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Quotes of the Day:
“Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world.”
- Albert. Einstein
“An arrogant person considers himself perfect. This is the chief harm of arrogance. It interferes with a persons main task in life – becoming a better person.”
- Leo Tolstoy
"The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history."
- George Orwell.
1. U.S. officials pick Greenbelt, Md., for new FBI national headquarters
2. Israel says it will maintain 'overall security responsibility' for Gaza. What might that look like?
3. US launches airstrike on Syria site linked to Iranian-backed militants
4. Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion
5. What Does the U.S. Space Force Actually Do?
6. Israel Must Destroy Hamas’s Tunnels
7. How the World Lost Faith in the UN
8. Military officers used prostitution ring that checked IDs, credit cards, employers
9. Three Arrested for Operating High-End Brothel Network (DOJ Press Release)
10. Five Scenarios for How Israel-Hamas War Could End — Or Get Even Worse
11. Most young vets think it’s time to retire ‘Thank you for your service’
12. Israeli troops fight Hamas in north Gaza, hospitals in firing line
13. Wars in Ukraine and Mideast Show Why the US Needs to Dominate the Drone Industrial Base
14. Rare Earths in the South China Sea: Adding Fuel to the Geopolitical Fire
15. China’s State Security Departments and Nationwide System
16. An Irregular Use of Military Force: Stability Policing Operations
17. Philippines drops China's Belt and Road as tensions flare
18. Republican senator calls for TikTok ban, cites influence on Israel-Hamas war opinions
19. US plans to build a $553 million terminal at Sri Lanka's Colombo port in rivalry with China
20. The Devil Went Down to Georgia: Executing Cyberspace Resistance to Counter Russia
21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2023
22. Iran Update, November 8, 2023
1. U.S. officials pick Greenbelt, Md., for new FBI national headquarters
A long awaiting decision but from the article it looks like it may not be a done deal.
U.S. officials pick Greenbelt, Md., for new FBI national headquarters
The Washington Post · by Perry Stein · November 8, 2023
Federal officials have decided the FBI will leave its iconic but decaying headquarters in downtown Washington for the Maryland suburbs, multiple people familiar with the decision said Wednesday. The move follows years of pointed arguments about where the multibillion-dollar project should land.
But the decision to build the massive project in Prince George’s County won’t necessarily end the debate. The FBI has raised concerns about the site-selection process in recent months, according to a person familiar with the internal discussions who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe them. The person declined to further describe the concerns. An FBI spokeswoman referred questions to the General Services Administration, the federal agency overseeing the process.
The headquarters complex would be built on an empty 61-acre plot outside the Greenbelt Metro station — the marquee tenant in a proposed mixed-use development site that would include apartments, a hotel and retail and could bring billions of dollars of new tax revenue to the county.
Maryland leaders had pitched Greenbelt in Prince George’s, a majority-Black county just outside the nation’s capital, as a Metro-accessible site that would deliver on President Biden’s promise to invest in historically underfunded communities. Local officials in Virginia and D.C. had also lobbied hard for the project, viewed as a crown jewel for its associated jobs, prestige and economic development.
For more than a decade, local and federal leaders and real estate developers jockeyed over who would build and host a modern new FBI headquarters serving thousands of employees. The high-stakes process has been delayed and punctured by politics, with governors and members of Congress aggressively trying to sway the decision-makers.
President Donald Trump jumped in at one point, putting the entire project in limbo.
The FBI — located in the large, Brutalist-style J. Edgar Hoover Building on Pennsylvania Avenue NW since 1975 — has said it needs a new headquarters to consolidate 11,000 personnel from more than a dozen locations around the region. The federal law enforcement agency is expected to still have some office presence in the District, though it is unclear if that space will remain at the current location or move elsewhere.
A new headquarters campus must be funded by Congress and will take years to build. A developer has not yet been selected.
The GSA, which has been overseeing the process, manages federal real estate for the federal government. Over the years, the agency developed a number of factors for officials to consider when making the decision, including cost, transportation access and proximity to other law enforcement buildings.
D.C. initially lobbied to keep the headquarters in the city. In 2013, then-Mayor Vincent C. Gray (D) proposed Poplar Point — waterfront property in Southeast Washington near the Anacostia Metro station. But the GSA said the size required for the FBI facility meant a suburban site near the Capital Beltway was needed. The agency whittled the competition down to three finalists: Greenbelt and Landover, both in Prince George’s County, and Springfield, in Fairfax County, Va.
FBI leaders have long said they want to remain in D.C. and rebuild their current headquarters, where they have quick access to the Justice Department across the street and high-level visibility as a public-facing symbol of law and order between the White House and the U.S. Capitol. Every morning, top Justice Department and FBI leaders gather for an in-person meeting in a secure room at the Justice Department. That said, the urban location is far smaller than the other sites, sits on more expensive land and creates challenges from a security standpoint.
In 2018, Trump canceled the selection process and scrapped the three finalists. He proposed keeping the headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue and moving 2,300 workers out of the Washington area altogether, to Alabama, Idaho and West Virginia. Members of Congress were livid, accusing Trump of derailing the plans to benefit his namesake hotel — which has since closed — located a short distance away on Pennsylvania Avenue.
Once Trump was out of office, lawmakers in Maryland and Virginia secured language in a 2022 federal spending plan to again steer the headquarters to one of their suburban sites.
On the Virginia side, lawmakers touted the Springfield site’s location, close to other national security assets. The GSA had said that proximity to other FBI facilities — including Quantico, the FBI training facility in Virginia — would be the most important criteria.
Maryland leaders argued that both of their two finalist sites in Prince George’s County would be cheaper locations to build than Springfield. The county has not historically been selected for big government projects, and leaders said that doing so would show that the Biden administration values equity.
The decision was finalized in recent weeks after a three-person panel, consisting of two GSA representatives and one FBI leader, submitted a recommendation to a senior GSA official. That official was charged with either accepting or rejecting the choice, according to criteria GSA established for the selection process. The White House was then informed of the agency’s decision.
In December, in his final days as House majority leader, Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) held up the entire omnibus spending bill to get language added that opened the door to changing the selection criteria. The move ultimately helped tip the scales in Maryland’s favor by reducing the importance of proximity to Quantico.
Hoyer touted the importance of the project Wednesday on the House floor, arguing against a measure from Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.) that would prohibit including funds for acquiring property for a new headquarters building as part of a major federal funding bill.
Gaetz, one of a group of Republican lawmakers who has attacked the FBI over its criminal investigations of Trump, said agents “deserve to sit in the rat-infested J. Edgar Hoover building until they get their act straight.”
Hoyer — noting the “present building is falling down” and there is netting around it to protect people on the sidewalk from falling concrete — said the new headquarters could not afford another delay after more than a decade of negotiations.
“I’m not totally objective — they’re going to build it somewhere in this region. I live in this region. I’m supportive of this region,” Hoyer said, without giving any indication of where specifically he hoped it would be built. “This building, when and if it’s built, is going to be built sometime in the future, but is absolutely essential.”
Erin Cox, Meagan Flynn and Tyler Pager contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Perry Stein · November 8, 2023
2. Israel says it will maintain 'overall security responsibility' for Gaza. What might that look like?
Israel says it will maintain 'overall security responsibility' for Gaza. What might that look like?
BY JOSEF FEDERMAN
Updated 8:50 PM EST, November 8, 2023
AP · November 8, 2023
JERUSALEM (AP) — Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu didn’t elaborate when he said this week that Israel would maintain indefinite “overall security responsibility” in Gaza once it removes Hamas from power in response to a deadly Oct. 7 cross-border raid by the Islamic militant group.
Experience suggests that any Israeli security role will be seen by the Palestinians and much of the international community as a form of military occupation. This could complicate any plans to hand governing responsibility to the Palestinian Authority or friendly Arab states, and risk bogging Israel down in a war of attrition.
Even if Israel succeeds in ending Hamas’ 16-year rule in Gaza and dismantling much of its militant infrastructure, the presence of Israeli forces is likely to fuel an insurgency, as it did from 1967 to 2005. That period saw two Palestinian uprisings and the rise of Hamas.
Benny Gantz, of Israel’s three-member War Cabinet, acknowledged Wednesday that there’s still no long-term plan for Gaza. He said any plan would have to address Israel’s security needs.
“We can come up with any mechanism we think is appropriate, but Hamas will not be part of it,” he told reporters. “We need to replace the Hamas regime and ensure security superiority for us.”
Here’s a look at what a lingering Israeli security role might look like and the opposition it would inevitably generate.
OUTRIGHT OCCUPATION
In the 1967 Mideast war, Israel captured Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem, territories the Palestinians want for a future state. Israel annexed east Jerusalem, home to the Old City and its sensitive religious sites — a move not recognized by the international community — and considers the entire city its capital.
The military directly governed the West Bank and Gaza for decades, denying basic rights to millions of Palestinians. Soldiers staffed checkpoints and carried out regular arrest raids targeting militants and other Palestinians opposed to Israeli rule.
Israel also built Jewish settlements in all three areas. Palestinians and most of the international community consider these settlements illegal.
After two decades of outright military rule, Palestinians rose up in the first intifada, or uprising, in the late 1980s. That was also when Hamas first emerged as a political movement with an armed wing, challenging the secular Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership of the national struggle.
THE WEST BANK MODEL
Interim peace deals in the mid-1990s known as the Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Authority as an autonomy government in the West Bank and Gaza meant to lead the way toward an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.
Several peace initiatives by a string of American presidents failed. The Palestinian Authority lost control of Gaza to Hamas in 2007.
That has left the Palestinian Authority in charge of roughly 40% of the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Its powers are largely administrative, though it maintains a police force. Israel wields overall security control.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is deeply unpopular, in large part because his forces cooperate with Israel on security even as Palestinian hopes for statehood have all but disappeared. Many Palestinians view the PA as the subcontractor of a never-ending occupation.
Israel keeps tens of thousands of soldiers deployed across the West Bank. They provide security for more than 500,000 Jewish settlers and carry out nightly arrest raids, often sparking deadly gunbattles with militants.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has suggested the Palestinian Authority could return to Gaza after the war. That could further unravel Abbas’ legitimacy among his own people, unless it were linked to concrete steps toward Palestinian statehood.
Arab leaders, even those closely tied to Israel, will likely face similar backlash if they step in to help it control Gaza.
THE GAZA MODEL
What about an over-the-horizon presence, with moderate Palestinians maintaining security inside Gaza and with Israel intervening only when it deems absolutely necessary?
That’s been tried as well.
In 2005, in the wake of a second and far more violent intifada, Israel withdrew soldiers and over 8,000 settlers from Gaza. The PA administered the territory, but Israel continued to control its airspace, coastline and all but one border crossing.
Hamas won Palestinian elections the next year, leading to an international boycott and a severe financial crisis. Months of unrest boiled over in June 2007, when Hamas drove out forces loyal to Abbas in a week of street battles.
Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on Gaza, severely restricting trade and travel in what Israel said was an effort to contain Hamas. Palestinians and rights groups considered it a form of collective punishment. It caused widespread misery among the enclave’s 2.3 million residents.
Israel, like most Western countries, considers Hamas a terrorist organization. Hamas has never recognized Israel’s existence and is committed to its destruction through armed struggle.
But over 16 years that saw four wars, the two entered into various undeclared cease-fires in which Israel eased the blockade in return for Hamas halting rocket attacks and reining in more radical armed groups.
For Israel, the arrangement was far from ideal but preferable to other options and bought yearslong periods of relative calm.
THE LEBANON MODEL
In 1978 and then again in 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in a battle against Palestinian militants.
That led to an 18-year occupation enforced through local ally the South Lebanon Army, which received arms and training from Israel.
In 1982, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah was founded with Iranian backing with the objective of pushing Israeli forces out of the country. It carried out attacks on both the SLA and Israeli troops, eventually leading to Israel’s withdrawal in 2000.
The SLA quickly collapsed, creating a vacuum that was filled by Hezbollah. In 2006, the group battled Israel to a stalemate during a monthlong war.
Today, Hezbollah is the most powerful force in Lebanon. With an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, it’s considered a major threat by Israel.
ANOTHER WAY?
Israel has sent mixed messages about evolving plans for Gaza.
Leaders say they don’t want to reoccupy Gaza. They also say troops need freedom to operate inside Gaza long after heavy fighting subsides.
“On the question of the operation’s length -- there are no limitations,” Gantz said Wednesday.
That could mean leaving troops stationed inside the territory or along the border.
Some officials have discussed a buffer zone to keep Palestinians away from the border. Others, including the U.S., have called for the Palestinian Authority’s return.
In another twist, Gantz suggested any future arrangement for Gaza be contingent on calming Israel’s northern front with Hezbollah and the West Bank, where troops regularly battle Palestinian militants.
“Once the Gaza area is safe, and the northern area will be safe, and the Judea and Samaria region will calm down – we will settle down and review an alternative mechanism for Gaza,” said Gantz, using the biblical term for the West Bank. “I do not know what it will be.”
_____________
AP reporter Joseph Krauss contributed.
AP · November 8, 2023
3. US launches airstrike on Syria site linked to Iranian-backed militants
US launches airstrike on Syria site linked to Iranian-backed militants
militarytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · November 8, 2023
The U.S. launched an airstrike on a facility in eastern Syria linked to Iranian-backed militias, in retaliation for what has been a growing number of attacks on bases housing U.S. troops in the region for the past several weeks, the Pentagon said.
The strike by two U.S. F-15 fighter jets was on a weapons storage facility linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
“The President has no higher priority than the safety of U.S. personnel, and he directed today’s action to make clear that the United States will defend itself, its personnel, and its interests,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin testifies before a Senate Appropriations Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington, Oct. 31, 2023. (Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP)
This is the second time in less than two weeks that the U.S. has bombed facilities used by the militant groups, many operating under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which U.S. officials say have carried out at least 40 such attacks since Oct. 17.
That was the day a powerful explosion rocked a Gaza hospital, triggering protests in a number of Muslim nations. Palestinian officials claim the blast killed hundreds of people. The Israeli military has attacked Gaza in retaliation for the Hamas rampage in southern Israel on Oct. 7.
Israel denied responsibility for the al-Ahli hospital blast, and the U.S. has said its intelligence assessment found that Tel Aviv was not to blame. The Israeli military has continued an assault on Hamas, with ground troops now deep inside Gaza City in a war that has a death toll of more than 10,000 Palestinians, two-thirds of them women and children, according to the Health Ministry of the Hamas-run territory.
The latest U.S. strike in Syria was designed to take out supplies, weapons and ammunition in an effort to erode the abilities of the Iranian-backed militants to attack Americans based in Iraq and Syria. And it reflects the Biden administration’s determination to maintain a delicate balance. The U.S. wants to hit Iranian-backed groups suspected of targeting the U.S. as strongly as possible to deter future aggression, possibly fueled by Israel’s war against Hamas, while also working to avoid further inflaming the region and provoking a wider conflict.
Similar U.S. airstrikes on Oct. 27 also targeted facilities in Syria, and officials at the time said the two sites were affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. When asked why those locations in Syria were chosen — since many of the attacks have happened in Iraq — officials said the U.S. went after storage sites for munitions that could be linked to the strikes on U.S. personnel.
The U.S. has often avoided bombing sites in Iraq in order to lessen the chances of killing Iraqis or angering Iraq’s leaders.
While officials have said the strikes are meant to deter further attacks, they have not had that effect. Rocket and drone attacks have occurred almost daily, although in nearly all cases they have resulted in little damage and few injuries.
According to the Pentagon, a total of 45 personnel have been injured and all of those were in attacks on Oct. 17 and 18. Of those, 32 were at al-Tanf garrison in southeastern Syria, with a mix of minor injuries and traumatic brain injuries, and 13 were at al-Asad air base in western Iraq, with four cases of traumatic brain injury and nine of minor injury. One person was injured at Irbil air base in Iraq.
The Pentagon has faced repeated questions about whether deterrence against Iran and its proxies is working because the attacks have only increased.
At the same time, the department has moved a number of air defense systems and other forces into the region to beef up protection for U.S. forces. And on multiple occasions, the systems have intercepted incoming strikes. According to a U.S. official, the number of ships in the Middle East has more than doubled, the number of Patriot air defense missile systems has about tripled, a few more fighter jet squadrons have been added and hundreds of additional troops have been deployed to the region. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss force numbers not yet made public.
Editor’s note: Military Times has updated language in this Associated Press story to better reflect the fluid nature of the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict.
4. Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion
Conclusion
Taiwan’s government, legislature, civil society groups, and media outlets have worked assiduously to expose and counter disinformation and increase media literacy. The United States should do as much as possible to support Taiwan’s efforts to build resilience against disinformation campaigns. To strengthen U.S.-Taiwanese cooperation and more effectively respond to Chinese disinformation, Shen has advocated that Washington and Taipei establish a “center of excellence” to analyze and respond to disinformation campaigns, including investigating the source of campaigns through the identification of IP addresses. The United States and its allies should also advocate for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and nongovernmental organizations that create rules and norms for internet governance and wireless communications.
It is unrealistic to expect that Taiwan will ever fully combat Chinese gray-zone tactics, given the power imbalance across the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s ever-evolving toolkit. But Taipei, along with external partners, should prioritize building the capabilities to blunt the more pernicious aspects of the People’s Republic of China’s pressure campaign. While the United States should develop the capability to deter and defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion, that scenario remains a low probability. What’s more, Taiwan is under assault day in and day out through the types of intimidation, boundary probing, and coercion described above. The discussions on and preparations for deterring a direct attack or blockade cannot come at the expense of the types of investments needed to ensure Taiwan’s continuing resiliency and confidence.
Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion - War on the Rocks
JUDE BLANCHETTE AND BONNIE GLASER
warontherocks.com · by Jude Blanchette · November 9, 2023
What is the greatest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait? For a growing number of analysts and officials in capitals around the world, the answer is straightforward: An invasion or blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army.
Such a fear is not without reason. China’s overt military threats to the island have grown steadily since 2016, when the Chinese government cut off formal contact with Taipei after the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen as president. China’s military regularly conducts drills in the Taiwan Strait in order to signal resolve and hone its capabilities to seize and control Taiwan. The joint air and sea exercises that the People’s Liberation Army conducted after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi traveled to Taiwan in August 2022 were widely seen as a rehearsal for a blockade. And, although Chinese leader Xi Jinping has not articulated a precise timeline to invade Taiwan, authoritative statements and documents clearly threaten to use military force to compel “reunification” if Beijing concludes it has no better options.
Preparing for a possible invasion or blockade, including ensuring that Taiwan and the United States have the capabilities to deter and defeat the Chinese military, remains essential. Indeed, the very foundation of any effective approach to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait begins with the Chinese Communist Party assessing that the United States has the means and determination to respond to a Chinese military attack.
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Yet while an invasion is the most consequential scenario, we do not think it is the most probable, and treating it as if it is comes at the cost of distraction from the short- and near-term challenges to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing seeks to compel Taipei to enter formal negotiations on “reunification,” and to achieve goal, it is pursuing an increasingly aggressive “gray zone” campaign of political, psychological, economic, and diplomatic coercion that is designed to make Taiwan’s citizens feel powerless, divided, and isolated. If China can visibly undermine the credibility of American support and security assistance while simultaneously demonstrating to the Taiwan people that their government lacks the will or capability to respond to Chinese pressure, an invasion won’t be needed.
What’s more, Beijing’s “salami slicing” today means an even greater challenge tomorrow. A sustained and successful campaign of economic coercion and information warfare gives the Chinese government the ability to shape the strategic landscape of a possible future conflict. For example, the Chinese Communist Party has attempted to leverage the “provocation” of Pelosi’s visit to erase the center line in the Taiwan Strait and normalize air and naval operations up to the edge of the contiguous zone that extends 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s coastline. The unwillingness of the United States and Taiwan to aggressively confront coercion at the lower end of the spectrum will only embolden the Chinese Communist Party to feel comfortable taking even more aggressive steps. Thus, deterring gray-zone actions is not a separate enterprise from deterring a blockade or invasion, but rather a critical early step in doing so.
While the United States and Taiwan should continue to focus on foundational military capabilities, they should also develop an aggressive campaign to counter Chinese gray-zone actions. Such an effort would include a higher tolerance for pushback against Chinese aggression, greater efforts to increase the transparency around Chinese actions, which have largely remained in the shadows, and stepped-up efforts to combat China’s information warfare.
Defining the Gray Zone
What is the “gray zone”? One Center for Strategic and International Security report defines the gray zone as the “contested arena that lies between routine statecraft and open warfare,” in which an actor probes for advantage and gains without “crossing a threshold that results in open war.” Perhaps the simplest way to conceptualize it is as a political strategy that seeks economic, military, diplomatic, or political gains without eliciting a costly and direct response from an opponent. While major gray-zone movements capture media attention, such as the People’s Liberation Army’s response to last year’s trip to Taiwan by Pelosi, the accretion of marginal gains through subtle actions can have an equally pernicious impact. This is precisely the strategy Beijing has been undertaking against Taiwan for decades, aimed at inducing psychological despair and persuading Taiwan’s government to begin formal political negotiations over the island’s de jure incorporation into the People’s Republic of China. While there have been periods of relative stability and improved ties in the cross-Strait relationship, such during the presidency of the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang’s Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), since 2016 the Chinese government has leveraged a range of coercive tools, including disinformation, cognitive warfare, economic and diplomatic pressure, cyber attacks, “united front” activities, and military operations in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.
Consider disinformation. In June, Chinese spokesperson Zhu Fenglian claimed that the United States was preparing to “abandon” Taiwan after turning it into a “minefield” and “ammunition depot.” Still another narrative held that the United States is seeking to provoke a war in the Taiwan Strait in order to protect its regional influence from growing Chinese power, and that Taiwan should be wary of becoming America’s cannon fodder. Of course, such opinions are not in themselves “disinformation,” and there are many in Taiwan who organically hold these opinions. But the scale and coordination of these narratives strongly points to direct Chinese orchestration. And more worrying, this messaging campaign is facilitating the spread of “American skepticism” (疑美论) and an accompanying decline in belief that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense, as measured in a number of recent Taiwan polls.
The Chinese government has also been leveraging its deep economic ties with Taiwan to exert influence over specific political constituencies on the island. Earlier this year, the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Commerce launched a “trade barrier investigation” of more than 2,000 imported products from Taiwan that it claimed were non-World Trade Organization compliant. The political nature of this investigation was only thinly veiled, given that the investigation is set to wrap up on Jan. 12, 2024, just one day before Taiwan’s voters head to the polls to elect a new president. This latest action builds on previous de facto import bans of pineapples, sugar and wax apples, grouper fish, and mangos, all of which are among Taiwan’s top exports to China and are grown in southern Taiwan, historically a stronghold of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. Beijing has also hinted that it could cancel the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which was inked during the Ma presidency and facilitated significant tariff cuts for nearly 600 Taiwan products entering the Chinese market. While such a move would have a relatively limited impact on Taiwan’s overall economy, it is nonetheless a less-than-subtle attempt to shape political calculations in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election.
