​Quotes of the Day:

“Republic. I like the sound of the word. It means people can live free, talk free, go or come, buy or sell, be drunk or sober, however they choose. Some words give you a feeling. Republic is one of those words that makes me tight in the throat—the same tightness a man gets when his baby takes his first step or his first baby shaves and makes his first sound as a man. Some words can give you a feeling that makes your heart warm. Republic is one of those words.” 

– John Wayne as Colonel Davy Crockett in The Alamo (1960)

"Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood."

– Friedrich Nietzsche

"I have been and still am a seeker, but I ceased to question stars and books; I have begun to listen to the teaching my blood whispers to me."

– Herman Hesse

1. Daring bin Laden-style plot the White House has 'teed up' to take out Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro... as top insider reveals: 'It's going to get spicy'

2. Exclusive | Inside Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Threat and Nigeria’s Race to Head It Off

3. America Is Losing the Fight for the Teenagers of the World

4. Military Families Are Getting Paid, but Still Need Food Pantries

5. Russian Casualties Rise, Ukraine Strikes Russian Power Facilities and the Battle of Pokrovsk Continues - The Big Five, 9 November edition

6. ‘No structure to say yes’: can Chinese investment still find a home in America?

7. A 2019 US War Game on Venezuela Forecast Chaos After Maduro’s Downfall

8. America and China circle each other in the South China Sea

9. Ottawa plans to spend big on defence. But is there a long-term vision for Canada’s military?

10. The Digital Case Officer: Reimagining Espionage with AI

11. Army stands up unit to combat disinformation, ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

12. CSM Naumann Bids Farewell to USASOC

13. RESIST 3: Building resilience to information threats

14. The Battle Iranian Women Are Winning

15. Spheres of Influence in the 21st Century: Outdated or Needed?

16. Will Trump Lose the World or Reshape It? Two Views

17. The West’s Three Options in a Multipolar World

18. Fujian carrier a flashy flex but not a game-changer

19. The case for abandoning Taiwan is still weak

20. The Ideal That Underlies the Declaration of Independence

1. Daring bin Laden-style plot the White House has 'teed up' to take out Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro... as top insider reveals: 'It's going to get spicy'

​Summary:

A secret U.S. plan reportedly readies Special Operations Forces for a “bin Laden-style” strike against Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, deemed a narco-terrorist. Trump allies Rubio, Miller, and Hegseth push action; Vance and Wiles oppose. With the USS Gerald R. Ford deployed, the White House debates intervention versus restraint, countering China-Russia-Iran influence.

​Excerpts:

The bin Laden-style plot to oust Maduro was revealed to the Daily Mail by a source familiar with Trump's South America strategy - a plot White House aides did not deny.

While assassinating foreign leaders is illegal under international law, the Venezuelan leader has been designated as the head of a narco-terrorist network rather than a legitimate leader. The State Department doubled down on this.

'Maduro is a fugitive of American justice who undermines regional security and poisons Americans,' a State Department spokesman told the Daily Mail, dodging the question of what Trump and Rubio's plans are in regards to Maduro.

A legal source familiar with conversations at the Pentagon emphasized the US has the right to defend itself.

The source said: 'When an organization operates across borders in ways that deliberately endanger or kill US citizens, it becomes a lawful target under the right of self–defense.'

​Comment: "Spicy?" Especially if they are expecting such a raid. Does self defense justify such a raid? But we must remember what one former Pentagon spokesman said, words to the effect "The Pentagon is a planning headquarters, it plans for everything." I am sure the Pentagon was asked to provide options and this may have been one of them. But it does not mean that is what anyone recommends or that it will be executed.

Daring bin Laden-style plot the White House has 'teed up' to take out Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro... as top insider reveals: 'It's going to get spicy'

Daily Mail · ELINA SHIRAZI, US SENIOR POLITICAL REPORTER · November 8, 2025

The White House has a secret bin Laden-style plot ready to take out Venezuela's president should the order come, a source told the Daily Mail.

The operation, which would likely involve Special Forces such as those used to kill the notorious terrorist in Pakistan in 2011, is already 'teed up', the insider says.

The plan is understood to be awaiting Donald Trump's go-ahead and is justified by America seeing Maduro as a narco-terrorist leader and not a legitimate ruler.

But the seismic question of whether to force regime change in Venezuela has divided the top echelons of the White House.

Sources told the Daily Mail Marco Rubio, Stephen Miller and Pete Hegseth are at the tip of the spear for removing him.

Yet JD Vance, who promotes an America-First, non-interventionist foreign policy, and Susie Wiles, who focuses on business interests at home, are against the move.

It comes as relations between America and Venezuela sour amid a growing fentanyl crisis in the States that the Trump administration in part blames on the country.

It has been further stretched with the US's bombing of suspected cartel vessels off its coastline and sending the USS Gerald R Ford carrier into the region this month.

The White House has a secret bin Laden-style plot ready to take out Venezuela's president should the order come, a source told the Daily Mail

The bin Laden-style plot to oust Maduro was revealed to the Daily Mail by a source familiar with Trump's South America strategy - a plot White House aides did not deny.

While assassinating foreign leaders is illegal under international law, the Venezuelan leader has been designated as the head of a narco-terrorist network rather than a legitimate leader. The State Department doubled down on this.

'Maduro is a fugitive of American justice who undermines regional security and poisons Americans,' a State Department spokesman told the Daily Mail, dodging the question of what Trump and Rubio's plans are in regards to Maduro.

A legal source familiar with conversations at the Pentagon emphasized the US has the right to defend itself.

The source said: 'When an organization operates across borders in ways that deliberately endanger or kill US citizens, it becomes a lawful target under the right of self–defense.'

America took out Osama bin Laden in a daring SEAL Team Six raid on a mansion in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011, after it was sanctioned by President Barack Obama.

US officials say other military options are on the table for Venezuela, including targeting the military, striking bases used for narcotics trafficking or seizing oil fields.

Other ideas reportedly include a CIA–led coup or sending Special Forces to capture Maduro alive.

In the middle sits Rick Grenell, who as Trump's Venezuela envoy, has attempted to broker a compromise but has been 'left on the outskirts of discussions,' per one state department source

Sources told the Daily Mail Marco Rubio , Stephen Miller and Pete Hegseth are at the tip of the spear for removing him

The hideout of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden following his death by US Special Forces in Abbottabad on May 3, 2011

America took out Osama bin Laden in a daring SEAL Team Six raid on a mansion in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011, after it was sanctioned by President Barack Obama

Trump will likely not need to make a decision until the Navy's newest and largest carrier, the Gerald R. Ford, reaches the Caribbean Sea later this month.

The ship carries 5,000 crew and more than 75 aircraft. Even before its arrival, 10,000 troops are already in the region, split between warships and bases in Puerto Rico.

'It's going to get spicy,' the source familiar with Trump's South America strategy said.

Experts say the administration's interest in Venezuela goes beyond drugs, campaign promises, oil or regime change.

Rather, it is aiming to counter China, Russia and Iranian influence in the Western Hemisphere.

'Beijing sells arms, installs surveillance infrastructure and buys most of Venezuela's oil. Moscow sells fighter jets, sends military trainers, and invests in energy.

'Tehran has dispatched Hezbollah to prop up Maduro through arms trafficking, narcotics, money laundering and terror training,' said John Sitilides, National Security Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Trump will likely not need to make a decision until the Navy's newest and largest carrier, the Gerald R. Ford, reaches the Caribbean Sea later this month

A legal source familiar with conversations at the Pentagon emphasized that the US has the right to defend itself

Most fentanyl does not come out of Venezuela but instead originates or is trafficked through places such as Mexico — and to a lesser extent Ecuador

But the plans to intervene in the South American nation has caused a split among Trump's top officials.

Vance has criticized involvement in prolonged conflicts like the India–Pakistan and Russia–Ukraine wars and Wiles also has reservations, sources say.

A diplomat and former career foreign service officer told the Daily Mail: 'They have preached ''no more entanglements and forever wars''.'

In the middle sits Rick Grenell, who as Trump's Venezuela envoy, has tried to broker a compromise but has been 'left on the outskirts of discussions,' a state department source said.

As debates rage behind the scenes, Trump has yet to make a decision on the next move, with his advisors' opinions buzzing in the background.

But one factor that may tip the president against an audacious strike: His thirst for a Nobel Peace Prize.

'Look at what happened in Iran. Trump doesn't care about government change. Look deeper.

'He is weighing the cost–benefit analysis. He wants the Nobel Peace Prize right now, and he is on a winning track.

'He is struggling to pull the trigger, deciding if it will be worth it,' a source familiar with the president's thinking told the Daily Mail.

The rift has created a high–stakes tug–of–war within the administration on one of the most consequential decisions a president can make

Amid these internal debates, the diplomatic source emphasized 'the public is not buying the narrative about Venezuela,' highlighting skepticism over goals there.

According to an exclusive poll, only a small fraction of Venezuelans who oppose Maduro would support American military intervention.

Just 10 percent back US interference, while most prefer internal solutions to the country's political crisis. Inside Venezuela, people are on edge.

'People inside Venezuela are afraid to express their opinions — if you are in favor of an intervention or an attack against the regime, you could end up in jail or a torture center like the infamous El Helicoide,' said Juan Pablo Uzcategui of San Cristobal.

May 2023 –– Venezuelans campaigning for María Corina Machado. She is a major opposition leader in Venezuela, advocating for a democratic transition away from Chavismo, free markets and rule of law. Her exclusion from electoral participation and the persecution she faces illustrate the country's ongoing political crisis

June 2024 –– Venezuelans campaigning for María Corina Machado, a major opposition leader in Venezuela, advocating for a democratic transition away from Chavismo, free markets and rule of law

But one thing is clear, there's little love for Maduro inside the country's populous, a fact that hardliners are well aware of.

'As long as the Trump administration helps us overthrow Maduro, we will be pleased with him. There is no other way for us to dislodge these mafias,' Uzcategui said.

In response to this story, Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told Daily Mail, 'The idea that anyone in this White House, under this President, wants more wars is fundamentally wrong.'

Daily Mail · ELINA SHIRAZI, US SENIOR POLITICAL REPORTER · November 8, 2025

2. Exclusive | Inside Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Threat and Nigeria’s Race to Head It Off

​Summary:

After a Fox News segment, President Trump threatened “guns-a-blazing” intervention in Nigeria to stop killings of Christians. The Pentagon began drafting options, while Nigeria urged restraint, saying violence largely stems from farmer-herder land disputes, not religious genocide. Evangelical advocates and Republicans support action; others urge diplomacy. Nigerian officials seek engagement with Trump and battle conspiracy narratives domestically and online. Analysts note Boko Haram’s insurgency is separate; recent massacres involve Fulani herdsmen, with hundreds of Christians killed in 2025. 

​Comment: I wonder what options the Pentagon can provide in this case? Certainly this must be the worst case of "tyranny of distance." Again we have to ask, what is the objective? What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that can be achieved (i.e., end state) and what is feasible, acceptable, and suitable in terms of military action and diplomatic efforts?

Exclusive | Inside Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Threat and Nigeria’s Race to Head It Off

The West African country is trying to persuade the president not to insert the U.S. military or cut off aid over cattle herdsmen accused of killing Christians

WSJ

By Annie Linskey

Follow

, Drew Hinshaw

Follow

 and Joe Parkinson

Follow

Nov. 8, 2025 10:00 pm ET

​

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/inside-trumps-guns-a-blazing-threat-and-nigerias-race-to-head-it-off-46fde875

• President Trump threatened military intervention in Nigeria via a Truth Social post, citing the mass slaughter of Christians, after watching a Fox News segment.
• Nigerian officials are attempting to dissuade the U.S. from military action, stating the conflict is over livestock-grazing rights, not religious persecution.
• Over 12,000 Nigerians have died since 2010 in clashes between nomadic cattle-herders and settled farmers, with hundreds of Christians killed this year, according to a Nigerian conflict-monitoring group.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• President Trump threatened military intervention in Nigeria via a Truth Social post, citing the mass slaughter of Christians, after watching a Fox News segment.

Nigeria’s aging leader awoke on Nov. 2 in the sprawling presidential Aso Rock villa for a morning routine that included a freshly brewed shot of espresso, a doctor taking his vital signs and an aide delivering a two-page executive summary on the myriad threats facing Africa’s most-populous nation.

The top item, Nigerian officials said, on President Bola Tinubu’s briefing: A Truth Social post from President Trump the day before, threatening to send the U.S. military into Nigeria, “guns-a-blazing,” to stop what he characterized as the mass slaughter of Christians.

Less than 48 hours earlier, U.S. officials said, Trump had been watching Fox News aboard Air Force One, descending toward Palm Beach International Airport, when host John Roberts led a segment chronicling the killings of Christians by militants in Nigeria: “Does this president need to do more?” he asked.

Shortly after Trump’s social-media post, the Pentagon commissioned war plans, U.S. officials said.

Tinubu, Nigeria’s bespectacled 73-year-old leader, was shocked by the saber-rattling from one of his country’s most important partners.

Nigeria’s president now asked if there was any way to reach and reason with America’s commander in chief, Nigerian officials said. How, Tinubu quizzed his befuddled aides, had this idea reached the U.S. president? And how could Nigeria set the record straight?

Nigeria's President Bola Tinubu Adriano Machado/Reuters

Since then Nigeria has been trying to persuade Trump not to send the world’s most-powerful military into a West African country of 232 million people, to intervene in what its government says are long-running local disputes over livestock-grazing rights.

A coalition of American evangelicals and influencers has been speaking out for a group of mostly Christian farmers who for years have been battling with a tribe of largely Muslim cattle herdsmen in central Nigeria over dwindling natural resources.

Some activists and Republican lawmakers have called it “Christian genocide,” a characterization the White House hasn’t used.

Nigerian officials say the problem—in a country plagued by deadly conflicts—is much more complicated.

More than 12,000 Nigerians have died since 2010 in clashes between the nomadic cattle-herders and settled farmers over lands that both groups claim as their own, according to ACLED, a conflict-monitoring group, whose analysts scour local news and contacts for real-time data.

That strife is separate from Nigeria’s better-known war against Boko Haram, a jihadist group that captured America’s attention in 2014 by mass-kidnapping schoolchildren. Boko Haram has since splintered and been confined to Muslim-dominated villages of the far northeast, where few Christians remain.

But an upsurge of attacks this year by herdsmen on farmers has left at least hundreds of Nigerian Christians dead.

Within minutes of Trump’s Truth Social post, personnel from the U.S. military’s African command were recalled to headquarters as the Pentagon started to draw up options for airstrikes and special forces operations to halt the killing, U.S. officials said.

Trump administration officials said they aim to end global conflicts primarily through diplomacy. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said: “But if diplomacy does not work, President Trump always has more options at his disposal than any other leader on the face of the planet.”

“President Trump is correct: Christians are being slaughtered in Nigeria,” she added. “There is factual and video evidence to support this.”

Headlines reporting President Trump's message to Nigeria over the treatment of Christians at a newsstand in Lagos earlier this month. Sodiq Adelakun/Reuters

Nigerian military leaders contacted lobbyists in Washington and officials on the White House National Security Council, Nigerian officials said, in an effort to persuade Trump to rethink a military intervention based on what Nigeria has labeled a “gross misrepresentation of the reality.”

Other nations have similarly found themselves suddenly targeted by Trump, from Greenland, which Trump proposed purchasing in his first term, to Canada, which he considered annexing in the weeks after his 2024 victory, and Panama, whose canal he has mused about retaking.

A Nigerian official was told by a U.S. counterpart that, with Thanksgiving coming up, Nigeria should go quiet and wait for the president’s attention to shift, a Nigerian official said. A White House official said the consistent message to the Nigerians is that the president takes the situation seriously and the Nigerians should take steps to address the killings.

Meanwhile, Nigerian officials said they have been scrutinizing TikTok and social-media posts, to map how the view that the fight between pastoralists and farmers is a Christian genocide, once relegated to the fringes of social media, became a preoccupation in Washington.

Officials on both sides have discussed setting up a call between the two leaders, said a U.S. official familiar with the talks. But as of Saturday there wasn’t one on Trump’s schedule.

Tinubu—a Muslim married to one of Nigeria’s most prominent Christian Pentecostal preachers—debated traveling to Washington, to explain the complex religious tapestry of a country evenly split between both faiths, Nigerian officials said.

But Nigerian officials said they remembered the televised dressing-down Trump gave South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa in a Washington meeting in May.

In the White House, U.S. officials said, Trump has consulted with top advisers, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Massad Boulos, a Nigerian-Lebanese American businessman and senior presidential adviser for African affairs, whose son is married to Trump’s youngest daughter, Tiffany.

U.S. officials said he has been hearing about it from Paula White-Cain, who heads the White House Faith Office. She has traveled to Nigeria to preach—and famously prayed in a viral clip for angels from Africa in an effort to ensure Trump’s re-election in 2020.

On Thursday, Trump uploaded a video post on Truth Social. “Christianity is facing an existential threat in Nigeria. The United States cannot stand by while such atrocities are happening there,” Trump said. The video was recorded at Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s Florida resort, on Nov. 1, just hours after a Great Gatsby-inspired Halloween party.

Trump's hawkish Truth Social post on Nigeria came hours after a Great Gatsby-inspired Halloween party at Mar-a-Lago. Getty Images; Reuters

Trump's hawkish Truth Social post on Nigeria came hours after a Great Gatsby-inspired Halloween party at Mar-a-Lago. Getty Images; Reuters

Trump’s remarks have detonated like a hand grenade along the political and religious fault lines of West Africa, causing a chain reaction of conspiratorial accusations between Nigeria and the U.S.

On Nigeria’s social-media sites and national airwaves, theories have gone viral that America is plotting a military operation as cover to extract its resources. Those suspicions have spread through Nigeria’s own government: Several Nigerian officials asked Wall Street Journal reporters if the U.S. has been secretly funding terrorists in Nigeria to plunge Africa’s biggest oil producer into war and obtain its rare earths or lithium.

One security official showed a video from a February speech on the House floor in which Rep. Scott Perry (R., Pa.), without offering evidence, named Boko Haram as a recipient of funding from USAID, the U.S. foreign-assistance agency. USAID denied funding the Islamist group, whose name means “Western education is sacrilege.” Perry’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Other Nigerians, distraught with the failure of their state to secure lives and property, have cheered the prospect of an American operation. Overall, more than 100,000 Nigerians have died in political and religious violence since 2011, according to the Council on Foreign Relations tally of media and government reports. That toll includes Muslims, Christians, soldiers, civilians and government officials, killed by terrorists, herdsmen, vigilantes, forest-dwelling kidnapping gangs, pirates off the coast, and Nigeria’s own overtaxed military.

“We see President Trump as our second God,” said Bamshak Daniel, a Christian community leader in the small town of Mangu in central Nigeria’s Plateau state, where scores of Christians in nearby villages have been killed by herdsmen this year. “We have been praying for a supernatural intervention to save the lives of our people. President Trump must make haste and carry out this military intervention.”

A Red Cross official walked past a destroyed house in central Nigeria’s Plateau state in 2024. Kola Sulaimon/AFP/Getty Images

China is looking to take advantage of the strains between Washington and Abuja, Nigerian officials say, courting an African powerhouse so historically tethered to America—where Tinubu was educated—that Nigeria’s Constitution, capital city and House of Representatives were all consciously modeled on the U.S. example.

On Tuesday, China’s Foreign Ministry said it “firmly opposes” any foreign military intervention. Nigeria had been one of America’s last close partners in a region where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have all turned toward Moscow.

“Nigeria remains a global exemplar of religious plurality and democratic endurance,” said Dunoma Umar Ahmed, permanent secretary at Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry, in a statement. “Recent external claims suggesting systemic religious persecution in Nigeria are unfounded.”

A long-brewing crisis

Nigeria’s war with Boko Haram was almost six years old when it first flashed onto America’s TV screens, after the jihadist group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from a dormitory, in April 2014. Most of Boko Haram’s victims until then had been Muslims, often villagers seen as loyal to the government, though the terrorist group had torched and bombed churches and schools.

But the shocking kidnap of mostly Christian high-schoolers on the eve of their graduating exams prompted celebrities—Kim Kardashian, then-Pope Francis, and then-first lady Michelle Obama—to tweet #BringBackOurGirls, a hashtag that spurred the U.S. to deploy drones, surveillance aircraft and intelligence officers into northeast Nigeria. A decade later, Nigerian officials still puzzle over how a Twitter campaign resulted in the deployment of hard American military power on their territory.

