and other drastic policy shifts across the board, experts said Thursday.
"If the policy stance stressed by Trump is materialized, it is expected to affect our economy considerably. Given features of our economy with high external dependency, uncertainties in our industry environment would grow bigger," Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok said during a meeting with relevant ministers to assess the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.
This AP file photo, released Sept. 18, 2024, shows former President Donald Trump pumping his fist at a campaign event in New York. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
A key economic concern for South Korea is his possible implementation of sweeping tariffs.
Last month, Trump said that tariff "is the most beautiful word in the dictionary," vowing to impose a minimum 10 percent, and up to 20 percent, tariff on all imported goods, and raise tariffs on imports from China to as high as 60 percent.
According to a report by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, the policy of the "universal baseline tariff" of 10 percent, if levied, could slash South Korea's exports by US$44.8 billion per year. The real gross domestic product could also shrink by up to 0.67 percent.
"Such a broadscale use of tariffs would bring down the global trade volume and shrink investment," said Joo Won, a researcher at Hyundai Research Institute.
"Weak global demand would make a serious dent in the export-oriented South Korean economy, while exports are already projected to slow down through the first half of next year in line with a semiconductor cycle," he added.
The finance ministry earlier presented a 2.2 percent economic expansion for South Korea next year, slowing from this year's anticipated 2.6 percent growth.
Higher tariffs would result in mounting inflationary pressure and weak domestic demand in the U.S., which could also adversely affect South Korean exports, according to experts.
This file photo taken April 1, 2024, shows a port in South Korea's southeastern city of Busan. (Yonhap)
There have also been growing concerns about greater trade pressure by the U.S. on South Korea, given America's growing trade deficit with the Asian partner.
In 2023, the U.S. suffered a trade deficit of $44.5 billion in trade with South Korea, up sharply from a $13.2 billion deficit in 2018.
The $44.5 billion marked the highest-ever surplus for South Korea in its bilateral trade with the U.S., and the figure for the first nine months of this year came to $39.9 billion, according to government data.
"In 2018, the first-term Trump administration demanded the revision of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, citing its trade deficit," said Chang Sang-sik, an expert from the Korea International Trade Association.
"Though it would not be easy for Trump to revisit the pact only with executive orders, there are chances of his government seeking other restrictive measures, just as was the case with steel tariffs under its Section 232 tariff rules," he added.
Officials check news about the U.S. presidential election in the dealing room of Hana Bank in Seoul on Nov. 6, 2024. (Yonhap)
Adding to woes is Washington's acceleration of the decoupling from China and the further shift in supply chains.
Trump staged a grueling trade war with China during his first presidency by levying high tariffs on Chinese imports for what he called China's unfair practices, such as currency manipulation and technology theft.
Should Trump again take such hawkish policies against China, it would trigger retaliatory measures from Beijing, leading to further diversion in trade and investment between the two economies and greater economic and geopolitical fragmentation across the globe, the experts note.
"Despite diversification efforts, the South Korean industry, including the semiconductor sector, is still quite dependent on China. Some say South Korean firms would benefit from the conflict, but a slowdown in the Chinese economy will ultimately worsen broader economic circumstances for us," said Song Young-gwan, an expert from the Korea Development Institute.
Expected unpredictability and policy discontinuity are widely projected to increase volatility in the foreign exchange market as well.
The South Korean currency weakened sharply against the U.S. dollar to drop to a two-year low Wednesday.
This file photo, provided by Samsung Electronics Co. on Sept. 7, 2022, shows its production line in the city of Pyeongtaek, about 60 kilometers south of Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · November 7, 2024
5. N Korea-Russia in suspected missile tech for troops quid pro quo
Excerpts:
Austin and Kim emphasized the need to address North Korea’s recent deployment of troops to Russia while prioritizing expanding science and technology collaboration.
South Korea has also issued stern warnings to Russia about its support of North Korea’s missile program. Last month, NPR reported that South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol has warned of potential military support for Ukraine in response to North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia.
NPR mentions this announcement came after a summit with Polish President Andrzej Duda in Seoul. According to the report, Yoon emphasized that South Korea would not “sit idle” in the face of such provocations, hinting at a potential shift in policy to supply offensive weapons to Ukraine.
In response, Russia warned South Korea of severe consequences if it intervened in the Ukraine conflict. In June 2024, Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin said that South Korea would face severe repercussions if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.
Reuters said that Putin emphasized that Russia would respond in a manner that would be particularly painful for South Korea. The report mentions that Putin’s remarks underscore the potential for further escalation on the Korean Peninsula, as he also hinted at the possibility of supplying advanced weapons to North Korea in response to Western actions.
N Korea-Russia in suspected missile tech for troops quid pro quo - Asia Times
North Korea likely seeks Russia’s technical expertise in missile targeting and reliability in exchange for sending boots on the ground to Ukraine
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · November 6, 2024
North Korean troops training in Russia for deployment to Ukraine are sparking alarms over missile tech transfers that could supercharge Pyongyang’s missile arsenal and escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Defense One reported that South Korea’s Defense Minister Kim Yong-Hyun warned that North Korea might seek advanced missile technology from Russia in exchange for troop deployment.
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has confirmed that around 10,000 North Korean soldiers are in Russia, where they are “drawing equipment and conducting some training.”
He said they might be sent to Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukraine has held territory since a surprise invasion in August.
The Russia-North Korea military exchange comes amid Pyongyang’s ongoing efforts to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities in the face of international sanctions. The Defense One report suggests that Russia’s potential assistance could significantly improve North Korea’s missile targeting and reliability.
Defense One says the US and South Korea have responded by advancing new cooperation agreements to bolster regional security, including technology transfers and joint military exercises that build on a trilateral security framework with Japan aimed at countering North Korea’s growing threat.
As stated in the report, Austin emphasized the existential threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs to the Indo-Pacific region.
In a February 2022 article in the peer-reviewed International Security journal, Jaganath Sankaran and Steve Fetter highlight critical limitations in the reliability and targeting accuracy of North Korean missiles, emphasizing the challenges the US faces in intercepting such threats.
Sankaran and Fetter mention that North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), like the Hwasong-15, though capable of reaching the US, exhibit significant vulnerabilities due to their liquid-fueled technology, which results in longer boost phases.
They say this makes the missiles detectable and more easily intercepted by airborne Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) systems, such as Aegis-equipped destroyers. They point out that North Korea’s future shift to solid-fuel technology could reduce intercept vulnerabilities, as these missiles would have shorter boost phases.
Further, they say North Korea may acquire sophisticated countermeasures from allies like China or Russia, challenging the effectiveness of the US’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.
Underscoring North Korea’s progress in developing ICBMs capable of hitting the US mainland, The War Zone reported this month that North Korea has tested its longest-ranged ICBM to date, the Hwasong-19, amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
The War Zone says that the missile, launched from a massive 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), is a solid-fuel, multi-stage weapon capable of reaching cities across the US mainland if flown on a standard trajectory.
The report mentions that the Hwasong-19 achieved a record altitude of 7,686 kilometers and flew for 137 kilometers, surpassing previous North Korean ICBM tests. It further states that the missile’s design includes a larger-diameter body and a more advanced TEL than its predecessors, indicating significant advancements in North Korea’s missile technology.
However, despite its impressive capabilities, The War Zone poses questions about the missile’s reliability and survivability, given its size and the challenges of hiding and maneuvering such a large TEL.
Further, Oleksandr Danylyuk mentions in a July 2024 article for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that despite public concern, Russia’s support for North Korea’s missile program is not new.
Danylyuk says that analysis of North Korean missiles used by Russia against Ukraine, such as the KN-23, reveals significant Russian technological influence, including the use of Russian materials and design standards.
He points out that cooperation dates back to the Soviet era, with North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities heavily reliant on Soviet and later Russian assistance. Danylyuk says this is part of Russia’s strategy to destabilize regions where the US has security interests, forcing the West into negotiations favorable to Russia.
In addition to missile technology, Victor Cha mentions in a June 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank article that in return for providing Russia with troops, ammunition and ballistic missiles for its Ukraine war effort, North Korea seeks advanced military technology such as telemetry, nuclear submarine technology and military satellite wares.
However, Sankaran and Fetter point out that even with these potential advancements, North Korean ICBMs remain unlikely to match the accuracy and reliability of US missile defense systems, given North Korea’s resource constraints and technological limitations.
Despite that, they point out that the psychological and strategic impact of possessing such weapons amplifies their threat value beyond technical reliability.
Matching Russia’s technology transfer to North Korea, Breaking Defense reported last month that US Defense Secretary Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Kim announced the formation of a new joint defense science and technology executive committee during a meeting at the Pentagon.
Breaking Defense says this committee will explore Seoul’s participation in AUKUS Pillar II, focusing on cutting-edge technologies such as autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies.
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It mentions the announcement follows a US-South Korea security consultative meeting attended by both countries’ respective defense ministers, aiming to enhance defense cooperation and technological advancements within the alliance.
Austin and Kim emphasized the need to address North Korea’s recent deployment of troops to Russia while prioritizing expanding science and technology collaboration.
South Korea has also issued stern warnings to Russia about its support of North Korea’s missile program. Last month, NPR reported that South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol has warned of potential military support for Ukraine in response to North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia.
NPR mentions this announcement came after a summit with Polish President Andrzej Duda in Seoul. According to the report, Yoon emphasized that South Korea would not “sit idle” in the face of such provocations, hinting at a potential shift in policy to supply offensive weapons to Ukraine.
In response, Russia warned South Korea of severe consequences if it intervened in the Ukraine conflict. In June 2024, Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin said that South Korea would face severe repercussions if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.
Reuters said that Putin emphasized that Russia would respond in a manner that would be particularly painful for South Korea. The report mentions that Putin’s remarks underscore the potential for further escalation on the Korean Peninsula, as he also hinted at the possibility of supplying advanced weapons to North Korea in response to Western actions.
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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · November 6, 2024
6. Allies Fret Over Trump Presidency as Authoritarian Axis Challenges U.S.-Led Order
Since the President-elect is the master of chaos and sowing uncertainty, what if he realizes that alliances are key to him winning in foreign affairs and national security?
What if he realizes the the "Dark Quad" of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea have been building their relationships out of fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
They fear the strength of the silk web of US alliances. They are weak because of their internal political conditions and contradictions. Some are desperate for aid and assistance and their own strength in numbers. And lastly they envy the US silk web of alliances even though they are unwilling to build their alliances on a foundation of trust, respect, and shared values and can only be transactional.
What if the President-elect realizes that the "Dark Quad" is trying to "out-alliance" the US? I do not think the President-elect wants to lose that competition. This is an easy win for him. And he will also more easily get allied cooperation to increase their spending for their own defense as well. What if he is responsible for defeating the Dark Quad just as President Reagan was responsible for winning the Cold War. This is a win-win for him because it is a competition he can win.
What if the President-elect turns conventional wisdom on its head and embraces alliances?
Excerpts:
In Japan and in South Korea alike, the new sense of uncertainty is likely to reopen debates about indigenous military capabilities, including potential nuclear weapons. This new environment may pull American allies and partners—such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines—closer together into defensive cooperation, but it could also encourage hedging in their relationship with Washington, said Gordon Flake, CEO of the Perth USAsia Center at the University of Western Australia.
In any case, Trump’s comeback—and the scale of his victory—will force America’s allies to recalibrate their approach, he said.
“I don’t think anybody can predict how those recalibrations will take place because we also live in democratic societies here,” said Flake. “And in a democratic society, you can no longer take support for the U.S. for granted in a way we have always had.”
Allies Fret Over Trump Presidency as Authoritarian Axis Challenges U.S.-Led Order
Western capitals brace for White House shifts on trade and security as cooperation among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea deepens
https://www.wsj.com/world/allies-fret-over-trump-presidency-as-authoritarian-axis-challenges-u-s-led-order-3f2d2cb9?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1
By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
Nov. 6, 2024 9:30 am ET
Donald Trump is returning to the White House as the world is embroiled in two widening regional wars, America’s rivals are coalescing into a new global authoritarian axis and some of the U.S.’s closest allies fret over his re-election’s consequences.
Russia has now enlisted North Korea into its nearly three-year war in Ukraine, where it is making slow but steady advances. Israel’s year-old war with Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza has expanded into an invasion of Lebanon and the first-ever direct exchanges of missile strikes between Israel and Iran. China is giving crucial economic and political support to the cooperation among Moscow, Pyongyang and Tehran—while strengthening its own military for a possible war over Taiwan.
In remarks that sent shivers through allied capitals, Trump declared days before the Nov. 5 election that “in many cases, our allies are worse than our so-called enemies.” He also repeated his threat not to protect “under any circumstances from Russia” the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization who are “delinquent” in their contributions to the alliance’s security.
Many in the Arab world believe Donald Trump would force Israel to scale back fighting in Gaza. Photo: mahmoud issa/Reuters
Europeans are among those most worried worldwide about a second Trump presidency. A Gallup opinion poll carried out last month showed that overwhelming majorities rooted for Kamala Harris in Germany, France, Italy and the U.K.—as well as in South Korea and Japan. By contrast, she was supported by only 12% of surveyed people in Russia.
