Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The greatness of America lies not in being more enlightened than any other nation, but rather in her ability to repair her faults."

– Alexis de Tocqueville

"The essence of America - that which really unites us - is not ethnicity, or nationality or religion - it is an idea - and what an idea it is: That you can come from humble circumstances and do great things."

– Condoleezza Rice

"I consider anybody a twerp who hasn't read 'Democracy in America' by Alexis de Tocqueville. There can never be a better book than that one on the strengths and vulnerabilities inherent in our form of government."

– Kurt Vonnegut

1. Biden administration rolls out new plan on 'quartet of chaos'

2. Hamas Concedes on Israeli Troops in Gaza, Raising Hopes for Hostage Deal

3. Syria’s Many Factions Explained in a Single Map

4. The Age of Decentralized Information Warfare is Here

5. The Wrong Lessons From the Iraq War

6. Trump picks Kari Lake to lead Voice of America

7. Has Syrian rebel leader al-Golani really shaken off his al Qaeda past?

8. The Tech Investment Playbook for Victory

9. Putin’s regime may be closer to a Soviet collapse than we think

10. HTS is no ‘liberation movement’

11. In Syria, Be Careful What You Wish For

12. Chinese suspect arrested for flying drone over US military base

13. The Emergence of Two Distinct Jihadist Ways of War

14. Chinese Surge 53 Military Aircraft, 19 Ships Near Taiwan, Officials Say

15. Trump’s NASA pick says military will inevitably put troops in space

16. What China Must Do to Stop the Flow of Fentanyl

17. How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine

18. US, allies send message to Beijing over South China Sea clashes with the Philippines

19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2024

20. Iran Update, December 11, 2024

1. Biden administration rolls out new plan on 'quartet of chaos'

Axis of Upheaval. Quartet of Chaos.

Will this have any impact on the incoming administration?

The transcript from the NSC officials is below this article.

It is probably a good move to keep it classified so the new administration can objectively review and not dismiss it out of hand. If there are useful concepts the incoming administration can objectively assess them and then accept them without being forced to discount them because they came from the outgoing administration.

Excerpt from the VOA article below::

The classified national security document aims to “provide a road map for the U.S. government to tackle this challenge moving forward,” said an administration official, who was not named as is common practice in briefing reporters.

Its exact contents are not publicly available because White House officials say it lays out classified military and technical details. But officials outlined four goals: improving cooperation among U.S. government agencies; faster sharing of information among allies; improving preparation; and using diplomatic and economic tools, like sanctions, to maximum effect.

Officials stressed that they began work on this document well before the presidential election.

“We see this as something we're bequeathing that will hopefully be helpful,” said one of the two unnamed officials who briefed reporters. “And, you know, they're totally free, obviously, to do their own NSM [National Security Memorandum] if they want to do it in a different way."

Excerpts from the NSC transcript below:

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, sure. So, work started on this -- [senior administration official] can correct me if I have the timing a little bit off -- but basically over the summer, over the late summer. And we had most of it completed before the election. So this is something I think we were, you know, planning on and working on well before we knew the outcome, you know, of the election.

I think that if you look -- you know, when the new team sort of looks at it, I don't think they will see anything in it that is trying to box them in or tilt them toward one policy option or another. What this is really doing is building capacity inside the U.S. government to be able to monitor what we're seeing for the reasons that [senior administration official] laid out because of the way we're sort of structured sometimes.

But within the intelligence community and in the interagency, there were certain things we needed to do to make sure there was greater sort of awareness within the system so people could see what they needed to see and collaborate with each other even if they came at it from different regions or different countries, each of these four countries.

And the second thing I think it's doing is really teeing up the type of options within the interagency that would then give the new team, sort of, real options to be able to address this problem.

So we see this as something we're bequeathing that will hopefully be helpful. And, you know, they're totally free, obviously, to do their own NSM if they want to do it in a different way. Or if they sort of reject any of it, that's totally their prerogative. But I don't think -- you know, I think if you look at this, you know, carefully, I don't think it does that. I think it basically is about building capacity and starting the work in the interagency sort of to tee up options. And it should save them some time, really, and just give them something to work off of.

Biden administration rolls out new plan on 'quartet of chaos'

voanews.com · December 11, 2024

Washington —

President Joe Biden is using the waning weeks of his presidency to tout his road maps on national security and the economy, along with overt warnings to help his successor avoid pitfalls.

On Wednesday, his administration issued a new national security document for the incoming administration. It aims at countering what the Biden administration sees as growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, dubbed by the administration as the new “axis of upheaval,” or alternatively, the “quartet of chaos.”

A day earlier, Biden appeared at a prominent Washington think tank to discuss his economic success and remind President-elect Donald Trump of the global value of a strong and stable U.S. economy.

At that event, he raised his customarily whisper-soft voice — which he said was throttled by a cold — to make a point.

“If we’re not leading the world, who does?” he asked.

‘Quartet of chaos’

The classified national security document aims to “provide a road map for the U.S. government to tackle this challenge moving forward,” said an administration official, who was not named as is common practice in briefing reporters.

Its exact contents are not publicly available because White House officials say it lays out classified military and technical details. But officials outlined four goals: improving cooperation among U.S. government agencies; faster sharing of information among allies; improving preparation; and using diplomatic and economic tools, like sanctions, to maximum effect.

Officials stressed that they began work on this document well before the presidential election.

“We see this as something we're bequeathing that will hopefully be helpful,” said one of the two unnamed officials who briefed reporters. “And, you know, they're totally free, obviously, to do their own NSM [National Security Memorandum] if they want to do it in a different way."

U.S. intelligence officials recently testified that for now, the quartet has yet to harmonize into a cohesive threat to U.S. security.

"They're not acting as a bloc," said Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, speaking earlier this month at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Motivations

The official outlined the motivations of each of the four actors. Russia’s main goal, the official said, is “to meet its wartime needs for materiel and manpower” on the battlefield in Ukraine, a conflict that officials say has accelerated this cooperation.

North Korea, the so-called Hermit Kingdom, seeks to diversify its alliances while weaning itself from China and sidestepping its mountain of sanctions.

Iran, also under the weight of heavy Western sanctions, seeks to bolster its economy.

And China, the heavyweight of the group that national security adviser Jake Sullivan recently identified as the single biggest foreign policy challenge to the U.S., poses the most complex challenge.

“China is in a little bit of an unusual position, though, because it's also, more than the others, economically interdependent with the rest of the world,” the official said. “And so, I think this realignment sort of raises for China the question about what kind of future it wants to see, and if it really wants to be all in with this grouping.”

So far, Trump has not responded publicly to these overtures.

Analyst Anna Borshchevskaya told VOA that Trump’s strategy for dealing with this threat is “unclear,” though his team has indicated that “they're looking to split Russia from China,” and Trump has vowed to swiftly end the conflict in Ukraine.

“Trump never actually articulated what his plan is,” said Borshchevskaya, a Russia analyst at the Washington Institute. “Even in the last several days, when he's started discussions about talks with [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy, he tweeted this intent and there's been reporting about an ongoing discussion about what a potential negotiation might look like. We still don't really know what the plan is.”

Little seen that's 'polarizing'

As for whether Trump’s administration will seriously consider Biden’s advice, she said, “he does have a tendency to change his mind, and again, we don't know what that might look like. But at this point, based on what I've seen, this document looks fairly bland. There's nothing that I see in it that is potentially polarizing, so it is possible that he might take that into consideration.”

The new administration’s transition teams have only this week begun to land at federal agencies that are tasked with this actual work, and getting up to speed takes time, said David Berteau, chief executive of the Professional Services Council and a veteran observer of eight presidential administration handoffs.

“We’ve all had our own taking new jobs in new organizations,” he said in a Tuesday interview aired on the Federal News Network. “Takes a while to figure them out — some agencies more than others. I would think the Pentagon is a little bit more of a labyrinth, although I have gotten lost in the Energy Department building as well.”

voanews.com · December 11, 2024

For awareness, but not for attribution, speaking on today's call is [senior administration official] and [senior administration official].

With that, I will turn the call over to [senior administration official] to kick us off, and then we will take some questions.

Over to you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Michael. And thanks, everyone, for joining.

So I'll just walk through partly the diagnosis that we have, and then [senior administration official] will take over in terms of the lines of effort arising out of the NSM.

So just to start, President Biden today issued a new classified national security memorandum laying out a strategic approach to the growing cooperation and alignment we're seeing between our competitors and adversaries, in particular China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

We've been monitoring and addressing this development for almost three years now, but this document is an effort to pull all of our ongoing efforts together into a comprehensive policy framework and provide a roadmap for the U.S. government to tackle this challenge moving forward.

We'll share with you our diagnosis of the problem and the steps we're taking to improve the government's capacity to address this and to maintain our strategic advantage, and then we'll open it up to questions.

So, just to start in terms of what we're seeing, the cooperation between these four countries, obviously, has antecedents that go back decades, but to us, it's really accelerated since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

After Russia failed to achieve its initial war aims in February ’22, it was forced to settle in for a grinding war of attrition. And when that happened, Putin and the world saw Russia's military shortcomings in living color. And we know what followed then: Russia had to turn to Iran for drones and missiles; North Korea for artillery and missiles, and now troops; and China for dual-use components to help keep its military industrial base afloat.

From the early days, we warned that this assistance wouldn't be free. Russia has been giving each of these countries vital assistance in return, and that, I think, to us is very significant. We often look at what Russia is getting, but the key driver here was Russia's decision to give more and then what that opened up in return.

So, Iran is receiving fighter aircraft and cooperation in missile defense and space technology as it continues to work to destabilize the Middle East.

North Korea is receiving much-needed fuel and funding and dual-use technology and equipment that North Korea can use to improve its manufacturing and military capabilities. And Russia has, de facto, accepted North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, shielding it at the U.N. Security Council, including by vetoing the mandate of the U.N. panel that monitored enforcement of the sanctions regime there.

And China is benefiting from Russian know-how as the two countries work together and deepen their military-technical cooperation, and the two are conducting ever-more ambitious joint patrols, including near our Arctic region, to improve interoperability.

So, much has been sort of written about this, obviously, and it's been described as an “axis of upheaval” or a “quartet of chaos.” And, you know, these terms, I think, are pretty catchy but do -- they miss some key, sort of, nuances. We want to just describe briefly probably what we see.

When we look at this growing cooperation, most of it's happening bilaterally between each pair within this cohort. It is transactional in that it is an exchange driven on self-interest, based on present circumstances, but it has major strategic consequences. So, sometimes we call that strategic transactionalism, that it has profound strategic implications.

Each of these countries obviously have an anti-Western bent, but they have different motivations, sometimes that are in contradiction with each other.

Russia's overarching goal is to meet its wartime needs for materiel and manpower, with the early days of the conflict revealing huge deficiencies that it’ll have to address.

North Korea is looking to diversify its partnerships in the international stage, to reduce its dependence from China, and to work around longstanding sanctions, and to get some significant military modernization.

Iran is looking for support for its withering economy after years of isolation and intense sanctions pressure, including more than 800 sanctions that we have imposed.

And China, you know, sees Russia as a valuable partner that can help it balance against the United States and also provide it with valuable new technologies. China is in a little bit of an unusual position, though, because it's also, more than the others, economically interdependent with the rest of the world. And so, I think this realignment sort of raises for China the question about what kind of future it wants to see and if it really wants to be all-in with this grouping.

This growing alignment definitely poses real dilemmas and challenges for us, but we've also seen the limits of its partnerships, including just over the past week as Russia and Iran have failed to come through to prop up a stalwart ally in Syria.

We've also seen certain friction points between these countries, obviously China's view of Russia-DPRK cooperation being one. But what we've also seen is a real, sort of, concerted effort to address and sidestep or marginalize these irritants. China's steadfast support for Russia, despite its cooperation with North Korea, is one case in point.

So, we -- from our perspective, all of this suggests that we can't ignore this phenomenon. We need to undertake certain steps, particularly in sort of reorganizing the U.S. government to monitor and to address it. It's not going to dissipate overnight. We need to tackle it while understanding the nuances, and monitor the effectiveness of what we are doing, and also be prepared for strategic surprises that could result.

And so, that is what the NSM is designed to do. And I'll turn it over to [senior administration official] who can walk through some of the specific lines of effort.

So, over to you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, [senior administration official]. And hi, everyone.

So, just as [senior administration official] said, the NSM does two things. It provides what we see as a level-headed, nuanced diagnosis of the problem, which is that we are seeing, essentially here, a series of bilateral relationships that are deepening in scope and scale, and that poses real dilemmas for us. It's not, you know, a four-way axis necessarily, and in fact, we don't use that term. But the fact that they're all cooperating much more and in new arenas with each other is the challenge that we're really grappling with.

So, the first half of the NSM really puts that diagnosis front and center.

And the second half issues a series of directives across the U.S. government that's aimed at, you know, really building our capacity to be able to both monitor the changes that we're seeing, because this is so dynamic and is changing in real time. So, improve our ability to monitor it, respond to it, identify and mitigate the risks, and, as [senior administration official] said, really make sure that we are avoiding strategic surprise.

So, before I walk through the lines of effort and sort of the four big priority areas, I think it's really important to note here that what this NSM doesn't do is that it does not prescribe specific policy towards each of the four countries, being, you know, specific policy towards China, towards Russia, towards Iran, towards the DPRK. We're, of course, leaving that to future administrations to determine.

But rather, what we're trying to do with this NSM is build capacity across the USG and generate a series of options so that the next team that's coming in has options to start to tackle this problem from day one, learning the lessons that we have learned from the last several years of doing this.

So, as I think through the line of efforts, I would sort of boil it down into four big priorities here, and the first one is fundamentally organizational. It's about breaking down silos across the interagency, which I know is a much clichéd term. But by and large, most departments and agencies across the U.S. government are organized, you know, regionally or geographically, because until recently, all of these problems were, by and large, fairly independent of one another. Obviously, there are exceptions -- China and North Korea being one.

But we're now in a world where our adversaries and our competitors are learning very quickly from one another. They're transferring technology and know-how and expertise. And so, what we are trying to do with this NSM is force a slight shift in how we approach collectively what have previously been separate problem sets.

So what we've done now is really encourage the development of new cells and task forces across each of the national security departments and agencies that are charged with not just looking at Russia or China or Iran or North Korea, but monitoring the range of all four countries and really sort of matching up the analytic picture of what we're seeing in terms of the cooperation, identify what that means for us in terms of risks, and then make sure that the USG is adapting in real time.

And so, the idea is: By creating this structure, we're ensuring that there are dedicated folks across the national security enterprise that can help identify trends and anticipate how events in one theater could have an impact on another, which previously was something we were not necessarily immediately primed to think about.

The second big focus area for us is that we recognize that it's going to be critical that we establish and share a common operating picture with our allies and partners about what's going on, both about the nature of the cooperation between each of the members of this cohort, if you will, and the risks. And NATO has already started doing some of this work, which we need to energize in the coming months. Obviously, South Korea and Japan are starting to think about the interconnectivity between theaters.

And what we have tried to do through this NSM is task departments and agencies across the government to really prioritize efforts to share with our allies and partners on a very routine basis what we are seeing in terms of this cooperation, because it is, of course, evolving rapidly, deepening rapidly, and we want to make sure that our allies and partners are following in real time, because in many cases, this is quite -- some of this is obvious, like North Korean troops landing in Russia; we see that, obviously. But much of this is happening behind the scenes, and so some of it is compartmented information -- intelligence information that we're going to need to figure out how to share more with our allies and partners, and then to use this to make sure we are all seeing the same picture and coalescing around a common approach to this problem.

The third line of effort is about honing the tools of statecraft that I think we see as most germane to this problem, and there's, you know, the economic realm and the diplomatic -- and the military realm, excuse me.

So, on the former, you know, I won't say too much about this, but I'll say we know, and we have seen over the past couple years, that the credible threat of sanctions and export controls and their use have actually been quite useful in throwing sand into gears and hampering some of the most damaging types of cooperation that we're worried about.

And so, our focus now is to make sure that as we are using these tools, we're also protecting the integrity of these tools. And what that means is making sure that our enforcement and compliance side of the house is keeping up and it's fit for purpose and it's appropriately resourced for the task at hand.

And, you know, we're explicit in this document that our approach to sanctions and export controls isn't changing, that we are using this just the way we have been for the last several years, which is we're using these tools when necessary. We're using these tools in a tailored and calibrated way to make sure that we're imposing costs on bad actors without inadvertently risking blowback for ourselves and our partners. But we need to make sure that the integrity of these tools is protected, that we're appropriately resourced, we have the right workforce. And that's been a big focus in this line of effort.

