Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"There are no great limits to growth because there are no limits of human intelligence, imagination, and wonder."

– Ronald Reagan

"The world of reality has its limits; the world of imagination is boundless."

– Jean-Jacques Rousseau

"A man does what he must - in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures - and that is the basis of all human morality."

– John F. Kennedy

1. The 2024 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

2. A Bipartisan Failure in Congress on National Defense

3. Biden Gets Lost in Trump’s Shadow

4. Vets Recognize Hegseth as One of Their Own

5. Nato must switch to 'wartime mindset', warns secretary general

6. Assad’s collapse triggers race to find missing chemical weapons

7. U.S. and Allies Race to Shape a New Syria Trying to Get on Its Feet

8. Trump’s Kari Lake ‘pick’ sparks fears at Voice of America

9. Appointing Kari Lake as VOA Director?

10. US, allies must rebuild air forces, invest in drones to counter China's missile threat to runways: Stimson

11. Whole-of-society resilience: A new deterrence concept in Taipei

12. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2024

13. Iran Update, December 12, 2024

14. Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle

15. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 12, 2024

16. Trump Team Weighs Options, Including Airstrikes, to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program

17. Tracking Putin’s Most Feared Secret Agency—From Inside a Russian Prison and Beyond

18. Lawmakers wonder: why don't we hack back against China?

19. The defense policy bill is handing the Army a to-do list

20. Syrian rebels offer to help US search for journalist Austin Tice

21. Micromanaging Foreign Nations: A Bipartisan Syndrome

22. Beyond Rhetoric: Passing the Afghan Adjustment Act

23. Hardware and Hard Truths: Trump’s Tariffs Could Hurt American AI

24. The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part I: From Prescription to National Security Epidemic

25. The Price of Russian Victory

1. The 2024 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

A lot of great book recommendations. Here are my two (descriptions below):

The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea, Victor Cha.

Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan, Frank Sobchak.

https://warontherocks.com/2024/12/the-2024-war-on-the-rocks-holiday-reading-list/

The 2024 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · December 12, 2024

Every year we kick off the holiday season with a roundup of books recommended by the War on the Rocks team. Enrich your friends’ libraries, get a family book club going, or treat yourself to something new. We hope you enjoy!

Kerry Anderson

MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed bin Salman, Ben Hubbard. This book came out in 2020 so isn’t brand new, but it offers thorough research and balanced insights from journalist Ben Hubbard into the rise of the Saudi crown prince. Given MBS’s important role in the modern Middle East and beyond, this is an essential book to understand his background and vision.

The Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals that Reshaped the Middle East, Jay Solomon. This book also isn’t new, dating back to 2016, but it offers crucial reporting on U.S.-Iran relations under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Solomon weaves together Iran’s role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the development of its nuclear program.

Benjamin Armstrong

To Fix a National Character: The United States in the First Barbary War, 1800–1805,Abigail Mullen. The First Barbary War has been the focus of a number of books, including by hosts of Fox & Friends. However, Abby Mullen’s new look at the conflict is going to rapidly become the “go-to” book. Looking at the American efforts in the Mediterranean in width, depth, and with context, she broadens the traditional military history to include the diplomatic, economic, and political histories involved. The book offers us important insights on how navies, maritime security, asymmetric military campaigns, and undeclared wars integrate with all of the elements of national power, and helped define the Early American approach to the world.

Too Far on a Whim: The Limits of High-Steam Propulsion in the US Navy, Tyler Pitrof. Today we read a lot about technological innovation, adaptation, and the integration of new ships and ship designs into the navies of the world. We regularly see articles about “conservative” military bureaucracies. But what about when a military goes all-in on a new technology that actually doesn’t end up working as advertised? Tyler Pitrof’s new book on the innovations in steam propulsion during the interwar years flips much of what we’ve known about the technological history on its head. Tyler upends decades of received wisdom, showing that “high steam” didn’t actually work and that it had profound operational implications in the Pacific during World War II. This book is a must-read for those interested in how new technologies impact operations and strategy for the navies of the world.

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Nora Bensahel

Orbital, Samantha Harvey. This little gem of a novel just won the prestigious Booker Prize for its lyrical meditation on our world and those who view it from above. It takes place during a single day in the lives of six people aboard the International Space Station, with the minimalist plot providing access to their innermost observations and plots. When David Barno and I recommended this lovely book on our summer vacation reading list, we wrote that the “elegantly breathtaking language borders on poetry, describing the otherworldly experience of astronauts encountering one sunrise and sunset after another, broken by stunning vistas of a fragile Earth slowly unfolding below — a glimpse of eternity.” It’s an equally good pick for your winter holidays, as you huddle indoors, warm yourself by a fire, and ponder how our small blue planet fits within the immensity of the universe.

All the Beauty in the World: The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Me, Patrick Bringley. I grew up just a few blocks away from the Met, and when I was in sixth grade I spent at least one day each weekend exploring the treasures of its vast collection. I’d wander for hours without a map, and when the closing bell rang at 4:45pm, I’d ask one of the security guards to help me find the nearest exit. Bringley spent a decade as one of those guards, after a family tragedy led him to quit a promising career at The New Yorker and process his grief in one of the most beautiful places in the world. You don’t need to know anything about art to appreciate this slim volume. Indeed, I most enjoyed reading about the close-knit community of 500 guards, hailing from dozens of countries, whose daily lives unfold alongside some of the greatest artworks ever made.

Claude Berube

Napoleon: A Life, Andrew Roberts. This is, perhaps, the second-best biography I’ve read. Meticulously researched, Roberts provides a better understanding of this complex Corsican and how, with very little, he rose to power. At the time, I was teaching at the US Naval Academy and made sure my students were aware of how voracious a reader Bonaparte was, especially in his formative years, and how that enabled him to succeed.

Biographical series on Lyndon Johnson (4 thus far: “Path to Power,” “Means of Ascent,” Master of the Senate,” and “The Passage of Power“), Robert Caro. This, not the previous entry, is the best biography I’ve encountered – truly it is second to none. Johnson came from nothing and just on pure willpower, a photographic memory when it came to anything political, and a deviousness to achieve his goals. This is the only biography where no redeemable qualities are attributed to the subject; Johnson was a pure political animal who achieved each rung on the political ladder by using people, even those closest to him. Caro notes that long before Johnson stole the 1948 Senate election, he was doing so in college and later as an aide on Capitol Hill. Still this story is impressive and tells us much behind the scenes of DC politics and policy-making in the mid-20th century.

Brad Carson

AI Snake Oil, Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor. While I often disagree with the authors’ views about generative AI, their criticism of predictive AI – that it just doesn’t work a lot of the time – is an underappreciated criticism. As we rely on these technologies, we usually debate whether or not they are fair; but a more fundamental question is, Do they even work?

On Settler Colonialism, Adam Kirsch. Timely, provocative, and worth reading to understand the intellectual roots of activism about Gaza on university campuses – and far beyond.

Ryan Evans

This Earthly Globe: A Venetian Geographer’s Quest to Map the World, Andrea Di Robilant. Understanding power and politics requires understanding history. Too often, the history studied by those of us in national security is limited to that of the last 200 years, perhaps with a smattering of Thucydides. Over the last three years, I’ve taken a mild interest in the experiences of the Venetian empire, so when I spotted this book in my local bookshop, I was quick to snag it. Through the prism of the life, times, and remarkable work of the geographer and civil servant Giovambattista (what a name!) Ramusio, this book offers a window into Venetian ambitions and statecraft. It explores how this maritime empire grappled with the Age of Exploration and shifting trade routes, which posed both opportunities and threats to its fortunes. Ramusio emerges as a crucial figure in the generation and propagation of knowledge of the world – most notably through his monumental and anonymously published collection of travel accounts and maps.

Planning for Protraction: A Historically Informed Approach to Great-Power War and Sino-US Competition, Iskander Rehman. Speaking of looking beyond the history of the last two centuries for critical lessons, Rehman has established himself as someone who can substantively and originally engage with diverse historical periods, from the height of Rome to the Middle Ages to the Cold War, in a way that not only appeals to the generalist but passes muster with specialists of those period. This sort of erudition and versatility is rare and it is on vivid display in this book. As listeners of the podcast know, I have been long concerned over America’s strategic cultural obsession with short, decisive wars when they are such a historical rarity, which has led me to recommend Cathal Nolan’s Allure of Battle more times than I can remember. Rehman’s book on protracted war between great powers joins the same small but growing pantheon of books that serious strategists simply must read.

The Lonely City: Adventures in the Art of Being Alone, Olivia Laing. In 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies’ seminal work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), introduced a dichotomy between two types of social organization: one defined by close and cohesive bonds of traditional life and the other defined by impersonal and transactional relationships typical of the industrial cityscape. Many people have since written about the loneliness of modern life, but this 2016 book by Laing is my favorite of the genre. She depicts the city as an irreplaceable source of both isolation and creativity, where loneliness fuels some of the most extraordinary art ever made. Why did I select this book for this list? Among those of us who work in national security – from soldiers to scholars to leaders of state – there is an art to what we do. There is also a lonely quality to it, whether one is toiling in the archives or grappling with a consequential decision about life and death.

Madeline Field

Sparks: China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the Future, Ian Johnson. While the Chinese Communist Party’s rewriting of its history books is well-documented, little light has been shed on the individuals trying to stop it. Johnson’s book highlights these counter-historians and their efforts, contextualizing them within history, geography, and modern events. It is equal parts informative and moving, and well worth a read.

The Demon in the Freezer: A True Story, Richard Preston. Preston weaves together two separate storylines- the efforts of the Smallpox Eradication Program in the 1970s and the events of the 2001 Anthrax Attacks- to make a compelling case for the prospect of biological warfare, aided and abetted by remaining stocks of smallpox in Russian and American freezers. The book, released almost 25 years ago, is a must-read for anyone interested in bioterrorism and infectious disease. Post-pandemic, however, its conclusions are more thought-provoking than ever.

Richard Fontaine

The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the CIA, and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq, Steve Coll. This gripping account starts in Saddam’s early years and runs through the 2003 U.S. invasion. Relying on internal, Nixon-like tapes of Saddam’s cabinet meetings, the volume adds new details and perspectives to a tragic story.

Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality, Frank Wilczek. This is a book on modern physics and cosmology – what we know about the universe and how we know it. It’s not a rehash of high school and college-level physics but rather a conceptual and philosophical dive into the nature of reality. Wilczek is a Nobel-prize-winning theoretical physicist with a talent for clear and compelling writing. Good stuff.

Amos Fox

Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars, edited by Assaf Moghadam, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss. Considering the frequency of proxy strategies and range of proxy actors at work in armed conflict today, the Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars provides an excellent place to turn to help understand modern proxy wars. As the book makes clear, modern proxy wars differ significantly from those of the Cold War period, and thus we require fresh analysis to help appreciate 21st-century proxy war, the strategy that fuels it today, and the relationships that can exist between principals and proxies. The Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars should sit atop anyone’s reading list if they are attempting to understand the geopolitics of the Middle East and eastern Asia, the prevalence of private military companies, and state-to-state sponsorship in modern armed conflict.

Advanced Land Warfare: Tactics and Operations, edited by Mikael Weissman and Niklas Nilsson. Has modern technology accelerated a fundamental change in the nature of war? Does drone warfare represent a new, game-changing method of warfighting, or do existing models of operation, command and control, and combined arms continue to thrive? These are two of the primary considerations addressed in Advanced Land Warfare. With contributions to the editor volume from the likes of Jack Watling, Jim Storr, and Olivier Schmitt, the answers to those questions are compelling and varied. This book is a must for anyone interested in probing the future with existing warfighting methodologies to identify potential changes and continuities in land warfare.

Ulrike Franke

The Wizard of the Kremlin, Giuliano da Empoli. It is fiction, but then not really. Guiliao da Empoli has written a fictional encounter with “Vadim Baranov”, nicknamed the Tsar, the man behind Vladimir Putin. Baranov is fictional but clearly inspired by Vladislav Surkov, who, for several years, was Putin’s man in the shadow. A fascinating read about Russia and Putin’s rise.

Freedom. Memoirs 1954 -2021, Angela Merkel. Former German chancellor Angela Merkel’s memoirs had been eagerly awaited by the German and international political commentariat. Many were hoping – though not necessarily expecting – excuses and explanations for what are now seen to be Merkel’s biggest mistakes, from abandoning nuclear power (faster), authorising the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, her handling of the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, or the Minsk II agreement on Ukraine. She does not admit mistakes, and the readers are left with many questions – but her 700 page memoirs are still an interesting view into German history, from her youth and early adulthood in the Democratic Republic, the beginning of the united Germany, and of course her 16 years in office.

T. X. Hammes

Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World, Michael Shuman. Shuman provides a coherent rendition of the continuity of the fundamental Chinese narrative that China is a rightful superpower. He traces the continuity of that strategic belief through over 3000 years of Chinese dynasties.

The Dark Path: The Structure of War and the Rise of the West, Williamson Murray. Murray provides a majestic narration of the five major revolutions that have shaped the character of warfare today. Scholars and practitioners seeking to understand the major changes taking place today will find this a thought-provoking and valuable work.

Nicholas Hanson

Invisible China, Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell. This book explores the stark disparities between urban and rural populations in China and their implications for the country’s future development. The authors argue that while China’s urban centers have experienced rapid economic growth and modernization, rural areas, which house the majority of the population, lag significantly behind in education and economic opportunities. This urban-rural divide jeopardizes China’s long-term stability and economic growth, as the rural population lacks the skills needed to transition to a modern, high-tech economy. Drawing on extensive data and field research, the book highlights the urgent need for investment in education and human capital in rural China to sustain the nation’s rise.

Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, Arlie Russell Hochschild. This book examines the emotional and cultural foundations of political conservatism in the United States, particularly in the Deep South. Through extensive fieldwork in Louisiana, Hochschild seeks to understand Tea Party supporters’ underlying grievances and worldviews. The book explores economic stagnation, environmental degradation, and a sense of displacement and isolation, revealing how cultural values and emotional experiences shape political identities. By empathizing with her subjects, Hochschild provides a nuanced account of the polarization in American politics, bridging ideological divides through understanding.

Frank Hoffman

Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War, edited by Tim Sweijs and Jeffrey Michaels. An early effort to identify issues about the changing character of warfare, including insights from ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Contains a diverse array of different visions of future conflict. Key contributions from Azar Gat, Audrey Kurth Cronin, T.X. Hammes, Antoine Bousquet, and Tony Echevarria.

Melting Point. High Command and War in the 21st Century, Kenneth. F. McKenzie, Jr. While most General’s memoirs are poorly crafted and self-serving, readers will find that Melting Point is an invaluable and smartly written book. McKenzie looks back at his time as Commander, U.S. Central Command during several Middle East conflicts with an emphasis on the campaign in Afghanistan. Melting Point contains insights on the endgame in Kabul for those trying to understand how that war unraveled. Any professional who aspires to higher command or expects to provide strategic and operational staff support to a senior commander will benefit from a study of this work.

Burak Kadercan

Oceans Rise Empires Fall: Why Geopolitics Hastens Climate Catastrophe, Gerard Toal. In his new book, Gerard Toal, a leading political geographer and an expert on the concept of geopolitics, deals with the intricate relationship between geopolitics-as-practice and climate change. In an argument that both travels across and transcends Geography (both political and physical geography), International Relations Theory, and strategic studies, Toal suggests that traditional forms of geopolitics not only undermine efforts to address climate change, but they also render it a secondary thought for the leading powers in global politics. Toal’s new book is a most welcome entry to the interdisciplinary and unconventional approaches to international security.

On Wars, Michael Mann. Following his four-volume magnum opus, The Sources of Social Power (1986, 1993, 2012, 2013), Mann turns his full analytical attention to the concept of war. Mann’s theoretical ingenuity and empirical reach is impressive, as the book travels across numerous time periods and geographies, from ancient Rome and China to the World Wars, or from the American Civil War to recent conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. Mann’s thesis is simple and very pertinent to the study of international politics and security studies: While most analyses on the causes and conduct of armed conflicts focus on a form of “rational actor assumption,” Mann makes a strong case for the inherent “irrationality” of wars, which are driven more by societal dynamics and historical contingency, as opposed to some universal geopolitical “logic” which itself is based on a version of rational actor assumption.

Sameer Lalwani

Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War, Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff. In Unit X, two US national security insiders offer an account of the motives, development, resourcefulness, antibodies, and near-death experiences of the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx) across three administrations, resembling the challenges of a defense startup’s minimum viable product. The book also effectively presents a rough, first-cut history of US defense technology competition over the past decade, drawing a throughline from new government institutions (DIU, NSCAI, the Chips Act), to new defense industry players (Palantir, Anduril, Capella Space), to their utility in evolving national security challenges (ISIS, DPRK missiles, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, cross-Strait deterrence). Readers will find Unit X a case study in government adaptation while policymakers can draw insights for future technology ventures like DIANA, AUKUS, or INDUS-X.

Rick Landgraf

Oceans Rise Empires Fall: Why Geopolitics Hastens Climate Catastrophe, Gerard Toal. The title of this book is derived from the chorus of a song from the musical Hamilton, which aptly summarizes the climate emergency which defines our present. Toal argues that even though we are approaching a tipping point in a global environmental catastrophe, powerful states, including the United States, remain fixated on economic and military competition against rival world powers. Tragically, this competition appears more important than the necessary collective action against potentially irreversible climate change.

Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West, Maximillian Hess. This book offers a thoughtful analysis about the ongoing global economic clash between Russia and the West over finance, energy, and capital markets. Max reminds us that the power of the dollar and its central role in global financial markets gives the United States an unmatched ability to wage economic war on Russia and its friends. However, there is significant risk that politicians in Washington could abuse the dollar’s power for purposes that are not in the interests of the people of the United States, nor of its allies or partners across the globe.

Carrie Lee

On Obedience, Pauline Shanks Kaurin. This is a terrific exploration of the duties and obligations of military officers to obey and be loyal to their oaths to the Constitution. It is an absolute must-read for military officers anxious about the future, and anyone struggling with what it means to swear an oath to an idea, rather than a person.

Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer. A good re-read right now about ethical responsibilities in war. It’s in need of an update to account for both our more sophisticated understandings of civil-military relations and contemporary conflict, but that’s all the more reason to sit with this text for a while and think deeply about how the world has changed since its initial publication.

David Maxwell

The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea, Victor Cha. This is a must read for all those who know a new strategy is needed to solve the “Korea question” (i.e., the unnatural division of the peninsula) after nearly four decades of failed denuclearization policy. This innovative book provides never before collected and analyzed data to look at the critical issues surrounding unification. While Cha is cautionary about predictions, for those who believe that the path to denuclearization goes through unification (e.g., the freedom of the Korean people in the north as they seek their human right of self-determination), this work can serve as the foundation for a strategic estimate to support strategy and campaign development for the pursuit of a free and unified Korea by the Korean people.

Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan, Frank Sobchak. While U.S special operations forces pursue a high-tech future (e.g., the “triad” of SOF, Cyber, and Space) there is one foundational Special Forces capability that will remain enduring across the spectrum of conflict from peace through strategic competition and the gray zone, to before, during, and after large scale combat operations. That is the ability to conduct campaigns “through, with, and by” indigenous forces and populations and partner militaries. Frank Sobchak objectively analyzes five case studies to provide critical lessons and insights for future advisory operations: El Salvador, the Philippines, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While the focus is on Special Forces, the author recognizes that to build viable host nation partner forces with a broad range of capabilities requires more than Special Forces, thus this book is of value to all those who will participate in advisory operations in the future.

Bryan McGrath

The Demon of Unrest, Erik Larson. I have only lately discovered Larson’s work, which is exceptional. This history of events leading up to the reduction of Fort Sumter tracks events in Charleston, Washington, and in eventual Confederate State Capitals with equal depth.

The Glorious Cause: the American Revolution 1763-1789, Robert Middlekauff. A superb history of the politics, economics, and military operations of this most meaningful of eras in human history. I find great comfort in returning to the first things as it were, diving deeply into exactly what it is my political ideology seeks to conserve.

Douglas Ollivant

Land Between the Rivers: a 5,000 Year History of Iraq, Bartle Bull. In this work of brightly polished prose (by my friend and occasional co-author), Bull sweeps through five millennia of history, showing the central role of Iraq in events from Gilgamesh, through the Greeks and then Islam, to the fall of the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958. By ending the story before US entanglements begin, Bull shows us a different Mesopotamia than is carried in our modern imagination. Watch the central storyline move from Uruk to Ur to Nineveh to Babylon to Selucia and to Kufa before finally settling in Baghdad.

The City and its Uncertain Walls, Haruki Murakami. Not one but two libraries; a woman who disappears suddenly; a mysterious figure who may or may not be a ghost; alternative dimensions; and yes, a hole in the ground. Murakami arranges his usual tropes in ways utterly unexpected and wildly thought-provoking. Another masterful but remarkably accessible novel from a perennial favorite for literature’s Nobel Prize.

Iskander Rehman

Faustian Bargain: The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World War, Ian Ona Johnson. The 1939 partition of Poland between Hitler and Stalin has often been described as a moment of opportunism, a temporary alignment of interests between the two dictators. In fact, it was the culmination of nearly twenty years of intermittent cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union.” So begins Ian Ona Johnson’s magisterial and exhaustively researched history of the (largely covert) military-industrial cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union during the interwar years. Few books could be more timely. First, by reminding us of the simple historical fact that for decades the Soviet Union constituted Nazi Germany’s prime technological and military enabler, it provides a welcome corrective to Putin’s warped narrative about the history and origins of the Second World War. And second, this elegantly written book provides a richly informative and hugely relevant historical case study, at a time when US security managers are struggling to come to terms with the rapid growth in defense cooperation between the motley array of revisionist countries (Iran, Russia, China, DPRK) belonging to what has been alternatively dubbed the “authoritarian axis,” “quartet of chaos”, or “axis of upheaval,” but which this author prefers to simply call the “phalanx of thuggery.”

Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, Manfred M. Bomeke. This edited compilation of essays examines how leading intellectuals, policymakers and strategic thinkers in Germany and the United States–the two great rising industrial powers of their time–viewed the future of warfare between 1871 and 1914. Deriving their variegated insights from their experiences with punishing colonial conflicts (the Boer War), grueling industrialized wars (the American Civil War) or largely unanticipated reversals in military fortunes (the relatively rapid defeat of France during the Franco-Prussian War, or of Russia during the Russo-Japanese war), these thinkers—for all their raw intellectual firepower– still struggled to fully anticipate quite how grimly transformational and resource-demanding World War 1 would prove to be. A salutary reminder of how difficult it can be to conduct force planning within a protean environment, one characterized by great geopolitical uncertainty and rapid disruptive technological change. I would love to see an entrepreneurial academic expand this volume (or edit a follow-up volume)–this time incorporating a series of parallel reflections on the development of strategic thinking in Russia, France, Britain and Japan during this critical period in history.

