Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"More is lost by indecision than by wrong decision."

– Marcus Tillius Cicero

"What we think, or what we know, or what we believe is, in the end, of little consequence. The only consequence is what we do."

– John Ruskin

"Self education is, I firmly believe, the only kind of education there is."

– Isaac Asimov

1. North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Big Picture

2. Russia's defense chief departs Pyongyang after two-day visit: KCNA

3. South Korean lawmakers back $1.1 billion initial payment for US troop presence

4. 1st subway in Saudi Arabia built by Samsung C&T begins operation

5. Pres. Yoon’s approval rating falls back to 10% range

6. S. Korea aims to expand imports from U.S. 'constructively' to address Trump uncertainties: minister

7. S. Korea's exports grow for 14th month in Nov. on record shipments of chips

8. Over 8 in 10 S. Korean companies see Trump's reelection as negative factor for economy

9. Talk of direct US-N. Korea dealings already emerging

10. Editorial: South Korea must avoid Japan's decades-long stagnant growth

11. Why South Korea is now a bigger player in US-China cyberwarfare

12. South Korea’s balloon barrage has hit a nerve in the North

13. Engaging North Korea: Prospects And Challenges Of Another Trump-Kim Meeting – Analysis

14. Why China faces a ‘dilemma’ as North Korea’s Kim vows steadfast support for Russia

15. South Korea may become the first country to disappear from the face of Earth. The reasons are not as simple as they seem to be

1. North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Big Picture

Let's exploit the opportunity Kim is presenting rather than succumb to our fears.

Excerpts:

The deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine represents a troubling convergence of two states with little regard for international norms. This partnership strengthens Russia’s capacity in Ukraine while extending North Korea’s influence and reach beyond Northeast Asia. The international community must recognize this as a significant escalation requiring coordinated responses.

We must increase diplomatic pressure including pushing for stronger sanctions targeting DPRK troop deployments and any further military cooperation with Russia and encourage closer collaboration between South Korea, the United States, NATO, and other allies to counter DPRK-Russian ties. Additionally, we must strengthen intelligence efforts to track North Korean troop movements, equipment, and their battlefield impact in Ukraine. We must also exploit the cultural and logistical divides between Russian and North Korean forces to undermine their cooperation.

The free world should enhance military readiness and cooperation, particularly through joint exercises and missile defense capabilities, to deter DPRK provocations and engage China diplomatically to discourage its tacit support of DPRK actions, leveraging their interest in regional stability. Also, it is imperative to disrupt illicit trade networks that sustain the DPRK’s military programs, particularly its arms exports and penalize financial institutions or entities facilitating North Korea’s global operations. Finally, prioritize efforts to block the DPRK’s ability to export advanced tactics, technology, or nuclear materials to other destabilizing actors.

By addressing this challenge with a combination of strategic pressure and strengthened alliances, the global community can mitigate the immediate threat while undermining the foundations of this emerging partnership.

2024-11-29 by In-bum Chun

North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Big Picture

https://www.isdp.eu/north-korean-troops-in-ukraine-the-big-picture/

In October 2024, reports emerged from Ukraine and South Korea suggesting that North Korean combat troops had been deployed in significant numbers to the Ukraine-Russian front. As of this writing, the North Korean military, or Korean People’s Army (KPA), has integrated troops into the Russian army. This development is alarming but, in one sense, a logical evolution from the DPRK’s initial supply of ammunition and missiles to Russia, culminating in a Russia-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) mutual friendship agreement. This agreement stipulates mutual military support in the event of an attack.

Kim’s Private Army

The KPA was established in 1948 but traces its lineage to 1932, when Koreans fought against the Japanese in China and Russia. The KPA received formal training and military equipment from the Soviet Union during its occupation of northern Korea in 1945. By 1950, the KPA had sufficient capacity to launch an invasion of South Korea with tanks and combat aircraft, coming close to victory. With the UN counter attack, and a brilliant amphibious landing that almost defeated the North Koreans it seemed the KPA was finished until the last-minute intervention of Chinese “volunteers” averted its defeat.

The KPA serves as an arm of the North Korean Communist Party and operates as a de facto private army of the Kim family. With approximately 1 million active personnel and 7 million in reserve, nearly the entire nation of 25 million people functions as a militarized state. Mandatory military service requires males to serve 7–8 years and females 5 years, with additional time often spent in construction units. This system enables the DPRK to maintain a massive military force while simultaneously completing large-scale infrastructure projects.

KPA soldiers typically become proficient after three years of service, during which time some are recruited as non-commissioned or career officers—an “honor” few refuse without severe consequences. Daily indoctrination of 2–4 hours ensures ideological loyalty, instilling anti-American and anti-South Korean sentiment. The DPRK also has a history of deploying troops abroad, including during the Vietnam War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, using these opportunities to acquire advanced weaponry and technology for reverse engineering. While unable to feed its own population without external aid, the DPRK sustains a military doctrine of Bae-Hab-Jun (배합전/配合戰, “Mix and Match Warfare”), blending conventional and guerrilla tactics with little regard for casualties, including civilians.

KPA in Ukraine

The deployment of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine provides Russia with a more disciplined and motivated force than its recent recruits. For North Korean soldiers, this deployment is both a chance to improve their social standing and a path to becoming “heroes” of the republic, though the brutal realities of war may temper their initial enthusiasm.

How the North Korean soldiers perform is still a question to many. There will be good fighters and weak fighters for sure. These “raw soldiers” are new to war especially in Ukraine but they know hardship and they were handpicked. Among all the reinforcements that Putin has available, these North Koreans are the best trained and best motivated. The ones that survive the war will be better soldiers.

Despite this, the North Korean leadership is taking a risk as to how North Korean society will respond to eventual casualties from this war. Although there is a possibility that this could be destabilizing to the North Korean leadership, it is hard to believe that they are not prepared for this eventuality.

This development has broad implications, highlighting the DPRK as not merely a regional threat but a destabilizing force on a global scale. The DPRK’s history of arms exports and its possession of nuclear weapons exacerbate the risks of proliferation and international instability.

Looking Ahead

The deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine represents a troubling convergence of two states with little regard for international norms. This partnership strengthens Russia’s capacity in Ukraine while extending North Korea’s influence and reach beyond Northeast Asia. The international community must recognize this as a significant escalation requiring coordinated responses.

We must increase diplomatic pressure including pushing for stronger sanctions targeting DPRK troop deployments and any further military cooperation with Russia and encourage closer collaboration between South Korea, the United States, NATO, and other allies to counter DPRK-Russian ties. Additionally, we must strengthen intelligence efforts to track North Korean troop movements, equipment, and their battlefield impact in Ukraine. We must also exploit the cultural and logistical divides between Russian and North Korean forces to undermine their cooperation.

