|
Quotes of the Day:
“Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world.”
- Albert. Einstein
“An arrogant person considers himself perfect. This is the chief harm of arrogance. It interferes with a persons main task in life – becoming a better person.”
- Leo Tolstoy
"The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history."
- George Orwell.
1. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks amid tightening N.K.-Russia military ties
2. U.S. envoy calls for human rights dialogue with N. Korea after regime's criticism of her activities
3. ‘China hacked S. Korean foreign ministry emails last year’
4. U.N. committee unveils draft resolution on N. Korea's human rights violations
5. For the first time since 1948, North Koreans given a choice in an election
6. A Closer Look at Kim Jong-un's Limited Public Appearances in October: Is a Satellite Launch on the Horizon?
7. Kim Family Spends Billions on Luxury Imports Amidst North Korean Starvation Crisis
8.China Bends to Seoul’s Demands on Tracking Fishing Boats
9. Japan-South Korea Cooperation Amid Israel-Hamas Conflict Proves Benefits of Trilateral With US
10. N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts
11. Seoul Eyes Hiking Trails for Tourists in the Demilitarized Zone Dividing Korea, Even as Peace Prospects Look Dimmer Than Ever
1. Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks amid tightening N.K.-Russia military ties
Sure the nK-Russia cooperation is concerning. But we should not be shaking in our boots. We should be taking a political warfare approach to dealing with this axis of authoritarians. Let's dust off the George Kennan playbook. The entire policy planning memo is pasted below the article but here are the key excerpts:
1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures
[Page 669]
(as ERP), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin’s conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of [struggle, in and out of war.]1
3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare and should be recognized as such.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269
Top diplomats of S. Korea, U.S. to hold talks amid tightening N.K.-Russia military ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 9, 2023
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Park Jin and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken were set to hold talks Thursday on North Korea, alliance, regional and global issues, amid concerns over expanding military cooperation between the North and Russia.
The talks come after revelations that the North provided Russia with a large amount of munitions and weapons for use in the war in Ukraine under an arms deal apparently reached at a rare September summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Blinken arrived in South Korea late Wednesday, after attending a Group of Seven foreign ministerial meeting in Tokyo. Park and Blinken previously met in person during the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September.
Following the bilateral talks, Park and Blinken will hold a joint press conference.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (L) shakes hands with his South Korean counterpart, Foreign Minister Park Jin, ahead of their bilateral talks in Washington, D.C., on Feb. 3, 2023, in this file photo provided by Seoul's foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The deeper military cooperation between the North and Russia has given rise to the prospect that Pyongyang could be receiving Moscow's technical assistance for its long-range missile program. Seoul officials said the North appears to be readying for a third attempt to launch a military spy satellite after failed attempts in May and August.
At a press availability in Tokyo on Wednesday, Blinken said, "We're deeply concerned about what Russia is providing Pyongyang in return for the weapons and munitions," vowing to push for "full implementation" of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Blinken is likely to use the trip to reaffirm the U.S.' security commitment to defending its key Asian ally against North Korean threats and highlight its steadfast strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, even amid the Israel-Hamas war and other global challenges.
"I'm going on to Korea and then going on to India, again, further evidence of the fact that we're very focused on the Indo-Pacific and will remain so," he said in Tokyo.
China-related issues could be discussed ahead of a highly anticipated summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in San Francisco, set for later this month.
The Israel-Hamas conflict is to be addressed, as Washington is cranking up diplomacy to prevent an escalation and to facilitate humanitarian aid into the besieged Gaza Strip.
While in Seoul, Blinken was expected to pay a courtesy call on Yoon and meet with National Security Adviser Cho Tae-yong, the State Department said earlier.
Blinken will depart for India later in the day, to be joined by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin for joint talks with their Indian counterparts, capping his nine-day multination trip that included stops to the Middle East.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 9, 2023
269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum0
Washington, May 4, 1948.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269
The Problem
The inauguration of organized political warfare.
Analysis
1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures
[Page 669]
(as ERP), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin’s conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of [struggle, in and out of war.]1
3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare and should be recognized as such.
4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare—one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.
5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin’s political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].
6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago2 a consideration of specific projects in
[Page 670]
the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.
7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:
a. Liberation Committees.
Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event of war.
Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]3
What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression.(The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.
[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.
Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combatting communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.
[Page 671]
Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.
Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.
Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.
8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.
9. [6–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.
Recommendations
11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.
12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.
13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers designated by the Secretary of National Defense.
14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish existing covert political warfare activities.
[Page 672]
15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.
16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course, be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State.
-
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30, is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944–47: Lot 64 D 563, Box 11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: “There was a discussion of the Planning Staff Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants.” (Ibid., Box 32)↩Although the following page of the source text indicates in an unidentified hand that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above identified that only the 6 words in brackets were missing.↩Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.↩The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.↩
2. U.S. envoy calls for human rights dialogue with N. Korea after regime's criticism of her activities
I was able to participate in the meeting before this press event. I think it is really important for both Ambassadors to engage the press together as often as possible. Human rights is a tough issue. But after listening to both of them speak today I see real opportunities for a strong synergy between the two (and also with Elizabeth Salmon from the UN). I can tell that they would stand up and stand tough to the regime's negotiators if they can ever meet face to face.
But north Korea is going to have to address human rights. It cannot only talk about the nuclear issue (nor can we only talk about the nuclear issue). And if it wants sanctions relief in any form it is going to have to address human rights issues. Kim probably does not grasp this but in our system no president can unilaterally decide to lift sanctions that have been imposed by Congress or by the UN. And even if sanctions were to be lifted Kim must understand if he wants external investment there are no major companies that will do business in the north if the human rights abuses continue. Their shareholders would not stand for it (and also with no rule of law in north Korea and its poor business practice there will never be any investment in the north even if all sanctions were lifted). Human rights must be on the table at negotiations.