Kori Schake

You Dreamed of Empires, Alvaro Enrigue. A brilliant, brilliant and historically-based reimagining of Cortez’ conquest of Mexico, told from the indigenous point of view. Glittering sophistication of Tenochtitlan, brutality of Mexica priests, smart women trying to create space of their own — and a surprising theory of Montezuma’s motives. Even better to listen to it than read it so you can hear the cadences of Mexica words.

The Cutting Off Way: Indigenous Warfare in Eastern North America, 1500-1800, Wayne E. Lee. The history and strategy of Native Americans is still predominantly told through the prism of their contact with European settlers, but Wayne Lee shows what they looked like, fought like, and learned from each other as European intrusion affected them all. His exploration of the cultural and demographic basis for restraint in combat (the acquisition of prisoners) is especially interesting.

Jeremy Shapiro

The Embrace of Unreason: France, 1914-1940, Frederick Brown. As certain points in history, countries find themselves drawn to unreason. They find themselves turning away from rational, enlightenment ideals and embracing xenophobia and demagoguery. In one such example, Brown tells the story of how the French intelligentsia, traumatized by World War I, lost its way in the interwar period, culminating in the eventual ruin of the nation. Not to worry, though, it could never happen here.

The Embrace of Unreason picks up where Brown’s previous book, For the Soul of France, left off to tell the story of France in the decades leading up to World War II. We see through the lives of three writers (Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras, and Pierre Drieu La Rochelle) how the French intelligentsia turned away from the humanistic traditions and rationalistic ideals born out of the Enlightenment in favor of submission to authority that stressed patriotism, militarism, and xenophobia; how French extremists, traumatized by the horrors of the battlefront and exalted by the glories of wartime martyrdom, tried to redeem France’s collective identity, as Hitler’s shadow lengthened over Europe. The author writes of the Stavisky Affair, named for the notorious swindler whose grandiose Ponzi scheme tarred numerous political figures and fueled the bloody riots of February 1934, with right-wing paramilitary leagues, already suffering from the worldwide effects of the 1929 stock market crash.

Polostan, Neal Stephenson. A Neil Stephenson novel is always an investment. He writes long, intricate many-layered plots, whose wide-ranging erudition always makes one feel that one hasn’t read widely enough. But he ties it together in the end and convinces that you finally understand. This is his first spy novel, but not his last as it is the first of a trilogy. You’ll need eventually to read all three to understand what is really going on, but assuming your ego survives, you will be better off for the (long) journey.

Abigail Taylor

A Woman I Know: Female Spies, Double Identities, and a New Story of the Kennedy Assassination, Mary Haverstick. While aiming to create a film about a female aviator, Mary Haverstick accidentally stumbles into a potential conspiracy involving the Cold War, the CIA, and the Kennedy assassination. Her deeply researched book offers a glimpse into the life of a 20th-century female spy.

Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, Barbara Demick

Instead of focusing on the politics of North Korea, Barbara Demick’s book looks into the everyday lives of North Koreans across fifteen years. This book also provides interesting insights into the challenges that defectors face.

Joseph Wehmeyer

On All Fronts: The Education of a Journalist, Clarissa Ward. Reporting on some of the most consequential events of the 21st century so far, Clarissa Ward’s memoir provides firsthand insights covering some of the biggest developments of the past two decades. Her memoir details the rollercoaster experience of being a war correspondent both professionally and emotionally while many of the issues she reported on continue to unravel today.

Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World, Robert M. Gates. Secretary Gates gives a sobering assessment of post-Cold War American foreign policy and makes a strong argument that leaders have failed to understand the complexities, expansiveness, and limitations of American power. His insights remain relevant in a world that is more precarious and dangerous than four years ago. In an era where many question America’s global leadership and its capabilities, Gates gives readers both a reality check and a way forward.

Nicole Wiley

Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James M. Olson. Written by a career Directorate of Operations intelligence officer, Fair Play explores the big moral questions decision-makers and case officers alike are faced with in the espionage business. I loved this book the first time I read it, and I go back to it often to get a good dose of both fictional scenarios you might see in any spy thriller movie and real-world implications of morally ambiguous intelligence collection methods.

Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest, Angela Stent. Although this book was written pre-full scale invasion of Ukraine, it offers a comprehensive and easy-to-follow analysis of why President Putin is so difficult for the U.S. to deal with and understand. It gives historical context without sounding overly academic and is a great read for anyone who wants to understand the decades of context behind Putin’s decision-making. My favorite quote from the book is: “For the time being, NATO serves a useful purpose for Russia. It provides a most convenient main opponent.”

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Image: Adam Bernaert via Wikimedia Commons.

Lists and Contests

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · December 12, 2024

2. A Bipartisan Failure in Congress on National Defense

"slinks"

A Bipartisan Failure in Congress on National Defense

Congress slinks out of town without spending more on the military.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/congress-national-defense-authorization-act-military-spending-roger-wicker-lindsey-graham-john-thune-f55c9af8?mod=hp_opin_pos_6#cxrecs_s

By The Editorial Board

Dec. 12, 2024 5:43 pm ET

U.S. Marines during training at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Dec. 7. Photo: daniel cole/Reuters

The 118th Congress is slinking to its unlamented end, but we shouldn’t let it pass without noting a missed opportunity on the National Defense Authorization Act. Congress is eager to pass more “emergency” spending, but it won’t do more to serve its main duty of providing for national defense in a dangerous world.

House and Senate conferees have agreed to $884 billion in fiscal 2025 defense spending, kneeling to the spending caps set in 2023’s debt-ceiling bill. The House passed the bill this week. This number rejects the additional $25 billion that Mississippi Republican Roger Wicker skillfully negotiated to include in the Senate version of the bill. This authorization is inadequate to current defense needs and does no favors to President-elect Donald Trump.

So-called House conservatives threatened to blow up Mike Johnson’s speakership if the final bill included the Senate number, despite their success in muscling through many of their own priorities in the NDAA. Only a few GOP dissenters could defeat Mr. Johnson in the looming Jan. 3 vote for the next Speaker. Mr. Trump chose to stay out of the debate.

Mr. Trump ran on “peace through strength,” and his GOP platform vowed to make America’s military the “most modern, lethal and powerful.” He won’t do that with the current defense budget, which is sliding to a post-World War II low of less than 3% of GDP. President Biden, bowing to his party’s left, proposed a defense cut after inflation in every one of his budgets.

Mr. Wicker’s increases target pressing needs such as homeland air and missile defense (what Mr. Trump calls an Iron Dome for America); submarine and shipbuilding to compete with China; space superiority; and rebuilding munitions capacity and stockpiles, notably in long-range fires. The Senate bill also included steps to inject more competition and innovation into defense procurement.

The silver lining is that new Senate GOP leader John Thune is teeing up Plan B for early next year. The idea is to use the first of two budget bills in 2025 to address border security, energy production and national defense.

This is a chance to add back the Wicker priorities, which are also Mr. Trump’s. Democrats for years have used the 60-vote filibuster rule to hold defense increases hostage to “parity” with domestic spending, but that won’t apply in the 51-vote budget reconciliation process that the GOP majority will control.

Mr. Thune and Lindsey Graham, the next budget chairman, are vowing to offset any spending increases with comparable cuts in that first 2025 budget bill. There’s plenty of Mr. Biden’s spending to cut. But national defense has to be a priority in a world that is far more perilous than the one Mr. Trump inherited when he first took office in 2017.

America’s political class has been sleep-walking for years as global threats mount, and history won’t forgive the Republicans of the 2020s if they join the Republicans of the 1930s in failing to protect the country.

Biden Gets Lost in Trump’s Shadow

The president-elect acts as if he’s already in charge. There’s never been a transition like this before.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/biden-gets-lost-in-trumps-shadow-lame-duck-transition-ae42cc94?mod=hp_opin_pos_2#cxrecs_s

By Peggy Noonan

Dec. 12, 2024 6:04 pm ET

Volodymyr Zelensky, Emmanuel Macron and Donald Trump after their meeting in Paris, Dec. 7. Photo: Michel Euler/Associated Press

Like Donald Trump or dislike him, hate him or love him, doesn’t matter: You have to see that what we are witnessing right now is truly remarkable, with no precedent.

He is essentially functioning as the sitting president. In the past, a man was elected and sat in his house, met with potential cabinet members, and courteously, carefully kept out of the news except to make a statement announcing a new nominee. The incumbent was president until Inauguration Day. That’s the way it was even in 2016; Barack Obama was still seen as president after Mr. Trump was elected. All that has changed.

Mr. Trump is the locus of all eyes. He goes to Europe for the opening of Notre-Dame. “The protocols they put in place for his arrival were those of a sitting president, not an incoming one,” a Trump loyalist and former staffer said by phone. He holds formal meetings with Volodymyr Zelensky and Emmanuel Macron. There he is chatting on a couch with Prince William. Why not the prime minister? Because the British know Mr. Trump is enchanted by royalty and doesn’t want to be with some grubby Labour pol. Mr. Trump talks of new tariffs on Canada, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau rushes down to Mar-a-Lago. After their meeting, Mr. Trump refers to him, on Truth Social, as “governor” of “the Great State of Canada.” (The Babylon Bee follows up with a headline: “Trump Tells Trudeau He Won’t Annex Canada if They Admit Their Bacon Is Just Ham.”)

The government of Syria suddenly falls and the world turns to America for its stand. Naturally it comes, quickly, from Donald Trump. “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. . . . DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” The next day, Joe Biden characterizes the moment as one of “risk and uncertainty” for the region. Was there ever a moment that wasn’t one of risk and uncertainty for the region?

Mr. Trump tells Vladimir Putin that now that he’s abandoned Syria, he should make a deal to end the war in Ukraine. “I know Vladimir well. This is his time to act. China can help. The world is waiting!”

Mr. Trump’s cabinet picks—especially the highly questionable ones!—dominate the discourse in a country that hardly ever notices a cabinet nomination below that of secretary of state. His representatives, most famously Elon Musk, are greeted on Capitol Hill with a rapture comparable to past visits by heroic leaders of allied nations.

Donald Trump hasn’t overshadowed Joe Biden; he has eclipsed him. A former senior official in Mr. Trump’s first term told NBC News a few days ago that Mr. Trump “is already basically running things, and he’s not even president yet.”

To some degree the status shift is expected. Mr. Trump is the future, Mr. Biden the past; Mr. Trump wide-awake, Mr. Biden sleepy. The 46th president is a worn tire, the tread soft and indistinct. With the pardon of his son he lost stature. Also, Mr. Trump makes other leaders nervous, as he enjoys pointing out. They can neither predict him nor imitate him, so they can’t take their eyes off him. And Mr. Biden’s been rocked by something he knew in the abstract that’s become all too particular: after 50 years at the center of public life he’s been dropped, cast aside, because it was about power all along, and not about him.

A president, however, still has the machinery—the National Security Council, the State Department, the nuclear football. I can hardly believe our biggest adversaries don’t capitalize on this split presidency, this confusion. For all our woes you sometimes forget what a lucky country we are.

Here I mention a part of the amazing interregnum that I think is important, one that his friends and staffers speak of. Mr. Trump is calmer and more confident than he has been in the past. It is a commonplace to say that his surviving a shooting—that a bullet came within an inch or so of his brain—would change anyone, even a man in his eighth decade, even a man with fairly brittle ingrained views, even Donald Trump. But all of his friends go back to this as they speak of the Trump they’re seeing now. They think it took time for it to be absorbed and settle in. They see him as at least presenting himself in an altered way.

The former staffer said by phone, “Right now he is extremely relaxed.” It isn’t only the assassination attempt. “Everyone thought he was gonna change in a way that would be normal for most people to change—an outward reflection, more humble. I laugh when people say, ‘Normally, a president would—.’ Don’t use ‘normal’ with him.”

But, he said, after the second assassination attempt was thwarted, at Mr. Trump’s golf course, it had real impact. “Trump began to recognize, not in an unappreciative way but in a reality way, that he’d been spared. It gave him a stronger sense of confidence, some extra level of relaxation and of determination. He feels the American people are in trouble and if he can be a small part of fixing that, he must.”

The former staffer said Mr. Trump feels that “this wasn’t an election, it was a vindication.” The court cases, the indictments, the impeachments—“all these things against Donald Trump, and he doesn’t just come back, he roars back in a way that defies logic, reason and history. Few can fathom this.” He meant the history, but also its effect on Mr. Trump.

Something else, he said. When Mr. Trump was elected in 2016, his policy priorities and intentions weren’t fully clear. They are now, and have been popularized. “He knows the mission he laid out to the people—sane border policy, unleash energy, monetize ‘the liquid gold,’ make the tax cuts permanent—there’s an air of confidence about his mission now, and an understanding of the systems in place.” He is living something few get to live: “If I could do it all over again.”

A different observer, who’s seen Mr. Trump up close, said this week, “This is the best version of Donald Trump we will see.”

Back to the former staffer: “The gravity of this historic moment cannot be overstated. He has a level of swagger, a new level. People say, ‘Can I get the policy without the personality?’ No, you need a certain level of ‘I don’t give a damn.’ If you think he had it the first time, Katy bar the door.”

He had a prediction: “This has the potential to be historic in a way that only a handful of administrations have been. We remember some administrations with a level of history-altering moments. This one’s gonna have a lot.”

What about the potential for wrongdoing, such as using government to suppress or abuse foes? “He’s said a million times his revenge is going to be success. When Trump wins, he lets bygones be bygones.”

He paused. “Some of the people he’s hired aren’t that way, so there’s a chance some people may take it upon themselves to do some stuff. I don’t know.”

4. Vets Recognize Hegseth as One of Their Own

Two thoughtful letters to the editor at the Wall Street Journal.

Vets Recognize Hegseth as One of Their Own

He can root out the wokeness that has eroded the sense of character and mission in the upper ranks of the military.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/vets-recognize-pete-hegseth-as-one-of-their-own-71d8d3ff?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Dec. 12, 2024 11:15 am ET

Pete Hegseth, President-elect Donald Trump's nominee for defense secretary, in Washington, Dec. 10. Photo: Tom Williams/Zuma Press

Regarding Pete Hegseth’s op-ed “I’ve Faced Fire Before. I Won’t Back Down” (Dec. 5): In 1915, in the First World War, Winston Churchill, with faults well on display, was being turned out of the Admiralty. His wife, Clementine, made a deep appeal to the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. She wrote, “Winston may in your eyes and in those with whom he has to work have faults, but he has the supreme quality which I venture to say very few of your present or future Cabinet possess—the power, the imagination, the deadliness to fight Germany.”

I would not compare Mr. Hegseth, of course, to Churchill. I know Pete; he has had some rocky, troubled years and he knows he has much to answer for. To take a line from Evelyn Waugh, “his diaries will need some editing.”

But the men—and women—who have been in combat know that he is one of them. They know that he has wit, the imagination and the nerve to root out the wokeness that has eroded the sense of character and mission in the upper ranks of the military.

Hadley Arkes

Washington

Mr. Hegseth makes more of a case for why he should be nominated for secretary of veteran affairs—his service and advocacy on behalf of veterans—instead of defense secretary.

As a SecDef nominee, Mr. Hegseth should have laid out the top challenges faced by the Pentagon in the next four years: fielding organized, trained and equipped U.S. forces that can deal with the emergent military threat from China; Vladimir Putin’s quest for a Greater Russia; and regional instability caused by Iran and North Korea. Add to this the imperative to reinvigorate our technology and industrial bases, so they can sustain our current military forces yet rapidly pivot to new threats posed by our adversaries.

Paul Berg

Bellevue, Neb.

Appeared in the December 13, 2024, print edition as 'Vets Recognize Hegseth as One of Their Own'.

5. Nato must switch to 'wartime mindset', warns secretary general

Nato must switch to 'wartime mindset', warns secretary general

Katya Adler

BBC Europe Editor in Brussels

Maia Davies

BBC News

BBC

33 minutes ago

Maia Davies

BBC News

Reuters

Mark Rutte called the current security situation the "worst in [his] lifetime"

The head of Nato has said it is time to "shift to a wartime mindset", as he warned the military alliance's members were not prepared for the threat of a future conflict with Russia.

Secretary general Mark Rutte said Moscow was "preparing for long-term confrontation" with the West, describing the current security situation as "the worst" in his lifetime.

"We are not ready for what is coming our way in four to five years," he said in his first major speech since becoming secretary-general in October, and urged members to "turbocharge" their defence spending.

His comments come weeks before president-elect Donald Trump takes office, having previously suggested the US would not protect Nato allies that were failing to spend enough on defence.

How much do Nato members spend on defence?

What is Nato and which countries are members?

Trump 'encourages' Russia to attack non-paying Nato allies

Nato members have pledged to spend at least 2% of the value of their economies - measured by GDP - on defence per year by 2024.

But speaking at an event in Brussels, the former Dutch prime minister said "a lot more" would be needed as danger "[moves] towards us at full speed".

He said European members had spent upwards of 3% of GDP on defence during the Cold War.

"If we don't spend more together now to prevent war, we will pay a much, much, much higher price later to fight it," he said.

He added that Russia's economy was "on a war footing", with its defence spend by 2025 set to be "a third of Russia's state budget – and the highest level since the Cold War".

While the average defence spend for Nato members in Europe and Canada is estimated at 2%, not all meet the target.

Trump said in February that he would "encourage" Russia to attack any Nato member that fails to pay its bills as part of the Western military alliance.

Nato's 32 members in Europe and North America agree that if one member is attacked, the others should help defend them.

Nato members also pledged that by 2024 at least 20% of their defence expenditure should go on acquiring and developing military equipment.

But Rutte warned Russia and China were "racing ahead" and said ramping up defence production was a "top priority".

The defence industry in Europe is "too small, too fragmented and too slow", he warned.

"Meanwhile, Russian arms factories are churning out war equipment around the clock."

He spoke at a critical juncture in the war in Ukraine, where Moscow has been capturing and retaking territory in the east and in Russia's Kursk region.

"What is happening in Ukraine could happen here, too," Rutte warned,

"We are not at war. But we are certainly not at peace, either."

BBC

6. Assad’s collapse triggers race to find missing chemical weapons

Assad’s collapse triggers race to find missing chemical weapons

The regime hid some of its deadly nerve agents from inspectors. With Syria in chaos, finding out what happened to the arsenal is a top priority.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/12/syria-chemical-weapons-search-mustard-sarin/

Updated

December 12, 2024 at 6:17 p.m. ESTtoday at 6:17 p.m. EST

Updated

December 12, 2024 at 6:17 p.m. ESTtoday at 6:17 p.m. EST

Smoke billows on the outskirts of the Syrian capital, Damascus, after Israeli airstrikes on Monday. (Aaref Watad/AFP/Getty Images)

By Joby Warrick

In 53 years of Assad family rule, Syria’s government made chemical weapons by the ton, from giant vats of World War I-era mustard gas to nerve agents so deadly that just a few drops could kill. But by far the most worrisome Syrian weapons of mass destruction are the ones that simply disappeared.

The list of the missing is long. It includes, according to an audit by international weapons inspectors, more than 360 tons of mustard gas that Syria admitted making but has never been fully accounted for. Then there’s the five tons of missing precursors for the nerve agent sarin — enough poison to fill a small swimming pool. When pressed, Syrian officials offered an excuse that seemed laughably absurd.

“Lost during transportation, due to traffic accidents,” the Syrians said, according to notes from a confidential 2016 investigation obtained by The Washington Post.

What happened to those chemicals — at least some of which are suspected to have been hidden away for future use — is a suddenly urgent question in the wake of last week’s takeover by Syrian rebels. In a country with no governing authority, and with terrorist groups such as the Islamic State roaming its lawless eastern deserts, securing whatever chemicals remain has become a top priority not only for Syria’s neighbors but also for countries around the world.

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Even a small amount of sarin — one of the most lethal man-made substances ever produced — in the hands of terrorists would carry the potential for hundreds or even thousands of casualties. Experts say the existence of such weapons in Syria could turn out to be among the darker legacies of President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, one that could pose a threat long after the autocrat’s downfall.

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“Although Assad is gone, the specter of chemical weapons still hangs over Syria,” said Gregory Koblentz, a nonproliferation expert and director of biodefense studies at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. While the threat of a large-scale chemical attack appears to be diminished, he said, there is a “growing risk that chemical weapons may be looted by profiteers, competing rebel groups or terrorists.”

That risk was underscored this week by Western governments and arms-control officials as the leading rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, sought to consolidate control over Damascus and other major cities. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the international chemical weapons watchdog, convened an emergency meeting on Syria on Thursday at its headquarters in The Hague amid a flurry of diplomatic efforts to negotiate access to known chemical weapons sites throughout the country.

OPCW Director General Fernando Arias said afterward that the agency was prepared to send teams to Syria, adding that the watchdog was “much better prepared to face such a challenge” than when OPCW inspectors first arrived in the country 11 years ago. In a statement, the group cited the possible existence of “not only residual elements, but also potential new components” of a chemical weapons program in Syria.

U.S. Defense Department officials expressed concern as well, although U.S. personnel have not yet been dispatched to help with the search for weapons. Spokesperson Sabrina Singh told reporters Wednesday that the Pentagon remains focused on ensuring that “chemical weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.” In Syria, rebel leaders behind the weekend’s march into Damascus reiterated claims that they have no interest in chemical weapons, pledging to work with the OPCW to ensure that all dangerous materials are secured and destroyed.

Israel, meanwhile, has refused to wait for inspector visits. The Israel Defense Forces conducted multiple airstrikes in the past week targeting military research centers and storage sites in what was widely seen as a preemptive measure to eliminate any weapons that might have been made. Israeli warplanes have previously struck suspected stockpiles of industrial chemicals that could be used to make more weapons.

Yet it is still unclear how many weapons remain hidden or what a new disarmament process would look like. A European diplomat familiar with the OPCW’s internal deliberations said the group is prepared to work with the successors to the Assad government but added that the stakes are too high to wait until all of the formalities are in place.

“We need to talk with the Syrians, no matter who is in charge,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomacy. “We’re trying to make everyone understand that there is a risk of proliferation.”

A deadly deceit

It’s unknown how much usable sarin or mustard gas remains in Syria. What is irrefutably clear is that Assad once possessed massive quantities of nerve agents and other deadly chemicals. And after swearing that he had given them all up in 2013, he repeatedly used them again.