The free world should enhance military readiness and cooperation, particularly through joint exercises and missile defense capabilities, to deter DPRK provocations and engage China diplomatically to discourage its tacit support of DPRK actions, leveraging their interest in regional stability. Also, it is imperative to disrupt illicit trade networks that sustain the DPRK’s military programs, particularly its arms exports and penalize financial institutions or entities facilitating North Korea’s global operations. Finally, prioritize efforts to block the DPRK’s ability to export advanced tactics, technology, or nuclear materials to other destabilizing actors.

By addressing this challenge with a combination of strategic pressure and strengthened alliances, the global community can mitigate the immediate threat while undermining the foundations of this emerging partnership.

2. Russia's defense chief departs Pyongyang after two-day visit: KCNA

Solidifying the defense relationship.

Based on the photo below enquiring minds want to know: whose soldiers are more proficient in goose stepping? Russia's or north Korea's?

Russia's defense chief departs Pyongyang after two-day visit: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 1, 2024

SEOUL, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- Russia's Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has left Pyongyang after a two-day visit during which he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the North's state media reported Sunday.

Belousov and a Russian defense ministry delegation he led departed Pyongyang the previous day via Pyongyang Sunan International Airport after visiting the Liberation Tower and Mangyongdae in the capital earlier in the day, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.

The Russian minister arrived in the North Korean capital on Friday for high-level talks with North Korean military officials, amid deepening military cooperation between the two countries.

On Friday, he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who expressed support for Russia's war against Ukraine.

The KCNA said that Belousov and his delegation visited the Liberation Tower in Pyongyang's Moranbong area on Saturday, where they laid flowers before departing the North Korean capital.

The monument was established in 1946 to honor Russian soldiers who died fighting for North Korea's liberation from the Japanese colonial rule during World War II.

The Russian minister also visited Mangyongdae, the birthplace of North Korea founder Kim Il-sung, where he wrote in a guest book his wishes for "welfare and peace" for North Koreans and a "grand victory" for North Korea's efforts to build a powerful nation, according to the KCNA.

North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang-chol and Jong Kyong-thaek, director of the military's General Political Bureau, sent the Russian delegation off at the airport, it said.

North Korea and Russia have been bolstering military cooperation under a major defense treaty signed in June that calls for providing military assistance "without delay" if either side comes under attack.

North Korea deployed thousands of troops to fight for Russia in its war against Ukraine, with South Korea and the United States assessing that some of them already entered combat.

No mention of an agreement has been made by North Korea in connection with the latest visit by the Russian delegation, but the two sides are expected to have discussed a potential increase in North Korea's arms transfers or troop deployments for Russia and the rewards it would receive from Russia in return.

This image, published by Russia's TASS news agency, shows a Russian delegation visiting the Liberation Tower in Pyongyang, North Korea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 1, 2024

3. South Korean lawmakers back $1.1 billion initial payment for US troop presence

Just as a reminder, no money is transferred from South Korea to the US for "payment" of US troops. South Korea agrees to provide support for US forces in Korea, and funds South Korean labor, utilities, and designated facilities construction costs.

South Korean lawmakers back $1.1 billion initial payment for US troop presence

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 29, 2024

Asia-Pacific

ByDavid Choi

Stars and Stripes •

A U.S. Army AH-64 Apache shoots rockets over the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex near Pocheon, South Korea, Oct. 30, 2024. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea’s National Assembly has approved a new cost-sharing agreement with the United States for stationing roughly 28,500 American troops on the Korean Peninsula, clearing the way for the deal to take effect in 2026.

The assembly voted 173-36 to pass the upcoming Special Measures Agreement, which establishes the financial framework for maintaining the U.S. military presence in South Korea for five years.

The deal follows eight rounds of negotiations this year in Washington, Seoul and Hawaii.

Under the new terms, South Korea will pay $1.1 billion initially and increase its contribution annually in line with proportional changes to its consumer price index. The deal includes a 5% cap on annual increases to shield against sharp rises during economic downturns, according to the South’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The current accord, which went into effect in 2021, required Seoul to pay $1 billion and gradually increase its annual contribution based on its defense budget until the end of 2025.

South Korea’s contributions pay for U.S. military operations, construction projects on American bases, and local workers employed by U.S. Forces Korea.

Recent projects include two barracks at Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. base overseas, which cost $67 million and began housing 600 soldiers in June.

Cost-sharing negotiations have been contentious in the past. During President-elect Donald Trump’s previous administration, Trump accused South Korea of not paying enough, reportedly demanding as much as $5 billion annually.

Trump said in a 2019 interview with Bloomberg News that South Korea “would be happy” to contribute $10 billion annually for U.S. military assistance.

Negotiations stalled in 2019 over disagreements, forcing South Korea to extend its contribution rate into 2020.

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 29, 2024

4. 1st subway in Saudi Arabia built by Samsung C&T begins operation

South Korea: A global pivotal state.

1st subway in Saudi Arabia built by Samsung C&T begins operation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · December 1, 2024

SEOUL, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- A metro in Saudi Arabia built partly by South Korea's Samsung C&T Corp. began operations in the Middle Eastern country's capital city on Sunday, officials said.

The construction unit of Samsung Group announced the opening of Lines 1, 4 and 6 of the Riyadh Metro, a major part of the infrastructure bid for the "vision 2030" project pushed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Lines 2 and 5 are expected to begin operations on Dec. 15, and Line 3 will launch its service on Jan. 5.

Samsung C&T formed a consortium with FCC Construction of Spain and others to build six subway lines covering 176 kilometers in Riyadh, which traverse across the city's major locations, such as King Khalid International Airport and the King Abdullah Financial District.

King Salman bin Abdulaziz declared the start of metro services in an opening ceremony held Wednesday, the South Korean company said.

This file photo, provided by Samsung C&T Corp., shows the Riyadh Metro, the first public transit in Saudi Arabia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · December 1, 2024

5. Pres. Yoon’s approval rating falls back to 10% range

Pres. Yoon’s approval rating falls back to 10% range

donga.com

Posted November. 30, 2024 07:28,

Updated November. 30, 2024 07:28

Pres. Yoon’s approval rating falls back to 10% range. November. 30, 2024 07:28. by Hyung-Jun Hwang constant25@donga.com.

