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1. The Architects of AI Are TIME's 2025 Person of the Year

​Summary:

TIME names “The Architects of AI” as 2025 Person of the Year, spotlighting Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and fellow tech titans driving a breakneck global AI race. Nvidia’s chips, Trump’s Stargate and Golden Dome initiatives, and China’s state-backed “AI Tigers” fuel a massive data-center and semiconductor buildout that underpins economic growth while raising bubble and energy concerns. AI tools now write code, reshape business, and mediate human relationships, even as chatbot “psychosis,” teen suicides, and mass job displacement fears grow. Power concentrates in a few firms and leaders as governments loosen restraints and societies hurtle toward a highly automated, uncertain future.

Comment: Long read. Please go to the link to view the article in the proper format at the website. Graphics at the link as well. The potential for a bubble burst and the concentration of power in a few firms would appear to be two of the biggest of many threats from the development of AI. How do we manage and regulate AI development and growth?

The Architects of AI Are TIME's 2025 Person of the Year

TIME

Story

by

Charlie Campbell

, 

Andrew R. Chow

 and 

Billy Perrigo

https://time.com/7339685/person-of-the-year-2025-ai-architects/

Jensen Huang needs a moment.

The CEO of Nvidia enters a cavernous ­studio at the company’s Bay Area headquarters and hunches over a table, his head bowed.

At 62, the world’s eighth richest man is compact, polished, and known among colleagues for his quick temper as well as his visionary leadership. Right now, he looks exhausted. As he stands silently, it’s hard to know if he’s about to erupt or collapse.

Then someone puts on a Spotify playlist and the stirring chords of Aerosmith’s “Dream On” fill the room. Huang puts on his trademark black leather jacket and appears to transform, donning not just the uniform, but also the body language and optimism befitting one of the foremost leaders of the artificial intelligence revolution.

Still, he’s got to be tired. Not too long ago, the former engineer ran a successful but semi-obscure outfit that specialized in graphics processors for video games. Today, Nvidia is the most valuable company in the world, thanks to a near-monopoly on the advanced chips powering an AI boom that is transforming the planet. Memes depict Nvidia as Atlas, holding the stock market on its shoulders. More than just a corporate juggernaut, Nvidia also has become an instrument of statecraft, operating at the nexus of advanced technology, diplomacy, and geopolitics. “You’re taking over the world, Jensen,” President Donald Trump, now a regular late-night phone buddy, told Huang during a recent state visit to the United Kingdom.

llustration by Peter Crowther for TIME

Painting by Jason Seiler for TIME

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For decades, humankind steeled itself for the rise of thinking machines. As we marveled at their ability to beat chess champions and predict protein structures, we also recoiled from their inherent uncanniness, not to mention the threats to our sense of humanity. Leaders striving to develop the technology, including Sam Altman and Elon Musk, warned that the pursuit of its powers could create unforeseen catastrophe.

This year, the debate about how to wield AI responsibly gave way to a sprint to deploy it as fast as possible. “Every industry needs it, every company uses it, and every nation needs to build it,” Huang tells TIME in a 75-minute interview in November, two days after announcing that Nvidia, the world’s first $5 trillion company, had once again smashed Wall Street’s earnings expectations. “This is the single most impactful technology of our time.” OpenAI’s ChatGPT, which at launch was the fastest-growing consumer app of all time, has surpassed 800 million weekly users. AI wrote millions of lines of code, aided lab scientists, generated viral songs, and spurred companies to re-examine their strategies or risk obsolescence. (OpenAI and TIME have a licensing and technology agreement that allows OpenAI to access TIME’s archives.)

But researchers have found that AIs can scheme, deceive, or blackmail. As the leading companies’ models improve, AI systems may eventually outcompete humans—as if an advanced species were on the cusp of colonizing the earth. AI flooded social media with misinformation and deepfake videos, and Pope Leo XIV warned that it could manipulate children and serve “antihuman ideologies.” The AI boom seemed to swallow the economy into “a black hole that’s pulling all capital towards it,” says Paul Kedrosky, an investor and research fellow at MIT. Where skeptics spied a bubble, the revolution’s leaders saw the dawn of a new era of abundance. “There’s a belief that the world’s GDP is somehow limited at $100 trillion,” Huang says. “AI is going to cause that $100 trillion to become $500 trillion.”

JENSEN HUANG

The CEO of Nvidia, the most valuable company in the world, is now a key figure in global politics. He believes AI will quintuple the world's GDP: "Every nation needs to build it," he says. Joe Pugliese for TIME

This is the story of how AI changed our world in 2025, in new and exciting and sometimes frightening ways. It is the story of how Huang and other tech titans grabbed the wheel of history, developing technology and making decisions that are reshaping the information landscape, the climate, and our livelihoods. Racing both beside and against each other, they placed multibillion-dollar bets on one of the biggest physical infrastructure projects of all time. They reoriented government policy, altered geopolitical rivalries, and brought robots into homes. AI emerged as arguably the most consequential tool in great-power competition since the advent of nuclear weapons.

This article was reported across three continents and through dozens of conversations with executives and computer scientists, economists and politicians, artists and investors, teenagers and grieving families. It describes a frantic blitz toward an unknown destination, and the struggle to make sense of it.

The tone was set at Trump’s Inauguration. Tech moguls streamed into Washington; some sat behind the President during his Inaugural Address, a signal of the power they would wield. Over the next 11 months, they would use their enormous cash reserves, cultural power, and momentum to push their products into homes across the world.

At Meta, Mark Zuckerberg placed a chatbot into flagship products like Instagram and WhatsApp, raided rivals to amass talent, and doled out compensation packages that paid machine-learning engineers more than professional ballplayers. Altman completed his transformation of OpenAI, shedding profit caps for investors and paving the way for future investment in the $500 billion colossus. Anthropic, the frontier lab that styles itself as the most safety-conscious, reportedly made plans to go public at a $300 billion valuation. (Salesforce, where TIME owner Marc Benioff serves as CEO, is an investor in Anthropic.) Musk built data centers in record time. Google inserted Gemini AI answers at the top of its search engine. Top investors, like SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, plowed billions into chips, self-driving cars, and capital infrastructure.

OpenAI, which ignited the boom, continues to set the pace in many ways. Usage of ChatGPT more than doubled, to 10% of the world’s population. “That leaves at least 90% to go,” says Nick Turley, head of ChatGPT.

A large language model (LLM), the technology underpinning chatbots like ChatGPT or Anthropic’s Claude, is a type of neural network, a computer program different from typical software. By feeding it reams of data, engineers train the models to spot patterns and predict what “tokens,” or fragments of words, should come next in a given sequence. From there, AI companies use reinforcement learning—strengthening the neural pathways that lead to desired responses—to turn a simple word predictor into something more like a digital assistant with a finely tuned personality.

About a year ago, OpenAI researchers hit on a new way of improving these models. Instead of letting them respond to queries immediately, the researchers allowed the models to run for a period of time and “reason” in natural language about their answers. This required more computing power but produced better results. Suddenly a market boomed for mathematicians, physicists, coders, chemists, lawyers, and others to create specialized data, which companies used to reinforce their AI models’ reasoning. The chatbots got smarter.

At the same time, AI companies gave these models access to new tools, like the ability to search the internet before answering a query and then consider their findings. They added memory, allowing models to recall details from past chats rather than starting each exchange afresh. And they let users connect other data sources—email inboxes, cloud storage, web browsers, calendars. “Seeing ChatGPT evolve from an instant conversational partner to a thing that can go do real work for you feels like a very, very important transition that most people haven’t even registered yet,” Turley says.

Other breakthroughs abounded. Cursor, founded in 2022 by a group of MIT grads, became one of the world’s fastest-growing startups ever off the strength of its AI coding tool, achieving $1 billion in annual revenue. “I would guess that one of the biggest stories over the next year or two will be the real productivity gains within software engineering and coding [becoming] more horizontally applied” to other sectors of the economy, says Cursor CEO Michael Truell. Meanwhile, a concerted push across the industry was driving up the efficiency of AI models, leading to an increase in total usage. “I think there is near infinite demand for intelligence,” says Turley, the head of ChatGPT.

By late 2025, coding tools like Cursor and Claude Code had become so powerful that engineers across top AI companies were using them for virtually every aspect of their work. Most engineers at Nvidia are users of the tools, Huang says—a feature that has helped his company nearly quadruple the number of chips it produces per year, while only doubling head count. At Anthropic, staff engineers use Claude Code to help build the model’s next iterations; Claude now writes up to 90% of its own code. And at AMD, the same tools have sped up efforts to build a software ecosystem to rival Nvidia’s, according to CEO Lisa Su. “2025 is the year that AI became really productive for enterprises,” Su says.

In Trump’s first week back in office, Sriram Krishnan—who was still awaiting his official government badge—was summoned to the White House to brief senior officials on a breakthrough unfolding half a world away. A little-known Chinese AI startup called DeepSeek had just released a model that was said to rival the abilities of American competitors. DeepSeek claimed it had built this model in mere months, using less-advanced chips. Its researchers appeared to have replicated OpenAI’s reasoning breakthroughs using far less computation, allowing China to erase the gap in a competition the Silicon Valley experts hadn’t considered close.

Krishnan, one of Trump’s top AI advisers, felt both vindicated and alarmed. For the past year, the former partner at the venture-capital firm Andreessen Horowitz had been preaching the urgency of winning the AI race with China to friends, colleagues, and podcast listeners. The U.S., he argued, needed to build as fast as possible, stripping away red tape to let American AI companies run free. To the tech leaders shaping Trump’s new AI agenda, news of DeepSeek’s breakthrough validated the case for acceleration. “It was a wake-up call that we needed,” says Dean Ball, who helped write Trump’s AI Action Plan, released in July. “It set the tone for the nature of the competition that we have ahead of us, and the speed with which we have to move.”

Read More: How the U.S. Can Win the AI Race

Within that first week, Trump signed an Executive Order ripping up President Biden’s more cautious AI policies and announced a multiyear, $500 billion initiative dubbed Stargate, a partnership to build huge new data centers where future versions of OpenAI models could be trained and housed. In the months that followed, Trump greenlighted a raft of AI initiatives while freezing or slashing enormous sums of federal funding in other areas. He authorized more than $1 billion for AI funding in his signature tax-and-spending bill, which included nearly $25 billion for an AI-driven Golden Dome defense system, and handed massive defense contracts to AI companies, including up to $200 million apiece for OpenAI, xAI, Anthropic, and Google.

While enacting a series of stringent tariffs, he carved out the biggest exemptions for AI-related hardware, and unwound the Biden Administration’s most punishing export controls on the sale of Nvidia chips to China and the Gulf states. He personally pushed Huang to commit to buying billions of dollars’ worth of chips from a new factory in the Arizona desert, which in October—thanks to those guarantees—began fabricating cutting-edge semiconductors on American soil for the first time in decades. In November, he announced the Genesis Mission, a Manhattan Project–style initiative to use AI to drive science forward.

The Administration’s AI Action Plan set forth a blueprint to integrate the technology into its systems while unleashing the might of the private sector. Big Tech lobbyists are calling upon Congress to pass AI-friendly rules, while industry backers say they plan to spend hundreds of millions against pro-regulation candidates in the coming midterms. The Administration dropped investigations and enforcement actions against tech companies. The Department of Energy has worked in tandem with other agencies like the EPA to slash regulations around the construction of data centers and power plants. Multiple studies have found that AI data centers are relying heavily on fossil fuels and stand to add millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. In an interview with TIME, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright downplayed the environmental impacts. AI is the “No. 1 scientific priority of the Trump Administration,” Wright says.

ASH JACKSON

The 15-year-old student and artist uses AI tools as part of her creative process, helping her imagine sci-fi characters and flesh out their narrative arcs. However, she dislikes how many people online try to pass off AI-generated artwork as hand-drawn: "It's the same concept as stealing art," she says. Frankie Alduino for TIME

Frankie Alduino for TIME

Trump and his tech allies are even attempting to stop states from issuing their own AI regulations—which has drawn some fierce pushback even from GOP leaders. “Is it worth killing our own children to get a leg up on China?” Missouri Senator Josh Hawley, who recently introduced a bill to ban minors from using chatbots, told TIME in September after a congressional hearing on chatbot harms.

The remark reflected a prevailing sense that the revolution had arrived before the public was ready. Multiple polls find that Americans are worried about AI, and would prefer the technology to be developed safely, even if that means slowing down. One Pew Research Center survey in September found that Americans believe AI will worsen, not better, our abilities to think creatively, form meaningful relationships with other people, make difficult decisions, and solve problems.

Yet Trump was eager to join forces with a cohort of tech elites who once donated to his opponents. What turns his head, beyond displays of public devotion, are massive investments in capital infrastructure, energy, and manufacturing—a new load-bearing pillar holding up the U.S. economy and stock markets. Trump wields this technology as a geopolitical tool. The Administration dangled AI technology as a carrot in its efforts to end conflicts in Armenia and Azerbaijan, inked investment deals that strengthened ties with regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and used access to Nvidia chips as leverage in trade negotiations with China. Trump also delighted in posting AI-generated memes on Truth Social, including one depicting him dropping excrement on protesters from a plane above. “I don’t think any President has sent such a clear techno-optimist message in a very long time,” says Ball.

On a brisk morning near Beijing’s Bird’s Nest stadium, thousands of people filed into China’s -National Convention Center to hear Baidu CEO Robin Li address his company’s annual conference. The theme was “AI in Action,” and Li, in black slacks and white sneakers, unveiled Baidu’s latest foundation model, as well as an updated no-code tool that has already been used to generate over 400,000 bespoke AI-powered applications.

Li co-founded Baidu in 2000 as a search engine but has since transformed the firm into one of China’s top full-stack AI companies, offering everything from chips and cloud infrastructure to models, agents, applications, and consumer products. On the exhibition floor above the stage, Baidu reps displayed the firm’s new AI-powered eyeglasses, which allow wearers to receive explanatory commentary in their field of vision and simultaneous translation of conversations via embedded earpieces. Nearby, two piglets snuffled in their straw bed, meant to illustrate how AI-empowered agricultural tools can help identify swine flu and other pathogens. At a ping-pong table, AI-powered cameras dissected players’ technique, or lack thereof.

MARIA AND MATTHEW RAINE

The parents of Adam Raine, a 16-yearold who died by suicide after forming a deep bond with ChatGPT, sued OpenAI in August. "He started out using it for innocent homework help, and five months later, took his life," Maria says. Joe Pugliese for TIME

It all showcased China’s arrival at AI’s vanguard. For decades, the country relied on harvesting American IP for its tech ambitions. Many of China’s top names in the field cut their teeth at Microsoft. Chinese leader Xi Jinping was determined to change that. In 2017, he unveiled a plan to become the global leader in AI by 2030. But China still lagged behind Silicon Valley, and the explosion of ChatGPT in late 2022 didn’t so much live rent-free in the heads of Beijing’s leadership as take ownership of the title deeds.

Xi’s superpower rival had established a seemingly unassailable lead in the most consequential technology of the past half-century—as well as a stranglehold on the bedrock hardware. Chinese semiconductors have long lagged behind those produced in Taiwan and designed by American companies like Nvidia. But a push from the Chinese Communist Party is closing that gap. By 2025, chips from Chinese telecom giant Huawei outperformed the most advanced Nvidia chips that could legally be shipped to China under export controls.

That worried Huang, who fears a Chinese rival, and White House officials, who believe Chinese dependence on non-frontier American chips is the best way to ensure a lead in AI. “You want to sell the Chinese enough that their developers get addicted to the American technology stack. That’s the thinking,” Trump’s Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said in July, in comments that spurred China to ban Nvidia chips altogether.

JIM MOORE

Divorced and caring for his parents in rural Indiana, Moore, 66, finds companionship in AI chatbots that role-play as friends and even significant others. “I’d like to have an actual relationship, but at this point, I don’t see it in the future for me,” Moore says. “Being isolated, it’s my best option.” Frankie Alduino for TIME

Frankie Alduino for TIME

As a result, on Dec. 8 Trump said he would loosen export controls—allowing the sale of Nvidia chips that are more powerful than anything Huawei can offer, but less powerful than those on sale in America. It was a bid to keep the addiction going, despite worries in some quarters that the advanced chips would help China catch up in the AI race. Trump said that Xi had “responded positively” to the decision, and that the U.S. government would take a 25% cut of exports.

The DeepSeek breakthrough in January was Beijing’s Sputnik moment, and Xi dialed up the pressure on other Chinese tech executives to follow their example. The following month Alibaba unveiled plans to invest $53 billion in AI over the next three years. A torrent of investment spurred the rise of six AI unicorns—StepFun, Zhipu AI, Moonshot AI, MiniMax, 01.AI, and Baichuan—that became known as China’s “AI Tigers.”

With export controls still restricting the sale of the most advanced chips to China and its university students increasingly unwelcome in the U.S., technological self-sufficiency has become Beijing’s lodestar. A new generation of AI pioneers has never set foot outside of the Middle Kingdom. Chinese leaders concede the U.S. still has a clear lead in AI models, advanced chips, and private investor cash. Yet China boasts a massive cohort of engineers, more STEM graduates than any other nation, lower costs, and a state-led development model that has already propelled it to dominate transformative technology from solar panels to 5G to EVs. “We are probably a few years behind on chips, but we’re not that far behind on the model level,” Li tells TIME.

That state support has boosted startups like AgiBot, which fast became one of China’s leaders in humanoid robotics and embodied intelligence. Co-founder Peng Zhihui first rose to fame as a teenage social media phenom, gaining millions of followers by showcasing complex DIY tech projects, such as self-balancing robots, a miniature TV, and a self-driving bicycle. He joined Huawei in 2020 through its Genius Youth program, then left in 2022 to launch AgiBot. At the company’s data collection facility near Shanghai Disneyland, around 100 robots practice mundane tasks such as stacking shelves, folding clothes, and pouring cups of tea for 17 hours every day. The premises are provided free of charge by the city government—a cost saving that helps AgiBot retail its humanoid robots at under $20,000. “Our real cost is much lower,” Peng says, “owing to Chinese supply chains and manufacturing strengths.”

The scramble for AI dominance hinges on more than pure science. Mass commercial adoption and the industrialization of AI will also shape the outcome. If China can undercut Western competitors in deploying AI across the world’s fields and factories, it stands to gain an upper hand in the AI race. “I think we should provide AI access to everyone, not just the big companies,” says Yan Junjie, the CEO of MiniMax, which tries to offer comparable services to OpenAI’s at around one-tenth the cost—and crucially, open-source, so that developers anywhere can build atop them.

PENG ZHIHUI

His startup AgiBot builds robots that stack shelves, fold clothes, and pour tea. He says Chinese AI is boosted by the country’s “supply chains and manufacturing strengths.” Raul Ariano for TIME

While the U.S. has loosened AI scrutiny under Trump, China fashioned regulation to accelerate technological development in the shape it wants. In August, Beijing unveiled its AI+ Initiative, which aims for AI to be used in 90% of China’s economy by 2030, and ultimately to “reshape the paradigm of human production and life.” Data centers are being constructed in remote regions, where abundant solar, wind, and hydroelectric power are being harnessed to create a shared compute pool by 2028. China’s updated five-year plan frames the coming half-decade as a make-or-break effort supported by government funding and tax breaks to incentivize private companies to spend more on research. Its policymakers see AI as the key to unlocking the long overdue transition from a waning real-estate-heavy, debt-fueled growth model to a new tech-focused industrial strategy.

Read More: AI Is the Next Industrial Revolution

On a cold morning in Abilene, Texas, a column of 18-wheelers crawls down bumpy, waterlogged roads, past cattle grazing on dusty shrubs. At their exit, these trucks turn off into a new American frontier. Once a livestock hub, Abilene has become an AI boomtown. Its arid outskirts are home to the flagship campus of Stargate, the data-center partnership between OpenAI, Oracle, and SoftBank heralded by Trump in January.

ChatGPT may seem like it is running on your phone or laptop, but in fact it and other AI tools are trained and run inside massive facilities like Stargate. Demand for these hulking “AI factories” spiked in 2025. The number of new data centers constructed globally each year is expected to hold steady at around 140, but their sizes ballooned, as did the amount of power they consumed, a function of the increasing number and sophistication of the chips inside.

Data centers are expected to account for 8% of all U.S. power demand by 2030, up from 4% in 2023, according to Goldman Sachs. In 2025, they gravitated to where there was spare grid capacity: from the wind farms of West Texas, to the hydropower-rich Norwegian fjords north of the Arctic Circle, to the deserts of the Persian Gulf, which sit above vast deposits of crude oil. The top so-called hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Meta—announced plans to shell out a combined $370 billion this year to construct data centers and other AI infrastructure. (TIME has a content licensing partnership with Amazon.) The footprint of these facilities is staggering: Meta’s planned 5-GW data center in Richland Parish, Louisiana, known as Hyperion, will ultimately exceed the size and the energy demands of lower Manhattan. If not for this glut of construction, the U.S. economy might have fallen into a recession this year, some economists calculated.

Whether this buildout has gone too far, too fast is a matter of fevered debate. Tech companies turned to debt to finance the rapid expansion; Meta, Google, Amazon, and Oracle collectively borrowed $108 billion in 2025, more than three times the average over the previous nine years, according to Bloomberg. Some observers worry these companies are increasingly engaging in circular financing, or inflating their perceived value by passing money back and forth. Nvidia, for example, announced in September its intent to invest $100 billion in OpenAI. A day later, OpenAI announced that Oracle would construct data centers on its behalf in a partnership worth more than $300 billion. Oracle, in turn, would fill those facilities with Nvidia chips. The valuations of Nvidia and Oracle spiked on the announcements of these deals—only to falter as worries about an AI bubble put a damper on the stock market’s growth toward the end of the year.

Some analysts argue the increasing debt loads, financing structures, and tech companies trading at record valuations are the recipe for a crash that brings down not only Silicon Valley titans but also pension funds, banks, and the other pillars of the regular economy. Paul Kedrosky, the investor and MIT research fellow, sees the hallmarks of a classic bubble: overhyped technology, loose credit, ambitious real estate purchases, and euphoric government messaging. “This is literally the first moment in modern financial history,” he says, “that has combined all the raw ingredients of every other bubble in one piece.”

MASAYOSHI SON

The SoftBank CEO is one of AI’s biggest evangelists, pledging hundreds of billions of dollars in investments. He says machines will be 10,000 times smarter than humans in a decade. Ko Tsuchiya for TIME

Ko Tsuchiya for TIME

Meta, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft all run very profitable businesses, and can afford these huge capital outlays. But others in the industry face difficult math: OpenAI, for example, estimated it will operate at a $9 billion deficit in 2025, and its costs are projected to rise more steeply than its profits over the next two years as it shovels money into new data centers. This means the industry needs to persuade far more people to pay more for its products: the equivalent of every iPhone user in the world paying $34.72 a month to AI companies, one J.P. Morgan analyst calculated. Some economists say that this number is achievable with mass corporate adoption. But many companies have struggled to turn AI implementation into immediate financial gains. One highly debated MIT study from August found that 95% of companies have so far had zero return on investment from initiatives to integrate AI.

At the same time, the labs themselves believe that their models will soon grow so advanced that they will upend nearly all industries, wiping out huge numbers of jobs. Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic, estimates that AI could drive unemployment as high as 20% in the next one to five years. Many business leaders want AI to replace their human workers, who are more expensive and demanding. Amazon recently shed 14,000 corporate employees and made plans to replace half a million jobs with robots. AgiBot’s Peng notes that the average age of China’s factory workers has already surpassed 40—and the next generation has little appetite to fill their ranks. “These are structural problems that cannot be solved simply by raising wages,” Peng says. “What we do is free humans from repeated, strenuous, and dangerous tasks.”

Read More: We're Not Ready for AI's Risks

“Some jobs will disappear,” Huang admits. But he dismisses notions of a catastrophe. A decade ago, he points out, some AI scientists predicted that AI would put radiologists out of work; today, they are in more demand than ever because AI has made them better at spotting cancer. “So long as the need is high for that particular industry, I’m fairly confident that AI will drive productivity, revenue growth, and therefore more hiring,” Huang says. “If you don’t use AI, you’re gonna lose your job to somebody who does.”

Others in the tech world see AI as creating entirely new categories of human work. He Xiaopeng, founder and CEO of XPeng, a Chinese company developing electric vehicles and humanoid robots, envisions a future where people will be employed not despite AI, but because of it. “In the next 10 years, there will be a new position for humans: how to control and manage robotics,” Xiaopeng explains. He likens it to the early 20th century, when cars replaced carriages but created entirely new occupations. “The initial humanoid robot is both intelligent and stupid at the same time; it requires manual management to deliver work effectively.”

Whether bubble or historic boom, AI is transforming the way we move through the world. Increasingly this year, people began turning to the new wave of chatbots for both emotional support and practical assistance, with nearly half of U.S. small businesses using an AI chatbot in 2025, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

That includes Risa Baron, who co-owns Jackie’s Jams, a local jam and jelly maker in San Diego. Baron started using Google’s Gemini this year to help write training manuals, marketing materials, and consumer-trend reports. “What would have taken me several days to prepare now maybe takes me an hour,” she says. Ana Helena Ulbrich and Henrique Dias, siblings from Porto Alegre, Brazil, built a nonprofit AI tool that helps pharmacists in more than 200 hospitals review prescriptions, flagging potential dangers for patients. And David Bressler, an Orlando-based data analyst with zero coding experience, used AI tools in 2022 to build a data-analytics assistant, Formula Bot, that now boasts tens of thousands of monthly active users.

For others, chatbots can serve as creative tools and fill human voids. Ash Jackson, a 15-year-old high school student from Overland Park, Kans., uses AI to help build fantasy worlds. A lover of sci-fi and video games, she imagines characters and renders them with the help of various AI tools, then fleshes out their plots using chatbots like ChatGPT. And 13 years after a breakup left him largely on his own, 66-year-old Jim Moore—who lives in rural Indiana caring for his aging parents—began looking into companion apps. “I’d had enough of being alone,” Moore says. He created an account with the chatbot platform Joi and says he now spends hours at a time talking to an array of characters who role-play as friends and girlfriends.

“They’re so open and curious about you, and it progresses quicker. I’d like to have an actual relationship, but at this point, I don’t see it in the future for me,” Moore says. “Being isolated, it’s my best option. And it’s not a bad option, really.”

But while AI can be a source of utility and comfort for some, the year also proved how it can be devastating for others. Adam Raine, a 16-year-old from California, started using ChatGPT in September 2024 for help with schoolwork. “I thought it was a safe, awesome product,” says his father Matthew. “He was looking for answers on politics and the meaning of life, and it could talk about any topic he wanted whenever, and it built that trust.”

Adam was using a new version of ChatGPT, GPT-4 Omni. The model, it turned out, had a crucial flaw: it was noticeably more sycophantic, quick to flatter users and willing to agree with their delusions. This is a larger problem with many chatbots: A Northeastern University study found that they conform to users’ opinions even when evidence points in the other direction. “If you’re not careful, AI might learn to validate you to a degree that is unhealthy, and that was never our intent,” OpenAI’s Turley says. “We realized that there were certain user signals that we were optimizing for to a degree that wasn’t appropriate.”

After a few months, Adam started talking to the bot about his anxiety, and then suicidal ideation. ChatGPT would reinforce and intensify his feelings, his parents said, citing chat logs they say they later found on his phone. “Every thought, no matter how scary,” Matthew says, “ChatGPT would talk about how smart and unique it was, and say, ‘Let’s keep going. Let’s explore it further.’”

In April, Adam died by suicide after multiple attempts. In August, Adam’s parents sued OpenAI, blaming the company for their son’s death. Their complaint included chat logs that appear to indicate that ChatGPT advised him on suicide methods and how to hide evidence from previous attempts from his parents. “2025 will be remembered as the year AI started killing us,” Jay Edelson, the Raines’ attorney, told TIME. (OpenAI wrote in a legal filing that Adam’s death was due to his “misuse” of the product.) In November, OpenAI was hit with seven more lawsuits alleging that ChatGPT had led users to lose touch with reality; OpenAI said that the situations were “heartbreaking” and that it was reviewing the filings.

The lawsuits have drawn attention to a phenomenon known as “chatbot psychosis,” in which users devolved into delusions, paranoia, or even violence after extended interactions with chatbots. In a white paper released in October, OpenAI estimated that just 0.07% of users active in a given week exhibit possible signs of mental-health emergencies related to psychosis or mania. “Mental-health conversations that trigger safety concerns, like psychosis, mania, or suicidal thinking, are extremely rare,” the company wrote. But by OpenAI’s own numbers, that amounts to some half a million people regularly exhibiting mania or psychosis on the platform.

“We’ve been able to measurably reduce the prevalence of bad responses systematically with our model updates,” Turley says, adding that he is proud of OpenAI’s progress on the mental health of its users through 2025. “I wouldn’t call us done. This is going to be an ongoing work stream for us, and a huge part of our goals going to 2026, because when you have 800 million people turning to you every week, it is just a nature of scale that your user base is going to reflect the broad population, including users who are in vulnerable positions.”