Multiple independent investigations confirmed that Syria built one of the world’s most potent arsenals of chemical weapons beginning in the 1980s, initially as a deterrent against Israel, its nuclear-armed enemy. But as Syria descended into civil war in 2011, Assad repurposed the internationally outlawed weapons to kill rebels and their civilian supporters.

Syria’s army is documented to have carried out scores of chemical attacks, culminating in a massacre on the morning of Aug. 21, 2013. That day, rockets and shells laden with sarin gas landed in rebel-held suburbs east and south of Damascus, killing more than 1,400 people, most of them women and children, according to a U.S. accounting.

The 2013 chemical attack, one of the deadliest ever against civilians, shocked the world. The international outcry forced Assad — who had long denied even possessing chemical weapons — to acknowledge the existence of his stockpile, then consent to its removal and destruction under international oversight. Assad’s weapons factories were demolished and some 1,400 tons of chemicals were destroyed, mostly by U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors in a hastily constructed mobile chemical weapons destruction facility that was bolted to the decks of a ship from the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force.

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CIA analysts assessed that at least 90 percent of Assad’s stockpile was destroyed, intelligence officials have said. But from the start, Western and Middle Eastern intelligence agencies suspected that Assad kept a small amount of sarin in reserve. That suspicion was borne out when Syrian forces used the deadly nerve agent in an attack on a rebel-held town in 2017.

In the years since, Assad’s deputies played a shell game with the OPCW, concealing records and frequently blocking access to key scientists and sites to prevent investigators from accounting what Syria once had, and might still possess, according to former inspectors and diplomats.

Syria’s official explanation for what happened to its weapons was “neither accurate nor complete — there are gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies,” the European diplomat said. Since 2020, when Assad sharply curtailed the OPCW’s access, independent insight into Syria’s weapons activity diminished further. Former inspectors said they were left with numbers that simply did not add up and excuses that tended to fall apart on closer examination.

“We don’t know how much they may have kept back,” said Jerry Smith, former head of operations for OPCW-U.N. missions to Syria and now a risk adviser to the London insurance industry.

Missing munitions

Among the unknowns is the missing mustard gas — called such for its distinctive odor. Inspectors who scoured Syrian archives during OPCW investigations found evidence that Syria produced enormous quantities of sulfur mustard, the corrosive chemical that caused tens of thousands of casualties on European battlefields during World War I. But of the 385 metric tons logged in factory reports, Syrian officials could account for the whereabouts of only a fraction — about 20 tons. Government officials claimed that the rest had been incinerated over the years, but they never produced credible records showing that large-scale destruction had occurred. Intelligence officials believe Syrian officials may have destroyed some of the chemicals but not all of them.

Were the chemicals to still exist, hidden away, they would probably have deteriorated into a “viscous syrup,” Smith said — less effective than when new, but potentially deadly.

“Still usable as a terror weapon,” he said.

More troubling questions surround the nerve agents that the Assad regime acknowledged making. Syrian officials never convincingly explained a 20-ton shortfall in the accounting for a chemical called methylphosphonyl difluoride, or DF, a highly toxic concoction that, when combined with one other chemical, becomes sarin. In their explanations to OPCW inspectors, Syrians officials claimed that a quarter of the missing DF was lost because of traffic accidents. They said the rest — about 15 tons — was expended during weapons tests, an extravagantly large figure that OPCW dismissed as improbable.

Former OPCW officials and weapons experts said the DF would probably have deteriorated as well but could still be used to make sarin.

It is also possible that Syria succeeded in producing new stores of chemical weapons. Until last week, Syria continued to employ hundreds of scientists and technicians experienced in making military-grade poisons. Although the old chemical weapons factories are gone, U.S. and Middle Eastern intelligence officials believe that Syria continued to conduct research and may have produced small amounts of weapons in laboratories.

Former OPCW officials said they doubt that Syria could have reconstituted its weapons program on a scale that even remotely compares to what existed in 2013. Battered by civil war and international sanctions, and under constant surveillance by multiple foreign intelligence agencies, the Assad government appeared to lack the resources or capacity to rebuild what it had lost, the officials said.

“I do not see a strategic option to keep big amounts of sarin in the country while the whole world is watching,” said one former official, a European weapons expert who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of his past work in Syria.

To make more weapons, the Syrians would “need the complete chain: They would have to buy the products, import the products, do the research and development, the mixing, production, the filling of munitions,” he said. “This is quite complex, and while the Syrians once had the capability for such complex procedures, I don’t believe they do now.”

What remains far more likely is the possibility of a surprise discovery of something the Syrians tried to keep hidden, such as artillery shells that were filled with chemicals before 2013, he said. Whatever exists, in whatever degraded form, he said, it is important that qualified inspectors find and secure the weapons before someone else does.

“We are not aware of such things in Syria,” he said, “but it is not excluded.”

By Joby Warrick

Joby Warrick joined The Washington Post’s National staff in 1996. He has served with the Post's investigative and national security teams, and writes about the Middle East, terrorism and weapons proliferation. He is the author of three books, including “Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS," which was awarded a 2016 Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction.follow on X@jobywarrick

7. U.S. and Allies Race to Shape a New Syria Trying to Get on Its Feet

U.S. and Allies Race to Shape a New Syria Trying to Get on Its Feet

As a rebel alliance with a tenuous hold on power struggles to assert control of the fractured country, Israel, Turkey and the United States are trying to influence what Syria will become.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/12/world/middleeast/syria-us-israel-turkey.html

A Syrian flag was hoisted over Saadallah al-Jabiri Square in Aleppo, Syria, on Thursday.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times

By Michael Crowley Aaron Boxerman and Michael Levenson

Michael Crowley, traveling with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, reported from Aqaba, Jordan, and Aaron Boxerman from Jerusalem.

Dec. 12, 2024

Updated 5:18 p.m. ET

As Syria’s new leaders take on the task of governing the country, world powers sent emissaries into the region on Thursday to begin trying to shape Syria’s future and their relations with the rebels who toppled Bashar al-Assad from the presidency.

The U.S. secretary of state, Antony J. Blinken, met in Jordan with King Abdullah II and called it “a time of promise but also peril for Syria and its neighbors” before flying to Turkey to meet with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Mr. Blinken said it was essential for Syria’s new government, led by a Sunni Islamist group that the United States and others have called a terrorist organization, to respect basic principles of human rights, including the protection of minorities, and to ensure that Syria “is not used as a base for terrorism by groups like the Islamic State.”

He and Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, also delivered a message to Israel on Thursday, saying that its military presence in Syria, where it has taken control of a buffer zone along the Syrian-Israeli border, must be temporary. After the Assad government fell last weekend, Israel moved troops into the area and has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against the regime’s military assets, saying it worried that extremists could exploit the power vacuum and seize abandoned weapons to attack Israeli territory.

“Israel is concerned that that vacuum could be filled by terrorists, by extremists, and so it moved forces into the buffer zone,” Mr. Blinken told reporters in Jordan. “It has told us and told others that that’s a temporary move, just to ensure, again, that this vacuum isn’t filled by something bad.”

Image

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, in Jordan on Thursday, said it was essential for Syria’s new government to ensure that Syria “is not used as a base for terrorism by groups like the Islamic State.”Credit...Pool photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds

Mr. Sullivan, after meeting in Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said that Israel’s decision to send troops into the buffer zone was “logical and consistent” with its right to self-defense. But he said that the United States had “every expectation” that Israel’s military presence there would not be permanent.

Mr. Netanyahu said Israeli troops would remain in Syrian territory “temporarily,” but did not provide a definite timeline for them to withdraw.

“The collapse of the Syrian regime created a vacuum on Israel’s border and in the buffer zone,” Mr. Netanyahu said in a statement. “Israel will not permit jihadi groups to fill that vacuum and threaten Israeli communities.”

The rebel alliance that toppled Mr. al-Assad — whose family ruled more than 50 years — was led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group once affiliated with Al Qaeda. The group’s leaders have said that they long ago abandoned the goal of global jihad and would work with all sects in Syria, but their agenda remains to be seen. Some analysts say the international community should remove the terrorist label from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to enable countries to send aid to Syria and to exert influence over the group.

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Turkey on Thursday appeared to be the first country to send a high-level official to Syria since the rebels seized control of the country.

Image

Families looking for information on detained relatives at the Al Mujtahid Hospital in Damascus, Syria, on Thursday.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Ibrahim Kalin, the head of Turkey’s national intelligence agency, known by its acronym MIT, was seen in Syria’s capital, Damascus, in footage showed on Turkish television. Mr. Kalin was shown leaving the Umayyad Mosque with armed personnel around him while dozens of Syrians recorded videos.

It was the same mosque that the leader of the Syrian rebel offensive, Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, visited on Sunday to commemorate the success of the rebellion.

Turkey’s intelligence agency did not immediately comment on Mr. Kalin’s visit to Damascus. But the trip came as Mr. Blinken indicated concerns about new offensives by Turkish forces and a Turkish-backed militia against U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria’s northeast, calling it “really important at this time that we’re not sparking any additional conflicts.” Turkey calls the Kurdish force a terrorist group, tied to rebel Kurds in Turkey.

The Kurdish-led civil administration in Syria’s northeast said on Thursday that it had raised the Syrian independence flag above all government buildings, a largely symbolic move that it said affirmed “Syria’s unity and national identity” — apparently a signal to the new leaders in Damascus, who also have ties to Turkey.

Image

The control tower of the Aleppo Airport was riddled with bullet holes on Thursday after fighting over the previous week.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times

For years, the de facto autonomous region and its military wing, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, have positioned themselves as an independent party in the Syrian civil war, unaligned with either the Assad regime or the opposition. In recent days, however, they have expressed a readiness to communicate with the new government in Damascus.

The chaos in Syria has given Israel a chance to severely weaken the military forces of a country that has long been a bitter enemy, without waiting to learn whether it will remain one. Israeli warplanes have conducted over 350 strikes across Syria in recent days, targeting the remnants of the former government’s Navy, as well as chemical weapons, warplanes and long-range missile caches, according to the Israeli military.

The Israeli military has also moved into a 155-square-mile zone on the Syrian-Israeli border that was intended to be a demilitarized area monitored by United Nations peacekeepers. Israeli troops then also took up positions deeper inside Syrian territory for the first time since the 1973 war.

Image

Israeli soldiers occupying an outpost with a Syrian flag painted on the roof near the village of Majdal Shams on Thursday.Credit...Atef Safadi/EPA, via Shutterstock

On Wednesday, the Israeli military took Israeli reporters on a guided tour in the area of Kodana, a village on the Syrian side of the buffer zone. Video from the excursion — including of what were said to be deserted Syrian military fortifications — was later broadcast on several Israeli networks.

“It’s clear that we will remain here for quite some time,” Benny Kata, a local military commander, said in an interview with Israel’s public broadcaster. “We’re prepared for this.”

Any deal to restore the buffer zone appears distant, given the upheaval in Syria and Israelis’ concerns about the rebels who now lead the country. Mr. Netanyahu’s office said Israeli soldiers would remain in Syrian territory “until there is an effective force that will enforce” a 1974 cease-fire in the buffer zone.

Israel’s allies have mostly stayed quiet on the capture of territory in the buffer zone and beyond, although France on Wednesday called for Israel to withdraw and respect Syria’s sovereignty.

In Damascus on Thursday, a funeral attested to the emotions loosed by the fall of the brutal Assad government. A large crowd filled streets, carrying the coffin of Mazen al-Hamada, who had spent years alerting the world to the torture he and other detainees had suffered at the hands of the regime.

His niece wrote on social media that he had been tortured to death by the authorities in the regime’s final days.

Reporting was contributed Isabel Kershner, Safak Timur, Euan Ward and Ephrat Livni.

Michael Crowley covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times. He has reported from nearly three dozen countries and often travels with the secretary of state. More about Michael Crowley

Aaron Boxerman is a Times reporter covering Israel and Gaza. He is based in Jerusalem. More about Aaron Boxerman

Michael Levenson covers breaking news for The Times from New York. More about Michael Levenson

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 13, 2024, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. and Allies Race to Shape a New Syria Trying to Get on Its Feet. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

8. Trump’s Kari Lake ‘pick’ sparks fears at Voice of America

I wonder how much all the VOA critics actually listen to and read VOA reports?

Trump’s Kari Lake ‘pick’ sparks fears at Voice of America | CNN Business

CNN · by Brian Stelter · December 12, 2024

Kari Lake is Trump's pick to lead Voice of America.

Caitlin O'Hara/Reuters

CNN —

Presidents don’t ordinarily pick the director of Voice of America, an international news broadcaster funded by the US government. But President-elect Donald Trump says he wants his ally Kari Lake to take over VOA.

Trump’s Wednesday night social media post – in which he said, “I am pleased to announce that Kari Lake will serve as our next Director of the Voice of America” – presages many future fights over VOA, which became an ideological battleground during Trump’s first term in office.

Some journalists at VOA are highly concerned about that idea that Lake, a longtime local TV anchor turned media-basher and election denier, could take over the outlet.

“We’re hoping that the guardrails will hold,” a VOA employee told CNN on condition of anonymity.

At issue: What should VOA be and who should it serve?

Voice of America is part of the US Agency for Global Media, which also runs networks like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Middle East Broadcasting Networks. VOA produces award-winning journalism and, in doing so, promotes democratic values around the world. The US government has historically portrayed VOA as a counterweight to foreign propaganda and a model for free, fair, truth-telling news coverage.

Partly for that reason, VOA says it has a “firewall” in place that “prohibits interference by any US government official in the objective, independent reporting of news.”

Installing a new director of the news operation is a lot more complicated than a Truth Social post.

So for now, Trump’s announcement is more of a suggestion – albeit a highly influential one.

Trump’s statement said Lake “will be appointed by, and work closely with, our next head of the US Agency for Global Media, who I will announce soon.”

Reform at VOA

During Trump’s first term in office, it took two years for his pick to run the agency, Michael Pack, to get confirmed by the Senate. Once Pack arrived, chaos ensued inside VOA and other parts of the agency. Pack dismissed the heads of multiple networks; stacked their boards with Trump loyalists; reportedly tried to meddle in news coverage; and brought in political appointees who investigated a VOA White House reporter for alleged anti-Trump bias.

Some conservatives cheered his efforts. But a federal investigation later followed up on whistleblower complaints and found a long list of abuses.

The Trump-era purge efforts led Congress to institute reforms. A bipartisan group called the International Broadcasting Advisory Board now works with the CEO of the U.S. Agency of Global Media. By law, the head of VOA can only be “appointed or removed” by a majority vote of the board.

If it sounds like a lot of bureaucracy, it is. But it is intended to provide some measure of independence to the broadcasters.

That’s why, by announcing Lake, Trump is “putting the cart before the horse,” a veteran of the agency told CNN.

The board just celebrated the swearing-in of a new VOA director, Michael Abramowitz, a few months ago. Abramowitz is a former Washington Post correspondent and president of Freedom House. He said VOA’s mission is to “provide accurate, comprehensive, and objective news and to tell America’s story to people around the world, many of whom have no alternative source of information.”

Trump described the mission in more overly political terms Wednesday night. He said Lake – who bitterly criticized American journalists during her two failed campaigns for office in Arizona – will “ensure that the American values of Freedom and Liberty are broadcast around the World FAIRLY and ACCURATELY, unlike the lies spread by the Fake News Media.”

Speaking anonymously for fear of retaliation, a VOA employee told CNN that Abramowitz has been well received at the organization, while “many of us are very disturbed” by the notion of Lake taking his place.

First, Trump has to nominate someone to run the U.S. Agency of Global Media. Then, that person and the advisory board will consider the VOA position. The board’s makeup will tilt in the GOP’s favor next year because one member will come from Trump’s State Department. But the other board members have terms that somewhat insulate them from political pressure.

When reached on Wednesday night, current board chair Kenneth Jarin, a Biden appointee who has two more years on the board, said, “No comment.”

CNN · by Brian Stelter · December 12, 2024

9. Appointing Kari Lake as VOA Director?

Some inside baseball on VOA and the USAGM from Matt Armstrong.

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Appointing Kari Lake as VOA Director?

Barriers to prevent obvious politicization exist, but they can be overcome

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/appointing-kari-lake-as-voa-director?utm

Matt Armstrong

Dec 12, 2024

I was expecting that my next post here was going to be on the Project 2025 chapter on the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) or a review of a recent article called “The Lonely “I” In DIME: How the US Can Address the Information Challenge of Our Time,” both of which make valid points but are, on the whole, quite bad and unhelpful. Or, maybe I’d publish a short post where I give a name—Armstrong’s Paradox is what I’ve leaned toward—to the ironic misinformation that permeates discussions around government actions against disinformation, resulting in unnecessary and sometimes illogical restraints in dealing with the same. Instead, this will be about how President-elect Trump can put Kari Lake as the Director of the Voice of America (VOA).

Subscribed

Before I begin, since there are many new subscribers (and twice as many followers as subscribers), a relevant intro is in order. I served as a Governor on the formerly-named Broadcasting Board of Governors, now called the USAGM, from 2013 to 2017. Though President Obama nominated me to the bipartisan board, I was a Republican appointee, and my Senate sponsors were Mitch McConnell and the late Tom Coburn.1 Coburn approached me to serve on the board as a subject matter expert because of my efforts as the executive director of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. I’ve worked extensively with the State Department, Congress, and the military, including NATO member counterparts. I am honored to have been inducted as an Honorary Member of the Psychological Operations Regiment at USAJFKSWCS.2 And, Russia sanctioned me in May 2022. I’ve been actively engaged in and writing about US international information activities, including public diplomacy, for twenty years.

Without discussing Kari Lake’s qualifications or fit to be VOA Director,3 let’s dive into how she can be placed in the position.

If you’re interested in VOA and how it differs from commercial media, see:

Why do we still have VOA, RFE/RL, and the other broadcasters under USAGM?

Matt Armstrong

Dec 5

A decade ago, I was a Governor on the formerly-named Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). That agency has since been renamed the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) after the board was abolished through a bill that had no public comment, no hearing, was kept secret from the public, was withheld from most of the board, and supporters apparently deceived…

Read full story

To start, the legislation abolishing the governance board I was on established a replacement advisory board. The advisory board is to have up to six members, with no more than three from one party. Some minor authorities are vested in this advisory board, but its real power is gatekeeping the hiring and firing of the network chiefs. USAGM has five broadcast entities: VOA, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), and the Middle East Broadcast Network (MBN). The law—specifically, 22 USC 6205(e)1—states the network heads “may only be appointed or removed if such action has been approved by a majority vote of the Advisory Board.”

So, what is this advisory board? The President appoints the members with the advice and consent of the Senate (i.e., they are all Senate-confirmed Presidential appointments). Except, four of the members are selected by Congress. You see, the Chair and the Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee each give a list of “at least three” candidates for the President to pick from. The same is true in the House: the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also each give a list of at least three candidates to the President. This method, which intended to vest some political control in Congress, may increase Congress’s historically low interest in the agency. It also means 2 Republican and 2 Democrat board members. The President selects the two remaining appointees. Since there is a legal limit on party representation, the President selects a candidate of his choosing while the other is a candidate forwarded by the ranking Senator of the other party.

However, advisory board appointments do not expire with the administration. They are on their own calendar. They are appointed to a single four-year term but serve until replaced (or they quit). Right now, there is one vacancy on the board, and I do not know when the terms for the other five will expire or have already expired.

In addition to the six appointed board members, there is the Secretary of State, typically represented by a designee, most likely the largely abandoned and ignored position of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.4

The advisory board website does not list appointment dates, term lengths, or expirations. That information is available by searching the White House nomination announcements, but I’ll leave that research to you, the reader.

Since the board doesn’t appoint but merely approves hiring the VOA Director and the other network chiefs, the USAGM CEO must want Kari Lake. It’s safe to say the current CEO, Amanda Bennett, will not want to appoint Lake. It’s also safe to say the Trump administration will seek to replace Bennett. Whether they do so quickly or not is up to the administration. In the first administration, USAGM was low on the White House priority list, plus Pack had other interests and introduced his own delay in the nomination timeline. The Senate was also not too interested. Will it be different this time around?

We’ll have to see what happens once Trump replaces USAGM’s CEO. Will the advisory board look differently? Will Trump designate a new advisory board chair? He’ll need the Senate’s advice and consent to do that.

Approving an appointment to lead VOA or the other networks requires only a simple majority. For completeness, a quorum for this board is only four members, and the Secretary of State is a member.

Is it possible for Kari Lake to become the Director of the Voice of America? Sure, but I honestly think it’s not going to happen. At the very least, I doubt she’ll wait for the White House to muscle her appointment through the advisory board, which I cannot believe would accept her appointment under any normal circumstance.

By the way, the advisory board can unilaterally fire a network chief. They need only to “consult” with USAGM’s CEO beforehand.

Update 17:05 Dec 12: To make it clear and save you the math: only 3 of the 5 currently serving appointed advisory board members need to vote yes on Lake to allow her through. Or, if one or two members are absent from the meeting, only 2 need to vote yes, assuming the State Department rep votes yes. Again, I don’t know the political make-up of the current board, nor do I assume a Republican member will automatically vote yes. Once Trump appoints the USAGM CEO, the hurdle to appoint Kari Lake the Director of the Voice of America would come down to two or three people on the advisory board.

Thanks for reading.

I’d have to look it up to be sure, but I think I technically replaced Dana Perino on the board.

This is obviously pronounced “swicks,” which is faster than saying the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Any discussion would be short: she has none and is unfit. In the first Trump administration, after the White House announced Michael Pack as USAGM CEO, I spoke with Brian Stelter on his Reliable Sources program about Pack’s lack of fitness for that job. A then-colleague was upset with my comments. During our discussion where she defended Pack, she admitted Pack wasn’t a good manager. I laughed.

I have tracked the lack of a confirmed appointment to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs office since 2011. The office has lacked a confirmed appointment 45% of the days since the office was established in 1999 as the successor to the Director of the US Information Agency. See https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/r-changes-coming (from 2023).

10. US, allies must rebuild air forces, invest in drones to counter China's missile threat to runways: Stimson

That is a sobering assessment of our Patriot and THAAD stocks for warfighting.

US, allies must rebuild air forces, invest in drones to counter China's missile threat to runways: Stimson - Breaking Defense

The Stimson study predicts that the US "would likely run out of Patriot and THAAD interceptors within the first 24 hours of a military conflict."

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · December 12, 2024

US Army Privates 1st Class Danica Sasakura and Dean Werner, 1-1 Air Defense Artillery, Charley Battery Patriot Missile operators, perform pre-launch checks on a Patriot missile launcher as part of a field training exercise on Kadena Air Base, Japan. Kadena hosts the largest combat wing in the Pacific. (U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Maeson Elleman)

SYDNEY — The US, its allies and partners must change their air forces to cope with China’s enormous missile force that could cripple air bases throughout the Indo-Pacific for up to 12 days in event of war, according to a new report by the Stimson Center.

