​Quotes of the Day:

"We will freedom for freedom’s sake, in and through particular circumstances. And in thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own. Obviously, freedom as the definition of a man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as my own. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim."

– Jean-Paul Sartre

"We will never have true civilization until we have learned to recognize the rights of others."

– Will Rogers

“One man who stopped lying could bring down a tyranny.”

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956

1. Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

2. Top retired U.S., Korean generals detail tensions in Indo-Pacific

3. Military exercises 'critically important,' U.S. Forces Korea commander says

4. Why Trump isn’t talking about North Korea

5. South Korea-U.S. alliance frictions appear in plain sight

6. There's a lot in the way of South Korea acquiring nuclear subs

7. South Korea's Lee steps up as Asia peacemaker

8. US General Says Drills ‘Absolutely’ Needed as Korea Floats Shift

9. How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea

10. Rookie Minister Gets $7 Billion to Catch US, China in AI Arena

11. A top South Korean shipbuilder is arming the Philippines with a new fleet of warships built for tougher Pacific fights

12. Leaving Too Much to Chance (South Korea Policy)

13. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un lauds troops sent to fight overseas, vows to root out ‘evil’

14. Korea’s English Exam Was So Hard It Prompted an Apology. How Would You Do?

1. Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

Comment: ​I have just pre-ordered this. This will be a very important contribution to those who seek transformation inside north Korea and who just need to know what it is like and how to understand what is happening inside north Korea. This is what we should be focusing on.

This is paradox of north Korea: this weakness is both the path to change and transformation in north Korea but at the same time there is the danger that this is also the path to conflict as KJU is threatened by the Korean people in the north – whom he fears more than the ROK and US combined militaries.

I have long followed and benefited from Dr. Beak's extensive and thorough research. She should be contributing to the ROK/US alliance information and influence activities toward north Korea.

The only criticism (question) I have is why do we have to wait until May 5, 2026.  :-)  I want to read this and more importantly employ this now.

Privileged but Powerless

How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

by Jieun Baek

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300272284/privileged-but-powerless/

264 Pages, 6.12 × 9.25 in, 7 b-w illus.

• Hardcover
• 9780300272284
• Published: Tuesday, 5 May 2026

$38.00

Coming soon

Also Available At:

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• Description
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• Praise

A compelling examination of North Korea’s elites, their hidden discontent, and the role they may play in shaping the regime’s future

Jieun Baek’s second book on North Korea is a deeply researched and sharply analytical account of the grievances harbored by the country’s elite. Drawing on hundreds of hours of in-depth interviews with escapees from Pyongyang, Baek examines how members of this privileged class, granted access to forbidden information and superior material benefits, publicly uphold the regime despite their underlying discontent. She argues that this performative loyalty, born of fear and a desire to survive, masks a critical vulnerability within the regime’s core.

Grounded in firsthand testimony and enriched by insights from a global network of academics, intelligence analysts, human rights practitioners, and policymakers, Baek’s research challenges the prevailing view of North Korea’s elites as uniformly loyal actors. Instead, she reveals a complex and precarious reality faced by those closest to power.

This book sheds new light on how elite grievances may shape the trajectory of the regime’s stability and security. Baek offers a provocative argument—that those who seem most invested in preserving North Korea’s status quo may become its most dangerous disruptors, not for ideological reasons but because of simmering resentment and vanishing alternatives.

2.  Top retired U.S., Korean generals detail tensions in Indo-Pacific

​Summary:

Retired Gen. Charles Flynn said the Asia-Indo-Pacific is vast, with Hawaii to Guam about the same flight as Hawaii to Washington, and that planners need maps to grasp it. He warned China is building military infrastructure and using debt deals to gain leverage over smaller states, so U.S. ties with Vietnam, Thailand, and India matter, and Guam is homeland. Retired ROK Gen. Leem Ho-young said Taiwan dominates debate, but the Korean peninsula is packed with forces. He said one million troops face off near the DMZ still. Kim’s succession in north Korea could spark infighting, with China backing factions there.

