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Quotes of the Day:
“Republic. I like the sound of the word. It means people can live free, talk free, go or come, buy or sell, be drunk or sober, however they choose. Some words give you a feeling. Republic is one of those words that makes me tight in the throat—the same tightness a man gets when his baby takes his first step or his first baby shaves and makes his first sound as a man. Some words can give you a feeling that makes your heart warm. Republic is one of those words.”
– John Wayne as Colonel Davy Crockett in The Alamo (1960)
"Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood."
– Friedrich Nietzsche
"I have been and still am a seeker, but I ceased to question stars and books; I have begun to listen to the teaching my blood whispers to me."
– Herman Hesse
1. Defense Minister Ahn: Nuclear Submarines Unnerve Kim Jong-un
2. Kim Jong-un names '72 Hours' war film
3. Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi States Taiwan Contingency Threatens Japan's Existence
4. North Korea prepared for war after South’s drone mission during Yoon’s last months: report
5. Today Trump Is Talking to a Different North Korea
6. Korea-China relations fully restored? Not yet
7. Security tightens around Cheong Wa Dae as presidential office eyes return by year end
8. Bribery controls North Korean university admissions as slots allocated by connections
9. Korean Universities Recruit Tesla, Google, IBM Talent With Research Freedom
10. Seoul launches national scientist program, expands R&D budget
11. Mass AI cheating scandal uncovered at Yonsei University, hundreds of students reportedly involved
12. Korea risks tapping foreign reserves to fund U.S. investment
1. Defense Minister Ahn: Nuclear Submarines Unnerve Kim Jong-un
Summary:
South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said nuclear-powered submarines would “keep Kim Jong-un awake,” citing their stealth and endurance. He noted South Korea’s 30-year technological buildup, nearing completion, and clarified coordination delays with Washington. Ahn emphasized domestic construction as most rational and downplayed concerns over potential Chinese backlash.
Excerpt:
Regarding the delay in releasing the *Joint Fact Sheet* for over 10 days following the South Korea-U.S. summit on the 29th of last month, Ahn stated, “Coordination among U.S. government departments on the nuclear submarine construction issue likely requires more time. I expect it to be released within a few days.” This implies the submarine issue is the cause of the delay.
Comment: I give the MINDEF credit for at least trying to answer the question: What deter's KJU? I fear we do not spend sufficient intellectual capital trying to understand this and we throw around the deterrence word as if it means the same to everyone, us and our enemies alike. We should always be thinking hard about what deters KJU (and Xi and Putin, and the Iranian leadership).
Defense Minister Ahn: Nuclear Submarines Unnerve Kim Jong-un
Minister highlights South Korea's advanced nuclear submarine technology, addresses fact sheet delays
By Kim Min-seo
Published 2025.11.09. 21:54
Updated 2025.11.09. 22:44https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/11/09/S742YQ7T5ZFPZBGPAWN6PHZGRE/
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back explains the proposed 2026 budget at the 6th plenary session of the National Assembly Defense Committee held on the 5th at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul. /News1
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back stated on the 9th regarding the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, “Theoretically, as long as food supplies are maintained, nuclear submarines do not need to surface,” adding, “Kim Jong-un (North Korean leader) will likely struggle to sleep.” During an appearance on KBS’s *Sunday Diagnosis* the same day, Ahn remarked, “Given the stealth of nuclear submarines—where they might appear in the east, west, or south, and their submerged capabilities and speed—it would probably send a chill down one’s spine.”
Regarding South Korea’s nuclear submarine technological capabilities, Ahn said, “Our military has prepared for over 30 years through relentless effort,” and assessed, “We have reached a significant level, nearing completion as long as fuel is available.” He further noted, “Core technologies such as reactor core completion technology and variable-speed conversion device technology have advanced considerably,” adding, “While it typically takes over 10 years, we can achieve this in a shorter timeframe.”
Regarding the delay in releasing the *Joint Fact Sheet* for over 10 days following the South Korea-U.S. summit on the 29th of last month, Ahn stated, “Coordination among U.S. government departments on the nuclear submarine construction issue likely requires more time. I expect it to be released within a few days.” This implies the submarine issue is the cause of the delay.
Concerning U.S. President Donald Trump’s mention of “construction at the Philadelphia Shipyard,” Ahn clarified, “Philly Shipyard lacks the necessary facilities for submarine construction,” and emphasized, “Domestic construction is the most rational approach.” Ahn also mentioned, “Pete Hegseth, U.S. Secretary of War (Defense), stated that President Trump’s resolve is strong and that they will actively support the effort.” The Ministry of National Defense explained, “This was not a statement about domestic construction but an explanation of the U.S. side’s overall willingness to support.”
Regarding potential Chinese backlash against South Korea’s nuclear submarine introduction, Ahn stated, “I have no intention whatsoever to single out a specific country.”
2. Kim Jong-un names '72 Hours' war film
Summary:
North Korea’s war film “72 Hours,” reportedly titled and co-written by Kim Jong-un, dramatizes the 1950 capture of Seoul, mixing anti-South propaganda with romance and special effects to attract younger audiences. Initially banned, apparently for using “Seoul,” the film later resurfaced on state TV, reflecting Kim’s personal influence and Hallyu-inspired aesthetics.
Comment: Hard to believe that it was banned simply for using the name of the capital of South korea. And co-written by KJU? Perhaps useful for understanding regime propaganda. But we should also see the influence of the South. Kim has to accept that the Korean people in the north like things from the South. Kim can no longer outright reject them without providing a north Korean "alternative." This is an indication of how powerful information from the South and the outside world is. It is having an effect on the people and the regime.
Kim Jong-un names '72 Hours' war film
Banned for 'Seoul' use, film mixes anti-South scenes, romantic subplots for youth
By Park Sun-min
Published 2025.11.08. 09:05
Updated 2025.11.08. 13:06https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/11/08/BHPWA5Q6FJH7TAOI2HRY6CZPOY/
The Choson Sinbo, the organ of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, draws attention by highlighting the North Korean movie '72 Hours' released in North Korea last year. The media claims Kim Jong Un personally named the movie title and participated in writing the script. The photo shows a computer-graphics composite image of the Seoul Central Government Complex. /Choson Sinbo-Yonhap
Choson Sinbo, the organ of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, highlighted the North Korean film *’72 Hours’*, which was released last year to commemorate the Korean War. The title *’72 Hours’* refers to the time North Korea took to occupy Seoul after its southern invasion and is reportedly named by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
Choson Sinbo featured production anecdotes and interviews with the lead actors in two articles published on the 3rd and 5th. The media praised the film as a “masterpiece of the era,” attributing its success to Kim Jong-un. It specifically reported that Kim Jong-un personally named the film and participated in writing the script.
The film was released nationwide on February 16 last year, coinciding with the birthday of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, known as “Light’s Day” in North Korea. It was also aired on state television, Joseon Central TV, in January and July of last year. On September 26 last year, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexandr Matsegora watched the film at the Daedongmun Cinema in Pyongyang at the invitation of the North Korean Foreign Ministry.