Despite lofty promises of “Zeitenwende”—a historic turning point—made by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe hasn’t expanded its security capabilities by nearly as much as it would need to defend itself. The continent remains highly dependent on American protection that is no longer guaranteed.
Now, as Trump’s support for European security is very much in doubt, Europe faces a test of whether it will have the political will to protect its future—which involves, in the immediate term, preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine.
“If this is not the jolt that Europe needed to get its act together, I don’t know what could be one. Absent U.S. leadership, NATO could be paralyzed,” said Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think tank that advises the French government. The leaders of the U.K., France, Germany and Poland should urgently meet to coordinate a joint stand, he said, especially to avoid the pitfalls of the first Trump presidency, when individual European nations sought to cut bilateral deals with Washington.
“The result needs to reaffirm the commitment of the United Kingdom and European allies to the values of freedom and democracy,” said British lawmaker Alex Sobel, chair of the U.K. parliament’s all-party group on Ukraine. “We all need to work together to ensure there is no creeping isolationism and protectionism.”
Trump’s former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Photo: J. Scott Applewhite/Associated Press
When asked about dealing with Trump, senior officials in allied capitals said they first need to see what kind of administration he assembles and who fills key national-security and foreign-policy positions. Many national-security professionals from Trump’s first term have publicly broken with him and won’t return to the new administration.
Trump’s current orbit includes people such as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, an old-school Republican hawk on Russia and China, JD Vance, his vice-presidential pick, who favors cutting commitments to Europe and focusing on Asia, as well as outright isolationists and backers of a purely transactional approach. “Everything will depend on who gets what job,” a senior European official said. “The bench is thin.”
While Trump has promised to negotiate a peace in Ukraine within 24 hours, he hasn’t indicated how. European officials expect him to try to seek some kind of grand bargain with Russian President Vladimir Putin—but wonder whether he will have the persistence to actually reach a deal or will give up, as he did after a failed summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019.
U.S. President Donald Trump, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a meeting in 2019. Photo: Associated Press
In a way, the better option for Europe would be Trump simply stopping American military aid for Ukraine, saying it is a European problem and putting Europe in front of its own responsibilities, said Norbert Röttgen, a leading lawmaker from Germany’s center-right CDU party. Far worse for Europe would be a Trump who is actually determined to strike a deal with Putin, Röttgen said: “Such an agreement can only come at the expense of Ukraine’s, and therefore Europe’s, security.”
In the first scenario, as long as Washington continues sharing intelligence and remains benevolent, the Europeans could buy weapons from the U.S. for Ukraine, preventing a collapse on the battlefield, a German official said. But it would be much tougher, the official said, if Trump decided to withhold all security assistance as a means of pressuring Ukraine to adhere to a deal on terms that would be acceptable to Putin.
Among the large European countries, only Poland has massively invested in its military, and plans to spend more than 4% of its gross domestic product on defense this year. Over the past three years, total delivered and pledged German military aid to Ukraine—some of which won’t arrive until 2028—amounted to 28 billion euros, or roughly $2 a week per German citizen.
A military exercise in Sweden. Trump’s support for European security is very much in doubt. Photo: Åsa Sjöström for WSJ
Officials in France, Poland and several other European nations worry that Germany is increasingly inclined to work with Trump on a deal that would erode Ukrainian sovereignty—as Scholz positions himself as the “candidate of peace” ahead of national elections that must be held next year at the latest. Pro-Russian parties on the far right and the far left in the country are eating into Scholz’s electoral base, and opinion polls predict that the center-right CDU will return to power. The CDU leader, Friedrich Merz, has been somewhat more hawkish, saying that, under certain conditions, he would approve supplying Ukraine with Taurus long-range precision missiles able to hit Russia, something that Scholz has repeatedly ruled out.
Lithuania’s outspoken foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, took to social media this week, warning fellow Western leaders that by trying to cut a deal with Russia, “we are choosing dishonor and we will have war.”
While one of Trump’s closest confidants in Europe has been Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban—who opposes aid to Ukraine and favors warmer ties with Russia—the president-elect has also developed a close relationship with Poland’s conservative president, Andrzej Duda. In a meeting with Duda in April, Trump quoted Orban as saying that Russia has always been victorious in land wars, defeating Hitler and Napoleon, and therefore would crush Ukraine, according to people familiar with the encounter. Duda challenged that record, pointing out that Russia was only successful when it had been invaded—and doesn’t have such a record of invincibility when invading other nations.
A U.S. Army combat outpost in northeastern Syria. Turkey hopes Trump will recall U.S. troops from the country. Photo: Emanuele Satolli for WSJ
A demonstrator holds a picture of Iran’s Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, whose killing was ordered by Trump during his first administration. Photo: Maryam Rahmanian for WSJ
In the Middle East, unlike in Europe, many American allies and partners are sanguine or outright thrilled by Trump’s victory. With checkered human-rights records, many of these governments look forward to not being lectured by Washington.
Turkey hopes Trump will withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, abandoning the Kurdish enclave there. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is counting on Trump’s support for more aggressive actions against Iran, while the Saudis and other Gulf states believe Trump would provide more credible guarantees of their own security. Many in the Arab world also believe Trump—unlike President Biden—would force Netanyahu to scale back fighting in Gaza, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed by Israeli military action over the past year. Israel has repeatedly defied the Biden administration’s demands.
“There is a sense of relief that Trump has won,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a political scientist and commentator in the United Arab Emirates. “We need a strong U.S. president rather than a weak U.S. president that Biden has proven to be, and that Harris would have been too. A weak U.S. president is bad for the region—and is even bad for the Palestinians.”
This leaves Iran as the only major Middle Eastern nation that sees Trump’s return to the White House as a clear threat. Trump, during his previous term, authorized the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and pulled the U.S. from a nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration. “The way the Iranian authorities will read this outcome will be, I think, to try to accelerate their nuclear program so as to acquire a nuclear deterrent to protect the safety of their regime—because of the fear that there could be an agenda of regime change inside Iran,” said Sinan Ulgen, director of the Edam think tank in Istanbul.
In Asia, as in Europe, the betting is on what shape the second Trump administration will take. A Chinese former official pointed out that, despite the presence of China hawks in Trump’s orbit, Trump—unlike Biden—never explicitly said the U.S. will go to war over Taiwan, and is more likely to listen to the business lobby that wants a detente with China. The former official cited Trump’s flip-flop over banning TikTok as proof of his pragmatism when it comes to Beijing. Tesla chief executive and Trump supporter Elon Musk also has significant investments in China.
While officials in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are concerned about stiff tariffs potentially coming their way, some also see new opportunities in a Trump presidency. Takashi Kawakami, the foreign-policy adviser to Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, made headlines this month by saying in an interview with the Daily Cyzo publication that a Trump victory would finally allow Japan to reclaim sovereignty curtailed since the end of World War II, returning control over much of Japanese airspace and reclaiming land occupied by U.S. military bases.
“We can take the initiative and become a truly independent country,” he said, and instead of following the U.S. lead, “find a skillful way to manage the power balance with China, Russia and North Korea.”
A U.S. military helicopter in Japan, where uncertainty is likely to reopen debates about the country’s military capabilities. Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
American allies and partners—such as South Korea—could be pulled closer together into defensive cooperation. Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
In Japan and in South Korea alike, the new sense of uncertainty is likely to reopen debates about indigenous military capabilities, including potential nuclear weapons. This new environment may pull American allies and partners—such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines—closer together into defensive cooperation, but it could also encourage hedging in their relationship with Washington, said Gordon Flake, CEO of the Perth USAsia Center at the University of Western Australia.
In any case, Trump’s comeback—and the scale of his victory—will force America’s allies to recalibrate their approach, he said.
“I don’t think anybody can predict how those recalibrations will take place because we also live in democratic societies here,” said Flake. “And in a democratic society, you can no longer take support for the U.S. for granted in a way we have always had.”
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
7. Ex-USFK commanders visit Hanwha
Photo at the link: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/11/113_385729.html
Ex-USFK commanders visit Hanwha
The Korea Times · November 5, 2024
Former commanders of the Korea-United States Combined Forces Command pose with Hanwha Aerospace CEO Shin Hyun-woo, center, during their visit to the company's plant in Changwon, South Gyeongsang Province, Friday. Hanwha Aerospace said Tuesday that the former commanders were briefed about the plant's production line for the K9 self-propelled howitzer and expressed their opinion that the K9 and the K10 ammunition resupply vehicles are "necessary assets for U.S. Forces." Fourth from left are retired Gen. Walter Sharp, Shin, retired Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation President Leem Ho-young and retired Gen. Robert Abrams. Courtesy of Hanwha Aerospace
The Korea Times · November 5, 2024
8. S. Korea eyes Yoon, Trump's meeting before Trump's inauguration: official
Many people assume the Japanese Prime Minsters' visit in 2016 made a difference in the US-Japan relationship. But did it really? How did it pay off for Japan?
Excerpts:
The official suggested that Seoul might explore the possibility of a meeting taking place even before Trump is officially sworn in early next year.
Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a rare surprise meeting with Trump when Trump won his first presidency in 2016.
(US election) S. Korea eyes Yoon, Trump's meeting before Trump's inauguration: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is seeking to arrange an early meeting between President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, possibly before Trump assumes office in January, a foreign ministry official said Thursday.
The presidential office earlier said that Yoon spoke by phone with Trump to congratulate him on his reelection and they agreed to hold an in-person meeting at an early date.
"As the president said they agreed to meet at an early date, we plan to coordinate the matter (with Washington)," a foreign ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
The official suggested that Seoul might explore the possibility of a meeting taking place even before Trump is officially sworn in early next year.
Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a rare surprise meeting with Trump when Trump won his first presidency in 2016.
"Given that Trump had met with many international leaders, it seems fair to say that he would be open to such an early meeting with Yoon as well. We take this as a positive sign and will proceed with preparations accordingly," the official said.
President Yoon Suk Yeol holds phone talks with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump at the presidential office in Seoul on Nov. 7, 2024, in this photo provided by Yoon's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
9. Taekwondo body chief says Trump promised to address Congress in taekwondo uniform
I do not think these kinds of articles and comments are helpful.
Photos at the link: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241107011600315
(US election) Taekwondo body chief says Trump promised to address Congress in taekwondo uniform | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 7, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- The chief of South Korea's taekwondo governing body congratulated U.S. President-elect Donald Trump on his reelection Thursday, saying Trump promised to address Congress in a taekwondo uniform if reelected.
Lee Dong-sup, president of the World Taekwondo Headquarters, also known as Kukkiwon, made the remark in a phone interview with Yonhap News Agency as he recalled his meeting with Trump in November 2021.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump (L) poses in a taekwondo uniform after being presented with an honorary ninth-dan certificate from Lee Dong-sup, president of the World Taekwondo Headquarters (Kukkiwon), at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida on Nov. 19, 2021, in this file photo provided by Kukkiwon. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"President-elect Trump and I had a long conversation about the South Korea-U.S. alliance and inter-Korean peace," Lee said. "He said he would contribute to inter-Korean peace."
Lee said he met Trump at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida at the time and presented him with an honorary ninth-dan certificate and a taekwondo uniform.
"President-elect Trump promised at the time that if he succeeded in getting reelected, he would give a speech to Congress wearing the uniform," Lee said.
Lee also expressed his wishes that Trump will "play a big role for peace in the Republic of Korea" and actively support the development and spread of taekwondo in the U.S.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump (L) poses in a taekwondo uniform after being presented with an honorary ninth-dan certificate from Lee Dong-sup, president of the World Taekwondo Headquarters (Kukkiwon), at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida on Nov. 19, 2021, in this file photo provided by Kukkiwon. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 7, 2024
10.Unification ministry pledges efforts to improve N.K. human rights under 2nd Trump term
And a number of us have policy proposals ready for the new administration that address a human rights upfront approach, the effective use of information, and support to the ROK the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as core elements of a radical new US policy toward the Korean peninsula. These are all Nobel Prize level potential for the President-elect.
(US election) Unification ministry pledges efforts to improve N.K. human rights under 2nd Trump term | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 7, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry on Thursday pledged efforts to maintain cooperation with the United States to improve human rights in North Korea, addressing concerns that human rights issues might take a back seat during the second Trump term.
Trump's election to a second presidential term has sparked concerns that his "top-down" diplomacy and presumed preference for direct contact with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may lead to less attention on North Korean human rights issues than during the Joe Biden administration.
Speaking to reporters, a unification ministry official said that the government "will continue efforts to maintain cooperation between South Korea and the U.S." regarding the North Korean human rights issues.
The official said that U.S. policies on North Korean human rights are based on "widespread" support within the country, and a universal consensus on the need to improve rights in the North is firmly established between the governments and power circles of the two allies.
"The importance of and sensitivity toward human rights are continually increasing," he said.
The official also highlighted the attention Trump gave to North Korean human rights issues during his first term, citing the invitation of North Korean defector-turned-former South Korean lawmaker Ji Seong-ho to stand in the spotlight during his State of the Union address in 2018.