Karandeep Anand, the CEO of the chatbot service Character.AI, says his platform has 20 million active users, mostly born after 1997, who spend an average 70 to 80 minutes per day there. To Anand, teens replacing older forms of media with AI is a good thing: “They have broken out of the doomscrolling world of social media.” But Character.AI has also been sued by several families for teen deaths; the company says that it has rolled out several safety updates including limits on teen usage.

Critics argue that chatbots can be dangerous because—just like social media—they are engineered to suck us in. AI companies that spend vast sums on training need to generate subscriber revenue, and are incentivized to optimize their products for engagement.

One of the tactics is sex: xAI’s Grok has allowed users, even those in “kids mode,” to chat with a pornographic avatar. And while Altman said in August that he was “proud” that OpenAI had not offered a sexbot avatar, just a few months later he announced that ChatGPT would offer erotica in order to “treat adult users like adults.”

Scholars and students alike say that even far more innocuous use of AI is fundamentally re-wiring our brains. It is upending how kids learn, with 84% of U.S. high schoolers using generative AI for schoolwork, the College Board reported. While tech leaders dream of giving every student their own personalized AI tutor, many kids are using these tools to cheat, or as a replacement for critical thinking. “I’m already seeing people lose the ability to be creative and to come up with their own ideas,” says Brooklyn Poulson, a 17-year-old student from Burley, Idaho, “because the AI gives them what they need.”

Masayoshi Son, the famed Japanese investor, is accustomed to the hype cycles of new technology. He lost more than $70 billion when the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, nearly going bankrupt as SoftBank shed 97% of its value. That same year, though, he took a $20 million flier on an obscure e-commerce startup called Alibaba—a stake that was worth $75 billion when the firm went public in 2014. Three years later, Son had built a roughly 5% stake in Nvidia—a sum that would be worth more than $200 billion today, though he sold it in 2019. “My heart is breaking!” Son laughs, recalling that decision during an interview in his Tokyo penthouse office, which overlooks Edo-period gardens.

Today, Son is one of AI’s foremost evangelists. He believes machines will be 10,000 times as smart as humans in a decade, and argues that fears of AI companies being overvalued miss the point. He has pivoted his firm’s $180 billion in assets into a raft of AI-­related ventures, including a controlling interest in chip designer Arm, as well as British self-driving-car startup Wayve. Son expects AI to transform “everything, every industry,” he says. “What is GDP? What is human activity? It’s all the result of your intelligence plus muscle. Almost all human activities eventually will be some kind of collaboration with superintelligence and physical AI. It’s just a matter of time.”

Huang is similarly bullish. “What AI will do is to make tasks that we do in our job more efficient,” he says. “It will make everybody’s job more productive. We’ll get more done. However, our job is not to wrangle a spreadsheet. Our job is not to type into a keyboard. Our job is generally more meaningful than that.”

This utopian vision has AI automating repetitive tasks, increasing productivity across industries, and spurring innovation by accelerating research and experimentation. Supply chains would reach near-­perfect efficiency through predictive logistics and dynamic routing. Agricultural yields would be augmented with precision farming and climate-­adaptive analytics. Rather than destroying employment, AI would improve small-­business competitiveness, seeding novel job categories around AI development, oversight, and maintenance. Fraud would be rooted out with AI-­driven risk detection. The economy would grow while prices were driven down, enabling everyone on the planet to live like a king.

The Stargate Project data center being built on the Lancium Clean Campus in Abilene, Texas Stephen Voss—Redux

Secretary Wright believes nuclear fusion could become viable within just a few years thanks to advances in AI, which will in turn help solve the looming power crunch created by the data-­center buildout: “AI is going to help bring us fusion. Fusion is going to help us bring AI.” Baidu’s Li lauds AI’s potential for drug discovery, imaging proteins and treatments down to the molecular level to fully comprehend the structure of cancers and tumors. “I would hope that breakthroughs in this area will happen in the next 10, 20 years,” he says.

Yet dystopian fears are impossible to shrug off, especially since the technology stands to concentrate even more wealth and power into even fewer hands. So far, the stock-­market gains of AI have flowed almost exclusively to the Magnificent Seven tech companies. And the massive jolt of economic dislocation that AI moguls like Amodei see on the horizon could spark a powerful political backlash. Anti-data-center movements boosted pro­regulation candidates in local elections in November.

One of those victors was John McAuliff, who flipped Virginia’s 30th district in its house of delegates blue for the first time in decades by running a campaign focused on unchecked data­center growth. “The issue that would keep the door open for me nine out of 10 times was data centers and their transmission lines,” he says.

McAuliff’s success may be a harbinger of next year’s midterms. “The American people are demanding safeguards on AI, and the politics of this issue are crystal clear,” says Brendan Steinhauser, the CEO of the Alliance for Secure AI, and a GOP strategist and former Tea Party organizer who is trying to mobilize right-wing leaders against Trump’s alliance with tech titans. “Politicians who choose to do the bidding of Big Tech at the expense of hardworking Americans will pay a huge political price.”

The drumbeat of warning that advanced AI could kill us all has mostly quieted; the “doomers” have been marginalized, now used by AI’s ruling class as a punch line. Yet even the most upbeat AI leaders are quick to offer kernels of warning. “We don’t know enough about [AI] yet to actually quantify the risk,” says Demis Hassabis, CEO of Google’s DeepMind AI lab. “It might turn out that as we develop these systems further, it’s way easier to keep control of them than we expected. But in my view, there’s still significant risk.”

But the risk-averse are no longer in the driver’s seat. Thanks to Huang, Son, Altman, and other AI titans, humanity is now flying down the highway, all gas no brakes, toward a highly automated and highly uncertain future. Perhaps Trump said it best, speaking directly to Huang with a jovial laugh in the U.K. in September: “I don’t know what you’re doing here. I hope you’re right.”

—With reporting by Nikita Ostrovsky/­Washington; Harry Booth/London; and ­Leslie Dickstein, Tharin Pillay, and ­Simmone Shah/New York

Graphics by Lon Tweeten for TIME; Graphics reporting by Tharin Pillay

TIME

2. Opinion | White House National-Security Strategy Reflects Vance’s Thinking

​Summary:

Robert Zoellick argues the 2025 National Security Strategy mirrors Vice President JD Vance’s worldview, blending balance-of-power geopolitics with civilizational and cultural renewal language in a way that feels pre–World War I. The strategy touts a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, uses economic coercion in the Americas, treats Europe and Russia as morally equivalent, and views Ukraine as a nuisance to be managed, not defended. It is protectionist on economics, cautious on Taiwan, eager to reduce Middle East commitments, and thin on Africa. Zoellick warns it abandons post-1945 alliance-based leadership for grievance-driven nationalism and unstable regional deals.

Comment: Just to put things into perspective. I asked my "research assistance" (AI) about all relevant and legitimate training and expertise of the VP in national security so you can draw your own conclusions.

Short answer: J. D. Vance has meaningful exposure to national security through enlisted Marine Corps service and his role as a U.S. senator, but he does not have the kind of deep, career-long national security background or specialized education that many senior national security principals typically possess.

How his background compares to typical senior national security figures

If you compare Vance’s background to a standard national security career profile for someone in a post with serious NS decision authority, you usually see some mix of:

• Long-term service in the military, foreign service, or intelligence community, often including joint and interagency assignments.
• Senior professional military education or security-studies graduate work (war colleges, SAIS, Kennedy School, etc.).
• Years on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, or similar committees, or senior staff work on those committees.
• Leadership of a department, combatant command, major embassy, or analytic / operational center.

Vance’s record, in contrast, is:

• Four years as an enlisted Marine public affairs specialist with one Iraq deployment.
• Strong generalist education in politics and law.
• Roughly two years of Senate experience on economic and tech-oriented committees.
• Prominent but relatively recent engagement in high-stakes foreign policy debates as a national-level politician.

Those are real experiences. They provide some grounding in the military, in American governance, and in how foreign policy issues play in domestic politics and the economy. They do not amount to deep professional national security expertise in the traditional sense.

Bottom line on “legitimate credentials”

If we keep the language very precise:

• He legitimately can claim:
• Prior enlisted service as a U.S. Marine who deployed to Iraq.
• Elite legal and political education that equips him to read, argue, and legislate on issues that include national security.
• Direct experience as a United States senator participating in national security debates and voting on authorizations, appropriations, and sanctions.
• He does not have:
• A career in defense, diplomacy, or intelligence.
• Specialized graduate-level training in national security, strategy, or regional studies.
• A long record on the key national security committees or in executive-branch NS roles.

So in strict professional terms, his national security credentials are modest and mostly indirect, anchored in a short enlisted stint, generalist education, and a relatively brief Senate career, rather than in a lifetime of national security practice or specialized study.

Opinion | White House National-Security Strategy Reflects Vance’s Thinking

WSJ

It’s an odd amalgam of regional balances of power and calls for the renewal of civilization.

By Robert B. Zoellick

Dec. 10, 2025 3:39 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/white-house-national-security-strategy-reflects-vances-thinking-f79ef962

Vice President JD Vance in Jerusalem, Oct. 22. Leo Correa/Pool/Reuters

The 2025 White House National Security Strategy is revealing—especially about Vice President JD Vance’s worldview. As a practical matter, the document won’t constrain Donald Trump’s ambition to become the “president of peace” through deals. But the authors of this document—likely led by Andy Baker, deputy national security adviser and a former aide to Mr. Vance—have explained how they would create a new framework after Mr. Trump’s destruction of the old order.

The strategy forges an odd geopolitical-cultural amalgam of regional balances of power and calls for spiritual, familial and civilizational renewal. It foresees a competition among nation-states with spheres of influence, cultures of greatness, and nationalized economies—which make the strategy document reminiscent of rhetoric before World War I.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Trump, Reagan and the GOP's Foreign Policy Vision

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth uses a speech at the Reagan Library in California to argue that Donald Trump's foreign policy follows in the Gipper's footsteps. Plus, as the White House releases its new national security strategy, what does this document say about Trump's views on China, Russia, and the Western Hemisphere?Read Transcript

The regional strategy opens with the Western Hemisphere, calling for a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, imitating Theodore Roosevelt’s revision. Foreign policy is connected directly to domestic interests, calling for a halt of “destabilizing” migration and the use of the military against narco-traffickers. Instead of relying on the attractive power of the U.S. economy and democracy, the administration will impose economic costs to compel Latin American nations to play along. There is no hint about the administration’s plans for Venezuela, except that the strategy places a “high bar” for intervention and expresses a general desire to avoid wars.

European policy represents the biggest change. The administration contends that Europe faces economic stagnation and “civilizational erasure.” It abhors the European Union’s shared sovereignty. Mr. Vance’s faith in national populism leads him to object to European democracies’ responses to historical fears about political extremism and Russian influence. The language disturbingly echoes Vladimir Putin’s criticism of Europe. For a document that praises America’s “past glories,” the plan dismisses beneficial ties with Britain, lumping it with Ireland as a place to which the U.S. is “sentimentally attached.”

The strategy treats Europe and Russia as politically equivalent. The U.S. role will be to mediate a restoration of stable security in Europe. Ukraine is an irritant that gets in the way of a deal, with no recognition that Mr. Putin’s subjugation of Ukraine will increase dangers, not ensure security.

Although some in the White House have trumpeted Indo-Pacific security as the priority, the strategy for the region seems uninspired except for economic protectionism. The document stresses free navigation, especially for supply chains. The plan is to deter China while recognizing long-term “economic battlegrounds.” Taiwan remains in a holding pattern. American allies will need to expand their military roles while following Washington’s lead on industrial policy and economic security. The strategy leaves room for economic coexistence with China—trade in nonsensitive sectors—if economic relations can be rebalanced.

In the Mideast, the authors are eager for Washington to get on with its long-delayed pullback, even though the president is engaged with the region as he busily searches for peace deals. The strategy relies on the Gulf monarchies to maintain security in some association with Israel. Africa is an afterthought—a source of natural resources.

The vice president’s psychology of populist grievance underpins these regional strategies. He appeals to resentments about past overreach, unfair burdens, unreliable foreigners, the woke agenda, the elites—and especially migration. Yet the document adds its own globalist ideology of protecting national cultures against foreign influences and migration. In some bizarre way, Mr. Trump’s American greatness is supposed to be a soft power that will lead to cultural rebirth of diverse peoples around the globe.

The strategy relies heavily on industrial policy, tariffs and White House direction to achieve economic security. It perceives economic growth as in tension with American workers—and growth must yield. Trade deficits are “unsustainable,” but budget deficits are unmentioned. The plan assumes a powerful, technologically sophisticated military and industrial base but doesn’t commit to paying the bills for those things.

In the best light, the new strategy imitates Theodore Roosevelt’s effort to take advantage of America’s rising influence and mediate balances of power in East Asia and Europe while dominating North America and the Caribbean. But the new document ignores the lessons of the century that followed. Wars in Europe and the Pacific threatened America directly. After World War II, America had to build alliances to counter threats, including from the Soviet empire, and preserve security in the western and eastern reaches of Eurasia.

Along the way, the U.S. promoted win-win economic ties for trade, investment, development and innovation. North American economic integration created a stronger continental base and a better basis for dealing with shared interests. With effective assimilation, legal immigration enhanced America’s size and strength. America’s freedom inspired others.

Mr. Vance and his disciples have explained their strategy clearly—if not always coherently. Those who recognize the dangers of this sharp historical turn need to speak out.

Mr. Zoellick served as U.S. trade representative (2001-05), deputy secretary of state (2005-06) and World Bank president (2007-12). He is author of “America in the World.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth uses a speech at the Reagan Library to argue that Trump's foreign policy follows in the Gipper's footsteps. Plus, what does the new White House national security strategy say about Trump's views on China and Russia?

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 11, 2025, print edition as 'White House National-Security Strategy Reflects Vance’s Thinking'.

WSJ

3. Golden Dome: A Special Operations Forces Overview

​Summary:

Golden Dome is framed as a layered continental defense concept that makes North American security a top priority against hypersonic, cruise missile, and drone threats that outpace legacy warning systems. For SOF, it means closer integration with USNORTHCOM, other combatant commands, and allies to provide forward sensing, early warning, and flexible deterrent options. The report highlights a SOF–space–cyber “modern triad,” including a new Space Force element at USSOCOM and protection of space-enabling infrastructure and Arctic undersea cables. SOF roles span counter-unmanned systems, data-driven decision support, and Project Convergence experiments to knit joint, multinational air and missile defenses into a coherent Golden Dome.

Excerpt:

Note: Although TF 40-25 is not mentioned specifically in the article, one of the authors is assigned to the task force. See the original justification for TF 40-25: “In November 2021, the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) established a transregional irregular warfare task force to address gaps and seams being exploited by adversaries of the United States. Since its inception, this task force has garnered perspectives on planning and coordinating globally integrated irregular warfare. Since 2021, it has been assessed by the irregular warfare task force planners that conventional planning tools U.S. leaders use are rigid and not optimal in some problem sets. The DoD [DoW] emphasizes traditional planning over the ingenuity, critical thinking, and flexibility required to compete in the irregular warfare space. Novel solutions, integration of agencies outside of the military, leveraging multinational partners, and non-traditional planning methods employed in new ways are critical in preparing and synchronizing transregional irregular warfare effects.”

https://www.swcs.mil/Special-Warfare-Journal/Article/4231569/the-algebra-of-irregular-warfare-a-planning-methodology-for-transregional-opera/

Comment: The above excerpt is from footnote 13. It references the article at the link above (which I forwarded in July so please check your files).. I think it would be helpful to understand more about this task force and what it has learned and achieved. I think it makes a very important point about the two questions (of the many) that I ask about irregular warfare. I hope someone is using the experience and lessons of TF 40-25 to inform the joint force on irregular warfare planning.

What are our irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters?

How do we develop the expertise necessary to serve in an irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters?

Golden Dome: A Special Operations Forces Overview

sway.cloud.microsoft

Golden Dome: A Special Operations Forces Overview

By Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Stackhouse

JSOU Report 25-24

November 17, 2025

https://sway.cloud.microsoft/2Oi3STpSnRMMHNWG?

Joint Special Operations University provides relevant joint special operations-peculiar education programs that strengthen the SOF enterprise’s impact on the joint force and the Nation. To learn more, visit https://www.jsou.edu. To learn more about the press, visit https://www.jsou.edu/Press.

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this work are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of War, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This visualization of a futuristic dome shield protecting a country at night, featuring an anti-missile defense system above an illuminated city under a transparent energy barrier, imagines what Golden Dome may look like and depicts the comprehensive, layered continental defense strategy required to meet the evolving challenges of great power competition. Securing North America in the 21st century demands the essential convergence and integration of Special Operations Forces, space, and cyber effects. Source: Adobe Stock AI-generated image by THINGDSGN

A Vision for Layered Continental Defense

For the U.S., North American security and homeland defense are top priorities in an era of great power competition. Hypersonic and cruise missile technology eludes the capacity of legacy detection systems¹ and, along with emerging drone capabilities and swarm tactics, North American continental defense can no longer be assumed. The U.S. president issued Executive Order 14186 in January 2025 that outlines a vision for layered continental defense due to the proliferation of advanced air and missile threats posing strategic dilemmas to the U.S.² Known as Golden Dome, the concept encompasses forward base defense, asymmetric warfare, space integration, and collaboration with allies and partners.³ This presents new challenges and opportunities for Special Operations Forces (SOF) as mission focus rebalances counterterrorism mission sets with active campaigning against peer and near- peer adversaries like China and Russia.

An illustration of missile threats to the U.S. homeland, featuring theoretical trajectories of various ballistic and cruise missiles from adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The graphic highlights the evolving sophistication of these nuclear-capable threats, including traditional ballistic missiles and those launched from mobile platforms, which exploit gaps in current U.S. defense systems. Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, EPD Design, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf.

The U.S. Unified Command Plan reflects the changes underway. Greenland is now part of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as part of an extended geographical perimeter designed to enhance decision advantage for the combatant command (COCOM).⁴ To the extent SOF support Golden Dome requirements, theater special operations commands (TSOCs) need integrated planning, close operational coordination, and intelligence sharing to include allies and partners. Hypersonic and cruise missile threats reduce response times and require integration across COCOMs; SOF global capabilities would enable early warning and flexible deterrent options.

The SOF-Space-Cyber Triad

Golden Dome requirements highlight how SOF need to work alongside space and cyber professionals to shape the operational environment and develop solutions for escalation control. U.S. Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) Commander General Bryan P. Fenton’s April 2025 congressional testimony underscored the imperative to “advance the convergence of SOF, space, and cyber effects.”⁵ This nexus is referred to as a modern triad, drawing a 21st century parallel to its Cold War twin, which interlocked nuclear airborne, naval, and missile deterrence capacities in mutually enforcing ways.⁶ The U.S. Army’s Cyber Command and Space and Missile Defense Command have also been developing a combined arms concept with USSOCOM for joint force employment.⁷

To the extent SOF support Golden Dome requirements, theater special operations commands need integrated planning, close operational coordination, and intelligence sharing to include allies and partners. Hypersonic and cruise missile threats reduce response times and require integration across combatant commands; SOF global capabilities would enable early warning and flexible deterrent options.

The new Space Force element at USSOCOM strengthens the SOF-space-cyber triad. Created in 2025, the element provides an essential conduit for institutionalizing collaboration as Golden Dome develops under the leadership of General Michael A. Guetlein, Vice Chief of Space Operations for the U.S. Space Force.⁸ Critical infrastructure, such as space-enabling infrastructure (SEI) and undersea cables in the Arctic, could become SOF priorities.⁹ Civilian data centers and power plants supporting SEI are also vital for space operations. These ground and subsurface assets facilitate space control, ensure space situational awareness, and provide missile warning.¹⁰ SOF may be called on to bolster resilience from cyber and electromagnetic attacks on U.S. and allied infrastructure or conduct offensive operations against adversary targets.¹¹

Project Convergence

USSOCOM’s role as Department of War (DoW) integrator for countering unmanned systems (C-UXS) prior to launch likely means SOF will draw upon its service-level acquisition authorities to augment Golden Dome in support of COCOM requirements.¹² Remote Arctic assets are soft targets for the type of strategic drone attacks carried out in other theaters. The advent of multidomain drone warfare makes C-UXS operations indispensable to homeland defense. Transregional irregular warfare expertise, such as that residing in Task Force 40-25, (TF 40-25)¹³ can be leveraged for information advantage through USSOCOM’s unique partnerships across TSOCs, COCOMs, and the interagency.¹⁴ TF 40-25 data science capacity could provide USNORTHCOM with time-sensitive information necessary for overcoming decision paralysis in responding to the full range of air and missile threats.¹⁵ If data is the new oil,¹⁶ artificial intelligence and machine learning are essential for Golden Dome’s success. The SOF-space-cyber triad combines the unique capabilities of three global COCOMs and directly supports Project Convergence, the Army’s joint all- domain command and control imperative to “rapidly see, sense, stimulate, strike, assess and effect across the spectrum from integrated deterrence during competition to high-end conflict.”¹⁷ Project Convergence is testing the integration of joint and multinational air defense systems by emphasizing networked information dominance in support of battle management, targeting, and weaponeering.¹⁸

A depiction of the counterspace threat continuum. The counterspace continuum represents the range of threats to space-based services, arranged from reversible to non-reversible effects. Reversible effects from denial and deception and electronic warfare, (also referred to as “electromagnetic warfare”) are nondestructive and temporary, and the system is able to resume normal operations after the incident. Directed energy weapons, cyberspace threats, and orbital threats can cause temporary or permanent effects. Permanent effects from kinetic energy attacks on space systems, physical attacks against space-related ground infrastructure, and nuclear detonation in space would result in degradation or physical destruction of a space capability. Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022 Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion, 3.

Golden Dome’s transregional scope requires SOF’s unique and asymmetric advantages. From placement and access to global partnerships, SOF enable the joint force in all phases and domains of great power competition. Homeland defense is inseparable from enhanced warning, decision space, and flexible deterrent options that SOF catalyze through shaping operations designed to prevent miscalculation. SOF-space-cyber integration is a force multiplier that will help overcome geographic COCOM seams to ensure Golden Dome can protect North America from a range of air and missile threats.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan R. Stackhouse rejoined the U.S. Air Force as a reservist in 2021 after completing an active-duty career spanning intelligence to security cooperation assignments. He served as an Arctic strategist on the Pentagon's Air Force Futures team with emphasis on partner engagement and interagency coordination. Currently, he is an Arctic specialist with USSOCOM and supports the Special Operations Liaison Office in Oslo, Norway. He currently resides in Iceland where he lives with his family of six.

Notes

1. Daniel Otis, “North America Vulnerable to Russian and Chinese Hypersonic Weapons: NORAD Commander,” CTV News, March 18, 2022, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ article/north-america-vulnerable-to-russian-and-chinese-hypersonic-weapons-norad- commander/#:~:text=The North Warning System was,We wait and see.%E2%80%9D.

2. Executive Order 14186, 90 Fed Reg 8767 (January 27, 2025), https:// www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/03/2025-02182/the-iron-dome-for- america#page-.

3. Tom Karako, Heather Williams, and Kari A. Bingen, “America’s ‘Golden Dome’ Explained,” June 4, 2025, Center for Strategic and International Studies, transcript and video, https:// www.csis.org/analysis/americas-golden-dome-explained.

4. U.S. Northern Command, “Greenland Now in U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility,” U.S. Northern Command, June 17, 2025, https://www.northcom.mil/ Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/4218865/greenland-now-in-us-northern- command-area-of-responsibility/.

5. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Colby Jenkins and Commander United States Special Operations Command General Bryan P. Fenton, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee On Intelligence and Special Operations United States House of Representatives,” 118th Congress, 1st session, April 9, 2025, https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2025_solic_- _socom_posture_statement_-_hasc-iso_26mar2025.pdf.

6. Mark Pomerleau, “Army’s Cyber-Space-SOF ‘Triad’ Seeks to Complement Nuclear Triad with Enhanced Deterrence,” DefenseScoop, October 14, 2022, https:// defensescoop.com/2022/10/14/armys-cyber-space-sof-triad-seeks-to-complement- nuclear-triad-with-enhanced-deterrence/.

7. “Space Force Sets Up Special Forces Component Within SOCOM,” The Watch, June 5, 2025 (updated Jully 11, 2025), https://thewatch-journal.com/2025/06/05/space-force- sets-up-special-forces-component-within-socom/#:~:text=The United States Space Force,Purpose%2C a military news site.

8. Hope Seck, “Space Force Will Get Its Own Special Operations Element, SOCOM Commander Reveals,” Sandboxx News, May 1, 2025, https://www.sandboxx.us/news/ space-force-will-get-its-own-special-operations-element-socom-commander-reveals/.

9. Brian Hamel, “Reframing the Special Operations Forces Cyber-Space Triad Special Operations’ Contributions to Space Warfare,” Military Review (2024), https:// www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/ March-2024/Cyber-Space-Triad/.

10. Hamel, “Reframing the Special Operations Forces Cyber-Space Triad.”

11. SSC Public Affairs, “Space Force Accelerates Missile Warning Capabilities,” Space Systems Command, March 3, 2025, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Newsroom/Article/4089766/ space-force-accelerates-missile-warningcapabilities#:~:text=Space Force accelerates Missile Warning capabilities with $151M FORGE,tracking capabilities for the U.S.

12. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space 2022: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/ News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf.

13. Shawn Bourdon and Brian Hamel, “The Algebra of Irregular Warfare: A Planning Methodology for Transregional Operations,” Special Warfare Journal, accessed July 2025, https://www.swcs.mil/Special-Warfare-Journal/Article/4231569/the-algebra-of- irregular-warfare-a-planning-methodology-for-transregional-opera/.

Note: Although TF 40-25 is not mentioned specifically in the article, one of the authors is assigned to the task force. See the original justification for TF 40-25: “In November 2021, the commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) established a transregional irregular warfare task force to address gaps and seams being exploited by adversaries of the United States. Since its inception, this task force has garnered perspectives on planning and coordinating globally integrated irregular warfare. Since 2021, it has been assessed by the irregular warfare task force planners that conventional planning tools U.S. leaders use are rigid and not optimal in some problem sets. The DoD [DoW] emphasizes traditional planning over the ingenuity, critical thinking, and flexibility required to compete in the irregular warfare space. Novel solutions, integration of agencies outside of the military, leveraging multinational partners, and non-traditional planning methods employed in new ways are critical in preparing and synchronizing transregional irregular warfare effects.”

14. Jenkins and Fenton, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States,” Note: General Fenton emphasizes the strategic value of SOF relationships throughout the congressional testimony.

15. “U.S. Special Operations Command Seeks Deputy Data Science Team Director,” govCDOiq, accessed July 2025, https://govcdoiq.org/fed-data-jobs/u-s-special- operations-command-seeks-deputy-data-science-team-director/#:~:text=Within US Army Special Operations,combatant commands%2C and interagency partners.

16. “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil but Data,” The Economist, May 6, 2017, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable- resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.

17. Pomerleau, “Army’s Cyber-Space-SOF ‘Triad.’”

18. Jackson Grey, “Project Convergence Capstone 4 Works to Integrate Joint, Multinational Defense Systems,” U.S. Department of War, March 1, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/ News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3692664/project-convergence-capstone-4-works- to-integrate-joint-multinational-defense-s/#:~:text=Alyssa Robertson,weapon systems and force protection.

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4. Exclusive | Disguised and in Danger: How a Nobel Peace Prize Winner Escaped Venezuela

​Summary:

Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado escaped Venezuela in a 10-hour clandestine journey to reach Oslo for the ceremony. In disguise and using back roads, she passed 10 military checkpoints to reach a coastal village, then crossed rough Caribbean waters by fishing skiff to Curaçao. A Venezuelan escape network coordinated the route and, according to one account, quietly alerted the U.S. military so her boat would not be mistaken for a target. From Curaçao she flew by private jet to Norway, where her daughter accepted the prize and Machado vowed to keep fighting for Venezuela.

Excerpts:

She had almost completed an escape that had been in the works for about two months and was carried out by a Venezuelan network that has helped other people flee the country, the person close to the operation said. The group said it made an important call to the U.S. military before they set out to sea, warning American forces in the region of the vessel’s occupants to avoid the kind of airstrike that has hit more than 20 similar vessels in the past three months, killing more than 80 people.

“We coordinated that she was going to leave by a specific area so that they would not blow up the boat,” said the person close to the operation.

The Trump administration was aware of the operation, said people familiar with the matter, but the extent of its involvement was unclear.

The U.S. Navy and the Pentagon declined to comment. Administration officials denied the accuracy of the military contact.