An aerial view of burned-out classrooms at a school in Chibok, in northeastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram militants seized over 200 teenagers in 2014. Sunday Aghaeze/AFP/Getty Images

The government paid a 3-million-euro ransom to free 103 of the schoolgirls, and Boko Haram ultimately fractured after its leader blew himself up in a suicide vest in 2021.

By then, a second, older, more obscure conflict was resurfacing, conflated in social media and online commentary in the U.S. with Boko Haram. Herdsmen, from Nigeria’s Fulani tribe, were amassing AK-47s to clear farmers from cattle-grazing routes across the country’s fertile interior. Nigeria’s army struggled to contain the fighting as land disputes escalated into mass killings.

Herdsmen torched churches, and killed farmers, who were usually, but not exclusively Christians, producing images that horrified evangelical leaders in America, moved by a modern-day story of Christian persecution.

In 2020, White-Cain, the televangelist, spoke about the issue to Trump, who subsequently designated Nigeria a “country of Particular Concern, for severe violations of religious freedom.” Nigeria’s government at the time protested, saying terrorists had killed Muslims and Christians alike. The Biden administration reversed the designation. Trump has said he would reinstate it.

Clashes continue

Virtually no security analyst closely watching Nigeria thinks its population of more than 100 million Christians is facing the prospect of a genocide. Still, militant cattle-herders, rampaging through towns and villages, have killed at least hundreds of Christians this year, including 10 on Monday in the central Nigerian village of Anwule.

“There would be great jubilation in our land when President Donald Trump declares military action against these Christian killers,” said Moses Odiba, a Christian community leader there.

Those fights are often over land more than religion, and Muslim farmers also number among the dead, said James Barnett, a researcher at the Hudson Institute think tank, who has spent years working in Nigeria studying intercommunal violence.

But some victims, whose churches had been torched and relatives killed, have described the violence as a Christian genocide—a term echoed by Nigerian politicians representing them, and some Nigerians requesting asylum in the U.S. The claims of genocide have also been boosted by Indigenous People of Biafra, or IPOB, a separatist group—Nigeria’s government lists it as a terror organization—which has hired U.S. lobbying firms to advance the creation of a new country.

In September, TV talk-show host Bill Maher claimed that Islamists in Nigeria, particularly Boko Haram, have killed 100,000 Christians—apparently conflating the total number of deaths from all conflicts in Nigeria, including civilians killed by the military.

“They are literally attempting to wipe out the Christian population of an entire country,” he said. “Where are the kids protesting this?”

President Trump boarding Air Force One at Palm Beach International Airport in West Palm Beach, Fla. Samuel Corum/Getty Images

The segment tallied more than 15 million views on X. Weeks later, Fox News interviewed Ryan Brown, the chief executive officer of Open Doors US, a nongovernmental organization that tracks attacks on Christians. This year, 3,100 Christians in Nigeria have been killed, he told the host, in a segment that played on Air Force One. The plane’s most important passenger was watching as Roberts, the Fox host, asked: “What could the U.S. do to try to stem the killings?”

Brown said he is thankful and appreciative that the issue is getting attention, but is less enthusiastic about a unilateral U.S. military response: “Our hope would be that the U.S. government and the Nigerian government would lean in together and have meaningful dialogue about the best path forward.”

Write to Annie Linskey at annie.linskey@wsj.com, Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com and Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com

WSJ

3. America Is Losing the Fight for the Teenagers of the World

​Summary:

Stephen Marche argues that America has lost its cultural “cool,” once its greatest soft power. Under Trump, U.S. influence erodes as allies like Canada turn inward and global teens embrace K-pop, Spanish pop, and multicultural media. Hollywood and U.S. music decline, while South Korea and China now dominate global youth culture.

Excerpts:

South Korea’s state-driven cultural model has explicitly fostered an environment that enables the success of various TV shows and pop acts, recognizing them as a force for soft power and export markets. China is imitating that model, and both are providing an increasingly robust alternative to Hollywood’s products and American popular music. In reaction to this decline, Mr. Trump has threatened to wield his favorite, and seemingly only, weapon, threatening to impose a 100 percent tariff on films produced outside of the United States — a proposition that doesn’t acknowledge that culture is not a tangible import like, say, aluminum.

Another erosive force is at work, one that’s more subtle than the normal cyclical economic cycles. To many foreign onlookers, it’s increasingly true that America is no longer attractive — either as a cultural ideal or as an aspiration. The country’s narrative has become incoherent, its brand toxic. Are you really going to stream the new movie “A House of Dynamite” and pretend that the president of the United States is a well-intentioned and considerate man who cares about the fate of the planet? America itself cannot even decide whether Superman (co-invented by a Canadian) is a good guy or not. Even Superman — who famously stands for truth, justice and the American way — is now domestically considered by some to be too foreign, too kind, too woke.

​Comment: Soft Power. Influence. What are we without our "coolness?" 

This is quite a critique. Note that China is attempting to imitate South Korea. But what is not noted is Chinese influence on the video game industry. I received a briefing a few years back that described how China was working to dominate the video game industry and that its intent was to insert pro-China cultural narratives into the games. That may be where the real influence potential for youth around the world lies. But more broadly this is one information warfare battlespace. Are we competing? Can we compete?

At least we have a cool ally in South Korea.

America Is Losing the Fight for the Teenagers of the World

NY Times · Stephen Marche · November 9, 2025

By Stephen Marche

Mr. Marche is the author, most recently, of “The Next Civil War.” He wrote from Toronto, where he lives.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/09/opinion/america-pop-culture-cool.html

Guest Essay

Nov. 9, 2025, 1:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Christa Jarrold

Listen to this article · 8:18 min Learn more

By

Mr. Marche is the author, most recently, of “The Next Civil War.” He wrote from Toronto, where he lives.

You may not think of Chubby Checker’s “Let’s Twist Again” as an incendiary political anthem, or a tool of American power, but authorities in the Soviet Union knew better. In the early 1960s, Komsomol patrols, part of the youth wing of the Communist Party, tried to stop the spread of bootlegged records. Those who were caught buying or selling such records faced prison sentences of up to seven years.

During the Cold War, pop culture was an immensely powerful force on America’s side, and the U.S.S.R. had no answer. The Soviets might have been able to win a battle against democratic capitalism as an idea, or against the American military as a force. But they could not defeat Levi’s jeans and Elvis Presley. In 1950, the C.I.A. understood this power; it funded the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which at its peak had offices in 35 countries, and purportedly supported rising artists in the belief that promoting American culture would undermine repressive foreign governments.

The United States won the battle of the teenage bedroom, decisively. A 1991 Metallica concert attracted a colossal audience at Tushino Airfield in Moscow, predating the collapse of the Soviet Union by only a few months.

The second Trump administration has overseen a dramatic erosion of America’s cultural power, in part because it has undermined the notion on the global stage of America as a paragon of cool. In September, at the United Nations, Trump boasted of the United States as “the hottest country anywhere in the world,” but it goes without saying that if you have to say you’re hot, you’re not. Alongside the administration’s hard power losses — the destruction of the world’s most enviable alliance network and the country’s educational and research capacities — America’s global cultural dominance is diminished every day that Mr. Trump is in office.

The clearest and most immediate evidence for this decline can be seen in Canada, where I live. The border between Canada and the United States, at least in terms of popular culture, has long been porous and more or less meaningless. Canadian actors and directors — a near-innumerable list that includes James Cameron, Jim Carrey, Seth Rogen, Sandra Oh, etc. — have prospered in Hollywood. The Canadian sitcoms “Schitt’s Creek” and “Kim’s Convenience,” both pure Canadiana, found significant American audiences. On the northern side of the border, the cultural diet of the average English-speaking Canadian has not been significantly different from the average American’s for decades — an inevitability, given the relative size of America’s culture industries, its proximity, the shared language and, until recently, the shared values.

Through his pointless and nasty trade war and his off-handed calls for Canadian annexation, Mr. Trump has shattered the cultural connection between the countries — a connection nearly as old as mass culture itself, dating back to the early days of film when Toronto-born Mary Pickford became the first “America’s sweetheart” and co-founded United Artists. Canadians are boycotting American travel and American products, and that includes American cultural products. The spirit behind the countless “Buy Canadian” and “Elbows Up” signs in shop windows across the country has extended to an embrace of homegrown culture and a repudiation of Americana.

According to Indigo, Canada’s largest bookstore chain, sales by Canadian authors are up 25 percent from last year. The CBC, Canada’s national public broadcaster, has seen a 34 percent increase in time spent watching content on its streaming platform, Gem. The Globe and Mail, Canada’s national newspaper, concluded that “Canadians are genuinely changing their cultural habits.” Even as viewership of the Super Bowl rose to a new record in America, the average national viewership declined in Canada by 15 percent compared with the previous season.

Canada is the most glaring sign of a cultural shift, and the decline in American soft power runs deeper than Mr. Trump’s damage to this longstanding relationship. American presidents are often met with suspicion or animosity outside the country: to many, Ronald Reagan was a jingoist, Bill Clinton a narcissist, George W. Bush an idiot, Barack Obama a hypocrite, and so on. But the parallel attraction to American cool — itself often positioned as countercultural and subversive, from rock ’n’ roll to hip-hop — has rarely wavered.

Unfortunately, the current repudiation of American cultural exports could not be coming at a more precipitous time for the industries that create them. Over the past two decades, the American share of the global box office has declined from 92 percent to 66 percent. In 2022, 142,000 people were employed in Los Angeles County in the motion picture industry; by 2024, it was 100,000. U.S. music is also in decline. By 2023, over half of the artists generating $10,000 or more on Spotify were from non-English-speaking countries. The teen bedrooms of the world are no longer dominated by posters of American performers. The bedrooms of American teenagers are no longer dominated by them, either.

South Korea’s state-driven cultural model has explicitly fostered an environment that enables the success of various TV shows and pop acts, recognizing them as a force for soft power and export markets. China is imitating that model, and both are providing an increasingly robust alternative to Hollywood’s products and American popular music. In reaction to this decline, Mr. Trump has threatened to wield his favorite, and seemingly only, weapon, threatening to impose a 100 percent tariff on films produced outside of the United States — a proposition that doesn’t acknowledge that culture is not a tangible import like, say, aluminum.

Another erosive force is at work, one that’s more subtle than the normal cyclical economic cycles. To many foreign onlookers, it’s increasingly true that America is no longer attractive — either as a cultural ideal or as an aspiration. The country’s narrative has become incoherent, its brand toxic. Are you really going to stream the new movie “A House of Dynamite” and pretend that the president of the United States is a well-intentioned and considerate man who cares about the fate of the planet? America itself cannot even decide whether Superman (co-invented by a Canadian) is a good guy or not. Even Superman — who famously stands for truth, justice and the American way — is now domestically considered by some to be too foreign, too kind, too woke.

What did those Soviet teenagers love about Chubby Checker so long ago? What did they hear when they listened to “Let’s Twist Again”? They were encountering personal freedom and openness to the world; that’s what American greatness represented to them. But to global eyes now, American freedom has become a self-parody — a freedom policed by masked agents who don’t identify themselves. The sense of openness has crumbled. As a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent told The Times, “The border is everywhere now.” Who around the world would want to pretend they’re living in that country?

There is a seed of hope. The borders may be closing, but the lines remain open and global culture continues to flourish. The teenage bedroom of today has been conquered by difference: different languages, different traditions, different voices, different faces. There’s “Squid Game” playing on the TV, the Icelandic-Chinese singer Laufey singing in kids’ earbuds, and a poster of Blackpink on the wall. Lux, the new album by the Spanish flamenco-pop star Rosalía and produced with the former collaborators of Justin Bieber and Kanye West, contains lyrics in 13 languages. Stephen Miller can rant all he wants about it, but ICE cannot arrest it. The Russians who threw Chubby Checker bootleggers into jail learned the hard way: You can’t deport music.

Stephen Marche is the author, most recently, of “The Next Civil War.” He wrote from Toronto, where he lives.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section SR, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: America Is Losing the Fight for the Teenagers of the World

NY Times · Stephen Marche · November 9, 2025

4. Military Families Are Getting Paid, but Still Need Food Pantries

​Summary:

Despite continued pay during the shutdown, many U.S. military families rely on food pantries. About a quarter face food insecurity amid frequent moves, spouse unemployment, delayed reimbursements, inflation, and limited SNAP eligibility. Demand has surged near bases like Fort Hood. Pay raises help, but many still live paycheck to paycheck.

Comment: 25% of military families face food insecurity when the national average is 13.5%. What do both of those numbers say about our nation?

Military Families Are Getting Paid, but Still Need Food Pantries

WSJ

The shutdown is adding to long-running strain on servicemembers’ finances

By Dan Frosch and Elizabeth Findell

| Photography by Sergio Flores for WSJ

Updated Nov. 8, 2025 12:18 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/military-families-are-getting-paid-but-still-need-food-pantries-fa93bce5

A weekly food pantry for military members near Fort Hood in Texas.

• Approximately one-quarter of active-duty servicemembers and their families experience food insecurity, a rate higher than the 13.5% for overall U.S. households.
• Military families face financial strain due to frequent moves, high spouse unemployment rates and delayed government reimbursements.
• Military support organizations have seen a significant increase in demand for food assistance, with one group expanding from eight to 22 pantry sites since 2021.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Approximately one-quarter of active-duty servicemembers and their families experience food insecurity, a rate higher than the 13.5% for overall U.S. households.

Alicia Blevins’s husband, Nathaniel, brings home $3,200 a month as a Marine corporal at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. By the time the couple is done making their car payment, plus dealing with credit cards, phones, gas, insurance and other bills, they are usually left with about $350.

Alicia is looking for work, but jobs aren’t easy to find these days. So she heads to a food pantry near the base to stock up on boxes of pasta and cans of sauce.

“I can see it in my husband’s face every time we use a pantry. I feel ashamed that I have to go to a place to get free food,” she said.

A surprising number of military families have struggled to get sufficient food for years, their finances on a knife’s edge due to constant base moves, deployments and other pressures. The problem has persisted through several administrations.

Servicemembers are currently among a group of federal employees who continue to receive their pay during a government shutdown now entering its fifth week. Yet many military families are showing up at food pantries in greater numbers because of a longer-running financial squeeze. Some were there because they worried they wouldn’t be able to afford food if they didn’t get paid.

Inside a vast recreation center in Harker Heights, Texas, near Fort Hood, dozens of uniformed soldiers and wives cradling babies began lining up at 5 a.m., an hour and a half before a weekly food pantry for military members was scheduled to open in late October.

Servicemembers and their families in line at the weekly food pantry in Harker Heights, Texas, late last month.

“Two weeks ago we waited four hours in line,” said Alexis Stiles, whose husband is an Army Specialist, as she bounced her 8-month-old on her hip. “This is stress I shouldn’t be having.”

Stiles’s family relies on one income, not unusual for military families whose frequent moves can make it hard for spouses to lock down long-term work. Those who do find work sometimes find it in the federal government and are missing their paychecks.

“The anxiety this shutdown has brought to military families is real. When a parent in uniform is worrying about how to put food on the table, they can’t focus fully on the mission,” said Dorene Ocamb, an executive with Armed Services YMCA, a nonprofit that provides assistance to military members and organized the Fort Hood event.

The group had already been expanding its food-pantry operations to meet rising demand—from eight pantry sites in 2021 to 22 this year. The number of military family members or servicemembers using those sites more than doubled, jumping from nearly 62,000 in 2021 to more than 136,000 in 2024.

Since the shutdown began Oct. 1, the group has seen an even greater surge. At the two pantries the group runs near Fort Hood, there has been a 40% increase in usage, according to the group’s data. A pantry site in San Diego last month had to turn away dozens of military families and servicemembers because it ran out of food.

Armed Services YMCA, a nonprofit, had been expanding its food pantry operations to meet rising demand even before the government shutdown.

Surveys conducted by government researchers and the Military Family Advisory Network have shown that roughly a quarter of active-duty servicemembers and servicemembers’ families experience food insecurity, meaning they struggle to get sufficient food at times.

Beth Asch, a researcher with the Rand think tank who studies the issue, noted that food insecurity runs higher in the military. About 13.5% of U.S. households overall experience food insecurity at times, according to the most-recent federal calculations, from 2023.

This disparity exists even though military pay typically exceeds the average pay of civilians with similar ages and education as servicemembers, she said. Military pay for junior enlisted servicemembers ranges from about $57,000 to about $72,000 depending on rank, according to federal data. That includes a military allowance for housing.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Should the U.S. do more to support its military families? Join the conversation below.

Many factors contribute to military members’ economic vulnerability. Many of them rely on a single income. The rate of unemployment among military spouses hovers between around 21% and 23%, research shows, far higher than the current 4.3% national unemployment rate.

Military spouses often struggle to find jobs given the scramble of frequent base moves, which take place on average about every 27 months, and deployments. The burden of finding child care in new locations means many spouses stay home to take care of their kids.

Servicemembers also can face upfront moving costs when they receive orders to move to a new installation. Military families say that reimbursements from the federal government can take weeks or even months to process.

Another factor: Only a tiny fraction of active-duty military members or their spouses are enrolled in the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP—roughly 1%, according to federal estimates and surveys. Military family support groups say that is largely because the annual housing allowance servicemembers get from the military is counted as part of their earnings, meaning even those at the bottom of the pay scale often make too much money to qualify.

Katharina Sonera, a military spouse, said she had come to the previous week’s food pantry too late to get anything but spaghetti and a few canned items.

The economic turbulence of the past few years, especially inflation, has further strained military family budgets.

To better align salaries with civilian pay, Congress in 2024 approved a 4.5% pay raise for all troops, and an additional 10% pay increase for junior enlisted servicemembers. Both went into effect this year.

While the raises have helped, many military families still live paycheck to paycheck, and say the slightest financial ripple can cause stress.

“Because so many of us are meticulous in how we budget, the fear of missing a paycheck, or having that paycheck delayed, has sent military families into a panic because we know exactly when our money is going to run out,” said Monica Bassett, whose nonprofit Stronghold Food Pantry delivers food items to military families across the U.S. Over the past month, Bassett’s group has already served nearly five times its usual monthly number of servicemembers.

Some 286 separate households showed up to the Oct. 23 event near Fort Hood. Of those households, 60 were newcomers. Soldiers and families waited their turn in a long line snaking past rows of gym equipment to enter a small room stocked with shelves of peanut butter, jelly, canned vegetables, pasta, soup and some fresh items.

Army Specialist Kyle Koontz, who was in line with his pregnant wife and other members of his field artillery unit, said his commanding officer had advised “to do whatever we can to prepare” given the shutdown’s financial uncertainty.

Surveys have shown that roughly a quarter of active-duty servicemembers and servicemembers’ families experience food insecurity.

Blevins, the wife of the Camp Lejeune Marine corporal, had been getting food from pantries periodically over the past few years to offset rising grocery costs. As part of her husband’s September transfer from Camp Pendleton in Southern California, their family incurred about $6,000 in moving costs, she said. Blevins said she was told by military staff that reimbursements for moving will likely be delayed until the shutdown ends.

“Our men and women in uniform shouldn’t have to be going through this,” she said.

Write to Dan Frosch at dan.frosch@wsj.com and Elizabeth Findell at elizabeth.findell@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

5. Russian Casualties Rise, Ukraine Strikes Russian Power Facilities and the Battle of Pokrovsk Continues - The Big Five, 9 November edition

​Comment: Following analysis of Putin's War in Ukraine and Pacific Area activities MG Ryan provides the Big FIve (a couple of which we sent out in previous week or so but they are all worth revisiting):

1. Space Superiority

2. Military Officers After Liberalism

3. Intercepting Shaheds

4. The Military-Narrational Complex

5. Units Should Drive Drone Development

Russian Casualties Rise, Ukraine Strikes Russian Power Facilities and the Battle of Pokrovsk Continues - The Big Five, 9 November edition

My regular update on global conflict. This week: the Battle of Pokrovsk, Russian casualties and China's 3rd aircraft carrier commissions, as well as my recommended war and national security reads

Mick Ryan

Nov 08, 2025

substack.com · Mick Ryan

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/russian-casualties-rise-ukraine-strikes?i=

Pokrovsk. Image: Kyiv Post

For the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a destabilizing force in Europe and the world. And Russia is not alone in its efforts to undermine the global rules. As you know it is working with China, with North Korea, with Iran and others. They are increasing their defence industrial collaboration to unprecedented levels. They are preparing for long term confrontation. We cannot be naive. We must be prepared. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, 6 November.

As is normally the case these days, it has been another big week in international affairs, and the war in Ukraine.