U.S. envoy calls for human rights dialogue with N. Korea after regime's criticism of her activities | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 9, 2023
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- The new U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights made an overture for dialogue with the recalcitrant regime Wednesday, after Pyongyang accused her of "distorting and slandering" its rights records.
Ambassador Julie Turner made the call, underscoring that the North Korean rights records have been "well documented" as highlighted in the 2014 report by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the situation in the reclusive country.
"I would welcome the opportunity to have a conversation with the North Korean government about their human rights record," she told reporters, noting the United States is "open" and "willing" to be transparent about its own records as well.
"We are not perfect. No government in the world is perfect," she added.
Ambassador Julie Turner (L), the new U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, and Lee Shin-wha, South Korea's ambassador-at-large for international cooperation on North Korean human rights, attend a press meeting in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 8, 2023. (Yonhap)
Turner called attention to the COI report that showed evidence of North Korean human rights abuses as she underscored she is not "making up" things to "inflame" the North Korean regime.
"The 2014 U.N. COI report lays out over 400 pages of evidence demonstrating the conditions and the egregious human rights violations and abuses being committed by the North Korean government," she said.
After Turner made her first trip to South Korea last month shortly after her inauguration, a spokesperson for the North's Korea Association for Human Rights Studies accused her of having warped the North's rights records and made a "sinister" attempt to tarnish its image.
Turner appeared unperturbed by Pyongyang's tirade.
"There continues to be refugee and escapee testimony that corroborates the information that was collected in that (COI) report. There continues to be open source satellite imagery that corroborates that the prison camp system still exists," she said.
Asked to comment on diplomacy with China to prevent North Korean escapees from being sent back to the North, Turner reiterated that the U.S. government "regularly" raises the issue of "forced repatriations" with Beijing.
"In terms of numbers (of the escapees), I prefer not to focus on the exact number," she said. "I think the bigger problem is the fact that these forcible repatriations are occurring and that the international community should come together to urge the Chinese government not to refoul North Korean asylum seekers."
South Korean human rights groups said China forcibly sent hundreds of North Korean defectors from its northeastern border regions back to the North in recent weeks.
The South Korean government has confirmed the repatriation had taken place, without specifying the number of those who were repatriated.
As Pyongyang's key ally, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates them to their home country, where they can face harsh punishment.
Lee Shin-wha, the ambassador-at-large for international cooperation on North Korean human rights, also attended the press meeting.
Lee said she and Turner are pushing to issue a joint statement with other "like-minded" countries to address the refugee issue.
Turner took office last month, filling a vacancy that had lasted more than six years. Her official swearing-in ceremony took place Monday.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 9, 2023
3. ‘China hacked S. Korean foreign ministry emails last year’
‘China hacked S. Korean foreign ministry emails last year’
donga.com
Posted November. 09, 2023 08:49,
Updated November. 09, 2023 08:49
‘China hacked S. Korean foreign ministry emails last year’. November. 09, 2023 08:49. by Kwan-Seok Jang jks@donga.com.
It was confirmed Wednesday that South Korea's foreign affairs ministry was hacked by Chinese authorities in January last year during the Moon Jae-in administration, resulting in the leak of 4.5 gigabytes (GB) of emails. Chinese authorities were also found to have infiltrated the computer network of the Presidential Office, leaking documents related to the national defense ministry.
According to government sources on Wednesday, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service identified China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Chinese equivalent of the South Korean NIS, as the epicenter of the hacking attack. This means that South Korean intelligence officials have concrete evidence that the MSS, which is part of the State Council and the home of Chinese espionage, attempted to hack into the South Korean government and the president's office. This is the first time the MSS has been identified as a hacking entity against the South Korean government. The incumbent South Korean presidential office has reportedly confirmed the findings.
"We understand that around April last year, about a month after the inauguration of the new South Korean government, an ally country transmitted through South Korean intelligence channels specific intelligence on Chinese hacking clues against the South Korean foreign affairs ministry, including the hackers and the timing of their activities," a government source told The Dong-A Ilbo Wednesday. The Yoon Suk Yeol government then launched a detailed verification effort. It has been confirmed that the circumstantial evidence included activities of hacking defense information through the Presidential Office’s computer network.
The NIS received the hacking tip in January last year and started an investigation to confirm that the Chinese Ministry of State Security had exploited a vulnerability in spam-blocking equipment to leak 4.5 Gigabytes of emails. It also reportedly confirmed circumstantial evidence of an attempt to infiltrate the Presidential Office’s computer network.
At the time, the South Korean NIS and the foreign affairs ministry did not publicly disclose the hacking attack, which was investigated to reveal the involvement of China's Ministry of State Security. "In January last year, 4 Gigabytes of data stored in the ministry's spam blocking system was leaked externally in a hack whose attack route has not been confirmed," the foreign affairs ministry said in response to The Dong-A Ilbo’s request for confirmation. "The leaked data did not contain any secrets." The NIS said it "could not confirm" the report.
한국어
donga.com
4. U.N. committee unveils draft resolution on N. Korea's human rights violations
Excellent. Can we get this passed in the General Assembly? I should think so.
U.N. committee unveils draft resolution on N. Korea's human rights violations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · November 9, 2023
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- A U.N. General Assembly committee has unveiled a draft resolution denouncing North Korea's human rights violations and voicing concerns over the regime's punishment of those repatriated from abroad.
