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Quotes of the Day:
"When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one.
– Edmund Burke
"The smallest minority on earth is the individual. Those who deny individual rights cannot claim to be defenders of minorities."
– Ayn Rand
"What good is it to man if he has learned to read and write, but leave the rest of the thinking to someone else.?
– Ernst R. Hauschka
1. Lee Jae Myung's END Strategy: Path to Progress or Dead End?
2. Can Seoul Take the Lead & The Alliance Expand Its Aperture?
3. U.S. Expert Advocates South Korea's Nuclear Armament
4. South Korea scrambles jets as Russian, Chinese planes enter air defense zone
5. North Korea fires artillery rockets as key party meeting begins
6. The global crisis of election integrity: why South Korea must act now
7. S. Korea lodges protest with China, Russia over military jets' KADIZ entry
8. N. Korea begins ruling party meeting to prepare for key party congress
9. Lee touts ex-President Kim Dae-jung's legacy in S. Korea's democracy
10. S. Korea, U.S. maintaining 'very close' cooperation on all N. Korea-related issues: U.S. envoy
11. Defense ministry dismisses drone command chief over martial law probe
12. N. Korean women criticize lectures claiming unification ‘absolutely unnecessary’
1. Lee Jae Myung's END Strategy: Path to Progress or Dead End?
Summary:
Lee Jae Myung’s END (Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization) strategy revives the progressive engagement playbook in the least permissive environment since the Cold War. He seeks to ease tensions, restore channels with north Korea, and act as “pacemaker” while POTUS pursues a legacy “peacemaker” role. Yet Pyongyang’s hardened nuclear posture, tilt toward China and Russia, and Washington’s de-prioritization of the peninsula constrain outcomes. END risks unilateral concessions, Seoul’s sidelining in rapid US–DPRK deals, and a peace regime on north Korea’s terms. At best, it may manage instability rather than deliver denuclearization, demanding exceptional diplomatic agility.
Excerpts:
Lee Jae-myung is deploying a familiar, time-tested progressive playbook under the most adverse structural conditions any South Korean progressive government has faced. END has value as a stability-management tool that keeps open the idea—even the aspirational possibility—of normalization and a future nuclear settlement.
Yet it may also mark the point at which the old engagement playbook reaches its limits. Whether END becomes a last, serious attempt to structure inter-Korean diplomacy, or the moment when the logic of that playbook finally stops working, will depend less on Lee’s intent than on how far the strategic environment continues to drift away from the assumptions that once made engagement viable. In this harder game, Lee’s vision demands not just optimism, but unprecedented diplomatic agility to avoid a dead end.
Comment: This is once the most succinct yet thorough analyses of POTROK's "END" policy. And it is a policy that will surely end in failure simply because of the lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. I concur with George, it is probably best described as a dead end.
Lee Jae Myung's END Strategy: Path to Progress or Dead End? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · George Hutchinson
https://www.38north.org/2025/12/lee-jae-myungs-end-strategy-path-to-progress-or-dead-end/
Like South Korea’s progressive presidents before him, Lee Jae Myung is trying to reopen channels for engagement with Pyongyang. Framed through his END policy—Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization—Lee’s approach revives the progressive tradition of dialogue and reconciliation that eventually leads to a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The playbook is familiar—END is a sequenced vision that starts with low-stakes exchanges (humanitarian aid, cultural ties), builds toward normalization (diplomatic recognition, economic integration), and ultimately achieves denuclearization—but the game has gotten harder.
Unlike his progressive predecessors, Lee faces a sharply altered strategic landscape: deeper US-China confrontation; constitutional enshrinement of South Korea as a “hostile state” by the DPRK; Russia and China’s growing strategic backing of Pyongyang, including Beijing’s tacit acceptance of its nuclear arsenal; Pyongyang’s formal rejection of denuclearization; and an American administration that expects more from its Asian allies as it seems to deprioritize North Korea and pivots to other fronts.
Lee’s political resets at home—pursuing accountability for the Yoon-era martial-law attempt, signaling openness to apologize to Pyongyang over past drone incursions, and moving to end leaflet launches—are designed to lower the political temperature around inter-Korean issues. His rhetorical shift from “denuclearization” to the more neutral “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” serves a similar purpose.
These steps have been accompanied by modest humanitarian openings—including relaxed rules on remittances, limited humanitarian outreach by NGOs, and selective repatriation measures—intended to soften atmospherics and reduce friction before any formal diplomatic overture.
Layered onto this is the unique unpredictability of the second Trump presidency. Trump appears open—perhaps even eager—to revisit leader-level diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. But his approach could be more personalized, less structurally anchored, and potentially less aligned with Seoul’s objectives than the summitry observed during 2018-2019.
At its core, Lee’s END framework is an attempt to revive a familiar progressive playbook in the least permissive environment since the Cold War—one where structural asymmetries, great-power dynamics, and Pyongyang’s hardened nuclear posture may limit it to a risk-management tool rather than a viable pathway toward real progress.
How Earlier Progressives Moved
To understand Lee’s strategy—and its risks—it helps to situate his moves within the lineage of progressive engagement.
Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003). Kim’s Sunshine Policy unfolded during a relatively benign great-power environment. China was emerging but not yet confrontational, Russia was preoccupied with its own post-Soviet recovery and not yet revisionist, and the US under Clinton was supportive of diplomacy. This allowed Kim to nurture engagement by spending nearly two years constructing political conditions, institutional channels, and international support before the 2000 summit materialized.
Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). Roh Moo-hyun, Kim’s successor, operated under tighter constraints. His 2007 summit with Kim Jong Il came late in his term, framed within the Six-Party Talks—a multilateral format that included the US, China, Japan, and Russia. The US maintained tight oversight—US policy under George W. Bush emphasized denuclearization first, limiting Roh’s room to cut deals with Pyongyang. Still, Roh pushed for inter-Korean projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex, emphasizing reconciliation as a path to peace.
Moon Jae-in (2017–2022). Moon capitalized on an unusual convergence: the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics served as a fitting, neutral venue to begin the exchange; Trump was eager to break from US diplomatic tradition and engage directly with Kim Jong Un; North Korea was willing to initiate a long-range missile testing moratorium; and China had not yet entered full strategic confrontation with Washington. This enabled the summit cycle that began in 2018, starting with the Trump-Kim Singapore summit. Moon’s approach aligned with Trump’s deal-making style, creating early momentum that reached working-level talks, but the process was unsuccessful in reaching a deal at the 2019 summit in Hanoi, and shut down after a final working level meeting in October that year.
Lee’s moves early in his administration echo Moon’s proactive push but unfold in a far less permissive context. He is attempting an outreach strategy at a moment when every major structural variable runs against engagement. That does not make END’s early stages impossible—but it does make them qualitatively different from previous attempts by progressive administrations—attempts that even under favorable conditions only partially succeeded.
Stakeholder Motivations
Understanding END’s prospects requires dissecting the incentives of key players.
Seoul. For Lee, END aligns with a clean break from the hardline Yoon era. His pursuit of martial-law accountability, designation of People’s Sovereignty Day, and quiet restructuring of inter-Korean coordination mechanisms, such as changes at the Red Cross leadership level, serve internal politics and signal well to Pyongyang. Externally, Lee aims to position the US as the door-opener to engagement. The logic behind this holds that if Trump is willing to reopen a diplomatic aperture with North Korea, Lee’s role as “pacemaker” and Trump’s role as “peacemaker” can play out.