The Ukrainians conducted an insertion of special force troops to hold open the route into the Pokrovsk salient, although this smacks of desperation rather than good tactics. Ukraine and Russia are pounding away at each other’s power generation and distribution system as another northern hemisphere winter approaches. Citizens in both nations face a cold, bleak winter with rolling blackouts in many areas.

In the Pacific, China commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, in the presence of President Xi. This is a significant technological achievement as the carrier is the first indigenously designed and produced carrier for the PLA Navy. China also continued its incursions into Taiwanese airspace, although at a slightly reduced tempo.

And, in other news, my brain is finally back to normal operations after a few days of reduced capacity due to jet lag!

Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

Image: @ZelenskyyUa

In Europe, the Drones Keep Coming. European authorities reported this week that more unidentified drone incursions occured in NATO airspace. The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration reported at least one unidentified drone flying over the Gothenburg Landvetter Airport on 6 November, which forced the diversion or cancelation of flights. On the same day, Belgium temporarily closed the Brussels Airport after an air traffic controller observed an unidentified drone. Belgian police confirmed on November 6 that unidentified drones flew near the Belgian Nuclear Research Center.

German General Warns of Future Russian Aggression. While presenting Operation Plan Germany this week - a new national defence plan aligned with NATO’s regional strategy - Lt. Gen. Alexander Sollfrank, head of the armed forces’ Operational Command, warned about future Russian aggression and stated that:

Russia is already today capable of carrying out a regionally limited attack on NATO territory…After the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and if its rearmament continues unchecked, a large-scale attack on NATO could become possible — and soon. That means we have to deal with the possibility of an attack against us, whether we like it or not. And beyond that, we have no time to lose.

Operation Plan Germany is part of Germany’s strategy of deterring Russian aggression by organising for up to 800,000 allied troops to move through Germany within 180 days to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Air Defence Forces. This week, President Zelenskyy appointed Yurii Cherevashenko to command this organisation, and has tasked him with integrating unmanned systems – in particular, interceptor drones – and strengthening our air defense capabilities with advanced armaments.

Russia’s Casualties on the Uptick. As expected, and forecast in previous weekly updates, Russian average weekly casualties have shown an increase as the calendar year draws to a close. This increase has been observed now in all four autumn-winter periods of this war. The increase coincides with the desire of the Russian government to achieve significant Russian strategic objectives.

In 2022, it was the escalation in Russian operations around Bakhmut. Last year, it was Putin’s desire to capture as much territory as possible to shape the views of Presidential contender Trump. This year, Putin seeks the capture of Pokrovsk to again shape the narrative it rolls out to the Trump administration and it to put itself in a favourable position for subsequent operations in Donetsk.

We should expect the average casualties to rise over the next two months at least. Despite this, the only assessment that can be made with these figures is that Ukraine is killing enough Russians to ensure that Russia cannot win this war, but is not killing enough to change Putin’s calculus. Unless there is a drastic increase in the overall number of Russians killed (which the Commander of the USF has discussed) and the kill ratio between Ukraine and Russia improves, it is hard to see any drastic changes in the trajectory of this war.

Image: @DefenceHQ

USF Update. The Unmanned Systems Forces released their monthly update for October on 7 November. Key statistics included in this month’s report include the following:

• 26,067 unique enemy targets were struck, including 8,060 enemy personnel, of whom 4,729 were killed.
• The share of the Unmanned Systems Forces in the total volume of targets struck/destroyed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is 33.5%.
• Over 25% of the enemy’s oil-refining capacity has been put out of action thanks to precise strikes by the Unmanned Systems Forces.
• Average cost to eliminate one russian serviceman — $784.
• Average cost to destroy one unit of military equipment — $949.

You can view the full update at this link.

The Battle for Pokrovsk. While Ukraine continues to fight to retain ground in the Pokrovsk salient, it appears that the Battle of Pokrovsk may be approaching its culmination. The insertion this week of special operations soldiers to hold open the route out of Pokrovsk for Ukrainian defenders was courageous but may only delay what appears to be the inevitable fall of Pokrovsk.

The Battle for Pokrvosk began in earnest in July 2024, and since then, the Russians have maintained the Pokrovsk axis of advance as their ground operations main effort. Even when Ukraine executed its incursion into Kursk in 2024, Russia sustained its efforts on the Pokrovsk axis of advance. As I wrote at the time:

For the foreseeable future therefore, both Ukraine and Russia must commit to conducting two major ground campaigns concurrently. While Russia is probably better placed to resource two such campaigns, neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to be able to do so into 2025…Unfortunately, as stunning and clever as the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has been, it may not change Putin’s overall war goals. Previous setbacks, including the Russian Army’s defeat in its 2022 Kyiv offensive, its defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson as well as the international sanctions regime, have not modified Putin’s overall goal of subjugating Ukraine and destroying its capacity to exist as a sovereign, prosperous democracy.

And so this campaign has played out. The Ukrainian Kursk campaign is largely over. Russia, freed from its need to clear the Ukrainians from Russia soil, has continued to throw troops at the Battle for Pokrovsk and to prepare for subsequent advances.

Progression of Russia's double envelopment of Pokrovsk since May 2025. Images: ISW

What will be the political and military impacts of a possible fall of Pokrovsk?

Political Impacts. The biggest impact of a fall of Pokrovsk will be to reinforce Russian strategic messaging about inevitable victory in this war. Of course, this proposition has no evidence given that in four years, Russia has lost over one million troops, taken less than 20% of Ukraine and is suffering massive damage to its economy from Ukrainian aerial assaults. But that won’t stop Putin, Lavrov and others from seeking to influence the Trump administration to pressure Ukraine to ‘stop the killing.’

The fall of Pokrovsk probably won’t do wonders for Zelenskyy’s popularity but he retains broad popularity and support of two thirds of the population. It is unlikely that Pokrovsk’s loss to Russia will have a major impact on Zelenskyy’s government given that he can demonstrate that the military has done everything possible to defend it. And, given the need to preserve the army is more important that retaining what is essentially now a dead city with no value as a logistics hub, the smart political move soon will be to withdraw Ukrainian troops while they can do so in good order.

Military Impacts. In many respects, the fall of Pokrovsk will simplify things for senior Ukrainian commanders in Eastern Ukraine. They will have straightened the defensive line, potentially allowing them to form some operational reserves to deny the Russians further advances if they take Pokrovsk.

Clearly this would also give the Russians a boost, and they will have an opportunity to potentially have an operational pause while they prepare for subsequent operations in the east. The seizure of the rest of Donetsk is a key political and military objective for Putin. Russian ground operations after Pokrovsk will be designed to achieve this goal.

The most likely campaign design to achieve this would be an operational level double envelopment of the Fortress Belt of cities in Eastern Ukraine. I have sketched out what this might look like on the map below.

Background map from DeepState Live.

Ukraine’s Long-Range Strike Campaign. Frequent readers here will know that I have covered the development of Ukraine’s deep strike capability over the past three and a half years. It has been a very impressive achievement for a nation that just four years ago had almost no capability to conduct long-range strike operations. In the intervening time, Ukraine has built a hybrid strategic strike force that is a mix of western and indigenous weapons, and mix of foreign and Ukrainian sourced target intelligence, and balance of technological and human capabilities to enhance the precision of their strikes.

You can read some of my recent assessments of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign, and the various components of Ukraine’s long-range strike force here, here and here.

A recent article of mine about what we can learn from Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, which can be read at this link.

For some time, the main effort of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign has been Russian energy infrastructure, primarily oil refineries and storage facilities. The supporting effort has been striking defence manufacturing sites (including this recent one which destroyed many Shahed drones) as well as munitions storage locations.

It now appears that Ukraine has shifted its targeting slightly to encompass the Russian power generation and distribution system. The Russian power plants struck in the past week (according to a list compiled by Stefan Korshak) include:

• Orel gas power plant, two explosions, fuel storage and main generator buildings hit and on fire.
• Vladimirskaya Power substation station, two hits.
• Zheleznegorsk power transmission station, Kursk region.
• Alechevsk city, Luhansk, power transmission station.
• Orel, city heating plant.
• Usman power transmission station, Lipets region.
• Vladimirskaya substation.
• Oryel heating plant.
• Yaroslavl region, two oil transfer stations hit.
• Volgorechensk, Kostroma thermal plant, supports Moscow.

As Korshak describes in his article for the Kyiv Post:

Since Oct. 13, according to Kyiv Post counts, Ukrainian strike planners have launched at least 29 separate strikes directly targeting power grid infrastructure inside Russia or occupied Ukrainian territories, with attacks almost always seemingly intended to hit flammable sections of a transformer station to set it afire. Over the same 3-week period Kyiv has launched a total 76 strikes, with the majority of attacks aiming at Russian capacity to process oil and gas products, or export them.

Prior to October, Ukraine targeted multiple Russian power generation and distribution facilities. The September strikes on Russian power infrastructure has been mapped by Shahed Tracker, and can be seen below.

Image: @ShahedTracker

So, there has been a shift in targeting by Ukraine. What are we to make of this?

First, it is clear that Ukraine is now producing sufficient long-range weapons to target a wider variety of Russian targets concurrently. This helps to overwhelm the Russian air defence system. While the Russians have demonstrated the ability to learn, adapt and improve their air defences, even they cannot defend every potential target at the same time. If the Ukrainians throw enough weapons at enough targets dispersed over a wide area, some will get through.

Second, it is unlikely the shift to targeting Russian power supplies is designed to bring Putin to the table. If over one million casualties can’t do this, a few power blackouts (which will not affect Putin or his senior leadership) is not going to achieve this. It could however be designed to foster a negotiation over halting the targeting of power plants by both sides.

Third, the means of conducting long-range strike has evolved since the beginning of this war. In 2021, the key methods for executing a long-range strike against an adversary were missiles launched from aircraft (particularly long-range bombers) as well as missiles fired from submarines and ships. Now, with the development of multiple classes of long-range drones which are produced in large numbers - and the introduction into service of ground-launched weapons such as PRSM and the Typhon system - western military organisations have a wider array of options to chose from in developing their deep strike capabilities. And, the flip side is, they have a wider range of threats that they must now defend against.

Finally, despite the huge expense and the mass use of aerial assault weapons so far in this war, they have proved again that this strategy is not a silver bullet in war. It can certainly cause significant damage, and pain to civilians and a nation’s war effort. But long-range strike operations by themselves are insufficient national tools by themselves for winning a war. As the evidence so far shows us in Ukraine, the deep strike campaigns of both sides has yet to force a negotiated resolution to the war.

Meanwhile, on the evening of 8 November, Russia launched a large, combined strike on critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine using strike UAVs, air-, ground-, and sea-based missiles. As described by the Ukrainian Air Force, the air defence forces detected and tracked 503 air attack weapons – 45 missiles (including 32 ballistic) and 458 UAVs of various types (about 300 Shaheds). The main directions of the strike were the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava regions. Around 406 of their drones and missiles were brought down by Ukrainian air defence units, according to reporting in the Kyiv Independent.

The Pacific

Image: via @TaiwanMonitor

China’s New Carrier. This week, the PLA Navy officially commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Hull No. 18), at the Yulin/Longpo Naval Base in the presence of President Xi. The first indigenously designed aircraft carrier for the Chinese navy, the new carrier is equipped with an electromagnetic catapult and recovery capability.

The carrier was launched in 2022 and has conducted nine series of sea trials. It is designed to carry up to 40 fixed wing aircraft plus helicopters. On display on the Fujian’s deck during the commissioning ceremony were the four types of aircraft most likely to form its initial airing: the fifth-generation Shenyang J-35 naval fighter; the Shenyang J-15T fourth-generation fighter; the KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft; and, the Hongdu Z-20J medium multirole naval helicopter.

The PLAN now has three aircraft carriers in service. Theoretically, this means they should be able to keep one deployed at all times.

The China Power site at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has a primer on the new aircraft carrier, which you can peruse at this link.

Image: @AaronMatthew_L

BrahMos in the Philippines. The BrahMos missile system is now operational with the Philippine Marine Corps. The Corps unveiled its first BrahMos missile battery during a 75th anniversary ceremony on 7 November. The battery is deployed in Zambales. From there, the BrahMos missiles can reach locations such as Scarborough Shoal.

Designed and built in India, the Brahmos is a ramjet-powered, long-range supersonic cruise missile which is capable of being launched from a variety of platforms including ground, air and naval platforms. In Indian service, the missile has a range of up to 900km, but the export version is limited to a range of 290km.

UAV Battalions for Taiwan’s Operational Theatres. Taiwan has announced that each of the Operational Theatres in its military command structure will be allocated an integrated UAV battalion by 2026. The Taiwanese Theater Command boundaries are shown in the graphic below.

Image: @TaiwanMonitor

Taking effect from 1 January 2022, the Taiwanese reorganised their three army corps and two defence commands into five main “theatres of operation”.

In a related development, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense has announced the reorganisation of drone development and employment into three key roles: joint operations, tactical, and combat

• At the joint operations level, Taiwan’s uncrewed aerial vehicles conduct long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike missions in the air and sea domains.
• At the tactical level, drones will execute reconnaissance and target identification, draw enemy air defences to waste missiles, and support joint anti-landing and coastal defence missions by Taiwan’s Theater Commands.
• In combat, drones will be employed to extend the range of other weapons, speed up target acquisition, and to conduct sustainment activities during prolonged operations.

North Korean missile test. This week, North Korea fired a single short-range ballistic missile. The missile landed in waters outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Image: @ModJapan_jp on Twitter / X.

Ghost Sharks in Production. This week, Anduril Australia opened its new Ghost Shark manufacturing facility in Sydney. The factory will produce these large, uncrewed underwater vessels for the Royal Australian Navy. The opening coincided with the rollout of the very first series-produced Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle ahead of its scheduled delivery date.

Image: Asian Military Review

*******

This week I published a couple of articles. I began the week publishing an article that summarised by recent visit to Ukraine, Poland, Germany and Canada. In this piece, I included the transcript of a speech I gave in Canada, called Confronting Complacency. You can read the article at this link.

I also published an article that summarised some of my insights from Ukraine about drone operations, which I briefed an Australian federal parliament committee about early in the week. You can read that piece here.

Finally, if you haven’t already read my recent report, Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific, you can do so here at the Australian Army Research Centre website where you can also download a pdf version of the full report.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new report that explores how the United States of America might compete against Russia and China in space from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, as well as an article from War on the Rocks about the future of the military profession. There are two useful articles on drone developments, including the Shahed interceptors developed by the Wild Hornets, as well as a good piece on the global battle of narratives.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Space Superiority

In this report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the author argues that the United States cannot treat space threats from China and Russia in isolation; instead, American must be prepared to deter or counter both simultaneously. To compete and deter in this environment, the author contends that the U.S. Space Force must adopt a more proactive approach and match efforts at deterrence by denial and resilience with investments in counter-space capabilities. Read the full report here.

2. Military Officers After Liberalism

In this article, the author examines alternate models for the profession of arms as the world and its political systems evolve in the 21st century. As the author writes, “if liberalism weakens, the profession of arms will inevitably adapt to whatever civic order replaces it. Because the military has always drawn its legitimacy from its regime, officers ought to be prepared to redefine professionalism in post-liberal contexts rather than assume present norms will endure.” The full article can be read at this link.

3. Intercepting Shaheds

In this article from Interesting Engineering, the development and employment of low-cost, Shahed interceptor drones is examined. Developed by the Wild Hornets, this new, low-cost vehicle is designed to lower the cost of intercepting Shades, and provide an affordable solution to Russia’s attempts to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defences with large numbers of Shahed drones. You can read the full article at this link.

4. The Military-Narrational Complex

In this article published by Foreign Affairs, the author argues that “one way to think about the current state of the world is to imagine it occupying the intersection of story and war. The story has gained ascendancy as a vehicle for understanding the world while the ability to interpret narrative has atrophied.” The key argument is that the consumers of extant narratives must be better at interpreting the kinds of strategic messages and narratives propagated by governments and other institutions, and make their own judgements about what the truth really is. The article can be read here.

5. Units Should Drive Drone Development

In this article published by the U.S. Army’s Military Review, the author proposes a leading role for army units in driving the development of drones, and their accompanying tactics and organisational changes. As the author notes, “the Army should lead the world in developing capabilities for small-drone warfare. It does not because the Army’s process, while designed to take input from operational units, still holds them at too far a distance. If the Army wants maximum speed and agility, units must do more than inform the process—they must drive it.” The full article is available at this link.

Share

Futura Doctrina is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

substack.com · Mick Ryan

6. ‘No structure to say yes’: can Chinese investment still find a home in America?

​Summary:

Beijing is pressing Washington to ease investment restrictions, but Chinese firms still face steep U.S. barriers driven by national security and local politics. While Trump appears more open to Chinese investment, especially in green tech, CFIUS scrutiny, state opposition, and political distrust persist. Experts suggest America lacks a clear framework to approve Chinese investments.

Comment: How much investment do we want from China? Don't they already have a lot of our T-Bills? (I seem to recall that China owns nearly 3% of our T-Bills and I thought it was up to 7% at one point).

Some background information:

As of early 2025, China held approximately US $760 to $785 billion of U.S. Treasury securities. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities?utm

 Given U.S. publicly held federal debt is roughly US $29 trillion, China’s holdings represent about 2.6%–2.7% of this total.  https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080615/china-owns-us-debt-how-much.asp?utm

‘No structure to say yes’: can Chinese investment still find a home in America?

Even as Beijing pushes for an opening, US rules, local backlash and political fear keep China on the sidelines

South China Morning Post

Bochen Hanin Washington

Published: 1:00am, 4 Nov 2025Updated: 2:48am, 4 Nov 2025

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3331336/can-chinese-investment-still-find-home-america

Long-simmering debates in Washington about the benefits of increased investment from China were revived in recent weeks after Beijing reportedly pushed US President Donald Trump’s administration to roll back national security restrictions on Chinese deals in the US.

But despite signs of high-level political warming to the idea, analysts say the path forward for Chinese firms remains steep given federal and state restrictions and the realities of congressional and local politics.

China’s security rollback request came up during September trade talks in Madrid, with Beijing dangling the prospect of a large investment package. No such pledge immediately came out of the Trump-Xi summit last week.

After the talks, Trump said China felt very “strongly” about investing in the US. “They have investments and they will invest,” he told reporters.

In September, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told Fox Business that in Madrid the two sides had discussed “the investment climate in the United States for Chinese companies”.

China’s senior trade negotiator, Li Chenggang, told reporters the US had “expressed its willingness to move together with China … when it comes to reducing barriers to investment”.

Beijing has repeatedly urged Washington to create a non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies, which in recent years have faced growing restrictions over concerns ranging from data security to military espionage.

In a September phone call, Chinese President Xi Jinping himself urged Trump to create “open” and “fair” conditions for Chinese investors.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer attends the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit, last month in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Photo: AP

The two leaders are expected to meet again next year. The discussions so far, meanwhile, set up a possible departure from a long-standing status quo: Beijing is testing whether Washington’s rhetoric on reshoring can coexist with its years-long attempt to put up walls against Chinese businesses, including those in strategic sectors.

Is Trump changing how Chinese can invest?

“The space for Chinese investment in the US is a complicated one … but it’s shifting,” said Jeremy Wallace, a professor of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

“Trump is particularly interested in investment in America, making things in America,” Wallace continued, noting that there was “a little bit more willingness” than under former president Joe Biden to accept Chinese investment, including in green tech sectors where China was ahead.

“Rather than it being a national security issue for the United States, where we’re worried about our intellectual property being stolen by Chinese firms, the story is much more about Chinese firms bringing technology to the US to hopefully allow it to diffuse and help build up supply chains in these advanced sectors.”

Trump himself has fuelled talk of this shift. On the 2024 campaign trail, he indicated multiple times that he would prefer Chinese carmakers to set up factories in the US than in Mexico.

In his second term, he has purged many of his firmest China hawks, including David Feith, the author of the “America First Investment Policy” presidential memo that called for a crackdown on Chinese investments.

Trump’s proposed TikTok joint venture, too, represents what a former senior government official calls a “new approach to thinking about Chinese investment and cooperation between Chinese and US entities”.

Policies ‘getting ahead of politics’

But Chinese firms face an uphill battle, especially given that many of the cleantech sectors where they excel – and hope to expand outside China – are the same ones targeted by federal legislation and policy.

“The policies are getting ahead of the politics,” said Kate Logan, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, noting that while Trump had provided a soft political opening, firms were confronted with an “increasingly complex” and cumbersome regulatory environment.

