Quotes of the Day:

"When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one.

– Edmund Burke

"The smallest minority on earth is the individual. Those who deny individual rights cannot claim to be defenders of minorities."

– Ayn Rand

"What good is it to man if he has learned to read and write, but leave the rest of the thinking to someone else.?

– Ernst R. Hauschka

1.  The Pentagon Just Issued New Guidance on Irregular Warfare: What Does It Say and Why Should You Care?

2. Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump's second National Security Strategy

3. Hegseth Introduces Department to New AI Tool

4. Why Russia Loves the New US National Security Strategy

5. Inside Ukraine’s Daring ‘Operation Spiderweb’ Attack on Russia

6. Navy Strikes Deal With Palantir for AI Overhaul of Submarine Maintenance

7. How China is shackling Trump's cyber agenda

8. Trump’s New Strategy Document Is Misguided and Dangerous

9. Strategic Depth Reimagined: Expanding Decision Time in 21st Century War

10. Five Reasons Why the Boat Strike Debate Matters for the US by James Stavridis

11. At the Boundary of Law and War

12. Time to tell the "Foggy Tale": Taiwan’s Strength to Counter China’s Cognitive Warfare

13. How China Wins the Future

14. Do China’s Foreign Policy Experts Matter? How?

15. The Time to End the War in Ukraine Is Now

1. The Pentagon Just Issued New Guidance on Irregular Warfare: What Does It Say and Why Should You Care?

​Summary:

The new DODI 3000.07 on irregular warfare replaces a brief directive with a detailed implementation roadmap and a much broader definition of IW. It now covers violent and nonviolent, indirect, asymmetric activities across all domains, in competition and conflict, by conventional and special operations forces with interagency and partner support. It explicitly folds in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-threat finance, counter-transnational crime, information operations, and security force assistance as IW tools to erode adversary legitimacy and bolster allies. It tasks services, combatant commands, and the Irregular Warfare Center, but success hinges on fixing and empowering ASD/ASW (SO/LIC) against strong conventional-warfare bias over time.

Excerpt:

The new irregular warfare instruction, while written in verbiage that is almost impenetrable to all but the policy and planning shops across DOD, represents a potentially substantial expansion of irregular warfare’s stature across the department. The fact that the Pentagon’s top policy official signed out a more robust document with a significantly broader definition, detailed lists of implementation tasks, and requirements for regular assessments of task completion, capability development, and institutionalization is a notable development for those who believe irregular warfare should be a core competency and sizable arrow in the U.S. military’s quiver. That said, the department has issued implementation guidance for irregular warfare before, only to see the uniformed services ignore it and cut IW capabilities in line with their cultural dispositions for high end conventional forces and weapon systems.

While the new instruction rightfully attempts to leverage institutional mechanisms to advance its aims beyond what a proclamation from the Under Secretary for Policy might achieve on its own, its reliance on the same underpowered champion for irregular warfare—ASD(SO/LIC)—will likely undermine any lasting impact. Going forward, it seems likely that the new instruction will result in some advancements of irregular warfare within the department, but these improvements will not come easily, quickly, or without continued bureaucratic grinding by IW proponents. If irregular warfare itself is an external campaign of coordinated activities to advance U.S. interests through influence (as opposed to attrition), so too will the advancement of irregular warfare be an internal campaign of a similar nature for similar ends.

Comment: Jonathan, Rob Burrell, Joshua Hasty, and I will be on a panel at the SOF and IW symposium today in Tampa and of course this will be a topic of discussion.

Jonathan gets at many of the key issues. But I will ask my rhetorical questions anyway:

Who is the champion of IW in the government (it is not ASW/ASD SO/LIC)? (E.g., who are the Donovan, Roosevelt, Nunn-Cohen, Shy Meyer, Ike Skelton – like figures who will champion IW?

What are the IW proficient campaign HQ?

How do we develop and sustain IW proficient campaign HQ

How does the document help me "do strategy?"

How does this help me communicate IW to Congress, policymakers, the press, and the public?

How does it help me to campaign in the IW environment in support of US national security objectives?

I would add that we need to examine 3000.07 in light of the new NSS and the forthcoming National Defense Strategy to determine how IW will support our national strategies.

The Pentagon Just Issued New Guidance on Irregular Warfare: What Does It Say and Why Should You Care?

by Jonathan Schroden

12.10.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/10/the-pentagon-just-issued/

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of the Irregular Warfare Initiative as part of a republishing arrangement between IWI and SWJ. The original article was published on November 10, 2025 and is available here. 

On September 29, 2025, the Pentagon released a new Department of Defense Instruction (DODI), numbered 3000.07 and titled “Irregular Warfare.”1 Clocking in at 32 pages and consisting of 80 to 90 percent highly technical or moderate jargon (according to a ChatGPT analysis of its text), the new DODI nonetheless made a splash across the irregular warfare community of interest. Why is that? What does the new DODI say (in plain English), what does it mean, and what is its likely impact? I’ll answer those questions in turn.

Why is this news?

Let’s start with an obvious and reasonable question: Why should anyone outside of some deeply wonky offices in the Pentagon care about a new DOD instruction? To answer that, it’s worth briefly explaining what came before. The U.S. military’s understanding of irregular warfare has a long history of change, but the term was defined in 2008 as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”

While that definition suited the U.S. military’s experiences with the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, in the years that followed, the definition became less and less satisfying. Scholars of irregular warfare have advanced numerous criticisms of this definition, not least of which is its emphasis on violence, since it seemed to omit non-violent activities such as information operations. In the wake of the Pentagon’s issuance of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its emphasis on competition between the U.S. and its peer or near-peer states, the definition’s limitation to state versus non-state actors seemed to preclude irregular warfare as a tool of competition—an implication that even cursory scholarship of the Cold War would render ridiculous. The Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 strategy tried to update the definition and improve its relevance for competition, but that document was rendered irrelevant when DOD superseded the 2018 NDS with a new version in 2022 that did not have such an annex and made only three minor mentions of irregular warfare.

The new DODI is news, therefore, primarily because it formally updates the U.S. military’s definition of irregular warfare (IW), as follows:

“IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. IW provides an important complement to other joint force activities, operations, and investments in both competition and conflict.”

Addressing some critiques of the prior definition, this new rendering expands the aperture to encompass violent and non-violent activities, all manner of actors, and the spectrum of both pre-war competition and war itself. While the definition’s emphasis on indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities could limit what may fall into this category of warfare, the other changes comprise a considerable broadening from what came before.

On a wonkier note, the DOD Instruction is news within military policy circles because it replaces a DOD Directive. The change suggests a shift from high‐level policy statement (a directive) to more detailed implementation and managerial guidance (an instruction). That change is evident by the more than doubling in length of the new document relative to its predecessor, with the bulk of its additional pages dedicated to lists of detailed tasks for the military services, combatant commands, and other entities. The DODI also goes beyond the issuance of tasks and includes requirements (e.g., by the Joint Staff) for assessments of progress in the accomplishment of those tasks and the furtherance of irregular warfare capabilities across the U.S. military. The DODI is thus both a statement of policy and an implementation plan.

What do these changes mean?

The broadening of the new definition goes even further than adding non-violent activities and state-based competition. The new instruction explicitly adds space and cyber as domains in which the military can conduct irregular warfare. It states that irregular warfare is not solely the purview of special operations forces but is expected of conventional forces as well. It allows for the conduct of irregular warfare reactively—to counter adversary activities that threaten U.S. interests—as well as proactively, “to create dilemmas, deny access, or subvert an adversary’s capability and capacity to engage in aggressive or coercive behaviors.” It directs the uniformed services to “develop and maintain the military capability to conduct or support IW as a core competency.” It asserts that DOD will conduct irregular warfare in “permissive, semi-permissive, and hostile environments as well as in denied areas.” And it says that the Pentagon’s forces will conduct irregular warfare in collaboration with, and in support of, other U.S. government agencies, foreign allies and partner nations, relevant international organizations, and “other necessary mission partners,” which presumably includes proxy and surrogate forces. These statements appear to more forcefully direct much of what the 2018 IW Annex attempted to establish.

In addition to these broadening aspects, the new DODI also expands the list of specific activities to be considered explicitly as irregular warfare. While it includes missions such as unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency as did the previous directive, it adds counter‐threat finance, counter-transnational organized crime, operations in the information environment, and aspects of security cooperation and security force assistance that were mentioned in the IW Annex but not so explicitly included in prior guidance. It also broadens the purpose of irregular warfare. While the new definition itself states that the U.S. conducts IW “to assure or coerce states or other groups,” other paragraphs of the DODI add that irregular warfare will be used to “erode an adversary’s legitimacy, influence, and political will” or bolster “the legitimacy, influence, and political will of allies and partners engaged in a political struggle or confronting acute forms of coercion.”

At this point, you may (rightly) be wondering what is not irregular warfare? If it consists of violent and non-violent activities conducted by special operations and conventional forces in all domains and environments, reactively and proactively, with or against allies, adversaries, state and non-state actors, for the purposes of stabilization or destabilization, is there anything left that doesn’t qualify as IW?

On this point, the new DODI provides little in the way of explicit limitations. The definition itself emphasizes “indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities,” which attempts to carve out a more limited space than the whole of the U.S. military’s activities. However, one need only to look at the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan to recognize that some of the activities the DODI calls out expressly as irregular warfare—counterinsurgency, for example—were hardly “non-attributable.” The same can be said about the military’s security force assistance and counterterrorism activities worldwide, many of which were publicized in press releases of the commands and organizations conducting them.

There are two additional, potential limiters of what might be considered irregular warfare that can be inferred from the DODI. The first is that irregular warfare should be conducted as part of a whole of government effort, synchronized with the activities of other relevant U.S. government agencies. The implication of this emphasis is that irregular warfare should not be something DOD conducts in a vacuum. The second is that irregular warfare should be conducted as a campaign, or a set of activities synchronized in time and space, and across domains, to achieve higher-order effects. In other words, DOD should avoid conducting irregular warfare activities as “one-off” events. Yet, in neither of these cases does the DODI say that isolated or singular military activities are not the realm of irregular warfare. The DODI thus represents not just a semantic redefining of irregular warfare, but an attempt to blow the doors off the confines of its prior interpretations that may exceed the comfort level or risk tolerance of some senior decision makers.

What impact will this have?

As the observations above make clear, the net effect of the DODI could be a substantial intellectual expansion of irregular warfare capabilities and activities. This is further bolstered by the instruction’s guidance on the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), a relatively new entity that was created by an act of Congress to help institutionalize lessons of the United States’ post-9/11 irregular wars and educate military leaders on the challenges of irregular warfare now and in the future. The instruction’s language on the IWC helpfully clarifies its roles, position, and standing within the department and hopefully will empower the IWC to fulfill its mission. Beyond that, the instruction’s detailed lists of tasks to subordinate entities and inclusion of regular, required assessments of the accomplishment of those tasks and the military’s irregular warfare capabilities hold the potential to drive actions in a more concerted and productive manner than did previous approaches, such as addressing irregular warfare in an annex, as the Pentagon did for the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

The proof of these potential impacts will, however, be in the pudding of the years to come. The U.S. military’s cultural disposition and traditional incentives toward high end, direct, attributable, attrition-centric warfare presents substantial headwinds to the successful implementation of this instruction. Whether it is the Army’s disestablishment of the Asymmetric Warfare Group or attempts to cut special forces, the Air Force’s disbanding of its air advisory unit, the Marine Corps’ shuttering of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning, or the Navy shedding its maritime civil affairs forces, it is not hard to find examples of the services’ predilection for cutting capabilities primarily oriented toward irregular warfare to free up dollars for high-end weapons systems.

As I concluded years ago when examining the military’s deficiencies in assessing operational progress, the key to advancing the kinds of changes the new instruction seeks is not simply the issuance of high-level guidance. Doing so also requires the identification and empowerment of an institutional champion for those tasks (and the ideas they represent) within the department and each of the services. Here, the new instruction ostensibly assigns this role to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, though in practice this role has been (and will highly likely continue to be) deferred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).

The issues that negatively impact ASD(SO/LIC)’s ability to effectively play that role have been well discussed elsewhere; suffice it to say, the office suffers from a number of chronic and, at times, crippling, issues. While the new instruction’s requirement for the Joint Staff to conduct an annual assessment of “the joint force’s military capability to conduct and support IW operations necessary to implement [combatant commander] global, functional, and regional campaign and contingency plans” holds the potential to help push through the services’ cultural headwinds against irregular warfare, successful implementation of the new instruction’s substantially broader intent will almost necessarily require substantially empowering (and fixing) ASD(SO/LIC). Ensuring that the Joint Staff does not similarly defer the assessment to a lower echelon—such as U.S. Special Operations Command—will also be important.

Closing thoughts

The new irregular warfare instruction, while written in verbiage that is almost impenetrable to all but the policy and planning shops across DOD, represents a potentially substantial expansion of irregular warfare’s stature across the department. The fact that the Pentagon’s top policy official signed out a more robust document with a significantly broader definition, detailed lists of implementation tasks, and requirements for regular assessments of task completion, capability development, and institutionalization is a notable development for those who believe irregular warfare should be a core competency and sizable arrow in the U.S. military’s quiver. That said, the department has issued implementation guidance for irregular warfare before, only to see the uniformed services ignore it and cut IW capabilities in line with their cultural dispositions for high end conventional forces and weapon systems.

While the new instruction rightfully attempts to leverage institutional mechanisms to advance its aims beyond what a proclamation from the Under Secretary for Policy might achieve on its own, its reliance on the same underpowered champion for irregular warfare—ASD(SO/LIC)—will likely undermine any lasting impact. Going forward, it seems likely that the new instruction will result in some advancements of irregular warfare within the department, but these improvements will not come easily, quickly, or without continued bureaucratic grinding by IW proponents. If irregular warfare itself is an external campaign of coordinated activities to advance U.S. interests through influence (as opposed to attrition), so too will the advancement of irregular warfare be an internal campaign of a similar nature for similar ends.

1Author’s Note: While President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order authorizing the Department of Defense to call itself the “Department of War” (DOW) as a secondary title, that change has yet to be codified in law. Additionally, the new instruction was issued as a “DOD Instruction,” still carries the DOD (as opposed to DOW) logo, and uses “defense” (as opposed to “war”) titles throughout. This article follows suit, given its focus on the instruction itself.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the CNA Corporation, the University of South Florida, the Department of the Navy, the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

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Tags: Department of Defense, irregular warfare, IW, Pentagon

About The Author

• 
  
• Jonathan Schroden
• Jonathan Schroden, Ph.D., is the chief research officer at the CNA Corporation, a not-for-profit, nonpartisan research and analysis organization based in Arlington, Virginia. He is also a non-resident senior fellow with the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute. You can find him at www.linkedin.com/in/jonathanschroden.

2. Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump's second National Security Strategy

Summary:

The 2025 NSS earns mixed but generally passing marks. Analysts praise its clear prioritization, focus on the Western Hemisphere (“Trump Corollary” to Monroe Doctrine), explicit vital interests, and hard-nosed alignment of ends, ways, and means. It defines crisp goals, stresses nuclear deterrence and technological leadership, and rejects open-ended democracy promotion. Critics warn it underdevelops strategic context and the threat from revisionist autocracies, downgrades human rights and coalition-building, and risks reshaping America as a transactional, revisionist power. The strategy is implementable but high-risk, likely to trigger recalculations by rivals and allies as US global commitments narrow and values language erodes.

Comment: Matthew Kroenig, Nate Freier, Alexander B. Gray. One "B." One "F." One "A." A "grad school B" for the NSS? (In graduate school, a "B" grade is generally considered a passing grade. Some faculty and advisors view a "B" as a warning sign that a student may need to improve their performance, with one advisor famously stating that a "B" should prompt a student to consider whether they should continue in the program.)

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump's second National Security Strategy

atlanticcouncil.org · Andrea Ratiu · December 8, 2025

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/scorecard/scowcroft-strategy-scorecard-grading-trumps-second-national-security-strategy/

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:

Grading Trump’s second National Security Strategy

Last week, the White House released its new National Security Strategy (NSS), representing the Trump administration’s view of the world’s greatest challenges—and how the United States can protect its interests. The strategy marks a significant departure in framing from the first Trump administration and has caused a stir in Washington and around the world. Experts at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security dove into the document and graded it based on five criteria.

Matthew Kroenig

Vice president and senior director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The strategy earns a “B” grade from me. It explains what is new and different, with a new focus on the Western Hemisphere. It reaffirms longstanding principles of US grand strategy, like nuclear deterrence and preventing hostile countries from dominating important regions. It announces new policies for new problems, like how to maintain US technological leadership. On the negative side of the ledger, it dismisses longstanding principles that continue to work, such as promoting democracy and human rights. It also fails to adequately identify the threat posed by revisionist autocracies and a strategy for countering it.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Yes. The strategy identifies the Western Hemisphere as a priority theater for US national security strategy through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. This is a change from past strategy, and the promise of new economic engagement will be welcomed by countries in the region.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategy would have benefited from a dedicated strategic context section. The discussion of the national security threats facing the nation—especially from the “Axis of Aggressors” —are only thinly sketched.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

Yes. The strategy is remarkably clear in its articulation of the goals on page five. This includes defined goals to achieve US dominance in emerging technologies, support allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and counter adversaries in the Western Hemisphere.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The strategy lists many principles and activities, but it does not aggregate these up into major lines of effort.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

More so than its predecessors, this strategy does specify clear priorities and rules out activities (like intervention and democracy promotion) that had been part of past strategies. One can debate the wisdom of the prioritization, but the hard-nosed prioritization does make the strategy inherently sustainable. As with all strategic documents, resourcing will be a major challenge to enacting the vision laid out within it.

