Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Expose yourself to your deepest fear; after that, fear has no power, and the fear of freedom shrinks and vanishes. You are free."

– Jim Morrison

"Nothing is more despicable than respect based on fear."

– Albert Camus

"I tell people, make a list of 10 things you hate and tear them down in a short story or poem. Make a list of 10 things you love and celebrate them. When I wrote Fahrenheit 451 I hated book burners and I loved libraries. So there you are."

– Ray Bradbury

1. Russian Forces in Ukraine Near First Major Conquest in More Than Two Years

2. How the Lowly Soybean Got Trapped in the Crossfire of the U.S.-China Trade Wars

3. Autonomous Systems: Learning the Right Lessons from Ukraine for Down Under

4. Poland to Train 400,000 Citizens in “Largest Military Readiness Drive” Since WWII

5. New Aircraft Carrier Advances China’s Naval Power

6. Opinion | Hitting Putin Where It Hurts

7. Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela

8. Senate Republicans Reject Measure to Block Military Action in Venezuela

9. U.S. Military Draws Up Nigeria Plans, With Limited Options to Quell Violence

10. Commentary: How long can China play its rare earths trump card against the US?

11. Codifying Convergence: Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities for Operational Control Over Adversary Decision-Making

12. More Than Just the Tigers: How America and its Chinese Partners Dominated the Skies Over WWII Asia

13. Pentagon policy shop shifts story on pause in Ukraine aid again

14. A list of US military strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels

15. Thinking First, Adapting Fast: Debating the Marine Corps’ Need for the Information Group

16. Culture on the Front Line: Building Indo-Pacific Resilience through Cultural Property Protection Training

17. Inside the clever marketing overhaul that turned the US Army into a recruitment powerhouse

18. Not a tactical ploy, Trump’s G2 framework represents a fundamental shift in US perception towards China

19. Pentagon’s ‘One Boss’ Fix: The Acquisition Shake-Up America Actually Needs

20. 6 Most Successful Insurgencies in Military History

21. Douglas Kelley, The U.S. Army Psychiatrist Who Took His Own Life After Interviewing Nazis At Nuremberg

1. Russian Forces in Ukraine Near First Major Conquest in More Than Two Years

Summary:

Russia is close to capturing Pokrovsk, its biggest gain in over two years, amid a grinding attritional struggle. Russian forces outnumber Ukrainians in the city and dominate the skies with drones and glide bombs, cutting supply routes and forcing troops to move on foot. Ukraine debates whether to hold or withdraw to avoid unsustainable losses; casualty ratios may favor Kyiv tactically but manpower is scarce and units are depleted. Analysts say Pokrovsk may not fall imminently, yet its loss would aid Russia’s push to seize Donetsk and bolster Putin’s narrative to Trump. The battle underscores industrial capacity and mobilization gaps.

Comment: I hope this does not jinx their operations with premature reporting.

Russian Forces in Ukraine Near First Major Conquest in More Than Two Years

WSJ

Russia’s troops have advanced inside the city of Pokrovsk, but the progress has been costly. Ukraine says it is resisting.

By Ian Lovett

Follow and Nikita Nikolaienko

Nov. 6, 2025 8:22 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russian-forces-in-ukraine-near-first-major-conquest-in-more-than-two-years-ee29de51?mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1

Russia is close to capturing Pokrovsk, a city in southeastern Ukraine, which would be its most significant territorial gain in more than two years.
Ukrainian troops in Pokrovsk are outnumbered by Russian forces, and Russian drones dominate the skies.
The conflict around Pokrovsk highlights a strategic battle of attrition, with both sides aiming to deplete the other’s military resources.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Russia is close to capturing Pokrovsk, a city in southeastern Ukraine, which would be its most significant territorial gain in more than two years.

Russia’s army is on the verge of its biggest Ukrainian conquest in more than two years. But the potential prize, a devastated city strewn with corpses, points to what could be a more important battle than the one for territory: Which side will bleed out of military resources first?

As the war approaches a fifth year, Russia is betting that its military machine, fed by its vast industrial capacity and much-larger population, will eventually overwhelm its western neighbor. Ukraine is seeking to deplete those resources and relying on Western allies to keep it funded and armed.

That battle has played out in the past two years around the southeastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, once a mining hub with a population of around 60,000. Russia has thrown infantry into deadly assaults along tree lines and through villages around the city, while Ukraine has used explosive drones to keep them at bay.

Russian troops now outnumber Ukrainian soldiers inside the city, and their drones dominate the skies overhead, according to Ukrainian troops there. Military analysts say it could fall within weeks. The Russian Defense Ministry said Wednesday that its troops were advancing north through the city and clearing out Ukrainian troops that it said were cut off in Pokrovsk and its environs.

For Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals, who deny Ukrainian soldiers are cut off there, the question is how long they keep fighting to hold the city.

Taking Pokrovsk would be Moscow’s most significant territorial gain since its forces seized Bakhmut 2½ years ago. Its capture would bolster the argument Russian President Vladimir Putin is making to President Trump: that Russian victory is inevitable and sending weapons to Kyiv is a waste.

“They don’t have a result they can ‘sell’ to the Americans,” Zelensky told reporters last week.

Russia’s main war aim, to destroy Ukraine as a nation and subjugate it, remains distant. Taking Pokrovsk would advance its immediate aim of seizing all of the eastern Donetsk province, although Ukraine still controls a clutch of large cities further north in the region.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals must decide how long to keep fighting to hold onto Pokrovsk. Ukrainian PreSIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE/Zuma Press

Though Russia retains a manpower advantage, there are indications that its war machine might be starting to sputter. The country’s economic growth has slowed, and several Russian regions have cut signing bonuses for new recruits this year. But Trump hasn’t fully followed through on threats to impose the kind of sanctions that could cripple Russia’s economy and force Putin to negotiate.

At the same time, with a population a fourth the size of Russia’s, Ukraine is facing severe manpower shortages. Zelensky and his generals have faced criticism in the past for waiting too long to withdraw from politically significant positions and expending Ukrainian soldiers’ lives with the delay.

“I hope the tough decisions will be made on time,” said one officer from Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Brigade, which is fighting in the area. “Without sacrificing people for territory.”

As drone technology has advanced over nearly four years of war, territorial progress has become glacial and devastatingly costly. In nearly two years since Moscow’s forces took the smaller eastern city of Avdiivka, they have advanced just 24 miles toward Pokrovsk.

If Ukraine pulls out of Pokrovsk, it will also have to abandon the nearby city of Myrnohrad, which is already at risk of being cut off.

A Ukrainian pilot in Donetsk prepares to launch a bomber drone against Russian forces on the Pokrovsk front line. maria senovilla/epa/shutterstock

Ukrainian drone pilots in Donetsk prepare to launch a nighttime mission on the Pokrovsk front line. maria senovilla/epa/shutterstock

For now, the officer said he believed that fighting in Pokrovsk was still in Ukraine’s favor, with his own brigade killing roughly 50 to 100 Russians a day, and leaving more wounded. Several troops said the casualty ratio could be as high as 10-to-one in Ukraine’s favor.

“In the entire war, I haven’t seen them take such insane losses and still keep pressing,” the officer said.

George Barros, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said Pokrovsk wasn’t likely to fall imminently, based on how long it had taken Russia to seize other urban areas. By continuing to fight there, he said, Ukraine had the chance to bleed the Russians, while suffering far smaller losses itself.

Still, the officer from the 25th brigade and other troops in the area painted a bleak picture of the fighting in Pokrovsk.

Moscow is striking the supply routes into the city with every kind of munition. Burned-out vehicles are visible in videos from the outskirts of Pokrovsk. Soldiers often have to hike more than 10 miles on foot to reach positions inside the city.

“The closer you get to Pokrovsk, the closer you are to losing your vehicle and maybe your men,” said an officer from Ukraine’s 68th Jaeger Brigade, which is also fighting in Pokrovsk.

Russian drones are a constant threat in Pokrovsk. WSJ’s Ian Lovett reported from the city where some residents were determined to remain, in a video published in February. Photo: Serhii Korovayny, Nikita Nikolaienko

Earlier in the war, Ukraine often defended inside cities. In Bakhmut, Kyiv’s forces spent months engaged in brutal, block-to-block combat. But more recently, as drones have taken over as the first line of defense, they have shifted their focus to hitting Russians outside urban areas, where advancing soldiers have far less cover.

Inside Pokrovsk, the streets are nearly empty apart from packs of stray dogs. Massive Russian glide bombs rattle Pokrovsk nearly every hour. Overhead, the whir of drones is constant—as many as 10 Russian craft for every Ukrainian one, according to Ukrainian troops.

“They dominate the skies—the buzz of drones never stops, even for a second,” the officer from the 25th brigade said. “They simply have more resources—people, drones, crews. They try to solve problems with quantity: more bodies or more metal.”

Most of the city itself is a gray zone controlled by neither side. About 250 to 300 Russian soldiers have been able to advance into the city, moving on foot in small groups. Those who survive the trek gather in basements, trying to build up numbers.

The Ukrainians have even fewer men inside Pokrovsk, according to several troops in the area, and many units there are severely understaffed—some at just 20% of full strength.

Taking Pokrovsk would advance Russia’s immediate aim of seizing all of the eastern Donetsk province. Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

A reconnaissance company commander working around Pokrovsk said only five of his 20 men are combat ready—several were killed over the past month and many are in the hospital. “Fighting gets harder over time,” he said. “There’s more and more technology aimed at killing people.”

The officer from the 68th brigade said it was time to withdraw from the city.

“The losses aren’t worth it. They’re just meaningless,” he said. “There’s no situation, even with a large number of reinforcements, that we’d take the city back.”

Earlier this year, Ukrainian forces continued to hold hundreds of square miles in Russia’s Kursk region, even as Moscow began to cut off their logistics. In the end, Ukrainian troops conducted a chaotic retreat, with substantial losses.

Zelensky is sensitive to the criticism that the command is wasting soldiers’ lives.

“One must protect the soldier,” he said at a press conference on Monday. “This is the most important thing.”

Still, the president gave no indication that Ukraine might pull back.

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

WSJ

2. How the Lowly Soybean Got Trapped in the Crossfire of the U.S.-China Trade Wars

Summary:

U.S. soybean farmers remain caught in the middle of U.S.-China trade tensions, as Beijing leveraged Argentina’s tax holiday and Brazil’s growing dominance to reduce reliance on American crops. Despite a new Trump-Xi agreement pledging future Chinese purchases, U.S. farmers face low prices, rising costs, and uncertain market access. China’s agricultural diplomacy with Argentina and Brazil—both beneficiaries of U.S. financial or corporate support—undermines Washington’s leverage and exposes weaknesses in America’s global economic strategy.

Comment: Who would think the soybean is a national security issue? But agricultural dependence on China is a strategic vulnerability. Beijing’s manipulation of commodity markets erodes U.S. economic resilience and influence, highlighting the need for diversified export markets and food-security policy integration into national-security planning. But can we reduce our dependence on China?

How the Lowly Soybean Got Trapped in the Crossfire of the U.S.-China Trade Wars

Farmers from the heartland have come to depend on Chinese consumers for their livelihood, handing Beijing a potent weapon as it negotiates with Trump

WSJ

By Patrick Thomas

Nov. 6, 2025 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/finance/commodities-futures/soybeans-china-trade-war-36f8cd88

After years of getting whipsawed by global politics, Illinois farmer Dean Buchholz thought he had seen it all. But even he was shocked when his soybean crop got caught up in a South American financial crisis.

Just days after the Trump administration pledged a $20 billion loan to backstop the finances of Argentina under libertarian President Javier Milei, China bought billions of dollars worth of soybeans from Argentina. The massive agriculture deal ricocheted through international markets, pressuring U.S. soybean prices and providing a bump to Argentina’s currency.

In the middle of a Chinese trade war with Washington, Beijing and Buenos Aires had teamed up to show that the world could live without American soybeans.

Some U.S. farmers saw this as a betrayal by Argentina. “We paid all our taxpayer money to help out a foreign country,” said Buchholz, and then “they basically cut our throats.”

Last week, President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed to lower trade tensions after meeting in South Korea. Trump said he would cut tariffs on Chinese goods if Beijing curtailed exports of ingredients used to make the powerful opioid fentanyl. China pledged to buy 12 million metric tons of American soybeans during this harvest season and 25 million metric tons a year for the next three years, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

President Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping agreed to lower trade tensions in a meeting last week in South Korea. andrew caballero-reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

“Our great soybean farmers who the Chinese used as political pawns—that’s off the table. They should prosper in the years to come,” Bessent said.

But many American farmers are still feeling like pawns. China’s gambit underscored the dangers of relying on a national superpower that can damage fortunes by turning off the trade spigot.

Terms of the deal haven’t been made public. Based on what has been released, China agreed to buy fewer U.S. soybeans this year than it did last year. Over the past 10 years, the country has imported an average of 29 million metric tons of beans annually from the U.S.

“I think everybody uses us as pawns,” said David Isermann, who farms about 1,000 acres in LaSalle County, Ill. Like many farmers, he is waiting to see whether China actually follows through on its soybean pledge. A large swath of farm country supports President Trump, Isermann said, but “he’s irritated the soybean farmers.”

Prices that farmers are being paid for their soybeans are up since the U.S.-China trade deal announcement. But at Walsh Grain Terminal in northeast North Dakota, the recent per-bushel price under $10 still makes the oilseed a money-loser for most growers.

Marvin Yoder, who farms more than 2,000 acres of corn and soybeans in Jacksonville, Ill., said he drove about 80 miles south to the St. Louis area. The Mississippi River port will buy his beans for about 40 to 45 cents more than the local grain elevator near him.

Yoder said the Trump administration’s trade deal may help farmers’ finances in the short term, but it won’t solve the bigger issue: Brazil. The U.S. farmer once dominated global agriculture exports, but the rest of the world has caught up, he said.

“Brazil keeps expanding every year, they’ve got cheap land and labor,” he said. “They’ve got some sharp farmers down there too.”

Bad timing

The market uncertainty comes at a bad time for American soybean farmers. This year’s crop was projected to be one of the biggest ever, leaving growers with more beans than places to send them.

Their costs are rising, and prices are low. Some farmers who have already sold bushels from this year’s crop are facing financial losses. President Trump has pledged a multibillion-dollar bailout to keep farms afloat.

A combine harvests soybeans at a farm in Harvard, Ill., last month. Christopher Dilts/Bloomberg News

Mike Dahman, who farms about 8,000 acres in Winchester, Ill., said soybeans have been a losing financial proposition this year. Between costs for renting the land and his operating expenses, he estimates that he’ll lose roughly $100 per acre harvested.

Dahman has been storing most of his crop this year instead of trying to sell it. He drove a truckload of his freshly harvested beans last month to a Cargill-owned storage elevator in Florence, Ill., but was turned away while the facility unloaded its crop onto a barge. He sold it to a neighboring elevator instead for a slightly lower price.

“If you’re raising beans, you’re probably going to lose money,” Dahman said.

The China story

China, by far the world’s biggest importer of soybeans, helped turn the oilseed into America’s second most planted crop. The U.S. Soybean Export Council, a trade group, opened a Beijing office in 1982 to spread the word about protein-packed U.S. soybeans used to fatten livestock.

During the 1990s, China’s expanding middle class acquired a preference for pork and poultry, making large quantities of soybeans essential. In response, American farmers shifted millions of acres away from crops such as wheat, especially in the Great Plains.

Roughly half of all American soybeans are exported each year. The rest are processed into oil for cooking and biofuels, such as diesel, and meal for livestock feed. Technological advancements from the world’s largest seed and pesticide companies are expected to help farmers raise more soybeans per acre in the years ahead.

A worker handles soybean meal at a crushing factory in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, China.

Bottles of soybean oil at a crushing factory in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, China. Andrea Verdelli/Bloomberg News

A worker handles soybean meal which will be made into soybean oil at a crushing factory in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, China. Andrea Verdelli/Bloomberg News

An entire logistics chain sprouted around soybeans and to support shipments to China—plants that crush and process beans into oil, rail lines and upgrades to West Coast ports. For decades the oilseed has supported the livelihoods of thousands of farmers and rural American economies who had relied on sales to China.

A pivotal change came during Trump’s first term, when he imposed tariffs on China that touched off a broad trade war. This led to a drastic decline in Chinese imports of U.S. soybeans, severely impacting American farmers. To offset these losses, the government provided around $23 billion in compensation to soybean growers in 2018 and 2019.

Exports later rebounded, but China has since spent tens of billions of dollars building up the agriculture supply chain and infrastructure of South America, specifically Brazil, according to industry officials. Cofco, a Chinese state-owned agricultural giant, is developing a massive port terminal on Brazil’s coast for soy and corn exports.

Brazil overtook the U.S. as the world’s top soybean exporter over a decade ago, helped by an influx of investment and lots of arable land. Last year, the country accounted for 70% of China’s soy imports, double the share from 15 years ago.

Brazil’s been criticized by leaders and NGO groups for tearing down the Amazon rainforest for agriculture production. At a conference earlier this year, Deputy U.S. Agriculture Secretary Stephen Vaden said Brazil’s deforestation was an unfair trade practice that gives it an edge over U.S. farmers.

A soybean processing and crushing facility in Rosario, Argentina. Sebastian Lopez Brach/Bloomberg News

Trump ratcheted up trade tensions with China after returning to the presidency. Administration officials believed that China needed U.S. beans and tough talk emerged as a tit-for-tat battle on trade barriers ensued between the countries. China didn’t stand idle.

Argentina in September dropped its 26% export tax on agriculture exports until sales reached $7 billion. Days later, it sold most of that amount to China, including dozens of cargoes of soybeans.

Argentine officials saw the export-tax holiday as a way to bolster the country’s sagging peso, according to a social-media post by the then-presidential spokesman. But coming as it did in the middle of a $20 billion financial rescue engineered by the Treasury Department, many in the U.S. farming community felt stabbed in the back.

Treasury Secretary Bessent was sitting in the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September when he read a text message from a displeased colleague. “Soy prices are dropping further because of it,” wrote Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins, adding, “This gives China more leverage on us.”

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent checks a text message about Argentina’s sale of soybeans to China. during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly. AP

American agricultural trading outfits such as Cargill—the country’s largest private company by sales—and Archer Daniels Midland were the ones carrying the Argentine beans overseas to China. It’s part of the way that traders make money from activities outside the U.S., even as American soybean farmers are getting crushed by a narrowing export funnel.

Countries like Brazil are slated to help expand production of agricultural commodities to feed a growing global population, said Brian Sikes, Chief Executive of Cargill, which buys, sells and processes crops around the world.

“We see South America as an investment, for sure,” Sikes said, adding that the company’s most significant investments during the past three years are the U.S. and Brazil. In Brazil, Minnesota-based Cargill has invested roughly $1.5 billion over the past five years, including in soybean crushing and processing facilities.

Uncertain future

Trade groups representing U.S. farmers cheered Trump’s trade deal with China.

“Expanding markets and restoring purchases by China will provide some certainty for farmers who are struggling just to hold on,” said American Farm Bureau Federation President Zippy Duvall.

Still, farmers and industry analysts caution that tensions between China and the U.S. could deteriorate, putting soybean growers back in a bind.

“There’s a cautious sense of optimism,” said Arlan Suderman, chief commodities economist at market research firm StoneX. “But also a knowing reality that the two countries are far from settling all of their differences, leaving us vulnerable to re-escalation at any point that could unravel these agreements.”

Archer Daniels Midland Chief Executive Juan Luciano said this week that the timing of any benefits from President Trump’s recent trade deal with China remains uncertain.

“We really need this clarity on the trade deal,” Luciano said. “On the surface, it is possible, it is positive for ADM and for grain in general [but] we haven’t seen yet a joint document highlighting the details.”

U.S. soybean farmers are making some progress finding other markets.

Between September and early October, soybean export volumes, excluding China, were up about 45% from the same time last year, said Jim Sutter, who runs the U.S. Soybean Export Council.

Animal feed processors and food companies in Thailand, which consistently buys from Brazil, have picked up their U.S. soy purchases. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and European countries are also increasing their purchases. North African countries like Egypt and Morocco present growth opportunities, Sutter said.

Still, it doesn’t completely offset China. The country’s large purchases of beans each week during the U.S. harvest season provide certainty for farmers. Purchases from other nations are more variable, which increases storage costs for farmers and creates a more unpredictable market.

Greg Amundson on his farm in North Dakota. Greg Amundson

Greg Amundson, who farms on about 3,000 acres in northeastern North Dakota, said in a normal year all of his soybeans would go to China.

This year, he’s trucking them to a soybean crushing plant—where the beans are ground into oil and meal for livestock feed—but has been frustrated by the prices being lower than he’d prefer. Those cents per bushel can make all the difference between turning a profit and losing money this year.

Signs of trouble emerged in the farm economy before Trump took office. A glut of corn and soybeans after several years of bumper crops has depressed prices. Amundson’s fertilizer costs are about $100 a bag higher than last year. Seed costs are also up about 10% to 20%.

Amundson said the trade deal with China should add some stability to the market. Despite that, there’s still an oversupply of soybeans globally, where prices are still not high enough to make up for rising farmer costs.

“Short term this doesn’t do a lot,” he said. “There are just too damn many beans in the world, that’s why prices are so low.”

WSJ

3. Autonomous Systems: Learning the Right Lessons from Ukraine for Down Under

Summary:

In his testimony before the Australian parliament, MG Ryan highlighted that autonomous systems extend, not replace, human capacity, and their effectiveness depends on integration with electronic warfare, training, and rapid adaptation. Ukraine’s “drone saturation” model shows both opportunities and limits. Russia now leads in innovation and standardization. Ryan urged Australia to balance exquisite and cheap drones, foreign and domestic production, long- and short-range systems, and crewed and uncrewed forces. The ADF must expand drone units and industrial capacity to prepare for Pacific conflicts where China may dominate uncrewed innovation and production.

Excerpts (5 recommendations):

Recommendation 1: Ensure we translate the right lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific theatre.

Recommendation 2: Balance small numbers of exquisite and expensive drones with larger numbers of cheap, attritable drones.

Recommendation 3: Balance imported and indigenous drones.

Recommendation 4: Balance long range and short-range drones.

Recommendation 5: Balance crewed and uncrewed systems.

Comment: An Australian view. Common sense recommendations. To not follow these would be foolish. Other than the right lessons the recommendations are focused on manufacturing, acquisition, procurement. technology. But the bulk of his article prior to the recommendations provides significant content that can influence doctrine and tactics which cannot be overlooked as we produce and procure systems in ever increasing numbers. Innovation must be correctly balanced between technology and systems and concepts of employment and doctrine.

Autonomous Systems: Learning the Right Lessons from Ukraine for Down Under

My testimony about the lessons of Ukraine and the future of autonomous systems in war for an Australian parliamentary committee hearing this week.

Mick Ryan

Nov 06, 2025

substack.com · Mick Ryan

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/autonomous-systems-learning-the-right?i=

Image: @DefenceU

Our experience will be invaluable for the entire rational world, because any country could face a similar scenario. I don’t know of a single NATO country capable of defending its cities if faced with 200-300 Shaheds every day, seven days a week. Robert ‘Madyar’ Brovdi, July 2025.

On 4 November 2025, I appeared as an expert before Australia’s federal parliament Defence subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. I testified about autonomous systems, AI and defence partnerships and their implications for Australia’s defence and national security.

In my testimony, I covered two crucial issues.

First, what are the trends in drone operations during the war in Ukraine that we must understand and learn from in the Australian Defence Force (and other military forces). And, second, what might we do now to adapt the force structure, warfighting concepts, training and procurement systems to ensure that our military remains at the leading edge of 21st century capability.

Below is not a transcript of my testimony. The sections below however do cover the key concepts and ideas that I explained to the Defence subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade.