In February, two undersea cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Island were unexpectedly severed, disrupting access to the internet for the island’s nearly 14,000 residents. While Taipei has refrained from formally accusing Beijing, it is widely believed that a Chinese fishing vessel and a separate freighter were responsible for the severing. Matsu Island has also seen a dramatic increase in the presence of Chinese sand-dredgers operating just off its shores, as well as in the waters near the center line of the Taiwan Strait. According to reports, more than 4,000 Chinese sand-dredgers and accompanying sand-transport vehicles were confronted by Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration in 2020 alone. Such activities not only literally reform the territory around Taiwan, but they also send a potent political message to the residents on Matsu and nearby Kinmen Island that the People’s Republic of China dominates the waters surrounding Taiwan.
The above only scratches the surface of the Chinese government’s proliferating coercive tool kit. Other areas of concern including the use of legal and administrative means to normalize Chinese territorial claims (collectively known as “lawfare”), the leveraging of market access (or its denial) in order to compel Taiwan firms to lobby on China’s behalf, and diplomatic pressure on third countries to distance themselves from Taiwan in public forums and international bodies. Taken together, this is a systematic and unrelenting campaign designed to erode Taiwan’s domestic cohesion and resolve while dividing and degrading international support for Taiwan’s continuing autonomy.
How Can Taiwan — and the West — Respond?
The first step to formulating a response is to understand that the Chinese government’s gray-zone challenges, not an invasion by the People’s Liberation Army, pose the most significant near-term threat to Taiwan, its future, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait more broadly. As the recently released Department of Defense China Military Power Report states, the Chinese goal is to “force Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC [People’s Republic of China]’s terms.” An all-out invasion of the island would be, according to the report, “one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army],” which would also bring “significant political and military risk for Xi and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]…” Beijing would likely only contemplate such a move if all other options are exhausted, or if Taiwan takes the drastic step of formally declaring independence. While it’s important to appreciate that autocrats can and do take risky and even reckless actions, as Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrates, as it stands there are no signs that Xi has pivoted away from Beijing’s long-term strategy of isolating and strangulating Taipei in order to deter Taiwanese independence and force its government to enter into formal “reunification” negotiations.
Indeed, the Chinese government won’t need to launch a kinetic attack if it can continue to press forward with its current strategy unimpeded. Of course, Taiwan needs to press ahead with significant investments in its defensive capabilities, including asymmetric capabilities such as mines, anti-ship missiles, and other air-defense measures that could slow down an invading military, as well as stockpiling food, medical supplies, and energy to cope with a blockade. But, as officials in Taipei ceaselessly remind a growing chorus of newly converted “friends of Taiwan,” planning for a Chinese invasion cannot come at the expense of dealing with the entire range of threats the island faces, many of which are already having an impact on Taiwan’s struggle for security and prosperity.
What should Taiwan do to respond more effectively to the intensifying gray-zone threats? And how can other countries support their efforts? An effective counter-gray-zone effort should be centered on Taiwan prioritizing even more aggressive steps to counter Chinese influence.
As Chinese military operations across the center line and circumnavigating Taiwan become routine, Taiwan’s air force should maintain capable fleets of fighter jets that can scramble and intercept People’s Liberation Army aircraft operating in its air defense identification zone, even if they are unlikely to survive beyond the early hours of a conflict. Taiwan also needs surface combatants to respond to People’s Republic of China naval vessels now operating up to Taiwan’s 24 nautical mile contiguous zone, a demarcation that the Chinese military is likely to test in the future as it tries to probe Taipei’s resolve. Equally as important, Beijing will also use these boundary-probing actions to create scenarios where it can attempt to call the bluff of the United States and other regional actors. While some might criticize these efforts as a distraction from building an asymmetric “porcupine” defense strategy, these critics underappreciate the psychological influence on the Taiwanese people of knowing that the People’s Liberation Army is unopposed as it navigates the airspace and waters near Taiwan. True, scrambling F-16s to meet oncoming Chinese fighter jets won’t likely lead to Beijing pulling back on the number or frequency of these flights, but these actions will send an important signal to the Taiwanese people and other international observers that Taipei won’t bend to Chinese pressure tactics.
The United States and other regional partners can support these efforts by maintaining a calm yet persistent presence in international waters around Taiwan, including in the Taiwan Strait. Australian and French warships should continue to conduct occasional Taiwan Strait transits, and Canadian coast guard vessels can again join U.S. destroyers sailing through the strait. Other countries should consider doing so as well, not because they want to accept more risk, but because these signs of solidarity are important deterrence signals to the Chinese leadership.
Further, the United States should increase the effectiveness of its communications strategy around some of its air and naval activity in the Taiwan Strait to tie it more directly to Beijing’s growing belligerence. Recent efforts by the Philippine government to capture and publicize Chinese aggression in and around the Second Thomas Shoal are a good example of how to counter — or at least problematize — Beijing’s gray zone toolkit. The Chinese Communist Party does not like sunlight, and a new approach of aggressive transparency on their actions should be developed for the Taiwan Strait.
The more Beijing leans on displays of military aggression, including mock blockades, missile tests, and drone harassment, the more it should expect to see the United States provide weapons and training to Taiwan. As is stated in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States will supply Taiwan with “defensive articles and defense services” that are commensurate with the threat environment that it faces. The People’s Liberation Army has elevated that threat by increasing its presence in and around Taiwan and adopting actions that are bolder and more aggressive. This necessitates an even stronger show of support from the United States, including more active and direct engagement with the Taiwanese military, as well as supplying Taiwan with the hardware and training it needs to more effectively respond. The Taiwanese military, along with the United States and regional partners, don’t have to lock themselves into a rigid “tit-for-tat” response to Chinese military actions against, but they do need to increase the cost to Beijing for its growing impunity operating in the Taiwan Strait. Most importantly, Beijing should see a stronger direct linkage between its own bad behavior and outcomes that work against its interests.
Related to this is how to shape effective narratives around the growing prevalence of unsafe People’s Liberation Army maneuvers, which have targeted not only the Taiwanese military, but also the United States and other partners operating in the region. Whether this is operating at unsafe distances from U.S. ships, as in the case of the USS Chung-Hoon this past June, or a May 2023 incident where a People’s Liberation Army Air Force J-16 flew dangerously close to a U.S. surveillance aircraft operating over the South China Sea, the U.S. response has been to publicly call out the Chinese military for conducting unsafe and unprofessional actions. This approach is designed to bring more reputational cost onto Beijing, and these efforts should be expanded. The United States and other partners in the region should also strengthen the narrative that this Chinese strategy of deliberate escalation is aimed at deterring countries from operating in the international airspace and waters near Taiwan.
Taiwan, with the support of the United States and other partners, should also increase the security and reliability of its electrical grid and telecommunications system, both of which are vulnerable to Chinese government cyber attacks and sabotage. As it stands, Taiwan’s grid system is prone to blackouts and malfunctions, and its network is highly vulnerable since it relies on 15 undersea cables that come to shore at just seven landing stations. This is a very precarious position for an island economy. Building overlapping or redundant systems that rely on low earth orbit and medium earth orbit satellites is one step that Taiwan should take, with the support of the United States and other partners. Making the necessary investments to upgrade these systems and demonstrating urgency in doing so would not only be good for Taiwan’s economic resiliency but would also send a strong signal to both Beijing and the outside world that Taipei is serious about ensuring that Taiwan’s economy can withstand Chinese pressure.
According to Tsai, about 30 million cyber attacks target the island’s government every month, and more than half of these attacks are launched by the People’s Republic of China. Beijing employs cyber means to spread disinformation, sow chaos, and demonstrate its ability to bring the island to its knees. In the event of an invasion, cyber attacks would likely be used to aid a rapid takeover. Since Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, including gas, water, and electricity, is highly digitized, its systems are highly vulnerable to effective cyber attacks. During Pelosi’s visit last year, the television screens in all of the over 6500 7-Eleven convenience stores in Taiwan were hacked to display the message, “Warmonger Pelosi, get out of Taiwan.” Hours before Pelosi landed on the island, several websites run by the government of Taiwan were disrupted by distributed denial-of-service attacks, and immediately following her departure, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said its network was taken offline by such an attack.
The United States is quietly helping Taiwan to strengthen its cyber forces. For example, it has held joint cyber warfare exercises with Taiwan since 2019. But more can be done to ensure that Taipei has the digital capabilities to defend the island’s military and economic networks and infrastructure from malicious attacks. In addition to providing Taiwan with training and technology, the United States should conduct cyber security training exercises with Taiwan and leverage U.S. cyber security technologies to help defend Taiwan. The United States should also assist Taiwan in identifying intrusions and making its networks as resilient as possible by dispatching its cyber teams to the island, as it does for other allies and partners.
Disinformation is rampant in Taiwan, disseminated both domestically and by Chinese actors. Research by Puma Shen, director of Taiwan’s Double Think Lab, has found that online disinformation can significantly impact Taiwan’s democratic process, particularly when it reinforces offline rumors. Chinese disinformation campaigns frequently spread rumors designed to reduce the confidence of Taiwan’s people in its government and spread fear and panic throughout the society. During elections, such disinformation campaigns often target swing voters who can influence the outcome.
Conclusion
Taiwan’s government, legislature, civil society groups, and media outlets have worked assiduously to expose and counter disinformation and increase media literacy. The United States should do as much as possible to support Taiwan’s efforts to build resilience against disinformation campaigns. To strengthen U.S.-Taiwanese cooperation and more effectively respond to Chinese disinformation, Shen has advocated that Washington and Taipei establish a “center of excellence” to analyze and respond to disinformation campaigns, including investigating the source of campaigns through the identification of IP addresses. The United States and its allies should also advocate for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and nongovernmental organizations that create rules and norms for internet governance and wireless communications.
It is unrealistic to expect that Taiwan will ever fully combat Chinese gray-zone tactics, given the power imbalance across the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s ever-evolving toolkit. But Taipei, along with external partners, should prioritize building the capabilities to blunt the more pernicious aspects of the People’s Republic of China’s pressure campaign. While the United States should develop the capability to deter and defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion, that scenario remains a low probability. What’s more, Taiwan is under assault day in and day out through the types of intimidation, boundary probing, and coercion described above. The discussions on and preparations for deterring a direct attack or blockade cannot come at the expense of the types of investments needed to ensure Taiwan’s continuing resiliency and confidence.
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Jude Blanchette is the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific Program.
Image: Taiwan Navy Command
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Jude Blanchette · November 9, 2023
5. What Does the U.S. Space Force Actually Do?
Will this help recruiting?
THE SPACE ISSUE
What Does the U.S. Space Force Actually Do?
Inside the highly secretive military branch responsible for protecting American interests in a vulnerable new domain.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/magazine/space-force.html?utm
By Jon Gertner
Chief Master Sgt. Ron Lerch of the U.S. Space Force sat down in his office in Los Angeles one morning in September to deliver a briefing known as a threat assessment. The current “threats” in space are less sci-fi than you might expect, but there are a surprising number of them: At least 44,500 space objects now circle Earth, including 9,000 active satellites and 19,000 significant pieces of debris.
What’s most concerning isn’t the swarm of satellites but the types. “We know that there are kinetic kill vehicles,” Lerch said — for example, a Russian “nesting doll” satellite, in which a big satellite releases a tiny one and the tiny one releases a mechanism that can strike and damage another satellite. There are machines with the ability to cast nets and extend grappling hooks, too. China, whose presence in space now far outpaces Russia’s, is launching unmanned “space planes” into orbit, testing potentially unbreakable quantum communication links and adding A.I. capabilities to satellites.
An intelligence report, Lerch said, predicted the advent, within the next decade, of satellites with radio-frequency jammers, chemical sprayers and lasers that blind and disable the competition. All this would be in addition to the cyberwarfare tools, electromagnetic instruments and “ASAT” antisatellite missiles that already exist on the ground. In Lerch’s assessment, space looked less like a grand “new ocean” for exploration — phrasing meant to induce wonder that has lingered from the Kennedy administration — and more like a robotic battlefield, where the conflicts raging on Earth would soon extend ever upward.
The Space Force, the sixth and newest branch of the U.S. military, was authorized by Congress and signed into law by President Donald Trump in December 2019. Its creation was not a partisan endeavor, though Trump has boasted that the idea for the organization was his alone. The initiative had in fact been shaped within the armed forces and Congress over the previous 25 years, based on the premise that as satellite and space technologies evolved, America’s military organizations had to change as well.
At its incarnation, the Space Force was an assemblage of programs and teams that already existed, mainly as entities within the Air Force. “It’s one of the common misperceptions that it cost money to create the Space Force — and it really didn’t, because we already had space forces,” Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told me. “These were just spread throughout the military: the people, the bases, the platforms, the satellites, the ground stations.” What the new directive did accomplish, however, was to group space endeavors under a central chain of command and authorize its leaders to chart a unified future. “One of the things that we were lacking without a Space Force was an organization that would argue for its own destiny,” Douglas Loverro, a former Pentagon official involved in helping start the branch, told me. The concern was that without a dedicated team within the military’s bureaucracy that could push for the specific tools they needed, the United States would be at a disadvantage. Some strategists worried that the nation already was. Loverro pointed out that two decades ago, a Chinese military analyst named Wang Hucheng wrote a paper that presaged an aspect of China’s aerospace strategy: “For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.” The argument identified space as the U.S. military’s “soft ribs” and “strategic weakness.”
From the start, the Space Force had detractors. Air Force officials wondered if it was necessary, while some political observers believed that it signified the start of a dangerous (and expensive) militarization of another realm. What seemed harder to argue against was how nearly every aspect of modern warfare and defense — intelligence, surveillance, communications, operations, missile detection — has come to rely on links to orbiting satellites. The recent battles in Eastern Europe, in which Russia has tried to disrupt Ukraine’s space-borne communication systems, are a case in point. And yet the strategic exploitation of space now extends well beyond military concerns. Satellite phone systems have become widespread. Positioning and timing satellites, such as GPS (now overseen by the Space Force), allow for digital mapping, navigation, banking and agricultural management. A world without orbital weather surveys seems unthinkable. Modern life is reliant on space technologies to an extent that an interruption would create profound economic and social distress.
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The Morrell Operations Center at the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida.Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
The work of the Space Force is by its nature highly sensitive, often classified and mostly out of sight. This leaves the organization in a battle for visibility and, at times, viability. Some members of the force — guardians, as they’re called — told me that even now they find themselves bumping into members of other branches of the military who see their arm patches and ask, in earnest: “Space Force, is that a real thing?” The Steve Carell Netflix comedy series, which members of the actual Space Force sometimes argue is neither good nor funny, doesn’t help their cause.
It likewise doesn’t capture their seriousness of purpose. For the moment, the force has taken up a problem not often contemplated outside science fiction: How do you fight a war in space, or a war on Earth that expands into space? And even if you’re ready to fight, how do you make sure you don’t have a space war in the first place?
More on U.S. Armed Forces
The Space Force’s operations division is headquartered on the southeastern side of Colorado Springs, in a massive three-story building within the guarded perimeter of Peterson Space Force Base. Until recently, it was Peterson Air Force Base. The office’s inner workings are highly secure and secretive; the force, as one security analyst told me, has a larger proportion of its budget — around $26 billion this year — dedicated to classified spending than any other branch of the military. Visitors to headquarters are not allowed to bring electronic devices or walk unescorted inside. The building nevertheless hums with activity, with personnel hustling about under a canopy of scale-model satellites, large replicas of machines that now orbit Earth, hanging in a bright, airy atrium.
When I visited in late September, several military and civilian personnel took me through their day-to-day work. Right away they noted that the Space Force is often mistaken for United States Space Command, also headquartered in Colorado, that reports to the U.S. secretary of defense. Space Command is a decision-making entity that coordinates space-related operations for all branches of the armed forces. The Space Force, by contrast, outfits and trains troops for potential space conflicts, scrutinizes space for dangers and launches satellites for the Department of Defense. The Space Force regularly consults with Space Command to ask how (or whether) the potential threats it discovers should be addressed.
As large as the Space Force’s remit seems to be — to monitor, protect and ensure access to a territory far larger than Earth’s oceans — technology now enables economies of scale. “It’s a big domain with the smallest force, smaller than the Coast Guard,” Christopher Ayres, the technical director to the deputy commanding general for operations, explained. All told, the Space Force has about 8,600 military guardians and about 5,000 civilian guardians. But you don’t need hundreds of people to operate a satellite after launch. You may need only one. Space Force personnel often do their work in air-conditioned, windowless buildings, outfitted with computer servers and robust intelligence links. During critical situations, they “deploy in place” — that is, they report to the same offices but at a heightened state of readiness.
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A mission-control room at Morrell before a recent NASA launch.Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
Guardians tend to think of the realm they patrol as a kind of structured multilevel terrain — Earth as being surrounded by three highways, or three rings. The nearest level, low Earth orbit (LEO), is host to constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink network and the International Space Station, which moves about 250 miles above us at 17,500 miles per hour. A medium Earth orbit (MEO), between 1,200 and 22,000 miles above, is where GPS satellites circle. At the highest ring — at least for now — is a track known as “geosynchronous” orbit (GEO), because an object in such an orbit keeps pace with Earth’s rotation. This band is home to DirectTV satellites, weather-tracking instruments from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and crucial Defense Department communication links.
It’s a technological zoo up there. The satellite mix is foreign and domestic, young and old, sinister and peaceful. The technologies are all different sizes, flying at different speeds and altitudes. The challenge for the force is to monitor all movement but also to track the threatening presence of debris, some of which is naturally occurring (tiny rocks, for instance) and some of which has human origins (like shards of old rockets). Because space junk can move at extraordinary velocities, a floating screw might pack a destructive punch equivalent to a small bomb.
The main focus within the Space Force is on observation and deterrence — nobody wants a space war, I was reminded frequently. But the force has a capacity to mobilize when necessary. At Peterson, I visited an electromagnetic-warfare center, a building not far from headquarters — but ringed with surveillance cameras and an additional perimeter of high fencing — where men and women train to unjam signals that may be intentionally interfering with American planes, ships and ground troops. “It would be like watching TV and you can’t get the signal,” Lt. Col. D.J. Thomas, who leads the team, told me. In emergencies, Thomas said, his guardians would pack up a pair of portable dish antennas and a customized computer console at a moment’s notice (a combined unit that struck me as fitting easily into a minivan) and ship out to remote locations all over the world.
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The rooms I visited at the electromagnetic-warfare center were for defensive training. A part of the building was given over to offensive tactics. Clearly, the force sees both as necessary. And if a requirement to “blind and deafen” an enemy’s satellites were to arise from U.S. Space Command, the Space Force could help fulfill the order. The means would most likely not be “kinetic” — some form of physical or explosive contact — but electronic, a weapon of code-related stealth, or perhaps a kind of debilitating high-energy burst. Col. Chandler Atwood of Space Force Operations Command told me that what concerns him most is his belief that Americans are unaware of how rapidly orbital dangers have evolved. He acknowledged that the force observes “multiple events daily” in space that require its attention. “It’s not the kinetic threat that keeps me up at night,” he added. “It’s the cyberdefense aspect. We have significant vulnerabilities we have to harden up.”
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The Space Force oversees all satellite launches for the Department of Defense.Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
From Peterson, I took a 30-minute ride to a smaller Space Force base in Colorado known as Schriever, which sits on a grassy plain with a distant view of Pikes Peak. To reach the Space Force’s orbital-warfare unit meant passing through a gated station at the base’s perimeter and barriers of high protective fencing, monitored by guards with body armor and weapons. Lt. Col. Galen Thorpe escorted me inside the complex. The most crucial part of his work occurs inside a building where about 120 guardians, working in teams of five at a time, “push buttons,” as Thorpe put it, to drive five maneuverable observation satellites known as GSSAPs (for the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program) at a distance of 22,300 miles above Earth. Unlike many satellites, which cannot be significantly steered once they’re put into orbit, these have tanks of propellant and are akin to enormous remote-controlled drones.
The program was originally created inside the Air Force. I asked Thorpe how things had evolved since his unit was reconfigured within the Space Force three years ago. He pointed to a “shift in posture” — from merely cataloging all the satellites in orbit to scrutinizing their behavior, using tools like GSSAPs, in terms of “threat awareness.” Or, as he put it, “We have to know where these objects are in a protect-and-defend sense.”
Thorpe’s colleague, Capt. Raymond Pereira, drawing on a white board, pointed me to another concern: the crowd of satellites in low Earth orbit. “I would say we’re probably already entering into an area where congestion is a problem,” he said, “and anything that would generate debris would be catastrophic for the domain.” One plausible theory is known as the Kessler Syndrome, named after the former NASA scientist Donald Kessler, which posits that a release of wreckage and fragments in this orbit could eventually lead to a domino effect of unstoppable destruction. Pereira pointed out that if someone (or something) were to touch off such an event, “they would not only be harming their adversary; they would be harming themselves.” But even short of that, a single collision or attack might hamstring science missions to the moon, or to Mars, or lead to failures for GPS and communications systems, a problem that could have huge consequences for life on Earth.
Keeping track of 44,500 items moving around the planet, along with new arrivals that slip into orbit nearly every week, poses a multidimensional task: Who launched these machines? Why? What could they do? “We need to know what’s up there, where is it going and why we should be concerned,” Col. Bryon McClain of the Space Force told me. This goal, known as space-domain awareness, has become one of the force’s overarching priorities. There are enormous challenges in creating a system of constant observation and making sense of so much data. What constitutes threatening activities in orbit, moreover, and what might necessitate a strategic response is not always clear. In truth, space has few unquestioned laws apart from those relating to gravity. A treaty from the late 1960s, signed by most of the major nations on Earth, prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in space and designates the moon for peaceful purposes. But recently, I was told, satellites from foreign adversaries have been coming close to machines from the United States and its allies. The treaty says nothing about such provocations — or about grappling hooks, nesting dolls and cyberwarfare.