Nate Freier

Nonresident senior fellow, Geostrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS 25) appears to signal that the United States is no longer the broadly collaborative status quo power that the world has come to rely on since World War II. Instead, it suggests that the United States is now increasingly a more transactional revisionist power intent on altering its relationship with the rest of the world, often explicitly to its near-exclusive benefit. Since World War II, US strategy has generally exhibited an enlightened self-interest, recognizing the tangible and intangible benefits of its being a coalition-builder, a first-among-equals leader, and a reliable heavyweight international arbiter. The first has historically generated exploitable power via strength in numbers and the latter two have often preserved for the United States the right to set agendas and tilt outcomes in its favor. NSS 25 appears to mark a sharp departure from this traditional governing philosophy and, in doing so, engenders significant risk.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

In practical terms, NSS 25 is distinct in that it does articulate a clear, unambiguous, and circumspect set of vital interests and priorities. And specifically, for example in the Indo-Pacific, it does at times deliver clear strategic logic as to why continued US commitment is essential. Further, NSS 25 exhibits a novel predisposition to lead with US economic, commercial, and technological advantage as principal competitive instruments. However, there is real risk in its under-defined approach to the often-malign behavior of “larger, richer, and stronger” rival states (e.g., Russia) and their illegitimate employment of the cover of “sovereignty” to prey on vulnerable neighbors and third parties. The strategy also exhibits an explicit abandonment of some timeless US commitments to political liberalization, human rights, and human security as if these are not—even in the context of “flexible realism”—often prerequisites for the long-term security of US interests.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Strategic context is the environment against which strategy is applied, within which it unfolds and adapts, and because of which it succeeds or fails. NSS 25 is excessively inward-looking and offers little substance on what is a highly contested competitive environment between rival states. The United States faces ongoing resistance from a combination of its purposeful rivals (e.g., the People’s Republic of China and Russia), as well as the environment within which it and they compete for advantage (e.g., physical proximity, structural vulnerability, prolific connectivity, fragile alliances and economies, and domestic and foreign disharmony). US rivals want to weaken the US position, replace the United States as the world’s indispensable great power, and force onerous constraints on US influence where it counts most. NSS 25 harbors real risk in that it focuses on what the United States wants but does not adequately portray the degree to which rivals will exploit strategic conditions, their inherent capabilities, and US action and/or inaction to advance their interests at US expense.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

In combination and from a practical standpoint, an interpretation of NSS 25’s description of what the United States should want for itself and what it also wants “in and from the world” provides an adequate picture of this administration’s direction. However, it is critical that goals match context. Context should, after all, flag the kinds of hazards and opportunities that help define and realistically shape goals. Thus, NSS 25’s limited articulation of context and the lack of substance attending this gap makes it difficult to adequately assign value to the strategy’s goals in isolation. Nonetheless, as a practical matter—save for what might be called the strategy’s rebalance to the Western Hemisphere—NSS 25’s goals at home and abroad are by themselves clear and, for the most part, consistent with traditional US security objectives. But there are risks embedded in the goals. For example, the strategy’s explicit rebalance to the Western Hemisphere and its softer, more conditional commitment to European defense and security have the potential to trigger horizontal rival escalation in perceived vacuums of US interest and commitment, as well as unfavorable ally and third-party bargaining with rivals as US activism is perceived in retreat.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

In some combination of NSS 25’s “Priorities,” as well as the “how” embedded in its description of regional approaches, one can discern actionable lines of effort. The “Enlist” and “Expand” elements of Western Hemisphere strategy and the three elements described under Asia (“Leading from a Position of Strength,” “Economics,” and “Deterring Military Threats”) have within them testable hypotheses for success and broad approaches to achieving it. However, NSS 25 would benefit from a more coherent design that is animated by a thorough description of the context within which it is to be implemented. Context, goals, and lines of effort, after all, provide a singular theory of the case. As described earlier, the degree to which economics dominate the amended US approach to Asia is notable and novel. But success here would seem to rely on a distinctively US commercial line of effort lying substantially outside the traditional control of US decisionmakers. Novel can be a strength and weakness. At minimum, novel here suggests an area of risk that merits significant alignment in a coherent strategic design with other complementary lines of effort where the risk associated with underperformance is mitigated by the potential for acceleration in adjacent efforts more under US policymaker control.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

Overall, this is a high-risk strategy. At times, it is stripped down and minimalist. And, therefore, the prospects of the United States achieving its limited objectives are better than are the chances for success in pursuit of more expansive and ambiguous strategic ends. However, the real risk here is in the strategy’s broad thrust. As US decision makers implement a strategy that so explicitly rethinks and rescopes the United States’ global role, they should expect that those who have either relied on or resisted US influence will themselves recalculate their strategic choices in ways that ignite a disruptive and unfavorable realignment of actors and forces within the international system. Further still, there are troubling elements of values erosion, ethno-centrism, and cultural shaming throughout the strategy that—when operationalized—have the potential to change how the world sees the United States, as well as the degree to which the actors upon whom the United States relies are willing to cooperate with it.

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident senior fellow, Geostrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The Trump NSS is a powerful break from thirty-five years of US strategies that promise to prioritize everything and end up prioritizing nothing. With shrinking resources and public aversion to global entanglements, the NSS provides defined, manageable, and clear US national interests and places them in a strategic framework that can serve to advance US strategy.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The Trump administration’s NSS is a fundamental break with three decades of US strategy. The document is unlike anything put forward by a US administration since the end of the Cold War. Rather than assume that the United States has limitless global interests, the NSS seeks to undertake a difficult and needed referencing of “ways” and “means,” ultimately giving priority to those regions and tasks deemed most essential to core US interests. By seeking prioritization, and making the concomitant difficult choices, the NSS is truly unique and the most definitionally “strategic” document produced by the US government since 1991.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The NSS accurately reflects a more constrained strategic environment, with less material resources and public support for international engagement that is ancillary to core US interests. By focusing on the “basics,” and starting with defense of the homeland and working outward, the NSS refuses to accept that US strategy must ceaselessly expand to meet global challenges rather than picking and choosing which global challenges are most directly tied to US interests. The focus on the Western Hemisphere, and the unique threat posed by extra-hemispheric actors like China, is decades overdue; the NSS makes plain that protection of the homeland and the hemisphere and the pursuit of US interests in the Indo-Pacific are interwoven for the foreseeable future.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The NSS’s goals are clear: defend the homeland; defend the Western Hemisphere, particularly from extra-hemispheric actors; prevent the rise of a dominant hegemon in Eurasia; and secure a free and open Indo-Pacific. This is a crisp, thoughtful, and calibrated elucidation of the central challenges facing US policymakers, and it forces Washington to ask difficult questions about commitments and obligations outside of these core tasks.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The NSS is the most prioritization-focused strategy produced by the US government since 1991. The challenge facing implementers of the NSS will come down to interpreting and crafting policy responses for the main lines of effort mentioned. For instance, when extra-hemispheric powers meddle in the Western Hemisphere, what should be the US response? What level of Chinese influence is acceptable, and how should it be addressed? These are the types of questions, below the level of grand strategy, that force policymakers to make difficult decisions in real time.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The most difficult part of any strategy, and particularly one as different from the recent past as this NSS, is implementation. Not only will there be extraordinary institutional resistance in Washington, and in allied and partner capitals, to this dramatic reorientation of US policy; there will also be the pressure of world events that frequently pull policymakers, even those dedicated to changing course, into unwanted entanglements. To execute this strategy, the Trump administration will require discipline to resist the “noise” of day-to-day news and focus with determination on prioritizing the core US interests named in the NSS.

3. Hegseth Introduces Department to New AI Tool

​Summary:

SECDEF/SECWAR has launched GenAI.mil, a secure generative AI platform based on Gemini for Government, for all War Department personnel on the nonclassified network. Approved for controlled unclassified information, it can draft and refine documents, analyze data and satellite imagery, and review code, while reminding users to verify outputs. Hegseth directs every member of the department to adopt GenAI immediately, framing AI as a daily “teammate” and critical to maintaining strategic advantage in the global AI race. Additional American frontier AI tools and online training are planned to accelerate mass AI adoption across the department.

Hegseth Introduces Department to New AI Tool

Dec. 9, 2025 | By C. Todd Lopez, Pentagon News |   

https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4355797/hegseth-introduces-department-to-new-ai-tool/

Yesterday, several employees at the Pentagon got a pop-up on their computers inviting them to use a new artificial intelligence tool developed for the War Department. Some were skeptical, wondering if the invitation was part of a cybersecurity test.

But by this morning, those concerns were gone — posters around the Pentagon and an email from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth assured everyone that the new tool is not only legit, but that he wants everybody to start using it. 

"I am pleased to introduce GenAI.mil, a secure generative AI platform for every member of the Department of War," Hegseth wrote in the email. "It is live today and available on the desktops of all military personnel, civilians and contractors. With this launch, we are taking a giant step toward mass AI adoption across the department. This tool marks the beginning of a new era, where every member of our workforce can be more efficient and impactful."

Visitors to the site will find that what's available now is a specialized version of the Google AI tool Gemini, Gemini for Government. This version is approved to handle controlled unclassified information. A green banner at the top of the page reminds users of what can and can't be shared on the site. 

In addition to Gemini for Government, the site indicates that other American-made frontier AI capabilities will be available soon. 

"There is no prize for second place in the global race for AI dominance," said Emil Michael, undersecretary of war for research and engineering.

"We are moving rapidly to deploy powerful AI capabilities like Gemini for Government directly to our workforce. AI is America's next manifest destiny, and we're ensuring that we dominate this new frontier." 

Access to the site is available only to personnel with a common access card and who are on the War Department's nonclassified network.

When GenAI was asked, "How will you help the Department of War achieve its mission," through a user prompt, it replied with a list of capabilities, including, among other things, creating and refining documents, analyzing information, processing and analyzing satellite images, and even auditing computer code for security purposes.

"I can support the DOW's mission by providing a range of capabilities designed for a secure, high-impact environment," GenAI replied. "I am ready to support your mission requirements."

The tool reminds users to double-check everything it provides to ensure accuracy. The highest authority within the War Department, Hegseth himself, provided that validation. 

"The first GenAI platform capability ... can help you write documents, ask questions, conduct deep research, format content and unlock new possibilities across your daily workflows," he wrote. "I expect every member of the department to log in, learn it and incorporate it into your workflows immediately. AI should be in your battle rhythm every single day; it should be your teammate. By mastering this tool, we will outpace our adversaries."

For those unfamiliar with how to use AI, online training is available at https://genai.mil/resources/training.

4. Why Russia Loves the New US National Security Strategy

​Summary:

The new NSS is a strategic gift to Moscow. It seeks rupture with the transatlantic alliance and treats the EU as a rival to be weakened into exploitable nation-states, aligning US and Russian interests on Europe. POTUS and Putin share an interest in undermining liberal, pluralist governments that challenge their domestic narratives, fueling culture-war alignment and gaslighting about who threatens democracy. The strategy promotes spheres of influence over rules-based order, risks empowering far-right “mini-Trumps” in Europe, and exploits real European weaknesses, while Europeans remain reluctant to reduce dependence on US security, hoping Washington is only briefly “off course.”

Why Russia Loves the New US National Security Strategy

December 9, 2025 at 12:00 AM EST

Corrected December 9, 2025 at 1:02 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-12-09/us-national-security-strategy-why-russia-loves-the-anti-eu-plan?sref=hhjZtX76

By Marc Champion

Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump both have domestic motivations for criticizing European liberalism.Photographer: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images North America

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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• The Trump administration's new National Security Strategy calls for a rupture in the Transatlantic Alliance, which Moscow has sought since 1945.
• The US strategy's authors believe American interests now align with Moscow's when it comes to the European Union, preferring an atomized group of nations that can be exploited for economic gain.
• Trump and Putin share an interest in unseating liberal, pluralist leaderships in Europe, as they pose a threat to their domestic political narratives and power.

Nothing about the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy should shock European leaders, still less the enthusiastic welcome that this confirmation of a revolution in US foreign policy has received from Moscow. It calls, after all, for a rupture in the Transatlantic Alliance that every Kremlin leader — with brief exceptions for Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin — has sought since 1945.

Why that is should be self evident. Moscow has been fighting wars to expand or protect its westward borders and influence since at least the days of Peter the Great. US interventions to help defeat Russia’s primary 20th century rival for continental dominance — Germany — were helpful to the Kremlin’s goals. America’s decision to stay on as guarantor of a new transatlantic “West” was not.

This much won’t be disputed by the US strategy’s authors. It’s just that, unlike their predecessors, they believe American interests now align with Moscow’s when it comes to the European Union; Better it should be an atomized group of small- and medium-sized nations that can be pushed around and exploited for economic gain, than a $20 trillion-plus economic rival with potential to retaliate, especially on issues such as trade.

A second interest that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin share in Europe is perhaps less obvious: Unseating the liberal, pluralist leaderships that continue to run most European states — because they pose a threat to the domestic political narratives that both are dependent on to stay in power. More bluntly: When it comes to the culture wars, Trump and Putin are allies; liberal Europe is the enemy.

The reason Putin was so triggered over Ukraine in 2013, when it sought to sign a trade deal with the EU, was that the Kremlin couldn’t afford to have so similar a neighbor achieve Polish-style prosperity and liberties in the bloc. What might Russians then think about the necessity of their own authoritarian system? Putin had had to suppress a Russian pro-democracy movement less than two years before and could ill-afford for Ukraine to rekindle it by providing proof of concept.

Trump, likewise, needs liberal Europe to fail if he’s to persuade future voting majorities of Americans that he offers the only solution to their problems. Hence the extraordinary acknowledgment in Trump’s new security strategy that the US feels it has the right and obligation to interfere in European politics to ensure that MAGA-style leaders come to power there, too.

Like so many ideologues, including Karl Marx, Trump and his co-authors are far better at diagnosing the ills of a troubled system than proposing effective remedies. It took decades for many on the left to realize that just because capitalism had exploitative and disruptive tendencies didn’t mean this must lead inevitably to proletarian revolution and socialist utopia; similarly, I suspect it may take a while for the penny to drop on what the far right is offering today.

The attempt to close the vast gap that quickly opened between Marxist doctrine and reality led to industrial-scale Soviet gaslighting and repression. You can see echoes today. To pick just one example, as early as February, Trump’s Vice President JD Vance took to Munich the new administration’s idea that it was here, in “woke” liberal Europe, that democracy and freedom of expression were under threat. Never mind that his own boss had sought to overturn an election he lost in 2020, was imposing personal political control over independent democratic institutions, was trampling over the constitutional separation of powers, and has since gone on to abuse the power of both the National Guard and federal funds to impose his will on cities and universities that disagree with him.

It simply isn’t true that you can restore democracy by bending all institutions to the will of a leader, or improve freedom of expression by suppressing academic independence. Nor can you deliver peace by demolishing international institutions and reverting to an age of great power spheres of influence. We know this from most of human history. So, the gaslighting is needed to maintain these fictions. The same goes for Trump’s empty claims on bringing peace to wars that either continue or were already over, and in particular his casting of Europe and Ukraine as the villains of Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Viktor Orban has done the same in Hungary. Poland has shown how hard it is to restore the independence of courts and other institutions once lost, even if a political opposition can overcome a tilted playing field to regain power. From the UK to Germany, far right mini-Trumps are waiting in the wings to take power across Europe.

At least some will succeed, because the populist diagnosis of what ails liberal democracies is largely accurate. Europe is indeed weak. Its democracies are struggling to restore dynamism lost to years of disarmament, poor demographics, bloated welfare states and complacency over deindustrialization. Some insurgents from the right, like Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, will prove astute political operators who reject populist policies they know can’t work once in office. Others won’t.

In the meantime, there’s nothing to suggest Europeans will have the courage to voluntarily cut their overdependence on US arms and tech, a move fraught with economic risk from the trade war that inevitably would follow. Easier to go on pretending the US is a briefly errant ally, because to do otherwise would involve alliance shifts and a butter-to-guns policy revolution so dramatic it would put Trump’s new doctrine in the shade.

This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

(Corrects figure for European Union GDP in third paragraph.)

Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.

5. Inside Ukraine’s Daring ‘Operation Spiderweb’ Attack on Russia

​Summary:

Ukraine’s SBU mounted Operation Spiderweb, a covert deep-strike campaign against Russian bomber bases using 117 custom quadcopters hidden in prefabricated “cabins” trucked inside Russia. Tasked by Zelensky, SBU chief Maliuk retooled the service, recruited a Ukrainian couple in Chelyabinsk to assemble drones and launch pods, and exploited corrupt border channels for covert logistics. On June 1, remotely triggered roofs opened and drones, hand-flown from Kyiv via Russian cell networks, hit parked aircraft, with Ukraine claiming damage to 41 bombers. The operation exposed Russian rear-area vulnerability, showcased Ukrainian innovation, and elevated the SBU as a strategic offensive tool.

Comment: please go to the link to view the interactive website and the article in the proper format.

What can we learn from this?

Inside Ukraine’s Daring ‘Operation Spiderweb’ Attack on Russia

WSJ

By

James Marson , Jane Lytvynenko and Serhii Bosak | Design by

Annie Ng

Dec. 9, 2025 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-drone-attack-operation-spiderweb-24d821ab?st=7yqizb&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

KYIV, Ukraine—One of the most audacious covert operations in modern warfare almost fell apart when a Russian truck driver placed a panicked call to the Ukrainian who had hired him.

The roof of the pre-fabricated cabin on the back of his truck had slid off, the driver said, revealing an unexpected and illicit cargo. “This is some kind of bulls—,” the driver told the transport manager, Artem Tymofeyev. “There are drones under the roof.”

“What the f—?” replied Tymofeyev, feigning ignorance.

In fact, the drones were part of a clandestine operation planned by the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, targeting Russia’s massive bomber fleet, which was terrorizing Ukrainian cities. Tymofeyev, a 37-year-old Ukrainian based in Russia, was the main on-the-ground coordinator.

Back in Kyiv, the operation’s planners were sweating, according to people involved in it. What if the trucker couldn’t get the roof back on? What if Russian security services were watching him? What if he told his wife, and she told friends?

They came up with a just-about-plausible explanation to relay back to the driver: The cabins were hunting lodges with drones used for tracking animals across large areas.

The driver soon texted Tymofeyev with a photo of the roof placed back atop the cabin and a single word: “Closed.” Operation Spiderweb was back on.

​Ukraine's Lt. Gen. Vasyl Maliuk​ examines airport maps and images of airplane weak points. Security Service of Ukraine

Five days later, on the morning of June 1, more than 100 drones emerged from cabins on the back of four trucks and swooped toward four Russian airfields. For the drone pilots hundreds of miles away in Kyiv, the defenseless warplanes were like fish in a barrel. An hour later, dozens of Russian warplanes had been destroyed or damaged.

The operation elevated the global standing of the SBU, long maligned as a corrupt successor of the Soviet KGB shot through with traitors. Lt. Gen. Vasyl Maliuk, a gruff and muscular career security officer, took charge of the agency soon after Russia invaded in 2022. He went on to reinvent it, winning acclaim for innovative operations such as blowing up Russia’s Kerch Bridge to Crimea with a truck bomb and killing a Russian general with an exploding scooter.

Spiderweb was the SBU’s most ambitious operation yet, and this account is the first to detail its planning and execution. Pulling it off required 18 months of meticulous planning, daring subterfuge, high-tech gadgets, cool nerves—and a dollop of luck.

‘It’s not enough’

It was fall 2023 when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called Maliuk into his office. Russia was targeting Ukrainian cities with missiles fired from warplanes beyond the range of Ukraine’s air-defense systems. Kyiv was strapped for interceptors to shoot down the missiles. So Zelensky instructed Maliuk to target the planes on the ground.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky​ meeting with Maliuk in June. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Reuters

The SBU had started using long-range drones, but they had limited range, accuracy and explosive power, and were vulnerable to Russian air defenses.

The operation would need to be launched from inside Russia. A hastily drawn-up plan envisaged smuggling a handful of drones into Russia through a network of agents and launching them from concealed locations near an airfield, such as long grass, according to the people involved in the operation. But the damage to Russia’s bomber fleet, one of the world’s largest, would be minimal.

“It’s not enough, damn it,” an SBU planner recalled thinking.

They would need to go bigger. That meant a more complex operation that would deliver more drones to several airfields. But they needed a Trojan Horse to bear them.

The SBU planner had an idea: Pre-fabricated cabins the size of shipping containers, transported on the back of trucks, could serve as launchpads for the drones. A dash of electrical and design wizardry created custom locks for the roofs, which were constructed to slide open when triggered remotely. The houses were equipped with batteries and solar panels to maintain communications with Ukraine and keep the drones charged.

The drones themselves were a more straightforward challenge. The SBU needed a bespoke machine of the kind that Ukraine’s war industry, which is at the forefront of drone technology, was well placed to produce. The device that emerged was a quadcopter about the size of a large dinner plate, with four rotors that could carry four pounds of explosives that would detonate on impact. The explosive mixture was tailor-made to penetrate the aircrafts’ outer layers and cause the fuel in their tanks to ignite.

The drones were designed to fly autonomously toward the target airport, where a pilot in Kyiv would take over control using connection via local cell towers, guided by a feed from a camera on the drone.

To prepare for the operation, the SBU brought in some of their best drone pilots to train on the machines, flying all day long to develop muscle memory. They weren’t told what they’d be targeting, leading some of them to grumble about being pulled off the front line.

Only a handful of people knew the full details of the operation, preventing details from leaking.

“The cabin manufacturers didn’t know that they would go near the airports, and the drone makers didn’t know that they would fly at these specific planes,” Maliuk said in emailed comments.