The film contains elements hostile toward South Korea and aims to strengthen ideological armament among residents. It refers to South Korea as “South Korea” or “puppet regime” instead of “South Chosun” and includes scenes where North Korean soldiers tear down the South Korean flag and raise the North Korean flag after occupying Seoul.
Rarely for a North Korean production, the film also features a romantic subplot. The male lead is actor Choi Hyun, 32, who starred in the popular TV drama *’New Spring in Baekhak Valley’* this year, while the female lead is newcomer Lee Yun-kyung, 20, a graduate of the Pyongyang Theatre and Film University.
Battle scenes filmed with special effects. /Choson Sinbo-Yonhap
North Korean movie '72 Hours' themed on the Korean War. /Korean Central Television-Yonhap
As a war film, special effects were emphasized. Park Guk-cheol, head of the Pyongyang Film Technology Studio’s Special Effects Team, told Choson Sinbo that “special effects were applied to one-third of the battle scenes.” The film appears to have strengthened romantic elements and special effects to appeal to the younger generation, dubbed the “Market Place generation,” who are accustomed to diverse foreign media.
Additionally, Hong Cheol, the son of James Joseph Dresnok—a U.S. soldier who defected to North Korea in the 1960s—appeared in the film in a U.S. military role.
According to Radio Free Asia (RFA), a North Korea-focused media outlet, the film was abruptly banned from screening approximately five months after its release. While the exact reason for the ban was not disclosed, a source suggested that the use of the South Korean place name “Seoul” might have been problematic. The film resumed airing on state media earlier this year. A source from Yanggang Province stated on January 9, “Residents were astonished when the film, which had been completely banned by central orders, was suddenly broadcast on television to mark the new year.”
Cho Han-beom, a senior researcher at South Korea’s Korea Institute for National Unification, evaluated the film in February as “significantly groundbreaking compared to past North Korean films,” noting that it incorporates elements similar to capitalist cinema. He added, “Every aspect of the film, from its concept to dialogue, was directly guided by Kim Jong-un,” and speculated, “Kim Jong-un’s direct involvement in directing suggests he has been significantly influenced by the Hallyu (Korean Wave).”
Lead actors Lee Yun-kyung (left) and Choi Hyun of the North Korean movie '72 Hours'. /Choson Sinbo-Yonhap
3. Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi States Taiwan Contingency Threatens Japan's Existence
Summary:
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi declared a Taiwan conflict would be a “crisis threatening Japan’s existence,” signaling possible Self-Defense Force action alongside the U.S. against China. Her unprecedented statement reflects Japan’s hardline shift toward collective defense, contrasting South Korea’s refusal to involve its forces or U.S. troops in a Taiwan contingency.
Comment: South Korea cannot refuse to involve US troops in Korea. It does not and cannot have a veto of US troops (Just as Japan does not and cannot). Of course both could refuse to allow bases and overflight for continued operations but another country can refuse to allow US forces to deploy in any contingency tha the US finds necessary. Any attempts to refuse the deployment of US troops would lead to the end of the alliances. Sure there will be discussions and diplomatic overtures and expressions of concern, but in the end they will have no recourse other than to allow the US to deploy forces as the US deems necessary. But how does the ROK view a contingency in Taiwan - is it as much an existential threat to Korea as it is to Japan. I would argue yes from the standpoint that it could cause KJU to act against the South either from an opportunity perspective or from a collusion perspective with China (though I think the latter is less likely). But as always I must ask if there is a Taiwan contingency, what comes next for the US, Japan and the ROK?
Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi States Taiwan Contingency Threatens Japan's Existence
Takaichi's remarks challenge Japan's cautious approach, contrasting South Korea's opposition to military involvement in Taiwan crisis
By Sung Ho-chul
Published 2025.11.10. 00:57
https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/11/10/6KDNCFIEUNHSNLT6TJKHTX4FO4/
Sanae Takaichi (second from left), Japanese Prime Minister, shakes hands with military officials on the deck of the USS George Washington anchored at Yokosuka U.S. military base in Kanagawa Prefecture on the 28th of last month, a scene watched by U.S. President Donald Trump. Takaichi states that day, 'Peace is not maintained by words, but only by firm resolve and action.' /AP-Yonhap
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan stated that a Taiwan contingency (an emergency situation such as war) “should be regarded as a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence.” This implies that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could engage in military action alongside U.S. forces against Chinese troops invading Taiwan. It marks the first time a sitting Japanese prime minister has officially mentioned the possibility of military intervention in the Taiwan issue, a stance starkly different from the South Korean government, which opposes both the involvement of South Korean forces and an active role for USFK in a Taiwan contingency.
According to the Asahi Shimbun on the 9th, Prime Minister Takaichi said on the 7th during a House of Representatives budget committee meeting, “If warships are used and there is military action, it could clearly be seen as a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence.” She added, “A simple increase in civilian vessels making it difficult for ships to pass would not constitute such a crisis, but if the sea is blockaded and drones are flying during a war, different interpretations may arise.”
◇ Takaichi Officially States Possibility of Self-Defense Force Using Force, Unlike Former Prime Ministers
The “crisis that threatens Japan’s existence” is a concept distinct from a “military attack situation” where Japan is directly attacked, first introduced in security-related laws enacted in 2015. If a close ally of Japan faces a military attack, and this poses a clear danger to Japan’s territory or the lives of its people, the government can judge it as a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence and respond with military force under the pretext of collective self-defense.
Graphics by Yang In-sung
Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan being a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence were reportedly not coordinated within the government. The Asahi Shimbun noted, “Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks go beyond the government’s existing stance,” adding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described them as her personal opinion. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi stated on the same day, “Whether a situation constitutes a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence is a judgment made by the government after comprehensively reviewing all information, and the prime minister’s remarks were in this spirit.”
Past Japanese governments had internally judged that a Taiwan contingency could be seen as a crisis that threatens Japan’s existence but avoided mentioning it officially. This is due to the significant diplomatic repercussions of a sitting prime minister discussing the possibility of exercising collective self-defense against China. Former Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso made remarks to this effect after leaving office but avoided clear statements while in power.
This has led to interpretations that Prime Minister Takaichi’s highly sensitive remarks in the Diet were driven not only by her pro-Taiwan stance but also a deliberate intention. It is suggested that she aims to establish as official government policy the stance of Japan’s hardline conservatives, who believe that Taiwan—separated from China—is essential for Japan’s security and economic prosperity.
Even before becoming prime minister, Takaichi stated in a press conference, “A contingency in Taiwan is undoubtedly a contingency for Japan,” adding, “The distance between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island is 110 km, so if this were Tokyo, it would be like foreign warships deploying in the nearby city of Atami.” Her position essentially advocates for Japan’s military intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
If Taiwan falls to China, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces would directly confront Chinese troops alongside U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture. Additionally, most of the oil from the Middle East entering Japan passes through waters near Taiwan, with over half of Japan’s overseas trade volume using the same route. Takaichi’s perception is that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would be equivalent to severing Japan’s economic lifeline.