And then the second part of that, when I talk about the tools of statecraft -- the second part of that is, frankly, foot-stomping once again the importance of the defense industrial base. Jake Sullivan just gave a speech about this last week. And I think we really, really see this effort to modernize and expand our defense industrial base as absolutely critical to be able to address this new phenomenon that we're dealing with.

And what is key is institutionalizing the work that we're doing on this front with NATO, with our partners in the Indo-Pacific, with our partners in the Middle East, to really strengthen our defense capacity, strengthen their defense capacities, and ensure that we're maintaining our edge and strengthening deterrence across all the major theaters.

I think this basically boils down to, you know, our adversaries and our competitors are working together to build each other's defense capacity, and we need to make sure that we're doing this faster, better, and more comprehensively with our allies and partners.

So, there are quite a few directives in this NSM that are aimed at generating new options so that a new team and Congress can really hit the ground running as soon as these options are fleshed out and brought to the table.

And then the last thing -- the last line of effort that I will talk about, maybe in slightly less detail just because of sensitivity, is this recognition that we need to be better prepared to manage simultaneous crises. We're obviously already seeing this play out right now with the war in Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East, periodic tensions in the Indo-Pacific. And we need to prepare for the fact that this will likely be a feature of the global environment for the coming years. And what that means is we're going to have to be prepared, along with our allies and partners, to fight fires on multiple fronts while strengthening our deterrence on multiple fronts as well.

So, again, I won't go into too much detail here, but I'll note that there are a range of directives in this NSM that are aimed at, you know, evaluating, integrating, and accounting for these trends in our defense planning and our operational planning and our crisis management and crisis response planning as well.

So, that was a lot, so let me stop there.

But I think that the last sort of point I would make is just what we are seeing here is a change that has happened quite -- you know, it had its antecedent, certainly dating back over the past decade, but the Ukraine war has really accelerated these trends. And we've been dealing with this for the last several years. We've been taking quite a few actions on this front. But this is an effort to pull it all together and to provide a proactive framework, a blueprint, a roadmap, if you will, given that we see this as a feature of the global environment for the next few years at least.

So I'll stop there and turn it back over to [senior administration official].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Great. I think we're done, Michael, so I think we can open it up to questions.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you so much. All right, we will now take some questions. We will go to Trevor with Reuters. Trevor, you can unmute yourself.

Q Hey. Thanks for doing this. So could you talk a little bit about the significance of doing this during a presidential transition and whether it will have the effect of constraining future presidents’ choices?

Could you also talk a little bit about how this interacts with President Biden's prior national security memoranda on the nuclear weapons problem?

And can you talk a little bit about why you declined to describe this as a four-way axis? Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, sure. So, work started on this -- [senior administration official] can correct me if I have the timing a little bit off -- but basically over the summer, over the late summer. And we had most of it completed before the election. So this is something I think we were, you know, planning on and working on well before we knew the outcome, you know, of the election.

I think that if you look -- you know, when the new team sort of looks at it, I don't think they will see anything in it that is trying to box them in or tilt them toward one policy option or another. What this is really doing is building capacity inside the U.S. government to be able to monitor what we're seeing for the reasons that [senior administration official] laid out because of the way we're sort of structured sometimes.

But within the intelligence community and in the interagency, there were certain things we needed to do to make sure there was greater sort of awareness within the system so people could see what they needed to see and collaborate with each other even if they came at it from different regions or different countries, each of these four countries.

And the second thing I think it's doing is really teeing up the type of options within the interagency that would then give the new team, sort of, real options to be able to address this problem.

So we see this as something we're bequeathing that will hopefully be helpful. And, you know, they're totally free, obviously, to do their own NSM if they want to do it in a different way. Or if they sort of reject any of it, that's totally their prerogative. But I don't think -- you know, I think if you look at this, you know, carefully, I don't think it does that. I think it basically is about building capacity and starting the work in the interagency sort of to tee up options. And it should save them some time, really, and just give them something to work off of.

On the axis question, you know, I think the reason we sort of hit that hard, in a way, was, you know, to us, we don't see -- I think you do see so-called sort of soft power issues, like critiques of the West, critiques of international institutions. Some of the economic pieces, you see them working together as a group, whether it's in the BRICS or in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or in the G20; sometimes there are other forms.

But on hard power stuff, on military issues, on military integration -- there, I think it is bilateral. And that is not to say that it is not a concern. Our view is that that is a real concern that we should recognize and we should deal with, but it's just a little bit different to how it's been described sometimes as an axis that these four countries will get together formally and do things as a group.

And I think if you look at it, you know, Russia, I think, is probably a bit more comfortable with that. I think the others, particularly China, want to sort of cooperate with each other, but they are also wary of it being seen as sort of an axis, so they avoid -- you know, they avoid formalizing it or structuring it in that way.

And on the nuclear piece, there's not a huge amount I can say about that, but I think we are, you know, concerned. And I think we mentioned, you know, in the North Korea piece in particular, you know, that Russia, I think because its foreign policy is more singularly focused on the war and servicing its needs over the war, is much less committed to nonprolif- --(audio disconnected) --

MODERATOR: All right, we will go to the next question here from David Sanger. David, you should be able to unmute yourself.

Q Yeah, I’ve unmuted. Thanks, [senior administration official].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I can hear her.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, can you hear me?

Q Yeah, [senior administration official], you cut out there for about (inaudible).

MODERATOR: Sorry, were you still answering that question? Sorry, you were muted. I moved on, but feel free to keep going.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, can you hear me? Sorry, I seem to be cutting in and out.

MODERATOR: Yes. We will wait on David's question. So, [senior administration official], the floor is yours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was just going to make one point that I think is very critical for us and was very intentional in how we wrote this document.

As [senior administration official] said, we started writing this quite a while ago and locked the text well before the election. And our objective here was very much not to tie the hands of future administrations on their policy towards each of the four countries.

I said this earlier, but I think it really bears repeating: This NSM is not -- it does not prescribe a specific policy approach towards China or Russia or Iran or North Korea. Rather, it's building -- it's, A, laying out in some detail what we have seen about the type of cooperation so that a future administration has it all in one place, has our sort of assessment and diagnosis; and, two, sets up the groundwork across the U.S. government so that we're better able to monitor, address, respond to in real time.

But we were very explicit and intentional about making this quite flexible when it comes to what does that mean for individual policy choices towards individual countries.

Over.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. All right, David, we will now go to you.

Q Great. Thank you, [senior administration official]. And thank you, [senior administration official]. We've been waiting for this one for a while, so I'm delighted that it is out.

Three -- two questions for you and a clarification on something you asked.

First, the President said at his news conference in July, after the NATO Summit -- I asked him whether there was a policy in the United States to try to interfere in the Russia-China relationship, the biggest piece of this, and he essentially said, “Yes, but I'm not going to give you the details of how it is we are doing that.”

Does this document argue that no matter what administration is there, it should be our desire to get in the way of that relationship? And does it prescribe in any way different options about how one might do that, even if you don't prejudice those with specific country-by-country policies, as [senior administration official] suggested?

The second is: Explain to us why all of this is classified. I can imagine why specific elements of what they're doing might be, but the administration's problem throughout here, it seems to me, has been an inability to get allies and the public to understand the nature of this change. So, leaving the entire document classified strikes me as perpetuating that problem, or at least running the risk.

And then the clarification for you, [senior administration official], is: Secretary of State Blinken said at one point that there had been some evidence of nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran, but I didn't hear that in the list that each of you provided.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, I'm happy to take those, and [senior administration official] can jump in as well.

So, yeah -- so on the first part, I mean, I think the short answer is yes. I think we -- in terms of Russia-China, I think there are parts of that, obviously, that we're concerned about. Lethal, you know, was one that we pressed very hard on earlier, but we've gone beyond that since to include, you know, assistance that would have battlefield effects, and also, you know, what China is currently doing in terms of its assistance to Russia in reconstituting its military industrial base.

And, you know, when we said that it's sort of hard to, you know, stop this or end this cooperation overall, I think it is true that we can throw sand in the gears, and there are different sort of tools we have to do that. We can make it more difficult. There's a diplomatic piece to that. There's also an economic and a sanctions piece to it. And so, we lay that out, I think, in -- you know, trying to lay those options out, and to undertake some of the steps in the interagency to tee up some additional options for how to do that.

And I'll turn it over to [senior administration official] in a second, if there's anything she would like to add.

I mean, I think we're sort of focused in particular on the types of cooperation that they would engage in that threaten our interests, and so that could be on military modernization and some of these technologies and assistance that Russia is giving other countries in ways that would improve their capabilities, that would pose an additional threat in crises or future conflicts, as well as, obviously, action against Ukraine or other sort of key partners.

On the classified piece, you know, I think there are, I would say, sort of two things about that. I think, one, you know, we do get into quite a lot of detail in the document that gives more, you know, granularity on what we spoke about, on military modernization and the exchange of technologies and assistance. And all of that is classified.

We are sharing some of this with allies. We have, you know, some sort of downgraded information that we are sharing with allies and partners to brief them on it. But we wanted to, you know, in the document itself, sort of lay out the full story. So that's one key reason.

And then the other reason is: On the lines of effort and the overall strategy, we felt it was best to, you know, keep that sort of classified, because we don't want to give a roadmap, obviously, to other countries in terms of exactly what we're doing. But I think the lines of effort, as we laid it out, hopefully provides some sort of detail there.

But, [senior administration official], did you want to add anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I just -- I think I’d focus on the point about the classification question, which is that the first -- the diagnostic half is just very heavily classified, and there's the sources and methods question. And then the second half is just -- we're fundamentally talking about our, you know, foremost competitors and adversaries. We're talking about our toolkit. We're talking about the organization of our government. We're talking about investments in them. Pretty sensitive things.

And so, it was a real challenge for us in thinking through this how much of this we could put out publicly. But I think you're right -- I think one big task for us, a priority for us, is going to be to figure out how forward-leaning we can be and how much we can share with allies and partners. And, in fact, that is a key line of effort in the NSM itself. So, totally take your point there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And just on -- David, on the Iran-Russia question, I'd have to check and get back to you. I'm not sure what I can share on that, so I’ll check and get back to you on that.

Q Okay. If you could, just look at what Secretary Blinken said.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah.

Q It was very carefully prescribed, as you would imagine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you both. It looks like we have no further questions. So, [senior administration officials], did you have any closing remarks before we wrap today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I'm good. [Senior administration official], do you have anything to add?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, just thank you all for your time on this.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you all. And just a reminder, today's call will be held under embargo until 5:00 a.m. tomorrow. Feel free to reach out to myself or the NSC press team if you have any follow-up questions here. Thank you for your time.

2. Hamas Concedes on Israeli Troops in Gaza, Raising Hopes for Hostage Deal

Hamas Concedes on Israeli Troops in Gaza, Raising Hopes for Hostage Deal

Militants back down on presence of Israeli troops in Gaza after the war and hand over list of hostages they would release under a pact

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-gaza-palestine-ceasefire-hostage-negotiations-d599e1d1?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Summer Said

Dec. 11, 2024 9:00 pm ET

People walked past collapsed and damaged buildings along a street in Gaza City on Wednesday amid renewed hopes for a cease-fire deal. Photo: Omar Al-Qattaa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Hamas has yielded to two of Israel’s key demands for a cease-fire deal in Gaza, Arab mediators said, raising hopes of an agreement that could release some hostages within days despite the repeated collapse of previous negotiations.

The militant group told mediators for the first time that it would agree to a deal that would allow Israeli forces to remain in Gaza temporarily when the fighting stops. Hamas also handed over a list of hostages, including U.S. citizens, whom it would release under a cease-fire pact, something it hasn’t done since the first truce in the conflict last year.

The new plan, proposed by Cairo and backed by the U.S., seeks to build on momentum generated by the cease-fire in Lebanon secured in November, which has broadly held despite both Israel and Hezbollah accusing each other of violations.

The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to comment.

Netanyahu said Monday there were certain developments in the cease-fire talks but it was too early to tell whether a deal was within reach.

Progress toward a deal comes after an Egyptian delegation visited Israel in late November, and after President-elect Donald Trump said on Truth Social earlier this month that there would be “hell to pay” in the Middle East if the hostages aren’t released before he assumes office in January.

As part of the latest proposal, Israel and Hamas are considering a 60-day cease-fire period that would see the release of up to 30 hostages being held in Gaza, including U.S. citizens, according to the mediators. In exchange, Israel would set free Palestinian prisoners and allow greater humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza, they said.

Israeli soldiers, shown near the border with the Gaza Strip earlier this month, would remain in the enclave temporarily under terms of a cease-fire pact being discussed. Photo: Amir Levy/Getty Images

Negotiations picked up pace this week with an Israeli delegation visiting Cairo on Tuesday, days after Hamas officials were in the Egyptian capital. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan is expected to travel to Israel, Egypt and Qatar this week to push for a deal, the mediators said.

Previous rounds of talks repeatedly faltered, but Hamas in recent weeks has displayed more flexibility on several key issues. The mediators said those include a willingness to accept Israeli forces remaining temporarily in the Philadelphi corridor, a tiny strip of land along Gaza’s border with Egypt, and the Netzarim corridor, which divides the enclave. The militant group has also agreed it wouldn’t run or have a presence in the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza.

Hamas had long resisted those Israeli conditions for a deal, but has expressed openness to a compromise since its ally Hezbollah agreed to a cease-fire in Lebanon. That deal left Hamas, already weakened by Israel strikes on its leadership and fighters, isolated in its fight against Israel.

In October, Israel killed Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who had insisted that a deal must include a complete end to the war and the retreat of all Israeli forces from Gaza. Hamas is now run by a collective leadership, including officials from the Palestinian diaspora, people familiar with the matter say, until a successor to Sinwar is chosen.

Still, Arab negotiators warned that Hamas could still pull out of the deal at the last moment, as it has done previously.

A woman sits by rubble and a heavily-damaged building in Gaza City on Wednesday. Photo: omar al-qattaa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Hamas on Sunday submitted to mediators in Cairo a list of hostages that includes U.S. citizens, women, the elderly and captives with medical conditions, as well as the bodies of five dead hostages, Arab mediators said. It also compiled a list of Palestinian detainees held in Israeli prisons, whose release the group has demanded as part of the deal.

Hostages could be freed shortly after signing the deal, and more time would be given to Hamas to establish the names of remaining hostages, their whereabouts and their state of health, the mediators said.

“A prisoner exchange deal requires both parties, and thus the enemy must make a political decision to reach a cornerstone agreement,” Hamas said in a statement to The Wall Street Journal.

The last round of cease-fire talks had stalled over Netanyahu’s demands for Israeli forces to remain in the strategic corridors in Gaza. Other sticking points included whether any halt to fighting would be temporary or become permanent, how to secure the border between Gaza and Egypt and Israel’s ability to screen Palestinians returning to northern Gaza. Other issues were which Palestinian prisoners would be approved for release and the number of living hostages to be freed.

Netanyahu, in response to a reporter’s question about whether he was willing to give up Israel’s presence along the Philadelphi corridor to facilitate a deal, said the corridor should continue to be under Israel’s control.

Israeli negotiators are currently pushing for more hostages to be released in the initial phase of the cease-fire but have agreed to gradually withdraw from the Philadephi corridor. Israel has told negotiators it is willing to reposition Israeli forces in other parts of Gaza but rejected a demand to restrict its presence in other parts, including northern Gaza.

The war was triggered by the Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 that left 1,200 people dead and around 250 taken hostage. More than 44,000 people have been killed in Gaza since then, according to Palestinian health authorities, who don’t say how many were combatants.

Israel says there are now 96 hostages remaining in Gaza, most of them Israeli. They include dual nationals and at least 30 hostages whom Israel has concluded are no longer alive. Four additional hostages taken before Oct. 7, 2023 bring the total to 100 hostages.

Months of diplomatic efforts led by the U.S. to reach a deal to stop the violence and free the remaining hostages have stalled over deep disagreements about whether Israeli troops can remain in Gaza and whether there should be a permanent end to the fighting. The only negotiated pause in fighting took place in late November last year.

Arab negotiators believe after an initial cease-fire is reached, it would be difficult for Israel to restart the war in Gaza.

An Israeli military vehicle moves along the border with the Gaza Strip earlier this month. Photo: Amir Levy/Getty Images

Anat Peled and Saleh al-Batati contributed to this article.

Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

3. Syria’s Many Factions Explained in a Single Map

Please go to the link to view the explanatory map:

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-map-control-factions-civil-war-a5730e6f?st=gg3ca7&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Syria’s Many Factions Explained in a Single Map

The rebel groups and foreign powers contending to shape the country’s future

By Michael AmonFollow

, Elizaveta GalkinaFollow

and Daniel KissFollow

Dec. 11, 2024 2:05 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-map-control-factions-civil-war-a5730e6f?mod=hp_lead_pos2

The stunning fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syria thrusts several rebel groups and foreign powers into the spotlight as they vie for control and influence.

There are Turkish-backed rebels and Sunni Muslim jihadists in the north, Kurds ruling over much of Syria’s east, and Jordan-backed militants in the south, among others. These groups fought a civil war against Assad for almost 14 years and will now contend to shape the country’s future without him.

The kaleidoscope of rebel groups reflects the country’s history as a melting pot. Distinct ethnic and religious groups have called for self-determination for more than a century since their land was absorbed into the larger, Sunni Muslim-led entity created after World War I. The sects were often set against each other by the Assad family and interventionist foreign powers such as Iran.

4. The Age of Decentralized Information Warfare is Here

Hmmm..... NAFO - North Atlantic Fellas Organization. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/01/nafo-ukraine-russia/)

Excerpts:

Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the military concept of the “fog of war.” War brings a great amount of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. What NAFO does about information warfare shows a new battleground where irregular warfare occurs through non-traditional methods and tactics—such as digital campaigns, “meme warfare,” and decentralized coordination. These elements are employed to combat a conventionally superior adversary in terms of state-backed propaganda resources. Clausewitz acknowledged the efficacy of using asymmetric tactics in confronting a stronger foe, suggesting that the weaker party must adopt unconventional methods to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities. NAFO’s online presence does precisely this, turning the perceived strength of Russian propaganda into a vulnerability by neutralizing its effect through mockery.

This concept of decentralized information warfare also mirrors the challenges faced by other nations like Taiwan, which contends with China’s “Wolf Warrior diplomacy” and the “50 Cent Army.” These entities employ disinformation and cyberattacks to manipulate public opinion and maintain a narrative favorable to the Chinese government. Like NAFO’s efforts to combat Russia, there is a need for a similar, decentralized entity to counter Chinese information warfare.

Some have pointed out that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a movement similar to NAFO could arise to support the democratic forces behind Taiwan.

NAFO’s approach—leveraging humor, community, and a decentralized structure—offers a potential blueprint for future conflicts where digital information warfare plays a pivotal role. While NAFO might not fight in information battles beyond the war in Ukraine, it has certainly kick-started an evolutionary process and clearly shown how decentralized communities based in the democratic world can effectively resist the disinformation campaigns employed by authoritarian adversaries.

The Age of Decentralized Information Warfare is Here - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by David Kirichenko · December 11, 2024

Since February 2022, Russia has focused its war effort across numerous fronts, one of which is informational warfare. Throughout the past two years, Russia has found success in spreading disinformation to undermine support for Ukraine in the West. The information battlefield is equally as important as the physical battlefield, as the capture of the hearts and minds of the Western public directly connects to the battlefield aid given to Ukraine. One online group that has been trying to fight Russian disinformation and rally support for Ukraine has been the North Atlantic Fellas Organization (NAFO).

Modern military battlefield strategy today is always accompanied by irregular warfare efforts such as disinformation campaigns. NAFO offers a valuable asymmetric approach to undermining Russia’s vastly superior state-sponsored propaganda, demonstrating the potential of internet movements as unconventional methods. For future battlefields, NAFO offers a useful case study in irregular warfare, particularly in the informational environment.

Russia’s Information Offensive

US House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul previously said that “Russian propaganda has made its way into the United States.” Arguably, it played a role in delaying US aid to Ukraine at a critical juncture in the war earlier this year, enabling a series of battlefield gains by Russia that Ukraine is still struggling to stall. Without US aid, Ukraine was forced to withdraw from the stronghold of Avdiivka in February 2024.

Russian state interests have also been working with influencers in the United States to promote anti-Ukraine messages to undermine support for Ukraine. In September 2024, Tenet Media, a Tennessee-based company, was identified as a firm allegedly funded by Russian operatives as part of a Kremlin influence campaign targeting the 2024 US election. The company is linked to prominent right-wing commentators with millions of followers, including Benny Johnson, Tim Pool, and Dave Rubin. Prosecutors claim Russian state media funneled nearly $10 million to Tenet Media to spread pro-Russia propaganda, including content supportive of Donald Trump and other Kremlin-friendly figures. With a loyal fanbase, the influencers had around 6 million combined followers on YouTube alone.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken also revealed new US intelligence findings, stating that the Russian government had quietly embedded an intelligence-gathering unit within RT (formerly known as “Russia Today”) to promote propaganda to achieve these goals. Meanwhile, Anastasia Trofimova, a former employee of RT, produced a documentary titled Russians at War, which promoted pro-Russian narratives. The project received partial funding from the Canadian government through the Canada Media Fund, which contributed $340,000 via its broadcaster envelope program. In parallel, with the controversy surrounding the film, news emerged that RT, where Trofimova had been a former employee, was involved in influence operations and was acting as “an extension of Russian intelligence services.”

Initially, the film was slated for screening at the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF). There was a significant public outcry against what many saw as an attempt to push pro-Russian propaganda, and the screening was suspended. However, within a week, TIFF opted to resume screenings of the film. Among those who led the effort to suspend the screenings were the NAFO fellas. NAFO members of the Ukrainian-Canadian diaspora like the user “@CanadianKobzar” on X, formerly known as Twitter, helped to rally other members to join protests against the film’s screening.

The film’s producer, Sean Farnel, went on various rants, blaming NAFO members for “canceling” the film and even alleging that they had threatened violence to stop the screenings on the social media platform X. Originally, NAFO targeted Trofimova, the film’s director, but when Farnel engaged with the group in a hostile manner, the situation escalated. In response, NAFO launched a relentless “meme and bonk” campaign against both Farnel and the film.

Who Are the NAFO Fellas?

Ever since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense has been a fight of everyday people. In that spirit, the North Atlantic Fellas Organization (NAFO) is a social media movement that has taken up digital arms by using humor—primarily through memes—to combat and debunk Russia’s state-sponsored disinformation and raise awareness about the conflict.

While Russia has historically relied on disinformation as a vector to disseminate false narratives, NAFO has successfully harnessed the power of credibly sourced information paired with humorous memes. By ridiculing Russian propaganda, NAFO disarms it. An enduring motif among NAFO participants is the portrayal of their online accounts as actual Shiba dogs and other creatures, poking fun at the idea held in many anti-Ukraine circles that they are operatives of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Profiles associated with NAFO on social platforms often list “[redacted]” under employer details and cite “Langley, VA” as their location. This facetious narrative acts as a playful “open secret” so absurd that it traps opponents into appearing irrational when they allege that NAFO receives CIA backing, thus turning the tables on propagandists by using their tactics against them. The pro-Russian commentator Kim Dotcom even went as far as saying that NAFO fellas are “social media terrorists funded by the CIA.”

Another strength is the movement’s decentralized nature. Unlike Russia’s reliance on paid troll factories, NAFO benefits from global volunteers—calling themselves “fellas”—who have the freedom to respond creatively and with personal conviction. Anyone with an internet connection and a desire to counter misinformation can join the effort, providing NAFO with a diverse, dynamic, and all-volunteer force. The social nature of the group attracts new members, providing continuous growth and the infusion of fresh ideas. This fluidity makes NAFO an unpredictable and formidable opponent in the information war that proves challenging for its adversaries to destabilize. Vasyl Myroshnychenko, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Australia, stated that “NAFO is impossible to undermine,” adding: “It is decentralized; it’s just a group of random people.” With no central leader to target and no technical infrastructure to hack, Russia cannot stop its collective force. However, there is an argument that greater organization could increase its effectiveness.

During the early stages of the full-scale invasion, NAFO effectively identified and countered Russian disinformation, thereby countering the anti-Ukraine narrative pervasive in some media circles. NAFO fellas mocked Russia’s top diplomat in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, who found himself at the center of a social media storm after responding to NAFO profiles that criticized his promotion of Russian propaganda. “You pronounced this nonsense, not me,” Ulyanov wrote before leaving the platform for several weeks.

Nonetheless, apart from Russia, even American officials have attempted to target NAFO. Former Trump administration official Elbridge Colby also got into an online spat with NAFO members that ridiculed him. By August 2024, US Senator Mike Lee of Utah promoted a theory put forth by the pro-Kremlin commentator Kim Dotcom, suggesting that NAFO “was actually a CIA-backed operation run by former congressman Adam Kinzinger.” Colby followed up, doubling down on claims that the dog memes being produced by NAFO are being funded by the CIA.

NAFO’s Battlefield and Information Warfare Burden Sharing

Andriy Yermak, Head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, recently recognized NAFO’s online campaign, stating, “A massive shoutout to the incredible NAFO Fellas for your unwavering support of Ukraine! Your ongoing fight for truth and against disinformation is of immense importance. Together, we are stronger!” NAFO’s success has been so significant that RT, the Russian state media outlet, tried attacking NAFO by labeling it a pro-Ukrainian “bot army.” In July 2023, Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman personally took the time to attack NAFO, showcasing how a bunch of random people masked as cartoon dogs on social media occupy the mental real estate of the Kremlin elite.

NAFO’s impact extends beyond the digital realm. They have been instrumental in fundraising efforts, supporting Ukraine’s war effort by purchasing drones, vehicles, tourniquets, electronics, and other equipment. These contributions have tangible effects on the ground, providing much-needed support to Ukrainian forces. Many NAFO members “adopt” units in Ukraine and maintain communications with Ukrainians on the front lines to respond to real-time requests. The NAFO fellas helped raise hundreds of thousands of dollars to fund naval drones through United24. Due to the “fellas” being decentralized, it is nearly impossible to quantify their total impact on fundraising. However, it wouldn’t be far-fetched to estimate it to be at several million dollars, if not in the tens of millions already.

Paul Lushenko, Assistant Professor and Director of Special Operations at the U.S. Army War College, noted, “Memes are helpful to bolster public support.” He further highlighted that “Memes will continue to play a supporting role to what goes on the battlefield.” We have seen this play out live as Ukraine went on the offensive, invading Russia in August 2024. Pro-Kremlin commentators like David Sacks were stunned by Ukraine’s invasion of Russia, and it took him over a week to comment on the event. NAFO and the pro-Ukrainian community began ridiculing David and others like him who were promoting Russian talking points and utilizing memes to help continue bolstering online public support for Ukraine.

Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the military concept of the “fog of war.” War brings a great amount of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. What NAFO does about information warfare shows a new battleground where irregular warfare occurs through non-traditional methods and tactics—such as digital campaigns, “meme warfare,” and decentralized coordination. These elements are employed to combat a conventionally superior adversary in terms of state-backed propaganda resources. Clausewitz acknowledged the efficacy of using asymmetric tactics in confronting a stronger foe, suggesting that the weaker party must adopt unconventional methods to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities. NAFO’s online presence does precisely this, turning the perceived strength of Russian propaganda into a vulnerability by neutralizing its effect through mockery.

Making Global Decentralized Information Warfare Global

This concept of decentralized information warfare also mirrors the challenges faced by other nations like Taiwan, which contends with China’s “Wolf Warrior diplomacy” and the “50 Cent Army.” These entities employ disinformation and cyberattacks to manipulate public opinion and maintain a narrative favorable to the Chinese government. Like NAFO’s efforts to combat Russia, there is a need for a similar, decentralized entity to counter Chinese information warfare.

Some have pointed out that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a movement similar to NAFO could arise to support the democratic forces behind Taiwan.

NAFO’s approach—leveraging humor, community, and a decentralized structure—offers a potential blueprint for future conflicts where digital information warfare plays a pivotal role. While NAFO might not fight in information battles beyond the war in Ukraine, it has certainly kick-started an evolutionary process and clearly shown how decentralized communities based in the democratic world can effectively resist the disinformation campaigns employed by authoritarian adversaries.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. His analysis is widely published in outlets such as the Atlantic Council, Center for European Policy Analysis, and The Hill, as well as in peer-reviewed journals. He can be found on the social media platform X @DVKirichenko.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Destroyed Russian tank with NAFO “fella” in front of Russian embassy in Berlin. (Photo by Leonhard Lenz via Wikimedia Commons)

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

5. The Wrong Lessons From the Iraq War

A view from Australia.

Excerpts:

The folly was failing to restore the monarchy—the only form of government that works in the Arab world—or failing to hand the government to the least bad of Saddam’s generals. The Iraq war was never “all about oil,” as many critics suggested. It was a commendable, if poorly executed, attempt to bring a measure of humanity to a benighted people. I doubt the women of Afghanistan, once more imprisoned behind their veils, regarded the Western efforts as futile effrontery. The fruits of such efforts have been affirmed elsewhere. The people of Germany, Japan and South Korea are the transformed beneficiaries of the first global hegemon ever to use its power to help rather than oppress the weak.

It is a tragedy that so many Americans have perished in recent wars. But the best way to honor their memory is to be smarter about future conflicts, not to surrender the ideals for which they died. Allies can pick up the slack. Australia and others should swiftly move to spend 3% of gross domestic on their armed forces. Britain and Europe should take a stronger lead on Ukraine. The West’s military-industrial base must be rebuilt.

Effectively managing this transition is the great challenge Messrs. Trump and Vance must meet. Much hangs on their success.

The Wrong Lessons From the Iraq War

The U.S. has made foolish mistakes, but withdrawing from the world would be the worst of them all.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-wrong-lessons-from-the-iraq-war-middle-east-isolationism-foreign-policy-national-security-e38f36aa?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Tony Abbott

Updated Dec. 11, 2024 4:58 pm ET

U.S. Vice President-elect JD Vance walks on Capitol Hill in Washington, Nov. 13. Photo: leah millis/Reuters

JD Vance is tired of Washington lawmakers who believe they can “remake the entire world in America’s image.” So he said in an October podcast with Joe Rogan, adding that the Iraq war was America’s “biggest world-historical catastrophe.” This came after insights into issues as diverse as climate and energy, immigration and assimilation, and the clash between the right to autonomy and the right to life. It is to Donald Trump’s credit that he chose a running mate capable of handling such topics so adeptly.

Messrs. Trump and Vance are right that it’s past time for American allies to pay their bills. That’s true of Britain and Australia too, the nations least inclined to shirk their obligations. Americans are also right to feel underappreciated, given that the long Pax Americana has mostly been better for the world than for America itself. Still, thanks to America’s blood and treasure, the world has been freer, fairer, safer and richer for more people than at any time in history.

As a weary titan, America’s reluctance to be the main guardian of the universal decencies of mankind is understandable. But the incoming administration should understand that this would be the worst time for the indispensable nation to step aside. An axis of dictatorships—a militarist one in Moscow, an Islamist one in Tehran and a communist one in Beijing—are united by a hatred of the West and a desire to undo history. Without America’s active engagement, the dictators will create a much bleaker and more dangerous world.

Consider the threats and who is prepared to resist them. Vladimir Putin wants to re-create a greater Russia—an impoverished police state across the Eurasian landmass. Xi Jinping wants a restored Middle Kingdom as the world’s dominant power. Ali Khamenei wants a global caliphate, regardless of the violence and bloodshed needed to create it. Standing in their way are Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. Yet none of these nations can battle alone. Even Israel, a highly motivated warrior state, needs American help to neutralize the Iranian nuclear program. Taiwan’s safety depends on American readiness to help defend it until it’s succeeded in turning itself into a military porcupine. And Ukraine will be ground into defeat without more American materiel, with the Baltic states Mr. Putin’s next target.

The notion that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization somehow provoked Mr. Putin’s war is absurd. Post-Soviet Eastern Europe rushed into collective security because it knew the nature of Mr. Putin’s regime. The fate of Russia’s non-NATO neighbors—such as Georgia—vindicates their judgment. While it might make sense to surrender territory for security, that is true only if real security is on offer. Any attempt to force Ukraine into a cease-fire without a tripwire of, say, British and French troops on the ground, would be a surrender on the scale of Munich. As Churchill is reputed to have told Chamberlain after the 1938 agreement: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.”