This year's resolution, disclosed by the Third Committee of the General Assembly dealing with human rights and social affairs Wednesday (U.S. time), comes amid growing concerns over China's forced repatriation of North Korean defectors.
The resolution, sponsored by Spain on behalf of the European Union, expressed "serious" concern about the North's situation of asylum seekers and the "cruel" punishment of its citizens who have been repatriated from abroad.
It strongly urged all member states to respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, "especially in the light of a resumption of cross-border travel."
Although it did not mention China by name, the addition of the phrase on "cross-border travel" on this year's resolution appears to reflect concerns over Beijing's forced repatriation of North Korean defectors.
Non-refoulement refers to the international principle of not forcing refugees back to countries where they face the risk of persecution.
However, as Pyongyang's key ally, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates them to their home country, where they can face harsh punishment.
South Korean human rights groups said China forcibly sent hundreds of North Korean defectors from its northeastern border regions back to the North in recent weeks.
The South Korean government has confirmed the repatriation did take place, without specifying the number of those who were repatriated.
This image shows a resolution on North Korea's human rights violations at a session of the U.N. Security Council. (Yonhap)
Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted the resolution condemning North Korea's dire human rights situation every year.
In previous years, the committee passed the resolution on the North Korea issue in mid-November for approval at the U.N. General Assembly in December.
Last year, South Korea co-sponsored the resolution for the first time in four years, as the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration has taken a proactive stance in dealing with the North's rights issues since its launch in May 2022.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · November 9, 2023
5. For the first time since 1948, North Koreans given a choice in an election
Fascinating. Who is the target audience for this? Are we supposed to believe the north is transitioning to democracy? I wonder how the Korean people in the north interpret this?
Excerpts:
The possibility of a choice — and the use of secret ballots – generated both confusion and interest among voters, another Ryanggang resident said.
“For the first time, some people were unfamiliar with the voting method to select candidates for the provincial People's Assembly,” he said. “Interest in elections has grown among the residents who have now had the taste of [choice] in these preliminary elections.”
...
Elections in North Korea have always been a closely monitored, compulsory event where women wear traditional clothing and men wear their finest suits to declare their loyalty to the party by choosing the only option available, all with party officials watching their every move.
This is why voter turnouts are always near 100%, and every candidate is assured to get close to 100% of the vote.
But secretly, citizens have complained that elections are nothing more than a political show.
For the first time since 1948, North Koreans given a choice in an election
Two women compete in primary for a seat in provincial assembly, puzzling residents used to one-candidate elections.
By Kim Jieun for RFA Korean
2023.11.08
rfa.org
For the first time since the country’s founding in 1948, North Koreans were given a choice between two candidates in an election, residents told Radio Free Asia, puzzling people accustomed to simply voting for the single, party-approved candidate.
Two women ran in a Nov. 4 primary election in the northern city of Hyesan, which borders China in Ryanggang province, to determine a candidate for the provincial People’s Assembly, a resident who requested anonymity for security reasons told RFA Korean.
The two candidates were “Choe Hye Yong, born in 1979, a manager at the Food Administration Office in Ryanggang province, and Kim In Hui, born in 1973, the finance manager at the Aprogak restaurant,” the person said.
A voter uses an ID card to register to cast their ballot at the “3.26 Pyongyang Cable Factory” during voting for the Supreme People's Assembly elections, in Pyongyang on March 10, 2019. Credit: Ed Jone/AFP
The possibility of a choice — and the use of secret ballots – generated both confusion and interest among voters, another Ryanggang resident said.
“For the first time, some people were unfamiliar with the voting method to select candidates for the provincial People's Assembly,” he said. “Interest in elections has grown among the residents who have now had the taste of [choice] in these preliminary elections.”
Choe emerged victorious from the primary, and will run unopposed for a seat in the provincial People’s Assembly elections on Nov. 26, the first source said. The assembly is a largely rubber-stamp body that purports to represent the will of the people on the provincial level, but in reality simply ratifies the policies of the central party.
“[Choe] has worked in the food sector for a long time, and she received more than 70% of the votes in her favor,” she said. “The residents say she is the person who can solve our food problems.”
Showing loyalty
Elections in North Korea have always been a closely monitored, compulsory event where women wear traditional clothing and men wear their finest suits to declare their loyalty to the party by choosing the only option available, all with party officials watching their every move.
This is why voter turnouts are always near 100%, and every candidate is assured to get close to 100% of the vote.
But secretly, citizens have complained that elections are nothing more than a political show.
People line up to vote during the election for the Supreme People's Assembly in this undated picture released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 11, 2019, in North Korea. Credit: KCNA via Reuters
Elected bodies in North Korea hold almost no real power. They simply carry out the will of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, which in turn follows the will of the North Korean leadership. On the local level the elections occur every four years.
On the national level, the Supreme People’s Assembly is the highest state power organ, and elections are held every five years, most recently in 2019.
The new voting system is likely an attempt by the country’s leader Kim Jong Un to show measurable change to the people, a former high-ranking North Korean official who fled from the North and resettled in the South in 2015, told RFA.
“The fact that multiple candidates are running in the election is meant to show that Kim Jong Un is bringing about changes in national policy,” he said on the condition of anonymity for the safety of his family still in North Korea.
“Rather than just oppressing people by coercively regulating and controlling them and making various laws, the idea is to give a signal that says, ‘In this way, I will give freedom to residents and bring about democratic changes in social development and national management.’”
But the changes in the election process are merely cosmetic, and at its core, the North Korean regime has not and will not change, he said.
“The introduction of democratic methods in this election is a small change, but it is not a major change in North Korean society,” the former official said. “I think it must be a bit of a democratic imitation.”