Her remarks also align with the Trump administration’s desire for active intervention by allies in a Taiwan contingency. Immediately after taking office, Takaichi pushed for an increase in defense spending as requested by Trump. She accelerated the goal of raising defense spending to 2% of GDP, originally set for 2027, to be achieved within the year and is pursuing further increases. She also included the “possession of next-generation propulsion-powered submarines” in the coalition government’s policy agreement, effectively pushing for the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines. However, concerns persist within Japan that Takaichi’s hardline approach could lead to actual diplomatic and military tensions. Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan lawmaker Katsuya Okada, who questioned Takaichi in the Diet, criticized, “Military action should not be spoken of lightly.”
In contrast to Japan, the South Korean government is not only negative about the involvement of South Korean forces in a Taiwan contingency but also cautious about an active role for USFK. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back stated on the 8th during an appearance on KBS’s Sunday Diagnosis, “According to the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, USFK’s primary purpose is the defense of the Korean Peninsula,” adding, “It is a bilateral relationship and not an issue of intervening in a third country.” President Lee Jae-myung also said in August that the strategic flexibility of USFK is “a matter not easily agreed upon.”
The U.S. hopes South Korea will actively engage in the Taiwan issue, similar to Japan. On the 4th, after holding the South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul, U.S. Department of Defense (War Department) Secretary Pete Hegseth said during a press conference, “It is undoubtedly necessary to enhance flexibility to respond to other emergencies in the region.” This is interpreted as implying that USFK could participate in a Taiwan contingency.
4. North Korea prepared for war after South’s drone mission during Yoon’s last months: report
Comment: If this report is true I hope that the intelligence community was able to gather significant intelligence about how the regime and the nKPA will prepare to go to war. But recall the timing of this: this is when nKPA forces were deploying to Russia to support Putin's War. Another question is whether the nKPA even detected the flights until they allegedly found the remains of a crashed system?
North Korea prepared for war after South’s drone mission during Yoon’s last months: report
Prosecutors have accused the former president of ordering the mission to provoke a security crisis that could help him cling to power
SCMP’s Asia desk
Published: 2:43pm, 7 Nov 2025 November 7, 2025
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3331899/north-korea-prepared-war-after-souths-drone-mission-during-yoons-last-months-report?utm
South Korea flew military drones over Pyongyang just weeks before then-president Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law last December, a provocation that triggered North Korea to prepare for war, according to Seoul’s defence intelligence agency.
The revelation, disclosed in a closed-door parliamentary briefing on Wednesday, adds to mounting scrutiny over Yoon’s final months in office, with opposition lawmakers accusing him of attempting to fabricate a national security crisis to justify an unconstitutional power grab.
During the session at the National Assembly, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) confirmed that drones operated by the South’s military had breached North Korean airspace on October 3, 6 and 9 last year.
Lawmaker Park Sun-won of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea, who attended the briefing, told local media that the drone flights were part of a formal reconnaissance operation overseen by senior field commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This undated picture released by North Korea’s state news outlet on October 19, 2024, shows what is claimed to be a recovered South Korean drone, at an undisclosed location in North Korea. Photo: AFP
The incursions drew swift condemnation from Pyongyang. On October 11, its foreign ministry released a statement claiming that South Korea, “the most hostile, malicious and rogue state, has carried out a severe political and military provocation of infiltrating drones into Pyongyang” and “scattered anti-North Korea leaflets”, CNN reported.
flip.it · November 7, 2025
5. Today Trump Is Talking to a Different North Korea
Summary:
POTUS now faces a fundamentally transformed, more dangerous North Korea. Since 2019, Pyongyang has constitutionally enshrined itself as a nuclear state, deepened ties with Russia, and built a mature deterrent force. Denuclearization is no longer negotiable; future diplomacy must focus on containment, communication, and risk reduction.
Excerpts:
By ‘constitutionalizing’ the bomb, Kim closed the door on any negotiation premised on denuclearization. The political cost of surrendering the arsenal has become existential.
...
In this altered landscape, Trump’s pledge to “work very hard with Kim Jong Un” reflects optimism against a geopolitical reality that has fundamentally changed. The long-held vision of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula has yielded to the permanence of a nuclear North Korea. Policy must adapt to this new reality. Since threat derives from both capability and intent, Washington is more likely to influence Pyongyang’s intent to use nuclear weapons than to dismantle its existing arsenal.
Trump and Kim may one day share the stage again, but if so, they will be speaking across a greater divide. North Korea now defines its legitimacy through nuclear permanence rather than diplomatic engagement. The brief window for a grand bargain on denuclearization has long closed. Any future dialogue will be a sober exercise in managing the limits of power, and the ever-deepening shadow cast by the bomb.
Comment: This is not POTUS 45's KJU.
If we are going to adapt to the "new reality" of a permanent nuclear north Korea then we need to adopt a new strategy and not one that is based on peaceful coexistence and arms control negotiations. Kim does not seek peaceful coexistence, only domination. Therefore, we must adapt to that reality (again, you know my position and fourteen words: Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights).
Today Trump Is Talking to a Different North Korea
The DPRK of 2025 is fundamentally different – and far more dangerous – than when Trump last met Kim Jong Un.
By James M. Minnich
November 07, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/today-trump-is-talking-to-a-different-north-korea/
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump shake hands across the line that divides the two Koreas during their last meeting at Panmunjom, June 30, 2019.
Credit: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead
U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent declaration that he would “work very hard with Kim Jong Un” to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula felt like an echo from a bygone era. The remark, made upon Trump’s arrival in South Korea in late October for a state visit with President Lee Jae-myung, confirmed that a reunion with Kim was not logistically possible during the trip.
Yet the pageantry surrounding the Lee-Trump summit – from the conferral of the Grand Order of Mugunghwa to praise for Trump’s “wonderful skills as a peacemaker” – recalled the high-stakes theater of 2018 and 2019. That period of personal outreach briefly redefined the global perception of North Korea-U.S. relations.
But the Korean Peninsula of 2025 bears little resemblance to that earlier moment. In the intervening years, Pyongyang has constitutionally codified itself as a nuclear-armed state, deepened strategic cooperation with Russia, and tightened ideological control at home. Kim Jong Un’s nuclear deterrent is no longer a bargaining chip but the constitutional foundation and non-negotiable guarantor of his regime’s legitimacy. For Trump, pursuing “peace” on this new terrain means engaging a North Korea that regards denuclearization not as a negotiable objective but as a direct threat to its sovereignty.
Trump’s renewed talk of reconciliation, therefore, underscores the widening gap between political nostalgia and geopolitical reality. His appeal to peacemaking now unfolds in the shadow of a North Korea that has institutionalized the very nuclear capability Washington once sought to trade away. While the image of summitry remains powerful – handshakes, border crossings, symbolic gestures – the substance beneath it has hardened into strategic permanence.
From Summits to Stalemate (2018–2019)
Trump’s first round of summit diplomacy with Kim remains a defining chapter in North Korea-U.S. relations. The 2018 Singapore meeting broke a seven-decade presidential precedent, projecting a vision of a reconciliation anchored on the “complete denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula. It produced striking imagery and a four-point declaration emphasizing peace and new relations.