President Yoon Suk Yeol's approval rating has fallen back into the 10% range. Following the first instance of dipping into the 10% range late last month, it hit a record low of 17% in the first week of this month. After maintaining a 20% approval rating, it has now resumed a downward trend after three weeks.

According to the results of a public opinion poll for the fourth week of November released by Gallup Korea on Friday, President Yoon's approval rating for job performance stood at 19%, a one-percentage-point drop from the previous week. Among his core conservative support base in the Daegu-North Gyeongsang region, the approval rating fell by one percentage point to 40%, and it also declined by nine percentage points among supporters of the ruling People Power Party (50%).

The disapproval rating remained unchanged from the previous week at 72%, with respondents citing reasons such as "economy, livelihoods, and inflation" (15%), "issues involving First Lady Kim Keon Hee" (12%), "diplomacy" (8%), and "insufficient communication" (7%). While concerns over "issues involving First Lady Kim" dropped by two percentage points from last week, it remained among the top reasons. Meanwhile, criticism of "diplomatic failures," particularly following the disruption at the Sado Mine memorial event, led to an increase in the mention of "diplomacy" by three percentage points compared to the previous week.

Despite President Yoon’s plans to address public welfare issues, such as "resolving polarization" in the latter half of his term, assessments suggest these efforts are insufficient to reverse the declining approval ratings in the short term. A presidential office official told reporters that day, "We are taking the approval ratings seriously and will do our utmost every day to regain the trust of the people."

한국어

donga.com

6. S. Korea aims to expand imports from U.S. 'constructively' to address Trump uncertainties: minister

(Yonhap Interview) S. Korea aims to expand imports from U.S. 'constructively' to address Trump uncertainties: minister | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · December 1, 2024

By Kang Yoon-seung

SEOUL, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun has said that South Korea plans to "constructively" increase imports from the U.S. to address concerns over potential protectionist measures under the incoming Donald Trump administration targeting key trade partners.

"As it is well known that Trump will focus on the agenda of trade balance, we also need to make efforts to ensure balanced exports and imports," Ahn said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency on Friday when asked about Seoul's plans to prepare for the launch of the new U.S. administration.

His remarks came as Trump continued to warn of raising trade barriers, including the possible imposition of sweeping tariffs of at least 10 percent on all imported goods.

Trump has also announced plans to impose a 25 percent tariff on goods from Mexico and Canada, as well as an additional 10 percent on Chinese imports, once he takes office in January.

These policies have raised concerns that his administration may take similar steps against South Korea, which recorded a record trade surplus of US$44.4 billion in bilateral trade with the U.S. in 2023.

Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Seoul on Nov. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)

Ahn, however, emphasized that efforts to expand imports would build on current initiatives to strengthen bilateral ties in cutting-edge sectors, which will inevitably increase the demand for parts, machinery and other related goods.

"The government is working to constructively utilize these opportunities as part of our industrial and business strategy," Ahn said. "There is a possibility for us to secure oil and gas, which we greatly need, at more competitive prices as well."

"In terms of diversifying the industrial supply chain with the U.S., there is room for us to leverage this move to advance our industrial policy to the next level," he added.

The industry minister also noted that the government is monitoring changes in major U.S. policies, including the Inflation Reduction Act, to provide necessary support to affected businesses if needed.

As for the country's exports, Ahn noted that South Korea has been successfully diversifying its trade portfolio, which could help the country address trade uncertainties in 2025 as well.

"We will continue efforts to diversify exports to bolster our export capacity and enhance national economic security," Ahn said.

Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Seoul on Nov. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)

With regard to the ongoing resource exploration project in the East Sea, Ahn said he hopes the project will serve as an opportunity for the country to enhance its capabilities to implement similar initiatives on the Korean Peninsula in the future.

"I hope the exploration will become the starting point for the country to expand its foundation for rolling out resource exploration projects on the Korean Peninsula," Ahn said, adding the government will also continue to update the public on the project's progress as early as possible.

South Korea is set to initiate the first drilling operation this month for the project, which could potentially uncover between 3.5 billion and 14 billion barrels of gas and oil.

"If there are any profits generated from the project, they will be fully allocated to the people," Ahn added.

Touching on South Korea's ongoing efforts to finalize a deal to build two reactors in the Czech Republic by March, Ahn expressed hope that the state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and U.S.-based Westinghouse will resolve their ongoing conflict to enable broader bilateral cooperation.

Westinghouse has been claiming that KHNP's nuclear reactors are based on its technology.

"There is an intellectual property infringement lawsuit under way, and the companies need to address such issues in a constructive manner," Ahn said, emphasizing that there is significant room for cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. in the nuclear energy sector.

In November, South Korea and the U.S. announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding on principles regarding nuclear exports and cooperation, reaffirming their mutual commitment to promoting the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy while upholding the "highest standards of nonproliferation, safety, safeguards and security."

"We have established the framework for government-level cooperation in the global market. I believe the companies will also make efforts to come up with constructive solutions," he added.

Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Seoul on Nov. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · December 1, 2024

7. S. Korea's exports grow for 14th month in Nov. on record shipments of chips

(2nd LD) S. Korea's exports grow for 14th month in Nov. on record shipments of chips | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · December 1, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 5, 9-12, 15)

By Kang Yoon-seung

SEOUL, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's exports extended on-year gains to the 14th straight month in November, data showed Sunday, on the back of the strong performance of chips.

Outbound shipments rose 1.4 percent from a year earlier to US$56.3 billion last month, according to the data compiled by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

Imports shed 2.4 percent on-year to $50.7 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of $5.61 billion. South Korea has been maintaining a trade surplus for 18 consecutive months.

By sector, exports of semiconductors shot up 30.8 percent to hit $12.5 billion, marking the highest amount for any November. It was also the fourth consecutive month the country has set a new monthly high for chip exports.

The ministry attributed the growth to premium models, including high-bandwidth memory chips.

Outbound shipments of automobiles, on the other hand, tumbled 13.6 percent on-year to $5.6 billion, due to production disruptions following major auto parts makers' strike in November. The ministry added that weather conditions also hindered shipments of automobiles late last month.

Exports of petroleum and petrochemical products dipped 18.7 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively, due to falling crude prices.

The biohealth sector logged 19.6 percent on-year growth to $1.4 billion, maintaining growth for five straight months. Exports of ships spiked 70.8 percent on-year to $2.5 billion.

Exports of batteries decreased 26.3 percent to $658 million due to weaker global demand for electric vehicles.

By destination, exports to China, the top trading partner, edged down 0.6 percent to $11.28 billion, as weaker consumer sentiment in Asia's top economy led to sluggish demand for mobile devices.