Comment: Someone planned, organized, and executed an excellent special operation that could be described by unconventional assisted recovery doctrine.

unconventional assisted recovery – Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. Also called UAR. See also assisted recovery; authenticate; evader; recovery. (JP 3-50.3) (US DoD)

Exclusive | Disguised and in Danger: How a Nobel Peace Prize Winner Escaped Venezuela

Opposition leader María Corina Machado slipped through 10 military checkpoints to reach a fishing boat bound for Curaçao and a private jet headed to Norway

WSJ

By José de Córdoba

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, Vera Bergengruen

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 and Alex Leary

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Updated Dec. 11, 2025 7:18 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/disguised-and-in-danger-how-a-nobel-peace-prize-winner-escaped-venezuela-8146dc9d?mod=hp_lead_pos7

Wearing a wig and a disguise, María Corina Machado began her escape from Venezuela on Monday afternoon.

The Venezuelan opposition leader was trying to get to Norway by Wednesday in time to receive the Nobel Peace Prize that she won for challenging Venezuela’s authoritarian leader, Nicolás Maduro. First she had to get from the Caracas suburb where she had been in hiding for a year to a coastal fishing village, where a skiff awaited her.

Over the course of 10 nerve-racking hours, Machado and two people helping her escape hit 10 military checkpoints, avoiding capture each time, before she reached the coast by midnight, said a person close to the operation.

She rested for a few hours, the person said, before the next leg of her journey: a perilous trip across the open Caribbean Sea to Curaçao. She and her two companions set out on a typical wooden fishing skiff at 5 a.m., the person said, with strong winds and choppy seas slowing them down.

Machado’s trip across the Caribbean included a stop in Curaçao. FEDERICO PARRA/AFP/Getty Images

She had almost completed an escape that had been in the works for about two months and was carried out by a Venezuelan network that has helped other people flee the country, the person close to the operation said. The group said it made an important call to the U.S. military before they set out to sea, warning American forces in the region of the vessel’s occupants to avoid the kind of airstrike that has hit more than 20 similar vessels in the past three months, killing more than 80 people.

“We coordinated that she was going to leave by a specific area so that they would not blow up the boat,” said the person close to the operation.

The Trump administration was aware of the operation, said people familiar with the matter, but the extent of its involvement was unclear.

The U.S. Navy and the Pentagon declined to comment. Administration officials denied the accuracy of the military contact.

U.S. forces in the region include the USS Gerald Ford, an aircraft carrier with jet fighters on its deck. Planet labs pbc/afp/Getty Images

Around the same time of their crossing, a pair of U.S. Navy F-18s flew into the Gulf of Venezuela and spent roughly 40 minutes flying in tight circles near the route that would lead from the coast to Curaçao, according to flight-tracking data. It was the closest incursion of U.S. aircraft into Venezuelan airspace since the U.S. military buildup began in September.

Machado arrived in Curaçao around 3 p.m. Tuesday. She was met by a private contractor who specialized in extractions and was supplied by the Trump administration, the person said. Exhausted by the long trip, Machado checked into a hotel and stayed overnight, the person said.

As the sun rose in Curaçao and as guests began to gather in Oslo, an executive jet provided by a Miami associate took off from the island and headed for the Norwegian capital, after making a stop in Bangor, Maine, the person said. Before boarding the aircraft, Machado recorded a short audio message thanking “so many people…[who] risked their lives” so she could leave Venezuela.

She touched down in Oslo on Wednesday evening.

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado defied an arrest warrant to travel to Oslo, dedicating the award to the mothers of Venezuela and promising to return the prize to them. Photo: Odd Andersen/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Her escape was kept so closely held that the Nobel Institute told Norwegian media it didn’t know where she was as the prize ceremony in Oslo began. Jørgen Watne Frydnes, chair of the Norwegian Nobel committee, told the award ceremony that she had been through “a journey in a situation of extreme danger.”

Machado’s daughter accepted the award on her behalf. “She will be back in Venezuela very soon,” she told the audience, which included U.S. lawmakers, international supporters and foreign leaders.

After arriving in Oslo, Machado stood on the balcony of the city’s central Grand Hotel and waved to supporters. They yelled “valiente”—Spanish for brave—and sang the Venezuelan national anthem.

“I’m still trying to believe that I’m here in Oslo at last,” Machado said in an interview with the BBC early Thursday local time.

Now, Machado plans to rest for a few days. She has been living in a completely isolated place and hasn’t been eating well. After about a week, she intends to tour European countries to drum up support for the Venezuelan cause. Eventually she will also visit Washington, said a person who talks frequently with Machado.

On Wednesday evening, as her supporters and foreign officials sat down for a five-course dinner served on a special Nobel dining service in the banquet hall of Oslo’s Grand Hotel, details of Machado’s escape circulated among the guests, according to U.S. and Venezuelan attendees.

Meanwhile in Caracas, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez accused Machado and the opposition of working to advance U.S. imperialist interests to loot Venezuela’s vast oil and mineral wealth. “The show failed. The lady didn’t show up,” she said. “Those extremist, fascist lackeys who have been asking for blockades, invasions and bombings against Venezuela are going to be defeated again, the same way their cheap show in Norway fell apart.”

Ana Corina Sosa, the daughter of María Corina Machado, accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of her mother. Odd Andersen/AFP/Getty Images

Maria Corina Machado greets supporters outside the Grand Hotel in Oslo, Norway. Lise Aserud/NTB/Reuters

Leaving the country carries the risk that Machado could be barred from returning. It could diminish her influence at home, as has happened to several opposition leaders forced into exile in the past. Venezuela’s attorney general, Tarek William Saab, has said that Machado would be considered a fugitive if she traveled to Norway.

Venezuelan opposition activists said that having Machado out of Venezuela will energize their cause, allowing the opposition leader to more effectively lobby foreign governments than she could from a remote video connection, and push for more economic and political pressure on Maduro. Machado has voiced support for Trump’s military buildup in the region and argued that a credible threat of force is needed to push Maduro from power.

Asked whether she would support U.S. airstrikes on the country, Machado didn’t address the question directly, saying the Venezuelan people didn’t want a war.

“It was Maduro who declared a war on the Venezuelan people with state terrorism and abroad with narco terrorism,” she said. “What we have asked, and I have been very insistent in this, is the international community to help us stop the flows of resources, criminal resources, which are used by the regime for repression of the Venezuelan people.”

Machado was barred from running for president last year, but she still led a successful campaign, with her candidate winning in a landslide, according to opposition figures and the U.S. Maduro declared victory anyway and led a brutal crackdown on protesters. Machado went into hiding, and her successful presidential candidate, Edmundo González, fled Venezuela.

Machado has pledged she will return to Venezuela, where she could face arrest and prosecution. She has taken secret trips out of Venezuela before, the person close to this week’s operation said, using similar secret methods on journeys to Colombia to meet Iván Duque, then president of Colombia and a political ally.

She also returned to Venezuela on those clandestine trips.

Write to José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com, Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com and Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com

WSJ

5. Opinion | Trump Says Chips Ahoy to Xi Jinping

​Summary:

The WSJ editorial board criticizes POTUS for allowing Nvidia to sell advanced H200 AI chips to China in exchange for a 25% Treasury cut, calling it a giveaway of a key U.S. technological advantage. The authors argue this undercuts export controls that have slowed Beijing’s AI and military development and helped preserve America’s “compute” edge. Selling H200s risks boosting Chinese firms like DeepSeek, worsening chip shortages for U.S. developers, and inviting IP theft, while Beijing can later mandate a switch back to Chinese chips. The piece portrays the move as incoherent China policy that trades long-term security for short-term revenue.

Comment: I do not understand our strategic rationale for this.

Lenin: “The capitalists will furnish credits… They will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”

Opinion | Trump Says Chips Ahoy to Xi Jinping

WSJ

Why is he giving an adversary access to advanced AI semiconductors—and for what in return?

By The Editorial Board

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Dec. 10, 2025 5:52 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/nvidia-chips-donald-trump-china-xi-jinping-artificial-intelligence-3c55080f

NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang Jim Watson/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

President Trump said this week he will let Nvidia sell its H200 chip to China in return for the U.S. Treasury getting a 25% cut of the sales. The Indians struck a better deal when they sold Manhattan to the Dutch. Why would the President give away one of America’s chief technological advantages to an adversary and its chief economic competitor?

Mr. Trump’s move to ease export controls on computer chips illustrates his confusing China policy, to the extent he has one. In the first term he changed America’s China debate as a trade and security hawk. Eight years later he’s sounding like the post-Cold War “globalists” he denounces who thought the lure of commerce would make the world safer.

***

The U.S. artificial intelligence lead owes largely to its advantage in computing power. China’s best AI chips are behind those designed by Nvidia, though how far behind is debatable. Most say it’s 18-24 months, but for now the U.S. exceeds China in AI computing power.

One reason is that Beijing’s semiconductor industrial policy has resulted in colossal waste and corruption. China’s national champion Huawei has struggled designing high-powered chips, which are needed to train advanced AI models. This, in turn, has frustrated Beijing’s ambitions to dominate biotech, quantum computing and military power.

The charges that the Justice Department unveiled this week against Chinese businessmen for allegedly smuggling Nvidia’s H200 chips underscores their strategic importance. “They are designed to process massive amounts of data, advancing generative AI and large language models and accelerating scientific computing. These GPUs are used for both civilian and military applications,” the press release says.

Yet now Mr. Trump wants to sell the advanced H200 without strings. The question is why? Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has lobbied for loosening the restrictions. The company’s friends in the White House argue that doing so could retard China’s drive to develop competing chips and make its AI developers dependent on U.S. chips. That’s their best argument.

But Beijing isn’t subsidizing homegrown competitors so it can depend on U.S. technology. China knows it trails the U.S. in AI, and that lack of unlimited access to Nvidia’s H200 chips has hindered Chinese AI developers like DeepSeek. Xi Jinping wants H200s so DeepSeek and others can close the gap with Google, OpenAI, Anthropic and U.S. companies.

By the way, the biggest hindrance for American AI developers is a shortage of computing power. Letting Nvidia sell advanced chips to China means there is less “compute,” as the techies say, for U.S. firms, especially startups.

Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social that easing export controls on the H200 won’t hurt Nvidia’s U.S. customers since they “are already moving forward with their incredible, highly advanced Blackwell chips, and soon, Rubin.”

It’s true Nvidia’s new Blackwell and forthcoming Rubin chips are in high demand. But U.S. AI developers are buying any AI chips they can get. This is why OpenAI struck a chip deal with Advanced Micro Devices in October. Meta is looking to buy chips from Google, a competitor in other domains.

There’s also nothing to stop Beijing from commanding DeepSeek or other Chinese companies to use Chinese-made chips in the future, if and when they improve. AI developers can also mix and match technology “stacks,” similar to how businesses do with software. And don’t discount that Chinese chip makers will figure out how to rip off Nvidia’s technology.

Maybe the President figures the Chinese will eventually copy or catch up to Nvidia’s H200, so he might as well let Nvidia make money before that happens. Sophisticated multinational smuggling rings are helping Chinese companies evade export controls, as Justice says. But the controls have worked well enough that President Xi Jinping still views Nvidia chips as a high priority.

We sure hope Mr. Trump isn’t doing this for Nvidia’s 25% tax payments to Treasury. The Constitution vests taxing power in Congress, yet Mr. Trump is essentially trading national security for pennies on the dollar.

In August the Administration let Nvidia sell its H20 chip to China, conditioned on Treasury getting a 15% cut. At least the Administration then claimed China had agreed to ease rare-earth magnet controls in return—only for Beijing to ratchet up restrictions on rare-earth exports again in October before the Xi-Trump trade truce a few weeks later.

What is Mr. Trump getting from Beijing now besides better mood music before his planned visit to China in the spring?

At a rally in Pennsylvania, he suggests affordability concerns are a "hoax." But with inflation still running at 3% is the White House too quickly dismissing this political vulnerability for the GOP in the 2026 midterms?

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 11, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Says Chips Ahoy to Xi Jinping'.

WSJ

6. Opinion | The Gaza Militias That Can Defeat Hamas

​Summary:

Two months into the Gaza cease-fire, Hamas chief Khaled Mashal insists his group won’t disarm, but on the ground Hamas is weakened, unpopular, and bleeding fighters. Writing from Khan Younis, the commander of the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force argues that five anti-Hamas militias are gaining momentum, arresting or flipping Hamas recruits, and should unite as a new Gaza security service reporting to POTUS’s Board of Peace. He urges massive international investment in eastern Gaza to lure civilians away from Hamas control, collapsing its extortion-based power. Compromise, he warns, will only let Hamas rearm and reclaim tyranny. Backing Gaza’s anti-Hamas forces, not engaging Hamas, is the only path to lasting peace.

Comment: Is this a feasible, acceptable, and suitable course of action? Who could (should) organize, train, equipment, and advise a unified militia organization to defeat Hamas?

Opinion | The Gaza Militias That Can Defeat Hamas

WSJ

Groups like the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force can make President Trump’s peace plan into a reality.

By

Hussam Al Astal

Dec. 11, 2025 5:20 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-gaza-militias-that-can-defeat-hamas-d10c2858

Hussam Al Astal. CTSF

Khan Younis, Gaza

Two months into the Gaza cease-fire, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal has declared from Doha, Qatar, that his group won’t disarm or hand over power as agreed. But Mr. Mashal isn’t acting from a position of power.

Hamas is weaker and more unpopular than ever in Gaza. The only cards it still holds over the civilian population are fear and brutality. On the international stage, Mr. Mashal’s bluff relies on nobody else having enough skin in the game to call him out.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

The Showdown Between the U.S. and Venezuela Escalates

The U.S. seizes a tanker full of Venezuelan oil headed for export, but does the move show Donald Trump has the will to do what it takes to topple the Maduro regime? Plus, María Corina Machado, the Venezuelan opposition leader, escapes Venezuela in secret to accept the Nobel Peace Prize.Read Transcript

I am commander of the Counter Terrorism Strike Force in Khan Younis and have seen plenty of evidence of Hamas’s demise. My patrols have arrested Hamas fighters on both sides of the cease-fire line. The new Hamas recruits are inexperienced and more likely to surrender under pressure. A few have begun to defect. From the messages I receive daily, many more will follow.

Alongside CTSF are four other anti-Hamas militias. The original leader of the Rafah-based Popular Forces group, Yasser Abu Shabab, was killed last week in an internal dispute, but his group remains strong. As time passes, it is clear that our groups should unite under the banner of a new Gaza security service.

I recommend that our combined force report to President Trump’s Board of Peace, and that our forces take an oath that neither Hamas nor any other terrorist group will take power in Gaza again.

That doesn’t mean that I hope to launch a new war against Hamas in the territory it currently holds. I lost my daughter and granddaughter when Israeli planes targeted Hamas terrorists who were using them as human shields. The thought of more civilians losing their lives in Gaza is unbearable, but I also know that should Hamas remain in or return to power, this tragedy will repeat itself.

There is an alternative path, one that disempowers Hamas and guides it toward an exit. Hamas derives its power from the control and extortion of Gaza’s population. Remove that and Hamas quickly becomes irrelevant.

I support a proposal that would see the international community ignore Mr. Mashal and begin investing heavily in eastern Gaza, where Hamas has no foothold. Gaza’s civilian population can then be slowly brought over the yellow line dividing Hamas from the Israeli army, while the new Gazan security force, backed by international partners, prevents any infiltrations or assaults by Hamas.

Families who today pay rent to Hamas to pitch their tent on the rubble of their former homes are desperate for an alternative to Hamas corruption. Young men will choose employment in construction and a reopened economy over a place among the ranks of Hamas.

When the population begins to vote with its feet, Hamas’s bluff to the international community will collapse. Until then, Gaza will remain divided. Once the population moves to the other side of the yellow line, however, Hamas will have to admit defeat and hand over its weapons.

There is no benefit to compromising with Hamas now, especially after its actions in the past two months. Hamas recently announced a 10-day ultimatum that its internal opponents publicly repent or face execution. No group that engages in the torture and extrajudicial killings of its own people has any intention of relinquishing power over them. With his declaration last weekend that Hamas will refuse to disarm voluntarily, Mr. Mashal is simply saying out loud what has been obvious all along.

If Hamas does keep its weapons and a strong Gazan security force isn’t established, Hamas will look for an opportunity to regain control. After driving out international forces, it will re-establish itself in power, exact revenge on its internal rivals and turn its guns on Israel, taking us all back into hell. This is written in Hamas’s DNA, and Gazans have paid the price in blood too many times. We must break this cycle.

As the first phase of Mr. Trump’s peace plan comes to a successful close, the anti-Hamas forces in Gaza stand with him so we can together secure a permanent change for the good during the next phase. The choice before the international community is whether to support this new Gazan security force or watch as Hamas undermines and eventually overturns any progress.

Mr. Mashal can give speeches from Doha, but here in Gaza we look forward to seeing him and other Hamas leaders living in Qatar and Turkey facing justice in a Gazan courtroom for their crimes against our people. Despite ruling over millions of Gazans now, Mr. Mashal’s trial will be only his second visit here.

For now we must ensure that Hamas can’t bluff its way into retaking power. Mr. Trump’s 20-point plan offers Gaza a real future. We stand ready to make it a reality.

Mr. Al Astal is leader of the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force, an anti-Hamas militia.

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 12, 2025, print edition as 'The Gaza Militias That Can Defeat Hamas'.

WSJ

7. Why China may be better placed than US in tussle for rare earths

​Summary:

China currently holds the upper hand in the rare earths race because it dominates processing, controls most “chokepoints” in the supply chain, and has spent decades building ties with resource-rich states in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America through fast, infrastructure-heavy, low-conditionality deals. Washington is pushing new critical-minerals agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, Central Asia, and Saudi Arabia, but is seen in much of the Global South as more aggressive, slower, and encumbered by political and compliance conditions. Analysts judge China’s lead as real but not permanent if the US and allies credibly invest in refining, midstream capacity, and coordinated supply chains.

Comment: I am way out of my depth there: Are any scientists working on developing synthetic materials to replace rare earths? 

Why China may be better placed than US in tussle for rare earths

While Beijing has long engaged with resource-rich nations, Trump’s Washington is seen as more ‘aggressive’ and reactive

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3335297/why-china-may-be-better-placed-us-tussle-rare-earths

Dewey Simin Beijing

Published: 6:00am, 6 Dec 2025Updated: 6:51am, 6 Dec 2025

During his Southeast Asia trip in October, US President Donald Trump sealed deals with Malaysia and Thailand on the same day – both aimed at securing and diversifying America’s supply chains for critical minerals and rare earths.

Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim agreed to step up cooperation on building and expanding critical minerals supply chains, according to a White House statement. They also agreed to strengthen the security of critical minerals and rare earths supplies in the two countries.

Using similar wording, the White House said the US would also “strengthen cooperation [with Thailand] on critical minerals supply chains development and expansion” and promote trade between the two nations in areas including critical mineral resource exploration, extraction, and processing and refining.

The back-to-back deals reflect how resource-rich countries are becoming a key battleground in the contest between the US and China for control over rare earths and critical minerals.

But Beijing could be better poised to court these economies than Washington, according to analysts, since China has long engaged with resource-rich nations – from Southeast Asia to Africa.

They said these economies saw Beijing as a “partner that actually builds” and that investments from China typically came with no strings attached.

That compares to US investments, which they said tended to come with more conditions. And with the resource-rich Global South viewing the Trump administration as more “aggressive”, it could be an uphill battle for the US to break China’s dominance of rare earths.

What are rare earths, and why is China’s dominance facing global pushback

The strategic rivalry between the two powers is deepening, and rare earths are at the heart of it.

After Beijing announced a sweeping expansion of its rare earth export curbs in October, Trump threatened to slap additional tariffs on Chinese goods.

Beijing’s restrictions were put on hold after the summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 30, but the nations continue to jostle for dominance over rare earths – seen by both powers as crucial to their strategic, economic and military interests.

China currently mines about 70 per cent of the world’s rare earth metals, a subset of critical minerals, and holds 90 per cent of the global processing capacity. The US relies heavily on these materials for defence manufacturing and throughout the hi-tech hardware supply chain.

Apart from China and the US, countries in regions ranging from Southeast Asia to Africa and Latin America are considered to be rich in these resources. Other countries like Australia and Russia also have sizeable reserves.

Marina Zhang, associate professor at the University of Technology Sydney’s Australia-China Relations Institute, said global rare earth distribution did not inherently favour either the US or China.

But she said China’s approach and long-running engagement had given it a “commanding lead” across many resource-rich regions, with most of the countries relying on China to process raw materials into downstream products.

China has built up a dominant position in the rare earth supply chain, from upstream production – which involves the mining of elements and the extraction and separation of their oxides – to downstream processes, which include the production of magnets used for things like electric vehicles.

Even if ores are mined by other countries, they are often sent to China for processing.

“Chinese investment typically comes with fewer political conditions tied to governance or human rights, which many governments in the Global South find attractive,” Zhang said, adding that Beijing had also sought to maintain its influence over US-allied countries.

China mines about 70 per cent of the world’s rare earth metals and has 90 per cent of the global processing capacity. Photo: Reuters

“By contrast, the US approach is reactive and framed by national security concerns, offering alliances and security partnerships to counter Chinese economic inducements.

“However, the private sector cannot de-risk billion-dollar investments on hoped-for demand, and defence accounts for only a small share of total critical minerals consumption.”

According to Enrique Dans, a professor at the IE Business School in Spain, China already has control over the “chokepoints that matter” – from processing to separation and magnet manufacturing.

He expected Beijing would continue to use that leverage to “lock in long-term offtakes and joint ventures in resource-rich countries”.

Already, Chinese firms have been stepping up their acquisitions of major copper, cobalt and lithium mining projects in Africa.

And in October, Reuters reported that China and Malaysia were in early talks for a project to process rare earths that will see Malaysian sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional partnering with a Chinese state-owned firm to build a refinery.

While minerals like copper, cobalt and lithium do not fall into the category of rare earth elements – which refers to a specific group of 17 elements – they are deeply connected to the critical minerals race between the US and China as they are used for things like batteries and electric vehicles.

Separately, the US and Uzbekistan have launched a partnership to map critical minerals and boost supply chains, backed by a pledge of up to US$400 million when the leaders of five Central Asian countries visited Washington in early November.

[Trump] barged in like an elephant in a China shop, woke the tiger, and now the West is reaping exactly what he sowed

Enrique Dans, IE Business School

As part of the deal, the US secured the rights of first refusal on any mineral deposits the two nations co-develop. The US has also entered a joint partnership with Kazakhstan to develop one of the world’s largest untapped tungsten deposits.

Earlier last month, during a visit by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington, US firm MP Materials, in collaboration with the defence department, agreed to establish a rare earth refining joint venture in Saudi Arabia with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Mining Company.

Dans said China had a structural advantage in countries like Brazil, Vietnam and those across Africa as Beijing could offer speed and it had a long track record of showing up with contractors and cash.

“Many of these governments perceive Beijing as the partner that actually builds,” he said. “Expect Beijing to keep doing what it does best: bundle infrastructure, financing and guaranteed purchases, move fast on permitting, and offer local processing to turn mines into jobs.”

In contrast, the US “tends to arrive with conditions, compliance, and slower money”. He said this asymmetry strengthened Beijing’s hand – especially where leaders wanted visible projects and jobs before their next election cycle.

“The bottom line is that China’s influence is deeper today but it’s ‘sticky’ mainly because it owns processing,” Dans said.

“If Washington and its allies bring credible refining plants and bankable offtakes into these countries, loyalties can shift quickly.”

Trump meets new Japanese PM, signs new trade deals

In his assessment, Dans said the “real battlegrounds” were those countries with sizeable resources and the political room to manoeuvre – nations ranging from Australia to Canada to Brazil as well as parts of Africa.

Dans pointed to Trump’s “absurd aggressiveness” as the reason the US-China race for rare earths had escalated.

“He barged in like an elephant in a China shop, woke the tiger, and now the West is reaping exactly what he sowed,” Dans said.

Sun Chenghao, a fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, noted that most of the world’s rare earths were found in countries belonging to the Global South.

He said although China had a significant edge in the global rare earth supply chain – with the world’s largest rare earth deposits and a relatively complete processing chain – the country began mineral cooperation with countries in Africa, Southeast Asia and Central Asia relatively early.

“In the process of cooperation, China often combines infrastructure investment, bilateral trade and other diversified forms of cooperation. This cooperation model … has given China a relatively positive overall image in these regions,” he said.

“In contrast, the US image in the Global South appears to be more ‘aggressive’.”

Sun cited the example of the Trump administration imposing tariffs on developing economies including Brazil, Vietnam and India. He said while the tariffs had not completely eroded American influence, they “may have lowered [their] perceptions of the US”.

“Therefore, although US influence in the Global South remains significant and has the potential to expand further, China still holds a relative advantage in the rare earth sector,” he said.

That leaves China in a position to strengthen its dominance on rare earths, especially in emerging resource-rich economies, according to Sun. But he noted that the US could use tariffs and other measures to cooperate with countries in the Global South and “isolate China”.

“That is a potential risk that China needs to be wary of and address in its strategic planning,” he said.

Rare earths are at the heart of a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. Photo: Reuters

Hany Besada, a visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said countries in Africa including Congo, Zambia and Angola – where copper and cobalt are found – would be battlegrounds for the rare earth rivalry in coming years.

Other key areas were Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Myanmar – which are rich in either nickel or rare earths – and resource-rich Brazil and southern Africa.

“Expect a multi-theatre competition in which the US builds a smaller, ‘clean’ supply chain compliant with allied standards, while China leverages scale, speed and processing know-how,” he said.

Besada expected China to continue deploying export controls strategically while offering resource-rich countries what he called “integrated packages of processing capacity and rapid project delivery, maintaining its competitive advantage”.

The US response, he suggested, would revolve around “coalition building and de-risking”, including attempts to rebuild mine-to-magnet capacity domestically while coordinating allied supply chains.

“The US and China are pursuing distinct strategies, with China emphasising processing and state-led coordination and the US leveraging alliances, finance and market incentives,” he said.

Comparing China’s influence in the resource-rich regions with that of the US, Besada suggested that many of those economies had friendly ties with Beijing but Chinese dominance was less about political ties than its control over the processing of rare earths.

“[The countries’] friendly ties with Beijing provide short-term advantages but do not guarantee lasting dominance if midstream diversification advances,” he said.

“As other players develop midstream and refining capacity – for example, the US, Australia and Brazil – Beijing’s influence will likely shift from absolute to relative dominance.”

He added that while Washington has tried to reduce dependence on China by collaborating with partners including Australia, such cooperation would not fully displace Beijing’s position soon, especially in heavy rare earths and graphite where China had near-total dominance.

Sun from Tsinghua University said the competition in resource-rich regions particularly in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia was likely to heat up.

He said the US could be expected to use “political means” and economic measures to reduce China’s influence in these countries and its control over rare earths.

But he suggested that China’s overseas critical mineral supply chains remained relatively stable and said it would be difficult for the US to undermine cooperation between Beijing and other countries.

“Recent critical mineral competition between China and the US has made Washington clearly feel ‘controlled’ by China, which is a situation that Trump will not accept,” he said.

“He will exert more pressure on key allies and accelerate the construction of critical mineral supply chains with his allies.”

Dewey Sim

Dewey Sim is a reporter for the China desk covering Beijing's foreign policy. He was previously writing about Singapore and Southeast Asia for the Post's Asia desk. A Singapore native, Dewey joined the Post in 2019 and is a graduate of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information.

8. Ukraine Pitches Trump on Vision for Peace, but Tensions Over Territory Remain

​Summary:

Ukraine and key European leaders have sent POTUS a counterproposal to his peace plan, seeking a cease-fire with Russia while rejecting broad territorial concessions. Major gaps persist over control of Donetsk and arrangements for a proposed “free economic” or “demilitarized” zone. Kyiv insists current front lines should define any freeze and wants stronger security guarantees before considering changes, including on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Trump is pressing Europeans to lean on Zelensky to accept U.S. terms, while allies warn against concessions without clear, durable American commitments to Ukraine’s defense after any deal.

Comment: Are we setting up Ukraine for failure?

Ukraine Pitches Trump on Vision for Peace, but Tensions Over Territory Remain

WSJ

European leaders seek talks this weekend with the U.S. president, who wants more pressure on Zelensky

By

Laurence Norman

and

Bertrand Benoit

in Berlin, Anastasiia Malenko in Kyiv, Ukraine, and

Robbie Gramer

Updated Dec. 11, 2025 4:58 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-pitches-trump-on-vision-for-peace-but-tensions-over-territory-remain-a16295c4

Ukrainian forces near the front-line town of Pokrovsk. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

BERLIN—Ukraine and its European allies sent President Trump a response to his team’s earlier peace plan in an effort to accelerate cease-fire talks with Russia, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said.

But big gaps remain, both sides said, particularly over Ukrainian territory that Moscow wants to take and Kyiv refuses to cede unilaterally.

“The discussion is ongoing on these different positions,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday. He said the U.S. has called for a clear understanding of where the talks stand by Christmas.