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Atlas V boosters, made by the United Launch Alliance, a partnership of Lockheed Martin and Boeing, at Cape Canaveral, which will launch future government missions. Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
Space Force leaders readily describe their guardians as working toward a state of combat readiness, even as they hope an era of actual conflict never arrives. In October, I went to the Pentagon to meet with Gen. Chance Saltzman, the chief of space operations and the Space Force’s highest-ranking officer. Saltzman remarked that several decades back, when he began working with satellites in the Air Force, the notion that there could be combat losses in space was not part of the conversation. But “those are discussions now,” he told me, “because both the Chinese and the Russians have demonstrated operational capabilities that truly placed those assets at risk.” In 2007, China’s decision to test an ASAT weapon to destroy one of its own satellites sent shock waves through the U.S. military and created a vast field of debris. A similar Russian tactic, in 2021, generated more than 1,500 fragments and led Secretary of State Antony Blinken to describe the act as “recklessly conducted.” The Space Force’s own squadrons, Saltzman told me, were still tracking pieces of junk that date to the 2007 explosion. “You know, the other domains kind of clean themselves up after war,” Saltzman said. “You shoot an airplane down, it falls out of the sky. Ships sink out of the sea lanes. Even on land, you bring the bulldozers in and you move things around. But space doesn’t heal itself.”
Debris has led military strategists to ponder a related issue: In space, it’s difficult to get out of the way of conflict. Right now, Saltzman noted, if you pull up real-time data to see where flights are around the world, the airspace over Ukraine is empty. “You will see a void,” he said. “Commercial air traffic does not want to fly over Ukraine.” The same thing happens in shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz, when the Middle East is in turmoil, as it is now. “So in other domains, refugees, displaced persons, people get out of the way of conflict. Commercial entities move out of the way and avoid conflict.” In space, orbital mechanics take over; machines keep going around and around, following the laws of gravity. NASA satellites may not be able to steer away from a potential combat zone. And commercial entities can’t move — or won’t know where or when to move. “And then potentially every satellite becomes more debris,” Saltzman remarked. “Every peaceful satellite could become a weapon accidentally.”
I asked Saltzman what he and his colleagues had learned from observing the war in Ukraine. With a caveat that the fighting is hardly over — “it could still be a catastrophe on a grand scale,” he said — he pointed to several crucial events. The first was how one of Russia’s earliest endeavors was to deny Ukrainian troops access to a satellite communications system they relied upon, known as Viasat, which is stationed in the distant geosynchronous orbital belt. “And they did it with a cyberattack against the ground infrastructure,” he said. “So you attack the ground network to achieve the space effect you want.” This wasn’t a surprise to him, he said, yet it was a reminder of the potential power of cyberwarfare and how battles to dominate space could still be terrestrial.
Another crucial point came after that attack — Ukraine’s decision to go to a commercial vendor, SpaceX, and use its Starlink system for combat communications. Here the lesson was twofold. First, that what Saltzman called “commercial augmentation” could prove vital in a crisis. As important, he added, Starlink — a configuration of hundreds of “proliferated” small satellites flying in low Earth orbit — has proved hard to bring down. “The Russians are trying to interrupt it,” he said, “and they’re not having very good success.” And the takeaway is that proliferated systems of many small machines in low orbit can be more technologically resilient to hacking and disruption than a few big machines in higher orbits. This seems to fit into Saltzman’s goal of maintaining strength during combat while achieving a larger objective of avoiding conflict altogether. “If I have two or three satellite communications doing nuclear command and control, maybe those are targets,” he explained. “But if I take nuclear command and control and spread it across 400 satellites that are zipping over the horizon [every] 15 minutes, there’s a targeting problem. How many satellites do I have to shoot down now to take out the U.S. nuclear command and control?”
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An overarching priority of the Space Force is to have an awareness of every object — natural and man-made — in Earth’s orbit.Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
If the answer was 400, it would make things difficult for the enemy. And while small satellites in a large configuration could potentially be a more expensive investment than two or three megasatellites, the shift could be worthwhile. If an adversary believes that it cannot achieve a military objective, Saltzman remarked, it will hesitate to cross “a threshold of violence.” No conflicts. No debris. No crisis.
Over the course of several days in Los Angeles at Space Systems Command — a Space Force division that plans and acquires technology — I met with about a dozen colonels who detailed their ideas for the next decade. Some discussions addressed the Space Force’s goal of being able to launch satellites within, say, 24 hours in urgent situations. I learned the force is working on developing machines that can be refueled in orbit, as well as satellites that can repair other satellites. Because rockets and orbital objects travel so fast — the International Space Station circles Earth every 90 minutes — some tacticians are pondering being able to deliver, via launches into space, a high-value package, such as a rare medication or a vital part for an F-35 fighter jet, halfway across the world in as little as 30 minutes.
Other projects are less speculative. There are deep concerns within the military about China and Russia’s hypersonic glide weapons, which may be able to avoid defense systems through bursts of speed and pretzeled flight paths. In response, the force is trying to implement a new system of detection in the next several years at low and middle Earth orbits. It took ample funds to build and launch the old systems, Col. Heather Bogstie, who helps oversee the program, told me. “But with the speed our adversaries are fielding these hypersonic glide vehicles, we don’t have the luxury of time anymore.”
Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, a nonprofit that focuses on keeping the orbital realm peaceful and sustainable, told me that the U.S. military has faced perennial challenges in reducing costs and delivery times for new space-based projects — and that the Space Force has yet to prove it can buck that trend. Still, the force is trying to nurture America’s domestic rocket industry — acting as a facilitator for national-security launches while stoking the growth and bringing down the expense of fledgling commercial enterprises. The Department of Defense sometimes requires big rockets to take heavy satellites farther into space — that is, into the MEO or GEO layers — making for significant technical challenges for new companies. Col. Douglas Pentacost, the deputy director of launch enterprise at Space Systems Command, also told me that because some launches carry “very precious,” “supersecret” instruments, they cannot fail under any circumstances.
For now, SpaceX has demonstrated the capabilities and safety record to carry these payloads. But Pentacost told me: “We can’t rely on one company to always be there for us. That’s basically taking us back to the 1980s, when we were relying on the space shuttle. And then when the space shuttle had its unfortunate accident, we had no way into space for several years.” In an effort to diversify risks, Pentacost’s team is working with the United Launch Alliance, a partnership of Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Commercial companies — Firefly, Rocket Lab and Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin, for instance — are in the mix, too. The goal would be a range of reliable and cheaper launch companies to choose from by the late 2020s. Pentacost said he would soon like to be able to get any payload into orbit at any time.
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The decommissioned Launch Complex 14 at Cape Canaveral is part of a museum of historical orbital space missions.Credit...Christopher Payne for The New York Times
There is a darker side that accompanies a future of rampant growth. As space becomes commercialized, it increasingly becomes a geopolitical arena for competition too. Just as China launched a space plane that stayed aloft for months, so has the U.S. Space Force. Just as competitors develop satellites that make close and unnerving approaches to our satellites, so does the U.S. Space Force. With so many launches now planned, and so many designs for enigmatic satellites in the works, it becomes hard not to wonder if the United States will become engaged in a new arms race. Or to ask if it already has.
In 1950, a political scientist named John Herz introduced the term “security dilemma,” noting that in international affairs, a state concerned with “being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated” by others can be drawn into a “vicious circle” of building up its defenses. One implication of this, a political scientist named Robert Jervis later posited, is that “one state’s gain in security inadvertently threatens others.” When I asked Saltzman if this was a concern, he acknowledged that it was, but he also said that the security dilemma was a phenomenon that probably dated back thousands of years. Weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive, Saltzman maintained. “Weapons are just weapons. And the operations that you choose to undertake with those weapons makes them more offensive or defensive.”
The important question, as he saw it, was this: At what point does a buildup of defensive weapons in space constitute an ability to conduct offensive operations so that someone else feels threatened? “There is a balance here,” he said. “And this is about stability management. What actions can we take to protect ourselves before we start to cross the line and maybe create a security dilemma?” The line, he suggested — harder to find in space, no doubt, and at this point not clearly defined — had not yet been crossed.
Jon Gertner has been writing about science and technology for the magazine since 2003. He last wrote about A.I.’s threats to Wikipedia. Christopher Payne is a photographer specializing in architecture and industry. His new book, “Made in America,” was published in October.
A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 12, 2023, Page 14 of the Sunday Magazine with the headline: Infinite Battlefield. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
6. Israel Must Destroy Hamas’s Tunnels
Excerpts:
Despite the difficulty of managing these risks, the destruction of Hamas’s network of tunnels and subterranean structures must remain a top priority for the Israeli military as this operation evolves. Leaders and fighters can be replaced, but Hamas will be hard pressed to recover and reorganize while being exposed and unable to hide.
...
Israel faces the almost insurmountable operational challenge of identifying and eliminating subterranean military capabilities in a tunnel-laden urban battlefield that Hamas has had years to prepare. Distributed within this urban and subterranean jungle are the over 200 people Hamas is holding hostage in Gaza. Their presence makes Israel’s options even more limited. Israel perceives the kidnapping of any number of soldiers and civilians as a strategic event. Hamas has taken hostage children, babies, women, and elderly people, as well as an unknown number of soldiers. Until the release of all hostages, anti-tunnel operations in Gaza—via deep-penetrating airstrikes or a ground incursion—put their lives at risk and add another layer of complexity to Israel’s military operation. In this setting, the traditional dilemmas associated with urban warfare, chief among them the need to minimize harm caused to innocent civilians, are magnified exponentially.
Hamas has purposefully placed its entire military apparatus within and underneath civilian infrastructure, from supply lines and transportation routes in tunnels crisscrossing Gaza’s cities to underground command-and-control centers, ammunition depots, living quarters, rocket launchers, and even military hospitals. Hamas’s main military bases are located beneath Gaza’s hospitals and schools, notably Al Shifa Hospital in the heart of Gaza City, and beneath many facilities operated by the United Nations. By using civilians, hospitals, and schools to shield itself from attack, Hamas has committed war crimes, certainly; but it has also made it that much more difficult for Israel to achieve substantial military gains.
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Destroying Hamas’s tunnel network is the most difficult aspect of the Israeli military’s mission today, but it is also among its most important. It is at least as important as the elimination of Hamas’s chain of command. The destruction of the tunnels will leave Hamas with a compromised infrastructure and a depleted arsenal, resources more difficult to replace than fighters. It is crucial that Israel not lose sight of this as the fighting intensifies.
Israel Must Destroy Hamas’s Tunnels
But Doing So Takes Airpower, Not Boots Underground
November 9, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Daphné Richemond-Barak · November 9, 2023
No blueprint exists for the ground assault that Israel has launched in the Gaza Strip. Israel must balance its stated objective of eliminating Hamas’s subterranean military capabilities with the need to protect its troops in a highly volatile environment, and it must do so while minimizing harm to the innocent population of Gaza and to Israeli nationals and others who have been taken hostage. For these reasons, Israel’s ground assault is guaranteed to be a slow and difficult operation.
Working in Israel’s favor is the overwhelming size and capability of its military. After Hamas’s October 7 attack, the Israeli military heavily bombed Gaza for three weeks before sending in ground forces. Today, Israeli airstrikes continue to degrade Hamas’s capabilities and infrastructure. Israel has tanks, an air force, and the most advanced weapons systems in the world, plus the support of the United States. But Hamas has been able to reduce this battlefield asymmetry through its concealment within the civilian population and its underground tunnel network.
For Israel to maintain its strategic advantage, it will need to avoid subterranean combat as much as possible. Although attention has turned to Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza, the elimination of Hamas’s tunnel network is more a job for Israel’s air force than for its ground troops, whose tasks should be to solidify the results of the extensive yet focused aerial campaign, to verify that subterranean structures have effectively been eliminated, to destroy any remaining ones, to collect useful intelligence, and to kill any Hamas leaders who survive airstrikes.
If military history is any indication, the way to achieving these goals will sadly be long and bloody. The destruction of Hamas’s high-value military assets, hidden beneath the surface, will at times cause casualties among innocent civilians who remain in the zone of combat. Evacuation orders are meant to minimize civilian casualties; so are precision-guided strikes, leaflets, and text messages. The attempt to mitigate civilian casualties also leads to a slower pace of the war. Military commanders and their legal advisers will have to make complicated assessments, required under the law of war, to determine whether the expected collateral damage to civilian life and civilian infrastructure “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” from the strike. But when it comes down to it, the harsh reality of this combined urban and subterranean warfare means that civilians will get hurt, as was the case when U.S. and partner forces fought the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria. There are no magical solutions to overcome the unique operational difficulties inherent to this terrain, as tragic as it sounds. Israel’s actions will unavoidably pose great risk to its forces, to innocent Palestinians in Gaza, and to the hostages.
Despite the difficulty of managing these risks, the destruction of Hamas’s network of tunnels and subterranean structures must remain a top priority for the Israeli military as this operation evolves. Leaders and fighters can be replaced, but Hamas will be hard pressed to recover and reorganize while being exposed and unable to hide.
GOING UNDERGROUND
Israel faces the almost insurmountable operational challenge of identifying and eliminating subterranean military capabilities in a tunnel-laden urban battlefield that Hamas has had years to prepare. Distributed within this urban and subterranean jungle are the over 200 people Hamas is holding hostage in Gaza. Their presence makes Israel’s options even more limited. Israel perceives the kidnapping of any number of soldiers and civilians as a strategic event. Hamas has taken hostage children, babies, women, and elderly people, as well as an unknown number of soldiers. Until the release of all hostages, anti-tunnel operations in Gaza—via deep-penetrating airstrikes or a ground incursion—put their lives at risk and add another layer of complexity to Israel’s military operation. In this setting, the traditional dilemmas associated with urban warfare, chief among them the need to minimize harm caused to innocent civilians, are magnified exponentially.
Hamas has purposefully placed its entire military apparatus within and underneath civilian infrastructure, from supply lines and transportation routes in tunnels crisscrossing Gaza’s cities to underground command-and-control centers, ammunition depots, living quarters, rocket launchers, and even military hospitals. Hamas’s main military bases are located beneath Gaza’s hospitals and schools, notably Al Shifa Hospital in the heart of Gaza City, and beneath many facilities operated by the United Nations. By using civilians, hospitals, and schools to shield itself from attack, Hamas has committed war crimes, certainly; but it has also made it that much more difficult for Israel to achieve substantial military gains.
Israel’s perception of how to deal with this threat has changed radically over the years. Israel assumed that Hamas’s digging would stop after Israelis withdrew from Gaza in 2005. That assumption proved wrong: Hamas only increased its reliance on tunnels over the past two decades. When Hamas kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006 via one of its tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, Israel blamed it on improper military preparation, rather than on a flawed assessment of the threat posed by the tunnels. Israel saw the tunnels as simply another method used by terrorists to launch attacks, not as the strategic threat that they were quickly becoming.
That perception changed with the 2014 Gaza war, also known as Operation Protective Edge, in which Israel launched an air campaign followed by a two-week-long ground operation inside of Gaza. Once inside Gaza, the Israeli military was surprised by the extent of Hamas’s subterranean operations, and it focused on destroying Hamas’s cross-border tunnels. Now, following Hamas’s October 7 attack, during which the group killed more than 1,400 people inside Israel, it has become clear that degrading Hamas’s capabilities requires the destruction of the entire subterranean network, or, more realistically, a significant portion of it.
The underground tunnels neutralize Israel’s military capabilities.
The challenge for the Israeli military will be doing this while avoiding fighting inside Hamas’s warren of unmapped, dark, and claustrophobic tunnels. In this terrain, Hamas has the upper hand. It has perfected the art of maneuvering, communicating, and surviving below the surface. The underground tunnels neutralize Israel’s military capabilities and serve as a great equalizer between the two sides. Aircraft, tanks, mechanized vehicles, and modern communications either cannot operate or are made irrelevant underground. The three-dimensional battlefield becomes an environment in which any sophisticated military would struggle to prevail.
On the face of it, this is a conflict that appears to be completely asymmetric between a state and a terrorist group, but subterranean warfare reduces this imbalance, making underground warfare attractive to terrorist groups all over. As advanced surveillance capabilities, signals intelligence, and unmanned vehicles have proliferated on the battlefield, the underground became increasingly attractive to groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas.
Even the most sophisticated armies—especially the most sophisticated armies—find tunnels unsettling. The presence of tunnels elicits deep fears of the unknown and affects all aspects of a military operation, from the ability to secure territory to intelligence gathering and rescue operations. Tunnel combat negates the basic military doctrine of modern armies, which have invested in technology to overcome less sophisticated enemies and to compete on a level playing field in peer-to-peer warfare.
The harm inflicted to U.S. forces during the Battle of Iwo Jima at the end of World War II serves as a reminder of how deadly subterranean warfare can be. When they landed on the island, U.S. forces were met by thousands of Japanese soldiers who had entrenched in a large tunnel complex equipped with fortified rooms, steel doors, and military medical facilities. The battle, which killed an estimated 7,000 American troops over several weeks, demonstrated the scope and nature of the violence that underground warfare can generate. Those tunnels, unlike Gaza’s, were in mountainous terrain, far from the civilian population. But what Iwo Jima and Gaza both demonstrate is the difficulty of destroying the entirety of a large and intricate network of military tunnels. When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the destruction of 32 tunnels, including 14 cross-border tunnels, in 2014, plus another 62 miles’ worth of tunnels in 2021, it was clear that only a small portion of Hamas’s immense subterranean network had been hit. This was a setback that Hamas has since overcome.
THE HIDDEN PROBLEM
The destruction of Hamas’s underground infrastructure in Gaza must remain a central objective for the Israeli military, regardless of the cost and the operational difficulties. It will be important for Israel to eliminate, rather than neutralize, Hamas’s tunnels. Neutralization, by pouring cement into the tunnels or by sealing their openings, cannot permanently remove the security threat. It is time-consuming but not impossible to pierce through cement. Only a “hard kill,” meaning the collapse of the walls and roofs of the subterranean structures, will sufficiently degrade Hamas’s capabilities over the long term.
Bulldozers can be used to expose tunnels during a ground operation. Drones, robots, or dogs can help clear tunnels. There might be a need to enter the tunnels to rescue hostages, as a measure of last resort. But a ground operation will not bring about the destruction of Hamas’s underground military apparatus. This is a job that needs to be done mainly from the air, using thermobaric weapons, bunker buster bombs, and precision-guided munitions, and from the surface using liquid emulsion (a combination of two harmless liquids that turn into a powerful explosive when mixed) and other and newer tools developed by the Israeli military. This is how most states have eliminated subterranean threats in the past, and this is what Israel should do, as well.
Important intelligence will likely emerge as Israeli forces uncover how tunnels are being used by Hamas. Details will emerge on how cross-border tunnels between Gaza and Egypt helped in arming Hamas, and on whether tunnels between Gaza and Israel were used on October 7. Hamas might use additional land-to-sea tunnels to infiltrate Israel territory. Perhaps most daunting, the threat of Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnels could once again become relevant in the event of an escalation on the northern border. Israel exposed six of those tunnels during Operation Northern Shield in 2018. More cross-border Hezbollah tunnels, already or soon to be operational, could be used against Israel to invade, kidnap, and launch surprise attacks in an expanded confrontation.
Destroying Hamas’s tunnel network is the most difficult aspect of the Israeli military’s mission today, but it is also among its most important. It is at least as important as the elimination of Hamas’s chain of command. The destruction of the tunnels will leave Hamas with a compromised infrastructure and a depleted arsenal, resources more difficult to replace than fighters. It is crucial that Israel not lose sight of this as the fighting intensifies.
- DAPHNÉ RICHEMOND-BARAK is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Reichman University, Israel.
Foreign Affairs · by Daphné Richemond-Barak · November 9, 2023
7. How the World Lost Faith in the UN
Personally I still believe we need the UN and I believe we need to try to make it work but we also have to have a realistic understanding of what it can and cannot do (as well as what it should and should not do). I don't believe in the one world government conspiracy stuff. The UN is not competent enough to pull that off.
Excerpts;
Although the United States, China, and Russia now find themselves at loggerheads at the UN over many issues, the Security Council could yet settle into a new equilibrium. It can still serve as a venue for defusing conflicts among great powers and tackling a small but significant subset of crises in which those powers share an interest in cooperation—a scope of action that recalls the UN’s function during the Cold War. The major powers are unlikely to agree on much, but there are cases—including the Security Council’s March 2021 agreement that the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan should remain in the country to deal with the Taliban—in which Washington, Beijing, and Moscow still have reasons to work through the UN.
Even with the Security Council in the doldrums, the wider UN system can still play a substantial role in international conflict management. UN relief agencies have unique capacities to mitigate and contain the effects of violence, and they continue to operate despite their current budgetary headaches. UN officials are also looking for ways to work on conflict prevention that do not rely on Security Council oversight, such as harnessing funds from the World Bank to support basic services in weak states. In a period of geopolitical tension, the UN may not take the lead in resolving major crises, but it can do a lot on the margins to protect the vulnerable.
The wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as tensions between China and the United States, are making international cooperation both more difficult and more vital. In recent weeks and months, many UN officials and diplomats have worried that the organization is in free fall. But if it updates its diplomatic and security roles to adapt to new global realities, the UN can still find its footing.
How the World Lost Faith in the UN
Regaining It Will Require Accepting a Diminished Role for an Age of Competition
November 9, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Richard Gowan · November 9, 2023
Ever since 1947, when the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, the organization has grappled with crises in the Middle East. In recent decades, discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the UN have featured the same basic dynamic: the United States uses its veto to block criticism of Israel at the Security Council while Arab states rally developing countries to defend the Palestinians. The debate at the UN in the weeks after Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel has largely followed this familiar pattern. The United States has blocked the Security Council from calling for a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip, but it could not stop a resolution passed in late October by a huge majority in the General Assembly demanding a “humanitarian truce.”
Yet diplomats at UN offices in New York and Geneva say that this crisis feels different—and that its effects could spread beyond Israel and the Gaza Strip to the UN itself. Their warnings are in part a reaction to the brutality of Hamas, the rising death toll in Gaza from Israel’s bombardment, and the risks of regional escalation. But widespread pessimism about the UN’s future also reflects a loss of confidence across the organization. Skepticism about the efficacy of an institution designed to reflect twentieth-century power relations and deal with postwar problems is hardly new. Over the last year, however, the UN has seemed more rudderless than ever, unable to respond to crises ranging from violent flare-ups in Sudan and Nagorno-Karabakh to the coup in Niger. Security Council diplomats say that tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine—the topic of scores of fruitless UN debates since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022—are undermining discussions of unrelated issues in Africa and the Middle East. In September, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned at the annual General Assembly meeting that a “great fracture” in the global governance system was looming.
The war between Israel and Hamas threatens to deal the coup de grâce to the UN’s credibility in responding to crises. Soon, national governments and UN officials will face a reckoning. They must confront the question of how the UN can contribute to peace and security at a time when the common ground among great powers is shrinking by the day. Since the end of the Cold War, states and civil society organizations have called on the UN to deal with conflicts large and small as a matter of habit. But now the institution appears to be running up against its geopolitical limitations.
A UN fit for the current age will need to scale down its ambitions. On security matters, the organization should focus on a limited number of priorities and hand off the reins of crisis management to others when it can. Certain international problems will still require the kind of coordination that is only possible at the UN. Even when competing countries seem to abandon diplomacy, the institution remains a place where adversaries can hash out their differences and find opportunities to cooperate. Rather than let current conflicts tear the institution apart, national governments and UN officials alike must work to preserve its most vital functions.