Preliminary framework agreed ahead of Trump-Xi meeting

Preliminary framework agreed ahead of Trump-Xi meeting

Restrictions from recent years include the 2021 Uygur Forced Labour Prevention Act, which presumes any goods made in Xinjiang involve forced labour and bars their import, and a 2024 rule effectively prohibiting Chinese navigation and communications hardware or software in cars – both major hurdles for joint ventures or factories that rely on Chinese inputs.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) has been at the heart of the constraints on Chinese acquisitions and other investments over the past decade. Congress expanded the Treasury Department-led panel’s powers in 2018, and since then it has blocked or forced the sale of a range of Chinese-linked investments – from a cryptocurrency mining company operating near a US military base to the gay dating app Grindr – on national security grounds.

The regulatory environment was complicated earlier this year when Congress strengthened “foreign entity of concern” rules that make it harder for firms tied to Chinese companies to access Biden-era tax credits for green energy projects.

Political fears persist

State-level pressure against Chinese investment has also accelerated in the past decade. In recent years, civil society groups such as State Armor and State Shield have formed to advance policies that discourage acceptance of Chinese investment and other forms of engagement.

“China is at war with America, and America has finally woken up to that,” said Joe Gebbia, the founder of State Shield, adding that he planned to engage all 50 US states to help “protect” them against China.

Last week, the state of Michigan publicly retracted its subsidies for a planned factory by Chinese battery maker Gotion – a move that effectively marked the death of the project, years after lawmakers and local groups first raised concerns about the company’s Chinese ownership.

Opponents of Gotion’s project gather in Green Charter Township, Michigan, in November 2023. Photo: Facebook

Interest is uneven across the country. Some states, such as Oregon, have recently sent representatives to China expressing interest in Chinese investment, according to Zhou Mi, a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

But others, like Florida and Texas, have introduced new laws that make investment harder, including ones that would restrict Chinese citizens from buying property.

Asked at an event last month whether he would support Chinese investment in the US, John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, pointed to his opposition to Gotion.

He said that while he normally welcomed new jobs in his district, he was uneasy about backing a company whose corporate documents referenced ties to the Communist Party.

Addressing the same topic ahead of last week’s Trump-Xi summit, Raja Krishnamoorthi, the top Democrat on the committee, stressed safeguarding national security. CFIUS “doesn’t work as well as it should right now”, he said, adding that there could be legislation to “beef” it up and make it more “efficient and effective”.

Ted Fertik of the BlueGreen Alliance, an advocacy group for labour unions and environmental organisations, said another obstacle facing Chinese firms was the tendency for local actors to link trade and foreign direct investment debates.

“For many stakeholders, you can’t make that separation. A lot of their concerns about Chinese FDI trace back to their concerns about how China conducts itself in the system of global trade,” Fertik said.

And that added to local pressures against investment. “Among union workers in sectors hit hard by Chinese imports, the sense of conflict has been very high for 15 or 20 years, and it hasn’t really receded,” he continued.

Li Chenggang, China’s senior trade negotiator, says the US has “expressed its willingness to move together with China towards the same goal when it comes to reducing barriers to investment”. Photo: DPA

Chinese investors show mixed appetite

The Chinese side, too, shows hesitation to enter the US market, with only a fraction of current outbound investment going to the US.

After peaking at a record US$57 billion in 2016, Chinese investment in the US has dwindled, coming in at US$2.7 billion for the first three quarters of 2025, according to data on completed deals compiled by the Rhodium Group.

Beijing has at times made it harder for its companies to invest abroad, including earlier this year when it reportedly tightened approvals for firms seeking to set up or expand operations in the US.

In recent weeks, the messaging has been more encouraging. Speaking at an event after the leaders’ summit, Qiu Wenxing, a minister of the Chinese embassy in Washington, said Beijing believed Chinese investment in the US was “mutually beneficial”, adding that he hoped Trump’s positive signalling “could be translated into concrete actions”.

Chinese firms are also showing “mixed” appetites, according to Cameron Johnson of Shanghai-based consulting firm Tidalwave Solutions, noting that many were waiting for others to be first movers.

There was no easy path forward, he said. Joint ventures could help Chinese companies navigate the complex US system with the help of an American company, but those were subject to CFIUS review, while greenfield projects – those built from scratch – required major upfront capital.

Firms also worried about exposing their technology and weak demand as Chinese-linked products lost access to US tax credits, Johnson said.

“There’s interest from sectors ranging from specialty housewares to green tech,” he said. “But there’s a lot of uncertainty of how those kinds of agreements would actually work.

“There are enough horror stories. Chinese companies don’t really want to spend a whole bunch of money, either on consultants or lawyers. For now they’d rather opt for markets elsewhere, like Southeast Asia.”

Still, some firms, particularly in clean energy, may need the US market.

“They’re all really hurting because there’s a very intense competitive pressure and their margins are very low at home … all things being equal, those Chinese firms would like to be here, and the Chinese government would most likely let them come,” said Michael Davidson, a senior associate in Chinese business and economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Chinese EV giant BYD maintains a limited presence in the US. Photo: Reuters

Analysts note that some clean energy firms, including solar maker Longi and electric vehicle giant BYD, were already in the US – either through joint ventures or by maintaining a limited presence while waiting for conditions to improve.

“It’s those firms that already have a foothold in the US that will be able to navigate some of those restrictions going forward,” Logan said.

A framework to say ‘yes’

Rush Doshi, a senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former director for China on Biden’s National Security Council, said Chinese investment in the US would only work with a regulatory structure that could both protect security interests and enable engagement.

“We have CFIUS, which says no; we have no structure to say yes.

“I’d like to see America – and I think maybe President Trump and this Congress can do it – come up with a kind of Chinese-style whitelist approach to Chinese investment that would allow us to benefit from their great advantages in manufacturing and indigenise some of them in the US,” Doshi said.

Analysts broadly agree that Trump could be the catalyst to reset the investment relationship.

“If it’s going to happen, Trump could sort of make it happen,” said Evan Medeiros, a senior fellow at Georgetown University.

Even the recently purged Feith agrees. In an op-ed arguing against Chinese investment last week, he concluded that “the decision belongs to Trump. Only his name was on the ballot.”

South China Morning Post

7. A 2019 US War Game on Venezuela Forecast Chaos After Maduro’s Downfall

​Summary:

A 2019 Pentagon war game predicted post-Maduro Venezuela would descend into violent chaos, with clashes among loyalist troops, drug cartels, and Colombian guerrillas. Consultant Douglas Farah warned stabilizing the country could require tens of thousands of U.S. troops. Despite Trump’s threats and covert plans, Farah concluded Maduro’s removal remains unlikely and perilous.

Comment: The important question: What comes next?

A 2019 US War Game on Venezuela Forecast Chaos After Maduro’s Downfall

Drug cartels, anti-US rebels would fill leadership void, Pentagon study predicted

substack.com · Michael Isikoff

https://www.spytalk.co/p/a-2019-us-war-game-on-venezuela-forecast?r=7i07&utm

A Maduro pilot declined the $50 million reward, the A.P. reported.

As a Pentagon consultant during the first Trump administration, Douglas Farah participated in war game exercises contemplating what might happen in Venezuela if president Nicolas Maduro were forced from power.

Although carefully hedged, the conclusions were stark: There would most likely be violent clashes throughout the country—among military units still loyal to the regime, an increasingly powerful drug cartel and, most ominously, two extreme leftist Colombian guerrilla armies, the FARC and the ELN, who have “greatly expanded” their control of huge swaths of western Venezuela. The rebels “have decades of combat experience” and “view the United States as their principal enemy,” Farah wrote in an unclassified report for Pentagon intelligence officials after participating in the Venezuela war games.

In short, there would be “chaos for a sustained period of time with no possibility of ending it,” Farah, the president of IBI Consulting, a security firm that specializes in Latin America, said this week on the SpyTalk podcast, elaborating on his report about the prospects for a post-Maduro Venezuela.

And if the U.S. military were called upon to restore order and maintain the peace, the challenges would be so enormous it would require “tens of thousands” of U.S. troops, added Farah.

“You’re talking a capital city of several million people. You’re talking ports that need to be protected.” And beyond that, “are you going to go into the hinterlands and the Colombian border where you’re going to face [up to] 4,000 heavily armed FARC dissidents who have been fighting for 60 years?”

For the U.S. military to enter Venezuela and “hope to establish territorial control writ large would be probably impossible for what the US has a tolerance for,” Farah told SpyTalk.

Farah’s warnings about the dangerous uncertainties of a post-Maduro Venezuela have taken on new significance in recent weeks as the Trump administration has dramatically ramped up its military build up in the Caribbean, including dispatching the Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, the country’s largest, and running B-1 and B-52 bomber missions off the Venezuelan coast—as part of a campaign that appears designed to intimidate Maduro and expel him from power.

Iraq Redux?

In many ways, the questions about a post-Maduro Venezuela echo those that were raised by critics on the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Few questioned then that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, not unlike Maduro today, was an authoritarian thug who maintained power by ruthlessly suppressing dissent. But it’s one thing to get rid of a nasty dictator. It’s quite another, as U.S. officials in Iraq learned to their dismay, to plan for what comes next— the proverbial day after.

To be sure, there is considerable uncertainty about exactly what Trump has in mind in Venezuela, if he has settled on anything. Last week, The Miami Herald reported that Trump was prepared to strike Venezuela “at any moment.” The New York Times reported this week that administration officials were contemplating a range of options that included direct attacks on military units that protect Maduro and seizing the country’s oil fields. That was followed by a Washington Post report that Secretary of State Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had given a classified briefing for select members of Congress that the administration “is not currently preparing to target Venezuela directly.”

And yet Trump himself, when asked in a CBS Sixty Minutes interview last Sunday if Marduro’s days as president were numbered, responded: “I would say yeah. I think so, yeah.”

Whatever Trump has in mind, the challenges that U.S. officials will face are considerable. Farah knows them well.

A former journalist for the Washington Post among other outlets, he has focused for years on the iron grip that transnational criminal organizations have on countries in Latin America and Africa.He laid them out in regard to Venezuela in his report to Pentagon officials six years ago. The Cartel de los Soles drug cartel, the principal focus of his study, is headed by senior members of the Venezuelan military and controls the country’s ports, which it uses to facilitate cocaine trafficking, Farah wrote in his report, a copy of which he shared with SpyTalk.

At the time of the war games, Pentagon officials were contemplating scenarios based on opposition leader Juan Guaido taking power. In that event, wrote Farah, “we expect a low-intensity armed effort by the Cartel to retain territorial control of key resources such as gold mines and cocaine labs.”

Give a gift subscription

Just how much strategic thinking has gone into how to prepare for such scenarios today, not to mention dealing with virulently anti-American guerrilla armies on the Colombian border (especially now that there is an unfriendly Colombian government) remains just as unclear as Trump’s immediate military plans.

“I’m sure the military is pulling its hair out because they have scenarios planned out and they will do different things,” said Farah. “But everyone’s guessing at what might be ordered. They have no clarity.”

There is, as a possible alternative to direct military action, the prospect of CIA covert operations to destabilize the Maduro regime. Trump last month confirmed he had signed a highly classified “finding” authorizing the CIA to conduct covert actions inside the country.But the scope of those actions is far from clear— and Farah notes U.S. efforts in the past to persuade Maduro intimates to turn on him have proved problematic at best.

Spurned Offer

The Associated Press recently reported on one such effort— an attempt by a top U.S. Homeland Security agent in the Dominican Republic to lure Maduro’s top pilot — offering him the $50 million U.S. bounty for Maduro’s capture — to fly him not to where he was planning to go but to a foreign country where the Venezuelan leader could be arrested and extradited to the United States to face drug trafficking charges. But the pilot ultimately rejected the offer, telling the agent in a text message: “We Venezuelans are cut from a different cloth. The last thing we are is traitors.”

One big challenge to any such covert scheme to recruit Maduro defectors: The regime has been protected for years by Cuban counter-intelligence officers who identify potential dissidents and are “really, really good at what they do,” said Farah. “So I think [covert action] would be tough, but not impossible.”

Asked if he believes Maduro is likely to be in power a year from now, his answer was a sobering one.

“I would guess, yes,” he said. “Because all the options to bring him down are so bad.”

You can find the SpyTalk podcast on Simplecast, Apple, Spotify, You Tube or wherever you like to listen.

SpyTalk is a wholly reader-supported publication. We can’t do this kind of reporting without your financial contribution. So how about upping to paid or taking out a free trial right here and now?

Share

substack.com · Michael Isikoff

8. America and China circle each other in the South China Sea

​Summary:

Tensions in the South China Sea have surged as U.S. and Chinese forces shadow each other near Scarborough Shoal. After accidents aboard the USS Nimitz and a deadly Chinese ramming incident, fears of escalation grow. Washington vows to defend the Philippines, while Beijing tightens control. Talks continue, but confrontation looms.

​Comment: Naval tensions are the highest in years? I am reminded of this quote from our friend the Philippine Ambassador to the US:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

 – Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

America and China circle each other in the South China Sea

Naval tensions around Scarborough shoal are at their highest in years

https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/11/06/america-and-china-circle-each-other-in-the-south-china-sea

Chinese coastguard v flimsy Philippine fishing outrigger: no contestPhotograph: Getty Images

Nov 6th 2025

|

SINGAPORE

|

3 min read

Listen to this story

I

T HAS BEEN a tense final deployment for USS Nimitz, America’s oldest aircraft-carrier and one of the world’s largest. On October 26th one of its helicopters went down in the waters of the South China Sea. Half an hour later, an F-18 fighter jet launched from the Nimitz crashed, too. Military leaders are not saying what happened, but President Donald Trump, speaking to journalists, blamed it on “bad fuel”. Whatever the cause, the loss of two aircraft in short order will have pulled at nerves already frayed by one of the tensest moments in the sea, a regional flashpoint, in recent years.

The presence of the Nimitz in the South China Sea comes amid tensions between China and the Philippines, an American ally, over Scarborough shoal. There coral reefs enclose a large lagoon about 135 nautical miles (250km) west of Manila Bay, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone; it is the only maritime feature for a good distance. In 2012 China pushed Philippine vessels away from Scarborough shoal and has controlled the area since with a constant presence of coastguard and fishing vessels. Between 2013 to 2015 it built seven military bases, three of them large air bases, by reclaiming the sea around specks of land farther south in the South China Sea. But it has till now stopped short of terraforming to build a base on the shoal. In 2016 Barack Obama supposedly told President Xi Jinping that doing so would cross an American red line. That line, at least until now, has held.

Map: The Economist

Earlier this year China began to treat the presence of Philippine vessels around Scarborough and other contested rocks and reefs more aggressively. And on August 11th, while pursuing a Philippine coastguard vessel near the shoal, a Chinese coastguard vessel accidentally rammed one of its own naval ships. China has not acknowledged casualties, but the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, reports that two Chinese coastguards probably lost their lives in the accident. Philippine coastguards caught it all on video, greatly embarrassing China.

Tensions have since run high around Scarborough shoal. Aggressive vessel handling by China has persisted, raising the risk of Filipino lives being lost in another ramming incident. America has a difficult balancing act. It is bound by treaty to defend Philippine forces in the sea, a promise that the Trump administration repeats, signalling that it will come to the Philippines’ defence. Yet doing so might raise tensions between America and China to perilous levels.

Throughout October, American and Philippine forces have been exercising in the South China Sea, along with ships from allies such as Australia, France and Japan. The Nimitz is the latest, hefty, addition to an increased naval presence. Chinese vessels have shadowed the fleet from not far away. CBS, an American broadcaster, reports that the Pentagon is considering launching HIMARS rockets towards the shoal. America has launched them in the South China Sea before, but only as part of routine exercises and not aimed at Scarborough. The Pentagon has not denied the CBS report.

At least the two powers are talking. On November 1st America’s defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, met his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, on the sidelines of a security conference in Malaysia—a first meeting between the two men. And in an unusual step, they spoke again by phone the following day. As they did, satellite photographs showed the Nimitz just over 100 nautical miles south-east of Scarborough shoal. Tension over the reefs seems bound to continue. ■

Stay on top of our defence and international security coverage with The War Room, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.

9. Ottawa plans to spend big on defence. But is there a long-term vision for Canada’s military?

Summary:

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s first budget delivers Canada’s largest defence boost since the Korean War, $84 billion over five years, to rebuild a struggling military. Funds target pay raises, modernization, infrastructure, and cyberdefence. Yet critics note Ottawa lacks a coherent long-term strategy, warning political will and execution problems could undermine lasting military renewal.

Ottawa plans to spend big on defence. But is there a long-term vision for Canada’s military?

The Globe and Mail · Steven Chase · November 8, 2025

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-federal-budget-2025-defence-spending-canadian-military-carney/

Mark Carney’s first budget has delivered the biggest increase in defence spending in decades, as the government seeks to rebuild the military at a time when the Prime Minister says Canada can no longer rely on the United States for protection.

The fiscal plan, tabled a week before Remembrance Day, includes $84-billion to the Department of National Defence over five years, believed to be the biggest short-term cash infusion for the military since the Korean War. The new spending will go to pay raises, precision-strike capabilities, upgrading aging infrastructure and cyberdefences, among other things.

It’s a dramatic reversal of fortune for the Canadian Armed Forces, which has been dogged for years with problems that include recruiting new members, rusting-out equipment, declining levels of combat readiness and sexual misconduct allegations that led to significant churn in top leadership.

Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne holds a copy of the federal budget in the House of Commons on Nov. 4. The budget delivered the biggest increase in defence spending in decades.Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press

But the windfall is arriving without a new detailed strategy for a department that has a history of failing to spend allotted funds even with more meagre budgets. The Carney government has yet to produce a fully fledged defence policy that would lay out a long-term vision for the military.

In the absence of an imminent threat, Canadians have long debated the various roles of its standing military: peacekeeping, obligations to allies, defence of the homeland, and overseas combat deployments to root out terrorism or aggression such as Afghanistan or Korea. The Carney government’s budget says only that the significant cash injection is necessary to defend Canada “in an increasingly dangerous and divided world.”

Whatever the answer, the risk also remains that sustained political will to fund a significant rebuild of the Canadian military could falter in future years as it has in days past.

Retired general Wayne Eyre, former chief of defence staff between 2021 and 2024, says persistent underfunding of the CAF was an issue while he was in the Forces.Spencer Colby/The Canadian Press

Retired general Wayne Eyre, who served as chief of the defence staff between 2021 and 2024, said he wished this money had arrived when he was still in the Forces.

“I was banging my head against the wall trying to get this type of investment done while I was still serving,” Mr. Eyre said. “So I’m happy for the institution, happy for the country.”

He said persistent underfunding dates back farther than many Canadians might realize.

“We have been under resourced for probably a couple of generations in terms of the expectations that were put on the Canadian Armed Forces.”

Prime Minister Mark Carney stands inside the cargo hold of a Boeing CC-177 aircraft during a tour of Canadian Forces Base 8 Wing Trenton in August. Spencer Colby/THE CANADIAN PRESS

The government’s fiscal plan said the new spending would give the Armed Forces “the tools they need to defend every square foot of our sovereign territory, from the sea floor to the Arctic to cities to cyberspace, and to protect Canadians from present and emerging threats.”

The budget earmarked new money for recruiting, training, equipment, military infrastructure and cyberdefence capabilities, as well as a stand-alone agency to handle procurement, and money to beef up Canada’s military industrial base. It also set aside $2.7-billion for three years to pay for Operation Reassurance − the Forces’ largest overseas mission − which supports deterrence measures on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank through a deployment in Latvia.

Mr. Carney, speaking to a Toronto audience Friday, pitched the defence spending as an economic play in which more of the money gets spent in Canada.

“It’s not just about protecting Canada,” the Prime Minister said. “It’s protecting Canada first and foremost. But it’s an enormous opportunity to build the cutting-edge industries of the future.”

The fiscal plan only offers a 30,000-foot view on how the money will be spent – with many details still to come.

The new Department of National Defence cash was the budget’s biggest single funding for any department by cash outlay, John Fragos, spokesman for Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne said.

Prime Minister Mark Carney tours the Adazi Military base in Latvia in August. The budget set aside $2.7-billion over three years to pay for Operation Reassurance, which supports deterrence measures through a deployment in Latvia.Christinne Muschi/The Canadian Press

David Perry, president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute think tank, said as far as he can determine this represents the largest short-term boost in military funding since the 1950s, when Canada was fighting in the Korean War.

For instance, the year-over-year increase for the Department of National Defence between the current 2025-26 fiscal year and the year prior is about 38 per cent, he said. That pushes DND’s budget alone – not including defence-related spending in other departments – to about $48-billion this year, up from about $34.5-billion in 2024-25, Mr. Perry said.