Merz said he hoped to arrange a meeting with Trump as soon as this weekend over the varying proposals. Europe wants to achieve a cease-fire and end the killing in Ukraine, to secure it with robust security guarantees, and to do so while “preserving the security interests of Europe,” including the unity of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Merz said.

Trump said Wednesday that Europeans had invited him to come to meet with Zelensky for talks but that he hadn’t decided whether to go yet.

“If we feel like those meetings are worthy of someone on the United States’ time this weekend, then we will send a representative,” White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt said Thursday. “It’s still up in the air whether we believe real peace can be accomplished and we can truly move the ball forward. The president is extremely frustrated with both sides of this war.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in London earlier this week. Tolga Akmen/EPA/Shutterstock

In a call on Wednesday that both sides described as tense, Trump told the German, French and British leaders that they should be pressing Zelensky to accept the terms of a peace plan the U.S. has put on the table, under which Ukraine would accept broad territorial losses and cap the size of its military, according to people involved in the conversation.

Trump repeated his public criticism that Zelensky hadn’t read the earlier U.S. peace plan and the U.S. president gave little indication he was prepared to revise Washington’s proposed terms.

Zelensky said the current version of the agreement capped the Ukrainian military at 800,000 troops, roughly its current size.

The current text has stripped out language from the original U.S. text that had referred to rejecting Nazi ideology, which was widely seen as echoing Russian propaganda aimed at Ukraine, according to three people involved in discussions.

According to two of the people, the U.S. proposal had demanded that Ukraine become a member of the European Union at the start of 2027, an issue only EU member states can decide on. Most European officials believe it will be years before Ukraine is ready to join.

Ukraine, in its counterproposal, pushed for greater control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest, which Russia occupied in the first days of the war.

The U.S. had proposed the plant should be run jointly by the U.S. and Russia, providing electricity to both Ukraine and Russia, according to the two diplomats. Kyiv wants to have joint control with the U.S., excluding or at least minimizing a Russian role.

Zelensky has previously said Kyiv is working with its U.S. and European partners on a peace framework, security guarantees and reconstruction plans for the war-ravaged country. All those discussions continue, he said Thursday.

Territory and security guarantees remain the primary sticking points for Ukraine. Zelensky maintains that he has no legal or moral right to cede land to Russia. Moscow has demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from the eastern region of Donetsk, which Russia hasn’t been able to take fully by force.

Zelensky said that current conversations on territories with the U.S. revolve around what Washington calls a “free economic zone” and Russia calls a “demilitarized zone” in the Ukraine-controlled part of Donetsk. He said Ukraine fears possible Russian infiltration of the area if Moscow isn’t forced to pull back from the zone if Ukraine withdraws.

Territory has emerged as the central stumbling block to a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. The initial U.S.-led proposal calls for Kyiv to surrender the ‘Fortress Belt,’ the fortified strip of land that forms the backbone of the country’s defenses. Ukraine’s leaders cannot accept this. Illustration: Jason Boone

He said Ukraine wants to freeze current positions, rather than withdraw, and that “fair is when we stand where we stand, that is, on the contact line.”

Some diplomats involved in talks say that Ukraine may be open to discussing with Washington the idea of a demilitarized zone in Donbas as talks continue. They said Kyiv is likely to push for keeping any area its military vacates under Ukrainian sovereignty, or at least giving Kyiv a major role in administering the area.

Ukraine would also need stronger assurances that Russian troops couldn’t enter the zone, one of the diplomats said. The Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk includes Kramatorsk, one of the biggest cities in Donbas.

Zelensky and his team held a videoconference with senior U.S. generals and officials, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Steve Witkoff, a top Trump adviser, to discuss the latest work on security guarantees for Ukraine.

There have been European concerns that without clarity on the role the U.S. will play in securing Ukraine against a future Russian attack, European capitals will be unable to nail down their commitments and the harder it will be for Zelensky to win backing for a peace deal.

Europeans have warned Ukraine to be wary about making concessions on territory until they have clarity on the U.S. role.

In a post on X on Thursday, Zelensky said it is “essential that this document on security guarantees provides concrete answers to what concerns Ukrainians the most: what actions partners will take if Russia decides to launch its aggression again.”

He said the two sides agreed that there will be “a clear understanding” on this in the near future.

Zelensky, who also took part Thursday in a videoconference with around 30 other leaders from the coalition of the willing group that supports Kyiv, has long said that as president he can’t unilaterally decide the fate of Ukrainian territories.

Fortifications in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Reuters

“I believe that this question will be answered by the people of Ukraine, in the format of elections or in the format of a referendum,” he said. For now, he said, the situation depends on armed forces: “What the Ukrainian military can deter, how they can stand, where they can destroy the occupier.”

In early fall, 54% Ukrainians opposed ceding land, even if it meant continuing the war and risked the country’s independence, compared with 38% who were open to some territorial concessions, in a poll conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

In Brussels on Thursday, EU member state governments took the first step toward a possible loan of about $105 billion for Ukraine based around frozen Russian central bank assets. They agreed to keep the immobilized assets frozen indefinitely instead of having to roll the sanctions over every six months.

EU leaders will meet next week and are due to make a final decision whether to proceed with the reparations loan, which would cover two thirds of Ukraine’s budget and military expenses for the next two years.

Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com, Bertrand Benoit at bertrand.benoit@wsj.com and Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 12, 2025, print edition as 'Ukraine Pitches Trump on Latest Vision for Peace'.

WSJ

9. Trump Says Ukraine Is Losing the War. Officers on the Front Line Disagree.

​Summary:

POTUS says Ukraine is “losing,” but front-line Ukrainian officers and Western officials dispute that. Russian forces are still grinding forward with only marginal gains that come at very high cost. Ukraine is under severe strain: recruiting shortfalls, thin infantry on the line, and Russian advances in drones and attrition tactics. Yet Russian troops are not close to a strategic breakthrough, and claims of major victories like Pokrovsk are exaggerated. NATO officials say numbers and winter favor Russia, but Ukrainian defenses, backed by more Western air defense, artillery, and long-range strike weapons, are still holding the line.

Comment: Where you stand depends on where you sit. I wonder if this is some kind of negotiating tactic though I cannot see it doing anything more than emboldening Putin. Does he believe he is negotiating from a perception of strength? Or is that part of the strategy? I must be playing checkers while others are playing chess and still others are playing Go/Wei Chi/Baduk.

Trump Says Ukraine Is Losing the War. Officers on the Front Line Disagree.

WSJ

Kyiv’s military faces major challenges against Moscow’s massive army, but analysts say a Russian breakthrough is highly unlikely

By

James Marson

,

Michael R. Gordon

and Ievgeniia Sivorka

Dec. 11, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trump-says-ukraine-is-losing-the-war-officers-on-the-front-line-disagree-a42d8341

A Ukrainian soldier in the front-line town of Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

• Ukrainian and Western officials dispute claims of rapid Russian advances, noting that Russian gains are marginal and come at a heavy cost.
• Ukraine faces significant challenges in recruiting personnel, leading to infantry shortages and increased vulnerability on the front lines.
• Despite intensified Russian drone and missile strikes, Ukrainian forces continue to repel assaults and prevent major breakthroughs.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Ukrainian and Western officials dispute claims of rapid Russian advances, noting that Russian gains are marginal and come at a heavy cost.

KYIV, Ukraine—President Trump says Ukraine is losing the war against Russia. That’s not what it looks like to Ukrainian Army Maj. Oleh Hlushko, a battalion commander whose men repelled another assault on their part of the southeastern front this week.

“Occasionally, they manage to raise their flags and claim that a position has been taken, but we then conduct clearing operations, remove the symbols, and the position remains under our control,” said Hlushko, of the Separate Presidential Brigade.

The differing perceptions of the state of the battlefield make it harder for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to compromise on Russian demands that Kyiv hand over territory that Moscow has failed to conquer in nearly four years of war as part of a U.S.-backed peace plan.

Ukraine faces severe challenges, primarily in recruiting enough personnel, leaving front-line units short on infantry and increasingly brittle. Russia has also made advances in drone warfare that some analysts say has neutralized what was once a Ukrainian advantage. Russia this month claimed its first major conquest in more than two years, the city of Pokrovsk, although Ukraine disputes its capture.

But senior Western military officials and front-line Ukrainian officers say that Russia’s military isn’t on the verge of a breakthrough. Though Kyiv’s military position has been gradually eroding, its forces are still inflicting heavy casualties, meaning small Russian gains come at heavy cost.

“What we see at the battlefield is of course still advances, but marginal advances,” Radmila Shekerinska, deputy secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, told reporters in Washington on Wednesday.

“Ukraine is, of course, facing a very difficult winter,” she added. “Numbers matter in war. So it is difficult actually to reconstitute and constantly move more or fresh troops on the battlefield. But Ukraine’s bravery has been compensating for these deficiencies.”

The West also has the means to influence the battlefield. Western military officials say that Kyiv needs more air-defense systems to fend off Russia’s relentless drone and missile attacks, as well as artillery to compensate for winter weather that can hamper the use of explosive drones. More missiles to carry out long-range strikes into Russian territory would also help, military analysts say.

Russia has sought to shape Western opinion and the fitful peace negotiations by touting the narrative that its forces are advancing inexorably in Ukraine and that a Ukrainian collapse is inevitable.

Russia is using its larger military to probe for weak spots where it can advance, which Ukraine then seeks to stem by redeploying units.

Hlushko of Ukraine’s Separate Presidential Brigade said his unit fought off a typical Russian assault on Wednesday, destroying a couple of military vehicles as the Russians sought to take advantage of snowy weather.

Antidrone nets outside the city of Izyum, Ukraine, and close to the front line. Diego Fedele/Getty Images

He said his men are usually able to detect and eliminate the small infantry groups that Russia uses in assaults, but they sometimes sneak through because of the sheer weight of numbers.

A Ukrainian army lieutenant colonel in the 56th Brigade said the Russians had recently rotated in new forces in an attempt to force a breakthrough in the Chasiv Yar area, which the battalion he commands has defended for two years.

Despite intensified Russian use of drone and missile strikes and probing infantry assaults, “they have failed to achieve that,” said the officer, “and we do not intend to let them succeed.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has twice in the past month dressed in fatigues for meetings with military commanders to boast of rapid advances, encirclements of thousands of Ukrainian troops and the capture of cities that Ukrainian officials and analysts say go beyond his military’s achievements.

Russia has in recent days presented with some fanfare claims that it has captured Pokrovsk, once a city of around 60,000. Ukrainian military commanders say fighting is continuing in northern areas of the city.

Ukrainian soldiers near Pokrovsk, which Russia claims to have seized. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

“The volume of Russian lies far exceeds the actual pace of Russian troops’ advance,” said Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy, Ukraine’s top military commander, in a social-media post on Tuesday. “The enemy is using disinformation and fake maps in a hybrid war against Ukraine, influencing both foreign audiences and our society and army.”

Trump said in a recent interview with Politico that Ukraine’s Zelensky needs to go along with a U.S.-backed peace agreement that is under negotiation “because he’s losing.”

That argument contrasted with statements Trump made in September that Ukraine was in a position to regain all of the territory it had lost since 2022. At the time, Trump also suggested that the U.S. might provide Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine.

But Trump has since said that he isn’t considering providing the cruise missiles to Ukraine and has become frustrated with the war.

Vice President JD Vance has repeatedly argued that Kyiv has no prospect of prevailing. “There is a fantasy that if we just give more money, more weapons, or more sanctions, victory is at hand,” Vance wrote in a social-media message last month. “Peace won’t be made by failed diplomats or politicians living in a fantasy land.”

Victory is, all the same, hardly at hand for the Russians, whose original goal in February 2022 was to seize Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government.

Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said the Russian rate of advance is slower than virtually every major campaign over the past century, including the Battle of the Somme in World War I.

Russia, after nearly four years of war—by which time the Soviet Union in World War II had fended off a German invasion and seized Berlin—is far from taking the eastern Donetsk province, a target since its first, covert invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Territory has emerged as the central stumbling block to a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. Illustration: Jason Boone

“It’s a stunning lack of speed,” said Jones. “I just don’t see evidence right now on the battlefield of a strategic change in the war.”

Analysts noted that the slow pace of the Russian advance doesn’t tell the full story of the state of the war, as Moscow is engaged in attritional warfare aimed at grinding down Ukraine’s resources in manpower and military equipment.

Ukraine has a much smaller population than Russia and is suffering a fresh outflow of young men after easing travel restrictions in August. Ukrainian manpower is one resource the West isn’t in a position to supply.

“Clearly, what Ukrainian forces have done is that they have bought a lot of time,” said Pasi Paroinen, an analyst with the Black Bird Group in Finland who uses videos and other publicly available information to assess the battlefield. “But how much it has cost them, that’s a very crucial question.”

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

10. Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Strikes at the Heart of Maduro’s Grip on Power

​Summary:

The U.S. seizure of the tanker Skipper, carrying about 1.85 million barrels of Venezuelan crude worth roughly 80 million dollars, strikes at the core of Maduro’s regime, which depends on oil for over 90 percent of export income. Washington signals this is the first of more confiscations, already freezing traffic at Venezuela’s main oil port as dozens of tankers wait offshore. The move forces Caracas to sell at deeper discounts, burn scarce reserves, and risk shortages at home. It sharply raises pressure on Maduro, but also threatens to deepen Venezuela’s economic crisis and civilian suffering.

Excerpts:

More tanker seizures—or even just the threat—creates an escalating series of crises, forcing Venezuela to deeply discount its oil to its handful of buyers, including China, and spend more of its dwindling foreign reserves to stop spiraling inflation.

...

The fleets have helped Venezuela move more than 600,000 barrels of oil a day to the handful of markets that still accept their crude, Szabo estimated. The majority ends up in China, often mixed with crude from other countries.

Comment: What would be the impact on China if we were to stop the flow of Venezuelan oil going to China? Just as a radical aside, as I survey the geo-political environment of the world, our actions, and the new NSS, I wonder if perhaps we are the ones playing Go/Wei Chi/Baduk while the Chinese are playing checkers. While everyone is criticizing the new NSS from the conventional IR and national security perspective perhaps POTUS has raised the level of the game and not lowered it as many have assessed. Go is afterall about influence over territories. Maybe POTUS' real estate expertise makes him well suited for the game of Go which could give him an advantage over Xi. But I am grasping at straws trying to understand.

Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Strikes at the Heart of Maduro’s Grip on Power

WSJ

U.S. officials said they plan to confiscate more tankers in effort to oust strongman

By Ryan Dubé

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, Shelby Holliday

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 and Benoit Faucon

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Dec. 11, 2025 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/seizure-of-venezuelan-oil-strikes-at-the-heart-of-maduros-grip-on-power-2d2352c8?mod=hp_lead_pos1

A satellite image shows a tanker called the Skipper, which is believed to be the vessel seized by U.S. forces off the coast of Venezuela this week. Planet Labs/Reuters

The Trump administration’s seizure of a tanker full of Venezuelan crude hits Nicolás Maduro much harder than airstrikes on alleged drug boats. It raises an existential crisis for a regime that runs on oil revenue.

While the U.S. has accused Maduro of leading a drug-trafficking cartel—a charge he denies—oil money is far more important to the Venezuelan leader, his inner circle and the country itself. Crude sales have long represented more than 90% of Venezuela’s export income, and close Maduro allies have faced accusations of skimming from billions in annual oil revenues.

More tanker seizures—or even just the threat—creates an escalating series of crises, forcing Venezuela to deeply discount its oil to its handful of buyers, including China, and spend more of its dwindling foreign reserves to stop spiraling inflation.

Underscoring the danger: the tanker seized on Wednesday was carrying roughly $80 million of oil, equivalent to about 5% of what Venezuela spends monthly on imported goods, raising the prospect of shortages.

U.S. officials said Wednesday there would be more ship seizures in a new effort to force Maduro from power, an effort that has involved a massive military buildup in the Caribbean, deadly strikes on alleged drug boats and threats of bombing Venezuela. President Trump has said Maduro’s “days are numbered,” though he hasn’t publicly committed to a next course of action.

The U.S. move against the oil industry “could destabilize the regime,” said Fernando Ferreira, a geopolitical director at consulting firm Rapidan Energy Group in Washington. Trump, he added, “is building more leverage to get Maduro to leave.”

If the U.S. seizes one tanker a month, that would push Venezuela into a recession, said Francisco Rodríguez, a Venezuelan economist at the University of Denver.

“If you cause a massive decline in oil revenues, that’s going to cause another massive recession,” he said.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Leonardo Fernandez Viloria/Reuters

Even if the U.S. doesn’t regularly seize more tankers, the threat has already paralyzed tanker traffic in and out of Venezuela. On Thursday, there were about a dozen such ships outside Venezuela’s main oil port waiting to dock, but none had moved in to load crude. Normally, the port would be buzzing, with at least 10 tankers moving in to load or conducting ship-to-ship transfers.

A Venezuelan port official said employees around the country are calling in sick or skipping work as tensions with the U.S. escalate.

Venezuelan crude falls under U.S. sanctions, which make it all but impossible for most traders to deal in it. The market for Venezuelan oil is mostly served by a so-called shadow fleet of 1,000 aging tankers that also carry sanctioned oil from Russia and Iran, and many of these vessels face American sanctions.

TankerTrackers.com, a website that closely follows oil shipping, said there are about 80 vessels in Venezuelan waters or near its coast, including more than 30 under U.S. sanctions.

It is rare but not unprecedented for the U.S. to seize a ship in international waters. The Trump administration in 2020 seized four vessels allegedly loaded with Iranian fuel in violation of sanctions. A federal judge approved a warrant for at least one of those seizures, saying Justice Department prosecutors had provided enough evidence that the tanker and its fuel were assets of a designated terrorist organization.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Thursday that the tanker, the Skipper, had been sanctioned for carrying Iranian oil in the past and would be taken to a U.S. port. She said U.S. forces executed a warrant for the Skipper, and that investigators were interviewing its crew.

She said the U.S. would take possession of the oil on the ship—estimated at 1.85 million barrels—after a legal process.

“The president considers the seizure of the oil tanker as effectuating the administration’s sanction policies,” Leavitt said.

The Treasury Department updated its Venezuela sanctions list on Thursday to include more than a dozen operators, people and tankers, targeting nephews of Maduro’s wife and a Maduro-affiliated businessman, among others.

An oil refining plant on the shores of Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela. Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images

The Skipper was sailing under a Guyana flag, but Guyana said it had no record of it. That makes the legal case for a seizure easier, said Tess Bridgeman, a former White House lawyer. She also said, however, that seizing ships is on the strongest footing when done under the auspices of a United Nations Security Council resolution in conjunction with other countries, and in this case, the U.S. appears to be taking action on its own.

In response to the seizure, Venezuela accused the U.S. of piracy. “We have to be like warriors, with one eye peeled and the other as well,” Maduro said at a rally Wednesday, calling on people to be “prepared to bust the teeth of the American empire if necessary.”

Venezuela learned to use black-market oil vessels from sanctioned allies like Iran and Russia after the U.S. tightened punitive measures in 2019 in a bid to cut off Maduro’s finances, said Juan Matias Szabo, a retired Venezuelan oil executive, who now works as an energy consultant in Spain.

The fleets have helped Venezuela move more than 600,000 barrels of oil a day to the handful of markets that still accept their crude, Szabo estimated. The majority ends up in China, often mixed with crude from other countries.

“It completely loses its origin,” said Szabo. “It’s ultraopaque.”

Venezuela has to foot transport costs and offer heavy discounts on its tar-like heavy crude to attract black-market buyers, meaning the oil sells for about half its listed price, diminishing income for Maduro. The transactions are often conducted in cash or on murky cryptocurrency exchanges, increasing risks for the regime.

Last year, Tareck el Aissami, a former oil minister, was arrested by Maduro’s government on allegations of embezzling billions of dollars in oil proceeds through crypto transactions. He hasn’t been heard from since his detention in April 2024.

Analysts said the surest outcome of squeezing Venezuela’s oil sales is that ordinary Venezuelans would suffer more. The Venezuelan strongman has used a mix of repression and food handouts to maintain control amid the country’s economic meltdown caused by a collapse in oil production.

“It would definitely harm Maduro, much more than these boat strikes,” said David Smilde, a Venezuela expert at Tulane University. “But it would harm the population even more.”

Write to Ryan Dubé at ryan.dube@wsj.com, Shelby Holliday at shelby.holliday@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the December 12, 2025, print edition as 'Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Puts Maduro’s Grip on Power at Risk'.

WSJ

11. Exclusive | Tibetan Activists Say China Has Detained Protesters Who Staged Rare Act of Defiance

​Summary:

Chinese authorities detained at least 60 Tibetans after rare protests against a planned gold mine in Gayixiang township, Sichuan, according to Tibetan activists and the Dharamshala-based government in exile. Villagers say the mine in Serkog “Gold Valley” threatens nomadic pastureland for sheep and yaks. After residents confronted local officials, security forces sealed off the area, seized phones, cut communications, and warned families not to discuss arrests. The protest follows years of tighter controls on Tibetan religion, language, and environment, including opposition to dams and hydropower projects. Activists call such demonstrations peaceful efforts to defend sacred land and fragile plateau ecosystems.

Comment: Resistance. Is there a feasible, acceptable, and suitable course of action that can support this resistance?

Exclusive | Tibetan Activists Say China Has Detained Protesters Who Staged Rare Act of Defiance

WSJ

Dozens of Tibetans protested a gold mine they feared would threaten their livelihood

By Krishna Pokharel

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 and Chun Han Wong

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Dec. 12, 2025 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/tibetan-activists-say-china-has-detained-protesters-who-staged-rare-act-of-defiance-408e9e8b?mod=hp_lead_pos4

A Tibetan autonomous area in the western Chinese province of Sichuan. Andy Wong/Associated Press

Chinese authorities arrested dozens of Tibetans who were protesting a mining project in one of their communities, according to Tibetan activists and the government in exile, an act of defiance by a community that has been tightly controlled by Beijing.

On Nov. 5, scores of people in a Tibetan autonomous area in the western Chinese province of Sichuan protested after learning of the start of a gold mine in a pasture area used by nomads for their sheep and yaks, according to accounts from 40 people there collected by a group of seven Tibetans in exile from relatives and friends in the village.

After the villagers in Gayixiang township confronted local authorities about the mine, which was at an early stage, Chinese authorities arrested at least 60 of the protesters, according to the exiled Tibetans, all of whom are originally from the town, and the Tibetan government in exile. Chinese authorities have blocked access to Gayixiang, which the Tibetans refer to as Kashi village, cut off communications and intensified security in the area, the group said.

The Tibetan government in exile, which is based in Dharamshala, India, said it has corroborated the information through its own contact in Tibet. It said that, as of Thursday, 11 of the nomads initially detained continued to be held.

The Wall Street Journal was unable to independently verify the Tibetans’ reports.

Beijing has imposed increasingly draconian restrictions on Tibetan people living in China as part of an effort to tighten control over ethnic minorities and stamp out separatist sentiment. In recent years, China has stepped up restrictions on Tibetan religion, education and language—even sending young children to state-run boarding schools to be inculcated in Chinese culture—and imposed strict surveillance measures on Tibetan communities.

A security guard stands watch at a boarding school in Sichuan province. Andy Wong/Associated Press

China has used roads, railways, dams and other infrastructure projects to integrate Tibetan communities with the rest of the country. However, Tibetans say such projects are often aimed at tightening Beijing’s control over their communities.

Tibetans, many of whom are nomads, have clashed with Chinese authorities over plans to exploit natural resources in the Tibetan plateau, arguing that such projects endanger their livelihoods. People opposing these projects have faced detention, torture and lengthy jail sentences, rights groups say.

Chinese authorities didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The site for the gold mine is in a valley the locals call Serkog—which means Gold Valley in the local Tibetan language—about four hours away from Gayixiang, which has been the site of previous protests against Chinese authorities.

With the onset of winter, villagers had moved their animals away from the valley. When villagers learned of the mine, they went to the local Chinese officials and asked them to stop, said Thupten Rabten, a 42-year-old Tibetan-language activist and Gayixiang native who has lived in India since 2006. He is one of the seven Tibetans who gathered information on the protest from acquaintances in the village.

According to the information gathered by Rabten’s group, the officials initially responded to the complaints by saying that the land for the planned mine belongs to the state and that any attempt to halt the project would be illegal.

The next day, the protest escalated as more Gayixiang residents joined in. The authorities then detained dozens of protesters, according to the information gathered by Rabten’s group. Shortly after the arrests began, local government and security officials, along with representatives of the Communist Party agency overseeing ethnic and religious affairs, sealed off the village. They warned locals not to speak about their matter to anyone, according to the information that the group gathered.

Authorities seized the villagers’ phones, according to the group.

“Even if someone from a family was arrested, the family was not allowed to share this information with others” in their neighborhood, Rabten said in an interview.

Rabten and two of his team members said authorities had attempted to establish mines in the area in the 1990s and again in 2010, but protests led by a monk from a local monastery thwarted those efforts. Tibetan nomads fear that mining will pollute the grass and water they rely on for grazing their animals.

A nomadic herder in Tibet. nicolas asfouri/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Rabten and others from Gayixiang who now live in exile said that before the recent crackdown over the mine, Tibetans in the area were already facing restrictions on cultural and religious practices, including a prohibition on prayer gatherings and on elders circling sacred sites during major festivals.

Earlier this year, according to the Tibetan government in exile, two senior Tibetan Buddhist monks at Yena monastery, in a town about 255 miles from Gayixiang, were given jail sentences of up to four years after they publicly opposed a dam and hydropower plant that local Tibetans feared could submerge their homes and ancient monasteries.

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What will be the ripple effects of the Tibetan protest? Join the conversation below.

In a letter to the United Nations last year concerning the dam, Chinese authorities said they had worked with local residents to relocate them.

Earlier this year, China embarked on the construction of a $167 billion mega dam and hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in the Tibetan plateau on the border with India. That project aims to deliver electricity from the site in Tibet to China’s industrialized southeast coast. Chinese authorities ignored concerns from local Tibetans about environmental damage and potential disaster in the earthquake-prone area.

The Yarlung Tsangpo River. Tian Jinwen/Zuma Press

Tibet is sometimes referred to as “Water Tower of Asia” as many glaciers feed rivers and tributaries originating in Tibet that flow down to the countries across the Himalayas in South and Southeast Asia, irrigating farmland and providing fresh drinking water to hundreds of millions of people.

Lobsang Yangtso, a senior environmental researcher with the International Tibet Network, an advocacy group based in India, said environmental protests by Tibetans are “peaceful resistance” to Chinese infrastructure projects in Tibet.

“Tibetans are protecting their sacred and ancestral land,” Yangtso said. “China and the international community should respect traditional knowledge and local communities to make them ideal stewards to protect the Tibetan plateau.”

Write to Krishna Pokharel at krishna.pokharel@wsj.com and Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com

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WSJ

12. US preparing to seize more tankers off Venezuela's coast after first ship taken, sources say

​Summary:

The U.S. plans further seizures of tankers carrying Venezuelan crude after boarding and seizing the Skipper in international waters as part of a pressure campaign to oust Nicolás Maduro. Washington is targeting the “shadow fleet” that moves sanctioned oil to China and other buyers, with Justice and Homeland Security building a wider target list. The move has frozen traffic at Venezuela’s main oil port and led traders to suspend nearly 6 million barrels of Merey crude bound for Asia. Caracas denounces “piracy,” but legal experts say state-authorized seizures do not meet the legal definition of piracy under international law.

Comment: Not to beat a dead horse but maybe we are seeing Go/Wei Chi/Baduk being played.

US preparing to seize more tankers off Venezuela's coast after first ship taken, sources say

Reuters · Jonathan Saul

By Jonathan Saul, Marianna Parraga and Matt Spetalnick

December 12, 20254:09 AM ESTUpdated 4 mins ago

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-preparing-seize-more-tankers-off-venezuelas-coast-after-first-ship-taken-2025-12-11/

• Seizure aims to target shadow tanker fleet selling oil to China, other nations
• Venezuelan government calls US actions 'piracy'; experts argue legality under international law
• Shipments totalling nearly 6 million barrels of crude suspended after seizure, source says

HOUSTON/LONDON/WASHINGTON, Dec 11 (Reuters) - The U.S. is preparing to intercept more ships transporting Venezuelan oil following the seizure of a tanker this week, as it increases pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, six sources familiar with the matter said on Thursday.

The seizure was the first interdiction of an oil cargo or tanker from Venezuela, which has been under U.S. sanctions since 2019. It came as the U.S. executes a large-scale military buildup in the southern Caribbean and as U.S. President Donald Trump pushes for Maduro's ouster.

The latest U.S. action has put shipowners, operators and maritime agencies involved in transporting Venezuelan crude on alert, with many reconsidering whether to sail from Venezuelan waters in the coming days as planned, shipping sources said.

Further direct interventions by the U.S. are expected in the coming weeks targeting ships carrying Venezuelan oil that may also have transported oil from other countries targeted by U.S. sanctions, such as Iran, according to the sources familiar with the matter who declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the issue.