STARTING TO SPIRAL
The crisis of confidence in the UN has been building since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the weeks afterward, diplomats worried that tensions between great powers would paralyze the UN. At first, it looked as if their fears were misplaced. Russia, the United States, and its European allies engaged in fierce debates over the war in Ukraine, but they grudgingly continued to coordinate on other matters. The Security Council, for instance, managed to impose a new sanctions regime on the gangs terrorizing Haiti and to agree on a new mandate for the UN to work with the Taliban government in Kabul to deliver aid to suffering Afghans. Both Russia and the West seemed willing to use the UN’s most powerful body as a space for residual cooperation.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies rallied considerable support for Ukraine in a series of votes in the General Assembly to condemn Russia’s aggression. Until the early months of this year, many diplomats hoped that the UN would retain its capacity for joint action even as many of its members faced off over the war in Ukraine.
By the spring, this fragile balance started to break down. Russia has acted as a spoiler at the UN with increasing frequency. In June, Moscow schemed with the government of Mali—which had turned to the Kremlin-backed Wagner private military company for security assistance—to force UN peacekeepers to withdraw from Malian territory, ending a decade-long mission. In July, Russia vetoed the renewal of a Security Council mandate, in place since 2014, for UN aid agencies to deliver aid to rebel-held parts of northwestern Syria. Moscow also pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a deal brokered by the UN and Turkey in July 2022 that had allowed Ukraine to export agricultural products without Russian interference.
Over the last year, the UN has seemed more rudderless than ever.
The war in the Middle East has underlined this increasingly sharp-elbowed approach to UN diplomacy. During past eruptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the outbreak of violence in Gaza in May 2021, Russia and China refrained from criticizing the United States’ involvement too loudly at the UN. This time, China has once again avoided the controversy, limiting its comments to calls for a cease-fire. But Russia has gone out of its way to take advantage of the situation. After the United States vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for humanitarian assistance to Gaza in mid-October, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, lamented the “hypocrisy and double standards of our American colleagues” and implied that Washington might be fueling the war to boost U.S. arms sales. Russia’s posturing over the conflict has annoyed its fellow Security Council members, which have sought common ground on humanitarian issues, and even Arab states, which suspect that Moscow is exploiting Palestinian suffering for its own ends.
If Russia is ruffling feathers at the UN, the United States’ unconditional support for Israel has caused greater diplomatic damage. The effects are clearest in the General Assembly, where the coalition of states that previously backed Ukraine has splintered over Gaza. On October 27, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a “humanitarian truce” between Israel and Hamas, with 120 yeas, 14 nays, and 44 abstentions. The United States voted against the resolution, citing the text’s failure to condemn Hamas for its atrocities. European countries were divided, with some voting in favor, some against, and some abstaining. The fallout was predictable. Diplomats from developing countries privately indicated that they might reject future UN resolutions in support of Ukraine in response to the lack of Western solidarity with the Palestinians.
This latest divide is likely to undercut the United States’ recent push to improve its relations with the global South at the UN. The Biden administration has called for reforms to the Security Council that could give powers such as Brazil and India a greater voice in the body, and it has promised to work with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to deliver much-needed financing to debt-laden developing countries. Before the current conflict, Washington had made tentative headway with the latter gestures: poor countries may appreciate the kind words, but they are still waiting for the cash. Now, the Biden administration’s position on Israel and Gaza may undo what fitful progress it had achieved.
SITTING ON THE SIDELINES
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have not just aggravated diplomatic frictions between UN member states. They have also put enormous pressure on the UN’s leader, Guterres, and the institution’s entire conflict-management system. Without unified support from the Security Council, Guterres and the UN Secretariat, which has day-to-day oversight of UN peace operations, have struggled to keep the organization’s conflict management work on track. In trouble spots such as Sudan, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, governments and warring parties have refused to work with UN mediators or demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, conscious that they are unlikely to face any real penalties for doing so. The organization has managed to maintain its humanitarian presence in places such as Afghanistan, but it faces growing shortfalls in funding for this work as many Western donors trim their aid budgets while spending considerable sums on military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Guterres has found himself caught in the diplomatic crossfire over events in the Middle East. After he said that Hamas’s attack on Israel “did not happen in a vacuum” in a speech before the Security Council on October 24, Israel called on Guterres to resign and reduced its cooperation with UN humanitarian officials. Guterres denied any suggestion that his words could be interpreted as justification for what he called Hamas’s “acts of terror,” and the Israeli response ended up giving Guterres a boost as other countries, including the United States, rallied to his defense. But the way the comment spiraled into a diplomatic incident underlined just how vulnerable UN aid operations are to political discord. That vulnerability has been tragically clear on the ground, as well: nearly 100 UN employees have been killed in Gaza since the war began.
Depending on the length and scope of the war between Israel and Hamas, the UN’s presence in the region may expand or shrink. If hostilities end relatively quickly, UN relief agencies will play a significant role in recovery efforts. In one post-conflict scenario that has reportedly been floated as a possibility by U.S. and Israeli officials, the UN could be asked to administer Gaza after the Israeli military clears Hamas from the territory. Conversely, if the war lasts long enough to spread across the region, it could put the UN’s long-standing peacekeeping presence in southern Lebanon and in the Golan Heights at risk. When Israel last launched an operation in southern Lebanon, in 2006, the Security Council came close to shutting down the UN mission there but reversed course after the Lebanese government objected. Today, a widening war that draws in Hezbollah and Iran could not just force the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers but also threaten the organization’s humanitarian and diplomatic work elsewhere in the Middle East, such as in Iraq and Yemen.
LOWERING AMBITIONS
No matter how the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine end, trends at the UN point to problems ahead. The diplomatic disunity and operational vulnerabilities that plague the organization now will likely persist or worsen as global divisions widen. The UN is not about to return to the dog days of the Cold War. In 1959, the Security Council passed just one resolution. Since the start of 2023, despite the poor state of relations among its permanent members, the council has passed more than 30 resolutions to update the mandates for various UN peace operations and sanctions regimes. But the UN is also far from its post–Cold War heyday, when the body regularly authorized peace operations, mediation efforts, and sanctions packages in response to emerging conflicts.
There may not be a clear path for the UN to reclaim its former role as an all-purpose platform to address the international crises of the day, but the organization can still make the best of a diminished role. UN officials already appear to recognize their shrinking mandate. In July, Guterres released the UN’s “New Agenda for Peace,” which played down the organization’s peacekeeping missions and instead urged UN members to focus on new security threats, such as artificial intelligence. Even here, it is unclear how much influence the UN can have: the big players in artificial intelligence, particularly the United States and China, may not want the organization to preside over the regulation of AI technologies.
But there seems to be an appetite for the UN to maintain its role of promoting global security, even if it takes on a more limited operational involvement in conflict than it has in the past. Rather than deploying its own forces, the UN could support other crisis managers, namely regional organizations and even individual countries. This model is already being tested. In October, for example, the Security Council authorized Kenya to lead a multinational security assistance mission in Haiti. The United States is also working with several African countries on proposals for the UN to fund African-led stabilization missions on the continent, in the hope that these forces will be more motivated than UN peacekeepers to fight militias and insurgents.
If adapts to new global realities, the UN can still find its footing.
Although the United States, China, and Russia now find themselves at loggerheads at the UN over many issues, the Security Council could yet settle into a new equilibrium. It can still serve as a venue for defusing conflicts among great powers and tackling a small but significant subset of crises in which those powers share an interest in cooperation—a scope of action that recalls the UN’s function during the Cold War. The major powers are unlikely to agree on much, but there are cases—including the Security Council’s March 2021 agreement that the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan should remain in the country to deal with the Taliban—in which Washington, Beijing, and Moscow still have reasons to work through the UN.
Even with the Security Council in the doldrums, the wider UN system can still play a substantial role in international conflict management. UN relief agencies have unique capacities to mitigate and contain the effects of violence, and they continue to operate despite their current budgetary headaches. UN officials are also looking for ways to work on conflict prevention that do not rely on Security Council oversight, such as harnessing funds from the World Bank to support basic services in weak states. In a period of geopolitical tension, the UN may not take the lead in resolving major crises, but it can do a lot on the margins to protect the vulnerable.
The wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as tensions between China and the United States, are making international cooperation both more difficult and more vital. In recent weeks and months, many UN officials and diplomats have worried that the organization is in free fall. But if it updates its diplomatic and security roles to adapt to new global realities, the UN can still find its footing.
RICHARD GOWAN is UN Director at the International Crisis Group.
Foreign Affairs · by Richard Gowan · November 9, 2023
8. Military officers used prostitution ring that checked IDs, credit cards, employers
What the.....?
Don't these officers know these activities will eventually be exposed?
Military officers used prostitution ring that checked IDs, credit cards, employers
Three men were arrested for running a ring that, prosecutors say, drew officers and contractors with security clearances along with politicians, high tech executives and scientists.
BY MATT WHITE | PUBLISHED NOV 8, 2023 6:56 PM EST
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · November 8, 2023
Military officers are among the alleged clients of a sprawling prostitution ring that federal prosecutors say asked potential clients for IDs, credit card numbers and employer information in order to book “modeling shoots.”
Prosecutors charged three men Wednesday with operating a prostitution network with clients that included “elected officials, high tech and pharmaceutical executives, doctors, military officers, government contractors that possess security clearances, professors, attorneys, scientists and accountants, among others,” according to a release from the Department of Justice.
No military officers or defense contractors were named in the indictment and no arrests of clients were announced.
The three men, all of Korean heritage, are alleged to have turned luxury apartments into “multiple brothels” in suburbs of Boston and Washington D.C., and enticed mostly women of Asian heritage into sex work there, authorities say.
The D.C. brothels, authorities say, were in Fairfax and Tysons, Virginia. Those two suburbs of Washington sit just minutes from the Pentagon and are home to hundreds of defense contracting firms. The Boston locations were in Cambridge and Watertown, Massachusetts. Several major defense contractors like Raytheon and BAE maintain major facilities nearby.
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To book an appointment, which one website named in the indictment referred to as a “modeling shoot,” prosepective clients had to fill out a form providing their full names, email address, phone number, employer and reference if they had one, according to the indictment.
The ring ran through two websites, bostontopten10.com — which has been seized by federal authorities — and the still-active browneyesgirlsva.blog. The second site refers to itself as ‘BEG’ and includes photo galleries of partially undressed women.
The front page of a website authorities say handled bookings for the ring. Another page mentions a first time client form.
The indictments do not indicate that the ring actively sought military or defense-related clients, only that military officers and cleared contractors were customers. The charges announced do not relate to intelligence or espionage.
The three men arrested were Han Lee, 41, of Cambridge, James Lee, 68, of Torrance, Calif, Junmyung Lee, 30, of Dedham, Mass. The workers who the men employed charged between $350 and $600 per hour. The FBI’s Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit found the men “coordinated the women’s airline travel and transportation and permitted women to stay overnight in the brothel locations so they did not have to find lodging elsewhere, therefore enticing women to participate in their prostitution network.”
The men also engaged in elaborate money laundering schemes to hide the hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash the scheme generated.
They face charges of conspiracy to coerce and entice to travel to engage in illegal sexual activity which provides for a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000.
The arrests are not the first time military officers have been connected with prostitution rings.
The Navy’s “Fat Leonard” scandal revolved around a naval contractor plying high ranking Navy officials with booze and and a “rotating carousel of prostitutes.”
A Marine colonel was busted in 2017 in Florida for soliciting prostitutes in “Operation No Tricks, No Treats” and an Air Force-employed civilian was charged with arranging a job for a sex worker in a military propulsion lab so he could have sex with her.
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · November 8, 2023
9. Three Arrested for Operating High-End Brothel Network (DOJ Press Release)
Wait for the client list to come out:
Over the course of the investigation, a wide array of buyers were identified, including, but not limited to, politicians, high tech and pharmaceutical executives, doctors, military officers, government contractors that possess security clearances, professors, lawyers, scientists and accountants.
PRESS RELEASE
Three Arrested for Operating High-End Brothel Network
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/three-arrested-operating-high-end-brothel-network
Wednesday, November 8, 2023
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For Immediate Release
U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts
Interested sex buyers were allegedly required to provide employer information and references before booking appointments
BOSTON – Three individuals have been arrested in connection with operating sophisticated high-end brothels in greater Boston and eastern Virginia. Commercial sex buyers allegedly included elected officials, high tech and pharmaceutical executives, doctors, military officers, government contractors that possess security clearances, professors, attorneys, scientists and accountants, among others.
The following defendants have been charged with conspiracy to coerce and entice to travel to engage in illegal sexual activity:
- Han Lee, a/k/a “Hana,” 41, of Cambridge, Mass.;
- James Lee, 68, of Torrance, Calif.; and
- Junmyung Lee, 30, of Dedham, Mass.
Han Lee and Junmyung Lee were arrested this morning and will appear in federal court in Boston later today. James Lee was arrested in the Central District of California and will appear in federal court in Boston at a later date.
According to the charging documents, from at least July 2020, the defendants operated an interstate prostitution network with multiple brothels in Cambridge and Watertown, Mass., as well as in Fairfax and Tysons, Va.
It is alleged that the defendants collectively established the infrastructure for brothels in multiple states which they used to persuade, induce and entice women – primarily Asian women – to travel to Massachusetts and Virginia to engage in prostitution.
Specifically, the defendants allegedly rented high-end apartment complexes as brothel locations, which they furnished and regularly maintained. The monthly rent for the brothel locations were as high as $3,664. It is further alleged that the defendants coordinated the women’s airline travel and transportation and permitted women to stay overnight in the brothel locations so they did not have to find lodging elsewhere, therefore enticing women to participate in their prostitution network.
The defendants allegedly advertised their prostitution network primarily on two websites – bostontopten10.com and browneyesgirlsva.blog – which offered appointments with women in either greater Boston or eastern Virginia, respectively. Both websites purported to advertise nude Asian models for professional photography at upscale studios as a front for prostitution offered through appointments with women listed on their websites. The websites listed the height, weight and bust size of women available for appointments and depicted nude and/or semi-nude photographs of each. The women listed as available on the websites updated frequently, with updates to include “coming soon” or “open” to reflect an impending arrival of new women arriving in the area.
Each website allegedly described a verification process that interested sex buyers undertook to be eligible for appointment bookings– including requiring clients complete a form providing their full names, email address, phone number, employer and reference if they had one.
It is further alleged that the defendants maintained local brothel phone numbers which they used to communicate with verified customers and schedule appointments via text message. In these text message exchanges, the defendants allegedly sent customers a “menu” of available options at the brothel, including the women and sexual services available and the hourly rate. Additionally, the defendants allegedly texted customers directions to the brothel’s location – a high-end apartments – where they engaged in commercial sex with the women.
According to the charging documents, the defendants charged sex buyers a premium price for appointments with the women advertised on their websites, which ranged from approximately $350 to upwards of $600 per hour depending on the services and were paid in cash. The defendants allegedly concealed the proceeds of the prostitution network through depositing hundreds of thousands of dollars of cash proceeds into their personal bank accounts and peer-to-peer transfers. Additionally, it is alleged that the defendants regularly used hundreds of thousands of dollars of the cash proceeds from the prostitution business to purchase money orders (in values under an amount that would trigger reporting and identification requirements) to conceal the source of the funds. These money orders were then used to pay for rent and utilities at brothel locations in Massachusetts and Virginia.
Over the course of the investigation, a wide array of buyers were identified, including, but not limited to, politicians, high tech and pharmaceutical executives, doctors, military officers, government contractors that possess security clearances, professors, lawyers, scientists and accountants.
The investigation into the involvement of sex buyers is active and ongoing.
Members of the public who have questions, concerns or information regarding this case should contact USAMA.VictimAssistance@usdoj.gov.
The charge of conspiracy to coerce and entice to travel to engage in illegal sexual activity provides for a sentence of up to five years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.
Acting United States Attorney Joshua S. Levy; Michael J. Krol, Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations in New England; and Cambridge Police Commissioner Christine Elow made the announcement today. Valuable assistance was provided by the Central District of California; the Eastern District of Virginia; the U.S. Postal Service; and the Watertown Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lindsey E. Weinstein of the Criminal Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Raquelle Kaye, of the Asset Recovery Unit are prosecuting the case.
The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Updated November 8, 2023
10. Five Scenarios for How Israel-Hamas War Could End — Or Get Even Worse
Excerpts:
Israel has vowed that Hamas will be, in the words of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, “wiped from the face of the earth.” But its assault on Gaza won’t eliminate support for the group or take out all its leaders, many of whom aren’t even in Gaza. As IDF forces move into northern Gaza and surround Gaza City, the goal is to destroy Hamas’s tunnel network and military equipment, but Netanyahu and his commanders haven’t made clear what would lead them to declare that the job is done.
Michael Koplow, chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum, told The Messenger that Israeli leaders probably “don't know that. They're going to assess it based on how the military operation in northern Gaza goes.”
Factors that could determine the length of the operation include the number of Israeli military casualties as well as how much leeway they get from the United States. For now, the U.S. is calling only for humanitarian pauses and more efforts to reduce civilian casualties rather than a full cease-fire, and Netanyahu may feel free to brush off even these statements as long as the U.S. keeps the supply of weapons flowing.
Five Scenarios for How Israel-Hamas War Could End — Or Get Even Worse
From international peacekeepers to Palestinian rule to a wider war, there are a range of ways the conflict may play out
Published 11/08/23 04:42 PM ET|Updated 14 hr ago
Joshua Keating
themessenger.com · November 8, 2023
Even as Israel’s war in Gaza continues to rage, there is increasing talk among world leaders about how it might end, and what will come after. There is no shortage of scenarios–but Israel and its most important international backers don’t appear to be on the same page about the aftermath of war.
Israeli leaders have kept their public statements focused mostly on the fight to destroy Hamas, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave his clearest statement yet on post-war plans in a Monday interview with ABC News, saying that Israel, “for an indefinite period, will have the overall security responsibility [for Gaza] because we've seen what happens when we don't have it.”
This would suggest some future Israel military presence in the Gaza Strip, from which it withdrew in 2005.
But on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking at a meeting of G7 foreign ministers in Tokyo, said a post-war settlement should include “no reoccupation of Gaza.”
Blinken also said Palestinians should be in charge in “post-crisis” Gaza, and that there must be “no forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza,” which may have been intended to push back on an idea floated by some Israeli officials to transfer Gaza’s civilian population to Egypt.
It’s far too soon to know exactly what the war's end will look like, but the recent statements suggest several competing scenarios, and the disputes that will likely arise with each of them.
A short war
It’s possible, though unlikely, that Israel will accomplish its goals and withdraw its troops quickly. The question is at what point Israeli leaders will decide those goals have been met.
Israel has vowed that Hamas will be, in the words of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, “wiped from the face of the earth.” But its assault on Gaza won’t eliminate support for the group or take out all its leaders, many of whom aren’t even in Gaza. As IDF forces move into northern Gaza and surround Gaza City, the goal is to destroy Hamas’s tunnel network and military equipment, but Netanyahu and his commanders haven’t made clear what would lead them to declare that the job is done.
In a photo taken during a controlled media tour conducted by the Israeli military, Israeli troops are pictured during operations in northern Gaza on November 8, 2023.DAPHNE LEMELIN/AFP via Getty Images
Michael Koplow, chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum, told The Messenger that Israeli leaders probably “don't know that. They're going to assess it based on how the military operation in northern Gaza goes.”
Factors that could determine the length of the operation include the number of Israeli military casualties as well as how much leeway they get from the United States. For now, the U.S. is calling only for humanitarian pauses and more efforts to reduce civilian casualties rather than a full cease-fire, and Netanyahu may feel free to brush off even these statements as long as the U.S. keeps the supply of weapons flowing.
Hamas, meanwhile, is clearly digging in for an extended war. The group’s leaders have said they believe they have enough weapons to continue fighting for several months without additional supplies.
All of which suggests a short war isn't likely.
A new Israeli occupation
In Israel itself, there’s little public support for another long-term occupation of Gaza; the previous one, as well as Israel’s years-long occupation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, ended in frustration and withdrawal. But if the war turns into a prolonged counterinsurgency operation against the remnants of Hamas, an Israeli presence in Gaza may be inevitable.
Koplow noted that Netanyahu left himself some wiggle room in his statement about “overall security responsibility.”
“It could mean a number of things, ranging from a maximal Israeli military presence to a situation where Israel just retains the right to go in when it wants,” he said.
The latter scenario could resemble the current state of affairs in the parts of the West Bank known as “Area A.” These are areas that are formally under the control of the Palestinian Authority, but where Israel still frequently conducts military raids.
International peacekeeping force
Netanyahu adviser Mark Regev told CNN on Tuesday that rather than assuming responsibility for governing Gaza, “We are interested in establishing new frameworks where the Gazans can rule themselves, where there can be international support for the reconstruction of Gaza. Hopefully, we can bring in countries–Arab countries as well-–for a reconstruction of a demilitarized, post-Hamas Gaza.”
According to a recent Bloomberg report, the U.S. and Israel have been discussing several proposals for an international peacekeeping force for post-war Gaza.
One plan would give temporary oversight of the strip to countries in the region, backed by troops from the U.S. and Europe. But it’s unclear whether Arab governments, even those that enjoy relatively good relations with Israel, would want to participate in a plan where they would be widely seen as policing other Arabs on Israel’s behalf. Meanwhile, White House spokesperson John Kirby has said that there are “no plans or intention to put U.S. military troops on the ground in Gaza, now or in the future.”
Other options include an international force based on the one that currently operates in the Sinai Peninsula, monitoring the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. For more than four decades, there have been almost no challenges to that treaty — though the peacekeepers have occasionally come under attack from militant groups, including ISIS — and the U.S. has even considered removing some of its troops from the force in favor of remote surveillance technology.
But compared to Gaza, Sinai is a thinly populated place and a calm assignment for peacekeepers. Patrolling Gaza would be a far more active and dangerous mission.
A third possibility would involve placing Gaza under a temporary U.N. mandate, meaning U.N. peacekeepers would assume security responsibility. But the Israeli government is highly skeptical of the U.N., which it views as implacably hostile to its views.
More fundamentally, it’s not clear that Israel would view any of these three options as satisfying its security requirements.
Palestinians in charge
One increasingly popular idea among both Israeli and U.S. policymakers is for the Palestinian Authority, the current government in the West Bank, to assume responsibility for Gaza.
Fatah, the party that dominates the PA, is a bitter rival of Hamas and was forced out of the Gaza Strip after a brief civil war in 2007. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas indicated some openness to the idea in a meeting with Blinken last weekend, saying, “We will fully assume our responsibilities within the framework of a comprehensive political solution that includes all of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.”