Mr. Vance served honorably in Iraq, but he misreads that war, and his views have implications for today’s conflicts. It wasn’t wrong to remove the monstrous Saddam regime, which breached several United Nations resolutions. The catastrophe was disbanding the Iraqi army, leaving hundreds of thousands of unemployed men with guns, and sacking the Baathist public service, so that civilian infrastructure largely collapsed.

The folly was failing to restore the monarchy—the only form of government that works in the Arab world—or failing to hand the government to the least bad of Saddam’s generals. The Iraq war was never “all about oil,” as many critics suggested. It was a commendable, if poorly executed, attempt to bring a measure of humanity to a benighted people. I doubt the women of Afghanistan, once more imprisoned behind their veils, regarded the Western efforts as futile effrontery. The fruits of such efforts have been affirmed elsewhere. The people of Germany, Japan and South Korea are the transformed beneficiaries of the first global hegemon ever to use its power to help rather than oppress the weak.

It is a tragedy that so many Americans have perished in recent wars. But the best way to honor their memory is to be smarter about future conflicts, not to surrender the ideals for which they died. Allies can pick up the slack. Australia and others should swiftly move to spend 3% of gross domestic on their armed forces. Britain and Europe should take a stronger lead on Ukraine. The West’s military-industrial base must be rebuilt.

Effectively managing this transition is the great challenge Messrs. Trump and Vance must meet. Much hangs on their success.

Mr. Abbott served as prime minister of Australia, 2013-15.

Trump picks Kari Lake to lead Voice of America

He called VOA’s coverage of the pandemic a ‘disgrace’ in 2020.

https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2024/12/11/congress/kari-lake-to-voa-00193921

Kierra Frazier

12/11/2024, 10:27pm ET

President-elect Donald Trump has selected Kari Lake to serve as the next director of Voice of America — the publicly funded broadcast network that drew his ire in his first term.

Lake, a former local news anchor and staunch Trump ally, will be appointed by the next head of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which Trump plans to announce soon, the president-elect said in a Truth Social post Wednesday. The U.S. Agency for Global Media oversees Voice of America.

Trump said in the post that Lake and the head of the U.S. Agency for Global Media will work “to ensure that the American values of Freedom and Liberty are broadcast around the World FAIRLY and ACCURATELY, unlike the lies spread by the Fake News Media.”

Lake has mimicked Trump’s disdain for the media since she has become a MAGA lightning rod. She won his endorsement in both of her unsuccessful bids for an Arizona Senate seat last month and for governor in 2022.

Trump clashed with Voice of America during his first term in office for its reporting on China and the coronavirus pandemic.

Michael Abramowitz was sworn in as director of Voice of America in July.

7. Has Syrian rebel leader al-Golani really shaken off his al Qaeda past?

Has Syrian rebel leader al-Golani really shaken off his al Qaeda past?

The leopard claims he has changed his spots, but will he bring stability to the devastated nation?

https://www.politico.eu/article/has-syria-rebel-hts-leader-abu-mohammed-al-golani-really-shaken-off-his-al-qaeda-past/

“A person in their twenties will have a different personality than someone in their thirties or forties, and certainly someone in their fifties. This is human nature,” Abu Mohammed al-Golani said. | Aref Tammawi/AFP via Getty Images

December 11, 2024 4:01 am CET

By Jamie Dettmer

In the not so distant past, Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani sported a long unkempt beard, wore a style of turban favored by jihadis and looked like he was auditioning for the role of a young Osama bin Laden.

But the man who toppled the regime of Bashar Assad on Sunday cuts a very different figure today. Like a political chameleon, he wears green fatigues in the style of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or preppy blazers and chinos, and his beard is neatly trimmed. He even recently dropped his nom de guerre and reverted to using his real name, Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a.

But how convincing is the makeover? Should Syrians be worried that a man who once made the pledge of allegiance — or bay’ah — to al Qaeda, and fought Western forces in Iraq, is now the most powerful man in their country, and is poised to play a major role in the transition from the 54-year-long autocracy of the Assad dynasty?

He could even lead the country.

Is this a case where the apparel really does proclaim the man? Has the Damascus medical school dropout genuinely transitioned from being a jihadi, or is his embrace of toleration a ruse?

Those are the questions Western leaders and officials are also grappling with as they plot their next steps. France and Germany have promptly agreed to work with the Syrian opposition groups that took power in Damascus, while the U.S. and Britain are deliberating whether to delist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the main insurgent Islamist faction led by al-Golani that swept into Damascus, as a terrorist organization.

For now, everyone is watching and waiting, piecing together clues about who al-Golani really is and what future HTS has planned for Syria — an inclusive, democratic one embracing the country’s diversity, its religious sects and ethnic minorities, including Christian, Alawite, Druze and Kurds; or an Islamist state that oppresses, restricts and elevates the Sunni majority? Or somewhere in-between?

Maturity or masquerade?

The 42-year-old al-Golani has been making all the right noises to try to calm fears. In an interview with CNN, as his troops bore down on the Syrian capital on Friday, he sought to distance himself from his extremist past, his ties to al Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the notorious Islamic State (IS) emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his war experience in Iraq, where he was jailed.

“A person in their twenties will have a different personality than someone in their thirties or forties, and certainly someone in their fifties. This is human nature,” he said.

He insisted minorities have nothing to fear, arguing that HTS’s rights violations during their governance of the Idlib enclave, which the group has been running for the past eight years, could be blamed on “certain individuals during periods of chaos, but we addressed these issues.”

“No one has the right to erase another group. These sects have coexisted in this region for hundreds of years, and no one has the right to eliminate them,” he added.

Over the weekend, another rebel commander, Anas Salkhadi, reinforced this message of tolerance, telling Syrian state television: “Our message to all the sects of Syria, is that we tell them that Syria is for everyone.”

Abu Mohammed al-Golani insisted minorities have nothing to fear, arguing that HTS’s rights violations during their governance of the Idlib enclave, which the group has been running for the past eight years, could be blamed on “certain individuals during periods of chaos, but we addressed these issues.” | Omar Haj Kadour/AFP via Getty Images

So far so good. But there are also warning signs says Edmund Husain, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior adviser to former British Prime Minister Tony Blair from 2014 to 2017. There’s much that remains enigmatic about al-Golani, Husain told POLITICO. “We don’t know, cannot even verify, where he was born. Some say Saudi Arabia and others claim Deir al-Zor in Syria — worse, we don’t know how many Americans and Arabs he killed as an al Qaeda commander,” he said.

Husain worries: “All the D.C. talk of delisting him and his group is hasty and hazardous. His initial statements of pluralism and inclusion are encouraging. Let’s see these policies in action, but I am skeptical he and his movement of radicals will meet expectations of a harmonious Syria.”

Victory for the entire Islamic nation

Al-Golani’s pick of Damascus’ venerated Umayyad Mosque for his victory speech after Assad fled Syria for Russia hasn’t gone unnoticed. He could have chosen a secular venue but didn’t. Although he did criticize “spreading sectarianism,” he linked it solely to Shiites and Iran. He also didn’t play up moderation, inclusivity and pluralism as he did in his CNN interview, but struck notes of Sunni triumphalism.

“This victory, my brothers, is a victory for the entire Islamic nation,” he said. And he added: “This victory is born from the people who have languished in prison, and the mujahideen (fighters) broke their chains.”

His mujahideen have little in common with the more secular and moderate personalities that were the public face of the rebellion against Assad. And pro-democracy Syrian activists worry what HTS has in store for the country.

Bassam al-Kuwatli, president of the Syrian liberal party Ahrar, fears Western powers will repeat mistakes of the past by prioritizing stability over democracy.

Abu Mohammed al-Golani’s pick of Damascus’s venerated Umayyad Mosque for his victory speech after Assad fled Syria for Russia hasn’t gone unnoticed. | Abdulaziz Ketaz/AFP via Getty Images

“Even Assad, before the revolution, was seen as a good partner,” he said. “Al-Golani is pragmatic, which is good and it isn’t a bad trait. But he’s playing a game, basically, with the minority thing. Unfortunately, a lot of Western media outlets focus only on the minorities, and he might be inclusive but to what extent isn’t clear,” he told POLITICO.

Kuwatli’s biggest concern is that Syria won’t move toward real democracy under al-Golani.

“I haven’t seen in history many military leaders who take power willing to give it up easily. I don’t expect anything different. The fact that he has appointed a prime minister unilaterally gives a very strong signal that he’s acting as the sole leader. I’m not very hopeful of an inclusive process, basically. And I worry that the international community will rush to recognize a new government in the name of stability and hoping to return refugees, which will mean the incentive of being more inclusive will be lost,” he added.

Shifting allegiances

Syrian pro-democracy moderates can’t shake off their memories of when al-Golani first rose to prominence in chaotic war-torn northern Syria, where he’d been dispatched to set up Jabhat al-Nusra, a Syrian branch of al Qaeda.

His group initially maintained an alliance with al-Baghdadi’s IS and sought to resolve disputes through mediation. But al-Golani increasingly moved away from the ideology of transnational jihad and began framing his struggle more as an Islamist nationalist one. In a press interview in 2014, he told a reporter he wanted to see Syria governed under Islamic law and emphasized there would be little space for the country’s Alawite, Shiite, Druze and Christian minorities.

In the meantime, al-Nusra and IS began to clash as they each vied for supremacy, with both factions conducting retaliatory assassinations. Among the fractured allegiances and micro conflicts created by Syria’s brutal civil war, many rebel groups opposed to both IS and the Assad regime started to consider al-Nusra something of a moderate force. For these rebel factions, al-Nusra’s jihadist ideology was secondary to the fight against Assad, and al-Golani positioned his disciplined and militarily effective group as a necessary ally for them.

“We don’t know, cannot even verify, where he was born. Some say Saudi Arabia and others claim Deir al-Zor in Syria — worse, we don’t know how many Americans and Arabs he killed as an al Qaeda commander,” Edmund Husain said. | Aaref Watad/AFP via Getty Images

Of course, none of that made it into the al-Nusra’s angry rhetoric toward the West. In a 2014 statement, al-Golani warned American and European civilians: “Your leaders will not pay the price for the war alone, you will pay the higher price.” Unless the airstrikes in Syria stop and America pulls out of the Middle East, al Qaeda “will transfer the battle to your very homes.”

In 2016, al-Golani then cut ties with al Qaeda and renamed his group Jabhat Fateh al-Sham — the Syria Conquest Front. The fact that al Qaeda accepted this severing of ties without condemning him raised the suspicions of some that al-Golani had convinced jihadist superiors that a stealthier, gradualist strategy might be more suited to Syria. Others, meanwhile, see his extrication as testimony to his smart political skills.

Either way, al-Golani was increasingly able to assert control over fragmented militant groups and consolidate his power in Idlib, rebranding once more and calling his faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — the Organization for Liberating Syria. In the Idlib rebel enclave he ruled over, the group started to soften its attitudes toward the Christian and Druze minorities. Upon seizing Aleppo, al-Golani promised Christians they would be safe, and the city’s churches were able to function unmolested.

A perilous transition

But the question of whether al-Golani and HTS have truly left behind their extremist roots still remains.

“There are, of course, acute risks,” said Julien Barnes-Dacey of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “For Europeans, the dramatic transformation has provoked welcome shock but also deep uncertainty. Concerns are already emerging about what comes next, with fears regarding the Islamist nature of the HTS and the prospect of new chaos, violence and fragmentation amid a possible contested transition,” he added.

Said former U.S. diplomat Alberto Fernandez, trusting al-Golani and HTS is “very much like Oscar Wilde’s famous quip about second marriages [as] ‘the triumph of hope over experience.’” | Bilal al Hammoud/EPA-EFE

But Barnes-Dacey sees the glass as half full. “HTS is perhaps the clearest example” of Syrians internalizing the awful costs of war, he said. “It has moderated its ideological position, broken with al Qaeda and committed to an inclusive process that protects the rights of all Syrians, as demonstrated by initial reassuring outreach to the country’s minorities.”

But others are more cautious. They fear HTS has just undergone a cosmetic makeover, swapping clothes but not changing what they cloak — namely, a militant Islamist heart. Said former U.S. diplomat Alberto Fernandez, trusting al-Golani and HTS is “very much like Oscar Wilde’s famous quip about second marriages [as] ‘the triumph of hope over experience.’”

8. The Tech Investment Playbook for Victory

Excerpts:

Venture capitalists also need to recognize that the defense sector is inherently a long-tail market that demands sustained commitment. While returns may not be immediate, the potential for significant impact and financial gain is real. It’s critical to identify and highlight key milestones, such as securing warfighter approval, winning a tactical funding increase, or landing a prime contractor partnership. These markers validate a startup’s trajectory and end-customer understanding, as well as increasing its credibility within the department. It’s also incumbent on the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to break through the bureaucracy to get funding out the door and into the hands of the dual-use companies faster and more efficiently, as noted above, or risk a mass exodus of private funding over the next five to ten years, a problem that China does not have.

Parting Thoughts

By harnessing the creativity and adaptability of commercial, private, and startup organizations, the United States can compete effectively and establish a new era of economic and national security, underpinned by peace and stability.

Without immediate and substantial investment in the activation and scaling of dual-use technologies, the United States risks falling behind in the global power race. That requires streamlining Department of Defense authorities and operations and improving the investment environment to help promising dual-use startups survive and bring the best possible tech to defense missions at the speed of need, and for the future.

The Tech Investment Playbook for Victory - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Brian MacCarthy · December 12, 2024

If the United States doesn’t act fast, the next generation of dual-use technological innovation will belong to its adversaries — creating an irreversible gap. America’s technical advantage has kept adversaries in check for decades, but new near-peer competition in dual-use technologies threatens that balance. Over the past decade, China has rapidly evolved from an emerging economic and geopolitical force to an imminent great power threat.

China and the West have seen their commercial markets supplant the government in innovation leadership, including in the defense space. In everything from AI to drones, batteries, and robotics, China’s venture capital–backed companies and university networks are leading the way in technological development.

This is important because to compete with the pacing threat of China’s burgeoning commercial dual-use ecosystem, the Department of Defense needs to deliver at the speed of need in inventing and assimilating new technologies. This will require the United States to redefine its tech investment playbook to develop better entrance pathways for the private industry and startups working on promising dual-use technologies. This is also important to me personally. My bias is rooted in seeing first-hand the current and possible state of innovation for our country as a venture capitalist (as the managing partner of Booz Allen Ventures and our Foreign Tech Intelligence Team), a technologist, and an American citizen, concerned that we are on the precipice of ceding our tenured advantage on the global scale. The United States needs a new roadmap — a new playbook for victory — and needs it now.

Become a Member

What’s Driving the Pacing Threat

China follows a similar dual-use scaling approach to the United States, leveraging a mix of public and private capital, with one major difference being China’s dedicated venture capital investment funds. For example, with roughly 2,100 government-linked funds called Government Guidance Funds, China offers more flexibility to deploy capital and has long time horizons for success. This provides Chinese dual-use startups with a vital runway that most startups desperately need to succeed. From 2018 to 2023, Chinese startups raised well over half a trillion dollars, with much of this capital flowing into inherently dual-use companies such as EHang (autonomous cargo and passenger drones), Zhipu AI (generative AI), and GalaxySpace (micro-satellites).

Moreover, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has centralized China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy to reduce acquisition barriers and make it easier for Chinese innovators to do business with the People’s Liberation Army. Xi’s decision centralizes military-civil fusion, a longstanding but wavering program in China, underscores that the Chinese Communist Party considers indigenous, dual-use technology development as paramount to China’s future.

Playbook to Drive Defense Department–Commercial Collaboration in the United States

The United States should improve the environment for collaboration between the Department of Defense and the private sector to meet the technological challenge of China. That means streamlining the Department of Defense’s authorities and operations and improving the investment environment to speed the integration of advanced tech into current missions and develop the right tech for the future. Funding and authorities need to be modernized, including when and where funds can be spent and the contracting process itself.

Multi-Year Funding

Similarly to Defense Production Act funding, money appropriated for the Defense Innovation Unit and other innovation cells dedicated to bringing dual-use advanced tech to the Department of Defense should be non-expiring and valid until expended. Determining technology shortfalls and being able to execute funds as needed — not through the Department of Defense planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process — can be a key contributor to overcoming the “valley of death” for promising startups.

Fiscal Flexibility

Department of Defense innovation units should have more flexibility to support startups through proof of concept. A good example is the flexibility Congress provided the Defense Innovation Unit to use its budget both for company prototype development and for initial fielding of new technologies. Likewise, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering programs — such as Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies — are extremely useful in addressing the valley of death but need more funding support from Congress, as well as continued support to existing Air Force work projects such as the Tactical Funding Increase and Strategic Funding Increase programs.