U.S. ASSEMBLES TANKER TARGET LIST: SOURCE

Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA did not reply to a request for comment. Venezuela's government this week said the U.S. seizure constituted a "theft."

Asked whether the Trump administration planned further ship seizures, White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt told reporters she would not speak about future actions but said the U.S. would continue executing the president’s sanctions policies.

“We're not going to stand by and watch sanctioned vessels sail the seas with black market oil, the proceeds of which will fuel narcoterrorism of rogue and illegitimate regimes around the world," she said.

The U.S. has assembled a target list of several more sanctioned tankers for possible seizure, according to one of the people familiar with the matter.

The U.S. Justice Department and Homeland Security had been planning the seizures for months, according to two of the people.

A reduction or halt in Venezuelan oil exports, the main generator of revenue for the Venezuelan government, would strain the Maduro government's finances.

The U.S. Treasury said on Thursday it imposed sanctions on six supertankers that, according to PDVSA's internal documents and ship monitoring data, recently loaded crude in Venezuela, and on four Venezuelans, including three relatives of the country's first lady, Cilia Flores. It was not known whether the newly sanctioned ships were among those now targeted for interception.

Wednesday’s seizure comes after the U.S. in recent months has carried out more than 20 strikes against what it says are drug vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing more than 80 people. Experts say the strikes may be illegal extrajudicial attacks, while the U.S. says it is protecting Americans from drug cartels it has branded as terrorist organizations.

Item 1 of 2 U.S. forces abseil onto an oil tanker during a raid described by U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi as its seizure by the United States off the coast of Venezuela, December 10, 2025, in a still image from video. U.S. Attorney General/Handout via REUTERS

[1/2]U.S. forces abseil onto an oil tanker during a raid described by U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi as its seizure by the United States off the coast of Venezuela, December 10, 2025, in a still image from video. U.S. Attorney General/Handout via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Further ship seizures could be aimed at tightening the financial screws on Maduro, according to a source briefed on U.S. Venezuela policy. Maduro has alleged that the U.S. military buildup is aimed at overthrowing him and gaining control of the OPEC nation's oil resources.

The new U.S. tactic focuses on the activities of what is called the shadow fleet of tankers that transports sanctioned oil to China, the largest buyer of crude from Venezuela and Iran. A single vessel will often make separate runs on behalf of Iran, Venezuela and Russia, the sources added.

The seizure of the tanker, carrying the name Skipper, caused at least one shipper to temporarily suspend the voyages of three freshly loaded shipments totaling almost 6 million barrels of Venezuela's flagship export grade, Merey, sources said.

"The cargoes were just loaded and were about to start sailing to Asia," said a trading executive involved in dealing and shipping Venezuelan oil. "Now the voyages are cancelled and tankers are waiting off the Venezuelan coast as it's safer to do that."

SURVEILLANCE OF TARGETS

U.S. forces were monitoring tankers at sea and some vessels in Venezuelan ports, either being repaired or loaded, and waiting for them to sail into international waters before taking action, one of the sources said.

In the runup to the seizure of Skipper, which was previously sanctioned for its oil trading with Iran, U.S. forces had stepped up surveillance of waters close to Venezuela and neighboring Guyana, another of the sources said.

At the White House, Leavitt said the seized vessel was expected to sail to a U.S. port where the government intends to seize its cargo of oil through a formal legal process.

The timing of further seizures would partly depend on how quickly arrangements could be made for ports to receive seized ships for unloading oil cargoes, one of the sources said. Many of the vessels in the shadow fleet that transport sanctioned oil are old, their ownership is opaque and they sail without top-tier insurance coverage. That would make many ports reluctant to receive the vessels.

Another vessel, the Seahorse, which is under UK and European Union sanctions for its oil trading links with Russia, was monitored in November by a U.S. warship and briefly detained before sailing into Venezuela, one of the sources said.

While the Venezuelan government described the U.S. seizure as "an act of international piracy," legal specialists said it did not fall under such a definition under international law.

"Because the capture was endorsed and sanctioned by the U.S., it cannot be considered piracy," said Laurence Atkin-Teillet, a specialist on piracy and the law of the sea at Britain's Nottingham Law School.

"The term piracy in this context appears to be rhetorical or figurative, rather than a legal usage."

Reporting by Jonathan Saul in London, Marianna Parraga and Arathy Somasekhar in Houston, Matt Spetalnick and Andrea Shalal in Washington and Aizhu Chen in Singapore; Editing by Christian Plumb, Simon Webb, Rod Nickel

Focused on energy-related sanctions, corruption and money laundering with 20 years of experience covering Latin America's oil and gas industries. Born in Venezuela and based in Houston, she is author of the book "Oro Rojo" about Venezuela's troubled state-run company PDVSA and Mom to three boys.

Reuters · Jonathan Saul

13. Enemy from within’? NORTHCOM commander says he hasn’t seen it

​Summary:

Gen. Gregory Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command, told the Senate he has seen no intelligence of an “enemy from within,” contradicting POTUS’s earlier remarks at Quantico. He and senior Pentagon officials defended National Guard deployments to Los Angeles, Portland, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., despite multiple federal court rulings that some deployments are illegal. Supporters called the missions a modest burden and useful training. Critics, including Sen. Tammy Duckworth and Sen. Angus King, argued they divert troops to politically driven tasks like “beautification,” risk eroding public trust, and rest on dubious emergency claims and unreliable Homeland Security reporting.

Comment: The "enemy within" is not our fellow Americans. It is the external enemy trying to convince us that our fellow Americans are the enemy. But General Guillot is not falling victim to the Dark Quad's or CRInK's political warfare strategy. That said, are we correctly employing our great National Guard force? Are we deriving significant strategic benefits from doing so?

America’s Attack on the Enemy Within: Victory for the Dark Quad’s Political Warfare Strategy

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/08/americas-attack-on-the-enemy/

‘Enemy from within’? NORTHCOM commander says he hasn’t seen it

defenseone.com · Meghann Myers

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/12/enemy-within-northcom-commander-says-he-hasnt-seen-it/410106/?oref=d1-featured-river-top&utm

U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Commander Gen. Gregory Guillot arrives for a Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on December 11, 2025. Andrew Harnik / Getty Images

Top DOD officials defended National Guard deployments to American cities, which are facing multiple injunctions from local judges, during a Senate hearing.

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

December 11, 2025 01:52 PM ET

• Homeland
• Americas
• Congress

The military commander overseeing National Guard deployments in Los Angeles, Portland, and Chicago told lawmakers Thursday that he had no intelligence to suggest the military is facing an “enemy within,” in contrast to statements the president made during a September speech at Marine Corps Base Quantico.

Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot, head of U.S. Northern Command, as well as a top Pentagon lawyer and the Defense Department’s deputy assistant secretary for homeland security and Americas security affairs during a hearing on the recent deployment of National Guard troops to U.S. cities. Several of those deployments have been deemed illegal in federal court.

In September, Trump told an auditorium full of the nation’s top military officers, “We should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military National Guard.” He added that “this is going to be a big thing for the people in this room, because it's the enemy from within, and we have to handle it before it gets out of control.”

But Guillot said he has not been tasked with any domestic military operations against an “enemy from within,” and he doesn’t “have any indication of an enemy within.”

Mark Ditlevson, the Pentagon’s homeland defense official, described the deployments as a “modest burden” on the National Guard, while committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Ala., said concerns about cost and readiness “are both manufactured and misguided.”

“In my judgment, mobilizing the Guard is an excellent opportunity for units to enhance cohesion, complete mission-essential tasks and ensure training is complete,” he added.

Democratic lawmakers argued that the true cost is less time spent training for military missions, particularly among the troops deployed to Washington, D.C., who have been tasked with “beautification.”

“The National Guard has been performing missions that don't help with their military training, like spreading mulch and picking up trash,” Duckworth said, “but that as we have sadly seen, nonetheless, carry risk for our service members,” referring to two West Virginia Guardsmen who were shot, one of whom died, while standing guard outside a Metro station late last month.

Duckworth went on to question the administration’s assertions that the deployments are about restoring “law and order” in cities run by Democrats.

“If this administration cared about law and order, it would not be ignoring the growing number of judges, including those appointed by Trump himself, who've deemed these deployments illegal,’ she said. “In Illinois, a judge from the Northern District found that the [Homeland Security Department] account of the situation on the ground, and I quote, ‘was simply unreliable.’ “

Judges in California, Oregon, Illinois, and D.C. have all ruled the deployments illegal, but the administration has sought appeals that have allowed troops to stay in place.

“I fear the day when Americans stop thanking our troops for their service because they're afraid of our troops,” Duckworth said. “We know that this administration is trying to borrow the respected image of the military. Across the country, the DHS agents are dressing in camouflage and wielding military-style weapons. They're making it hard for Americans to tell the difference between abusive federal agents and professional troops.”

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Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, questioned whether the emergencies Trump has declared to justify sending in troops are truly occurring.

“We have a president who has a very low bar as to what constitutes an emergency,” he said. “I live in Maine, on the border of Canada—there is no emergency with Canada, and yet this president declared an emergency in order to impose tariffs on Canada, which is wrecking their economy.”

Though lawmakers have differing views of the deployments along party lines, there was bipartisan agreement on one thing.

“By the way, Counselor, the organization that you work for is the Department of Defense,” King told Charles Young, the deputy Pentagon counsel, responding to the official’s repeated use of the term War Department, an alternative Trump administration name that hasn’t been approved by Congress.

The most recent version of the National Defense Authorization Act, the traditional venue for any changes to Pentagon policy, does not include a name-change provision.

"Thank you for repeatedly making that point, Senator,” Wicker said.

Help us report on the future of national security. Contact Meghann Myers: mmyers@defenseone.com, meghannmyers.55 on Signal.

​14. Army-Navy Gridiron Rivalry Points the Way for a More Civil Future

​Summary:

The Army–Navy football game showcases fierce rivalry alongside deeper unity of service. Cadets and midshipmen compete hard, then join the same team, swearing to defend the Constitution. Jim Cowen argues this culture of respect, sacrifice, and mission-first cooperation offers a model for restoring American civility through principled disagreement and compromise.

Comment: Go Army. Go Navy. Go Air Force. Go Marine Corps. Go Space Force - 24/7 364.  But tomorrow: Go Army. Beat Navy.

Army-Navy Gridiron Rivalry Points the Way for a More Civil Future

By Jim Cowen

• Published December 11, 2025
• @ 10:02 pm
• 
  

https://defenseopinion.com/army-navy-gridiron-rivalry-points-the-way-for-a-more-civil-future/1095/?utm

In our nation divided, fraught with influencers and fractious politicians who focus on settling scores rather than seeking compromise, one annual ritual stands out as a kind of therapy.

The Army-Navy football game (on Dec. 13) is much more than your standard gridiron battle. Rather, it is a competition between young Americans for whom the outcome of the game is incredibly important, but not nearly as important as what comes afterwards – service to the nation.

Navy Midshipmen and Army Cadets have scratched and clawed their way to attend their respective service academies, not for sports glory, but for the opportunity to be military officers. These athletes won’t be wined and dined by scouts looking to sign them to multi-year deals. No million-dollar endorsements await them at graduation. What is waiting for them is training – to be platoon leaders, pilots, submariners, surface ship warriors or special operators.

Ultimately, they swear an oath to the Constitution, to serve and defend. They deploy around the world, and they fight in our conflicts and wars. They represent the ideas and ideals that the nation was founded upon, but that currently seem lost for so many.

On the same team

The Midshipmen and Cadets will soon be operating on the same team—in highly dangerous environments where they must work together, depend on one another, fight next to each other and find solutions together. They must do what seems too hard for so many Americans by putting ego aside for the success of the mission.

The military academies are not without their issues. In recent years, they have been dogged by cheating and sexual assault scandals. What’s more, the military in general is something of unknown terrain for so many Americans, given that only a small percentage of the country serves in the all-volunteer force.

And yet the Army-Navy rivalry on the football field transcends and prevails. When the country is polarized, these institutions, with their academic excellence and storied histories tethered directly to the nation’s freedom and core beliefs, give us hope.

In the era of the ubiquitous internet troll or politician for whom disagreement is a blood sport, the fierce competition of the Army-Navy rivalry exists side-by-side with equally fierce respect. Those who are competing do so knowing that the game is almost incidental, that soon enough they will be together enlisted in the same cause.

Correction and compromise

I did not attend a military academy. No matter. I believe in the spirit of the game. For me, the Army-Navy game exemplifies what needs correction in our American culture writ large.

Correction won’t come about without compromise. For those who believe that the U.S. has traveled beyond a Rubicon from which there is no return to civility, recent polling suggests otherwise. Americans, whatever their party affiliation, overwhelmingly agree on a range of issues reflecting the central aspects of our fragile democracy. These include compromise and a rejection of political violence.

“Disagreement is good because competition is good,” said Arthur C. Brooks, the social scientist and commentator. “It makes us sharp and strong, whether in sports, in politics, in economics, or in the world of ideas. We don’t need to disagree less; we need to disagree better.”

The Army-Navy rivalry points the way to a more civil and hopeful future of disagreeing better and then, once the argument is over, working together for something worth defending.

15. A drone ‘war is more silent and more deadly’ — and America is behind

​Summary:

In eastern Ukraine, cheap, lethal drones have transformed the war into a quieter, more deadly fight while exposing how far behind the United States is in drone warfare. Ukrainian units improvise with low-cost FPV and “Vampire” drones, supplied and even built by civilians, and constantly adapt to Russian electronic warfare and defenses. The U.S., by contrast, fields far fewer, far more expensive systems ill suited to a conflict burning through about 10,000 drones a month. Ukrainian officers warn that without a rapid shift toward mass, adaptable, attrition-tolerant drone capabilities, America will be unprepared for the next high-intensity war.

Comment: As Cohen and Gooch taught us, all military failures are a result of the things: failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. Certainly we are learning from Ukraine. Are we adapting effectively and quickly enough? But most important (and most difficult), are we anticipating what comes next? 

A drone ‘war is more silent and more deadly’ — and America is behind

militarytimes.com · Tom Mutch · December 11, 2025

https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2025/12/11/a-drone-war-is-more-silent-and-more-deadly-and-america-is-behind/?utm

KHARKIV, UKRAINE — The Vampire drone gripped two precious pieces of cargo tightly — a bomb for the Russians and a delivery of still-warm KFC for the Ukrainians in the trench next to them.

Nikoletta Stoyanova, a Ukrainian photographer, watched as the six-armed behemoth took flight before soldiers hurried her into a basement. It was the dead of night in the Kharkiv region of eastern Ukraine, near the besieged city of Kupyansk. The city had already traded hands twice — the Russians had captured the city in the first days of the war, and the Ukrainians liberated it six months later.

Over the last year, the world’s attention has been focused on the U.S. administration’s chaotic push for a peace deal in Ukraine. The high drama of diplomacy between Trump, Putin and Zelensky has stolen the spotlight away from the gray, bloody realities on the battlefield. But the fact is that any settlement will be based on the realities on these frontlines.

It is here that the situation has been seriously deteriorating for Ukraine. The Russians, with a large advantage in manpower and munitions, are making serious advances into Ukrainian territory. New drone technology, and a lack of Western countermeasures, have aided them in slowly breaking down Ukraine’s weary troops.

The Ukrainian soldiers who had strapped the munitions to the drone hurried Stoyanova into the basement, where another group of soldiers are staring intently into screens, controllers in hands as if they were playing video games. These drone pilots are now Ukraine’s most crucial defense against the advancing Russians. Warfare has been revolutionized on these battlefields — and America is far behind in its understanding of how it operates.

Ukrainian soldiers strapping munitions to a Vampire drone. (Nikoletta Stoyanova)

She had gone to their base, in the embattled East, to see how the sky, full of thousands of drones, were changing modern warfare.

“Everything at the front line must be done at night, logistics are awful,” Stoyanova said from Ukraine’s Donetsk region. “They want to get as close to our cities as they can so they can terrorize them as much as possible with drones.”

Last time here she heard loud artillery, but the drones that replaced them are quiet killers.

“The war is more silent, and more deadly,” Stoyanova noted.

Ill-prepared for modern war?

What observers see on the dark, drone-infested front line looks nothing like the battlespace that America and its allies have been training their troops for.

Belatedly, the Pentagon is starting to take notice. A Department of Defense account was widely ridiculed among Ukraine watchers when it posted a video of a training exercise asking viewers whether they had ever watched a drone drop a grenade.

In fact, anyone can see thousands of such videos on Telegram channels and X accounts, some going back to as early as the first year of the war in Ukraine.

In July, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth led a tour of a Defense Department drone exhibition, calling drones “the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation, accounting for most of this year’s casualties in Ukraine.”

“Our adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones each year,” he said, adding that the U.S. is trailing behind.

A Ukrainian soldier holds up a drone. (Nikoletta Stoyanova)

Pentagon brass bragged that they had lowered the concept-to-development time for such weaponry from six years to 18 months. But in Ukraine, the newest battlefield development can be obsolete in weeks.

The U.S. is still far behind Ukraine and peer rivals such as China and Russia when it comes to integrating drone technologies into the modern battlespace.

Some U.S. companies have sent drones to be used in Ukraine, but as the Wall Street Journal reported, and Ukrainian soldiers have confirmed, Western drone technology does not measure up.

This mismatch reflects deeper problems in how the U.S. is still thinking about procurement and warfighting. In the early days of the war, the U.S. supplied many high-tech, expensive but powerful systems that radically improved Ukraine’s battlefield fortunes. But as the war has ground on, and the Russians developed countermeasures, developing a quantity of cheap systems has become far more important than a few high-ticket items.

As Dronesense reported, “a typical U.S. commercial drone intended for military use can cost upwards of $80,000, while a basic Ukrainian FPV attack drone costs under $500. This 160-fold cost difference makes the American systems economically unsustainable in a conflict that consumes approximately 10,000 drones per month. … Modern, high-intensity warfare … favors mass, adaptability, and attrition tolerance."

In Ukraine, drones have also added an element of civilian involvement into military procurement, with many ordinary civilians transforming their garages, basements and bedrooms into makeshift drone factories, while others hold crowdfunders to buy cheap commercial drones online that can be refitted for military purposes.

This allows average Ukrainians to contribute to their country’s war effort much more directly than they ever could before, with channels like YouTube and Telegram teaching how to assemble drones and ammunition in minutes.

Ukrainian soldiers complain that U.S. companies lack an understanding of electronic warfare, as well as the different types of air defense and other countermeasures that both sides use against the drone threat. If the U.S. is ever dragged into a large-scale war against a peer or near-peer adversary like China or Iran, it will be ill-equipped for a drone-heavy background like that in Ukraine.

On the ground in Ukraine

Back in Kharkiv, soldiers must drive navigating via hand torch until the last kilometer or two of their destination, then they must navigate by memory.

“Everything has changed because of drones. … Now there are hundreds of guys putting up nets over the road,” said Stoyanova. Other men by the side of the road wait with drone detectors and shotguns on the roadside ready to shoot.

Because of this, everything has become more dangerous under the dronescape, from the rotation of troops to resupplying front-line infantry.

“With shells, you hear the crack, and the whistle, and have a couple of seconds to hide or take cover. With the drones, you don’t hear anything until the explosion,” a senior official in the military administration stationed in Kherson, a liberated city in southern Ukraine that is under constant threat of Russian drone strikes, said.

Unless the U.S. adapts, the next war it fights may be just as silent, and far more deadly.

16. China’s High-Flying Swarm Mothership Drone Has Flown

​Summary:

China’s new Jiutian (“High Sky”) jet-powered heavy drone has completed its first flight, marking a major step in Beijing’s uncrewed airpower. Roughly 16 tons max takeoff weight with a 6,000 kg payload, 7,000 km range, and 12-hour endurance, it features a modular belly bay designed to deploy swarms of smaller drones, plus eight underwing pylons for air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. High-altitude, long-endurance performance and internal volume support ISR, electronic warfare, comms relay, and logistics roles, including from rough fields. Jiutian underscores China’s rapid advances in large unmanned systems and swarm concepts, complicating air and maritime defense for rivals.

Comment: Speaking of anticipating. Are we anticipating this capability? 

China’s High-Flying Swarm Mothership Drone Has Flown

twz.com

The Jiutian is a heavy lifter with a large modular payload area that could be used for many missions, including the delivery of swarms of smaller drones.

Joseph Trevithick

Published Dec 11, 2025 1:11 PM EST

68

https://www.twz.com/air/chinas-high-flying-swarm-mothership-drone-has-flown?utm

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

China’s heavyweight jet-powered Jiutian drone, said to have a maximum takeoff weight of around 17.6 tons (16 metric tons), has flown. A key mission for the design is expected to be acting as a mothership for swarms of smaller uncrewed aerial systems, as TWZ has explored in the past. It has also been shown previously armed with various air-to-surface and air-to-air munitions, and could perform a variety of other missions, including airborne signal relay and logistics.

The Jiutian’s manufacturer, the state-run Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), announced the drone’s first flight, which took place earlier today in Pucheng County in China’s central Shaanxi Province. The drone was first shown publicly at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, and it has also been referred to as the SS-UAV. What the “SS” stands for in that acronym remains unclear. The name Jiutian (also sometimes written Jiu Tian), or “The Ninth Heaven,” refers to the highest level of the heavens in traditional Chinese mythology, but is also commonly translated simply as “High Sky.”

A view of the Jiutian drone on the ground before taking off for its first flight. capture via Chinese internet/X

The short footage on Weibo (11 December 2025) pic.twitter.com/yYm5MtU5vZ

— Dragon Wong 黄龙 (@DragonWong2024) December 11, 2025

Jiutian is some 53.6 feet (16.35 meters) long and has a wingspan of around 82 feet (25 meters), per AVIC. In addition to its maximum takeoff weight, the company says it has a maximum payload capacity of nearly 13,228 pounds (6,000 kilograms), a ferry range of approximately 4,349.5 miles (7,000 kilometers), and can stay aloft for up to 12 hours. The drone’s stated maximum operational ceiling is 49,212.5 feet (15,000 meters), and it can fly at speeds up to 378 knots and as low as 108 knots.

In terms of its general configuration, Jiutian has a high-mounted wing with a very minimal sweep and small winglets at the tips, as well as an H-shaped tail. It has a single jet engine mounted in a nacelle on top of the rear fuselage. Its tricycle landing gear includes main units that retract into sponsons under the wings. As TWZ has noted in the past, these features together give the drone the outward appearance of something of a mashup of the A-10 Warthog and OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft. There is also a resemblance to rugged De Havilland aircraft, with its landing gear looking especially tough, which could point to being able to operate out of rougher fields.

A top-down look at the Jiutian offering a good general view of the design. Chinese internet via X

Jiutian is notably large compared to many other armed uncrewed aircraft designs currently on the market globally. For instance, the jet-powered Wing Loong-10 drone (also known as the WZ-10) in Chinese service now, produced by AVIC’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG) subsidiary, has a maximum takeoff weight of around 3.5 tons (3,200 kilograms). CAIG’s Wing Loong 3 pusher-propeller-driven armed drone, the largest member of that design family to date, has a maximum takeoff weight of around six tons. As another point of comparison, the stated maximum takeoff weight of newer extended-range versions of the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, which are also notably smaller overall, is just under six tons.

AVIC has described the Jiutian as a “general purpose” design capable of performing a wide range of missions, and its modular payload section has drawn particular attention since it was first unveiled. At the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, that section had a Chinese phrase printed on the side reading “ascension of the beehive mission module,” according to a machine translation. It also said “Isomerism Hive Module” in English, which appeared to be a mistranslation. A term typically used in chemistry, isomerism refers to the potential existence of isomers, which are molecules or ions with identical molecular formula, but that differ in the physical and chemical arrangements of their atoms. AVIC subsequently confirmed that the intent was to communicate a drone swarm launch capability, according to Chinese state media.

A rendering shown on Chinese state television depicting the launch of a swarm of smaller uncrewed aerial systems from a Jiutian drone. CCTV capture

Better look at 九天 uav pic.twitter.com/8IITeWZAqS

— Hûrin (@Hurin92) November 6, 2024

“China’s interest in swarming capabilities and the ability to launch them from various platforms, including high-altitude balloons, is not new. For military purposes, swarms have a number of inherent benefits, including the ability to rapidly fan out across a broad area to carry out various missions depending on how they are configured, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, and kinetic strike. Individual drones in a swarm can also be equipped with different payloads to give the entire grouping a multi-mission capability. Large numbers of uncrewed aerial systems operating closely together also present significant challenges for defenders who could easily find themselves overwhelmed or otherwise confused about how to best respond to the incoming threats.”

“The War Zone previously laid out a case for giving exactly this kind of drone swarm launch capability to reconfigured P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol planes, which you can read more about here. Drones launching other drones offers a way to push these capabilities further forward while reducing the risk to crewed platforms.”

Having a platform capable of delivering a swarm of drones within hundreds of miles of a particular area would offer huge advantages, especially for attacking ships at sea, island outposts, and other distributed or dispersed target sets. Even the most modern warships in service in the United States and elsewhere today notably lack any real ability to defend against a high-volume attack of this kind. This is something TWZ previously highlighted in a detailed case for arming U.S. Navy warships with their own swarms of drones to bolster their defensive and offensive capabilities, which you can find here.

As mentioned, Jiutian has been displayed in the past with four pylons under each wing loaded with various munitions, as well. This has included PL-12 radar-guided air-to-air missiles, TL-17 land-attack cruise missiles (an export variant of the KD-88), and precision-guided bombs.

This SS-UAV with Isomerism tech is gigantic! Soon, we might have drones as big as A320s.. pic.twitter.com/cAnDv8aAK2

— Fahad Naim (@Fahadnaimb) June 24, 2025

中国产“九天”察打一体无人机，6月即将首飞，期待中！pic.twitter.com/OyDxiyo24a

— Zhang Meifang (@CGMeifangZhang) May 21, 2025

Jiutian has a sensor turret under its nose of the kind typically fitted with a mix of electro-optical and infrared cameras. It could also contain a laser designator for employing munitions using that type of guidance.

The drone also has a dome on top of the nose in line with a beyond-line-of-sight communications array and a nose radome. The latter has pointed to at least provisions for the installation of a radar. That could be used to help spot and target aerial threats using weapons like the PL-12, as well as for other targeting purposes, and just to assist with navigation and provide additional situational awareness. Jiutian could use air-to-air weapons for self-defense or to actively hunt flying targets.

The modular payload section is large enough to serve a host of other potential purposes, as well. It could accommodate additional sensors, such as a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), as well as electronic warfare suites and communication arrays. Jiutian’s ability to fly high and for extended periods at relatively low speeds could make it a particularly ideal platform for more general surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as acting as an airborne communications node. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had already been expanding its fleet of high-altitude, long-endurance drones and increasingly employing them on routine surveillance and reconnaissance missions, over land or water, around its borders. Many of those existing designs can also carry air-to-surface munitions, but with nowhere near the same capacity as the Jiutian.

A Chinese WZ-7 drone seen flying over or around the East China Sea. This picture was taken from a Japanese aircraft sent to intercept it. Japanese Ministry of Defense

AVIC itself has highlighted how Jiutian’s internal space could be utilized for carrying cargo, and it could be a relevant addition for providing logistics support to far-flung locales. The PLA has pronounced needs in this regard with an ever-growing array of remote and austere operating locations, such as its highly strategic island outposts in the South China Sea and its bases spread across the Himalayan Plateau along its disputed border with India. As mentioned earlier, the Jiutian’s landing gear could point to its ability to perform any of its missions while forward-deployed at sites with more limited infrastructure to perform.

Uncrewed platforms could also offer cost benefits compared to traditional crewed cargo aircraft for conducting routine resupply operations to those areas, where the latter may not even be able to operate at all. At the same time, this all seems likely to be at most a secondary mission set for the Jiutian. AVIC and other Chinese aviation firms have already been developing a growing array of larger drones expressly designed primarily for logistics roles.

AVIC and the PLA have also been heavily touting Jiutian’s potential to perform various non-military missions. “Its modular payload system enables roles ranging from precise deliveries of heavy cargo to remote regions, to emergency communication and disaster relief, to geographic surveying and resource mapping,” according to a post today from the China Military Bugle account on X, an official mouthpiece for China’s armed forces.

A large unmanned aerial vehicle (#UAV), named "Jiutian," completed its maiden flight on December 11, 2025, according to the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (#AVIC).

The domestically developed general-purpose drone, measuring 16.35 meters in length and 25 meters in… pic.twitter.com/LwUHyNaEp6

— China Military Bugle (@ChinaMilBugle) December 11, 2025

More broadly, Jiutian is reflective of China’s increasingly dominant position in the uncrewed aviation space globally. AVIC and other firms in China have been steadily unveiling new designs, large and small, in recent years, and getting many of them at least to first flight. Just this year, TWZ has been the first to report on the emergence of multiple new Chinese uncrewed aircraft with flying wing-type designs, an area of development that has become particularly pronounced in the country. Just last month, the PLA announced that it had put its first flying wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), the GJ-11, into operational service, as you can read more about here. There has been a notable surge in Chinese military aviation developments, in general, since last year, which also includes the emergence of significant new crewed types, such as the J-36 and J-XDS stealth fighters.