Contested elections on the national level were held in Soviet-occupied North Korea on Aug. 25, 1948, prior to the nation’s official founding later that year, with 228 candidates contesting 212 North Korean electoral districts.
These elections were held separately from the U.N.-sponsored elections on May 10, 1948, in South Korea, that had originally been intended to be held also in the North, but were refused by the Soviets and their preferred leader Kim Il Sung, the current North Korean leader’s grandfather.
In every subsequent election held in North Korea, voters were given a choice of only a single candidate for each race.
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
6. A Closer Look at Kim Jong-un's Limited Public Appearances in October: Is a Satellite Launch on the Horizon?
I just learned of this newsletter put together by escapees. Here is their website: https://sand.or.kr/kr/
They have asked me to review the newsletters and make recommendations for research and article topics. I think it will be very helpful to have escapees providing regular analysis of events in north Korea.
Writer manager Registration date 2023-11-03 views 25
A Closer Look at Kim Jong-un's Limited Public Appearances in October: Is a Satellite Launch on the Horizon?
https://sand.or.kr/kr/opinion/news.php?bgu=view&idx=22923
October has seen a noticeable decline in Kim Jong-un's public appearances. His sole known engagement was with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a visit to Pyongyang City on the 19th. For the rest of the month, Kim has kept a low profile, even missing the 78th anniversary celebrations of the Party Foundation Day on the 10th.
Kim Jong-un engaged in discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, captured in a photo dated October 20, 2023. / Rodong Sinmun
The scarcity of public appearances has led to widespread conjecture about Kim's current focus and potential future plans. Analysts are pondering whether he is channeling his efforts towards the imminent launch of a reconnaissance satellite, frequently overseeing the developments with the help of Russian satellite technicians. Despite this, the anticipated third launch of a reconnaissance satellite, slated for October as per North Korea's public declarations, has yet to materialize, sparking a variety of theories about the reasons for this postponement.
An examination of the state media outputs from North Korea in October highlights that Kim's meeting with Sergey Lavrov was his only public engagement, as documented by Rodong Sinmun on the 20th. The same media outlet reported on a series of non-public activities undertaken by Kim, including dispatching a reply message to the General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party on the 21st, sending a message to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the 12th in celebration of 75 years of diplomatic ties between North Korea and Russia, laying a wreath in honor of the late Workers' Party of Korea Secretary Kim Yong-il on the 2nd, and extending greetings to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the 74th anniversary of China's founding on the 1st. To his active public presence Compared to his in the months of July, August, and September, Kim's level of engagement in October can almost be described as reclusive.
Kim Jong-un has a history of disappearing from the public eye for extended periods. After his visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun to kick off the new year, he went unseen for 36 days. He finally made a public appearance at the military parade marking North Korean Army Foundation Day on February 8th. From March onward, he resumed his usual provocations, which included launching short-range missiles at South Korean military installations and conducting artillery firing exercises.
A photo captures North Korea's reconnaissance satellite launch attempt on May 31st, a mission that ultimately concluded in failure. / Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)
A subsequent period of inactivity followed his visit to the National Space Development Agency on April 18th, lasting about a month. During May, while Kim was absent from public view, North Korea proceeded to test-fire a Hwasong-17 type Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) aimed at the United States and conducted short-range missile launch drills aimed at South Korea.
Some speculate that his absence in October could be attributed to his involvement in preparations for a satellite launch. Despite North Korea's explicit intentions to execute a third reconnaissance satellite launch within the month, the event did not transpire.
On the final day of October, October 31st, there were no observable indicators at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyong-an Province, suggesting an imminent launch. Usually, in the lead-up to a satellite launch, North Korea demonstrates distinct preparatory activities. These activities include a noticeable increase in staff presence at the launch site, the commencement of fueling procedures, and the dissemination of alerts to international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Considering that launch preparations, particularly the liquid fueling phase, typically span about a week, the likelihood of the third launch attempt occurring within the month of October appeared to be slim.
North Korea revealed its October satellite launch plans through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), unavailable to its citizens, showing little regard for public opinion in scheduling such events.
Cho Han-bum, a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, noted, "Considering August's failed launch, North Korea likely faced significant challenges fixing the technical issues in time for an October launch. Kim Jong-un's lack of public appearances "during the month suggests the satellite launch may have been postponed."
Some analysts speculate that the delay in North Korea's third launch could be tied to its military-technical cooperation with Russia.
Technical assistance for the satellite has been highlighted as a key area of cooperation. According to an intelligence source, Russian technicians are believed to have been sent to North Korea to aid in the satellite launch.
Cho added, "Given Putin's pledge to support the satellite launch, North Korea seems to be taking this opportunity to upgrade their basic satellite's capabilities and get ready for a subsequent launch." He also mentioned that authorities from South Korea and the US had previously deemed the 'Manrikyong-1' satellite — which fell into the West Sea during its initial launch in May — to be rudimentary and devoid of any military utility.
Faced with the urgent need for a successful satellite launch, North Korea may have chosen to seek satellite launch assistance from Russia, rather than food aid.
Speculation around the time of the North Korea-Russia summit in September suggested that North Korea might trade conventional weapons for food aid and strategic weapon-related technical support from Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's offer of food aid was declined by North Korea. Russian Ambassador to North Korea, Aleksandr Matsegora, confirmed this on the 17th to TASS, mentioning that North Korea had a satisfactory harvest this year.
However, this claim of a successful harvest is contradicted by North Korea's substantial food imports from China throughout the first three quarters of this year. Reporting on the 28th, Voice of America, citing data from China's General Administration of Customs, revealed that North Korea had imported food worth $71.08 million (152,216 tons) from China between January and September. This amount is 13 times the total imported during the same period last year, which was $5.66 million. The surge in rice imports, despite official North Korean media boasting a bountiful harvest, points to persistent food shortages in the country.