Excerpt:

The current supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, has signaled that his chosen heir is his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, who is believed to be 12 or 13. That could be a problem for stability in North Korea, Mr. Leem said, where women are looked down upon.

Mr. Kim is overweight, smokes four packs of cigarettes a day and drinks up to 10 bottles of wine daily. Mr. Leem noted that his father and grandfather died as a result of bad hearts.

“It’s in his bloodline. It wouldn’t be surprising at all if he dropped dead today,” he said. “If that happens, there’s going to be a power struggle in North Korea. The power will be given to the person with a gun. China will pick a faction and support that faction.”

Mr. Leem said he wouldn’t be surprised if the other side in a North Korean internal dispute reaches out to South Korea or even the U.S. for backing.

Comment: Okay. Riddle me this: What do we do if we learned today that Kim Jong Un is dead? What are our contingency plans? What happens if there is opposition inside north Korea after KJU dies that reaches out to the ROK or US? What do we do? If we are not working on such contingency plans then we are not doing our jobs. And the most important line of effort to any such contingency plans will be information preparation of the environment that will lay the foundation for what options are available to anyone who seeks change inside north Korea. What do we tell the nKPA to do in such a situation? What options do they have and what options can the ROK/US alliance provide them? There is so much work to be done on this. Who is doing it?

I am curious as to why General Flynn is commenting on Korea. The last time I heard him speak and asked him about the potential for irregular warfare in north Korea he said he was not worried about that and only worried about the nuclear weapons and artillery pointed at Seoul and the US but that he would leave Korea to General LaCamera (the commander at the time).

Top retired U.S., Korean generals detail tensions in Indo-Pacific

washingtontimes.com · Mike Glenn

By - The Washington Times - Friday, December 12, 2025

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/dec/12/top-retired-us-korean-generals-detail-tensions-indo-pacific/

If America’s relationship with Europe defined the 20th century, then the 21st century will be marked by Washington’s connections to the Indo-Pacific.

However, the former commander of U.S. Army troops in the region said some people can’t grasp its complexities or immense distances without a map.

In an address to the Gold Institute think tank, retired Gen. Charles Flynn on Thursday noted that the flying time from Hawaii to Guam, America’s farthest western territory, is roughly the same as a flight from Hawaii to the District of Columbia.

“When you’re in Guam, you’re in the second island chain. That’s how big this area of operations is. It’s massive,” Mr. Flynn said.

The Indo-Pacific encompasses two continents — Asia and Australia — and the Southeast Asia archipelago, which serves as a land bridge connecting both. By some estimates, 7 out of 10 people on the planet will be in the region by 2040, he said.

China, which the Biden administration referred to as America’s “pacing challenge,” is amid a construction frenzy. The buildup is part of its Belt and Road Initiative, a Beijing-led global infrastructure and investment program launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping that aims to connect Asia, Europe, Africa and beyond through land and sea routes.

China is moving ahead with explicitly military building projects as well, including along its mountainous border with India, known as the Line of Actual Control. About 20,000 to 30,000 Chinese troops regularly rotate in and out of the area, Mr. Flynn said.

“In the last five to seven years, they’ve built rail and road infrastructure to move laterally. They’ve also put surface-to-air missile systems there,” he said.

China is continuing to flex its economic muscles by applying pressure to several countries in Southeast Asia, from Cambodia and Laos to Bhutan and Myanmar. Beijing’s coercive campaign is becoming a dangerous security situation, Mr. Flynn said.

“That is why it’s really important for the United States to maintain relations with Vietnam, Thailand and India, the sort of bookends of countries in South Asia,” he said. “And by the way, Thailand is a treaty ally of the United States.”

China’s strategy is to float high-interest construction loans to countries it wants to exploit. When the country can’t repay the loan, Beijing moves in and assumes control over the project, whether it’s a port facility or an airfield. That also means access to its information technology system or electrical grid.

“We have one hell of a time getting them out of these small countries,” Mr. Flynn said.