Next, the drones and cabins needed to be moved covertly into Russia. That’s where another of the SBU’s functions came in handy. In its efforts to combat contraband, the agency had learned how smugglers moved goods across the border, taking advantage of corruption in the ranks of Russian customs authorities. This time, though, the SBU was the smuggler. The drones were broken down into parts to be assembled later. The cabins had documents that falsely identified their provenance.

Once the equipment was in Russia, the SBU needed someone who could be trusted to reassemble it meticulously and coordinate its dispatch toward airfields in far-flung corners of Russia. A map of the routes with arrows arching across the country gave the operation its arachnid moniker.

They couldn’t use a dupe or someone of questionable reliability for an operation of this magnitude. So they turned to a former DJ and his tattoo-artist wife.

The couple

There was little to suggest what Artem Tymofeyev and his wife, Kateryna Tymofeyeva, were really up to in a nondescript warehouse in the industrial Russian city of Chelyabinsk this spring.

Artem, who sported a bushy goatee and used to spin discs in Kyiv clubs, had moved to Chelyabinsk in 2018 on an invitation to go into business with his father, who ran a flour mill there. Kateryna, whose social-media pages are lined with pouty photographs, worked as a tattoo artist.

Artem Tymofeyev and Kateryna Tymofeyeva, in a photo from their social media.

The Tymofeyevs had taken part in street protests in Kyiv in 2014 that ousted a pro-Russian president. But Moscow’s subsequent annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine tanked its neighbor’s economy, and the couple joined a Ukrainian diaspora in Russia numbering millions. These Ukrainians are largely indistinguishable from the natives due to their cultural similarities, including fluent Russian.

For the SBU, the Tymofeyevs ticked all the boxes. But the agency had to be sure, so it brought them to Lviv in western Ukraine for a lie-detector test. Convinced of their loyalty, the SBU placed them at the heart of the operation. The couple lived and breathed their mission, quickly learning how to assemble the drones and the cabins.

When they returned to Russia, they were questioned at the border by officers from the Federal Security Service, the FSB. The couple had Russian passports, but their place of birth was listed as Ukraine, drawing suspicion. After three hours, they were allowed through.

Back in Chelyabinsk, Artem set up a logistics company and rented a large warehouse and office in an industrial part of the city not far from the FSB’s local field office.

Tymofeyev set about buying trucks and hiring drivers. He placed an ad on a Russian website and interviewed more than 20 candidates. The drivers needed to be reliable but not inquisitive, passing not only Tymofeyev’s screening but also, secretly, the SBU’s, which included checks for any links to Russian law-enforcement agencies.

Kateryna kept inking while she helped out on the operation. As the equipment began to arrive, the couple spent hours in the warehouse assembling 150 drones and eight cabins under guidance by phone and video calls from Ukraine.

The drones took about a week, but the cabins were more awkward to put together. The roof of one kept coming off its delicate hinges. They remounted it under instructions from their SBU handlers.

Pre-fabricated cabins on the back of a truck on May 26. Security Service of Ukraine

The cabins had batteries and solar panels to maintain communications with Ukraine and keep the drones charged. Security Service of Ukraine

By late April, everything was ready. The SBU wanted to strike its blow around Russian Victory Day on May 9, a day celebrated with fervent military pomp. But the operation ran into an unexpected issue: Excessive liquor consumption laid low several drivers over an extended holiday period for Orthodox Easter, Labor Day and Victory Day.

Finally, from May 23 to 26, five trucks set out from Chelyabinsk in different directions carrying eight houses on journeys that would last several days. The drivers were oblivious to their real cargo.

‘Everything is flying’

The Tymofeyevs were asleep at home in Chelyabinsk when the driver called in shock at discovering drones. The roof of the cabin on his truck had slid off 180 miles into the 2,000-mile drive, revealing the drones inside.

It was a heart-stopping moment for the couple. One wrong word and their cover could be blown and the FSB racing to their door. After calming the driver, Tymofeyev called the SBU planner, who consulted with Maliuk. The SBU chief came up with the hunting lodge story. One factor worked in the Ukrainians’ favor: The driver couldn’t see the explosives, which were concealed within the bodies of the drones.

The driver bought the story. He fixed the roof with the help of a local tractor driver.

It was the one point the SBU worried most that the FSB might get wind of the operation. The SBU planner said he overestimated his foe, but also that he saw an element of divine guidance that helped them through tough moments, as he and Maliuk would regularly pray together.

The cabins’ roofs could slide open when triggered remotely. Security Service of Ukraine

The SBU had to overcome other headaches along the route, such as finding a replacement truck after one of them suffered a mechanical issue.

The Ukrainian team gathered at the operational headquarters in Kyiv at dawn on June 1. The trucks were set to arrive at inconspicuous locations near the airfields, such as gas stations, to release their cargo.

Maliuk stood in front of the pilots and finally revealed the targets of their mission: Russia’s bomber fleet. He displayed maps and schematics of the planes with their weak spots marked, so the pilots knew where to strike.

The pilots, accustomed to the high pressure of front-line combat, reacted with sangfroid.

“There was no anxiety,” recalled one pilot. “We had a specific goal and we knew we would achieve it.”

A problem soon arose: The link between Kyiv and two cabins—on the truck that had been replaced—was spotty.

SBU members in Kyiv tried to guide the driver to tweak the wiring inside one of the cabins, but it didn’t seem to be working. Then he stopped answering their calls. Images of the burned-out cabins later appeared online, indicating that something had triggered a fire that caused the cabins and their cargo to explode, killing the driver.

Meanwhile, the other four trucks had arrived and were ready for action.

“Let’s get to work. Operators, to your battle stations,” instructed Maliuk as he prowled the room, according to video footage.

The pilots took their seats. Thousands of miles away, the roofs of the cabins slid open, and 117 drones launched toward the airfields. The pilots flew using monitors, and groups soon gathered around to watch the action.

“Once the first strikes took place, there was nothing complicated about where to fly,” said another pilot. “You just flew up in the air, saw the black smoke and understood where to fly.”

Cheers broke out as plane after plane was hit.

“It was so emotional,” the pilot said. “When you hear someone cheering, you understand that everything is working, everything is flying.”

In Russia, onlookers including military personnel and the truck drivers themselves watched in astonishment as the parade of drones took to the skies.

Video feed from drones during the attack. Security Service of Ukraine (4)

By the time the assaults were finished an hour later, 41 Russian planes had been struck and damaged, at least a dozen of them irreparably, according to Ukraine’s tally. Some analysts have suggested that count might overestimate the damage, based on satellite imagery. The SBU has stuck by its numbers, saying Russia sought to trick analysts by moving undamaged aircraft to replace damaged ones.

The following day, Russian authorities named Tymofeyev as a suspect. He and his wife were already gone.

Five days earlier, at around 7 a.m., the couple had crossed the border into Kazakhstan in a hired Toyota Hiace van, under the pretense of taking a vacation. They brought their most valuable belongings, including a Scottish Straight cat and a Shih Tzu dog.

WSJ

6. Navy Strikes Deal With Palantir for AI Overhaul of Submarine Maintenance

​Summary:

The Navy has awarded Palantir a $448 million contract to overhaul supply-chain management for the nuclear submarine fleet. Using Palantir’s “Ship OS” platform, the program will replace labor-intensive spreadsheet tracking, provide end-to-end visibility on parts and suppliers, and use predictive analytics to anticipate shortages 60–180 days in advance. Funded by POTUS’s July spending bill, the effort aims to cut years off cumulative maintenance and production delays across submarines, with potential expansion to carriers and fighters. Initial rollout covers two major shipbuilders, three public shipyards, and 100+ suppliers, supporting a broader push to revive U.S. shipbuilding and industrial capacity.

Navy Strikes Deal With Palantir for AI Overhaul of Submarine Maintenance

WSJ

The award to the data-management company, valued at $448 million, is designed to make supply chains quicker and more efficient

By Marcus Weisgerber

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 and Heather Somerville

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Dec. 9, 2025 5:54 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/logistics/navy-strikes-deal-with-palantir-for-ai-overhaul-of-submarine-maintenance-848f15f2

The USS Pasadena nuclear submarine arriving in Cartagena, Colombia, in 2023. Ricardo Maldonado Rozo/Zuma Press

• The U.S. Navy awarded Palantir Technologies a $448 million contract to manage the supply chain for its nuclear submarine fleet.
• Palantir’s software aims to reduce maintenance downtime and predict part needs, replacing manual tracking that takes 20,000 man-hours.
• The contract, funded by a presidential spending bill, seeks to accelerate submarine production and overhauls, which often face delays.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The U.S. Navy awarded Palantir Technologies a $448 million contract to manage the supply chain for its nuclear submarine fleet.

The U.S. Navy has awarded Palantir Technologies PLTR 0.19%increase; green up pointing triangle a contract valued at hundreds of millions of dollars to manage the supply chain of its nuclear submarine fleet in the hope of reducing maintenance downtime.

The deal marks an expansion of the company’s work with the U.S. military in a sector that is a high priority for the Trump administration.

The contract will initially focus on submarines and could expand to other types of vessels, including aircraft carriers and jet fighters, Navy Secretary John Phelan said Tuesday.

Palantir’s software is designed to give the Navy more visibility into its supply chain, by replacing workers needed to manually track parts using spreadsheets, and better predict when parts are needed, according to the Navy and the company. Palantir Chief Executive Alex Karp said manually tracking parts takes roughly 20,000 man-hours.

“It gives us more predictive analytics to understand when we’re going to potentially have problems in the supply chain,” he said. “Rather than hearing about a problem that day that will stop us, we will know 60, 90, 120, 180 days in advance that we’ve got it.”

Palantir believes there are “not just months, but years to be saved with the rapid and widespread adoption” of its software, said Mike Gallagher, a former congressman who is now a Palantir executive.

The deal, valued at $448 million, is being paid for with money from President Trump’s signature spending bill, passed in July, said Jason Potter, the acting assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.

The aim is to speed up production of new submarines and labor-intensive overhauls of existing vessels.

The entire overhaul process is designed to take 18 months, but parts shortages often cause delays, according to Mark Montgomery, a retired Navy admiral who is senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“Making sure parts are available where and when they’re needed historically … has been a challenge,” Montgomery said.

The Navy says the program with Palantir will provide a comprehensive view of the supply chains and production capacity of shipbuilders in a bid to end unnecessary delays and cost overruns that have plagued shipbuilding.

The contract marks a significant expansion with the Navy for Palantir, which has contracts with the service going back at least a decade. Its more lucrative business sits elsewhere in the Defense Department, particularly with the Army.

The deal with the Navy builds on a focus Palantir Chief Technology Officer Shyam Sankar has often spoken about—Palantir’s role in revitalizing U.S. manufacturing, including the country’s struggling shipbuilding sector, by helping companies untangle complicated supply-chain problems.

“China has 232 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States, whose industry has consolidated to the point where we have to choose between building submarines for our allies or for ourselves,” Sankar wrote last year.

Rebooting America’s shipbuilding is also a key priority for the Trump administration. An April executive order calls for the expansion of shipbuilding through investment and other incentives.

Since President Trump has returned to office, Palantir has landed new government contracts valued at roughly $2 billion, according to federal contracting data. Its run has extended since 2019, with the Defense Department the largest single agency driving its government revenue growth.

Palantir’s project with the Navy, called Ship OS, will initially include two major shipbuilders, three public shipyards and more than 100 suppliers, the Navy said.

The Navy repairs its submarines exclusively at government-owned shipyards. Submarines are overhauled every six to eight years, said Bryan Clark, a Navy expert who is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

“The Navy’s public shipyards have been terrible at the management process in general and they’re extremely inefficient,” Clark said. “There’s a lot of dead time where submarines are just waiting because the right people and the material are not in the right place at the right time to start the job when they were supposed to start the job.”

Write to Marcus Weisgerber at marcus.weisgerber@wsj.com and Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com

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WSJ

7. How China is shackling Trump's cyber agenda

​Summary:

POTUS' cyber agenda to retaliate against nation-state hackers is constrained by China’s economic leverage and the October trade truce. The administration has paused sanctions over China’s sweeping Salt Typhoon espionage campaign and has not publicly answered multiple PRC intrusions, including hacks on POTUS, VP Vance, and Treasury. Economic deals on chips, fentanyl precursors, agriculture, and rare earths are taking precedence over cyber deterrence. Meanwhile, cyber governance is weakening: CISA leadership gaps, headcount losses, FCC rollback of telecom cyber rules, and a thin new cyber strategy. The result is a growing gap between tough rhetoric and actual China cyber costs.

Excerpts:

This isn't the first time the Trump administration has sidestepped national security concerns for economic considerations.

...

Trump's China problem comes as his administration reworks the federal government's role in cybersecurity policy and struggles to get top leaders in place.

• A forthcoming cyber strategy, expected as soon as next month, is reportedly just five pages.

Comment: Are we not taking this threat seriously enough?

16 hours ago -Technology

How China is shackling Trump's cyber agenda

• Sam Sabin

https://www.axios.com/2025/12/09/china-salt-typhoon-trump-economic-policy?utm

President Trump wants to drive a hard line against nation-state cyber hackers.

• There's just one — pretty significant — obstacle in his way: China.

The big picture: China is America's biggest cyber adversary, but it's also the country that wields the most economic leverage over the U.S.

• For the Trump administration, keeping its promise to strike back against nation-state cyber spies, including China's, is a lower priority than managing trade ties with Beijing.

Driving the news: The Trump administration has paused plans to sanction China over last year's Salt Typhoon intrusions, according to a Financial Times report last week.

• Officials worry sanctioning China over Salt Typhoon would hurt the trade deal framework the U.S. and China struck in October.
• Thus, the administration has still yet to mount any public response to one of the most sweeping cyber espionage campaigns ever to hit the U.S.
• A Treasury spokesperson declined to comment on the sanctions pause. A U.S. official said the administration is "committed to ushering mutually beneficial trade relations with China without compromising on our national and economic security."

What they're saying: "We've made ourselves into a big target," Matt Pearl, director of the strategic technologies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Axios.

• "It would be unfortunate if this was more than a short-term, tactical decision."

Between the lines: This isn't the first time the Trump administration has sidestepped national security concerns for economic considerations.

• Trump said Monday that he was lifting a blockade on exports of Nvidia's H200 chips to China, in exchange for a 25% cut from future sales for the U.S. government.
• Meanwhile, the TikTok ban — which passed with huge bipartisan majorities due to fears of cyber-enabled Chinese disinformation and data sharing — is still in limbo. The ban started as Trump's idea in 2020, before he changed his tune and declined to enforce it.
• The U.S. official noted that there are still export controls on top-of-the-line Blackwell AI chips, and that China had agreed "crack down on fentanyl precursors, purchase U.S. agricultural products, and keep rare earths flowing," under the trade truce.

Zoom out: Trump's China problem comes as his administration reworks the federal government's role in cybersecurity policy and struggles to get top leaders in place.

• A forthcoming cyber strategy, expected as soon as next month, is reportedly just five pages.

• Congress failed this year to approve Trump's pick to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — forcing the administration to resubmit a nominee for consideration in 2026.
• The Federal Communications Commission voted last month to roll back Salt Typhoon-inspired cyber rules for telecommunications providers.
• CISA is now ramping up for a hiring spree after losing more than a third of its headcount this year to buyouts and layoffs.

Reality check: China has been behind a range of cyberattacks on government agencies in the last year — and the Trump administration hasn't publicly responded to any of them.

• Anthropic uncovered evidence of China using its AI model to orchestrate 80%-90% of a cyber espionage campaign.
• The Salt Typhoon hackers reportedly broke into the phones of Trump and Vice President Vance.
• The U.S. has also said China breached the Treasury Department last December.

Yes, but: Sanctions are just one tool the administration can use to target China, and it's been common in past administrations to tamp down anti-China rhetoric and actions during similar economic negotiations, Pearl said.

• Indictments of individual hackers, visa restrictions and offensive cyber strikes are all on the table, Pearl added.
• The annual defense policy bill includes millions for the U.S. Cyber Command to increase its own cyberspace operations.

Go deeper: Beijing's hackers are playing the long game

8. Trump’s New Strategy Document Is Misguided and Dangerous

​Summary:

Simon and Stevenson argue the 2025 NSS is incoherent, ahistorical, and dangerous. By elevating the “Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” it militarizes the Western Hemisphere, shrinks the US strategic perimeter, and drains forces from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The strategy fuses America First culture war with security policy, legitimizes extrajudicial force against cartels, erodes constitutional limits on domestic and hemispheric military use, and subverts the EU and NATO. They warn this hemispheric “homeland” concept invites war crimes, empowers adversaries like Russia, accelerates authoritarianism at home, and will leave the United States weaker, isolated, and less secure.

Comment: The negative assessments are starting to pile on. The administration should look at this from a Nietzsche perspective: this public "staffing" makes it stronger.

Trump’s New Strategy Document Is Misguided and Dangerous

Dec. 9, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/09/opinion/trump-security-strategy-threats.html

Credit...Photo Illustration by The New York Times

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By Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson

Mr. Simon held senior positions in the State Department and at the National Security Council. Mr. Stevenson served on the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration.

Even Republican members of Congress seem to be getting unnerved about U.S. government-ordered strikes in the Caribbean that are an illegal, immoral and distinctly unstrategic use of a superlative professional military. Yet the administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy, released last week and by turns incoherent, ahistorical and specious, casts the strikes as a legitimate exercise of “the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” and one of any number of “targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels.”

This strategy document focuses the United States’ attention on the Western Hemisphere. It subjects strategically crucial regions and allies to relegation and, in the case of Europe, outright subversion. It denigrates the European Union “and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty,” while implicitly contemplating Europe’s right-wing nativist parties as instruments for “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory.” Those comments effectively codify JD Vance’s hectoring speech at the Munich Security Conference last February. As the United States systematically eviscerates its constitutional order and international standing, it presumes to tell Europe that it risks “civilizational erasure.”

This exposes an America morally and politically devouring itself while its true enemies, like Russia, watch astonished by their good fortune. The strategy looks like the Janus face of a fraying domestic constitutional order, providing geopolitical cover for domestic authoritarian rule and corporate aggrandizement.

National strategy documents have tended to concentrate on external threats, from the Soviet Union to transnational jihadist terrorism to China. There is no reason the current strategy should break from this tradition. The salient risks to American interests do not lie within the United States or its longitudes.

China has 600 nuclear warheads, an aggressive nuclear expansion and modernization program, little interest in arms control, a blue-water navy, a vast industrial base and hostile designs on Taiwan, a U.S. partner that depends on American support for its defense, yet the new strategy is rather quiet on China. Iran has enough fissile material squirreled away to produce up to 10 nuclear warheads and is regarded as enough of a strategic threat to justify an American air campaign involving advanced conventional weapons. The Islamic State, an implacably violent Islamist movement based in the Middle East, inspires attacks on Americans and U.S. allies. Russia has invaded a European neighbor, killed at least 75,000 civilians and soldiers, sent armed drones and combat aircraft into the airspace of NATO allies, and overtly threatened the security of others.

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The Trump administration justifies its proposed trillion-dollar defense budget by citing these threats from longstanding adversaries, and the newly released National Security Strategy pays lip service to them. But its call for “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our hemisphere” betrays a deeper strategic miscalculation, draining resources from areas that remain strategically vital to advance its pursuit of Latin American criminal gangs and phantom antifa groups. The U.S. military’s Northern and Southern Commands, which cover the Western Hemisphere, are customarily relatively lightly endowed, but with the buildup of U.S. forces in the Caribbean are now absorbing assets normally allocated to the Indo-Pacific Command, European Command and Central Command, which are responsible for more challenging regions..

Most significantly, on the pretexts of protecting the country against “cultural subversion” and exercising “full control over our borders,” the strategy weaves together domestic and international America First agendas and unites North and South America as a geopolitical unit. This restructuring has profound strategic effects.