Exports to the United States fell 5.1 percent to $10.39 billion due to losses in the automobile and machinery sectors, although shipments of semiconductors gained ground on strong demand from the data center and cloud computing industries.

Outbound shipments to Southeast Asian nations edged up 0.4 percent, supported by chip exports, and those to the European Union increased 0.9 percent, driven by higher demand for biohealth products and ships.

"In November, there were unexpected hurdles in exports, including the strike by auto parts makers, which led to decreased car production, and weather conditions that disrupted shipments," Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said in a statement.

"However, South Korea has been able to maintain export growth for 14 straight months, along with 18 consecutive months of trade surplus, thanks to the strong performance of key items, including chips and ships," Ahn added.

Over the January-November period, South Korea's exports shot up 8.3 percent on-year to $622.2 billion, compared to the 7.4 percent decrease recorded for all of 2023.

Containers are stacked at a port in the southeastern city of Busan on Nov. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · December 1, 2024

8. Over 8 in 10 S. Korean companies see Trump's reelection as negative factor for economy

But not quite 9 in 10 I guess.

Over 8 in 10 S. Korean companies see Trump's reelection as negative factor for economy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · December 1, 2024

SEOUL, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- More than 8 out of 10 South Korean companies expect Donald Trump's reelection as U.S. president will have a negative impact on the national economy, a survey showed Sunday.

In the annual survey on 239 companies with at least 30 employees on their management, 82 percent said the Korean economy will be negatively affected by the protectionist policy of the incoming second Trump administration as it has high dependence on exports, according to the Korea Enterprises Federation (KEF).

Only 7.5 percent answered the Korean economy will benefit from his reelection thanks to his China policy, expected to be aimed at curbing the growth of the world's second-largest economy.

This image provided by the Korea Enterprises Federation on Dec. 1, 2024, shows 82 percent of South Korean companies expect Donald Trump's reelection as the president of the United States will have a negative impact on the economy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Amid uncertainties surrounding the economy, 49.7 percent of the companies said they plan to go into belt-tightening mode next year, while 28 percent and 22.3 percent plan to maintain the status quo and expand their business, respectively.

The KEF said the rate of companies going on austerity management was the highest since 2019.

As measures for austerity, cost reduction was cited the most at 66.7 percent, followed by the efficient use of manpower at 52.6 percent and a decrease in new investments at 25.6 percent.

The local companies forecast the Korean economy will grow 1.9 percent next year and start recovering after 2026, according to the KEF.

This image provided by the Korea Enterprises Federation (KEF) shows nearly half of South Korean companies plan to go into belt-tightening mode in 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · December 1, 2024

9. Talk of direct US-N. Korea dealings already emerging

Early visit? When is President Yoon traveling to the US?

It is imperative that the Yoon and Trump administrations share the same assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime to deal with the "Korea question" as a strong alliance.

Excerpt:

The government hopes that President Yoon Suk Yeol's early visit to the United States will sufficiently convince the new administration. However, if we remain overly hopeful, we may find ourselves in a situation where we must watch the "picture we don't want to imagine" unfold from a distance. Our government must prepare for the dramatic changes that Trump's second term could bring. It is crucial to urgently expand our outreach to countries that have been ignored or neglected, such as by easing tensions with North Korea and improving relations with China and Russia.

Talk of direct US-N. Korea dealings already emerging

donga.com

Posted November. 29, 2024 08:02,

Updated November. 29, 2024 08:02

Talk of direct US-N. Korea dealings already emerging. November. 29, 2024 08:02. .

The South Korean government has not officially responded to a Reuters report stating that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's team is discussing the possibility of direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, referring to it as “the realm of what-ifs.” However, a high-ranking source stated, “It's hard to imagine North Korea and the United States sitting down at the negotiating table without us, and it's not a picture we want to imagine.” While the U.S. is unlikely to engage directly with North Korea without South Korea's involvement, it would be a big deal if it were to materialize.

The reports are actually quite a predictable scenario, amounting to nothing more than what Trump's second-term transition team has been discussing. President-elect Trump has frequently touted his friendship with Kim, stating numerous times that he will “get along with him when I'm back in office.” For now, he says he wants to restore relations between the two, but he has not set clear policy goals or a precise timetable. According to Reuters, this issue could take a backseat to more pressing matters, such as Ukraine and the Middle East. This is likely why our government is not paying much attention.

Moreover, a direct deal between the leaders of North Korea and the United States would not be easy to achieve as the government predicted. Trump and Kim have already met three times, but each meeting ended with ‘no deal.’ At the time, there was a promise of ‘complete denuclearization’ from North Korea, even if it was empty, but even that precondition seems unlikely now. Given Kim Jong Un's more advanced nuclear capabilities and his strengthened strategic position, bolstered by close ties with Russia, it is improbable that he will respond positively to Trump's overtures for reconciliation.

However, President-elect Trump's relentless deal-making instincts, combined with Kim's attention-seeking behavior that fuels them, are bound to continue frustrating our government, regardless of the meeting's outcome or the progress of the negotiations. Kim Jong Un's recent statement that he has “gone as far as he can in negotiations with the United States” and Trump's selection of a former North Korean negotiator as the next White House principal deputy national security advisor has further heightened the government's concerns about being ‘excluded’ from the process.

The government hopes that President Yoon Suk Yeol's early visit to the United States will sufficiently convince the new administration. However, if we remain overly hopeful, we may find ourselves in a situation where we must watch the "picture we don't want to imagine" unfold from a distance. Our government must prepare for the dramatic changes that Trump's second term could bring. It is crucial to urgently expand our outreach to countries that have been ignored or neglected, such as by easing tensions with North Korea and improving relations with China and Russia.

한국어

donga.com

10. Editorial: South Korea must avoid Japan's decades-long stagnant growth

Editorial: South Korea must avoid Japan's decades-long stagnant growth

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/12/01/UPZC6XKOIVC3DEWWSGNF2HFBYI/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2024.12.01. 10:24

Containers arrive at Incheon Port. / Newsis

South Korea’s October economic data revealed a triple blow, with production, consumption, and investment all declining month-on-month. Production and consumption fell simultaneously for two straight months, marking the first such decline in four years and seven months since the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in February and March 2020. Retail sales dropped 0.8% year-on-year last month, extending their decline to eight consecutive months since March. Such a prolonged slump in retail sales was last seen during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, 15 years and six months ago.