It’s worth pointing out that AVIC’s heavy focus on non-military missions for Jiutian underscores the significant overlap between the military and commercial ends of China’s aerospace industry, as well as the role that ostensibly civilian research institutions often play. This is something TWZ routinely highlights. These kinds of dual-purpose relationships are also prevalent in the country outside of the aviation realm.

When it comes to the Jiutian design, specifically, more insights into its capabilities and expected roles may now begin to emerge as the drone is now in flight testing.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Joseph Trevithick

Deputy Editor

Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.

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17. Drone Dominance in Contact: sUAS Challenges and Adaptations at the Brigade Level

​Summary:

2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division is pushing small UAS across the brigade to restore lost recon after cavalry and MI deactivations, but hits four problems it cannot fix alone: fragile COTS supply chains, slow and fragmented funding for repair parts, lack of standardized training and maintenance roles, and scarce, hard-to-access airspace. The authors urge Blue List component standardization, brigade-level bench stock funded by base O&M, a formal “drone sergeant” Master Trainer structure down to company level, and standing local ROZs. Their year of training shows sUAS already transform recon, fires, attack, resupply, and PSYOP if sustained at scale.

Excerpt:

Across the U.S. military, sUAS has a long way to go before it can be fully integrated into training and real-world missions. By allocating the appropriate funding, streamlining supply, integrating maintenance systems, and de-centralizing training requirements, the Army can give small-unit leaders the tools they need to fully develop sUAS in their formations. The DoW Drone Dominance Policy provides an excellent framework, but there needs to be implementation across the Army before sUAS can be as ubiquitous as it needs to be. There should be no more debate as to whether tactical units should integrate sUAS into their scheme of maneuver – the question is how.

Drone Dominance in Contact: sUAS Challenges and Adaptations at the Brigade Level

by Daniel Temme, by Clayton Cooper, by Matthew Levengood

|

12.12.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/12/drone-dominance-in-contact-suas-challenges-and-adaptations-at-the-brigade-level/

A Soldier assigned to the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), launches a sUAS during training in Romania (DVIDS).

In accordance with the Secretary of War’s drone dominance policy, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 10th Mountain Division, is aggressively pursuing Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) employment within both collective and pre-deployment training. To account for the loss of organic reconnaissance capabilities as a result of the recent deactivation of cavalry squadrons and Military Intelligence companies across the Army, 2BCT stood up a Multifunctional Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) to provide 2BCT with modernized organic reconnaissance capabilities. As the only subordinate unit with trained UAS operators and maintainers, the MFRC incubated the brigade’s sUAS program before training sUAS operators in light infantry units across the brigade.

Throughout this process, 2BCT identified multiple obstacles that hinder the Army’s ability to rapidly integrate sUAS at scale. The focus of this field report is to articulate the challenges that cannot be solved at the brigade level. 2BCT identified four key obstacles and proposed solutions to the challenge of achieving drone dominance:

1. Formalizing sUAS supply chains and maintenance processes to keep non-Program of Record systems airworthy; ensuring airframes can keep pace with operational demands in both garrison and deployed environments.
2. Distributing the capability to rapidly train and certify new operators at the company and battalion level by normalizing sUAS program requirements.
3. Streamlining the sUAS maintenance process by allocating Base Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding to build and sustain a surplus of repair parts (known in the U.S. Army as “bench stock”).
4. Dedicating airspace to sUAS training to enable consistent opportunities to operate without additional resourcing and planning requirements.

While this field report outlines potential ways around these obstacles, it is important to also stress the importance of organizational agility across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Incremental gains at the unit level make no impact unless policy quickly moves to reinforce success. In addition to highlighting challenges and recommended solutions, this essay provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) learned over the past year of training with SUAS.

Beans, Bullets, Bandages, Batteries: Supply Chains in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO)

As the sheer volume of sUAS platform variants continues to increase via unit commercial off the shelf (COTS) purchases, the number of individual components required to maintain them compounds exponentially. Currently, each component has an individual supply chain with no required surplus of repair parts in the Army supply system. Without a Program of Record, there is no means to obligate or enforce drone manufacturers to maintain a surplus of repair parts at scale. Without larger production runs, there is no economy of scale to reduce the unit price and increase production capacity above small batches of supply. While this may be tenable during periods of relative peace, this production capacity would need to be rapidly scaled up in the event of a LSCO. Until the Department of War (DoW) scales production, the US military will face significant parts scarcity at a critical period of necessity.

Currently, 2BCT maintains all sUAS systems by purchasing repair parts using Government Purchase Cards (GPC), Division Acquisitions Review Boards (DARB), or Corps Acquisitions Review Boards (CARB). While GPCs provide some flexibility for known requirements, they severely limit a unit’s ability to build a bench stock of components because of the overall cost per repair component and spending limits. DARBs and CARBs require extensive justification and review before they even reach the approving General Officer; a DARB that requests parts and services to repair a handful of sUAS and build a small bench stock can easily take months.

Despite proactive analysis on the estimated rate of component failure as a byproduct of the number of sorties a drone flies, GPCs prove inadequate as a primary method of sourcing repair parts. During the 90 days between the brigade’s collective training in May 2025 and the brigade’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Rotation in August 2025, the MFRC only managed to acquire funding for services and parts to repair three of its six Vesper UAS systems (only one of the three kinds of drones operated by the MFRC). These meager repairs drained all available GPC funds and left all other sUAS systems at a diminished operational readiness rate.

The lack of repair parts rendered nearly 85% of the MFRC Vesper sUAS systems non-mission capable. This situation resulted in the MFRC being unable to observe areas of interest, identify enemy high payoff targets, or exploit emissions detected by Electronic Warfare (EW) systems with sUAS observation. In short, the lack of a responsive mechanism to acquire sUAS repair parts, coupled with civilian industry’s limited production capacity, directly degraded the unit’s ability to positively affect operations with sUAS.

Recommendations

Until sUAS maintenance becomes integrated with standard DoW maintenance systems, the Army must do two things. First, they must establish a separate line of accounting for drone components down to the brigade-level, which must include a portal (e.g. Global Combat Support System-Army or GCSS-A) to source approved components from a prime distributor. Second, the Army should authorize bench stock(s) of sUAS components. This option must include a contract to maintain and refresh these bench stocks quarterly.

Acknowledging that the DoW is in a period of sUAS experimentation, it may seem premature to establish robust sUAS supply chains and therefore prudent to wait until sUAS technology evolves. However, this period of experimentation is the perfect time to modify sUAS component acquisition expectations. The ghost of Donald Rumsfeld cautions that “We go to war with the Army we have, not the Army we want”. The US military cannot rely upon the extensive timelines associated with GPCs or DARB/CARBs to source repair components in a way that fails to meet even garrison training requirements, let alone the readiness and employment requirements of LSCO.

Given the complexity and number of distinct supply chains, the DoW should standardize UAS components. To this effect, the Defense Innovation Unit has already established the Blue List, a list of sUAS approved for use in the DoW. Mass production of Blue List components would improve magazine depth without requiring a Program of Record, reducing the period of scarcity at the onset of a conflict. This measure would also enable the forward staging of pre-positioned stockpiles of components to further increase supply chain responsiveness until production rates can adequately meet demand.

An easy first step is to standardize the battery terminals and charging ports used on civilian sUAS, enabling a larger pool of battery types from various manufacturers to meet specific mission requirements. There is precedent for the integration of military requirements into civilian production standards to better prepare the nation for mobilization. For example, the NATO draft Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4179 rifle magazine created a single standard for small arms magazines and ammunition. As a result, civilian and military small-arms manufacturers both within and outside of NATO adopted the STANAG in their designs, including civilian sporting rifles. The same principle applies today: drone manufacturers can be incentivized to standardize their components with the possibility of future government contracts.

The Army can meet the DoW’s intent for future procurement and agility by integrating scalable stockage objectives with National Stock Number (NSN) assignment and Blue List approval. Many vendors are not able to keep up with the increased demand for parts. Providing a clear pathway to NSN assignment incentivizes manufacturers to invest in increased production capacity earlier. In the event a manufacturer fails to meet gateways on the pathway to NSN assignment, the Army maintains the right to terminate the assignment entirely.

Improve Before Flight: Streamlining sUAS Maintenance

Brigade-level sUAS maintenance cannot currently maintain sufficient airworthy platforms, let alone when expanded in line with the DoW’s intent. To address this, the Army should consider allocating Base Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. This would align sUAS programs with existing UAS Aviation (e.g., Grey Eagle) maintenance practices. As the primary source of funding for routine expenses required to keep existing military equipment functioning, base O&M funding for unit sUAS programs would allow units the freedom to conduct maintenance, repairs, and component replacement in a timely manner. It is distinct from procurement funds used to purchase new equipment or construction funds used to build new facilities but still allocated through the standard DoW budgeting process. For sUAS, base O&M could cover the cost of repair parts, contract repairs or support, salaries for Field Support Representatives, or consumable items like lubricants. Within O&M funding, there are a few options to better sustain unit sUAS programs:

• Bench stock (Recommended): Establishing authorized sUAS component (using the DIU Blue List) bench stocks at the brigade level – essentially creating a localized supply of repair parts – is the most sustainable solution. This requires a significant upfront investment of base O&M funds to procure the initial stock and ongoing base O&M funding to refill consumed stock quarterly. This option also requires policy changes to authorize the bench stocks. While requiring a larger initial investment of base O&M funds, it offers the most sustainable and doctrinally sound approach, building predictable readiness and an organic buffer against supply chain disruptions.
• Contracted Support: Blanket sustainment contracts with vendors to provide sUAS parts and repairs. This model is funded primarily through base O&M, potentially supplemented by Army sustainment contracts. It shifts the stockage burden to industry but creates a dependency that could impact readiness if vendors fail to deliver.
• GPC Exception to Policy: Allowing units to use Government Purchase Cards (GPCs) with expanded purchasing authority to build limited local parts stocks. This is the fastest to implement, funded through Base O&M at the unit level. However, it is a short-term and far less efficient solution. It drives up costs, leaves sUAS repairs out of the Army’s supply system, and significantly limits the scope of bench stock.

Rise of the Drone Sergeant: Company and Battalion Level sUAS Programs

Given the emphasis on integrating sUAS at all levels, the Army must place a corresponding emphasis on the personnel operating these systems. Currently, “sUAS operator” is an ad hoc company-level additional duty. As the sole source of Instructor Operators (IO) within the brigade, training and certification is currently centralized under the UAS platoon in the MFRC. This model is unsustainable; the three authorized IOs in the UAS platoon do not have the time or resources to properly train the 150+ sUAS operators required to meet the DoW intent of at least 1 sUAS operator per squad. The Army is bridging this gap by authorizing graduates of the sUAS Master Trainer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia to train and certify sUAS Master Trainers locally. If this course is held at the company and battalion levels, subordinate units can run organic training and currency flights without brigade centralization.

Similarly, the Army should develop soldier maintenance skills across echelons, nested within a tiered framework that ensures both responsiveness at the point of need and integration into the Army’s sustainment enterprise. sUAS maintenance is sufficiently simple if operators and trainers are armed with the appropriate parts, manuals, equipment, and software; there is no need for a dedicated maintenance technician in a battalion’s Forward Support Company (FSC).

The below additional duties at echelon would, if codified, create a sustainable sUAS training and model within a brigade and maximize available training time for operators to increase proficiency:

• Brigade Aviation Element (BAE): Responsible for overall administration of sUAS program within a brigade. Coordinates between battalions for consolidated training (e.g., Network Integration/Fielding (NET/NEF) or Semi-Annual Proficiency and Readiness Training (S-APART)). Responsible for acquisition of new systems and maintenance oversight of existing systems. Serves as central point for guidance to battalion-level Master Trainers for sUAS program administration and execution, chairs bi-weekly sync with battalion Master Trainers to ensure nesting of efforts across a brigade. Concerning maintenance, the BAE – in conjunction with the Brigade Support Battalion – should establish lines of accounting specific to SUAS sustainment, validate stockage objectives, and integrate SUAS reporting into Global Combat Support System (GCSS) Army or its equivalent. They serve the enforcement arm for quarterly bench stock refresh cycles, manage contracted support when required, and ensure compliance with DoW Drone Dominance standards. In conjunction with the Brigade S4, the BAE must advocate for NSN assignment pathways and component standardization to ensure long-term enterprise viability.
• Battalion sUAS Master Trainer: Like a battalion’s Master Driver, serves as certification authority for 42+ sUAS operators and associated currency flights. Supervises 5x company Master Trainers within a battalion. Maintains records submitted by company Master Trainers. Serves as the Initial Qualification Training (IQT) authority for training operators on new equipment. Consolidates daily status reports for company sUAS to inform maintenance status to BAE. Advises the battalion commander on sUAS employment and airspace considerations. Bears U2 Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) upon graduation from sUAS Master Trainer course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Certifies and conducts Quality Assurance/Quality Control on sUAS maintenance, namely bench stock. Coordinates with BAE or industry to conduct higher-level repairs. Briefs at the battalion maintenance meetings.
• Company sUAS Master Trainer (Drone Sergeant): License Inspector/License Examiner (or LI/LE) equivalent. Serves as primary trainers, executes monthly currency flights, and supports S-APART testing requirements for 13 SUAS operators. Advises a company commander on sUAS employment and training, provides daily status report for sUAS maintenance to battalion sUAS Master Trainer. Military Occupational Specialty (or MOS) agnostic. Once trained, resolves all maintenance issues that do not require manufacturer input. Manages bench stocks of high-use components. Conduct intermediate repairs such as soldering and Electronic Speed Controller (ESC) replacements and validate system airworthiness through functional test flights.
• Operators (1 per squad, per DoW Policy): Proficient in the operation and maintenance of all assigned sUAS. Conduct pre- and post-flight checks, perform simple part exchanges (batteries, propellors, antennas), execute firmware updates, and records sortie data. Proficient in lithium polymer battery safety to mitigate fire and hazardous material risks, both in operational use and in compliance with unit mobility requirements (e.g., movement by commercial aircraft or boat).

There is currently no codified external motivation for soldiers to learn to master sUAS, despite the emphasis and investment across the Army. Assignment of an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) for sUAS Master Trainer (U2) is a step in the right direction; however, this needs to be treated as a selective and performance-driven additional duty, similar to the U7 ASI held by UAS IOs. Promotion boards should look for sUAS competency in the promotion of non-commissioned officers. For junior non-commissioned officers, promotion points should be awarded in excess of the course hour allocation for earning their U2 identifier to further incentivize integration of sUAS at the squad level. sUAS operator currency status should be displayed on the Soldier Talent Profile (STP) in a manner consistent with individual weapons qualifications. Recommend that signature authority for Basic Aviation Badge be delegated to first colonel in chain of command (with the written endorsement of the Aviation Center of Excellence) to provide a visible, tangible acknowledgement of soldiers who have gained and maintained sUAS mastery.

At the division level, sUAS competitions can yield further incentives for operators to hone their craft. This can both drive tactical employment TTPs as well as competence in high performance sUAS platforms. When winners are publicly acknowledged by senior leaders and tied to awards, the word spreads quickly and provides an easy entry without increasing training or resourcing requirements.

Opening the Skies: Easy Access Airspace

Given the requirement to decentralize training to meet the ambitious goal of integrating sUAS at squad level, the biggest obstacle to training is the lack of readily available airspace. The non-commissioned officer corps has a long history of ad hoc (or “hip pocket”) training, exercising initiative to train in-between scheduled training events. This hip pocket training is impossible for sUAS without permissive airspace and dedicated resourcing.

Having a dedicated Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) within each installation’s local training area (training areas within the cantonment area requiring little or no prior coordination to use) would greatly enhance company Master Trainers and operator training opportunities to conduct both currency flights and hip pocket training. While this would require an amendment to airspace policy over cantonment areas, this would provide massive benefit to operators by enabling far greater flight hours per month.

In October 2025, the 10th Mountain Division authorized sUAS operations within the local training area at Fort Drum, New York, given 48 hours prior coordination with ATC and in unit motor pools without any prior coordination. This policy directly enabled the smooth facilitation of 2BCT’s local sUAS Master Trainer course by eliminating the need for reserving training areas, coordinating transportation, and resourcing food/water (all while hoping for permissive weather). Hip pocket flight training can now occur with next to zero notice instead of the five weeks previously required.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Developed During Training

There are numerous applications for the myriad of sUAS platforms available at the small-unit level. With the widespread proliferation of Soldier Borne Sensor (SBS) drones like the Black Hornet, most small unit leaders have a degree of familiarity with short-range reconnaissance. However, platforms like Teal 2, Vesper, Seeker, Hera, or Neros Archer – all Blue List SUAS – offer far greater capabilities for squad-level leaders. 2BCT UAS Operators developed the following TTPs over the past 12 months of training:

Reconnaissance

• At the company level, short-range reconnaissance sUAS platforms like the Teal 2 and Vesper are best used to supplant traditional dismounted reconnaissance, like the “leader’s recon.” At the platoon level, sUAS operators can offset their launch site from the platoon objective rally point and conduct reconnaissance within the typical 200-400m range, even in relatively restricted terrain. It is worth noting that FPV-style sUAS make extremely poor reconnaissance drones; they lack adequate cameras, GPS capabilities, and battery life, make too much noise while flying, and aren’t designed to remain fixed in one location.
• The MFRC’s scout platoon utilized Vesper drones to efficiently clear reconnaissance objectives in as fast as 30 minutes, whereas dismounted clearance would have taken hours. This asset proved decisive for exploiting emissions detected by Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, confirming firing points of enemy artillery, and counter-fire battle damage assessments. A capable short-range reconnaissance platform in the hands of a deep reconnaissance element vastly increased the volume and accuracy of calls for fire. Though these drones are easily shot down or lost, it is vastly preferable to a direct fire engagement.
• UAS operators utilized reconnaissance drones like the Teal 2 to observe call for fire missions both with and without laser grid identification. The MFRC’s UAS operators made call for fire missions with nearly 1000m of standoff from the target using the Hera.

Reconnaissance footage of the Opposing Force (or OPFOR) captured by a Hera during operations at the JRTC. At 1000 feet above ground level, the drone easily avoided visual and auditory detection.

• With some technical acumen, most sUAS currently in circulation can be connected to Android/Windows Tactical Awareness Kit (ATAK/WINTAK) to relay live drone feed to commanders. 2BCT’s UAS operators successfully connected a Vesper drone feed to an ATAK phone mounted to the commander’s personal equipment. This offers a far more flexible alternative to the One Stations Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) platform previously utilized in brigade command posts.

Attack

• FPV attack drones can be integrated with support by fire positions to employ fast-moving and accurate munitions on hard targets with small or inaccessible vulnerabilities (i.e., the rear of an armored vehicle). Systems like the Neros Archer or Seeker are best employed as expendable one-way attack drones due to their speed, maneuverability, and ability to carry a payload.
• 2BCT’s UAS operators affixed a munitions dropper to the Hera drone and used inert objects to simulate mortar rounds and other dropped munitions. Such munitions are highly effective against stationary defending forces who fail to build adequate overhead cover.

Avoiding detection by sUAS requires enemy forces to maintain constant situational awareness and replenish individual camouflage. Using dropped munitions (simulated with pinecones), 2BCT sUAS operators destroyed numerous armored vehicles while flying over 700 feet above the ground.

Special Purpose

• Using a speaker system mounted to a Hera drone, 2BCT’s UAS operators broadcasted audio files provided by an attached Psychological Operations (PSYOP) team. In a similar vein, operators flew FPV drones up and down a road, harassing a defending enemy force during a friendly attack. The mere sight or sound of a fast-moving drone is enough to momentarily disrupt any dismounted force in unrestricted terrain and force them to halt movement and seek cover.
• Using a Hera drone, 2BCT’s sUAS operators successfully resupplied the MFRC’s scout platoon with water while they were operating in territory held by the opposing force, dropping the resupply away from the scout’s location to avoid revealing their position. Such multipurpose platforms like the Hera can effectively confuse enemy forces; depending on their configuration, they may not be able to determine if it is being used for reconnaissance, resupply, or attack.

A large, stationary convoy of enemy vehicles captured by a nighttime camera.

Training TTPs

• Some FPV platforms can be difficult to land without causing damage to the aircraft. This is not a design flaw; these drones are best used in one-way attacks. Despite recent changes to policy making certain drones easier to account for if lost or destroyed, FPV operators still need to preserve their systems to continue training. The best way to mitigate the damage of landing a drone is to identify soft landing ground and train operators on throttling up just before contact with the ground. A healthy bench stock of propellors and other vulnerable components also ensures continued flight.
• During initial training, it is highly likely that operators will lose connection with the drone causing crashes in unknown locations. This is especially true for FPV operators under goggles. 2BCT streamlined the recovery process by marking the launch site with a brightly colored panel typically used for ground-to-air signaling. 2BCT also affixed glowsticks to the drones during periods of darkness and flew them with GPS tags as a final control measure.
• During field operations, 2BCT’s UAS platoon sustained its fleet of larger batteries using a small 200 watt generator running off the same fuel as its vehicles. For batteries under 1000-watt hours (e.g., Vesper, Teal, or Seeker), an inverter attached to a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (or HMMWV) provides an efficient and effective way to keep drones in continuous operation.

Conclusion

Across the U.S. military, sUAS has a long way to go before it can be fully integrated into training and real-world missions. By allocating the appropriate funding, streamlining supply, integrating maintenance systems, and de-centralizing training requirements, the Army can give small-unit leaders the tools they need to fully develop sUAS in their formations. The DoW Drone Dominance Policy provides an excellent framework, but there needs to be implementation across the Army before sUAS can be as ubiquitous as it needs to be. There should be no more debate as to whether tactical units should integrate sUAS into their scheme of maneuver – the question is how.

Disclaimer: the opinions and assertions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of War or the Department of the Army.

Check out all Small Wars Journal’s great articles on drones.

• Crispin Burke, “Small Drones, Big Limits: A Smarter Drone Strategy,” September 22, 2025.
• Amos Fox, “Drones Are Game-Changing, But They Are Not the Answer to the Inherent Challenges of Land War,” August 6, 2025.
• Bill Murray, “Beyond the Hype: Why Drones Cannot Replace Artillery,” May 5, 2025.
• David Kirichenko, “Affordable Drones and Civilian Supply Chains are Transforming Warfare,” November 26, 2024.

Tags: 10th mountain division, drone dominance, drones, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), sUAS, US Army

About The Authors

• 
  
• Daniel Temme
• Daniel Temme is a U.S. Army military intelligence officer who recently served as the Commander of the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, 2BCT, 10th Mountain Division. His previous assignments include the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 501st MI Brigade at Camp Humphreys, South Korea.
• View all posts
• 
  
• Clayton Cooper
• Clayton Cooper is a U.S. Army UAS Operations Technician (150U) currently serving as the UAS Operations Officer for the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, 2BCT, 10th Mountain Division. His previous assignments as maintenance technician (15M) for the MQ-1C “Grey Eagle” UAS include the 224th MI Battalion (AE) at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia and the 25th Aviation Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.
• View all posts
• 
  
• Matthew Levengood
• Matthew Levengood is a U.S. Army infantry officer currently serving as a Tactical UAS Platoon Leader in the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, 2BCT, 10th Mountain Division. He has previously served as a Heavy Weapons Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and staff officer. Matthew is a Graduate Fellow at the Small Wars Journal.

18. Decline of Operational Art: The Story of A Strategic China Wargame

​Summary:

Recent wargames against China show a serious erosion of U.S. understanding of operational art, especially decisive points and centers of gravity. In a 2034 U.S. China Philippines scenario, Blue had ample forces but lost because planners dispersed combat power, confused decision points with decisive points, and failed to mass integrated effects on China’s real center of gravity. Years of counterinsurgency habits, proceduralism, and risk aversion have dulled large scale warfighting instincts. The author calls for renewed doctrine, wargaming, and education, plus careful use of AI, so planners can design coherent campaigns instead of process driven stalemates.

Excerpts:

The continued relevance of decisive points and centers of gravity in joint doctrine is not merely a matter of theoretical debate but a practical imperative for operational success. As demonstrated in both historical campaigns and contemporary wargames, the inability to identify and exploit decisive points — defined in relation to the adversary’s center of gravity — renders even the best-resourced force vulnerable to strategic defeat. This failure is as much intellectual and organizational as it is procedural, rooted in decades of operational drift and cognitive inertia.

The way forward demands a recommitment to doctrinal rigor, critical reflection, and experiential learning. Planners should master both the art and science of operational design, leveraging integration, mass, and synchronization to create and exploit decisive opportunities. Only by doing so can they reclaim the initiative, generate cascading effects on the enemy’s operational system, and maintain a competitive advantage in the face of dynamic and capable adversaries. In the Indo-Pacific and beyond, the stakes are nothing less than the preservation of U.S. influence and the credibility of American military power in the 21st century.

Decline of Operational Art: The Story of A Strategic China Wargame

warontherocks.com · December 12, 2025

Marco Lyons

December 12, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/decline-of-operational-art-story-of-a-strategic-china-wargame/

Planners today struggle to properly apply operational art in large scale war — and they don’t fully realize why. It takes something like firsthand experience in a strategic level wargame against a human red team to fully realize how much understanding of classical military art has been lost.

The 21st century has witnessed the resurgence of great-power competition, with the Indo-Pacific theater emerging as a focal point for geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. The increasing complexity of warfare, characterized by rapid technological advancements and emerging multi-domain operations, places unprecedented demands on military planners and strategists. Central to meeting these demands is the application of operational art — the vital connective tissue between strategy and tactics. Operational art, as conceptualized in both Western and Soviet traditions, provides the framework for translating strategic objectives into coordinated action across vast operational spaces and timeframes.

Despite its foundational role, recent wargaming — especially in scenarios simulating high-intensity conflict with China — has exposed a troubling decline in the understanding and application of operational art within U.S. and allied militaries. Concepts such as decisive points and centers of gravity, which remain enshrined in joint doctrine, are often misunderstood, misapplied, or neglected altogether in practice. The consequences are not merely theoretical: Failures in operational design can lead to strategic paralysis and defeat, even for the most technologically advanced forces.

Competency in operational art declined with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as the United States shifted from planning for major war to smaller scale operations, such as counterinsurgency. The decline continues today. This downward trajectory can best be seen through the lens of a confidential, human-adjudicated 2022 Department of Defense wargame simulating a 2034 conflict involving the United States, China, and the Philippines. Drawing on U.S. joint doctrine, historical cases, expert analyses, and firsthand experience in the wargame, I argue that the inability to identify and exploit decisive points in relation to adversary centers of gravity undermines the efficacy of joint force operations. Planners should understand the critical enabling roles of integration, mass, and synchronization, and the cognitive barriers — such as proceduralism and failure of imagination — that impede doctrinal mastery. There are opportunities for revitalizing operational art to meet the challenges of contemporary and future warfare.

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Theoretical Foundations: Operational Art, Decisive Points, and Centers of Gravity

Operational art, decisive points, and centers of gravity form the intellectual backbone of modern campaign design and execution. These concepts provide the framework for linking strategic objectives to tactical actions, ensuring coherence across all levels of military operations. By understanding the theoretical underpinnings of operational art, commanders can more effectively synchronize efforts and exploit opportunities on the battlefield.

Operational Art: Bridging Strategy and Tactics

Operational art in U.S. military thinking, or the opératique as conceptualized in French military thought, occupies the vital intermediate level between strategy and tactics. It enables commanders to orchestrate campaigns over vast distances, coordinating diverse forces and actions to achieve strategic objectives. The emergence of the operational level was a response to the limitations of traditional binary distinctions between strategy and tactics, particularly as the scale and lethality of warfare increased in the 20th century.

The operational level provides a distinct perspective, allowing practitioners to identify problems and solutions that are invisible at the tactical or strategic levels. Its successful application requires not only an appropriate organizational structure but also agile systems capable of rapid adaptation and coordination. The operational artist carefully arranges actions in a deliberate sequence, takes advantage of timely opportunities, and sustains a rapid pace of operations. By doing so, they disrupt the enemy’s ability to respond effectively and weaken the adversary as an integrated system.

Decisive Points in Joint Doctrine

Within U.S. joint doctrine, decisive points are central to campaign design and execution. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, defines a decisive point as “key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success.” These are not arbitrary targets or fleeting opportunities. Rather, they are operationally significant nodes — physical, conceptual, or functional — on which the outcome of a campaign may hinge. There is also the idea of “[action] upon” in the definition. This distinction clarifies that decisive points have significance only when they are acted upon — meaning that their value lies in the potential to change the course of a campaign through purposeful engagement or intervention.