Image: @DefenceU

Key Contemporary Trends in War and Autonomous Systems

Ukraine now a saturated drone operating environment. Now, within 15km of the front line, vehicle movement is difficult to impossible. Infantry soldiers must march to their positions for 10-15km. Where armoured vehicles and artillery are deployed, these can be subject to dozens of attacks per platform per day. Ukraine has invested in decoys and deception activities, and every HQ is now buried deep underground to avoid detection and destruction by Russian drones.

There is a question however is whether this saturated environment, which has built in scale and intensity over the last three and a half years, is possible elsewhere like the non-contiguous Pacific theatre? It is not the same in the Middle East for example. And, if drone saturation is possible elsewhere, how quickly might combatants build the kind of density of autonomous systems we are seeing in Ukraine?

Drone don’t replace, but extend, human and conventional military capacity. Ukraine brigades use artillery and drones collaboratively. And for every drone battalion, brigades have 3-5 infantry battalions. Thus, despite a saturated drone environment, infantry troops remain more important than ever to hold ground.

EW and drones are a co-evolutionary system. One cannot be considered without the other in modern war. Both drone operations and EW operations must be integrated and have common learning and adaptation systems. Believing that a military can do one without the other is a false premise.

Drones and counter-drones operations may achieve parity. Counter-drone technologies are improving rapidly. We might ponder whether drones and counter-drone systems will achieve parity in many circumstances in future conflicts. Drones may not be as decisive in future as they were 2022-2024. But they still remain an essential component in combined arms and joint warfare.

Drones are an air, land and sea system. While the initial stages of this war saw drones primarily used in the aerial domain, since 2022 there has been proliferation of drones in the maritime and ground environments. These are becoming as integral to land and naval forces as their aerial counterparts have since 2022. As such, drone operations apply to all services in all domains. While different ratios of crewed to uncrewed systems will be required in different domains, and for different mission sets, drones are here to say in all then physical warfighting domains.

Multi-domain drone operations is now manifesting as next gen robotic warfare. is seeing drones carry drones, and drones attack drones. This has become apparent in the past year or so, as drones are employed to carry smaller drones to their operating areas. Interceptor drones are now widespread in counter-shaped operations, and UAVs are often used to destroy Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) on the frontline. The use of drone motherships, in all domains, and drone-on-drone combat is a growing trend.

Training is vital to drone effectiveness. Ukraine has found that well trained operators have a better success rate at completing the missions assigned to them. But this training is not just about drone operations. Drone armourers and maintenance personnel must be trained. So too is training required for tactical planners in the integration of drones into combined arms activities.

Training and leadership development culture must evolve. The proliferation of AI in robotics means our entire training and leadership culture must evolve from one of using machines to one of partnering with them. Since the dawn on human conflict, humans have used tools and machines to aid them in their competition with, and destruction of, enemy forces. For the first time, drones and other tools of war now include a form of very basic non-human sentience. These are no longer dumb tools, but potential partners in military operations. As such, how we train military personnel and their leaders will have to change to take this into account.

Drone operations are a critical part of the larger adaptation battle in Ukraine, and the wider global adaptation war. Adaptation in drones is occurring daily and weekly. This involves the evolution of both software and hardware, as well as the development of new systems continuously. In many respects, the pace of the adaptation battle has shifted beyond the comprehension of many military procurement and strategic decision-making capabilities.

Russian innovation in drones probably now just outstrips that of Ukraine. This was the view of frontline combat leaders I spoke with on my recent visit. This has several contributing factors. First, Russia stole a march with fibre-optic controlled drones and continues to lead in their development and employment. These provide a stealthier platform and superior imagery for targeting other drones, artillery, etc. Second, Russia has standardised its drone production around a limited number of models. This has logistics, training and production implications. Finally, the Russian Rubikon units have transformed Russian drone operations and the targeting of Ukraine drone control centres.

There is no reason that China might not steal a similar lead in innovation and production of uncrewed systems in the Pacific theatre in the near future.

Finally, it bears emphasising that drones are NOT a silver bullet in war. In some commentary on the role of drones, there are dogmas developing that are similar to the “bomber will always get through” ideas developed in the 1930s. This fallacy led to untold numbers of deaths and injuries to Allied airmen in the early stages of the Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe during the Second World War.

We must take care to avoid drones (or any other exquisite technology) being the centre of a similar fallacy about the realities of war in the 21st century.

Drones do not replace humans or conventional capacity. However, they do extend and improve human capacity, and are now an essential element - but not the only element - of every modern military warfighting system on land, in the air and at sea.

Australia must move beyond its current approach of using limited numbers of drones for a limited number of missions. Image: Department of Defence

What do we need to do?

The second part of my testimony before the committee was to provide some initial recommendations about how the Australian Department of Defence, and the Australian Defence Force might respond to these insights into the employment of drones and autonomous systems in modern war.

I offered five recommendations:

Recommendation 1: Ensure we translate the right lessons from Ukraine for the Pacific theatre. This will allow for the integration of appropriate drone operating concepts and technologies into all of our warfighting as well as humanitarian assistance concepts. My recent report on this topic, Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theatre, was offered to members of the committee as an example of how to undertake this translation process.

Recommendation 2: Balance small numbers of exquisite and expensive drones with larger numbers of cheap, attritable drones. The current Australian Defence Force focus on exquisite, expensive drones is probably unsustainable. This committee might recommend changed procurement rules for cheaper, bulk drone purchases that can be done annually.

Recommendation 3: Balance imported and indigenous drones. It is very likely in a future war, as happened in World War Two, that Australia might be cut off from key defence suppliers. In order to address this risk, indigenous production is necessary. This committee might recommend policy that ensures 50% of all military and public safety drones are made in Australia to prime Australian industrial development and production of drones.

Recommendation 4: Balance long range and short-range drones. Ukraine has demonstrated that a mix of long and short range drones are necessary. In our region, the balance of long and short range drones may be different because of the vast size of the Pacific theatre, but both remain necessary. Not every problem in the Pacific theatre needs drones will a range of 1000km or more. This committee might recommend this be included in the coming NDS.

Recommendation 5: Balance crewed and uncrewed systems. The Australian Defence Force has very few drone units. More drones are needed in normal units, and more specialised drone units are needed across all elements of the joint force. This committee might recommend that the ADF requires many more drone companies and battalions; army is several drone battalions short. Air Force is multiple drone squadrons short. Navy should have hundreds of surface drones to prevent or at least challenge future Chinese naval circle work around Australia.

You can view my testimony at this link (I start at the 1:09:00 mark).

Futura Doctrina is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

substack.com · Mick Ryan

4. Poland to Train 400,000 Citizens in “Largest Military Readiness Drive” Since WWII

Summary:

Poland launched “wGotowości” (“Ready”), its largest defense-training initiative since WWII, aiming to teach 400,000 citizens basic military, medical, and cyber-resilience skills by 2027. The voluntary program, starting November 2025, involves 130 training centers nationwide. It reflects Poland’s shift toward societal readiness, amid heightened Russian threats and record-high defense spending of 4.8% GDP.

Comment: National resistance and national resilience. What other country comes close to training civilians on this scale (in the free world that is)?

Poland to Train 400,000 Citizens in “Largest Military Readiness Drive” Since WWII

united24media.com · Vlad Litnarovych

https://united24media.com/latest-news/poland-to-train-400000-citizens-in-largest-military-readiness-drive-since-wwii-13178

Poland has announced what officials call the largest national defense training program in its modern history—a sweeping effort to teach up to 400,000 citizens basic military, medical, and cyber-resilience skills by 2027, Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said, according to Polish media TVP Info on November 6.

The new initiative, dubbed “wGotowości” (“Ready”), will open voluntary military and crisis-response courses to anyone willing to participate—from students to retirees. The pilot phase begins this month, with training to be conducted at more than 130 units of the Polish Armed Forces and Territorial Defense Forces.

Participants can choose from modules including basic military instruction, first aid, survival skills, and cybersecurity. Around 20,000 people are expected to complete courses by the end of 2025. Civilian university students who agree to join the reserve will receive monthly stipends of $250.

Category

World

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Sep 20, 2025 15:40

“We live in the most dangerous times since the end of the Second World War,” Kosiniak-Kamysz said during the program’s launch at the Polish General Staff headquarters in Warsaw.

“A war is raging across our border, acts of sabotage occur in the Baltic Sea, and there is constant struggle in cyberspace. All this drove us over the past six months to design a nationwide defense-training project.”

The minister described wGotowości as Poland’s first large-scale attempt to build “societal resilience and readiness for crisis or security threats.” He added, “Security begins with each of us. Every citizen is called to care for our homeland.”

Category

War in Ukraine

Which Country Has the Biggest Army in Europe? Ranking All European Forces by Size

Jun 16, 2025 12:34

Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk said that 32 training centers—mainly from the Territorial Defense Forces—are already ready to host participants.

“We trained the instructors over the last six months, and now, in November and December, we aim to train around 20,000 people. By 2026, we plan for 400,000 citizens to complete the courses,” Tomczyk noted.

Poland has dramatically ramped up defense spending and mobilization since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Warsaw has signed major arms deals with the United States, South Korea, and other partners, and plans to spend 4.8% of its GDP on defense in 2026—the highest proportion among all NATO members. The figure amounts to roughly $54.2 billion.

Category

New Aircraft Carrier Advances China’s Naval Power

WSJ

Leader Xi Jinping marks step in his mission to modernize nation’s military

By Chun Han Wong

Nov. 7, 2025 1:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/new-aircraft-carrier-advances-chinas-naval-power-18d85895?mod=hp_lead_pos8

China's Fujian aircraft carrier last year. Ding Ziyu/Associated Press

China commissioned the Fujian, its third and most advanced aircraft carrier, enhancing its naval power and regional influence.
The Fujian is China’s first carrier with electromagnetic catapults, enabling its aircraft to be deployed with larger payloads.
Despite the Fujian’s commissioning, the U.S. Navy maintains 11 active aircraft carriers, compared to China’s three.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

China commissioned the Fujian, its third and most advanced aircraft carrier, enhancing its naval power and regional influence.

SINGAPORE—China has put its largest and most sophisticated aircraft carrier into active service, boosting Beijing’s quest to create a formidable oceangoing navy that can challenge U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Leader Xi Jinping presided over the commissioning ceremony this week for the Fujian, the country’s third aircraft carrier and the first to be fully designed and built in China.

More than 2,000 personnel attended the ceremony at a naval base in Sanya, on China’s southern island province of Hainan, the official Xinhua News Agency reported on Friday. Xi boarded the warship during the event on Wednesday to speak to its crew and inspect its systems, and activated the carrier’s catapult system as part of a demonstration, Xinhua said.

Named after the coastal province that sits closest to Taiwan, the island democracy that Beijing claims as its territory, the Fujian features electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft, including new early-warning radar planes that China’s other two carriers can’t deploy.

China has the world’s largest navy, with more than 370 surface ships and submarines, according to Pentagon estimates, though the U.S. still operates the most aircraft carriers of any country.

Since taking power in 2012, Xi has directed an ambitious effort to modernize China’s military and turn it into a 21st-century fighting force that can take on Western powers—particularly at sea, where Chinese forces have confronted U.S. counterparts while asserting Beijing’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan and in the South China Sea.

Defense analysts say Beijing is still developing its ability to operate aircraft carriers. The Fujian will contribute to that process as both a combat platform and a test bed for refining Chinese naval tactics and strategy.

Putting the Fujian into service also boosts China’s ability to project power further from its shores, with three carriers that can be rotated to sustain naval operations over greater distances and for longer periods.

Beijing is already “carrying out more complex carrier drills further afield into the Western Pacific,” said Nick Childs, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank. “The new ship’s characteristics will allow it to provide a more rounded capability and operate more effectively in a wider range of scenarios.”

The first aircraft carrier to be fully designed and built in China, the Fujian is about 1,033 feet long and can carry an estimated 40 aircraft, according to the Pentagon. The warship has three electromagnetic catapults and is conventionally powered. Pu Haiyang/Xinhua/ZUMA

The most advanced U.S. carrier, the 1,092-foot USS Gerald R. Ford, can carry more than 75 aircraft, has four electromagnetic catapults and is powered by two nuclear reactors. US Navy/Maxwell Orlosky/Shutterstock

China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is smaller than its U.S. counterparts and can carry 40 fixed-wing aircraft, in addition to helicopters, according to Pentagon estimates. The latest American carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, can deploy more than 75 aircraft. Both carriers feature electromagnetic catapults, while the Ford’s nuclear reactors give it greater operational endurance than the conventionally powered Fujian. Pu Haiyang/Xinhua/ZUMA, US Navy/Maxwell Orlosky/Shutterstock

The Fujian represents a marked upgrade from China’s two other carriers, the first of which was refurbished from a Soviet-made hull bought from Ukraine in 1998. The second, commissioned in 2019, is a design based largely on the first.

These two older carriers lack catapults that are standard on American carriers and instead use “ski jump” ramps to deploy fixed-wing aircraft. This method limits the types of aircraft that a carrier can operate and the payloads that its planes can carry.

With its catapult systems, the Fujian can operate the domestically developed KJ-600 airborne early-warning aircraft—in addition to China’s new J-35 stealth fighter and updated variants of the J-15, the mainstay Chinese naval fighter developed from Russian Sukhoi models.

State media said in September that the Fujian had successfully launched and recovered these three models of aircraft during training voyages. The J-35, J-15 and KJ-600 all appeared on the carrier’s flight deck during Wednesday’s commissioning ceremony, according to Xinhua.

With the Fujian, analysts say, Beijing can now field a carrier with its own capabilities in airborne early-warning radar and electronic warfare, similar to what U.S. carriers have long been able to offer.

The Fujian’s ability to operate more specialized aircraft and conduct flight operations faster will enhance the striking power of a Chinese carrier battle group “when deployed to areas beyond the PRC’s immediate periphery,“ according to a 2024 Pentagon assessment on Chinese military power, which used an abbreviation for the People’s Republic of China.

While the Fujian represents a step up in Chinese naval power, it is conventionally powered and smaller than its nuclear-powered American counterparts. The Pentagon has estimated that the Fujian, which displaces more than 80,000 tons when fully loaded, can deploy up to 40 fixed-wing aircraft alongside a complement of helicopters.

Many Western military analysts consider the Fujian to be less capable than the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, which can carry more aircraft and sail far longer without refueling—though only one U.S. carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, uses electromagnetic catapults, with the others using steam-powered catapults.

The Fujian “has only three instead of four catapults” that U.S. carriers have, said Childs, the IISS analyst. “Its flight deck layout appears to limit its ability to carry simultaneous aircraft launches and recoveries so it probably won’t be able to generate as many aircraft missions over a given period.”

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Washington has 11 aircraft carriers in active service, though one of them is scheduled to be decommissioned next year. The U.S. Navy also operates nine amphibious assault ships that can deploy aircraft.

“China’s got three carriers. We have more,” Rear Adm. Brett Mietus, one of the top U.S. commanders for Guam, said in an interview in September. “And the good news for us is that we’ve been operating them for a long, long time.”

“The ability to be able to operate safely and effectively at a high level of lethality is something we’ve just been doing for a long time, and China’s learning how to do,” Mietus said.

First launched in 2022, the Fujian started conducting sea trials last year to test its systems and operational capabilities. These maneuvers included a recent passage through the strategically important Taiwan Strait as the carrier headed to the South China Sea to carry out what Chinese officials described as “scientific research tests and training missions.”

Some analysts say Beijing appears to have started work on building a fourth aircraft carrier, citing satellite imagery of a major shipyard. The Fujian “will provide lessons for the next Chinese carrier, which is apparently in the early stages of construction, and is expected to be bigger still and possibly also have nuclear propulsion,” Childs said.

Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com

WSJ

6. Opinion | Hitting Putin Where It Hurts

Summary:

The WSJ editorial board argues that Ukraine and its Western supporters should intensify pressure on Putin by targeting Russia’s energy and military-industrial infrastructure, sanctioning oligarchs, and disrupting arms supply lines to inflict economic and political pain. Sustained Western measures, the board contends, are necessary to push Moscow toward negotiation and compromise.

Comment: will Ukraine targeting AND western sanctions and other measures result in an end to Putin's War, either through a negotiated settlement of defeat of Putin? Will these activities create sufficient pressure to cause Putin to at least agree to a cease fire? If he agrees to a cease will it be because he understands his inherent weakness caused by Ukrainian targeting of his key revenue source?

Opinion | Hitting Putin Where It Hurts

WSJ

Ukraine is increasingly striking at energy and arms targets in Russia.

By The Editorial Board

Nov. 5, 2025 5:59 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/ukraine-russia-long-range-missiles-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelensky-d878813c?mod=hp_opin_pos_5

Russian President Vladimir Putin Kristina Kormilitsyna/Zuma Press

Vladimir Putin’s military has long enjoyed a sanctuary in its war on Ukraine, as the West has restrained Kyiv from using donated missiles to strike inside Russia. That taboo is now being lifted, and Ukraine is putting more energy and ammunitions targets at risk inside Russia.

Russian oil exports finance Mr. Putin’s war, and President Volodymyr Zelensky makes a good point when he says Ukrainian strikes on energy targets are “long-range sanctions.” In the last half of October Ukraine carried out 15 strikes on Russian energy facilities in 15 days. This year Ukraine has made nearly 160 successful attacks against Russian energy targets, says Vasyl Malyuk, the head of Ukraine’s Security Service.

The best way to counter Russia’s assault is to deprive Mr. Putin of the means to carry it out. This year Ukraine has conducted “hundreds more” operations against Russia’s military, Mr. Zelensky said Friday. One recent target was the Bryansk Chemical Plant that makes gunpowder, explosives and components for rocket fuel for ammunition and missiles.

That strike included Storm Shadow missiles from Britain, and Ukraine is also increasing its own production of long-range drones and missiles. Western intelligence helps with targeting. But U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles could threaten Russia’s Alabuga factory that produces Shahed drones, as well as missile factories.

The Russians are clearly concerned about Kyiv’s long-range drone missile campaign. Ukrainian intelligence that we recently reviewed included satellite footage showing heavy Russian air defenses around an ammunition depot hundreds of miles from the front. Mr. Malyuk said last week that Ukraine has destroyed about 48% of the Pantsir air-defense systems Russia uses to counter long-range drone strikes. Non-Ukraine sources confirm the increasing pace of strikes inside Russia.

Some in the Trump Administration say Ukraine is losing the war as a way to justify ending U.S. support. But Ukraine isn’t losing, as its strikes inside Russia show. Kyiv is forcing Mr. Putin to make uncomfortable choices about which military and energy targets to protect. That pressure is what’s needed to force the Russian dictator to the negotiating table.

Following Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace, and inspired by the innovation demonstrated on Ukraine’s front lines, European nations are confronting the threat with a ‘Drone Wall,’ drone vs. drone takedowns, and in countries such as Lithuania training children as young as six to pilot drones.

Appeared in the November 6, 2025, print edition as 'Hitting Putin Where It Hurts'.

WSJ

7. Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela

Summary:

Trump administration officials told Congress the U.S. lacks a current legal basis to strike inside Venezuela. In a classified briefing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said existing Justice Department opinions only authorize targeting drug boats, not land operations. While military assets are deployed in the Caribbean, officials claim they support counternarcotics missions, not regime change. The administration is exploring a new legal opinion to expand authority without congressional approval. Lawmakers questioned the legality and intelligence supporting recent lethal strikes on suspected cartel vessels, which have killed at least 67 people since September.

Comment: To regime change or not to regime change, that is the question. But how do you expand legal authority to do this without congressional approval? Why doesn't congress execute its congressional responsibilities to declare war? (rhetorical question).

Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela | CNN Politics

CNN · Natasha Bertrand, Jennifer Hansler, Katie Bo Lillis, Zachary Cohen, Kylie Atwood ·

https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land

People watch the USS Gravely depart the Port of Spain in Trinidad and Tobago on October 30. The warship arrived in Trinidad and Tobago on October 26, for joint exercises near the coast of Venezuela, as the Trump administration ratcheted up pressure on Venezuela.

Martin Bernetti/AFP/Getty Images

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Trump administration officials told lawmakers on Wednesday that the US is not currently planning to launch strikes inside Venezuela and doesn’t have a legal justification that would support attacks against any land targets right now, according to sources familiar with the briefing conducted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and an official from the White House’s Office of Legal Counsel.

Lawmakers were told during the classified session that the opinion produced by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to justify strikes against suspected drug boats, first reported by CNN last month, does not permit strikes inside Venezuela itself or any other territories, four sources said.

The “execute order” that launched the US military campaign against suspected drug boats that began in September also does not extend to land targets, the briefers said, according to the sources.

The existing OLC opinion includes a list of 24 different cartels and criminal organizations based around Latin America it says the administration is authorized to target, according to one of the sources familiar with the document.

But the Trump administration is seeking a separate legal opinion from the Justice Department that would provide a justification for launching strikes against land targets without needing to ask Congress to authorize military force, though no decisions have been made yet to move forward with an attack inside the country, a US official said.

“What is true one day may very well not be the next,” said that US official when discussing the current state of the policy, pointing out that Trump has not decided how he will handle Venezuela.

The massive buildup of military assets in the Caribbean, which will soon include the Ford Carrier Strike Group, has raised questions about whether the US intends to strike inside Venezuela. But the briefers said the military assets are only moving there to support counternarcotic operations and conduct intelligence gathering, two of the sources said.

The administration has to date tried to avoid involving Congress in its military campaign around Latin America. A senior Justice Department official told Congress last week that the US military can continue its lethal strikes on alleged drug traffickers without congressional approval and that the administration is not bound by a decades-old war powers law that would mandate working with lawmakers, CNN has reported.

The US military has carried out 16 known strikes against boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific since September, killing at least 67 people. In several briefings to Congress, including the one on Wednesday, administration officials have acknowledged that they do not necessarily know the individual identities of each person on board a vessel before they attack it.

Strikes are instead conducted based on intelligence that the vessels are linked to a specific cartel or criminal organization, sources said. Administration officials walked through the process they use to identify and target the vessels and discussed the types of intelligence they had connecting the vessels to cartels during Wednesday’s briefing, one of the sources said.

Democratic Sen. Mark Warner, the ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told reporters after the briefing, “I think our intelligence assets are quite good,” explaining that he believes the administration does have “visibility” into the transport of illegal drugs.

But he questioned why the administration had to use lethal force against the boats instead of interdicting them, as the Coast Guard has routinely done in the past, which could produce evidence of the trafficking.

House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking member Rep. Gregory Meeks, however, told CNN after the briefing that he heard “nothing” to convince him of the legality of the strikes. He also said the briefers did not share the evidence that ties the vessels or their passengers to the drug trade.

Administration officials have repeatedly said they have intelligence that ties the vessels to the drug trade, but have offered few details publicly.

“I can assure you that every one of these strikes involves boats and shipments that were tracked from the very beginning,” Rubio said in late October. “From the moment these things were put together, the moment they were coordinated, we know where they’re headed. We know what their drop-off points are; we know what organizations they’re involved in. These things are tracked very carefully.”

“There are hundreds of boats out there every single day, and there are many strikes that we walk away from and that the Department of War walks away from because it doesn’t meet the criteria,” he said in remarks to the press. “This goes through a very rigorous process.”

CNN · Natasha Bertrand, Jennifer Hansler, Katie Bo Lillis, Zachary Cohen, Kylie Atwood ·

8. Senate Republicans Reject Measure to Block Military Action in Venezuela

Summary:

The Senate rejected a war-powers resolution to block unauthorized U.S. military action in Venezuela, 51–49. Republicans largely opposed it; GOP Sens. Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski joined Democrats in support. Backers warned of potential land operations, while opponents argued broad commander-in-chief authority. Since September, at least 15 U.S. strikes on suspected drug boats have killed 60+ people; another killed three Thursday. The Pentagon plans to send a carrier to the Caribbean, signaling possible escalation. Trump now says he isn’t considering strikes inside Venezuela. Lawmakers from both parties demand clearer legal justifications and intelligence, with requested documents still outstanding.