“By denying the United States the use of runways and taxiways in the region, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could gain air superiority without ever defeating America’s arsenal of advanced fighters and bombers,” says the think tank report, released today. “No combination of U.S. countermeasures — including the greater dispersal of aircraft in the region, improved runway repair capabilities, and more robust missile defenses — is likely to solve the problem. There is a real and growing danger that Beijing might conclude that it could keep American airpower at bay long enough to accomplish a quick fait accompli.”

Central to the analysis is US vulnerability to attacks on runways in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. And it modeled how well missile defense, faster runway repair times and the dispersion of U.S. aircraft across the theater would perform against the Chinese threat.

The three authors say initial strikes by China that close air bases could cripple US and allied forces for 12 days, especially at the Japanese bases. But it would be the loss of runways for airborne tankers; that would affect operations “for over a month.”

Without refueling, US fighters with relatively short ranges “will not be able to put most of their weapons within range — much less fly a combat air patrol over Taiwan or the South China Sea.”

With the stark challenge laid out, coming up with solutions is “arguably the most critical and daunting task facing the U.S. Air Force today,” claims the report. “The Air Force finds itself in danger of operating much less effectively than previously assessed, if at all, at the start of a military conflict when the Joint Force would expect it to quickly set up a combat air patrol or sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait. Worse, Chinese military planners might calculate that they have a window of over 30 days — when American airpower would be largely sidelined — to accomplish a fait accompli.”

That could make it very hard to deter Beijing should push come to shove.

Buying more missile defense systems or more fighters or bombers is not the answer for the US and its allies, the authors write. It should instead build “large numbers of long-range drones and missiles of all types to ensure that they can keep the skies contested and blunt Chinese attacks early in a war without massive support from American fighters and bombers.”

To illustrate just how spare the US missile defense enterprise is for all its impressive results in limited conflicts, they note that in October this year, two US Navy ships fired roughly one dozen SM-3 interceptors at Iranian ballistic missiles headed for Israel — using a year’s worth of production in one day. The Stimson study predicts that the US “would likely run out of Patriot and THAAD interceptors within the first 24 hours of a military conflict.” The inventory of 1,200 Patriot missiles would run dry within a few days. So positioning THAAD and Patriot batteries around US and allied bases won’t be of enough help for long enough.

They also recommend allies and partners should pick up “the bulk of the burden for contesting control of the air early in a war.”

For example, instead of allies buying what the report calls “prestige weapons systems” such as Japan’s upgraded F-16s and Tokyo’s plans to co-develop a sixth-generation fighter jet with Britain and Italy, which they argue “will be of limited utility early in a war,” they should spend more on defense and, specifically, expanding training in drone warfare.

In the end, the authors offer a grim reminder of the stakes. The United States, they write, “should be under no illusions: there will be no refuge or rest from the long reach of Chinese missiles for U.S. air bases in a war. U.S. decision-makers should ask themselves the hard questions: whether — and when — paying that high price in materiel and human lives will be in the United States’ national interest.”

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · December 12, 2024

11. Whole-of-society resilience: A new deterrence concept in Taipei

Excerpts:

Societal resilience and the fundamental notion that Taiwan’s people have agency are integral to Taiwan’s democracy. Promoting those messages is therefore as important to protecting Taiwan’s way of life as the actual investments in preparedness. The messaging and visible steps being taken within the committee’s five pillars also enhance other aspects of societal resilience beyond the committee’s scope, such as societal responses to disinformation and influence campaigns. The resilience campaign is an important measure against the comprehensive political, economic, and military coercion the Taiwanese people now face. It has the added advantage of being inherently defensive and unprovocative.

The WOSR campaign will give the Taiwanese people hope and appreciation that they can stand up to threats. It is central to Taiwan’s continued ability to deter China from using force to compel unification and therefore complements Taiwan’s military defense spending. U.S. cooperation with Taiwan in the WOSR campaign amplifies the deterrence effect and builds the confidence of Taiwan’s citizens.

Lai’s campaign to foster WOSR improves Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and meaningfully contributes to Taiwan’s deterrence. It also increases the population’s morale and will to resist and ultimately fight should China choose to use coercion or force against Taiwanese, thereby justifying the strategy and the investment of public resources. Furthermore, WOSR creates new avenues for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation which enhance deterrence, and Washington also benefits because increased cooperation accentuates U.S. credibility as a partner and security provider in the eyes of U.S. regional allies as well as the people of Taiwan. Expanded U.S.-Taiwan cooperation as well as Taiwan’s resilience investments will not go unnoticed in Beijing either. Taiwan’s investments in WOSR complicate Beijing’s choices about whether to use force and challenge assumptions that Taiwan would succumb to a blockade military assault and surrender. WOSR is a potentially game-changing policy that should be wholeheartedly supported by the incoming Trump administration.

Whole-of-society resilience: A new deterrence concept in Taipei

Drew Thompson

December 6, 2024

Editor's note: This piece is part of a series titled “The future of U.S.-China policy: Recommendations for the incoming administration” from Brookings’ John L. Thornton China Center.

The Brookings Institution ·

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te announced in June the establishment of a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee to better prepare the country to face natural and human-made disasters, including the threat of blockade or invasion by China. Taiwan is disaster-prone—it experiences approximately 18,649 earthquakes and three to four typhoons annually which regularly cause flooding and landslides. Taiwan’s infrastructure is built to withstand natural disasters due to some of the most stringent building codes in the world, but Lai determined that Taiwan’s society needs resilience on par with its buildings. Beijing’s military coercion and the threat of blockade, missile strikes, and invasion are the primary human-made challenges Taiwan must also contend with. Just as Taiwan faces increasing risk from climate change-driven natural disasters, the military threat from China is also growing.

The whole-of-society resilience (WOSR) effort is a substantial part of Taiwan’s overall approach to defense and deterrence. By changing the Taiwanese people’s perceptions of China’s military threat and realizing their own agency to address it, Lai is seeking to empower the Taiwanese people. He plans to counter military coercion by galvanizing society to cooperate with the military and government to increase Taiwan’s will to resist coercion. Taiwan’s commitment to developing WOSR presents significant opportunities to expand U.S.-Taiwan cooperation to enhance Taiwan’s deterrence and increase cross-Strait stability.

WOSR and the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

The foundations for Lai’s WOSR campaign were laid in 2022 during the previous Tsai Ing-wen administration. The Ministry of National Defense stood up the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) on January 1, 2022, and published a handbook for civil defense. In September 2022, the National Security Council began studying other countries’ resilience initiatives, including national plans for incident response centers; civilian training; stockpiling strategic materials, medical, and social welfare; digital resilience; and civil air defense and evacuation models. Some relevant materials have been translated, such as Swedish government handbooks on resistance.

Lai chaired the first Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee meeting on September 26, 2024, establishing the political framework for mobilizing society and coordinating government efforts. The committee is made up of government departments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and academic experts.

The committee’s mandate is to address societal resilience to natural disasters and military operations against Taiwan, such as a blockade or missile strikes. There are important distinctions between a natural disaster and a military operation. A natural disaster would likely last days or a few weeks, would likely be localized, and would likely not disrupt communications between national command authorities and responders in the field. A blockade or missile strikes would likely last weeks or months, affect all of Taiwan, potentially result in greater casualties, and likely disrupt civil and military communications and the government’s command and control networks. The WOSR campaign clearly intends to address vulnerabilities in both long- and short-term risk scenarios.

The committee has prioritized three key objectives in its implementation of the WOSR campaign: to ensure the government can maintain continuous operations, sustain critical social services and core functions of society, and provide civil support to military operations when necessary. These objectives will be supported by five “pillars”: civilian training; strategic material stockpile and distribution; critical infrastructure; social welfare, medical, and evacuation; and information systems, communications, transportation, and financial networks.

Civilian training

Lai’s administration has set a goal to train 400,000 citizens to contribute to societal resilience. A critical aspect of the campaign is ensuring citizens are aware of threats, aware of available resources, know their roles in a disaster or attack, and feel empowered to protect themselves and their country. One goal is for citizens to be able to augment government-provided services such as emergency first response, distributing emergency supplies, and supporting victim services, including shelters. Lessons are being taken from the Baltic states and Sweden, which have well-developed total defense doctrines and infrastructure to address the threat they face from Russia.

The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is currently evaluating its role in citizen training efforts and will play a central role in the campaign. MOI works in conjunction with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to manage Taiwan’s conscription program, and it plans to establish an Alternative Military Service and Social Resilience Training Center. It is also planning to overhaul the Taiwan Civil Emergency Response Teams program to enhance volunteer firefighter training, update equipment, and initiate call-up training for reservists in alternative service.

Nongovernmental organizations are training civilians, while social and religious groups are providing training, education, and disaster relief services. Retail companies are also expected to serve as distribution points for critical materials.

Strategic material stockpile

Government departments are tasked with identifying and stockpiling critical materials, including food items, cooking fuels, ready-to-eat meals, and self-heating rations. They are also developing plans for the distribution of these materials to affected communities and for coordination with local governments and retail outlets. Local disaster coordination centers have been established in local governments throughout Taiwan, and apps are being developed to efficiently distribute supplies to citizens.

Critical infrastructure resilience (energy, utilities)

Protecting critical infrastructure, particularly Taiwan’s energy supply and the delivery of electricity, is critical to meet society’s needs, sustain government operations, and supplement and support military operations. The Ministry of Economic Affairs currently manages the supply of imported coal, petroleum, and natural gas and is investing in expanding facilities for a strategic energy reserve. Initiatives are also underway to enhance Taiwan’s power grid and secure water supplies, including drilling water wells for emergency use. Plans are being developed to increase the security of critical infrastructure, including protection against sabotage.

Social welfare, medical, and evacuation facilities

According to conversations I had with members of Taiwan’s National Security Council, Taiwan’s authorities have already established over 84,000 air raid shelters, 4,600 wartime disaster relief centers, and 6,000 evacuation centers to be used in the event of an attack. Buildings with basements in urban areas are marked with shelter signs, while plans are being made to utilize underground facilities, such as parking garages, as temporary medical centers, which will be staffed with civil and military medical teams. A National Resilience Medical Preparedness Management Center has been set up by the Ministry of Health and Welfare to oversee a wartime medical command system and implement a National Medical Resilience Preparedness Plan.

Information systems, communications, transportation, financial network security

The Ministry of Digital Affairs is developing a redundant emergency communications network to ensure civil and military authorities can maintain command and control in the event of a contingency. This includes the planned deployment of medium- and low-orbit satellites, cross-network roaming, cloud-based data backup for government and public networks, and the development of a public protection and disaster relief communications system. Smartphone apps are being developed to support societal resilience, access to resources and services, and continuity of operations for critical communications networks.

The WOSR campaign is an ambitious undertaking that requires considerable financial and human resources and is only sustainable with Lai’s continued attention and commitment. Involved ministries will all need to develop specific line items in their budgets for WOSR initiatives, which will likely be debated in the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan. Exercises will be conducted in each of the five pillars to test plans and assumptions, including a planned tabletop exercise in December 2024 and small-scale disaster relief exercises in each pillar beginning in spring 2025. Civilian involvement in exercises will be expanded, including in Wan’an air defense drills and the Han Kuang annual military exercises starting in June 2025. The presidential-level Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee will continue to meet quarterly and hold continual coordination meetings at working levels convened by the National Security Council and Executive Yuan.

Role of the military, fire, and police in WOSR

The ministers of defense and interior are key members of the presidential-level committee, and their respective subordinates already play critical roles in national responses to a major disaster or military contingency, especially the Ministry of National Defense’s All-out Mobilization Department and the Ministry of the Interior’s fire and police agencies. However, these ministries and agencies do not have clear roles in the five pillars set out by the committee. Since the WOSR campaign is top-down, not bottom-up, these agencies will face challenges in committing resources to internal strategic planning efforts and determining how to integrate their efforts with society and the other agencies to avoid waste and inefficiencies.

Interagency coordination is a challenge in any government, and Taiwan is no exception. Still, there are a few mechanisms to help departments break through stove pipes or share information. For example, the Ministry of Digital Affairs is developing an emergency communications network, but it is uncertain whether there is adequate coordination with the Taiwan Armed Forces and fire and police agencies to ensure that the wartime communications system meets their and civilian ministries’ requirements. Likewise, the Ministry of the Interior is building a system to train civilians as an alternative to the military reserve system, which is already struggling to adapt to changes in conscription terms as well as the overall challenge of a shrinking population.

Risks and challenges

The WOSR campaign is ambitious, complex, and expensive, all of which present risks to execution. The president’s personal attention and the WOSR approach’s clear rationality increase the campaign’s chances of success over the long term, but there are at least three risks that the government will need to monitor: public opinion, resource constraints, and bureaucratic competition.

At its core, the WOSR campaign is a narrative about resilience, and Taiwan’s ability to confront human-made and natural disasters. Taiwan’s citizens have lived with the specter of a Chinese blockade or invasion for decades and are already cognitively resilient to the threat, which sometimes leads outside observers to determine that Taiwanese are naïve or ignoring it. Lai needs to tread carefully when making the case for society to enhance its resilience against aggression from the People’s Republic of China without overhyping the threat, causing panic, or undermining confidence in Taiwan’s long-term development and prosperity.

Resilience is expensive. Developing redundant communications systems and stockpiles of critical materials is costly and not necessarily a high priority for Taiwan’s taxpayers, who prefer to see government resources expended on social services they immediately benefit from. Making the case for WOSR investments and their price tag will certainly be politically contentious, particularly in the opposition-controlled legislature.

The WOSR campaign entails extensive government involvement and coordination and will likely result in some competition within the bureaucracy, particularly over scarce resources. There will undoubtedly be a need to meld civilian and military requirements for certain resiliency programs, such as emergency communications and the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum for civil and military use. There may also be competition between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Defense for a shrinking number of conscripts due to Taiwan’s low birthrate. Coordination between the national government and local governments will need to be developed to roll the program out to the entire country. Local government needs and national government prescriptions and support may not be perfectly aligned.

These challenges are likely manageable because of Lai’s personal attention to the WOSR campaign, but it will be crucial to align interests and objectives, maximize coordination, and minimize friction between diverse stakeholders in both the public and private sectors.

Recommendations for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation

The Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee and the WOSR campaign comprise a rational approach to defense and deterrence and present an opportunity for the U.S. government and civil society to expand engagement. Societal resilience is an integral component of Taiwan’s national defense that contributes to deterring China’s use of force. It is therefore advantageous for the United States to look beyond arms sales and military strategies to expand how Washington conceptualizes and bolsters Taiwan’s deterrence.

The American Institute in Taiwan, the de-facto U.S. Embassy in Taipei, already sponsors and participates in NGO training sessions, but the WOSR campaign creates more opportunities to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience and the bilateral relationship. Expanded bilateral cooperation should not be limited to direct-counterpart ministries, since the government departments on either side do not always line up evenly in terms of roles and missions. While Taiwan has a Ministry of Interior, for example, its role and structure are different from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Therefore, U.S. government interlocutors should reach beyond counterpart dyads to expand cooperation to nontraditional partners, including local governments and the private sector. Working across agencies on the Taiwan side of a cooperation equation could help foster interagency coordination between Taiwanese organizations that lack a culture or history of engagement with one another.

Individual U.S. government departments at the national and state levels have tremendous experience and expertise that they can share to help Taiwan counterparts tackle monumental WOSR tasks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, for instance, has a massive inventory of civilian resilience materials and expertise to contribute. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency under DHS coordinates cyber and critical infrastructure defense, including missions aligned with the WOSR Defense Committee such as protecting the power grid from electromagnetic pulse and geomagnetic disruption. DHS’s Office of Emergency Communications could share valuable experience about contingency communications networks and spectrum management with Taiwan counterparts.

DHS should consider making significant human resources investments to ensure effective coordination and strategic planning with Taiwan, both at headquarters and based full-time in the American Institute in Taiwan. A DHS attaché based in Taipei working closely with a robust “Taiwan Desk” in Washington could develop engagement and cooperation plans and encourage and coordinate partnerships between state-level emergency management departments and local-level Taiwan counterparts.

Likewise, other U.S. government departments, including Defense, Treasury, Energy, and others, should evaluate how they can support the WOSR campaign as part of a whole-of-government effort to enhance Taiwan’s resilience and deterrence. Taiwan, for its part, should consider designating a full-time coordinator at the National Security Council level to lead bilateral dialogues and strategic planning with U.S. counterparts.

U.S. companies in Taiwan should also consider engaging NGOs such as the Forward Alliance (a member of the WOSR Defense Committee) to conduct resilience training for their employees.

Conclusion

Lai’s intention is to raise awareness of resilience as much as prepare for catastrophe. He sees WOSR as a means to demonstrate Taiwan’s resolve to defend itself, enhance its defense and economic security, and strengthen its democratic institutions and relations with other democracies—what Lai has described as his four-pillar plan, including a stable and consistent cross-Strait policy.

Societal resilience and the fundamental notion that Taiwan’s people have agency are integral to Taiwan’s democracy. Promoting those messages is therefore as important to protecting Taiwan’s way of life as the actual investments in preparedness. The messaging and visible steps being taken within the committee’s five pillars also enhance other aspects of societal resilience beyond the committee’s scope, such as societal responses to disinformation and influence campaigns. The resilience campaign is an important measure against the comprehensive political, economic, and military coercion the Taiwanese people now face. It has the added advantage of being inherently defensive and unprovocative.

The WOSR campaign will give the Taiwanese people hope and appreciation that they can stand up to threats. It is central to Taiwan’s continued ability to deter China from using force to compel unification and therefore complements Taiwan’s military defense spending. U.S. cooperation with Taiwan in the WOSR campaign amplifies the deterrence effect and builds the confidence of Taiwan’s citizens.

Lai’s campaign to foster WOSR improves Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and meaningfully contributes to Taiwan’s deterrence. It also increases the population’s morale and will to resist and ultimately fight should China choose to use coercion or force against Taiwanese, thereby justifying the strategy and the investment of public resources. Furthermore, WOSR creates new avenues for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation which enhance deterrence, and Washington also benefits because increased cooperation accentuates U.S. credibility as a partner and security provider in the eyes of U.S. regional allies as well as the people of Taiwan. Expanded U.S.-Taiwan cooperation as well as Taiwan’s resilience investments will not go unnoticed in Beijing either. Taiwan’s investments in WOSR complicate Beijing’s choices about whether to use force and challenge assumptions that Taiwan would succumb to a blockade military assault and surrender. WOSR is a potentially game-changing policy that should be wholeheartedly supported by the incoming Trump administration.

The Brookings Institution ·

12. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024

Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that unspecified sources with knowledge of the matter stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) thinks it has an "informal understanding" with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that would allow Russian forces to stay at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but noted that the situation could change due to instability in Syria. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS in Damascus and that Russian bases "continue to be located on Syrian territory." Bogdanov expressed hesitancy in response to a question about whether Russia expects its bases to remain in Syria, stating that the bases will "probably" remain but that there are no other decisions yet on the matter. Bogdanov implied that Russia's continued presence in Syria is important for the ongoing fight against terrorism in the country, likely as part of efforts to convince Syrian authorities to allow Russia to continue to operate its bases in the long-term. Russia has been using the cover of "fighting terrorism" as an excuse for military activities primarily aimed at supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime since it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 11 that Syrian "militants" have surrounded Hmeimim Air Base and are periodically attempting to conduct provocations and shell the facility. The milblogger claimed that Russia reached a "preliminary" agreement about the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria but that the agreement only lasts for 75 days, after which Russia will withdraw from Syria. It is unclear if the reported Russian agreement with Syrian authorities is permanent or temporary. The Syrian opposition encompasses several factions with varying ideologies and political objectives, and it is unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria.

Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations —further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 12 that Russian forces from throughout Syria are withdrawing to Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are flying four to five miliary transport sorties daily between Hmeimim and unspecified airfields in Russia. The GUR stated that Russia is moving its Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship to Tartus to evacuate weapons and equipment. The GUR stated that the two ships are currently in the Norwegian Sea and are scheduled to pass the English Channel in "a few days." The GUR stated that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships also left Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, respectively, and are heading to Tartus. It will likely be weeks until these ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and arrive at the Port of Tartus, and Russia may be moving these ships as a precaution should Moscow decide to conduct wider evacuations of the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in the coming weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.

Key Takeaways:

Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term.

Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations — further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria.

Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia.

People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty.

India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner.
Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin's effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space.

Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12.

Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Svatove.

The Russian military command's efforts to ensure operational security amongst Russian forces continue to draw ire from select milbloggers, who derided these efforts as disruptive overreach.

13. Iran Update, December 12, 2024

Iran Update, December 12, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-12-2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS stated on December 12 that it would hold accountable any fighters who fail to comply with orders. HTS also stated that any individuals violating orders do not represent HTS-led forces or the transitional government. This statement comes after HTS announced that interfering in women’s choice of clothing or demanding that women dress modestly is ”strictly forbidden.” HTS has also ordered its fighters to protect public and private property, respect public institutions, and treat former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers well. HTS is trying to present itself as a moderate force with these orders.

The most recent statement threatening to punish fighters is likely in response to reports of HTS-led fighters conducting religion-based harassment and revenge killings. Some reports, for instance, claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which is a holy Shia shrine. The reports claimed that the fighters chanted “provocative slogans” while in the shrine. Several reports claimed that the fighters were affiliated with HTS, which reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites and minorities in Syria. CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of the event or the accuracy of the reports. But their prevalence in the information space could nevertheless stoke sectarian tensions. CTP-ISW similarly reported on December 11 that an HTS-led fighter questioned a Christian journalist about her religious background, asking specifically whether she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze."

These incidents and the traction they gain in the information space create opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious-based violence and destabilize the government formation process in Syria. These incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. HTS is comprised of numerous Islamist groups formed with varying degrees of representation in the broader HTS leadership structure. It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian tensions or whether they are coordinated activities among several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and religion-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

Key Takeaways:

Syria: HTS is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS likely recognizes the risk of revenge killings and sectarian violence, which could destabilize Syria further.

Syria: The US-backed SDF is facing intense external and internal pressure. The SDF did, however, reach a four-day ceasefire agreement with the Turkish-backed SNA around Manbij in northern Syria.

Syria: The HTS-led transitional government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state by publicizing its engagement with foreign actors. No foreign countries have yet recognized the transitional government as the legitimate state, however.

Iran: The E3 sent a letter to the UN Security Council, threatening to impose “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 is responding to the dramatic expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian non-cooperation with the IAEA.

14. Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle

Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle

by James Stejskal0 Comments1 day ago

sofrep.com

1 day ago

CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE (C.Q.B.)

The aim of CQB training is to guarantee success in killing. It is much more of a personal affair than ordinary combat, and it is just not good enough to temporarily put your opponent out of action so that he can live to fight another day. He must be definitively and quickly killed so that you can switch your whole attention onto the next target.

Besides obvious physical abilities, the CQB operator must be cool-headed and, above all, remorseless.

Opponents must never be given “gentlemanly” chances. He must be kicked whilst he is drown so that he stays down. This is imperative.

The pistol and submachine gun are the main weapons used by the CQB operator. These weapons are generally regarded by the ignorant as “dangerous” and “useless.” In the hands of a trained. CQB operator, these weapons are extremely lethal. However, for the CQB operator to maintain a high degree of professionalism, he must train continuously in an aggressive manner;

The end product of CQB training must be automatic and instantaneous killing.

The general coverage of CQB is under six headings:

a. Surprise – The operator must gain complete surprise over his opponents in all possible situations. This is achieved by good intelligence, planning, briefing, method of approach, choice of weapon for the job, choice of footwear, etc. If these principles are adhered to, they will result in the success of the operation and also ensure that the operator himself is never surprised.

b. Confidence – Successful CQB is largely a matter of confidence. Confidence in himself, the situation, and his weapon play a very big part in ensuring the success of an operator. The confident handling of his weapon makes lethal CQB shooting from almost any angle as easy as punching a drunk on the nose.

c. Concentration – Another abbreviation of close-quarter battles could well be CTK (Concentrate to Ki11). The operator shoots to kill, not hit. He must build up a clear, defined picture of every aspect of the job at hand. Nothing must distract him from his purpose of killing in a systematic fashion.

The mind does wander quite easily, but this must not be tolerated in CQB. It must be emphatically stressed upon from the moment the student starts his training. A wandering mind is usually detected in training by a fall-off, which results in and, of course, in the real thing by a vacancy for a new operator arising.

d. Speed – In CQB, contact is over in a matter of split seconds. Therefore, speed is vital, but it must be the correct type of speed. The mad. A wild, plan-less rush is not only foolish but, in most cases, catastrophic. The speed must be of a cool, unruffled, deliberate nature. Accuracy and success go naturally with this speed. The tempo of all CQB is “Careful Hurry.” This tempo must be adhered to throughout the training. Keenness and excitement are natural amongst students, but they develop at an incorrect speed. It must be stamped out from the word “Go.” The Battle-crouch, with its ensuing good, deft footwork, must be strictly adopted. An exited student will get himself into the oddest firing positions and so become off balance. The CQB Operator must never become flustered and stray from the “Careful Hurry.”

Det “A” Trooper training with German GSG9 (Author)

e. Teamwork – individual CQB operators in Special Forces are exceptional, and normal operations are carried out by small teams or patrols. Due to the close proximity and speed of the participants in CQB, the absolute essence of teamwork is of primary importance. Who goes where and when? Who kills whom and how? Synchronized timing, etc., must be spot on. A team going on an operation must be given all the time possible to study its target and plan its execution. They must rehearse time and time again, taking into account all the possibilities of target routine change. After initial CQB training, Students should be made to work in pairs, covering each other during tactical approach and withdrawal, etc. Afterward, add a third and fourth man, building up to patrol strength,

f. Offensive Attitude – In CQB, from the very start, the gloves are off. It is a simple matter of “his life, or yours.” Squeamishness, pity, remorse, or mistakes are fatal. Nothing should be done in self-defense. All actions must be of an extremely offensive nature. Operators should develop hatred and contempt for the opposition but never underestimate him.

Students should be edged into this determined and offensive spirit from the commencement of training.

RESTRICTED

About the Author

Present at the beginning of U.S. Army Special Forces’ involvement in CT operations, James Stejskal was trained in and later taught “CQB” techniques during his military service. He has written both the narrative history Special Forces Berlin and a series of Cold War espionage / special forces novels called “The Snake Eater Chronicles.” His novels, Appointment in Tehran and Direct Legacy, describe what it was like to go through SF Berlin’s and SAS CQB training in the 1970s and 1980s.

As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.

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Brandon Webb former Navy SEAL, Bestselling Author and Editor-in-Chief

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Trump Team Weighs Options, Including Airstrikes, to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program

Advisers to the president-elect, concerned economic pressure isn’t enough to contain Tehran, are considering military action

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-plan-nuclear-weapons-def26f1d?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Alexander Ward

in Washington and Laurence Norman

in Berlin

Updated Dec. 13, 2024 12:05 am ET

Iranian ballistic missiles on display during a military parade in Tehran in September. Photo: Rouzbeh Fouladi/Zuma Press

President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options for stopping Iran from being able to build a nuclear weapon, including the possibility of preventive airstrikes, a move that would break with the longstanding policy of containing Tehran with diplomacy and sanctions.

The military-strike option against nuclear facilities is now under more serious review by some members of his transition team, who are weighing the fall of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad—Tehran’s ally—in Syria, the future of U.S. troops in the region, and Israel’s decimation of regime proxy militias Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran’s weakened regional position and recent revelations of Tehran’s burgeoning nuclear work have turbocharged sensitive internal discussions, transition officials said. All deliberation on the issue, however, remains in the early stages.

Trump has told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent calls that he is concerned about an Iranian nuclear breakout on his watch, two people familiar with their conversations said, signaling he is looking for proposals to prevent that outcome. The president-elect wants plans that stop short of igniting a new war, particularly one that could pull in the U.S. military, as strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities have the potential put the U.S. and Iran on a collision course.

Iran has enough highly enriched uranium alone to build four nuclear bombs, making it the only nonnuclear-weapon country to be producing 60% near-weapons-grade fissile material. It would take just a few days to convert that stockpile into weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

A jet fighter lands on the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Arabian Gulf. Photo: U.S. Navy/Reuters

U.S. officials have previously said it could take Iran several months to field a nuclear weapon.

The president-elect’s transition team is devising what it calls a “maximum pressure 2.0” strategy against the regime, people familiar with the planning said, the sequel to his first-term approach centering on strict economic sanctions. This time, the president-elect and his aides are fleshing out military steps that could be central to its anti-Tehran campaign, though still paired with tighter financial penalties.

Two broad options have come up in discussions, including in some talks that have taken place with Trump, four people familiar with the planning said.

One path, described by two people familiar with the plan, involves augmenting military pressure by sending more U.S. forces, warplanes, and ships to the Middle East. The U.S. could also sell advanced weapons to Israel, such as bunker-busting bombs, strengthening its offensive firepower to take Iranian nuclear facilities offline.

The threat of military force, especially if paired with U.S.-imposed sanctions that manage to cripple Iran’s economy, may convince Tehran that there is no choice but to diplomatically resolve the crisis.

The alternative path is to seek to use the threat of military force, especially if paired with U.S.-imposed sanctions, to drive Tehran into accepting a diplomatic resolution. That is the strategy Trump employed with North Korea in his first term, although the diplomacy eventually faltered.

It isn’t clear which option Trump, who has talked about avoiding a third World War and brokering deals with Tehran, would choose. While Trump has insisted that he seeks to avoid massive escalation in the Middle East, he told Time in an interview published Thursday that there is a chance the U.S. could go to war with Iran, partly because Tehran plotted to assassinate him.

“Anything can happen,” he said. “It’s a very volatile situation.”

Some incoming administration officials have yet to fully weigh in on the issue, and Iran-related proposals could shift as cabinet officials get into place, classified information becomes available, and discussions are held with regional allies like Israel. Crucially, Trump rarely delves deep into details about foreign-policy matters until he is presented with finalized options and a decision needs to be made, former Trump administration officials say.

Iran’s United Nations mission didn’t respond to requests for comment. Leaders in Tehran have long denied that they seek to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The Israeli government also didn’t respond to requests for comment about whether it would pre-emptively attack Iran during the Trump administration. But in November, after holding three calls with Trump, Netanyahu said he and Trump “see eye to eye on the Iranian threat in all its components, and the danger posed by it.”

Trump weighed the idea of pre-emptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear program toward the end of his first term, former officials said, shortly after international inspectors revealed Iran’s stockpile of nuclear material had grown. But Trump, after he left office, has since disputed he ever considered military action seriously, claiming senior defense aides developed war plans and pushed him to authorize a strike.

President-elect Donald Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago estate in July. Photo: Alex Brandon/Associated Press

Trump aides and confidants supporting military options for his second term said the main idea would be to support Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities like Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, and even potentially have the U.S. participate in a joint operation. Many current and former Israeli officials say there are huge uncertainties of how successful Israel would be in mounting a solo attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, some of which are buried deep underground.

Still, some of Trump’s allies insist his first months back in office present him with the rare opportunity to counter Iran’s nuclear buildup while the regime is in a weakened position.

“If you were going to actually do something to neutralize the nuclear-weapons program, this would be it,” said Mark Dubowitz, chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who speaks regularly with top Trump aides, including some set to enter the new administration.

Should Trump reach for a serious military option, he would be breaking with recent U.S. policy, and that of his first presidency.

The Obama administration aimed to settle Iran’s nuclear rise with a multinational deal, culminating in 2015’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which temporarily constrained Tehran’s nuclear work. Trump withdrew the U.S. from that pact and mounted economic pressure on Iran in hopes it would abandon the nuclear program. President Biden sought to revive the 2015 agreement, but Iran ended up walking away, leading his administration to keep many of the Trump-era sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

Israel, meanwhile, has for years considered attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities but hasn’t done so, in part, because of U.S. caution against it. The Obama administration in 2012 warned Netanyahu off launching attacks as Iran built its nuclear program before the 2015 nuclear deal. The Biden administration has consistently said it seeks a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear advances.

Discussions of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be different this time around.

“There is strong support for Israel to take military action as they deem in their interests,” said Gabriel Noronha, who worked on Iran policy at the State Department during the first Trump administration. “Iran does not have much room to go before they hit [Israel’s] red lines, and they still seem intent on escalating further.”

Officials on Trump’s transition say they intend to enforce current sanctions and impose new ones, including redesignating the Tehran-backed Houthis in Yemen as a foreign terrorist organization and prohibiting countries that buy Iranian oil from purchasing American energy.

But more needs to be done than increased economic and financial pressure because Iran “is actively trying to kill President Trump,” a person on the transition said. “That certainly influences everybody’s thinking when it comes to what the relationship is out the gate.”

Iran has given the U.S. assurances it wouldn’t assassinate Trump in retaliation for his 2020 order to kill top Iranian paramilitary leader Qassem Soleimani. The killing of Soleimani was the most aggressive military action by the U.S. against Iran in years.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has signaled that he is open to diplomatic talks with the incoming Trump administration. Photo: Iran’s Presidency/Reuters

The incoming administration insists Tehran’s network of proxies can’t be fully countered unless Iran is starved of economic and military resources. “It’s the head of the octopus,” the transition official said. “We’re not going to solve all these issues where they are. We’re going to solve them in how we deal with Tehran.”

Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, appears to be appealing to Trump’s appetite for high-profile agreements. Pezeshkian “is ready to manage tensions with the United States” and “hopes for equal-footed negotiations regarding the nuclear deal—and potentially more,” Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice president for strategic affairs, wrote in Foreign Affairs last week.

But the diplomatic approach has its pitfalls. Iranian officials say they won’t negotiate with the U.S. under pressure, and they told European officials in Geneva last month that they wouldn’t take any unilateral steps to clip back their nuclear program.

Tehran already has enough fissile material to produce more than 12 nuclear bombs, according to a U.S. intelligence estimate released last week. Although Iran isn’t currently building a bomb, the report said, it is better prepared to do so thanks to research it has carried out in recent months.

Iranian officials have long made it clear their reaction to a strike would be to kick out U.N. inspectors and leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits Tehran to not develop nuclear weapons.

The only country that has ever done that is North Korea, which went on to covertly start producing nuclear weapons—a path Tehran has hinted it could take.

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

17. Tracking Putin’s Most Feared Secret Agency—From Inside a Russian Prison and Beyond

It is good to see Evan Gershkovich's byline again.

Excerpts:

DKRO’s officers also increasingly operate on foreign soil, recruiting spies and conducting sabotage operations in Eastern Europe. In former Soviet states, DKRO has organized kidnappings, Eastern European officials say. When foreigners cross key border points, like the Estonian Narva post where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s boundaries meet Russian soil, DKRO has local FSB officers systematically interrogate them, hoping to recruit or threaten visitors into spying on their homelands. Officers working for the unit once dashed across the border, setting off a smoke grenade then dragging an Estonian security official into Russia for use in a later trade for a Russian spy held by Estonia.

As part of Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, DKRO is sabotaging railroads and gathering intelligence on high-ranking officials, likely to prepare assassination attempts or targeted acts of violence, a Western intelligence official said. Ukrainian officials say it was Minaev himself who ordered officers to detonate two car bombs in Kyiv in 2017. The blasts killed officials from the country’s military and domestic intelligence agencies, the HUR and the SBU. Minaev was also behind an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian officials said.

But the agency’s primary focus is internal, where Russia’s growing conflict with the West has only intensified Putin’s obsession with spies. One former Russian intelligence officer described an extraordinary twist: The president at one point established a counterintelligence committee to look for collaborators among the ranks of counterintelligence agencies looking for collaborators among ordinary Russians.

DKRO has managed “to make counterintelligence the pre-eminent FSB branch,” said Andrei Soldatov, the exiled founder of investigative website Agentura.ru, “and vital for protecting the political regime.”

Tracking Putin’s Most Feared Secret Agency—From Inside a Russian Prison and Beyond

The spy unit that arrested a Wall Street Journal reporter is leading the biggest campaign of internal repression since the Stalin era

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/evan-gershkovich-russia-putin-arrests-spies-9a75e1c3?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Evan GershkovichFollow

| With Drew HinshawFollow

, Joe ParkinsonFollow

and Thomas GroveFollow

Dec. 12, 2024 9:00 pm ET

ABOARD A RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL JET—The spy at the front of the cabin drew open the curtain.

Wearing a sand-colored jacket and brown shoes, with a salt-and-pepper goatee, the man had spent the past few hours organizing the final preparations for the largest East-West prisoner swap since the Cold War. Now, as the pilots started the engines to take off for an airport in Turkey’s capital, he came out to look at the 16 prisoners he was escorting to freedom, a haul of Americans, Russians and Germans in their first hours fresh from jails and penal colonies.

Scanning the passengers, he locked his eyes squarely on one of those prisoners—me. He said nothing, staring in silence for nearly a minute. Then he turned and walked back to his curtained-off section of the presidential jet. I was left to wonder about this man at the helm of the exchange, who appeared to hold my fate in his hands.

When I was arrested by Russia’s security forces in 2023—the first foreign correspondent charged with espionage since the Cold War—I never stopped reporting. On my release I set out to identify the man who had taken me, and to learn more about the spy unit that had carried out his orders.

During my 16 months’ imprisonment, colleagues at The Wall Street Journal had been asking parallel questions.

Prisoners including Evan Gershkovich were transferred from the Lefortovo prison in Moscow to the capital’s Vnukovo airport on Aug. 1 for a flight to Turkey.

Together, we have identified the man behind the curtain as Lt. Gen. Dmitry Minaev and can now reveal a trove of fresh details about the unit that he runs: the Department for Counterintelligence Operations. Known as DKRO, it is at the very core of Putin’s opaque wartime regime. The story of how it got there reveals much about how Russia’s autocratic system became entangled in a broiling conflict with the West.

Among our findings:

DKRO has played an enormous and unreported role in plunging Russia into its biggest wave of repression since the demise of Joseph Stalin, including a purge of the Defense Ministry after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine faltered.
The department was ordered to secure the release from Germany of Vadim Krasikov, a Russian hit man convicted in the 2019 assassination of a Putin enemy in a Berlin park.
DKRO then accelerated a campaign of arresting American citizens on Russian soil, including basketball star Brittney Griner. DKRO used former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan and me as trade bait to secure the release of Krasikov.
Among DKRO’s other missions was to harass and surveil Western diplomats in Russia, even pressuring students in the U.S. Embassy high school to spy on their classmates.

Despite DKRO’s growing importance to the regime, there was almost no mention of the agency anywhere on the internet until the Journal reported last year that it was behind my arrest. It didn’t even have a Wikipedia page. Almost nobody outside of a tight circle of Russia experts and intelligence officers had ever heard of it.

The more we tugged at this simple question—who in Russia was arresting Americans?—the more we revealed the secret inner machinery that has made it possible for Putin to tighten the screws across Russia’s 11 time zones, creating what a U.N. special rapporteur on human rights called an atmosphere of political persecution “unprecedented in recent history.”

DKRO, one person familiar with the unit’s operations said, was like the axle on a car. Without it, the entire machine would cease to function.

Though it numbers only about 2,000 officers, according to U.S. and European officials, DKRO is the Kremlin’s most elite security force. It wields the power to compel hundreds of thousands of personnel across Russia into surveilling, intimidating, or arresting foreigners and the Russians it suspects of working with them. DKRO officers are generously paid, even by the standards of Russia’s powerful and sprawling Federal Security Service, or FSB, of which it is part.

They enjoy bonuses for successful operations and access to low-cost mortgages, even the best time slots at Russia’s beachside resorts. Not a single DKRO officer is known to have defected to the West, according to U.S. and European officials.

Turkish officials at the Ankara airport on Aug. 1 during the largest East-West prisoner swap since the Cold War. Photo: FSB/TASS/Zuma Press

To understand how power really flows in Putin’s security state, we tracked the unseen rise of this shadowy unit of elite spies. We spoke to Russians and Westerners targeted by DKRO, and U.S. and European security and intelligence officials and diplomats who have tried to learn its secrets. Former Russian security officials, exiles and dissidents added their own takes.

Along the way, two of my Journal colleagues were openly followed through the streets of Vienna and Washington in acts of surveillance apparently designed to intimidate. In the hours after one article was published, they were inundated with hundreds of spam emails alongside password-reset attempts. One reporter received a message through an intermediary that the FSB wanted to invite him to Moscow for questioning. The Russian foreign ministry would later label two of them as persona non grata.

At home, DKRO has ordered the arrests of hundreds of Russians accused of spying, collaborating or treason. After Putin’s invasion of Ukraine faltered, the agency largely responsible for its planning—the FSB—won an internal power struggle over who should take the blame, according to U.S. and European officials.

DKRO, along with the FSB’s military-intelligence wing, led a purge of the Defense Ministry, Western security officials said. Dozens of defense officials were accused of corruption. In a chilling historical echo, many were bundled into Lefortovo—the infamous Moscow prison where DKRO’s Stalin-era predecessors sent purged Communists and Nazi spies to be tortured and executed.

In March 2023, I was taken into the same prison by a group of FSB operatives that oversee Rosgvardia, Russia’s National Guard, known as Military Unit 3600, under DKRO’s command.

It was a unique vantage point to observe how such a small cadre of officers has managed to help turn the world’s largest country into a tightly controlled police state. The 9-by-12-foot cells of the maximum-security facility were regularly welcoming new Russian officials and accused collaborators arrested under DKRO’s supervision for spying on behalf of the West or colluding with Ukraine. So many people have been jailed there on espionage or treason cases since the start of the war that FSB officials with the First Investigative Department told me they had doubled their staffing.

It was at Lefortovo that I came to understand the power of the shadowy force that had taken away my freedom. In one of the First Investigative Department’s offices, under the watch of two portraits of Putin and a third of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet Union’s first secret police service, the chief investigator on my case explained that I had been arrested and charged as a CIA agent because DKRO had said that’s what I was. “That’s enough for me,” the investigator said.

Death to Spies

DKRO is rooted in some of the Soviet Union’s bloodiest and most ruthless traditions.

In World War II, as Nazi agents infiltrated the Soviet Union, Stalin developed an umbrella counterintelligence agency meant to catch the spies wreaking havoc behind the front lines.

The agency, named SMERSH, a Russian abbreviation for Smert’ Shpionam, or Death to Spies, developed a toolbox of tricks meant to identify the Nazi collaborators and lure them into elaborate traps where they were taken prisoner or killed.

With the war’s end, SMERSH was folded back into the secret services agency that became the KGB. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the KGB collapsed as well, split into three separate and competing agencies by President Boris Yeltsin.

Putin ran one of those agencies, the FSB, and when he became president in 2000 it emerged on top. His first FSB director, Nikolai Patrushev, came to see Russia as a fortress besieged by the West and elevated DKRO’s role in monitoring visiting American businesspeople and diplomats, according to a former chief of a European intelligence agency.

Visiting the FSB’s Lubyanka headquarters to address its board each spring, there is one data point Putin almost always reads aloud: the number of spies captured over the preceding 12 months. The statistic carries a thinly veiled imperative, that next year’s number should surpass the last.

In 2011, Russian security forces said they caught 199 individuals spying on behalf of the Kremlin’s adversaries. By 2020: 495. At least 53 Russians were known to have been convicted of treason in the first eight months of this year alone, compared with just four in 2018. They include Ksenia Karelina, a Russian-American spa receptionist and ballerina from Los Angeles, sentenced to 12 years in August for donating $51.80 to a charity supporting Ukraine.

“Because foreigners are now enemies, we always have to catch them,” said Mikhail Kasyanov, prime minister during Putin’s first term and now an opposition figure, in an interview. “Or make them up.”

Neither the Kremlin nor the FSB responded to requests for comment.

Not long ago, policing economic crimes, not quashing dissent, paved the path to power for an officer in Russia’s FSB. Officers could extort contracts or business deals by opening a spurious investigation. At one point before the war, the FSB was probing one in six Russian businessmen.

Today, espionage and treason cases are the most valuable currency for ambitious FSB officers. The spy agency’s alumni so dominate Russia’s elite that some 80% of Putin’s top-level officials are current or former members of the security forces, including the FSB.

In the final years of the Soviet Union, the comparable number was just 3%, according to sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya.

The headquarters of Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB, in central Moscow. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty images

As the war supercharged the presidential appetite for spies and traitors—real or imagined—the job of satisfying it fell to DKRO. Putin’s invasion gave DKRO an “entirely new raison d’etre…catching spies at home and going head-to-head with U.S. intelligence in Ukraine,” said Boris Volodarsky, a former Russian military-intelligence officer who is now a fellow at London’s Royal Historical Society.

DKRO isn’t the only agency on the hunt: As the war in Ukraine rumbles on, institutions of all sizes are expected to report suspicions upward. Like a stage manager behind the curtain, DKRO’s role is to design and orchestrate operations yet rarely be seen. To do this, it borrows top officers from other FSB departments for specific tasks, then rotates them out.