This image provided by Yonhap News TV shows President-elect Donald Trump cast against the backdrop of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's image. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 7, 2024
11. FM Cho vows close communication with Trump's side for deeper ties with U.S.
(2nd LD) (US election) FM Cho vows close communication with Trump's side for deeper ties with U.S. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS Cho's remarks on defense cost-sharing deal in paras 11-13)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said Thursday that the government will make efforts to closely communicate with people close to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump to further deepen ties with Washington.
Cho made the remarks after the Republican candidate and former U.S. president won Tuesday's election, a victory that raises expectations in Seoul of major policy shifts from the Joe Biden administration in a way that could shake up the bilateral alliance with Washington.
"We plan to refine our messages about security and economic issues and deliver them (to Trump's side) through personal networks and other channels, until the launch of the new U.S. administration," Cho said at a parliamentary session.
The phone talks President Yoon Suk Yeol had with Trump earlier in the day represents the importance Trump attaches to the alliance with South Korea, Cho said.
"It's a symbolic example of how importantly the president-elect thinks of the South Korea-U.S. alliance," Cho said.
Yoon was one of the first world leaders Trump has talked to by phone since Trump won his reelection.
Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks during an interagency meeting of foreign, industry and finance ministers at the central government complex in Seoul on Nov. 7, 2024. (Yonhap)
In response to lawmakers' questions about the uncertainties arising in key security and alliance issues with the incoming U.S. leadership, Cho expressed confidence that South Korea will further advance the relations with the U.S. based on the solid foundation of cooperation in all areas.
With his return to the Oval Office, Trump is widely expected to abandon many of the alliances-centered foreign policy approaches taken by his predecessor and reinforce his pursuit of reducing America's contributions to alliances.
"Many of the key figures and officials with the Trump camp that we've met have highlighted their unwavering and bipartisan support for our alliance with the U.S. and the trilateral cooperation with Japan," he said.
"As we have utilized all our diplomatic assets to establish a solid foundation for cooperation in all areas, including security, economy and industry, I am confident that we will be able to forge an even closer relationship with the new U.S. administration," Cho said.
Regarding the defense cost-sharing deal, Cho stressed that the government will consult with Washington based on the outcome of the new agreement reached last month.
"Even if the U.S. demands a renegotiation, I believe it's advantageous for us to discuss it based on the result of the agreement that was finalized," Cho said.
Since Trump emerged as a presidential candidate, it has been widely anticipated that he would attempt to renegotiate Seoul's financial contribution toward the costs of maintaining American troops in South Korea.
When asked about the sustainability of the U.S. "extended deterrence" against North Korean threats, Cho said that it is the "most suitable strategy for now."
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to using all of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.
Trump's win has spawned skepticism over the future of Washington's commitment to providing extended deterrence for South Korea, since Trump has insisted the U.S. should not have to bear huge expenses to protect other countries.
Cho said it is too early to comment on the prospect of Moscow's war in Ukraine and North Korea's troop deployment to Russia, as Trump has yet to give a clear outline on how he will address the war. During the campaign, Trump said, if elected, he will end the conflict "in one day."
The minister also noted the first Trump administration had highly spoken of South Korea's technological prowess and shown much interest in expanding economic cooperation with Seoul.
Coordination with key allies like South Korea would be essential for Washington as well, as North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats and its expanding ties with Russia pose many security challenges to the world, Cho added.
"The government will make sure we closely communicate with the President-elect Trump's side to continue discussions on ways to weather these challenges based on our comprehensive strategic alliance," Cho said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 7, 2024
12. Seoul shares close tad higher amid Trump policy uncertainties
(LEAD) Seoul shares close tad higher amid Trump policy uncertainties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · November 7, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS bond yields at bottom; CHANGES photo)
SEOUL, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korean stocks finished slightly higher to end a two-session losing streak Thursday as investors scurry to gauge the potential impact of the upcoming President-elect Donald Trump administration's policy on key sectors like semiconductors, EV batteries and shipbuilding. The Korean won edged down against the U.S. dollar.
After opening slightly lower, the benchmark Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) added 1.12 points, or 0.04 percent, to close at 2,564.63.
Trade volume was moderate at 447 million shares worth 10.6 trillion won (US$7.6 billion), with losers beating winners 352 to 512.
Foreigners and institutions led the daily gain with a net purchase of 97.6 billion won and 113.4 billion won, respectively, while individuals sold a net 235.9 billion won.
Overnight, major U.S. indexes closed at record highs after Trump won the 2024 U.S. presidential election as investors expected lower taxes and deregulation.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped 3.5 percent, and the Nasdaq Composite gained 2.95 percent. In particular, electric vehicle maker Tesla shot up 14.8 percent as its CEO Elon Musk supported Trump's reelection campaign.
Employees work in a dealing room at Hana Bank in central Seoul on Nov. 7, 2024. (Yonhap)
In Seoul, large caps finished in mixed territory sector by sector.
Shipbuilders were the biggest winners as Trump mentioned South Korea's participation in the U.S. shipbuilding industry, particularly in naval shipbuilding, exports, repairs and maintenance, during a phone conversation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Hanwha Ocean shot up 21.76 percent to 33,850 won, and HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering jumped 6.03 percent to 197,000 won.
Defense firms were also strong, with industry leader Hanwha Aerospace lifting 4.52 percent to 405,000 won and LIG Nex1 increasing 3.66 percent to 197,000 won.
Chip giant Samsung Electronics rose 0.35 percent to 57,500 won, and its rival SK hynix climbed 0.82 percent to 197,400 won.
But EV battery makers went south as LG Energy Solution fell 1.15 percent to 386,000 won, and Samsung SDI sank 3.52 percent to 288,000 won.
Leading bio tech firm Samsung Biologics skidded 3.02 percent to 995,000 won, and SK bioscience declined 3.79 percent to 50,800 won.
The local currency was trading at 1,396.6 won against the greenback at 3:30 p.m., down 0.4 won from the previous session. During intra-day trading, the won-dollar rate topped 1,400 won on rising demand for the U.S. dollar after Trump's election win.
Bond prices, which move inversely to yields, closed higher. The yield on three-year Treasurys fell 3.8 basis points to 2.922 percent, and the return on the benchmark five-year government bonds lost 4.5 basis points to 2.978 percent.
brk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · November 7, 2024
13. What does Trump's win mean for the world? by Sir Lawrence Freedman
My biased focus (Asia and Korea) and provocative conclusion.
The best way to assure our allies is to demonstrate what are US interests and how we are working to sustain, poroect, and advance US interests around the world. Where those interests align with those of our allies they will be reassured. For example, it is in the US national security interest to prevent war on the Korean peninsula therefore we are going to act accordingly to protect our interest there.
Excerpts:
Lastly there is China and North Korea. The rise of China as a strategic rival to the US was a big theme of the first Trump administration, and one that continued as a priority for Biden. China’s rise has stuttered in recent years and it faces major problem of demography, debt, and a controlling, authoritarian ideology that is stultifying social and economic development. I suspect Trump relishes an economic war with China more than a proper war. O’Brien’s article suggests a readiness to disengage completely economically from China. I doubt that will be so easy and the effort to try might add to the risks of a financial crisis.
Taiwan may be an interesting test case of his readiness to go for peace through strength. That would require him to repeat Biden’s promise to defend Taiwan should Beijing attempt reunification through force and I am not convinced he will. Taiwan’s defence budget is not large relative to the threat and we can expect pressure on Taiwan to do more to help itself rather than just rely on the US coming to the rescue. A concern for Taiwan is that a conspicuous boost to its military preparations might be one of the moves that could trigger Chinese aggression, a concern that may not impress Trump whose line may be that the US will only help those who help themselves, although then there are still no guarantees.
There is also the question of the Korean peninsula where Kim Jong-un has become more aggressive and less predictable – Pyongyang combined its recent despatch of troops to support Russia with an ICBM test. Based on his comments last time round, Seoul and also Tokyo will also be anxious about the potential combination of Trump’s disinterest in the obligations of alliance with a readiness to impose tariffs on allies. Last time this led to suggestions that perhaps it was time to consider their own nuclear programmes as a source of deterrence. Such thoughts may well return.
Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, once called the US the world’s ’indispensable nation’. It had influence and responsibilities that far exceeded any other state and this meant that it should embrace this unique role. It meant that others depended on the US more than the US depended on them. But this role had not been adopted out of altruism but also because it served US political and economic interests, which would be damaged irretrievably if it was abandoned. During his first term Trump toyed with the possibilities of breaking free. The question for his second is whether this time he will try harder or whether the logic of the US’s international position continues to act as a restraint.
What does Trump's win mean for the world?
https://samf.substack.com/p/what-does-trumps-win-mean-for-the?utm
Lawrence Freedman
Nov 07, 2024
We are going to do a Q+A for paying subscribers next week - so please put your questions in the comment section below (or email us if you want to ask anonymously). We’ll focus on the US election but we’ll include questions on other topics too. As ever Lawrence will cover those on international relations and Sam on UK (and US) domestic politics.
What does Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the presidential election mean for the international system? No other country matches the US in its number of alliances and partnerships, or in its ability to influence others through its economic and military policies. It has prided itself as offering an exemplary vision of the best sort of society, which it encouraged others to emulate.
Yet Trump campaigned with a darker vision of a failing country let down by its elites, and promised instead nationalist remedies – anti-immigration, protectionist, and potentially isolationist. Past advisors, veterans of his first term, have warned of how he has toyed with radical and disruptive notions, such as leaving NATO. In principle he finds the very idea of alliance, that the US must come to the defence of others if attacked, is offensive. He has shown little interest in international organisations or multilateral initiatives, while climate change is a ‘hoax’ designed to undermine the US oil industry. He abandoned the Paris accords on climate change during his first term and, although Biden rejoined, he will abandon them again.
We have had enough experience of Trump to know that he is not going to turn out to be a closet globalist. His instincts are well set. Allied governments have rushed to congratulate him on his victory and expressed a desire to work with him on their shared interests. They are engaged in damage limitation. They dare not assume that NATO is doomed or that a transatlantic trade war is imminent. Their message is that the choices that he will face on questions such as Ukraine may turn out to be more complex than he has supposed and that he will soon find that the challenges that emerge cannot be easy resolved on a purely national basis. So, however much we think we know what to expect we should not assume that the direction of the second Trump administration has been firmly set. Trump has often seemed to be delighted by his own unpredictability and impulsiveness.
The New Administration
Trump will return to the White House older, if not necessarily wiser, but without any evident need to pacify the establishment figures who were so hostile to his re-election. The experience of his first term left Trump suspicious of the government bureaucracy and the FBI, CIA, and the military. There are MAGA enthusiasts who have been plotting radical restructuring of the government (and this is one task he has set for Elon Musk). It is not just the top leadership of government, the political appointees that change with every incoming administration, but also the levels below that who should expect upheaval. This could result in more dysfunction than usual in the system and a loss of state capacity.
In 2016 there were hopes that he would be tamed by office and obliged to govern from the centre. Some appointments to the senior positions led to expectations that he would be restrained by the ‘adults in the room.’ In the event the adults came and went, exhausted by the efforts to contain the prejudices and channel the energies of their boss. Numerous accounts of Trump’s first term describe senior staff struggling to cope with his tantrums and idiosyncrasies, often deliberately ignoring his instructions in the hope he would forget what he had just demanded. His reputation renders it unlikely that many individuals not already in Trump’s orbit would agree now to work for him, even if they were asked. This will narrow the pool of talent from which he can draw.
Until we see who is nominated for the key positions it is hard to be sure of the policies the new administration will follow. Mike Pompeo, who served Trump as Director of the CIA and then became Secretary of State, without falling out with him, is no isolationist. Nor is Robert O’Brien, Trump’s national security advisor from 2019 to 2021. His article for Foreign Affairs last June described a potential Trump foreign policy that would be robust but ready to work with other states in pursuit of shared interests. But also look at this interview with now Vice-President-elect J D Vance (who could quite possibly become president at some point over the next four years). He offers a transactional approach to NATO and a stance towards Moscow far less robust than reported by O’Brien.
Tariffs
It is easier to adopt a unilateral approach than attempt to exert international leadership in multilateral forums for that requires an energetic and imaginative diplomacy. Letting the world get on with its business while you get on with yours need not involve much international engagement. Except that it is rarely that easy to ignore the rest of the world. The reaction of other countries to your policies and the impact of unexpected events in important parts of the world can demand attention and lead to unanticipated challenges and shifts in policy.
To take one obvious example, dealing with unwanted immigration will require engagement with countries to the south, especially if the aim is to deport large numbers of people who have crossed the border. Another, with a wider impact, concerns tariffs. Trump waxed lyrical about their wonders during the campaign, as if they were an almost painless way to raise money and even an alternative to taxes.
It is not that difficult to impose them. All that is required is an executive order. Now a case can be made that Chinese trade practices, including dumping manufactured goods for which it has failed to generate a domestic market, deserve tariffs. Many other countries feel the same way. But he has suggested not only a 60% tariff on imported goods from China but also 10% and possibly more on those from everywhere else. This would invite retaliation and soon have a dire effect on the international economy, pushing up inflation and causing job losses. This is the area that worries the EU most and on which it will seek early discussions before Trump does anything drastic. (Here the UK may regret no longer being in the EU: it will be very exposed in the event of a trade war.)