Even with the food scarcity in North Korea, the rejection of Russian food aid suggests a more pressing need for technical support for the satellite. Kim Jong-un's desperation is apparent in the hastened announcement of the third launch in October, just two months after the failed attempt in August. Typically, it would take about six months to plan a relaunch after a failed satellite launch. Nevertheless, North Korea is pressing forward, motivated by political considerations.
However, the lack of a satellite launch in October suggests that North Korea might be taking extra time to fix the problems encountered during the second launch. Shortly after that failure, they cited an 'emergency explosion system error during the third stage of flight' as the issue, downplaying it as a minor glitch. Nevertheless, there is speculation that the problems could be more complex than they have let on. Solving the reliability issues of the engine is already a significant challenge, and there's speculation that the team might have promised an October launch as a way to avoid responsibility.
Producing a new satellite body might also be contributing to the delay. Given that the previous two satellites were likely lost in the failed launches, a new satellite body would need to be created for the third launch, and it's possible that this has not yet been completed.
Cho commented, "Even though the launch did not happen in October, North Korea is highly likely to attempt a satellite launch with improved technical capabilities within this year, possibly during the winter months, similar to their actions in 2012."
7. Kim Family Spends Billions on Luxury Imports Amidst North Korean Starvation Crisis
Writer manager Registration date 2023-11-03 views 58
Kim Family Spends Billions on Luxury Imports Amidst North Korean Starvation Crisis
https://sand.or.kr/kr/opinion/news.php?bgu=view&idx=22924
Kim Jong-un and his family blatantly flaunt their luxurious lifestyle, with their annual spend on luxury imports estimated by the South Korean government to be in the billions of won. All the while, North Korean residents are facing a dire food crisis, with some even succumbing to starvation.
Kim Jong-un donated a 16-million-won Swiss luxury watch while overseeing the ICBM test launch in March 2022 / Newsis
At an October 19 press briefing on recent economic and social trends in North Korea, a Ministry of Unification official underscored the stark disparity in living conditions. He emphasized that since Kim's regime began, his family has been openly flaunting their wealth, wearing pricey garments and accessories without any regard for public sentiment.
Even during a September 13 summit at Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome, Kim was seen wearing a high-end Swiss watch and using a prestigious German fountain pen, all of which was reported by North Korean media.
The official went on to elaborate that the procurement of these luxury items is meticulously managed by North Korea's highest-ranking officials. They leverage diplomatic networks, employing embassy and trade representatives across several countries, including China, Russia, and various European nations.
Most of these luxury items are smuggled into the country, mainly via cargo ships, with the annual value of goods meant for Kim family alone estimated to be in the hundreds of millions to billions of won range.
Educated in Bern, Switzerland, Kim Jong-un has acquired a fondness for luxury watches. He showcased a 16 million won 'Portofino Automatic' from International Watch Company (IWC) at a Hwasong-17 ICBM launch in March of the previous year. In 2015, he was also spotted wearing a Patek Philippe watch worth around 200 million won during a Workers' Party of Korea anniversary event.
Korean Central Television aired footage on March 16, 2022, showing the Hwasong-17 ICBM launch at Pyongyang International Airport, with Kim Jong-un in attendance. Noticeably, his daughter Kim Ju-ae, is spotted in the background, clad in a coat believed to be from a high-end fashion label. /Korean Central Television
Kim Yo-jong, accompanying Kim on his trip to Russia, was spotted with a handbag from the French luxury brand, Christian Dior. The 'Lady Dior Large Bag' she carried is priced at approximately 10 million won. Considering the average annual income of North Korean residents has plummeted to about 1.42 million won in 2021, primarily due to the impacts of COVID-19, Kim Yo-jong is essentially flaunting a handbag that costs as much as seven years' worth of income for an average North Korean citizen.
From left to right: Kim Yo-jong, Choe Son-hui, and Hyon Song-wol, each elegantly holding a handbag /NK News, Korean Central News Agency
Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui was seen sporting a high-end handbag during her visit to the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Plant in Khabarovsk, Russia. She carried a Gucci handbag crafted from ostrich leather, a product that is no longer in production. Currently, this rare item is fetching around $10,000, equivalent to approximately 13.3 million won, on various secondary market platforms.
Kim Jong-un's penchant for luxury seems hereditary, with his daughter Kim Ju-ae spotted in a 2.5 million won Christian Dior coat during a March ICBM launch. This caught the media's attention globally. However, in a noticeable shift, she donated a modest 20,910 won blouse from a Chinese mall during an April visit to the DPRK's National Aerospace Technology General Bureau.
Considering the United Nations Security Council's sanctions resolution 1718 from 2006, which bans the export of luxury goods to North Korea and has seen consistent updates to its list of prohibited items over the past 17 years, the Kim family's display of luxury items may directly contravene these sanctions.
8. China Bends to Seoul’s Demands on Tracking Fishing Boats
China Bends to Seoul’s Demands on Tracking Fishing Boats
November 08, 2023 9:30 PM
voanews.com · November 8, 2023
WASHINGTON —
A new maritime deal requiring Chinese fishing vessels to keep location tracking devices turned on when operating in South Korean waters signals a concession by Beijing — a small gesture to save ties from declining further with Seoul, experts say.
China agreed with South Korea that it will be mandatory for its fishing fleets to install and keep on the internationally accepted automatic identification system (AIS) while sailing in South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) starting in 2024.
The requirement to install and turn on the location tracking devices will help South Korea deal with China’s illegal fishing, Seoul’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries said in a statement announcing the deal on Nov. 3.