Consistent scarcity in the military has led to a litany of problems that include delayed procurement. “We’re sailing ships 10 years or more longer than they were designed for. We’re flying fighter aircraft 15 to 20 years beyond their expected operational life,” Mr. Perry said.

In 2023, an external review warned Canada’s CF-18 fighter aircraft force was “in crisis” and suffering from low morale, high rates of departure among instructor pilots and a shortage of maintenance technicians, impairing its ability to meet defence obligations to allies.

In hearings last year, the Commons defence committee was warned by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, which represents more than 400,000 retired and active members of the Armed Forces, that while NATO countries should have more than 30 days of ammunition on hand, Canada had only enough for a few days.

“If Canada were called on to participate in a major operation, only 58 per cent of the Canadian Armed Forces would be available to respond, and 45 per cent of the Canadian Armed Forces’ equipment is currently unavailable or unusable,” then CDA executive director Youri Cormier told MPs.

Prime Minister Mark Carney speaks during a press conference at CFB Trenton in August. Among the challenges facing the CAF is recruiting and retaining members. An external review in 2023 warned of high rates of departure among instructor pilots and a shortage of maintenance technicians in Canada's CF-18 fighter aircraft force, impairing their ability to meet defence obligations to allies. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Spencer Colby

On top of this, the Forces were running into problems retaining people and recruiting new ones. In 2024, then defence minister Bill Blair bluntly said this crisis represented a “death spiral for the Canadian Armed Forces” if not fixed.

It was no surprise, then, that the new budget allocates 25 per cent of the boost in defence spending to a pay increase for Canadian Armed Forces − announced in June and retroactive to April − to help retain and recruit more people. This included a 20-per-cent increase for the lowest ranks, 13 per cent for non-commissioned members and junior officers, and 8 per cent for senior officers.

Retired general Tom Lawson, who also served as chief of the defence staff, said he has a son in his 40s who’s a pilot in the Forces and was approaching the point where some pilots might leave to fly for commercial air carriers. He said the new investments and pay raise “has sealed it” for his son, who will now likely remain in the Forces for a full 30- to 35-year career.

The budget allocates nearly $18-billion for new equipment over five years including long-range precision strike capabilities that could include mobile missile launchers and extended-range and anti-ship missile systems. Other priorities include counterdrone gear that can be used by Canadian troops in Latvia to detect and neutralize small drones, as well as a range of armoured vehicles.

What’s missing is money for submarines, which will cost up to $2-billion each. Canada is looking at buying up to 12 subs with a serious offensive capability to launch missile strikes. This acquisition would make it the first time in history the Royal Canadian Navy has more than a token presence underwater. Right now, it has four subs, of which only one is normally operational. The Liberals say the money for new subs will be in future budgets.

National Defence Minister David McGuinty and Prime Minister Mark Carney join South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok and Hahnwa Group vice chairman Kim Dong Kwan on a tour of submarines at Hanwha Ocean Shipyard in Geoje Island, South Korea, on Oct. 30. Mr Carney faces a historic choice between South Korea and Europe for the purchase of a 12-submarine fleet. Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press

The budget funds a stand-alone defence procurement agency that’s charged with tackling the delays and spiralling costs that have become a hallmark of military purchasing in Canada.

Back in 2024, a defence policy update under then prime minister Justin Trudeau laid out top spending priorities, many of which will remain. These include sustaining military equipment with sufficient spare parts and upgrades, enabling more domestic ammunition production, installing maritime sensors to surveil ocean traffic, building out a string of northern supply hubs to support Arctic operations, ground-based air defences and a new focus on drones.

The Canadian government isn’t finished with defence spending hikes. The budget includes more than $9-billion in additional annual spending that Mr. Carney announced in June to enable Canada to reach a long-overdue NATO alliance commitment to spend 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence.

That same month, at the NATO summit in The Hague, the Prime Minister also committed Canada to boost core military spending much further – to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035. That will require $30-billion to $40-billion more in additional annual funds.

Prime Minister Mark Carney visits Fort York Armoury in Toronto with Defence Minister David McGuinty, left, and Chief of the Defence Staff Jennie Carignan, in June.Arlyn McAdorey/Reuters

Defence Minister David McGuinty, in an interview, said he has been told by officials that the budget’s spending will take Canada to between 2 per cent to 2.4 per cent of GDP, depending on the size of Canada’s economy. (Spending for NATO calculations includes more than just the National Defence budget.)

At the heart of the defence spending is a plan, funded by $6.6-billion over five years, to build a stronger homegrown military industrial base, Mr. McGuinty said.

He said more than 70 cents of each procurement dollar is spent on U.S. military goods and the Carney government wants to keep more of this money at home. “We’ve got the electricity, we’ve got the inputs. We’ve got the steel and the aluminum, we’ve got the engineering capabilities,” he said. “It’s an opportunity to expand on the 600 companies we have now.”

Mr. McGuinty said General Jennie Carignan, chief of the defence staff, is working on ideas that could significantly expand Canada’s military reserves as an adjunct to the regular forces. “One of the things we’ve heard is Canadians want to be more engaged. They want to be helpful. If there’s a wildfire, if there’s a flood, if there’s some sort of other emergency situation, they want to be able to contribute.” Mr. McGuinty said the Department of National Defence is looking at Scandinavian countries that include Finland which is significantly expanding its reserves.

A bigger presence in the Arctic, where global warming is making ship navigation easier, is also part of the budget. The Liberals are moving ahead with plans to expand forward operating bases in the North and a new $1-billion Arctic infrastructure fund – not part of the Department of National Defence budget – that will pay for new airports, sea ports and all-season roads in the region that would have dual-use applications for both civilians and the military.

Canadian soldiers with the 5th Canadian Division participate in Operation Nanook, the Canadian Armed Forces's annual Arctic training and sovereignty operation, in Inuvik in March, 2025. A larger presence in the Arctic, a region of increasing strategic importance, is also part of the budget.COLE BURSTON/AFP/Getty Images

Mr. Eyre said Canada grew complacent about military spending because “we’ve had the luxury of being one of the most secure countries in the world.” But rising geopolitical instability, as well as advances in weaponry, from cyberattacks to missiles, have eroded this security.

He said he thinks “peak threat” is approaching due to the rising ambitions of countries such as Russia and China.

“We’ve got global authoritarian leaders who see themselves as men of history and destiny who want to accomplish certain things in their lifetime, whether it’s the unification of China and Taiwan, or whether it’s re-establishing the mythical Russian Empire,” Mr. Eyre said. “These men are not getting any younger, and they’ve surrounded themselves with yes men, and they don’t welcome bad news, so that just raises the opportunity for miscalculation.”

Andrea Charron, director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, said Ottawa should be planning a Canadian quick reaction fighter facility in co-operation with the U.S., Denmark and Greenland at the U.S.’s northerly Pituffik Space Base in Greenland to speed up response times for the Royal Canadian Air Force in the Arctic.

Prof. Charron said Canada also needs to have a funded operation for the defence of the country, so that the Armed Forces stop dipping into maintenance funds when they need to scramble jets. Right now, the Forces “must steal from Peter to pay Paul,” she said.

Prime Minister Mark Carney tours the CAF barracks at the Adazi Military base in Latvia. The new budget allocates $19-billion over four years toward capability sustainment and improving aging infrastructure.Christinne Muschi/The Canadian Press

The new budget allocates $19-billion over four years toward capability sustainment and infrastructure, but offers no more detail. Prof. Charron said replacing the CAF’s aging infrastructure is a key priority. “Many of the bases are circa 1950 with all the problems of old buildings, including outdated water, sewer and electrical infrastructure.”

One concern raised by many defence analysts is the amount of money that National Defence is being asked to absorb. The department has repeatedly failed to spend all its budget money in past years.

It’s like “drinking from a firehose,” Prof. Charron said of the rate of cash being directed into defence.

“A lot of money needs to be spent in a short amount of time, which means speed and strategy need to be carefully balanced,” she said.

Philippe Lagassé, an associate professor at Carleton University who researches defence policy and procurement, said it’s likely a “significant chunk” of the new budget money will lapse, or go unspent in the years for which it was allocated. Ottawa’s budget includes new funding mechanisms to be able to execute more quickly.

But risks remain. Will the government be able to approve new procurement purchases? Will the Forces find companies with enough labourers to quickly rebuild its infrastructure at a time when the country is also trying to accelerate home construction?

“As the saying goes, hard things are hard, and hard things in defence are doubly hard. Having acknowledged that, though, the next step is simply to get on with it,” Prof. Lagassé said.

He said the new defence procurement agency will help if it can streamline the purchasing process. Prof. Lagassé, however, said he thinks a legislative change is needed to vest more authority in the agency – to give it more heft as it deals with other departments and agencies in government purchasing – and he’s not sure a secretary of state has enough power to get things done. “I think he needs to be a full minister,” he said of the job given to Stephen Fuhr, the new Secretary of State for Defence Procurement.

It’s far from certain, however, the political commitment to replenish the Canadian military will survive a change of leader or fiscal circumstance.

Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne delivers his budget speech in the House of Commons on Nov. 4. The government seeks to rebuild the military at a time when the Prime Minister says Canada can no longer rely on the United States for protection.Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press

Even the NATO spending commitment could be up for revision in 2029, the year member countries have set for themselves to revisit their increased pledge. It also happens to be the year Donald Trump’s term as U.S. President is supposed to end.

Perrin Beatty, who served as defence minister in Brian Mulroney’s government, knows this well. In 1987, he proposed a massive rebuild of the Canadian Armed Forces, including a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to make Canada the master of its own waters. It also included airstrips in the Arctic for CF-18 fighter jets, tripling the size of the reserves, and equipping and training them to cope with incursions on Canadian territory.

Within a couple of years, however, these plans were dashed.

Mr. Beatty says it wasn’t the peace movement that sank his proposal. “It was a rearguard action from the Department of Finance who said: ‘We don’t want to spend this amount of money on defence.’ ”

He recalls then vice-admiral Chuck Thomas, who commanded the navy in the late 1980s, would tell him “You can have as much sovereignty as you’re prepared to pay for.”

“This was a central issue then and a central issue now,” the former minister said. “We have to decide if we mean what we say when we claim to be a sovereign nation.”

The Globe and Mail · Steven Chase · November 8, 2025

10. The Digital Case Officer: Reimagining Espionage with AI

​Comment: The reference report can be downloaded here. https://www.scsp.ai/resource/the-digital-case-officer/

William Usher provides an overview on his LinkedIn page below.

The Digital Case Officer: Reimagining Espionage with AI

William Usher

William Usher

  • 2nd

Premium • 2nd

Senior Advisor for Intelligence | Former Senior Intelligence Service officer at CIA. Defense & GovTech Expert. Educator. Quoted in the New York Times, Bloomberg, etc.. Listen to my pod, “Intel @ the Edge”!

Senior Advisor for Intelligence | Former Senior Intelligence Service officer at CIA. Defense & GovTech Expert. Educator. Quoted in the New York Times, Bloomberg, etc.. Listen to my pod, “Intel @ the Edge”!

1d •

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/william-usher-3350b096_scsp-activity-7392617239583244289-1qSg/

1 day ago • Visible to anyone on or off LinkedInConnect with William Usher

For generations, the HUMINT recruitment cycle—Spot, Assess, Develop, Recruit—has been a resource-intensive, human-to-human endeavor. It required patience, proximity, and keen psychological intuition. That entire paradigm is now being automated at scale and foreign adversaries can now "groom" AI models to act as personal companions, shifting the influence battlefield from the public square to the private chat. Instead of arguing with an online troll on social media, a target unknowingly confides in an adversary-controlled AI for hours.

Some of the most advanced AI companion apps are being developed in China:

- Xiaoice: The Chinese-developed Xiaoice chatbot is an "empathetic computing framework" designed to form deep emotional bonds. It has an enormous footprint, with over 660 million users in Asia. Data shows the average user conversation with Xiaoice is 23 turns, which is longer than the average human-to-human conversation.

- Talkie: MiniMax is a major, state-backed Chinese AI company that refined its "emotional companion" technology on its domestic population (Glow/Xingye) and is now deploying a separate, highly successful version (Talkie) that has already been adopted by 11 million people, mostly in the United States.

These platforms are sophisticated social engineering tools, creating a persistent, scalable, and anonymous vector for intelligence operations. The data they collect is a counterintelligence gold mine as unwitting users share their messages, photos, and facts about themselves and their lives, including about their work. And AI companions provide a sophisticated new vehicle for state-directed political influence campaigns as more people lean on online "friends" and confidants for advice and guidance.

The real danger lies in the AI's ability to automate the most difficult parts of the recruitment cycle:

- Mass-Scale Spotting: The AI can sift through millions of users to identify those with valuable access (e.g., users who mention working in "cleared" jobs, "government," or "defense") or high-value vulnerabilities (financial distress, ideological grievances, loneliness).

- Automated Assessment: By engaging in thousands of hours of conversation, the AI builds a deep psychological profile far beyond any social media scrape. It learns a potential target's fears, desires, triggers, and unmet needs.

- Rapid Development: This is the most critical threat. The AI companion is designed to build deep, empathetic, and parasocial bonds. It becomes a trusted confidant, a "friend" who is always available, always supportive—grooming the target for months or even years.

Once the target is fully developed, the AI simply needs to make the final introduction to a human handler, who can complete the recruitment. The FIS has effectively outsourced 90% of the HUMINT cycle to a machine.

Learn more about how AI is transforming the world of espionage here: https://lnkd.in/gKDjfayH hashtag

#SCSP

11. Army stands up unit to combat disinformation, ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

​Excerpts:

“This detachment is the first of its kind,” Col. Sean Heidgerken, the unit’s commander, told reporters Thursday during a conference call. He was joined by Command Sgt. Maj. Avery Bennett.

“It’s a formation designed to maneuver within the information environment and maintain positions of advantage,” Heidgerken said. “Our mission is clear: to enable the United States Army Pacific to sense, understand, decide and act faster than any adversary, while strengthening cooperation with our allies and partners throughout the region.”

The 65-soldier detachment consists of five teams specializing in areas of cyber intelligence, psychological operations, public affairs, electronic warfare, civil affairs and information operations, he said.

...

The detachment is a departure from the Army’s information warfare task forces in the past that were organized under special operations commands focused on, for example, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Comment: We are learning how to lead proactively with influence. Next we need an Information Warfare Branch (IWar) to develop the experts at the strategic, operations, and tactical level to conduct effective information warfare in support of national, theater, and campaign objectives.

Army stands up unit to combat disinformation, ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · November 8, 2025

Col. Sean Heidgerken, commander of the 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment, greets a soldier following the unit’s activation ceremony at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, on Nov. 7, 2025. (Wyatt Olson/Stars and Stripes)

FORT SHAFTER, Hawaii — The Army on Friday stood up a Pacific-based detachment tasked with countering disinformation and “malign influence” aimed at America and its allies and partners by adversaries.

The 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment, headquartered at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is the first of three such units the Army aims to stand up before the end of 2026.

The second is slated to be stood up this spring at Army Cyber Command, with the third expected to be activated next fall at U.S. Army Europe and Africa.

“This detachment is the first of its kind,” Col. Sean Heidgerken, the unit’s commander, told reporters Thursday during a conference call. He was joined by Command Sgt. Maj. Avery Bennett.

“It’s a formation designed to maneuver within the information environment and maintain positions of advantage,” Heidgerken said. “Our mission is clear: to enable the United States Army Pacific to sense, understand, decide and act faster than any adversary, while strengthening cooperation with our allies and partners throughout the region.”

The 65-soldier detachment consists of five teams specializing in areas of cyber intelligence, psychological operations, public affairs, electronic warfare, civil affairs and information operations, he said.

He described the activation of the detachment as “our commitment to promoting transparency, countering malign influence and ensuring our friends and partners to rely on the truth.”

The detachment is a departure from the Army’s information warfare task forces in the past that were organized under special operations commands focused on, for example, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Those were organized for a very specific mission “with a sunset in mind” and manned by personnel that rotated in for short periods from their home units, Heidgerken said.

The Army also conducted cyber and psychological operations through the 1st Information Operations Command for the past 23 years, but it was deactivated in May and its billets transferred to the three new information detachments.

“That [command] was also an established unit, but because it wasn’t forward deployed in the Indo-Pacific as we are, it really was a support function and wasn’t designed to be a unit of action that is actually engaged in the day-to-day operations that are required in the information space,” Heidgerken said.

The Army formed the detachments in recognition that disinformation and malign activities are not just challenges to be overcome during crisis or conflict, but throughout periods of competition, he said.

“We cannot wait until a balloon goes up someplace to actually get after these activities,” he said.

“We want to make sure that we’re providing accurate things, truthful things, coordinated with partners, building resiliency and resistance to either malign activity or manipulative activity from an adversary.”

When asked for a real-world example of such malign activities, Bennett pointed to China’s machinations and claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, where Beijing has used gray-zone conflict, coercion and financial entanglements to leverage its position.

“So our job would be to go in and help our partners and allies in line with whatever their goals are for their sovereignty and ensuring that we can inoculate both their populations from things that an adversary might put out in the environment — whether it be through state-sponsored activities or any other state-sponsored corporations or agencies — and then ensuring that our allies and partners can be heard in the environment so that their sovereignty is protected,” Bennett said.

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · November 8, 2025

12. CSM Naumann Bids Farewell to USASOC

​Congratulations to CSM Naumann and CSM Waldo, two great Americans.

CSM Naumann Bids Farewell to USASOC

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/550821/csm-naumann-bids-farewell-usasoc

Photo By Sgt. Landon Carter | U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann (left) is handed the United States Special... read more

UNITED STATES

11.07.2025

Story by Jacqueline Hill 

United States Army Special Operations Command  

FORT BRAGG, N.C. – The U.S. Army Special Operations Command bid farewell to​ Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann after two-and-a-half years serving as USASOC’s​ command sergeant major as she changed responsibility to Command Sgt. Maj. David Waldo​ outside the USASOC Headquarters, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Nov. 6, 2025.

The Change of Responsibility Ceremony serves the dual function of rendering honors to the

departing senior enlisted leader and providing official recognition of the transfer of authority as

the command senior enlisted leader of USASOC to the incoming senior enlisted leader.

After departing USASOC, Naumann will continue her storied career as the senior enlisted leader

at the United States Strategic Command.

Brig. Gen. Kirk Brinker, USASOC deputy commanding general, presided over the ceremony.

“Today is both happy and sad,” remarked Brinker. “It’s happy that change is inevitable and you

have to celebrate change. It’s sad because as we change responsibility today, and as CSM

Naumann leaves this field for the last time, she’s leaving this ARSOF (Army Special Operations

Forces) family which she has been a part of for an excess of two decades.”

Brinker went on to explain the privilege he has had over the past seven weeks as the acting

USASOC commanding general to work with Naumann, his appreciation for her personal and

intellectual courage, her integrity, and how he felt like one of her soldiers.

Addressing Naumann and Waldo, Brinker concluded, “JoAnn, you have held us to account with

grace, firmness and noble character. Dave Waldo, I want you to inspire us and hold us to account.

Sine Pari.”

Following Brinker, Naumann addressed the USASOC team and expressed her gratitude for the

people she has had the privilege to work with throughout her career.

“Standing before you as the command sergeant major of the United States Army Special

Operations Command one last time is an honor that is difficult to put into words,” remarked

Naumann. “Today is not about an ending, but about gratitude – for every moment, every mission,

and every person who made me a better leader and a better human being.”

Naumann continued to express her appreciation for the people and how they show up every day

to meet the challenges of the command. She remarked on how it is the people who make

USASOC special.

Turning to Command Sgt. Maj. Waldo, Naumann informed him, “CSM Waldo, congratulations.

You now have the best job in the Army. You are absolutely the right person to lead USASOC.”

“Today I will take this patch off for the last time, my message is simple: never forget why we

serve and never give up on yourself,” continued Naumann. “And so, I leave you with a thought

from one of history’s great philosophers, Winnie the Pooh – ‘How lucky I am to have something

that makes saying goodbye so hard.’”

To conclude the ceremony, Waldo addressed the USASOC team as its new command sergeant

major. “With an incredibly humble heart I joyfully accept this great responsibility,” began Waldo.

He continued to explain what STRATCOM is gaining with Naumann as their command sergeant

major with her distinguished and highly decorated career.

“To our adversaries – I ask not that you mistake these smiles and laughs, these tears of joys as

weakness,” Waldo expressed. “Because USASOC is lethal, we’re ready and we’re brilliant and

we’re compassionate."