Weak domestic demand, coupled with a downturn in the construction sector, is slowing down the economy further. Construction performance has fallen for six straight months since May, the first on record since recordkeeping began in 1997. Construction output has also been shrinking for six consecutive months, the most prolonged downturn since 2000. New construction orders, which had previously shown year-on-year growth, fell sharply by 11.9% last month. While public sector orders rose by 77%, private sector orders plummeted by 30%, reflecting the limits of fiscal measures to boost the construction industry.

The only bright spot in the sluggish economy was the manufacturing sector, bolstered by semiconductor demand. The semiconductor production index reached an all-time high in October.

The Bank of Korea unexpectedly lowered the benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 3.0% on Nov. 28, surprising the market with the first back-to-back rate cut since 2009. The move underscores growing concerns about an economic slowdown. The central bank also revised the economic growth forecast for next year downward to 1.9%, with 2026 growth projected to drop further to 1.8%. This signals that South Korea is no longer facing a temporary slump but is sliding into a long-term low-growth phase, with growth falling below its potential rate of 2%.

The BOK’s pessimistic outlook for the next two years stems from uncertainties expected to arise after Donald Trump’s second administration takes office in January. If China retaliates against Trump’s new tariff measures, Korea’s export-dependent economy will likely face significant challenges. The Korean economy, driven almost entirely by export giants, including chipmakers, may struggle as changes to trade dynamics weigh on exports, prolonging the period of sub-2% growth.

The government and the central bank must mobilize all available resources to prevent the economy’s growth from falling into this low-growth tunnel. Delays could lead Korea down the same path as Japan’s 30-year-long economic stagnation.

11. Why South Korea is now a bigger player in US-China cyberwarfare

Our ally can contribute to winning in strategic competition versus China.

Excerpts:

While China did not take part in any of these events, it was an obvious presence.

Observers say South Korea has been working more closely with the United States and its allies in a cybersecurity strategy aimed at China – one that looks set to deepen.

Chinese military observer Liang Yongchun said the impact of this growing cooperation on security in East Asia “should not be underestimated”.

Why South Korea is now a bigger player in US-China cyberwarfare

Seoul has been taking part in more Indo-Pacific cybersecurity exercises with Washington and Nato

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3288818/why-south-korea-now-bigger-player-us-china-cyberwarfare?utm_source=rss_feed

Meredith Chen

Published: 10:00pm, 30 Nov 2024

For three days earlier this year, defence personnel from more than 20 Nato and Indo-Pacific countries descended on the South Korean capital to work out what a regional cyberwar might look like.

In the APEX war gaming, critical infrastructure of multiple allies was attacked and participants had to share and verify information to come up with defensive strategies and countermeasures.

The APEX exercise is one of a series of multinational cybersecurity drills and summits that South Korea has taken part in over the past year.

South Korea also attended the annual Nato-supported Cyber Champions Summit in Sydney, Australia in September, and will host the event next year. In addition, it took part in the Locked Shields live-fire cyber defence exercise with Nato members in April.

While China did not take part in any of these events, it was an obvious presence.

Observers say South Korea has been working more closely with the United States and its allies in a cybersecurity strategy aimed at China – one that looks set to deepen.

Japan, South Korea and US hold trilateral military exercise amid rising tensions

Chinese military observer Liang Yongchun said the impact of this growing cooperation on security in East Asia “should not be underestimated”.

Liang told state broadcaster CCTV last month that South Korea was actively seeking to be a strategic “beachhead” for Nato’s cyberwarfare in Asia, with the potential to be a base for US cyberattacks against third parties.

The move, he said, was on a par with the deployment of a controversial US anti-missile system in South Korea in 2017, which set off an upheaval in Seoul’s relationship with Beijing.

“This could pose a security threat to East Asia that is comparable to the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system by US forces in South Korea, which must be taken very seriously by China,” Liang said.

Zhao Minghao, deputy director at the Centre for American Studies of Fudan University in Shanghai, agreed on the THAAD comparison.

He also said China would see the US-South Korean engagement against the broader backdrop of the US-China tech rivalry.

Zhao said that as a hi-tech ally, South Korea played a critical role in supporting the US efforts to bolster its cyberwarfare abilities and “integrated deterrence” – a strategy targeting China and other adversaries.

The goal of the efforts was to consolidate abilities across different operational domains, including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, Zhao said.

Part of South Korea’s importance in this area is its role as a gateway for regional communications infrastructure.

By controlling nodes like South Korea, the US can penetrate transmission systems and steal network secrets more easily

Liang Yongchun, analyst

Liang said South Korea was a “key hub country” for cybersecurity because it connected the trans-Pacific submarine cables to the Asian continent, including many to China.

South Korea’s hosting of the US-led APEX event was a clear signal of US intentions towards China, Liang said, adding other node countries such Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore also took part in the exercise.

“By controlling nodes like South Korea, the US can penetrate transmission systems and steal network secrets more easily,” Liang said.

“By roping in these countries, Nato will gain access to entries where it can launch cyberattacks against China.”

War of words erupts over North Korea’s multi-warhead missile test claims

The US and Nato have conducted numerous cybersecurity exercises in the Indo-Pacific – not only with South Korea but other allies such as Japan and Australia through Aukus and the Quad.

Zhao at Fudan University said the efforts highlighted a growing trend of bloc confrontation in the Asia-Pacific, posing increasingly military and strategic threats to China.

He said the US was aiming to expand these coalitions to areas such as 6G and artificial intelligence.

“Cyber cooperation might serve as a precursor for the US to explore a framework or mechanism for building alliances and expanding influence, and then move forward in other areas. I believe this is something China is very concerned about,” he said.

China has been boosting its military applications in cyberspace.

In April, China created new People’s Liberation Army units for information, space and cyber operations in its most sweeping military reorganisation in nearly a decade.

But, Zhao said, there could still be a gap between the PLA’s strength and that of the US and Nato overall.

“[China] must consider strengthening its military abilities for future warfare while addressing the intensifying security challenges in cyber operations,” he said.

He also said China must try to head off the formation of blocs, saying a big driver behind the US-South Korea cyber cooperation was likely to be North Korea.

North Korea was at the centre of South Korea’s decision to allow THAAD’s deployment seven years ago.

Sean O’Malley, professor at the department of international studies of Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea, said the continuing cyberattacks from North Korea, along with its growing cooperation with Russia, bolstered South Korea’s need for greater cooperation with the US and other like-minded states in cybersecurity.

“From the South Korean perspective, this cooperation is strictly for defensive purposes and should be understood as necessary protective measures against an increasingly dangerous cyber landscape,” he said.