Outcomes-Based Contracting

The Department of Defense needs to be empowered to adopt outcomes-based contracting to unlock the commercial-level thinking and innovation needed to drive modernization forward. Such contracting allows the government to pay for services and products based on achievement of specific outcomes. In other words, tell the contractor “where you want to go” instead of “how to get there.” It would also align incentives between primes and systems integrators and non-traditionals in a way that treats these platforms that are built and integrated together as one firm fixed-price unit as opposed to being treated as ammunition or bolts and screws. The Department of Defense has been an early adopter of outcomes-based contracting, especially in the push toward prototyping, but it should apply the approach more broadly.

Enforce the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s Fiscal Year 25 National Defense Authorization Act pushed to help ensure fidelity to the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which is a good thing for adoption of emerging dual-use technologies. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act requires the federal government to use commercial products, when available, instead of trying to build their own. Department of Defense processes and policy need streamlining too, opening up internal collaboration opportunities, making processes survivable for cutting edge startups, and sharpening focus on America’s main defense technology competitor.

Codify Intra-Department of Defense Collaboration

Department of Defense leaders should take advantage of new programs such as Competitive Advantage Pathfinders, which empowers requirements, budgeting, and acquisition communities across the services to collaborate on technology development and acquisition. The importance of collaboration between service branches and flexible spending authorizations has been echoed by Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu, whose research, development, test, and evaluation units have the procurement flexibility to rapidly field technologies, in conjunction with service branches, to seamlessly transition to the appropriate service branch sub-units.

Streamline the Authority to Operate Process

Even the best tech for the Department of Defense’s needs will sit on the shelf if it doesn’t make it through the ponderous authority to operate processes required to be allowed on the department’s networks. These are long-established information technology risk-management processes required by the decade-old Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. Much of the authority to operate process is done manually, particularly the intensive reporting and documentation requirements for implementing security controls. However, today few startups have the runway to wait for full authority to operate approvals under the best of circumstances. A Department of Defense–accredited platform, like Second Front’s Game Warden, can be part of the solution (Booz Allen Ventures invested in Second Front in January 2024). Game Warden provides a secure environment that streamlines and automates authority to operate compliance processes, enabling the rapid delivery of commercial software to government end-users. However, fundamentally, the authority to operate procedures themselves need streamlining to make them survivable for promising startups. The Department of Defense is moving in this direction, looking at cutting out redundant accreditation with reciprocity for authority to operate across Department of Defense networks, ensuring digital availability and sharing of key documentation with stakeholders on issues like cybersecurity, accreditation, and performance.

Focus on China

Legacy intelligence practices of analyzing Chinese policy and end-to-end People’s Liberation Army military systems are vital, but they do not give the U.S. government a full picture of Chinese technological development. The Department of Defense and intelligence community leaders need a deeper understanding of China’s private sector, from which the People’s Liberation Army and China’s state security services increasingly procure dual-use technologies. For example, Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturing and systems integrators are increasingly incentivized to supplement their services with dual-use products from Chinese startups. The Department of Defense should similarly look for creative ways to incentivize the acquisition and delivery of dual-use products.

Evolving the U.S. Venture Capital Market to Meet Mission Demands

U.S. venture capitalists also have a vital role to play as startup investments become increasingly pivotal in geopolitical tech competition. The nation’s competitive advantage will depend on startups’ ability to overcome the valley of death phenomenon, where roughly seven in ten startups fail in the first two to three years. The odds are even more daunting for defense tech startups due to limited funding for research contracts and inadequate support to navigate Department of Defense processes.

While significant private capital has flowed into early-stage dual-use technology startups over the past three years, it is insufficient. Sustained investment is needed as these companies scale to ensure they achieve product-market fit within robust Department of Defense programs. Furthermore, success will hinge on venture capitalists understanding the changing state of the defense market, mission problems, the budgeting and procurement cycle, and which technologies will solve real issues for national security.

Mission First

Venture capital investing in dual-use tech isn’t new, but its value proposition varies. Most venture capital firms claiming defense tech expertise only provide financial backing, while just a select few truly drive strategic value for both startups and the Department of Defense. To bring dual-use technology to the warfighter, the United States needs more venture capital firms committed to a mission-driven approach that requires deep knowledge of the Department of Defense’s complexities and requirements and include long return cycles, often 7 to 12 years.

As former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work noted at the National Defense Industrial Association conference, “The Department is an economy.” It is vast, with its own culture, language, and intricate processes. Investment success here demands not just funding but hands-on expert navigation, which most emerging dual-use startups cannot manage alone. Mission-focused guidance is critical to deploying technology that matters.

To bridge this gap, venture firms ought to make both strategic hires and hyper-focused military specification hires to add value to their portfolio. These hires are individuals with deep Department of Defense experience who understand mission needs, know the acquisition process, have the connections to champion the technology and ultimately have served on the ground downrange and have encountered first-hand the problems to address — also known as “Operators.” Venture capital firms should also cultivate mission-aligned partnerships to guide product development, ensuring the technology is truly dual-use from the start. Take the challenge of mitigating adversarial autonomous drone swarms — it’s a high-priority area where contractors like Booz Allen are partnering through investing in startups to turn potential into operational capability on large systems integration–led contracts. If systems are not built to handle austere conditions from first principles, they will not hold up in theater. This deep knowledge and expertise will move emerging technology through the valley of death and into impactful defense solutions.

Government Budgeting Realities

Venture capitalists should understand that while Department of Defense budgeting and procurement processes are slow, they are always in motion. Successful defense technology investors need a deep understanding of the department’s multi-year budget planning and shifting priorities, and they should help guide their portfolio to align development timelines with these cycles. Patience and strategic flexibility are essential, as these startups should be prepared for extended runways while remaining agile to capitalize on changing requirements, urgent capability needs, and unexpected funding and leadership shifts.

Winning in the Long-Tail

Venture capitalists also need to recognize that the defense sector is inherently a long-tail market that demands sustained commitment. While returns may not be immediate, the potential for significant impact and financial gain is real. It’s critical to identify and highlight key milestones, such as securing warfighter approval, winning a tactical funding increase, or landing a prime contractor partnership. These markers validate a startup’s trajectory and end-customer understanding, as well as increasing its credibility within the department. It’s also incumbent on the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to break through the bureaucracy to get funding out the door and into the hands of the dual-use companies faster and more efficiently, as noted above, or risk a mass exodus of private funding over the next five to ten years, a problem that China does not have.

Parting Thoughts

By harnessing the creativity and adaptability of commercial, private, and startup organizations, the United States can compete effectively and establish a new era of economic and national security, underpinned by peace and stability.

Without immediate and substantial investment in the activation and scaling of dual-use technologies, the United States risks falling behind in the global power race. That requires streamlining Department of Defense authorities and operations and improving the investment environment to help promising dual-use startups survive and bring the best possible tech to defense missions at the speed of need, and for the future.

Become a Member

Brian MacCarthy is a Booz Allen senior vice president and managing partner for Booz Allen’s $100 million venture capital fund, Booz Allen Ventures, in addition to Booz Allen’s Tech Scouting team including its Foreign Technology Intelligence Practice. He leads a team of venture investors, technologists, and business developers who scout, partner, and invest in cutting-edge dual-use technologies that can transform the markets and missions of clients. He has over 20 years of experience in the federal and commercial sectors, spanning software, hardware, cloud, AI, cyber security, and health operations.

Image: Kisha Johnson

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Brian MacCarthy · December 12, 2024

9. Putin’s regime may be closer to a Soviet collapse than we think

Also be careful what you might wish for. But more importantly what do you do if this happens? Are we ready?

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

Putin’s regime may be closer to a Soviet collapse than we think

Russia’s resurrected military industrial complex is cannibalising the rest of its economy

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/12/10/putins-regime-may-be-closer-soviet-collapse-than-we-think/

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

HTS is no ‘liberation movement’

The Islamist rebels that toppled Bashar al-Assad should be viewed with extreme caution.

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Topics Politics World

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The overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad’s despotic regime in Syria this weekend has been cheered on by the UK government as well as much of the mainstream media.

Speaking on Sunday with Laura Kuenssberg on BBC One, deputy PM Angela Rayner said that she ‘welcomed’ the news of Assad’s fall. Yesterday, foreign secretary David Lammy celebrated the Syrian president’s toppling, telling MPs that Assad is a ‘monster’, a ‘drug dealer’ and a ‘rat’.

In a sense, the government’s response is understandable. No one should mourn the end of the Assad dynasty’s brutal decades-long rule. Furthermore, Assad’s fall deals another significant blow to his despotic backers, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, depriving both of a key strategic ally. Lammy’s geopolitical analysis leaves a lot to be desired at times, but he is right to say that Assad’s defeat is a humiliation for both Moscow and Tehran.

Yet too often, this understandable happiness over the fall of the Syrian dictator has morphed into an endorsement of the Islamist forces that toppled him. Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6, even went so far as to describe Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the offensive against Assad, as ‘a liberation movement’.

It’s enough to make you wonder if parts of the British state have mislaid their critical faculties. The HTS-led forces now vying to replace Assad should be viewed much more cautiously.

After all, HTS, which had previously been confined to the Idlib province in Syria’s north-west, is a Sunni Islamist paramilitary group. Its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, was once aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS), and headed up HTS’s predecessor movement, al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. In 2017, the US State Department put up a $10million reward for information that could lead to his capture. This came after its decision in 2013 to classify him as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’. Likewise, the British state lists HTS as a proscribed terrorist organisation, although the government has now mooted removing it from the list.

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Tom Slater

Jolani has attempted to present himself and his militia as a more ‘moderate’ force in recent years. In 2016, he severed al-Nusra’s ties with al-Qaeda, renaming his group Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, before rebranding it again a year later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Leading the group in the late 2010s, he proceeded to fight and defeat both al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates as he fought to establish HTS’s so-called government of salvation in Idlib. Yet despite claiming to have moved away from hardline Islamism, few are convinced. In 2022, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom said that HTS ‘restricts religious freedom’ and threatens the safety of religious minorities in the part of Idlib it controls. This does not bode well for Syria’s Shia, Alawite, Christian and Druze religious minorities.

The UK and the West more generally should remember what has happened in Afghanistan since the Taliban took over in 2021. At the time, the Taliban, like HTS, also offered a rebranded, moderate image of itself to the world. Within months, however, it had turned Afghanistan into a hardline ‘Islamic Emirate’, something it was close to being before the Western occupation began in 2001. There is little reason to think HTS does not harbour similar aspirations.

Still, the status of HTS as a proscribed terrorist organisation may become a major headache for the UK government – especially if it wants to secure the organised return of Syrian refugees. After all, how could it justify such a return if HTS assumes control of Syria, but remains a proscribed terrorist organisation in the UK?

Assad’s fall is to be welcomed. But that doesn’t mean Britain or the West should uncritically embrace HTS. When it comes to Islamist militias, you would hope that caution would be every politician’s watchword.

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Rakib Ehsan is the author of Beyond Grievance: What the Left Gets Wrong about Ethnic Minorities, which is available to order on Amazon.

11. In Syria, Be Careful What You Wish For

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, Syrians are understandably celebrating in the streets of Damascus. Supporters of the shah also celebrated in the streets of Tehran in August 1953. So too did the marching band joyously greeting Lenin and company as they passed through Finland—the same Finland victimized by the Soviet Union in its 1939 Winter War, with nearly twenty-five thousand dead Finns in less than four months of fighting.

“Lenin’s entry into Russia is successful. He is working exactly as we would wish,” wrote a German Foreign Ministry official within a week of the Bolshevik revolutionary’s arrival in St. Petersburg. In the days that followed Roosevelt’s “countercoup” in Iran, he too triumphantly recounted his exploits to UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and, later, US President Dwight Eisenhower. It will be many years before we know whether those who passed secret messages to Syria’s rebels while watching from the sidelines as they toppled Assad have celebrated similarly.

Regardless, we should not mourn Assad’s fate. Nor should we call out the marching bands, at least not yet.

In Syria, Be Careful What You Wish For - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Collin Meisel · December 12, 2024

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“No one should shed any tears over the Assad regime.” US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Daniel Shapiro’s reaction to last week’s toppling of the Assad family’s decades-long rule in Syria is fully justified given Bashar and his father Hafez’s infamous brutality. Having forcibly disappeared nearly one hundred thousand people, including thousands of children, and murdered hundreds of others in 2023 alone, and with a long track record of other atrocities and human rights violations, Shapiro is right. The most appropriate reaction to Assad’s flight to Moscow is good riddance.

But this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s time to celebrate. History is replete with short-term victories that have evolved into long-term losses.

In 1917, at the height of World War I and the dawn of the Russian revolution that year, Germany was struggling to bring at least one front of its two-front war to a close. As part of the solution, the German government organized and funded a secret train with thirty-two Russian revolutionaries—chief among them V. I. Lenin—to foment turmoil in Russia and guarantee Russia’s permanent exit from the war. It did. And yet it also led to the founding of the Soviet Union, the future source of a seemingly inexhaustible well of people who were essential in defeating Germany just over two decades later.

In 1953, with approval from senior officials in the Central Intelligence Agency, US spies engaged in the opposite, propping up the unpopular Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and stymying an attempt by the Soviet-backed Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh to strip the shah of political power and concentrate it in his own hands. The spy driving this operation forward, Kermit Roosevelt, trumpeted his success in his book Countercoup, ironically published in 1979. That same year, Ruhollah Khomeini led the Iranian revolution, ushering in the Iranian theocracy that has proved so problematic for US foreign policy since.

Would the Soviet Union have emerged as a thorn in Germany’s side without Lenin? Or Iran in the side of the United States with Mosaddegh? It is hard to say. But it is doubtful that things would have turned out much worse for those Germans and Americans who respectively meddled in their affairs.

From this long-term perspective we can better understand the hesitance on the part of President Joe Biden’s administration to get further involved in Syria today following its passing of secret messages to Syrian rebels in the lead-up to Assad’s removal. Perhaps Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group at the head of the rebel takeover and also a former al-Qaeda affiliate and current US-designated terrorist organization, will usher in a moderate theocracy that returns to Syrians some of the freedom they once knew. Or perhaps not. While HTS has distanced itself from al-Qaeda in recent years, its leader is a former Islamic State soldier who certainly seemed intent on establishing a caliphate in the past, declaring in 2018, for example, “With this spirit . . . we will not only reach Damascus, but, Allah permitting, Jerusalem will be awaiting our arrival.”

The truth is, we don’t know what the future holds for Syria. What we do know is that political events often have effects that unfold across many years, even decades, sometimes boomeranging in ways that are difficult to anticipate at the outset.

The German facilitation of Lenin’s return to Russia and the CIA’s “countercoup” in Iran are of course imperfect proxies for the present situation in Syria. If HTS returns to its roots in the coming months or years, US leaders will at least be able to take solace in the fact that while they did not resist the rebel surge to Damascus, they did not support it either, retaining their designation of HTS as a foreign terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, Syrians are understandably celebrating in the streets of Damascus. Supporters of the shah also celebrated in the streets of Tehran in August 1953. So too did the marching band joyously greeting Lenin and company as they passed through Finland—the same Finland victimized by the Soviet Union in its 1939 Winter War, with nearly twenty-five thousand dead Finns in less than four months of fighting.

“Lenin’s entry into Russia is successful. He is working exactly as we would wish,” wrote a German Foreign Ministry official within a week of the Bolshevik revolutionary’s arrival in St. Petersburg. In the days that followed Roosevelt’s “countercoup” in Iran, he too triumphantly recounted his exploits to UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and, later, US President Dwight Eisenhower. It will be many years before we know whether those who passed secret messages to Syria’s rebels while watching from the sidelines as they toppled Assad have celebrated similarly.

Regardless, we should not mourn Assad’s fate. Nor should we call out the marching bands, at least not yet.

Collin Meisel is the associate director of geopolitical analysis at the Pardee Institute for International Futures at the University of Denver, a senior fellow with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, a nonresident fellow with The Henry L. Stimson Center, and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Collin Meisel · December 12, 2024

12. Chinese suspect arrested for flying drone over US military base

Chinese suspect arrested for flying drone over US military base

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · December 11, 2024

Published Dec 11, 2024 at 7:24 AM ESTByChina News Reporter

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A Chinese national has been arrested for allegedly flying a drone over Vandenberg Space Force Base in California's Santa Barbara County.