The U.S. is an Indo-Pacific country not just because of its far-reaching military power, but also because “it has skin in the game.” The people living in Guam and the Northern Marianas are U.S. citizens.

“We can’t forget about this part of the homeland,” Mr. Flynn said.

Retired South Korean Gen. Leem Ho-young, a former deputy commander of the U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Command, said most discussions about possible military action in the Indo-Pacific seem to focus on whether China will invade neighboring Taiwan.

“It seems like they don’t really discuss much about the threat that exists on the Korean peninsula because the two Koreas — the North and the South — are charging up,” Mr. Leem said.

He said President Trump — whom he called “The Global Peacemaker” — will likely prevent any cross-strait invasion of Taiwan.

The Korean Peninsula is another story. Mr. Leem said he spent most of his military career along the tense Demilitarized Zone between the North and South.

“For 50 kilometers to the north and 50 kilometers to the south [of the DMZ], there are about 1 million soldiers there pointing their guns at each other,” he said.

While North Korean officials mouth communist slogans, Mr. Leem said it would be more accurate to call the country a feudal dynasty. The Kim family has run the country since its founding in 1948 by Kim Il-sung.

The current supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, has signaled that his chosen heir is his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, who is believed to be 12 or 13. That could be a problem for stability in North Korea, Mr. Leem said, where women are looked down upon.

Mr. Kim is overweight, smokes four packs of cigarettes a day and drinks up to 10 bottles of wine daily. Mr. Leem noted that his father and grandfather died as a result of bad hearts.

“It’s in his bloodline. It wouldn’t be surprising at all if he dropped dead today,” he said. “If that happens, there’s going to be a power struggle in North Korea. The power will be given to the person with a gun. China will pick a faction and support that faction.”

Mr. Leem said he wouldn’t be surprised if the other side in a North Korean internal dispute reaches out to South Korea or even the U.S. for backing.

“If that happens and there are two different military factions in conflict in North Korea, this could lead to a conflict between China, which represents communism, and the U.S. and South Korea, which represent the powers of freedom,” he said. “The issues surrounding Taiwan will seem small by comparison.”

• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Mike Glenn

3. Military exercises 'critically important,' U.S. Forces Korea commander says

​Summary:

Gen. Xavier Brunson said combined U.S. ROK exercises are critically important because readiness sustains peace on the peninsula. Speaking in a webinar, he did not address Seoul’s proposals to scale back drills to revive dialogue, but stressed that the spring and summer exercises remain the cornerstone of realistic training and alliance readiness. He warned the threat is expanding as north Korea deepens cooperation with Russia, with developments that could improve DPRK training, techniques, and procedures. Brunson argued exercises separate this alliance from others, and he urged modernization across land, sea, air, cyber, and space to meet what may come next.

​Comment: If we use exercises as a bargaining chip we should understand all we are doing is bargaining away the security of the ROK and US. And if we use it as a bargaining trip we are revealing that we know nothing about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Cancelling, postponing, or casling back exercises will not cause KJU to negotiate in any responsible way. He will simply assess that his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy is working and he will double down.

World News Dec. 12, 2025 / 12:40 AM

Military exercises 'critically important,' U.S. Forces Korea commander says

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/12/korea-Gen-Xavier-Brunson-USFK-joint-military-exercises-critical-North-Korea/8941765511704/

USFK commander Gen. Xavier Brunson (L) said Friday that joint military exercises are "critically important" for defending the Korean Peninsula. In this January photo, Brunson is saluting alongside then-chairman of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff Kim Myung-soo. Photo by Yonhap

SEOUL, Dec. 11 (UPI) -- Combined U.S.-South Korea military exercises are essential to defending the Korean Peninsula, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Xavier Brunson said Friday, amid recent suggestions from Seoul officials that the drills could be scaled back to help revive dialogue with Pyongyang.

"The way that we exercise is critically important to us going forward," Brunson said during a Zoom webinar hosted by the Korean Defense Veterans Association and the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation. "Peace is maintained by our ability to maintain our readiness, and so we've got to ensure that our exercises remain the cornerstone of all the readiness that we can achieve on the Peninsula."