Washington. President Trump—self-styled as a peacemaker who solves wars and deserves a Nobel Prize—is drawn to symbolic, high-profile, leader-level diplomacy. This makes him receptive to an “historic” breakthrough that appeals to his legacy-building instincts. But Trump is also a negotiator capable of walking away from bad deals—a precedent established in Hanoi. For Lee, this presents both opportunity and danger. Trump may open diplomatic space, but he could also pursue an “historic” victory that sidelines Seoul or reframes the Peninsula in ways that cut against South Korean interests.
Pyongyang. North Korea’s immediate priorities are familiar: sanctions relief, an end to what Pyongyang calls US ‘hostility’—the DPRK’s contemporary stand-in for security guarantees—and de facto nuclear recognition, but the new constitutional and geopolitical context diminishes inter-Korean incentives. Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic bandwidth is increasingly concentrated on Russia and China—and on deepening ties across the broader anti-Western alignment—not Washington. However, the window of diplomacy has not closed entirely. Kim has taken denuclearization off the table but if it seems Washington is willing to drop its “hostile policy,” talks could happen. Even in this context, engagement with Lee would be purely tactical—useful for extracting limited symbolic gains and for probing cracks in the alliance, not for securing the kind of sanctions relief Pyongyang ultimately seeks, and certainly not for yielding on nuclear weapons. Bottom line: Pyongyang’s incentive to engage Seoul—absent US participation—is lower than at any point since the 1990s.
Beijing and Moscow. Both capitals prefer a Korean Peninsula that remains a strategic pressure point on Washington. They will not torpedo engagement outright, but they will work quietly to ensure that any diplomatic track does not constrain Pyongyang in ways that would undermine Chinese or Russian strategic interests — keeping the DPRK aligned and politically useful rather than allowing progress that might strengthen the US–ROK alliance.
Early Steps to Reopen Space
Since his June 2025 inauguration, Lee suspended border loudspeaker broadcasts and urged civic groups to halt high-visibility activities that heighten tension, including leaflet-balloon launches. In July, after receiving official approval of his appointment as new Unification Minister, Chung Dong-young visited the border area of Panmunjom, where he announced that restoring severed inter-Korean dialogue would be the “top priority.” Kim Yo Jong swiftly rejected the overture, stating that no matter the proposal from Seoul, there was “no interest” from Pyongyang. Her rejection was contained in a statement entitled “Inter-Korean Relations Have Left Behind the Era of Kinship,” which also dismissed rumors of Kim Jong Un attending the APEC summit in Gyeongju as “ridiculous delusion.”
Even after these snubs, President Lee persisted, deploying Chung Dong-young to strategically message possibilities to Pyongyang. For his part, Chung, who had previously served as Roh Moo-hyun’s Unification Minister in 2004-2005, announced he would recommend that President Lee consider adjusting the upcoming Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise to create conditions for dialogue. This established Chung as a “forward scout,” floating sensitive or controversial ideas in public without attribution to Lee—a role previously played by Moon Chung-in during the Moon Jae-in administration.
In September, Chung argued in favor of accepting South and North Korea as “two states” under international law, with critics warning that his words risked an endorsement of Pyongyang’s “hostile two-state theory.” In November, Chung doubled down on his advocacy of adjusting combined military exercises, saying a scale-back was “inevitable” if a US-DPRK summit were to take place in the first half of 2026. More recently, Chung attributed the “nature of the Korean Peninsula problem” as being rooted in a “bureaucratic mindset that waits for U.S. approval and authorization” and pushed for legislation that would let the government approve access to the DMZ without seeking authorization from the United Nations Command.
Lee has continued shaping a posture toward Pyongyang for inter-Korean engagement built on signals—assuring Pyongyang Seoul has no intention of pursuing “unification by absorption”—institutional adjustments, and micro-openings that could scale if conditions improve.
Alliance calibration. While Chung sticks his neck out trial ballooning ideas, Lee is taking care to signal that his emerging END framework is meant to complement Washington’s deterrence approach, assuring Trump aides that Seoul’s outreach does not undercut alliance cohesion. Collectively, these moves are designed to thaw inter-Korean relations incrementally as a way to lead to dialogue while preventing Washington from perceiving END as a deviation—or worse, an attempt to free-ride on the alliance while cutting a separate deal antithetical to deterrence.
Taken together, these steps form a coherent posture: restore political credibility at home, rebuild technical channels, lower rhetorical friction with the North, and keep Washington reassured. These steps position Lee to attempt the kind of atmospheric easing he associates with his “pacemaker” role—though how far that can go remains uncertain in the current environment.
Risk and Opportunity
Despite these efforts, END carries real risks for Seoul.
Sidelining risk. If Washington and Pyongyang reenter direct talks—especially at the Trump-Kim summit level—Seoul could again find its agenda overshadowed, this time holding even less leverage amid Pyongyang’s hardened position. A fast-moving US–DPRK track could spin out of control, resulting in a declaration or agreement that unfavorably reshapes alliance dynamics vis-à-vis Seoul’s own priorities.
Asymmetry risk. North Korea is well practiced at pocketing concessions without offering meaningful reciprocity. Exchanges and humanitarian gestures from Seoul can reduce tension at the margins, but Pyongyang no longer shows interest in them—limiting their utility and risking a dynamic in which Seoul offers concessions without meaningful reciprocity.
Great-power risk. Great-power dynamics amplify threats: Beijing and Moscow are positioned to quietly undercut progress by diluting sanctions further and shaping diplomatic narratives in ways that favor Pyongyang.
Domestic political risk. If engagement stalls, Seoul is entirely sidelined, or talks are perceived as entirely one-sided, Lee will own the failure, eroding support for continued engagement.
Conceptual risk. Conceptually, Lee’s move toward the phrase “peninsula without nuclear weapons” reduces rhetorical resistance, but it does not bridge the gap between a South that is becoming more integrated into US nuclear planning—through frameworks like Conventional Nuclear Integration—and a North that has constitutionally defined the South as an enemy and anchored its legitimacy in nuclear status. It also introduces contradictions for Seoul, given the ROK’s own nuclear-latency debate and its growing identification with a “nuclear alliance” posture.
Although, even under these conditions, END could still lead to exchanges, manage exposure, and buy time.
For Lee, a revived diplomatic track bolsters his diplomatic legitimacy as a “pacemaker” and opens the possibility of “peaceful” strategic stabilization—even if it carries the risks identified above. Trump, as “peacemaker,” is positioned to extend stabilization into something more. The convergence of these two incentives—Trump’s desire for a legacy-defining “peacemaker” moment and Lee’s desire to rebuild inter-Korean space as a “pacemaker”—creates the first real opening for diplomacy since 2019. But openings are not outcomes.
Peace Agreement—Promise or Strategic Trap?
Progressive South Korean governments have long viewed a peace regime as a necessary, cornerstone step in any serious inter-Korean settlement. The logic runs: formally end the Korean War, reduce the legal and symbolic basis for hostility, normalize relations, and create conditions in which denuclearization can be addressed without existential fear on either side. From Lee’s perspective, a peace declaration—even one reached mainly between Washington and Pyongyang—could be framed as part of END’s normalization phase. But under current structural conditions, it risks becoming normalization on North Korea’s terms.
Conclusion
Lee Jae-myung is deploying a familiar, time-tested progressive playbook under the most adverse structural conditions any South Korean progressive government has faced. END has value as a stability-management tool that keeps open the idea—even the aspirational possibility—of normalization and a future nuclear settlement.