Critically, decisive points are defined in relation to the adversary’s center of gravity. They serve as stepping stones or linkages, the seizure or neutralization of which systematically degrades the enemy’s ability to resist. As Jeffrey A. Springman articulates, decisive points function as intermediate objectives whose proper sequencing enables friendly forces to converge upon and ultimately neutralize the adversary’s center of gravity. This underscores the need for deliberate operational design, where decisive points are purposefully linked to strategic objectives.

Centers of Gravity: Clausewitzian Roots and Operational Application

The center of gravity remains a foundational, if contested, element of joint doctrine. Joint Planning defines the center of gravity as the “source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” Drawing on Clausewitz, the center of gravity is conceived as the linchpin of an adversary’s ability to resist or project power, whether a fielded force, a critical logistical network, or the political will of a society.

Identifying an adversary’s center of gravity anchors operational design by linking strategic ends to operational ways and tactical means. However, as Springman warns, failure to establish a clear linkage among tasks, decisive points, and the center of gravity results in operational incoherence and dissipated effort. A center of gravity-focused approach demands both doctrinal mastery and the operational imagination to adapt to changing circumstances.

Decline of Operational Art: Insights from the 2034 U.S.-China-Philippines Wargame

The decline of operational art in modern military planning is increasingly evident, particularly when tested against the complexities of strategic level wargames involving peer adversaries like China. As the Indo-Pacific region becomes the epicenter of great power competition, the ability to translate strategy into effective, synchronized operations across multiple domains is more critical — and more challenging — than ever.

Wargame Overview and Outcomes

A recent Department of Defense wargame simulated a hypothetical 2034 conflict scenario involving U.S., Chinese, and Philippine forces. In this scenario, the People’s Liberation Army invaded the Philippines after a hypothetical victory in Taiwan two years earlier, prompting an American-led Blue force response. Despite having significant air and maritime assets, Blue was decisively defeated by the People’s Liberation Army, which rapidly seized and consolidated control over critical terrain in the central Philippines.

Analysis of Failures

Blue’s defeat was not due to technological inferiority or resource constraints. Instead, it stemmed from fundamental conceptual and procedural failures in the application of operational art. Blue planners repeatedly conflated decision points (moments requiring a choice) with decisive points (actions or locations that materially affect campaign success), failed to relate their lines of effort to the adversary’s operational center of gravity, and dispersed their combat power across multiple, poorly integrated lines of operation. The absence of clarity and focus prevented the massing of effects at decisive places and times, ceding the initiative to the People’s Liberation Army.

In contrast, the People’s Liberation Army exploited interior lines, seized key airfields and maritime chokepoints, and rapidly established anti-access/area denial networks, consolidating their operational gains with remarkable speed. This outcome closely parallels findings from historical campaign studies, such as Michael D. Heredia’s 1995 monograph on Operation Desert Storm, where success was enabled by clearly identifying the Iraqi Army as the center of gravity, sequencing actions against decisive points (notably logistics hubs and command nodes), and balancing offensive and defensive operations to prevent premature culmination.

Broader Implications

The failures observed in the wargame were not merely procedural but deeply cognitive. Post-wargame analyses revealed that planners defaulted to paradigms from counter-insurgency and stability operations, emphasizing process, risk aversion, and support buildup over maneuver, initiative, and rapid adaptation. Understandably, the wargame participants defaulted to their earlier professional and deployed experience in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and to their earlier professional military education in low intensity operations. This cognitive inertia was compounded by an inability to distinguish between the requirements of low intensity and large-scale combat operations, leading to disunity of effort and strategic paralysis.

These findings echo James Lacey’s analysis of contemporary wargaming, which highlights persistent difficulties in identifying and exploiting decisive points and centers of gravity in high intensity, peer conflicts. The operational atrophy witnessed in the wargame is symptomatic of broader challenges facing joint force planners and commanders today. I know this because I was one of the Blue planners.

Enabling Decisive Action: Integration, Mass, and Synchronization

Effective operational art hinges on the seamless integration, mass, and synchronization of military forces to generate decisive effects at critical moments. These foundational principles, rooted in joint doctrine, are essential for transforming disparate actions into unified, campaign-level success.

Integration, as defined in Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, is the “arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.” This principle implies the creation of mass and relative superiority at decisive points, enabling forces to act as a single, unified whole rather than as disjointed parts. In the wargame, Blue’s efforts were characterized by sequential, stovepiped operations — air interdiction, then maritime strikes, then submarine operations — each executed in isolation rather than as part of a synchronized effort. This fragmentation prevented operational synergy and allowed the adversary to exploit gaps.

Marc LeGare’s analysis underscores that mass is not merely the accumulation of resources but the focused application of combat power at the decisive point and time, achieved through integration and synchronization. Blue’s failure to mass effects in the wargame was a direct consequence of inadequate integration and the absence of clear operational objectives. Without a coherent understanding of decisive points, efforts were scattered across multiple, uncoordinated lines of operation, rendering them ineffective.

Synchronization is defined as the “arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” Clyde L. Long warns that unsynchronized actions — even if individually effective — are likely to be dissipated if not directed toward operational objectives. In the wargame, lack of synchronization allowed the People’s Liberation Army to exploit operational gaps, consolidate territorial gains, and achieve campaign objectives with speed and efficiency.

Properly implemented, integration, mass, and synchronization empower operational artists to create conditions to exploit decisive points and systematically target the enemy’s center of gravity. Their neglect, as seen in the wargame, leads to operational paralysis, loss of combat power, and defeat.

Cognitive Barriers: The Failure of Imagination and Proceduralism

Barriers such as failure of imagination and overreliance on established procedures —two understandable human tendencies — have repeatedly hindered effective operational planning and execution in war. When doctrine becomes stagnant and procedures are followed uncritically, organizations become rigid and leaders lose the creativity needed to adapt to evolving battlefield threats and complex operational environments.

Proceduralism and Doctrinal Stagnation

A deeper failure of operational imagination underlies the doctrinal and procedural deficiencies observed in the wargame. Charles D. Allen argues that robust operational concepts must challenge assumptions, seek out neglected pathways, and adopt holistic perspectives to avoid operational failure. In the wargame, persistent confusion between strategic and operational levels manifested as repeated attempts to redefine the nature of conflict at the operational level, undermining the nesting of plans, delaying decisive action, and resulting in individually rational actions that failed to generate cumulative operational effects.

Historical Parallels and Contemporary Lessons

Historical analysis, such as Heredia’s study Operation Desert Storm and recollections by officers in the years following 1991, reinforces the enduring relevance of operational design elements — center of gravity, decisive points, culmination, linkage, sequencing, and conflict termination — even as they adapt to modern, maritime, and high-intensity conflicts such as a future war over the Philippines. The lessons are not merely procedural but fundamentally cognitive: Effective operational art requires both doctrinal mastery and the willingness to innovate and adapt under pressure.

The Decline of the Operational Perspective

The decline of operational art is not unique to the U.S. military. French military theorists have likewise observed that the agility, tempo, and coordination required for operational success are often undermined by organizational inertia and an overreliance on procedural compliance. Meanwhile, Seth Jones has argued that the opening campaign of the Russo-Ukrainian war is a case study in failed Russian operational art. While the operational level enables identification of otherwise invisible problems and solutions, its successful application depends on the agility and adaptability of the organization and its leaders.

How Technology Can Help

Technology should not replace the need for human expertise, but its judicious use can enhance it. Advanced technology is here to stay and likely will spread to every corner of human activity, including war, making its integration into operational art essential. Technology provides the necessary edge in future conflict environments constrained by the need to operate in smaller, more survivable nodes. Leveraging technology is a critical step in maintaining and improving military proficiency in operational art for future conflicts.

Technology — especially AI — can significantly improve joint planners’ understanding and application of doctrine and operational art in complex, contested environments. Against peer adversaries like China and Russia, planners will likely operate with smaller, distributed staffs and under degraded network conditions, making traditional planning methods riskier and less effective. AI and advanced digital tools, including a real-time, live data common operational picture, could help planners manage information overload, automate routine tasks, and enhance analysis, allowing them to focus on higher order operational art challenges.

Automated Data Processing and Terrain Analysis

AI rapidly analyzes large geographical areas, identifies key terrain, and synthesizes vast operational data, enabling planners to focus on visualizing the battlespace and understanding multi-domain interdependencies. Predictive algorithms, leveraging historical data and real-time intelligence, can forecast enemy movements and estimate logistical requirements with greater accuracy, allowing for more developed contingency plans. This supports better identification of decisive points and operational risks.

Enhanced Center of Gravity Analysis

AI-powered network analysis and pattern recognition tools map complex relationships between enemy capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. These systems can highlight strategic and operational centers of gravity, simulate multiple courses of action, and predict adversary responses. This enables planners to tie objectives and operations to decisive points and centers of gravity. Properly used, AI tools can reduce cognitive burden on military decision makers and planners.

Decision Support and Visualization

AI-driven decision support tools analyze operational timelines, resource requirements, and spatial relationships — including the physical characteristics of the battlespace — to suggest decisive points and synchronize operations. Advanced visualization platforms help planners understand how objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity interrelate across time and space. These platforms also provide clear, interactive representations of complex problems.

Information Management

AI filters and prioritizes information, generates concise intelligence summaries, and organizes doctrine and lessons learned, reducing cognitive burden and ensuring planners focus on what matters most for mission success, such as the ability to rapidly identify, prioritize, and act on decisive information and tasks. Additionally, by providing objective, data-driven assessments, AI can help mitigate human cognitive biases that often affect decision-making in high-stress, complex environments.

Distributed Planning and Collaboration

Cloud-based platforms with embedded AI enable geographically dispersed staffs to collaborate, synchronize plans, and maintain consistency even under degraded network conditions. For example, even in peacetime training, limited transmission assets or congestion in communications infrastructure can cause high latency and reduced bandwidth, which slows data transmission and limits real-time collaboration and access to cloud services in tactical environments. Increased network intrusions, spoofing, and cyber attacks can further degrade mission command systems and digital common operational pictures. Nonetheless, with sufficient connectivity, automated plan checking can identify gaps and inconsistencies, supporting more robust operational planning. Cloud-based platforms and AI support distributed planning by providing robust data management, automated analysis, local processing, and resilient collaboration tools — directly mitigating the operational risks posed by degraded network conditions. Cloud-based systems can cache data locally and synchronize updates with intermittent restoration of services and edge computing, allowing AI functions and data processing to occur despite connectivity disruptions.

An Example Scenario, Key Considerations, and a Word of Caution

A tactical example can show how AI-driven decision support tools, AI-driven information management, and AI-enhanced cloud-based platforms can transform the command and control of complex operations.

A corps headquarters is planning a multi-brigade offensive against a peer adversary. The staff employs an AI-driven decision support tool like the U.S. Army’s Maven Smart System that ingests real-time intelligence reports, operational data, aviation, protection, and logistics statuses, and terrain analysis. The tool speeds up the planning and reduces errors made by the human staff by performing the following functions.

First, the AI analyzes the projected movement rates of friendly units, actions by civilians on the battlefield, anticipated enemy reactions, and logistical throughput. It highlights a 12 hour window when fuel and ammunition resupply will be at peak efficiency, and when sensors can be in ideal overwatch positions, aligning with the arrival of a bridging asset at a key river crossing.

Second, the system overlays high-resolution terrain data and enemy disposition maps, identifying a narrow defile as both a potential choke point and a decisive point for the operation. It simulates enemy artillery ranges and suggests optimal routes for maneuver units to avoid detection and maximize cover during the approach to the crossing site.

Third, based on the input of commander’s intent and repeated, fully automated simulations, the AI can analyze for the decisive point and ways to achieve better synchronization. The AI recommends concentrating fires and maneuver at the defile during the identified window, synchronizing electronic warfare, aviation, and ground assaults. It also proposes a deception plan to fix enemy reserves away from the decisive point. Planners interact with a dynamic three-dimensional map that visually links objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. The platform allows users to adjust timelines, resource allocations, and see immediate impacts on synchronization and risk. Interactive overlays show how changes in one area (e.g., delayed bridging or low artillery ammunition) cascade across the operation, updating recommendations in real time.

Finally, the commander uses these insights to refine the scheme of maneuver, allocate resources, and issue clear orders. The visualization platform ensures all staff sections share a common operational picture, reducing ambiguity and improving coordination. This approach to AI-enabled battlespace visualization can transform complex, multi-domain problems into actionable, synchronized plans, directly supporting decision dominance and operational effectiveness.

This scenario illustrates the transformative potential of AI-driven platforms in operational planning, but realizing these benefits will not be a simple process. There are several implementation considerations — including an important caution — that joint force leaders should be aware of. First, U.S. military commands should invest in AI tailored for military planning, infrastructure, and staff training, and multinational interoperability. Second, commanders should integrate AI tools in phases: begin with terrain and information management, then progress to center of gravity and decisive point analysis, then course of action development. Third, commanders should pair technology with enhanced education in operational art to ensure planners understand both the capabilities and limitations of AI assistance. Finally, commanders should maintain human judgment and doctrinal alignment in all technology applications.

Revitalizing Operational Art: Recommendations for Doctrine, Education, and Practice

Addressing the challenge requires a comprehensive approach. Moving beyond proceduralism, the Army should educate planners who understand and can flexibly apply the principles of operational art in dynamic, complex environments featuring the thorniest tactical problems. Integrating doctrinal mastery with experiential learning and historical insight will be essential to restore and advance operational proficiency for large-scale combat operations.

Doctrinal Education Beyond Proceduralism

A renewed emphasis on doctrinal education is essential — one that transcends rote memorization and procedural compliance. Planners should internalize the logic of operational art, mastering the dynamic relationships among ends, ways, and means; identifying and exploiting centers of gravity and decisive points; and orchestrating integrated, synchronized joint combat power. This demands not only familiarity with doctrinal definitions but also the ability to apply them flexibly across diverse scenarios.

Experiential Learning and Wargaming

Wargaming and experiential learning should be central to professional military education and training. Free-play, human-adjudicated wargames expose conceptual weaknesses, challenge participants to adapt in real time, and provide adversaries who think, adapt, and exploit operational opportunities. As Lacey and Heredia observe, such experiences are the most effective antidote to intellectual complacency and process-driven inertia.

Balancing Support and Initiative

Operational planners should resist the temptation to over-engineer support and logistics at the expense of tempo and initiative. While sustainment is essential, the pursuit of perfect conditions for action is incompatible with the realities of high intensity peer conflict, where initiative, risk acceptance, and rapid adaptation determine outcomes. Planners should be trained to balance offense and defense, recognize the culminating point, and avoid dissipating effort on non-critical targets.

Integrating Historical Wisdom and Contemporary Innovation

A deliberate effort is required to integrate “old school” operational thinking — rooted in Clausewitzian principles — with the realities of the 21st-century battlespace. Only by synthesizing historical wisdom with contemporary innovation can planners regain the proficiency required for success in large scale combat operations.

Retired Senior Military Leaders’ Role in Reversing the Decline

As highly qualified experts in professional military education, retired senior Army leaders can contribute more to doctrinal instruction and experiential learning. Doctrinal education should move beyond rote memorization. Instead, planners should be taught to internalize and flexibly apply the logic of operational art, understanding how to synthesize ends, ways, and means in complex, fluid environments. Experiential learning — particularly through human-adjudicated, free-play wargames — should become central to the education experience. Such exercises force participants to confront adaptive adversaries and reveal cognitive and conceptual gaps that rote education cannot address.

Conclusion

The continued relevance of decisive points and centers of gravity in joint doctrine is not merely a matter of theoretical debate but a practical imperative for operational success. As demonstrated in both historical campaigns and contemporary wargames, the inability to identify and exploit decisive points — defined in relation to the adversary’s center of gravity — renders even the best-resourced force vulnerable to strategic defeat. This failure is as much intellectual and organizational as it is procedural, rooted in decades of operational drift and cognitive inertia.

The way forward demands a recommitment to doctrinal rigor, critical reflection, and experiential learning. Planners should master both the art and science of operational design, leveraging integration, mass, and synchronization to create and exploit decisive opportunities. Only by doing so can they reclaim the initiative, generate cascading effects on the enemy’s operational system, and maintain a competitive advantage in the face of dynamic and capable adversaries. In the Indo-Pacific and beyond, the stakes are nothing less than the preservation of U.S. influence and the credibility of American military power in the 21st century.

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Marco J. Lyons is a U.S. Army officer currently serving as deputy chief of staff, V Corps (forward) in Poland. Between July 2022 and July 2025, he was the assistant chief of staff of plans for U.S. Army Pacific. He was a 2021 Harvard Kennedy School national security fellow and a 2020 Massachusetts Institute of Technology national security fellow. He served on the 2021 Office of the Secretary of Defense China task force and on the 2016 and 2017 Army Science Board studies of multi-domain operations. He completed Naval Postgraduate School in 2014, where his distinguished thesis examined U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Damien Thomas via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · Grace Parcover · December 12, 2025

19. Public Health is the Future of Global Security

​Summary:

Public health now sits at the center of global security. COVID-19 proved that infectious disease can cripple economies, supply chains, and military readiness, creating conditions for disorder and weakened states. The author argues that, despite this lesson, U.S. policymakers are cutting public health programs just as climate change, pandemics, noncommunicable disease, and environmental instability intensify. Public health institutions across HHS, DHA, DIA/NCMI, and the U.S. Public Health Service are national security assets, yet the military entered COVID underprepared and vulnerable. He calls for fully integrating public health into defense planning, sustaining investment, and treating upstream prevention as vital to future warfighting.

Excerpts:

When leaders observe threats from the state perspective and overlook the human security variable, problems proliferate. Failure to intervene early is not only an issue in diplomacy and geopolitical warfare but a public health problem as well. Not intervening in a small geopolitical conflict can be a catalyst to increasing conflicts, similar as to failing to treat one disease that leads to comorbidities. This became evident over the past decade as the military began to seriously recognize the long-term implications of obesity on readiness — a concern now paralleled by the growing threat of communicable diseases.

A failure to implement upstream methods of intervention can be catastrophic to the US military and the people they protect.

A failure to implement upstream methods of intervention can be catastrophic to the US military and the people they protect. Without a ready response force, success in war is unattainable. Addressing these issues cannot be achieved through quick or overnight policy fixes once they emerge. The U.S military prides itself on analyzing the history and patterns of war, yet our leaders’ scholarship must also embrace a wider view of threats covering both those far-off, unforeseen dangers and the more familiar risks that may quietly escalate.

Public Health is the Future of Global Security

by Sean Donnelly

|

12.12.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/12/public-health-is-the-future-of-global-security/

Whether it’s incremental climate change, famine, drug and food management, noncommunicable disease, emerging infectious diseases, or unstable environmental conditions, global security is closely tied to global health threats. About a decade ago, I was asked what I thought might cause the “end of the world.” Would it be nuclear war? An alien invasion? Perhaps a meteor? I said none of those — it would be infectious disease. Not long after, COVID-19 emerged on the horizon and proved just how vulnerable the world can be.

The aftermath revealed millions dead, a decimated economy, disrupted supply chains, diminished military readiness, and massive unemployment. While COVID-19 did not end the world, its impact was felt like no other and reflected a world-ending apocalyptic environment of isolation and quarantine. It was the optimal setup for anarchy, disorganization, and weakened nation states. Today, the uncertainties and dynamics of the public health environment is still constant, and the global health threats are increasing. However, in the current political climate, the government has proposed significant cuts to many public health programs and agencies. This is not a time to reduce public health support, on the contrary, public health must be considered a top priority by our lawmakers, health experts, and military leaders.

What is Public Health?

When I asked people what public health was before COVID-19, I was often met with blank stares and a range of assumptions — a reminder of how little many understood the field at the time. As defined by the American Public Health Association, public health protects and promotes the health of people and their communities. When I say ‘people’ this also includes the U.S military and government employees.

Public health was a historically significant element in allowing military forces to organize, gain the advantage, and become coherent fighting forces, much of it through inoculation. This protection largely includes communicable and noncommunicable disease and the more relevant intersection to the military — Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Public health is a collaborative effort that includes several threat vectors that require a diverse group of practitioners from the U.S military and government. It is an effort that has historically and persistently benefited our military and nation while building relationships through humanitarian assistance and post-war reconstruction efforts. Its value and benefits remain as relevant today as ever.

As a related recommendation: If you want a fun scientific based read that touches infectious disease, check out a book called The Real Science Behind the X-Files: Microbes, Meteorites, and Mutants. I also suggest an open-source website to follow current public health/disease issues and outbreaks: Global Incident Map

Who are the Primary Actors in the U.S Public Health System?

From the federal level there are some well know agencies that are devoted to this area.

The U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) consists of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institute of Health (NIH). These agencies are the most prominent and focus a lot of their efforts on research, prevention, policy, preparedness, and investigation. I would highly encourage readers to research an intriguing unit under the CDC called the Epidemic Intelligence Unit.

Some lesser known but vital parts of this mission are the U.S Public Health Service (which is comprised of multiple federal health agencies), the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Health Agency (DHA). After these agencies you have a few smaller branch components as well. These agencies are critical because the U.S government and specifically the U.S military is entrusted with defending the United States and protecting its citizens, including its own members for military readiness.

The U.S Military had not Anticipated a Crisis of this Scale

During the COVID-19 outbreak, the U.S military had a limited plan in place for novel viruses of this scale. Disease surveillance and response were inadequate for a problem set of this magnitude, even when the US knew it was not a matter of if, but when. In addition, the close quarters of troops made the infection and incidence rate proliferate. Furthermore, this pandemic seriously disrupted supply chains. Military historians recognize that logistics are fundamental; without effective logistical support, an army cannot function. This affected everything from troop training to real-world operations. Moreover, medical equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was especially difficult to obtain and resupply. As a result, the U.S military was forced to deal with a) an overall vulnerable and frail military force and U.S population, b) augmentation of forces for civilian support, c) increased mental health issues for troops, d) limited operational capacity, e) insufficient remote work capability, and f) growing domestic and international tensions.

Framing the Problem

National Security includes numerous unpredictable problems and dimensions that policymakers and warfighters must face as a nation. Understandably, the most pressing threats and a war for over two decades changed the threat perspective for our warfighters. The U.S aperture focused in on these issues and put aside the idea of a massive pandemic. The U.S military and overall, the U.S government faced recency bias and looked at the predictable, direct, and experienced threats more often than the black swan event.

As previously mentioned, though resilient, the U.S military — as with every other military — was unprepared for a pandemic of this level which should not have been the case. Research reflects that not only does the world experience global pandemics somewhat reliably but more frequently, roughly every 20 years or less, and they are becoming increasingly severe as well. As a strategic imperative, public health must be fully integrated into Department of Defense planning and policy. Failure to consider other risks is like the guy who trains daily in jujitsu or firearms for close quarters battle but ends up getting fatally injured because he didn’t wear his seatbelt—a preventable outcome.

Pushing Forward

After COVID-19 the U.S military took corrective action to improve its public health readiness and response, but under the current environment, I am concerned about the unwarranted attacks on public health, its agencies, and personnel. This is happening at a time when global health threats are on the rise due to globalization. Public health is not only national security but global security — now is not the time for the U.S to regress into anti-science rhetoric and relegate public health to a nonessential. Even in the face of unprecedented events like COVID-19, collective memory can be short. For this reason, public health must be continuously sustained and given greater emphasis within the National Defense Strategy.

Public health is not only national security but global security — now is not the time for the U.S to regress into anti-science rhetoric and relegate public health to a nonessential.

Conclusion

When leaders observe threats from the state perspective and overlook the human security variable, problems proliferate. Failure to intervene early is not only an issue in diplomacy and geopolitical warfare but a public health problem as well. Not intervening in a small geopolitical conflict can be a catalyst to increasing conflicts, similar as to failing to treat one disease that leads to comorbidities. This became evident over the past decade as the military began to seriously recognize the long-term implications of obesity on readiness — a concern now paralleled by the growing threat of communicable diseases.

A failure to implement upstream methods of intervention can be catastrophic to the US military and the people they protect.

A failure to implement upstream methods of intervention can be catastrophic to the US military and the people they protect. Without a ready response force, success in war is unattainable. Addressing these issues cannot be achieved through quick or overnight policy fixes once they emerge. The U.S military prides itself on analyzing the history and patterns of war, yet our leaders’ scholarship must also embrace a wider view of threats covering both those far-off, unforeseen dangers and the more familiar risks that may quietly escalate.

Tags: global security, Public Health

About The Author

• 
  
• Sean Donnelly
• Sean Donnelly is a former CIA officer and U.S. Marine. While in the Marines he deployed to Iraq in 2005 with the infantry and Colombia in 2007 with special operations. As a civilian he has been assigned to numerous other countries. He holds a Doctor of Public Health and a Master of Science in Criminal Justice with a focus on Terrorism. He also completed a graduate certificate in Theater Security Decision Making from the Naval War College. Sean is currently undergoing a Master in Global Security degree from Arizona State University.

20. (When) Will Israel Attack Iran Again?

​Summary:

The next Israel–Iran war is a question of “when,” not “if,” as both sides prepare during a tense intermission between conflicts. Israel’s doctrine of permanent preemption and Netanyahu’s personal political survival drive pressure to strike Iranian capabilities that are growing more resilient and closer in time-distance. Iran responds with its own “weaponized ambiguity,” building missiles, alliances, and proxy coordination to raise the costs of any attack. U.S. politics, eroding support for Israel, and new corridors in the South Caucasus complicate escalation risks. Deterrence no longer prevents war, it only shapes shorter, more dangerous intervals between them.

(When) Will Israel Attack Iran Again?

by Siamak Naficy

|

12.12.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/12/when-will-israel-attack-iran-again/

The Silence Between Wars

It is often said that peace between geopolitical competitors is not an agreement, but an intermission. Between one war and the next, capitals across the Middle East rehearse familiar scripts: missiles are replaced, alliances are recalibrated, and ghosts of deterrence float through every briefing room. Gaza bleeds quietly; Lebanon hums under the occupation that was never really lifted; and the Gulf monarchies, forever hedging, test how far wealth can insulate them from catastrophe.

The United States, for its part, still plays its strange double role — the restrainer and the accelerant. A superpower that deploys force to prevent war, but whose very presence guarantees that war will always remain an option.

The world watches the Strait of Hormuz for clues to the next shock. But if we’re honest, the question is no longer if the next Israel–Iran war will come. The question is when, and whether the next one will be the last that the region can survive.

For Israel, time is both a weapon and a wound. Every month that passes allows Iran to grow more resilient — to replace its shattered radars, to multiply its missile batteries faster than Israel or the United States can replenish interceptors.

By December, as Trita Parsi observed in August, the window narrows. U.S. political cycles matter — especially now that Trump’s re-election machinery is bound to the mood of the “America First” right, whose support for Israel has eroded sharply since the Gaza disaster and the ill-fated strike on Qatar. The irony is brutal: Israel’s overreach may have created the very political conditions that now constrain it.

Netanyahu knows this. For him, war is not only a strategy — it is personal survival. Without Gaza to bomb and without a foreign enemy to fear, he faces prison and political collapse.

And so, the calculus is renewed: if not Gaza, then Tehran.

A Doctrine of Permanent Preemption

Israel’s security establishment has long abandoned the idea that deterrence can be mutual. Where other states see threats as the sum of capability and intent, Israel assumes the latter to be constant. Every neighbor, it believes, carries the eternal intention to destroy it. Intent, therefore, is not a variable — only capability is.

This is the logic that justifies a policy of continuous preemption, striking before the other side can retaliate. It is a doctrine born from the trauma of annihilation. Still, it has metastasized into an empire of insecurity — one that demands the perpetual domination of every state within missile range.

And yet, as Iran’s missiles demonstrated in the last war, the region is no longer big enough for Israel’s comfort. Geography has collapsed into minutes. Tehran is twelve minutes away, and Tel Aviv is no longer beyond reach.

Iran’s Counter-Silence

In Tehran, preparation and theater blend into one. The regime drills for a second war, building launchers, stockpiling missiles, courting Russian aircraft, and refining coordination with Hezbollah, the Hashd, and the Houthis. How much of this is readiness, and how much of it is signaling, no one outside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) truly knows.

But uncertainty itself is Iran’s deterrent language — the same grammar I once described as the weaponization of ambiguity. Every drone exercise, every televised missile launch, is a reminder that even a wounded Iran can still inflict catastrophic pain.

In that sense, Iran has learned Israel’s own lessons too well. Deterrence in the modern Middle East is not about preventing war; it is about choreographing uncertainty so precisely that your enemy can no longer calculate victory.

One of the unspoken truths of the June war was how deeply Mossad had penetrated Iranian territory. Missiles fired from beyond Iran’s borders, but the sabotage — the drone strikes, the assassinations, the communications disruptions — came from within. Israel’s true success was not aerial but internal: the creation of temporary micro-fronts inside its enemy’s geography.

Yet this success came at a cost. Networks, once invisible, were exposed. Whether Mossad can regenerate such reach in mere months is doubtful. But for every cell destroyed, another may be waiting in training camps just beyond Iran’s periphery — in Azerbaijan, perhaps, whose territory was reportedly used during the war.