The agreement goes into force on May 1, 2024. It also reduces the number of fishing boats each country will allow in its EEZ to 1,200 — down from 1,250 in 2022.
The agreement reached on Nov. 2 came a week after South Korea seized a Chinese vessel for illegal fishing in its waters near Hongdo, an island in the Yellow Sea. The vessel underreported its catch in violation of South Korea’s EEZ restrictions, said Cho Seung Hwan, spokesperson for the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries.
“The agreement is significant as it provides a diplomatic solution to the dispute, and China, through the inclusion of the AIS provision, has offered a concession to South Korea,” said Terence Roehrig, a professor of national security and a Korea expert at the U.S. Naval War College.
“Chinese leaders have seen the increasingly negative views of China in South Korea, along with the rising tensions in ROK-China relations, and may have wanted to make a gesture that in a small way addresses the decline, or at least doesn’t worsen the relationship,” Roehrig told VOA via email.
Worsening relationship
The relationship between South Korea and China soured this year as Seoul forged a closer alignment with Washington and mended diplomatic ties with Tokyo, leading to a historical trilateral summit at Camp David in August.
The tension reached a peak in June when Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming publicly warned that betting against China will end with Seoul regretting the move.
Ken Gause, director of the CNA’s Special Projects for Strategy and Policy Analysis program, told VOA Monday in a telephone interview that Beijing is looking for “an avenue” to draw Seoul closer to its side as South Korea’s trilateral ties with the U.S. and Japan become stronger.
“Japan is a very difficult country to engage with from China’s point of view,” Gause said. “South Korea holds out more potential for China to be able to exert its influence.”
China and Japan have a fraught, centuries-old relationship marked by periods of conflict and persistently negative perceptions.
Since World War II, Beijing and Tokyo have disagreed on Japan’s atrocities during the war and challenged each other over who controls a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea — called the Senkaku by the Japanese and the Diaoyu by the Chinese. With China’s increasing activity in the air and water surrounding Taiwan, a self-governing nation it considers its own, Japan has been increasingly fearful of conflict in that arena.
Gause said that although China agreed to apply a stricter requirement for its fishing boats, it is questionable whether China will enforce it. He added that South Korea’s major concern is Chinese vessels conducting illicit transfers to North Korea without turning on the AIS.
Illegal fishing
The AIS agreement builds on a deal the two countries reached in June to crack down on Chinese fishing vessels operating illegally in North Korean waters. In 2017, the U.N. Security Council banned U.N. member states from fishing in North Korean waters in a bid to prevent Pyongyang from obtaining foreign currency by selling fishing rights.
Under the June deal, South Korea is to inform Beijing of suspected illegal Chinese fishing vessels in the North Korean portion of the East China Sea, and Beijing is to investigate and report its investigation results and measures to Seoul.
The dispute over illegal fishing by Chinese ships is rooted in overlapping EEZ claims in the Yellow Sea, according to Roehrig.
Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, a country has jurisdiction over living and nonliving resources within its EEZ, which extends for 370 kilometers beyond its shoreline.
However, the EEZs declared by South Korea and China overlap in some parts of the Yellow Sea, a narrow body of water whose width ranges from 740 to 1,074 kilometers.
Chinese vessels are known to fish illegally worldwide and have drawn condemnation for depriving maritime nations of their livelihoods, undermining international norms and environmental impacts that include overfishing.
In South Korean waters, China’s fleet activities have created dangerous clashes with local fishing crews. In 2011, while trying to crack down on a Chinese boat illegally operating near South Korean waters, a member of South Korea’s coast guard was fatally stabbed by a Chinese fisherman, and dangerous encounters have continued since then.
Courtney Farthing, director of international policy at Global Fishing Watch, told VOA via email Tuesday that the AIS agreement between Seoul and Beijing is “highly important and necessary.”
She said her organization’s analysis shows about 30% of vessels originating from China and operating in South Korean waters “cannot be identified as authorized due to their lack of AIS broadcasting.”
International regulations requiring the use of AIS by Chinese vessels operating outside their own waters have existed at least since 2018, but the efforts to strengthen AIS usage and enforcement in South Korean waters is a welcome development, Farthing said.
The International Maritime Organization requires all ships with 300 or more gross tonnage traveling in international waters to use AIS.
However, “There is still a considerable journey ahead, as the majority of nations do not yet mandate public tracking of fishing vessels or provide public information regarding authorizations for their fleet’s activities at sea,” she said.
Tabitha Grace Mallory, CEO of the China Ocean Institute and an affiliate professor at the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, told VOA that a vessel monitoring system (VMS) is necessary in addition to AIS.
“VMS is even more specific to fisheries than AIS, which is meant for safety at sea. But most countries don’t like to share VMS data,” Mallory said.
VMS equipment monitors a vessel’s location through a satellite and is used to enforce maritime regulations, according to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization.
voanews.com · November 8, 2023
9. Japan-South Korea Cooperation Amid Israel-Hamas Conflict Proves Benefits of Trilateral With US
Japan-South Korea Cooperation Amid Israel-Hamas Conflict Proves Benefits of Trilateral With US
Coordination on evacuations of their citizens from the Middle East is a seemingly small but symbolically significant step for Tokyo and Seoul.
By Evan Wright and Jessica A. Guarini
November 08, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Evan Wright · November 8, 2023
U.S. President Joe Biden, center, greets South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol, left, and Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, right, on Aug. 18, 2023, at Camp David, the presidential retreat, near Thurmont, Maryland.
Credit: AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, File
The Israel-Hamas war is proving to be the first major test of Japan and South Korea’s ability to deepen collaboration in the spirit of the Camp David Summit, and so far, they are passing the test.