Excerpts:

Trump said last week that he isn’t considering ordering military attacks in Venezuela, though he had suggested earlier in October that he was. The White House said the boat strikes are part of a counternarcotics initiative, but lawmakers and analysts across the aisle say the effort is instead aimed at increasing pressure on Maduro to leave office.

There has been limited public intelligence to justify the strikes. After Republicans initially received a closed-door briefing last week, Democrats protested their lack of access, prompting a second, wider session with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday.

Comment: What is the broad commander in chief authority? To wage wars of choice? What is the national emergency that POTUS must respond to without a declaration of war? Why does the senate want to expand rather than limit presidential war making powers? (rhetorical question). I am surprised to see a national security briefing to only one party or where one party is deliberately excluded. Is that normal? (a question for all the congressional experts out there).

Senate Republicans Reject Measure to Block Military Action in Venezuela

WSJ

Resolution was meant to stop Trump administration from expanding strikes on alleged drug boats in Caribbean to attacking the country directly

By Anvee Bhutani

Updated Nov. 6, 2025 10:56 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/senate-republicans-reject-measure-to-block-military-action-in-venezuela-67c96acc

Sen. Tim Kaine, right, was one of the bill’s sponsors. Jim Lo Scalzo/EPA/Shutterstock

Senate Republicans rejected a measure to block military action in Venezuela without congressional authorization by a 49-51 vote.
Two Republicans joined Democrats in supporting the resolution, while others maintained the president’s full authority as commander in chief.
U.S. military actions targeting alleged drug boats have resulted in over 60 casualties from at least 15 strikes since September 2025.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

Senate Republicans rejected a measure to block military action in Venezuela without congressional authorization by a 49-51 vote.

WASHINGTON—Senate Republicans on Thursday rejected a measure to block military action by the Trump administration in Venezuela without congressional authorization.

The 51-49 vote against the war-powers resolution was largely along party lines, with two Republicans joining all Democrats in supporting the measure.

“Strikes on boats? That is not what this is about,” said Sen. Tim Kaine (D., Va.), one of the sponsors of the War Powers Resolution. “This is about the prospect discussed by the president of a land invasion of a sovereign nation.”

Two Republicans, Sens. Rand Paul (R., Ky.), who was a co-sponsor of the measure, and Lisa Murkowski (R., Alaska) joined Democrats in supporting the resolution.

Republicans maintained that the president should have full authority as commander in chief to authorize any necessary action. “Venezuela, in the hands of Maduro, is an existential threat,” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said, referring to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. “Whatever power that President Trump would like to use to stop that, I think he has the authority.”

The vote came as the U.S. military has been targeting what it calls drug boats in Latin America. Since September, there have been at least 15 strikes resulting in more than 60 deaths.

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Scoops, analysis and insights driving Washington from the WSJ's D.C. bureau.

The latest strike on a vessel allegedly “trafficking narcotics” in the Caribbean was carried out Thursday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in a post on X. Three people were killed.

Thus far, U.S. action has been confined to the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, but the Pentagon recently made plans to send the Navy’s most advanced aircraft carrier to the Caribbean, signaling a possible ground operation.

This is the second war-powers resolution regarding U.S. activities in the Caribbean that has failed to pass in the Senate. The first effort, which was broader in scope, sought to block the administration from attacking the alleged drug boats. Sen. John Fetterman (D., Pa.) voted in favor of Thursday’s resolution, after previously voting with the Republicans to reject the earlier one.

Trump said last week that he isn’t considering ordering military attacks in Venezuela, though he had suggested earlier in October that he was. The White House said the boat strikes are part of a counternarcotics initiative, but lawmakers and analysts across the aisle say the effort is instead aimed at increasing pressure on Maduro to leave office.

There has been limited public intelligence to justify the strikes. After Republicans initially received a closed-door briefing last week, Democrats protested their lack of access, prompting a second, wider session with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday.

Lawmakers left that classified briefing still asking questions. “What we heard isn’t enough. We need a lot more answers,” said Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.).

Sen. James Lankford (R., Okla.) also said he was unsatisfied. “Oh no, we need a lot more information,” he told reporters Wednesday but added that “the president has the authority on it.” He voted against the resolution Thursday.

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s top Republican and Democrat, Roger Wicker (R., Miss.) and Jack Reed (D., R.I.), said last week they have written to the Pentagon twice demanding copies of legal justifications and lists of designated terrorist organizations tied to the strikes on the alleged drug boats. Their requests have remained outstanding for more than a month.

Write to Anvee Bhutani at anvee.bhutani@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 7, 2025, print edition as 'Measure to Block Use Of Force in Venezuela Defeated'.

WSJ

9. U.S. Military Draws Up Nigeria Plans, With Limited Options to Quell Violence

Summary:

Following President Trump’s order to plan intervention in Nigeria, U.S. defense officials drafted limited military options to counter Islamist violence but warned success is unlikely without a major campaign. Plans include joint raids with Nigerian forces, drone strikes on Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa targets, and a possible carrier deployment to the Gulf of Guinea. Officials cautioned that deep-rooted ethnic, religious, and land disputes drive the conflict, complicating intervention. U.S. drone operations are constrained after vacating Niger bases now used by Russia. Analysts say large-scale intervention would risk quagmire, offering “shock and awe” without resolving Nigeria’s complex insurgency.

Comment: Would we be walking into a forever war in Nigeria? What are feasible, acceptable, and suitable (FAS) plans for military operations in Nigeria? What are the military objectives and what is the strategic end state that must be accomplished to support US national security interests?

U.S. Military Draws Up Nigeria Plans, With Limited Options to Quell Violence

NY Times · Helene Cooper · November 5, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/politics/nigeria-us-military.html

American forces are unlikely to be able to end a decades-long insurgency in Africa’s most populous country, despite President Trump’s order, officials said.

Nigerian troops during a training exercise in July in Borno State, in the country’s northeast, which has experienced a surge of attacks.

Reporting from Washington

Nov. 5, 2025

First, the self-evident: Despite President Trump’s order that the Pentagon prepare to intervene militarily in Nigeria to protect Christians from attack by Islamic militants, U.S. forces are unlikely to be able to end a decades-long insurgency that has claimed lives across sectarian lines in Africa’s most populous country, military officials say.

The American military cannot do much to quell the violence unless it is willing to start an Iraq- or Afghanistan-style campaign, the officials said, something that no one appears to be seriously contemplating. But they said there were some steps available to American war planners that could have limited impact on the militants.

The Air Force could conduct airstrikes on the few known compounds in northern Nigeria inhabited by militant groups, officials said. American drones like the MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-1 Predator could attack a few vehicles and even a handful of convoys. And American forces could team up with Nigerian soldiers to raid villages to root out insurgents who have ensconced themselves in rural hamlets in the country’s north.

These were all part of the options that officials with United States Africa Command drew up this week, defense officials say, to forward to the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. They generated the plans after Mr. Trump’s announcement over the weekend threatening military action to stop what he described as attacks on “CHERISHED Christians” but in reality is a campaign of violence and land disputes that have killed thousands of Muslims and Christians alike.

Militant groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province have targeted Christians in Nigeria, along with many Muslims accused of not being devout enough. Any major military operation by the United States would be likely to fail, current and former military officials said.

“It would be a fiasco,” said Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, a retired Army veteran of the war in Iraq and U.S. efforts to counter the insurgency there. The American public had not shown much interest in repeating the Iraq- or Afghanistan-style military campaigns in Nigeria, he noted. Nor had the president, beyond his recent social media posts.

Any potential effort by Mr. Trump to direct the military to target Nigerian insurgents through his preferred method — airstrikes — would be likely to cause shock and awe but not much more, military officials said. General Eaton likened such an effort to “pounding a pillow.”

Current and former military and national security officials, including those with experience fighting Islamic militant groups in West and Central Africa, said Mr. Trump’s latest directive had left them stumped.

“I am hereby instructing our Department of War to prepare for possible action,” Mr. Trump wrote in a social media post on Saturday. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was quick to respond, also on social media. “Yes, Sir,” he wrote.

Mr. Hegseth’s office quickly directed Africa Command to send plans for possible strikes.

International special forces during a training exercise in northern Ghana last year. U.S. military and national security officials, including those with experience fighting militant groups in West and Central Africa, said President Trump’s latest directive had left them stumped.Credit...Francis Kokoroko for The New York Times

Officials at the command, which is based in Stuttgart, Germany, and which like much of the U.S. military apparatus has plans for every conceivable contingency, duly dusted off their options for the Sahel and sent them to Washington. The new AFRICOM commander, Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, has a previously scheduled trip to Nigeria in the next month or so.

Three defense officials said the plans from the command had three options — light, medium and heavy — and were intended to be escalatory.

The light option, the officials said, included what the military called partner-enabled operations. Under that option, the U.S. military and the State Department would support government forces in Nigeria to target Boko Haram and other Islamic insurgents who have attacked, kidnapped and murdered civilians, mostly in northern Nigeria, where sectarian and ethnic violence has raged for almost 20 years. The United States would have to conduct these operations without the expertise of the U.S. Agency for International Development, whose office in Abuja, the capital, officially closed in July, after the Trump administration shuttered the agency.

But that action would come with a host of issues, the thorniest being that the violence in the northern Nigerian Sahel falls along linguistic, cultural and religious lines. Much of it is based on land use and tenure and is fomented in some cases by corruption in the Nigerian government. Farmers and herders in the region have battled one another over land use for decades, and militant Islamic groups have taken advantage of the distrust to push their own agenda.

Boko Haram has attacked, kidnapped and killed both Christians and Muslims. Previous American governments provided Nigeria with intelligence and security to help target the group but balked at selling some weapons because of concerns over human rights abuses by the Nigerian military.

The medium option being put forward by Africa Command, officials said, includes drone strikes on militant camps, bases, convoys and vehicles in northern Nigeria. American Predator and Reaper drones can loiter for hours before striking, and other U.S. intelligence can gather information on specific targets’ pattern of life.

But that option comes with its own issues, not least being that the U.S. military in August vacated its two nearest drone bases, in Agadez and Niamey, both in neighboring Niger. Russian forces now occupy those bases.

Drones launched from Niamey or Agadez could reach Nigeria in an hour, one military official said. But now, the closest known places from which the United States could launch drones are southern Europe and perhaps Djibouti, in East Africa, where the U.S. military has a large base.

U.S. troops at an air base in Agadez, Niger, in 2018. The United States vacated its drone base in the city in August.Credit...Tara Todras-Whitehill for The New York Times

One official suggested that West African countries seeking favor with the Trump administration might allow their territories to be used, but that is less clear. Doing so would also go against the wishes of the Nigerian government, which is hugely influential on the continent, and could open up another set of problems for neighboring countries.

The Nigerian government has said it welcomes U.S. assistance in targeting Islamist insurgents but added the caveat that any action must respect Nigeria’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

The heavy option, military officials said, would be to move an aircraft carrier group into the Gulf of Guinea and to deploy fighters and perhaps long-range bombers to conduct strikes deep in northern Nigeria. But the United States is already in the process of moving one of its aircraft carriers, the Gerald R. Ford, from its deployment in Europe to the southern Caribbean, where Mr. Trump has declared war on drug cartels. Other aircraft carriers are currently deployed in the Pacific or in the Middle East or are undergoing maintenance.

Deploying an American aircraft carrier to the Gulf of Guinea to take on Islamic insurgents in Nigeria was not deemed to be a 2025 national security priority as recently as Friday, several military officials said.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent for The Times. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. Military Drafts Menu of Plans to Curb Islamist Violence in Nigeria

NY Times · Helene Cooper · November 5, 2025

10. Commentary: How long can China play its rare earths trump card against the US?

Summary:

China’s use of rare earth export controls helped secure concessions from the U.S. in a new Trump-Xi trade deal, but the tactic carries long-term risks. Beijing gained tariff relief and pauses on shipping fees and tech restrictions, while Washington won renewed Chinese purchases and a one-year reprieve on rare earths. Yet, overplaying this “rare earths trump card” could accelerate U.S. diversification through new mining deals with Australia, Japan, and others, weakening China’s leverage within five to seven years. Both nations’ “maximum pressure” diplomacy risks mutual escalation, deepening decoupling and instability. China’s short-term success may erode its strategic advantage over time.

Comment: Is this a US achilles heel?

Commentary: How long can China play its rare earths trump card against the US?

Beijing’s playbook of maximum pressure borrows from the Trump administration’s diplomatic style. But if they have similar strengths, they also share flaws, says Kevin Chen from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

channelnewsasia.com

Kevin Chen

07 Nov 2025 06:00AM

(Updated: 07 Nov 2025 08:29AM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/us-china-trade-deal-rare-earths-xi-trump-5450516

SINGAPORE: You don’t have to be an expert in international security to see that China is currently emboldened on the world stage.

And to be fair, it has good reason to be confident, especially after United States President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in South Korea last week and reached a trade deal.

Compared to the 2018 trade war during Mr Trump’s first term, Beijing is much better prepared to deal with the US this time. It fortified its economy and identified points it could use for leverage. Instead of skirmishing with tariffs and counter-tariffs, China went for what one scholar called the “nuclear” option.

In the lead-up to the meeting in South Korea, China instituted sweeping export controls over rare earths. And it worked, paving the way for a deal where it gained concessions on key tariffs and export restrictions.

This playbook is strongly influenced by the belief among Chinese leaders that they understand Mr Trump and know how to deal with him. To them, Mr Trump is not a natural China hawk, his policies are not rooted in ideologies beyond a preference for tariffs, and he is open to trading strategic concessions for non-strategic incentives.

Yet, it is also this playbook of maximum pressure that introduces several risks to the US-China relationship. Taken too far, China’s confidence in its rare earths card can lead to miscalculations, which in turn can have grave consequences for regional stability.

THE ART OF THE (CHINESE) DEAL

To be fair, playing the rare earths card didn’t give China a free pass. The deal delivered results for both sides.

China walked away with some tariff relief, along with pauses on two fronts: port fees on Chinese-built, owned and flagged ships, and a Bureau of Industry and Security rule that could have prevented more than 20,000 Chinese companies from buying sensitive American technology. The US received a commitment from China to buy American soybeans and a one-year reprieve on rare earth export controls.

There are also omissions from the deal that would relieve some observers. Taiwan and its supporters are probably glad that US support of the island was not included in the deal. There was no loosening of export controls on Nvidia’s high-end Blackwell chips as US security experts had feared.

However, arguably the most significant thing that Beijing gains from this deal is vindication of its approach. Chinese leaders now have evidence that Mr Trump can back down when threatened with the supply of goods that the US depends on China for, like rare earths. And it could easily go further to weaponise the supply of pharmaceuticals, lithium-ion batteries and mature chips.

With two more meetings between Mr Xi and Mr Trump reportedly in the works for 2026, it is still possible to extend or deepen the ongoing truce. But there are ample opportunities for escalation and a breakdown in ties, too.

SAME APPROACH, SAME WEAKNESS

There is a certain irony that Beijing’s maximum pressure approach borrows from the Trump administration’s own diplomatic style. Yet, utilising this playbook not only shares its strengths, but its weaknesses too.

Notably, just as traditional trade partners of the US are looking to diversify their trade networks to avoid overdependence on Washington, Beijing’s leveraging of its rare earth chokehold will only spur efforts by the US and other countries to diversify away from overdependence on Chinese supply chains, starting with rare earths.

The signing of the US$8.5 billion deal between the US and Australia to expand mining and processing facilities, along with other critical minerals agreements signed with parties such as Japan, Malaysia and Thailand, are signs of this push for diversification.

The standoff over EU-based, Chinese-owned Nexperia showed how countries are concerned about China’s potential weaponisation of supply chains. The Netherlands took control of the chipmaker under national security laws in September and China responded by halting exports from Nexperia factories in China.

FILE - In this July 6, 2010 file photo, workers use machinery to dig at a rare earth mine in Baiyunebo mining district of Baotou in north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. (AP Photo, File)

Granted, countries will not be able to dramatically rewire their rare earth supply chains overnight, with one estimate giving it five to seven years before the investments are translated into functioning projects. Nonetheless, it is important to start building an alternative supply chain now.

In the meantime, the more Beijing uses its rare earth trump card, the less effective it will become in the long term. Yet this realisation may also encourage Chinese leaders to use this point of leverage while they still have it.

NO INCENTIVE TO DE-ESCALATE

In the short term, a related challenge with a maximum pressure approach is that it gives the US few incentives to de-escalate.

While China’s toolkit still retains carrots such as the TikTok sale and more soybean purchases, its response to US actions would likely involve rare earths and other sticks. In doing so, issues with proportionality and credibility could emerge.

Suppose, for example, that Mr Trump goes through with a previously reported package of secondary sanctions against China for its purchases of Russian oil, as part of US efforts to pressure Russia to the negotiating table to end its war with Ukraine. Naturally, China would be expected to retaliate.

But if China immediately reaches for the rare earth card against such a relatively minor issue, the US would be inclined to escalate as well. There is little incentive to keep the standoff contained to a relatively minor issue if China charges in with all guns blazing.

Alternatively, the US may choose to call China’s bluff on rare earths. It could be seen as a mirror image of the expectation that Mr Trump always caves on tariffs; if China wants to re-use its rare earth card in a future dispute, it will need to allow the flow of minerals to resume at some point.

Inherently, sorting out the complex dynamics of the US-China relationship becomes even more challenging if both sides adopt a maximum pressure approach.

It creates a field rife with opportunities for miscalculations, and incentives to escalate instead of de-escalate. It will also hasten the decoupling of the two economies, with both convinced that reliance on the other is an unacceptable vulnerability.

The maximum pressure approach with rare earths worked for Beijing during the Trump-Xi meeting and may still provide some utility in future meetings. But it contains risks that cannot be ignored in the interest of regional stability.

Kevin Chen is an Associate Research Fellow with the US Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He writes a monthly column for CNA, published every first Friday.

Source: CNA/ch

Newsletter

11. Codifying Convergence: Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities for Operational Control Over Adversary Decision-Making

Summary:

Scott Hall argues that modern warfare demands synchronization of Non-Lethal Effects (NLE) and Non-Kinetic Activities (NKA) with traditional maneuver and fires to achieve Information Advantage (IA) and operational control over adversary decision-making. Drawing on U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, he proposes a five-step planning framework, from capability mapping and target analysis to convergence-window design, synchronization with maneuver, and codification in operational plans. Properly integrated, cyber, electronic warfare, psychological, and civil-affairs tools can disrupt enemy cohesion, delay responses, and shape perception before conflict escalates. Codifying NLE/NKA in doctrine and targeting cycles institutionalizes information dominance as essential to 21st-century warfare.

Excerpt:

Conclusion:

The evolving character of warfare demands a planning framework that is anticipatory, integrated, and information-centric. Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities within Multi-Domain Operations is not merely a doctrinal adjustment; it is a strategic imperative. These capabilities provide scalable, reversible options that enable commanders to operate decisively across the competition continuum. As threats grow more hybrid and cognitive, Army planners must lead the Joint Force in codifying and operationalizing these tools, embedding them from concept to execution. Codifying and synchronizing NLE and NKA ensures the Army can dominate the information environment, preserve freedom of maneuver, and win in multi-domain competition and conflict.

Comment: This is the type of work that should be part of an Information Warfare (IWar) branch. But an IWar branch cannot be solely focused on enemy decision making (though that is a critically important line of effort). It must also focus on influencing other target audiences to include the broader and relevant populations.

Codifying Convergence: Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities for Operational Control Over Adversary Decision-Making

by Scott Hall

11.07.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/07/synchronizing-non-lethal-and-non-kinetic-effects-for-operational-control/

Introduction

Commanders are putting soldiers at unnecessary risk, not because they lack firepower, but because they fail to synchronize the effects of information forces with ground maneuver. In today’s multidomain battlespace, failing to integrate information effects can fracture adversary cohesion, delay enemy movements, or erode public support. Modern battlefields are increasingly shaped by information – its use, misuse, and contestation – across all domains. U.S. Army formations, long valued for mobility, firepower, and shock effect, now operate amid pervasive informational, physical, and human dimensions, networks, ubiquitous sensors, and global media. To prevail, maneuver forces must be enhanced by integrating Non-Lethal Effects (NLE) and Non-Kinetic Activities (NKA) into operations. Such integration seeks to “bake in” information advantage rather than sprinkle it on top.

Converging NLE/NKA with maneuver operations creates synergistic effects across domains, allowing commanders to exploit adversary vulnerabilities and establish Information Advantage (IA) at decisive points in time and space. By influencing how adversaries think, decide, and act at every echelon, we can mitigate or deter aggression before it escalates into full-scale war. This requires strategic leaders and operational planners to adopt new doctrines, advanced technologies (such as AI/ML), and innovative targeting processes, including Non-Lethal Critical Vulnerability Analysis (NLCVA), that converge effects across domains. The following analysis combines an accessible strategic narrative with in-depth technical details on integration, providing actionable recommendations for Army leaders to institutionalize these concepts through doctrine, training, and planning.

The Evolving Operational Landscape

The future is now, conflicts are unfolding across all domains—land, air, sea, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum—as outlined in the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. Adversaries like Russia and China already weaponize information through cyberattacks and influence operations to achieve strategic effects below the threshold of war. In April 2024, Israel’s precision strike on Iran marked a turning point in MDO, as Israeli forces synchronized cyber effects, electronic warfare, and psychological operations to disable Iranian anti-access/area denial (A2AD) and paralyze command and control systems, paving the way for airstrikes with minimal resistance.

These NLE and NKA were converged to generate physical outcomes, collapse decision cycles, and achieve surprise. This approach shaped the conditions for Operation Rising Lion in June 2025, which combined kinetic strikes by over 200 aircraft and was accompanied by cyber operations targeting Iran’s financial and communications systems. Israel again achieved information dominance by disrupting perception, deceiving its leadership, and degrading command and control coherence.

U.S. Army doctrine reflects this evolution. ADP 3-13: Information (2023) defines Information Advantage as “a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of situational understanding, decision making, and relevant actor behavior.” To maintain decision superiority, U.S. forces must integrate NLE/NKA into operational planning—protecting friendly information, projecting influence, and contesting the information domain alongside traditional maneuver—to act faster and force the adversary to react.

Selecting and Applying NLE/NKA Capabilities: A Doctrinal Approach

Effective integration of NLE and NKA begins with identifying an adversary’s center of gravity (COG) through an analysis of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities, as outlined in ADP 5-0. This foundational step informs Target Systems Analysis (TSA), which maps systemic dependencies—including Non-Kinetic Vulnerability Characteristics (NKVC), such as leadership cohesion or reliance on unsecured electromagnetic command channels—using Non-Lethal Critical Vulnerability Analysis (NLCVA) to uncover exploitable weaknesses. For instance, if maintaining legitimacy is a COG, NLCVA might reveal vulnerability to information operations that disrupt messaging coherence, providing a non-kinetic avenue for strategic disruption.

Once NKVCs are identified, planners must match available NLE/NKA capabilities using a “menu of options” approach recommended in JP 3-0. This includes cyber operations, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), civil affairs, and electronic warfare—all evaluated against the desired effect, feasibility, and specificity. Planners must define measurable outcomes, such as reduced recruitment or increased dissent, to ensure the effectiveness of their efforts.

Synchronizing all capabilities—whether lethal or non-lethal—through standard targeting boards, execution matrices, and decision support templates is the only way to achieve true multi-domain convergence.

Critically, Army planning doctrine warns against assuming low risk. ADP 5-0 stresses analyzing second- and third-order effects, recognizing that poorly targeted NLE/NKA may escalate conflict or reduce local support. Legal and ethical constraints under the Law of Armed Conflict and national policies require that all actions remain compliant with the law. Moreover, mission command demands decentralized execution within those boundaries. Ultimately, integrating NLE/NKA with kinetic operations in MDO campaigns maximizes synergy and achieves unified operational effects.