Yet it may also mark the point at which the old engagement playbook reaches its limits. Whether END becomes a last, serious attempt to structure inter-Korean diplomacy, or the moment when the logic of that playbook finally stops working, will depend less on Lee’s intent than on how far the strategic environment continues to drift away from the assumptions that once made engagement viable. In this harder game, Lee’s vision demands not just optimism, but unprecedented diplomatic agility to avoid a dead end.
38north.org · George Hutchinson
2. Can Seoul Take the Lead & The Alliance Expand Its Aperture?
Summary:
The latest SCM and joint fact sheet link Seoul’s long-sought “leading role” and wartime OPCON transition to a broader mission set for the ROK-US alliance, including deterrence beyond the peninsula. Clint Work argues this rhetoric marks real pressure for South Korea to assume greater conventional defense burdens while the United States repurposes forces for regional contingencies in the Asia-Indo-Pacific. Yet it is unclear whether this reflects an integrated strategy or ad hoc compromises. Making Seoul “lead” credible will require clarifying OPCON realities, retooling combined command structures, and renegotiating the alliance bargain to handle third-party intervention and linked regional crises.
Comment: Clint Work has done some of the best research on the OPCON transition process. I think Clint's work has helped inform the language in the NDAA 2026.
I think we need to move forward with the "Change of Command" (the Commander who replaces General Brunson would be a Korean General) and simultaneously move to establish a Northeast Asia Combatant Command in Seoul. The ROK/US CFC must deter and defend on the Korean peninsula but we need a Northeast Asia Command to deal with Third Party Intervention and Influence, Counter Nuclear Operations, Conventional -Nuclear Integration, Combined Joint All Domain Operations and strategic agility to support contingencies throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
We need to have a ROK Commander of the ROK/US CFC for a very specific reason. All military operations in north Korea need to be commanded by a Korean General officer for a number of reasons. The only political outcome following war or regime collapse is unification. The military must support the political process and therefore that must be a Korean general, not an American. Second, the US cannot allow the perception of American occupation of the north. It cannot create the perception of another Iraq and Afghanistan.
When Korea's next war will not stay in Korea
Here's why the Republic of Korea--U.S. alliance needs a Northeast Asia combatant command.
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/21/perspective-new-military-command-proposed/7291763740526/
Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/
Can Seoul Take the Lead & The Alliance Expand Its Aperture?
Published December 2, 2025
Author: Clint Work
Category: US-Korea alliance
https://keia.org/the-peninsula/can-seoul-take-the-lead-the-alliance-expand-its-aperture/
U.S. and South Korean defense authorities met for the fifty-seventh Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on November 4 in Seoul. Conventionally, the SCM Joint Communiqué is released at the conclusion of the meeting; however, this year it was delayed, coinciding with the release of the long-awaited Joint Fact Sheet on U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung.
In some areas, the communiqué’s language reveals continuity in alliance policy. In others, the revision, removal, or reintroduction of language can indicate subtle or even significant policy shifts. To properly analyze any single communiqué, it must be placed in proper context, including in relation to other U.S, South Korean, and joint alliance statements, current and past trends in the relationship, and previous joint communiqués. The following provides such contextualized analysis, specifically focused on the issue of wartime operational control (OPCON) transition and its connection to a rhetorical broadening of the alliance’s regional aperture.
A Leading Role in the Defense of the Korean Peninsula
In the communiqué’s first substantive section, South Korean National Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-Back “emphasized that the ROK will assume the leading role in the defense of the Korean Peninsula,” which U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth welcomed. President Lee—in the context of self-reliant defense and striving to complete wartime OPCON transition within his term of office—has emphasized the same point.
Language on South Korea taking the lead role in the defense of the Korean Peninsula is hardly new; it goes back to early post-Cold War U.S. regional policy initiatives in the 1990s, was repeated in the 2009 Joint Vision Statement, and was mentioned several times over the last decade in the sections on wartime OPCON transition in SCM communiqués. Rhetorically speaking, the alliance has been here before.
At the 2017 Trump-Moon Jae-in summit, both leaders decided to “expeditiously enable the conditions-based transfer” of wartime OPCON. Months later, the 2017 SCM communiqué stated that U.S. and South Korean defense authorities were going to “implement steadily” the leader-level political decision to “enable the expeditious” transfer. However, by 2019 only South Korean officials continued to unilaterally mention an expeditious process. While Moon administration officials pushed for a time-based approach to complete wartime OPCON transition before President Moon left office in early 2022, they failed to achieve the goal and caused pushback and frustration among U.S. officials.
Ultimately, though, the friction was fruitful. Officials learned lessons and in 2022 better synchronized elements of the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) by aligning South Korea’s acquisition of critical capabilities with the process by which its ability to lead the combined defense posture was assessed and certified. Meanwhile, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration deemphasized taking the lead role and instead pushed intra-alliance bargaining for a more robust extended deterrence commitment.
The reemergence and prominent placement of language in the latest communiqué about South Korea taking the lead role reflects alignment between the Lee administration’s priorities and the Trump administration’s push for allies to take on a greater burden in defense spending and in military roles. It also tracks with similar language in the joint fact sheet, which states: “With the support of the United States, the ROK pledged to accelerate efforts to strengthen its military capabilities necessary to lead the combined conventional defense against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” Consistent with language used since 2020, the latest communiqué reaffirms that the “conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned,” but the use of words like “expedite” and “accelerate” in the communiqué and joint fact sheet further shows this added political impetus. Yet challenges remain.
The Devil is in the Details
Within South Korea, there is widespread ignorance about COTP’s conditions—even among defense analysts—and a lingering belief that they are arbitrarily or unrealistically set. However, conditions #1 and #2—Seoul’s acquisition and development, respectively, of critical South Korean and alliance military capabilities—are quite clear and concrete, as is the three-phase process by which they are assessed and certified. But condition #3—a security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region that is conducive to a stable OPCON transition—is open to interpretation. Furthermore, wartime OPCON transition has been alliance policy since 2007 but has gone through several different plans, including several revisions to COTP itself. Some wonder why it can’t be revised again.
Nonetheless, as noted, all indications are that COTP was refined through a contentious yet constructive process into a coherent, achievable plan. If the latest communiqué’s mention of a “roadmap” to acquire the capabilities necessary to expedite the fulfillment of conditions and pursue the certification of Full Operational Capability (FOC)—when capability and system development is complete, all designated units or organizations have received the system, and those organizations can operate and maintain it—is geared to proactively complete COTP, and both sides are in concert, then it may be a positive sign.
However, if the “roadmap” is viewed by South Korean officials as means to cut corners on mutually agreed-upon conditions and U.S. officials are not supportive or oppose the effort, it could result in alliance frictions and another delay in a two-decades-long alliance policy. It bears note that the reason FOC certification has not occurred thus far is that Seoul has not acquired all required South Korean and alliance capabilities to lead the combined defense. Does it want certification without doing so? If so, is it prepared for the consequences of that decision?
To be fair, U.S. officials have historically approached the issue of OPCON with a “control rod” logic which, as I describe elsewhere, “holds that by having a U.S. commander in the lead role (i.e. the control rod), the United States can maintain control or, more accurately, a degree of relative if still considerable influence over the security environment on the peninsula.” The logic is that this ensures credibility in deterring North Korea, mitigates crisis escalation including restraint of disproportionate ROK retaliation, and, if necessary, allows the U.S. to lead in a conflict and shape an outcome consistent with U.S. interests.