“Once the team is assembled they’re given carte blanche,” said a Russian former counterintelligence officer, who worked in a different agency. “They have access to technology, they might have technology support staff, and they’ll have whatever cover they need.”

DKRO leaders also enjoy rare access to Putin himself. One of the few Russian officials privileged enough to play ice hockey with the president is the head of the FSB’s first service, which oversees DKRO, Lt. Gen. Vladislav Menschikov. He personally briefed Putin before and after my arrest, the Journal reported while I was incarcerated. Barely known outside a small circle of Russia analysts, the spy chief previously ran the presidential directorate responsible for Russia’s nuclear bunkers.

His subordinate, who runs DKRO itself—the goateed Lt. Gen Minaev—has a hands-on role in selecting which Americans to arrest, and which Russians to trade them for. Awarded the prestigious Hero of Russia medal for bravery during Russia’s war in Chechnya, he is described by intelligence chiefs who have met him as frighteningly perceptive. “He understands everything about his environment—everything,” said one Western officer who has met him several times. “He knows immediately who is a shark and who is a pussy.”

Minaev usually stays in the shadows, but he was present from the beginning to the end of the Aug. 1 swap. I first saw him when I was escorted from the Lefortovo prison onto a gray coach with other prisoners on the morning of the exchange. At 10:30 a.m., Minaev climbed aboard and stood at the front, resting his arms on the backs of two seats on either side of the aisle. He was a representative of the FSB, he announced, and we prisoners were gathered for an exchange. He didn’t give his name.

The longtime intelligence officer who accompanied him was formerly head of the DKRO subdivision that tracks foreign journalists, its “Tenth Department.” Sergei Latkov now works for Putin at the presidential administration, according to flight manifests seen by the Journal.

Sergei Latkov and Vadim Krasikov arrive in Moscow after the prisoner swap on Aug. 1. Photo: Mikhail Voskresensky/tass/Zuma Press

Latkov was the first Russian official Putin welcomed when the presidential jet returned to Moscow, carrying the Russian prisoners the West freed in exchange: a collection of deep-cover spies, hackers, and a hit man.

On the day of the swap, the Russian dissident hacking group Black Mirror, which sells data about Russian officials, posted on its Telegram channel a purported photo featuring Latkov and Alexei Komkov, the former head of DKRO who now runs the FSB’s foreign-intelligence wing, playing billiards. The tableau was reminiscent of a scene from a Soviet action movie, “The Elusive Avengers,” with the spies posing as the bad guys. Black Mirror also posted a still from that scene, under the tagline: “The Game.”

The hacking group Black Mirror posted on its Telegram channel a purported photo featuring DKRO officials and others, bottom, posing in a scene reminiscent of a Soviet-era film, top.

U.S. officials blame DKRO for a string of strange incidents that blurred the lines between spycraft and harassment, including the mysterious death of a U.S. diplomat’s dog, the trailing of an ambassador’s young children and flat tires on embassy vehicles.

In 2020, a DKRO officer told a local student at the U.S. Embassy school in Moscow, popular among the capital’s foreign diplomatic corps, that his mother had been detained and would be released only if the student started hanging out with those named on a list of diplomats’ children, and reported on their families’ hobbies and vacation plans. Russian authorities later ordered the school closed.

There is another set of visitors the unit has taken a keen interest in: middle-aged American men with military or defense-contracting careers, flying in to be with younger Russian women, or occasionally men, they’ve met online or through dating apps. Several months before Putin invaded Ukraine, America’s Moscow embassy sent a memo to Washington warning that the number of Russian women requesting K-1 fiancée visas to marry American men with security clearances was statistically improbable.

The German Foreign Ministry in March cautioned its nationals visiting Russia to “be careful with Tinder, Hinge, Bumble and the like,” noting that “Russia is currently not the best travel destination for a first date with an online flirt.”

DKRO’s officers also increasingly operate on foreign soil, recruiting spies and conducting sabotage operations in Eastern Europe. In former Soviet states, DKRO has organized kidnappings, Eastern European officials say. When foreigners cross key border points, like the Estonian Narva post where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s boundaries meet Russian soil, DKRO has local FSB officers systematically interrogate them, hoping to recruit or threaten visitors into spying on their homelands. Officers working for the unit once dashed across the border, setting off a smoke grenade then dragging an Estonian security official into Russia for use in a later trade for a Russian spy held by Estonia.

As part of Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, DKRO is sabotaging railroads and gathering intelligence on high-ranking officials, likely to prepare assassination attempts or targeted acts of violence, a Western intelligence official said. Ukrainian officials say it was Minaev himself who ordered officers to detonate two car bombs in Kyiv in 2017. The blasts killed officials from the country’s military and domestic intelligence agencies, the HUR and the SBU. Minaev was also behind an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian officials said.

But the agency’s primary focus is internal, where Russia’s growing conflict with the West has only intensified Putin’s obsession with spies. One former Russian intelligence officer described an extraordinary twist: The president at one point established a counterintelligence committee to look for collaborators among the ranks of counterintelligence agencies looking for collaborators among ordinary Russians.

DKRO has managed “to make counterintelligence the pre-eminent FSB branch,” said Andrei Soldatov, the exiled founder of investigative website Agentura.ru, “and vital for protecting the political regime.”

Bojan Pancevski contributed to this article.

Write to Evan Gershkovich at evan.gershkovich@wsj.com, Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com, Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com and Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

18. Lawmakers wonder: why don't we hack back against China?

Or the question might be why don't we acknowledge that we are hacking back? Who can say we are not doing so? And some lawmakers should be read into our cyber activities so lawmakers should not have to ask these questions.

Lawmakers wonder: why don't we hack back against China?

One senator said his colleagues often ask national-security officials why American cyber forces don’t go on the attack more often.

defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta

The intrusion of Chinese-backed hackers into telecommunications systems in the U.S. and around the world drew questions in a Wednesday Senate hearing about whether American cyber warriors should be further authorized to digitally retaliate against their adversaries in the East.

“On cyber, we are so much on defense,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, told Nextgov/FCW. Sullivan said that in classified briefings about the hacking collective dubbed Salt Typhoon, “it’s very bipartisan where senators say, ‘OK, wait. I understand why we’re trying to defend against this…but what are we doing to raise the level of deterrence?’

“This Salt Typhoon fiasco"—in which some 80 telecom providers and their wiretap-request systems were breached—"it’s gotta take a suite of policies [to fix it]. But one in my view that’s missing is that nobody fears us. We’re like the cyber punching bag of the world, and we need to change that,” Sullivan said.

On Wednesday, witnesses with backgrounds in national security and cyber policy told Senate Commerce Committee lawmakers that an offensive deterrence strategy — the act of hitting back at enemy hackers to disrupt their systems — would make China think twice about spelunking into communications networks and other critical U.S. infrastructure.

“It isn’t a capabilities discussion,” said James Mulvenon, a Chinese cyber-espionage expert and chief intelligence officer at Pamir, which advises clients about investing in China. “It is absolutely a political-will and National-Command-Authority decision-making discussion.”

The U.S. can “take action to interrupt [cyber] operations” of foreign adversaries, said Justin Sherman, who leads Global Cyber Strategies, a tech policy and geopolitics advisory firm.

The FBI’s cyber division has launched several operations this year to pulverize digital infrastructure used by nation-state hacking groups to break into U.S. networks. In January, it disabled a nexus of devices used by Volt Typhoon, another well-storied Beijing-backed hacking group. It also took several actions against Russian operatives spreading disinformation in the months leading up to November’s presidential election.

But those moves, at this point, have served more of a defensive strategy, said Sherman. “Did that stop them from getting back up? Definitely not.”

James Lewis, head of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said an offensive blueprint will require diplomatic warnings, too.

“You need to start by telling the Chinese: This is unacceptable, you’ve gone too far and if you don’t stop we’re going to take action now.”

“The next step is to actually do something,” added Lewis, a former United Nations information security advisor who helped craft the Wassenaar Arrangement that oversees some 40 nations’ exports of technology and security tools. From there, U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency could develop a “menu of responses” to rip apart digital infrastructure used by China to launch their cyberattacks, he said.

Cyber Command deployed its digital force in “hunt forward” missions 22 times to 17 countries in 2023. The missions seek to root out hackers and slow adversaries’ cyber operations while gaining important defensive insights for future cyberwar.

But that dynamic could change during the next administration. Trump transition advisors are crafting a plan to split the leadership of both entities, The Record reported Wednesday, citing people familiar with the discussions. Cyber Command and NSA are currently managed in a dual-hat role by Gen. Timothy Haugh and are both based in Fort Meade, Maryland.

Defense strategies aren’t useless. Lawmakers have touted the addition of a $3 billion investment that closes a financial shortfall in a Federal Communications Commission program to help rural broadband providers rip out and replace Chinese-made internet equipment.

The funding was slotted into the must-pass national defense bill, which advanced out of the House Wednesday evening.

“Everybody knows [rip and replace] has to be done. The little guys just don’t have money for it,” Roger Entner, a telecom industry analyst and founder of Recon Analytics, said in a phone interview. “What’s really interesting is that some of the big guys got infected through the small guys,” he said, referring to Salt Typhoon. “This is a clear and present danger.”

FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel last week shared a draft ruling with colleagues that, if adopted, would immediately require telecommunications firms to secure their networks against unauthorized access to systems that house wiretap requests from law enforcement.

The United States wiretap environment is governed by the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, and requires telecom carriers to engineer their system for “legal access” surveillance requests. Salt Typhoon moved through the systems of at least two victims before pivoting to their respective CALEA environments, a senior FBI official said last week.

Under current standards, the FCC lets carriers develop their own wiretap solutions tailored to their networks, purchase solutions from equipment manufacturers and rely on a third party to determine whether they are CALEA-compliant.

“Public telecom networks are primarily designed around reachability, which means security trade-offs often take place and can leave you inherently vulnerable,” Blackberry VP of Secure Communications David Wiseman said in a statement. “No doubt, telco and internet providers globally will be assessing vulnerable entry points and legacy systems comprehensively in an effort to boost resilience against espionage efforts.”

Amid the breaches, officials have suggested Americans and federal employees use encrypted messaging services. A phishing campaign that piggybacked on those encrypted messaging advisories has targeted lawmakers on Capitol Hill, Nextgov/FCW reported last week.

The hacking collective has likely accessed communications of some 150 select, high-value political targets, including people affiliated with President-elect Donald Trump, according to previous media reports. Last week, a senior administration official said that the campaign may have started a year or two ago and that eight or so of the victims are American telecom firms.

“Clearly, it’s very serious and something we have to address, but it’s gonna take time,” Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, told Nextgov/FCW.

“I imagine we’ll see some ideas come together where both [offensive and defensive] tools are going to be put together in some form and fashion that will strengthen the policies here in the United States and send a clear message to anyone thinking about doing this in the future,” Sen. Ben Ray Luján, D-N.M., told Nextgov/FCW after Wednesday’s hearing.

defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta

19. The defense policy bill is handing the Army a to-do list

The defense policy bill is handing the Army a to-do list

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

A soldier takes aim at the rifle zeroing range at Ft. Eisenhower, Georgia. U.S. Army / Lt. Col. Eric Young

Add anti-drone systems, make robotic targets, pick a point PEO for open source software—and more in the 2025 NDAA.

December 12, 2024 05:45 PM ET

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

The Army would upgrade its tech to protect troops downrange and improve training at home, and may put its efforts to procure open-source intelligence tools under a program executive office under proposals in the compromise version of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act.

The House passed its version of the bill, which lays out where the military will spend its funding, on Wednesday.

Here are some of the items Congress has placed on the Army’s to-do list:

Designate one of the service’s existing program executive offices to oversee the acquisition of open-source intelligence tools—programs that scour the internet, and the deep web, for content that could provide insights to Army missions. The provision in the bill allows but does not mandate the redesignation.
Buy more air defense systems to shoot down the types of low, slow-flying drones deployed by Iran-backed militias that attacked U.S. troops in the Middle East in record numbers over the past year. The plan is due to the House and Senate Armed Services committees by Sept. 30.
Create a pilot program, dubbed the ‘‘Lethality and Warfighting Enhancement Program,” in which the Army would select Army Reserve and National Guard infantry units on at least three posts to incorporate robotic targets on live-fire small arms ranges. The targets can move across a range on their own, simulating close combat, and collect data on shots taken. The service would have six months to get the pilot off the ground, with a requirement to run it for five years and then report back to the armed services committees on its effectiveness.
Install anti-lock brakes and stability-control systems in all of its Humvees. The service has awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts to Ricardo Systems, dating back to 2021, to develop and install safety upgrade kits at Red River Army Depot, Texas. The Army will have 90 days to deliver a report detailing how to speed up the production and installation of the kits and solutions for any associated challenges, a funding plan for the undertaking, and a plan to potentially open a second depot for the retrofits.

The Senate is expected to vote on this latest version in the coming days, paving the way for President Joe Biden to sign the bill into law before the new year.

20. Syrian rebels offer to help US search for journalist Austin Tice

Syrian rebels offer to help US search for journalist Austin Tice

Stars and Stripes · by Ellen Nakashima · December 12, 2024

Marc Tice, left, and Debra Tice, the parents of Austin Tice, a journalist who was kidnapped in Syria, update the media about their son’s condition as they continue to push for his release, Friday, Dec. 6, 2024, during a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington. (Jacquelyn Martin/AP)

The rebel group that now runs Syria’s government offered on Thursday to “cooperate directly” with the United States to search for missing American journalist Austin Tice, a move that analysts said could hasten efforts to learn his whereabouts, or whether he is living or dead.

The overture to Washington from the political wing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, known by its initials, HTS, was made publicly on the messaging app Telegram. Its statement indicated the group was already engaged, calling the search for Tice “ongoing.”

The development was welcomed by the Tice family, who have grown frustrated with the Biden administration and what they see as its inadequate action to this point. “We’re obviously pleased with anyone that’s making a concerted effort,” Marc Tice, Austin’s Tice’s father, told The Washington Post on Thursday. “I would be hopeful that the U.S. government would accept that offer.”

Thus far, the Biden administration has been communicating indirectly with the rebel group, through Turkey. It declined to comment on whether Thursday’s outreach from HTS would change that. The United States considers the organization, once affiliated with al-Qaeda, a terrorist group.

For now, the administration is refraining from deploying U.S. personnel to aid the search in Syria for Tice, who was abducted 12 years ago outside Damascus while reporting on Syria’s civil war.

“There’s a high bar to sending U.S. personnel into potentially dangerous situations where they could face harm,” a senior administration official said in a statement to The Post earlier this week. “In this case, we unfortunately do not have any verifiable information about where Austin Tice is.”

If Tice, a Marine Corps veteran who was 31 years old at the time of his disappearance, is alive and still in a facility in Syria, “HTS is probably the best positioned on the ground to confirm this,” said Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robert Ford, the last U.S. ambassador to Syria before the embassy was shuttered in 2012 and who urged the government then to designate the group as a terrorist organization, said HTS “appears to have evolved.” He urged the Biden administration to at least engage with the group’s leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. “I don’t know if he’s credible,” said Ford, now a fellow at the Middle East Institute. “But you have to press to test.”

President Joe Biden and other administration officials have sought to project optimism that Tice will be located, saying the fall of Syria’s longtime dictator, Bashar al-Assad, presents an opportunity to collect and assess leads. “We are talking through the Turks and others, to people on the ground in Syria to say: ‘Help us with this. Help us get Austin Tice home,’” national security adviser Jake Sullivan said earlier this week on “Good Morning America.”

Yet privately, many officials in Washington have taken a more sober view, noting there is no confirmed evidence he is alive or dead. The CIA’s “low confidence” assessment that Tice is living, officials said, is underpinned by the absence of intelligence showing otherwise.

“We’re hopeful,” said one U.S. official. “But there’s been no proof of life in a long time.”

Tice was abducted in August 2012. Weeks later, video emerged showing him blindfolded, being led through rugged terrain by armed men in white robes. That 47-second clip, in which Tice can be heard uttering “Oh Jesus,” was the last direct indication he was living, officials say.

Tice wrote for The Post, McClatchy newspapers and other U.S.-based media outlets before his disappearance. A gritty and determined journalist, he was committed to telling the story of Syrian civilians caught up in the conflict, colleagues have said.

Last week, Tice’s parents and six siblings held a news conference in Washington after meetings at the White House and State Department, talks that Marc Tice characterized to reporters as “complaints and finger pointing about who is preventing things from happening, and who’s responsible for doing what.”

“We’ve seen what real commitment looks like,” he said during the news conference, alluding to recent prisoner swaps with Russia, China and Hamas fighters in Gaza that have seen U.S. captives go free. “We’ve yet to see it for Austin Tice.”

Prisoner swaps are more challenging, U.S. officials say privately, when the government the United States believes to be holding an American citizen does not acknowledge doing so, as in the case of Tice.

American journalists, including from The Post, traveled this week to Damascus to report on the release of thousands of detainees from prisons where the Assad regime held and tortured dissidents and other political prisoners. A Post team visited the notorious Sednaya prison, where executions were so commonplace that it became known to Syrians as the “slaughterhouse.”

The Tice family is working with the American group, Hostage Aid Worldwide, which specializes in trying to find and win the release of individuals unlawfully detained overseas. Its president, Nizar Zakka, a dual Lebanese-American citizen, has arrived in Damascus, and is coordinating with nongovernmental groups in Syria as well as Lebanese officials who might have leads about Tice.

It was Zakka and his group who on Thursday were among the first to encounter Travis Timmerman, an American who told reporters in Syria that he had been freed after spending seven months in Sednaya prison. Zakka said he sent video of Timmerman to his contacts in the FBI to help verify his identity.

“It was crazy,” Zakka said in an interview, “because we were looking for Austin and we found another guy. I was so surprised.” Lebanon’s intelligence chief, Abbas Ibrahim, told The Post on Thursday that his main interlocutor in the regime regarding Tice was Ali Mamlouk, who was a top intelligence officer and aide to Assad. Mamlouk has disappeared in the wake of Assad’s ouster, but “could help if he is found,” Ibrahim said.

Assad fled over the weekend to Russia, where he has obtained asylum.

Over the years, U.S. officials have gathered a number of unconfirmed intelligence reports about Tice’s status. In March 2022, according to one such report, a senior Syrian opposition leader stated that Tice had been in a Damascus prison since July 2021, said one person familiar with the unconfirmed intelligence.

A British newspaper, the Times, reported Wednesday that a Syrian journalist, Saher al-Ahmad, who was imprisoned by the Assad regime said in an interview that he believes he was held in the same Damascus jail as Tice as recently as 2022. Ahmad was released that year and has since moved to the United Arab Emirates. He told the Times that, after his release, he sought to contact the American Embassy in Dubai via Instagram, hoping to share the information, but that officials there never responded.

There have been more than a dozen other reports this year alone, including some that indicate Tice was held variously in an Iranian-controlled prison, and in a Hezbollah facility, this person said. Hezbollah is a militant group based in Lebanon that is closely aligned with Tehran. As recently as this week, there was fresh information suggesting Tice might be at Damascus facility formerly controlled by Syrian military intelligence, the person said.

The State Department is offering a reward of $10 million, and the FBI $1 million, for information that leads to Tice’s safe return. Speaking to reporters earlier this week, White House spokesman John Kirby said that if the U.S. government develops credible leads on Tice’s location, that could “give us options” for how to retrieve him.

Suzan Haidamous and Loveday Morris in Damascus, Syria, and Mohamad el Chamaa in Beirut contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by Ellen Nakashima · December 12, 2024

21. Micromanaging Foreign Nations: A Bipartisan Syndrome

Conclusion:

The world matters to America. Yet U.S. officials shouldn’t assume that they can forever rule the rest of the world. Some issues really aren’t Washington’s business. If Donald Trump really wants to make America great again, he should halt its promiscuous interference in other nations’ affairs. Absent exceptional circumstances, the U.S. should leave them alone to govern themselves.

Micromanaging Foreign Nations: A Bipartisan Syndrome

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · December 12, 2024

If one thing is certain, there will be more uncertainty abroad. Yet most Washington officials believe their job is to manage the world, even the least minutiae involving other states. And the rest of the world’s job is to obey them. At a time of multiplying wars, U.S. policymakers continue to waste time, resources, and credibility on issues that are frankly none of America’s business.

Consider Georgia in the Caucasus. It had the misfortune in 2008 to be ruled by Mikheil Saakashvili, who triggered an invasion by recklessly bombarding Russian troops, apparently expecting the American cavalry to race to his rescue. Even the war-happy President George W. Bush, however, wasn’t prepared to confront Moscow.

Today a new government is in power in Tbilisi. Derided as pro-Russian, it has won several elections and appears to be carefully balancing Moscow and Brussels, a far smarter approach. Yet it has been under siege of late. Claims of electoral fraud have been leveled without proof. Charges of excessive force against demonstrators are better grounded, although protestors also were violent. Another issue is the European Union, which younger Georgians are impatient for their country to join.

None of this should matter much to Washington. Georgia is not a security interest for America. It has no notable economic, cultural, or historic connection to the U.S. Yet Washington joined Europe in funding groups backing Georgia’s entry into the EU. The Biden administration then was outraged when the Tbilisi government targeted foreign funding for domestic organizations, the sort of political interference that Washington politicians ritualistically criticize in the U.S. Indeed, the Georgian legislation looks like America’s broad Foreign Agent Registration Act. Rather than taking this as a sign of flattery, Washington suspended financial aid to Tbilisi, its position apparently that the U.S. is entitled to make secret contributions to influence other nations’ politics.

More recently, Georgia’s prime minister said that he was suspending discussions involving EU membership. Protests erupted. Last month the administration issued a statement, citing alleged threats to the freedom to protest, while calling on “all sides to ensure protests remain peaceful” (emphasis added), a tacit admission that protestors also had been at fault. Yet the State Department led with criticism of “the decision by Georgian Dream [administration] to suspend Georgia’s EU accession process” and concluded by reiterating “our call to the Georgian government to return to its Euro-Atlantic path.” The U.S., a great power a continent and an ocean away, was telling another Russian neighbor that it should ignore Moscow’s sensitivities and go all in with the West—even though the U.S. refused to intervene militarily on Tbilisi’s behalf in 2008 and, as demonstrated in Ukraine, would not do so today in the event of conflict.

The International Criminal Court indictment of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant also brought out the worst in some U.S. policymakers. Washington’s job should be to protect its own, but instead President Joe Biden defended Israel turning Gaza into a human abattoir: “The ICC issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli leaders is outrageous.… We will always stand with Israel against threats to its security,” obviously irrespective of the human cost.