This underscores why traditional Air Tasking Order (ATO) structures are ill-suited for synchronizing non-lethal and non-kinetic activities. The ATO was developed to sequence air-delivered fires on predictable 72-hour cycles, optimized for kinetic operations. It struggles to accommodate the flexible delivery, approval chains, and tempo required by many NLE/NKA effects. Consequently, information forces have often been treated as secondary, scheduled around kinetic priorities rather than being fully synchronized with maneuver from the outset.

Recognizing this, the Joint Force has replaced the ATO with the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO), designed to integrate effects across all domains under a unified construct. This evolution compels the Army to modernize its targeting processes. While D3A (Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess) remains foundational for ground targeting, it must now incorporate NLE/NKA as primary operational effects. As one fires battalion commander succinctly put it: “An effect is an effect is an effect—no matter how it’s delivered.” Synchronizing all capabilities—whether lethal or non-lethal—through standard targeting boards, execution matrices, and decision support templates is the only way to achieve true multi-domain convergence and maintain operational control over the adversary’s decision-making.

A Method for Designing Convergence: A Five-Step Approach to Planning and Synchronizing NLE/NKA Effects

In today’s Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), achieving overmatch requires more than physical force—it demands cognitive and informational dominance. This imperative is encapsulated in the Army’s concept of Information Advantage (IA), which asserts that commanders must possess a superior understanding, faster decision-making, and greater influence over the behavior of relevant actors across the competition continuum. Central to achieving IA is the deliberate integration of NLE and NKA into campaign and operational plans.

The following five-step planning framework enables operational planners to move beyond ad hoc inclusion of information-related capabilities. Instead, it offers a doctrinally informed, synchronized approach to operationalizing NLE/NKA as force multipliers alongside fires and maneuver.

At the heart of this approach is the convergence window model, which serves as a planning tool to sequence multiple NLE/NKA effects alongside maneuver and fires. It helps staff visualize lead times, duration, and residual impacts to achieve multi-domain convergence. However, this model is not a rigid template—it is a guide. Commanders must apply judgment and creativity to adapt these concepts to the specific operational environment, recognizing that no diagram alone can guarantee convergence.

Step 1: Build the Menu of Options

NLE/NKA planning begins with building a tailored menu of available capabilities. These include cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, psychological operations (PSYOP), space-based effects, deception, operational security (OPSEC), civil affairs, and public affairs. This inventory should be based on the unit’s echelon, authorities, and current theater posture.

Each capability must be mapped according to its delivery method (such as platform, range, or medium), effect type (including influence, deny, degrade, or deceive), and the approval process and timeline required, whether at the tactical, operational, or national level. This structured menu enables planners to visualize which information forces are available and how they align with mission objectives.

Figure 1. Menu of Non-Lethal Effects/Non-Kinetic Activities (NLE/NKA) Options. This capability and effects matrix serves as a visual planning tool for staff officers and commanders to identify and synchronize the appropriate NLE/NKA assets to support desired end states. Adapted from an original product by LTC Felix F. Figueroa, Director, Joint Information Planners Course, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University (2024).

Step 2: Match Effects to Targets

Once the capability menu is established, the next step is to conduct target-to-effect matching. Identifying exploitable NKVCs through TSA and NLCVA methodology enables planners to pinpoint critical nodes in the adversary’s system-of-systems, particularly those in the cognitive and informational.

Each effect must be mapped to the adversary’s key functions or decision-making processes, the specific domains it influences—whether physical, informational, or human—and its time sensitivity and sequencing requirements. NLE/NKA effects are rarely immediate and often require buildup or repeated exposure. This reinforces the importance of deliberate planning during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and joint targeting cycles.

Figure 2. Staff planners provide recommendations (yellow boxes) and a commander adds additional capability requirements (red boxes) to match effects to targets.

Step 3: Designing the Convergence Window

A convergence window is a deliberately planned point in time and space in which multiple effects—spanning lethal, non-lethal, and non-kinetic domains—are synchronized to generate maximum operational impact. Within MDO, this synchronization is critical for achieving operational control over adversary decision-making by overwhelming the adversary’s capacity to perceive, orient, and respond. Non-lethal effects and non-kinetic activities (NLE/NKA) must not be executed in isolation or added late in planning cycles; instead, they must be fully integrated with maneuver schemes, deception plans, and shaping operations to ensure complementary and reinforcing effects across the competition continuum. This level of integration demands both foresight and precision, especially since many NLE/NKA tools require extended preparation and authorization timelines.

Commanders and staffs must also distinguish between cascading effects, which trigger secondary impacts across domains or echelons (often in unpredictable ways), and compounding effects, where repeated or layered actions build exponentially, much like the snowballing impact of compound interest. Visualizing these dynamics within the convergence design helps avoid timing misalignments and ensures effects are synchronized to influence the adversary precisely when maneuver forces need it most. A well-orchestrated sequence of NLE/NKA can not only force the adversary to react but also create dilemmas that multiply over time, steadily eroding cohesion and initiative.

Figure 3 illustrates how layering NLE and NKA over time creates a cumulative, compounding impact on the adversary, similar to the accelerating growth of compound interest or a snowball gathering mass. Each integrated effect increases cognitive and operational pressure, depicted by the growing snowballs, ultimately forcing adversary decisions within a constrained window. This synchronization ensures that by the time maneuver forces engage, the adversary’s cohesion and ability to respond have already been substantially degraded. Legend: Yellow Box is the NLE/NKA effects convergence window. Green Box is the maneuver forces convergence window.

Effective convergence design depends on several key planning variables. First is lead time—how far in advance an effect must be initiated to achieve desired outcomes. For example, psychological operations aimed at shifting audience sentiment require a longer runway than an electronic warfare action designed to suppress enemy radar. Second is duration—how long the effect must be sustained to influence adversary behavior or systems. Finally, sequencing is essential to determine what supporting actions must occur before, during, or after effect delivery to optimize impact. Together, these elements define not only when and how an effect should be employed, but also the dependencies that govern its tactical and strategic value. Planners must account for these factors early in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) or joint planning cycle to ensure NLE/NKA effects are synchronized with tempo, intent, and objectives.

Figure 4. Visual planning model illustrating phased synchronization of NLE/NKA effects and maneuver convergence windows in multi-domain operations.

Figure 4 illustrates a comprehensive model for orchestrating non-kinetic and maneuver effects. The timeline begins with the Commander’s Decision Point (CDR DP) to initiate NLE/NKA development and extends through sequencing phases that include capability build, testing, positioning, and employment. It delineates six primary planning windows: the NLE/NKA Effect Development Sequence (blue), the Effect Firing Window (yellow), the Effect Time of Flight (orange), the Effect Impact Window (red), the Maneuver Convergence Window (green), and the Lasting Impact Window (dark green). The Lasting Impact Window highlights how some effects continue shaping the battlespace well beyond their initial application, influencing adversary decision-making cycles long after the initial application has occurred.

This window forces planners to look beyond momentary disruption and consider how non-lethal effects can create a persistent operational advantage. To see this in action, refer to Figures 5 and 6, where you can observe the Lasting Impact dotted lines and the orange boxes indicating the estimated effect and conclusion. Specific decision points, resource dependencies, and synchronization requirements define each phase. This visual framework supports operation-specific and targeted products, enabling commanders and staff to align informational and physical effects in a unified scheme of action. Such planning rigor ensures that NLE/NKA are not only integrated doctrinally but operationalized to achieve true cross-domain convergence.

Step 3a: Integrated Effects Timing: Orchestrating NLE/NKA to Enable Operational Control over Adversary Decision-making

Figure 5. Timeline visualization of multiple NLE/NKA effects synchronized across domains to arrive within the planned convergence window, enabling information advantage conditions in support of maneuver.

The deliberate synchronization of multiple non-lethal effects (NLE) and non-kinetic activities (NKA) across diverse domains into a unified convergence window. Each effect, represented along separate planning timelines, requires varying levels of development, posture, and infiltration time. By mapping each capability against a shared zero-hour, planners ensure these effects culminate in the designated convergence window when the commander requires them to shape the battlefield.

This synchronization enables conditions for Information Advantage by degrading, denying, or influencing the adversary’s decision-making processes in time to enable the maneuver element’s success. Figure 5 illustrates how to sequence NLE/NKA efforts, layered in time and domain, to generate cumulative and reinforcing effects that expand the commander’s decision space and set favorable conditions for operational dominance.

Step 4: Synchronize with Maneuver and Fires

In MDO, NLE and NKA must be deliberately synchronized with maneuver and fires to generate complementary and reinforcing effects across domains. They cannot exist as parallel or isolated lines of effort; they must be integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver. Just as fires are plotted on doctrinal overlays, such as the Fire Support Overlay, planners must similarly develop NLE/NKA overlays that depict timing, delivery platforms, intended effects, and the supported maneuver objectives. This integration enables commanders to visualize how information-related capabilities impact tempo, deception, and operational reach across the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.

Figure 6. Synchronization of NLE/NKA effects with maneuver and fires, aligned to the convergence window. Organizations time and layer effects to enable tactical breakthroughs, support deception, and set conditions for operational success.

Synchronization enables tactical formations to use NKA to suppress, isolate, or disorient enemy forces in advance of direct action. For example, cyber or electronic warfare (EW) effects may disrupt enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities before a combined arms breach. At the same time, PSYOP messages and narrative shaping may delay enemy reserve mobilization or fracture unit cohesion at the decisive point. Operational-level deception efforts—including feints, decoys, and information camouflage—can mask the timing and location of the main effort, enabling maneuver to retain the initiative. When these effects are timed precisely within a convergence window, they collectively expand the commander’s decision space while constraining the adversary’s.

The graphic in Figure 6 visualizes this principle by layering synchronized NLE/NKA effects with the maneuver convergence window. Plotted over time, each effect builds, postures, and culminates precisely when needed to enable tactical breakthrough. Visual coordination tools, such as the Combined Information Overlay (CIO), can further enhance this process, allowing planners to represent cyberspace, electromagnetic influence, and deception effects alongside fire and movement graphics. Together, this methodology provides the cognitive and spatial structure necessary for commanders to integrate all warfighting functions, enabling them to achieve Information Advantage and mission success. Staff must visualize not just immediate impacts but how effects compound—layering to overwhelm decision cycles—or cascade, triggering secondary and tertiary consequences beyond the initial plan.

Step 5: Codify in Plans and Authorities

Finally, selected NLE/NKA effects must be codified in Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Operational Plans (OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), as well as in Corps and Division-level supporting plans tied to those higher OPLANs and CONPLANs. This codification must be updated in all supporting documents, including operations, fires, and information operations (IO) annexes, information forces overlays, the menu of available NLE/NKA options, and target synchronization products such as the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). This formal integration ensures effects are not only conceptual but properly resourced, tasked, and positioned within approval chains. Legal and policy reviews, along with mission command requirements, demand that decision points be aligned with effect delivery so commanders can adjust in stride.

Only through this deliberate alignment can maneuver formations execute NLE/NKA with the same rigor, confidence, and predictability as traditional fires.

Codification also addresses the practical reality that many NLE/NKA capabilities require lengthy development timelines or even national-level authorization. By embedding these effects early within OPORDs and annexes, staffs ensure they are fully vetted, approved, and executable when needed, avoiding last-minute delays that could fracture the carefully designed convergence window.

U.S. Army operations plans nest within higher-level strategic guidance, flowing from national strategies through global campaign plans and combatant command directives, down to ASCCs. This nesting underscores the need for NLE/NKA effects to be codified across all echelons to remain synchronized with overarching operational objectives and authorities. Only through this deliberate alignment can maneuver formations execute NLE/NKA with the same rigor, confidence, and predictability as traditional fires. Without this level of formal integration into the joint planning process, information-related effects risk being delayed or overlooked entirely due to complex approval requirements or unclear execution authorities, undermining their intended impact on the operational scheme.

Integration into Joint and Army targeting cycles is also essential, particularly for effects requiring interagency coordination or national-level approval, such as cyber operations, influence activities, or deception plans. Planners must ensure every effect appears in the appropriate fragmentary order (FRAGORD), fire support execution matrix (FSEM), or information overlay to support visualization and execution. Codification represents the final step in the synchronization process, as it transitions concepts into action, authorizing the deliberate employment of information forces alongside maneuver and fire.

Conclusion

The evolving character of warfare demands a planning framework that is anticipatory, integrated, and information-centric. Synchronizing Non-Lethal Effects and Non-Kinetic Activities within Multi-Domain Operations is not merely a doctrinal adjustment; it is a strategic imperative. These capabilities provide scalable, reversible options that enable commanders to operate decisively across the competition continuum. As threats grow more hybrid and cognitive, Army planners must lead the Joint Force in codifying and operationalizing these tools, embedding them from concept to execution. Codifying and synchronizing NLE and NKA ensures the Army can dominate the information environment, preserve freedom of maneuver, and win in multi-domain competition and conflict.

Tags: campaigning, convergence, Cyber Activities, information operations, information warfare, Joint Operational Planning, Kinetic, MDO, Multi-Domain Operations, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), nonkinetic, Second Order Effects, strategy, Targeting

About The Author

Scott Hall
Scott Hall is a U.S. Army Major and Information Operations officer serving as Chief of the Influence Branch at U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER). A career Armor officer and IO planner, he has held key leadership positions at the platoon, company, squadron, and division levels, as well as strategic and operational assignments with U.S. Army Europe, NATO, and ARCYBER. His work focuses on advancing strategic information advantage, integrating non-lethal and non-kinetic activities, and enabling multi-domain operations. He has been published in the Cavalry and Armor Journal, has appeared on The Cognitive Crucible podcast, and has presented at the Information Professionals Association’s INFOPAC conference.

12. More Than Just the Tigers: How America and its Chinese Partners Dominated the Skies Over WWII Asia

Summary:

Samuel Hui profiles the Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW), a WWII Sino-U.S. air partnership built by Claire Chennault that went beyond the “Flying Tigers.” Trained at Luke Field, integrated Chinese-American squadrons fought under dual command, combining U.S. doctrine with Chinese combat experience. Trust, equal leadership, and shared risk produced air superiority raids, effective bomber escorts, and enduring camaraderie. The CACW’s success was measured in capability, morale, and legitimacy shaped postwar U.S. advisory models and lives on in Taiwan’s air force lineage. Hui argues today’s cuts to SFAB/CAA overlook historical proof that empowered, co-led advising yields strategic returns impossible through training and materiel alone.

Comment: History remains relevant. We can still learn so much from our history. Look at the concepts discussed here: trust, morale, advisory activities, building capacity of allies, equal leadership, shared risk, legitimacy. Many of these are at the heart of every combined or coalition organization and operation from NATO in Europe and the ROK/US Combined Forces Command in Korea to a future combined multi-domain task force to a small coalition task force in a remote area operating alone and unafraid..

More Than Just the Tigers: How America and its Chinese Partners Dominated the Skies Over WWII Asia

by Samuel Hui

11.07.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/07/more-than-just-the-tigers/

American and Chinese pilots of the 5th Fighter Group pose in front of their P-40 fighter aircraft (Source: David Chiao).

More Than Just the Tigers: How America and its Chinese Partners Dominated the Skies Over WWII Asia

In May of this year, reports emerged that the U.S. Army would disband two Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). This followed the Air Force’s decision to shutter its dedicated Combat Air Advisor (CAA) units, with both actions sparking intense discussion among military circles about the folly of cutting these partner-focused capabilities. The mission of training, equipping, and advising partner forces has always carried significance for U.S. national interests beyond the purely military realm to encompass strong political and symbolic dimensions. General Claire Chennault and his 14th Air Force’s support to the Chinese American Composite Wing (CACW) in World War II offers a novel case study in war-time aviation security force assistance that achieved remarkable success and provides enduring lessons for military advisory efforts.

The CACW represents one of the earliest examples in American military history of a “train and equip” program directed at a foreign air force. Yet the program revealed that simply training and equipping alone could not secure victory in the skies over China—it also required trust and camaraderie between the airmen of both nations. Chennault’s most significant achievement, therefore, was not measured merely by the number of enemy aircraft downed by his Flying Tigers, but by his success in integrating a cadre of professional American and Chinese pilots and rebuilding the war-torn Republic of China (ROC) air force. This experience provided the embryonic U.S. Air Force an enduring model for conducting advisory missions in the postwar era. The principles of coordination, empowerment, and mutual respect that underpinned the CACW continued to guide U.S.-led coalition operations for decades to come.

The legacy of the CACW remains visible today in the close cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and its allies, and notably the continued existence of core CACW units in Taiwan’s current air force structure. Above all, this enduring spirit of collaboration stands as one of the most valuable assets Chennault bequeathed to the modern U.S. Air Force. Drawing on research conducted at the U.S. National Archives, the Hoover Institution Archives, the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, and oral interviews with pilots who participated in the CACW, this paper illuminates the struggles and outstanding achievements of the American-Chinese WWII air campaign over four years of combat.

Advisory Challenges in the Republic of China

Although the ROC Air Force had previously invited retired American pilots led by former Army Air Corps member Colonel John Jouett to train its personnel, most of these instructors returned home by 1935 due to America’s prevailing isolationist policies. When Madame Chiang Kai-shek invited Chennault to China in 1937 to serve as the chief instructor at the Central Aviation School, he found its air force training program dominated by a disorganized group of Italian advisers, whom he held in very low regard. (See Note 1). The core group of pilots initially trained under Jouett had been nearly depleted within three months of the war’s outbreak, leaving the Chinese Air Force with an uneven pool of replacements ill-prepared to confront Japan effectively. Chennault hoped to reintroduce the American-style flight system to enhance ROC pilot combat effectiveness.

Unexpectedly, at this time the Soviet Union became the primary supplier of fighter aircraft to the ROC Air Force and even dispatched volunteer pilots to fight in China—once again sidelining Chennault’s efforts. Although Chennault regarded Soviet pilots more favorably than the Italian advisors, he recognized another major threat: the risk of communist indoctrination among Chinese Air Force pilots under Soviet influence. (See Note 2). Chennault believed that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable. He saw China not only as an ally that would defeat Japan alongside the United States, but also as a vital postwar trading partner for America. Given the widespread admiration for ace pilots from various nations during World War I, a strong air force served as a powerful symbol of nationalism. If the United States could train Chinese pilots to become celebrated air heroes, they would likely emerge as one of the most pro-American forces within China.

Chennault finally got his opportunity in 1941. First, in response to the German threat, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan, cutting off its aid to the ROC Air Force. Secondly, FDR recognized China’s importance and included the ROC in the Lend-Lease Act. Thus, in November 1941 just before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the first group of Chinese pilots departed to the United States for flight training. It was also at this time that Luke Field in Arizona, now known as Luke Air Force Base, became the primary training base for Chinese fighter pilots.

Chennault’s genius lay not only in his ability to train pilots, but also in his skill to convince the American public—during an era still marked by racial segregation—that Chinese pilots could fly and fight effectively.

Lieutenant Colonel Chen Ping-ching recalled that Chennault strategically selected their group of Chinese pilots—already fully trained—to undergo basic flight training from scratch in Arizona. Once they took to the trainer aircraft, they all performed exceptionally well, earning widespread praise from the people of Arizona, who hailed the Chinese airmen as flying geniuses. (See Note 3).

Photo 1. Chinese cadets walk to their P-40s during their training at Luke Field, Arizona (Source: National Archives and Records Administration).

Small Trial Effort

Chen became one of the first 12 Chinese P-40 fighter pilots to complete training at Luke Field. Upon returning to China, they joined the 74th, 75th, and 76th Fighter Squadrons of the U.S. 23rd Fighter Group, with four pilots in each squadron. (See Note 4). Under the command of American squadron leaders, they participated in combat missions and gradually adapted to the American style of air warfare. Assigned to the 75th Fighter Squadron, Chen developed a close friendship with squadron leader Major Edmund Goss. These twelve Chinese pilots fought fiercely in aerial combat and suffered heavy casualties, including six killed in action. Chen himself was shot down and captured on October 1, 1943, while escorting B-24 bombers attacking Haiphong, Vietnam. He did not attain his freedom until the end of the war.

Despite losing more than half of the Chinese airmen assigned to the 23rd Fighter Group, Chennault confirmed through this trial that Chinese pilots could fight alongside American airmen. He then formed the CACW under the 14th Air Force, comprised of the young Chinese pilots trained in the United States combined with experienced veterans of the earlier Sino-Japanese air war who were willing to adopt American combat doctrines. The CACW was a unique unit composed of both Chinese and American air and ground crew personnel. It included the Chinese Air Force’s 1st Bomber Group, 3rd Fighter Group, and 5th Fighter Group.

Photo 2. Pilots of the CACW 3rd Fighter Group prepare for their mission against Hong Kong (Source: National Archives and Records Administration).

Major General Fred Wu-o Chiao, a pilot from the 5th Fighter Group, noted that during the war, many air force units were composed of multinational pilots. For example, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) incorporated large numbers of Polish and Czech exile pilots. However, in the case of the RAF’s No. 303 Squadron, Polish officers commanded the unit which consisted exclusively of Polish pilots. In contrast, the CACW was uniquely integrated at every level with both Chinese and American airmen—from the wing down to the groups and squadrons.

Moreover, at each command level was both an American and a Chinese officer—from wing commander to group commander to squadron leader, marking a historic first in integrated combined command structures. (See Note 5).

This would not have been possible without Chennault’s boldness in experimenting with a small initial effort and accepting risk to expand at scale.

Photo 3. The unique CACW command structure enabled dual leadership within each unit. Pictured here is the 3rd Fighter Group, led jointly by U.S. Colonel Alan Barnett and Chinese Major Yuan Chin-han. This bilateral command system exemplified the equal partnership between American and Chinese forces (Source: National Archives and Records Administration).

Trust and Camaraderie

The United States’ mission in the China theater was not limited to fighting the Japanese military. It also involved supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s central government based in Chungking in its struggle against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the Chinese puppet Wang Jingwei regime it sponsored. While FDR prioritized allocating significant resources to the European Theater of Operations (ETO), he was also determined to “keep China in the war” to tie down as many IJA forces as possible. Reengaging Chinese pilots in the air war against Japan—and enabling them to once again shoot down enemy aircraft—became one of the most effective ways to strengthen public confidence in the war effort.

Cheng Sung-ting, the Chinese squadron leader of the 28th Squadron, 3rd Fighter Group, developed a close friendship with his American counterpart, Eugene Strickland. Reflecting on their time together, Cheng remarked, “During the period when we fought alongside the Americans, the camaraderie among our teammates was truly remarkable. These American pilots were not only outstanding in character and flying skill, but also unmatched in their coordination during combat. Such harmony and professionalism were rare anywhere in the world.” He was credited with shooting down three Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters during his combat service. However, Cheng’s most courageous act came during a low-altitude attack on a Japanese airfield in Hupei Province, where he destroyed multiple enemy fuel depots and inflicted heavy damage on the IJA Air Force. For this daring mission, he was promoted to the rank of major. He later remarked that such extraordinary courage was made possible by the tremendous encouragement and moral support he received from his American comrades, especially Strickland. (See Note 6).

Photo 4. Brothers in arms, Eugene Strickland and Cheng Sung-ting conduct P-40 pre-mission checks (Source: Cheng Min-lee, son of Major General Cheng Sung-ting).

The CACW carried forward the flexible and enterprising spirit of the Flying Tigers. Its operations were not limited to air-to-air engagements or purely defensive missions—instead, the CACW also took the initiative to strike at IJA forces deep behind enemy lines. Fred Chiao from the 5th Fighter Group recalled that the unit carried out three air raids on the Japanese Army Air Force base at Paliuchi in Hubei. These strikes destroyed many Ki-43 fighters belonging to the enemy’s 48th and 25th Sentais on the ground. With minimal losses, the Chinese forces successfully established air superiority over Central China.

What made it possible for the United States to help resurrect the ROC Air Force—a force nearly annihilated before the outbreak of the Pacific War, was not merely doctrine or matériel, but the genuine brotherhood and camaraderie forged between Chinese and American pilots within the CACW.