Yet the early optimism soon collided with marked asymmetries of expectation. Washington demanded complete and verifiable disarmament, while Pyongyang sought reciprocal concessions – chiefly, sanctions relief and security guarantees. The 2019 Hanoi summit exposed these gaps. Kim offered to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for the lifting of key sanctions – a proposal that fell well short of U.S. expectations. Trump ended the talks abruptly, remarking, “Sometimes you have to walk.” For Pyongyang, Hanoi confirmed that Washington would not reward incremental steps; for Washington, it reinforced doubts about Kim’s willingness to ever fully denuclearize.
The impromptu DMZ meeting that summer – and Trump’s symbolic step across the line at Panmunjom – briefly revived hopes of renewed dialogue, but no substantive negotiations followed. Within months, Kim declared that North Korea was no longer bound by its April 2018 self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing, signaling the end of restraint. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent U.S. political transition then froze diplomacy entirely, cementing a protracted stalemate.
These encounters left a durable, two-sided legacy. Kim learned that nuclear capability ensures regime survival and that summitry can yield global stature without material compromise. For Washington, the outcome was sobering. It showed that personal diplomacy can command global attention, but without verifiable concessions, it cannot alter North Korea’s strategic calculus.
Institutionalizing the Bomb
Since the collapse of the Kim-Trump talks, North Korea has undergone an important internal transformation. The failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit did not push Kim Jong Un toward compromise; it hardened his conviction that nuclear weapons are the only reliable guarantor of regime survival. That conviction has since been codified in both law and ideology.
In September 2022, Pyongyang enacted a law that designated the nation a “responsible nuclear weapons state” and authorized automatic retaliation if its command structure is attacked. One year later, a constitutional amendment enshrined this doctrine: Article 58 now defines North Korea as a “committed nuclear state” that will “accelerate the development of nuclear weapons” to guarantee its existence and deter war. Together, these measures elevate nuclear arms from instruments of deterrence to constitutional pillars of sovereignty. This language deliberately echoes Juche-era ideals of self-reliance and enduring strength.
By “constitutionalizing” the bomb, Kim closed the door on any negotiation premised on denuclearization. The political cost of surrendering the arsenal has become existential. Relinquishing it would violate the state’s founding charter and unravel the leadership’s mythos of defiance. To sustain this shift, Kim’s directives since late 2023 have channeled resources into the munitions base and machine-building sectors, with multiple assessments noting that defense industries now drive a significant portion of the country’s economic activity. Reporting in 2025 on factory automation and serial production, including Kim’s inspections of “automated” missile lines, further illustrates the acceleration.
The ideological outcome is a state that equates popular hardship with nuclear strength, with suffering redefined as sacrifice for sovereignty. This tightening of ideological control has had tangible external effects. South Korea’s humanitarian assistance to North Korea fell to zero in 2024 – the first complete halt since 1995 – amid Pyongyang’s refusal to accept most outside aid. By rejecting assistance, the regime reinforces a posture of isolation that preserves ideological purity and total narrative control. In this environment, diplomacy that demands disarmament is politically impossible. Any U.S. effort to revive denuclearization as a negotiating baseline now collides directly with Pyongyang’s constitutional and ideological reality.
Realignment With Russia
As North Korea entrenched its nuclear posture at home, it simultaneously recalibrated its external alignments. Since 2023, the revival of its partnership with Russia has reshaped regional dynamics, providing Pyongyang with both material lifelines and political insulation from international isolation. North Korea has reemerged as a transactional actor in Moscow’s long confrontation with the West.
Widely documented arms transfers to Russia, including artillery shells, rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles, serve a critical strategic function for Kim Jong Un. In exchange for munitions, Pyongyang receives cash, fuel, food, and advanced military technology, including satellite and missile development. These exchanges have created a Cold War-style symbiosis: Moscow gains a steady supply of conventional ordnance for its war in Ukraine, while Pyongyang secures diplomatic cover at the United Nations and renewed technological lifelines for its own weapons programs.
This new axis has also altered the structural balance of North Korea’s external relationships. By deepening ties with Russia, Kim has reduced dependence on Beijing and expanded his room for maneuver. China remains North Korea’s dominant trading partner, accounting for more than 90 percent of total commerce, but its political leverage has waned as Pyongyang has diversified its sources of support. In practical terms, Kim no longer needs dialogue with Washington to guarantee regime survival. The deterrence triad of nuclear permanence, Russian backing, and consolidated domestic control now provides sufficient confidence for continued defiance.
The consequences extend beyond the peninsula. North Korea’s growing military cooperation with Russia has undermined international sanctions enforcement, accelerated its technological advancement, and demonstrated to other authoritarian regimes that nuclear armaments can coexist with partial diplomatic rehabilitation. Kim’s participation in this emerging coalition of convenience situates Pyongyang within a broader anti-Western network that rewards resistance and deters punishment.
In this environment, Trump’s renewed bid to engage with Kim Jong Un faces a leader operating from a position of greater security, legitimacy, and external support than at any time since his grandfather’s rule. Engagement remains possible, though only on Pyongyang’s terms.
What Future Engagement Could Look Like
If renewed diplomacy is to serve any practical purpose, it must begin by abandoning the fiction that denuclearization is achievable in the near term. Recognizing this reality does not mean accepting North Korea’s arsenal as legitimate; it means reorienting diplomacy from abolition toward management.
Future engagement should prioritize reducing the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and accidental conflict. This strategic pivot requires two parallel efforts: restoring communication channels and pursuing incremental arms control. The first step is to reestablish the basic contact mechanisms that have been dismantled since 2019: military hotlines, liaison offices, and humanitarian coordination frameworks. Even modest exchanges, such as discussions on repatriating remains, deconfliction protocols in the West Sea, or public health cooperation, could serve as practical starting points for rebuilding trust at the working level.
Washington and Seoul might also explore a phased arms control framework tailored to the peninsula’s realities. Such an approach would not demand nuclear surrender but would seek verifiable restraints on specific activities: testing, fissile material production, or missile deployment patterns. This kind of risk-reduction diplomacy echoes early Soviet-U.S. precedents: the 1958-61 voluntary test moratorium, the 1963 Washington-Moscow “hotline,” and the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Each was an incremental step that paved the way for later, more formal arms-control accords. Stability, not idealism, was the necessary foundation for sustained dialogue.
For such an approach to succeed, allied coordination must remain steady. The United States and South Korea will need to calibrate expectations carefully, ensuring that humanitarian gestures are not mistaken for strategic concessions. At the same time, Washington must prepare domestic audiences for a sobering truth: peace on the Korean Peninsula is likely to mean containing danger, not resolving conflict.
Beyond Illusions of Peace
While Trump’s renewed language of peacemaking may evoke nostalgia for the summit diplomacy of his first term, the North Korea of 2025 is a fundamentally different – and far more dangerous – state. The conditions that once made engagement possible are no longer in place. Pyongyang has institutionalized, by its own design, a permanent and non-negotiable nuclear status: it has enshrined nuclear weapons at the core of its governing ideology, declared its armed posture “irreversible,” and accelerated expansion with renewed intensity.
This institutional permanence is now matched by a rapidly advancing arsenal and delivery system. In June 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that North Korea had assembled roughly 50 warheads and possessed enough fissile material for about 40 more. That trajectory is consistent with Kim’s November 2024 call for a “limitless” expansion of the nuclear program.