His remarks come after South Korea's Unification Ministry and President Lee Jae Myung signaled flexibility on downsizing or adjusting the drills as potential leverage in restarting negotiations with North Korea, a shift reflecting the administration's efforts to reopen communication channels

The USFK commander did not directly comment on the proposals but stressed the importance of the two major combined exercises held each spring and summer. The allies have previously scaled back large-scale field drills during periods of diplomacy, including in 2018-19 when Washington and Pyongyang were engaged in summit talks.

"Whenever someone -- I don't care who it is -- talks about exercising less or exercising differently, they need to understand that there are two times in a year where we absolutely need some support," Brunson said. "Sometimes we forget that our ability to engage in rigorous, realistic training is a thing that separates this alliance from any other that exists."

Brunson also warned of the expanding threat posed by North Korea as it deepens military cooperation with Russia.

"Russian-DPRK collaboration is real -- it is not a quid pro quo relationship," Brunson said, using the official acronym for North Korea. "There are things we know are happening right now that give me pause as I look at what might face us down the road, whether that be training, or techniques and procedures they're learning from the front."

Pyongyang has provided significant support for Moscow's war effort in Ukraine, sending thousands of shipping containers of munitions and deploying 15,000 troops to help Russian forces in the Kursk region, according to Seoul's National Intelligence Service.

In exchange, experts assess that Russia is transferring advanced military technology to Pyongyang, including assistance with space launch vehicles, reconnaissance satellites and air defense systems.

Brunson added that the allies must prepare for an evolving threat environment by accelerating modernization efforts across multiple domains, including cyber and space.

"We've got to change the way that we're organized for the fights," he said. "There are insidious things being done on and off the Peninsula that impact the Republic of Korea. So we've got to change the way that we're organized."

4. Why Trump isn’t talking about North Korea

​Summary:

Politico argues the new National Security Strategy’s silence on north Korea is deliberate, not forgetful. Victor Cha suggests POTUS may be clearing space for another round of summit diplomacy and a “glidepath” back to Kim. Yet the threat has not eased. north Korea has fielded new systems, tested missiles, and promised more offensive action against the U.S. and Seoul. Joel Wit warns POTUS may be thinking in 2019 terms while Kim’s alignment has shifted toward Russia and China. The White House says policy is unchanged, but softer language on regime end could invite provocation.

Comment: What causes north Korean provocation? Perceived weakness in the alliance and the opportunity to gain an advantage for KJU.

Why Trump isn’t talking about North Korea

Politico · Phelim Kine · December 12, 2025

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/12/12/why-trump-isnt-talking-about-north-korea-00689723

With help from Ari Hawkins, Maggie Miller, John Sakellariadis and Daniella Cheslow

The National Security Strategy released last week didn’t include a single mention of the North Korean regime of KIM JONG-UN. That’s a big change from President DONALD TRUMP’s first-term strategy, but it doesn’t necessarily mean Pyongyang has fallen off his radar.

VICTOR CHA, former National Security Council director for Japan and Korea in the second Bush administration, told NatSec Daily that North Korea may have been left out “because the president is trying to build a glidepath back to summitry with Kim.”

After all, as recently as October, Trump teased a potential meeting with Kim, saying “If he’d like to meet I’m open to it.”

North Korea has been flagged as dangerous to U.S. national security over successive Republican and Democratic administrations. The first Trump administration called Pyongyang “a global threat” in its 2017 strategy. The Biden administration warned of its “illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs” in 2022.

There’s no evidence that threats from North Korea have abated. Pyongyang rolled out a hypersonic missile system in August and Defense Minister NO KWANG-CHOL vowed “more offensive action” targeting the U.S. and Seoul after a North Korean ballistic missile test last month.

Trump tried in his first term to negotiate a deal with Kim that would swap an easing in U.S. sanctions in exchange for Pyongyang committing to give up its nukes. Despite three meetings in 2018 and 2019 the effort failed. And negotiations could be even more difficult this time around.