In August, the United States, Japan, and South Korea announced plans to cooperate trilaterally on a broad range of issues affecting regional and global stability and prosperity, including a commitment to consult and coordinate responses to challenges affecting their mutual security interests. In their joint remarks at Camp David, the leaders emphasized that “challenges that threaten regional security must be addressed by us building a stronger commitment to working together.”
Beyond the need to seize the momentum from Camp David, Japan and South Korea have good reason to work together in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Both strongly depend on Arab oil imports. Japan, which imports roughly 94 percent of its energy, has historically acquired more than 80 percent of its oil from the Middle East. Likewise, South Korea imports 98 percent of its energy needs, with 60 percent originating from the region.
While Tokyo and Seoul are separately engaging their Arab trade partners to maintain access to oil, the two nations are coordinating with one another to evacuate civilians. Coordination on evacuations is a seemingly small but symbolically significant step for Tokyo and Seoul.
On October 11, South Korea began a government evacuation of 192 citizens on a commercial aircraft. Following this initial movement, on October 15 South Korea coordinated a multilateral evacuation utilizing a KC-330 military aircraft to transport 163 South Koreans, 51 Japanese, and six Singapore citizens from Tel Aviv to Seoul Air Base, South Korea. On October 20, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force returned the favor, evacuating 83 foreign nationals, including 18 South Koreans, on a KC-767 destined for Haneda Airport in Tokyo. These efforts are unprecedented and would have been politically impossible only a couple of years ago, when bilateral relations were at a particularly low point.
Japan and South Korea are also coordinating their diplomatic efforts. In a flurry of activity, Japan has met with regional interlocutors more than 20 times since the October 7 Hamas attack and has dispatched a special envoy to the Middle East to help facilitate peace talks. On October 15, Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko talked on the phone with South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin to thank the South Korean government for assisting the evacuation of Japanese nationals leaving Israel and confirmed that the two ministers would continue to “communicate and coordinate with each other closely.”
This unprecedented cooperation comes on the heels of historic Japan-South Korea-U.S. military exercises. On October 22, the three nations conducted their first-ever trilateral aerial exercise, including a U.S. B-52 bomber, South Korean F-15Ks, and Japanese F-2s. Two weeks earlier, the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group conducted a maritime trilateral exercise in the East China Sea, the first of its kind in seven years. These operational exercises serve to underscore the commitments to military cooperation outlined in the Camp David Summit.
There are additional ways leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul can cooperate on the Israel-Hamas crisis to immediately operationalize trilateral relations, seizing the momentum of the Camp David Summit. Low effort, high impact opportunities should be prioritized, such as further enhancing information sharing and coordination beyond the Korean Peninsula. Likewise, because the fog of war and disinformation are impacting the world’s ability to understand what is happening in the Israel-Gaza conflict, the three partners should use this opportunity to practice countering foreign information manipulation. Lastly, the three partners should consider integrated contingency planning, in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, for the evacuation of civilians. While the operational environments differ, the tyranny of distance will be an equally challenging endeavor in the Indo-Pacific as it is in the Middle East. Such efforts will pay dividends for trilateral coordination even beyond the Middle East theater.
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk-yeol’s domestic unpopularity will continue to challenge the durability and efficacy of cooperation in a bilateral and trilateral context. Japan and South Korea’s cooperation on the Israel-Hamas conflict is a positive indication of rapprochement between the two capitals, and a powerful sign to each state’s citizens that there is a clear benefit to their national interests in working together. Leaders in Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington will need to continue practical, high-visibility forms of cooperation to justify the value of the trilateral to their citizens.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force or The Air University.
Authors
Guest Author
Evan Wright
Evan Wright is a research assistant for the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He is a nonresident fellow at the Johns Hopkins SAIS Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, an Institute for Defense Analyses Consultant, and a Pacific Forum Young Leader.
Guest Author
Jessica A. Guarini
Lt. Col. Jessica A. Guarini currently serves as a Department of Air Force Senior Military Fellow, Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C. She is a command KC-135 pilot with over 3,200 flight hours.
thediplomat.com · by Evan Wright · November 8, 2023
10. N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts
Fences and barriers in north Korea are designed to keep people in.
N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts
As economic conditions worsen in the North, more and more people are risking their lives in the attempt to defect, a source told Daily NK
By Choi Han-bin - 2023.11.07 4:00pm
dailynk.com
N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts | Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: A North Korean guard post on an unidentified part of the China-North Korea border. (© Daily NK)
A number of North Koreans trying to cross the China-North Korea border in North Hamgyong Province have been injured or killed by landmines recently, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK Monday that five would-be defectors were wounded or killed by detonating mines while trying to cross the Tumen River near the city of Musan in mid-October.
The band of defectors split up into two groups with the idea that staying together would be more dangerous. But both groups set off landmines near the crossing, the source said.
The North Korean authorities have been laying landmines around the border with China since August to keep people from defecting. The mine fields are supposed to be particularly dense near narrow sections of the river, where defection attempts are more common.
Landmines that have been buried for a long time often fail to explode even when stepped on, but the newly laid mines are almost certain to go off, placing defectors in great danger, the source explained.
According to another source in North Hamgyong Province, three other people died on the spot when a land mine went off during a defection attempt near Musan this past September.
“When the mine went off late at night, there was a boom near the Tumen River and a crimson flash. There wasn’t anything to recover afterward,” the source said.
“The people tried to cross despite being aware of the land mines in the area. That’s how desperate they were to get across the river,” the source said.
In addition to placing mines along the main defection routes, the North Korean authorities have also been stringing up large numbers of security cameras to beef up surveillance on the country’s border with China. But as economic conditions worsen in the North, more and more people are risking their lives in the attempt to defect, the source said.