But this idea presents its own complications. The PA is deeply unpopular and it’s currently having trouble maintaining order in the areas it already controls. Assuming control of Gaza under these circumstances would only reinforce the view of many Palestinians that it is merely a tool of the Israeli occupation.
“They got kicked out of Gaza the first time around, and now, the optics would be that they are returning on the back of Israeli tanks,” Raphael Cohen, a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation, told The Messenger. “That doesn’t bode well for their long-term success.”
Still, the PA may want the opportunity to take over from its vanquished rival, and Abbas’s statement, with its reference to a “comprehensive political solution,” indicates he may feel he can use the Gaza crisis to extract political concessions from the Israelis when it comes to Palestinian independence.
Wider war
As devastating as the Hamas attacks against Israel and the subsequent bombardment of Gaza have been, there have been widespread fears since the beginning that the conflict could spread. These fears have only grown as Hezbollah has repeatedly traded fire with the IDF across the Israel-Lebanon border, and Iran-backed Houthi rebels have fired missiles at Israel.
Some of those fears may have eased after a speech last Friday by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Rather than declaring a full-scale war on Israel, as many had feared, Nasrallah limited his remarks to fiery rhetoric and said that Hezbollah was already in the fight.
But the rocket attacks on Northern Israel continue, as do attacks by other Iran-backed groups on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Koplow said that a wider escalation is still possible, and that Israeli leaders are unlikely to be reassured by Nasrallah’s words or remove their troops from the Northern border.
“I don’t think they want to be caught unprepared a second time, after Oct. 7,” Koplow said.
Greater involvement in the war by Hezbollah or other states or militant groups in the Middle East could mean a much longer, more complicated, and more devastating war.
themessenger.com · November 8, 2023
11. Most young vets think it’s time to retire ‘Thank you for your service’
Excerpts:
Are there adequate alternatives to “Thank you for your service,” opportunities to connect beyond small talk, to educate, to honor those who embodied selfless service? Surely. Such one-on-one connections could even help close the perceived chasm between American troops and civilians.
Better understanding between those who serve and those who take an oath to protect seems more needed now than ever before.
After all, the USAA survey notes that more than a quarter of civilians polled indicated they had no clue why Veterans Day was even celebrated.
Most young vets think it’s time to retire ‘Thank you for your service’
militarytimes.com · by Jon Simkins · November 8, 2023
Veterans Day is fast approaching, and with it comes a gathering storm of American civilian “Thank you for your service” platitudes so relentless that they threaten the structural integrity of the very veteran eardrums receiving them.
For many who have donned the uniform, the phrase elicits myriad awkward responses. Some vets have no response chambered and instead offer nonsensical replies like “You too,” “Thanks for your support” or “The son of man did not come to be served, but to serve,” before launching into a “Stomp the Yard” dance routine.
And while authentic sentiment and genuine gratitude no doubt have merit, “Thank you for your service” has lost its appeal to many who served in America’s 21st-century wars.
But precisely how much today’s veterans shun the phrase has remained largely unquantified — at least until now.
Thanks to a survey produced and sourced over September and October by USAA, Endeavor Analytics and YouGov, there exists concrete evidence that veterans are indeed tired of the withering barrage of thanks.
All told, half of the 1,639 veterans and military personnel surveyed said “Thank you for your service” makes them feel downright “uncomfortable or awkward.”
That number, however, climbs to nearly 70 percent when it comes to veterans between the ages of 18 and 29. Only veterans 65 and over responded that the phrase is favorably received.
On the civilian side, meanwhile, one recent proposition to inject new life into the tired phrase was to alter the language in a way that ... well, quite frankly, would only exacerbate the cringe.
Rep. Jack Bergman, R-Mich., filed a non-binding legislation last year aimed at replacing the phrase “Thank you for your service” with “Thank you for our freedom.”
Bergman, a retired Marine Reserve three-star general who oozes medically concerning amounts of motivation, said at the time that the “resolution will help ensure those of us blessed to call America home understand the personal importance of our servicemen and women’s sacrifice for our Nation.”
Though Bergman’s legislation had virtually no chance of becoming law, his particular example of unbridled, all-inclusive appreciation is one of many that have helped spawn the notorious “Vet Bro,” a mythical Florida Man of the military draped in tactical gear, Punisher stickers, and shirts replete with eye-melting slogans and sleeves elongated during manufacturing just to accommodate colossal flag prints.
Are there adequate alternatives to “Thank you for your service,” opportunities to connect beyond small talk, to educate, to honor those who embodied selfless service? Surely. Such one-on-one connections could even help close the perceived chasm between American troops and civilians.
Better understanding between those who serve and those who take an oath to protect seems more needed now than ever before.
After all, the USAA survey notes that more than a quarter of civilians polled indicated they had no clue why Veterans Day was even celebrated.
Army Times reporter Davis Winkie contributed to this story.
Observation Post is the Military Times one-stop shop for all things off-duty. Stories may reflect author observations.
About Jon Simkins
Jon Simkins is a writer and editor for Military Times, and a USMC veteran.
12. Israeli troops fight Hamas in north Gaza, hospitals in firing line
Israeli troops fight Hamas in north Gaza, hospitals in firing line
Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi
- Summary
- LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:
- Gaza residents say Israeli troops inch way closer to the Al Shifa hospital, where Israel believes Hamas has a command centre
- Israel opens corridor for residents to leave Gaza City for fifth day
GAZA/JERUSALEM, Nov 9 (Reuters) - Israeli forces fought Hamas militants through shell-blasted buildings in the north of the Gaza Strip on Thursday as the plight of civilians in the besieged Palestinian territory worsened.
Gaza residents said Israeli troops were inching their way closer to the Al Shifa hospital, Gaza's biggest health facility, where Israel believes Hamas has a command centre. Thousands of Palestinians have taken refuge there from the relentless Israeli bombardments.
The United Nations human rights chief called for a ceasefire and said both sides had committed war crimes in the month of fighting over the enclave.
In Paris, officials from about 80 countries and organisations were meeting to coordinate humanitarian aid to Gaza and find ways to help wounded civilians escape the siege.
Residents in Gaza City - a militant stronghold in the north of the Hamas-ruled territory - said Israeli tanks were stationed around the city. Both sides reported inflicting heavy casualties on one another in intense street battles.
Israel unleashed its assault on Gaza in response to a cross-border Hamas raid on southern Israel on Oct. 7 in which gunmen killed 1,400 people, mostly civilians, and took about 240 hostages, according to Israeli tallies. It was the single worst day of bloodshed in Israel's 75-year history.
Palestinian officials said 10,569 Gaza residents had been killed as of Wednesday, about 40% of them children, while a humanitarian crisis has gripped the enclave, with basic supplies running out and buildings demolished by unrelenting Israeli bombardments.
Israel, which has vowed to wipe out Hamas, says 33 of its soldiers have been killed in its ground operation as they advanced into the heart of Gaza City.
Israeli troops had secured a Hamas military stronghold called Compound 17 in Jabalya in northern Gaza after 10 hours of combat with Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants above and below the ground, the Israeli military said on Wednesday.
It said troops killed dozens of militants, seized weapons, exposed tunnel shafts and discovered a Hamas weapons manufacturing site in a residential building in the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood.
Israeli military footage showed soldiers walking through rubble into a building where one wall had been blasted away, finding weapons-manufacturing equipment, instruction manuals and a tunnel shaft with a cooling system. Nearby was a little girl's bedroom with pink walls, pink wardrobes and three little beds.
The armed wing of Hamas said it had killed a greater number of Israeli soldiers than the military has announced, and destroyed dozens of tanks, bulldozers, and other vehicles. It released footage of fighters firing anti-tank rockets and scoring direct hits to vehicles.
NOWHERE TO RUN TO
Thousands of Palestinians have sought refuge at Al Shifa hospital inside Gaza City despite Israel's orders to evacuate the area it has encircled. They are sheltering in tents in the hospital grounds and say they have nowhere else to go.
The U.N. humanitarian office OCHA said the Israeli military had again told residents of the north to move southwards, opening a four-hour corridor for the fifth consecutive day. About 50,000 people left the area on Wednesday, it said.
Clashes and shelling around the main road continued, it said endangering evacuees. Corpses were lying alongside the road, while most evacuees were moving on foot as the Israeli military had told them to leave vehicles at the southern edge of Gaza city, it said.
Huge numbers of displaced people from among Gaza's 2.3 million population are already crammed into schools, hospitals and other sites in the south.
Although the fighting is concentrated in the north, southern areas have also come under regular attack. In Khan Younis, Gaza's main southern city, residents picked through the rubble and twisted debris of a building destroyed by an Israeli air strike, hoping to find survivors, on Thursday morning, witnesses said.
"As deaths and injuries in Gaza continue to rise due to intensified hostilities, intense overcrowding and disrupted health, water, and sanitation systems pose an added danger: the rapid spread of infectious diseases," the World Health Organization said.
WAR CRIMES
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, on Wednesday called for an immediate ceasefire - which Israel and its main ally the United States have consistently rejected as benefiting Hamas.
"The atrocities perpetrated by Palestinian armed groups on 7 October were heinous, they were war crimes - as is the continued holding of hostages," Turk said at the Rafah crossing in Egypt on the border with Gaza.
"The collective punishment by Israel of Palestinian civilians is also a war crime, as is unlawful forcible evacuation of civilians," he said.
A conference in Paris on Thursday, attended by Arab nations, Western powers, G20 members and NGO groups such as Doctors Without Borders will discuss measures to alleviate the suffering in Gaza, but without a pause in fighting expectations are low.
Among the options discussed will be setting up a maritime corridor, potentially to use sea lanes to ship humanitarian aid into Gaza or evacuate the wounded.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has crossed the region on a diplomatic mission, on Wednesday outlined Washington's expectations for Gaza when the conflict ends. He pushed back at Israeli comments that it would be responsible for security in Gaza indefinitely.
There should be "no reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends. No attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza. No reduction in the territory of Gaza," Blinken said at a press conference in Tokyo.
Blinken said there may be a need for "some transition period" at the end of the conflict, but that post-crisis Gaza must "include Palestinian-led governance and Gaza unified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority."
The Palestinian Authority (PA), which exercises limited self-rule in parts of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, says the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has ruled since 2007, is an integral part of what it envisions for a future Palestinian state.
Israeli officials have said they do not intend to occupy Gaza after the war, but have yet to articulate how they might ensure security. Israel withdrew its forces from Gaza in 2005.
Reporting by Nidal al-Mughrabi in Gaza, Maytaal Angel, Emily Rose and Maayan Lubell in Jerusalem, Rami Amichay in Tel Aviv, Matt Spetalnick and Humeyra Pamuk in Washington, and other Reuters bureaus; Writing by Michael Perry and Angus MacSwan; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore and Peter Graff
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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Nidal Al-Mughrabi
Thomson Reuters
A senior correspondent with nearly 25 years’ experience covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including several wars and the signing of the first historic peace accord between the two sides.
Maytaal Angel
Thomson Reuters
Award-nominated reporter covering high impact events in soft commodities and agricultural commodities more broadly, analysing industry trends and uncovering developments that drive the market. Work has included market moving investigative stories on commodity trade flows, corporate strategy, farmer poverty, sustainability, climate change and government policy.
Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi
13. Wars in Ukraine and Mideast Show Why the US Needs to Dominate the Drone Industrial Base
Excerpts:
More critically, the U.S. has moved too slowly toward a full ban on DJI products. Most state and local agencies, as well as operators of critical infrastructure such as electrical utilities or oil and gas operators, still depend on Chinese drones to accomplish such missions as monitoring pipelines and overhead power lines. Unless a real ban on DJI drones is enacted, U.S. companies will continue to face vastly better capitalized, under-priced Chinese manufacturers, preventing us from building an industrial system for a strategically critical capability.
Meaningful funding and a real federal ban on DJI will not only produce the two-year quantum SUAS leap that Replicator is looking for. It also will jump-start a thriving American drone manufacturing base critical to our national security and, in turn, fuel re-shoring and friend-shoring of advanced battery systems, sensor technologies and microcomputers, and spur the additional AI development necessary to create the next generation of SUAS.
The Biden administration should move to ban all DJI products within the next fiscal year, and tie that ban to a series of programs in the fiscal 2025 budget to incentivize rapid SUAS industry growth.
This would be an enormous step forward for the U.S. and its allies. A coherent UAS expansion plan would catapult the U.S. into global leadership in drone technology before the end of the decade, create hundreds of thousands of American jobs and, crucially, provide the U.S. with an edge in a rapidly developing military capability whose potential already is shaping events in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Wars in Ukraine and Mideast Show Why the US Needs to Dominate the Drone Industrial Base
Published 11/08/23 07:00 AM ET
Seth Cropsey
themessenger.com · November 8, 2023
Hamas’ use of small commercial-grade drones, generally classified by the Federal Aviation Administration as Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS), should come as no surprise to those interested in national security. The terrorists employed Chinese-made SUAS to take out sensors along Israel’s Gaza security fence and later dropped a Russian-model grenade on an Israeli tank in a manner reminiscent of Ukraine’s operations against Russia.
Drones increasingly define the modern battlefield, and SUAS are the most rapidly growing category of those. However, the Pentagon has yet to accelerate domestic procurement to ensure that we have the defense industrial base to produce these vital systems at scale.
The solution is a series of regulatory mechanisms to protect American markets from Chinese penetration, alongside additional funding for the Defense Innovation Unit’s (DIU’s) Blue UAS program and Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks’ recently announced Replicator Initiative in fiscal 2024. Together, the goal must be to cultivate American and allied SUAS ecosystems to sustain European, Middle Eastern, and Asian combat operations.
Ironically enough, Israel and then-Soviet Russia realized the potential of drones before the U.S. and Western Europe. Israel employed drones in combat for the first time in 1982, using them as decoys to suppress Syrian air defenses in the Beqaa Valley and enabling a ground invasion of Lebanon. The Soviets, meanwhile, recognized the role of pervasive sensing on the modern battlefield, embodying it in the term “Reconnaissance-Strike Complex,” a concept that makes the interaction between high-volume sensors and a variety of munitions the centerpiece of military power.
Yet the post-Cold War period, during which the U.S., its allies and its adversaries faced largely non-state threats lacking conventional capabilities, warped drone development. The drones that defined the Global War on Terror — the Predator and Reaper — were large, highly-sophisticated, low-volume assets used for continuous surveillance and strikes against enemies that could only hide, not respond.
However, SUAS — low-cost units under a meter or so across with four to eight rotors, a handful of increasingly sophisticated sensors, and potentially a mounting for small grenades or mortar shells — were first employed on battlefields during the counter-ISIS campaign. ISIS jihadists used SUAS to deliver grenades against Iraqi forces in ferocious urban combat, among other tactics, amplifying the already brutal reality of urban assault.
Ukraine and Russia have both employed SUAS extensively since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukraine uses thousands of these attritable, mostly Chinese-sourced drone systems to track Russian forces in a fluid system enabled by StarLink communications satellites (when allowed by its owner, Elon Musk). It then feeds that information back to artillery crews to enable a fully disaggregated firing system, in which each “non-precision” gun becomes a highly accurate weapon. Russia has copied the Ukrainian system and, now, both sides expend many thousands of SUAS per month, spread across nearly every unit and embedded down to the platoon level.
SUAS, however, will be crucial when integrated into a strike complex akin to what Ukraine has developed. They enable responsive, rapid fires, thereby increasing the lethality of the battlefield when properly applied, as well as providing low-cost “eyes in the sky” for troop protection and battle-damage assessments.
The cat-and-mouse game between SUAS and counter measures will remain dynamic for the coming decade, as advanced computing and AI make SUAS more autonomous and enable swarming, just as counter-UAS systems become smaller, more mobile and better integrated into their own SUAS sensor networks. Winning this fight will require a vibrant dual-use SUAS ecosystem, comprised of multiple companies that can combine rapidly evolving commercial capabilities with innovations stemming directly from the battlefield, building in new modifications to their products as they become apparent in combat. This, in turn, necessitates a large-scale SUAS industrial base in the U.S., linked to counterparts and supply chains in allied states.
China recognized the relevance of SUAS to future combat several years ago. This explains why China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have supported Chinese SUAS manufacturers, foremost among them DJI, which holds a 70% global market share of SUAS. Beginning in 2017, DJI swept into the American market and crushed the nascent domestic SUAS industry with low pricing and other tactics; its products quickly became ubiquitous, not just in private companies but in local public safety and law enforcement, critical infrastructure operators and federal agencies alike. DJI’s global expansion strategy explains why its products are prevalent on the Ukrainian battlefield for both sides, and in the Middle East.
The U.S. and its allies cannot simply integrate Chinese drones into their forces absent serious security risks, as well as the very real possibility of Chinese supply-chain disruption if tensions between the two nations worsen. This is why Congress and the Defense Department began acting in 2020 to ban Chinese drones from federal use. Three years later, small American SUAS producers still have seen few opportunities to close in on DJI’s massive head start in technology and scale.
As an example, DJI purchased legendary Swedish camera manufacturer Hasselblad in 2017, locking down the superior optics and sensor technology of a company that put cameras on the Moon. High-definition aerial imaging is a critical battlefield SUAS technology. To rapidly close this sensor-technology gap, and to prevent further Chinese takeovers, America and her allies must forge similar pan-Pacific and pan-Atlantic alliances, such as with Sony in Japan, Phase One in Denmark and Workswell in the Czech Republic. That will require American venture capital, and that capital will not follow until there are funded federal programs.
The Defense Innovation Unit’s Blue UASprogram is a good start. It provides a framework for American and allied drone manufacturers to win federal contracts and grants them a U.S. security credential confirming that they are insulated from hostile supply chains. Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks can further accelerate Blue UAS by folding it into her ReplicatorInitiative aiming to jump-start domestic drone manufacturing and field tens of thousands of cheap, attritable SUAS within the next 24 months.
Despite these two programs, there is no dedicated funding line for SUAS procurement. A real funding mechanism with a specific focus on SUAS procurement would go a long way to scale up U.S. capacity quickly. Ideally, this would allow American SUAS manufacturers to feed products onto the Ukraine battlefield — a $1 billion annual program would work, based on current pricing. It also would give American SUAS manufacturers and their Blue UAS-certified supply chains a strong incentive to innovate and build rapidly, unleashing tens of billions in venture capital and strategic industry investments.
More critically, the U.S. has moved too slowly toward a full ban on DJI products. Most state and local agencies, as well as operators of critical infrastructure such as electrical utilities or oil and gas operators, still depend on Chinese drones to accomplish such missions as monitoring pipelines and overhead power lines. Unless a real ban on DJI drones is enacted, U.S. companies will continue to face vastly better capitalized, under-priced Chinese manufacturers, preventing us from building an industrial system for a strategically critical capability.
Meaningful funding and a real federal ban on DJI will not only produce the two-year quantum SUAS leap that Replicator is looking for. It also will jump-start a thriving American drone manufacturing base critical to our national security and, in turn, fuel re-shoring and friend-shoring of advanced battery systems, sensor technologies and microcomputers, and spur the additional AI development necessary to create the next generation of SUAS.
The Biden administration should move to ban all DJI products within the next fiscal year, and tie that ban to a series of programs in the fiscal 2025 budget to incentivize rapid SUAS industry growth.
This would be an enormous step forward for the U.S. and its allies. A coherent UAS expansion plan would catapult the U.S. into global leadership in drone technology before the end of the decade, create hundreds of thousands of American jobs and, crucially, provide the U.S. with an edge in a rapidly developing military capability whose potential already is shaping events in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Seth Cropsey, president of the Yorktown Institute, served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy and assistant secretary of Defense during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. He is the author of “Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy” (2013) and “Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do About It” (2017).
themessenger.com · November 8, 2023
14. Rare Earths in the South China Sea: Adding Fuel to the Geopolitical Fire
Excerpts:
The advancement of underwater mining technology, which is crucial for extracting mineral resources from inaccessible locations, is now restricted to a select few states possessing the necessary resources and financial capabilities to undertake such endeavors. However, the pace of extraction in this region, which is characterized by high biodiversity, is experiencing a rapid increase.
Given the abundance of resources and the unregulated nature of a large portion of the ocean, deep-sea mining using remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) appears to be a viable alternative to locating new sources close to societally significant areas. However, public opposition has already emerged and is likely to grow. Nonetheless, as the ability to extract valuable resources from these areas increases, so too will geopolitical competition for influence with the Pacific Island states that control these areas.
Whether in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean, it is evident that the extraction of REMs from the ocean floor could become another source of contention between nations. The introduction of this factor would pose an additional potential geopolitical risk to a region that is already burdened with a multiplicity of geopolitical challenges that currently lack viable remedies.
Rare Earths in the South China Sea: Adding Fuel to the Geopolitical Fire
Competition for rare-earth mineral wealth on the seafloor could lead to further tensions and even conflict.
By Tobias Burgers and Scott N. Romaniuk
November 09, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Tobias Burgers · November 9, 2023
As the green energy revolution continues to progress and gain traction in Europe, the United States, and China, there is a noticeable surge in the demand for rare-earth metals (REMs), which are among the vital building blocks for clean energy technology. The 17 elements that make up REMs, also known as rare-earth elements, are lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. Countries are actively seeking to acquire these vital resources, leading to a competitive race among nations.
The term “rare-earth elements” was first attributed to these compounds when they were discovered during the 18th and 19th centuries. At the time, “earths,” was a designation used to describe materials that displayed resistance to further modification when subjected to heat. In contrast to other types of earth materials, such as lime or magnesia, these “rare earths” were discovered to be rather limited in abundance.
Despite their current prevalence in comparison to their historical availability and application, the perceived scarcity of these resources is assessed and established based on the level of competition surrounding them. Although most REMs do not exhibit the level of scarcity that their classification implies, they are now essential to modern technology and lifestyles.
Moreover, the concentrated and economically feasible deposits of REMs are far less prevalent, rendering their identification and extraction more challenging.
REMs occupy a pivotal role in a diverse array of items that are integral to the continuous shift toward sustainable energy. From solar photovoltaic (PV) plants, wind farms, and electric vehicles to electric networks, battery storage, and hydrogen, REMs are indispensable to producing these systems and instruments. REMs also serve a vital role in the production of various goods that are integral to numerous aspects of society and daily life. These goods encompass a wide range of items, from guided missiles to items used by civilians around the world: hybrid and electric vehicles, flat-screen televisions, computer monitors, smartphones, and digital cameras, as well as fluorescent and light-emitting diode (LED) lights.