Having spent seven years in China, Chennault strictly forbade American pilots in the 14th Air Force from discriminating against their Chinese counterparts. At the same time, he understood the importance of “face” in Chinese culture. Chennault designed this approach to emphasize the equal partnership between China and the United States. Therefore, mutual respect and understanding between U.S. and Chinese commanders were crucial to the unit’s success.

Fred Chiao noted that one of the primary missions of the 5th Fighter Group was to escort the U.S. 308th Bombardment Group’s B-24 bombers in their strategic raids against Japanese targets across central China. The Chinese pilots were often required to remain in close formation with the American bombers, prioritizing protection over the pursuit of enemy aircraft. Chiao emphasized that his proudest achievement was ensuring that none of the B-24s under his protection were ever shot down. For their exemplary performance, FDR awarded the 5th Fighter Group the Presidential Unit Citation.

Transition to Chinese Leadership

As Chinese pilots became increasingly accustomed to American combat doctrine and operational culture, command authority within the CACW gradually transferred to Chinese hands. In some cases, seasoned Chinese aviators even led less experienced American pilots into combat. Toward the end of the war, Fred Chiao served as the deputy commander of the 29th Squadron, 5th Fighter Group. During this period, the American group commander, John Dunning, trusted Fred with operational command over all Allied air units based at Chihkiang. This included not only the four squadrons of the 5th Group, but also the 75th Squadron of the 23rd Fighter Group stationed at the same base. The fact that Dunning placed purely American combat units under the command of experienced Chinese pilots speaks volumes about his confidence in the capabilities and professionalism of the CACW’s Chinese personnel. It reflected a deep level of trust and respect extended to an allied force.

Photo 5. Colonel Cheng Sung-ting, the Chinese commander of the 5th Fighter Group, and his American counterpart, Colonel John Dunning, shared a deep mutual respect during the war. Their bond endured beyond the battlefield, evolving into a lifelong friendship after the war ended (Cheng Min-lee, son of Major General Cheng Sung-ting).

Hal Javitt, an American pilot who once flew combat missions under Fred Chiao’s command, told the author later in life that flying with Fred felt like a guarantee of safety—he always brought his men home unscathed. Javitt emphasized that seasoned Chinese pilots like Fred had accumulated substantial combat experience against the Japanese and, in many cases, possessed a far more profound understanding of the battlefield than newly arrived American aviators. (See Note 7).

Photo 6. Hal Javitt on his P-51D Mustang. He believed that flying as a wingman of a senior Chinese pilot would increase his survivability (Source: Hal Javitt).

During the battle to defend Chihkiang in the early summer of 1945, the United States even embedded air-ground liaison teams with elite Nationalist Army units. Equipped with radios, they called in precise air strikes against Japanese forces. Scenes that would later reappear in the early 21st century—when Kurdish fighters cooperated with U.S. forces against the Islamic State—had, in fact, already unfolded on the battlefields of China in the final phase of World War II. (See Note 8). The allocation of the state-of-the-art P-51 Mustang to Chinese pilots in the CACW was another powerful expression of American confidence.

Cheng Sung-ting became the first among the CACW to take the Mustang into the skies. He recalled that when he first arrived in India, many of the American pilots doubted whether a Chinese pilot could handle the Mustang. Relying on his superb flying skills, he carefully read through the flight manual and then immediately took the P-51B in front of him into the air. He performed a series of impressive maneuvers, leaving the American pilots watching from the ground thoroughly convinced of his abilities. By the time victory was achieved, Cheng was flying the more advanced P-51D Mustang and had risen to become the Chinese commander of the 5th Fighter Group. It was in this capacity that he received and escorted the Japanese surrender delegation at Chihkiang, bringing the war to a formal close.

Photo 7. Cheng Sung-ting proudly became the first pilot in the Republic of China Air Force to fly the P-51 Mustang, marking a milestone in Sino-American aviation cooperation (Source: Cheng Min-lee, son of Major General Cheng Sung-ting).

Lessons and Legacy of CACW

Downing enemy aircraft and gaining air superiority were only the visible aspects of America’s success in the skies over China. The more profound and more decisive factor was that the United States had won China’s—especially its pilots’—hearts and minds. That a group of elite Chinese, epitomized by the nation’s pilots, chose to place their trust in the United States lent Washington greater moral legitimacy in the war. Most importantly, a group of Americans—led by Claire Chennault—maintained unwavering confidence in the capabilities of the ROC pilots. As Chennault himself once remarked,“I have seen Chinese pilots as good, skillful, brave, and spirited as any of the finest pilots in the world. If given good ships, they would match any air force in the world.” (See Note 9).

The CACW helped ensure that the postwar ROC would possess an air force that was both technically proficient and pro-American. This legacy proved critical during the air battles that followed the ROC’s withdrawal to Taiwan after 1949.

Taiwan’s F-86 Sabres even achieved a historic milestone by recording the world’s first successful air-to-air missile kill using the Sidewinder missile.

In retrospect, Chennault’s strategic foresight was nothing short of remarkable. The legacy of the CACW lives on in today’s ROC Air Force. The 1st Bombardment Group, the 3rd Fighter Group, and the 5th Fighter Group—all core units of the wartime CACW—continue to exist within Taiwan’s current air force structure. Among them, the 5th Tactical Composite Wing, now primarily composed of F-16 fighter pilots, carries forward the spirit and traditions of the CACW. In recent years, Taiwan’s F-16 pilots have transitioned their training from Luke Air Force Base, now repurposed as an F-35 training hub, to the Air National Guard Base in Tucson, Arizona.

The same spirit of combined operations was not only carried forward in the U.S. Air Force after becoming its own service, but also became institutionalized in the U.S. Army’s SFAB framework. In the campaign against the Islamic State, SFAB-trained Peshmerga units reclaimed key terrain around Mosul and played decisive roles in multiple counteroffensives. These battlefield outcomes demonstrate not only measurable results, but also the enduring value of cross-cultural trust and camaraderie—echoing the legacy of the CACW. The close bonds between U.S. advisors and their partner forces proved essential in shaping the outcomes of past wars and will continue to serve as the key ingredient for success into the future.

Notes:

(1) Wanda Cornelius and Thayne Short, Ding Hao: America’s Air War in China, 1937-1945 (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1998), p. 60.

(2) Gordon K. Pickler, United States Aid to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, 1931-1949 (Ph. D. dissertation, Florida State University), pp. 62-63.

(3) Interview of Lt. Col. Chen Ping-ching, Taipei, Taiwan, August 14th, 2017.

(4) “Chow to Chennault”, March 17th, 1943, Claire L. Chennault Papers, Box 9, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Library & Archives

(5) Interview of Major General Fred Wu-o Chiao, Atlanta, Georgia, May 26th, 2013.

(6) Interview of Cheng Min-lee, son of Major General Cheng Sung-ting, Los Angeles, California, December 21st, 2024.

(7) Interview of Hal Javitt, Los Angeles, California, September 20th, 2016.

(8) “Chihkiang Campaign,” 14th Air Force Papers, April 10th to June 3rd, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 862.4501-2.

(9) John Goette, Japan Fights for Asia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company 1943), p. 108.

Tags: Air Advising, Aviation FID, China, Combat Aviation Advisor, Japan, resistance, Security Force Assistance, Taiwan, World War II

About The Author

Samuel Hui
Samuel Hui is an American military historian who holds a Master’s degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University in Taiwan. He specializes in U.S.-China wartime relations and psychological operations during World War II. He is also a research fellow of the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies based in Washington.

13. Pentagon policy shop shifts story on pause in Ukraine aid again

Summary:

At a Senate hearing, nominee Alex Velez-Green contradicted earlier Pentagon statements, claiming his office never ordered or recommended a pause in Ukraine weapons shipments—despite public reports and July comments by Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirming one. Confusion among officials has frustrated Congress, which accuses the Defense Department’s policy shop of poor communication, inadequate coordination, and withholding information on key decisions, including AUKUS reviews and force deployments. Lawmakers demanded clearer, proactive engagement. Velez-Green pledged to personally communicate with legislators and restore transparency, acknowledging that failing to brief Congress on Ukraine aid and other actions has damaged trust and oversight.

Excerpts:

More generally, the Pentagon has broken with norms in not consulting members of the Armed Services Committees during the development of the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, a document required by law.

“I believe we developed that document in direct coordination with the secretary's front office for his direction and intent,” Velez-Green said. “With respect to interagency coordination or notification, there were discussions, but I’m afraid it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to discuss the particulars in this setting.”

He added that he would provide documentation of those discussions in a classified meeting.

Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., asked Velez-Green to agree that he would personally respond to requests for information from lawmakers, rather than relying on the office of legislative affairs, as a recent Pentagon memo requires for communication between defense officials and Congress.

“I do quite recognize the frustrations voiced today, as well as earlier this week,” Velez-Green said, after agreeing to communicate personally. “If confirmed, you have my commitment to lean as far forward in engaging proactively with Congress, including on matters of consultation and not just coordination, while doing my part to protect the secretary’s and president's decision space.”

Comment: A question is, when will we see the new National Defense Strategy and the Global Force Posture review? And will there be a public version or only classified versions?

Pentagon policy shop shifts story on pause in Ukraine aid again

defenseone.com · Meghann Myers

Alex Velez-Green tours Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz during a visit to Guam as a Congressional staffer, August 12, 2022. U.S. Marine Corps / Lance Cpl. Garrett Gillespie

A second Senate hearing this week further mined the tension between DOD and its congressional oversight bodies.

November 6, 2025 03:02 PM ET

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

November 6, 2025 03:02 PM ET

A senior advisor and former deputy to the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy told senators on Thursday that his office “neither ordered nor even recommended a pause to any weapons shipments to Ukraine” over the summer, contrary to the press reporting from the time, but also in contrast to testimony from his colleague on Tuesday and statements from the Pentagon on July 2.

For a second day, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee tried to find some clarity on recent Pentagon moves that took both Congress—and in at least one case, the White House—by surprise, during a confirmation hearing that included Alex Velez-Green, who was formally nominated in June to become Elbridge Colby’s deputy.

“Again, what I am aware of is that there were brief disruptions to delivery of weapons associated with the implementation of the capabilities review that Mr. Parnell was discussing at that time,” Velez-Green said.

His version of events was different than that of his colleague on Tuesday to the same committee.

“I'm not aware of any pause in that aid,” Austin Dahmer, who is currently “performing the duties” in the position Velez-Green is nominated for, said during a confirmation hearing for a different Pentagon position. “I think there's been some I'm aware of, a lot of inaccurate reporting in the public on this, but I'm not aware of any pause.”

Two Pentagon spokespeople did not respond to a request from Defense One for clarification. One of those spokespeople, Sean Parnell, told reporters during a briefing on July 2 that there was indeed a pause to weapons shipments, as a result of a review of weapons stockpiles that had reportedly been recommended by Colby.

“Proactive engagement from us would have been helpful, at least, to share our side of what we understood to have happened, and that's something I do take on board and if confirmed and committed to addressing in a forthright manner,” Velez-Green said Thursday.

The lack of clarity over aid to Ukraine is one example of the Pentagon making moves without coordinating with Congress ahead of time—a trend that lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have publicly derided this week.

Republican senators on Tuesday lamented how difficult it is to get in contact with the policy office, with Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton at one point comparing the shop’s lack of communication and coordination to Pigpen, the messy Peanuts character.

“Do you agree that meaningfully engaging with Congress is necessary for the department to ultimately receive the authorities and the funding that are needed to implement ‘peace through strength?’” Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., asked Velez-Green. “If we do have areas of disagreement —for example, how best to support our allies, our partners—would you agree that a healthy discussion with members of this committee would still be valuable?”

The lack of notification or coordination on a host of moves, including a review of the AUKUS agreement and the cancelation of a rotational Army deployment to Romania, has led to lawmakers learning about them in the press.

In some cases, media reports were “the opposite of reality,” Velez-Green said, specifically pointing to a June story from Semafor that reported Colby’s office opposed deploying an additional carrier strike group to the Middle East in support of Operation Midnight Hammer.

At the time, Parnell told Semafor that Colby was “totally synced up” with the administration.

More generally, the Pentagon has broken with norms in not consulting members of the Armed Services Committees during the development of the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, a document required by law.

“I believe we developed that document in direct coordination with the secretary's front office for his direction and intent,” Velez-Green said. “With respect to interagency coordination or notification, there were discussions, but I’m afraid it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to discuss the particulars in this setting.”

He added that he would provide documentation of those discussions in a classified meeting.

Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., asked Velez-Green to agree that he would personally respond to requests for information from lawmakers, rather than relying on the office of legislative affairs, as a recent Pentagon memo requires for communication between defense officials and Congress.

“I do quite recognize the frustrations voiced today, as well as earlier this week,” Velez-Green said, after agreeing to communicate personally. “If confirmed, you have my commitment to lean as far forward in engaging proactively with Congress, including on matters of consultation and not just coordination, while doing my part to protect the secretary’s and president's decision space.”

14. A list of US military strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels

Comment: For those trying to keep score.

A list of US military strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels

militarytimes.com · Riley Ceder

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/11/06/a-list-of-us-military-strikes-against-alleged-drug-carrying-vessels/

Editor’s note: This list was updated on Nov. 6, 2025, at 1:07 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

Since early September, the U.S. military has conducted strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean in support of what the Pentagon has called continued counternarcotics efforts.

President Donald Trump signed an executive order on his first day in office designating cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. The administration, arguing the U.S. is in a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels, has described the strikes as necessary to prevent illicit drugs from entering the United States.

Military Times is maintaining a list of strikes conducted by the U.S. military since early September, based on reporting by Military Times, The Associated Press and strikes acknowledged by the Trump administration.

As of Nov. 6, the Trump administration has disclosed 16 strikes, killing at least 66 people.

November 2025

Nov. 4: The U.S. military launched a lethal strike against an alleged drug-carrying vessel that the Trump administration said was operated by a designated terrorist organization in the eastern Pacific, killing two, according to an X post from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Nov. 1: Hegseth said in a social media post that the U.S. military conducted a strike on an alleged drug-carrying vessel in the Caribbean, killing three people.

October 2025

Oct. 29: The U.S. military struck an alleged drug-carrying vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing four. Hegseth announced the lethal strike in an X post, claiming intelligence showed the vessel to be carrying narcotics.

Oct. 27: The U.S. military launched three strikes against three alleged drug-carrying vessels in the eastern Pacific, killing 14 and leaving one survivor, Hegseth said in a post on X.

It was the first time multiple strikes occurred in one day and the second instance in which there was a survivor.

Oct. 24: The U.S. military conducted its tenth strike against an alleged drug-carrying vessel that was purportedly associated with the Tren de Aragua gang and operating in the Caribbean, killing six people, according to Hegseth. That same day, the Pentagon ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and its strike group to deploy to the U.S. Southern Command area of operations, said Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell.

Oct. 22: Hegseth announced a ninth strike against an alleged-drug carrying vessel and the second conducted in the eastern Pacific. The strike killed three people.

Oct. 21: The U.S. military conducted an eighth strike against an alleged drug-carrying vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing two, according to a social media post from Hegseth.

It was the first strike to take place outside of the Caribbean.

Oct. 17: Hegseth confirmed in an X post that the U.S. military launched a lethal strike against an alleged drug-carrying vessel in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, killing three.

Those on board were affiliated with designated terrorist organization Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Hegseth claimed, calling the cartels the “Al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.”

Oct. 16: The U.S. launched a sixth strike on an alleged drug-carrying submarine in the Caribbean, killing two and leaving survivors for the first time.

The Trump administration didn’t initially acknowledge the strike, with details first emerging from news reports.

The two survivors were initially picked up by the U.S. military before being repatriated to their countries.

On Truth Social, Trump confirmed the strike and said that U.S. intelligence confirmed the submarine contained fentanyl and other narcotics.

The same day as the sixth strike, Hegseth announced in an X post that U.S. Navy Adm. Alvin Holsey would be stepping down as the head of US. Southern Command.

Holsey had served in the position for less than a year at the time, overseeing military strikes in the Caribbean.

While Hegseth said in his X post that the admiral was retiring, the reason was unclear.

The New York Times reported that Holsey had voiced concerns about the U.S. military’s mission in Central and South America and the recent strikes on alleged drug boats off the Venezuelan coast.

Oct. 14: Trump announced on Truth Social that the U.S. military struck a small boat off the coast of Venezuela, killing six people.

Republican and Democratic lawmakers in Congress voiced concerns over the legality of the strikes against the alleged drug-carrying vessels. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., asked for “the evidence linking them to being part of a gang” and for the names of those killed.

Rep. Jim Himes, D-Conn., labeled the strikes “illegal killings.”

Oct. 3: Hegseth announced a fourth strike on an alleged drug-carrying vessel in the Caribbean, killing four.

He posted the information to X, including a video of the boat that was destroyed during the strike.

A Pentagon memo sent to congressional national security committees earlier in the week declared that Trump said the U.S. was involved in a “non-international armed conflict” with cartels designated as foreign terrorist organizations.

“The President directed the Department of War to conduct operations against them pursuant to the law of armed conflict,” the memo said. “The United States has now reached a critical point where we must use force in self-defense and defense of others against the ongoing attacks by these designated terrorist organizations.”

September 2025

Sept. 19: Trump took to Truth Social to provide details about a third strike against alleged drug-carrying vessels in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility.

He announced the death of three individuals aboard the vessel, which he claimed was “affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization conducting narcotrafficking.”

Sept. 15: Trump announced on Truth Social that the U.S. military carried out a second lethal strike against an alleged drug boat coming from Venezuela, killing three on board.

Sept. 2: At an Oval Office event, Trump announced the first U.S. strike in the southern Caribbean against an alleged drug-carrying vessel that departed from Venezuela. Trump offered few details about the strike during his remarks at the event, but later said on Truth Social that 11 people belonging to the Tren de Aragua gang were killed. Trump included an unclassified video of the lethal strike on what appeared to be a small boat.

U.S. military operations in the southern Caribbean ramped up in late August 2025 when the U.S. deployed three Aegis guided-missile destroyers — USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson — to the waters off Venezuela.

Former Military Times reporter Carla Babb contributed to this report.

About Riley Ceder and Beth Sullivan

Riley Ceder is a reporter at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice, investigations, and cyber. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the Abused by the Badge investigation.

Beth Sullivan is an editor for Military Times. Previously, she worked as a staff reporter for The Daily Memphian and as an assistant editor at The Austin Chronicle.

militarytimes.com · Riley Ceder

15. Thinking First, Adapting Fast: Debating the Marine Corps’ Need for the Information Group

Summary:

Brian Kerg examines the Marine Corps’ internal debate over the Information Group, a formation meant to integrate information warfare into maneuver operations. After a decade of experimentation, critics call it redundant and ineffective, while supporters argue it enhances deterrence and coordination. Kerg urges leaders to avoid debating the value of information itself and instead assess whether the Information Group delivers measurable advantages and whether it is greater than the sum of its parts, effectively synchronizes information across echelons, and justifies its resources. The issue, he concludes, is about optimizing means to achieve information advantage, not defending institutional turf.

Excerpts:

It is unclear if the information group is the optimal way to achieve information advantage. It is certainly a way, but whether it is the most effective way while also being feasible, suitable, and acceptable to the service is unclear.

To help settle this issue, leaders charged with iterating on the information group’s design should avoid entrenchment around the value of information itself, avoid emphasizing the provision of information forces, and not hold up individual programs of record. None of these elements prove the case under discussion.

Instead the debate ought to focus on whether the information group is worth the value invested into it, if it is greater than the sum of its parts, and whether it is a more useful means of synchronizing information than the legacy method that redundantly occurs at higher echelons. Exploring the debate focused on these areas will yield the data Marine leaders need to make better decisions on the future of the information group.

Comment: How do we learn to lead with influence? Consider the different views of warfighting among our adversaries. Why do our adversaries seem to be able to lead with influence better than we can? Do the Marines need an Information Group to do this better? More broadly, do we need an Information Warfare (IWar) Branch? (I think we do). I fully agree with the author that we need to focus on what is the right thing to do to achieve information advantage (and effectively lead with influence) and not on protecting our equities (or "institutional turf").

•What is the major difference in the views of conflict, strategy, and campaigning between China, Russia, Iran, nK, AQ, and ISIS and the US?

–The psychological takes precedence and may or may not be supported with the kinetic

–Politics is war by other means

–For the US kinetic is first and the psychological is second

–War is politics by other means

–Easier to get permission to put a hellfire on the forehead of terrorist than to get permission to put an idea between his ears

•Bonaparte: In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one

•In the 21st Century the psychological is to the kinetic as ten is to one

•The US has to learn to put the psychological first

–Can a federal democratic republic “do strategy” this way

–Or is it only autocratic, totalitarian dictatorships that can “do strategy” this way?

•An American Way of Political Warfare: A Proposal https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE304/RAND_PE304.pdf

Thinking First, Adapting Fast: Debating the Marine Corps’ Need for the Information Group

warontherocks.com

Brian Kerg

November 7, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/thinking-first-adapting-fast-debating-the-marine-corps-need-for-the-information-group/?utm

A decade into the effort to concretely integrate information warfare into its operations, the Marine Corps appears to be in the thick of another intellectual firefight. Consternation abounds regarding the value of the Marine units organized to employ information related capabilities. Moreover, some observers claim there is a deeper debate about the value of information operations as a central aspect of maneuver warfare.

Such arguments are common in the Marine Corps, especially in the face of change. The professional journal of the Marine Corps was replete with arguments about the service’s identity as early as the journal’s establishment in 1916. The maneuver warfare movement led to fierce debate across the service, culminating in doctrine that defines the Marine Corps to this day. Arguments clamored for a new mission and identity for the service in the waning days of the Global War on Terror. The adoption of Force Design 2030 led to a renaissance in Marine Corps thinking, writing, and speaking on its future, matched by stalwart and stubborn opposition from its fiercest critics. Critical dialogue on every front of the Marine Corps’ future continues, with a special emphasis on the roles and authorities of the Marine littoral regiment and the stand-in force.

As such, another hearty argument about warfighting should be seen as a sign of healthy discourse within the service. However, such discussions should be framed correctly and soundly if they are to serve the good of the Marine Corps and the nation.

While perhaps no marine is neutral regarding the impact of information advantage on warfighting, there are significant disagreements about the means of gaining that information advantage via a unit of action designed to do so within the Fleet Marine Force. I am neutral on that latter point and previously served as an operational planner at a Marine expeditionary force headquarters when debate swirled about the utility and mission of the information group. While not advocating for the group’s maturation or termination, instead I propose how commanders should think about and approach the debate in order to generate sound conclusions and meaningful ways forward.

What follows is not an argument for or against the specific unit of action built to integrate information operations. Rather, it is a discussion about the argument itself. It is intended to provide an aim point to ensure future discourse on this important subject is as valuable as possible.

BECOME A MEMBER

What the Debate Is and Isn’t

I cannot find evidence of an argument within the Marine Corps against the importance of information operations to maneuver warfare. As a warfighting philosophy, maneuver warfare is characterized by many traits that are achieved by information operations, from decentralized command and control to cognitive defeat mechanisms. The professional journals most closely tied to the Marine Corps and the sea services, the Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings, regularly publish articles authored by marines about information’s many uses and advantages. If anything, there is violent agreement about information’s value as a warfighting function, and commanders and staffs everywhere want more of it, not less.

Inasmuch as a debate exists on the topic of information operations, it is largely centered around a single, formation under which the preponderance of the Marine Corps’ information capabilities are found: the Marine expeditionary force information group (henceforth referred to simply as the “information group” or “group”). There is one such group found within each of the three Marine expeditionary forces, so each three star corps-level Marine commanding general employs one information group commanded by a colonel. Within each group are several subordinate commands, each aligned to information-related capabilities: a communications battalion, support battalion, radio (i.e., signals intelligence) battalion, air naval gunfire liaison company, and an intelligence battalion.