One way to stabilise relations with Seoul was for Beijing to acknowledge South Korea’s rationale for deploying the THAAD missile defence system, without endorsing it.

“China could then offer to play the good neighbour and call for nuclear security talks among the concerned powers in Northeast Asia,” he said.

Meredith Chen

Meredith Chen joined the Post in 2023 and covers China politics and diplomacy. She holds a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Hong Kong. Previously, she had stints with both international and Chinese-language media outlets, focusing on affairs in Asia.

12. South Korea’s balloon barrage has hit a nerve in the North

The balloon launches from the South are not government actions but those of the north Korean diaspora supported by NGOs.

But Kim Jong Un (and Kim Yo Jong) are deathly afraid of the information they provide to the Korean people in the north. That is because Kim is more afraid of the Korean people than any military threat from the South. We need to understand and exploit that.

And the only response to north Korean threats is strength. Anything less is a success for the Kim family regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

Excerpt:

The truth is that bowing down to the North would be a not-so-tacit admission of defeat. Yo Jong has repeated her claim that, if South Korea continued to send such “political agitation leaflets”, Seoul should prepare for calamity.

Her tantrums shouldn’t let us forget that freedom of expression is at stake here. Perhaps there’s a lesson here for Britain. Kowtowing to authoritarianism is never a good idea, a point which the incumbent government would do well to remember as Keir Starmer’s government seeks to re-formulate its foreign policy priorities, not least when it comes to China, in an attempt to demonstrate foreign policy leadership (even if leadership is hardly an apt description of Starmer’s prime ministership). Even closer to home is, perhaps, a more localised threat. As the anything-but-liberal “liberal authoritarian” zeitgeist of identity politics continues to engulf government, society, and hallowed institutions, not least universities, it must be met with resolve. Otherwise, the authoritarians will win.

Edward Howell

South Korea’s balloon barrage has hit a nerve in the North

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/south-koreas-balloon-barrage-has-hit-a-nerve-in-the-north/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=TheSpectator/magazine/Politics

1 December 2024, 5:00am

North Korean defectors, now living in South Korea, release balloons carrying propaganda leaflets denouncing North Korea (Getty images)

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Kim Yo Jong, the younger sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, has long been confined to her brother’s not-insignificant shadow. But, in recent weeks, Yo Jong has shown that she is far more than just her brother’s ashtray-carrying secretary. She has launched a series of fiery rhetorical attacks against South Korea, accusing “South Korean scum” of “polluting the inviolable territory” of the North by distributing “political and conspiratorial” material. The target of her ire is leaflets denouncing her brother’s regime, which have been distributed using balloons across the Korean border. Yo Jong’s way with words shows that she is a chip off the old block.

Yo Jong’s way with words shows that she is a chip off the old block

Her latest verbal assault came just a few weeks after she issued another invective, accusing the “military gangsters of the ROK [Republic of Korea]” of using South Korean drones to deposit “anti-DPRK propaganda leaflets” in the North. It’s clear that the leaflets have hit a nerve, and their contents give an indication why. The North Korean Foreign Ministry broadcast photographs of just what the South Korean leaflets contained, namely facts about the income disparities between the two Koreas, and photographs of how North Korea’s cash is being spent, such as on luxury Swiss watches for the Supreme Leader, and Christian Dior coats for his eleven-year-old daughter, Kim Ju Ae. Together with developing nuclear weapons and missiles, this is where the regime’s money is going; forget the people.

Over the past few months, the Korean peninsula’s battle of balloons has worsened considerably. Relations between the two Koreas – who remain, technically, at war – have soured as South Korean activist groups continue to send balloons carrying dollar bills, bottles filled with rice, and USB sticks containing South Korean media to their impoverished northern neighbour. The North has responded by deploying its own balloons, carrying bags stuffed with excrement and rubbish. Some of these balloons have hit central Seoul, with one bombardment last month reaching the South Korean presidential compound.

North Korea’s passionate dislike of the leaflets deposited by the South is no surprise, particularly since these manoeuvres form part of a long-term effort at seeking to change the hearts and minds of the North Korean people. Who can forget how, in June 2020, when much like its counterparts in the so-called free world, North Korea was under coronavirus-induced lockdown, Yo Jong threatened – in response to these leaflets – the collapse of the “useless” inter-Korean liaison office, which had served as a de facto embassy of the two Koreas (given the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries). Kim Yo Jong had her way; the liaison office was no more.

The decision to cut off all lines of communication – including, in the past few days, the dismantlement of power transmission lines across the inter-Korean border – has only escalated tensions. Some critics of the balloon barrage suggest that at a time of heightened provocations on the Korean peninsula, South Korean activist groups – frequently led by North Korean defectors – should stop bombarding the North with its much-hated leaflets. Back in December 2020, the then-ruling liberal South Korean administration of Moon Jae-in criminalised the sending of anti-North Korea leaflets towards North Korea, as part of what would become a highly unsuccessful attempt to improve inter-Korean relations. These actions, however, were rightly ruled as unconstitutional in September last year, by the current South Korean government of President Yoon Suk Yeol. In the years since, the balloon bombardment has intensified.

The truth is that bowing down to the North would be a not-so-tacit admission of defeat. Yo Jong has repeated her claim that, if South Korea continued to send such “political agitation leaflets”, Seoul should prepare for calamity.

Her tantrums shouldn’t let us forget that freedom of expression is at stake here. Perhaps there’s a lesson here for Britain. Kowtowing to authoritarianism is never a good idea, a point which the incumbent government would do well to remember as Keir Starmer’s government seeks to re-formulate its foreign policy priorities, not least when it comes to China, in an attempt to demonstrate foreign policy leadership (even if leadership is hardly an apt description of Starmer’s prime ministership). Even closer to home is, perhaps, a more localised threat. As the anything-but-liberal “liberal authoritarian” zeitgeist of identity politics continues to engulf government, society, and hallowed institutions, not least universities, it must be met with resolve. Otherwise, the authoritarians will win.

Edward Howell

Edward Howell is a politics lecturer at Oxford. He was involved in launching the BBC World Service in North Korea.

13. Engaging North Korea: Prospects And Challenges Of Another Trump-Kim Meeting – Analysis

Why doe no one suggest enaging Kim Jong Un using a superior political warfare strategy with the intent to support the Korean people in the north and their desire for transformation and freedom?

This short essay does provide a concise overview of many of the issues and interests.

Engaging North Korea: Prospects And Challenges Of Another Trump-Kim Meeting – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · November 30, 2024

The potential for President-elect Donald Trump to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to tackle two critical global issues: North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and its expanding military alliance with Russia, which has significant implications for both the Ukraine conflict and stability in Northeast Asia.