Yinpiao Zhou, 39, was taken into custody at San Francisco International Airport just before boarding a flight to China, according to the Justice Department. Zhou, a resident of Brentwood, has been charged with violating national defense airspace and failing to register an aircraft not providing transportation.

Zhou was set to make his first court appearance on Tuesday, according to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California.

Zhou was discovered after drone detection systems at the Space Force base detected the unmanned aerial vehicle, according to an affidavit filed with the court on Sunday.

Astronauts from NASA’s SpaceX Crew-8 mission on October 2. A Chinese national has been arrested for allegedly flying a drone over Vanderberg Space Force base in California, which was the site of a SpaceX 9... Astronauts from NASA’s SpaceX Crew-8 mission on October 2. A Chinese national has been arrested for allegedly flying a drone over Vanderberg Space Force base in California, which was the site of a SpaceX 9 launch in November. U.S. Space Force

The drone flew for nearly an hour, reaching a maximum altitude of almost 1 mile. The flight began in Ocean Park, which is likely a reference to Ocean Beach Park near the base, the press statement said.

Base security personnel who went to investigate found Zhou along with another person, whose identity was not disclosed. He was discovered carrying the drone in his jacket.

A search of Zhou's cellphone revealed a Google search for "Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules," as well as messages with another person about hacking the drone to fly higher than its normal altitude.

According to the statement, Zhou's last visit to China was in February, while his companion returned from the country on November 26.

If convicted, Zhou faces a maximum of four years in prison and criminal and civil fines totaling nearly $400,000.

Newsweek reached out to the U.S. Department of Justice and the Chinese Embassy by email with a written request for comment outside of office hours.

The arrest comes amid heightened concerns in Washington over Chinese spying operations targeting military bases, universities, and other sensitive sites.

Earlier this year, a China-born U.S. citizen, Wenheng Zhao, received a 27-month sentence for sharing classified information about Navy exercises, operational security, and radar system blueprints with a Chinese intelligence contact.

Vandenberg Space Force Base is central to many of the United States' defense-oriented space operations.

Late in November, the base hosted the launch of a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying satellites from the Department of Defense's National Reconnaissance Office. The mission was part of the office's growing constellation of cutting-edge satellites designed to boost the country's intelligence and defense capabilities.

Earlier in November, the base saw a test-firing of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The U.S. Space Force described the test as a demonstration of the country's ability to maintain its ICBM strengths during a time of strategic competition.

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About the writer

Micah McCartney

Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan. You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.

Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian ...

13. The Emergence of Two Distinct Jihadist Ways of War

Excerpts:

HTS is now the latest nonstate actor to deliver a surprisingly effective conventional military campaign against a better-armed state adversary. It has exhibited a distinct way of war, different from past campaigns by IS or other jihadist groups.

With the defeat of the Asad regime, HTS has proven itself the dominant armed faction in Syria and will now have to unite the rest of the country under the jihadist banner by force or otherwise. The United States and our SDF partners should ensure they are prepared to meet the threat should al-Jolani decide to expand further. It is unlikely the jihadist group would entertain sharing power with the secularist SDF, though HTS signaling of restraint could open the door for avoiding armed conflict in the near term. The United States should stand ready to assist the SDF with counter-drone and air support to blunt any determined jihadist assaults, learning from the SAA’s defeat. This will be especially important for preserving the SDF as it is fending off Turkish-backed groups reportedly seizing SDF-held Manbij and now attacking the strategic Tishreen Dam.

The Emergence of Two Distinct Jihadist Ways of War - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Ido Levy · December 12, 2024

On November 27, the jihadist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria initiated an offensive against the regime of embattled dictator Bashar al-Assad. In a matter of 11 days, HTS forces advanced more than 50 miles east and 200 miles south from its bases in the northwest Idlib region, seizing the cities of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and the capital Damascus, overthrowing the Asad regime.

These scenes are reminiscent of the swift conquest of much of Iraq by another jihadist group, the Islamic State (IS), a decade earlier. Units of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) disintegrated as IS fighters swept through Mosul, al-Qaim, Tikrit, Baiji, Sinjar, and other population centers, at its peak occupying about one-third of the country, along with half of Syria. It took US intervention and three years of grueling warfare to deprive IS of its territory in Iraq.

Both IS and HTS—at war with each other since 2013—are offshoots of al-Qaeda, but have developed into distinct entities, each with its own flavor of jihadist ideology, governance styles, and military operations. Indeed, a comparison of the current HTS-led offensive in Syria with the 2014 IS campaign in Iraq illuminates the emergence of two distinct jihadist ways of war.

Aggressive Light Infantry Forces

In my book on the Islamic State’s military effectiveness, I posit that four components of its operations determined effectiveness: innovation, robust shaping operations, initiative, and high determination. The presence of these four factors produced a highly aggressive and mobile military force, composed mostly of light infantry, that struck its enemies hard in their most brittle points. For example, in the June 2014 fall of Mosul (Iraq’s second-largest city), mere hundreds of determined IS fighters stormed the city in tandem with preinserted sleeper cells. The defenders disintegrated, hollowed out by years of sectarianism and corruption, and IS exploited its success by pushing additional forces to Mosul quickly and finally capturing it within a week. This was the IS army at its best: shaping the battlefield through infiltrations, assassinations, and sleeper cells, then striking hard at its weakened opponents.

HTS has demonstrated a similar operational approach. Videos filmed by HTS ahead of the assault on Aleppo show significant advances with armored vehicles as well as pickup trucks and motorcycles. In one, dismounting fighters storm the regime’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) trenches. Analysts reported HTS use of elite reconnaissance and “special forces” type units to direct fires and prepare the way for infantry. Better and more professional training seemed on display, too, likely part of HTS’s efforts to professionalize, as exemplified in its 2021 establishment of a military college. A large amount of captured materiel in good condition and soldiers, coupled with documentation of retreating regime forces, paints a picture of rapid breakdown against HTS strikes on Aleppo. Then, at Hama, HTS fighters met SAA lines north of the city and, over several days, secured its northern, eastern, and western outskirts, precipitating a regime retreat. Jihadist forces wasted no time in quickly extending south to contest Homs and Damascus, keeping the initiative and draining SAA morale.

IS Suicide Bombs, HTS Drones

Both groups also employed firepower to shock and break opposing defensive lines and facilitate infantry assaults. The Islamic State’s weapon of choice for the task was the car bomb, or suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED). Human drivers permitted more maneuverability and flexibility, and forward observers and drones could help guide them to their targets, enabling imitation of artillery, armor, or airstrike effects. A massive industrial enterprise and built-up bombmaking know-how sustained the frequent employment of SVBIEDs. Such weapons were also used to eliminate enemy armor or target specific commanders beyond the frontlines.

In the Syrian Civil War’s early years, Jabhat al-Nusra, as HTS was known between 2012 and 2016 when it was still affiliated with al-Qaeda, pioneered the use of SVBIEDs in military operations. However, there has been a notable lack of reported SVBIED strikes in the current HTS offensive (except for this possible sighting). In fact, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani stated in a 2021 interview with PBS FRONTLINE, “If we had planes, we would have used planes. If we had artillery to replace martyrdom [suicide bombing], we would have saved those brothers.”

Instead, there is evidence that HTS is relying on drones and other projectiles to shock SAA forces. At least one video showed the impact of an HTS kamikaze drone with a heavy payload. The group also showcased its drone launch and surveillance capabilities in a propaganda video. Other footage shows the use of first-person view (FPV) drones to hit SAA armor. One analyst reported the use of FPV drones to hinder SAA counterattacks, as well as for command and control and battle tracking.

Spreading Terror Versus Signaling Restraint

Perhaps the most striking contrast between IS and HTS is their respective information warfare approaches. IS achieved notoriety for its disseminating videos of beheadings, torture, and other brutal acts while touting its worst atrocities, such as the Camp Speicher massacre and enslavement of Yazidis. Such messaging was part of an IS psychological warfare campaign that demoralized opposing forces in advance of the Islamic State’s next attack while also encouraging IS supporters. Indeed, IS turned its guns on any outsider who refused to submit to its worldview and offered no quarter for dialogue. This outlook also manifested in the group’s relentless expansionism; virtually every entity that touched the Islamic State’s borders endured an IS attempt to subdue it.

In contrast, HTS has adopted seemingly conciliatory messaging toward other actors, emphasizing that it is focused exclusively on fighting the Asad regime and its backers. On November 29, HTS released a statement addressed to the “Syrian People and the International Community” asserting that the offensive is a “battle for justice and dignity, aimed at countering Assad’s crimes and the armed militias’ use of heavy weaponry against their own people,” a campaign to defend the Syrian people against an oppressive regime. It also called on foreign journalists and organizations to “amplify the voices of the Syrian people.” In a statement addressed to his fighters the same day, al-Jolani urged showing “mercy, kindness, and gentleness to our people in Aleppo.” Moreover, the group emphasized that it would offer amnesty to surrendering regime soldiers.

When the jihadists reached Aleppo’s Kurdish-majority neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood, held by the US-backed Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), they did not strike at the SDF as IS likely would have. Instead, HTS offered to allow the SDF to leave the city with its arms (though the SDF has yet to leave), affirmed that Kurds are an “integral part” of Syria, and condemned the “barbaric practices” that IS perpetrated against Kurds. The group also addressed reassurance messages to the Alawite and Salamiyah Ismaili Shia communities and called on Iraq and the “Lebanese people” to refrain from intervening. By signaling restraint, HTS avoids provoking foreign powers or other actors in Syria that might be alarmed by its success, a marked contrast with the Islamic State’s unabashed brutality.

Although one might interpret these recent messages as an indication of moderation, HTS remains as jihadist as it has always been, albeit of a different flavor from al-Qaeda or IS. A recent HTS “fatwa” in Arabic called on Syrians living abroad to return home to “join the ranks of the mujahidin [those who wage jihad].” It has imposed its version of Islamic law in Idlib for several years now, discriminating harshly against those that do not share its worldview, as in its seizure of property belonging to Christians and Druze and rocketing of Alawite communities. HTS, like other jihadist groups, rejects democracy. The group has praised the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and eulogized Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh. Hence, one must remain skeptical of al-Jolani’s façade of respectability. HTS actions now that it rules will reveal whether it really does mean to change.

Weak Enemies

To a significant extent, IS and HTS both owe some of their military successes to the weakness of their enemies. The Iraqi Army in 2014 was brittle, hollowed out by years of corruption, and collapsed with little resistance against IS. The best ISF units, the US-created special forces formations known as the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), were demoralized since the US withdrawal of 2011 and could not spearhead a serious counteroffensive until the United States reentered in June 2014. Thus, Iraq’s lack of foreign support was also a factor in its initial setbacks.

Similarly, SAA defensive lines have swiftly collapsed, with widespread reports of regime soldiers defecting or fleeing. Future research will better illuminate the causes of this collapse, but one expert on the SAA has pointed to “rampant” corruption within the army. The loss of Iranian and Russian military support likewise seems crucial as the regime had come to rely on these foreign backers. The 2015 Russian intervention in Syria likely saved Asad from defeat at the time and helped him claw back Aleppo and other territories he had lost in the preceding years to IS and rebel groups. Since 2012, Iran had its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Fatemiyoun Brigade train and provide sizable ground forces to back up the SAA.

Still, to take advantage of a weak enemy, one must be able to press the advance aggressively, exploit victories, and have intelligence identifying weak points. Both IS and HTS built nimble light infantry forces well-suited to these tasks.

Implications

HTS is now the latest nonstate actor to deliver a surprisingly effective conventional military campaign against a better-armed state adversary. It has exhibited a distinct way of war, different from past campaigns by IS or other jihadist groups.

With the defeat of the Asad regime, HTS has proven itself the dominant armed faction in Syria and will now have to unite the rest of the country under the jihadist banner by force or otherwise. The United States and our SDF partners should ensure they are prepared to meet the threat should al-Jolani decide to expand further. It is unlikely the jihadist group would entertain sharing power with the secularist SDF, though HTS signaling of restraint could open the door for avoiding armed conflict in the near term. The United States should stand ready to assist the SDF with counter-drone and air support to blunt any determined jihadist assaults, learning from the SAA’s defeat. This will be especially important for preserving the SDF as it is fending off Turkish-backed groups reportedly seizing SDF-held Manbij and now attacking the strategic Tishreen Dam.

Ido Levy is an associate fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a PhD student at American University. He is the author of Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State. Follow him on X @IdoLevy5.

Main Image: Two destroyed tanks in front of a mosque in Azaz, Syria, 2012 (by Christiaan Triebert, Flickr)

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14. Chinese Surge 53 Military Aircraft, 19 Ships Near Taiwan, Officials Say

Graphic at the link: https://news.usni.org/2024/12/11/chinese-surge-53-military-aircraft-19-ships-near-taiwan-officials-say

Chinese Surge 53 Military Aircraft, 19 Ships Near Taiwan, Officials Say - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · December 11, 2024

Taiwan Ministry of Defense Image

Taiwanese officials detected 53 Chinese military aircraft, 11 People’s Liberation Army Navy ships and eight other Chinese government ships operating around the island over a 24 hour period starting on Tuesday.

Twenty-three of the aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s northern, southwestern and eastern Air Defense Identification Zone, according to the Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense.

The number of aircraft in Wednesday’s report is less than the 66 aircraft recorded in July this year and the 103 recorded in September last year. Earlier on Monday, Taiwan’s MND stated the Republic of China Armed Forces had initiated combat readiness exercises in response to the Chinese . The MND also claimed it had detected PLAN ships from the Eastern, Northern and Southern Theatre Commands, along with China Coast Guard ships entering areas around the Taiwan Strait and the western Pacific.

“To counter PLA activities, ROC Armed Forces have initiated combat readiness exercises and will closely monitor the situation. Any unilateral provocations could undermine Indo-Pacific peace and stability. We will address all gray zone incursions and ensure our national security,” read an MND post on X.

On Tuesday, the MND reported that 47 PLA aircraft, 12 PLAN ships and nine Chinese government ships operating around Taiwan were detected between from Monday to Tuesday, and 16 of the aircraft had crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ. The MND denounced the activities on Tuesday.

“PLA naval deployments in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea have already created security risk and regional instability. For our national defense, regardless of Beijing’s drill announcements, ROC Armed Forces will monitor the situation and respond accordingly,” stated a post on X.

China’s military has yet to officially comment on the activities, though Beijing had been expected to carry out some form of military demonstration around Taiwan in response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s visits last week to the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu, along with stops in Hawaii and Guam.

The three Pacific nations are among 11 countries in the world, along with the Holy See, that formally recognize Taiwan. During his tour, Lai posted on social media channel X that he spoke by video call to House Speaker Mike Johnson and other U.S. congressional leaders and thanked them for their bipartisan support of Taiwan.

Since Monday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning in her daily press conferences has told reporters asking questions on China’s drills around Taiwan to contact the relevant authorities along with stating that the Taiwan issue is the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations and that China will firmly defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. China carried out the Joint Sword-2024A exercise in May following Lai’s inauguration as President and the Joint Sword-2024B exercise in October following a National Day speech by Lai where the Taiwan President asserted Taiwan’s independence from China.

The USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker shows the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group currently operating in the Philippine Sea.

So far, Japan Joint Staff Office (JSO) reports on PLAN ship movements around Japan have not shown any major increase in PLAN transits en route to the waters around Taiwan. On Friday, the JSO issued a release stating PLAN destroyers CNS Suzhou (132) and CNS Shaoxing (134) and frigate CNS Zhoushan (529) were sighted on Dec. 5 at 11 a.m, sailing east in an area 49 miles west of Kuchinoerabu Island, and subsequently sailing east through the Osumi Strait to enter the Pacific Ocean. The release stated Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) helicopter destroyer JS Ise (DDH-182), fast-attack craft JS Otaka (PG-826) and a JMSDF P-1 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) of Fleet Air Wing 1, based at JMSDF Kanoya Air Base on the main island of Kyushu, shadowed the PLAN ships.

On Monday, the JSO issued a release stating that on Saturday at 5 a.m., PLAN destroyer CNS Dazhou (135) and frigate CNS Xuzhou (530) were sighted sailing southeast in an area 74 miles northeast of Miyako Island and subsequently sailed southeast in the waters between Miyako Island and Okinawa to enter the Philippine Sea. A JMSDF P-3C Orion MPA of Fleet Air Wing 5 based at Naha Air Base, Okinawa, shadowed the PLAN ships, according to the release. Dazhou is believed to have been recently commissioned late this year and is the first ship of the flight IV variant of the Type 052D destroyer. The flight is known as the Type 052DM destroyer with nine more ships expected to enter service.