These formations have undergone significant experimentation since their initial activation a decade ago. As with any new enterprise, much was learned along the way, and there is still much to learn. Marines, characteristically as aggressive with organizational adaptation as they are in combat, have not been shy about sharing their assessments of the experiment.

One camp concludes that the experiment is a failure, arguing that the information group does not deliver information warfare effects at the operational level of war as intended. The staff work they perform is unnecessarily duplicative of work conducted at higher echelons. As a result, this camp argues that the information groups should be shuttered.

The other camp argues that information groups contribute to an aggregate deterrence effect by employing their many information related capabilities, and that the friction prohibiting the full potential of information warfare at this echelon resides within fat and unwieldy staff structures outside of the information group. It concludes that the information group’s efforts are value added and that the service should continue optimizing it.

Operational planning teams across each Marine expeditionary force continue to analyze the mission of their information groups, attempting to perfect the mission, organization, and concepts of employment. But with the debate at an apparent impasse, it is unclear if that progress is moving the needle forward or backward.

At the core of the debate are two simple questions: Are these units worth the resources placed against them, and how do you test for that?

What Will and Won’t Test the Information Group

As these units continue to evolve and the debate regarding their efficacy continues, commanders and staff officers should focus the debate on criteria which will prove the unit’s value — or disprove it. To truly be good stewards of their nation’s interests and the marines under their charge, Marine leaders should be agnostic toward the outcome, so long as the outcome is valid.

Approaches to Abandon

First, given how much attention has been given to unsound approaches, it’s worth highlighting what arguments to avoid. Practitioners need not appeal to the value of information as a warfighting function or as an enabler of operational art. As discussed above, there is no debate on that subject in the Marine Corps. You will find few fiercer advocates for deception, surprise, decentralized command and control, and shattering an enemy’s mental and moral cohesion than the maneuverists that are marines. Emphasizing this as a core of the debate incorrectly bins opponents of the information group as opponents of information’s value.

Moreover, pointing to the corpus of books and doctrinal publications about information is not useful. Identifying the plethora of military literature asserting the value of information operations does just that — asserts the value of information — and no more. But the existence of doctrine neither proves the value of its claims, nor does it prove the value of a particular unit.

Additionally, analysts should avoid pointing to the existence of information capabilities and their employment as validating. Just because the information group fields forces with information capabilities does not prove the value proposition of the headquarters sitting atop them. Even if the information forces are organized together as a task unit before ”chopping” them to the using unit, if the using unit simply piecemeals them out for conventional use, then no points are won. This merely highlights the information group as a force provider.

For example, marines that are chopped to the Marine expeditionary unit are employed under the tactical control of the staff section to which their capabilities fall. Communications marines sent here from the information group’s communications battalion are placed under the tactical control of the Marine expeditionary unit’s S-6, or communications, section. The same holds true with every other information related capability similarly chopped to a using unit.

Why the force provider argument is so obtuse is that this approach is little different from the predecessor to the information group, the Marine expeditionary force headquarters group. Then as now, information capabilities existed administratively under the headquarters group, but were chopped to their using units, transferring command relationships appropriately. Focusing on the employment of information forces themselves merely gives more credence to the idea that the information group is the headquarters group of old, albeit with better branding.

Finally, highlighting particular programs of record employed by the information group, such as the Maven Smart System, is an unproductive line of reasoning. Not only is this an errant pursuit of the technological “silver bullet” fallacy, but these same capabilities exist across the joint force and are now standard fare across the Marine Corps. This fails to demonstrate any distinct value of the information group, and the rationale runs counter to maneuver warfare as a warfighting philosophy.

Approaches to Explore

Instead of the above lines of argument, those intent on exploring or optimizing the value of the information group should focus on approaches that demonstrate whether or not it is greater than the sum of its parts. This is a tried-and-true test of any intermediate headquarters, in particular at the regimental and group level. Typically, such headquarters have additional enablers and staff sections that can coordinate, synchronize, and prioritize the combat power or capability resident within its subordinate units.

The information groups have such an organization that does this not just for itself, but for the Marine expeditionary force writ large: the information coordination center. This center plans, coordinates, integrates, and employs information activities on behalf of the Marine expeditionary force commander, facilitating friendly maneuver and denying enemy freedom of action in the information environment. Of note, this center is comprised of personnel from the information group’s headquarters, its subordinate battalions, and is organized and employed by the information group’s commander. This is a unique contribution that did not exist under the former construct of the Marine expeditionary force headquarters group, and is a distinct contribution of the information group.

What should be determined, though, is whether or not the information coordination center is a more effective means of organizing information activities than other staff sections that currently exist within the Marine expeditionary force headquarters. As an example, the G-2 fusion cell collates data to provide a more comprehensive picture of the battlespace. Are there elements of this function that are now duplicated at the information coordination center? Whether or not they are unnecessarily redundant, which element performs this function in a way that better supports the commander? And finally, is the effect generated by the information coordination center worth the additional personnel and resources that are sourced from the information group’s subordinate battalions, when compared to the opportunity cost of allowing these same personnel to otherwise provide general support to the rest of the Marine expeditionary force?

Another important avenue of exploration pertains to authorities and their execution. A common critique of the information groups is that while they have personnel who are trained and equipped to execute various information activities, the information group lacks the authorities to employ them. Many such authorities initially reside at the combatant commander level and might be delegated to a joint task force commander. This creates the risk that while the Marine Corps is expending significant resources to train marines in information warfare, their skills are of limited use because the Marines reside at a colonel level headquarters instead of at a four star combatant command.

This is an important consideration, but that line of reasoning doesn’t give full credit to the utility of having such skillsets at lower echelons. While residing within the information group, these information Marines serve at the behest of the Marine expeditionary force, or three star corps level commander. These Marines are subsequently the subject matter experts who are uniquely trained in requesting the given information effects that might otherwise be retained by the combatant commander, but which will be employed on behalf of a subordinate formation. Such relationships exist across echelons throughout the joint force.

What should be demonstrated, then, is that having these information enablers at this echelon, under the information group construct, is the optimal way to employ these Marines, achieve the effects they provide, and is done in a way justifying their placement at the information group compared to placement at other echelons or organized under different constructs.

Thinking First, Adapting Fast

Reasonable leaders will disagree on the application of scarce resources. The debate surrounding the information group is no different. At its heart, this argument is not about the information group, but about how to best achieve information advantage with the forces the Marine Corps can afford to train and equip.

Because ten years ago the Marine Corps elected to stand up the information group, this has served as the locus of the debate, which is about means and ways, rather than about ends.

It is unclear if the information group is the optimal way to achieve information advantage. It is certainly a way, but whether it is the most effective way while also being feasible, suitable, and acceptable to the service is unclear.

To help settle this issue, leaders charged with iterating on the information group’s design should avoid entrenchment around the value of information itself, avoid emphasizing the provision of information forces, and not hold up individual programs of record. None of these elements prove the case under discussion.

Instead the debate ought to focus on whether the information group is worth the value invested into it, if it is greater than the sum of its parts, and whether it is a more useful means of synchronizing information than the legacy method that redundantly occurs at higher echelons. Exploring the debate focused on these areas will yield the data Marine leaders need to make better decisions on the future of the information group.

BECOME A MEMBER

Brian Kerg is a Marine Corps operational planner, strategic planner, and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently the commanding officer, Marine Wing Communications Squadron-38.

The views in this article are those of the author and not those of Marine Corps, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Gunnery Sgt. Daniel Wetzel via DVIDS

warontherocks.com

16. Culture on the Front Line: Building Indo-Pacific Resilience through Cultural Property Protection Training

Summary:

Benjamin Roberts argues that Cultural Property Protection (CPP) is a powerful, overlooked tool of irregular warfare in the Indo-Pacific. Protecting heritage sites strengthens legitimacy, resilience, and trust which are core elements of societal defense against coercion and disinformation. CPP training, led by U.S. Army Civil Affairs Heritage and Preservation Officers, would counter illicit trafficking, build civil-military cooperation, and expand U.S. influence through shared values. Roberts proposes deploying mobile training teams in vulnerable nations like the Philippines and Thailand to foster local capacity and moral alignment. By safeguarding culture, the U.S. gains strategic advantage by cultivating durable partnerships and preempting instability before crises arise.

Comment: Bring back the Monuments Men. Remember that culture eats strategy for breakfast (or words to that effect - apologies for a slight attempt at humor). Culture is damn important and it is a key element of influence: recognizing, understanding, and respecting culture.

Culture on the Front Line: Building Indo-Pacific Resilience through Cultural Property Protection Training

November 7, 2025 by Benjamin Roberts, Kat Slocum, Jessica L. Wagner

irregularwarfare.org · Benjamin Roberts

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/culture-on-the-front-line-building-indo-pacific-resilience-through-cultural-property-protection-training/

Editor’s Note: This article was submitted as part of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s 2025 Writing Contest, in which authors were invited to explore how the United States and its partners can use irregular warfare to strengthen security cooperation, build trust, and enhance resilience among Indo-Pacific nations, particularly those with limited conventional military capacity. We have edited this piece after its selection. This piece stood out for its innovative framing of cultural property protection as a strategic instrument of irregular warfare, linking heritage preservation to trust-building, resilience, and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Irregular Warfare (IW) planning often prioritizes influence projection and security partnerships over cultural infrastructure. Yet, in regions with limited conventional military capacity, such as portions of the Indo-Pacific, this approach neglects a key variable in both resilience and trust-building: cultural property. As such, cultural property protection (CPP) efforts, led by the modern-day “Monuments Men” of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), represents an underutilized means for enhancing regional cooperation, countering illicit finance, and strengthening societal resilience to coercion and malign influences – all of which exemplify IW in the Indo-Pacific.

This analysis (1) examines the utility of CPP as an unconventional force multiplier, (2) review precedent cases where antiquities trafficking has funded conflict, and (3) propose the use of U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) Heritage and Preservation Officers to provide CPP training. It concludes with a finding that CPP, when framed as a function of trust-building and partner capacity, offers a scalable, cost-efficient path to strengthening security cooperation with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic Relevance of CPP

Cultural Property Protection is often dismissed as tangential to national security. However, in irregular warfare, where legitimacy, memory, and community identity are domains of competition, heritage sites and artifacts should be more aptly recognized for what they truly are: strategic assets or liabilities depending on their specific context.

The looting or destruction of cultural property does not merely erase history; as seen in Syria, disrupting cultural property can destabilize community cohesion, fund armed groups, and have lasting impact on regional stability. This dynamic is not new. During World War II, both Axis and Allied powers recognized culture as strategically significant. The Nazis systematically plundered art and antiquities to finance the war and assert ideological dominance. the Allies established the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) program, known as the “Monuments Men,” to protect and recover cultural property as a means of safeguarding European identity and restoring legitimacy in liberated territories. The war revealed a truth that remains relevant today: cultural heritage is not peripheral to security but central to the struggle for legitimacy and stability.

A similar construct applies in today’s Indo-Pacific region. Cultural heritage influences the legitimacy of governments, the resilience of populations, and the narratives that underpin strategic competition. As such, CPP takes on importance for security strategy and is not simply preservation work.

Illicit Trafficking

Echoing the Nazi regime’s use of art looted from occupied Europe to finance its war efforts, the trafficking of antiquities has become a known revenue stream for insurgent and terrorist organizations. For instance, during its territorial control in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State brought in an estimated $10–20 million annually through the illicit excavation and sale of antiquities. In another example, armed groups in Mali and Libya have taxed or trafficked cultural goods to sustain operations since the early 2010s.

This convergence of organized crime and ideological violence creates a transnational threat that exploits cultural sectors in fragile states. Within the Indo-Pacific, disaster vulnerability and weak site protection compound the existing threats to cultural heritage sites. For instance, heritage sites in the Indo-Pacific are frequently exposed to earthquakes, cyclones and typhoons, floods, sea‐level rise, coastal erosion, and tsunamis, which cause physical damage, weaken structures, and create opportunities for looting. Moreover, many heritage sites in the Indo-Pacific are located in remote or politically peripheral zones, operating under constrained budgets, limited staffing, and with minimal legal enforcement or surveillance. This combination of factors makes sites in Southeast Asia attractive to looters, smugglers, and illicit excavations.

Indo-Pacific Demand, U.S. Capability

Despite the strategic implications, many Indo-Pacific partners lack their own specialized CPP units. The participation of ASEAN member states in CPP training at the Center of Excellence for Stability Policing Units in Vicenza, Italy, highlights an institutional gap and a willingness to engage. This creates an opportunity for the United States to fill a capability void, one that U.S. Army Civil Affairs Heritage and Preservation Officers possess the expertise to deliver through CPP training, particularly when partnered with other U.S. government agencies and host nation civil institutions.

Deploying CPP Mobile Training Teams for IW

We propose the activation of U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) Mobile Training Teams, composed of U.S. Army Reserve Heritage and Preservation Officers and other CA personnel, to deliver Cultural Property Protection training throughout the Indo-Pacific in particularly vulnerable and strategic locations, such as the Philippines and Thailand.

These teams would:

Identify at-risk cultural assets through assessments in coordination with local ministries, heritage Non-Governmental Organizations, and academic institutions.
Deliver scalable training on documentation, emergency stabilization, trafficking prevention, and disaster preparedness.
Support information-sharing networks for early warning of cultural site targeting, using open-source and community-based intelligence.
Align training with existing Cultural Property Agreement goals and partner-nation legal frameworks, reinforcing trust and self-sufficiency.

Initial programs can be launched in the Philippines and Thailand, two nations with demonstrated interest, institutional will, and clear cultural property vulnerabilities. Importantly, this CPP effort would not require new structures or authorities. Training missions can operate within existing Department of State Cultural Property Agreements, already in place with Cambodia, India, and others. These agreements restrict U.S. imports of looted antiquities and support heritage protection efforts abroad. U.S. Army Civil Affairs-led CPP training would provide operational substance to these agreements, translating diplomacy into durable capacity.

In both the Philippines and Thailand, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and state-linked cultural diplomacy, such as Confucius Institutes, China Cultural Centers, and broader cultural exchanges, have established non-military influence pathways. In Thailand, Confucius Institutes are extensive and serve as instruments of Chinese soft power. In the Philippines, China’s Belt and Road framework includes both economic projects and “people-to-people” engagement designed to cultivate long-term goodwill and elite networks. A CPP training effort led by U.S. Civil Affairs would offer an alternative model of partnership that emphasizes heritage protection, sovereignty, and civil-society engagement. By engaging partner-nation cultural institutions rather than only security forces, CPP emphasizes a narrative of mutual respect and shared stewardship, which strengthens regional perceptions of the United States as a trusted and legitimate partner.

Comparable U.S. efforts, such as Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), Disaster Response Training (DRT), and Security Force Assistance (SFA) have successfully built partner resilience but are primarily oriented toward physical security or emergency response. CPP, by contrast, operates in the psychological and cultural dimensions of stability by addressing the intangible foundations of legitimacy and identity that underpin long-term governance. Cultural Property Protection engages trusted civilian sectors, such as museums, ministries of culture, and universities, that are often untouched by traditional defense programs. In doing so, CPP expands U.S. influence beyond the security apparatus and into societal spaces where narratives, values, and alignment are formed.

In this way, CPP training offers a value-added complement to existing U.S. engagement initiatives: it represents what others may call soft power, strengthening deterrence by denial through heritage protection, advances resilience through local empowerment, and indirectly enhances U.S. posture by cultivating trust-based networks that persist regardless of military presence.

Measuring Success

Evaluating CPP’s strategic impacts should emphasize trust-based and resilience-centered indicators including:

Increased incident reporting of cultural property crimes;
Integration of CPP into host nation national disaster response frameworks;
Expanded civilian–military engagement within host nation heritage sectors; and
Requests for continued bilateral cooperation outside of defense contexts.

Measuring CPP’s effectiveness should account for the degree to which it embeds the United States as a trusted, values-aligned partner in the Indo-Pacific, particularly within nations vulnerable to coercive influence. Effective CPP engagement would enhance deterrence by reducing the space in which malign actors can exploit cultural grievances, disinformation, or heritage destruction for political ends. It simultaneously advances the U.S. position by cultivating networks, interoperability, and moral legitimacy before crisis or conflict occurs.

In this sense, CPP operates across the continuum of competition: as a tool of influence in peacetime, a counterweight against gray-zone aggression, and a foundation for legitimacy should armed conflict arise.

Conclusion

Cultural Property Protection is not merely an act of preservation; it is an act of alignment. In the Indo-Pacific, where U.S. competitors seek influence through coercion, disinformation, and transactional engagement, the United States must build relationships through shared values and mutual respect. CPP offers a practical, efficient, and moral means to do so.

By deploying U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel to lead CPP training, the United States activates an existing but underutilized capability. This initiative would not only deter exploitation and trafficking but serve as a tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment to regional resilience, an irregular advantage that strengthens partnerships before conflict begins.

Consequences of inaction could extend far beyond the loss of monuments or artifacts. The erasure of cultural heritage undermines community identity, weakens national legitimacy, and leaves vulnerable populations more susceptible to coercion and extremist narratives. In the Pacific, where memory and identity are inseparable from sovereignty, neglecting CPP risks ceding both moral and strategic ground to competitors who understand the power of culture in shaping influence. What is at stake is not just history – it is the stability and trust upon which future alliances depend.

LTC Benjamin Roberts serves as a Heritage and Preservation Officer with the 351st Civil Affairs Command of the U.S. Army Reserve. In his civilian career, he is employed as a Senior Architectural Historian and Cultural Resources Planner with the Center for Environmental Management of Military Lands supporting Navy Region Hawaii’s Environmental Program at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. He has over 20 years of professional experience and extensive practice in project management, cultural resources identification, evaluation, and protection methods, geospatial analysis/GIS, and the protection of cultural property during armed conflict and natural disasters. His previous military assignments in the U.S. INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility include serving as Commander of Task Force RISEUP in Guam formed in response to Typhoon Mawar (2023), Interim Commander and Executive Officer of the 411th Engineer Battalion at Fort Shafter, Hawaii (2022-23), and Regional Team Leader for Task Force Oceania in support of U.S. Army Pacific (2021-22).

CPT Kat Slocum serves in the U.S. Army Reserve as a Heritage and Preservation Officer under the 412th Civil Affairs Battalion. In the Army, she has successfully led pre-deployment training and established Cultural Property Protection training material for use in the field. As a civilian, she works as a Cultural Resource Manager/Archaeologist at LMI working to support the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s efforts to deploy infrastructure, security, and surveillance along the U.S. Border. Along with military service and civilian employment, Kat is also a Fulbright Specialist currently assigned to assist with the protection of archaeological sites throughout Albania and the establishment of training material for security personnel. Previous experience includes multiple heritage partners- UNESCO, the F.B.I Art Crime Task Force, Homeland Security, the Center of Excellence for Stability Policing Units, Blue Shield, and the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative.

CPT Jessica L. Wagner is a Heritage and Preservation Officer with the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), the Director of Education for Smithsonian-Affiliate, The Durham Museum, and the Command Historian for the U.S. Army 353rd Civil Affairs Command. She has presented on the link between cultural property protection and humanitarian security with the U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, the University of Oxford, Harvard University, Central Michigan University, and the Institute for Holocaust Education. She has worked alongside the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative, UNESCO, Blue Shield International, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Stability and Human Affairs, the Hellenic Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center, and serves on the Board of Directors for the Sudan Heritage Preservation Council.

Main Image: Photo by Staff Sgt. Ashley Low, available via DVIDS. Soldiers from the 492nd Civil Affairs Detachment, U.S. Army Reserve, Arizona, and their Royal Thai Army counterparts stand for a photo during a cultural tour as part of Exercise Hanuman Guardian 2023 in Lop Buri, Thailand, July 16, 2023.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

17. Inside the clever marketing overhaul that turned the US Army into a recruitment powerhouse

Summary:

Amid global recruiting woes, the U.S. Army has become a model of success, enlisting over 62,000 recruits in 2025—its best year since 2019—thanks to a bold marketing overhaul. After a 2019 scandal, the Army created the Army Enterprise Marketing Office (AEMO) in Chicago, partnering with DDB to operate like a Fortune 500 firm. Civilian ad experts, data-driven storytelling, and revived branding, most notably the classic “Be All You Can Be” slogan, modernized its appeal. Campaigns now balance authenticity with cultural shifts, emphasizing service, opportunity, and lethality. The transformation shows how disciplined branding and creative storytelling can rebuild trust and boost enlistment.

Comment: Kudos to our Army and the Army Enterprise Marketing Office (AEMO) (which did not know existed). The following is a walk down memory lane for many of us with the timeline of Army themes and slogans. There are videos at the link. One thing I like is that they were not afraid to go back to the future to use what worked and determine that it is still relevant - Be All You Can Be. Hooah. Now for my first cup of coffee with the First Sergeant to do more before 0900 than most people do all day (though I wish I were on a drop zone and not sitting at desk!)

Inside the clever marketing overhaul that turned the US Army into a recruitment powerhouse - Monocle

monocle.com · Gregory Scruggs · November 6, 2025

https://monocle.com/affairs/defence/us-army-recruitment-marketing-ddb-aemo/

Home Inside the clever marketing overhaul that turned the US Army into a recruitment powerhouse

Defence
November 6, 2025
7 Min Read

While global militaries struggle to attract young recruits, the US Army is running a successful marketing operation from Chicago. The recruitment code has been cracked by enlisting ad executives and timeless messaging.

Though the US government crashed into a bruising shutdown at the end of its fiscal year on 30 September, one arm of Uncle Sam’s vast bureaucracy weathered the storm. The Army enlisted 62,050 recruits in the 12 months to September, its highest amount since 2019. That figure exceeded its 61,000-soldier target and marked the second year in a row in which the Army met its recruiting goal after falling short in 2022 and 2023.

Democratic nations are at a crossroads when it comes to staffing their armed forces, with Germany’s conscription debate taking centre stage in Europe. So what’s behind the success across the pond and why are more young Americans joining the Army than the Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps? The secret weapon is not, as some might think, the small but welcome wage bump but instead the Army’s advertising office.

Behind the camera: The US Army is working with ad agency DDB Chicago on its recruitment campaigns

The Army Enterprise Marketing Office (AEMO) is a creative agency born out of scandal. In 2019 the Department of Defense dissolved its marketing arm and cut ties with its old ad agency, McCann Worldgroup, after damning audits uncovered millions in wasted marketing dollars, alongside allegations of a romantic relationship between a US Army marketing director and a McCann staffer.

The Pentagon cleaned house, keeping only one employee from the disgraced department, and signed a 10-year, $4bn (€3.4bn) contract with ad agency DDB Chicago. DDB swiftly designated a group of specialists to work exclusively with the Army. The newly constituted AEMO set up shop a few blocks away in the global advertising hub of the Windy City and embarked on a novel hiring spree. First, it recruited seasoned marketing and advertising executives from the private sector. Second, it opened up some 50 internal jobs in marketing and behavioural economics – career paths that previously did not exist in the Army.

“We’re bringing best practices from the business world into the Army and operating more like a Fortune 500 company,” says deputy chief marketing officer Ignatios Mavridis, a former Johnson & Johnson associate marketing director with no prior military experience.

While DDB is plugged in to the latest trends in advertising and can keep abreast of what’s hot at the Cannes Lions, AEMO’s in-house team sits in on creative briefs to ensure that the Army experience is portrayed accurately and retains sole access to military data for prediction and modelling. With a central location in Chicago, the combined force of DDB and AEMO can easily reach bases around the world to gather footage, photos and interviews for campaigns, which tell the stories of real soldiers engaged in real-world training.

“We work closely with AEMO to make sure that we’re capturing the Army experience accurately within our concepts,” says Team DDB’s chief creative officer John Carstens. “Not just the technical aspects but the feeling of getting on the bus to basic training, jumping out of an aeroplane or creating the bonds that can only come from accomplishing difficult things together. So I’d say that we’re battle buddies, not just marketing partners.”