North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has also now become operationally diverse. Over the past two years, Pyongyang has tested a full spectrum of ballistic systems, from short- and intermediate-range missiles capable of striking regional targets to new solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles designed for rapid launch and survivability. The September 2023 launch of the Hero Kim Kun Ok, a modified Romeo-class ballistic-missile submarine equipped with ten vertical launch hatches, introduces a nascent second-strike potential. Together, these developments transform North Korea’s deterrent from a political instrument into a mature, integrated force structure with both regional and intercontinental reach.
In this altered landscape, Trump’s pledge to “work very hard with Kim Jong Un” reflects optimism against a geopolitical reality that has fundamentally changed. The long-held vision of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula has yielded to the permanence of a nuclear North Korea. Policy must adapt to this new reality. Since threat derives from both capability and intent, Washington is more likely to influence Pyongyang’s intent to use nuclear weapons than to dismantle its existing arsenal.
Trump and Kim may one day share the stage again, but if so, they will be speaking across a greater divide. North Korea now defines its legitimacy through nuclear permanence rather than diplomatic engagement. The brief window for a grand bargain on denuclearization has long closed. Any future dialogue will be a sober exercise in managing the limits of power, and the ever-deepening shadow cast by the bomb.
Authors
Guest Author
James M. Minnich
Dr. James M. Minnich is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. A retired U.S. Army colonel, he is the author of “The Denuclearization of North Korea” (2002) and “The North Korean People’s Army” (2005), and editor of “The Indo-Pacific Mosaic” (2025) and “Edge of Competition” (2025). He also hosts two podcast series, Dialogue and Strategic Voices. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies or the U.S. Department of Defense.
6. Korea-China relations fully restored? Not yet
Comment: Yes still a long way to go. One meeting does not restore trust and cooperation. Recall PRC economic warfare in 2017. But the real question is can there ever be a sufficient element of trust, especially if the ROK recognizes and understands the PRC/CCP strategy toward Korea and its employment of the three warfares? Or asked another way, should there be any trust with China?
Korea-China relations fully restored? Not yet - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
Choo Jae-woo
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20251109/korea-china-relations-fully-restored-not-yet
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, has concluded successfully, prompting a wide-ranging evaluation of the current Korean government’s pragmatic, national-interest-based diplomatic approach across various sectors.
It is often remarked that “it is easier to criticize than to act.” Evaluations are prone to result in criticism, potentially undermining the remarkable efforts of those who organized an event attended by heads of state from 21 APEC member economies from around the world. Nonetheless, critical evaluations are hard to circumvent, given that some of the results of President Lee Jae Myung’s series of bilateral summits remain unverified.
Lee's bilateral discussions included a notable meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which captured significant attention from the Korean public. The importance of the trip was underscored by the fact that it was Xi's first visit to the country in over a decade, with the last state visit occurring eleven years prior.
On the evening of Oct. 24, Koreans received the news of the visit from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than from their own government. The event came as a notable surprise, with many questioning the feasibility of a full-fledged state visit, given the time constraints.
During his three day visit, Xi was set to attend the full two-day APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, leaving less than 24 hours for bilateral meetings. It appeared that the schedule did not allow for a joint communiqué or news conference, which is usually considered essential protocol for a state visit.
The summit marked the first official meeting between South Korean and Chinese leadership since 2017. Before that, the two heads of state had only engaged in pull-aside meetings at multilateral venues. The Korean public was captivated by the event, fostering high expectations among attendees. The outcomes of the summit were communicated solely through statements from the presidential office, much to the disappointment of observers.
The phrase “state courtesy,” as used by various media outlets, may have been more accurate, given the absence of essential ceremonial elements that typically characterize a state visit. The presidential office announced that Seoul and Beijing achieved a “full restoration” of bilateral relations, but no evidence was presented to substantiate this claim.
The lack of visible outcomes can be attributed to the failure to issue a joint communiqué, which serves as a representation of mutual agreement. The lack of such a declaration suggests that no substantial agreements were reached in the end. Reports indicate that the South Korean delegation raised issues pertinent to its national interests, including North Korea’s denuclearization and maritime matters in the West Sea. This suggests that China not only rejected the establishment of any agreements regarding these matters but also declined to acknowledge a shared understanding. Crafting a mutually accepted joint statement presents a significant challenge.
Following the summit with Lee, Trump announced his “conditional approval” of Korea’s development of nuclear-powered submarines on his social media. Seoul expressed enthusiasm, viewing the situation as a potential opportunity to secure nuclear fuel and a catalyst for revising the United States-Republic of Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This action could potentially open the door for conversations regarding the reprocessing of spent fuel.
The euphoria was swiftly tempered the next day, as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement urging both Washington and Seoul to uphold their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The warning issued by Beijing is driven by some key concerns: A potential domino effect may unfold if Korea decides to acquire nuclear submarines, prompting Japan and Taiwan to consider similar actions. The acquisition of nuclear submarines by Korea also signals a significant move towards greater integration within the United States' naval framework.
China has concerns that it could accelerate the formation of a trilateral military alliance involving the United States, Japan and Korea. The issue is related to the (THAAD) system. Ongoing penalties linked to THAAD enacted by the Chinese government, including a ban on Korean cultural contents in China, remain in effect. Seoul has placed itself in a precarious position by treating Trump’s social media post as a de facto written guarantee, a move that could ultimately undermine its own interests.
Throughout history, the United States has engaged in nuclear submarine construction exclusively with the United Kingdom, having not collaborated with any other nation or issued licenses for the development of such vessels. The latest trilateral AUKUS arrangement with Australia does not involve any cooperative building; instead, it focuses solely on sales. Collaboration with Korea may prove advantageous, particularly in light of the shortcomings in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. The current situation reveals a lack of U.S. capability to meet its own commitments to Australia.
It would have been prudent for Seoul to first engage in negotiations regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement and then achieve advancements in spent fuel reprocessing. Finally, after securing a reliable fuel supply, it could pursue the development of nuclear submarines. The appropriate strategic sequence should have been followed in this instance. It is now crucial for South Korea to dispel the misconception that it has nuclear submarines, making it feasible to navigate around additional penalties imposed by China, while, paradoxically, implementing measures aimed at ultimately achieving such a capability.
Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
7. Security tightens around Cheong Wa Dae as presidential office eyes return by year end
Comment: Back to the Future? Back to the Blue House. I hope they kept everything ready and that it was not significantly affected by the tourists going though parts of it.
Security tightens around Cheong Wa Dae as presidential office eyes return by year end - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Lee Hyo-jin
Published Nov 9, 2025 4:12 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20251109/security-tightens-around-cheong-wa-dae-as-presidential-office-eyes-return-by-year-end
Police are stepping up security around Cheong Wa Dae as the government prepares to move the presidential office back to the compound by year's end.
According to local media reports on Sunday, Jongno Police Station is reviewing plans to restore 24-hour operations at nearby substations in preparation for the relocation.
Currently, the substations are operating with reduced staff and are open only from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays. They are expected to return to a 24/7 schedule, with four rotating teams of five officers each to strengthen security.