First, it contracts the United States’ defensive perimeter to the coastlines of these two continents, far from the reaches of the Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East that have defined it since the 1950s. Second, it removes boundaries and limits on the president’s use of the military. In deploying the military for domestic law-enforcement purposes in cities such as Chicago, Mr. Trump is already erasing the sovereignty of states and cities within the United States. With the National Security Strategy, he is removing national sovereign boundaries outside the United States, too.

The new strategy establishes an essentially undifferentiated hemispheric homeland — namely, North and South America — in which the president is free to act unilaterally. Anything he perceives as misbehavior within that space becomes an actionable national security problem, even though the region remains stable.

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This is the real Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

One possible benefit of a shrunken security perimeter and diminished projection of power could be greater restraint. The United States’ traditional forward defense has afforded it strategic depth and swift crisis response, but it has mismanaged these advantages with rash interventions, in particular the 2003 Iraq war. In any case, the dangers of this insular strategy are vastly greater. When the National Security Strategy prescribes “the use of lethal force to replace the failed law enforcement-only strategy of the last several decades” in the Western Hemisphere, it is referring to the pre-emptive military effort already underway against drug cartels, without serious reference to borders.

The most conspicuous move in that war is the use of U.S. forces to kill alleged drug traffickers, mischaracterized as “terrorists” and posing no immediate threat to Americans, on board Venezuelan boats in international waters. The Trump administration is enlisting soldiers and sailors in potential war crimes and looking to legitimize extrajudicial killings.

The U.S. military itself is not likely to rescue the constitutional order. The Pentagon is purging officers it deems as ideologically incompatible with its priorities. When Adm. Alvin Holsey, as commander of Southern Command, privately voiced concerns about their legality and appeared to hesitate in preparing plans for retaking the Panama Canal, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth apparently insisted on his resignation. While the United States’ geopolitical reorientation toward the Western Hemisphere has reportedly been contested within the Pentagon, the new National Security Strategy appears calculated to end the debate.

The United States’ adversaries will surely have taken keen notice of the Trump administration’s talk about Portland, Ore., in 2025 as though it were Stalingrad in 1943, as well as the president’s castigation of and distancing from American allies. They will see enhanced opportunities to stoke internecine tensions in the United States — as Russia has been doing for at least a decade — and thereby intensify the administration’s blinkered gaze on domestic enemies and enrich the pretexts for targeting them. The Trump administration might then repay the favor by maintaining its vow to undermine the political integrity of the European Union and NATO.

Despite the administration’s gaslighting, the Caribbean is not a war zone. Should domestic military operations turn lethal, if military targeting of suspected criminals becomes permanent practice, or if the Trump administration undertakes coercive regime change in Venezuela, the United States’ prestige and leverage will decline further. The country will be left with diminished national security as well as a shattered constitutional order. It might even face “civilizational erasure.”

Steven Simon teaches at Dartmouth and held senior positions in the State Department and at the National Security Council. Jonathan Stevenson is a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the managing editor of Survival. He served on the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration and was a professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College.

Photo illustration by The New York Times; source images by Fotograzia/Getty Images.

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9. Strategic Depth Reimagined: Expanding Decision Time in 21st Century War

​Summary:

The classic “space for time” strategic depth has eroded under long-range precision fires, drones, cyber, and persistent ISR, which collapse distance and decision windows. He reframes depth as spatial, temporal, cognitive, informational, and institutional distance that creates decision time and resilience. States must now manufacture time through strategic intelligence, mobility, alliances, digital resilience, and institutional robustness, combining internal depth with external breadth. Case studies of Israel, the Baltic states, and the UAE illustrate different mixes. The core requirement is decision advantage: leaders who can think and act faster and more coherently than adversaries in a compressed battlespace.

Excerpts:

Strategic depth and strategic breadth are complementary instruments for managing time and uncertainty. Depth grants endurance; breadth extends influence. As warfare accelerates across domains, the ability to create, preserve, and exploit decision-making time becomes the essence of strategic leadership.

For smaller nations, this fusion of strategic depth and breadth converts vulnerability into agility; for major powers, it offers adaptation to compression. In an era where milliseconds determine outcomes, the true measure of strategic leadership is decision advantage: the ability to think and act faster and more coherently than any adversary. The strategist’s task is no longer to find space; it is to manufacture time, the final and most enduring form of strategic depth.

Comment: Graphics at the link.

Strategic Depth Reimagined: Expanding Decision Time in 21st Century War

by Daniel McCauley

12.10.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/10/strategic-depth-modern-warfare/

Strategic depth has traditionally described a state’s ability to trade space for time—to absorb, adapt, and recover before vital centers are threatened. Strategic depth may be defined as the spatial, temporal, and cognitive distance that enables a nation or commander to absorb shocks, mobilize, and adapt before decisive outcomes occur. It represents the freedom to think and act over time, creating conditions to maintain initiative even under pressure.

At its core, strategic depth is about time, which is the most valuable currency in warfare. Commanders historically traded space for time to delay adversaries by accelerating their own tempo to seize the initiative. Mastering tempo, changing the pace to create time for decision, remains a critical component of strategy.

Yet in the twenty-first century, technological acceleration has collapsed the boundaries that once protected states and commanders from immediate danger. Precision-guided munitions, long-range drones, space-based reconnaissance, and cyber operations have eroded both physical and temporal buffers, making the battlespace continuous and persistent. The outcome is a radical compression of time and space, forcing leaders to make strategic decisions at tactical or operational tempo—often within minutes or hours.

In today’s security environment, where technology compresses distance and speed erodes deliberation, small states must manufacture time through intelligence, mobility, and alliances, while larger states must integrate breadth to restore lost depth.

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war provides a striking contemporary example. Ukraine’s operational depth has been steadily eroded by Russia’s employment of long-range fires, missile strikes, and drone swarms that reach deep into its territory. Meanwhile, Russia’s traditional strategic depth, long considered its great advantage, has been similarly reduced by Western-supplied precision weapons capable of reaching logistics hubs and airbases hundreds of kilometers from the front. Moscow has remained relatively unaffected in part because Western states have imposed restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range systems to avoid escalation. This dynamic demonstrates that geography no longer guarantees sanctuary. Cyber operations compound the problem by extending the battlespace beyond the physical domain, threatening command networks, energy systems, and information flows at the speed of light. Together, these capabilities collapse the decision-making window that once defined strategy, forcing nations to seek new forms of depth, especially informational and cognitive forms created by strategic intelligence and design.

This essay redefines the classical military concept of strategic depth, the use of geography to create time for decision, through two lenses: expanded time and strategic breadth. Assessing historical military theorists Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Fuller, Liddell Hart, Mao, Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky, and Gerasimov, it explores how time and space have been used to expand a commander’s decision window at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In today’s security environment, where technology compresses distance and speed erodes deliberation, small states must manufacture time through intelligence, mobility, and alliances, while larger states must integrate breadth to restore lost depth. The paper identifies five strategic approaches: forward deterrence, deny-and-survive, strategic breadth, hybrid, and distributed resilience, and concludes that a blended model integrating internal temporal depth with external breadth offers the most credible framework for deterrence, resilience, and decision advantage in the Twenty-First-Century security environment.

Classical and Doctrinal Foundations

Classical theorists viewed strategic depth as the relationship between time, space, and endurance (See Table 1). Sun Tzu described depth as achieving objectives without battle by subduing the enemy through foresight, deception, and preparation. Clausewitz saw depth as moral and physical reserves achieved through delay, trading ground for time to preserve the will to fight. Jomini expressed it geometrically through lines of operation and communication, each providing temporal flexibility and decision space. Fuller cautioned that mechanization and mobility were collapsing that space. Liddell Hart reframed space as psychological time—broadening an enemy’s perception and widening their decision loop through the indirect approach. Mao expanded depth to include political endurance with time replacing space. Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky inverted traditional depth with deep operations, seeking simultaneity to overwhelm the enemy’s ability to think. Gerasimov later argued that modern conflict blurs the line between war and peace, dispersing depth across non‑linear domains and compressing decision cycles.

Modern doctrine, from JP 1 Joint Warfighting to NATO’s Strategic Concept, carries this way of thinking forward, linking operations in time, space, and purpose to preserve decision freedom. Strategic depth, in doctrinal terms, is the conversion of physical distance and organizational endurance into temporal advantage.

Table 1: Classical Conceptions of Strategic Depth, Space, and Time

EditTheoristKey ConceptRelation to Strategic DepthInterpretation of Time and SpaceSun TzuExcellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.Depth comes from preparation, deception, and indirectness; it preserves decision space by avoiding premature engagement.Time and space are fluid dimensions to be shaped through foreknowledge and adaptability.ClausewitzDefense is the stronger form of war.Depth as both moral and physical reserve—the ability to trade ground for time, preserving the will to fight.Space provides delay, which generates time for decision and strengthens resolve.JominiLines of operation and communication.Depth expressed geometrically—secure lines provide temporal flexibility and sustainment.Space organizes forces; time is the sequence of operations along those lines.FullerThe object of strategy is to disintegrate the enemy’s power of co‑operation.Depth as a mechanized maneuver—expanding tempo and range to overwhelm enemy decision cycles.Time becomes a weapon, space becomes elastic, defined by mobility and mechanization.Liddell HartThe indirect approach.Depth achieved through dislocation—forcing the enemy to lose balance, physically and psychologically, before battle.Space creates freedom of maneuver by mental advantage; time is controlled by acting with speed and surprise.Mao ZedongProtracted war.Depth as strategic patience—time as a resource to exhaust a stronger opponent.Time replaces space as the decisive variable; victory through endurance.Triandafillov

TukachevskyDeep Operations.Reimagines depth as simultaneity and penetration to operational depth; successive operations disrupt the enemy’s rear, reserves, and command.Space is penetrated in multiple echelons; time is compressed via simultaneity and successive operations across front and depth.GerasimovBlurring the lines between war and peace.Depth distributed across non-linear domains (cyber, information, proxies).Space is multi-domain; time is continuous, demanding persistent influence.Contemporary Western ViewMulti-domain operations and decision advantage.Depth extends through information, alliances, and reach-back logistics.Time and space merge into decision cycles—creating tempo and resilience.

Expanding Strategic Depth

The proliferation of long-range precision weapons, unmanned systems, and cyber operations has eliminated traditional sanctuaries once afforded by space and time. Decision cycles that once unfolded over days now occur in minutes. As the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates, today’s strategic environment merges the tactical, operational, and strategic levels into a single, accelerated continuum.

If the purpose of strategic depth is to expand decision-making time, then the concept must be re-examined across dimensions other than the physical to increase that time for senior leaders. In that case, modern strategic depth exists along five interrelated dimensions that collectively preserve decision advantage:

• Geographic Depth. Physical distance and terrain enable absorption and recovery.
• Temporal Depth. Time is gained through readiness, delegation, and early warning; strategic intelligence and indications systems remain essential.
• Cognitive Depth. The intellectual agility of leaders to reflect, anticipate, and adapt.
• Informational Depth. The ability to generate and integrate knowledge faster than adversaries.
• Institutional Depth. The political, military, and social systems possess enduring resilience to absorb shocks and maintain legitimacy.

Together, these form a holistic model of depth, not as static space, but as dynamic design forming an integration of systems that converts knowledge and endurance into time.

How, then, do states manufacture depth when space and time are compressed? The next section presents practical pathways and illustrates them through three cases: Israel (informational, institutional, and temporal depth), the Baltic States (institutional and informational depth), and the United Arab Emirates (strategic breadth paired with cognitive and informational depth).

Mitigating the Loss of Strategic Depth: Adaptive Strategies for Modern States

The loss of traditional depth does not mean the loss of strategic advantage. States—large or small—can design adaptive depth through deliberate mitigation strategies aligned with the five approaches.

Case 1: Israel—Manufacturing Temporal Depth via Strategic Intelligence. Few modern states illustrate this transformation better than Israel. Surrounded by potential adversaries and lacking geographic depth, Israel has relied on strategic intelligence, the fusion of HUMINT, SIGINT, ELINT, and CYBINT, to create informational, institutional, and temporal depth.

From the 1956 Sinai campaign through the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel’s intelligence services (Aman, Mossad, Shin Bet) provided indications and warnings that converted information into time. HUMINT networks, Unit 8200 intercepts, and aerial reconnaissance extended the decision window, allowing pre-emption before converging threats could mature. Intelligence thus acted as a substitute for space, manufacturing time for decision, and transforming foresight into freedom of action.

In April 2024, Iran launched an unprecedented direct attack on Israel with more than 300 drones and missiles. U.S. Central Command reported intercepting or destroying over 80 drones and at least six ballistic missiles, and Israel reported intercepting roughly 99% of the projectiles, illustrating intelligence‑enabled, networked air-and-missile-defense layers that converted warning into decision time. Israel’s intelligence system acts as both shield and sword; it extends decision-making time by revealing adversary intentions and compresses the adversary’s decision window through deception, disruption, and pre-emptive action.

Case 2: Baltic States—Institutional/Informational Depth through Digital Resilience. The Baltic States exemplify this adaptation of strategic depth. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have almost no geographic depth, yet they create deterrent depth through collective defense (NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence), whole-of-society resilience, and digital redundancy. Estonia’s cyber defense infrastructure and data‑embassy in Luxembourg, the X‑Road data exchange, the volunteer Cyber Defense Unit, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) generate informational and institutional depth that substitutes for territory.

When the internal dimensions of depth—geographic, temporal, informational, and institutional—no longer suffice to delay or deter, states must seek time externally. This outward adaptation gives rise to strategic breadth: the expansion of deterrent geometry through alliances, access, and influence that multiply the options for decision before a crisis.

Case 3: The United Arab Emirates—Complementing Depth with Breadth. The United Arab Emirates, despite its limited size and population, increases decision-making time by expanding its influence via regional partnerships, expeditionary forces, and global access agreements. The UAE’s forward basing in the Horn of Africa and participation in coalition operations demonstrate how external engagement creates geographic and temporal buffers. Its emphasis on strategic foresight, leadership education, and technological modernization demonstrates cognitive and informational depth designed, not inherited.

Breadth multiplies deterrence through partnerships and global posture, while depth sustains endurance through institutional coherence. Together, they form the dual pillars of modern strategic resilience: endurance and reach.

Comparative Strategic Approaches

These national cases illustrate that no single expression of depth or breadth is universally sufficient. The following approaches generalize those patterns into strategic options for preserving decision-making time across diverse contexts.

1. Forward Deterrence and Denial. Confronting threats early to demonstrate readiness; high visibility but escalation risk.
2. Asymmetric Deny-and-Survive. Dispersion, mobility, and deception to gain time through survivability.
3. Strategic Breadth. Alliances and basing creating deterrent geometry and political assurance.
4. Hybrid Depth-and-Breadth Model. Blends internal temporal depth with external breadth; readiness at home, partnerships abroad.
5. Distributed Multi-Domain Resilience. Integrates cyber, space, and AI-enabled command networks for cognitive and digital depth—the future frontier.

The table below integrates the five dimensions, approaches, and examples. In today’s security environment, the proliferation of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and persistent ISR compresses the time-space continuum. Therefore, strategic intelligence becomes the decisive variable for all strategic approaches. Advanced HUMINT, SIGINT, and CYBINT fused with artificial intelligence and quantum-enabled analytics offer foresight at machine speed. Intelligence no longer merely informs decisions—it creates the time to make them. This is the essence of “expanding decision-making time for strategic depth”: trading insight and anticipation for moments of control in a world of uncertainty.

Table 2: Examples Applied to Strategic Approaches for Increasing Strategic Depth

EditDimensionMitigating StrategyIllustrative ExampleGeographicForward presence, distributed basingNATO Baltic deploymentsTemporalDelegation, mission command, anticipatory planningIsrael’s intelligence-led decision systemsCognitiveStrategic foresight, reflective educationUAE’s Strategic leadership programsInformationalIntegrated intelligence, cyber resilienceEstonia’s national e-resilienceInstitutionalAlliances, redundancy, whole-of-government mobilizationNATO Article 5; UAE regional partnerships

Assessment and Recommendations

No single approach is sufficient. Forward deterrence provides visibility but risks escalation. Strategic breadth offers assurance but can create dependency. Asymmetric Deny-and-Survive remains essential, converting information into time, yet it must be coupled with external breadth to ensure credibility. The Hybrid Depth-and-Breadth model provides the most balanced framework—internal resilience reinforced by external reach. Distributed Multi-Domain Resilience points toward the future, where cyber, space, and cognitive domains become the new dimensions of depth.

In short, depth provides endurance, breadth expands reach, and time facilitates enhanced decision-making. Together they define strategic survival in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

Strategic depth, as used in this paper, is the spatial, temporal, and cognitive distance that enables a nation or commander to absorb shocks, mobilize, and adapt before decisive outcomes occur; in essence, it creates freedom to think and act over time. This ability to think and act over time is inherent within all classical military theories: Sun Tzu situates depth in foreknowledge, deception, and preparation; Clausewitz in trading ground for time and sustaining moral and physical reserves; Jomini in the geometry of lines that organize space and sequence operations; Fuller and Liddell Hart in mobility and dislocation that weaponize time; Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky in deep, simultaneous operations that compress time across depth; Mao in protracted endurance that trades space for time; and Gerasimov in blurred war–peace conditions that disperse depth across non‑linear, multi‑domain space and continuous time.

In an era where milliseconds determine outcomes, the true measure of strategic leadership is decision advantage: the ability to think and act faster and more coherently than any adversary.

Israel exemplifies designed temporal depth: strategic intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT (Unit 8200), and integrated air–missile defense) has repeatedly converted warning into decision time, from the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six‑Day War to the April 2024 multi‑vector intercepts. For Ukraine and Russia, large states long assumed to possess territorial ‘strategic depth’, persistent ISR, long‑range precision fires, and cyber operations have shifted depth from geographic cushion to a function of dispersion, deception, mobility, protected command networks, and informational advantage; in short, depth increasingly resides in agility and cognition rather than physical distance.

Strategic depth and strategic breadth are complementary instruments for managing time and uncertainty. Depth grants endurance; breadth extends influence. As warfare accelerates across domains, the ability to create, preserve, and exploit decision-making time becomes the essence of strategic leadership.

For smaller nations, this fusion of strategic depth and breadth converts vulnerability into agility; for major powers, it offers adaptation to compression. In an era where milliseconds determine outcomes, the true measure of strategic leadership is decision advantage: the ability to think and act faster and more coherently than any adversary. The strategist’s task is no longer to find space; it is to manufacture time, the final and most enduring form of strategic depth.

Tags: Baltic States Security, decision advantage, Deterrence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Military strategy, modern warfare, Multi-Domain Operations, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, strategic depth, United Arab Emirates (UAE)

About The Author

• 
  
• Daniel McCauley
• Daniel H. McCauley is a professional military education consultant in the Middle East. He is a retired USAF pilot, a former Associate Dean at the Joint Forces Staff College, and earned a doctorate in Strategic Leadership.

10. Five Reasons Why the Boat Strike Debate Matters for the US by James Stavridis

​Summary:

Admiral James Stavridis argues the Caribbean “boat strike” controversy matters because it tests US law, ethics, strategy, and credibility. He says shoot-to-kill tactics and the reported “double tap” on unarmed survivors demand a full congressional investigation using video, audio, and legal advice. He lays out five reasons to care: moral duty to accept surrender; obligation to follow the laws of war; loss of intelligence when suspects are killed; reciprocity for captured US troops; and global optics. Handling this case transparently will signal whether the United States still upholds the rule of law in war. Congress must insist on rigorous oversight.

Five Reasons Why the Boat Strike Debate Matters for the US

December 9, 2025 at 5:00 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-12-09/four-reasons-why-the-boat-strike-debate-matters-for-the-us?sref=hhjZtX76

By James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.