At times, such logic has delayed wartime OPCON transition, and aspects of this U.S. mindset are rooted in the stark patron-client origins of the alliance and are overly hierarchical. However, U.S. reticence to move forward with wartime OPCON transition without South Korea meeting mutually agreed-upon conditions is also grounded in prudent and reasonable concerns not only about whether South Korea has acquired and integrated the proper military hardware but also whether it has the right software to lead a combined fight, to which the United States remains treaty bound.
On the South Korean side, proponents of wartime OPCON transition seem unaware of various important facts about the transition, opening the door to unintended consequences. The ROK/U.S. Combined Force Command (CFC) does not, in practice, violate either country’s highest sovereign authority. The CFC Commander is a four-star U.S. officer and his Deputy Commander a four-star South Korean officer, but the CFC operates on a binational basis through established bilateral consultative mechanisms, including both countries’ highest military and defense authorities, and both presidents retain their inviolate authority as commanders-in-chief of their respective armed forces.
In U.S. Joint Doctrine, operational control is not the same as command authority. It is derivative of command authority, is transferred for a specific period and mission, and consists of passing to the CFC Commander the authority to assign tasks to forces and units already deployed by both presidents, as the commanders-in-chief. The CFC Commander cannot change the mission of or deploy South Korean forces outside the area of responsibility agreed upon by both countries’ commanders-in-chief. The CFC Commander is under the firm direction and guidance of both nations’ political and military leaders in a consultative manner, receiving strategic guidance from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Secretary of Defense and the South Korean JCS and Minister of National Defense alike.
If wartime OPCON transition is complete and the alliance transitions to a South Korea-led Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC), a four-star South Korean officer will become the Commander and a four-star U.S. officer the Deputy Commander, but the overall structure and consultative processes will remain the same. Nonetheless, it seems as though some of the South Korean political hands that are the firmest proponents of wartime OPCON transition are more interested in the optics and symbolism of the transition than they are the mechanics of the combined command. Or they may have mistaken ideas about the authority the South Korean Commander will have because of wartime OPCON transition.
Perception Versus Reality
There is a longstanding tendency within South Korea to see United States Forces Korea (USFK)’s capabilities as belonging to the Korean Peninsula. Seoul’s lack of speed in acquiring certain capabilities required by COTP appears grounded in the belief that it can indefinitely depend upon U.S. capabilities. With wartime OPCON transition, some in South Korea may think they will have gained greater ownership over U.S. capabilities. Not only is this incorrect, but U.S. officials may well decide that some capabilities can be moved elsewhere because of the transition. The Lee administration may hope to fast track the process, but it needs to think about how this may affect U.S. force posture and structure.
Additionally, there may be misconceptions in Seoul about what wartime OPCON transition entails regarding ROK authority over the employment of U.S. forces and capabilities in the event of a conflict. Such misconceptions should be worked through in the process of developing the alliance’s operational plans for a post-transition environment. Yet if ROK authorities assert themselves in ways that run counter to U.S. joint doctrine or think they challenge national authorities that wartime OPCON transition does not effect, it may result in friction particularly during a crisis.
Additionally, the political optics of wartime OPCON transition may have powerful effects in Washington. Sovereignty (or the perception thereof) goes both ways. For years, lawmakers in the U.S. Congress have expressed reservations about putting U.S. forces under wartime OPCON of a South Korean officer, which likely explains why specific oversight language about wartime OPCON transition has made its way into the recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In an America First policy context, such sentiments are amplified. One can try to explain to a representative or senator that a South Korea-led F-CFC (like the current CFC) does not violate national sovereignty. But it looks like it does. This may not prevent wartime OPCON transition from happening, but it may result in a fundamental reconsideration of the U.S. presence and commitment in a post-transition environment.
It’s About More than North Korea and the Korean Peninsula
It is critical to note that following the language in the communiqué on South Korea taking the leading role, it states: “The United States and the ROK will enhance U.S. conventional deterrence posture against all regional threats to the Alliance, including the DPRK.” In other words, South Korea taking a lead role in conventional deterrence of North Korea, embodied through wartime OPCON transition, appears linked, at least discursively, with enabling the U.S. conventional posture on the peninsula to better handle multiple threats to the alliance on, around, and beyond it.
The Joint Statement of the fiftieth Republic of Korea and United States Military Committee Meeting (MCM), held the day before the SCM, sent an even clearer message. Following a description of growing North Korea-Russia cooperation, it noted, “the Alliance is effectively managing the threats through a strong combined deterrence,” and “that combined deterrence extends beyond the Korean Peninsula and contributes to regional deterrence.” Furthermore, USFK General Xavier T. Brunson, Commander of United Nations Command (UNC), CFC, and USFK, released an article recently that more concretely laid out the geographic and force posture advantages the peninsula offers in relation to North Korea, Russia, and China.
This emerging and increasingly amplified language on regional threats, alongside the push for South Korea to take the lead role on the peninsula, highlights an effort to reimagine and repurpose not just U.S. forces but also the alliance’s combined force posture, not only for deterrence of multiple threats other than North Korea on the peninsula but for deterrence of multiple threats beyond it. While U.S. officials and military officers have been sending this message in unilateral statements for years, the latest communiqué and fact sheet show the message is being featured more prominently in U.S.-South Korea joint statements.
What remains uncertain is whether the alliance is prepared for such a shift. Stating something in a high-level joint statement or communiqué does not make it so. To actualize the language examined above would require the alliance to prepare for third-party intervention during a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula, a range of regional contingencies beyond it, and for how such scenarios could intertwine. Such efforts are incredibly sensitive. North Korea and China—both of which have already disparaged the latest statements—would criticize such efforts, use them to justify their own aggressive and coercive activities, and exploit differences between the United States and South Korea in the process.
Does the language in the latest communiqué represent a patchwork of unilateral statements and bilateral compromises or an integrated alliance strategy? The drivers for a South Korean lead role on the peninsula and a broadened role for the alliance’s combined defense posture beyond it may be greater than ever. Yet it remains to be seen if the alliance can navigate such a shift. At root, it will require the transformation of decades-old institutions and psychologies and a fundamental renegotiation of the alliance bargain.
Clint Work is a Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s alone.
Photo from United States Forces Korea.
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3. U.S. Expert Advocates South Korea's Nuclear Armament
Summary:
Harry Kazianis argues POTUS' NSS confirms de facto US acceptance of a nuclear north Korea and the death of CVID, making arms control the only realistic option. He urges Washington to lift all constraints on Seoul’s self-defense, including a “green light” and even AUKUS-style support for ROK nuclear weapons, and accepts likely Japanese nuclearization. He predicts structural alliance changes, including major US troop reductions and rapid wartime OPCON transfer, if Seoul goes nuclear. Kazianis sees north Korea’s profitable arms partnership with Russia as locking in continued nuclear expansion, despite official US reaffirmations, per Acting Ambassador Kevin Kim in Seoul yesterday.
Comment: More and more I am coming to believe that Kim Joing Un must be enjoying these developments from the NSS to China's White Paper to South Korea's begging for engagement and now to an American expert's call for South Korean nuclear weapons. Kim is not afraid of South Korean nuclear weapons. He knows that this will drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance which is one of hsi objectives. I am sure he is assessing that his political warfare strategy is working for him.