The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency's units responsible for on-site and perimeter security around Cheong Wa Dae are also said to be completing preparatory work.
These measures come as the Lee Jae Myung government prepares to relocate from the current presidential office in Seoul's Yongsan District to Cheong Wa Dae within the next two months.
"Construction is underway with the goal of completing it by year-end," Kang Hoon-sik, the presidential chief of staff, said while speaking about the relocation during a National Assembly audit session Thursday.
However, moving the presidential residence back to the compound may not be feasible by then and could extend into the first half of next year, Kang said, citing ongoing construction and further security preparations.
Lee has said the presidential office should return to Cheong Wa Dae since his presidential campaign, citing its history, cultural significance and security advantages.
Under Lee's predecessor, former President Yoon Suk Yeol, the office moved to a former defense ministry building in Yongsan District in 2022, and Cheong Wa Dae was opened to the public as a cultural site.
Public tours were suspended Aug. 1 as preparations began for Lee's return.
The reinstatement of Cheong Wa Dae security zones is expected to affect nearby roads and may complicate protest management, as no laws are currently in place to directly limit demonstrations near the presidential compound.
Protests within 100 meters of the presidential residence had long been banned, but the Constitutional Court struck down the restriction in December 2022, ruling that it excessively limited freedom of expression. Police said they are preparing alternative measures under existing laws to maintain security.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
8. Bribery controls North Korean university admissions as slots allocated by connections
Comment: College admissions with Juche characteristics.
Bribery controls North Korean university admissions as slots allocated by connections
Top-down admission process concentrates opportunities in well-connected schools while countryside students lose access to higher education
By Eun Seol - November 9, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/bribery-controls-north-korean-university-admissions-as-slots-allocated-by-connections/
The main entrance of Kim Il Sung University. (Kim Il Sung University website)
As high school seniors apply for spots at North Korea’s universities, bribery in the admission process is once more coming into the spotlight. Party officials are bribed to give certain schools more university slots, which often leaves students in rural or less developed areas unable to even apply.
A source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK that North Korea’s Ministry of Education had recently designated the number of students who can apply to university from high schools around the country.
In South Korea, third-year high school students are free to apply to the universities of their choice based on their academic records or their scores on the College Scholastic Achievement Test or universities’ own admission tests.
But in North Korea, the education ministry selects the number of students for each university and major each year and the number of students who can be admitted from each school in the country — a top-down process, with all decisions made unilaterally.
The education ministry communicates its decisions about university admissions to education bureaus at the provincial level, which pass them down to bureaus at the municipal and county levels, with individual schools being notified last of all.
Schools need slots to send students
Third-year high school students in North Korea cannot apply to the university of their choice unless their high school has been allotted slots there. As a result, graduating seniors and their parents are keenly interested in whether their school will be granted admission to the most popular universities.
The admission slots assigned to each school are supposed to be totally confidential, so that information is impossible to learn without the right connections. As graduation approaches, an “information war” breaks out with families scrambling to learn that information, the source said.
Ordinary high schools generally aren’t given slots at universities administered by the Central Committee. For those schools to secure some slots at provincial universities, they have to offer bribes to powerful people, such as senior secretaries on municipal or county party committees, the source said.
Simply put, parents have to bribe well-positioned officials to ensure their children’s schools are granted spots at popular universities.
As a result, parents waste no time in preparing their bribes.
A bribe of 300 to 1,000 Chinese yuan is needed to lock in admission at a vocational college, while 2,000 yuan is needed for a provincial university. Basically, money is key to getting into college, the source said.
Under these circumstances, students with good grades often have to give up their college dreams when their parents lack the means to make such arrangements, the source said.
Rural students shut out
In Hoeryong, for example, a third-year high school student whose grades ought to have been good enough to apply for a provincial university did not even sit for the university preparatory exam — North Korea’s college entrance exam — because his family could not afford to send him to college.
The student’s principal and homeroom teacher urged him to at least sit for the test, but he refused, pointing out that the school had not even received many university admission slots.
Officials tend to funnel university admission slots to certain high schools. The result is that even the best students in rural areas and other backwaters rarely make it into university, the source said.
The government often forces teachers and doctors to move from cities to the countryside given the shortage of professionals there. Instead, it ought to help rural students make it into teaching and medical schools. Then those students could naturally be assigned as teachers and doctors in their hometowns, the source suggested.
9. Korean Universities Recruit Tesla, Google, IBM Talent With Research Freedom
Summary:
Korean universities are attracting global tech talent from Tesla, Google, IBM, and top U.S. institutions by offering research freedom, advanced equipment, startup support, and concurrent positions—despite lower pay. Tailored incentives and government funding enable rising academics to pursue independent research and entrepreneurship, boosting Korea’s competitiveness in robotics, AI, and materials science.
Comment: Are problems and policies in the US creating opportunities for Korean universities?
Korean Universities Recruit Tesla, Google, IBM Talent With Research Freedom
Universities lure global tech experts with flexible terms, advanced equipment, startup support despite lower salaries
By Choi In-jun,
Kim Min-ki
Published 2025.11.10. 00:56
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/11/10/UVBCFLYX3ZDX3EY2CFZSUSHANM/
Professor Kang Sung-hoon (center), who moved from Johns Hopkins University in the US to KAIST, guides students in research at a KAIST research lab on the 6th. /Photo by Shin Hyun-jong
Sungkyunkwan University recruited Dr. Ahn Min-seong, 36, who developed the humanoid robot ‘Optimus’ at U.S. big tech company Tesla in August of this year, as a professor in its College of Engineering. Optimus is a bipedal walking robot with world-class technology capable of maintaining balance even when slipping on a slope or being kicked in the torso by a person. Dr. Ahn was the core developer behind it.
To bring in Dr. Ahn, a "rising star" in the robotics industry, the university established a new robotics department in its College of Engineering and even changed its faculty recruitment process by skipping the mandatory "paper review." Instead, during the interview, they focused on verifying the technical capabilities of Dr. Ahn’s research by watching a video of Optimus in operation. They also allowed him to work at Tesla in the U.S. until February of next year before joining in Korea. A source from the university said, "Although the annual salary is lower than at Tesla, we succeeded in recruiting him by promising to provide the research environment he desired. Dr. Ahn also expressed high expectations, saying, ‘I will create our own humanoid robot within two years.’"
Domestic universities have repeatedly failed to attract global talent due to lower salaries and working conditions compared to the U.S., China, and Europe. They also struggled to prevent Korean professors from leaving for overseas positions. Facing a crisis due to the rapid rise of Chinese, Singaporean, and Hong Kong universities that attract top talent with government support, Korean universities overhauled their recruitment strategies. Instead of offering high salaries, they mobilized all possible means and resources, such as allowing concurrent positions for a certain period, providing advanced research equipment, and innovating faculty recruitment systems. Gradually, successes like Sungkyunkwan University’s recruitment of Dr. Ahn are emerging.