Legislators, especially Republicans, responded with hysteria. For instance, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a friend of tyrants like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, urged legislation to sanction the institution and its officials. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AK) invoked existing authority to employ “all means necessary and appropriate,” meaning military action, to free ICC prisoners. Curiously, the strongest advocates of Israel’s deadly campaign never say anything about Americans killed by the Israeli military. Rep. Michael Waltz (R-FL), slated to be national security advisor, wants the incoming Trump administration to take up the cause of Israel’s accused war criminals, announcing ominously, “You can expect a strong response to the antisemitic bias of the ICC [and] UN come January.”

Unfortunately, President-elect Donald Trump already has threatened economic war on much of the world. In this case, he is angry that the dollar’s share of international reserves has fallen, to 59 percent from 70 percent in 2000. That reflects the rise of a major alternative, the euro, as well as Washington’s ostentatious misuse of its position by sanctioning individuals, companies, and nations here, there, and everywhere.

Countries are increasingly trading in their own currencies. For instance, Moscow and New Delhi are exploring a shift to ruble–rupee payments. Reserve Bank of India Governor Shaktikanta Das explained, “Dependence on one currency can be problematic at times because of appreciation or depreciation.” Even more dramatic is the steady expansion of the BRICS grouping, which includes not only China and Russia, but also India, Brazil, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. The organization also has added partner countries including Malaysia, Turkey, Nigeria, and Vietnam. Some members would like to create an alternative currency, but today that remains far from a reality.

Other nations’ currency choices aren’t America’s business. They have every right to trade in whatever money they desire. Consider the dire consequences of past economic crises—such as in Asia in 1997, which swept up the American ally South Korea. Moreover, most trading and payment decisions are made by individuals and companies, not governments. America enjoys the benefits of dollar dominance, but is not entitled to it, especially when Washington abuses its influence to advance often dubious political ends.

Yet that’s not how Trump sees it. With characteristic bravado, he wrote on Truth Social, “The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar while we stand by and watch is OVER.”

He went on to declare, “We require a commitment from these Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or, they will face 100% Tariffs, and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. Economy.”

This threat is both foolish and stupid. First, the presumed problem is largely one of Washington’s own making. By sanctioning the rest of the world, American officials have pushed adversaries and friends alike to insulate their economies. As Russian President Vladimir Putin observed: “We are not refusing, not fighting the dollar, but if they don't let us work with it, what can we do? We then have to look for other alternatives, which is happening.” If the U.S. slipped behind economically, would Trump leave the American people vulnerable to its adversaries?

Second, by threatening to promiscuously impose tariffs on just about everyone for everything, Trump is undermining his credibility and reducing his leverage. Several nations, such as Russia, are already under harsh sanctions. Moreover, he wants to impose general tariff hikes, as well as hit specific adversaries, such as China, for other reasons. Once Washington has effectively cut a country off from the U.S. economy, he can threaten it no more.

Third, Americans would pay the price of moving toward de facto autarky. Trump appears to believe that wealth comes from endlessly piling up little pieces of paper from other nations, without buying anything in return. Other nations prefer to have the products and services. Trump’s plan would increase prices for U.S. consumers, especially after foreign nations retaliated. Among the victims would be American exporters: More than a quarter of imports to America are raw materials or “intermediate goods,” used in producing products sold abroad. US exports would become less competitive.

The economist Dean Baker of the Center for Policy and Economic Research, reviewed just the cost of closing the American market to China alone. He concluded: “The picture looks much worse from the U.S. standpoint. We will be paying substantially more for the $430 billion in goods that we had been buying from China. It would be necessary to look at possible substitutes for these imports on a sector-by-sector basis, but let’s say on average that the additional cost for the replacement is 40 percent of the price of the goods from China. In that case, we would be paying an extra $170 billion a year, roughly $1,400 per family, to cover the additional cost.” Ban goods from all of the BRICS nations, and the cost would be even higher.

Fourth, there also would be a geopolitical price. Other nations can move away from the dollar without attacking it. Marina Moreno, with Argentina’s Observa China, pointed out: “Even if [BRICS members] do not succeed in dethroning the dollar, it is certainly possible that they will be able to bypass it through payment systems that favor the clearing of transactions in local currencies.” Most trade is private. Would Trump sanction entire countries in an attempt to coerce every entrepreneur and firm around the world into using dollars?

Moreover, American market power is not so great as Trump apparently presumes. Explained the Financial Times’ Alan Beattie,

With the exception of a few economies highly integrated with the U.S. such as Mexico and Canada, most of those likely to face U.S. tariff coercion could replace it as a final market with pain but without catastrophe. [Global Trade Alert’s Simon J.] Evenett calculates that even if the U.S. market were completely closed to a particular trading partner, by 2030 more than 100 of them, including Australia, China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, India and Germany, would have recovered their lost exports elsewhere.

By one estimate, even if China, Trump’s main target, lost the entire U.S. market, it would see just a 2.3 percent drop in demand in its economy. Trump’s earlier China tariffs demonstrated the flexibility of international markets. Noted Beattie, “Quite apart from the loopholes negotiated by U.S. companies such as Apple, production and distribution networks proved good at slinking around blocks on exports.” In short, for most countries loss of the American market would be a painful rather than a killing blow. They might—indeed, probably would—prefer to pay that price rather than be forever at the mercy of an arbitrary power willing to destroy friends and adversaries alike to enforce its every whim. If even a handful of states initially said no and withstood the consequences, Washington’s economic weapon would prove hollow.

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Indeed, almost whatever the cost, rising nationalist powers would not be inclined to prostrate themselves before Washington. If they refused to comply and the U.S. punished them, they would likely move toward America’s potential adversaries. For instance, Washington desperately wants India as a counterweight to China. Waging economic war on the Indian people would encourage New Delhi to more tightly embrace Moscow and reconcile with Beijing. Other nations throughout Asia also could move toward China economically.

Finally, even if Trump’s threat bolstered the dollar in the short-term it would likely accelerate the long-term shift away from the dollar. There is serious interest in dedollarization today because the U.S. so flagrantly misuses its economic influence. Threatening to bring down the economic temple highlights the imperative of shifting way from America economically and likely will reinforce other nations’ determination to do so. Eswar Prasad, formerly with the IMF, predicted, “This will intensify other countries’ attempts to diversify away from use of the dollar for international payments and for foreign exchange reserves.” Indeed, Trump may inadvertently encourage otherwise disparate countries to cooperate against America, in this and other areas as well.

The world matters to America. Yet U.S. officials shouldn’t assume that they can forever rule the rest of the world. Some issues really aren’t Washington’s business. If Donald Trump really wants to make America great again, he should halt its promiscuous interference in other nations’ affairs. Absent exceptional circumstances, the U.S. should leave them alone to govern themselves.

About The Author

Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · December 12, 2024

22. Beyond Rhetoric: Passing the Afghan Adjustment Act

Excerpts:

Three years after the collapse of the Afghan government and the withdrawal of its international partners, Afghanistan remains inhospitable for many. Humanitarian protections are nonexistent, especially for those who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. If ANASOC veterans returned to Afghanistan, their lives would be in certain danger. Verified reports indicate that the Taliban regime continues a campaign to hunt down and punish our partners. Those who escaped to the U.S. were forced to make impossible decisions about leaving their families, homes, and the country they fought for behind.

Some may worry that providing SIV pathways to ANASOC veterans incentivizes future partners searching for migration pathways. However, the AAA is explicitly for those “who supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan”, and takes care to outline eligible groups. The convoluted path of joining a foreign military to possibly immigrate to the U.S. offers a slim chance at success, with the opportunity historically reserved for extreme circumstances. Also, there are pathways to the U.S. beyond joining a partner military, including joining the U.S. military as a legal immigrant. The extreme circumstances of a Taliban takeover, government and military collapse, and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan present a situation necessitating SIV pathways for ANASOC veterans.

Unfortunately, these at-risk partners remain uncertain of their immigration outcomes and ability to stay in the U.S. under legal protections, and thus cannot pursue their new lives fully. ANASOC veterans have clear ties to the U.S. and have earned an SIV pathway similar to Afghan translators. The Afghan Adjustment Act is the answer. The legislation will die at the end of this Congress, time is running short, and we must act now to honor our promise to our Afghan Special Operations partners.

Beyond Rhetoric: Passing the Afghan Adjustment Act

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/13/beyond-rhetoric-passing-the-afghan-adjustment-act/

by Luke Magyar

12.13.2024 at 06:00am

Introduction

The time to support our Afghan Special Forces partners through legislation and affirm their pathways to long-term stability in the U.S. is well overdue. Three years after Afghanistan’s collapse and the chaotic 2021 evacuation, Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) veterans in the U.S. remain in immigration limbo. Those in the U.S. have lived under the uncertainty of a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for three years. Those who could not escape remain trapped in Afghanistan, vulnerable to exploitation by other countries, or forced to attempt harrowing journeys to the U.S. border. In a period of renewed great power competition (GPC) and geopolitical instability, international security partnerships and the ability to leverage regional, cultural, and tactical expertise are crucial elements of effective American national security policy. ANASOC veterans provide an invaluable recruiting pool with proven abilities to perform at high levels in challenging tactical environments alongside U.S. military forces. The U.S. has so far failed to capitalize on the opportunity ANASOC veterans present: well-trained, vetted, and driven military partners with intimate knowledge of the geography and customs of Southwest Asia, and as a means through which to signal strategic competitors and existing and potential allies of America’s steadfast commitment to its security partners. Establishing a clear path to Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) eligibility through passing the Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA) benefits U.S. national security and a deserving partner.

ANASOC and The Afghan Adjustment Act

ANASOC veterans were a key NATO partner in Afghanistan, operating alongside U.S. and NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) for over a decade in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Founded in 2012 and fashioned after U.S. Special Operations units, ANASOC veterans were committed to rebuilding and protecting their country. As one soldier put it in an interview with the Corioli Institute, “I was doing it for a purpose…for my own people, for my own nation, for my own values, for the democracy that was helping us…”. ANASOC units were capable forces in their own right, at times conducting the majority of Afghan military missions and performing some of the most dangerous operations despite their small size relative to the whole force. ANASOC’s responsibilities included conducting “precision short-duration military special operations” including “direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, and counter-insurgency tasks” and “precision, short-duration military special operations beyond the range, scope, and capability of conventional ANA units.” In many locations, ANASOC units were the last Afghan forces fighting off the Taliban advance. After thousands of American and Afghan lives were lost across conventional and special operations forces, billions of dollars were spent, and nearly a decade of partnership with ANASOC, our partners were left to battle their way through the country they defended for a chance at evacuation. The few who made it to the U.S. have still not found lasting safety and remain burdened with uncertain immigration futures for three years and counting.

The Afghan Adjustment Act is a bipartisan bill that would make ANASOC veterans and other vetted Afghan military veterans eligible for SIVs if they receive a recommendation from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD review and recommendation process includes a review of the ANASOC service record and DOD data holdings, including biometric and fingerprint records, to confirm identities and identify any derogatory information, such as misrepresented service records or ties to illicit organizations. This process is meant to calm some congressional concerns regarding the standard of vetting and the potential to abuse the system. The bill currently remains stagnant in the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it has sat untouched for fifteen months. Though the bill has seventeen bipartisan co-sponsors, some Senators have voiced concerns about its “lack of parole reform” and “protections for Afghans…who did not work with U.S. forces”, as well as the “potential for abuse of virtually unlimited and unvetted family migration.” Though some challenges are legitimate, the bill does not provide for overall reform of humanitarian parole or temporary protected status, the concerns about abuse and overuse should be negated by the vetting process. Additionally, the bill explicitly lays out who is eligible to apply, cutting off instances of abuse. More recently, efforts to tie portions of the bill to border reform and security supplementals have fallen short. As we enter the 119th Congress, the bill must be reintroduced to the legislative process, and the likelihood of our ANASOC partners promptly achieving long-term safety and stability continues to dwindle. SIV status would ensure our Afghan partners, who sacrificed for their country and ours, are protected from deportation or the elimination of their temporary protected status. Additionally, this status would enable ANASOC veterans, many of whom expressed their desire to join the U.S. military during interviews with the Corioli Institute, facilitated by Honor the Promise, to pursue further military service if they choose. The U.S. spent over $2.3 trillion on the war in Afghanistan; comparatively, the AAA is a fiscally minuscule commitment to our deserving partners. Timely approval and implementation of the AAA honors America’s promise to our Afghan partners to stand by them “just as they stood with us.” In passing the AAA into law, America also demonstrates our unbending commitment to support global security partners beyond rhetorical assurances once a conflict ends.

National Security Imperative

The US National Security Strategy, published by the Biden administration in 2022, highlights the importance of building and maintaining U.S. security alliances and partnerships, claiming they are “our most important strategic asset”. The concept of global partnerships as vital to U.S. national security is bipartisan; even administrations perceived as the most isolationist amplify their importance. For example, the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy stated, “Allies and partners magnify our power.”

The U.S. faces an uncertain international arena with multiple active or potential conflicts. At the same time, would-be peer adversaries are growing in material power and deliberately violating and encroaching upon international norms. veterans can partner with the U.S. in new capacities. Afghanistan again risks becoming a front-page issue as the security situation deteriorates and terrorist organizations have increased freedom to plan and operate. Opening SIV pathways to ANASOC veterans and enabling their reported desire to “work and try (special operations) again” is a unique opportunity to tap their expertise. As the threat from Afghan-based terror groups rises, integrating ANASOC veterans and their expertise into military or advisory roles presents a national security opportunity to seize.

In an era of renewed GPC with China and Russia, America’s continued ability to achieve its national security objectives requires regional partners willing to stand alongside the U.S. to challenge nefarious and belligerent state and non-state actors, and cooperate economically, militarily, and politically. To succeed in GPC, the U.S. must foster a deep and reliable bench of partners and allies. Failing to support Afghan special operations partner forces after a multi-decade military campaign will undermine America’s commitment to its allies and raise the fear of abandonment should the US lose interest in supporting a partner in a regional conflict. To alleviate this potential crisis of American legitimacy and influence, Congress need only support existing legislation and demonstrate its commitment to those Afghans who fought alongside American and NATO forces in pursuit of peace and stability in Afghanistan. its back on a stalwart special operations partner from America’s longest foreign war may irreparably damage US credibility amongst its allies and negatively impact the ability to generate and sustain future security partnerships. These national security partnerships will be strong and sustainable if rhetorical assurances are supported by demonstrable actions. In this case, protecting and supporting ANASOC by passing the AAA into law.

Failing to protect ANASOC can have implications for years to come and impact various national security areas of concern, even beyond Afghanistan. Russia and China seized on the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan to paint the U.S. as weakened and unreliable. They will almost certainly seize an opportunity to reemphasize these points and sow doubt about ‘Western’ dependability while painting the U.S. as a hegemon unconcerned with the long-term well-being of its partners. This alone may not drive potential partners away, but it weaves neatly into an increasingly pervasive narrative of the U.S. interfering with the affairs of other countries while abandoning allies.

As many growing and developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, are pressured to walk a tightrope between the U.S. and China or Russia for economic, military, and political cooperation, the U.S. can ill-afford to be labeled a precarious ally. The AAA provides a tangible example useful for countering malign narratives, proving long-term dependability to potential allies, and showing that a partnership with the U.S. is not only rhetorical but also persists through challenges. Signaling reliability as an ally for future military partnerships is just one area in a wide-ranging GPC arena where supporting ANASOC veterans will pay off. From intelligence sharing to critical mineral management and international technological development, the U.S. and its current partners will need to foster new relationships and sustain existing ones if we are to succeed in a new era of GPC. These relationships will all have implications for national security, and signing the AAA into law is a cost-effective and imperative step in the right direction to ensure the U.S. and its allies are positioned for success.

Doing the Right Thing

Three years after the collapse of the Afghan government and the withdrawal of its international partners, Afghanistan remains inhospitable for many. Humanitarian protections are nonexistent, especially for those who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. If ANASOC veterans returned to Afghanistan, their lives would be in certain danger. Verified reports indicate that the Taliban regime continues a campaign to hunt down and punish our partners. Those who escaped to the U.S. were forced to make impossible decisions about leaving their families, homes, and the country they fought for behind.

Some may worry that providing SIV pathways to ANASOC veterans incentivizes future partners searching for migration pathways. However, the AAA is explicitly for those “who supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan”, and takes care to outline eligible groups. The convoluted path of joining a foreign military to possibly immigrate to the U.S. offers a slim chance at success, with the opportunity historically reserved for extreme circumstances. Also, there are pathways to the U.S. beyond joining a partner military, including joining the U.S. military as a legal immigrant. The extreme circumstances of a Taliban takeover, government and military collapse, and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan present a situation necessitating SIV pathways for ANASOC veterans.

Unfortunately, these at-risk partners remain uncertain of their immigration outcomes and ability to stay in the U.S. under legal protections, and thus cannot pursue their new lives fully. ANASOC veterans have clear ties to the U.S. and have earned an SIV pathway similar to Afghan translators. The Afghan Adjustment Act is the answer. The legislation will die at the end of this Congress, time is running short, and we must act now to honor our promise to our Afghan Special Operations partners.

Tags: AAA, Afghan Adjustment Act, Allies, ANASOC, Security Partners, US National Security

About The Author

Luke Magyar
Luke Magyar, Corioli Institute Director of Advocacy and Outreach. Luke Magyar is a Research Associate and Fellows Program Director for the Corioli Institute, a think-and-do-tank focusing on global formerly armed actor reintegration. He is also a Student-Veteran at the University of Chicago pursuing a BA in political science. In his spare time, Luke volunteers with Service to School as a peer mentor for veterans pursuing higher education. Luke served in the Marine Corps for five years and was honorably discharged in 2022.

23. Hardware and Hard Truths: Trump’s Tariffs Could Hurt American AI

Excerpt:

As the United States marches toward another Trump administration, his political motives are wracked by uncertainty. However, one thing remains certain: protectionism as a central foreign policy goal is an animating feature of his rhetoric and campaign platform. Tariffs placed on both competitors and allies are likely to be enacted, and widespread effects on not only America’s domestic economy, but also the U.S. military will be felt. The Trump administration may not let secondary and tertiary tariff effects fundamentally undermine U.S. military effectiveness. However, even if the government is willing to pay subsidies or larger contracts, the added cost is a crucially tradeoff. Tariffs are thus a lose-lose situation for high-tech applications like the U.S. military. Either the Department of Defense must offset the increased costs through other taxpayer-funded programs or risk losing ground to China. The race for advanced chips and artificial intelligence development cannot be viewed in isolation, and China is a huge potential winner poised to take advantage of constrained international markets. China’s insulated and centrally mobilized AI and security apparatus will be able to leverage its homegrown industry advantage over a U.S. market pressured by supply chain uncertainties and increased data center costs. Without the market options that it is configured to exploit, the U.S. military’s high-tech comparative advantage will be put into question.

Hardware and Hard Truths: Trump’s Tariffs Could Hurt American AI - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Alex Li · December 13, 2024

Earlier this year, an AI-piloted F-16 participated in its first full dogfight maneuver exercise. The pilot (who sat in the cockpit but did not control the aircraft) was so impressed by the computer’s performance that he stated that he would be willing to give the system fire control authority. However, America’s progress in fielding powerful AI solutions such as this may be at risk under the incoming Trump administration.

President-elect Donald Trump has made it clear that his foreign policy will be focused on promoting domestic industry through tariffs aimed at not only near-peer competitors but also allies and neighbors. With Elon Musk and crypto hawking abounding on the campaign trail, Trump appears to be a friendly ally to the technology industry. He has promised to reverse President Joseph Biden’s AI restrictions in military decision-making to promote America’s indigenous AI industry. However, proposed tariff and export control policies will have much larger effects on AI hardware supply chains. The future of AI hinges on access to advanced chips made in Taiwan, backed up by a global network of materials and manufacturing. While the first Trump administration had carved out exceptions for Taiwan in its Section 301 tariffs aimed at China, on the 2024 campaign trail, Trump made it a point to lambast not just China but took aim at Taiwan as well. He claimed that Taiwan was taking chip manufacturing away from the United States and that Taiwan should be paying the United States for defense. Moreover, aiming at traditional allies and partners that in the past have shared many of the same economic values is an even bigger challenge. Raising the price of computational hardware robs the United States of a key advantage in the global AI race — a competitive domestic market.

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Hardware, Hardware, Hardware

At the Windows 2000 launch, then-Microsoft chief executive officer Steve Ballmer jumped on stage and yelled “developers, developers, developers.” At a time when Moore’s law was holding strong, the strength of software developer talent made or broke a firm. This is no longer the case. While the death knell of Moore’s law has been speculated about for years, there is a clear push to look at other areas of improvement in computing. Both the scientific literature and NVIDIA’s chief executive officer, Jensen Huang, argue that the future of computational power will come from software, algorithms, and hardware infrastructure. The inseparability of these factors is impossible to understate, and tariffs on the hardware infrastructure economy will have blanket effects across the supposed “hyper Moore’s law.” Fundamentally, future AI will hinge on access to hardware. There are two ways that would-be startups can implement AI at scale: in-house development or leveraging cloud computing systems offered by large firms. Both mechanisms will be fundamentally altered after blanket tariffs, making it harder, if not impossible, for startups to engage in the artificial intelligence market.

NVIDIA has recently emerged as the preeminent hardware design firm in the United States, and indeed globally, for AI chips. Graphics processing units from NVIDIA remain the most powerful for enterprise solutions, particularly GB200 Grace Blackwell Superchips, which represent the cutting edge for data center offerings. Already, the next generation of GB200-based systems has incurred massive orders from Microsoft and Elon Musk’s xAI. NVIDIA, however, does not produce its own chips; the major effect that tariffs will have will not be on the design end, but on production. Blackwell architecture is built on proprietary 4NP nodes at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company plants, the only plants capable of producing NVIDIA’s chips.

Trump has indicated that he intends to implement a blanket 10 to 20 percent tariff on all imported goods, without exception. At a minimum, this would drastically raise operating costs in dealing with all foreign firms, but a 20 percent increase would hit Taiwan with a 1,000 percent increase in average tariffs. The Taiwan central bank has expressed concern over the policy, arguing that if implemented, it will be the most important trade policy of Trump’s administration. Moreover, with Trump potentially expanding export controls in strategic materials like silicon, this would massively impact Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s supply chain. Out of the five major suppliers of raw materials for the Taiwanese firm, two are headquartered in America — SunEdison (formerly MEMC Electronic Materials) and Short Elliott Hendrickson Incorporated.