The release added that on Sunday at 7 p.m., PLAN Dongdiao-class surveillance ship Yuhengxing (798) was sighted sailing southeast in an area 99 miles northeast of Miyako Island and subsequently sailed southeast in the waters between Miyako Island and Okinawa and entered the Philippine Sea. The release stated that destroyer JS Sazanami (DD-113) shadowed the PLAN surveillance ship.

A second release on Monday stated a Chinese Y-9 electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft flew in from the East China Sea area, passed between Okinawa and Miyako Island, flew south over the Philippine Sea before turning back north to passed between the Okinawa and Miyako Island again, and returned to the East China Sea. The release stated fighter aircraft of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Southwest Air Defense command were scrambled in response.

A JSO release on Tuesday showed a suspected Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operating off Taiwan. The release stated that between the morning and afternoon of that day, a presumed Chinese UAV flew in from the East China Sea, passed between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, reached the Philippine Sea, and then circled southwest of the Sakishima Islands before flying south. A map by the JSO showing the UAV’s flight path showed it conducting a circuit a distance away from the centre of Taiwan’s East Coast and then a second circuit a distance away off Taiwan’s southeast coast. The release stated JASDF fighter aircraft of the Southwest Air Defense command were scrambled in response.

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · December 11, 2024

15. Trump’s NASA pick says military will inevitably put troops in space

Finally the MOS we have always wanted: Space shuttle door gunner.

Trump’s NASA pick says military will inevitably put troops in space

Defense News · by Courtney Albon · December 11, 2024

President-elect Donald Trump’s choice to be NASA’s next administrator, Jared Isaacman, said Wednesday that as the U.S. establishes more of human presence in space, it will eventually need Space Force guardians stationed in the domain to protect its economic interests.

“I think it is absolutely inevitable,” Isaacman said at the Space Force Association’s Spacepower Conference in Orlando, Florida. “If Americans are in low Earth orbit, there’s going to need to be people watching out for them for all the reasons we described before.”

Isaacman, a tech billionaire who has traveled to space twice on commercial missions, said exploration and economic ambitions will drive more commercial and civil activity in space in the coming years — from space mining to NASA discovery missions. While some of that work will be done by robotic probes or remote operators, some of it will also require human input, he said.

Isaacman is CEO of Shift4 Payments, a payment processing company based in Allentown, Pennsylvania. In 2012, he co-founded Draken International — a firm that trains pilots on its own fleet of privately owned military fighter jets. He links his interest in space to his own background as a jet pilot.

In 2021, he self-funded a mission to space aboard a SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule, the first-ever spaceflight crewed only by civilians. In September, he took his second trip to space as part of a SpaceX program called Polaris. During that mission, he and three crewmates performed the first commercial spacewalk.

Isaacman is not the first to suggest that the military may one day have troops in space. The former second in command at U.S. Space Command, retired Lt. Gen. John Shaw, said in 2020 that the Defense Department would one day send guardians to operate command centers or perform other missions in the domain.

Other military officials have suggested it could be several decades before Space Force personnel deploy to orbit.

Isaacman didn’t offer a timeline for his prediction but suggested that a military presence in space could coincide with future NASA moon and Mars missions.

“This is the trajectory that humankind is going to follow,” Isaacman said. “America is going to lead it and we’re going to need guardians there on the high ground looking out for us.”

About Courtney Albon

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.

16. What China Must Do to Stop the Flow of Fentanyl

Unrestricted warfare or revenge for the Opium Wars?

Excerpts:

China must also address each of the disturbing findings of the Select Committee’s bipartisan investigation. For example, it is unacceptable that China’s value-added tax system offers rebates for illicit chemical producers. Beijing must terminate government ownership of entities that support the industry—and then take action against them.

China is part of the problem and part of the solution.

Chinese officials may be reluctant to take such measures against what is, to them, a foreign issue. Some analysts have even speculated that certain CCP officials may stall until the party can use the fentanyl crisis as leverage in unrelated international disputes. But with the American people’s eyes squarely on them, their current approach is increasingly untenable. If they fail to stop the flow of chemicals and thus keep fueling American pain, they will propel the U.S. government to employ even stronger measures.

The CCP now knows beyond any doubt the implications of what is occurring within China’s borders. Government officials know that failing to stem the flow of synthetic opioids means that death tolls in the United States will remain unacceptably high. And they know that intensifying cooperation in the battle against illicit narcotics is imperative to save these lives. If China fails to embrace a genuine whole-of-government effort to end the epidemic—from closing all regulatory loopholes to prioritizing enforcement—the status quo will become beyond inexcusable. The CCP should not play with fire.

But Americans must also be honest with themselves about China’s role. To put it bluntly, the CCP is both part of the problem and, by necessity, part of the solution. U.S. officials must hold bad actors in China accountable for the epidemic but also insist on progress and encourage the CCP to work with Washington. Doing so is the only way to protect countless Americans—and people around the world—from the scourge of fentanyl.

What China Must Do to Stop the Flow of Fentanyl

Foreign Affairs · by More by Raja Krishnamoorthi · December 12, 2024

It’s Time to Get Tough on the World’s Most Dangerous Opioid Supplier

Raja Krishnamoorthi

December 12, 2024

Pills in New York City, June 2024 Andrew Kelly / Reuters

Raja Krishnamoorthi is a Democratic U.S. Representative from Illinois and the Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

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Since the turn of the millennium, the United States has been ravaged by an opioid epidemic that has killed nearly one million Americans. At first, most of these victims died after overdosing on heroin or various prescription painkillers. But over the last five years, the deaths have been largely driven by a single, synthetic drug: fentanyl. Since finding its way into the illicit drug market, fentanyl has steadily crowded out other opioids, to the point where it is now responsible for most opioid poisonings. In 2023, for example, roughly 81,000 Americans died from opioids. Fentanyl caused nearly 75,000 of those deaths.

It is hard to overstate how deadly fentanyl is. The drug is more than 30 times as powerful as heroin, and so its spread has helped drive the number of opioid deaths to record highs. The human cost of the spike is visible to anyone who knows someone that overdosed, and to plenty who don’t. It was very apparent to me at a recent congressional hearing on this epidemic, where a packed auditorium of grieving families brought pictures of loved ones who succumbed to fentanyl poisoning.

In assigning blame for the fentanyl epidemic, experts and ordinary Americans alike point to a variety of factors, such as economic hardship, poor medical care, and the predatory behavior of opioid distributors—including infamous pill mills that overprescribe addictive substances. But increasingly, they are also blaming a country on the other side of the world: China. They do so for good reason. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, China produces the vast majority of the chemicals needed to make fentanyl. Just a few years ago, it was estimated that fentanyl sourced from China accounted for 97 percent of illicit seizures. According to a bipartisan investigation by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, of which I am the leading Democratic member, the CCP even subsidizes the production of illicit ingredients and allows the deadly substances to be openly sold on otherwise closely surveilled e-commerce platforms.

It isn’t surprising that the CCP has let this trade fester. For Beijing, the American fentanyl epidemic is an ocean away. There is little incentive to care about stopping a U.S. crisis. China’s legitimate chemical industry, meanwhile, benefits from light-touch regulation.

But if the CCP believes it can get away with ignoring the fentanyl trade, it has misread the room. Americans are more furious than ever about the epidemic, and they are beginning to demand their representatives take action against China to save the lives of their fellow citizens. Whatever marginal benefits China’s economy may derive from lax chemical regulations, they are far outweighed by the very real possibility that American anger regarding the CCP’s role in the epidemic will push Washington to adopt a harder line toward Beijing.

That means Beijing must get serious about cracking down on fentanyl production. The CCP must, among other things, prosecute more people for exporting the drug’s precursors. It must better police the online platforms on which these chemicals are openly peddled. It needs to go after the money-laundering schemes that allow the trade to flourish, including by cooperating with U.S. law enforcement officials. It also needs to tell its own local officials to prevent the export of these deadly substances. And the CCP must act fast. Otherwise, American anger toward China might push Beijing and Washington into a conflict that nobody desires.

ACTION IS NOT AUTOMATIC

China is essential to the fentanyl industry. It is effectively the sole source for the ingredients Mexican drug cartels use to make synthetic opioids, which the cartels then smuggle into the United States. This fact means the CCP could irreparably impair the cartels’ ability to produce fentanyl and thus largely prevent the drug’s distribution. Doing so would not end the U.S. opioid epidemic. But it would almost certainly curtail it.

Yet history shows that the CCP generally acts only when forced to do so. For years, U.S. officials—myself included—called for China to schedule (meaning to classify) certain critical precursor chemicals as controlled substances. Yet these pleas were too often ignored. Beijing made some progress only after consequence-backed diplomacy. For instance, in November 2023, the United States resumed bilateral counternarcotics cooperation and established a working group to facilitate these initiatives. But it also added China to the list of the primary, illicit-drug-producing countries. Being on this so-called “Majors List” restricts various forms of U.S. assistance, but such a formal designation also foreshadows even greater costs to come. Faced with real pressure and looming consequences, the CCP began to relent, scheduling many substances and taking other positive steps.

To understand why China will not act willingly—but will respond to pressure—one needs to understand what motivates Beijing. The CCP is a ruling party that subjects its own citizens to unthinkable abuses, so it is not going to prioritize preventing tragedy in the United States. But it will prioritize protecting its interests. Beijing does not like its companies facing sanctions and its government facing cascading, multilateral condemnation. And so when all branches of the U.S. government speak up, including through diplomacy, and demonstrate willingness to impose tangible consequences for facilitating the fentanyl epidemic, the CCP is more likely to listen and act.

Congress has an important role to play here. Earlier this year, we enacted fentanyl sanctions legislation that will help deter bad actors in China. Building off its investigatory findings, my Select Committee also established a bipartisan Fentanyl Policy Working Group, led by Representatives Jake Auchincloss and Dan Newhouse, with support from past committee chair Mike Gallagher and current committee chair John Moolenaar. Its purpose is to show Beijing that Washington’s concerns are acute and that it is ready to act, including by imposing significant economic consequences on bad actors that depend on the U.S. financial system. Even in a time of significant polarization, the United States must be crystal clear with China that Americans are united in stopping this epidemic. If the CCP fails to recognize this reality, it will not end well for either country.

WHAT WORKS

If China acts to stop the flow of fentanyl, it should be able to succeed. China’s counternarcotics enforcement, after all, is effective domestically. While the United States reported tens of thousands of fentanyl-poisoning deaths last year, China reported zero. That figure is almost certainly an underestimate, but it nonetheless reflects the fact that China does not tolerate fentanyl distribution within its borders. If a Chinese group supplies fentanyl at home, its members face severe sanctions—including death—in a criminal justice system that frequently abrogates international norms and values.

But even amid this harshness, exporters of fentanyl ingredients frequently suffer no consequence, even when U.S. law enforcement hands their names to Beijing on a platter. When Washington indicts a Chinese exporter, the CCP often refuses to extradite the person. In one case, China even asked U.S. officials to not file charges against a known exporter. Chinese officials claim they lack the legal framework needed to go after these exporters, but the country’s domestic enforcement suggests otherwise. Even if China does need to update its code, an authoritarian state should have no problem making those adjustments, including by closing the substantial loopholes related to pill presses (the industrial tools used for fentanyl manufacturing, which remain severely underregulated). It should be able to ensure every single U.S. law enforcement extradition request and request related to counternarcotics is never ignored and swiftly met.

Beijing must also vigorously pursue enforcement in noncriminal contexts. This means stopping Chinese e-commerce platforms from openly permitting the sale of fentanyl precursors and analogs. Today, people can log on to multiple Chinese platforms, type in the name of these chemicals, and find sellers who openly tout their ability to bypass U.S. customs enforcement. When the Select Committee tested just one of these sites earlier this year, it found over 5,000 offers for narcotics precursors, including in bulk. Even after Chinese authorities were on notice of these findings, far too many posts remained online.

Beijing should go after more than producers and markets. It must also go after the flow of funds between sellers and their drug cartel customers. That means better monitoring of transactions and working to prevent suspicious ones. To effectuate such enforcement, China must establish meaningful “know-your-customer” requirements across its chemical production and shipping industries, so that criminal sales can be easily traced. In addition, Beijing must ban all the remaining substances U.S. authorities have identified as opioid precursors but that nonetheless remain legal—as well as substances used to produce other dangerous drugs, such as xylazine (or “tranq”). Finally, Chinese law enforcement officials have to establish strong information-sharing mechanisms with U.S. law enforcement. Chinese officials can help U.S. officials identify not just importers, but also money-laundering schemes, given that some of those schemes extend across borders.

PLAYING WITH FIRE

When it comes to combating crime, these steps—enforcing criminal laws, acting against rogue e-commerce platforms, scheduling deadly substances, and sharing information—are fairly standard. As a result, they should be easy to enact. But given the gravity of the fentanyl crisis and China’s role in it, these steps may not be sufficient. To show that it is serious and fully crush illegal exports, Beijing will have to go further.

To begin, the CCP should instill accountability within its own ranks by imposing consequences on those who have turned a blind eye to fentanyl production. It should review how many opioid ingredients were exported from a given official’s region when deciding whether that person is promoted or demoted. It could even expel the worst offenders from the CCP altogether. Similarly, Beijing should establish a zero-tolerance policy toward those who do not prioritize stopping the export of these deadly substances. Ignorance is not an excuse.

China must also address each of the disturbing findings of the Select Committee’s bipartisan investigation. For example, it is unacceptable that China’s value-added tax system offers rebates for illicit chemical producers. Beijing must terminate government ownership of entities that support the industry—and then take action against them.

China is part of the problem and part of the solution.

Chinese officials may be reluctant to take such measures against what is, to them, a foreign issue. Some analysts have even speculated that certain CCP officials may stall until the party can use the fentanyl crisis as leverage in unrelated international disputes. But with the American people’s eyes squarely on them, their current approach is increasingly untenable. If they fail to stop the flow of chemicals and thus keep fueling American pain, they will propel the U.S. government to employ even stronger measures.

The CCP now knows beyond any doubt the implications of what is occurring within China’s borders. Government officials know that failing to stem the flow of synthetic opioids means that death tolls in the United States will remain unacceptably high. And they know that intensifying cooperation in the battle against illicit narcotics is imperative to save these lives. If China fails to embrace a genuine whole-of-government effort to end the epidemic—from closing all regulatory loopholes to prioritizing enforcement—the status quo will become beyond inexcusable. The CCP should not play with fire.

But Americans must also be honest with themselves about China’s role. To put it bluntly, the CCP is both part of the problem and, by necessity, part of the solution. U.S. officials must hold bad actors in China accountable for the epidemic but also insist on progress and encourage the CCP to work with Washington. Doing so is the only way to protect countless Americans—and people around the world—from the scourge of fentanyl.

More by Raja Krishnamoorthi

Foreign Affairs · by More by Raja Krishnamoorthi · December 12, 2024

17. How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine

Excerpts;

Of course, one more person needs to be convinced of the merits of this peace plan: Trump. Given his past skepticism about aid to Ukraine and NATO more generally, it will not be easy to persuade him to take this path. Such a deal, however, supports several of Trump’s objectives. By bringing Ukraine into NATO, Trump could achieve a significant victory for one of his foreign policy priorities: burden-sharing. After joining NATO, Ukraine’s armed forces would overnight become the best and most experienced European army in the alliance. Ukrainian soldiers could be deployed to other frontline states, allowing Washington to reduce its own troop commitments. Ukraine could also supply other NATO allies, especially those that share a border with Russia, with the air, sea, and land drones that the Ukrainian military has mastered in its defense of the country. Trump could explain to the American people that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would allow the United States to spend less on European defense and free up resources to contain China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a move should win the support of the many China hawks in Trump’s new administration.

This plan would prevent the kind of collapse and conquest that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It would also produce a lasting peace in Europe, not a temporary cease-fire easily broken by Russia in the future. If Trump succeeded in brokering this settlement, he could become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, an honor he covets.

The odds may be stacked against such a plan. Neither Putin nor Zelensky will be easily coaxed to the table, and Trump might resent the imperative of having to maintain, and even expand, support for Ukraine as a means to force negotiations. But an endless war or capitulation to Putin would be far worse.