U.S. Expert Advocates South Korea's Nuclear Armament
Harry Kazianis argues U.S. de facto accepted North Korea as nuclear state, urges lifting restrictions for Seoul's self-defense amid alliance shifts
By Park Kook-hee
Published 2025.12.10. 00:51
Updated 2025.12.10. 10:50https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/12/10/NQBEZEXM4RDQPDNCFIETXEQ42A/
Harry Kazianis, a U.S. realist security expert and chairman of the National Security Journal, comments on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a broadcast interview. /Fox News
Harry Kazianis, chairman of the National Security Journal and a prominent U.S. realist security expert, commented on the absence of the phrase “North Korean denuclearization” in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) released on the 5th, stating, “The U.S. has already de facto accepted North Korea as a nuclear state.” He added, “The concept of ‘CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement)’ for North Korea’s nuclear program is dead. What the U.S. should do is give South Korea a ‘green light’ to pursue its own nuclear armament.”
In an interview with this newspaper on the 7th, Kazianis said, “If North Korea already has nuclear weapons, why should South Korea, a peaceful ally, not be allowed to possess them?” He continued, “The only way to address North Korea’s nuclear threat now is through arms control. If the U.S. is a ‘true ally,’ it should remove all restrictions and allow Seoul to forge its own path to self-defense.” Regarding concerns about a potential chain reaction of nuclear armament in Japan, he argued, “Japan also faces an existential nuclear threat from the Kim Jong-un regime, and China’s nuclear arsenal poses an even greater danger. We have no reason to fear nuclear-armed allies. Deterrence against North Korea would be strengthened. Why punish our allies?”
Kazianis explained the difficulty of North Korean denuclearization by stating, “Kim Jong-un is earning billions of dollars annually by selling weapons to Russia due to the Ukraine war. North Korea is now a ‘necessary partner’ for Moscow, so there is no reason for Kim to make any concessions or engage in dialogue with Trump.” He added that even after the war ends, Russia will need North Korean artillery shells and missiles for the next 2–3 years to replenish its depleted stockpiles.
He predicted that if South Korea pursues nuclear armament, structural changes in the ROK-U.S. alliance would be inevitable. Kazianis noted, “If South Korea develops its own nuclear deterrent, the Trump administration might propose reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed in the country. While a full withdrawal is unlikely, a scenario like a 50% reduction is plausible.”
However, Kevin Kim, Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, met with Park Yoon-joo, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Seoul on the 8th and stated, “The leaders of South Korea and the U.S. reaffirmed their commitment to ‘complete denuclearization of North Korea’ in the joint fact sheet. That remains our current policy on the Korean Peninsula.” This appears to be an effort by diplomatic authorities to address multiple interpretations of the NSS.
Harry Kazianis, chairman of the National Security Journal. /X
The following is a Q&A with Chairman Kazianis:
- The phrase “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was omitted from Trump’s second-term NSS. Does this mean the U.S. has de facto recognized North Korea as a nuclear state?
“I argue that Washington de facto accepted North Korea as a nuclear state as early as 2021, when the Biden administration effectively ignored the North Korea issue. Regardless of criticism of former President Donald Trump’s approach, his first administration at least halted North Korea’s IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) and ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) tests through dialogue. But now, CVID is dead.”
- If denuclearization is impossible, how should the ROK-U.S. alliance respond?
“The only way to deal with North Korea now is through some form of ‘arms control.’ But that alone is insufficient. The U.S. should also remove all restrictions on South Korea’s defensive needs, even giving a ‘green light’ for Seoul to develop its own nuclear weapons in the future if it wishes. If North Korea can have nuclear weapons, why can’t a peaceful ally like South Korea? Let Seoul forge its own path to self-defense. That is what a ‘true ally’ should do.”
- There are predictions that Trump will resume dialogue with Kim Jong-un. Is a new ‘big deal’ possible?
“North Korea currently feels no need for any summit, arms control, or dialogue with Washington or Seoul. Why should it? Kim Jong-un appears to be earning billions of dollars annually from weapons deals with Moscow due to the Ukraine war. Kim has no reason to make any concessions to Trump.”
- Is the Ukraine war a variable?
“Yes. Even after the Ukraine war ends, I believe Putin will want North Korea to continue producing millions of artillery shells annually for at least 2–3 years to restock Russia’s depleted military stockpiles—possibly drones, small arms, and various missiles as well. Conversely, Kim Jong-un is likely receiving help from Putin on ICBMs, nuclear weapons, and submarine programs, which will not stop soon. It may sound absurd, but North Korea is now a ‘necessary partner’ for Moscow. This means there will be no dialogue, no concessions, and only more nuclear weapons and improved ICBMs.”
- From a Trump-style ‘America First’ perspective, would South Korea’s nuclear armament lead to a reduction of U.S. troops in the country?
“If South Korea moves toward nuclear weapons, yes. You will see the Trump administration argue for reducing the number of troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula. The 28,500 U.S. troops there are merely a ‘trigger,’ and in a full-scale war with North Korea, we would be talking about over 500,000 to 1 million U.S. troops. The Trump team could present a rationale for fewer troops. However, I do not foresee a complete withdrawal. But lower numbers? Definitely. For example, a 50% reduction. And for goodness’ sake, the U.S. must allow South Korea to control its own military in wartime. The U.S. looks like a colonial power in 2025, and that image is terrible. If Seoul acquires nuclear weapons, wartime operational control should be transferred immediately.”
- Some argue that South Korea’s nuclear armament would trigger Japan’s nuclearization and provoke China. Does a ‘nuclear-armed South Korea’ align with U.S. strategic interests in an era of G2 rivalry?
“I would argue that South Korea has every right to possess nuclear weapons, given that North Korea effectively has 20–40 nuclear weapons and is a virtual concentration camp capable of killing nearly its entire population within days. How can the U.S., as a good ally, not say it will not block South Korea if it wants nuclear weapons? Allies like the UK and France have nuclear weapons. So why not South Korea? This also means Japan could go nuclear. Again, Japan faces an existential nuclear threat from the Kim regime and fears China’s nuclear arsenal, which is an even greater threat. Japan is also a strong U.S. ally and would never use such weapons in anger or a preemptive strike, just like South Korea. We have no reason to fear nuclear-armed allies, and deterrence would be strengthened against North Korea, which seems ready to build more nuclear weapons and better missiles every day. Why punish our allies and friends? That is not friendship.”
- Does this mean the U.S. should provide nuclear technology support to South Korea, like the AUKUS model, or simply ‘turn a blind eye’ to South Korea’s independent nuclear development?
“I see no problem with Washington having an AUKUS-style agreement with South Korea on nuclear weapons production. Alternatively, simply stating that South Korea has the right to defend itself and, if that means nuclear weapons, so be it. No matter how advanced South Korea’s conventional capabilities are, it cannot allow such a significant military advantage for North Korea over Seoul. South Korea can build as many KF-21 fighter jets and K2 Black Panther tanks as it wants, but they will never become 1-megaton nuclear bombs. Sorry, but that’s the truth. Just as the UK and France developed nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union was a major threat in the 1950s, South Korea has the right to consider this choice without punishment or loss of prestige in the international community. As a democratic and freedom-loving nation, South Korea must have the right to defend itself. What would other countries have done if they faced a threat like North Korea?”
4. South Korea scrambles jets as Russian, Chinese planes enter air defense zone
Comment: PRC and Russia are challenging the US and allies in the region.
World News Dec. 9, 2025 / 3:33 AM
South Korea scrambles jets as Russian, Chinese planes enter air defense zone
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/09/korea-South-Korea-scrambles-jets-Russia-China-enter-KADIZ-air-defense-zone/2751765265432/
South Korea scrambled fighter jets Tuesday as Russian and Chinese planes entered its air defense zone, military officials said. In this 2016 photo, South Korean F-15K fighter jets fly above Osan Air Base. File Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA
SEOUL, Dec. 9 (UPI) -- South Korea's air force scrambled fighter jets as nine Chinese and Russian military aircraft briefly entered its air defense zone on Tuesday morning, military officials said.