Tariffs on neighbors and allies will also have a substantial impact. Microsoft’s data center expansion represents global ambitions of U.S. AI firms. One of Microsoft’s more notable expansions is in Quebec City, Quebec, designed specifically for AI. Trump threatened to levy a 25 percent tariff on all goods coming from Canada and Mexico, and after a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau failed to reach concession, relations have continued to cool between the two countries. As tariffs increase the price of moving goods across the Canadian border, data centers will undoubtedly be affected. Even discounting the increased transaction costs of tensions between Canada and the United States, the price of data centers will absolutely increase. Data centers will not be able to avoid a significant increase of battery prices, a market dominated by China. At the most charitable interpretation, this implicates accessibility to cloud computing systems, which certainly will become more expensive post-tariff, pricing would-be startup firms out.

Implications for the Security AI Market

The security implications for hardware constraints on new AI firms are potentially game-changing. The fundamental difference between the U.S. and Chinese models of military AI development is the democratization of the technology. Specifically, the U.S. military relies on an open and easily accessible market for AI firms, and thus security competition demands open and easy access to AI hardware. The U.S. military has made massive bets on the AI market, with billions being pumped into firms of all sizes to improve military capacity, efficiency, and efficacy. The U.S. Army has offered millions for specifically small business AI grants to enhance its capabilities. In fact, one of the first Pentagon contracts aimed at defending against generative AI threats was awarded not to large industrial players like Amazon or even OpenAI, but to Jericho Security, a small firm with a $1.8 million valuation. The U.S. Army itself has deployed its own generative AI system hosted on Microsoft’s Azure cloud services.

Thus, the hallmark of U.S. military AI development is based on competitiveness, which encourages new entrants into the market. With tariffs looming and the clear threat that computational power will become more expensive, new entrants are pushed out of the market. This only leaves large firms like Microsoft and Intel in play. Even discounting the increased cloud computing cost falling to consumers, this process introduces massive risk. While on face, a single large vendor might not be an impossible challenge to overcome (indeed, for other high-tech systems like fighter jets, this is the norm), AI is different. In the United States, AI is largely democratized already. Non-traditional defense companies like Anduril and Jericho Security represent potentially disruptive advancements in AI that democratization of both talent and hardware access was necessary to achieve. For a firm to enter the AI market requires relatively new systemic organization, but it is much cheaper than manufacturing an airframe.

Chinese Competitiveness

With the effectiveness of the future of military AI development in question, enter the challenger, China. China does not operate on market principles in its AI development or goals. The 2023 creation of China’s Central Science and Technology Commission illustrates the core strategy of Chinese innovation: to mobilize specific sectors of the Chinese state and industry to outpace the United States. The Central Science and Technology Commission was created in response to U.S. tariffs and is designed to operate in absence of access to foreign technology. This means that China has been preparing to innovate under the pressure of more U.S. tariffs. Going about AI alone is a road that will likely be tough for China to successfully traverse, but if the U.S. AI market were to be constrained, the security focus of China’s innovation system might allow it to achieve parity.

Chinese chip design firms are not as advanced as the United States’ NVIDIA, but their advantage is the development of a growing indigenous semiconductor manufacturing industry and centralized ambitions that have already weathered the tariff storm. The Center for Strategic and International Studies finds that export controls have mixed effects on technological progress in China, pointing to mixed effectiveness of protectionist policies to slow down Chinese AI development. Even under the pressure of hardware constraints, China has made major progress with older technologies. The Chinese firm Intellifusion has developed the “DeepEyes” AI box capable of competing with major players in the United States in the AI space. The remarkable aspect of DeepEyes is its development on a 14nm production node, a decade-old production standard. Thus, with or without export controls on China, there is little doubt that China is prepared to continue its AI development as part and parcel of its geopolitically competitive goals.

Notably, tariffs that target China are nothing new. Their developmental capacity has been developed under considerable tariff pressure; the proposed Trump tariffs, however, go much further than just targeting China. Playing out a scenario where hardware constraints indeed become salient for U.S. AI firms makes clear the long-term effects in a larger geopolitical context. Hardware costs increasing both data center costs and cloud computing costs will pressure potential new AI firms out of the market. With fewer vendors available to the U.S. military, there is little doubt that China will leverage its homegrown industries that it has been building for years to outpace the United States. Allies, like Canada, that have been traditionally viewed as safe investment locales will suddenly be thrown into disarray. Even though Biden’s recent export controls have attempted to carve out strategic exceptions, if the full weight of Trump’s protectionist sentiments should be believed, there is little doubt that these exceptions will stay static. Moreover, industrial watchdogs are already wary of supply chain effects due to a lack of exceptions for places like Malaysia or Taiwan. The lack of diverse options to choose from in the AI landscape will rob the Department of Defense of its current comparative advantage. Tariffs will allow the centralized mobilization of the Chinese developmental model to shine and, in the most pessimistic of views, allow the Chinese science and technology apparatus to outcompete the United States.

Reshoring Is a Fantasy

The protectionist counterargument is that tariffs forces companies like Intel to reshore manufacturing toward U.S. soil. The associated economic effects may be beneficial, overall growing the economy and encouraging high-tech employment, and allowing for decoupling. To put it bluntly, this is an impossible dream. Intel has been the poster child for America’s homegrown semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, and in recent years it has lost its competitive edge. The recent announcements are telling. Intel’s leadership restructuring promises to bring long-term gains, but there is broad skepticism that this change is on paper only.

The bigger problem, however, is that Intel is not the American competitor to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in chip fabrication that it used to be. Indeed, Intel relies heavily on the Taiwanese manufacturing. The newest generation of consumer-grade Intel graphics processing units, which promises robust AI improvements, is manufactured on Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s 5nm manufacturing node. Moreover, one of the primary points of blame placed on former Intel chief executive officer Pat Gelsinger was that he fundamentally mishandled the close relationship between Intel and the Taiwanese firm. The very ideals of a strong Intel (and thus a strong American manufacturing sector) are based in strong cooperation between the United States and overseas manufacturing.

The other barrier to American semiconductor manufacturing, which tariffs fundamentally cannot overcome, is simply an issue of labor in the United States. The semiconductor industry is well funded but faces a consistent labor shortage in the United States. This has been attributed to a wealth of federally backed job openings, fewer skilled engineers, and increased restrictions on foreign talent. Thus, relying solely on protectionist trade policy without addressing domestic shortcomings in workforce shortages, particularly an education gap, makes reshoring impossible. Finally, none of these economic considerations resolve the AI arms racing issue, and as Intel restructures, China will remain unimpeded, even under the behemoth of American tariffs.

Uncharted Territory

As the United States marches toward another Trump administration, his political motives are wracked by uncertainty. However, one thing remains certain: protectionism as a central foreign policy goal is an animating feature of his rhetoric and campaign platform. Tariffs placed on both competitors and allies are likely to be enacted, and widespread effects on not only America’s domestic economy, but also the U.S. military will be felt. The Trump administration may not let secondary and tertiary tariff effects fundamentally undermine U.S. military effectiveness. However, even if the government is willing to pay subsidies or larger contracts, the added cost is a crucially tradeoff. Tariffs are thus a lose-lose situation for high-tech applications like the U.S. military. Either the Department of Defense must offset the increased costs through other taxpayer-funded programs or risk losing ground to China. The race for advanced chips and artificial intelligence development cannot be viewed in isolation, and China is a huge potential winner poised to take advantage of constrained international markets. China’s insulated and centrally mobilized AI and security apparatus will be able to leverage its homegrown industry advantage over a U.S. market pressured by supply chain uncertainties and increased data center costs. Without the market options that it is configured to exploit, the U.S. military’s high-tech comparative advantage will be put into question.

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Alex Li is a political science doctoral student at the University of Oregon. He holds a masters of international affairs from the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, focusing on China and international politics. His work and research have focused on conflict and national security.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Alex Li · December 13, 2024

24. The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part I: From Prescription to National Security Epidemic

Download the 25 page report here: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Domestic-Fentanyl-Crisis-Strategic-Context_Prescription-National-Security-Epidemic.pdf

The Domestic Fentanyl Crisis in Strategic Context, Part I: From Prescription to National Security Epidemic - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · December 13, 2024

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Editor’s note: This report is the first in a three-part series that examines the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the ongoing fentanyl crisis in the United States. The first report traces the history of the opioid crisis, describes the global supply chain, and summarizes its profound impact on US public health and, consequently, national security. The second report identifies the PRC’s role as a major enabler of the crisis by deliberately facilitating illicit product sourcing for the fentanyl trade. Finally, the third report draws parallels between the PRC’s actions and asymmetric warfare, arguing that the United States must take a more concerted, whole-of-government approach to addressing the crisis that recognizes the PRC’s role in perpetuating it.

The history of the fentanyl crisis provides essential context for the current epidemic, helps identify root causes, and informs effective policy development. Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid developed as an intravenous anesthetic in the 1960s, quickly became popular for its powerful pain relief properties. By the 1970s, fentanyl had found its way into the illicit US drug market in laced heroin known as “China White,” foreshadowing China’s future role in the fentanyl trade. By the end of 2023, the Drug Enforcement Administration had intercepted over eighty million counterfeit pills laced with fentanyl and nearly twelve thousand pounds of fentanyl powder, representing more than 390 million potentially lethal doses.

Read the full report here.

Nicholas Dockery is a White House Fellow, Special Forces officer, United States Military Academy graduate, and Wayne Downing scholar. Dockery holds a master of public policy from Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs and previously served as a research fellow at the Modern War Institute.

Image credit: Jerry Glaser, CBP

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · December 13, 2024

25. The Price of Russian Victory

Excerpts:

And then there is everything else Washington will need to deter and defeat the Kremlin. The United States will have to maintain higher readiness for home-stationed and deployed forces, which means spending around $185 billion on additional training and exercises. It will need to improve its facilities and stockpiles of spare parts, which will cost close to $33 billion. It will need more and better special operations forces, which are essential to intelligence, shaping the battlefield, and generally disrupting the enemy. The price tag for that expansion will be over $10 billion. Given that Russia is an experienced space and cyber power, the United States will also need better architecture and command systems for both domains, costing another more than $36 billion.

Add up all these figures, and one arrives at $808 billion. It is an enormous sum—roughly equal to the entire Pentagon budget in 2022. And it may be an underestimate. Instead, if Kyiv prevails over Moscow, Russia would retreat behind its own borders with a defeated and diminished military, a struggling economy, weakened partnerships, and a healthy dose of domestic challenges. Ukraine, by contrast, would be vibrant and free, with a thriving industrial base and a modern military. Washington would thus be able to scale down its deployments and capabilities in Europe. It would still maintain a presence there, but it would be able to dedicate more resources and attention to the Pacific—a desire of many U.S. presidents, including Donald Trump.

Not only is the United States safer when it is engaged, but it is also more fiscally responsible. It is expensive to deter a war, yet it is more expensive to fight one. Washington is facing a multitude of global threats, and so it is understandable that officials would second-guess the cost of helping Kyiv. But given the stakes, Americans must have clarity on the long-term costs, not just the upfront expenses. Supporting Ukraine is not only morally right but financially right. It is a prudent investment in U.S. interests.

The Price of Russian Victory

Foreign Affairs · by More by Elaine McCusker · December 13, 2024

Why Letting Putin Win Would Cost America More Than Supporting Ukraine

Elaine McCusker

December 13, 2024

Russians soldier at military drills in the Krasnodar region, Russia, December 2024 Sergey Pivovarov / Reuters

Elaine McCusker is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. From 2019 to 2020, she served as the Pentagon’s Deputy and then Acting Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).

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Many Americans are concerned about the cost of aid to Ukraine. It took the U.S. Congress seven months to approve the last funding measure to provide aid. A November Pew poll indicates that most Americans support helping Ukraine, yet roughly a quarter believe that Washington has been providing too much assistance. Elected officials, including the Vice President-elect JD Vance, continue making misleading comments about being “half a trillion dollars in the hole for the Ukraine conflict.” The billionaire Elon Musk, who is helping the incoming Trump administration sort out plans to cut federal spending, posted on social media last February that it was “insane” for the United States to continue its investment in Ukraine.

Such worries are understandable. The United States is faced with numerous challenges. Illegal immigration, financing the national debt, competition with China, war in the Middle East, and a generally unpredictable global security environment all compete for attention and resources. It is not surprising that it is difficult for Washington to sort out its priorities.

But Americans worried only about the cost of helping Ukraine are thinking about the issue in the wrong way. They should be worried about the cost of not helping Ukraine. Right now, by providing aid to Kyiv, the United States is preventing Russia from directly menacing eastern and central Europe, which would doubtless consume even more U.S. resources. Washington may, in fact, be deterring a direct war between NATO and Moscow, one in which U.S. forces would have to fight.

To figure out just how much money supporting Kyiv saves Washington, in a report to be released in January, my colleagues and I at the American Enterprise Institute added up the expenses the United States would face if Russia defeats Ukraine and then positions forces along NATO’s border. We considered the military capability, capacity, and posture the United States would need to deter and, potentially, defeat Russia should the Kremlin attack a NATO ally—while still preventing further conflict with emboldened adversaries in the Pacific and Middle East.

The resulting number is exorbitant. According to our calculations, defeat in Ukraine would require the United States to spend $808 billion more on defense over the next five years than it has budgeted. Since 2022, by contrast, Congress has appropriated $112 billion to the Defense Department to assist Kyiv. That means the aid provided to Ukraine through the Pentagon is less than 14 percent of what it would cost Washington to defend Europe against a victorious Russia. (That $112 billion is also mostly spent at home, on domestic weapons production.) Put another way, allowing Russia to defeat Ukraine would cost the United States about seven times more than preventing a Russian victory. Aiding Ukraine, then, is clearly the right financial decision.

TOTAL DEFEAT

If the United States stops supporting Ukraine, Kyiv would be in deep trouble. Despite their efforts to mobilize their industrial bases, Ukraine’s European partners do not have the military and manufacturing capacity to fill the gap Washington would leave behind. The continent’s political will to build more capacity would diminish as U.S. support tapers off. Ukraine has made strides in expanding its own industrial base, but its military manufacturers cannot churn out enough weapons to hold off a country with more than three times its population. (Ukraine’s deficiencies in turning out air defense, artillery, and armored vehicles are especially pronounced.) Even if those manufactures could keep up with Russia, Moscow also has partners providing manpower, weapons, and other resources.

Without U.S. support, Russia would advance in 2025 as Kyiv runs out of weapons. By 2026, Ukraine would lose effective air defense, allowing Russia to conduct continual large-scale bombings of military and civilian infrastructure. Faced with such an onslaught, Ukraine’s conventional forces would fight valiantly, but they would have little hope of holding out. The country’s military would likely collapse by the end of that year, allowing Russia to seize Kyiv and then drive to the NATO border. Moscow, in other words, would be unequivocally victorious.

Russian President Vladimir Putin would be happy with such a victory. But he would be unlikely to be sated. Putin, who once called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, has not been bashful about his desire to dominate eastern Europe. He would, if anything, be emboldened by victory over Kyiv. He would also be motivated to maintain a posture of crisis management to avoid domestic challenges: Putin has staked his claim to power on the notion that he is protecting Russia from a rapacious West. After subjugating Ukraine, the Kremlin would likely reconstitute Russia’s combat units in Belarus and in western Ukraine, on the border with NATO members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Russia would also likely begin stationing missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment near the Baltic states and Moldova. Moscow would then establish interlocking air defense systems along the NATO frontier, from the Black Sea to the Arctic.

Ukraine’s resources would help Moscow threaten the rest of eastern Europe. With the Ukrainian army under its domain, the Kremlin would have hundreds of thousands of additional highly trained, skilled, and battle-tested soldiers whom it could press into service. It could also conscript the millions of Ukrainians whom Kyiv has not mobilized. Additionally, control over Ukraine would afford Russia more defense industrial capability and economic capacity. Moscow would still need time to recover from its current invasion before it could launch a new one. But by 2030, it could be ready to attack a NATO state.

THE SURGE

Some Americans may not care all that much about stopping Russia from attacking NATO. But the notion that Washington should disengage from Europe, and save its resources for other matters, misses the global nature of conflict. Europe should certainly invest more in its own defense. Yet over a century of history shows that when the United States disregards its interests in a region, violent conflict inevitably drags it back with threats to U.S. security and prosperity. U.S. retreat in one area also emboldens Washington’s adversaries elsewhere. Simply put, regional conflict is a thing of the past.

In order to protect itself—nationally, militarily, economically, and reputationally—the United States must therefore remain a global power and invest in the capabilities to do so. If Ukraine were allowed to fall, Washington would need a military that is larger, more capable, more responsive, and positioned in more locations. To deter Russia and, if necessary, defeat Russia after it topples Kyiv, the U.S. armed forces would need nearly 270,000 new service members. Most of those—161,000—would go to the army, which would require far more than the 943,000 soldiers it plans to have by 2029. It would use those additional soldiers to create 14 new brigade combat teams, giving the branch a total of 72 such teams. The extra 14 brigade combat teams would allow for 11 teams to be deployed to Europe at any given time, doubling the U.S. presence there. This extra presence would allow Washington to conduct fuller operations, as well as to respond more rapidly to any crises that broke out. It would also increase the all-important comprehensive exercises the U.S. and its allies undertook in the region, which would enhance their readiness and bolster deterrence. In total, the land component of the projected increase would come to nearly $88 billion.

Similarly, the planned U.S. Marine Corps force of 205,000 would have to increase by more than 31,000, in part to create eight new infantry battalions—two that are active and six in reserve. Each active infantry battalion is made up of around 6,600 marines, including support personnel such as logisticians and intelligence workers. Reserve battalions are made up of about 2,300 marines, plus support personnel. These new battalions would help the Marine Corps continue to deter China and North Korea, which would be more tempted to challenge Washington if Moscow wins. They could also help fully man three Marine Expeditionary Forces to fill any gaps the army leaves in the Middle East as it pivots to eastern Europe. The additional battalions would also provide the United States with more amphibious forces in the Baltics.

Preemptively building up Washington’s land presence in Europe would be particularly essential because, should Russia invade a NATO country, it would do everything possible to stop the United States from moving more resources in after the conflict breaks out. That fact also means Washington would have to carry out extensive construction in Europe to harden existing facilities and build new ones, likely costing about $31 billion. It would need to build many small, dispersed, and fortified weapons depots throughout the European theater. And it would have to either tell U.S. soldiers they can no longer bring their families to eastern Europe or spend more to protect those family members.

Defeating Moscow, of course, would require a lot of airpower. Making sure Washington could attain such air superiority would call for more fifth- and sixth-generation fighter jets that can take down Russian attackers. Winning would also necessitate more air-refueling tankers and transport craft so that fighter jets could stay in the air and so that the United States could move forces and equipment to and around the region. Washington would need to keep its F-22s in the fleet longer than expected and to accelerate the development of new military aircraft. Planned retirement of KC tankers, which refuel planes midair, and C-series transport craft would similarly be delayed. The United States would need to spend more on aerial refueling drones so it can extend the range of its jets. All in all, the United States would require a total of 683 more aircraft and associated capabilities than it plans to buy by 2029, costing around $109 billion.

THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY

The United States’ investment in unmanned systems would need to go beyond just refueling drones. The war in Ukraine has shown just how essential unmanned aerial vehicles are to the future of combat. Throughout the invasion, both Kyiv and Moscow have depended on masses of drones to see the battlefield and to overwhelm and attack the other. Yet when it comes to this type of technology, the United States is way behind. To handle a drone-savvy Moscow and acquire this disposable resource used in a growing array of missions, Washington would need to make a substantial investment in unmanned technology and platform manufacturing and development, to the tune of $29 billion.

The United States would also need better air defenses. If Ukraine falls, Russia would have a new, 2,600-mile border with NATO, where it can mass its weapons and more than 900,000 troops, plus whatever forces it conscripts from Ukraine. That means the United States would need to extensively deploy air defense and munitions, both precision and conventional, procurement of which will likely cost around $173 billion. Manufacturing these resources at the pace and quantity needed would require expanding the U.S. industrial base and maximizing existing production lines, particularly for short- and long-range weapons. To produce the quantities of munitions and ships Washington needs, the U.S. government would have to spend an additional $63 billion just on increasing industrial base capacity.

Although a conflict on the European continent would be primarily led by land forces, under the cover of air forces, Washington would need better maritime capabilities, as well. A resurgent Russia may harass shipping in the Black Sea and the Atlantic, and an opportunistic Iran and its proxies could do the same in the waters around the Middle East. To stop such harassment without curtailing its presence in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy would have to discard its plans to shrink its fleet by nine ships. In fact, it would have to add 18 new battle force ships, including two carriers, to stabilize the fleet at 12. The navy would also need four submarines (including delaying one LA class retirement), three new destroyers, and three frigates to improve its flexibility for positioning maritime combat power, as well as six more logistics and support ships to keep the fleet at sea longer. Together, the shipbuilding would cost around $50 billion more.

It is expensive to deter a war, but more expensive to fight one.

And then there is everything else Washington will need to deter and defeat the Kremlin. The United States will have to maintain higher readiness for home-stationed and deployed forces, which means spending around $185 billion on additional training and exercises. It will need to improve its facilities and stockpiles of spare parts, which will cost close to $33 billion. It will need more and better special operations forces, which are essential to intelligence, shaping the battlefield, and generally disrupting the enemy. The price tag for that expansion will be over $10 billion. Given that Russia is an experienced space and cyber power, the United States will also need better architecture and command systems for both domains, costing another more than $36 billion.

Add up all these figures, and one arrives at $808 billion. It is an enormous sum—roughly equal to the entire Pentagon budget in 2022. And it may be an underestimate. Instead, if Kyiv prevails over Moscow, Russia would retreat behind its own borders with a defeated and diminished military, a struggling economy, weakened partnerships, and a healthy dose of domestic challenges. Ukraine, by contrast, would be vibrant and free, with a thriving industrial base and a modern military. Washington would thus be able to scale down its deployments and capabilities in Europe. It would still maintain a presence there, but it would be able to dedicate more resources and attention to the Pacific—a desire of many U.S. presidents, including Donald Trump.

Not only is the United States safer when it is engaged, but it is also more fiscally responsible. It is expensive to deter a war, yet it is more expensive to fight one. Washington is facing a multitude of global threats, and so it is understandable that officials would second-guess the cost of helping Kyiv. But given the stakes, Americans must have clarity on the long-term costs, not just the upfront expenses. Supporting Ukraine is not only morally right but financially right. It is a prudent investment in U.S. interests.

Elaine McCusker is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. From 2019 to 2020, she served as the Pentagon’s Deputy and then Acting Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).

More by Elaine McCusker

Foreign Affairs · by More by Elaine McCusker · December 13, 2024

26.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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