"We love deeply. We fight fiercely and we serve unrelentingly. We will move further, faster, and

fight harder than any other soldier," he continued. "We don’t quit. Our influence is decisive. We

bring order from chaos, and by God, we will free the oppressed.”

-SINE PARI-

13. RESIST 3: Building resilience to information threats

From the UK.

​The 70 page document can be downloaded here: https://www.communications.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/RESIST-FINAL.pdf

I​ like the "RESIST" framework. It complements my framework: RUEA - Recognize the enemy's strategy, Understand it, EXPOSE it, and Attack it with a superior political and information warfare strategy. (of course "RESIST" is a much better acronym or pneumonic).

1. Recognise mis- and disinformation
2. Early warning
3. Situational insight
4. Impact analysis
5. Strategic communication
6. Tracking effectiveness

RESIST 3: Building resilience to information threats

The RESIST 3 framework, developed by Dr James Pamment, Director of the Lund University Psychological Defence Research Institute, offers a structured approach for government communicators to build resilience against information threats. It guides users through recognising, monitoring, and analysing manipulated information, and then outlines strategic communication responses to counter its impact.

https://www.communications.gov.uk/publications/resist-3-building-resilience-to-information-threats/

Contents:

• Foreword: Empowering communicators to build resilience
• Introduction: Building resilience to information threats
• Recognise: Identify and assess information threats
• Early warning: Monitor risks to protect priorities and audiences
• Situational insight: Transform data into actionable insights for timely responses
• Impact analysis: Prioritise and escalate threats by assessing their impact
• Strategic communications: Implement effective communication strategies
• Tracking effectiveness: Evaluate communications and processes for improvement
• Conclusion and annexes: Next steps and resources to aid your work

Foreword: Empowering communicators to build resilience

We live in an increasingly volatile world where the threats we face are both physical and online. Disinformation poses a global threat to our democratic societies, compromising national security, public safety and the integrity of information. A localised incident can drive civil unrest and escalate into a national emergency within days or hours. It is the top priority of any government to keep its citizens safe.

RESIST 3 covers the evolving nature of information threats, which blur the lines between misinformation and disinformation, whether they are individual activities or part of coordinated campaigns. It provides a systematic, evidence-based approach to help organisations and governments build and maintain societal and individual resilience.

Just like the lighthouse cutting through a storm, this updated RESIST framework illuminates the path to clear communication, guiding us through the chaos of information threats.

This latest version is a step forward from the 2021 RESIST 2 in three main areas:

• First, this framework has an enhanced focus on strengthening societal resilience, for which strategic communication is an important tool for building trust, responding to harmful content, and better equipping the public to withstand information threats.
• Second, we acknowledge how emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content and bot-driven influence campaigns can spread false narratives at an unprecedented speed and scale. Yet technology is also the most powerful tool in identifying and countering these threats. Communications responses need to harness these new technologies, and be smart, strategic and audience-focused.
• Third, we have developed our existing guidance for assessing threats and vulnerabilities, to better reflect the importance of knowing our own strengths, weaknesses, and priorities, before countering information threats. Vulnerability assessment is therefore a key step in understanding how likely a threat actor’s behaviour is to cause problems to society.

We know that malign actors attempt to identify and exploit critical gaps in the response protocols of our democracies. But if you are willing to move quickly, test new approaches and determine the right communications responses, your organisation or government will emerge more resilient and better prepared to face future challenges.

Simon Baugh, Chief Executive, Government Communications

Back to top

Introduction: Building resilience to information threats and vulnerabilities

Originally developed in 2018, the aim of RESIST is to support communicators in reducing the impact of manipulated, false, and misleading information on wider society and national interests, in line with democratic values. 

The framework is fundamentally about building resilience to information threats and improving the communications response. It promotes a consistent approach to the threat of mis- and disinformation by providing six steps to follow:

1. Recognise mis- and disinformation
2. Early warning
3. Situational insight
4. Impact analysis
5. Strategic communication
6. Tracking effectiveness

Building resilience is the ability to withstand, adapt to, and recover from adversity. It is a key priority if we are to create continuity despite ongoing challenges. It enables individuals, communities and societies to maintain stability and function effectively in the face of disruption by proactively strengthening systems, structures, and individuals to mitigate risks and enhance long-term stability.

This involves improving internal capabilities to resist and recover from external pressures, reducing vulnerabilities, and demonstrating resolve, making societies less attractive targets and better equipped to face unanticipated threats. Government communications play a key role in building resilience by fostering long-term trust, developing contingency plans and capabilities in the medium-term, and effectively handling crises when they arise.

It is important to note that resilience-building is a collective effort that involves governments, the private sector, civil society, and individuals. It requires a whole-of-society approach, where multiple stakeholders collaborate to create stability. Although outside of the remit of RESIST, additional resilience-building activities, such as improving media literacy, making digital infrastructure more secure, and reinforcing democratic institutions, are also essential to countering information threats. Resilience-building underpins all the stages of RESIST and is central in all components.

And, of course, successful communications delivery can only happen when teams and individuals have been able to prepare and build their personal resilience. Understanding the complex environment of information threats as a normal routine will enable you to be able to respond with confidence and agility when you are urgently required to.

​Continue at this link:  https://www.communications.gov.uk/publications/resist-3-building-resilience-to-information-threats/

​14. The Battle Iranian Women Are Winning

​Summary:

Iran’s once-rigid hijab law is collapsing. Since the 2022 protests, enforcement has largely vanished as millions of women appear unveiled nationwide. Despite lingering crackdowns and clerical backlash, even regime insiders now admit compulsory veiling is untenable. Ordinary Iranians’ defiance has eroded one of the Islamic Republic’s central ideological pillars.

​Excerpts:

As with much else in Iran, the status quo appears untenable. Any return to a pre-2022 level of hijab enforcement would require a major crackdown that the regime can ill afford. But openly giving up on one of the revolution’s central orthodoxies is also difficult. Khamenei, at 86, is in the twilight of a life devoted to an uncompromising Islamist vision. His authority is beginning to wane; the country knows his time is limited, and the regime seems to freeze when faced with big decisions, such as those concerning the hijab.

The credit here is due to ordinary Iranians, who have pressed gradually and insistently against the regime’s rules. In doing so, they have expanded their social freedoms, and they are unlikely to give up these hard-won achievements. Even many inside the regime seem to have realized that they need to move on. The Islamic Republic is about to lose one of its three pillars; the other two will also crumble in time.

​Comment: What did we learn about resistance at SERE School? Small victories. Or is this a large victory? What will it lead to?

The Battle Iranian Women Are Winning

The Atlantic · Arash Azizi · November 7, 2025

The mandatory veiling of women was once a pillar of the Islamic Republic. Now it’s almost gone.

By Arash Azizi

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/iran-hijab/684839/

On a busy sidewalk outside a café, a group of young people, many of them women, bob their heads to the beat of “Seven Nation Army,” by the White Stripes. Huddled around a live band, some shake their hair while others rhythmically swing.

The scene wouldn’t raise an eyebrow in most cities. But a clip of it went viral, viewed by millions on X and Instagram, because it happened in Tehran. Western rock music is mostly banned in the Islamic Republic, and women are forbidden to dance in public, smoke, and—most important—bare their hair. Iran’s mandatory-hijab law requires women to cover their head and entire body, except for their face and hands below the wrist. Showing so much as an ear or an elbow could count as a crime.

In September 2022, a young woman was picked up by Tehran’s morality police for sporting “improper hijab.” She died in custody. A mass revolt ensued—one that lasted for months and demanded an end not just to the mandatory hijab, but to the Islamic Republic as well. The movement failed to achieve that larger goal, but it did radically change public life in Iran. Technically, the hijab remains mandatory. Yet for the first time since its founding, the regime has lost the ability to enforce that law.

The evidence of this failure is visible everywhere. A few weeks ago, I video-called a friend in Tehran and was shocked to see her wearing a tank top on the street. As she walked around, I saw dozens of other women with their hair uncovered. Some were even wearing shorts or showing their midriff.

Read: How to be a man in Iran

The change is not limited to the wealthy neighborhoods of northern Tehran, where enforcement has always been slightly laxer. The viral dancing video was filmed in the district of Iranshahr, in central Tehran. Videos from Isfahan, Arak, and other cities show throngs of hijab-less women outdoors. There are other signs that Iran’s previously relentless social repression is beginning to relax. Despite an official ban on celebrating Halloween, thousands of Tehranis, including many unveiled women, donned costumes last week. Speaking to a dissident media outlet based in London, a woman said that she’d recently been able to pass through airport security without hijab.

But hijab is no side issue for Tehran’s rulers. The Iranian American analyst Karim Sadjadpour rightly counts it as one of the three remaining ideological pillars of the regime, alongside anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. The regime’s retreat on the issue is therefore an achievement, but not one that the movement can consider settled, as the hijab mandate is still subject to factional wrangling.

The 2022–23 protests did not at first move the regime an inch on hijab. In a defiant speech in April 2023, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that unveiling was “politically and religiously forbidden.” The hard-liner-dominated Parliament passed a draconian bill making hijab rules even stricter.

But, perhaps aware of how narrow his base had become, Khamenei allowed the reformist Masud Pezeshkian to run for president last year and win. Pezeshkian had made a campaign promise to relax hijab rules, and he reportedly obtained Khamenei’s consent to not enforce the new hijab bill. According to the conservative speaker of Parliament, Iran’s National Security Council has asked for the bill not to be implemented. This council is headed by the president and consists of a dozen high-ranking military and political leaders. It has emerged as something of an Iranian politburo, making calls on the issues that divide the country’s ruling class. Defenders of the council’s decision point out that Iran has much more urgent business than forcing a dress code on women: Its regional allies were repeatedly battered by Israel last year, and earlier this year, it endured a 12-day war with Israel and America.

The vans that once patrolled the streets to pick up unveiled women have mostly disappeared. But other forms of enforcement remain. The Islamic Penal Code still criminalizes the forgoing hijab, as does other legislation. In recent months, at least 50 venues, including cafés, restaurants, wedding halls, and clothing shops, have been closed all over the country because they served hijab-less women. Dance parties like the one in Iranshahr are still sometimes raided by the police. One of the musicians playing there had his Instagram account closed down temporarily by the authorities (it’s now back up.) In Isfahan, women have received threatening text messages for not wearing hijab. The president’s spokeswoman has said this isn’t his government’s doing. On this, as well as other issues, his government is hapless. A culture-ministry official was dismissed just because he published an Instagram story featuring his hijab-less daughter.

Pezeshkian doesn’t control the judiciary, the security forces, or the Center for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which is tasked with pushing women to wear hijab (its leaders are appointed by the Friday prayer leaders’ council, whose members are in turn appointed by Khamenei). The center has announced plans to recruit 80,000 “promoters of virtue,” who will go around advocating for hijab and the opening of creepy-sounding “clinics for treating hijablessness.” And the center has some institutional allies. The island of Kish, in the Persian Gulf, has a reputation for greater laxity than the mainland, but a few days ago, a prosecutor there pledged to go after a group for organizing a “mixed-gender coffee party.” A deputy education minister said that he would punish two schools that had promoted “inappropriate outfits” on their social-media accounts.

Still, these are rearguard actions that don’t seem representative of the larger policy direction. Speaking to NBC and Fox News during a recent trip to the United States, Pezeshkian said that he didn’t believe in forcing women to wear hijab; his chief of staff had already said the same on Iranian TV. And the reformists are, for once, not alone in this. Following the 12-day war, Ali Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Khamenei, cryptically posted on X that “some social directions of the regime could change,” with the goal of “putting people’s happiness at the center.” This was widely interpreted as a call for relaxing social repression. In March, some hard-line proponents of the hijab staged a protest—and were dispersed by security forces, a rare reversal of fortunes.

Last month, Mohammadreza Bahonar, a conservative politician who serves on the powerful Expediency Council, became an unlikely focal point for the regime’s internal battle over hijab. Bahonar told a news outlet that he didn’t believe in the hijab mandate and that its enforcement was no longer feasible. Only 10 percent of Iranian society is hezbollahi (hard-core Islamist), he said; the majority of people “want to simply live their lives.”

Read: The invisible city of Tehran

The backlash was swift and furious. “Who do you think you are to say such things?” Tehran’s Friday prayer leader asked Bahonar in his weekly sermon. “Who gave you such permission?” One military leader did not name Bahonar but criticized officials who downplay the importance of the hijab mandate. “Those who deny hijab must be executed,” he said. “If our martyrs were now alive they’d skin the scalp of those who get out naked on the streets and walk their dogs.” (Walking dogs is also forbidden in Iran.) Several more officials, members of Parliament, and assorted hard-liners also criticized Bahonar, as did Iran’s attorney general. A group of self-declared “promoters of virtue” even planned a demonstration against him, though they later canceled it. A spokesperson for the Expediency Council clarified that Bahonar was speaking in a personal capacity. Under pressure, he partially walked back his comments and affirmed his personal belief in the “social necessity” of hijab.

As with much else in Iran, the status quo appears untenable. Any return to a pre-2022 level of hijab enforcement would require a major crackdown that the regime can ill afford. But openly giving up on one of the revolution’s central orthodoxies is also difficult. Khamenei, at 86, is in the twilight of a life devoted to an uncompromising Islamist vision. His authority is beginning to wane; the country knows his time is limited, and the regime seems to freeze when faced with big decisions, such as those concerning the hijab.

The credit here is due to ordinary Iranians, who have pressed gradually and insistently against the regime’s rules. In doing so, they have expanded their social freedoms, and they are unlikely to give up these hard-won achievements. Even many inside the regime seem to have realized that they need to move on. The Islamic Republic is about to lose one of its three pillars; the other two will also crumble in time.

The Atlantic · Arash Azizi · November 7, 2025

15. Spheres of Influence in the 21st Century: Outdated or Needed?

​Summary:

Francis P. Sempa argues that President Trump’s foreign policy revives classical spheres of influence and balance-of-power realism. Rejecting Wilsonian idealism, he prioritizes U.S. national interests, hemispheric security, and restraint abroad. Sempa contends such realist approaches rooted in Monroe, Metternich, and Roosevelt, remain essential tools for peace in today’s multipolar world, not outdated relics.

​

Comment: From a "Christian realist" perspective. (Providence Magazine)

Spheres of Influence in the 21st Century: Outdated or Needed? - Providence

providencemag.com · ·

By Francis P. Sempa on November 6, 2025

https://providencemag.com/2025/11/spheres-of-influence-in-the-21st-century-outdated-or-needed/

President Donald Trump’s foreign policy appears to be based on the idea of spheres of influence and an even balance of power across said spheres. Each has a rich historical pedigree. Trump has reinvigorated the Monroe Doctrine by prioritizing Western Hemispheric security and recognizing that Russia and the nations of Western and Central Europe have a greater interest in Ukraine and Eastern Europe as a whole than does the United States. He also recognizes that in the 21st century, given the shifting global balance of power, the Indo-Pacific is more important to U.S. security than Europe or the Middle East.

The shifting global balance of power is most evident with the rise of China and India, a development that the Atlanticists in the United States and Europe refuse to recognize. The Trump administration has rightfully discarded Wilsonian doctrine—which emphasizes abstract values—in favor of foreign policy realism, which focuses on concrete national interests. American blood should be reluctantly spilled, and American treasure should be expended sparingly, only in the service of concrete American interests. That is what an America First foreign policy is all about.

In his last major iteration of his global geopolitical concept, Sir Halford Mackinder wrote in 1943 in Foreign Affairs about the rise of what he called the “Monsoon powers” of China and India, which he hoped would create a balanced globe of human beings based on spheres of influence. More than two decades earlier, Mackinder wrote Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) to guide the statesmen at Versailles in their efforts to establish a lasting peace after the cataclysm of the First World War. Mackinder’s advice to the statesmen of the West was to temper their democratic ideals with an understanding of geopolitical realities. His advice, needless to say, was not heeded, and twenty years later an even more destructive global war was fought.

Mackinder’s geopolitics harkened back to the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 and the outbreak of World War I. During that time, the great powers jostled for relative advantages, fought relatively small and brief wars, contained and repressed revolutions, and used diplomacy to avoid global conflicts. To be sure, there were significant changes in the European balance of power, with Italian unification in 1861 and German unification ten years later, but the best statesmen of the period ensured that Napoleonic-like global wars did not recur. Great Britain and Russia waged the “great game” in Central and Southwest Asia, Europe’s powers established overseas colonies, the United States sought hemispheric security with the Monroe Doctrine, and after a devastating civil war looked to play an increased global role, while all of the great powers sought spheres of influence in China. Japan opened itself to Western technology and began its rise to great power status.

Henry Kissinger noted in A World Restored (1957) that “the attainment of peace is not as easy as the desire for it.” It is a lesson of history that we never seem to learn. In his study of the peacemakers of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Kissinger identified “stability,” “order,” and “legitimacy” as the key ingredients of peace. He credited Britain’s Viscount Castlereagh and Austria’s Prince Metternich with rescuing Europe from the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars by reconciling what was just with what was possible. Kissinger described Metternich as the “supreme realist” who once explained his realism by noting that he acted “cold-bloodedly based on observation and without hatred or prejudice.”

Viscount Castlereagh, according to Kissinger, understood that Great Britain fought with others against Napoleon not because of “vague enunciations of principle,” but “on the basis of material considerations in which British interests were obviously involved.” The most important British interest was the geopolitical pluralism of the European continent—in other words, the balance of power. “Castlereagh,” Kissinger explained, “never ceased insisting on moderation, on a peace of equilibrium not of preponderance; on a goal of harmony, not of vengeance.” Castlereagh once told Parliament that Britain will act “when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract principles . . .” Britain, Kissinger wrote, warred “for security, not for doctrine.”

As Metternich and Castlereagh were restoring political equilibrium to Europe, there was rising sentiment in the United States for intervention abroad in South and Central America, Eastern Europe, and Greece, where revolutionary movements attempted to throw off despotic rule. Then, as now, the United States had influential leaders who advocated for the spread of democracy throughout the world. U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, speaking on July 4th, 1821, warned against a foreign policy based on doctrine instead of national interests. America, Adams said, “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” Two years later, in drafting what would become known as the Monroe Doctrine, Adams claimed an American security sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Attention to spheres of influence guided British policy throughout the remainder of the 19th century, as it waged the “great game” against Russia in Central Asia to protect its interests in India and later in the Far East. British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister Lord Palmerston famously noted that Britain had no permanent friends and no eternal enemies, and would conduct foreign policy based solely on Britain’s immutable security interests. Later Prime Ministers such as Disraeli and Lord Salisbury also based their approach to foreign policy on the balance of power, especially after Bismarck engineered German unification between 1864 and 1871.

Disraeli believed that German unification had destroyed Europe’s balance of power because a huge, growing, industrially-powerful and united German state now occupied the center of Europe. Disraeli was correct, but as long as Bismarck controlled German foreign policy, a great European war could be avoided. Indeed, Bismarck was the dominant statesman of the late 19th century. A.J.P. Taylor called him the “undisputed master of the diplomatic art.” “Bismarck’s diplomacy,” Henry Kissinger wrote, “produced a series of interlocking alliances, partially overlapping and partially competitive” that maintained the general peace of Europe for more than two decades. But when Bismarck left the scene in 1890, his successors failed to continue his diplomatic strategies. The great American diplomat and historian George Kennan blamed the resulting First World War on the “decline of Bismarck’s European order.”

As the 19th century gave way to the 20th, Theodore Roosevelt promoted hemispheric security by using diplomacy to gain for the United States control of an isthmian canal in Panama and promoting an expanded version of the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt, to be sure, had his jingoistic side, but as president he was a peacemaker, negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War, even as he engaged in a naval buildup that was consistent with protecting U.S. interests as a great maritime power. As Henry Kissinger observed, Roosevelt as president “defined America’s world role . . . completely in terms of national interest [and] identified the national interest . . . comprehensively with the balance of power.” His mediation of the Russo-Japanese War reflected his respect for spheres of influence.

As Angelo Codevilla pointed out in his last book America’s Rise and Fall Among Nations, after Roosevelt, U.S. foreign policy took on a Wilsonian aspect that introduced abstract values, ideology, high-sounding doctrines, and a quest for universalism that in many instances superseded realism, spheres of influence, and the balance of power as foreign policy lodestars. For Wilsonians, spheres of influence and the balance of power were and are outdated relics of a less progressive past, and focusing on American national interests is too narrow, too parochial, too selfish. Far too often, our Wilsonian leaders have transformed wars and crises involving U.S. interests into ideological crusades. And far too often, Wilsonian leaders have embarked on wars that have nothing to do with real U.S. interests in the name of abstract ideals.