The US Navy's USS Stockdale, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, docked near the entrance to the Panama Canal. Photographer: Enea Lebrun/Bloomberg 

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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• The Trump administration's "shoot-to-kill" doctrine in the Caribbean has raised concerns, particularly after a "double-tap strike" killed two alleged drug runners clinging to their boat's wreckage.
• Congressional leaders have disagreed on the justification of the strike, with Democrats calling for an investigation and Republicans defending it as justified.
• The author, a former Navy officer, argues that allowing enemies to surrender is a moral and ethical imperative, and that the US should follow the law and investigate the incident to determine whether it was justified.

It has been a turbulent couple of weeks in national security, highlighted by continuing strikes on high-speed boats in the Caribbean that are, according to the Trump administration, carrying drugs headed to the US. Whether that doctrine of “shoot-to-kill,” carried out without warning or any opportunity for surrender, stands up under congressional and judicial scrutiny over time remains to be seen.

But what has really struck a nerve is the so-called double-tap strike that killed two alleged drug runners while they were clinging to the wreckage of their boat. Very few analysts have seen the video of that second strike, and hopefully it will come out soon so that a wider group of observers can provide a more informed judgment on whether it was justified.

Perhaps predictably, among the congressional leaders who have seen the footage of the second strike, there is sharp disagreement. Democrats say it is deeply troubling and a possible war crime that requires a fulsome investigation. Senior Republicans are adopting a “nothing to see here” view that it was entirely justified because the two survivors were still somehow “in the fight,” despite having no weapons, radios or serviceable craft. It is a Rorschach test in every way.

Hopefully, we will see a bipartisan approach from the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, which are the principal oversight bodies for the military. In particular, I look to the leaders of the Senate committee, Roger Wicker (a former Air Force Judge Advocate General and retired lieutenant colonel) and Jack Reed (a West Point graduate and former Army officer), to conduct a full investigation, including the video of the second strike, audio from both strikes, and supporting advice from the commanders and JAGs involved, under oath.

But it is worth backing up to remember why all of this is so important for our nation. It is something I wrestled with throughout my own 37-year career in the Navy, including my time in that theater as head of US Southern Command for three years, overseeing many counter-narcotic operations in which we routinely stopped, searched and apprehended tons of cocaine coming toward the US. Additionally, during my time as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, I was likewise deeply concerned about issues of collateral damage, the treatment of prisoners (both at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan’s Bagram facility), and the general conduct of war.

First and foremost, the idea of allowing an enemy — no matter how despicable — to surrender is a moral and ethical imperative. We all grow up knowing we don’t continue to strike an opponent when they are knocked down on the ground. In war, this means we don’t machine-gun survivors in the water after their warship is sunk, shoot and kill pilots parachuting from an aircraft we’ve hit with anti-air missiles, or “double tap” an opponent on the ground with a bullet to the chest and another to the head when they are already knocked out by a concussive grenade.

Second, we follow the law. War — although inherently vicious and full of chaos — is governed by an extensive set of laws (both domestic and international); treaties to which our nation is a signatory (e.g., the Geneva Conventions); our own policies on the treatment of enemy combatants; and our standing and promulgated rules of engagement. In other words, there are laws and rules governing war, and when we appear to violate them, we need to investigate and determine whether we did the right thing — or not.

A third and frequently overlooked aspect of why we give quarter is pragmatic: intelligence. By capturing our downed opponents, we can interrogate them (where rules again apply) and glean much-needed and often highly useful intelligence. The drug runners floating in the water in September knew things: locations of logistics centers, routes, fueling stops, the next ship they were going to rendezvous with, the people who paid them and much more. By capturing instead of killing them, we can harvest that intelligence about the whole rotten network, reverse-engineer it, and dismantle it.

Fourth, there is the question of reciprocity. If those were two Navy SEALs floating on the wreckage of their small boat or recovered from their submersible by North Koreans, we would want them to receive humane treatment and be captured, not shot to death when they had no means to resist. While there is never any guarantee that our adversaries will follow our lead, it seems to me that we are in a better position to ensure the safety of our own people if we take the high road and capture instead of kill whenever we can.

Finally, the global optics of all of this matter. When the US has been involved in war crimes — e.g., the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, or the Haditha killings in Iraq — the world watched closely. We investigated each of those scenarios and found varying degrees of culpability, with some participants exonerated and others sanctioned. But the point is that we were unafraid to fully investigate and assign accountability, without fear or favor. We need to model the behavior we hope for from a global audience, including our allies, partners and friends.

I hope Congress, notably the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, will fully investigate this incident. If it needs to be done behind closed doors for security and to protect sensitive sources and tactics, so be it. But the reasons for further investigation seem clear: We must be a nation that follows and respects the rule of law — even when it applies to the worst of our enemies and hardened criminals.

Stavridis is dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group.

More From Bloomberg Opinion:

• The US Armada in the Caribbean Is After Maduro, Not Drugs: James Stavridis
• Hegseth and His War Department Have Lots of Explaining to Do: Andreas Kluth
• The US Military Just Sent a Clear Message to Maduro and Venezuela: James Stavridis

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11. At the Boundary of Law and War

​Summary:

The Venezuela boat strikes expose a dangerous blurring of war and law enforcement. September’s “double-tap” on shipwrecked suspects treated them as combatants, while an October case treated survivors as detainees, creating incompatible use-of-force standards. The author questions vague “positive identification,” warns that shipwrecked, unarmed survivors are clearly hors de combat, and rejects misapplied combat analogies. Using the 2001 AUMF to justify lethal counterdrug strikes stretches authority, erodes norms, and invites hostile reciprocity. The United States must clarify legal bases, evidentiary standards, and ROE to keep counterdrug operations consistent, lawful, and strategically sustainable.

Comment: We are going to be debating this for some time to come. At some point we will have to examine the overall effects.

At the Boundary of Law and War

Reexamining U.S. Maritime Re-Strikes Through the Legal and Ethical Standards Designed to Restrain Lethal Power

The Old and Bold

Dec 08, 2025

substack.com · The Old and Bold

https://vaberet.substack.com/p/at-the-boundary-of-law-and-war?r=7i07&utm

The recent U.S. strikes on suspected Venezuelan drug-trafficking boats raise serious legal, moral, and strategic questions — questions policymakers cannot afford to glide past with the usual partisan reflexes. The core problem is not whether the United States should act against narcotics networks; that answer is obvious. The problem is that two incompatible use-of-force standards have now emerged in the execution of this campaign, and unless they are reconciled, the United States risks entangling itself in legal vulnerabilities, operational confusion, and long-term strategic blowback. The question is not whether we should disrupt trafficking networks, but whether the way we are doing so is consistent, lawful, and strategically prudent.

Since early September 2025, the United States has carried out a series of maritime strikes against vessels identified as narcotics-trafficking platforms operating from Venezuela and through broader Caribbean routes. The administration has presented these as actions against “narcoterrorists,” a label intended to signal that these networks function not just as criminal enterprises but as violent organizations enabling mass harm inside the United States. From this vantage point, lethal operations become a logical extension of counter-narcotics campaigns, justified as a means to sever logistics, deny mobility, and preempt future drug flows. Maritime interdiction is undeniably dangerous; U.S. personnel face uncertain intelligence, unpredictable vessel behavior, and, in many cases, armed reactions from traffickers who have no interest in being taken alive. Boarding operations, warning shots, and compliance maneuvers can — and often do — escalate quickly.

It is also true that the operational record includes examples of restraint — but that restraint appears to have been learned, not presumed. In mid-October, U.S. forces struck a drug-carrying semi-submersible and then rescued two survivors, transported them aboard a U.S. naval vessel, and later repatriated them for detention and prosecution. That operation demonstrated a willingness to treat suspected traffickers as detainees rather than combatants once the immediate threat had passed. It aligned with U.S. law-enforcement norms and the long-standing maritime obligation to render aid to shipwrecked individuals regardless of their crimes. More importantly, the October action suggested that commanders had begun to internalize a principle that had been absent — or at least ignored — in the earlier operation: when lethal force is no longer necessary, the United States should revert to custodial control.

That shift cannot be understood without looking at what happened in September. On September 2, U.S. forces struck a suspected drug boat, capsized it, and then conducted a follow-on attack that killed at least two survivors who were visibly shipwrecked and clinging to the overturned hull. These individuals were unable to maneuver, posed no immediate threat, and were, under any reasonable application of the law of armed conflict, hors de combat. The administration defended the re-strike by asserting that all eleven individuals aboard had been “positively identified” as narcoterrorists and thus remained lawful military targets even after they were incapacitated. But if positive identification alone justified killing shipwrecked survivors, then the October rescuers would have been equally justified in killing the two men they instead brought aboard. They plainly chose not to — an operational reversal that strongly suggests the September strike, and the controversy that followed, shaped subsequent decisions. The result is a clear inconsistency: in September, survivors were treated as combatants whose status justified lethal force; in October, survivors were treated as criminals whose status required rescue. The two interpretations cannot both be correct, and the shift between them demands explanation.

This inconsistency places enormous weight on the administration’s claim of “positive identification,” a term that sounds precise but in this context raises more questions than answers. What, exactly, constituted this identification? Was it based on intelligence developed over time, signals intercepts, imagery, known vessel patterns, human sources, or something more circumstantial? Was the identification individualized — meaning specific persons on the vessel were assessed as belonging to an organized violent group — or was it categorical, relying on the assumption that anyone aboard a particular type of craft is part of a trafficking network? In domestic law enforcement, “positive identification” must meet evidentiary standards high enough to justify arrest and prosecution. In the military context, particularly outside a declared armed conflict, the standard must be at least as rigorous, because the consequences are irreversible. Without transparency on how this identification was made, the claim risks becoming a circular justification: they were targetable because we said they were, and we said they were because they were targetable. That kind of logic does not withstand scrutiny, nor does it provide commanders the clarity they need in the field.

None of this is to deny the reality of operational friction. Maritime interdiction is a fluid, high-risk mission set. Tactical commanders sometimes have seconds to interpret threat cues, track movements through ISR feeds, and assess whether a vessel is attempting to flee or maneuver toward hostile action. The chaos of the sea, the limitations of visual angles, and the latency of remote feeds can make life-and-death decisions hinge on imperfect information. Anyone who has operated in these environments knows how fast uncertainty compounds. But friction does not erase legal obligations, and commanders are expected to manage uncertainty within a framework that privileges the protection of those who are out of the fight. Acknowledging operational stressors does not excuse errors; it simply reinforces the need for clear, coherent rules that withstand the pressures of fast-moving situations.

This clarity becomes even more important because some public commentators have tried to justify the September re-strike by invoking analogies to ground combat, particularly the practice of engaging “squirters” — individuals who flee a building or compound during a raid, regroup, rearm, and re-engage U.S. forces. In that context, continued engagement is legitimate because the threat is imminent, mobile, and reversible within seconds. But that analogy collapses completely at sea. Individuals clinging to a capsized hull a thousand miles from U.S. shores, unarmed, injured, and unable to maneuver, do not resemble squirters in any operational or legal sense. They cannot regroup. They cannot rearm. They cannot re-enter the fight short of some miraculous intervention. Under the law of armed conflict, such individuals are plainly hors de combat and are protected from attack. The attempt to import urban raid logic into the maritime environment is not just a category error; it obscures the contextual nuances that make the difference between lawful force and unlawful killing.

This is why lawmakers — including those normally supportive of aggressive counter-narcotics operations — raised concerns after viewing strike footage. Their unease did not hinge on the character of the individuals involved or the moral repugnance of drug trafficking. It rested on the legal status of shipwrecked survivors and the principle that once an individual is incapacitated, the justification for lethal force cannot rest solely on their prior conduct or affiliations. This principle is not a luxury of advanced democracies; it is a norm the United States has defended for decades because American service members may one day depend on its reciprocal respect.

The strategic implications run deeper still. If Washington normalizes the idea that suspected criminals at sea — outside any declared theater of armed conflict — can be lethally targeted even when incapacitated, then other states will adopt that precedent for themselves. Authoritarian regimes will cite “U.S. practice” as justification to sink boats full of dissidents, migrants, contractors, or journalists, claiming they are criminals or terrorists. In future conflicts, adversaries could argue that downed U.S. aviators, surrendering soldiers, captured special operators, or shipwrecked sailors remain lawful targets because the United States itself blurred the line between combatants and criminals at sea. Norms rarely break in one direction; once cracked, they shatter outward.

This is why the legal foundation matters as much as the tactical execution. The administration’s reliance — implicit or explicit — on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force is not just a technical overreach; it fundamentally miscasts the nature of the problem. The AUMF was crafted in the specific aftermath of September 11 to pursue al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and those directly involved in that attack. It was never intended as a blanket authority to target criminal networks, however violent or destabilizing they may be. Drug cartels are not ideological enemies of the United States; they are not conducting armed attacks against U.S. forces; they are not “associated forces” of al-Qaeda or the Taliban in any meaningful legal sense. Treating them as wartime enemies risks diluting the AUMF into a universal permission slip for lethal action against any foreign group the executive branch deems threatening. Congress did not sign off on that, and the American people certainly did not debate it.

More importantly, erasing the boundary between war and law enforcement invites reciprocity in the worst possible ways. If the United States treats traffickers as combatants, other nations will feel emboldened to treat criminals — including Americans abroad — the same way. And once that line is crossed, it is extraordinarily difficult to restore. The rule-of-law framework for combating transnational crime is not a bureaucratic nicety; it is a strategic asset. It keeps American actions defensible, limits escalation, preserves legitimacy with partners, and protects U.S. personnel when they operate overseas.

These were not abstract concerns to me thirty-five years ago when, as a student at the Command and General Staff College, I argued that Special Operations Forces had a role to play in supporting counterdrug missions — particularly in intelligence gathering, partner-nation advising, and mobility operations. Even then, I cautioned that turning counterdrug missions into a de facto military campaign risked blurring the legal and moral lines that anchor American military conduct. Those warnings were not speculative. Excessive reliance on lethal force, the temptation to bypass due process, and the strategic damage caused by treating criminals as combatants were foreseeable risks. The events now unfolding at sea, especially the willingness to employ wartime lethal authorities against individuals who are clearly hors de combat, represent precisely the kind of missteps I feared.

The bottom line is clear: the United States can and should act forcefully against drug-trafficking networks, but it must do so within a framework that is consistent, lawful, and aligned with our strategic interests. Lethal force is sometimes justified. Sloppy standards never are. Before this pattern hardens into precedent, policymakers must clarify the legal authorities, refine the evidentiary standards that govern identification, articulate rules of engagement that prevent re-strikes on incapacitated individuals, and ensure that this campaign reflects the values and norms the United States expects others to honor.

Drug traffickers are bad people. The United States has every right to defend itself. But the measure of a nation is not how it treats the guilty when they are dangerous — it is how it treats them when they are no longer capable of fighting back. That is the line we must hold, not just for legal or moral reasons, but for the safety of our own people and the integrity of the international norms we depend on.

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substack.com · The Old and Bold

12. Time to tell the "Foggy Tale": Taiwan’s Strength to Counter China’s Cognitive Warfare

​Summary:

Taiwan’s creative sector, symbolized by A Foggy Tale’s Golden Horse sweep, is a strategic asset in resisting China’s cognitive warfare. By gently confronting the 228 Massacre, White Terror, and martial law, the film strengthens historical memory across ethnic groups and avoids zero sum victim narratives. Beijing counters with disinformation and legal distortion over Taiwan’s status, seeking to undermine the San Francisco system and the US-Japan alliance. The author urges clarifying ROC-PRC non subordination, ending China ambiguity, strengthening democratic resilience and defence, and using truthful storytelling as a first line of cognitive defence at home and abroad.

Comment: I do not think we appreciate the importance of storytelling in information and influence operations.

Time to tell the "Foggy Tale": Taiwan’s Strength to Counter China’s Cognitive Warfare - Ketagalan Media

ketagalanmedia.com · Ketagalan Media · December 8, 2025

https://ketagalanmedia.com/2025/12/07/time-to-tell-the-foggy-tale-taiwans-strength-to-counter-chinas-cognitive-warfare/

In recent years, the Taiwanese government has worked actively to consolidate cultural resources, using public funding and platforms such as the Taiwan Creative Content Agency (TAICCA) to connect creators with investors and expand opportunities for international collaboration. With a free and open creative environment, Taiwan has gradually grown into a major audiovisual production hub in Asia. The 2024 Golden Horse Awards (金馬獎) saw a record number of foreign nominees, with Thai actor Wanlop Rungkumjad becoming the first Thai nominee for Best Actor. In 2025, Vietnamese actor Liên Bỉnh Phát won Best Actor at the Golden Bell Awards (金鐘獎), marking the first time a Vietnamese performer received the honour.

Yet even in such freedom, works dealing with political subjects or Taiwan’s own history still deter many filmmakers. Concerns that touching on sensitive themes may hinder entry into the Chinese market create immense pressure for directors, screenwriters, actors, and production teams alike, making such projects high-risk undertakings. It is for this reason that A Foggy Tale (大濛)—written and directed by Yu-Hsun Chen (陳玉勳) —has drawn particular attention. The film centres on everyday life and the social atmosphere experienced by ordinary Taiwanese people between 1951 and the 1960s. Its Taiwanese title, Tà-bông (“Fog”), uses mist as a metaphor for the suffocating unease that permeated society from the post-war period into the White Terror (1949–1991).

A Foggy Tale ultimately swept the 2025 Golden Horse Awards, winning Best Feature Film, Best Original Screenplay, Best Art Direction, and Best Make-up & Costume Design. It became the year’s biggest winner and marked a significant milestone for Taiwanese cinema in its treatment of historical themes.

Taiwanese Cinema Between Truth and Reconciliation

In contemporary Taiwan, speaking about the 228 Massacre, the White Terror, or martial law is no longer taboo. Yet before full democratisation in the 1990s, these topics were precisely the parts of history the ruling authorities sought to suppress. Even after Taiwan built a mature democratic and liberal system in the 2000s, debates on such issues persisted due to partisan divides and competing historical interpretations.

In 1989, Hou Hsiao-hsien’s A City of Sadness (悲情城市) became the first major film to depict the 228 Massacre, reflecting the shadow of the White Terror through the fate of a single family. In 2019, Detention (返校), adapted from Red Candle Games’ 2017 PC game, portrayed students and teachers persecuted for participating in a reading group. In 2022, Untold Herstory (流麻溝十五號) adapted historical accounts to depict the real experiences of female political prisoners subjected to “thought reform” (思想改造) on Green Island in the 1950s. These works were at times more or less criticised for “inciting social division” or serving “specific political agendas”.

In contrast, A Foggy Tale—despite addressing equally heavy history—was praised for its gentle way of telling the story, winning the Golden Horse Audience Choice Award (金馬獎觀眾票選最佳影片). Director Yu-Hsun Chen explains that the film’s central concern is the fate of “political victims” (政治受難者), while also expanding its lens to ordinary people and the broader ambience of the era. “I feel heartbroken for these people… They were sacrificed and discarded, leaving nothing behind. Someone has to preserve a trace of their memory,” he said. Chen also paid tribute to mainlander veterans (外省老兵) who fled with the Nationalist Army: “They were conscripted, spent their lives on battlefields from the anti-Japanese war to the Civil War and then Taiwan, and were ultimately abandoned by the government. They deserve justice too.”

Unlike earlier works that navigated the sensitive ethnic narratives between mainlanders (外省人) and native Taiwanese (本省人), A Foggy Tale avoids casting any group as perpetrators or victims. Instead, it invites audiences to revisit the 1950s from 2025 and consider how people from various backgrounds confronted oppression and helplessness. While inspired by history, its characters are archetypes—political prisoners, family members, mainlander soldiers, civil servants of both ethnic backgrounds, and ordinary citizens.