Some items require a significantly higher quantity of REMs compared to others. On average, an electric vehicle (EV) requires six times the number of REMs compared to a conventional internal combustion engine vehicle. In contrast to a conventional automobile, which necessitates approximately 25 kilograms of copper and approximately 10 kilograms of manganese, an EV uses more than 50 kilograms of copper, roughly 45 kilograms of cobalt, more than 50 kilograms of graphite, and double the quantity of manganese. Within the realm of renewable energy technologies, an offshore wind system necessitates the use of 100 kilograms of copper and 75 kilograms of zinc.
Thus, as nations go deeper into the green energy revolution, there is an increasingly significant need for these minerals. According to a report titled “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions” by the International Energy Agency (IEA), since 2010, the average quantity of minerals required for the establishment of a new unit of power generation capacity has grown by 50 percent, coinciding with the increasing proportion of renewable energy sources in new investments. According to the IEA, the transition toward a clean energy system is expected to result in a substantial surge in the demand for certain minerals. Therefore, the energy sector is emerging as a significant influencer in mineral markets.
As the IEA noted, “our bottom-up assessment suggests that a concerted effort to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement (climate stabilization at ‘well below 2°C global temperature rise’…) would mean a quadrupling of mineral requirements for clean energy technologies by 2040.”
To achieve a more expeditious global transition toward achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, it will be necessary to increase mineral inputs in 2050 by a factor of six compared to the present. The positive aspect is that, notwithstanding the implications of their nomenclature, these minerals are abundant and may be readily obtained in significant volumes. But while these resources are abundant in terms of quantity, their deposits are only present in specific regions. Undoubtedly, a cursory examination of the primary locations for extraction, processing, and production reveals a restricted geographic distribution.
As a result, a handful of nations have a significant influence on the mining of REMs and associated minerals, including lithium, cobalt, and nickel. According to IEA data from 2022, the U.S., Russia, and Saudi Arabia dominated the extraction of fossil fuels, specifically oil and natural gas. Only a small number of nations engage in mineral extraction, including Chile for copper, Indonesia for nickel, the Democratic Republic of the Congo for cobalt, China for REMs, and Australia for lithium.
In terms of processing, the United States, Qatar, China, and Saudi Arabia were the principal entities engaged in the processing of fossil fuels, specifically in the areas of oil refining and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, while China held a prominent position in the processing of various minerals, including copper, nickel, cobalt, lithium, and REMs.
When observing the processing phase, it is evident how significant China’s dominance in this sector is. It controls 60 percent of the extraction of REMs and 90 percent of their processing. China has been the dominant supplier of REMs to the global market, accounting for around 85–95 percent of the total supply since the late 1990s.
The extraction of REMs in China has traditionally been conducted via subterranean mining within the country. However, this practice has resulted in adverse impacts on China’s environment. Beijing is seeking alternative sources of REMs, including in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea region has garnered significant interest mostly because of the strategic importance of the manmade islands and assets located there, as well as the substantial volume of trade, amounting to trillions of dollars, that traverses the disputed waterway annually. China has exhibited a growing interest in the South China Sea, demonstrating a strong determination to assert its maritime and territorial claims in the area.
Adding to the geopolitical significance, the subaquatic terrain in this region holds a vast abundance of REMs.
Cementing its authority over the South China Sea would ensure China’s current dominance in the market and production of REMs while avoiding further environmental damage to the Chinese mainland. In contrast to regions such as Central Africa, which not only are located at a considerable geographical distance from China but also entail distinct security challenges, the South China Sea emerges as a compelling reservoir of REMs.
In the South China Sea, the tempo of deep-sea exploration and extraction is accelerating. A lack of essential regulatory frameworks to protect shared interests, national sovereignty, and the environment exacerbates competition over REMs in the region. These three considerations are seen as less important for nations aiming to either preserve their dominance in extraction and processing (like China) or for nations contemplating the potential of challenging such monopolies by other governments.
Significant advancements in renewable energy and eco-friendly technologies have prompted states to seek control over REMs. As China strives to maintain its near-monopoly position, there is evidence that Chinese agents are working to undermine Western corporations. These developments have subsequently facilitated the intensification of rivalry, establishing the foundation for prospective conflicts and potentially military involvement. China and the United States are anticipated to experience the most intense competition over critical resources. But they are not the only players involved.
Across Southeast Asia, governments are attempting to set themselves up as hubs for crucial green technology, including electric vehicles. Many of these same nations – Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam – have claims to economic rights within the South China Sea that overlap with each other and with China. The race to develop new sources of REMs to set up domestic industries for success could see repeats of past incidents where deep-sea exploration efforts sparked tense standoffs between Chinese and Southeast Asian vessels.
The South China Sea is not the only site of geopolitical contest linked to maritime mineral wealth. The Pacific Ocean, which encompasses over 30 percent of the Earth’s surface, harbors significant mineral resources, offering states the opportunity to acquire a competitive edge through exploration and extraction activities.
The governments of the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga have allocated funds for exploratory expeditions aimed at identifying and assessing key mineral deposits inside the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ). This zone is situated in the depths of the ocean, extending over an expansive area of approximately 4.5 million square kilometers, located to the west of Mexico and to the east of the Hawaiian Islands.
The advancement of underwater mining technology, which is crucial for extracting mineral resources from inaccessible locations, is now restricted to a select few states possessing the necessary resources and financial capabilities to undertake such endeavors. However, the pace of extraction in this region, which is characterized by high biodiversity, is experiencing a rapid increase.
Given the abundance of resources and the unregulated nature of a large portion of the ocean, deep-sea mining using remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) appears to be a viable alternative to locating new sources close to societally significant areas. However, public opposition has already emerged and is likely to grow. Nonetheless, as the ability to extract valuable resources from these areas increases, so too will geopolitical competition for influence with the Pacific Island states that control these areas.
Whether in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean, it is evident that the extraction of REMs from the ocean floor could become another source of contention between nations. The introduction of this factor would pose an additional potential geopolitical risk to a region that is already burdened with a multiplicity of geopolitical challenges that currently lack viable remedies.
thediplomat.com · by Tobias Burgers · November 9, 2023
15. China’s State Security Departments and Nationwide System
Excerpts:
How do state security operations contribute to China’s overseas influence efforts?
Influence operations have been one of the most effective types of state security operations. I argued in my book, “Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World,” that the Social Investigation Bureau of the MSS was especially successful at influencing foreign elites. It was central to crafting and promoting the “theory of China’s peaceful rise” – an articulation of the idea that China would grow powerful without threatening the West or seeking to revise the existing international order. MSS officers pretended to be reformist scholars as they built relationships with foreign academics, diplomats, and policymakers, pushing narratives like the claim that China was inexorably moving toward democracy.
One lesson I took away from this was that access to important officials and privileged information about Chinese politics often comes with strings attached. Time and time again it’s undercover officers of MSS or Chinese military – or their proxies – who peddle access, using it as a tool in their intelligence operations. Nonetheless, carefully unpicking the backgrounds and cover stories of these individuals is something that can often be done through open-source research.
China’s State Security Departments and Nationwide System
Insights from Alex Joske.
Mercy A. Kuo
By Mercy A. Kuo
November 09, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo · November 9, 2023
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Alex Joske ̶ senior risk advisor at McGrathNicol, former analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and author of “Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World“ (Hardie Grant Books, 2022) – is the 390th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Explain China’s state security system structure and the role of provincial organs.
China’s state security system refers to the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its network of regional agencies across China. The structure of this system follows the general pattern of the rest of the Chinese bureaucracy. The central agency – the Ministry of State Security – exercises some degree of coordination and leadership over counterparts at lower levels of the bureaucracy.
Every province of China has its own state security department that is a provincial government agency while also being part of the national state security system. This is very different to how intelligence work is done in the West, where it is generally the sole remit of federal or central governments.
The vast majority of China’s state security personnel are working in these provincial agencies. By extension, they probably carry out the majority of foreign intelligence operations. As I point out in my paper, most known examples of MSS operations were actually carried out by agencies such as the Shanghai State Security Bureau or Guangdong State Security Department.
Chinese military intelligence is also structured according to this pattern but divided by regional theater command rather than province.
What is the relationship between China’s state security organs and state entities such as foreign affairs offices, overseas Chinese affairs offices, and United Front Work departments?
As a covert intelligence apparatus, the state security system relies heavily on cover to carry out operations. Other organs of China’s party-state are a natural source of cover. This is sometimes called “official cover.” I’ve found historical examples of state security officers donning the guises of United Front Work departments, overseas Chinese affairs offices (responsible for managing Chinese diaspora communities), and foreign affairs offices (local counterparts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
In some cases, this type of cover was used by quite senior intelligence officers in a way that may have given them direct involvement in the decision-making process of other agencies. This is consistent with the idea that the state security apparatus played a greater role that previously appreciated in China’s external affairs.
The depth of this integration has varied from province to province. For example, the founding head of the Zhejiang State Security Department had a close relationship with the provincial party secretary. Theoretically, this would be a source of political capital that would help increase the State Security Department’s influence over the province’s external affairs.
Of course, non-official cover is also widely used for intelligence operations but is much harder to spot and track.
How has foreign intelligence work in the state security system developed over time?
For a long time, the Ministry of State Security was often characterized by foreign observers as primarily an internal security agency – more FBI than CIA. This is true in some respects, but it downplays its extensive foreign intelligence work and the long history behind that.
As I found in my research, the state security apparatus took in experienced foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers upon its founding in 1983. One leader of the Fujian State Security Department had worked undercover in Tanzania and Tehran. The founding head of the Guangdong State Security Department came from a specialized public security unit that ran counterintelligence operations in Hong Kong and Macau, seeking to penetrate rival intelligence agencies from the United States, Taiwan and other nations.
The majority of state security personnel in the 1980s were more police officers than spies in terms of background. In many ways, the MSS’ use of front organizations and cover is a reflection of its origins as a domestic intelligence agency that had to build China-based structures for working on foreign targets. Up into the 1990s, the MSS lacked access to slots in Chinese embassies. This is also why many known cases of MSS operations involve foreigners being invited to China and then cultivated and ultimately pitched to become assets of the MSS. The state security system’s strong preference is to work on targets when they’re in China.
Of the first established 14 state security departments and bureaus, spotlight the top three in terms of influence, resources, and impact.
It’s difficult to find data on the size and effectiveness of state security agencies. Prosecutions, for example, aren’t an accurate sample of state security operations. Guangdong and Tianjin stood out in my research as being relatively large at the time of their establishment. Both remain prominent in the state security system.
Another difficulty in comparing state security agencies is that they sometimes have different focuses. These can be regional. Personnel in Yunnan, for example, had experience running cross-border operations into Southeast Asia. Some cities have large expatriate communities that are also natural targets for intelligence work. Other provinces might have pockets of technical expertise. Jiangsu is home to the Nanjing Institute of Information Technology, a large MSS research unit. Provincial state security agencies often hire locally, so you would also expect provinces with top-ranked STEM universities to have stronger cyber programs.
How do state security operations contribute to China’s overseas influence efforts?
Influence operations have been one of the most effective types of state security operations. I argued in my book, “Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World,” that the Social Investigation Bureau of the MSS was especially successful at influencing foreign elites. It was central to crafting and promoting the “theory of China’s peaceful rise” – an articulation of the idea that China would grow powerful without threatening the West or seeking to revise the existing international order. MSS officers pretended to be reformist scholars as they built relationships with foreign academics, diplomats, and policymakers, pushing narratives like the claim that China was inexorably moving toward democracy.
One lesson I took away from this was that access to important officials and privileged information about Chinese politics often comes with strings attached. Time and time again it’s undercover officers of MSS or Chinese military – or their proxies – who peddle access, using it as a tool in their intelligence operations. Nonetheless, carefully unpicking the backgrounds and cover stories of these individuals is something that can often be done through open-source research.
CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR
Mercy A. Kuo
Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.
thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo · November 9, 2023
16. An Irregular Use of Military Force: Stability Policing Operations
Conclusion:
The transformation of stability policing from its imperial origins to a pivotal component of global peacekeeping underscores its essential role in today’s conflict-ridden security environment. As global security needs grow more complex, the deployment of specialized law enforcement entities such as MSUs and Formed Police Units becomes increasingly relevant. As the world’s decision-makers weigh the merits of dispatching peacekeepers to address the unrest in Gaza, it’s crucial to factor in the distinct competencies of these units. Integrating their specialized expertise is not just beneficial; it’s essential to effective management of conflict resolution and cultivating enduring stability in regions beset by turmoil.
An Irregular Use of Military Force: Stability Policing Operations - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Emrah Özdemir · November 9, 2023
In the wake of escalating violence and deepening humanitarian crises in the Middle East, the international community finds itself at a pivotal juncture with recent calls for deploying a peacekeeping force to Gaza. As this discussion gains momentum, it highlights a vital yet frequently underestimated aspect of modern military operations: the practice of stability policing, commonly known as SP. Bridging the gap between military and police work, SP may play a significant role in maintaining order and fostering peace in volatile regions. Indeed, it could be a strategic asset in future planning for regions like Gaza, where the fabric of society has been severely disrupted by pervasive violence, leaving even the most fundamental services in ruins.
SP operations represent a departure from conventional military missions. They are designed to restore order, reestablish the functioning of the civil administration, and foster cooperation between civilian organizations and the military. Given the time and resources required to train conventional military units in these diverse responsibilities, specialized gendarmerie-type law enforcement forces with military status and military police units become the primary considerations for deployment. Yet, despite their increasing importance, these types of units are understudied and underappreciated.
The post-Cold War shifts in global security dynamics compelled a reassessment of military structures primarily designed for interstate warfare. The fundamental function of many of the world’s most powerful militaries—predominantly aimed at countering external threats – sparked intense discussion and uncertainty when considered for situations outside conventional warfare. Such reluctance was devastatingly evident in instances like Rwanda and Bosnia, where debate and hesitation contributed to horrific episodes of ethnic genocide.
New forms of security threats, such as civil wars, terrorism, ethnic and sectarian tensions, have led to the emergence of new actors on the battlefield that resemble organized criminal groups or gangs rather than traditional military units. Addressing these threats goes beyond the objectives and organization of conventional military units. To ensure public order and security in this complex landscape, it is imperative to employ specialized units that combine military readiness with expertise in human rights, crime prevention, judicial processes, and socio-cultural issues.
The crucial role of law enforcement units
In contemporary conflict environments, many SP functions align with the duties of domestic police organizations. However, these settings often present elevated threat levels that surpass the capabilities of conventional police forces. As a result, gendarmerie-type law enforcement forces, distinguished by their unique fusion of military and police attributes, emerge as a viable solution.
The practice of military units performing law enforcement functions, recognized in the 1990s as an important component of peace and stability operations, traces its origins to colonialism. C.W. Gwynn, for example, aptly referred to this practice as “imperial policing.” Unlike in traditional military roles, imperial policing emphasized suppressing insurrections, establishing administrative authority, minimizing the use of force, and winning over the local population. These tasks, often associated with “small wars,” were historically deemed secondary missions and received limited attention within military units. During the Cold War, such activities were considered non-prestige tasks to be performed by military units. However, the changing threat landscape has underscored the increasing importance of military-like law enforcement units.
The convergence of law enforcement and military functions came to the fore with initiatives like the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN International Police Task Force. Following the Dayton Agreement in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the challenge of preventing renewed violence, ensuring a secure environment for development efforts, combating organized crime, drugs, corruption, and terrorism, and maintaining public order. Military units lacked the necessary experience, training, and force structure for civilian law enforcement, leading to the creation of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), composed of gendarmerie and military police units from various countries.
The first MSU deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina on August 2, 1998. Its main tasks included supporting military operations, filling the security gap between military units and law enforcement agencies, gathering intelligence, verifying compliance with the Peace Agreement, and supporting local law enforcement elements. The MSU consisted of some 600 troops from Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and Italy, and later became a part of the European Union military mission (EUFOR Althea) under the name Integrated Police Unit (IPU).
MSU units were subsequently deployed in Kosovo, where they proved successful in activities such as riot control, maintaining public order, and executing high-risk arrests of war criminals and members of organized crime groups, mirroring their achievements in Bosnia.
While the MSUs performed well in Bosnia and Kosovo compared to other military units, they too encountered challenges. One primary issue was the lack of familiarity with gendarmerie-type forces among military leaders, particularly from nations that do not maintain such units. The gap in understanding often resulted in the MSUs being underutilized and relegated to secondary roles like reserve troops or guard duty. Moreover, the limited availability of gendarmerie forces – as countries with these specialized units often needed to retain them domestically – restricted the number of personnel available for international deployment.
UN Formed Police Units (FPUs), similar to MSUs, were first deployed in 1999 during peace missions in Kosovo and East Timor. Defined as specialized, mobile police units, FPUs secure UN personnel, protect civilians, and support police operations requiring a heavier, more organized response. Following NATO’s MSU initiative, the creation of FPUs marked a significant shift toward integrating law enforcement into peacekeeping. These units have effectively aided local police in diverse regions, including South Sudan, Liberia, Darfur, Mali, Central African Republic, Haiti, and Congo.
The rise of stability policing doctrine
The 2015 establishment of the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence (SP CoE) in Vicenza, Italy, marked a significant step toward formalizing SP doctrine. The center aims to improve SP capabilities and teamwork within NATO and its allies by developing doctrine, conducting training, and aiding operations for peacekeeping and crisis response. Nations like Türkiye, Romania, Greece, the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands contribute to the center’s work. The center has influenced NATO planning and future force structures, leading to the integration of stability policing into NATO joint doctrine in 2016 with the publication of AJP-3.22. One of the key objectives at the Center is to broaden understanding of SP Doctrine and the role of military forces in law enforcement among NATO members and partners, offering specialized courses at the Leader and Field Commander levels.
According to doctrine, SP aims to create a safe and secure environment, restore public order and security, and lay the foundation for long-term governance and development. This involves not only strengthening local law enforcement agencies but also, if required, temporarily replacing those agencies with external SP units. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of this approach. The doctrine highlights that gendarmerie-style units and military police are the most appropriate choice for the intricate job of preserving security, maintaining public order, and enforcing the rule of law.
The future of stability policing operations
Recent tensions in Kosovo as of May 2023, and ongoing stabilization operations in South Sudan, Mali, and Congo further emphasize the need for law enforcement forces with military capabilities. As mentioned earlier, the deteriorating situation in Gaza also represents a significant and recent case that underscores the importance of considering SP as a viable alternative. In fulfilling SP responsibilities, the earliest possible intervention, referred to as the “golden hour,” is of great importance in ensuring legitimacy and preventing conflict. To this end, in 2022, the UN Police Division developed a Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) to be added to the existing United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to create a Rapid Reaction Police Unit that can be deployed within 60 days of a request. It states that FPUs should be deployed at short notice to new stability and peace operations where different threats arise.
Given the changing security environment, it makes sense there are also calls for creating a NATO High-Readiness Constabulary Force (HRCF). This recommendation holds significant merit. Establishing such a force would be a positive step toward upholding peace and stability, especially in situations involving hybrid threats, and would enhance NATO’s crisis management capabilities. The insufficient recognition of the importance of stability policing among political leaders and military commanders often results in the ineffective utilization of specialized units like gendarmerie and military police. Consequently, it’s crucial to raise awareness and provide information about SP doctrine to NATO members and its partner nations.
International organizations like the UN, EU, and NATO each conduct SP operations, albeit under varying monikers. Harmonizing these operations into a unified framework would enhance coordination in peacekeeping and crisis management. The SP CoE has already made strides in this direction. The key to success in crisis response is rapid and prepared action, an area where NATO has demonstrated capable leadership. Integrating the HRCF into NATO’s structure would bolster these response efforts significantly. Moreover, the establishment of the HRCF would foster shared understanding and language among NATO members, particularly concerning gendarmerie-type law enforcement units, facilitating the exchange of different ideas and techniques.
The transformation of stability policing from its imperial origins to a pivotal component of global peacekeeping underscores its essential role in today’s conflict-ridden security environment. As global security needs grow more complex, the deployment of specialized law enforcement entities such as MSUs and Formed Police Units becomes increasingly relevant. As the world’s decision-makers weigh the merits of dispatching peacekeepers to address the unrest in Gaza, it’s crucial to factor in the distinct competencies of these units. Integrating their specialized expertise is not just beneficial; it’s essential to effective management of conflict resolution and cultivating enduring stability in regions beset by turmoil.
Associate Professor Emrah Özdemir is an ex-gendarmerie major and currently serving as a faculty member at the Military Academy at Turkish National Defense University, Ankara. He holds a PhD in politics from Swansea University and has book chapters and articles on military strategy, irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency. He is also an external subject matter expert at the Stability Policing Center of Excellence.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense as well as the Turkish National Defense University and the Ministry of National Defense.
Main image: Spanish armed forces Staff Sgt. Rovio de Rojas Rernandez assists Security Forces at the base gates during Operation Allies Refuge at Ramstein AB, Sept. 8, 2021. Military Police from NATO worked with Security Forces to ensure base operations continue efficiently during Operation Allies Refuge. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Jacob Wongwai)
17. Philippines drops China's Belt and Road as tensions flare
Is one belt one road a house of cards? Will it all come tumbling down crushed under the weight of its debt trap diplomacy?
Philippines drops China's Belt and Road as tensions flare – DW – 11/08/2023
DW
The Philippines in late October became the latest country to back out of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Transport Minister Jaime Bautista telling reporters the sudden withdrawal came after Beijing did not respond to funding requests on railway projects.
China had pledged almost $5 billion (€4.7 billion) to build three rail lines — two in Luzon and one in Mindanao — under the BRI, a keystone of Beijing's foreign policy offering Chinese-backed loans for major infrastructure projects mostly in developing parts of the world.
However, China and the Philippines have been locked in a years-long dispute over maritime territory in the South China Sea, which China has claimed in its entirety.
In the most recent incident, a Chinese coast guard ship rammed a Philippine fishing vessel in contested waters near Second Thomas Shoal.
However, Philippine officials did not mention territorial tension as the reason behind the pull out.
Don McLain Gill, a geopolitical analyst and lecturer in international studies at De La Salle University in Manila, told DW that there are also funding delays for six other projects, including a closed-circuit television project, the New Centennial Water Source, the Kaliwa Dam Project, and the Philippine National Railway's South Long Haul Project.
"The decision to withdraw from these projects can be assumed to be motivated by issues centered on their sustainability and the mounting concerns brought by Beijing's unwillingness to act like a responsible neighbor," he said.
South China Sea tensions
Tensions have recently been mounting between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea, particularly near the Second Thomas Shoal, or Ayungin Shoal, which are all part of the contested Spratly Islands.
Philippine troops live on the deliberately submerged BRP Sierra Madre, a ship used in World War II by the United States Navy. The ship has been under repair for years, so it remains habitable for the soldiers stationed there.
Philippines, China tussle in the high seas
China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, and for years has constructed military installations on shoals and reefs.