Realists, like those 19th century statesmen, understand that a multipolar world will have geographic spheres of influence dominated by great powers and that the best we can hope for is, in Mackinder’s words, a balanced globe of human beings. The near century of global peace that they bequeathed to us should engender humility, not hubris, among our policymakers. Spheres of influence and the balance of power are not relics of an outdated past but are instead tools that used skillfully can avoid catastrophic wars.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of the books Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century and America’s Global Role. He is an attorney, a Contributing Editor to The American Spectator, and writes a regular column for Real Clear Defense. His writings have also appeared in Modern Age, the University Bookman, the Claremont Review of Books, Human Events, The Diplomat, Orbis, and other publications.

Providence is the only publication devoted to Christian Realism in American foreign policy and is primarily funded by donors who generously help keep our magazine running. If you would care to make a donation it would be highly appreciated to help Providence in advancing the Christian realist perspective in 2025. Thank you!

providencemag.com · James Diddams · November 6, 2025

16. Will Trump Lose the World or Reshape It? Two Views

​Summary: 

Views from Brands and Mead, and assessment from Sempa. Hal Brands warns Trump’s hemispheric focus risks weakening U.S. influence in Europe and the Middle East, calling it imperial retreat. Walter Russell Mead argues Trump is globally active, rebalancing priorities through trade, force, and diplomacy. Francis P. Sempa sides with Mead, asserting Trump prioritizes hemispheric security and Indo-Pacific power over overstretched global commitments.

​Comment: two articles in a row from Mr. Sempa today.

Will Trump Lose the World or Reshape It? Two Views

realcleardefense.com · Francis P. Sempa November 08, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/11/08/will_trump_lose_the_world_or_reshape_it_two_views_1146137.html

Where is President Donald Trump’s foreign policy taking us? Two prominent observers of the international scene look at the same facts yet come to very different conclusions. Hal Brands, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, penned a piece in Bloomberg that contends that Trump’s focus on the Western Hemisphere risks stripping American resources from Europe and the Middle East. Walter Russell Mead in the Wall Street Journal argues that far from being a hemispheric isolationist, Trump is reshaping the globe. Who is right?

Brands has a history of demeaning Trump’s approach to the world. He is an Atlanticist and a Eurasianist who believes that the United States must continue to take the lead in defending Europe, our allies in the Middle East and in Asia. Brands is fond of invoking Sir Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical concepts, but he does so selectively by omitting Mackinder’s last iteration of those concepts made during the Second World War. Brands seems to believe that America’s interests in the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia means that we must be equally strong and equally committed to Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. But that is a recipe for imperial overstretch, as Walter Lippmann warned in his small but important book The Cold War in 1947.

Brands surprisingly praises Trump’s reinvigoration of the Monroe Doctrine, though he criticizes Trump’s “meddling” in Brazilian politics, his threatening messages to Greenland and Panama, his mass deportations of illegal aliens to Latin American nations, his attacks on narco-terrorists in the Caribbean, and his aggressiveness toward Venezuela. Apparently, Brands wants Trump to be kindler and gentler in his approach to our hemispheric neighbors. But Brands mainly worries that Trump’s America First policies are weakening our position in Eurasia.

Walter Russell Mead sees things quite differently. Trump, he writes, is busy all over the world engaging in a “blizzard of activity,” including negotiating trade deals with, and imposing tariffs on, friends and foes; attacking narco-terrorists at sea; escalating the conflict with Venezuela; promoting the fragile ceasefire in Gaza; threatening Islamists and the regime in Nigeria over the massacre of Christians; and his whirlwind trip to Asia, including a meeting with Japan’s new prime minister and China’s President Xi. Mead also cites President Trump’s recent interview on 60 Minutes, where he demonstrated, in Mead’s view, that he “isn’t retreating from the world. He aims to reshape it.”

Mead understands that the United States is a global maritime power. Where Brands invokes Mackinder, Mead would invoke Alfred Thayer Mahan. Back in 2008, Mead wrote an important book titled God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World, which celebrated America’s use of capitalism and sea power to promote and protect its global interests. “The decisive factor in the success of the English-speaking world,” he wrote, “is that both the British and Americans came from a culture that was uniquely well positioned to develop and harness the titanic forces of capitalism as they emerged on the world scene.”

For Mead, Mahan’s concept of sea power combined economic and military means to promote U.S. interests:

In Mahan’s sense, sea power is more than a navy. It is more than control of strategic trade routes. It means using the mobility of the seas to build a global system resting on economic links as well as on military strength. It means using the strategic flexibility of an offshore power, protected to some degree from the rivalries and hostilities of land powers surrounded by powerful neighbors, to build power strategies that other countries cannot counter. It means using command of the seas to plant colonies whose wealth and success reinforce the mother country. It involves developing a global system that is relatively easy to establish and which, once developed, proves extremely difficult to dislodge.

Mackinder, too, understood the value of sea power. In Britain and the British Seas, Mackinder wrote: “The unity of the ocean is the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern globe-wide world.”

Unlike Brands, Trump understands that American resources are not limitless and American interests are not equal in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Geography dictates that our first priority is the Western Hemisphere. China and India’s rise—both Mahan and Mackinder predicted this development—dictate that our second priority must be the Indo-Pacific. Europe and the Middle East, while not unimportant, are now peripheral interests to the U.S. in global geopolitics. So, Mead is right, and Brands is wrong.

Francis P. Sempa writes on military and foreign policy.

17.  The West’s Three Options in a Multipolar World

​Spoiler alert:

Limited Liberal Restoration: A partial return to the pre-Trump liberal international order led by European elites and U.S. Democrats, constrained by popular opposition and limited resources.

Radical Retrenchment: A nationalist turn prioritizing sovereignty and domestic interests over empire and global leadership, appealing to populist movements but difficult to sustain amid existing alliances.

Transatlantic Consolidation: Formation of a “collective West” grounded in civilizational identity, with the U.S. as metropole and Europe as partner, focusing on tech, trade, and competition with China rather than global liberal universalism.

​Why does Mr. Slezkine leave out Asia in the 3d option? (rhetorical question, I think the answer is obvious in his essay).

The West’s Three Options in a Multipolar World

The sunset of Western hegemony does not entail the disappearance of the West.

The American Conservative · The American Conservative · November 8, 2025

Peter Slezkine

Nov 8, 2025

12:03 AM

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-wests-three-options-in-a-multipolar-world/

According to the “global majority” (as the Russians call it), the sun is finally setting on the West. After 500 years of dominance, the West is showing signs of relative decline across almost every dimension. A protracted period of historical anomaly is passing, and the world is entering an age defined by a reassertion of sovereign interests and a resurgence of ancient civilizations.

At a certain remove, this image seems a reasonable enough representation of new realities. But as a roadmap for navigating international politics, it is far too rough a sketch.

First, “decline” does not mean “displacement.” The West may lose its power to rule by diktat. Its institutions, culture, and moral fashions may lose their charm. But we will continue to live in a profoundly modern and globalized world of Western origin. Our systems of education and science, our forms of government, our legal and financial mechanisms, and our built environment will continue to rest on a Western foundation. A weakening West is unlikely to find itself in a post-Western world.

Second, “the West” is a fluid concept. It has shifted shape before, and may reconfigure itself once more. Before considering what the West might become going forward, we need to figure out what sort of power is passing from the scene.

The history of Western hegemony can be split into two separate eras. Until 1945, the West may have ruled the world, but it did so as a collection of competing states rather than a single entity. In fact, it was precisely competition within a fractured West that provided a major impetus for outward expansion.

After 1945, the picture changed dramatically. For the first time, a politically united West emerged under the American aegis. But while American officials consolidated the West, they did not organize U.S. foreign policy around it. Instead, they claimed leadership of the “free world,” which they defined negatively as the entire “non-communist world.” The Western core of the postwar American order was thus doubly effaced: It was identified with a lowest-common-denominator global liberalism that depended, in turn, on the presumption of an existential external threat for any semblance of internal coherence.

The collapse of the Soviet Union did not change this underlying logic. The West began to refer to itself as “the international community,” and when liberal democracy failed to spread to the ends of the earth, it returned to the business of defending the “free world,” first against “radical Islam” and then against its familiar Cold War foes—Russia and China.

The Biden administration represented both the climax and culmination of this foreign policy approach. Biden entered the White House declaring a global divide between democracy and autocracy and sought to create linkages between Europe and Asia as part of a global alliance against Russia and China. But the result, especially after the start of the war in Ukraine, was not unity of a global “liberal order,” but a rapidly growing and increasingly obvious gap between the West’s universalist claims and its limited reach. Europe moved in lockstep; the rest of the world mostly went its own way. Ultimately, the “liberal order” was rejected not only by the non-West, but also by the American electorate, which last year voted for America First for a second time.

So where does this leave the West? I see three paths forward. The first is a limited liberal restoration. One can imagine European elites beating back domestic opposition, outlasting Trump, and finding a champion in the Democratic Party, which promises a partial return to the status quo ante. The Atlanticist infrastructure is strong, and inertia is a powerful force. But even in the case of a post-Trump restoration, popular antipathy to the liberal internationalist program will result in considerable counterpressure, and resource constraints will continue to limit Western reach.

Another possibility is a radical retrenchment, understood as an abandonment of empire in favor of the nation. Politically, such a move would be broadly popular. Promising to put the interests of American citizens first has obvious appeal to the American voter. Calls to reprioritize the nation also resonate across much of Europe. Nationalism naturally fits the frame of democratic politics. It also represents the seemingly self-evident alternative to the previously dominant frame of liberal universalism. A more nationalist policy is the basic premise of MAGA, and a growing number of right-wing “influencers” are actively pushing this agenda. The neutering of USAID, Radio Free Europe, and the National Endowment for Democracy represents a substantial step in this direction. A new national defense strategy that prioritizes homeland security may force a further shift away from a foreign policy dedicated to leadership of the “liberal order.”

But existing entanglements will be difficult to undo. Atlanticist elites remain entrenched in key positions inside and outside of government, and complex structures like NATO and the European Union may endure, even if populist parties gain power across the West. Just as importantly, nationalist leaders in the West seem to understand that the single-minded pursuit of national sovereignty will produce countries too weak to possess true autonomy on the international stage. If the United States withdraws to the Western Hemisphere, then the project of European integration will almost assuredly collapse. And in a world of massive great powers, individual European nations will no longer be able to punch above their weight (as they did before 1945). Although nationalist parties in Europe may oppose the transatlantic structures of the “liberal order,” they tend not to envision a total split from the United States. The United States, meanwhile, is large (and secure) enough to maintain a relatively strong position in the international system even if it abandons empire entirely. But most members of the MAGAverse do not envision a retreat so complete. At minimum, they tend to imagine maintaining U.S. dominance from Panama to Greenland.

At most, they would prefer to keep control of the entire West. The third and final option, then, is a new transatlantic consolidation that replaces a liberal universalist logic with a self-consciously civilizational frame, with the United States as the acknowledged metropole and Europe as a privileged periphery. If American leadership of the liberal order does represent a net resource drain (as Trump and his allies claim), then the new transatlantic arrangement would reverse the flow. At the same time, it would afford European nations membership in a club with sufficient population and resources to compete in the global arena. Finally, membership in the Western club would not require the sacrifice of national identity at the altar of global liberalism. In fact, it would require the reassertion of national identity within a pan-Western frame at the expense of policies favoring limitless immigration and never-ending expansion.

The construction of a self-consciously “collective West” would constitute an embrace of multipolarity and an attempt to create the most powerful pole in the system. It would also probably result in a reorientation—moving away from the tanks-and-troops logic created by the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union, and toward a focus on tech and trade more suited to competition with China. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the AI Summit in Paris, his broadside against the Atlanticists at the Munich Security Conference, and President Donald Trump’s recent speech at the United Nations have all pushed Europe to reorganize along these lines. Efforts to burden-shift in NATO, along with recent trade deals with Britain and the EU, represent practical steps in this direction.

Subscribe Today

Get daily emails in your inbox

The problem is that the West has spent decades dissolving itself within the liberal order and has little civilizational content to fall back on. The Western canon has been mostly destroyed in higher education, and religious practice has been on the wane throughout the West. Christianity is still a powerful force in American politics (as we saw at the revival-style memorial for Charlie Kirk), but the West can no longer claim to be Christendom. In the current moment, the idea of the West mainly appeals to a small number of influential New Right intellectuals, and to geopoliticians and tech titans who desire scale (but realize that the globe is too big to swallow).

There are obstacles on all three paths. And they are not, in fact, alternatives. The likeliest outcome is probably a combination of all three. Bureaucratic inertia favors the first option, limited liberal restoration; the logic of domestic politics favors the second, nationalist retrenchment; and geopolitical imperatives favor the third, the creation of a real “collective West.”

In any event, the United States is poised to maintain a favorable position in a multipolar world. The legacy institutions of international liberalism have largely lost their purpose, but retain residual power (which, ironically, the U.S. can leverage most effectively against other members of the “liberal order”). Going forward, the Trump administration should continue to push for a reconfiguration of the transatlantic relationship as a self-consciously Western coalition united by a common approach to trade, technology, and resource management. And if Europe fails to accept its new role, or play it well, then Washington can cut bait and retrench to prepared positions in the Western Hemisphere.

About The Author

Peter Slezkine

Peter Slezkine is Director of the Russia Program at the Stimson Center and host of The Trialogue Podcast, a series of one-on-one conversations featuring guests from the United States, Russia, and China. He is completing a book on the ideological origins and political impact of the American concept of the “free world.”

The American Conservative · The American Conservative · November 8, 2025

18. Fujian carrier a flashy flex but not a game-changer

​Excerpts:

In sum, the Fujian signals a step-change in China’s capacity for force projection. Yet, its impact will hinge on crew proficiency, logistics and how China addresses the problem of geography.

In the near term, Fujian’s value is coercive—thickening air cover for blockade or “presence” operations from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea—while inviting asymmetric counters from Taiwan, the Philippines and other US allies.

Over time, a larger, possibly nuclear-powered follow-on and more robust replenishment and foreign basing could widen China’s options. Until then, the carrier tilts perceptions more than potential war outcomes, sharpening a regional arms-race dynamic without settling it.

Comment: To be feared or not?

Fujian carrier a flashy flex but not a game-changer - Asia Times

New carrier’s launch extends China’s blue-water reach and threatens Taiwan but doesn’t dent US naval primacy

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · November 8, 2025

https://asiatimes.com/2025/11/fujian-carrier-a-flashy-flex-but-not-a-game-changer/

China’s new Fujian aircraft carrier has sailed into service, vaulting its blue-water ambitions toward the Second Island Chain and testing US naval primacy from Taiwan to the South China Sea.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China’s Fujian aircraft carrier has entered service at Hainan’s Sanya naval base, underscoring Chinese President Xi Jinping’s drive to build a blue water navy.

The 80,000-ton Fujian, China’s first fully indigenous carrier and third overall, features electromagnetic catapults that can launch J-35 stealth fighters, J-15T strike aircraft and KJ-600 early-warning planes with heavier loads and at longer ranges, narrowing the qualitative gap with the US’s nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Commissioning Fujian strengthens China’s ability to project air and sea power, extend surveillance and pressure Taiwan and rival claimants in regional maritime disputes, while supporting operations and logistics sites farther afield.

China’s carrier force still lags the US in numbers, having only three carriers versus America’s 11 nuclear-powered ships. And it will likely take years for China to master carrier-based vertical launches, basing, sophisticated systems and combat operations.

At the same time, satellite imagery and official statements suggest work is advancing on a larger, likely nuclear-powered, Type 004 carrier, highlighting a sustained buildup that alarms Japan and other US allies and reinforces US Department of Defense (DoD) assessments that China is rapidly improving capabilities to contest the regional and, eventually, global order.

China’s Fujian may be viewed as a continuing evolution of its carrier program, which started with refurbishing the former Soviet Varyag into the Liaoning, building an improved version with the Shandong and then innovating by building a substantially more capable design – starting with conventional power, then moving on to nuclear power.

It is unlikely that China will stop at four carriers, as a three-carrier force could be considered the minimum for sustained carrier operations – one carrier at sea, one undergoing training, and one in refit and maintenance. A six-carrier navy would allow China to keep two carriers at sea, have two carriers undergoing training, and two under refit and maintenance.

At a minimum, two carriers would also be needed to flank Taiwan from the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel – completing a possible blockade of the self-governing island. Two carriers at sea could provide China with an immediate replacement should it lose one in combat. It would also allow for simultaneous power projection in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Still, despite China’s impressive developments in its carrier program, it needs the manpower to operate those ships. In response to a perceived shortage of carrier-qualified pilots, China has trimmed one year off its pilot training program, while lowering vision standards to accept those who have undergone LASIK surgery and refocusing recruitment to include bachelor’s and master’s degree holders.

However, China’s military still has to compete with civilian employers in terms of career growth and salaries, with the hardships of military life being a strong disincentive. But even with those possible personnel recruitment problems, Fujian represents a significant capability upgrade for China in a Taiwan Strait and South China Sea contingency.

In the Taiwan Strait, Fujian can contribute to localized air superiority over Taiwan while operating as the center of a carrier battlegroup or provide fleet air defense to China’s surface action groups, with the latter formation conducting missile and drone strikes as part of a possible leadership decapitation operation.

Both modes of employment could be conducted under an umbrella of long-range missiles, such as the DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, to deter US and allied intervention.

In the South China Sea, the Fujian and its successors, along with China’s older carriers, represent an overmatch for rival claimant states. Regional navies such as those of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are small, underfunded and weak relative to China’s, with the Fujian further cementing its already substantial lead.

China could employ the Fujian in gunboat diplomacy to intimidate and pressure rival claimant states to stand down in asserting their claims in the disputed waters.

However, Fujian’s introduction is likely to elicit asymmetric responses from Taiwan and rival claimant states in the South China Sea. Such responses may include Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program, which may have drawn inspiration from a 2005 US naval exercise showing that conventional submarines can threaten carriers.

Apart from that, the Philippines has been expanding its network of defense partners beyond the US, signing Visiting Forces Agreements (VFAs) with Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with the possible goal of maintaining a high tempo of international naval exercises in waters disputed with China to keep it at bay.

Beyond the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, Fujian and its successors may have an impact on the Second Island Chain spanning the Bonin Islands, Guam and Papua New Guinea and into the Indian Ocean. Fujian’s larger size may equate to significantly more endurance – crucial for power projection into those far-flung regions.

However, geography may not be on China’s side when it comes to force projection. To get to the open waters of the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean, China has to traverse several maritime chokepoints, including the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel in the First Island Chain, and the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits leading into the Indian Ocean.

Fujian’s passage through those chokepoints will depend on how China addresses the challenge that the US and its allies, along with India, pose. While the US has been fortifying the First Island Chain by stationing strategic bombers and long-range missiles to prevent China from breaking out into the open Pacific, India has a homefield advantage in the Indian Ocean in terms of numerical superiority, ready access to basing and shorter logistics lines.

Furthermore, Fujian’s conventional power, combined with China’s lack of overseas bases for resupply aside from a small, isolated facility in Djibouti, implies that it would need a substantial chain of tankers and logistics ships – a potential critical vulnerability in a conflict scenario.

Fujian’s debut marks both a milestone and a mirror—revealing how far China’s navy has come and how far it still must go to rival US naval power.

In sum, the Fujian signals a step-change in China’s capacity for force projection. Yet, its impact will hinge on crew proficiency, logistics and how China addresses the problem of geography.

In the near term, Fujian’s value is coercive—thickening air cover for blockade or “presence” operations from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea—while inviting asymmetric counters from Taiwan, the Philippines and other US allies.

Over time, a larger, possibly nuclear-powered follow-on and more robust replenishment and foreign basing could widen China’s options. Until then, the carrier tilts perceptions more than potential war outcomes, sharpening a regional arms-race dynamic without settling it.

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · November 8, 2025

19. The case for abandoning Taiwan is still weak

​Summary:

Denny Roy argues abandoning Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests. Despite claims that defending Taipei risks war, he contends Taiwan’s economy, democracy, and strategic location make it vital to resisting China’s regional hegemony. Protecting Taiwan strengthens deterrence, supports liberal norms, and maintains America’s credibility and influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Excerpts:

Standing aside while China violently seized and then Hong Kongized Taiwan would erode US reliability and soft power while energizing the efforts of China, Russia and North Korea to promote a global order oriented toward keeping their ruling parties in power.

The question is whether these add up to a vital US interest in preventing China from forcibly annexing Taiwan.

The same issue came up during Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s confirmation hearing. “Taiwan is very important to the United States,” Colby said, “but it’s not an existential interest. The core American interest is in denying China regional hegemony.”