Two parables of water droplets serve as metaphors for those forgotten in the White Terror: some droplets become clouds that nourish the earth; others dissolve into fog, vanishing with the morning sun. These small existences nonetheless shaped the landscape we live in. The film reminds us that remembering such histories—and the lives within them—is never easy, especially as Taiwan now faces one of the world’s most severe forms of cognitive warfare, in which disinformation exploits the soil of free speech to sow confusion, foment internal division, and undermine global support for democratic Taiwan.

Taiwan on the Front Lines of Disinformation: Beijing’s Weaponisation of International Law

According to the 2024 V-Dem report, Taiwan has been the country most affected by foreign disinformation for 11 consecutive years, with China increasingly expanding such operations and even turning Hong Kong into a base for dissemination. In November 2025, “Taiwan’s international status” once again drew global attention.

The controversy began when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗), responding to questions in the Diet, outlined the conditions under which a crisis in Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” (存立事態危機) enabling Japan to exercise collective self-defence. China escalated this into a diplomatic dispute, announcing sanctions to pressure Japan into accepting Beijing’s territorial claims over Taiwan. On 26 November, Takaichi cited the Treaty of San Francisco, noting that “Japan is in no position” to determine Taiwan’s status. The next day, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the treaty’s legal validity, asserting that Taiwan had already been part of China since 1945 and that the People’s Republic of China, founded in 1949, naturally possessed sovereignty over Taiwan.

Crucially, China’s actions targeted not only Japan but the U.S.–Japan alliance through cognitive warfare. In September 2025, the American Institute in Taiwan stated that China was wilfully distorting the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty—none of which determined Taiwan’s final status. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are mutually non-subordinate, and that Beijing has no authority to represent Taiwan.

If A Foggy Tale uses nuanced storytelling to help audiences confront the legacy of authoritarian rule, China’s denial of the San Francisco Peace Treaty forces Taiwanese society to re-examine post-war international law and the relationship between the ROC and PRC.

Beijing’s posture is not simply a response to Takaichi’s remarks; it is a challenge aimed at the U.S.–Japan alliance. The reason is clear: Japan and the United States are the chief obstacles to Beijing’s expansion in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. By discrediting the San Francisco system, China seeks to undermine the post-war international order.

US Taiwan Watch notes that the treaty, led by the United States, never assigned Taiwan’s sovereignty to any state. In 1952, Japan renounced Taiwan and Penghu without designating a recipient. This “undetermined status” offered the ROC a legal loophole while preserving room for self-determination by the people of Taiwan. Since then, the United States has maintained strategic ambiguity, refraining from taking a legal stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty. In effect, the ROC exercised territorial authority over Taiwan after 1949, but Taiwanese people only gained genuine self-determination through democratisation in the 1990s.

China’s reaction, therefore, underscores a key truth: international law does not support Beijing’s claim of an “inevitable” sovereignty over Taiwan. As history and current geopolitics intertwine, Taiwan must recall not only the fog of the White Terror but also recognise the shifting currents of the international order. Memory and legal clarity form the first line of defence against cognitive warfare.

“Peace”: A Concept Beijing Seeks to Distort Through Cognitive Warfare

Amid intensifying Chinese pressure and cognitive warfare, the Lai Ching-te administration must articulate more clearly and firmly a simple fact: the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are mutually non-subordinate. This is not mere diplomatic phrasing, nor election rhetoric, but a cornerstone of national security. Taiwan must also begin a democratic conversation on normalising the state, enabling society to reach consensus grounded in fact and reason.

First, the government must end the ambiguous claim that “the ROC and PRC both represent China”, which only weakens Taiwan’s international standing. Secondly, strengthening democratic resilience is essential—through transitional justice and historical education—so citizens understand how Taiwan achieved its freedoms and prosperity, and that democracy is a hard-won achievement.

Worryingly, Chinese cognitive warfare has seeped into daily life. In July 2025, a street interview that went viral, one respondent said he “only hoped Taiwan’s national health insurance (健保) would not collapse after China takes over”, admitted he knew little about the failure of “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制) in Hong Kong, yet believed “China’s takeover could not possibly cause unrest”. He even blamed Taiwan’s “Great Recall” movement for social disorder. Such misconceptions reveal a dangerous conflation between “peace under annexation” and “peace under democracy”, obscuring the value of freedom and the fragility of democratic institutions.

President Lai’s “Ten Lectures on National Unity” hoped to foster societal consensus, but its tone drifted towards electoral mobilisation, prompting opposition parties to accuse it of suppressing dissent. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, chairperson of Chinese Nationalist Party Cheng Li-wen (鄭麗文) reaffirmed the “One China under the Constitution” doctrine, advocating that Taiwan and Beijing “jointly return to a democratic China”, and criticising the government’s defence policies as provoking war. The Chinese Nationalist Party leadership appears to believe that merely echoing Beijing’s stance that “Taiwan is part of China” can secure peace without strengthening defence or raising the cost of Chinese aggression. Such rhetoric sounds moderate but in effect places national security at the mercy of Beijing’s goodwill.

Claims that the “ROC represents China” (中華民國代表全中國) or that Taiwan was “returned” to China after the war originate from authoritarian narratives—alongside notions such as “Taiwanese culture is inferior” or “postponing elections is necessary to prepare for retaking the mainland”. These narratives never underwent democratic scrutiny. Today, Taiwan is paying the price: the Chinese Nationalist Party has proposed allowing Chinese spouses to run for office without renouncing PRC nationality; the civil defence manual (台灣全民安全指引) clarifies that “messages about defeat or surrender during invasion are likely disinformation”, yet the Chinese Nationalist Party politicians mock this and even accuse the government of irresponsibility for refusing to consider surrender.

In cognitive warfare, remembering one’s own story is the strongest form of defence. A Foggy Tale reminds us of the forgotten period of Taiwan we know today. Freedom comes at a price, and peace requires self-defence. Now is the moment to clarify the confusion between the ROC and PRC and to allow Taiwanese society—grounded in evidence and democratic reasoning—to chart its future.

Opponents often characterise any strengthening of Taiwan’s defence as “provoking Beijing”, arguing that declaring Taiwan part of China is sufficient for peace. Former president Ma Ying-jeou insists that under his watch, the Taiwan Strait enjoyed unprecedented stability with a defence budget one-fifth of today’s, and that Taiwan is now in a “quasi-war” due to President Lai’s misjudgement. Yet under Chinese united-front pressure and cognitive warfare, only by remembering its history and understanding the cost of freedom and peace can Taiwan work pragmatically with democratic partners and help uphold a peaceful international order.

(Featured photo by Yonghoon Jang on Pixabay)

ketagalanmedia.com · Ketagalan Media · December 8, 2025

13. How China Wins the Future

​Summary:

Beijing is racing to dominate the new frontiers of power: deep seabed, Arctic, outer space, cyberspace, and global finance. China couples long term industrial planning with institutional activism, flooding bodies like the International Seabed Authority and standards organizations, and building alternatives when it cannot bend rules to its advantage. It seeks control of minerals, data pipes, polar routes, lunar infrastructure, Internet protocols, and partial escape from dollar dominance. The United States lags in capabilities and strategy. Washington must invest, work with allies, and lead norm-building, or watch China shape the architecture of the next international system.

Excerpt:

The United States still has a window of opportunity to reaffirm its value proposition and align the world with its leadership. Despite Trump’s erratic behavior, Washington remains a more desirable partner for most governments. But the administration will need to reconcile its “America first” orientation with the reality of an increasingly multipolar world by combining transactional deal-making with a broader strategic framework that delivers real benefits to other countries. The first Trump administration’s creation of the Artemis Accords offers a useful model. It framed the accords as rules-based, transparent, cooperative, and inclusive while also providing capacity-building programs in areas such as space law, resource governance, and satellite data. Initiatives that embody this same type of innovation, openness, and true partnership distinguish American leadership from Chinese leadership, and they provide the best chance for sustaining U.S. influence across the uncharted frontiers of the international system.

How China Wins the Future

Foreign Affairs · More by Elizabeth Economy · December 9, 2025

Beijing’s Strategy to Seize the New Frontiers of Power

Elizabeth Economy

January/February 2026 Published on December 9, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-wins-future-elizabeth-economy

Eoin Ryan

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When the Chinese cargo ship Istanbul Bridge docked at the British port of Felixstowe on October 13, 2025, the arrival might have appeared unremarkable. The United Kingdom is China’s third-largest export market, and boats travel between the two countries all year.

What was remarkable about the Bridge was the route it had taken—it was the first major Chinese cargo ship to travel directly to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. The trip took 20 days, weeks faster than the traditional routes through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. Beijing hailed the journey as a geostrategic breakthrough and a contribution to supply chain stability. Yet the more important message was unstated: the extent of China’s economic and security ambitions in a new realm of global power.

Beijing’s efforts in the Arctic are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. As early as the 1950s, Chinese leaders discussed competition in the world’s literal and figurative frontiers: the deep seas, the poles, outer space, and what the former People’s Liberation Army officer Xu Guangyu described as “power spheres and ideology,” concepts that today include cyberspace and the international financial system. These domains form the strategic foundations of global power. Control over them determines access to critical resources, the future of the Internet, the many benefits that derive from printing the world’s reserve currency, and the ability to defend against an array of security threats. As most analysts focus on the symptoms of competition—tariffs, semiconductor supply chain cutoffs, and short-term technological races—Beijing is building capabilities and influence in the underlying systems that will define the decades ahead. Doing so is central to President Xi Jinping’s dream of reclaiming China’s centrality on the global stage. “We can play a major role in the construction of the playgrounds even at the beginning, so that we can make rules for new games,” Xi said in 2014.

Beijing has positioned itself well for this contest. It approaches these frontiers with a consistent logic and playbook. It is investing in the necessary hard capabilities. It is partnering with other countries to embed itself in institutions and flooding these bodies with Chinese experts and officials, who then campaign for change. When it cannot co-opt existing institutions, it builds new ones. In all these efforts, Beijing is highly adaptive, experimenting with different platforms, reframing positions, and deploying capabilities in new ways.

American policymakers have only started waking up to the full extent of China’s success at building power in key areas of today’s world. Now, they are at risk of missing its commitment to dominating tomorrow’s. The United States, in other words, is not just abdicating its role in the current international system. It is falling behind in the fight to define the next one.

TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA

In 1872, the British sent a ship to retrieve the world’s first store of polymetallic nodules: clumps of ocean debris that can contain critical minerals such as manganese, nickel, and cobalt. But it was not until the early 1960s that scientists posited these nodules could have significant financial benefits. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. company Deepsea Ventures, a subsidiary of Tenneco, claimed that it could fill nearly all the military’s demand for nickel and cobalt by mining the Pacific Ocean floor.

Deepsea Ventures never got the permissions it needed to dredge up huge quantities of nodules, and eventually, it folded. But meanwhile, other international actors had begun negotiations over countries’ rights and obligations regarding the world’s oceans. These negotiations culminated in the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in November 1994. It included governance rules over the deep-seabed resources that lay beyond countries’ territorial waters. The parties to the convention established and, along with the world’s major mining companies, funded the International Seabed Authority to manage these resources.

China began its own research into deep-seabed mining in the late 1970s. Its scientists and engineers developed prototypes of submersibles and machines that can mine as well as survey the ocean floor. In 1990, Beijing established the state-controlled China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association to coordinate its seabed prospecting and mining in international waters. It built seabed mining capabilities into its five-year plans starting in 2011. And in 2016, Beijing passed a deep-seabed law designed to develop China’s scientific and commercial capabilities and to provide a framework for engaging in international negotiations regarding ocean floor resources. In the process, China created at least 12 institutions dedicated to deep-sea research and built the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels.

Xi has targeted the deep seabed as a priority area for Chinese leadership. “The deep sea contains treasures that remain undiscovered and undeveloped,” he said in May 2016. “In order to obtain these treasures, we have to control key technologies in getting into the deep sea, discovering the deep sea, and developing the deep sea.” China already dominates land-based global supply chains of rare-earth elements, and a lead in deep-seabed mining would only enhance its chokehold over these minerals. Deep-seabed mining would also advance another Chinese security imperative by facilitating the mapping of the seabed and the laying of undersea cables that can be used in support of naval and submarine warfare. “There is no road in the deep sea,” Xi said in 2018. “We do not need to chase [after other countries]: we are the road.”

When China cannot co-opt existing institutions, it builds new ones.

As China’s domestic capabilities have expanded, so has its role in the International Seabed Authority. Since 2001, Beijing has served almost continuously on the ISA Council, the 36-member executive body that makes key decisions about mining regulations, contract approvals, and environmental regulations. China supplies significant support to the body, including by submitting papers and commenting on drafts. It has placed its own experts and officials in key ISA technical roles, and it provides more monetary support for the ISA than any other country. It has positioned itself to exert greater influence in shaping the rules and regulations that govern the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. Chinese firms have already secured five seabed mining exploration contracts from the ISA—the most of any country.

China is actively courting emerging and middle-income economies with its deep-sea capabilities, encouraging countries and companies that need Chinese-built platforms, vessels, or processing capabilities to align themselves with Beijing’s interests. China has established a research partnership with the Cook Islands with an eye toward eventually exploiting the seabed minerals in the area, and it is exploring a similar agreement with Kiribati. In 2020, in partnership with the ISA, Beijing established a training and research center in Qingdao to provide officials from developing countries with practical experience, such as operating underwater vehicles, and with opportunities for joint research. And within the BRICS, a ten-country group named for its first five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), China has sought to build cooperation via a BRICS deep-sea research center in Hangzhou.

But Beijing has also faced troubles along the way. Despite its cooperative initiatives, China is in a small minority of countries that advocate for a more accelerated approach to mining. According to a Carnegie Endowment report, in 2023 Beijing “single-handedly” prevented the ISA from discussing marine ecosystem protection and a precautionary pause on mining licenses. This places it at odds with almost 40 other ISA members, which support a pause or moratorium on mining until rigorous monitoring and environmental safeguards are in place. China has also not convinced BRICS members: Brazil supports a ten-year precautionary pause, and South Africa wants strong environmental frameworks and economic protections. India favors faster development but is wary of China’s use of research vessels for military purposes. And many governments in the Asia-Pacific, such as those in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Palau, and Taiwan, are worried about military-motivated incursions into their exclusive economic zones by China’s deep-sea survey vessels. Although Beijing has not yet won the rule-setting battle in the ISA, it is not sitting still. It is investing furiously in dual-use seabed mining technologies—those valuable for both civilian and military purposes—such as autonomous underwater vehicles and crewed submersibles that will enable it to dominate commercial seabed mining and, as one Chinese military analyst wrote, attack opponents’ large ship formations and naval bases.

OUT IN THE COLD

The deep ocean is hardly the only frontier that Xi wants to master. In 2014, he also declared his intent to make China a great polar power. Like the seabed, the Arctic is rich in natural resources, containing an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil supplies, 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas, and significant stores of rare-earth elements. As the ice there melts, it will also be home to new shipping corridors—like the one used by the Istanbul Bridge.In a 2018 white paper on the Arctic, Beijing promised to build a “polar Silk Road” by developing such routes and investing in the region’s resources and infrastructure. It also reframed Arctic governance to include issues such as climate change and to advance the rights of non-Arctic countries. “The future of the Arctic concerns the interests of the Arctic states, the well-being of non-Arctic states, and that of humanity as a whole,” the paper declared. “The governance of the Arctic requires the participation and contribution of all stakeholders.”

Beijing’s interest in the Arctic is not new. In 1964, China established the State Oceanic Administration, a government agency whose mandate included conducting polar expeditions. Its Arctic-related research accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1989, the government founded the Shanghai-based Polar Research Institute, and it expanded its Arctic research capabilities and partnerships throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2013, China became an observer to the governing Arctic Council, which consists of representatives of Canada, Denmark (which includes Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, as well as indigenous peoples. Since then, China has become one of the council’s most active observer members, participating in a wide array of working groups and task forces. Chinese researchers continue to argue that China should play a larger role in Arctic decision-making because climate change has made the Arctic an issue of global commons and because Chinese companies are essential to Arctic shipping and energy.

Beijing’s efforts have encountered resistance. Arctic countries have grown concerned about becoming overreliant on Chinese investment and the resulting security risks. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden all rejected or canceled a number of Chinese Arctic projects in their territories. According to a 2025 study by the Belfer Center, of China’s 57 proposed investment projects in the Arctic, only 18 are active.

But while democratic countries have mostly closed themselves off to new Chinese investment, a different kind of state has opened its doors: Russia. Since 2018, China and Russia have institutionalized their bilateral consultations on the Arctic. Their relationship became especially pronounced after Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022 and was economically isolated from the rest of the Arctic Council’s members. Since then, Chinese companies have signed agreements to develop a titanium mine and a lithium deposit, as well as to construct a new railway and deep-water port. Together, China and Russia’s capabilities for Arctic exploration, commerce, and patrol far exceed those of the United States. China has also used its partnership with Russia to enhance its military access to the region. Starting in 2022, the two countries have even conducted multiple joint exercises, including in the Bering Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and the greater Arctic Ocean, as well as a joint bomber patrol near the coast of Alaska. Beijing and Moscow have also teamed up to bring the BRICS more directly into Arctic discussions. They established a BRICS working group on ocean and polar science and technology, and Russia has invited the body to develop an international scientific station on the Svalbard archipelago.

China’s outreach, however, has come up short. Brazilian and Indian engagement with the Arctic has been primarily through bilateral partnerships with Russia. Some Indian analysts have expressed outright concern about China’s expanding role in the region. And despite the seeming alignment between China and Russia, Moscow has not supported Beijing’s pitch for an expanded role in Arctic governance. Their shared military exercises are largely performative. In 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s special envoy to the Arctic Council, Nikolai Korchunov, agreed with then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s comment that there are two groups of countries, Arctic and non-Arctic, and suggested that China had no Arctic identity. That same year, Moscow charged a Russian professor who studies the Arctic with high treason after he provided China with classified materials relating to submarine detection methods.

BOLDLY GO WHERE NO ONE HAS GONE BEFORE

Then there is the final frontier: space. As early as 1956, China deemed space exploration a national security priority. On the heels of the Soviet and U.S. satellite launches in 1957 and 1958, Chinese leader Mao Zedong pronounced, “We too shall make satellites.” The country then followed through, launching Dong Fang Hong 1 into orbit in April 1970.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China created an extensive space program driven by scientific, economic, and military imperatives. In 2000, the government published its first white paper outlining its priorities in outer space. They included making use of the resources of space, achieving crewed spaceflight, and undertaking space explorations centered on the moon. Space is also a particular priority for Xi. “Developing the space program and turning the country into a space power is the space dream that we have continuously pursued,” he said in 2013. In 2017, China laid out a road map to become a “world-leading space power by 2045,” with planned major breakthroughs. It has delivered: in addition to its advancing commercial space program, China has developed sophisticated space warfare capabilities, including a growing constellation of reconnaissance, communications, and early warning satellites. Of the more than 700 satellites that China has placed in orbit, over one-third serve military purposes. The country’s 2022 white paper heralded all this progress. Some U.S. space officials and experts believe that China will surpass the United States as the leading space-faring nation within the next five to ten years, including by being the first to return humans to the moon since the U.S. Apollo 17 mission in 1972.

As with the deep seabed, China’s significant technological capabilities and the frontier’s more open governance enable Beijing to play a significant leadership role in space. Beijing has become an important partner for other less developed countries interested in space research and exploration. It boasts bilateral agreements with 26 states. It also collaborates with the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs to carry out experiments from its Tiangong space station.