This essay examines the challenges and prospects of such a meeting, juxtaposing Trump’s direct engagement approach with President Biden’s multilateral strategy. It also considers the roles of South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia in shaping outcomes, arguing that Trump’s use of “carrot and stick” diplomacy must be carefully balanced to achieve meaningful progress. Success hinges on harmonizing incentives with firm deterrence while addressing North Korea’s destabilizing actions, particularly its military support for Russia. The results of this engagement could reshape U.S.-North Korean relations and influence broader regional security dynamics in 2024 and beyond.

Background: U.S.- North Korea Relations and Current Challenges

Historical Context

The U.S. relationship with North Korea has fluctuated between periods of heightened tension and cautious diplomacy. Trump’s historic summits with Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019 aimed to establish trust and negotiate denuclearization. However, the absence of substantive agreements and North Korea’s continued weapons development highlighted the limitations of these discussions.

North Korea’s Strategic Shift

North Korea has increasingly aligned itself with Russia, supplying military aid—such as ammunition and troops—to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. This partnership enhances Pyongyang’s access to resources and advanced technology, undermining international sanctions. North Korea’s military activities, including missile launches and advancements in satellite technology, further threaten regional stability.

The Significance of Trump Engagement

Trump’s diplomacy offers a chance to reframe negotiations. His readiness to directly engage with adversaries distinguishes him from Biden’s focus on building multilateral alliances and applying pressure. However, critics warn that Trump’s approach risks legitimizing Kim’s regime without securing meaningful concessions.

The Problem: Risks and Barriers to Progress

North Korea’s Role in Global Conflicts

North Korea’s military partnership with Russia complicates diplomatic efforts. By providing ammunition and personnel, Pyongyang not only supports Russia’s campaign in Ukraine but also strengthens its military-industrial complex. This dual advantage empowers North Korea to resist international pressure while advancing its nuclear ambitions.

The Deadlock on Denuclearization

Achieving denuclearization remains a significant challenge. North Korea views its nuclear program as essential to the survival of its regime and as a means to counter perceived U.S. aggression. Previous negotiations have stalled due to Pyongyang’s refusal to dismantle its substantial arsenal without first obtaining sanctions relief.

Regional Concerns and Mistrust

U.S. allies in the region, particularly South Korea and Japan, worry that unilateral U.S.-North Korea discussions may overlook their security priorities. Both nations emphasize the necessity of a coordinated approach that bolsters deterrence and maintains regional stability.

Opportunities: The Potential of a Trump-Kim Meeting

Reopening Dialogue

A meeting between Trump and Kim could revitalize stalled negotiations, establishing a platform for discussions on denuclearization and regional security. Trump’s strategy of direct engagement may ease tensions and create opportunities for gradual progress.

Economic Incentives

Trump’s “carrot and stick” approach could provide North Korea with tangible incentives, such as partial sanctions relief or economic aid, in exchange for verified steps towards disarmament. These measures may address Pyongyang’s urgent economic issues and promote goodwill.

Weakening the North Korea-Russia Alliance

By addressing North Korea’s military support for Russia, Trump could undermine this partnership, reducing Pyongyang’s reliance on Moscow and limiting its access to essential resources. Emphasizing the risks associated with continued isolation might spur North Korea to reassess its strategic alliances.

Stakeholder Perspectives

South Korea

South Korea advocates for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and condemns North Korea’s provocations. Seoul highlights the importance of U.S. commitments to its defence and insists that any agreements with Pyongyang must preserve regional stability.

Japan

Japan’s primary concern is North Korea’s missile capabilities, which pose a direct threat to its security. Tokyo supports a firm stance on denuclearization and insists that any concessions be contingent upon concrete actions from Pyongyang.

China

China’s relationship with North Korea is complex, as it balances economic support with a desire to prevent regional instability. While Beijing opposes North Korea’s military provocations, it also views Pyongyang as a buffer against U.S. influence in Asia.

Russia

Russia benefits from its alliance with North Korea, gaining critical military support while providing Pyongyang with food and resources. Moscow’s role complicates efforts to isolate North Korea and underscores the interconnectedness of global conflicts.

Recommendations for Trump Strategy

Confront Military Ties with Russia

Trump should address North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia, highlighting the global repercussions of these actions. By offering targeted incentives, such as food or economic relief, he could potentially weaken the Pyongyang-Moscow partnership.

Clear Incentives and Penalties

A balanced approach that combines economic incentives with enforceable penalties for non-compliance is crucial. Clear benchmarks for progress, such as a freeze on missile tests should guide negotiations.

Reinforce Regional Alliances

Involving South Korea and Japan in the negotiation process will ensure regional support and strengthen collective security. Maintaining transparency and coordination with allies is essential for building trust and deterring North Korean aggression.

Engage Multilateral Stakeholders

Involving China and Russia in discussions could help reduce their support for North Korea and encourage compliance with international norms. Multilateral forums provide a platform to address the broader implications of North Korea’s actions.

Conclusion

Trump’s proposed meeting with Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to tackle some of the most urgent security challenges for 2024. By utilizing his personal diplomacy style and adopting a balanced “carrot and stick” approach, Trump can work towards reducing tensions, promoting denuclearization, and undermining North Korea’s destabilizing alliance with Russia. Success will depend on careful coordination with regional allies, strategic engagement with China and Russia, and a commitment to actionable outcomes. The stakes of this engagement are significant, but with a clear strategy, it could represent a pivotal moment in U.S.-North Korea relations and overall regional security.

Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat. He received his master’s degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.

References

Snyder, Scott A. “What Would a Second Trump Administration Mean for North Korea?” Council on Foreign Relations, November 29, 2023.

Howell, Edward. “Any New Trump–Kim Summit Risks Another No Deal. The US Must Nurture Old Alliances to Contain North Korea.” Chatham House, November 21, 2024.

Revere, Evans J.R. “A New Trump-Kim Summit Would Be High Risk, Low Reward.” Brookings Institution, June 8, 2023.

eurasiareview.com · November 30, 2024

14. Why China faces a ‘dilemma’ as North Korea’s Kim vows steadfast support for Russia

Is Kim creating a dilemma for China so we do not have to? I say that with only half tongue in cheek. The real question is can we exploit this dilemma that Kim is creating? Or do we take Bonaparte's position and do not interrupt enemies when they are making mistakes?