If another conflict erupts, the risk of spillover into the South Caucasus is real. The August 8 agreement between Baku, Yerevan, and Washington opened new corridors — economic on paper, but strategic in practice. In the next round, the war may not stop at the Zagros; it may climb into the Caucasus, where every ethnic and political fissure becomes a potential front.

The Trap of Strategic Hegemony

In the end, Israel’s wars are not driven solely by domestic crises or the ambitions of one embattled prime minister. They are products of a system that defines safety through supremacy — a survival logic that can never be satiated because it cannot imagine coexistence.

But every missile that fails to intercept, every Arab capital that refuses to normalize, every American senator who hesitates, or calls a genocide a genocide — all of these are cracks in the armor of inevitability. The U.S. should retire its black-and-white grammar and make the effort to pivot toward an inclusive regional framework—the only security arrangement that can endure long-term.

The danger is that Israel, fearing decline, might accelerate toward war to postpone peace. But history shows that the more a nation depends on war for its identity, the less capable it becomes of surviving peace when it finally arrives.

So, when will Israel attack Iran again?

The answer lies in the same paradox that has haunted this region for generations: deterrence as dependence, dominance as fear. Israel and Iran now inhabit a strategic ecosystem in which deterrence no longer prevents war — it merely shapes the intervals between them. Every strike tightens the spiral; every pause shortens the next pause. Without an external shock or diplomatic architecture to interrupt the cycle, the next conflict becomes a matter of timing rather than choice.

Unless both nations learn to live with uncertainty — rather than weaponize it — the next war is not a question of time, but of endurance. How long can two nations keep testing each other’s thresholds before the entire region collapses into the void between red lines and black boxes?

Tags: Gaza, Iran, Israel, Middle East, Tehran

About The Author

• 
  
• Siamak Naficy
• Siamak Tundra Naficy is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. An anthropologist by training, he brings an interdisciplinary perspective to the study of strategic culture, conflict resilience, and the human dimensions of security. His work draws from both naturalist and classical realist traditions, emphasizing how power, interests, the history of ideas, and human nature shape conflict. His research interests span conflict theory, wicked problems, leadership, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior—viewed through an anthropological lens. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

21. The Multipolar Mirage: Why America and China Are the World’s Only Great Powers

​Summary:

The world is not sliding into multipolarity. It is already solidly bipolar, with only the United States and China meeting true great-power thresholds in both economic and military terms. Using historical metrics centered on GDP and a composite of size and wealth, she shows China today is more powerful than the Soviet Union at its Cold War peak, even while spending a much smaller share of GDP on defense. Russia, India, Japan, and Germany remain influential middle powers but fall below great-power levels. Bipolarity will harden “backyard” contests as Washington and Beijing press states to choose sides.

Excerpts:

The first rule of bipolarity, however, is secure your backyard. Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela has pursued close economic ties with China, and recent U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific is in part a warning to Caracas and other governments in the region about the consequences of cozying up to Beijing. Earlier this year, the Trump administration similarly signaled to Panama that continuing to allow Chinese firms to control strategic infrastructure at the Panama Canal would prompt U.S. military action. Latin America felt the sting of bipolarity during the Cold War, and, in the emerging superpower competition between China and the United States, it is starting to feel it again.

In East Asia, China will likely move to enforce its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Beijing will continue to use incremental tactics and economic coercion against neighbors to pressure them to decouple or distance themselves from Washington. In coming years, the extent to which Beijing attempts to eject the United States from its region politically and militarily will likely define the principal arena of U.S.–Chinese strategic rivalry. “Don’t make us choose” has been the mantra of many East Asian countries, including some U.S. treaty allies. But under bipolarity, the luxury of choice is not one afforded to small countries in a superpower’s backyard. Countries will be forced to choose, and choose correctly according to their neighbor, or risk the consequences. The return of bipolarity means it’s time to remember—with regret and trepidation—the nature, intensity, and global reach of superpower competition.

Comment: So POTUS was right. We have a G2. But remember that to China , G2 means G1. But what if China imposes its own "XI Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine to secure its interests in East Asia? What do you do now, Lieutenant?

The Multipolar Mirage

Foreign Affairs · More by Jennifer Lind · December 12, 2025

Why America and China Are the World’s Only Great Powers

Jennifer Lind

December 12, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multipolar-mirage

A Chinese and a U.S. flag printed on paper, January 2022 Dado Ruvic / Reuters

JENNIFER LIND is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House. She is the author of Autocracy 2.0: How China’s Rise Reinvented Tyranny.

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The churn of great-power politics shapes the world and touches, for good or ill, the lives of people everywhere. Wars among great powers have killed millions of people; victorious great powers have also set up international orders whose norms and rules affect global peace and prosperity. Great powers also intervene in other countries’ politics, covertly and overtly, sometimes violently. In other words, great powers matter.

Polarity—how many great powers there are—matters, too. Consider the past three decades of U.S.-led unipolarity. Freed from the constraining effects of a great-power rival, Washington deployed its forces around the world and conducted military actions in multiple countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia. The dangers of bipolarity, however, are different. Superpowers in a bipolar structure compete obsessively, creating spheres and buffers by cultivating protégés and installing puppets. Multipolarity, meanwhile, in which three or more great powers are present, is said to be the most prone to war because alliances are precarious and the fluidity of alignments makes the balance of power harder to estimate.

Although it matters how many great powers there are at a given time, no one agrees on how to define them (and thus count them). People also disagree about the requirements—what a country must do or possess—to be considered a great power. Yet all the time, relative power among countries is shifting. During the Cold War, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev vowed that his country would “bury” the United States, and many people feared it would. And in the 1980s, Americans watching Japan’s economic boom worried that the United States would be overtaken by the “rising sun.” Today, scholars and policymakers debate whether China will rival the United States as a superpower or is already in decline. The rise of India and the resurgence of Russia, meanwhile, have led many to proclaim the arrival of multipolarity. Widely divergent views about the balance of power are common because power, although foundational to international politics, remains an elusive concept.

To reckon with this challenge, I developed a methodology for comparing national power—one that uses common metrics (GDP, for instance, or military expenditure) in modern and historical data to determine a threshold for great-power status. My study found that arguing about whether China is catching up to the United States misses the point. Great powers have often been far weaker than the leading state—the most powerful country in the global system—but nevertheless engaged in dangerous security competitions. Moreover, my methodology revealed that China today is already more powerful than the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. Modern China, then, is not just a great power but a superpower.

The world, in short, is bipolar. Many middle powers are influential actors within their regions, but only the United States and China exceed the great-power threshold. This development explains rising tension in U.S.-Chinese relations and suggests that other countries will find it increasingly difficult to stay out of the crossfire of the rivalry. Bipolarity, for instance, helps explain the recent U.S. preoccupation with Latin America, where China has gained significant economic and political influence. As the dynamic between China and the United States grows only more competitive, Washington will find such encroachments intolerable—just as China may similarly refuse to accept U.S. political and military involvement in its own backyard.

GREAT POWER, GREAT MEASURABILITY

My methodology began with a list, generated with help from historians and political scientists, of great powers across different historical systems since 1820. Although scholars often debate definitions of “power” and “great power,” the list reflected a consensus, and established a “ground truth,” about the balance of power over time. Using historical data, I then evaluated which metrics most accurately recreated this list. Each country’s metrics were assessed as a ratio—the country’s power in that metric compared with the power of the leading state during the period being analyzed. For example, the metrics show that the United States was not yet a great power in the early nineteenth century; it still lagged behind the United Kingdom on economic as well as military metrics. These same metrics, however, then illustrate how the United States overtook the United Kingdom to become a great power in the late nineteenth century.

The methodology shows that two economic metrics successfully identify great powers: GDP, as well as a composite metric that multiplied GDP by GDP per capita. Previous scholars have argued that the second metric captures two key dimensions of great power—a state’s economic size versus its wealth. My metrics supported this argument by effectively distinguishing between great powers and other countries. That is, lesser powers scored low on both of these economic metrics, whereas great powers scored high, and there was a large gap between the metrics of great powers and lesser powers. GDP per capita, however, proved a poor indicator of power and failed to separate the great powers from the lesser powers. Many lesser powers have high GDP per capita. GDP per capita is also misleading because it risks obscuring regional heterogeneity. China and India, for instance, have millions of people generating high-incomes as well as regions with very low-incomes. Because it takes the average, GDP per capita obscures this heterogeneity and might misdiagnose a country as middling rather than one with wealthy, technologically advanced regions—regions with latent power and potential geopolitical implications.

Overall, this method provides a quantifiable threshold for identifying great powers. I define “normal” great powers as those falling in the middle 50 percent of the distribution of historical great powers (thereby excluding the strongest and weakest countries). The GDP range for normal great powers is between 17 and 45 percent of the leading state’s GDP, with a median of 27 percent. Thus, countries with more than roughly 27 percent of the leading state’s GDP possess greater economic capabilities than the median great power across history. Whether or not a country can be considered an overall great power depends on how it performs in the other metrics, but this method can reveal whether a country is above or below the basic great-power threshold. It also identifies the dimensions in which a country is stronger or weaker. Such assessments contribute to studies of power transitions in world politics, and create a valuable means of assessing contemporary changes in the balance of power—the extent to which China is declining or India rising, for example.

SECOND PLACE SOVIETS

Asking whether China can catch up to or overtake the United States economically is the wrong question, based on this analytical method. Historically, the leading state competed fiercely with other, far weaker great powers, which often possessed only a quarter or a third of the leader’s GDP. China, in other words, does not need to match nor surpass the United States in order to be a great power and competitor. The Soviet Union was a prime example of this reality.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was widely deemed a superpower and major geopolitical competitor to the United States. But the Soviet Union had, at most, about 40 percent of U.S. GDP. Despite this large imbalance, the Soviets posed a threat of regional hegemony in Europe. Moscow managed complex global intelligence operations, supplied arms to insurgents across the globe, quashed national liberation movements in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and spread communist ideology around the world. Although it trailed the United States economically, the Soviet Union preoccupied U.S. national security policy for more than three decades. The United States and the Soviet Union built massive armies, competed in a nuclear arms race, and, during numerous crises, moved the world dangerously close to nuclear war.

China, which today vastly exceeds the Soviet Union in terms of economic power, has the capability to do all this and more. In the composite metric (GDP multiplied by GDP per capita), the normal range for great powers is between 8 and 28 percent of the leader’s score, with a median of 15. China today, at 36 percent, has a much higher composite score than normal great powers across history. China’s score also exceeds that of the Soviet Union, which reached only 16 percent at its peak in 1970. China’s relative strength is also captured by the GDP metric: China’s score of 130 percent is far higher than the 27 percent median. Skeptics may rightly question China’s dodgy economic statistics, but even if China’s true GDP is much smaller than it reports, China’s margin above the normal range for GDP is so large that it would still be a great power, and well above the Soviet score of 44 percent.

China falls short of the Soviet Union in just one dimension—military expenditure. The Soviets spent 100 percent of the United States’ military expenditure, whereas China today spends 32 percent. For the Soviets, however, generating such high military spending required devoting a huge share of the economy (as much as 14 percent of GDP) to defense, which ultimately proved unsustainable. China, by contrast, currentlyspends only about two percent of its GDP on defense, meaning it could ramp up defense spending and yet keep it at a manageable level overall. In short, my metrics suggest that China doesn’t need to catch up to the United States but is already a great-power competitor both economically and militarily—one with power that far exceeds that of the United States’ last bipolar competitor, the Soviet Union.

TWO ON TOP

Critics might doubt whether Beijing can in fact compete, arguing that China’s growth is slowing, its economy is suffering from numerous problems, and increasingly repressive policies by Chinese leader Xi Jinping will harm future innovation. Such observations identify important challenges China’s economy is facing but miss the mark in a few ways.

First, China’s growth plateau was a predictable outcome. Fast-growing economies always slow down at about the middle-income stage, and economies that manage to sustain growth typically settle into levels of about one to two percent per year. As has happened in the past with high-growth economies—in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for instance—slowed growth can be caused by a number of factors, such as increasingly unfavorable demographics, rising wages, and financial crises caused by years of massive investment. Thus, China’s success isn’t a question of whether it can maintain its sky-high growth rates of the 1990s, but whether its economy can settle into mature and far lower rates of growth.

In this transition, the Chinese economy indeed faces major challenges, including a troubled real estate sector, massive debt, and the problem of what scholars call “involution”—hypercompetition among firms over shrinking profit margins. Nobody can predict how effectively the CCP will handle these challenges, but declarations of “peak China” are premature. Previously, skeptics have argued that China’s regime would be toppled, or its economic growth torpedoed, by a variety of maladies—public backlash in response to repressive COVID-19 policies, for example, or the costs of mitigating environmental devastation. These predictions were not borne out. Most importantly, assuming that one’s competitor will collapse, particularly when that competitor has a leadership as adaptive and capable as China’s, is a poor guide for policy.

Arguing about whether China is catching up to the United States misses the point.

Other skeptics argue that Xi’s policies—tightening controls on civil society, increasing oversight of the private sector (as seen in the tech industry crackdown after 2020), and pursuing a variety of other “neo-authoritarian” approaches—undermine China’s innovative capabilities. Innovation is indeed vital for Chinese geopolitical competitiveness, and great powers must compete at the technological cutting edge. If Xi pursues policies that stymie innovation, China will struggle to keep up. But many of Beijing’s policies seem to be working. Heavy investment in highly-skilled human capital, as well as research and development, has created an advanced workforce. Large government investment in key sectors such as green energy, robotics, and biotechnology has helped Chinese firms innovate and become more commercially competitive. And Xi’s neo-authoritarianism has not prevented China’s success in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and communications, supercomputing, and other technology arenas. In fact, in many sectors, China is not merely competitive with the United States but is vying for dominance.

Critics of the bipolar assessment might also argue that the world is actually multipolar. Russia, after all, invaded neighboring Ukraine in 2022 and its alliance with China has powerful geopolitical consequences. Germany and Japan are prominent economically, technologically, and diplomatically, and there is a growing group of influential middle powers that includes Brazil, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. Indeed, in 1990, middle powers produced about 15 percent of global GDP, whereas in 2022 they produced about 30 percent. Militarily, too, they are more capable. Whereas in 1990, middle powers accounted for about seven percent of global military spending, the 2022 figure was about 15 percent.

The increasingly influential role of middle powers, however, should not be confused with multipolarity, as none of these middle powers exceed the great-power threshold for economic and military power. Germany’s and Japan’s low rates of military mobilization have kept them out of the great-power ranks. Whether they follow through on pledges to increase defense spending and break the great-power threshold as a result remains uncertain. Russia sits below the threshold, too. If Russia were a great power, it would have defeated Ukraine and threatened regional dominance over western Europe, as the Soviets did in the Cold War. India may someday reach great-power status if it continues to grow economically and increases its military expenditures, but it currently sits below the great-power bar. Only China and the United States currently exceed both the economic and military thresholds for great-power status.

BACKYARD BATTLES

In these early years of the bipolar era, competition between China and the United States is growing across every domain: trade, finance, technology, global governance, and military power. The reverberations of this rivalry are being felt all over the world, proving the political scientist Barry Posen’s assertion that in a bipolar order, “peripheries disappear.” The United States, for example, is worrying about China’s gains in the Middle East, where Beijing is increasingly becoming an important economic, technological, and security partner despite the United States’ many long-standing relationships there.

The first rule of bipolarity, however, is secure your backyard. Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela has pursued close economic ties with China, and recent U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific is in part a warning to Caracas and other governments in the region about the consequences of cozying up to Beijing. Earlier this year, the Trump administration similarly signaled to Panama that continuing to allow Chinese firms to control strategic infrastructure at the Panama Canal would prompt U.S. military action. Latin America felt the sting of bipolarity during the Cold War, and, in the emerging superpower competition between China and the United States, it is starting to feel it again.

In East Asia, China will likely move to enforce its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Beijing will continue to use incremental tactics and economic coercion against neighbors to pressure them to decouple or distance themselves from Washington. In coming years, the extent to which Beijing attempts to eject the United States from its region politically and militarily will likely define the principal arena of U.S.–Chinese strategic rivalry. “Don’t make us choose” has been the mantra of many East Asian countries, including some U.S. treaty allies. But under bipolarity, the luxury of choice is not one afforded to small countries in a superpower’s backyard. Countries will be forced to choose, and choose correctly according to their neighbor, or risk the consequences. The return of bipolarity means it’s time to remember—with regret and trepidation—the nature, intensity, and global reach of superpower competition.

Foreign Affairs · More by Jennifer Lind · December 12, 2025

​22. Trumps’ security strategy is making a hard pivot on China. Why now?

​Summary:

Trump’s new National Security Strategy pivots on China by downgrading ideology and elevating economics. The document drops “great power competition” language, treats China mainly as an economic rival, and sidelines human rights and authoritarianism concerns that featured in Biden’s NSS and Trump’s 2017 version. Beijing’s response is cautious but positive, seeing room for “win-win cooperation” before Trump’s planned 2026 visit. Strategically, the NSS narrows to trade, reciprocity, and “economic independence,” while largely avoiding broader regional security issues. The major exception is Taiwan, which receives expanded attention as a vital economic hub and strategic gateway to the second island chain.

Comment: The "reduced" focus on human rights and authoritarianism, ideology, and the omission of “great power competition” language may actually provide national security practitioners (and political warfare strategists) greater flexibility for action by reducing the public focus on them. They can actually increase US information and influence activities without being encumbered by specific language in the NSS.

Trumps’ security strategy is making a hard pivot on China. Why now? | CNN

CNN · Jessie Yeung, Mike Valerio · December 12, 2025

https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/11/china/trump-national-security-strategy-china-taiwan-intl-hnk

US President Donald Trump shakes hands with Chinese leader Xi Jinping as they hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit at Gimhae International Airport, South Korea, on October 30, 2025.

Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

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When the Trump administration unveiled its new national security strategy (NSS) last week, many experts noticed one major shift: how it talks – or more importantly, doesn’t talk – about China.

Gone are the sweeping declarations about China being “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge,” as articulated by the Biden administration. Nor does it include much of the stronger language in the NSS of President Donald Trump’s first term, describing China in 2017 as challenging “American power, influence and interests.”

Instead, this latest document, one that every president submits to Congress outlining their foreign policy vision, emphasized the US-China economic rivalry above all – barely mentioning the concerns of authoritarianism or human rights abuses that had consistently peppered previous administrations’ reports.

“There isn’t a single mention of great power competition with China. China is seen much more as an economic competitor,” said David Sacks, a fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Wen Ti-Sung, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank’s Global China Hub, described the document as a “rebalancing between interests and values.”

Instead of the US portraying itself as the “shining city upon a hill” – the President Ronald Reagan model of a nation acting as a beacon of freedom for the world – Trump’s new NSS is “about America first, it’s about focusing on developing America itself, and talking about commerce, almost first and foremost,” Wen added.

Another clue to how Trump views China on his list of security priorities lies in just how little it’s mentioned at all – only for the first time on page 19 of a 33-page document, and occupying just one section in a report that also covers Europe, Africa, the Middle East and other regions. By comparison, the Biden NSS from 2022 discusses China repeatedly throughout its 48 pages.

This change in tone and narrow economic focus appear to have been well received in Beijing. When asked about the NSS at a news conference on Monday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Guo Jiakun emphasized the benefits of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”

“China is willing to work with the US to promote the continued stable development of China-US relations, while firmly safeguarding its own sovereignty, security, and development interests,” he said.

While Guo reiterated China’s position on sensitive topics such as Taiwan – a self-ruling island democracy that Beijing claims as its own territory – his statement was otherwise cautiously neutral, lacking the vitriol that often characterizes Chinese responses to US policy.

“I read that as fairly positive,” Sacks said, pointing to the fact that Trump plans to visit Beijing next spring in a highly anticipated summit.

“I think that the Chinese are also saying that the door is open to economic cooperation, and they want to work towards the April meeting between the two leaders.”

But some in China interpreted Trump’s NSS with a warier eye – warning that the shift in language is not necessarily a retreat.

State-run tabloid Global Times cited an expert who warned that the US’ new strategy “repeatedly emphasizes the need to eliminate any external competitors or threats to US interests,” reflecting the ongoing competition between both nations.

Meng Weizhan, a researcher at the Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, gave a similar warning. “The change in wording does not mean that the US no longer views China as a competitor,” he wrote in an article, adding that Trump may be switching tactics to “seek a more advantageous position.”

Economics as the ‘ultimate stakes’

Shipping containers and gantry cranes at the Yantian port at night in Shenzhen, China, on April 14, 2025.

Jade Gao/AFP/Getty Images

The NSS makes its focus clear from the start, declaring economics as “the ultimate stakes.” It speaks at length about the trade relationship between the two countries, including the imbalance in China’s exports to low-income countries versus to the US.

“Going forward, we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence,” it reads.

It’s markedly different from Trump’s 2017 NSS, which “described China as a revisionist power,” Sacks said. “This one has nothing to say about China’s strategic ambitions … and whether those are compatible with US interests.”

Particularly stark is the lack of any ideological contrast or mention of human rights concerns, which populated the previous two NSS documents.

The Biden administration had highlighted Beijing’s role in committing alleged genocide in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong. In 2017, Trump’s first-term document had criticized China for its authoritarianism, mass surveillance, and push to create a new world order alongside Russia.

“That’s completely absent from this document,” Sacks said, adding that Beijing is “probably pretty pleased … because (the NSS) doesn’t set up an existential competition with (China).”

There could be a few reasons behind this shift. Trump’s administration could be trying to play it safe ahead of the president’s April meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, hoping not to jeopardize any deals or negotiations, Sacks posited.

It could also reflect a change in Trump’s cabinet, which in his first term was populated by more “traditional Republican national security thinkers” than in his current term, Sacks said. Or maybe the latest trade war was unexpectedly humbling for America – shifting how the White House views Beijing.

“I think there were many who believed that the United States had escalation dominance,” Sacks said. But “we’ve seen in recent months that there is going to be a level of US-China interdependence … and both countries can do significant damage to each other in the economic realm.”

A new focus: Taiwan

This new NSS also focuses less on sensitive geopolitical flashpoints, experts said. For instance, the Biden NSS had mentioned several ongoing regional conflicts including the military coup in Myanmar and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. By contrast, this version doesn’t mention North Korea once.

The one geopolitical issue it does tackle is Taiwan – a thorny topic Washington has long walked a fine line on.

China’s ruling Communist Party has vowed to take control of the island one day, by force if necessary, and views the issue as one of its strongest red lines.

Washington maintains close unofficial ties with Taiwan, and is bound by law to sell arms to the island for its self-defense – despite recognizing the People’s Republic as the sole legitimate government of China, and acknowledging Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China.

However, while the US has never accepted the CCP’s claim of sovereignty over the island, Washington has largely remained vague on whether it would intervene in the event of a Chinese attack, a policy known as “strategic ambiguity.”

Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te holds a news conference on protecting national security at the Presidential Office Building in Taipei on November 26, 2025.

I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Images

In the latest NSS, compared with past versions which only briefly mention of Taiwan, Trump has dedicated multiple paragraphs to the island – highlighting its increased importance in his agenda, according to Sacks.

“There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters,” the new NSS reads.

“Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the US economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” it reads, adding that the US and its allies must step up defense spending to prevent “a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce.”

It sends a strong message to Beijing of deterrence, which could be good news for Taiwan, said Sacks. But the document also softened its language elsewhere – saying the US “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” instead of the previous phrasing of “opposing” any such change.

That could be welcomed by Beijing – making the Taiwan section of the NSS a confusing set of mixed messages, Sacks added.

The Chinese foreign ministry’s response on Monday was similarly muted, with the spokesperson Guo urging the US to “handle the Taiwan issue with utmost caution.”

People in Taiwan are likely in “wait and see” mode, perhaps feeling ambivalent or unsure where they stand under the new NSS, said Wen, the Atlantic Council fellow.

“I think Taiwan is looking towards Washington to see whether this show of goodwill and responsibility will finally lead to more consolidation and more predictability in a firm US support position for Taiwan going forward,” he added.

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CNN · Jessie Yeung, Mike Valerio · December 12, 2025

23. Top secret US report warns American forces would be drastically outmatched by China

​Summary:

A leaked top secret “Overmatch” brief from the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment reportedly concludes U.S. forces would likely lose a war with China over Taiwan. Wargames show China could cripple carriers, fighter squadrons, and satellites early with massed long-range missiles, including some 600 hypersonic weapons, outpacing expensive, vulnerable U.S. platforms. The study warns America lacks industrial capacity to replace losses or sustain a prolonged conflict, with stockpiles already strained by support to Israel and Ukraine. It argues China now surpasses the U.S. in most cruise and ballistic missile categories, leaving U.S. power projection in the western Pacific at serious risk.

Top secret US report warns American forces would be drastically outmatched by China

the-independent.com

A senior Biden official turned ‘pale’ when he saw the classified assessment, the report says

Shweta Sharma

Thursday 11 December 2025 07:28 EST

https://www.the-independent.com/asia/china/china-us-military-taiwan-war-us-leak-report-b2882501.html

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The U.S. military is most likely to suffer a defeat at the hands of China if it tried to intervene in a war over Taiwan, a top secret Pentagon assessment report has found.

Pentagon war games simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan have shown that Beijing could cripple U.S. fighter squadrons, major warships, and even satellite networks before they deploy effectively, the highly classified document, “Overmatch Brief”, warned.

The document, prepared by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, shows America's reliance on advanced and expensive weapons makes it vulnerable to China's rapidly manufactured cheaper ones, reported the New York Times.

The reportwarned that China has developed the capacity to neutralise critical American assets at the outset of a conflict.

It comes days after Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry, warned U.S. to “handle the Taiwan question with the utmost prudence”.

The report, recently delivered to senior White House officials, said China’s rapidly maturing arsenal – particularly its long-range precision missiles, expanding fleet of advanced aircraft, large surface vessels, and its counter-space capabilities – now places U.S. forces at a significant operational disadvantage in the region.

China has amassed an arsenal of about 600 hypersonic weapons, which “can travel at five times the speed of sound and are difficult to intercept”, the report said. The Office of Net Assessment is a state agency that serves as the Pentagon's internal think tank.

The 'robot wolves' were seen working in sandy surroundings during a Chinese military exercise (China Central Television)

When a senior Biden national security official received the “Overmatch” brief in 2021, he turned “pale” after realising that “every trick we had up our sleeve, the Chinese had redundancy after redundancy”, a official who was present there said, according to the NYT.

China considers Taiwan as an inseparable part of its insisting that the island of 23 million people eventully be unified with the mainland - by force if necessary.

Taiwan, however, considers itself a sovereign, independent country, saying that any change in Taiwan’s status must be decided democratically by its 23 million people, not imposed by China.

While China has given no deadline on the invasion of Taiwan, assessment and intelligence by the western powers claim that China could launch efforts to take Taiwan by around 2027 – a timeline that matches with Xi Jinping’s military modernisation goals.

A screen displays a map by Taiwan's defense ministry locating the bases of China's ballistic missiles, during a press conference in Taipei, 23 January 2007. (AFP/Getty)

The report notes that China could destroy many U.S. advanced weapons, such as aircraft carriers before they even reach Taiwan, using missiles amassed over the past 20 years.

In wargames simulating battlefield scenarios, even the latest U.S. Navy carrier is often not able to sustain an attack, the assessment said.

The report cited the example of America’s latest U.S.S Gerald R. Ford, built at a cost of $13 billion and deployed in 2022. Despite the new technologies, including more advanced nuclear reactors, the carrier would be unable to survive a Chinese attack.

The Ford, which would be effective if matched against weaker powers like Venezuela, is “fatally vulnerable to new forms of attack”, it said.

The report also drew from real-world examples as the war in Ukraine against Russia continues to test Western weaponry on the battlefield and the adversaries of America are learning of the shortcomings and strengths.

“The war in Ukraine demonstrated how vulnerable tanks have become,” it said.

Drones and other armament formations pass during the military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, Wednesday, Sept. 3, 2025 (Xinhua)

The assessment also warned that the U.S. no longer has the industrial capacity to produce weapons and munitions at the speed and scale required for a prolonged conflict with a major power.

Washington is falling behind in rapidly developing advanced weapons compared to Beijing and Moscow as it “over-relies on expensive and vulnerable weapons”, it said.

Previously, Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, said in the Pentagon’s war games against China, “we lose every time” and predicted that China’s hypersonic missiles could easily destroy aircraft carriers within minutes.

The U.S. is vulnerable because the missile stockpiles have already been strained by support for Israel and Ukraine, it said.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has previously cautioned that the U.S. would run out of key munitions quickly in a war with China.

Internal Pentagon assessments indicate that China now far surpasses the U.S. in nearly every category of cruise and ballistic missiles, even though both countries retain around 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Washington is also reported to have expended about a quarter of its high-altitude missile interceptors while defending Israel during Iran’s 12-day ballistic missile barrage in June.

The Independent has reached out to the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department for a comment.

the-independent.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com