“The people who died in the accident probably weren’t trying to go to South Korea — they just wanted to make some money in China. But as they were crossing the river in the hope of making a living, they were blown to bits, and now they won’t even get a funeral,” the source said.
The Chinese authorities have also been tightening their watch on the border with North Korea since September, putting North Koreans who do make it across the border at a greater risk of being arrested by the Chinese police.
“Why else would people in good health risk their lives to leave North Korea? If they had the cash to start a business, they could make some kind of living. But they don’t have anything, so they try to cross the border while knowing they’re taking their lives in their hands,” the source said.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
11. Seoul Eyes Hiking Trails for Tourists in the Demilitarized Zone Dividing Korea, Even as Peace Prospects Look Dimmer Than Ever
But what about all the unaccounted for (perhaps. million) landmines as well as unexploded ordnance in the DMZ. How can we ever ensure it has been cleared?
Perhaps a little revisionist history here. Do we really think Kim Jong ever interned to make a real deal?
Excerpts:
But appearances can be deceiving. The former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker, believes America missed a final opportunity for reaching a deal with North Korea when President Trump walked out of his second summit with Kim Jong Un in Hanoi in February 2019. They were supposed to be reaching a deal, but instead Mr. Kim went home “angry and frustrated.”
“I believe we had an opportunity, and we missed it,” said Mr. Hecker, talking at Ewha University. “Now we have to see what we can do to get it back.” Since then, he said, North Korea “has made a fundamental strategic change” — aligning with Russia and China while forgetting about seeking normalization with America.
Seoul Eyes Hiking Trails for Tourists in the Demilitarized Zone Dividing Korea, Even as Peace Prospects Look Dimmer Than Ever
The prospect of tourism south of the line where thousands of soldiers were killed between 1950 and 1953 seems like a relief from decades of tension, recriminations and occasional rifle shots.
A North Korean guard post near the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, July 19, 2022. Kim Hong-Ji/pool via AP
nysun.com
From the observation tower in the northeastern corner of South Korea you can see the distant crags of Mount Kumgang inside North Korea. Down steep steps from the tower, a rocky trail leads to the 2.5-mile-wide demilitarized zone that’s divided the two Koreas since the Korean War ended in an armed truce 70 years ago.
A yellow-painted board crosses the trail marking the southern side of the DMZ. A barbed-wire shields the path from the beach. A railroad track, never used since it was completed 16 years ago, winds from South to North — mute testimony to the frustrations of ever coming to terms between the two Koreas. Beyond the DMZ, a North Korean watch tower is visible on a far slope.
Soon, say officials accompanying us, they hope to open a dozen trails along the southern side of the DMZ to tourism. Small deer and wild pigs range free within the DMZ, uninhibited by encroaching development, even as North and South Korean soldiers eye one another from either side of the zone.
Despite this tranquil scene, the prospect of peace between the two Koreas appears at its lowest point in years. Back at Seoul, the chairman of a Korean government-financed think tank named the Sejong Institute, Lee Yong-jeon, acknowledged it was “ impossible to achieve real denuclearization” in talks with the North Koreans. They “will not agree to full-scale disarmament.”
The North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, isn’t responding to requests for talks, but Mr. Lee believes they would be useless even if negotiators again faced each other — something that hasn’t happened since President Trump met Mr. Kim for an impromptu meeting at the truce village of Panmunjom, 40 miles north of Seoul, in June 2019.
If there’s one thing that’s obvious, said Mr. Lee, it’s that three previous decades of sporadic talks in different venues, with different casts of negotiators, “have failed to deter North Korea’s ambition.” Even if talks resumed, he said, “progress in denuclearization” just won’t work.
True, the North hasn’t conducted another nuclear test since its sixth test in September 2017, but Mr. Lee thinks that’s due to “delays in development of tactical nuclear weapons,” not to any desire to ease tensions. He estimates that North Korea, producing nuclear warheads at a rate of five a year, as of 2020 had “around 100 warheads.”
In Pyongyang, a long-time commentator, Tong Thae-gwan, writing in the Workers’ Party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, supported that analysis. The North’s “nuclear force has sharply increased and firmly reached the world’s strongest level,” he wrote, presumably at the behest of Mr. Kim.
It’s difficult to worry about a North Korean attack, whether by artillery always trained on South Korea’s capital, Seoul, and biggest port, Incheon. The prospect of regular tourism south of the line where thousands of Americans and South Koreans, also soldiers from 16 other UN members, were killed between 1950 and 1953 seems like a relief from decades of tension, recriminations and occasional rifle shots.
But appearances can be deceiving. The former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker, believes America missed a final opportunity for reaching a deal with North Korea when President Trump walked out of his second summit with Kim Jong Un in Hanoi in February 2019. They were supposed to be reaching a deal, but instead Mr. Kim went home “angry and frustrated.”
“I believe we had an opportunity, and we missed it,” said Mr. Hecker, talking at Ewha University. “Now we have to see what we can do to get it back.” Since then, he said, North Korea “has made a fundamental strategic change” — aligning with Russia and China while forgetting about seeking normalization with America.
Mr. Hecker warns that “all South Korea” and “most of Japan” is within reach of North Korean nuclear weapons, and “they can put them” into long-range missiles capable of reaching North America.
He’s not impressed by the outward signs of peace like the opening up of hiking trails along the DMZ.“For the life of me, I don’t see why we’re not more concerned,” he said.
After a week-long “DMZ Freedom and Peace Grand March” along the South Korean side of the DMZ, Kang Min-joo could only think “how precious and grateful I am for the freedom and peace I have.”
nysun.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