But we should not be under any illusion that this will somehow cause China to align with our interests in north Korea. That is an assumption trap we must avoid

Why China faces a ‘dilemma’ as North Korea’s Kim vows steadfast support for Russia

China is deeply concerned about Ukraine war and ‘very grave’ situation in Korean peninsula but may find its leverage tested, observers say

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3288815/why-china-faces-dilemma-north-koreas-kim-vows-steadfast-support-russia?utm_source=rss_feed

Shi Jiangtao

Published: 9:00pm, 30 Nov 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vowed to “invariably support” Russia’s war in Ukraine, weeks after reportedly sending thousands of troops to fight for Russia.

Observers said North Korea’s deepening military ties with Russia might leave China in a bind, with tensions on the Korean peninsula at the “most dangerous” point in more than 70 years.

According to North Korean state media, Kim pledged to expand cooperation in all areas including military affairs during a “friendly and trustworthy” meeting with visiting Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov in Pyongyang on Friday.

The North Korean “government, army and people will invariably support the policy of the Russian Federation to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the imperialists’ moves for hegemony”, Kim was quoted as saying by the Korean Central News Agency on Saturday.

He also condemned Washington and the West for allowing Ukraine to use US-supplied longer-range missiles to strike targets inside Russia earlier this month as a “direct military intervention”.

“It is an exercise of the right to self-defence for Russia to take resolute action to make the hostile forces pay the price,” Kim said.

Putin suggests Russia may hold military drills with North Korea

KCNA did not say whether Kim and Belousov discussed North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia, which has fed concerns about an expansion of the protracted war.

However, it said that Belousov’s visit “would greatly contribute to bolstering up the defence capabilities of the two countries … promoting the friendly, mutual cooperation and development of the relations between the two armies”.

According to assessments by the US, Ukraine and South Korea, Pyongyang has sent more than 10,000 troops to Russia – on top of the artillery and conventional weapons it provided earlier – and some of them were already engaged in combat in Russia’s western Kursk region.

Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Beijing’s Renmin University, said Kim’s latest remarks were made against the backdrop of widespread rumours about heavy casualties among the North Korean troops sent to the front lines, including in Kursk.

“He is expressing his firm commitment to fulfilling the obligations of a mutual defence treaty by supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with troops and military equipment,” he said.

Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a strategic partnership treaty in Pyongyang in June that requires both states to provide military assistance “without delay” in the case of an attack on the other and jointly oppose Western sanctions.

The United States and its regional treaty allies South Korea and Japan pledged earlier this month to strengthen defence capabilities and expand coordinated efforts to counter North Korea’s “dangerous and destabilising cooperation with Russia”. In response, Kim urged his military to step up “preparations for a war”.

Shi said it might also be that “Kim’s vigorous defence of the quasi-alliance with Russia” was in large part because Putin had kept or partially fulfilled his promises to Pyongyang. These “may include not only providing advanced technology and equipment for Pyongyang’s nuclear programme, but also Moscow’s support in the event of a war on the peninsula”.

He warned that Kim’s latest pledge to Russia looked set to fan the tensions on the Korean peninsula, amid repeated provocations from Pyongyang and its growing hostilities with Seoul.

North Korea may send 100,000 troops to Russia, as Kim tells military to ‘go all out’

“The situation on the Korean peninsula is very grave and I would say it has reached probably the most dangerous juncture since the Korean war ended in an armistice in 1953,” Shi said.

Observers say China is deeply concerned about the situation both in Ukraine and on the peninsula, as it faces growing international pressure to help rein in both Kim and Putin.

President Xi Jinping issued a rare warning on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru earlier this month, saying: “China does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean peninsula.”

With Pyongyang apparently tilting away from Beijing towards Moscow, Wooyeal Paik, an associate professor and deputy director of the Yonsei Institute of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said the deteriorating situation on the peninsula laid bare China’s dilemma over North Korea.

“It is clear that China has not been comfortable with the Russia-North Korea rapprochement since last year or so,” he said, noting Beijing had refrained from directly criticising either country, two of its closest partners.

“Once again, China shows that it doesn’t have any real constraining power over North Korea, not to mention Russia. And China has no say if South Korea leans even more towards the US and its so-called latticework alliance system,” Paik said.

China’s strategic position in this region and beyond has been deteriorating, according to Paik, as it was unable to use its economic “leverage” over its neighbours, including Russia-backed North Korea and the US-backed South Korea.

China warns of escalating tensions on Korean peninsula after North blows up roads to South

Stephen Nagy, a professor at Tokyo’s International Christian University, also said China was worried about Russia gaining an edge on influence over North Korea.

“This will create problems for China by likely increasing more China-focused cooperation between South Korea and Japan on the Korean peninsula,” he said.

But despite China’s grave concerns about the impact of the Russia-North Korea military partnership on its strategic interests, it may not have much room to manoeuvre, Shi at Renmin University warned.

“China is certainly aware that once a war breaks out on the peninsula, regardless of who strikes first, it will severely infringe on China’s core interests. But what China can and is willing to do to restrain Kim Jong-un in particular is another matter,” he said.

There was little sign that Beijing had taken any steps to persuade or pressure Kim or Putin so far, according to Shi.

“If Putin and Kim’s core interests do not align with China’s, they will not listen to China anyway,” he said.

Besides, Beijing’s pressure tactics in the past had failed to rein in Kim’s nuclear brinkmanship.

Beijing tried to exert maximum pressure on Pyongyang in early 2017 by supporting US-led international sanctions following its sixth nuclear test, but Kim refused to bow down and this almost turned North Korea into China’s enemy, according to Shi.

“I guess China must be worried that too much pressure on North Korea would not only fail to achieve the desired effect but also could be counterproductive. That’s probably why we haven’t seen any indications that China has moved to rein in Kim,” he said.

Shi Jiangtao

A former diplomat, Shi Jiangtao has worked as a China reporter at the Post for more than a decade. He's interested in political, social and environmental development in China.

15. South Korea may become the first country to disappear from the face of Earth. The reasons are not as simple as they seem to be

Read at the link since it will not copy and paste into the message:

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/south-korea-may-become-the-first-country-to-disappear-from-the-face-of-earth-the-reasons-are-not-as-simple-as-they-seem-to-be/articleshow/115831629.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

South Korea may become the first country to disappear from the face of Earth. The reasons are not as simple as they seem to be

Synopsis

South Korea is grappling with a severe fertility crisis as birth rates plummet. The situation is exacerbated by socio-economic pressures and gender inequality. Despite government initiatives, many women prioritize careers over families. Immigration and marriage migration offer partial solutions. Addressing gender imbalances is critical to reversing the population decline and ensuring a stable future.