Beijing’s most meaningful bid for space leadership, however, is the planned International Lunar Research Station, a joint effort between China and Russia first announced in 2017. It is slated to begin as a permanent base at the moon’s south pole and eventually expand into a network of orbital and surface facilities supporting exploration, resource extraction, and long-term habitation. China aims to get 50 countries, 500 international research institutions, and 5,000 overseas researchers to join the ILRS by offering them opportunities for scientific training, cooperation, and access to some Chinese and Russian space technologies. To that end, it has pitched the ILRS through multilateral organizations, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

A Chinese rocket carrying three astronauts blasts off from near Jiuquan, China October 2025 Maxim Shemetov / Reuters

Beijing and Moscow have positioned the ILRS as an alternative to the U.S.-led Artemis program—Washington’s attempt to get back to the moon—and to the Artemis Accords. The accords, established in 2020 by the United States and seven other countries, set forth nonbinding principles and guidelines for peaceful space exploration, the use of space resources, the preservation of space heritage, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data. The accords are designed to be consistent with existing international space treaties and conventions; as of early November, 60 countries have signed on.

One senior Chinese expert described the accords as an American attempt to colonize and establish “sovereignty over the moon.” But China has been relatively unsuccessful at drawing countries into its venture. The ILRS has attracted only 11 states in addition to China and Russia, several of which have either no space program or only a nascent one. Two of the countries that joined the ILRS, Senegal and Thailand, later also joined the Artemis Accords. The broader appeal of the latter stems from several factors. Unlike the ILRS, the accords build on existing scientific, security, and commercial relations between NASA and other countries. They provide smaller states with opportunities to advance their own space industries. They offer clear norms of transparency, interoperability, and data sharing, and they do not entangle countries in Russia’s isolation from much of the world’s economic and scientific endeavors. Finally, unlike with the ILRS, countries that sign the Artemis Accords will have an opportunity to send their astronauts to the moon through NASA’s lunar program.

China’s broader approach to governing space has also run into difficulties. In 2022, only seven other countries joined it in voting against a UN First Committee resolution to halt direct-ascent antisatellite missile tests, which produce destructive space debris. In 2024, China abstained from a UN Security Council vote condemning the placement of nuclear weapons in outer space—a motion supported by all other members except Russia. Beijing and Moscow’s attempts to draft their own treaty on preventing and placing weapons in space have garnered support from only a limited number of countries, such as Belarus, Iran, and North Korea.

But Beijing has plowed ahead. It continues to push its governance frameworks and invest in space-related technologies. And if Beijing does return humans to the moon first, it will gain a powerful symbolic edge over the United States that will boost its efforts to shape norms and technologies in the space race.

HARDWIRE AND HARD POWER

China wants to dominate more than just physical domains. Xi also wants Beijing to rule the cyber realm. Over the course of his tenure, China has become a telecommunications powerhouse. His 2015 Digital Silk Road initiative has enabled two Chinese telecommunication companies, Huawei and ZTE, to earn approximately 40 percent of the market in global telecommunications equipment, measured by revenue. China’s Beidou satellite system boasts greater positioning accuracy than does GPS in many parts of the world. Chinese undersea cable technologies are also rapidly increasing their share of the global market.

Beijing also wants to set the global standards for future strategic technologies. Its initiatives, such as the China Standards 2035 strategy, have dramatically increased the number of Chinese participants in and proposals before standard-setting bodies. In 2022, according to Nature, Huawei alone submitted over 5,000 technological standard proposals to more than 200 standards organizations. (Some outside observers have reported that Beijing has undermined best practices by insisting that Chinese companies vote as a bloc for Chinese proposals and by offering companies financial incentives to make them, leading to a large number of poor proposals.)

For China, setting standards is not only about securing commercial wins. It is also about establishing favorable political and security norms. China’s proposal for a new Internet architecture, called New IP, is a case in point. In 2019, Huawei, China Mobile, China Unicom, and China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology jointly submitted New IP to the International Telecommunication Union’s telecommunication standardization advisory group. According to the Financial Times, Chinese officials argued that the 1970s-era Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, today’s system for routing and delivering data, will not be able to support the demands of the future Internet—such as the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles. Beyond technical practicalities, Chinese leaders believe that the current Internet, built on a U.S.-designed protocol, reflects an American-led governance system that does not align with Beijing’s interests. New IP, by contrast, embeds state control, including by making it easier for central authorities to shut down parts of the network. New IP is thus China’s bid to hardwire its own technical and political preferences into the global Internet.

Xi has targeted the deep seabed as a priority area.

The negative reactions to China’s proposal from Japan, the United States, and Europe, as well as from leading Internet engineers, were swift. Experts argued that the existing system was flexible enough to evolve and that New IP would fragment the Internet into state-controlled networks. Europeans pointed out that the current protocol had not hindered the development of AI or other important technologies. They also argued that established technical bodies, not the International Telecommunication Union, should set standards.

China worked hard to recruit support for its vision from emerging and middle-income economies. It created a BRICS Future Network Research Institute to coordinate R & D in 6G, AI, and new Internet protocols. It also made the case that its proposed Internet protocols, combined with its Digital Silk Road financing, equipment, and training, would help close the digital divide with emerging economies. A handful of African states—Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—stepped up to support the New IP proposal. But enthusiasm elsewhere was muted. Notably, as the China analysts Henry Tugendhat and Julia Voo have observed, there was no correlation between a country’s receipt of Digital Silk Road assistance and its support for New IP.

Some of China’s other digital efforts, however, are making more progress. Many BRICS countries, including Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, are cooperating commercially with Huawei. And China is trying to lay the foundations for a state-controlled Internet through a succession of new proposals and technologies. Huawei, for example, has rebranded China’s New IP proposal as “Future Vertical Communication Networks and Protocols.” As a group of Oxford University researchers has noted, China “forum shops” its proposals, often presenting the same or similar ones in multiple bodies, looking for buy-in. At a March 6G workshop before a standard-setting organization, Chinese participants pushed for a “completely new 6G core network” technology that enables greater control, which Huawei is already developing. Moreover, China continues to advance a routing system for Internet data that would grant network providers and governments more control over data traffic. Experts say that Beijing has rolled this system out in several African countries.

A RENMINBI FOR YOUR THOUGHTS

One of the last remaining pillars of U.S. global predominance is the central role of the dollar in the world economy. The dollar remains both the most traded currency and the dominant reserve currency. This grants the United States several advantages: lower borrowing costs for its government and corporations, the ability to restrict access to dollar-denominated transactions, and the continued primacy of U.S. financial markets.

China, however, is committed to expanding the international use of its currency, the renminbi, and to knocking the dollar off its pedestal. In the wake of the global financial crisis, China piloted a renminbi trade settlement scheme in 2009 with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Hong Kong, and Macau. China’s initial efforts to internationalize the renminbi did not gain traction, but it persisted. It introduced renminbi-denominated bonds, expanded currency swap lines with more than 30 countries, and established clearing banks to facilitate renminbi transactions in major financial centers. In 2015, it launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, which is designed to provide an alternative to the U.S.- and European-dominated Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, better known as SWIFT. Today, China’s payment system connects more than 1,700 banks globally.

Global finance, more than in any other frontier domain, has been fertile ground for China’s efforts to advance its interests through multilateral frameworks. Beijing has used the Belt and Road Initiative to push partner countries to accept renminbi in contracts. Some Chinese economists have even advocated requiring Belt and Road participants to settle in renminbi. These endeavors have worked: by June 2025, the share of China’s bilateral goods trade settled in renminbi reached almost 29 percent.

A humanoid robot at the inaugural World Humanoid Robot Games, Beijing, August 2025 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

China’s efforts have been bolstered by U.S. and European sanctions. In a speech before the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Finance Work Conference in October 2023, Xi underscored the point. “A small number of countries treat finance as tools for geopolitical games,” he said. “They repeatedly play with currency hegemony and frequently wield the big stick of financial sanctions.” Iran and Russia, among the world’s most sanctioned countries, have obviously abandoned the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade. But Brazil, India, and South Africa have also supported the adoption of local currencies and a connected BRICS payments system, even if they have not expressed interest in undermining the dollar’s central role.

As with its other strategic endeavors, China’s efforts to promote its currency have faced setbacks. The renminbi accounts for only 2.9 percent of global payments by value, and its share in global foreign currency reserves actually peaked in 2022, at 2.8 percent. Today, it is hovering around 2.1 percent. Full renminbi internationalization requires greater capital account openness, financial liberalization, and less government intervention in monetary policy—steps that would risk undermining the Communist Party’s control over the economy.

But China is also willing to move away from the dollar and expand the use of local currencies without increasing the use of the renminbi. And at that, it has succeeded, thanks in part to Washington’s weaponization of the dollar and other countries’ concerns about the sustainability of American debt. Foreign ownership of U.S. treasuries has declined from 49 percent in 2008 to 30 percent in 2024.

RACE TO THE TOP, RACE TO THE BOTTOM

Xi has made it clear that he wants to reform the international system in ways that reflect Chinese economic, political, and security interests. He wants China to lead in the exploitation of the deep seabed, the Arctic, and space. He wants to create a new Internet protocol that cements state control. He wants to create, invest in, and trade within a global financial system that the United States and the dollar do not dominate. To realize these objectives, Beijing has spent years—in most cases decades—marshaling an extraordinary level of state and private resources, developing human capital, trying to capture existing institutions, and developing new ones. Perhaps most important, Beijing has persisted. It bides its time, adapts its tactics, and seizes opportunities to make gains as they arise.

China has not won yet. In fact, in many respects, the country’s efforts have come up short. The world has not fully embraced China’s vision of change in any domain. Even middle-income and emerging economies, which China often purports to represent, have been wary of Beijing’s proposals. But China’s strategy has yielded notable success in each frontier. The government holds a leading position within the ISA. It has established itself as a leader in commerce in the Arctic, gained military access to the region, and is reframing narratives about who gets a seat at its decision-making table. In space, it has transformed itself into a top scientific and military power. It is making headway in standard-setting bodies that will help create and govern the world’s technological infrastructure. It has diminished the role of the dollar in the international financial system, increased the role of its own currency in foreign trade, and expanded the reach of its alternative payment system. And the capabilities China has accumulated in each of these domains, whether scientific, diplomatic, military, institutional, or physical, position it to keep advancing its vision. That means despite its failures to date, Beijing is unlikely to change course, and it will continue to make progress.

To respond, the United States has three options: step back and grant China the space it wants, try to find common ground, or actively compete. Option one is untenable; stepping back would impose material costs on the United States’ ability to ensure its political, economic, and national security. Option two is attractive, and the two countries could expand scientific cooperation in the deep sea and in space. But in most domains, the gap between the countries’ respective visions is too vast to bridge, at least in the near term.

That leaves only option three. But to compete, defend, or improve current governance in frontier domains, the United States will need to rebuild its capabilities and reclaim its reputation as a responsible global leader. Washington’s hard capabilities—including polar icebreakers, deep-seabed mining prototypes, financial payment innovations, telecommunications technology, and lunar exploration and other space technologies—either already lag well behind those of China or soon will. To fix that, the United States will need to invest in each.

Beijing could return humans to the moon before Washington does.

U.S. President Donald Trump has taken some initial steps in this direction by issuing executive orders that support the construction of Arctic security cutters, that deregulate space-related industries, and that support sending astronauts to Mars. Trump’s orders also support the development of seabed mining technologies. And Washington is backing stablecoins and other digital assets to enhance demand for the dollar, as well as promoting the American AI technology stack globally. But these steps do not provide the type of long-term road map that China has given its officials and industries. The United States needs a comprehensive strategy in each domain that includes a clear vision of U.S. economic and security objectives, significant investment in critical near-term hard capabilities, and sustained support for research and development to ensure long-term competitiveness. Financing these investments will require innovative forms of government–private sector cooperation, along the lines of the Biden administration’s CHIPS and Science Act on semiconductors and Trump’s Defense Department partnership on rare-earth minerals with MP Materials. The United States will also need to work with allies and partners to ensure that these domains’ governing institutions reflect values of transparency, openness, and market competition. Otherwise, the United States will not be able to match China’s ability to change a domain by simply claiming it.

Washington will also have to reestablish its stature as a responsible global leader. Trump’s tariff war, for example, has accelerated de-dollarization by making the United States an unreliable arbiter of the global economy. As the economist Kenneth Rogoff has noted, threatening countries only encourages them to diversify their currencies. The Trump administration’s threat to ignore International Seabed Authority prohibitions on seabed mining will cause rifts with many U.S. allies and may upend the ISA regime. This could trigger a literal race to the bottom—one that China is far better prepared to win than the United States, given its capabilities. In areas such as Internet governance and the global financial system, Washington will need to deploy its full suite of technological, financial, and diplomatic tools to get other countries to buy into the U.S. vision.

The United States still has a window of opportunity to reaffirm its value proposition and align the world with its leadership. Despite Trump’s erratic behavior, Washington remains a more desirable partner for most governments. But the administration will need to reconcile its “America first” orientation with the reality of an increasingly multipolar world by combining transactional deal-making with a broader strategic framework that delivers real benefits to other countries. The first Trump administration’s creation of the Artemis Accords offers a useful model. It framed the accords as rules-based, transparent, cooperative, and inclusive while also providing capacity-building programs in areas such as space law, resource governance, and satellite data. Initiatives that embody this same type of innovation, openness, and true partnership distinguish American leadership from Chinese leadership, and they provide the best chance for sustaining U.S. influence across the uncharted frontiers of the international system.

ELIZABETH ECONOMY is Co-Director of the U.S., China, and the World Project and Hargrove Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. From 2021 to 2023, she was Senior Adviser for China at the U.S. Department of Commerce. She is the author of The World According to China.

Foreign Affairs · More by Elizabeth Economy · December 9, 2025

​14. Do China’s Foreign Policy Experts Matter? How?

​Summary:

Chinese foreign policy experts matter, but their influence is conditional rather than constant. Power is centralized in the Politburo Standing Committee and Central Foreign Affairs Commission, yet a wider ecosystem of party think tanks and university scholars feeds ideas into the system. Their impact depends on two things: how institutionally “close” they are to the party-state and how strongly the leadership signals demand for expertise through funding, documents, and speeches. When Beijing wants conceptual innovation or legitimation, even distant provincial think tanks can shape agendas; when ideological tightening dominates, close scholars mostly reproduce and package official lines for domestic and foreign audiences.

Do China’s Foreign Policy Experts Matter? How?

warontherocks.com · · December 10, 2025

Sabine Mokry

December 10, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/do-chinas-foreign-policy-experts-matter-how/

Foreign policy communities in open societies love to debate their own relevance. Analysts quarrel over whether their insights inform statecraft or merely decorate it, and governments alternately embrace and ignore them depending on the moment. One might assume that in China this dynamic hardly exists, that an authoritarian system simply compels its experts to fall in line and rewards those who echo the leadership’s priorities.

The reality is more complicated. China’s foreign policy experts neither operate in lockstep with the state nor stand wholly apart from it. As I discuss in my new book, their influence rises and falls with their institutional proximity to the party-state and, just as importantly, with how clearly the leadership signals that it actually wants expert input. Even “distant” experts can influence policy when demand spikes, while “close” experts can be sidelined with it doesn’t.

Understanding when and how Chinese foreign policy experts influence the formation of China’s foreign policy is essential for grasping where Beijing’s priorities come from and how they evolve. For analysts outside of China, treating these experts as players whose influence fluctuates with institutional proximity and state demand allows for a more accurate reading of the ideas shaping China’s policy agenda.

BECOME A MEMBER

Foreign Policy Ecosystem and Demand for Expertise

Foreign policymaking in China is highly centralized. The Politburo Standing Committee decides upon strategic directions, while the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, chaired by Xi Jinping and supported by its office, integrates inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Military Commission, and the State Council. In recent years, Xi’s leadership over multiple central commissions has reduced bureaucratic fragmentation and concentrated authority at the top.

Beyond the party and the government’s inner circle of foreign policymaking lies an outer ring of institutions, specifically think tanks and universities. These actors provide analysis, policy advice, and public interpretation of foreign policy directions. They differ in their level of connection to the state, ranging from party-managed academies to independently funded research centers.

China’s foreign policy think tanks are integral components of the party-state system. Twenty-five institutions focus on international affairs, including party-affiliated, People’s Liberation Army-affiliated, government, local, and university think tanks. Historically modeled after Soviet precedents, they evolved in the 1980s and 1990s as China’s global engagement deepened. Since the early 2000s, they have proliferated amid “think tank fever,” responding to growing demand for expertise. These organizations provide background studies, host Track 1.5 dialogues, and circulate policy reports to ministries and party offices.

In addition, university-based international relations scholars play a substantial role in the outer circle of Chinese foreign policymaking. The field has developed rapidly since China’s opening and reform, with international relations departments emerging across major universities. Scholars serve in advisory bodies, conduct commissioned studies, and participate in dialogues with policymakers.

Observers of China’s foreign policy are keenly aware of the role that Chinese think tanks and scholars play within its foreign policy ecosystem. Think tanks’ institutional affiliations are well-documented, and a lot of research has explored channels through which Chinese think tanks can exert influence, ranging from direct participation in government work through briefing the Politburo or being seconded to China’s diplomatic missions, to exerting influence through leveraging personal connections, to submitting internal reports. Similarly, scholars have been characterized as influencing policy through forming an epistemic community, signaling policy, mirroring policy, or operating in a “free marketplace of ideas.” In authoritarian systems, scholars and think tanks are linked to the state in various ways. Their proximity to the state depends on institutional ties, such as formal affiliations, membership in policy advisory groups, and public recognition by ministries or party organs, as well as on how often they interact with policymakers. The state signals demand for expertise through funding priorities, policy documents, and leadership speeches.

My research shows that, in addition to proximity to the state, the extent to which the state signals demand for expertise also matters. The state’s signaled demand for expertise shapes foreign policy experts’ political opportunity structures, incentivizing them to voice their ideas. Originally developed in social movement research, political opportunity structures can be broken down into institutional arrangements, resource configurations, and policy environments. Adopting or changing policy measures that define expert involvement would affect the institutional arrangements, that is, the rules, norms, and procedures that enable expert involvement. Changes in funding patterns would affect the resources available to think tanks and scholars. Lastly, leadership statements outlining their relations to think tanks and scholars would affect the policy environment.

In practice, the state’s signaled demand for expertise comprises a structural and thematic dimension. Structurally, the state can signal different levels of demand for expertise to scholars and think tanks. Between 2013 and 2016, for instance, a comparatively open academic environment and generous funding signaled to scholars that the state was open to their input. This changed dramatically after 2016 when ideological tightening reduced scholarly autonomy and opportunities for academic debate. In contrast, from 2015 onward, the Chinese Communist Party focused on strengthening think tanks’ policy role, boosting their budgets, and enhancing their status. In addition to this structural dimension, the state can also signal at different levels for certain topics, primarily through issuing funding calls on these issues.

When Ideas Meet Demand: How Distant Experts Shape Policy

Experts working at think tanks relatively distant from the state influenced the Chinese government’s increased focus on reforming the global economic governance system, as the Chinese state signaled a strong demand for their expertise, both thematically and structurally.

China has steadily elevated global economic governance reform as a foreign policy priority under Xi. Since 2016, senior officials and policy documents have emphasized China’s ambition to shape a fairer and more equitable international economic order. Xi’s speeches at major international forums, including the World Economic Forum, BRICS Summit, and the Import-Export Expo, frame global governance reform as both urgently needed and aligned with China’s rise as a major power. Beijing argues that emerging markets and developing countries deserve a greater voice and calls for transparent, rules-based global economic and trade systems. Chinese leaders present China as a constructive force advocating equality, inclusiveness, and shared development, while promoting new institutional mechanisms and financial reforms. Over time, the tone has shifted from broad commitments to more modest but sustained calls for long-term improvements to global economic governance, underscoring China’s intention to shape, rather than overturn, the existing system.