The Biden years saw steady growth and revealed the many strengths of the American economy. Little however was done to bring down the national debt which is extremely high and still growing – last month it was put at $35.7 trillion, of which about a third is owned by foreigners. Servicing debt costs as much as the annual defence budget. The factors that drive up this debt are unlikely to go away, especially with an administration that wants to cut taxes and impose tariffs. It would not therefore be surprising if at some point this administration found itself facing a major financial crisis.
Peace Through Strength
A telling aspect of Trump’s critique of Biden’s foreign policy (reflected in O’Brien’s article) was that his failure to demonstrate strength meant that he could not deter others starting wars nor could he conclude them quickly once they had begun. We can question whether Putin would have held back his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, or Hamas its attack on Israel in October 2023, if Trump had then been in the White House. Nonetheless, while Biden’s instincts may have been sound after both these events, there was palpable hesitancy about the use of American power, reflecting a sense of potential risks and a determination to limit US liabilities. The result was that conflicts dragged on and got more rather than less dangerous.
Trump campaigned on the basis that he could keep the US out of wars. When he appeared to be fantasising about putting Liz Cheney in front of a firing squad his explanation was that he was denouncing her as a ‘war hawk’, at which point many leftist critics of her father, George Bush’s Vice President, nodded in agreement.
During his first term, Trump did authorise strikes against Syria after chemical weapons had been used against rebel groups (something Obama had been reluctant to do), took on ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and ordered the assassination of the leader of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. But at other times he held back. After appearing to threaten North Korea with ‘fire and fury’ early in his first term, he embarked on a summit and strange romance with Kim Jong-un to encourage him – unsuccessfully - to abandon his nuclear programmes. Although Biden got the blame for abandoning Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 it was Trump who had done the original deal with the Taliban, having made clear from the start of his administration that he thought this was a pointless commitment.
For those who worry that Trump’s natural belligerence marks him out as a warmonger this may be reassuring but it creates problems for America’s allies, because the durability of these alliances depends on the US being ready to fight on their behalf. This problem is compounded by Trump’s admiration for strongmen whose unconstrained power he seems to envy. Add to this his belief in his unique abilities to achieve great deals he is as likely to rely on personal diplomacy as much as shows of strength. He has already promised as much with Vladimir Putin when he claimed that he could sort out the Ukraine war in a day.
Trump expects the allies to do more to look after themselves. Whether they need to persuade Trump that NATO is worth preserving, or prepare for him concluding that it is not, European governments are going to have to do more on defence. The possible need to keep Ukraine going absent American support adds to the pressure – despite the stretched finances of European governments. The same issues will arise in the Indo-Pacific region, where they do not even have the advantage of a collective security agreement but instead Japan, South Korea and Australia have their own separate alliances with the US.
This point is well understood among European governments but they are suffering from anaemic growth, high debt, and unsettled populations. The German coalition is teetering on the edge of collapse. President Macron was left in a weak position after he called an unnecessary election in the summer which his party then lost. The UK government is secure in power but struggling to work out how it can be financially responsible while advancing its domestic agenda. It has a defence review now underway and this provides an opportunity to make the case for a greater effort, tending not just to 2.5% GDP but to 3%, however unhappy it may make the Chancellor. Trump is by no means the first American president to note the discrepancy between the American and European contributions to NATO but he is going to press the point insistently.
Ukraine
At the moment Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk, is skirmishing with North Korean troops in Kursk, and faces a difficult winter with insufficient energy and regular attack on cities. It is also imposing enormous casualties on the Russians and mounting attacks against targets deep inside Russia so it is still fighting back. In its remaining weeks the Biden administration will do what it can to get more weaponry and ammunition to Kyiv, having been tardy in spending the amount appropriated by Congress. Ukraine has not really recovered from the almost six month’s hiatus in support when the supplemental bill was stuck in Congress from late 2023.
The simplest assumption is that Trump will abandon Ukraine or at least force it to do a bad deal with Russia. That is possible (and this is where it matters who is in Trumps’ national security team) but far from certain.
First, it is not easy to impose a deal on Ukraine, even by withdrawing support. There are some negotiated outcomes that the Ukrainian people might reluctantly accept but otherwise, one way or the other, and with whatever support Europe can muster, it will carry on fighting. That was the message coming out of Kyiv in the aftermath of the election, even as President Zelensky sent his congratulations to Trump.
Second, Putin has shown no readiness to move away from his maximalist demands, and may feel tempted to test Trump to see how far he can push Ukraine to capitulation. If he is not prepared to offer compromises to give Trump something to work with, then Trump will have to decide whether he could threaten to raise the support to Ukraine to encourage Putin to back down. Putin will be keen to talk to Trump, if only to confirm his equal status, but may be more interested in an attempt to push for a new European security order (which he put on the agenda before the full-scale invasion) than make an offer on Ukraine – and there would be little in this for Trump as this really could have echoes of Munich in 1938.
Third, agreeing even a limited cease-fire never mind a full peace deal is not at all straightforward (drawing lines, disengaging forces, ensuring compliance).
Fourth, there are political dangers for Trump as he could look weak and feckless if he simply abandoned Ukraine to Russian aggression and stood back from the consequences. Many Congressional Republicans would be concerned as well as allies. This could usher in an even more dangerous period for European security - for which if it led to an even wider conflict Trump would be blamed. He has an interest in winding the conflict but not in a rampant Russian victory.
Middle East
On the Middle East TRump has stressed the urgency of ending the killing but said little more. Those supporters of the Palestine cause who are congratulating themselves on punishing the current administration for backing Israel are going to be disappointed if they think that Trump is at all inclined to pressure the Israelis to do more for Palestinian rights. Benjamin Netanyahu, who has just sacked his defence minister, was hoping for a Trump victory on the assumption that he will now face no pressure to moderate his policies in Gaza and Lebanon, where his aim is apparently to create buffer zones on the country’s northern and southern borders, and to push hard to suppress Palestinian restlessness in the West Bank.
Although Iran has become a key partner to Russia as a source of drones and missiles, it is much weaker than Russia’s other partners - China and North Korea. With Harris it might have hoped for sanctions relief at some point but not so much under Trump. Its ailing supreme leader is not the sort of strong man that attracts Trump’s admiration. (Though one could imagine him offering a summit with his eventual successor as with Kim Jong-un). This past year has seen Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ take a hammering. Teheran might conclude that this is as good time to call it a day.
Hezbollah has insisted it is prepared to carry on fighting but its purpose was always presented as supporting Hamas. Hamas has also been refusing to agree a hostage deal and cease fire but now that it is even easier for Israel to act with impunity it may feel that it really is time to work with Egypt and Qatar to cut its losses. Then there is still the question of more humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Gaza.
This is where Saudi Arabia may come in. The Saudis consider Trump a friend because of his indifference to human rights. Trump will expect to continue with the Abraham accords, which was one of the few signature achievements of his first administration. Prior to the Hamas attack on Israel the Biden Administration was trying to extend the accords to Saudi Arabia, with a carrot of arms sales. The Saudi view remains that there has to be something for the Palestinians before it can make this move, so that issue will not go away. When negotiating with Biden’s people the Saudis could assume that the President also wanted to see a pathway to a Palestinian state. They can make no such assumption about Trump.
China and North Korea
Lastly there is China and North Korea. The rise of China as a strategic rival to the US was a big theme of the first Trump administration, and one that continued as a priority for Biden. China’s rise has stuttered in recent years and it faces major problem of demography, debt, and a controlling, authoritarian ideology that is stultifying social and economic development. I suspect Trump relishes an economic war with China more than a proper war. O’Brien’s article suggests a readiness to disengage completely economically from China. I doubt that will be so easy and the effort to try might add to the risks of a financial crisis.
Taiwan may be an interesting test case of his readiness to go for peace through strength. That would require him to repeat Biden’s promise to defend Taiwan should Beijing attempt reunification through force and I am not convinced he will. Taiwan’s defence budget is not large relative to the threat and we can expect pressure on Taiwan to do more to help itself rather than just rely on the US coming to the rescue. A concern for Taiwan is that a conspicuous boost to its military preparations might be one of the moves that could trigger Chinese aggression, a concern that may not impress Trump whose line may be that the US will only help those who help themselves, although then there are still no guarantees.
There is also the question of the Korean peninsula where Kim Jong-un has become more aggressive and less predictable – Pyongyang combined its recent despatch of troops to support Russia with an ICBM test. Based on his comments last time round, Seoul and also Tokyo will also be anxious about the potential combination of Trump’s disinterest in the obligations of alliance with a readiness to impose tariffs on allies. Last time this led to suggestions that perhaps it was time to consider their own nuclear programmes as a source of deterrence. Such thoughts may well return.
Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, once called the US the world’s ’indispensable nation’. It had influence and responsibilities that far exceeded any other state and this meant that it should embrace this unique role. It meant that others depended on the US more than the US depended on them. But this role had not been adopted out of altruism but also because it served US political and economic interests, which would be damaged irretrievably if it was abandoned. During his first term Trump toyed with the possibilities of breaking free. The question for his second is whether this time he will try harder or whether the logic of the US’s international position continues to act as a restraint.
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14. What Donald Trump's victory means for North Korea
What if the President-elect says he gave KJU the opportunity of a lifetime in 2018-2019 and he blew it. I do not think he is going to try for a "do over,' I am hopeful that his advisors have a deep understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime (and he will listen to them) as well as the opportunities and challenges presented by the internal situation inside north Korea that is stressing KJU. I am hopeful that the President-elect will demand a radical new policy for north Korea and a strategy that has never been tried before. Some of us have such radical proposals. Based on the President-elect's personality and ability to tolerate criticism from the media and elite, if he chose to he could execute a superior political warfare strategy toward the north.
What Donald Trump's victory means for North Korea
Newsweek · by Maya Mehrara · November 6, 2024
As Donald Trump is elected the 47th president of the U.S., many wonder what his presidency will mean for the United States' relationship with North Korea.
Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were rumored to have a close relationship during his first presidency, but it has been reported that that dynamic might have shifted ahead of the 2024 election.
Trump's relationship with North Korea going forward might influence his response to the Russia-Ukraine war, one expert said, now that North Korean troops have been deployed to the Russian front lines.
Newsweek reached out to the North Korean embassy in the UK and the Trump campaign for comment via email.
The President-elect's relationship with North Korea is unlike that between other American presidents and Pyongyang. In 2019 he became the first U.S. president to visit North Korea, after officially meeting Kim for the first time in Singapore in 2018.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then President Donald Trump meet at a summit in Singapore in 2018. People are curious about what Trump's 2024 election win means for the future of U.S.-North Korea... North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then President Donald Trump meet at a summit in Singapore in 2018. People are curious about what Trump's 2024 election win means for the future of U.S.-North Korea relations. Evan Vucci/Associated Press
Following that meeting, Trump and the North Korean leader formed what Trump often called a good relationship. He said he had "largely solved" the tension between the two countries regarding denuclearization, which some experts have disputed.
The two world leaders reportedly kept up some correspondence during Trump's first presidency and exchanged 27 letters, according to the magazine Foreign Policy.
After Trump said that he gets "along with him [Kim Jong Un]" and "he'd like to see me back too. I think he misses me, if you want to know the truth," in July, North Korea dismissed the comments.
In response, Pyongyang issued a statement via the Korean Central News Agency that said: "Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this."
North Korea also stated that Trump "tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states" but added that he didn't incite "any substantial positive change."
Trump reiterated his feelings on his relationship with North Korea, and its leader, last month when he said: "I happen to get along with Kim Jong Un very well," as reported by The Hill.
Trump said that the relationship between himself and the North Korean leader started as "really nasty" and alleged that during Barack Obama's presidency they were close to war. He said the relationship improved during his presidency.
The President-elect also noted last month that he had a strong relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his first presidency, saying he "got along great with Putin," which could further complicate how he responds to the Russia-Ukraine war.
In regards to the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump said in the spring that he would "end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours."
Robert Orttung, an associate research professor of international affairs at George Washington University, previously told Newsweek that he believed "Trump has indicated a strong preference for Russia over Ukraine in both words and deeds."
Newsweek previously spoke to Edward Howell, a lecturer in politics at the University of Oxford and an expert in East Asian international relations, about North Korea launching several missiles on the eve of the election, and he gave some insight as to what a Trump presidency might mean for the country.
He said: "While a Trump victory might see Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump meeting for a highly optical summit, once again, North Korea has made clear already that, irrespective of the outcome of the U.S. election, its worldview vis-à-vis the United States will not change. Washington—as well as Seoul—will remain a hostile power, and Pyongyang will do what it does best, namely accelerate its nuclear development and the development of delivery systems, in response."
Newsweek · by Maya Mehrara · November 6, 2024
15. Trump voices concern about North Korean ‘provocations’ in phone call with Yoon
I hope the President-elect knows that President Yoon is someone he can work with and who will support US policy and strategy. They could make a good team.