The unconventional new marketing agency did initially have its sceptics, however, including US Army Recruiting Command’s Colonel Che Arosemena. When the old method was disbanded, he worried that “we were pulling apart something relatively understood and operationalised and now we have to relearn”. But Team DDB and AEMO won him over, especially through their signature move thus far: a comprehensive brand refresh with a new logo and the relaunch of Be All You Can Be, a popular military-recruitment tagline from the 1980s and 1990s.

Army messaging has long been a bellwether of the national mood and the agency isn’t immune to this decade’s whipsaw changes in US public opinion and political directives. Its 2021 campaign, “The Calling”, with animated ads, including one featuring a soldier with two mothers, reflected Biden-era cultural sensitivities that some critics thought had run amok. Amid a conservative backlash reflected by the election of Donald Trump and a slew of executive orders on culture war issues, a new Army Special Forces ad this year, “Generation”, harkens to the Second World War and the Greatest Generation, while a regular Army ad, “Own the Night”, showcases soldiers’ night-vision capabilities with an emphasis on “lethality” – a favoured priority of defence secretary Pete Hegseth.

Setting the scene: Working on the look of the campaign

Standby: Fatigues on the stylist’s chair, waiting for their next scene

The Army is officially apolitical and Mavridis declined to say whether “The Calling” could run today but argued for a throughline between radically different messages airing just a few years apart. “Our campaigns are grounded in American ideals of opportunity, service, resilience and the belief that anyone can rise to their full potential,” he says. “Attracting qualified, motivated, talented prospects is the driving force behind all our campaigns.”

Present and correct: Ensuring uniforms are camera-ready and army-standard

Attention grabbing: A soldier stands ready for filming

Col Arosemena knows the value of a resonant campaign. Two decades ago, as a young captain recruiting in Bronx secondary schools during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (he served multiple deployments in both), he relied on Yo Soy El Army, a Spanish-language campaign designed to connect with New York’s Latino communities.

“Those marketing materials changed the narrative and started to open some doors for us,” he tells Monocle. It’s a lesson that he now passes on to today’s recruiters, urging them to treat the Army’s sales pitch as strategically as any field manoeuvre. “If the recruiting force doesn’t understand what the marketing capability is, they’ll be less effective in the field.”

As Washington remains mired in partisan deadlock, the Army’s marketing revolution stands out as one of the few government success stories – a reminder that even the most traditional institutions can rebrand themselves when they start thinking like a business and, crucially, when they remember how to tell a good story.

—

A history of Army messaging

1917-1945: I want you for US Army

A bearded Uncle Sam dressed in red, white and blue pointing directly at the viewer, designed by James Montgomery Flagg, debuted as an iconic recruitment poster during the First World War in 1917. It returned to service in the Second World War.

1950s-1971: Choice, not chance

With a national draft still in place for men between the ages of 18 to 34 during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, this three-word slogan implied that those who enlisted would have more say in their Army career than those who were conscripted.

1971-1973: Today’s Army wants to join you

The transition to an all-volunteer military led to several iterations of slogans, starting with this message that puts the Army and the enlistee on a level playing field.

1973-1980: Join the people who’ve joined the Army

A clunky slogan by NW Ayer as the all-volunteer force still sought its groove.

1980-2001: Be all that you can be

The catchiest Army slogan was coined by copywriter Earl Carter with an infectious jingle by Jake Holmes.

2001-2006: Army of one

A short-lived attempt to reach Gen Xers with an individualistic message was deemed contrary to the Army’s spirit of teamwork.

2006-2018: Army strong

The Army’s second-best slogan of the modern era, with ads that issued a challenge: “There’s strong – and there’s Army strong.”

2018-2023: Warriors wanted

Tapping into the Army’s warrior ethos, this campaign also tinkered with the confusing interrogative “What’s Your Warrior?”

18. Not a tactical ploy, Trump’s G2 framework represents a fundamental shift in US perception towards China

Summary:

Trump’s embrace of a “G2” framework with China marks a deeper U.S. shift toward acknowledging Beijing as a co-equal superpower, not a rival. His conciliatory rhetoric and trade concessions—tariff cuts, tech export pauses, and legitimizing parity—reflect both strategic vulnerability and domestic change. The RAND Corporation now advocates coexistence and acceptance of China’s sphere of influence, while new polling shows most Americans prefer cooperation over confrontation. This evolving mindset erodes the long-held bipartisan consensus to contain China, undermines U.S. alliances, and forces India to rethink its Indo-Pacific strategy, as Washington moves from competition toward managed bipolarity with Beijing.

Excerpts:

Ever since Trump came out swinging with the G2 framework, a discarded concept from the Obama years, the current consensual position among Indian strategic community is Trump’s invocation of the concept was a superficial ploy to appeal to Xi’s vanity ahead of a crucial meeting, and that the US-China deal engineered by the two leaders is little more than a tactical pause because the great power rivalry is too entrenched, and possibilities of cooperation are remote.

In this piece, I want to push back against this notion a little.

My first contention is that in invoking ‘G2’, a term that carries historic baggage, Trump wasn’t playing the tough real estate tycoon from Manhattan who flatters to deceive his adversary in a tricky negotiation.

On the contrary, having underestimated the leverage China has over the US and bungling up the summit lead up with a chaotic mix of threats and climbdowns, Trump was trying to pander to Xi’s ego from a sense of vulnerability. His reference to the G2 framework came from a position of weakness and an acknowledgement that the US has lost the trade war and must sue for peace.

Comment: No the G2 does not mean the intelligence shop. Seriously, are we accepting the PRC as a peer power and are we considering "sharing power" with it? What does sit mean to "share power" with the PRC? The author offers a brutal critique of the G2 concept and our POTUS.

Not a tactical ploy, Trump’s G2 framework represents a fundamental shift in US perception towards China

Washington now accepts Beijing as a peer power in sharing responsibility for global leadership, complicating India’s grand strategy.

firstpost.com ·

Sreemoy Talukdar • November 6, 2025, 11:59:15 IST

https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/not-a-tactical-ploy-trumps-g2-framework-represents-a-fundamental-shift-in-us-perception-towards-china-13948330.html

I didn’t get the chance to sit through all 73 minutes of Donald Trump’s interview by CBS (the channel aired a 60-minute version of it, chopping off parts such as where Trump talks about Pakistan’s testing of nuclear weapons) but what I did instead was read the full transcript of the exchange.

What struck me was the US president’s rambling incoherence. Journalist Norah O’Donnell was having a hard time steering the conversation towards any meaningful direction, as Trump lapsed into a stream of consciousness monologues, frequently veered off-topic and kept alternating between airing of grievances, fanciful boasts and blame-Biden syndrome.

This, at an interview where he came prepared. His idea behind it was to sell the meeting with Xi Jinping as a ‘deal-making masterstroke’.

Now, I am not a psychoanalyst, but it is quite clear that the US president is suffering from age-related cognitive decline. Rhetorical bombast may be enough to spin any development as a ‘massive win’ to his doting MAGA cult, but it is evident that Trump’s impulsivity, inconsistency, unpredictability, incoherence and unreliability are systematically eroding American influence and handing China a crucial advantage.

Ironically, Trump instinctively grasps this changing power equation — even if he is incapable of deducing the causality — and his syrupy courting of the Chinese president during the Busan summit and casting it within the ‘G2’ framework springs directly from this intuitive assessment.

I’ll quote an exchange from the CBS interview to clarify my point. To a question on the US president’s meeting with the Chinese president, Trump replies:

“Well, first of all, we get along great, and we always really have. We had the COVID moment, which was not — attractive as far as I was concerned. I wasn’t so happy. But outside of that, we have always had a great relationship. He’s a powerful man. He’s a strong man, a very powerful leader.”

“And — we’ve always — had the best of relationships, probably the best of — I could — I think I could speak for him, just about as good as it gets from his standpoint and from my standpoint. And having that is important because of the power of the two countries.”

Trump’s public acknowledgement of the structural parity – a concession that Beijing sought for decades – has repercussions for middle powers such as India, because even a limited rapprochement between the United States and China directly impacts India’s regional security matrix. To add to this complexity, Trump has a unique way of dealing with strong adversaries who cannot be bullied or intimidated with bluster.

By now, it has been established that he often demands greater tributes and compliance from America’s allies and partners while courting adversaries or cutting unilateral deals with them on the side. Indians might wonder why they are still at the receiving end of an extra 25 per cent tariff for buying Russian oil while China, the largest buyer of Russian fuel, remains the subject of Trump’s intense flattery. The answer is simple. India is not powerful enough in Trump’s eyes.

This demonstration of asymmetric treatment that favours the bigger power is symptomatic of Trump’s foreign policy. Take Nexperia, the Dutch semiconductor company owned by China’s Wingtech that has become a symbol of a great power game and the new bipolar world ruled by the law of the fish.

The Dutch government seized control of the Chinese-owned chipmaker in September 2025, citing national security concerns and “serious governance shortcomings” under an obscure Cold War-era law from 1952 that splintered the company and hiked up geopolitical tension between the Netherlands and China.

Court documents indicate this action followed significant pressure and warnings from US officials that the Netherlands subsidiary will be added to a trade backlist unless the Chinese management and its CEO Zhang Xuezheng was removed. The Dutch authorities were acting under US pressure.

In retaliation, reports SCMP, “Beijing put restrictions on what Nexperia products could be shipped out of the country, where 70 per cent of the company’s chips — vital to car manufacturing — are processed and tested, sending panic through European industry.”

The Chinese commerce ministry on Tuesday blamed the Netherlands for the “turmoil and chaos in the global semiconductor supply chain,” and said it “should bear full responsibility” for the crisis.

Dutch hands were forced by an American law, the ‘updated 50 per cent subsidiary rule’ in late September that mandated expanding export restrictions to companies 50 per cent owned by blacklisted entities like Wingtech. Following the Trump-Xi meeting, however, Washington agreed to suspend the implementation of the new rule for one year. The pause, ostensibly to ensure a solution to an immediate restoration of the auto chip supply chain that also affects America’s automobile industry, effectively threw the Netherlands, America’s NATO allies, under the bus.

Beijing announced plans to resume chip exports from Nexperia China, provided the Netherlands surrendered executive control and reversed its seizure, or reach an agreement with China.

As the Dutch grapple with the legal and geopolitical consequences of its actions, the sequence of events demonstrates how Trump prioritised American interests and great power convenience over the interests of its treaty ally that may put thousands of European jobs on the line.

Nexperia China will resume global supply of 6 BILLION COMPONENTS PER MONTH with 100% China sourced wafers.

Contract with Nexperia China or close down industrial production.

Payment in RMB only.

Bye, Europe. You lose. Again. https://t.co/XspznNTC85 pic.twitter.com/Ldguzj95Dr

— Kathleen Tyson (@Kathleen_Tyson_) November 2, 2025

Trump’s foreign policy frequently appears shaped by business interests and hyper transactionalism rather than strategic coherence. Take the case of US tech giant Nvidia, and its advanced Blackwell AI chips. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who’s struggling to regain a foothold in the Chinese market, relentlessly lobbies Trump with whom he has a direct line of contact.

Just before the US-China summit in Busan, Trump told his advisers that acting on the Nvidia CEO’s request, he wants to discuss with Xi the sales of US tech firm’s new generation AI chips to China. Notably, after the Trump administration granted export licenses for certain Nvidia and AMD chips to China in exchange for 15 per cent of the revenues ignoring national security concerns, China still went ahead and blocked the sales. Nvidia’s market share went down from 95 per cent to 0 per cent.

According to the Wall Street Journal that broke the story, “greenlighting the export of Nvidia’s Blackwell chips would be a seismic policy shift potentially giving China, the US’s biggest geopolitical competitor, a technological accelerant… As they prepared to meet Xi, top officials including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Trump the sales would threaten national security, saying they would boost China’s AI data-centre capabilities and backfire on the US.”

Trump ultimately refrained from picking up the topic during the October 30 meeting, but it goes to show how the US president is not averse to using even national security as a bargaining chip for ‘deals’ and is totally oblivious to the dangers of his mercantilism yielding significant strategic advantages for China.

Ever since Trump came out swinging with the G2 framework, a discarded concept from the Obama years, the current consensual position among Indian strategic community is Trump’s invocation of the concept was a superficial ploy to appeal to Xi’s vanity ahead of a crucial meeting, and that the US-China deal engineered by the two leaders is little more than a tactical pause because the great power rivalry is too entrenched, and possibilities of cooperation are remote.

In this piece, I want to push back against this notion a little.

My first contention is that in invoking ‘G2’, a term that carries historic baggage, Trump wasn’t playing the tough real estate tycoon from Manhattan who flatters to deceive his adversary in a tricky negotiation.

On the contrary, having underestimated the leverage China has over the US and bungling up the summit lead up with a chaotic mix of threats and climbdowns, Trump was trying to pander to Xi’s ego from a sense of vulnerability. His reference to the G2 framework came from a position of weakness and an acknowledgement that the US has lost the trade war and must sue for peace.

I’ll quote one exchange from the CBS interview before explaining my contention further.

“CBS: Our own intelligence agencies say the Chinese have infiltrated parts of the American power grid and our water systems. They steal American intellectual property and Americans’ personal information. They bought American farmland. How big of a threat is China?

TRUMP: It’s like everybody else. We’re a threat to them too. Many of the things that you say, we do to them. Look, this is a very competitive world, especially when it comes to China and the US And — we’re always watching them, and they’re always watching us. In the meantime, I think we get along very well, and I think it’s — I think we can be bigger, better, and stronger by working with them as opposed to just– knocking them out…”

From recognising China as a “pacing challenge” that poses the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security", the Trump administration is pivoting towards cooperation with China, reading down the strategic threat, and signalling that it is ready to draw a ‘new type of major country relationship’ that Xi Jinping, then a vice-president, proposed during a visit to Washington in February 2012.

Regardless of the spin that Trump gives to the outcome of the Busan summit, fact remains that China secured substantial material gains in the negotiations that demonstrated its newfound leverage. Trump started the trade war, escalated without a backup plan, and in absence of allies whom he had alienated with tariffs and extractive deals, found himself outfoxed by China’s supply chain warfare via rare earths, a critical commodity over which Beijing enjoys unilateral control.

Conversely, American soybeans can easily be replaced by Brazilian or Argentinian harvest, as Trump found out rather painfully when American farmers faced steep losses and farm bankruptcies. Trump also overestimated the power of the American consumer. Massive though the market is, the plan to twist China’s hands and harm its exports-dependent economy by imposing huge tariffs failed to bring desired results. Why?

As Nikkei Asia points out in a report, though China’s exports to the US for January through September copped a 16.8 per cent hit year on year, “its overall global exports rose 6.1 per cent. Overall US imports between January and July climbed 11.5 per cent, suggesting that the tariffs have so far only accelerated the routing of Chinese products through Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The US trade deficit for that period widened 23 per cent on the year, while Chinese production growth continues to exceed 5 per cent.”

What this tells us is that China was prepared for Trump’s assault and had planned for a protracted war of attrition over trade. Taking lessons from 2018, when Trump’s actions caught Beijing off-guard, Xi identified Chinese vulnerabilities and through patient planning, worked to blunt ‘chokepoints’ where Washington enjoyed leverages.

Wall Street Journal’s Jonathan Cheng and Jason Douglas point out that “China has shifted its manufacturing model toward components and not just finished products—a change that has more deeply embedded the country in global supply chains.” Consequently, “almost any manufactured goods you buy, no matter where it comes from, has some exposure to Chinese supply chains.”

This indicates Xi’s doctrine of strategic endurance, the method of sustaining a drawn-out strategic competition for long-term dominance. The results are evident.

Trump reduced tariffs on Chinese goods from 57 per cent to 47 per cent — a 10-percentage-point cut that leaves India with the highest tariffs at 50 per cent — while abandoning his threat to impose 100 per cent tariffs starting November 1.

Trump made concessions on critical technology access, signalling openness to Chinese purchases of Nvidia microchips and pausing rules that would have blacklisted majority-owned subsidiaries of Chinese companies. Above all, China secured from Trump’s G2 rhetoric the conferral of ‘political legitimacy’ as a co-equal superpower.

On the other hand, China conceded nothing on Russian oil imports as the largest buyer, the Taiwan issue wasn’t even discussed – a major geopolitical concession by Trump – and by threatening export controls on materials critical to American defence and technology manufacturing, Beijing forced Washington into negotiations from a position of strength. Rare earths and critical minerals proved a powerful deterrent to which the Trump administration had no answer.

As China expert and former US national security council member Rush Dohsi points out on X, “We are back to something slightly worse than the status quo ex ante, and we took a disastrous path back to it that revealed our own weakness.”

My second contention is, in referring to the US-China meeting within a G2 framework that explicitly acknowledges China as a functional equal to the US and a peer power in sharing responsibility for global leadership, Trump wasn’t acting on his whims and fancy but reflecting a sea change in American perception towards China.

The theory, that the last bipartisan consensus in America revolves on China as a primary military, economic and strategic competitor to the US, should be put to rest. I will cite two indicators. The first one is a recent paper by RAND Corporation, a think tank that receives primary funding from different arms of the US government including the Pentagon. The paper titled ‘Stabilising the US-China Rivalry, published on October 14 this year, calls for a new ‘modus vivendi’ with China, and among other recommendations, suggests that the “Taiwan issue should focus on creating the maximum incentive for Beijing to pursue gradual approaches toward unification.”

On ‘sphere of influence’, a concept intrinsic to G2, the authors write, “Of course, just as the Monroe Doctrine justified a series of US interventions in the Western Hemisphere and was not popular with many countries, China’s expansion of its strategic space is likely to face similar criticism for understandable reasons. But China’s seeking of a sphere of influence in these terms does not necessarily imply intentions to pursue large-scale military adventurism.”

This is akin to giving a clean chit to China, and a tacit licence for unification efforts.

My second citation is a public opinion survey by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs. The survey results, published on October 28, 2025, show that Americans are reversing the course on US-China competition. It finds that “bipartisan embrace of US-China competition no longer holds among the public” and “driven by shifts among Democrats and Independents, a majority of Americans now favour a policy of cooperation and engagement with Beijing, oppose higher tariffs, and oppose cuts to bilateral trade.”

Some key findings are: “A majority of Americans (53 per cent) now say the US should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China, up from 40 per cent in 2024. Around two-thirds of Democrats (66 per cent) prefer the US to undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China rather than actively work to limit China’s influence, an increase of 19 percentage points from 2024. Just a third of Republicans (33 per cent) agree.”

Alongside, the US-China relationship is widely viewed as the “most consequential bilateral relationship in the world”, and “when asked to rate the global influence of the US and China on a 0 to 10 scale, Americans see the two nations as the two most globally influential countries in the world.”

There is a Republican-Democrat divide among perception towards China, going by the survey, “Americans are less likely to view China’s development as a world power to pose a critical threat to the US today (50 per cent) than in 2023 (58 per cent). That decline has occurred across partisan affiliations.”

This poses critical challenges for India. If the Americans accept Beijing as an equal partner rather than a competitor, then India’s grand strategy — along with Quad, Indo-Pacific strategic architecture — predicated on the assumption that America would remain committed to containing Chinese dominance in Asia, begins to fracture and must be fundamentally remade.

A bipolar framework where China shares America’s global decision-making power also poses a challenge to India’s foreign policy that is anchored in promoting a multipolar world order. Policy wonks in New Delhi must head back to the drawing board in search of new thinking.

(Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)

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firstpost.com · November 6, 2025

19. Pentagon’s ‘One Boss’ Fix: The Acquisition Shake-Up America Actually Needs

Summary:

A leaked Pentagon reform plan proposes a “one boss” system to fix America’s broken weapons procurement process. A single senior leader would oversee related programs, eliminate redundant reviews, cap costly change orders, and penalize contractor delays. By paying earlier and streamlining oversight, smaller firms could compete, revitalizing the defense industrial base. The goal is speed, scale, and fiscal discipline that treats industry as a true partner focused on solving problems, not managing bureaucracy. Success depends on strict oversight, replacing outdated procedures, and bipartisan congressional support. If implemented, the reform could save billions, accelerate innovation, and strengthen U.S. deterrence through timely capability delivery.

Comment: is this the right fix? Can there be an effective fix?

Pentagon’s ‘One Boss’ Fix: The Acquisition Shake-Up America Actually Needs

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Neal Urwitz · November 6, 2025

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/pentagons-one-boss-fix-the-acquisition-shake-up-america-actually-needs/

Key Points and Summary – America wastes time and billions on weapons that arrive late and over budget.

-A leaked Pentagon plan would flip incentives: empower a single senior leader over interrelated programs, kill unjustified reviews, cap change orders, and penalize contractor delays.

(Sept.9, 2011) The Virginia-class submarine Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) California (SSN 781) gets underway from Naval Station Norfolk to conduct weapons systems acceptance trials. California is the eighth Virginia-class submarine and is scheduled to be commissioned Oct. 29. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William Jamieson/Released)

-By paying earlier and trimming red tape, smaller firms can compete, rebuilding a stagnant industrial base.

-The aim is speed, scale, and cost discipline—treating industry as a true partner: “Here’s the problem—solve it.”

-Success will demand relentless oversight, clear replacement policies (not add-ons), and sustained congressional pressure. If implemented, this reform could restore deterrence by delivering capability on time.

Credit Where It’s Due: The Acquisition Reform America Needs

I’m a Democrat, and I’ve made no secret of my myriad disappointments with the Trump Administration’s approach to national security. President Trump’s decision to alienate India remains a generational mistake. It’s addressing crime by deploying the National Guard is ineffective, expensive, and dangerous. The President’s flip-flopping, Putin-courting approach to ending the war in Ukraine has been downright embarrassing.

Yet I’m an American before I’m a Democrat, and the difference between a patriot and a partisan is the capacity to root for initiatives that are good for the country to succeed, even if the “other team” gets the credit. If a leaked memo is to be believed, the Pentagon’s proposed sweeping changes to how America buys the weapons, platforms, and technologies that ensure it can win its wars is just such an initiative. Democrats and Republicans alike should vocally support it. Indeed, my fellow Democrats must ensure that something so good for our nation rises above partisanship; we don’t want to be on the wrong side of it simply because President Trump supports it.

Constellation-Class Frigate U.S. Navy. Image Credit: Industry Handout.

The current state of affairs is downright dangerous. It squanders tens of billions of dollars every year and, worse yet, invites war with our adversaries; every dollar wasted is a dollar not spent deterring aggressive, malicious adversaries. The current system doubles or even triples the cost of major projects. Just one ship, the USS Gerald Ford, cost $13.3 billion. It was $2.8 billion over budget and six years late. The U.S. Navy’s constant tinkering with the Constellation Class frigate (it has ordered over 500 alterations and counting) has doubled the cost of the first ship in the class. Yet these are a drop in the bucket compared to budget busters like the F-35, which will ultimately cost $2 trillion, or the projected $60 billion for the Littoral Combat Ship disaster.

Ironically, even our attempts to root out waste have proven wasteful. They’ve amounted to layers of bureaucratic hurdles, all of which involve squadrons of attorneys who do not work for free. Department of Defense (DOD) attorneys make over $150,000 a year. Defense contractors hire attorneys charging $1500 an hour (or more) and pass those costs to the taxpayer.

Littoral Combat Ship Deck National Security Journal Image by Stephen Silver.

If America is going to spend $900 billion a year – or roughly 3% of our economy – on defense, it stands to reason we should spend that money well. Right now, we’re not.

It’s not just the financial cost; it’s the time overruns, too. The first ship of the Constellation Class will be at least three years late. The fourth block of the Virginia Class submarine is also three years behind schedule. It’s not just the Navy; the fourth block of the F-35 is running five years behind. Nor is it just military hardware; software reviews can take three years, which, given the pace of tech sector innovation, means programs are often obsolete before DOD has even finished installing them. When I worked for the Secretary of the Navy, ancient software made my computer a glorified paperweight.

Getting the three million people (uniformed and civilian) who work for our military invested in a new system is clearly the hard part, but the proposed reforms are exactly what we need. That is why the new plan will flip incentives on their head.