Seven Russian and two Chinese military aircraft entered the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone, or KADIZ, above waters east and south of the country at around 10 a.m. before departing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.
"Our military identified the Chinese and Russian military aircraft before they entered the KADIZ and deployed air force fighter jets to take tactical measures in preparation for any contingency," the JCS said.
There was no airspace violation, it added.
An air defense zone is not territorial airspace but a broader region in which countries request foreign aircraft to identify themselves for security reasons.
China and Russia have entered the KADIZ without notification on numerous occasions since 2019 while conducting joint aerial training. In the most recent incident, 11 military planes from Russia and China flew into the KADIZ in November 2024.
The Russian and Chinese planes spent about an hour in the air defense zone on Tuesday, a military official told news agency Yonhap.
5. North Korea fires artillery rockets as key party meeting begins
Summary:
north Korea fired about 10 artillery rockets into the Yellow Sea as Kim Jong Un opened a key Workers’ Party plenary ahead of the Ninth Party Congress. Seoul’s JCS emphasized ROK-US readiness and is analyzing the launch with U.S. intelligence. The timing signals resolve and a likely hard-line course as Pyongyang prepares new economic, military, and foreign policy guidance and further elevates Kim’s “revolutionary ideology.” Analysts warn the congress may codify more hostile territorial and wartime language toward the South. This comes as President Lee Jae Myung’s conciliatory measures are rebuffed and north Korea continues incremental weapons provocations.
Comet: Possible KJU reaction to the NSS? Or is this just the "opening ceremony" to the meeting? A signal to Seoul in response to its outreach? Setting conditions for future negotiations to appear to be negotiating from a position of strength?
And of course we will parse every word from the plenary session and the future party congress.
World News Dec. 10, 2025 / 2:14 AM
North Korea fires artillery rockets as key party meeting begins
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/10/North-Korea-fires-artillery-rockets-key-plenary-meeting-begins/9801765349844/
North Korea launched around 10 artillery rounds from a multiple rocket launcher, Seoul's military said Wednesday. In this March file photo, people watch news of a North Korean launch at Seoul Station. Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA-EFE
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (UPI) -- North Korea fired 10 artillery rounds from a multiple rocket launcher, Seoul's military said Wednesday, as Pyongyang opened a key policy meeting of ruling party officials.
"Our military detected around 10 artillery shells fired into the north of the Yellow Sea from North Korea around 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday," the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.
"Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, the military is closely monitoring various North Korean movements and maintaining the capability and readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocation," the JCS said.
Details of the launch are still being analyzed by South Korean and U.S. military intelligence, it added.
Related
The volley coincided with the start of a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, presided over by leader Kim Jong Un.
State-run Korean Central News Agency said Wednesday that delegates approved five agenda items ahead of the party's Ninth Congress, including policy reviews and an evaluation of the Central Inspection Committee, which oversees official discipline and corruption issues.
The congress, expected in early 2026, is widely seen as a moment for Pyongyang to outline a new five-year economic plan and recalibrate its military and foreign policy priorities.
At a policy forum held in Seoul on Tuesday, analysts cautioned that the event may serve to cement a hard-line posture toward South Korea.
Yang Moo-jin, chair professor at the University of North Korean Studies, said Kim could introduce new territorial language and "reframe inter-Korean provisions around hostility management and wartime readiness."
Others at the event, held by the state-funded Institute of National Security Strategy, said the congress will likely be used to further consolidate the leader's authority.
"North Korea will use the Ninth Party Congress to promote Chairman Kim's leadership status and symbolize absolute authority, accelerating the 'Kim Jong Un revolutionary ideology' throughout society," Bomi Kim, director of North Korean studies at INSS, said.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has sought to ease inter-Korean tensions since taking office in June with conciliatory gestures such as dismantling border propaganda loudspeakers and tightening restrictions on activist balloon launches.
North Korea has dismissed the overtures, however, while continuing to conduct weapons tests.
Last month, Pyongyang fired a salvo of artillery rockets shortly before a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas.
The North also launched a short-range ballistic missile last month after Washington levied sanctions against individuals and entities connected with Pyongyang's cybercrime and money laundering schemes.
6. The global crisis of election integrity: why South Korea must act now
Summary:
A global crisis of election integrity is now a security issue for South Korea, not just a technical one. Trump’s fraud rhetoric and Smartmatic’s 2017 admission of manipulated Venezuelan turnout have undermined confidence in electronic systems worldwide, spotlighting Seoul based A-WEB. At home, persistent doubts over early voting, logistics, and ballot custody reveal a trust deficit despite no proven fraud. Combined with serious cyber breaches in Korea’s private sector, this demands action: an independent audit of election infrastructure, tightened procedures, radical transparency by the National Election Commission, and treating election security as a core national security priority.
World News Dec. 8, 2025 / 2:15 PM
The global crisis of election integrity: why South Korea must act now
By Youngjun Kim
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/08/skore-perspective-election-irregularities/4721765219497/
South Korean electoral officials count ballots at a ballot-counting station after voting for the presidential elections closed in Seoul, South Korea, on June 3. File Photo by Andres Martinez-Casares/EPA
SEOUL, Dec. 8 (UPI) -- When U.S. President Donald Trump speaks of election fraud, he is not merely reigniting a partisan debate.
He is amplifying a structural argument he has championed since 2020 that modern election infrastructure is riddled with systemic weaknesses -- registration gaps, verification failures and cyber vulnerabilities -- ripe for exploitation by both domestic actors and foreign intelligence services.
While U.S. courts have not validated specific claims of coordinated fraud, the geopolitical reality has shifted. Election integrity is no longer just a matter of domestic politics; it has become a paramount global security concern.
One indisputable fact anchors this international debate: the 2017 revelation by Smartmatic. Originating in Venezuela, the electronic voting giant publicly admitted that turnout figures for the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly were manipulated by at least 1 million votes based on its digital records.
That admission shattered the presumption of innocence for electronic voting systems worldwide and forced a reassessment of the risks posed by digital authoritarianism.
Since then, policymakers across the United States and Europe have rigorously scrutinized voting architectures, fearing exploitation by adversaries like China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. While some fears remain speculative, the narrative of vulnerability is potent enough to drive legislation and fuel public skepticism.
This is where South Korea enters the picture.
Seoul hosts the Association of World Election Bodies, or A-WEB, an organization that has faced criticism in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America for facilitating the deployment of electronic voting technologies.
Critics have often drawn parallels between these systems and the vulnerabilities exposed in other jurisdictions. Although South Korea denies any wrongdoing and no court has found A-WEB liable for fraud, in a post-Smartmatic world, the mere perception of digital vulnerability carries heavy diplomatic and political consequences.
This perception is compounded by South Korea's own domestic friction. Civil society groups and opposition figures have persistently raised questions regarding the chain of custody for ballot papers, the management of early voting and the opacity of logistics.
While the National Election Commission and the courts have historically found no evidence of intentional fraud, the durability of these suspicions indicates a deficit of trust that procedural reforms must address.
The urgency is magnified by Korea's precarious cybersecurity reality.
Recent breaches of major telecommunications providers exposed sensitive data and structural flaws in the nation's digital backbone.
Coupang, a giant in logistics and e-commerce, also suffered significant breaches. If private sector leaders with massive security budgets can be compromised, the assumption that public election systems are inherently impregnable is dangerously naive.