Trump voices concern about North Korean ‘provocations’ in phone call with Yoon
South Korean president says Trump expressed interest in DPRK issues, amid attention on if he’ll seek to restart talks
https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/trump-voices-concern-about-north-korean-provocations-in-phone-call-with-yoon/
Chad O'Carroll | Jeongmin Kim | Joon Ha Park November 7, 2024
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol (left) during a call with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump on Nov. 7, and then-President Donald Trump during a call with Governor Henry McMaster of South Carolina in Sep. 2019 | Images: ROK Presidential Office, Trump White House, edited by NK News
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol congratulated Donald Trump on his election victory in a phone call on Thursday, with the U.S. president-elect reportedly expressing concern about North Korean “provocations” like launches of trash balloons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
In a press conference after the call, Yoon said Trump appeared highly interested in the DPRK and not just the nuclear weapons issue, amid attention on whether the former president could seek to rekindle diplomacy with Kim Jong Un.
“The discussion wasn’t focused solely on North Korean nuclear weapons. Trump actually initiated the broader conversation about North Korea. He seemed particularly interested in that,” Yoon said.
“So I told him that North Korea has launched these trash balloons over 7,000 times now and that our citizens are suffering greatly from this. I said they’re also randomly firing all sorts of missiles like ICBMs … along with conducting GPS jamming.”
“Then Trump said ‘this is truly unbelievable,’ and we agreed to meet soon to discuss intelligence and potential measures we can take in response to this situation,” Yoon added.
The press conference came after Kim Tae-hyo, deputy principal director of the National Security Office, announced that Yoon had a 12-minute phone call with Trump at around 8 a.m. KST, agreeing to meet “soon” to discuss alliance matters in detail.
Yoon and Trump exchanged assessments about military developments, including DPRK troop deployments to fight against Ukraine, according to Kim, and both leaders “expressed concern” about North Korean “provocations” and nuclear developments.
The South Korean president also congratulated Trump on his “major victory under the MAGA (Make America Great Again) slogan” and expressed hope that “Trump’s leadership will guide America to greatness.”
At Thursday’s press conference, Yoon said he expected to have “good chemistry” with Trump since they have the shared experience of being political newcomers.
Asked by NK News why South Korea won’t state whether it flew drones over Pyongyang like North Korea claims, Yoon reiterated the position that the military can neither confirm nor deny the allegations.
“North Korea has violated our airspace with drones at least 10 times, sent over 7,000 trash balloons as I mentioned to Mr. Trump, and their GPS jamming severely affects our fishing vessels. Given this context, their baseless and hypocritical accusations don’t deserve a detailed response,” he said.
Trump’s statement during his phone call with Yoon suggests he remains interested in North Korea, after he prioritized diplomacy with Pyongyang during his first term and built personal rapport with leader Kim Jong Un across two summits.
But Min Tae-eun, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), told NK News that Trump is unlikely to bring major changes to U.S. policy toward North Korea during his second term.
“North Korea’s role remains a low priority in U.S. foreign policy, as the U.S. is far more focused on pressing issues like China and its economic policies,” the expert said, adding that even North Korea’s reported troop deployment to the Ukraine war is unlikely to change this.
Lee Sang-hyun, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, predicted Trump will press South Korea on defense cost-sharing but that U.S.-ROK cooperation will proceed given North Korea’s recent provocations.
“The key will be who handles Korean Peninsula issues in Trump’s second term as president,” he said, arguing that it’s too early to make specific predictions about policy shifts.
Min also warned that Trump could use defense-cost negotiations as a “bargaining chip” to pressure South Korea in other areas.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol shakes hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 15, 2023. | Image: ROK Presidential Office
PRESIDENTIAL CONFIRMATION: KYIV WEAPONS AID OPTION
At Thursday’s press conference, Yoon also addressed North Korea’s troop deployment to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, defending Seoul’s provision of non-lethal aid to Kyiv.
“It’s only natural that we help countries facing illegal invasions, given how much international support we received during our own difficult times,” he said. “Our foreign policy is grounded in internationalism, pacifism and humanitarianism, which is why we’ve focused primarily on humanitarian and economic support.”
Yoon explained that while Ukraine receives weapons from the U.S. and EU, it also needs significant financial support for basic operations, including military and civil servant salaries.
“We’ve been providing essential medicines, supplies and funding,” he said.
However, Yoon expressed concern about potential transfers of Russian military technology to North Korea that “critically threaten” South Korean security, and the combat experience that DPRK troops will gain from fighting against Ukraine.
“While there are reports of North Korea sending mercenaries to some previous conflicts, it’s different from deploying large-scale forces that can gain operational experience. South Korea, by contrast, gained significant combat experience during our deployment in Vietnam, which remains a major strength of our military,” he said.
North Korea’s troop deployment thus now requires South Korea to shift its strategy for Ukraine, according to Yoon.
“We’re considering adjusting our support methods based on the level of North Korean military involvement. My stance is that now, we don’t rule out weapons support … though we would prioritize considering defensive weapons if such support materializes,” he said.
Experts said Yoon’s comments reflect South Korea’s need to take a cautious approach as the situation in Ukraine rapidly changes.
“The key issue will be the level of lethal aid provided, but I don’t believe we need to make a definitive statement on the amount or type of aid at this stage,” Lee of the Sejong Institute said.
Min of KINU agreed that South Korea should avoid hastily committing to provide more aid to Ukraine.
“While, as an ally, South Korea can offer support, we should exercise caution in our approach, much as NATO countries have been careful in their responses,” Min said, alluding to possible changes in U.S. policy under Trump.
“It’s wiser to wait for signals from the U.S. rather than making proactive moves that could prematurely commit us to certain positions.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
16. Editorial: What Trump's return means for South Korea
A somewhat negative editorial. South Korea needs to see the opportunities with the President-elect. Korea should not be seeking countermeasures to the President-elect's policies but instead seeking the opportunities presented by them. Talking about "countermeasures" will do more damage to the alliance than any perceived negative US policies.
Excerpts:
Once Trump returns to the White House in January, the Yoon administration will have to work with the Trump administration for two years. Building a personal rapport with Trump, who appreciates flattery, will be crucial. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set a precedent by fostering strong ties with Trump, famously gifting him a gold-encrusted golf driver and extending generous hospitality.
If President Yoon can establish such a relationship, it could help mitigate risks related to North Korea, prevent U.S. troop withdrawals, and avoid trade sanctions. Proactively analyzing the Trump administration’s economic and security policies and preparing countermeasures in advance for each issue will be essential. With proper foresight, South Korea may be able to turn the potential crisis of Trump’s re-election into an opportunity.
Editorial: What Trump's return means for South Korea
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/11/07/FS6A746QJRDKBFWKOIXMRHQWPY/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.11.07. 08:20
Republican nominee Donald Trump was elected U.S. president, defeating Democratic nominee Kamala Harris on Nov. 6, 2024. Trump, who won the election in 2016 as the 45th president, will now be the 47th president. / Newsis
Former U.S. President Donald Trump was elected the 47th president on Nov. 6 and will begin his second term next year. The Republican Party also won control of the Senate and House of Representatives. This sweeping victory signals the beginning of a new “Trump era,” during which the second Trump administration will shape the future of the U.S., international security, and the global economy over the next four years.
Trump’s first term was marked by a series of America-first policies and abrupt actions that shocked both allies and adversaries. He declared a trade war with China and persistently exerted economic pressure on neighboring countries. He repeatedly demanded that allies pay more in return for U.S. defense commitments and security support. Trump’s second term is expected to be no different, casting a cloud of uncertainty over nations that have maintained economic and security alliances with the U.S., including South Korea.
South Korea’s primary export market has shifted from China to the U.S. in the wake of the U.S.-China trade war and global supply chain realignment. Trump’s trade protectionism could further pose significant risks to the Korean economy. Last year, South Korea’s trade surplus with the U.S. reached a record $44.5 billion. This figure is lower than that of the European Union, Japan, or Vietnam, but it could still position Korea as a potential target for Trump’s protectionist policies.
Trump has proposed to impose a universal baseline tariff of 10% to 20% on all imports and up to 60% on Chinese goods. Should a U.S.-China tariff war break out, Korea’s intermediate goods exports to the U.S. and China could decline. The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) projects that a tariff war could reduce South Korean exports by up to $44.8 billion, about 7% of the nation’s total exports. Such a decline could also shrink Korea’s GDP by roughly 0.4%.
He has also vowed to end subsidy benefits for foreign companies building semiconductor, electric vehicle, and battery plants in the U.S. This would impact Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and LG Energy Solution, Korean companies that have invested in U.S. plants based on subsidy promises. The sudden removal of these financial incentives would be akin to breaking a commitment, impacting investments worth over 12 trillion won ($8.5 billion). Automakers could also suffer severe consequences if Trump imposes a 100% tariff on vehicles produced outside the U.S., a policy that would affect about 50% of Korea’s automobile exports.
In light of these potential challenges, Korea needs to review its trade strategy with the U.S. Given Trump’s commitment to boosting the U.S. oil and gas sector, it would be prudent to consider increasing imports of U.S. crude oil and natural gas. Trump’s proposed ban on exports of U.S. strategic industries to China could potentially work in South Korea’s favor. This policy could buy time for Korea to stay ahead of China in sectors such as semiconductors, ultimately bolstering industrial competitiveness and exports.
Trump’s foreign policy centers on demanding allies to pay more in return for U.S. security support. His view of alliances is based not on shared values but on financial transactions. The sums he demands, however, are often disproportionate. He has called Korea a “money machine” and said the long-time U.S. ally should be paying $10 billion every year for U.S. troops stationed in Korea, a nine-fold hike in defense spending. While most U.S. officials agree that Korea contributes a fair share to the cost of stationing U.S. troops, this argument does not resonate with Trump. Once in office, he is expected to bring this issue to the forefront.
If Korea fails to offer a satisfactory response, Trump is likely to threaten to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in the country. He entertained this idea during his first term, but his aides reportedly advised prioritizing this issue during his second term. Addressing the possibility of a U.S. troop withdrawal has become a strategic challenge. The Camp David declaration under the Biden administration aimed to strengthen trilateral economic and security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan could also be rendered ineffective.
Trump has boasted about his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “It’s a good thing to get along with a leader who has nuclear weapons,” he said. There is a possibility that he will engage in talks with Kim during his second term. Kim Jong-un is seeking to obtain advanced military technology from Russia, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), military satellites, and nuclear submarines, in return for military support. South Korea must stay alert to potential agreements Trump may strike with Kim.
The next U.S. president is capable of showcasing a “U.S.-North Korea summit” as a step forward, framing it as a move that makes America safer by getting North Korea to agree to scrap ICBMs targeting the U.S. mainland and freeze its nuclear activities. He is unlikely to prioritize South Korea’s security in such a deal, and Kim Jong-un could exploit this dynamic. Under such a scenario, South Korea may find itself relying on a merely symbolic U.S. nuclear umbrella to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat. South Korea must leverage Trump’s “give-and-take” transactional diplomacy to its advantage in this situation. If Trump demands an excessive hike in defense cost-sharing, South Korea could negotiate for independent nuclear armament in return.
Once Trump returns to the White House in January, the Yoon administration will have to work with the Trump administration for two years. Building a personal rapport with Trump, who appreciates flattery, will be crucial. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set a precedent by fostering strong ties with Trump, famously gifting him a gold-encrusted golf driver and extending generous hospitality.
If President Yoon can establish such a relationship, it could help mitigate risks related to North Korea, prevent U.S. troop withdrawals, and avoid trade sanctions. Proactively analyzing the Trump administration’s economic and security policies and preparing countermeasures in advance for each issue will be essential. With proper foresight, South Korea may be able to turn the potential crisis of Trump’s re-election into an opportunity.
17. Criticism of Kim's sister leads to arrests, disappearances in Haeju
Obviously you should not criticize the Evil Sister because, after all, she is the most dangerous woman in the world.
But note the subject of criticism, that along with just the action of criticism itself, is an indicator that things are not quite right at home in the Socialist Worker's Paradise of north Korea.
Of course, Heaju has always been the hotbed of resistance over the years.
Criticism of Kim's sister leads to arrests, disappearances in Haeju - Daily NK English
The two people allegedly mocked Kim Yo Jong's leadership role and criticized her focus on military matters instead of economic and public welfare issues during the current hardships
By Jeong Seo-yeong - November 7, 2024
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · November 7, 2024
Sacks of grains at a farm in South Hwanghae Province (Rodong Sinmun-News 1)
Two Haeju residents were recently detained by the Ministry of State Security for allegedly making critical comments in private conversation about Kim Yo Jong’s statement regarding drones over Pyongyang.
According to a source in South Hwanghae province recently, their private conversation was overheard by an informer for the local branch of the Ministry of State Security.
The authorities took issue with several politically-charged comments the two individuals allegedly made. In private conversation, they expressed concern about recent tensions with South Korea, saying that “there must be a war for this country to collapse quickly, and that if there were a war, everyone would run to South Korea or China.”
The two people also expressed opinions about the North Korean government’s erasing of the concepts of “unification” and “nation” in propaganda materials. Comparing now with the times of former North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, they allegedly said that “everyone wants reunification, but the government no longer wants it. We’re left with half a country, and we’ve lost hope.”
The detained residents also allegedly mocked Kim Yo Jong’s leadership role and criticized her focus on military matters instead of economic and public welfare issues during the current hardships.