◇“Annual Salary Lower, but You Can Do All the Research You Want”… Secured Developer of Optimus
Professor Kang Seong-hoon, 51, formerly of Johns Hopkins University in the U.S., moved to the Department of Materials Science and Engineering at KAIST in August of last year. Even after joining KAIST, he has continued his research work at the U.S. university. This was possible because KAIST allowed him to hold a concurrent position to complete his ongoing research at Johns Hopkins. Kang, an authority in bio-inspired materials such as bone-hard biomaterials, has published five papers in top international journals like *Nature* and *Science*, and 65 papers in SCI-level journals, which rank in the top 10% globally. Initially, Kang hesitated to move due to lower salaries and conditions compared to U.S. universities. However, after KAIST promised to provide the best research environment, including high-cost experimental equipment and housing support, and allowed him to hold a concurrent position for over a year, he decided to relocate.
Graphics by Kim Hyun-kook
Lee Kyun-min, KAIST’s Vice President for Academic Affairs, said, "When professors consider moving, their biggest concern is whether they can continue their existing research. We focused all our strategies on maintaining the ‘research capabilities’ of the recruited professors." He added, "Recently, when we recruited two overseas professors, we also agreed to accept 20 of their graduate students, which played a significant role in the success." Other domestic universities, including Sungkyunkwan University, are increasingly allowing concurrent positions to attract outstanding faculty.
Previously, it was nearly impossible for Korean universities to recruit top-tier researchers from prestigious U.S. and European universities or big tech companies. Even when star professors joined, they often served only for a year before retirement or stayed abroad, providing online lectures to domestic students two to three times a year. Many cases saw large investments in overseas talent recruitment without resulting in improved research outcomes.
However, recent tailored strategies—such as providing optimal research conditions based on the target’s needs—have begun to yield success in attracting talent. Notably, there has been a significant increase in the number of young professors in their 30s and 40s who can continue to work in the domestic academic field. Although overseas professors who recently moved to Korea often face a 50–60% reduction in salary compared to their previous positions, many express satisfaction with the research environment.
Professor Kang Seung-gu (right), who worked at an IBM research subsidiary before coming to Sungkyunkwan University, guides students in the research building at the Suwon campus on the 22nd last month. /Photo by Chang Lian-cherng
Professor Kang Seung-goo, 52, of Sungkyunkwan University’s Nano Engineering Department, moved to Korea from IBM Research, a subsidiary of U.S. IBM, in early last year, with his annual salary reduced to one-third of its previous level. Kang, who received the "Outstanding Researcher Award" six times—given only to the top 1% of researchers at IBM—developed research that reduces new drug development time by half by analyzing millions of chemical substances using artificial intelligence (AI). After Google scientists won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 2023 for predicting protein structures with AI, the field of AI-driven drug research has gained even more attention. Despite his increased "value," Kang chose to move to Korea. He said, "Sungkyunkwan University already has or plans to soon introduce advanced analytical equipment like supercomputers and electron microscopes needed for AI-driven drug research. Additionally, Korea’s large hospital infrastructure for clinical research was appealing." Yonsei University also recruited AI expert Professor Lee Bong-shin, formerly of Microsoft Research, last year, promising incentives, research funding, and lecture adjustments for the next three years.
To compensate for lower salaries and conditions compared to overseas universities, government support is also being utilized. POSTECH recently recruited Dr. Choi Young-jun, 35, from Caltech in the U.S., who had published four papers in *Nature*. During the process, the National Research Foundation provided research settlement funds of 3 billion Korean won through its overseas talent recruitment program.
Universities are also actively using "startup support" to attract outstanding researchers. While big tech companies in Silicon Valley offer high salaries, they restrict researchers to assigned projects and prohibit independent startups. Universities are leveraging this limitation by highlighting their startup support policies when recruiting corporate researchers. Professor Lee Ki-min, 37, of KAIST’s AI Graduate School, moved from Google Research, Google’s AI and science R&D subsidiary, in August 2023. Although OpenAI also offered him a position, he chose KAIST. The university’s promise to provide separate space for faculty startups and administrative support to secure initial investment capital proved effective. Professor Lee said, "While salary is important for researchers, many also have a strong desire to start their own business using their research expertise." He added, "Although my salary was significantly reduced after moving to KAIST, I am satisfied because I can conduct the research I want and have startup opportunities." He is currently active in a university venture founded by a KAIST colleague.
10. Seoul launches national scientist program, expands R&D budget
Excerpts:
However, some in the scientific community remain concerned that the program may not be enough to stem the outflow of talent, as it lacks exceptional incentives such as lifetime tenure or high salaries offered to China’s Academicians.
Meanwhile, the government pledged to expand the R&D budget that had been reduced under the former Yoon Suk Yeol administration. President Lee Jae-myung, who attended the session, said, “We have decided to significantly increase R&D investment to a level few could have imagined, with a firm commitment to devote more national resources to science and technology.” He added, “A research environment that tolerates failure is essential for the nation’s prosperity.”
Comment: The South modeling China?
Seoul launches national scientist program, expands R&D budget
Posted November. 08, 2025 07:19,
Updated November. 08, 2025 07:19
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251108/5949385/1
The South Korean government announced plans to launch a new “National Scientist” program and expand the national research and development budget. Modeled after China’s prestigious “Academician” system, which recognizes the country’s top scholars, the program aims to help world-renowned researchers continue their work in South Korea.
The Ministry of Science and ICT unveiled its “Strategy for Securing Scientific and Technological Talent and Innovation in the R&D Ecosystem” during a national briefing titled “Korea Dreaming Again of Scientists and Engineers,” held Thursday at the National Science Museum in Daejeon’s Yuseong District.
The National Scientist program was established to prevent the outflow of top Korean researchers and to honor the contributions of scientists and engineers. About 20 scholars will be selected each year, each receiving 100 million won in annual research funding. They will also receive privileges such as priority airport services and the authority to plan national research projects.
The government also announced measures to attract talented researchers from overseas. Focusing on key strategic technologies such as artificial intelligence, it aims to bring in 2,000 outstanding early-career researchers from abroad by 2030. To support this goal, foreign researchers entering on student visas will be allowed to stay in Korea for up to 12 months as interns. The government also plans to establish an AI Science Academy for Gifted Students to foster domestic AI talent.
Ha Jung-woo, presidential secretary for future planning in artificial intelligence, said during a briefing at the Presidential Office in Yongsan, “The new National Scientist program will serve as a model for aspiring scientists and engineers, providing them with a clear path for growth and vision. Over the next five years, about 100 scientists will receive presidential certificates, annual research grants, and various benefits, including transportation support.”
However, some in the scientific community remain concerned that the program may not be enough to stem the outflow of talent, as it lacks exceptional incentives such as lifetime tenure or high salaries offered to China’s Academicians.
Meanwhile, the government pledged to expand the R&D budget that had been reduced under the former Yoon Suk Yeol administration. President Lee Jae-myung, who attended the session, said, “We have decided to significantly increase R&D investment to a level few could have imagined, with a firm commitment to devote more national resources to science and technology.” He added, “A research environment that tolerates failure is essential for the nation’s prosperity.”
장은지 jej@donga.com
11. Mass AI cheating scandal uncovered at Yonsei University, hundreds of students reportedly involved
Comment: Is this not taking place at universities around the world?