For President Lee Jae Myung, these converging crises -- global skepticism of electronic systems, domestic distrust in ballot management and escalating cyber threats --constitute a definitive test of leadership. South Korea's standing as one of Asia's most robust democracies depends not merely on the outcome of elections, but on the unshakeable confidence citizens place in the process itself.
South Korea cannot control the global narrative sparked by Smartmatic, nor can it dictate how the Trump administration assesses security risks. However, it can control its own response.
First, South Korea must authorize a comprehensive, independent audit of its election infrastructure. This should cover software supply chains, foreign-sourced components and international assistance programs. Crucially, the findings must be made public.
Second, election procedures require immediate modernization. Strengthening chain-of-custody protocols, tightening the security of early voting ballots and clarifying reconciliation rules would dismantle long-standing concerns, regardless of past findings.
Third, the government must elevate election integrity to the level of a national security priority. As the hacking of major corporations demonstrates, the digital threat already is inside the gates.
Fourth, the National Election commission must pivot to radical transparency, embracing open hearings, rigorous technical inspections and third-party verification. Trust is not earned through insistence; it is built on evidence.
South Korea stands at a critical juncture. It can choose the path of transparency, modernization and rigorous cybersecurity, or it can allow suspicion to fester until the foundation of its democracy erodes.
The lesson from 2017 is simple: Election vulnerabilities, once ignored, eventually surface with devastating clarity. South Korea should confront them now before history forces its hand.
7. S. Korea lodges protest with China, Russia over military jets' KADIZ entry
Comment: As they must. They cannot allow these actions to stand.
S. Korea lodges protest with China, Russia over military jets' KADIZ entry | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 10, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251210007900315
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry on Wednesday lodged a protest with the defense attaches of China and Russia based in Seoul over the brief entry of their military aircraft into South Korea's air defense identification zone (KADIZ) the previous day.
On Tuesday, two Chinese military planes and seven Russian aircraft briefly entered and left the KADIZ above waters east and south of the country, prompting the military to dispatch Air Force fighter jets in preparation for a possible accidental situation.
Lee Kwang-suk, director general of the ministry's international policy bureau, "sternly" protested their aircraft's entry into South Korea's air defense zone, according to the ministry.
"Our military will actively respond to aircraft activities from neighboring countries in the KADIZ in compliance with international law," the ministry said in a release.
The aircraft did not violate South Korea's airspace, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Russia has denied recognizing the air defense zone drawn up by South Korea, claiming it was not grounded in international law. The airspace above Ieodo, a submerged rock south of Jeju Island, where Chinese aircraft entered the previous day, is a point of dispute between Seoul and Beijing with their overlapping air defense zones.
This illustration shows Chinese and Russian military aircraft entering South Korea's air defense identification zone without notice. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 10, 2025
8. N. Korea begins ruling party meeting to prepare for key party congress
Summary:
north Korea convened an enlarged 13th plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Eighth Central Committee on December 9, chaired by Kim Jong Un, to prepare for the upcoming Ninth Party Congress. Delegates approved five agenda items, including a review of 2025 policy implementation and preparations for a new five-year economic plan and possible foreign policy adjustments. The plenary, expected to last several days, gains weight as a prelude to the congress, likely in February. Photos showed key elites present and confirmed the political return of propaganda secretary Ri Il Hwan, absent from state media for about a year.
Comment: What could be the foreign policy adjustments? Decisions to engage with the ROK and US or to continue to ignore outreach? Doubling down on political warae and blackmail diplomacy? Enquiring minds want to know.
(LEAD) N. Korea begins ruling party meeting to prepare for key party congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 10, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251210000351315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info, new photos from 7th para)
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has launched a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, state media reported Wednesday, as Pyongyang prepares for a key party congress that could offer glimpses into North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's plans for military and economy.
The enlarged 13th plenary meeting of the party's Eighth Central Committee was convened the previous day, presided over by Kim and attended by key central committee members, government ministry officials and observers, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
The meeting approved five agenda items for discussion, including the review of the implementation of this year's party and state policies and other major issues related to the preparations for the party's ninth congress, according to the KCNA.
The year-end plenary party meeting usually runs for several days to review the year's policy implementation and set the direction for future policies.
This year's meeting carries added significance as it was held in the run-up to the party's ninth congress, which South Korean intelligence authorities expect to take place in February, where the country is likely to unveil another five-year national economic development plan and possibly its foreign policy direction.
The last congress, the eighth, was held in 2021.
This image, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 10, 2025, shows the enlarged 13th plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea's Eighth Central Committee, which was convened on Dec. 9, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The agenda items for the ongoing party meeting may also include organizational, personnel or other internal issues.
Photos released by the KCNA on Wednesday also showed Ri Il-hwan, a party secretary for propaganda who had disappeared from state media for about a year, attending the party meeting at the podium.
Ri's absence from state media had sparked speculation that he may have been suspended for unknown reasons, with his return to the public eye indicating that he may have been reinstated.
Photos showed the North's leader Kim at the center of the first row on the podium, flanked by Premier Pak Thae-song, parliamentary standing committee chairman Choe Ryong-hae and party secretary for organization Jo Yong-won.
This image from the Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 10, 2025 shows Ri Il-hwan (Front row, L in blue circle), a party secretary for propaganda who had disappeared from state media for about a year, attending the enlarged 13th plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea's Eighth Central Committee, which was convened on Dec. 9, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 10, 2025
9. Lee touts ex-President Kim Dae-jung's legacy in S. Korea's democracy
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung marked the 25th anniversary of Kim Dae-jung’s Nobel Peace Prize by praising his legacy for democracy, peace and modernization. In a Facebook post, Lee said the prize honored Kim’s lifelong struggle against dictatorship and his reconciliation efforts with north Korea, as well as his role in building IT infrastructure and cultural policy that underpinned South Korea’s digital and cultural rise. Lee linked Kim’s peaceful transfer of power to the public’s ability to resist former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed martial law attempt, arguing the Korean people now also merit Nobel recognition.
Comment: I think we forget about the "Three Kim's" Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil. Recall that Kim was sentenced to death but President Raegan intervened with President Chun (who I believe was awarded the first State visit to the White House in Raagan's first term in return for not executing Kim). Of course Kim Dae Jung gets all the notoriety but Kim Young Sam was the first civilian president in 1993 and paved the way for Kim Dae Jung's election in 1997. The peaceful transfer of power I think occurred with the 1988 election of Roh Tae Woo and then 1993 with Kim Young Sam. Of course there was a peaceful transfer of power in 1998 from Kim Young Sam to Kim Dae Jung. I am not sure about Lee Jae Myung's dates in the article below.
That said, I do believe that Kim's Nobel was tarnished by the revelations of the transfer of money to north Korea in return for the summit with Kim Jong Il. That is why I believe there will never be another Nobel awarded for Korea for anything less than unification and the establishment of a free adn unified Korea. Whoever achieves that will win the Nobel.
Lee touts ex-President Kim Dae-jung's legacy in S. Korea's democracy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · December 10, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251210012000315
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday praised late President Kim Dae-jung's legacy in South Korea's democratic resilience, saying the Korean people who peacefully overcame the recent democratic crisis deserve a Nobel Peace Prize as Kim himself did.
Lee posted the message on Facebook to mark the 25th anniversary of Kim's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded for his lifelong dedication to Korea's democratic movement and his efforts to promote reconciliation with North Korea.
"The Nobel Peace Prize was a tribute and a gesture of respect from the world to former President Kim, who devoted his life to democracy and peace on the Korean Peninsula," Lee wrote.