In 2016, an international tribunal sided with the Philippines and ruled that China's territorial claims in the South China Sea had no basis in international law.
Tensions have grown since the election of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who has taken a less China-friendly stance than his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, and has nudged closer to the US on strategic policy.
In February, the Philippines Coast Guard accused its China counterpart of shining a military-grade laser at its ship and near the disputed Shoal, causing temporary blindness to its crew.
China denied the accusation was deliberate. Video footage in August showed China’s Coast Guard firing a water cannon at the Philippines Coast Guard and blocking them from delivery supplies to its military troops stationed on the Sierra Madre ship.
China has always maintained it is operating in its own territorial waters.
"The pretext for China's harassment has been that the resupply boats have been carrying 'construction materials,' with China has deemed 'illegal,'" said Col. Raymond Powell, SeaLight Director at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.
"In other words, China has been carrying out a blockade of the shoal, in which it only allows through food and replacement troops, but blocks and water cannons those carrying construction materials," he added.
"The last resupply occurred on October 21, so there will be another in the coming weeks. These have been the regular flashpoints, and China will need to decide whether it wants to continue this level of harassment. The question is whether China is willing to take a step back," Powell said.
Japan and India alternatives
With China seemingly stalling on its economic projects in the Southeast Asian country, Philippine senator Sherwin Gatchalian told local media the tensions in the disputed shoal could be the reason China's projects are delaying.
But Gill said the stalling of China-funded projects could help Manila in the long run to partner with other countries.
US promises 'ironclad' defense of Philippines
"Such developments will in fact prove to be beneficial for the Philippines' long term development agenda, given Manila's willingness to broaden and diversify its economic and development partners. Manila is now looking at Japan and India as viable sources of funding for railway projects," Gill added.
Despite Manila pulling out of the BRI, the Philippines and China have had close economic relations for years. Beijing has been Manila's top trade partner in recent years and its second largest export economy, only to be beaten by the United States, according to the World Bank.
"As things stand, Chinese foreign direct investments are not that substantial. The stoppage of BRI investments will not substantially affect investments in the Philippines," Jan Carlo Punongbayan, a Filipino economist and assistant professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics, told DW.
"In terms of trade, China is among the biggest partners of the Philippines. But in terms of investments, the Philippines is not a big destination of Chinese investments," he added.
But Punongbayan said tensions could endanger the two countries from collaborating on future development projects.
"China will continue to be a big trading partner of the private sector. But government-to-government partnerships may be more limited moving forward. It may be more difficult to get official development assistance from Beijing now, given China's intrusions in the West Philippine Sea."
Gill said there are signs that Manila wants to rely less on China. Philippine officials have said they are confident of securing funding from the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank.
"Manila's desire to lessen its dependence on China's economic partnership can also be understood as an element of its broader security interests in the West Philippine Sea at a time when China continues to expand its assertive interests against Philippine sovereignty and sovereign rights," Gill said.
"Given the asymmetric power relations between Manila and Beijing, the Philippines will have to embark on a multi-dimensional approach to lessen the risks brought by China's assertive rise. One of these methods will be to lessen its economic dependence," he added.
Philippines denounces China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea
Edited by: John Silk
DW
18. Republican senator calls for TikTok ban, cites influence on Israel-Hamas war opinions
I would rather he legislate smarter, more critical thinking American citizens who will question the propaganda they read. (note sarcasm)
Republican senator calls for TikTok ban, cites influence on Israel-Hamas war opinions
He called for the ban in a letter addressed to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen.
NBC News · by David Ingram
Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., asked the Biden administration Tuesday to ban TikTok in part because of how the app has handled content about the Israel-Hamas war.
He called for the ban in a letter addressed to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, who chairs the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency panel with the authority to block foreign involvement in corporations and markets on certain national security grounds. Treasury Department representatives did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Hawley wrote that the Israel-Hamas war is a “crucial test case” for TikTok’s influence as a media organization and source of news, and he expressed concern about what he called “the ubiquity of anti-Israel content” on TikTok.
“While data security issues are paramount, less often discussed is TikTok’s power to radically distort the world-picture that America’s young people encounter,” he wrote.
In recent weeks, TikTok has come under new scrutiny from members of Congress and tech investors who say the platform favors pro-Palestinian content.
Hawley’s letter cited a viral thread on the social media app X by venture capitalist Jeff Morris Jr., alleging that TikTok was the reason young Americans are more sympathetic to Palestinians than older Americans are.
Hawley wrote that CFIUS should ban not only TikTok, but also any app controlled by its parent company, ByteDance. That would also cover CapCut, a popular video-editing app. ByteDance did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
“This simply heightens the stakes of the TikTok question: the longer this app is allowed to operate in the U.S., the longer its Chinese Communist Party overseers will apparently be able to propagandize Americans. That is unacceptable,” Hawley wrote.
But the reality of the app’s influence on discussions around the war isn’t cut-and-dried. The perceived performance of pro-Palestinian content on the platform depends on how you parse TikTok’s data, according to an NBC News review of hashtags related to the conflict.
Hawley has sponsored legislation to ban TikTok based on its collection of personal data and, according to his office, he plans to try to fast track a vote on the legislation on the Senate floor in the coming days. Under Senate rules, holding such a vote would require unanimous consent from all senators. A similar request by Hawley failed in March.
TikTok did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The company has previously said that the allegations of bias are baseless.
“Our Community Guidelines apply equally to all content on TikTok and we strongly reject any of the baseless claims to the contrary. We’re committed to consistently enforcing our policies to protect our community,” the company said in an emailed statement last week.
The Biden administration has been negotiating a potential security agreement with TikTok to try to address data privacy concerns it’s expressed about the app.
Past efforts to ban TikTok have been blocked by federal judges for restricting people’s freedom of expression, and some legal scholars have said any future effort could raise First Amendment issues.
NBC News · by David Ingram
19. US plans to build a $553 million terminal at Sri Lanka's Colombo port in rivalry with China
Strategic competition.
US plans to build a $553 million terminal at Sri Lanka's Colombo port in rivalry with China
BY BHARATHA MALLAWARACHI AND DIDI TANG
Updated 3:51 AM EST, November 8, 2023
AP · November 8, 2023
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka (AP) — The U.S. announced a $553 million project Wednesday to build a deep-water shipping container terminal in Sri Lanka’s Port of Colombo as it competes with China in international development financing.
The project is billed as providing critical infrastructure for the South Asian nation with the potential to “transform Colombo into a world-class logistics hub at the intersection of major shipping routes and emerging markets,” according to the U.S. International Development Finance Corp.
The DFC loan of $553 million for the West Container Terminal will “expand its shipping capacity, creating greater prosperity for Sri Lanka — without adding to sovereign debt — while at the same strengthening the position of our allies across the region,” said DFC Chief Executive Officer Scott Nathan.
The announcement comes as Sri Lanka is struggling to recover from a dire financial and economic crisis.
The Port of Colombo has been operating near its capacity since 2021, and the new terminal will cater to growing economies in the Bay of Bengal, the DFC said.
The DFC will make a direct loan to the consortium developing the terminal, which is 51% owned by India’s largest port operator, Adani Ports & Special Economic Zones Ltd. The other partners are Sri Lanka’s John Keells Holdings, which has a 34% share, and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority with the remaining 15%.
Nathan said that with the loan, Sri Lanka will be the “2nd biggest exposure” for his institution in the Indo-Pacific region, after India.
“It’s high priority for the United States to be active in the Indo-Pacific region,” he told reporters in Colombo after visiting the site of the new terminal.
The DFC was established five years ago in response to Beijing’s massive global infrastructure building campaign, known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Through it, Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars each year to build roads, railways, ports and airports, typically in developing nations, to foster trade and goodwill toward China.
Some of those projects have raised controversy, among them Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, on its southeastern coast. Sri Lanka borrowed heavily from China to build the port and other infrastructure including an airport and a city being built on reclaimed land. The projects have failed to earn enough revenue to pay for the loans, and in 2017, Sri Lanka leased the seaport in Hambantota to China.
Sri Lanka’s multibillion-dollar debts to Beijing have hindered efforts to resolve its financial woes and have often been cited as evidence by critics of the Belt and Road Initiative who claim China engages in debt-trap diplomacy.
The Chinese government rejects such accusations. The debt trap argument was “fabricated to disrupt and undermine China’s cooperation with developing countries,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said during a daily briefing Tuesday.
Both neighboring India and China are jostling for influence in Sri Lanka and both have already invested in expanding facilities at the Colombo port. India worries about a growing Chinese presence on the island, which is on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes and in a region that India considers part of its strategic backyard.
The Colombo port also has a terminal run by China Merchants Port Holdings. Another Chinese project, a luxury oceanside development spanning over 269 hectares of reclaimed land called Port City, is being built by CHEC Port City Colombo Co., a unit of China Communications Construction Company.
The $1.4 billion project to build an integrated resort and casino and conference center zone, a marina, apartments, a business district and green space has raised concerns in Sri Lanka and India that the development could become a virtual Chinese outpost or colony.
In development financing, the U.S. faces tough competition from Beijing, which has recalibrated its BRI initiative to be greener, safer and more sustainable, according to AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, a public university in Virginia.
Nathan said that sustainability and “local appropriateness” are very important elements of the DFC’s work.
“We are not interested in giving money to projects that are not going to work,” he said. “Of course, sometimes, mistakes happen. But rarely.”
He called the Sri Lanka port terminal project “an investment in dynamics of the global economy, shipping and transhipment” and added that studies on the project “have demonstrated that dynamics with high confidence.”
In a recent report, AidData said the U.S. is catching up with China in development finance after being overtaken by Beijing in total official financial flows to the developing world in 2007.
The gap has narrowed recently as China scaled back its lending while the U.S. sharply raised loans through the newly launched DFC.
The U.S. now provides about $60 billion of development finance each year to low- and middle-income countries. Yet, at $80 billion a year in aid and credit commitment, China remains the single largest official source of international development finance, AidData says.
For the past two decades, China has dominated global infrastructure finance with faster and bigger projects. Now it has rebooted with more stringent environmental, social and governance safeguards, said Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData.
He said, “this finding is a big deal because China’s competitors in the global infrastructure market offer safety but not speed.”
“Beijing, on the other hand, is squaring the circle between safety and speed. It is several steps ahead of its competitors in the global infrastructure market. It is laser-focused on giving leaders in the developing world exactly what they want: rapid delivery of big-ticket infrastructure projects without unreasonably high levels of risk,” he said. “Whether the U.S. will be able to do the same is a big question mark.”
___
Tang reported from Washington. Associated Press writer Ken Moritsugu in Beijing contributed to this report.
___
Follow AP’s Asia-Pacific coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/asia-pacific
AP · November 8, 2023
20. The Devil Went Down to Georgia: Executing Cyberspace Resistance to Counter Russia
A PDF version can be downloaded here: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023-11-07-P14_The_Devil_Went_Down_to_Georgia.pdf
I wish we would stop using Phase Zero. It is inaccurate. We need to be able to conduct entire IW campaigns in what has been mistakenly called Phase Zero (e.g., without ever going to the conventional Phase three - decision conventional operations).
Excerpts:
Ukraine’s ordeal underscores that isolated cyber victories, such as significant power outages, may not equate to strategic achievements, unless they are aligned within a broader military strategy. Considering this, Georgia should broaden its approach beyond a purely technical focus on cyber and focus on the interdependencies between public administration, finance, media, economics, and the ICT. All must be fortified against cyber threats, while the public workforce must be informed about potential cyber risks. By enhancing these segments and elevating public recognition of cyber risks, Georgia can mitigate the societal and economic impacts of potential Russian cyber operations and activities.
Both Phase Zero and Resistance emphasize pre-conflict preparation, relationship cultivation, and non-combative measures that capitalize on local knowledge to further U.S. goals. Phase Zero seeks to preempt conflicts by fostering stability, whereas Resistance attempts to resist the overthrow of a legitimate government. To support friends and allies, entities like SOF and USCYBERCOM should consistently be ready, prioritizing proactive and sustained involvement rather than reacting to explicit acts of aggression. The blending of cyber operations is pivotal in fostering resistance in the digital realm, gauging public sentiment, and modifying communication for optimal resonance. Employing innovative tactics in cyber-enabled resistance can establish alliances, influence public sentiment, and bolster other resistance efforts, all while remaining alert to challenges from hostile countries. Essential to Georgia’s national defense, the U.S. must advocate for Georgia to augment its cyber resilience, incorporate lessons learned from Ukraine, and integrate Phase Zero cyber activities and resistance approaches. This approach will ensure that Georgia not only endures in the modern digitally connected world but also flourishes, staying ahead of Russian hostility.
The Devil Went Down to Georgia: Executing Cyberspace Resistance to Counter Russia
irregularwarfarecenter.org
November 7, 2023
Mark Grzegorzewski, PhD
William Holden
Amidst the focus on Russia’s military engagements in Ukraine over the past year, not enough attention has been given to the cyber resilience needs of other countries on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Notably, Georgia, Lithuania, and Poland warrant particular attention as they could become the next targets if Russia shifts its focus from Ukraine. Georgia, a victim of a Russian invasion in 2008 and a cyber-driven influence campaign in 2019, presents a compelling case study. Drawing from Ukraine’s experiences, Georgia can translate those insights into robust cyber resilience strategies to defend itself against future Russian aggression.
Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash
Recommended strategies include forging closer ties with the U.S. to bolster the capacity of Georgia’s cybersecurity, re-allocating resources to reduce the impact of Russian cyber operations and activities, and presenting a strengthened front to deter Russian cyber operatives. Moreover, experience is an unparalleled resource, and the Georgians can learn from Ukraine’s experience. In fact, there is a strong correlation between the experience Ukrainian cyber operators gained in the years of cyber conflict following the initial 2014 Russian invasion and today’s digital stalemate between Ukraine and Russia. In essence, nearly a decade of conflict honed the Ukrainians resistance capabilities, enabling them to counter Russian cyber operations effectively.
Given its proximity and history, Georgia has likely kept a close eye on how Russia executed irregular warfare in Ukraine since at least 2014, and ideally learned from those experiences to prepare itself for resistance should Russia return. Learning from the Ukrainian experience would enable Georgia to brace itself for Russian cyber effects, especially should a momentarily debilitated Russia seek to reassert its regional dominance by targeting countries within its sphere of influence. Thus, Georgia must be prepared not just for traditional Russian military tactics but also for improved strategies born from lessons learned in Ukraine. In the end, should Russia invade Georgia again, it will not be a replay of what happened in Ukraine. Indeed, it may not even be a physical invasion.
Within the limited scope of this essay, we cannot cover every Ukrainian lesson learned from Russia’s invasion relevant to Georgia’s resistance. Consequently, we shed light on Russia’s cyber operations in Ukraine, which were designed to infiltrate digital infrastructures, shape the information environment, and disrupt and manipulate adversaries. Within this context, we first provide background on the relationship between Russia and Georgia. We then analyze lessons learned from Ukraine in 2022 and assess the effectiveness of Russian cyber capabilities in both Ukraine and Georgia. Based on this evaluation, we highlight the importance of coordinated multi-domain operations and the importance of a well-prepared cyber defense. Finally, we offer suggestions for Georgian cyber resistance, incorporating insights from a 2022 Cyber-Unconventional Warfare (UW) seminar held at National Intelligence University. We conclude by emphasizing the urgency of enhancing Georgia’s cyber resilience, given the ever-present threat of a Russian invasion.
Georgia on My Mind
After breaking away from the disintegrating Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has continuously struggled through a tense relationship with Russia. Eduard Shevardnadze stepped down from his role as the Soviet foreign minister in 1991 due to the Soviet Union’s internal chaos, and by 1992, he emerged as Georgia’s leader, assuming the presidency in the country’s evolving post-Soviet environment. Historically, Russian dominance over Georgia can be traced back to the early 19th century, interrupted only briefly between 1918 and 1921 when Georgia enjoyed a short-lived independence. For Georgians, the future direction of their country is synonymous with safeguarding the state against potential Russian aggression.
To this day, the 2008 Russian invasion over the contested regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains a central point in their bilateral interactions. As background, following territorial disagreements in the early 1990s, Russia mediated a truce, positioning its peacekeeping forces in these contested areas. As Georgia’s ambitions for reintegration grew stronger, particularly during Mikheil Saakashvili’s tenure (2004-2012) and in a phase when the country was considering joining NATO, Russia perceived this as a direct threat to its security. The 2008 announcement of Georgia and Ukraine’s intention to join NATO intensified Russia’s concerns, prompting the conflict’s escalation. Although the conflict’s cause remains debated, Russia swiftly deployed a significant military presence, overpowering the Georgian forces and advancing into Georgian regions within days.
Tensions in cyberspace complemented Russia’s physical actions. In fact, Russia’s 2008 invasion featured some of the earliest examples of coordinated cyber operations, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and defacements of Georgian government websites. Even after the official end of hostilities, Russia has used its cyber capabilities to inflict costs on the Georgians any time they have been perceived as moving too closely to the West. Hence, ongoing Russian cyber operations have a historical precedence in Georgia and would likely play a pivotal role in any future Russian aggression towards the country.
Cri-mea River: Russia’s strategic miscalculation
The Russian security establishment sees cyber operations as a critical pillar of any operation, as indicated by its 2021 military strategy. This document lays out the concept of strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets (SODCIT), which uses a combination of long-range fires to inflict damage on an adversary to force them to capitulate to Russian demands early in a conflict. While this damage is generally focused on traditional military means, it also includes cyber operations, particularly where they can impact command of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), communications centers, infrastructure, and economics. Thus, Russian military thinking frames cyber operations in the larger context of information conflict, in which sufficient preparation of the information environment leads to sociopolitical conditions in support its objectives.
Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many experts anticipated the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to be short-lived. In principle, Ukraine found itself outmatched, and it was assumed an opening salvo of Russia’s cyber operations would overpower and devastate Ukraine swiftly, allowing Russia to showcase its exceptional command in another regional irregular conflict. While this was a possible outcome before the start of the invasion, it is not the situation today in Ukraine. While the Ukrainians suffered some early destructive cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, such as the attacks on Viasat satellite systems and energy companies, the Ukrainians have also displayed their ability to resist Russian occupation. To the surprise of many, the current Ukraine standstill has revealed how much Ukraine benefited from its many sources of external support.
Outside support to Ukrainian network defense was critical since Kyiv faced an adversary with comparatively immersive cyber capabilities. Possibly to signal Russia, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) publicized that it was supporting Ukraine and had executed Hunt Forward Operations (HFOs) in Ukraine’s networks. The fidelity of this support has surely surprised the Russians. Moreover, it has also become clear that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) trained Ukraine personal in the art and science of resistance since at least 2014. The support provided by these two U.S. military organizations, in addition to other U.S. agencies’ support, undoubtedly prepared the environment in Ukraine’s favor, including in the minds of Ukrainians. This bolstered resilience, both in the tangible and psychological realms, and likely served to counter the potential damage inflicted by Russia’s cyber operations and activities, safeguarding Ukraine’s critical information infrastructure in the process.
Back in the U.S.S.R.
Russia has a history of using cyber operations to pressure its neighbors, particularly states in its near abroad, which are all former Soviet satellites. These countries are generally targeted by Russia when the Kremlin feels that they are slipping out of Russia’s sphere of influence or are perceived to embrace Western democratic values. As such, Russia was not shy about employing cyberspace operations against Ukraine to pull it back into its orbit. Russia has used a variety of cyber operations since the 2014 conflict with Ukraine, including DDoS attacks against anti-Russian organizations, co-opting of social media platforms to minimize anti-Russian rhetoric, and attacking election infrastructure. As the 2014 conflict ground to a stalemate, Russia continued using Ukraine as a sandbox for new cyber and cyber-enabled capabilities and tactics. Notable incidents include cyber-induced power outages in the winters of 2015 and 2016, and the NotPetya attack targeting Microsoft Windows–based systems. As has been widely published, while this malware attack primarily targeted Ukraine, it then spread from intended targets and caused billions of dollars of damage around the world.
Russian forces used cyber operations during the Ukraine invasion across a spectrum of activities, from information operations, espionage, and offensive operations. These efforts were conducted by advanced persistent threats linked to Russia. Some Russian activities were also conducted by and through proxy groups—such as hacktivists, nationalist organizations, and criminal syndicates. From January 2022 to March 2023, the CyberPeace Institute identified 360 Russian cyber incidents against Ukrainian entities, wherein the public administration, financial, media, and information communication technology (ICT) sectors were targeted by Russian cyber actors. This finding is consistent with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis that during its 2022 invasion, Moscow primarily focused on disruptive cyber activities, accounting for 57.4 percent of incidents, while cyber espionage made up 21.3 percent. However, the CSIS report also suggests that despite this Russian activity, “the utility of cyber operations rests in setting conditions and intelligence more than in direct application during large-scale combat operations.”
Despite its scope and range, Russia’s cyber operations, like the rest of its invasion, failed to produce Russia’s desired outcome. Cyber operations did not bring Ukraine to its knees, cripple its economy, or drive it to the bargaining table. Ukrainian cyber defenses proved unexpectedly resilient, and the dramatic effects of anticipated cyberattacks failed to materialize as the Russians were largely unable to coordinate activities in other domains to capitalize on what attacks they did successfully execute. Thus, it is accurate to say, that without ground troops ready to use night vision, causing a citywide power outage merely inconveniences the Ukrainians instead of giving the Russians a strategic advantage in the darkness.
Considering the Ukrainian invasion, the efficacy of Russian cyber warfare seems to have been questionable. What caused this discrepancy remains uncertain. Could it be the swift integration of external support? Or the invaluable experience accrued by Ukrainian cyber defenders over the years? Alternatively, the shortfall might be attributable to Russia itself—due to ineffectiveness in pairing cyber exploits with activities in another domain. It might even be attributed to a Russian intent to preserve Ukrainian infrastructure for their own use. As Russia refrained from dismantling a significant portion of Ukraine’s ICT infrastructure during the invasion, countries like Georgia should consider cyber resilience strategies to prepare for how Russia might approach their own ICT assets in a future confrontation.
Midnight Train(ing) to Georgia
Recognizing that Georgia currently is not in a current conflict with Russia, it might seem unnecessary to plan for another Russian incursion. Nevertheless, it is imperative for Western countries to collaborate with Georgia during the “Phase Zero” stage, focusing on cyber resilience to foster a strong deterrence mechanism that could potentially prevent a future Russian provocation.
The concepts of Phase Zero and resistance are distinct but also similar in that they both emphasize pre-conflict shaping of the environment, relationship building, non-kinetic activities, and leveraging local insights. Phase Zero comes before the four-phase military campaign model: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero operations are “everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place… consist[ing] of shaping operations that are continuous and adaptive… to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.” Activities within the Phase Zero stage have direct impacts on the way any future conflict would play out.