Thanks to the informer, all these comments were recorded in the Ministry of State Security’s reports.
The day after the pair’s arrest, the families of the two individuals suddenly disappeared.
“Locals were astounded when they woke up one morning and both families were suddenly gone,” the source said. “Local residents who knew the two families are worried they might get caught up in this incident as well.
“Haeju is close to South Korea, so incidents like this sometimes occur. Another Haeju resident was recently arrested by the Ministry of State Security after he criticized the state while drinking at a private gathering.”
Meanwhile, the Haeju branch of the Ministry of State Security has established plans to increase its number of informants and bolster surveillance of city residents, the source said.
Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · November 7, 2024
18. N. Korea's anti-socialist watchdog faces internal probe over currency control failures
See yesterday's article on north Korean corruption from HRNK.
Historical Factors that have Led to the Rampant Corruption in North Korea
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/historical-factors-that-have-led-to-the-rampant-corruption-in-north-korea
N. Korea's anti-socialist watchdog faces internal probe over currency control failures - Daily NK English
"There's significant tension within Unified Command 82 as officials caught undermining the exchange rate campaign face severe punishment under this investigation," a source told Daily NK
By Seon Hwa - November 7, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · November 7, 2024
FILE PHOTO: North Korean currency. (Daily NK)
North Korea’s Unified Command 82, tasked with policing anti-socialist behavior, has launched an internal investigation into its own currency stabilization efforts. On Oct. 20, the agency ordered all regional branches to root out interference with the campaign while tightening training and restrictions.
The probe comes after top officials discovered that some Unified Command 82 members were undermining currency controls through corruption. Members must now attend self-criticism sessions to address how their misconduct has enabled illegal currency trading.
A document obtained by Daily NK reveals the timeline of the currency campaign. In March, the government issued two directives: Cabinet Administrative Directive No. 1 aimed to stabilize exchange rates to boost the economy, while Joint Instruction No. 10 ordered its implementation. By April 5, authorities had completely banned unauthorized currency trading.
The government is attempting to force citizens to use official exchange locations like banks and currency centers, which follow state-mandated rates. However, these official rates are far below market value. As a result, North Koreans continue to use private money changers who offer better rates for U.S. dollars and Chinese yuan, despite increasing crackdowns.
The internal probe was triggered when it became clear that Unified Command 82 officials were protecting illegal money changers instead of arresting them.
According to a South Pyongan province-based source recently, one case involved an official who conducted multiple illegal transactions worth tens of millions of won with a money changer using government funds. In response, all officials in Unified Command 82, their families, and associates have been ordered to avoid illegal currency trading.
“There’s significant tension within Unified Command 82,” the source added, “as officials caught undermining the exchange rate campaign face severe punishment under this investigation.”
Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · November 7, 2024
19. What Trump’s Win Means for U.S. Foreign Policy
I may have to cancel my subscription to Foreign Policy. This article and all the articles I skimmed through at the link at the bottom of this article make no mention of Korea, north or South.
Disappointing.
What Trump’s Win Means for U.S. Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy · by FP Staff
- U.S. Foreign Policy
- Foreign & Public Diplomacy
- United States
Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s election victory marks the beginning of another roller-coaster ride in U.S. foreign policy. The president-elect is poised to bring back the hallmarks of his first term: a trade war with China, a deep skepticism—even hostility—toward multilateralism, a fondness for strongmen, and an iconoclastic, tweet-from-the-hip style of dealmaking diplomacy. Trump’s advisors have said his “peace through strength” approach is what the country needs in this precarious moment.
This second term will bring new challenges, though—not least the two wars, in the Middle East and Ukraine, that the United States is deeply involved in. Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine before he even takes office, but he has yet to offer any detailed plan; his plans for bringing peace to the Middle East are equally vague.
Unclear as Trump’s designs may be, Foreign Policy waded into his track record as well as his statements and those of his advisors to offer clues on what the future of U.S. foreign policy holds. As Trump’s first term showed, his own whims often contrast with his advisors’ agenda; this time around, he may have a tighter grip on the wheel as a second-time president likely staffed by a more loyal circle of advisors.
Here’s a glimpse into the Trump 2.0 future.
JUMP TO TOPIC
China
Donald Trump wearing a suit and red tie grimaces as he pulls Xi Jinping's hand toward him in a handshake. Xi wears a suit and blue tie and smiles slightly. Behind them are U.S. and Chinese flags.
Trump shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2017. Fred Dufour/AFP via Getty Images
On China policy, to some extent President Joe Biden will just be passing the baton back to Trump. The current administration inherited much of the first Trump term’s harsher approach to China, and a second Trump term is likely to continue identifying China as the United States’ top national security challenge. But on specific issues—and certainly overall style—a second Trump term will bring significant changes.
As with his first term, Trump has set his sights first and foremost on trade. Trump told the Wall Street Journal in an October interview that “tariff” is “the most beautiful word in the dictionary,” and his clearest priority when it comes to China is relaunching the trade war that he began in 2018.
Trump’s campaign website calls for cutting the U.S. reliance on China for all essential goods. But that’s just the beginning. Biden maintained Trump’s original tariffs and added some additional ones; Trump is poised to go much further. With promised tariffs of at least 60 percent on all imports from China, Trump would get closer to the full decoupling of the world’s two largest economies espoused by some of his closest advisors.
Such a move would worsen the already tense bilateral relationship and cost American households thousands of dollars a year and U.S. exporters one of their biggest markets. But the knock-on effects of an aggressive trade policy toward China would also end up weakening other potential U.S. friends and allies.
China still depends overwhelmingly on exports to drive its growth, and measures designed to weaken that main motor of growth, such as Trump’s tariffs, would also weaken Chinese demand for manufacturing inputs, including energy and minerals. That would be bad news for U.S. neighbors such as Peru, Chile, and Mexico (all big exporters of copper to China), U.S. ally Australia (a big exporter of iron ore and coal), and U.S. frenemy Saudi Arabia, a big source of China’s crude oil.
In Trump’s first term, tariff leverage over China led to a bilateral deal that he deemed “the biggest deal anyone has ever seen.” It was meant to boost U.S. agricultural and energy exports to China, but it never came close to realizing its objectives. Reviving that Phase One agreement could be the starting point for a revamped deal under the new Trump administration, according to the America First Policy Institute, a think tank in Trump’s orbit.
If the purpose of the sky-high import taxes is to force China to overhaul its trade and economic practices—the ostensible and unmet goal of the first-term trade war with China—Trump’s other trade policies would make that much more difficult. The strong-arming of China would be undermined by similar treatment of friends and allies, as during his first term. Trump has promised tariffs as high as 20 percent on all other countries, including the European Union. That would not only bring instant and well-prepared reprisals on U.S. exports, further weakening U.S. economic prospects, but it would also dampen the prospects for a big-tent coalition of major economies that could bring coordinated pressure on Beijing to curb its most egregious trade abuses.
Beyond trade, Trump’s biggest point of departure from the Biden administration may be on Taiwan. During his campaign, he repeatedly cast doubt on the future extent of U.S. support, applying the same transactional approach he has taken with many countries to the island. “Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. … Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” he said in a July interview with Bloomberg Businessweek.
Such statements have led some China experts to think Trump will look to forge some sort of deal with Taiwan in exchange for further U.S. defense support. Taiwan’s military spending stands at some 2.6 percent of its GDP today; Trump may require the island to hike that number up, as former Trump National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien and senior defense official Elbridge Colby have proposed. TSMC, the Taiwanese semiconductor giant, has already invested more than $65 billion in new plants located in Arizona, but Trump may push for further domestic investment, Taiwan experts told Foreign Policy.
While Trump may drive a hard bargain, it is unlikely that he would actually abandon support for Taiwan. Among his potential top advisors is former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who is a staunch supporter of Taiwan and has called for formally recognizing Taiwanese independence. In interviews, Trump has stuck with the long-standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity when pressed about whether the U.S. military would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack or blockade. Trump’s own personal unpredictability also provides its own layer of ambiguity, strategic or not. When asked that question in his October interview with the Wall Street Journal, Trump responded, “I wouldn’t have to, because [Chinese President Xi Jinping] respects me and he knows I’m f— crazy.”
Which voices ultimately hold sway in Trump’s cabinet will also influence his administration’s China policy. As Foreign Policy previously reported, Republican China hawks are divided over how existential competition with China should be, along with other key questions, including how much to decouple the two economies. As with Trump’s first term, these battle lines will surely carry over into the White House.
Trump’s own guanxi—or personal relationships—will surely shape policy as well. The president-elect has repeatedly expressed admiration for Xi. “I very much respect President Xi. I got to know him very well. And I liked him a lot. He’s a strong guy, but I liked him a lot,” he told Businessweek. Trump’s first term showed his willingness to buck his administration’s policy in favor of his own brand of personal politics with Xi; that may well happen again in pursuit of a second trade deal.—Lili Pike and Keith Johnson
A pencil-drawn portrait of Robert Lighthizer seen in profile, wearing glasses and looking to the right.
A pencil-drawn portrait of Robert Lighthizer seen in profile, wearing glasses and looking to the right.
As a potential U.S. Treasury secretary, Robert Lighthizer has more than trade policy to revolutionize.
A photo collage illustration shows Chinese leader Xi Jinping walking down red-carpeted stairs. At left are two sparring hawks. Behind him is the US Capitol and Donald Trump with his hand to his face. At lower right are two Chinese protesters.
A photo collage illustration shows Chinese leader Xi Jinping walking down red-carpeted stairs. At left are two sparring hawks. Behind him is the US Capitol and Donald Trump with his hand to his face. At lower right are two Chinese protesters.
Republicans are divided on whether regime change in Beijing should be the ultimate goal.
Middle East
Benjamin Netanyahu leans in to speak closely to Donald Trump. Behind them is a blue and white clouded sky.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks with Trump in Tel Aviv on May 23, 2017.Kobi Gideon/GPO via Getty Images
Unless Israel’s wars with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon are fully resolved before Trump is inaugurated—which seems unlikely—one of the most urgent foreign-policy issues on his desk will be the escalating tensions in the Middle East. The president-elect has spoken about the need to bring the war in Gaza to a close, claiming in August that he told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “get your victory” because the “killing has to stop.”
It’s unclear what role, if any, the next administration would play in trying to bring that war to a close. Trump has criticized the Biden team’s call for a cease-fire, describing it as an effort to “tie Israel’s hand behind its back” and saying a cease-fire would only give Hamas time to regroup.
During his first term, Trump rhetorically backed a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while putting his thumb on the scale, handing Israel a series of long-sought diplomatic prizes such as moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, cutting funding to the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, and reversing decades of U.S. policy by recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and declaring that Israeli settlements in the West Bank do not violate international law.
Trump has previously said he “fought for Israel like no president ever before,” and his administration’s role in brokering the Abraham Accords—a series of diplomatic agreements between Israel and a number of Arab states—was regarded as one of his major foreign-policy triumphs; the Biden administration has continued those efforts.
While Netanyahu and Trump had a warm relationship during his first term, things soured after the Israeli leader congratulated Biden on his 2020 election victory a day after the race was called, angering Trump. His tone toward Israel in recent months has also been critical at times, with Trump warning in April that the country was “losing the PR war” in Gaza.
Trump takes to the White House for a second term as the wider Middle East has been ignited by clashes between Israel and Tehran’s proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and beyond. This year saw Israel and Iran directly trade fire for the first time. While the Biden administration has sought to de-escalate tensions, urging Israel not to strike Iran’s nuclear and energy facilities in a recent wave of retaliatory strikes, Trump is likely to be less cautious, saying in October that Israel should “hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later.”
The first Trump administration took a hard line on Iran, withdrawing from the nuclear deal, pursuing a policy of “maximum pressure” on the regime, and assassinating the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, in an airstrike in January 2020.
Speaking to reporters in September, Trump said he would be open to striking a new deal with Iran to prevent the country from developing a nuclear weapon. “We have to make a deal, because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal,” he said, without offering further details of what such negotiations could entail.
While Trump sought to wind down the U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, he is not entirely averse to bringing U.S. military might to bear in pursuit of clear goals, said Robert Greenway, who served as the senior director for the Middle East on Trump’s National Security Council. That could include preventing Iran from joining the short list of countries with nuclear arms. “The military option may be the only viable option left to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon,” Greenway said.
Adding another wrinkle, the U.S. intelligence community has warned that Iran has plotted to assassinate Trump and will likely continue those efforts beyond Election Day. “Now it’s also personal. I wouldn’t discount that,” Greenway said.—Amy Mackinnon
Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 15, 2020.
Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 15, 2020.
A second Trump administration might have less sympathy for Israel.
Russia-Ukraine and NATO
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are silhouetted as they walk in front of a set of stairs. Other leaders are seen in shadows at left.
Trump walks with Russian President Vladimir Putin before taking a family photo at the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019. Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images
Trump has criticized U.S. funding for Ukraine’s war effort and called for Europe to assume more of the burden of supporting Kyiv. He labeled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “the greatest salesman on Earth” for how much money he’s been able to get for Ukraine from the Biden administration, though he added, “That doesn’t mean I don’t want to help [Zelensky], because I feel very badly for those people.” Yet he has expressed doubt that Ukraine can defeat Russia.