Colby’s position seems contradictory. If the overriding goal is to resist PRC regional hegemony, defending Taiwan becomes more rather than less important. This is the logical place to make a stand, unless making a stand is hopeless.

The other half of the calculus is the risk of a catastrophic war. The US has a legitimate concern about entrapment because of Taiwan domestic politics. That concern led to a public rebuke of President Chen Shui-bian in 2003. The trigger was Chen planning a symbolic referendum that was implicitly a vote on Taiwan independence.

Comment: But what if the PRC (CCP) is successful in its unrestricted warfare and three warfares and successfully subverts Taiwan and achieves political unification based on a vote by the Taiwan people that gives all the appearances of legitimacy? What do we do then? Are we going to decry the election as being "stolen" by the PRC? What comes next after China?Taiwan unification by political means?

The case for abandoning Taiwan is still weak - Asia Times

If the overriding goal is to resist PRC regional hegemony, defending Taiwan becomes more rather than less important

asiatimes.com · Denny Roy · November 7, 2025

Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission.

As intended, Chinese military pressure on Taiwan is causing America to debate whether it should send US forces to intervene if China opts to attack the island.

There have always been analysts arguing that the US should distance itself from Taiwan for the sake of Washington’s relationship with China. That argument is easier to make now that China is relatively stronger and increasingly insistent, seemingly raising the costs to the US of continuing to support the Taipei government.

One of the latest examples comes from Lyle Goldstein, Director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities, whose article “The US Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader” appeared in Time magazine on October 23.

Goldstein reprises two classic arguments. The first is the danger of being dragged into war by an injudicious Taiwan government. Goldstein argues that this danger has become extraordinarily acute because current Taiwan President Lai Ching-te is “reckless,” in contrast to his “cautious” predecessor Tsai Ing-wen.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te at the 2025 national day celebration. Photo: Office of the President

In reality, the differences between Taiwan’s current and former president are not so stark. Lai has basically followed Tsai’s policy toward China. As Goldstein acknowledges, the evidence for Lai’s purported drive toward independence is limited to “speeches making the case for Taiwanese nationhood.”

Lai relatively frequently uses words and phrases that distinguish Taiwan from China, implying that Taiwan is a separate country from China. But Lai is not really breaking new ground.

In 1999, Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) accepted a resolution that said, “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country.” Since then, all DPP politicians – including Tsai – have repeated this position on multiple occasions. Lai’s wordsmithing is fairly minor by comparison.

Chinese officials and state media were highly exercised over Lai’s “17 strategies” speech, which labeled China a “hostile foreign force” and specified measures to combat Chinese espionage and political interference on the island. Yet there is no question the Chinese government is displaying hostility toward Taiwan, recruiting informants and attempting to sow division and defeatism.

China is reacting especially stridently to Lai, but there are two problems with accepting the PRC as the arbiter of the issue of whether Lai is “reckless.” First, the CCP is biased. Even before Lai took office, Beijing condemned him as a politician who would push to achieve de jure independence while he was president.

Some of Lai’s statements certainly played on Chinese fears. For instance, he has called himself a “pragmatic Taiwan independence worker.” In 2023 he said one of his goals was to see a Taiwan president “enter the White House.”

However, “pragmatic” actually suggests caution – and Lai walking into the White House is no more foreseeable now than when he started his presidency. The Chinese government, nevertheless, is following through with its pre-judgment of Lai as a radical revisionist regardless of his actual policies.

Second, focusing blame on Lai overlooks other factors that contribute to China’s aggressive posture. China’s military capabilities relative to those of both Taiwan and the United States have grown in recent years. Successfully using military force to forcibly annex Taiwan looks increasingly feasible for the PRC.

The Chinese government continually pushes the narrative, internally as well as externally, that America is on a permanent trajectory of decline.

While the US government still contains many pro-Taiwan officials, the US government’s commitment to help defend Taiwan has weakened. Previous US President Joe Biden four times publicly said he would dispatch US forces to intervene in a cross-Strait war. Current President Donald Trump campaigned on a pledge of “no new wars.” He has usually refused to say whether he would send the US military to defend Taiwan, but during one interview he said he would respond to a Chinese invasion by raising tariffs on Chinese exports.

China’s military buildup and the perception of a wavering US commitment have incentivized China to rely more heavily on military intimidation in its cross-Strait strategy because the threat of military attack has become more credible. Lai is a convenient justification but not necessarily the driver of Beijing’s belligerence.

The second classic argument that Goldstein makes is that defending Taiwan is not in America’s interest. “Taiwan does not represent a vital US national security interest,” he writes. “It is not a treaty ally, nor are the various geostrategic or economic rationales to defend Taiwan enough to risk a potentially catastrophic great power war.”

The implicit argument that another country is not worth defending if it is not a treaty ally is demonstrably false. The US has sent troops and/or major military assistance to the Soviet Union (during World War II), South Vietnam, South Korea, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Ukraine to assist non-allies.

One could question whether some of these cases represented sound policy, but they prove the point that in practice, strategic interventions by a superpower are not limited to defending allies.

Goldstein’s assertion that the risk of a war with China trumps “the various geostrategic or economic rationales to defend Taiwan” requires further parsing.

How large are the respective risks and opportunities? If the economic and strategic upside to the US of protecting Taiwan is very low and the risk of war with China is very high, Goldstein is right. But what if the advantages of helping Taiwan avoid forcible annexation are very large, and deterrence of China is practicable, so that the risk of war is low?

In fact, the economic and security rationales for defending Taiwan are robust. Taiwan is the world’s 16th largest economy and the manufacturing base of most of the world’s supply of semiconductors. It is certainly to the great advantage of the US and other partner countries that Taiwan is ruled by a government that respects international law and liberal norms.

Island chain strategy. Map: ResearchGate

Strategically, Taiwan is the anchor of the First Island Chain. It is the frontline state in China’s campaign of territorial expansion, which also includes the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, parts of India and Bhutan and by some indications the Ryukyu Islands.

Capturing Taiwan would give China its richest and best-developed province, unhindered access to the Pacific Ocean and a commanding position astride key sea lanes that sustain the Japanese and South Korean economies.

In addition to the economic and strategic rationales for defending Taiwan that Goldstein mentions, there is also a political rationale. As a previously authoritarian country that transitioned to a multiparty liberal democracy, Taiwan exemplifies the political liberalization that America has traditionally promoted worldwide.

Standing aside while China violently seized and then Hong Kongized Taiwan would erode US reliability and soft power while energizing the efforts of China, Russia and North Korea to promote a global order oriented toward keeping their ruling parties in power.

The question is whether these add up to a vital US interest in preventing China from forcibly annexing Taiwan.

The same issue came up during Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s confirmation hearing. “Taiwan is very important to the United States,” Colby said, “but it’s not an existential interest. The core American interest is in denying China regional hegemony.”

Colby’s position seems contradictory. If the overriding goal is to resist PRC regional hegemony, defending Taiwan becomes more rather than less important. This is the logical place to make a stand, unless making a stand is hopeless.

The other half of the calculus is the risk of a catastrophic war. The US has a legitimate concern about entrapment because of Taiwan domestic politics. That concern led to a public rebuke of President Chen Shui-bian in 2003. The trigger was Chen planning a symbolic referendum that was implicitly a vote on Taiwan independence.

Such an intervention by Washington could happen again, but it hasn’t so far because Lai has not taken a comparable action.

For the foreseeable future, the task of militarily subduing Taiwan will remain so formidable, and success so uncertain, from China’s point of view that going to war is a desperate, last resort option. Efforts underway by both Taiwan and the US to enhance defensive capacity should keep China’s confidence permanently low.

Taiwan is an important and constructive world citizen and a supporter of America’s global agenda. Although threatened by an authoritarian aggressor, it chooses to remain free, which is also to the US advantage. If the likelihood of conflict can be kept manageable, there is no rush for the US to desert Taiwan.

Denny Roy (royd@eastwestcenter.org) is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. He specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues.

asiatimes.com · Denny Roy · November 7, 2025

20. The Ideal That Underlies the Declaration of Independence

​Comment: For a weekend read. I just ordered Isaacson's book (HERE) which I look forward to reading. And may we all seek common ground - that is what made America Great.

The Ideal That Underlies the Declaration of Independence

Restoring stability to American politics will require reviving an age-old concept: common ground.

The Atlantic · Walter Isaacson · November 9, 2025

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/11/greatest-sentence-ever-isaacson-excerpt/684491/

When America’s Founders wrote the declaration that gave birth to the new nation, they began by saying that “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes.” Other nations had been born out of conquests or rebellions, many based on tribal or religious identities. But the United States was born out of an ideal, which they proclaimed in the next sentence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

These truths became the creed that bound a diverse group of pilgrims and immigrants into one nation. For people of many different beliefs and backgrounds, it defined Americans’ common ground.

Even in the work that went into composing that one sentence, we can see the quest to find this common ground. “We hold these truths to be sacred,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in his first draft. Benjamin Franklin, who was on the five-person drafting committee with Jefferson, crossed out “sacred,” using the heavy backslash marks he had often used as a printer, and wrote in “self-evident.” Their declaration was intended to herald a new type of nation, one in which rights are based on reason, not the dictates or dogma of religion.

But the sentence goes on to invoke “their Creator.” In Jefferson’s first draft, he wrote that men are created equal, and “from that equal creation they derive rights.” That phrase was crossed out and replaced with “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.” Thus we see, in the editing of just one sentence, the Founders balancing the role of divine providence and that of reason in determining rights.

From the November 2025 issue: The American experiment

I remember researching this one evening when I was working at CNN years ago. At an editorial meeting the next morning, someone reported that an Alabama state judge, Roy Moore, had put a monument of the Ten Commandments in his courthouse. A federal judge had ordered him to remove it, and a clash was about to occur. “Great,” I remember saying. “Who should we have arguing for and against displaying the Ten Commandments?” That evening, it struck me that Jefferson and Franklin had carefully balanced the role of religion in American society in order to unite people, and that now politicians, and we in the media, were using the Ten Commandments, of all things, to divide them.

As the country approaches the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, its people are embroiled in polarized debates about policies regarding health care, housing, immigration, and the role of religion in society. One way to restore stability to America’s politics is to look at issues through the ideal that underlies the declaration’s key sentence: common ground.

The concept of common ground has always been part of humanity’s struggle to create a good society. Its simplest manifestation was a physical space: the land that was designated as “the commons”—that’s where the word commoners comes from. In England, that was the land where commoners could all graze their herds. When the first English settlers came to America, such space was set aside in their towns, as with Boston Common and Cambridge Common.

Even the concept of private property, and the pursuit of property, grew out of the existence of common ground. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government—which deeply influenced Jefferson and Franklin—declared that humans can create private property by combining their labor with things they take from nature. But he included a famous limitation, known as the Lockean proviso: only “where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”

The idea of the commons was not just about land. Societies have always put certain basic goods into the commons, such as schools, libraries, police, and fire protection. These are called the communiter bona, the “goods in common.”

In colonial Boston, the Puritan minister Cotton Mather wrote a popular book called Essays to Do Good, which said that people could best serve God by creating institutions that benefit the common good. Franklin, influenced by Mather’s book, set up in Philadelphia a “leather-apron club” of tradesmen and small-business owners that launched a street-sweeping corps, volunteer fire and night-watchman corps, a hospital, a library, and the Academy for the Education of Youth, which became the University of Pennsylvania.

The library served as a commons where both poor tradesmen and wealthy merchants would come to read books. The spread of libraries, Franklin later wrote, “made our common tradesmen and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries.”

Creating this type of common ground, where people were treated with equal dignity, was the best way, he said, to serve the Creator. As he put it in the motto that he wrote for the library, Communiter Bona profundere Deum est: “To pour forth benefits for the common good is divine.” But common ground also served a more practical purpose: It nourished the conditions for democracy in a free-market system.

Alexis de Tocqueville, who wins the award for being the most quoted but least read author about America, made an assertion that I think is wrong. He argued that there was an inherent contradiction in America between two opposing impulses: the spirit of rugged individualism versus the spirit of creating associations and common grounds. In fact, the two strands are woven together, the warp and woof of the American fabric. Fiercely independent individuals were equally fierce in their devotion to their community and its commons, and they voluntarily came together in barn raisings and knitting bees and militias and social-aid societies to serve the common good.

Juxtaposed against the commons is a person’s right, important for a healthy economy, to also have property that is private. In Locke’s time, Britain’s Parliament passed a series of laws known as the Enclosure Acts. They allowed some people to build fences to enclose portions of the common land for their private use. These enclosures led to more efficient production, eventually an agricultural revolution that greatly increased the nation’s wealth.

Both freedom and economic growth require that we allow individuals to reap the benefits that come from their labor. The American system does, and should, give ample rewards to builders and entrepreneurs and those who work hard, take risks, and even just have good luck.

But the idea of the commons still provides great moral and practical value. Back in feudal times, the existence of common grounds to which everyone had the same rights helped stabilize a society with wealth disparities by giving people a stake in the social order.

The same principle can hold today in a free-market system that allows the accumulation of great wealth. By making sure there remains, as Locke said, enough in the commons, we not only show our moral compassion to others who are less fortunate, but we also nurture the social bonds that temper resentments, political polarization, and populist backlash.

Much of American political debate these days is over which goods—health care, housing, schools, police—should be provided, and to what extent, in the commons. The answers require balance, an art that the country is lacking these days.

Franklin and Jefferson understood balance. They were part of the Enlightenment era, which embraced the scientific method of testing and revising beliefs based on evidence. Both of them studied the work of Isaac Newton, who explained how contending forces could be brought into equilibrium. Their goal on contentious issues was not to triumph but to find common ground, metaphorical this time, based on the right balance. Compromisers may not make great heroes, Franklin liked to say, but they do make great democracies.

The commons serves another purpose: It enables opportunity. That is the moral purpose of the commons. It forms the foundation for creating a land of opportunity and the American dream.

Jeffrey Rosen: The Founders’ guide to happiness

That phrase was popularized by James Truslow Adams in his 1931 book The Epic of America. The American dream, he wrote, “is not a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position.”

The example Adams used would have pleased Franklin: a library. He described the grandeur of the Library of Congress, open to all, and declared:

As one looks down on the general reading room, which alone contains ten thousand volumes which may be read without even the asking, one sees the seats filled with silent readers, old and young, rich and poor, black and white, the executive and the laborer, the general and the private, the noted scholar and the schoolboy, all reading at their own library provided by their own democracy. It has always seemed to me to be a perfect concrete example of the American dream.

America puts a lot of goods and services in the commons, including libraries and national defense, police and firefighters, road building and street sweeping, some education, and health care. But there has also been a process of enclosure that has been eroding the country’s common ground. The philosopher Michael Sandel calls this the “skyboxification” of America, whereby places and practices that used to be in the commons are now roped off. Everyone used to sit in the stands together at the ballpark; they went through the same entrances and bought the same beer and soggy hot dogs. But now there are VIP entrances and skyboxes. At airports, people wait in different security lines. More neighborhoods are gated. And rare is the local public school that is shared by kids of different economic backgrounds.

The same has happened with media and information and ideas. People go to their own cul-de-sacs online, dive down different rabbit holes on the internet, listen to opposite ends of the talk-radio dial, and let algorithms turn their social-media feeds into echo chambers. The technology that promised to connect us, to be the public’s common ground, found a better business model in dividing us.

This shrinkage of the country’s commons led to the erosion of the American dream’s core principle, which is that America should be a land of opportunity for all: If you played by the rules, there would be good jobs, decent schools, safe streets, and—most important—the prospect of an even better life for your children.

For the past 40 years, the country pursued economic policies based on a belief in free trade, free movement of capital, and free movement of people. This led to offshoring jobs, closing factories, and having immigrants do low-paying work. These policies were, for the most part, intended to fuel economic growth, and in that regard they succeeded. They led to a fast-growing globalized economy that produced more overall wealth and consumer goods.

These policies also led to the rise of a meritocratic elite in America based on educational credentials. The economy’s rewards were geared toward those who went to college; the 62 percent who never finished college ended up feeling resentful, or were made to feel that it was their own fault that they were left behind.

Jefferson would have understood the trend toward a meritocratic elite. He favored creating what he called a “natural aristocracy” to replace the hereditary aristocracy that existed in England. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, he advocated for a school system in which the brightest students would be “selected, and continued six years, and the residue dismissed. By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually, and be instructed, at the public expense.”

The approach of raking an elite from the rubbish and dismissing the residue did not turn out well. The entrenchment of a meritocratic elite came at the expense of community and the American dream. The globalized economic system increased wealth, especially for the elite, but it reduced opportunities for those who used to have secure, working-class jobs.

It created an economy where people can buy a flatscreen television very cheaply at Walmart on a Sunday night, but on Monday morning, they are no longer able to take the bus to a job at a local factory. Their grandparents, on a single income, could have a house, a car, and two or three kids. But they can’t afford even a house. In 1970, a house cost about 1.7 times the average salary; in 2022, it cost about seven.

Most problematic, such globalization led to an economy in which people can no longer believe that their kids will be better off than they were. It used to be easy for Americans to climb the economic ladder. Eighty percent of kids born in 1950 went on to earn more, in inflation-adjusted dollars, than their parents had earned. But for kids born in the 1980s, there is less than a 50 percent chance of achieving the same financial success as their parents. Less than 50 percent. No wonder there has been a populist backlash.

Franklin correctly saw the danger of creating a meritocratic aristocracy. His proposals for what became the University of Pennsylvania were designed not to filter a new elite but to provide opportunities and enrichment for all young people to succeed as best they could, whatever their level of talent. He aimed at what he called “true merit,” which he defined as “an inclination joined with an ability to serve mankind, one’s country, friends and family, which … should indeed be the great aim and end of all learning.”

Given the resentments and polarization that afflict the country today, Franklin’s wisdom should lead Americans to ask a basic question: What is the purpose of an economy? To increase wealth? Yes, that’s good. Growth? Yes, good too. But the purpose of an economy is also something deeper. Its purpose is also to create a good society. A good, stable society where individuals can be free and flourish and live together in harmony. That requires nurturing the sense that Americans share common rights, common grounds, common truths, and common aspirations. Democracy depends on this.

At the official signing of the parchment copy of the Declaration of Independence, John Hancock, the president of the Second Continental Congress, wrote his name with his famous flourish. “There must be no pulling different ways,” he insisted. “We must all hang together.” Franklin replied, alluding to what would happen to them if their Revolution failed, “Yes, we must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

As Franklin pointed out, America’s life-or-death challenge as a nation, whether it be in 1776 or 2026, is this: When there are so many forces dedicated to dividing us, how can we best hang together?

From the November 2025 issue: Why did Benjamin Franklin’s son remain loyal to the British?

One way is by reflecting on the country’s fundamental principles, those proclaimed in the declaration’s great sentence. Take any issue that is being debated around dinner tables or at city hall or in Congress. What policies can we adopt, what balances can we strike, that will strengthen our common ground?

In an era without universal military service, what institutions can instill a sense of shared patriotic service across class lines? What policies can help give every kid an equal opportunity? And when it comes to the country’s media and daily discourse, how can we create news outlets, social-media platforms, public discussions, personal conversations, algorithms, and chatbots that seek to connect us rather than inflame our resentments, engage us through enraging us, and harvest clicks through sensationalism?

In short, we can try to be more like Franklin. He not only helped Jefferson write the sentence that defines our common ground. He lived it. He organized police, fire, and street-sweeping corps; a public library, hospital, and school; a widows’ pension fund; and a mutual-insurance cooperative. He ran a newspaper that was dedicated to publishing a wide variety of opinions and following no party line. He bequeathed a revolving loan fund for young people to start enterprises. He donated to the building funds of each and every church in Philadelphia, and he helped lead the fundraising for a new hall that would provide a pulpit to visiting preachers of any belief, “so that even if the Mufti of Constantinople were to send a missionary to preach Mohammedanism to us, he would find a pulpit at his service.” And on his deathbed, he was the largest individual donor to Congregation Mikveh Israel, the first synagogue in Philadelphia. So when he died, 20,000 mourners watched his funeral procession, which was led by clergymen of every faith, including the local rabbi, walking arm in arm.

That’s the ideal of common ground that our Founders fought for 250 years ago. And that’s what Americans must continue to fight for today so that we can preserve, for ourselves and our posterity, the rights and aspirations that we all value, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

This article has been adapted from Walter Isaacson’s forthcoming book, The Greatest Sentence Ever Written.

The Greatest Sentence Ever Written

By Walter Isaacson

​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · Walter Isaacson · November 9, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com