Mass AI cheating scandal uncovered at Yonsei University, hundreds of students reportedly involved
Published: 09 Nov. 2025, 16:20
Updated: 09 Nov. 2025, 18:21
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-11-09/national/socialAffairs/Hundreds-of-Yonsei-students-suspeted-of-using-AI-to-cheat-on-their-midterm/2440007
A pedestrian walks by a plaque of Yonsei University in western Seoul. [NEWS1]
A large-scale cheating scandal has erupted at Yonsei University, in which hundreds of students enrolled in a class are suspected of using AI tools such as ChatGPT to take their midterm exam.
The professor of a third-year course titled “Natural Language Processing (NLP) and ChatGPT” at Yonsei University’s Sinchon campus recently disclosed that numerous cases of academic dishonesty have been identified and that students found to have cheated would receive zero points for the exam.
Related Article
Roughly 600 students are enrolled in the course, which is conducted online due to the large class size. The test — held on Oct. 15 via an online platform — consisted of multiple choice questions. To prevent cheating, students were required to record their computer screens, hands and faces for the entire duration of the exam and submit the footage.
However, some students reportedly manipulated their camera angle to create blind spots or opened multiple windows on their screens to circumvent monitoring. Upon discovering signs of misconduct, the professor posted a notice stating that any student who came forward voluntarily would have their midterm score reset to zero but face no further penalty.
The exact number of students involved remains unknown, but speculation has emerged that over half of the class may have cheated. Following the professor's announcement, a poll appeared on the Yonsei board of the student community app Everytime — with the message “Let's vote honestly” — in which 190 out of 353 respondents admitted to cheating on that test.
The students are also believed to have used AI tools to cheat.
“Most of us used ChatGPT during the exam,” one student told Yonhap News Agency.
A student who took the course last semester added, “A lot of my classmates, myself included, looked up answers using AI.”
Although AI is spreading rapidly across Korean universities, most institutions have yet to establish clear guidelines or responses. A 2024 survey by the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training found that 91.7 percent of 726 students at four- and six-year universities used AI for assignments or research. But a separate study by the Korean Council for University Education found that 71.1 percent of 131 universities nationwide had not introduced any formal policies on generative AI.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY JANG GU-SEUL [yoon.soyeon@joongang.co.kr]
12. Korea risks tapping foreign reserves to fund U.S. investment
Comment: Does this put the ROK at risk for another IMF crisis such as occurred in 1997? If so, how does that do the US any good? Should US demands contribute to greater South Korean risk
Korea risks tapping foreign reserves to fund U.S. investment
Published: 10 Nov. 2025, 00:01
Korea JoongAng Daily
Korea risks tapping foreign reserves to fund U.S. investment
Lee Ha-kyung
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-11-10/opinion/columns/Korea-risks-tapping-foreign-reserves-to-fund-US-investment/2440052
The author is a senior columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo.
Heavyweight boxer Mike Tyson once said, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman borrowed the line to criticize U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric in a column titled “Trump’s Hot Mess of a China Policy.” The Wall Street Journal wrote, “Beijing hit back, and it is hard to see what the United States gained from tariffs.”
Korean President Lee Jae Myung, rights, toasts U.S. President Donald Trump during a dinner event at a hotel in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang, on Oct. 29, following their bilateral summit. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
China has been preparing carefully for its economic confrontation with the United States. Chinese engineers linked 384 domestically developed low-performance AI chips to build an advanced server comparable to Nvidia’s. Despite U.S. sanctions, China has achieved technological self-reliance. Its exports to the United States fell 16.8 percent this year, but overall exports grew 6.1 percent. The United States, meanwhile, relies on Chinese rare earths for defense and advanced manufacturing. Even with a full-scale effort like the Manhattan Project, it would take five to seven years to build a reliable supply chain. When China hinted at restricting rare earth exports, Trump backed down, saying cooperation could make America “bigger, better, stronger than ever before.” Still, Washington is pressuring its allies to shoulder the cost of its trade and fiscal deficits. Whether this is fair practice is a question worth asking.
President Lee Jae Myung presents U.S. President Donald Trump with the Grand Order of Mugunghwa and a model of the Gold Crown of Cheonmachong during the official Korea-U.S. welcome ceremony held at the Gyeongju National Museum in North Gyeongsang on Oct. 29. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Korea avoided the worst outcome in its tariff negotiations with the Trump administration, but the situation demands vigilance. When the first agreement was announced on July 1, the government said only up to 5 percent — about $17.5 billion — of the agreed $350 billion in investment would be in cash, with the rest coming in loans and guarantees. The second round of negotiations in October revealed a different picture: Korea must send as much as $20 billion in cash annually for 10 years, totaling $200 billion. A separate $150 billion will go to the MASGA shipbuilding cooperation project. Presidential policy chief Kim Yong-beom said “commercial rationality” was the top priority, but the final decision lies with the U.S. investment committee chaired by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, a former Wall Street currency broker. If decisions are made for political reasons, the consequences for the Korean economy could be severe.
In 2013, Korea’s foreign direct investment in the United States totaled $21.5 billion. Under the current plan, more than $40 billion will flow annually into the U.S. economy. Questions arise over the impact on domestic investment, employment and fiscal and monetary stability. Foreign reserves serve as emergency funds to stabilize the currency and address balance-of-payments crises. They have never been used for large-scale overseas direct investment. The government says reserves, now at $420 billion, will be maintained through interest earnings, dividends and external financing if needed.
Related Article
But the possibility of a foreign exchange crisis, however unlikely, must be considered. Japan ensured the phrase “respect for both countries’ domestic laws” was included in its agreement with the United States. The presidential office argues that the Korea-U.S. memorandum of understanding is not a treaty and does not require parliamentary ratification. That is a dangerous claim. Under the Constitution, the National Assembly holds the power to review and approve spending. The Trade Treaty Act requires submission of funding plans and measures to protect domestic industries. The prime minister and finance minister have already acknowledged the need for parliamentary consent. If tariffs continue to harm Korean companies, bipartisan approval could proceed swiftly.
Massive cash investment in the United States may create jobs there but could fuel unemployment in Korea. If foreign exchange management falters, the economy could deteriorate rapidly. Alliances must be based on cooperation, but Korea must assert its national interest when necessary. Like China’s rare earth leverage, Korea also needs a decisive bargaining chip.
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Samsung Electronics Executive Chairman Lee Jae-yong and Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chair Euisun Chung attend an event at Coex in southern Seoul celebrating the 25th anniversary of Nvidia’s GeForce GPU on Oct. 30. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who agreed to supply 260,000 GPUs to Korea, said, “The United States has strong software but weak manufacturing. Europe has strong manufacturing but weak software. Korea has both.” Korea’s strength lies in its companies. Leaders like Lee Byung-chull, Lee Kun-hee, and Chung Ju-yung built world-class semiconductor, shipbuilding and automotive industries by taking bold risks. It is time to revive that entrepreneurial “animal spirit” with bold deregulation and industrial policy.
China is rising at a staggering pace. The United States still dominates in advanced technology and military power. For Korea to survive without being sidelined, it must strengthen its capabilities and secure strategic autonomy. Only then can massive investments in the United States be mutually beneficial. The country cannot risk deindustrialization or a second IMF-style crisis.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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