Trump has claimed that it will take him just 24 hours to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war and that he will get it done before his inauguration in January. But details on how he intends to end the war are scant. In a July 2023 interview with Fox News, Trump suggested that he would force Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table by telling the Ukrainian leader that Kyiv will get no more U.S. aid and telling the Russian leader that Washington will dramatically increase aid to Kyiv if a deal isn’t made.
Trump has said even less about what a negotiated settlement would look like beyond that he wants “to see a fair deal made.”
Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has offered a bit more specifics on what such a deal might look like. Although he said Trump would leave it to the two warring countries as well as Europe to work out the details of a peace agreement, Vance suggested that it would likely entail the establishment of a demilitarized zone along current battle lines, allowing Ukraine to retain its sovereignty while forcing it to give up some of its territory currently in Moscow’s hands, as well as a guarantee that Ukraine will remain neutral—meaning it won’t join NATO or other “allied institutions.”
Analysts have noted that this is very similar to the terms that Putin has laid out for a cease-fire, which Ukraine and several of its backers—including the United States, Italy, and Germany—have rejected.
Trump is far from NATO’s biggest supporter, and the alliance is no fan of him, either. Trump has chastised NATO members that do not meet the bloc’s minimum defense spending goal, even encouraging Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to countries that don’t hit the 2 percent target. Eight countries in the 32-nation bloc do not meet this requirement.
Ahead of the election, NATO tried to Trump-proof the alliance. Fearing that a second Trump term would slow or halt aid to Ukraine, the bloc ramped up production of key weapons and equipment as well as worked to consolidate authority over training and provisions to Europe. At this year’s NATO summit in Washington, the alliance reaffirmed that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” but declined to extend an invitation for Kyiv to join or set a timeline for membership.
From Russia’s perspective, a second Trump presidency might pave the way for friendlier relations between Washington and Moscow, as the Kremlin has long preferred the Republican leader over his Democratic opponents. Yet even the Russians are hesitant about Trump’s promises to immediately end the conflict. This sort of thinking falls within “the realm of fantasy,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said in September.
Since leaving office, Trump has reportedly spoken to Putin as many as seven times. Trump has not confirmed these conversations, saying only that if he did have them, then “it’s a smart thing.” In September, Trump met with Zelensky in New York. The president-elect has a fraught history with the Ukrainian leader, having been impeached in 2019 for pressuring Zelensky to dig up political dirt on Biden and the Democrats to help Trump try to win the 2020 election; at the time, Trump was withholding nearly $400 million in U.S. military assistance to Ukraine.—Alexandra Sharp
Illustration of a torn map of Europe revealing Donald Trump
Illustration of a torn map of Europe revealing Donald Trump
Without Washington’s embrace, the continent could revert to an anarchic and illiberal past.
Africa
A youth wearing a U.S. flag shirt and cargo shorts stands barefoot on a pile of dirt. He holds a rectangular sifter above his head. Another youth is seen at left.
A youth works in a cobalt mine in Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on Dec. 13, 2005.Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images
U.S. Africa policy didn’t make much of a splash on the campaign trail this year, with neither Trump nor Democratic nominee Kamala Harris offering many—if any—details on what their plans would be on taking office. But Trump’s first term offers some clues about what his future approach might look like.
Trump’s signature regional initiative, known as “Prosper Africa,” focused on boosting trade and deepening U.S. companies’ business ties on the continent. Yet he often spoke of U.S. Africa policy in a dismissive, even racist way, perhaps most famously when he disparaged what he called “shithole countries” in Africa—all while never once stepping foot on the continent.
Further complicating matters is the fact that Trump consistently framed U.S. Africa policy in the context of the wider U.S.-China contest, frustrating African leaders who have grown tired of being treated as an afterthought in U.S. policy circles or, alternatively, seen solely as pawns in geopolitics.
Trump “very much framed the U.S. interest in Africa as a competition with China and, to a lesser degree, Russia,” said Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “The Biden administration has learned not to frame our interest in those terms because they realize that it doesn’t get us very far with African governments.”
U.S. engagement in Africa was mentioned in Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s 900-page conservative policy playbook that has deep links to Team Trump—even though Trump himself sought to distance himself from it on the campaign trail. Yet many of the foreign-policy interests outlined in Project 2025—including the continent’s growing population size, ample supplies of critical minerals, and vicinity to key shipping routes, as well as countering terrorism there—resemble the Biden administration’s priorities, as Hudson noted in a CSIS report. Project 2025 also stressed the importance of countering “malign Chinese activity on the continent” through public diplomacy.
One of the big questions going forward, Hudson said, is whether Trump will be able to stay on message and resist making the kinds of derogatory remarks about Africa that he did during his first term, which heightened tensions and impeded diplomacy. “Will he be able to refrain from those kinds of flip remarks that he’s frankly known for?” Hudson said. That’s a “big kind of wild card.”—Christina Lu
Trucks loaded with copper prepare to leave Tenke Fungurume Mine, one of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the world, in the southeastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 17, 2023.
Trucks loaded with copper prepare to leave Tenke Fungurume Mine, one of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the world, in the southeastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 17, 2023.
The move comes straight out of China’s Belt-and-Road playbook.
Immigration
Donald Trump stands behind a lectern wi the words "The Southern Border" on it. Behind him are four other men and a woman in a red dress. Fencing is seen on either side with mountains in the background.
Trump speaks about immigration and border security in Montezuma Pass, Arizona, on Aug. 22. Olivier Touron/AFP via Getty Images
Trump’s first term was marked by a hard-line immigration agenda that included his highly controversial family separation policy and travel ban on people from certain Muslim-majority countries. This time around, Trump has promised a more dramatic overhaul of U.S. immigration policy, vowing to carry out the “largest deportation operation in American history.”
The president-elect’s advisors have laid out a plan that would see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement conduct sweeping workplace raids and arrests in order to deport millions of undocumented immigrants every year. The administration would build “vast holding facilities,” likely in Texas near the U.S. southern border, in order to detain the immense number of immigrants expected to be awaiting deportation, according to Stephen Miller, Trump’s former immigration czar and current advisor. Trump also envisions halting the U.S. refugee program and reinstating some of the more contentious policies from his first presidential term, such as implementing another variation of the Muslim travel ban.
The implementation of those plans is estimated to cost upwards of billions of dollars; the American Immigration Council, a nonprofit advocacy group, put the total sum at $88 billion per year over more than a decade. Beyond those upfront costs—and the massive human toll of such a policy—economists have warned that conducting mass deportations on the scale that Trump has proposed would deal a painful blow to the U.S. economy.
An analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that Trump’s proposed mass deportations—which would target a key labor force that is difficult to replace—would drive up inflation, lower the U.S. GDP, and reduce employment. The report noted that agriculture would be the hardest-hit sector.
Trump’s proposed overhaul won’t be easy to implement, as it will likely face political, legal, and logistical obstacles, said Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, a policy expert at the Migration Policy Institute. “Domestically, it will be very difficult for the Trump administration to receive the congressional support needed to actually conduct mass deportations,” he said. “Logistically, it is difficult to try to identify migrants, detain them for long periods of time without violating the current U.S. law, and then return them to a country that they may have not been to for a while.”
Yet Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric and pledges are set to instill considerable fear among immigrant communities. “Whether they’re practical or implementable or not, these policy consequences will have real effects on people,” Soto said, who said there was a significant “chilling effect” under Trump’s first term.—Christina Lu
An aerial view of a long line of migrants walking through the jungle.
An aerial view of a long line of migrants walking through the jungle.
The Biden administration quietly helped develop a regional strategy to tackle the issue. Can it survive the U.S. election?
India
Donald Trump clasps his hands, Narendra Modi waves, both on stage in front of a large crowd. A U.S. flag and the words Namaste Trump are on a sign behind them. Flowers are banked in front of them.
Trump stands with Modi during the “Namaste Trump” rally on the outskirts of Ahmedabad, India, on Feb. 24, 2020. Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images
The U.S. relationship with India has for decades been touted as bipartisan and almost leader-proof on both sides. Trump’s first term was no exception, at least in terms of optics. Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—who was elected to a third term this year—established a relationship that seemed more personal and political than diplomatic. This was perhaps best exemplified by the “Howdy, Modi” rally that took place in Houston in September 2019 and the “Namaste Trump” rally that occurred in Ahmedabad, India, five months later.
There is thus far no reason to believe the two leaders won’t just pick up where they left off. But Trump’s transactional worldview also caused a degree of friction, with his “America First” doctrine clashing with Modi’s “Make in India” policy. On immigration (the topic closest to Indian hearts as the largest group of applicants by far for U.S. work visas), Trump imposed multiple restrictions on the H-1B visa program that thousands of Indians use to enter the United States every year. While Biden maintained some of those H-1B restrictions early in his administration, he has subsequently eased many of the immigration restrictions Trump put in place. Trump has slammed the H-1B program in the past as unfair to U.S. workers but has thus far not indicated how he would approach it this time around.
Washington and New Delhi are now in a markedly better place, with Biden and Modi having significantly deepened the two countries’ technology, trade, and defense relationship and with a mutual concern around China’s rise driving the two countries even closer together. That dynamic is likely to continue under Trump, with opposition to China boosting U.S. relations with other countries in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region as well. India’s increased purchases of U.S. defense equipment may also get the country into Trump’s good books, but his distaste for multilateralism could hurt groupings such as the Quad.
“I think India is pretty confident that it can deal with either of the administrations,” said Sushant Singh, a lecturer at Yale University and frequent Foreign Policy contributor, speaking shortly before the election—even if a Trump administration “can be highly unpredictable and inconsistent.”—Rishi Iyengar
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with U.S. President Joe Biden during the G-7 summit in Savelletri, Italy.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with U.S. President Joe Biden during the G-7 summit in Savelletri, Italy.
New Delhi’s relations with the West—and especially Washington—are likely to stay the course.
Technology
Donald Trump, seated, points up to Brian Krzanich, standing and holding a circular semiconductor chip. The curtains of the Oval Office frame them and a pile of papers sit on a desk in front of them.
Trump speaks during a meeting with Intel CEO Brian Krzanich, who holds a semiconductor wafer, at the White House in Washington on Feb. 8, 2017.Chris Kleponis/Getty Images
Given technology’s centrality in today’s geopolitics, Trump’s handling of the industry both domestically and from a national security standpoint will have big global ripple effects. His approach on the former is less clear—much of Silicon Valley enthusiastically supported his campaign, including Elon Musk, but Vance has also praised Biden’s Federal Trade Commission chair (and Big Tech’s nemesis), Lina Khan.
On the latter, however, Trump could bring more continuity than people might expect. After all, Biden’s semiconductor export controls were preceded by Trump’s Huawei crackdown, and Trump’s ban on TikTok in his first term was undone only for Biden—spurred on by Congress—to resurrect it. Actually kicking out the Chinese-owned app remains an open question, however, considering it may remain tied up in court for several more months and Trump on the campaign trail expressed a degree of previously unseen ambiguity on following through on a ban.
But in terms of curbing China’s technological rise and bringing tech manufacturing back to U.S. shores, Trump will likely continue what he started and what Biden furthered.—Rishi Iyengar
Sam Altman speaks into a microphone onstage at an event, flanked on either side by a group of five men and one woman in suits. A screen behind him shows the Open AI logo.
Sam Altman speaks into a microphone onstage at an event, flanked on either side by a group of five men and one woman in suits. A screen behind him shows the Open AI logo.
Two new books issue fresh warnings about Silicon Valley ahead of the U.S. election.
This post is part of FP’s live coverage with global updates and analysis throughout the U.S. election. Follow along here.
Foreign Policy · by FP Staff
20. South Korean facilities attacked by Russian hackers over plan to track North’s troops
The all-purpose sword has many uses and much value to the Kim family regime.
South Korean facilities attacked by Russian hackers over plan to track North’s troops
The hackers say its actions were due to Seoul’s plan to send military experts to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops in Russia
Reading Time:
2 minutes
Why you can trust SCMP
SCMP’s Asia desk
Published: 4:55pm, 6 Nov 2024
A Russian hacking group has launched cyberattacks on South Korea’s critical infrastructure in apparent retaliation for Seoul’s proposal to send military officials to Ukraine to track North Korean troops involved in Moscow’s war effort.
Z Pentest claimed it gained access to equipment at a warehouse that stored Ukrainian grains in the city of Naju in South Jeolla province.
The gang shared a video on social media supposedly showing how it breached the granary’s electronic controls for loading grain elevators, saying they “were loaded for a very long time, and then just poured tonnes of grain onto the ground”.
“We left all the equipment turned on at full power,” it said in a post last week.
Z Pentest also targeted a cultivation and irrigation system at an unnamed location in South Korea.
“Our specialist just turned everything off. Let them dry up,” the alleged cyber criminals said on Wednesday.
A TV screen in Seoul showing reportedly North Korean soldiers getting supplies from Russia. Photo: AP
The group said South Korean Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun’s support for dispatching military experts to Ukraine to monitor the actions of North Korean troops prompted it to wage the cyber intrusion.