(July 28, 2017) An F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23 approaches the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) for an arrested landing. The aircraft carrier is underway conducting test and evaluation operations.(U.S. Navy photo by Erik Hildebrandt/Released) 170728-N-UZ648-161

Join the conversation:

http://www.navy.mil/viewGallery.asp

http://www.facebook.com/USNavy

http://www.twitter.com/USNavy

http://navylive.dodlive.mil

http://pinterest.com

https://plus.google.com

Right now, everyone’s incentive is to make sure there is no mistake on their piece of the pie, regardless of the impact that has upon the entire project. The new system, according to an internal memo reported by Breaking Defense, would instead set up what reformers have long argued for: a single, senior leader in charge of interrelated projects, giving them substantial power and latitude, and judging them by the speed, scale, and cost-efficiency with which they get the job done. That person could put a stop to all of the change orders that balloon costs and delay projects, as he could see what they’re doing to the project as a whole. After all, he would have the incentive to do so.

The proposed plan also enables us to get rid of decades of bad habits. The memo states “every process, board, and review must justify its existence.” This new system, then, would start with the assumption that reviews and their associated costs (in money and time) are unnecessary, rather than the existing assumption that the more reviews we run, the less likely we are to make a costly mistake. Such thinking meant we thought we were being prudent each time we added another step in the process, but the cumulative impact proved we were being anything but.

The hope is that eliminating all of these steps will also eliminate the “valley of death” for smaller companies that want to challenge entrenched primes for big contracts. While bigger companies can wait years without revenue from a given project, ambitious young companies cannot, so they don’t even bid. If those younger companies can start seeing revenue earlier, they suddenly become viable contenders for major projects. This strategy, then, could reintroduce competition into the defense industrial base after decades of defense industry consolidation.

Further, the memo recognizes that while the Pentagon has scored countless own goals, partners in the defense industrial base have also often failed to hold up their end of the bargain. The lack of competition has meant incumbents on major projects haven’t felt much pressure to improve performance, even when that performance was poor. After all, no one would be able to take the contract from them, and DOD couldn’t cancel a project without taking a lot of blame itself. The memo, however, tries to give DOD targeted leverage over laggards. Specifically, it allows DOD to “proportionally” penalize contractor delays, and the prospect of losing money has a way of focusing the mind.

Perhaps most excitingly, the new system could ultimately treat building weapons systems as a true public-private partnership. It could move us from the current model, where DOD tells contractors exactly what they want, to a model where DOD tells contractors “here’s the problem we want to solve – tell us how you’d get it done as quickly and cheaply as possible.” This is the public-private partnership model Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson argue for in Abundance, and it works in states across the country. We Democrats do not have to betray any principles to support it.

What Needs to Happen

It’s far too early to declare “mission accomplished.” While I hope Secretary Hegseth will say the right things during his upcoming speech on acquisition reform, seeing these reforms through will require relentless oversight. It is easy for people who have been purchasing weapons the same way for 30 years to fall into bad habits. It will require detailed new policies and procedures that leave no room for ambiguity and that will replace (rather than simply sit on top of) the old ones.

Most of all, it will require congressional and public pressure and support so entrenched interests cannot gum up the works. Given that the Department of Defense needs Congress to apply relentless pressure on stragglers to make these reforms stick, the Department would be wise to overturn its policy restricting who can speak with congressional offices.

I’d rather be a patriot than a partisan, and, with credit to the late Senator John McCain, I’d rather lose an election than a war. If that means supporting a policy from an administration I vehemently disagree with, so be it. America’s defense acquisition needs this reform, regardless of who is behind it.

About the Author: Neal Urwitz

Neal Urwitz is CEO of Enduring Cause Strategies. He served as a speechwriter for and advisor to the Secretary of the Navy from 2021-2023.

In this article:

Written By Neal Urwitz

Neal Urwitz served as a speechwriter for and advisor to the Secretary of the Navy from 2021-2023. He is currently a public relations executive in Washington.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Neal Urwitz · November 6, 2025

20. 6 Most Successful Insurgencies in Military History

Excerpts- Spoiler Alert:

1. Haitian Revolution

2. Spanish Guerrilla War Against Napoleon

3. Great Arab Revolt of WWI

4. Yugoslav Partisans of WWII

5. Triumph of the Viet Minh

6. Afghan Mujahideen Against the Soviets

Comment: Revolution, resistance, and insurgency? Which categories do these "insurgencies" fit in? One size does not fit all? Whenever I read about Napoleon and the Spanish "Guerrilla War" I am reminded that Clausewitz thought and wrote about more tuna just conventional force on force war: “In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.” Clausewitz, 1832.

6 Most Successful Insurgencies in Military History | TheCollector

flip.it · Patrick Bodovitz

https://www.thecollector.com/most-successful-insurgencies-military-history/?utm

These six successful insurgencies from military history have captivated audiences fascinated by how weaker powers defeat stronger ones.

Published: Nov 6, 2025written by Patrick Bodovitz, BA Political Science/History, MA Peace & Conflict Resolution

Statistically, it is unlikely that an insurgency can defeat a conventional military without major outside support or a sanctuary. Despite this, insurgencies have proven to be successful in many cases and can capture the world’s attention. Read on to learn more about some of the most successful insurgencies in military history.

1. Haitian Revolution

Painting of the Haitian attack against French settlements, 1819. Source: National Museum of African American History & Culture

After its conquest by Spain in the 1500s, the island of Hispaniola became a colony of multiple European powers for around 300 years. France and Spain imported thousands of Africans to work in gold mines and sugar farms as slaves. By 1789, France controlled half of the island, which they named Saint-Domingue. The colony had a population of 560,000, most of whom were slaves. The horrific living conditions they endured made a revolt inevitable.

The revolutionary French government in 1793 banned slavery and granted citizenship to mixed-race Haitians. Toussaint Louverture, a wealthy mixed-race landowner, took control over much of the colony and agreed to keep it under French rule with limited autonomy. However, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte reinstituted slavery and launched a military expedition to oust Toussaint in 1802. Over 20,000 French troops arrived and began fighting Toussaint’s militias. They captured him and he subsequently died in French captivity in April 1803.

The Haitians continued to fight under the leadership of men such as Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who staged a hit-and-run campaign against French forces. French forces suffered staggering casualties from Haitian ambushes and yellow fever. They could beat the Haitians in pitched battles, but they struggled to track them down in the jungles. By 1804, French troops were bottled up by Haitian rebels and the British Navy in the last colonial outpost at Gonaïves. When they surrendered, Haiti gained its independence at the cost of over 200,000 people.

2. Spanish Guerrilla War Against Napoleon

French troops executing Spanish rebels during the Madrid Uprising against the French occupation. Painting by Francisco de Goya, 1814. Source: Museo del Prado

In 1807, Emperor Napoleon dispatched an army to invade Portugal through Spain. The French military presence in Spain was unpopular among many Spaniards, and in May 1808, residents of Madrid staged a revolt against French forces. The brutal suppression of this revolt led to the rise of a widespread insurgency throughout Spain. French forces struggled to handle the rise of ambushes and raids on their outposts and they lashed out at the civilian population.

In July 1808, Napoleon imprisoned King Charles IV of Spain and his son Ferdinand VII and installed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. The regular army struggled to resist French occupation, and many Spanish peasants and soldiers took to the countryside to fight as insurgents without a higher military command structure. They called themselves guerrilleros, coining the term guerrilla warfare.

The insurgents and Spanish regulars who refused to serve King Joseph received assistance from the British, who hoped to push the French army out of the Iberian peninsula entirely. As the French occupation grew more brutal, more Spaniards joined the revolt, threatening French supply lines.

By 1812, it was estimated that close to 40,000 guerrilleros were fighting the French. Their attacks grew more bold and Spanish regulars fought under the Duke of Wellington’s command. By 1814, British, Spanish, and Portuguese forces pushed the French out of the peninsula and invaded France. While the guerrilleros did not win the war single-handedly, their actions proved vital in destabilizing French rule in Spain.

3. Great Arab Revolt of WWI

Colonel T.E. Lawrence, a British officer who helped lead the Hashemite Revolt, pictured here after WWI ended, 1919. Source: National Army Museum, London

Before the First World War began, Arab tribes in the Mashriq began advocating for more freedom from the Ottoman Empire. After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, Arab nationalists began demanding more sovereignty and equality to Turks. They lacked the force to be able to get what they wanted, but many hoped that the British and French would help them realize their ambitions once the war broke out.

Starting in 1914, British officials in Egypt began surreptitiously communicating with the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, and his son Abdullah. Hussein originally sided with the Ottomans but decided to support the Entente, believing that it would create an Arab empire in the Hejaz.

Hussein ordered members of his family to lead Arab warriors in raids against Turkish outposts throughout the Arabian peninsula. The raiders struggled due to a lack of munitions and the unwillingness of many Arab soldiers within the Ottoman ranks to desert. However, by 1916, several important population centers, such as Ta’if and Mecca, were free of Ottoman control. Later that year, Hussein was joined by British Captain T.E. Lawrence.

Lawrence was sent along with other Anglo-French officers by his commanders to liaise with the Arab rebels. He managed to convince the different Arab leaders to work together and coordinate their actions with the Entente. Instead of marching on Medina, Lawrence and Hussein took their forces north along the Hejaz railway towards Aqaba. By 1918, they pushed into Syria and helped destroy the remaining Ottoman forces. While the aftermath of the war saw more conflict and turmoil, the Great Arab Revolt was one of the most successful insurgencies of WWI.

4. Yugoslav Partisans of WWII

Yugoslav partisans from Tito’s army with an American-supplied M3 Stuart tank, 1945. Source: The Online Tank Museum

The brutal Axis occupations of East Asia, North Africa, and Europe during World War II encouraged mass resistance among occupied populations. When Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary carved up the Balkans and sought to break up Yugoslavia, they created a massive resistance movement that undermined Axis control. The Yugoslav Partisan Army, led by Josip Broz Tito, became one of the most successful insurgent movements of the Second World War.

Following their seizure of Yugoslavia, several Axis nations broke up Yugoslavia while creating puppet governments in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and elsewhere in the region. The brutality of the Axis occupiers not only reopened sectarian divisions; it also led to large numbers of Yugoslavs to resist. Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party, began organizing people into a coalition of resistance groups. They fought against Serbian and Croatian collaborator militias as well as the Serbian Royalist Chetniks, who also despised the Axis occupiers.

Throughout the war, Tito’s Partisans fought the Axis armies and the Chetniks in a series of brutal clashes. They withstood repeated offensives and grew to over 650,000 men and women by 1945. Allied support proved crucial in ensuring they could dominate rival factions’ struggle. By the time the Soviets invaded Yugoslavia, the Partisans became Yugoslavia’s regular military and enabled Tito to become the head of state after the war. Unlike many other partisan movements in WWII, Tito’s army had access to heavy weapons from the Western Allies, meaning that they could launch major offensives against Axis forces and the Chetniks.

5. Triumph of the Viet Minh

Vietnamese communist troops raising their flag over the French command bunker at Dien Bien Phu, 1954. Source: Southeast Asia Globe

Tito’s accomplishments in defeating the Axis in Yugoslavia during WWII were mirrored in the French colony of Indochina by Ho Chi Minh and his fellow communists of the League for Independence of Vietnam. Ho was a longtime Communist who failed to achieve Vietnamese statehood at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Afterwards, he began forming an underground movement aimed at overthrowing French colonial rule and creating a communist republic. His plans were put on hold by Japan’s conquest of Indochina.

During the Second World War, Ho and his comrades organized a militia in the jungles in northern Vietnam to fight the French and Japanese forces. He had support from the US, which wanted the Japanese out of southern Asia entirely. When the war ended, the Viet Minh began fighting the returning French authorities. Lacking heavy weapons, they launched a jungle-based insurgency. Ho aimed to sap France’s strength until his army, known as the Viet Minh, could overwhelm the French forces. By 1950, this plan was working as the People’s Republic of China and the USSR began providing substantial aid to the Viet Minh.

Ho’s military commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, began launching major offensives against French forces. His most successful operation was besieging the French Army garrison in the Dien Bien Phu valley. In four months, the Viet Minh destroyed a French force of 15,000 men and strengthened their hand at the negotiating table in Geneva. By 1954, French forces vacated Vietnam, leaving behind two Vietnamese states, including Ho’s communist republic in North Vietnam. North Vietnamese forces would eventually defeat South Vietnam and reunite in 1975 after ill-fated American military intervention in the Vietnam War.

6. Afghan Mujahideen Against the Soviets

Soviet sniper outpost in Afghanistan, 1988. Source: AP Photo

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the faltering communist government and suppress the Mujahideen insurgency. This marked the USSR’s only military intervention outside Europe and coincided with the decline of communism in the Eastern Bloc. Approximately 100,000 Soviet troops occupied major Afghan cities, leading to intense and prolonged conflict with Mujahideen fighters.

The war, lasting nearly a decade, resulted in the deaths of around one million people and left Afghanistan in ruins. Despite overwhelming firepower, the Soviets failed to crush the different Mujahideen bands, who operated with outside support and had sanctuaries in Pakistan or Iran. By using the terrain and taking advantage of the weakness of the Soviet Army’s weaker Afghan partner force, the Mujahideen was able to inflict heavy losses on the communist forces.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 precipitated a power vacuum, leading to civil unrest and the eventual rise of the Taliban in 1996. This conflict significantly strained the Soviet economy and military, contributing to the USSR’s collapse in 1991.

The invasion had profound long-term effects, destabilizing the region and fostering conditions that led to the rise of extremist groups. Unlike the postwar insurgencies such as the Baltic Forest Brothers in Eastern Europe against Soviet forces, the Mujahideen benefited from several advantages that made them almost impossible to defeat. When the Taliban used the same tactics against the NATO coalition later on, they managed to take back power from the Western-backed government in Kabul in 2021.

flip.it · Patrick Bodovitz

21. Douglas Kelley, The U.S. Army Psychiatrist Who Took His Own Life After Interviewing Nazis At Nuremberg

As we get ready to watch the new film on Nuremberg this might be a timely story to consider.

Douglas Kelley, The U.S. Army Psychiatrist Who Took His Own Life After Interviewing Nazis At Nuremberg

allthatsinteresting.com

By Austin Harvey | Edited By Cara Johnson

Published November 5, 2025

https://allthatsinteresting.com/douglas-kelley

Douglas Kelley spent the months leading up to the Nuremberg trials interviewing Nazis about their motivations for the Holocaust, an assignment that shook him to his core — and seemingly led to his suicide in 1958.

Public DomainDouglas Kelley, the psychiatrist who interviewed Nazi leaders at Nuremberg prison.

In the fall of 1945, a 33-year-old American psychiatrist named Douglas Kelley walked into Nuremberg Prison carrying a leather briefcase filled with Rorschach inkblot cards for what he would describe as an “astounding” task: examining the minds of the most notorious war criminals the world had ever known.

It was an unprecedented assignment in the history of psychiatry, and though it laid the groundwork for how criminals would be evaluated in the future, Kelley’s work was full of missteps and ethical conflicts.

Lines were blurred. As he attempted to understand the Nazi mind, he crossed professional boundaries. And despite detesting the crimes of people like Hermann Göring, Kelley ultimately determined that the prisoners he spoke to were indeed fit to stand trial. Indeed, they were just as “sane” as he was.

Still, what Douglas Kelley discovered in those prison cells would ultimately haunt him for the rest of his life — and lead to his death.

Douglas Kelley’s Life Before Nuremberg

Douglas Kelley was born in California in 1912. Brilliant and ambitious, he breezed through his education, earning his medical degree from the University of California and specializing in psychiatry and neurology. By his early 30s, he had already established himself as a rising star in American psychiatry, publishing research on brain chemistry and the physiological basis of mental illness.

When the U.S. Army needed psychiatric expertise for the upcoming Nuremberg trials, Kelley seemed like an ideal choice. He was scientifically rigorous, intellectually curious, and unburdened by prejudices that might cloud his judgment.

The Psychomycologist/TwitterDouglas Kelley smiling for a television camera.

The military wanted answers to fundamental questions: Were these Nazi leaders insane? What kind of minds could orchestrate the Holocaust? Could psychiatry explain the Third Reich?

Douglas Kelley arrived at Nuremberg in the autumn of 1945, just months after Germany’s defeat.

The prison holding the surviving Nazi officials was a grim stone building adjacent to the Palace of Justice where the trials would take place. Inside its cells sat Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Julius Streicher, and 18 other architects of Nazi terror, awaiting judgment for their crimes against humanity.

And it was up to Kelley to determine if they were mentally fit to stand trial.

Into The Minds Of Monsters

Sony PicturesRami Malek plays Douglas Kelley in the 2025 film Nuremberg.

Douglas Kelley’s approach was methodical and, by the standards of the time, remarkably humane.

He conducted extensive interviews with each prisoner, administered psychological tests including the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Test, and carefully observed the behavior of his patients. He wanted to understand not just why they had carried out such heinous crimes, but who they really were — and he knew the gravity of the mission before him.

In papers obtained by Jack El-Hai for his famed Scientific American article, Kelley wrote, “the near destruction of modern culture will have gone for naught if we do not draw the right conclusions about the forces that produced such chaos. We must learn the why of the Nazi success so we can take steps to prevent the recurrence of such evil.”

What struck Douglas Kelley immediately was how ordinary the Nazi leaders seemed. These were not the raving lunatics he had expected to find.

In one manuscript, for instance, Kelley wrote of Robert Ley, Hitler’s Reich Labor Leader, that “despite his condemnation of anti-Semitism, Ley was still convinced that the Jews constituted a problem in Germany.”

Ley admitted in his interviews that, unlike Hitler, he would not have killed the Jews, but rather would have denied them the right to work and then refused to provide them with a place to live, thus driving them out of Germany without shedding a drop of blood. “All the Jews in Germany would have quietly packed up and moved elsewhere,” Ley said. “Is that not so?”

Public DomainRobert Ley, the Nazi leader who pushed Hitler’s “Strength Through Joy” campaign.

Kelley noted that Ley reiterated time and time again that he had not killed anyone and that he became “violently disturbed” when he read the indictment in which he was being called a criminal. He continued to maintain his innocence, even as he claimed that he and Hitler had only worked for the benefit of the German people.

Ley was erratic and at times suicidal, but there was nothing in his logic — however flawed — that hinted at insanity.

Hess, on the other hand, appeared disturbed, claiming amnesia, but his condition was more theatrical than psychotic. Streicher was crude and repugnant, but also not clinically insane. Hans Frank, the brutal governor-general of occupied Poland, spoke eloquently about art and culture in between his confessions to his unthinkable crimes.

Again, Douglas Kelley found these men, who had committed some of history’s greatest atrocities, were of sound mind.

Kelley also developed a particularly complex relationship with Hermann Göring, Hitler’s designated successor and the highest-ranking Nazi on trial.

Douglas Kelley’s Complicated Relationship With Hermann Göring

“Each day when I came to his cell on my rounds,” Douglas Kelley wrote of his talks with Göring, “he would jump up from his chair, greet me with a broad smile and outstretched hand, escort me to his cot and pat its middle with his great paw.”

The two men spent hours together, discussing everything from German history to American politics.

Göring was sharp and manipulative, and he had undeniable charisma. He performed well on intelligence tests and showed no signs of psychosis or severe mental illness. Göring also mentioned several times that he “felt great responsibility, not for [Germany’s] crimes, but for its evaluation by history.”

“Yes, I know I shall hang,” Göring told Kelley. “You know I shall hang. I am ready. But I am determined to go down in German history as a great man. If I cannot convince the court, I shall at least convince the German people that all I did was done for the Greater German Reich.”

Public DomainHermann Göring during the Nuremberg trials.

And when Göring learned that Kelley would be leaving the prison in 1946, the Nazi leader wrote to the psychiatrist: “I regret your departure from Nuremberg, as do the comrades confined with me. I thank you for your humane behavior and also for your attempt to understand our reasons.”

Douglas Kelley found himself simultaneously repelled and fascinated by the man — and this was precisely the problem. The longer he spent with these Nazis, the more unsettling his conclusion became: They truly were not insane.

At the same time, Kelley had been divulging information gleaned from his conversations to General William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the founder of what would soon be the CIA. It was information that, in a traditional doctor-patient relationship, would be considered confidential. He was conflicted about his role: Was he Göring’s doctor or was he a patriotic informant? Could he be both?

However he felt about his position, Douglas Kelley still had to reach a conclusion.

The Controversial Conclusions From Nuremberg Prison

Public DomainNazi defendants at the Nuremberg trials, which began in November 1945.

In 1946, Kelley published his findings, arguing that the Nazi leaders represented a particular personality type — authoritarian, nationalistic, and prone to following strong leaders — but not a pathological one. The capacity for their evil, he wrote, “could be duplicated in any country of the world today.”

This was not the answer anyone wanted to hear.

The idea that “normal” people could commit genocide was deeply threatening. It suggested that the Holocaust was not an aberration committed by madmen but rather something that emerged from human nature itself under certain conditions. If Göring and his cohorts were sane, then the comfortable boundary between “us” and “them” dissolved.

Evil was not safely quarantined in the minds of the abnormal.

Public DomainHermann Göring standing trial. He would die by suicide in October 1946, just hours before his scheduled execution.

Douglas Kelley’s conclusions were controversial and remain so. Some colleagues suggested that he had been manipulated by the very men he was studying. The psychologist Gustave Gilbert, who worked alongside Kelley at Nuremberg, eventually broke with him over their interpretations, with Gilbert arguing that the Nazis did show distinct pathological traits.

Others accused Kelley of being too sympathetic to his subjects, particularly Göring.

When recalling Göring’s suicide just hours before his scheduled execution, for instance, Kelley wrote, “His suicide, shrouded in mystery and emphasizing the impotency of the American guards, was a skillful, even brilliant, finishing touch, completing the edifice for Germans to admire in times to come.”

But if the greater scientific community and general public found Kelley’s conclusion disturbing, the weight of that assessment did not weigh nearly as heavily on them as it did on Kelley himself.

Douglas Kelley’s Shocking Death By Suicide

Kelley FamilyFollowing his time at Nuremberg, Douglas Kelley was prone to emotional outbursts and became an alcoholic.

After the trials, Douglas Kelley returned to America and attempted to resume his career. He taught at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote about his Nuremberg experiences, and continued his research.

But something had changed.

Colleagues noticed a restlessness in him, a darkness that hadn’t been there before. He became fascinated with criminology and the nature of evil, unable to leave behind what he had witnessed in those Nuremberg cells.

Kelley also became interested in poisons, particularly cyanide — the same substance Hermann Göring had used to cheat the hangman’s noose in October 1946.

No one suspected Kelley would go out the same way, though.

As his son, Doug Kelley Jr., told SF Gate in 2005, his father’s final years had been filled with stress, and the psychological toll was wearing on the psychiatrist. He began drinking heavily. He would fly into fits of rage. He had threatened suicide at least once before.

On Jan. 1, 1958, Douglas Kelley was at home with his wife, father, and three children when he suddenly burned himself while cooking in the kitchen and flew into a rage. “The next thing we knew,” his son recalled, “he was on the stairs saying he was going to swallow the potassium cyanide and that he’d be dead in 30 seconds.”

And that was exactly what Kelley did. There, on New Year’s Day, in front of his family, he ingested potassium cyanide — just as Hermann Göring had done 12 years earlier — and fell into a spasm that ended his life. He was 45 years old. His family could never truly explain why he did it.

“I know it’s ironic,” his son said. “I think maybe he knew he was on a runaway train. I think he knew what was inside, but he didn’t know how to make it go away.”

After learning about Douglas Kelley and how the Nuremberg trials affected him, read the story of John Douglas, the FBI agent who profiled history’s most notorious serial killers. Then, read about John Woods, the Army hangman who intentionally botched Nazi executions so they would suffer.

allthatsinteresting.com · Austin Harvey

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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