How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael McFaul · December 12, 2024

Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership

Michael McFaul

December 12, 2024

A Ukrainian soldier firing a howitzer near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, November 2024 Oleg Petrasiuk / Press Service of the 24th King Danylo Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces / Reuters

Michael McFaul is Professor of Political Science, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014. He is the author of From Cold War to Hot Peace: A U.S. Ambassador in Putin’s Russia.

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At a CNN town hall in May 2023, Donald Trump promised that if elected, he would end the war in Ukraine in a single day. That bullish pledge has now become a familiar refrain, with the president-elect insisting that he uniquely has the nous to bring Russia and Ukraine to the table and force a truce. His imminent return to the White House has stirred a great deal of speculation on both sides of the Atlantic about the prospects for a peace deal. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Kyiv and its backers have been wary of signaling an interest in negotiations, fearful that doing so would be seen as weakness. Trump’s reelection now gives Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky greater freedom to engage in talks: he can argue that he has no choice. In late November, in an interview with Sky News, he suggested that he was indeed ready to negotiate.

Conditions on the ground, however, are not conducive to a deal. Wars usually end in two ways: one side wins, or there is a stalemate. In Ukraine, neither side seems near victory, but the war has not yet ground to a standstill. Russian President Vladimir Putin thinks he is winning. If Trump threatens to cut aid to Ukraine, Putin will be even more emboldened to keep fighting, not end his invasion; advancing armies rarely stop fighting when their opponent is about to become weaker. If Putin senses that Trump and his new team are trying to appease the Kremlin, he will become more aggressive, not less.

The lessons from U.S. negotiations with the Taliban during Trump’s first term should inform the president-elect’s thinking about dealing with Putin. The Taliban and the Trump administration negotiated a deal that was highly favorable to the militant group but that the Biden administration nevertheless honored. Its terms included a cease-fire, a timeline for the departure of American forces, and the promise of a future political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban, however, did not commit to the agreement; instead, they used that peace plan as a weigh station on their path to total victory. Appeasement of the Taliban did not create peace. Appeasement of Putin won’t either. Instead of just giving Putin everything he wants—hardly an example of the president-elect’s much-vaunted prowess in dealmaking—Trump should devise a more sophisticated plan, encouraging Ukraine to nominally relinquish some territory to Russia in exchange for the security that would come with joining NATO. Only such a compromise will produce a permanent peace.

THE TRUMP CARD

In their rhetoric, Trump and many of his allies have long expressed skepticism about U.S. support for Ukraine. They claim that backing Kyiv is a drain on American finances and has done little to end the war. But to abruptly cut funding for Ukraine now would not bring about peace; it would only spur further Russian aggression. To work toward a peace deal, Trump should first accelerate the delivery of military aid to Ukraine that has already been approved and then signal his intention to provide more weapons to stop Russia’s current offensive in Donbas, the much-contested eastern region of Ukraine, and thereby create a stalemate on the battlefield. Putin will only negotiate seriously when Russian armed forces no longer have the capacity to seize more Ukrainian territory—or better yet, though less probable, when Russian soldiers begin losing ground. For serious negotiations to begin, Putin must first believe that the United States will not abandon Ukraine.

After he convinces Putin to negotiate, Trump must also persuade Zelensky to stop fighting. That will be a significant challenge, as doing so will require the Ukrainian president to give up the quest to liberate all Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian soldiers. In giving up land, Zelensky would also have to abandon his citizens in those occupied regions or find a way to guarantee that they would be allowed to emigrate to western Ukraine. No democratically-elected leader makes such a concession lightly. A poll conducted this fall showed that 88 percent of Ukrainians still believe that Ukraine will win the war. Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom now fight to avenge their comrades killed in combat, will find it very difficult to lay down their weapons.

Putin must believe that the United States will not abandon Ukraine.

Zelensky and the Ukrainian people will not make such a sacrifice without receiving something of value in return: NATO membership. Gaining immediate entry into NATO would help offset the bitter concession of allowing a giant chunk of their country to remain under Russian occupation. It is the one card Trump can play to convince Ukrainians to stop fighting.

Ukraine’s membership in NATO is also the only way to maintain permanent peace along the border between Russia and Ukraine, wherever it is finally drawn. Lesser security guarantees to Ukraine, such as the feckless 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States offered Ukraine security assurances in exchange for Kyiv’s handing over its nuclear arsenal to Moscow, or more recent proposals of support from individual countries are not credible. Ukrainians know that Putin has never attacked a NATO member but invaded Georgia in 2008, invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and keeps soldiers in Moldova. They have witnessed how Russia signed and then violated multiple international treaties and agreements prohibiting the use of force against Ukraine. Pieces of paper do nothing to constrain Russian aggression. Ukrainians rightly worry that a cease-fire in the absence of NATO membership will only give the Russian army and Russia’s military-industrial complex time to gain strength and prepare for a future invasion. That’s precisely what happened between 2014 and 2022. If Ukrainians are going to acquiesce to what promises to be a long Russian occupation of roughly a fifth of their country, they need the credible deterrence that only NATO can offer.

In such a compromise, the timing of NATO’s announcement that it is offering membership to Ukraine will also matter a great deal. The alliance must issue the formal invitation the day Zelensky and Putin agree to stop fighting. After NATO invites Ukraine to join, member states must ratify the country’s accession quickly. Trump personally must signal his unequivocal support so that other NATO leaders do not drag out the ratification process. Right now, Trump has tremendous political capital to wield over some of these potential holdouts, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. He should use this leverage early in his presidency to secure a swift deal and bring the dreadful war in Ukraine to an end.

A VICTORY DAY FOR ALL

Skeptics argue that Putin will never accept Ukraine’s joining NATO. But Ukraine and NATO members do not need to ask for Putin’s permission. Putin has no place in negotiations between Ukraine and the alliance. Allowing him to disrupt or put off these deliberations would be a sign of American weakness not only to Moscow but also to Beijing.

These skeptics also grossly overestimate Putin’s concern about Ukraine’s joining NATO. Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 to stop NATO’s expansion. In the run-up to 2022, NATO membership for Ukraine was a distant dream, and everyone in Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington knew it. Putin’s invasion had other objectives: to unite Ukrainians and Russians into one Slavic nation, overthrow Ukraine’s democratic and Western-oriented government, and demilitarize the country. Putin barely raised an eyebrow when Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, even though Finland shares an 830-mile border with Russia. His war has driven Ukraine ever closer to NATO, not pulled it away.

But if the Russians insist that Ukraine’s joining the alliance threatens Russia—and they will—Trump can explain to Putin that NATO membership will constrain Ukraine. Zelensky, of course, will never formally recognize the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory. Yet the possibility of NATO membership could lead him to agree to a formula in which Kyiv accepts that it will only seek the reunification of Ukraine through peaceful means. West Germany and South Korea agreed to similar terms in return for defense treaties with NATO and the United States. As a condition for joining the alliance, Zelensky and his generals could also be obligated to withdraw Ukrainian soldiers from the Russian region of Kursk, where they have maintained positions since August. NATO is a defensive alliance. It has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia, and it never will. Putin knows that.

Trump should secure a swift deal and bring the dreadful war in Ukraine to an end.

If appropriately timed to happen when the war ends, the day that Ukraine is invited to join NATO will also be the most glorious day in Putin’s career. He will be able to proclaim to the Russian people and the world that his invasion was a success, that he has “won.” He will hold a victory parade on Red Square with Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean leaders at his side atop Lenin’s tomb. He will claim a place in Russian history books next to Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin as a Kremlin leader who expanded the borders of the Russian empire. On this alleged “victory day,” he will not want to spoil his triumph by starting another war or threatening one to try to block Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Some politicians in NATO countries, including Germany and Hungary, have expressed worries that Ukraine’s admission to the alliance could trigger World War III. They argue that because some of the country is in Russian hands, a wider war is inevitable if Ukraine becomes a NATO member. This analysis is flawed. After three years of painful war with Ukraine, Putin has no appetite to fight the most powerful alliance in the world, anchored by the U.S. military, the world’s best. The Russian army has endured tremendous losses while making only incremental gains on the battlefield against an under-armed and undermanned Ukrainian foe. Putin will not dare to go to war with the mighty U.S. armed forces and their allies after some 78,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine—a figure that, according to some estimates, grows to between 400,000 and 600,000 when including Russian soldiers wounded in the fighting. The Kremlin is scrambling for manpower, and its military enterprises are struggling to replenish Russia’s most sophisticated weapons because of ongoing sanctions.

German leaders, in particular, should understand the advantages of NATO membership for a divided country. West Germany joined NATO in 1955. That act did not spark World War III, even though West Berlin was surrounded by East German territory. Just the opposite: NATO membership helped keep the peace. On its own, West Germany might not have survived with the Soviet Red Army just across the border in East Germany.

More broadly, Europe would benefit economically from a stable and secure Ukraine. NATO allies would no longer need to provide billions in economic assistance to Kyiv or care for the millions of Ukrainian refugees straining welfare systems in European countries. Just as NATO facilitated the economic development of Western Europe during the Cold War, Ukraine’s membership in NATO would help the economies of all NATO allies benefit from trade with and investment in a booming postwar Ukrainian economy. The U.S. economy would benefit, too, especially from access to Ukraine’s critical minerals for advanced batteries and other vital technologies, which could help reduce American dependence on more unreliable autocratic suppliers.

MAN IN THE MIDDLE

Of course, one more person needs to be convinced of the merits of this peace plan: Trump. Given his past skepticism about aid to Ukraine and NATO more generally, it will not be easy to persuade him to take this path. Such a deal, however, supports several of Trump’s objectives. By bringing Ukraine into NATO, Trump could achieve a significant victory for one of his foreign policy priorities: burden-sharing. After joining NATO, Ukraine’s armed forces would overnight become the best and most experienced European army in the alliance. Ukrainian soldiers could be deployed to other frontline states, allowing Washington to reduce its own troop commitments. Ukraine could also supply other NATO allies, especially those that share a border with Russia, with the air, sea, and land drones that the Ukrainian military has mastered in its defense of the country. Trump could explain to the American people that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would allow the United States to spend less on European defense and free up resources to contain China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Such a move should win the support of the many China hawks in Trump’s new administration.

This plan would prevent the kind of collapse and conquest that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It would also produce a lasting peace in Europe, not a temporary cease-fire easily broken by Russia in the future. If Trump succeeded in brokering this settlement, he could become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, an honor he covets.

The odds may be stacked against such a plan. Neither Putin nor Zelensky will be easily coaxed to the table, and Trump might resent the imperative of having to maintain, and even expand, support for Ukraine as a means to force negotiations. But an endless war or capitulation to Putin would be far worse.

More by Michael McFaul

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael McFaul · December 12, 2024

18. US, allies send message to Beijing over South China Sea clashes with the Philippines

US, allies send message to Beijing over South China Sea clashes with the Philippines

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · December 11, 2024

Mira Rapp-Hooper, director for East Asia and Oceania at the U.S. National Security Council, speaks in Tokyo at a maritime dialogue involving the United States, Japan and the Philippines, Dec. 10, 2024. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

TOKYO — Diplomats and representatives from the militaries and coast guards of the United States, Japan and the Philippines agreed this week they prefer a peaceful settlement of ongoing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

The trilateral maritime dialogue took place Tuesday against a backdrop of clashes involving Philippine and Chinese vessels in disputed territory.

In a joint statement after the Tokyo meeting, the U.S. and Japan expressed support for the Philippines’ efforts toward a peaceful settlement of the disputes. They reiterated their expectation that Beijing comply with a 2016 international court ruling against its claim to virtually the entire South China Sea.

The three-nation partnership benefits from consensus on Capitol Hill about “the challenges we face and the need to work closely with our partners as we address that,” Mira Rapp-Hooper, director for East Asia and Oceania at the U.S. National Security Council, said at the meeting.

The U.S. is “concerned about China’s aggressive and unlawful behavior in the South China Sea which undermines international law, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight,” she said.

The three nations were eager for an in-depth discussion about the South China Sea, Ryo Nakamura, director of the southeast and southwest Asian affairs department at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at the start of the meeting.

Last week, a Chinese coast guard ship fired a water cannon at a Philippine fisheries patrol vessel in the disputed waterway, the state-run Philippine News Agency reported Tuesday. It’s the latest in a series of similar incidents in the past two years.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. ruled out sending a navy ship to the area, noting that his country is not at war and would not escalate tensions.

Marcos, according to the news agency, told reporters in Pampanga that the government would continue protecting fishermen and the country’s territory.

“We don’t need navy warships,” Marcos said. “All we are doing is resupplying our fishermen, protecting our territorial rights.”

China will continue to safeguard its sovereignty, rights and interests, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Tuesday in remarks reported by the Reuters news agency.

“The recent maritime incidents between China and the Philippines are entirely caused by the Philippines’ persistent infringement and provocation,” spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular news conference.

The Philippines has proposed to host a second maritime dialogue involving the three nations next year.

Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · December 11, 2024

19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2024

Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south. Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about six kilometers south of Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on December 11 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian fortifications west of Novyi Trud, south of Novotroitske (southwest of Shevchenko), and on the southwestern outskirts of Shevchenko itself. Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces lost two positions during these attacks and are working to restore them. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Pokrovsk characterized the situation in this direction as "critical," largely because each Russian battalion-sized formation receives about 200 fresh personnel per month. The Ukrainian commander also emphasized that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions up to 30 times per day and have an advantage in artillery fires—suggesting that Russian forces are currently relying on a superior number of personnel and artillery ammunition to secure tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that the Russian command has resumed offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but that this maneuver is coming at a massive cost to Russian manpower and equipment. Another Ukrainian brigade officer reported that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks. Continued Russian losses at this scale will impose a mounting cost on Russia's already-strained force generation apparatus. Russian forces may well continue making gains towards Pokrovsk, but the losses they are taking to do so will temper their ability to translate these gains into more far-reaching offensive operations.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.

US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11.

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within Russian regional administrations.

20. Iran Update, December 11, 2024

Iran Update, December 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad interim Syrian government. The HTS-led military coalition has secured control over key civil and security services since the interim Syrian Salvation Government was established on December 9. HTS-led opposition forces have assumed control over the Syrian state media outlet SANA and local police forces, which has enabled the HTS-led opposition to disseminate and enforce official government edicts. HTS has also appointed loyal members to ministerial positions within the interim government to guarantee HTS’s role in shaping policies and the new Syrian constitution during this critical transition period. HTS—and Jolani in particular—is attempting to impose a fait accompli in which it controls the Syrian government, thus enabling it to influence Syria for the foreseeable future.

Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Other Syrian groups, including southern opposition forces and the SDF, have not yet subordinated themselves to Jolani’s control. The leaders of the Southern Operations Room, an opposition group that now controls most of southwestern Syria, met with Jolani on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs. The meeting probably discussed the future of the Syrian government while focusing on “coordination.” These leaders did not explicitly endorse the central government, though noted the importance of a “unified effort” and “cooperation.” The leaders of the Southern Operations Room previously fought against Jolani and the HTS predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s as part of the Southern Front. The SDF also appears to be preparing itself for negotiations that would create a broader-based Syrian government that is not under Jolani’s control. The SDF voiced support for a ceasefire but did not explicitly voice its support for the HTS-led government. The SDF’s position may harden further as Arab contingents within the SDF defect to HTS.

Key Takeaways:

Government Consolidation in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani and HTS may find it difficult to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled interim government. Some of these groups have previously fought against Jolani’s organization and may be reticent to see Jolani expand his influence.

Sectarianism in Syria: More extremist and sectarian groups within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian violence in Syria. Reported sectarian incidents and revenge killings—though the incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian government.

Israel in Syria: An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.

Eastern Syria: The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10. Arab forces within the SDF are also defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates. HTS has not yet assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to resolve their issues without resorting to fighting.

Iranian Response to Syria: The Iranian supreme leader gave a speech in which he claimed that Syria was “occupied” by opposition forces. The supreme leader compared Syria today to Iraq in the 2003-2011 period and said that Syrian youth would free Syrian just like Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “freed” Iraq from the United States.

Iran-Turkey: Khamenei criticized the "obvious role" that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.

Iranian Intelligence Operations in Israel: Four unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to recruitment over the past two years.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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PLAYING WITH FIRE

How Trump Can End the War in Ukraine

Convince Kyiv to Trade Land for NATO Membership

Michael McFaul

THE TRUMP CARD

A VICTORY DAY FOR ALL

MAN IN THE MIDDLE

US, allies send message to Beijing over South China Sea clashes with the Philippines