Analysts working at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and the Guangdong Institute for International Strategies influenced the Chinese government’s increased focus on global economic governance reform. By identifying problems with the current global economic governance system, think tank analysts’ reports provided the Chinese government with the rationale to reform it. Analysts also detailed how the transformation could be undertaken, highlighting the inclusive character of the Belt and Road Initiative by describing it as open to states, subnational, supranational, regional, and transnational organizations, and emphasizing the importance of coordination among these organizations.

I categorize these institutes as relatively distant from the state. Falling under provincial or municipal oversight, they maintain limited institutional proximity to the central party-state. Their ties to national-level institutions are largely informal, though each conducts commissioned research and receives occasional recognition, such as being named “Key Cooperation Units” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Leadership participation in government advisory groups is minimal, and interactions with central authorities typically occur only through lower-level seminars.

Nevertheless, they exerted influence because the state signaled a high demand for their expertise. Beginning in 2015, Beijing significantly increased its demand for input from Chinese think tanks. A central government guideline laying out how think tanks should be strengthened and integrated into policymaking clearly signaled this change: think tanks were tasked with supporting party and government decision-making, contributing to governance modernization, and advancing China’s soft power. The document instructed agencies to share policy needs more transparently, engage think tanks through hearings and seminars, and improve mechanisms for incorporating expert advice. Although financial data is difficult to obtain, available evidence suggests increased state funding, especially for designated high-end institutions. Broader political signals, such as Xi’s publicized meetings with experts and repeated references to think-tank development in major party documents, further reinforced the impression that the leadership sought more systematic, policy-relevant expertise.

When Proximity Prevails: How Close Scholars Shape China’s Global Initiatives

Chinese foreign policy experts who are relatively close to the state can exert influence even when the state’s signaled demand for expertise is fairly low. Several Chinese international relations scholars’ influence on the Chinese government’s increased emphasis on new initiatives in international politics is a case in point.

Over the past decade, China’s official foreign policy statements have increasingly portrayed Beijing as a generator of major international initiatives. Early references centered on the Belt and Road Initiative, which Xi framed as complementary to existing regional mechanisms. Soon, however, he signaled a broader ambition for China to introduce more concepts and initiatives aligned with global trends. This shift materialized from 2021 onward with the rollout of the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, both repeatedly highlighted in Xi’s speeches at the U.N. General Assembly, G20, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, and the China-Arab Summit, as well as in key government work reports. In 2023, Beijing added the Global Civilization Initiative, further expanding its portfolio of global proposals. Together, these initiatives reflect China’s effort to position itself as a norm-setter in international politics and to demonstrate its willingness to shape global governance in partnership with other states.

During a period when Beijing signaled relatively low demand for expertise, some scholars nevertheless shaped the emerging narrative that China should put forward new international initiatives. As the government began moving beyond the Belt and Road Initiative after 2015, scholars similarly broadened their focus. Wang Yiwei, for example, argued in 2016 that China should learn from America’s approach to building global influence by offering widely applicable, forward-looking solutions to international challenges. He framed U.S. leadership in international security cooperation as a model for how a rising power can gain discourse power and advance national interests, implicitly calling on China to play a more proactive, agenda-setting role.

Similarly, Guo Shuyong influenced a policy shift that described the Chinese government’s increased participation in global security governance. He described the international environment for global security governance after the end of the Cold War and its implications for China. He identified a “new and not-so-long” period of strategic opportunity but acknowledged that it is marked by instability and uncertainty. Besides, he described China’s growing ability to participate in global security governance, mainly attributing it to its rising maritime military power. These scholarly arguments resonated with the government’s later rollout of the Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization Initiatives, reinforcing China’s ambition to act as a provider of global public goods.

Based on their strong institutional ties and frequent interactions with party-state organs, I categorize these scholars as close to the state. Their backgrounds link them directly to government institutions, including prior service in the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Foreign Affairs Office. Most serve on government advisory committees, providing expertise to ministries and provincial authorities, and all have received state-funded research grants. The party-state has formally recognized them through State Council special allowances, talent program selections, or ministerial commendations, which underscores their political relevance. Their proximity is also reflected in regular engagement with officials through professional associations and, in some cases, briefings to the Politburo.

After 2016, the Chinese state sent increasingly clear signals that it was less interested in scholars’ expertise. Xi’s 2016 speech on ideological and political work in universities intensified political control over academic life, recasting faculty as “engineers of the human soul” whose primary task was to safeguard party leadership and instill Marxist–Leninist values. Implementation quickly extended beyond the classroom. Universities faced growing scrutiny, and retaliatory action against individual scholars, ranging from investigations to dismissals, rose sharply from 2017 onward. Restrictions multiplied: limits on overseas collaboration, tightened rules for international travel and meetings with foreigners, and heightened vetting of domestic and international publications. Together, these developments reshaped the academic environment, signaling that political reliability mattered more than analytical expertise. Funding patterns reinforced this shift. While the National Social Science Fund of China had expanded international relations topics between 2013 and 2016, the proportion of such topics declined steadily thereafter, and calls increasingly incorporated explicit ideological language. The steep rise in references to party concepts after 2018 indicated that securing prestigious “major project” grants now required close alignment with state ideology rather than original academic insight. Combined, these trends conveyed to scholars that the state’s demand for their expertise had markedly decreased.

Tracing how and when specific ideas, including the expansion of China’s national security concept, a renewed emphasis on regional diplomacy, or ideas for reforming global governance, transitioned from expert debates into official rhetoric, allows me to demonstrate how scholars and think-tank analysts act as intermediaries between party leadership and policy implementation, translating broad ambitions into actionable concepts.

Across think tank analysts and scholars, influence proved conditional rather than constant. The Chinese state’s demand for expertise fluctuated structurally and thematically, redistributing influence between scholars and think tanks. This dynamic shows that China’s foreign policy ecosystem is neither monolithic nor purely top-down: It is a responsive network in which timing, institutional proximity, and thematic alignment jointly determine which ideas shape Beijing’s foreign policy rhetoric.

Implications for Understanding China’s Foreign Policy

In China’s authoritarian system, no expert operates fully independently from the state. Treating them as politically embedded actors means recognizing the multiple functions they serve, rather than treating their work as objective scholarship. Some observers might view these experts primarily as instruments of state messaging or even as influence assets, especially given the recent ideological tightening. Their work, however, serves several co-existing functions: shaping policy, reproducing official narratives, and communicating China’s positions externally. It is worth paying close attention to because it reflects the incentives and constraints imposed by the party-state.

The analysis of key instances in which Chinese foreign policy experts influenced China’s foreign policy rhetoric shows that China’s foreign policy is shaped not only by top leaders and core party-state institutions but also by a wider ecosystem of experts who influence policy in structured and conditional ways. Scholars and think tanks help translate leadership slogans into implementable concepts, offering analytical framing, policy rationales, and concrete proposals. Tracing how ideas move from expert debates into official rhetoric demonstrates that foreign policy directions often originate outside the innermost decision-making circle. However, expert influence is never automatic. It depends on political opportunity structures shaped by the state’s institutional rules, resource allocations, and policy environment. The state’s signaled demand for expertise, expressed through funding, official documents, and leadership speeches, determines whether expert ideas resonate or are ignored. For foreign observers, this means that understanding China’s foreign policy therefore requires analyzing not only what Beijing says, but also the domestic conditions that determine when experts matter.

The findings also suggest that China’s foreign policy apparatus is more adaptive and dynamic than often portrayed. Influence shifts between “close” and “distant” experts depending on whether the state seeks conceptual innovation, legitimacy for new directions, or greater bureaucratic coherence. During periods of high demand, even think tanks and scholars that are distant from the state can shape policy by offering timely, actionable ideas, as seen in the case of global economic governance reform. Conversely, ideological tightening after 2016 reduced scholarly space and curtailed scholars’ impact. These fluctuations reveal that China’s major foreign policy initiatives, from the Belt and Road to the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives, are not isolated slogans but products of a structured idea-generation process involving experts at varying distances from the state.

For governments and analysts abroad, this has direct practical implications. First, Chinese experts should be treated as politically embedded counterparts whose influence depends on their institutional position and the timing of state demand rather than interchangeable commentators. Mapping who is speaking, from where, is essential for judging which arguments have policy traction. Second, monitoring the Chinese government’s demand signals provides an early indication of where its foreign policy is heading. Funding patterns, leadership speeches, and changes in the state’s treatment of scholars and think tanks often foreshadow shifts months before they appear in official documents. Third, policy dialogues with Chinese institutions should differentiate between participants: Insights from more distant think tanks during high-demand periods may matter more than commentary from close scholars during low-demand ones.

Grasping China’s foreign policy requires understanding its expert ecosystem. For Western governments seeking to anticipate China’s next moves, the key is not only to follow official statements but to watch who shapes them, when their ideas resonate, and why.

BECOME A MEMBER

Sabine Mokry, Ph.D., is a researcher at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Previously, she was a postdoctoral fellow in the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program. She obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands. Her book, Chinese Scholars and Think Tanks’ Constructions of China’s National Interest – Hidden Hand on Demand, was recently published with Routledge.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · Grace Parcover · December 10, 2025

15. The Time to End the War in Ukraine Is Now

​Summary:

The best attainable deal to end the Russia-Ukraine war is available now, not later. After years of grinding stalemate, both Ukraine and Russia lose more the longer fighting continues: Ukraine faces mounting destruction, demographic collapse, and democratic erosion, while Russia trades massive casualties and economic stagnation for marginal gains. He sketches a plausible settlement: a cease-fire along current lines without formal recognition, Ukrainian “armed neutrality” with EU prospects but no NATO entry, and no further NATO expansion into former Soviet space. Only the United States, led by POTUS through structured negotiations and working groups, can broker and enforce such a deal.

Excerpts:

Critics will argue that such a diplomatic effort is beyond the capabilities of the Trump administration. It allegedly lacks the discipline, consistency, capacity, and patience to pursue a sustained diplomatic effort. But even the admittedly halting progress in current negotiations would not have been possible had Trump not opened a dialogue with Putin in February with the goal of ending the war. Despite much speculation to the contrary, Trump has neither abandoned Ukraine to Russia’s will nor walked away from the problem as one that is too hard to solve. And the U.S. national security apparatus has the expertise and skill needed to manage a complex diplomatic undertaking, if only the administration could find a way to reliably control its own bureaucracy, which it does not trust.

Success is not assured, of course, and it will not come as quickly as Trump desires. But with one last effort, he could once again defy his critics and end a conflict others thought intractable.

The Time to End the War in Ukraine Is Now

Foreign Affairs · More by Thomas Graham · December 10, 2025

Trump Can Defy the Skeptics and Seal the Deal

Thomas Graham

December 10, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-end-war-ukraine-now

After a Russian strike in Kostiantynivka, Ukraine, November 2025 Oleg Petrasiuk / Reuters

THOMAS GRAHAM is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Getting Russia Right.

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Deep skepticism has surrounded U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest attempt to settle the Russia-Ukraine war. Ukraine, backed by Europe, has been clear that it is not prepared to accept terms that amount to surrender, while Russia has given no signal that it will back off its maximalist demands, which would end Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign, independent state. That, skeptics argue, leaves no ground for serious negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s evident refusal to make any substantive concessions at his talks with Trump’s envoys on December 2 only reinforces their doubts.

But the skeptics are wrong. The time is ripe for a resolution of the conflict in the coming months. The real question is whether the Trump administration can muster the skill, patience, and stamina to drive a diplomatic process to a successful conclusion.

NO TIME TO LOSE

Nearly four years of brutal combat, in which neither side has achieved a strategic breakthrough, has created a paradoxical situation in which both countries lose the longer the war rages on. The best deal each side can achieve is available now, not in six months or later. Ukraine will not gain anything by waiting to negotiate from a hypothetical future position of strength; such a position will not come soon, if ever. Ukrainian leaders have already acknowledged that they cannot liberate by force all the territory Russia has seized. What Ukraine cannot achieve on the battlefield will not be handed to it at the negotiating table. Nor will a stronger Ukraine incline Western countries to provide it with more formidable security guarantees. Western governments have already made it clear that they will not risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine. And the longer Ukraine waits, the more destruction it will have to endure.

Instead of seeking a position of strength, Ukraine urgently needs to settle the conflict, which has devastated the country economically and demographically. The cost of reconstruction over the next decade has been estimated at more than 2.6 times its pre-war GDP of $200 billion. Kyiv will find it increasingly difficult to man the frontlines and has yet to demonstrate that it can halt Russia’s grinding advance. Close to seven million Ukrainians—about one-sixth of the pre-war population—have fled the country; many will never return. In response to the national emergency, the concentration of power in the president’s office and the indefinite postponement of elections nationwide are slowly eroding the foundations of the country’s fragile democracy. An unfolding corruption scandal, which has engulfed senior officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s powerful chief of staff, graphically illustrates the corrosive impact of the concentration of power. Each day the war continues, Ukraine’s future looks bleaker.

Russia appears stronger. But it has paid a staggering price—more than one million dead or wounded—for marginal tactical gains. During this year’s offensive, Russia seized just one percent of Ukrainian territory at the cost of more than 200,000 dead and wounded. The cost of recruiting new volunteers is soaring, while the Kremlin still fears the social repercussions of a mass mobilization. After two years of growth of over four percent, the economy has stalled. The forecast for this year and next hovers around one percent growth. Meanwhile, Russia has invested negligible sums in cutting-edge technologies. In short, it is mortgaging its future to sustain the conflict. As a result, each day the war continues, Russia falls further behind the great powers—China and the United States, to be sure, and also possibly India and Europe, with which it hopes to compete in the decades ahead.

Unsurprisingly, Russia and Ukraine remain far apart on the terms of a settlement, particularly on territorial questions and the nature of security guarantees for both of them. Ukraine will not cede territory in the Donbas that Russia has not conquered, as the Kremlin demands. Nor will it, simply to make Russia feel secure, easily abandon its ambition of joining NATO—the ultimate security guarantee—or cap its military capabilities at levels inadequate to deter future Russian aggression.

But these gaps are bridgeable. Indeed, the contours of a final settlement are visible, even if both sides vigorously deny it: a cease-fire along the line of contact without either country formally recognizing the other’s control of territory it considers its own; armed neutrality, or sufficient military capabilities to reliably defend one’s territory, for Ukraine with the possibility of EU accession but not membership in NATO; and no further NATO expansion eastward into the former Soviet space. Such an outcome would enable Putin to declare victory and Zelensky to claim he had preserved what was most precious—Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence as well as its European aspirations. It would also spare both countries the further depredations of continued warfare. But agreement on these terms can only be achieved in strictly confidential negotiations, in which the two belligerents can make the necessary compromises on sensitive issues as part of a broader peace agreement.

SEEKING ASSURANCES

Achieving this outcome will, however, require a concerted diplomatic effort that engages all parties to the conflict: Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, as well as Europe. But only one country can lead that effort: the United States. It enjoys unique leverage over the other three parties. As it has already demonstrated, Washington can pressure Ukraine and Europe by threatening to cut essential assistance, including irreplaceable battlefield intelligence. It can also pressure Russia effectively, although not solely through sanctions or arms for Ukraine, which figure most prominently in public discussions. Those tools matter—especially the arms needed to stop Russia’s advance on the battlefield and to minimize the consequences of its aerial assault—but they alone will not deliver a settlement.

The United States also needs to deploy the formidable psychological leverage it possesses over Russia. One cannot overstate the role the United States—and Trump personally—plays in validating Russia as a great power and Putin as a global leader. This matters all the more because Russia has struggled on the battlefield against what it (and most Western observers) assumed was a second- or third-tier military. Instead of the anticipated blitzkrieg and swift conquest of Ukraine, the Kremlin will soon find itself fighting the Ukrainians for longer than it took the Soviet Union to crush Nazi Germany in World War II. Washington can exercise that leverage in the first instance by assuring Moscow that it would be willing to normalize relations. Such a measure will help convince Putin that the United States will not relegate Russia to a secondary tier of interest once the war is resolved. Trump’s new National Security Strategy makes clear that the administration no longer considers Russia a major threat, to the consternation of traditional U.S. allies. Normalization is also strategically important to Putin in its own right: it would allow him to rebalance Russia’s relationship with China and expand his room to maneuver globally.

Washington has already promised normalization once the war is on a clear path toward resolution. But words alone will not satisfy Putin. He seeks concrete evidence of Washington’s intentions. That could include establishing working groups on key bilateral issues—nuclear policy, the Arctic, and commercial relations, for example—and holding initial meetings to set the agenda and lay out the first steps. That would give Putin confidence that the United States will continue to treat Russia as a serious player, commensurate with Moscow’s own self-perception. The White House should make it clear that tangible progress on any of these bilateral issues depends on the Kremlin taking the hard decisions needed to end the war.

TRUST THE PROCESS

The Kremlin’s desire for normal diplomatic relations also applies to the narrower question of the Russia-Ukraine war. Earlier this year, it initially embraced the idea of a quick resolution reached through direct talks with Trump, using Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff as a confidential conduit. In the Kremlin’s scheme, the two presidents would agree on the deal, and Trump would impose it on the Ukrainians. But that approach ran aground by late spring. The Ukrainians resisted U.S. pressure, and the Europeans stepped in to support Ukraine in resisting both Moscow’s aggression and Washington’s bullying.

With the diplomatic situation more complex and the talks narrowing to a few crucial issues, Russian leaders wants to establish a more traditional negotiating process. They understand that presidential phone calls and long talks with Witkoff cannot do that, and presidential meetings produce lasting results only if lower-level officials work out the details in advance. That would entail creating expert working groups, which the Trump administration has hesitated to do. The Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov hinted at this approach after Putin’s December 2 meeting with Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and occasional envoy. U.S.-Russian talks, Ushakov said, would continue between the presidents, presidential assistants, and other officials.

That is a template that Washington should embrace. The Kremlin, to be sure, was speaking only of bilateral contacts. But the Trump administration should expand this approach to include Ukrainians and Europeans. The Russians will almost certainly resist participating directly with Europeans in any working groups, and they will be reluctant to engage Ukrainians in a trilateral format with Americans also in the room. That means that at least initially, the United States will have to shuttle between parallel working groups with the Ukrainians and Europeans, on the one hand, and the Russians, on the other, until there is sufficient trust to bring all the parties together in unified working groups.

Russia wants a more traditional negotiating process.

This broadened process would require a number of working groups that at a minimum would study territorial disputes, security guarantees, and cease-fire modalities. The composition of the groups would vary by topic: a U.S.-Russian working group could suffice for nuclear issues; Russians, Ukrainians, and Americans could address territorial issues; and Europeans would have to participate in discussions of security guarantees and broader matters of European security. The working groups would initially be tasked with reaching consensus on the elements of a settlement and developing sufficient detail on implementation so that the parties can sign a framework agreement and put a cease-fire in place. Subsequently, they would flesh out the framework agreement to produce a final settlement on all the issues in their purview.

Even if working groups are established, the White House–Kremlin channel will be indispensable. It is the only channel that can set the broad principles and parameters to guide the efforts of the working groups and break the logjams that will inevitably arise.

Critics will argue that such a diplomatic effort is beyond the capabilities of the Trump administration. It allegedly lacks the discipline, consistency, capacity, and patience to pursue a sustained diplomatic effort. But even the admittedly halting progress in current negotiations would not have been possible had Trump not opened a dialogue with Putin in February with the goal of ending the war. Despite much speculation to the contrary, Trump has neither abandoned Ukraine to Russia’s will nor walked away from the problem as one that is too hard to solve. And the U.S. national security apparatus has the expertise and skill needed to manage a complex diplomatic undertaking, if only the administration could find a way to reliably control its own bureaucracy, which it does not trust.

Success is not assured, of course, and it will not come as quickly as Trump desires. But with one last effort, he could once again defy his critics and end a conflict others thought intractable.

Foreign Affairs · More by Thomas Graham · December 10, 2025

16.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com