More than 10,000 North Korean soldiers are in Russia to support its war against Ukraine, Seoul and Ukrainian officials have said.
Ukraine said on Tuesday that its troops engaged North Korean units for the first time in Russia’s Kursk border region, which Kyiv’s forces had occupied.
Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov told South Korea’s public broadcaster KBS that the stand-off was “small” and the number of North Koreans deployed could rise in the coming weeks.
President Volodymyr Zelensky said the first battles with North Korean soldiers have “opened a new chapter of instability in the world”.
South Korea has said it is reviewing whether to send weapons directly to Ukraine in response, a move it has resisted so far due to long-standing domestic policy that prevents it from providing arms into active conflicts.
The ruined Ukrainian town of Vovchansk, Kharkiv, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Photo: AFP
Meanwhile, the South Korean defence ministry’s website encountered service disruptions after it came under a cyberattack on Tuesday.
A ministry official said the portal was back online on Wednesday and an investigation has been initiated to identify the suspects, Yonhap reported.
South Korea’s cybersecurity watchdog on Monday urged local institutions and businesses to boost their data protection readiness to reduce risks following the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.
In February, Microsoft said state-backed hackers from Russia and North Korea have been using the US company’s artificial intelligence tools to strengthen their spying capabilities. The company added it had blocked such groups to prevent them from accessing the technology.
21. How Ukraine Became a World War
Conclusion:
Countless countries have a vested interest in the war in Ukraine, and many of them have the tools to act on that interest. Were Russia to falter in the war and start seeking an exit, countries outside Europe could be vital to the ensuing diplomacy. If negotiations yielded arrangements suitable to Ukraine, to Europe, and to the United States, then it would not particularly matter which country hosted the talks or which plan was their catalyst. As for the military help that China, Iran, and North Korea are lending, there may be ways to limit it on the margins or to raise the costs of providing it. But the best defense against the possible erosion of European security via an advancing Russia is still the intelligent and patient support of Ukraine, especially as the United States’ financial (and possibly military) commitment to Ukraine is likely to diminish in Donald Trump’s second term. The whole world is watching.
How Ukraine Became a World War
New Players Are Transforming the Conflict—and Complicating the Path to Ending It
November 7, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability · November 7, 2024
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was an event of global magnitude. The scale of the invasion, commensurate with its goal of eliminating Ukrainian statehood, was massive. Millions of refugees fled Ukraine into the rest of Europe. Fuel and fertilizer prices shot up, stimulating inflation worldwide. The war disrupted the production and distribution of grain, generating concerns about supply far afield from Russia and Ukraine. And as the conflict stretched into its second and third years, its international repercussions have expanded in scope.
In the war’s early stages, countries outside Europe tried mostly just to manage its effects. For those that chose not to directly back Ukraine—not to provide Kyiv with weapons or to sanction Russia—two priorities predominated. Seeing that there were deals to be made, some countries sought to benefit from Russia’s loss of European and U.S. markets for gas, oil, and other commodities. Others offered themselves as mediators in the sincere (or insincere) hope of minimizing the war’s direct and ancillary costs or even of ending it altogether. Their diplomacy was motivated in part by the prestige that comes from adjudicating a large-scale conflict.
As the war drags on, however, non-European countries are becoming more and more involved. Some are giving Russia the means to prolong the war—men and munitions. By using Ukraine as a testing ground, they hope that they will be better prepared for wars they themselves may fight in the future. North Korea’s decision to deploy thousands of troops to help Russia reclaim the embattled Kursk region is just the latest example. Other non-Western states are trying to shape the course of the war or positioning themselves to be present at the creation of a postwar Europe—that is, to be at the table for the negotiations that will end the conflict, however distant that prospect may be. Amid this terrible war, non-European states are turning Europe into an object of their foreign policy. Many commentators have said that the precedent set by a Russian victory in Ukraine—a nuclear power seizing another country’s territory at will—would transform the global order. The deep involvement of powers outside Europe adds another layer to the war’s transformative potential. Europe, having projected its power outward for centuries, is becoming a theater for the projection of non-European power. Brussels, Kyiv, and Washington will have to come to terms with this new reality.
PEACE LOVERS
Non-Western countries have noted the limits of Western policy on Ukraine. The West’s diplomatic activity, although intense, has been confined to supporting Ukraine against what Western capitals consider an unjust invasion. They have tried to persuade any country that will listen about the righteousness of the Ukrainian war effort, the inadmissibility of conceding to Russian demands, and the importance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet Ukraine and the West have not brought Russia to heel, and the West’s backing of Ukraine has clearly plateaued since the war’s start. Fears of escalation constrain the kinds of weapons that Western states give to Ukraine, as well as the terms of those weapons’ use. Western countries are also unwilling to compensate for acute troop shortages in Ukraine by sending in their own soldiers, even though they characterize the war as existential to the European security order.
The obvious limits of Western policy and leverage have opened the door to actors outside Europe. Diplomatically, they have the opposite problem that the West does. Any country that is neither behind Ukraine nor sanctioning Moscow can approach Russian President Vladimir Putin with diplomatic schemes for ending the war. But if it adopts a neutral or pro-Russian attitude, it will struggle to get Ukraine on board. Whether pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian or somewhere in between, no force—no country, group of countries, or international institution—is powerful enough to impose a cease-fire in Ukraine, much less an armistice or a negotiated settlement. Yet no one wants to be seen as not trying to mediate.
Despite the obstacles, many countries have committed to mediator roles. Turkey offered its services on a variety of issues at the start of the war, lobbying for humanitarian corridors during the Russian siege of Mariupol, helping negotiate the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and facilitating exchanges on the security of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Turkey also hosted peace talks between Russia and Ukraine early in the war. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have assisted with prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine; Abu Dhabi recently claimed that its efforts allowed 2,200 prisoners to return home. The Saudi government convened some 40 countries (not including Russia) in Jeddah in August 2023 to discuss principles for ending the war. More recently, Qatar hosted renewed talks between Russia and Ukraine about halting strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure. Many more non-European countries, from China to Brazil to a delegation of African states, have put together peace missions or plans. This frenetic form of diplomacy is notable not only for its lack of progress so far and for its piecemeal and fragmentary nature but also for its considerable scale and scope.
These peace plans can be taken at face value, as the countries that advance them may genuinely want to help secure peace. The war in Ukraine has generated instability and exacted economic costs outside Europe, and to be at the negotiating table is to determine the postwar economic and geopolitical landscape. That was the lesson of the conferences at Versailles, Yalta, and Potsdam after the two world wars: to the negotiator go the spoils. The configuration of postwar Ukraine truly matters to China and Turkey, less so perhaps to Brazil and South Africa.
But the peace plans can also be interpreted as a stimulus to the Russian war effort. They are easy to propose and nearly impossible to implement. While paying lip service to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, these countries offer no viable path for Kyiv. The predictably tepid response to their plans in Ukraine and the West also fits into narratives of Western intransigence, a key Russian talking point, as if the West that (allegedly) caused the war in the first place is prolonging and exploiting it to weaken Russia.
MANPOWER AND MUNITIONS
If international diplomacy related to Ukraine has been both aspirational and ephemeral, assistance to the Russian defense enterprise has been all too tangible. Western sanctions have not been geared toward regime change or even toward altering Russia’s calculus on the war, welcome as the latter would be. The point of Western sanctions has been to grind down the Russian war effort, to starve it of capital and technology and thereby give Ukraine a long-term structural advantage in the war. Out of economic self-interest, non-European countries have undercut this approach by maintaining ties with Russia; by purchasing Russian oil, gas, and fertilizer; and by facilitating its “roundabout” trade. Throwing lifelines to Russia’s economy enhances its military machine, even though bolstering Russia’s defense industry may not be Brazil’s, India’s, or Saudi Arabia’s primary objective when conducting business with the Kremlin. If these countries’ priority had been that Russia lose in Ukraine, however, they would have adopted a different set of economic policies.
Most consequential are the countries directly assisting the Russian military. China has provided dual-use goods, from machine tools to microchips, that are highly coveted by Russian arms manufacturers. Its control over the supplies of these products gives Beijing significant leverage in Russia’s war. Western officials have also accused China of aiding the Russian military more fundamentally—by supplying it with attack drones, for instance. Iran’s support of Russia has been versatile, with Tehran providing combat drones (and related production technology), ammunition, and short-range ballistic missiles. Iran is building up its defense relationship with Russia even as its escalating conflict with Israel may temporarily curtail its weapons shipments. Although Iranian missiles have yet to enter the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia has been deploying North Korean missiles since the beginning of this year. By some estimates, Pyongyang has also supplied half the shells Russia is using in Ukraine. Ridiculed in the early phase of the war as fellow “pariahs” that Russia had resorted to working with, Iran and North Korea are now actively shaping the conflict’s trajectory.
Given the importance of manpower in a war of attrition, the first battlefield employment of thousands of North Korean troops recently deployed to Russia marks another escalation in non-European involvement. Although Russia has manpower advantages over Ukraine, it has lost an enormous number of soldiers in the war. Putin is reluctant to order another large-scale mobilization that might sour Russians on the war. Over the past two years, there have been episodic reports of Cuban, Indian, and Nepalese soldiers and volunteers lured to fight for Russia. But the North Korean deployments are of an altogether different magnitude, and the West has few tools to change North Korea’s calculus, as the country is already isolated and heavily sanctioned.
Europe’s war is slowly becoming the world’s war, an expansion that is not to Europe’s advantage. For China, Iran, and North Korea, deeper involvement in Ukraine might help prepare them for the wars they could fight in the future. At issue is not just Russia’s tangible contributions to these countries’ defense capacities to pay them back for the support Moscow has received; there is also the question of what they will learn from the battlefield. Chinese strategists are said to have been studying the performance of capabilities used in Ukraine—such as drones and HIMARS—that they might encounter in a war over Taiwan. Iran has obtained Western technology captured in Ukraine, including antitank and antiaircraft missiles, that it can study for reverse engineering or for developing countermeasures. North Korea may have decided to send troops to Russia not just to honor the two countries’ new defense treaty but also to afford the North Korean military firsthand combat experience. (North Korea has not fought a war since the 1950–53 Korean War.) Ukraine has become a laboratory for non-European powers contemplating future wars.
THE WORLD COMES TO EUROPE
Since the sixteenth century, if not earlier, Europe has been waging war beyond its continental borders. In just the past few decades, European countries fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Until recently, France had a pronounced military presence in the Sahel. Europe is a military factor, although a modest one, in the Indo-Pacific, and European countries provide substantial military aid to Israel, which is fighting multiple wars in the Middle East. For U.S. and European architects of the post–World War II transatlantic relationship, the use of European power beyond Europe was not anomalous. It was a Cold War necessity. European forces joined American ones in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Even the NATO alliance, tasked with defending its member states, has operated outside its members’ borders, most recently in Libya in 2011. The United States has welcomed an expeditionary Europe, whether the challenge has been counterterrorism or managing the revisionist activities of China or Russia.
Europe’s long history of power projection has conditioned worldviews in Western capitals, making it nearly impossible to imagine that countries such as Iran or North Korea could be determinants of European security. But what was once hard to fathom is now an obvious reality. If the United States and Europe are to counter the various interventions in Ukraine originating outside the continent, they must understand what local and national agendas each effort serves, what its potential impact may be, and where its vulnerabilities lie. The role of non-European countries in the war will only grow, and these states will not be absent from the diplomacy that concludes the war. Many of them will also jump into the reconstruction of Ukraine. The opportunity to gain a foothold in Europe will be too good (and too low cost) to pass up.
Non-European involvement in the war does not promise a Ukrainian defeat. Nor is it an unequivocal boon to Russia. Forced to turn to partners to try to sustain its progress on the battlefield, Russia must now balance a kaleidoscopic array of economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. And the motivations and interests of the countries contributing to Russia’s military capacity vary widely. Some may genuinely want the war to be over; some want Russia to win. Some want Russia not to fail—a nuanced but important difference—and some simply want to exploit Russia’s reliance on their money and materiel. Countries such as Iran and North Korea share Russia’s virulent anti-Westernism. Others, such as Brazil and India, work with Russia as members of BRICS but want to reform rather than renounce the existing global order. These disparities in attitude will intensify as the war gets closer to an end and as Ukraine’s postwar status comes into sharper focus.
Countless countries have a vested interest in the war in Ukraine, and many of them have the tools to act on that interest. Were Russia to falter in the war and start seeking an exit, countries outside Europe could be vital to the ensuing diplomacy. If negotiations yielded arrangements suitable to Ukraine, to Europe, and to the United States, then it would not particularly matter which country hosted the talks or which plan was their catalyst. As for the military help that China, Iran, and North Korea are lending, there may be ways to limit it on the margins or to raise the costs of providing it. But the best defense against the possible erosion of European security via an advancing Russia is still the intelligent and patient support of Ukraine, especially as the United States’ financial (and possibly military) commitment to Ukraine is likely to diminish in Donald Trump’s second term. The whole world is watching.
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MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and Richard C. Holbrooke Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin. He is the author of Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability.
- HANNA NOTTE is Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Nonresident Senior Associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Foreign Affairs · by Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability · November 7, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
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