Resistance is “an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.” It is a part of the theory of Unconventional Warfare, defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” To be effective in integrated deterrence through unconventional warfare, USCYBERCOM must be proactive and continuously engaged during Phase Zero. Additionally, both SOF and USCYBERCOM need to maintain constant readiness to allies and partners ahead of conflict, ensuring that they can provide support over the long term whenever required. This commitment equips allies and friends to deter against potential invasion. Waiting until Russian tanks roll across the border is much too late. Therefore, SOF should maintain regular contact with potential resistance entities, and concurrently, USCYBERCOM should proactively probe networks and persist within digital networks.
Pre-invasion activities associated with both Phase Zero and the first step in the UW model emphasize relationship-building with local entities, from government officials to grassroots movements. While these activities can involve combat, the focus is on non-combat initiatives such as training, advising, liaising, and information sharing. Likewise, deep local insights, cultural sensitivities, and socio-political dynamics are crucial to inform both strategies.
In the interconnected world, integrating these time-tested strategies with cyber enabled-operations (with local characteristics) is paramount. However, the U.S. defense community must first understand the other’s language. One significant observation from the 2022 Cyber-Unconventional Warfare seminar hosted at National Intelligence University was that the two communities, SOF and cyber, often spoke different languages when referring to similar concepts, such as Phase Zero and the preparation phase in the Unconventional Warfare model. After establishing a common vernacular, ensuing discussions presented suggestions that could be integrated into both Phase Zero and the preparation phase of UW phases to enable cyber support for resistance.
For instance, to lay the foundation for effective resistance, it is essential to first grasp public sentiment, build robust communication infrastructures, recruit allies, and adequately equip resistance forces. In addition, by analyzing public sentiment, narratives can be crafted to align with local concerns. Virtual personas might serve as invaluable channel for distributing information, gathering intelligence, and infiltrating opposition networks. Through consistent and meaningful messaging, the public’s perspective can be shaped, making them more receptive to external support. Finally, prioritizing secure communication platforms can strengthen resistance recruitment, and ensure the consistent provision of required resources.
When considering cyber-integrated resistance, initiating relationships with resistance groups or governments-in-exile requires creativity since meeting in-person may not be feasible. Using methods like flash mobs can be a way to assess public mood, spot potential allies, and carve out discreet communication pathways. Collaborating with key local influencers can help shape public sentiment to resonate with overarching objectives. Capitalizing on digital platforms catering to online gamers to engage younger audiences or even growing discrete messaging channels could empower digital outreach initiatives in alignment with both the resistance and U.S. objectives. These platforms could also be used to strategically spotlight the flaws of an invading force, creating an atmosphere ripe for resistance.
Considering Russia’s historically persistent regional aggression, the U.S., Georgia, and NATO must remain vigilant. Events in Ukraine are not isolated. They are indicative of Putin’s broader territorial aspirations. For that reason, enhancing Georgia’s cyber resilience capabilities against potential Russian maneuvers is of utmost importance to guard against and prepare for future Russian aggression.
Wind of Change
Given Russia’s intrusion into Ukraine, it is vital for the U.S. to collaborate with countries vulnerable to Russian aggression, such as Georgia, to enhance their cyber resilience, focusing on safeguarding their cyber infrastructure in key areas like command structures, ISR, communications, and other important infrastructure. Partnerships with Western countries, private sector entities, and other non-governmental organizations are also vital to preserve Georgia’s digital capabilities. Collaborative efforts should concentrate on developing robust defenses against cyber threats while also formulating resilience strategies.
Ukraine’s ordeal underscores that isolated cyber victories, such as significant power outages, may not equate to strategic achievements, unless they are aligned within a broader military strategy. Considering this, Georgia should broaden its approach beyond a purely technical focus on cyber and focus on the interdependencies between public administration, finance, media, economics, and the ICT. All must be fortified against cyber threats, while the public workforce must be informed about potential cyber risks. By enhancing these segments and elevating public recognition of cyber risks, Georgia can mitigate the societal and economic impacts of potential Russian cyber operations and activities.
Both Phase Zero and Resistance emphasize pre-conflict preparation, relationship cultivation, and non-combative measures that capitalize on local knowledge to further U.S. goals. Phase Zero seeks to preempt conflicts by fostering stability, whereas Resistance attempts to resist the overthrow of a legitimate government. To support friends and allies, entities like SOF and USCYBERCOM should consistently be ready, prioritizing proactive and sustained involvement rather than reacting to explicit acts of aggression. The blending of cyber operations is pivotal in fostering resistance in the digital realm, gauging public sentiment, and modifying communication for optimal resonance. Employing innovative tactics in cyber-enabled resistance can establish alliances, influence public sentiment, and bolster other resistance efforts, all while remaining alert to challenges from hostile countries. Essential to Georgia’s national defense, the U.S. must advocate for Georgia to augment its cyber resilience, incorporate lessons learned from Ukraine, and integrate Phase Zero cyber activities and resistance approaches. This approach will ensure that Georgia not only endures in the modern digitally connected world but also flourishes, staying ahead of Russian hostility.
irregularwarfarecenter.org
21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8.
- Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.
- Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 and advanced in some areas.
- Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus.
- Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 8, 2023
Nov 8, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2023
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 8, 2023, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a video address to the Reuters NEXT conference in New York on November 8 that Ukrainian forces have a battlefield plan for 2024 that he cannot disclose.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have several paths for future advances in southern Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, and Kherson Oblast. There are also plans to advance to specific occupied cities.[4] Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations without interruption in several sectors of the front, and Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that these operations will continue into this winter.[5]
Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality in response to another milblogger who questioned why Russian forces were not striking alleged large Ukrainian force concentrations close to the frontline.[6] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel on the front have access to the “real” map and that Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align the “real” map with the Russian General Staff’s map.[7] A separate milblogger claimed that there had been previous individual cases of Russian battalion and regiment-level assault operations aimed at achieving compliance with inaccurate maps of the frontline but that this is the first time that he has heard of a wider operational imperative to make advances that comply with a reported General Staff map.[8] A milblogger claimed that Russian commanders are incentivized to make the tactical gains depicted in the General Staff’s maps because the General Staff increasingly requires positive reports from frontline commanders.[9] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized Russian commanders throughout the chain of command for delivering false and overly positive reports to their superiors and have identified the Russian General Staff as fostering this widespread institutional dishonesty.[10]
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.[11] Putin promoted Kuzmenko to the rank of colonel general following Kuzmenko’s meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during Shoigu’s visit to the Eastern Grouping of Forces command post in the south Donetsk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) on October 25.[12] Shoigu’s visit confirmed Kuzmenko's position as the Eastern Grouping of Forces commander and likely the Eastern Military District (EMD) commander. This promotion is likely routine and intended to give Kuzmenko a rank appropriate to his position. Putin also promoted three Russian officers to the rank of lieutenant general, 11 officers to the rank of major general, and 29 internal affairs officers to the rank of major general and lieutenant general.[13]
Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.[14] Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on November 8 that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the presidential campaign aims to paint Putin as a leader who made Russia an “island of calm.”[15] Meduza sources claimed that Putin’s ratings increase after speeches in which he criticizes the West and that Russian state propaganda will encourage this by increasingly publishing stories about “difficulties” in Western countries and the United States’ alleged inability to support Ukraine and Israel simultaneously. A Meduza source also reportedly stated that the campaign would only discuss the war in Ukraine if there were a “very serious [Russian] success” on the front instead of continued “positional warfare.” Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his campaign this month, and Russian sources have consistently indicated that the campaign will not prominently promote the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin previously downplayed the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka, referring to it as “active defense,” which would be consistent with these reports.[17] The Kremlin-backed United Russia Party also reportedly realized that using the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in the run up to the September 2023 State Duma elections was ineffective and counterproductive.[18] Concerns within the Kremlin and United Russia over domestic support for the war are not indications that United Russia or Putin’s dominance of Russian politics faces a legitimate threat in the upcoming presidential election, however. This campaign framing, if it occurs, would double down on Putin’s refusal to mobilize Russian society to a wartime footing and may increase the informational cost necessary to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine.
Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine. Russian and occupation officials reported on November 8 that a car bomb killed LNR People’s Council member and the LNR Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Colonel Mikhail Filiponenko in occupied Luhansk City.[19] Filiponenko previously headed the LNR People’s Militia and the LNR’s Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC).[20] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR agents and Ukrainian partisans conducted the attack.[21] GUR stated that Filiponenko organized torture camps for Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) and that Filiponenko personally participated in the torture.[22] These accusations would be an apparent violation of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[23]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8.
- Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.
- Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 and advanced in some areas.
- Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus.
- Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 8 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk), Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[24] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 7 that Russian forces continued to advance west of Pershotravneve (20km east of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[25] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance due to dense minefields in the area.[26] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Bakhmut directions lost 1,826 personnel and 200 pieces of military equipment, including 22 tanks and 54 armored combat vehicles, between November 1 and 6.[27]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults southeast of Kupyansk near Tymkivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) on November 8.[28]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut on November 8.[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on November 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances from Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) towards Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also successfully counterattacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces reentered the settlement.[31] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka, Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka and reportedly advanced on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Keramik (14km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Tonenke (7km northwest of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) are pressuring Ukrainian forces in the direction of Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced to positions 400 meters from the southern border of Avdiivka, but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[35] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces advanced near the railway line near Stepove, but Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces suffered high casualties to make this advance.[36] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on November 7 that Russian forces in the Avdiivka area lost 585 personnel within the past day during light infantry attacks without armored vehicle support.[37]
Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces remain committed to the Avdiivka effort despite high losses and inclement weather. Ukrainian military spokesperson Anton Kotsukon stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 “reserves” in the Avdiivka direction, though it is unclear how many of these personnel are committed to offensive operations.[38] Ukrainian officials have recently stated that Russian forces have 40,000 total personnel in the Avdiivka area.[39] Kotsukon stated that Russian forces have recently been attacking in groups of 10-20 personnel and using a large number of drones to identify Ukrainian counterbattery elements.[40] Ukrainian Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are likely ready to conduct a third wave of assaults on Avdiivka but that inclement weather will impede Russian use of equipment.[41]
Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal gains during counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 8. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success while counterattacking Russian positions near Vodyane.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City but did not advance on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[43]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 8 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on November 6 shows that Russian forces advanced north of Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[44] Russian sources made similar claims of Russian advances in the area and claimed that there is additional fighting in the dacha area west of Mykilske and that hostilities near Vuhledar have intensified in recent days.[45]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed offensive operations on the western and southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City or in western Donetsk Oblast on November 8.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 8.[46]
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Staromayorske and south of Prechystivka (17km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) is operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[48]
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne).[50] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to capture unspecified heights northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne), where Russian forces withdrew from several unspecified positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces with armored vehicle support continued attacks near Robotyne and Verbove over the past several days.[52]
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive actions in the Zaporizhia direction.[53] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove on November 7.[54] Russian milbloggers amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 237th Airborne Assault (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating near Verbove.[55] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on November 8 claiming to show elements of the Russian 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (7th VDV Division) also operating near Verbove.[56]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and reportedly advanced near Krynky on November 8. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 7 and 8 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[57] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Krynky.[58] One Russian milblogger claimed on November 7 that Ukrainian forces are “creeping” forward at a rate of one meter per day.[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[60] Prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to transfer personnel to reinforce Ukrainian positions on the east bank.[61]
Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on November 8 that Russian air defenses downed three Ukrainian missiles over occupied Henichesk Raion, Kherson Oblast.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were targeting Crimea.[63]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 7 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed 17 Ukrainian drones, primarily targeting the Belbek and Saky airfields (just north of Sevastopol and 60km north of Sevastopol, respectively) in occupied Crimea.[64]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 8 that Egypt agreed in July 2023 to give Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopter engines back to Russia after Egypt reneged on a deal to send Russia rockets.[65] WSJ reported that Russia offered to forgive Egyptian debt and continue wheat supplies to Egypt in exchange for the engines and that Russia also threatened to remove its arms industry advisers from Egypt if Egypt did not agree to return the engines. WSJ reported that Egyptian shipments of about 150 engines will likely begin in December 2023. WSJ reported that Russia also asked Pakistan to return at least four Mi-35M helicopter engines and asked to buy back 12 decommissioned Mi-35M engines from Brazil, which Brazil reportedly refused. WSJ reported that Belarus agreed to sell six Mi-26 helicopter engines back to Russia and that Russia rerouted weapons destined for India and Armenia to Ukraine.
The Russian military reportedly attempted to conscript a Ukrainian minor illegally deported to Russia. The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration and Russian opposition outlet Vazhye Istorii (iStories) stated on November 8 that Russian authorities issued a military summons to a 17-year-old Ukrainian who was illegally deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia, where he then lived with a Russian foster family and received a Russian passport.[66] The minor’s lawyer reportedly appealed for the teenager’s return to Ukraine to Kremlin-appointed Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who previously claimed in April 2023 that Russian security forces detained the Ukrainian teenager on the Belarussian border as he tried to return to Ukraine.[67] ISW previously reported that Lvova-Belova continuously attempts to justify the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia as part of a large-scale Russian deportation campaign in Ukraine.[68]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
A Russian milblogger claimed on November 8 that the Russian Aerospace Forces received new Ka-52M attack helicopters. The milblogger claimed that the modernized helicopter variant includes a GOES-451 electro-optical targeting turret, an updated BKS-50M communications system, an SUO-806PM fire control system that can use new weapons such as the BKO L418 “Monoblock” air defense complex, and the integration of light multipurpose guided missiles (LMUR).[69]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik announced on November 8 that Russian occupation officials created a council of municipal entities in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[70] Pasechnik stated that recently elected occupation heads of 28 cities and municipalities in occupied Luhansk Oblast will participate in the occupation council of municipal entities and that Alchevsk City occupation head, Albert Apshev, will chair the regional governance body.[71] Pasechnik asserted that the creation of the council of municipal entities is an important step in the integration of the occupied Luhansk Oblast into the Russian legal field.[72]
Russian occupation officials continue to use maternity capital programs to augment passportization efforts in occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov stated on November 8 that residents in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast can receive maternity capital payments for their first and second children if they have Russian passports or if their children have Russian passports.[73]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with the Chinese Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council, Zhang Youxia, in Moscow on November 8 and reiterated boilerplate anti-Western rhetoric. Putin claimed that NATO activities are “attempt[ing] to go beyond” its geographic boundaries and that the US is drawing NATO countries into creating a “tense” situation in the Asian Pacific region.[74] Shoigu criticized Western countries for being “aggressive” in creating a “military bloc” and reiterated the Kremlin narrative about the close personal ties between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.[75]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
22. Iran Update, November 8, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas forces north of Gaza City conducted hit-and-run attacks that harassed Israeli forces, which supports CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip are screening a main defensive effort in central Gaza City.
- Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri said that Palestinians in the West Bank will respond to the Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip, which is consistent with repeated Hamas calls for further resistance in the West Bank.
- Hamas political leaders continue to call for Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) to increase its involvement in the Hamas-Israel war to alleviate the pressure that Hamas is facing in Gaza.
- Brazilian police working with Mossad arrested LH operatives who were planning an attack on Jewish targets in Brazil on November 8.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria on November 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 45 attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since October 18.
IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 8, 2023
Nov 8, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, November 8, 2023
Brian Carter, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, and Amin Soltani
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas forces north of Gaza City conducted hit-and-run attacks that harassed Israeli forces, which supports CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip are screening a main defensive effort in central Gaza City.
- Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri said that Palestinians in the West Bank will respond to the Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip, which is consistent with repeated Hamas calls for further resistance in the West Bank.
- Hamas political leaders continue to call for Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) to increase its involvement in the Hamas-Israel war to alleviate the pressure that Hamas is facing in Gaza.
- Brazilian police working with Mossad arrested LH operatives who were planning an attack on Jewish targets in Brazil on November 8.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria on November 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 45 attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since October 18.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip
Hamas forces north of Gaza City conducted hit-and-run attacks that harassed Israeli forces, which supports CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip are screening a main defensive effort in central Gaza City. This is consistent with Hamas’s intent to fight a “long war...to force” Israel into a ceasefire.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) published a map showing the area of responsibility of one Hamas company between al Toam and al Falouja roads in the northern Gaza Strip on November 3.[2] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters near al Sulatain and al Taom streets, which are in or in the vicinity of this sector, fired anti-tank rockets and mortars at Israeli forces in at least eight hit-and-run attacks.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery also showed tank tracks and cleared terrain consistent with Israeli clearing operations. Palestinian media also reported Israeli activity south of the al Toam-al Falouja sector.[4] This sector is large for a company-sized unit defending against a mechanized advance in an urban environment, assuming that Hamas tactical units are roughly similar to or smaller than US infantry units.[5] Hamas has not used more complex or advanced systems and tactics, such as house-borne improvised explosive devices, explosively-formed penetrators, advanced anti-tank missiles, or larger and more complex road-buried improvised explosive devices. This suggests that Hamas is weighting its main effort in Gaza City rather than the northern Gaza Strip.[6]
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip on November 8. The IDF released footage showing Israeli infantry destroying a Hamas tunnel near the UNRWA-run Beit Hanoun School.[7] The Israeli infantry and engineering units are tasked with clearing and destroying Hamas tunnels, according to the IDF.[8]
Israeli forces continued operations in the vicinity of al Shati Refugee Camp on November 8. Hamas claimed that it targeted IDF armor using anti-tank tandem rockets in Sheikh Radwan, which is east of al Shati Refugee Camp.[9]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israeli territory at their usual rate. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed responsibility for three indirect fire attacks, including two attacks against Tel Aviv.[10] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for nine indirect fire attacks on November 7-8, primarily targeting civilian and military targets in southern Israel.[11] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—conducted one mortar attack targeting a southern Israeli town.[12] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-appointed militant wing of Fatah—claimed responsibility for one rocket attack targeting an Israeli town in the south.[13]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli forces nine times across the West Bank on November 8. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade claimed it engaged Israeli forces with small arms fire and detonated an IED in Qalqilya city.[14] The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades-affiliated Tulkarm Battalion said one of its militants died during clashes on November 7 and threatened revenge against Israel.[15] Most small arms clashes occurred in the northern West Bank.[16] Unspecified militants shot at an Israeli settlement near Nablus amid heightened tension between Palestinians and settlers in the West Bank.[17] The attacks on Israeli settlements are consistent with Iranian and Hamas rhetoric describing Israeli settlers in the West Bank as legitimate military targets. The IDF detained 27 wanted persons in raids in the West Bank, 10 of whom are affiliated with Hamas.[18]
Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri said Palestinians in the West Bank will respond to the Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip, which is consistent with repeated Hamas calls for further resistance in the West Bank.[19] Arouri praised the Fatah fighters on the ground and called on everyone in the West Bank to actively participate in resistance.[20] Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation deal on October 13 after having been at odds for more than a decade.[21] Hamas chairman Khaled Mashaal called on Fatah to defeat Israel together with Hamas in late October.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Israel-Hamas War may be driving Palestinian militia coordination in the West Bank despite continued tension between the two groups.[23]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), continued cross-border attacks into northern Israel at their normal rate on November 8. LH claimed two unspecified attacks on Israeli border positions and one anti-tank guided missile attack near Dovev in northern Israel.[24] Israeli media reported that two IDF soldiers were wounded in the attack on Dovev.[25] The IDF responded by firing artillery at the source of the attacks in Lebanon.[26] Unspecified militants fired rockets, mortars, and anti-tank missiles in four separate attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets in northern Israel.[27]
Hamas political leaders continue to call for LH to increase its involvement in the Hamas-Israel war to alleviate the pressure that Hamas is facing in the Gaza Strip. Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri praised LH and called for it to increase its attacks on northern Israel on November 8.[28] LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem expressed support for Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel but did not say on November 8 that LH would increase operations against Israel.[29]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
Brazilian police working with Mossad arrested LH operatives who were planning an attack on Jewish targets in Brazil on November 8. Brazilian Federal Police arrested two people, whom LH allegedly recruited and financed, on terrorism charges in Sao Paulo.[30] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office stated Iran directed and financed the attempted terror attack, which was planned by LH.[31] LH has operated networks in South America for decades to launder money and conduct terror attacks.
-
LH conducted two terror attacks targeting the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1992 and 1994, respectively.[32] The US Treasury Department designated four LH operatives in September 2023, who were connected to these terror attacks and continue to facilitate financing for LH across Latin America.[33]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria on November 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 45 attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since October 18.
-
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack targeting a US position in al Shadaddi, Hasakah Province, Syria on November 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq separately claimed a drone attack targeting a US position in al Shadaddi and released a video showing the launch of two drones.[34]
-
The al Dhaferin Group of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a mortar attack targeting US forces at the al Harir Air Base in Erbil, Iraq on November 8.[35] This is the first mortar attack on the al Harir Air Base since October 18. Mortars have significantly shorter ranges than drones, meaning that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq cell that conducted the attack was operating from deep within Iraqi Kurdistan. Mortar attacks are also more difficult, though not impossible, for counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems to intercept. The attack came after the group released graphics on November 6 and 7 threatening further attacks.[36]
The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the Houthis shot down a US drone over Yemeni territory on November 8. The Houthi spokesperson said the US MQ-9 Reaper drone was “carrying out hostile monitoring and spying activities” in Yemeni airspace.[37] The Houthis previously claimed they shot down US drones over Yemen in 2021, but the US military denied some of these claims.[38]
The IRGC Navy commander warned that the presence of the USS Florida Ohio-class submarine endangers the Persian Gulf region on November 8.[39] The IRGC Navy commander said that “maintaining the security of the Persian Gulf is a red line for the IRGC.” This official consistently repeats similar threats in response to US deployments of naval assets to the region and does not constitute an actual red line, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[40] The United States deployed the Ohio-class submarine to the region on November 5 to deter further Iranian escalation of the Israel-Hamas war.[41]
Iranian officials are claiming the United States coordinated nuclear threats with Israel after an Israeli minister suggested nuking the Gaza Strip. This adds a new element to the Iranian information operation to frame the United States and Israel as the antagonists in the war. Senior Iranian officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi, condemned Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu’s November 4 suggestion that Israel could use a nuclear weapon on the Gaza Strip and argued that it demonstrated Israel’s threat to global security on November 8.[42] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency similarly claimed that Israeli officials coordinated Eliyahu’s suggestion with American officials.[43] Tasnim added that the United States has taken control of Israeli nuclear facilities.[44] These allegations are consistent with the long-running Iranian information campaign that claims the United States directs Israeli policy.[45] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is attempting to portray the United States and Israel as the antagonists in the war and deflect responsibility for any further escalation of the conflict away from itself.[46]
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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