President Lee Jae Myung salutes the national flag during a meeting on drawing up semiconductor industry strategy held at the presidential office in Seoul on Dec. 10, 2025. (Yonhap)
Lee highlighted Kim's accomplishments during his 1998-2003 presidency, noting he built nationwide information technology infrastructure despite the Asian financial crisis and adopted flexible cultural policies that helped lay the foundation for South Korea's emergence as a global digital and cultural powerhouse.
Kim, who spent decades resisting authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s, and survived imprisonment and house arrest, became the first opposition leader in South Korea's history to win a presidential election and take office peacefully.
Lee said Kim's peaceful transfer of power in 1998 helped build the foundation for the Korean people's ability to peacefully overcome the democratic crisis triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed martial law attempt last December.
He said the courage and solidarity shown by those who gathered in front of the National Assembly on the night of Yoon's brief martial law declaration offered "new hope and inspiration" to the world.
"I believe the Korean people who peacefully overcame the democratic crisis deserve to stand alongside former President Kim Dae-jung in receiving the Nobel Peace Prize," he said, vowing to take lessons from Kim's political philosophy to better serve the people.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · December 10, 2025
10. S. Korea, U.S. maintaining 'very close' cooperation on all N. Korea-related issues: U.S. envoy
Comment: It would seem that this should go without saying. But we must emphasize cooperation to install public confidence. And if we do not the critics will circle like sharks in the water to feed off any perceived friction within the alliance.
S. Korea, U.S. maintaining 'very close' cooperation on all N. Korea-related issues: U.S. envoy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 10, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251210011700315
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States are maintaining a "very close" partnership on all North Korea-related issues, acting U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Kevin Kim said Wednesday, as the allies are seeking a regular meeting on coordinating their policy on the North.
Kim made the remark after he met Jeong Yeon-doo, head of the office of strategy and intelligence at the foreign ministry, to discuss Seoul and Washington's policy on North Korea.
"The United States and Korea are closely coordinating on all issues, but it's very productive as always, and we have a very close partnership on all North Korea-related issues," Kim told reporters, when asked if the two diplomats discussed launching a task force on North Korea policy.
But Kim declined to comment when asked whether the U.S. is concerned about Lee's proposed policy goal to seek a "nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."
The allies are in talks to hold a regular meeting on coordinating their policy on North Korea as the Lee Jae Myung administration seeks to mend frayed ties with the North and resume inter-Korean talks.
Last month, Jeong was appointed to the vice-ministerial post responsible for intelligence and North Korean nuclear issues.
Acting U.S. Ambassador Kevin Kim speaks during a meeting with ruling Democratic Party leader Jung Chung-rae at the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 2, 2025. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 10, 2025
11. Defense ministry dismisses drone command chief over martial law probe
Comment: But we still need to know the "rest of the story" on the alleged drone incursion into the north.
Defense ministry dismisses drone command chief over martial law probe | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · December 10, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251210009800315
SEOUL, Dec. 10 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry said Wednesday it has dismissed the head of the military's drone command from office over a special counsel probe into former ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed martial law imposition.
Kim Yong-dae, former head of the Drone Operations Command, is suspected of being involved in sending drones over Pyongyang during Yoon's term in an apparent move to provoke the North and use it as a pretext for his imposition of martial law on Dec. 3 last year.
He was indicted last month without physical detention on charges of obstructing official duties and soliciting the drafting of false official documents by a special counsel team that also charged Yoon over allegations of sending the drones.
In another dismissal of a senior official, the ministry said it also had dismissed from office Kim Dong-hyuk, the former chief of the defense ministry's prosecution office, as of Tuesday.
Kim was indicted by a special counsel team over his involvement in a cover-up case related to the 2023 death of a young Marine.
This Sept. 18, 2025 file photo shows Kim Yong-dae, the former chief of the military's Drone Operations Command. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · December 10, 2025
12. N. Korean women criticize lectures claiming unification ‘absolutely unnecessary’
Summary:
In a Nov. 21 lecture in Sariwon, north Korean Socialist Women’s Union members were told that the DPRK is “a completely independent state” and that unification with South Korea is “absolutely unnecessary,” reflecting Kim Jong Un’s “two hostile states” line since late 2023. On the way home, several women quietly rejected the message, recalling that unification was long framed as the “dying wish” of past leaders. Some said unification could ease livelihood hardships and is the only path to real national strength, while others sarcastically compared south Korea’s competitive politics with north Korea’s permanent dictatorship.
Comment: Has Kim Jong Un miscalculated on unification? If only we had some information tools (e.g., VOA, RFA) to exploit this in themes and messages and help the Korean people in the north that it is the Korean people in the South and citizens around the world who support unification and a free and Kroea.
N. Korean women criticize lectures claiming unification ‘absolutely unnecessary’
Members express skepticism about "two hostile states" narrative two years after Kim Jong Un redefined South-North relations, saying unification could solve livelihood concerns
By Eun Seol - December 9, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korean-women-criticize-lectures-claiming-unification-absolutely-unnecessary/
New maps distributed to North Korean state agencies ahead of Sept. 9, 2025, Foundation Day. Unlike previous versions, these are half-peninsula maps showing only North Korea. This appears to reflect North Korea's "two hostile states" doctrine. (Daily NK)
Socialist Women’s Union members in Sariwon question narrative shift away from “dying wish of past leaders,” with some sarcastically comparing North Korea’s dictatorship to South Korean democracy after Nov. 21 lecture.
A source in North Hwanghae province told Daily NK recently that a women’s union branch in the city of Sariwon held a lecture on Nov. 21 asserting that “our republic is a completely independent state, rather than a divided state,” and that “North and South Korea are two states that can never be made one, so unification is absolutely unnecessary.”
But on their way home afterward, some members of the women’s union were apparently critical of the lecture, commenting that “it didn’t make sense.”
One union member said she doesn’t accept the regime’s current efforts to scrub the unification narrative. “Considering they used to tell us that unification was the dying wish of past leaders, what kind of nonsense is it to suddenly say we don’t need unification?” she asked.
A second member shyly suggested “we wouldn’t need to worry about our livelihood if the country were unified.”
“Unification is the only way to become a powerful country. The ‘strong and cultured socialist country’ we’re always talking about is a slogan that would be impossible to realize in this land right now,” said a third member, expressing her irritation with regime propaganda.
Two years after “hostile states” declaration, public struggles with narrative shift
North Korea first broached the “two hostile states” narrative in the ninth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee at the end of December 2023. During the subsequent two years, the regime has been working vigorously to erase its former emphasis on “one Korean people” and unification.
But it appears there are still many in North Korea who struggle to accept the new narrative.
“They’d always told us that unification, as the dying instructions of our former leaders, was something we had to achieve. But then they suddenly started saying that South Koreans aren’t part of the nation and that unification isn’t worth pursuing. That strikes people as bizarre and hard to swallow,” the source said.
“People can’t be spoon-fed ideological education and lectures anymore. Hardly anyone takes the lecture material at face value,” the source added.
After the lecture, some of the union members reportedly made a sarcastic joke comparing North Korea’s dictatorship to the South Korean political system.
“Down there (in South Korea), they get a new president every five years, and even the president goes to jail if they mess up. But up here it’s pretty easy to stay supreme leader forever because everybody is laying down their lives for you.”
“People nowadays are interested in the foreign news and information they hear at the marketplaces and often talk about the outside world. It’s becoming more common in these conversations for people to compare our country’s systems with those in other countries,” the source said.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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