“Donald Trump thinks it’s still 2019, and he can sit down again with Kim Jong-un and reach a deal” said JOEL WIT, the State Department’s coordinator of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea agreement aimed to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. “Kim Jong-un’s policy is very different from 2019. He’s interested in what Russia and China are interested in, and that is pushing the U.S. out of Northeast Asia.”

The White House told NatSec Daily that “U.S. policy on North Korea has not changed” but didn’t respond to a query about Trump’s possible ambitions for a summit.

The annual Washington-Seoul Consultative Meeting Joint Communique released last month by Defense Secretary PETE HEGSETH and his South Korean counterpart AHN GYU-BACK also hints at a shift in the U.S. security posture toward Pyongyang.

The document called out Pyongyang’s “profound challenges to peace and stability” and recommitted the U.S. to “denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula.

But gone was Biden-era warnings of 2022-2024 that North Korean nuclear aggression “will result in the end of the Kim regime.”

“It’s of a piece with shifting our attention to the Western hemisphere and North Korea as a problem for South Korea and Japan, but not our problem,” said DAVID RANK, former Korea desk official at the State Department in the Clinton administration.

The Pentagon didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Underplaying Pyongyang’s military threat could backfire.

“One thing North Korea doesn’t like is being totally ignored. They have a way of making themselves heard, usually to quite a negative extent,” JAKE SULLIVAN, former national security adviser in the Biden administration, told NatSec Daily. “So we will have to see if Kim Jong-un feels that he needs to rattle the cage.”

5. South Korea-U.S. alliance frictions appear in plain sight

​Summary:

Gen. Xavier Brunson publicly pushed back on Seoul’s goal to complete OPCON transfer by 2030, arguing conditions cannot be relaxed for a political timeline and must be updated for today’s threat environment, including deepened Russia–north Korea cooperation and advancing nuclear delivery systems. The article ties this debate to a second friction point: South Korean prosecutors’ July raid at Osan Air Base while investigating alleged 2024 drone operations tied to the failed martial law episode. After the raid, U.S. forces reportedly tightened gate control, raising SOFA and sovereignty optics, and sharpening alliance trust questions.

Comment: No professional military officer could advocate for a timeline based OPCON transition. Of course politics influences military decisions but military officers must stand firm on their recommendations for the right military course of action to ensure national security. And obviously the political decision will win out in the end and then military officers will salute and execute. But it is not a point of friction for General Brunson so offer his best military advice and recommended that the translation occur when the conditions are met. It only is made a point of friction but political pundits who do not sufficiently understand the role of the military and civil military relations.

That said, we need to get control of the narrative and actions at Osan. That is a point of friction that we must solve and solve quickly. Of course this does not compare to the 2002 tragedy of the Highway 56 incident but the longer these issues of perceived sovereignty fester the greater will be alliance friction.

South Korea-U.S. alliance frictions appear in plain sight

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Friday, December 12, 2025

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/dec/12/south-korea-us-alliance-frictions-appear-plain-sight/

SEOUL, South Korea — The senior U.S. officer in South Korea on Friday made clear that the conditions for a transfer of wartime operational control of Korean troops from Washington’s to Seoul’s command are not yet in place.

U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xaiver Brunson was speaking one day after local reports revealed that the U.S. military was taking full control of access to a joint air base recently raided by Korean investigators on a search-and-seizure mission.

Hovering in the background of both developments are high-profile domestic issues. Both have ramifications for the degree of trust uniting or dividing the two allies.

One of those issues is President Lee Jae-myung’s push to realize “OPCON Transfer” by the end of his term, in 2030.

“I know that, right now, President Lee says he wants to do this during his term of office,” Gen. Brunson told a webinar co-hosted by the Korea Defense Veterans Association and the Korea-U.S. Alliance Forum. “We cannot say we’re going to slide away from the conditions, just so that we can get this done in time.”

The full details of the conditions to be met by the South Korean armed forces have never been made public but are believed to include proven command and control skill sets and technologies, and the acquisition of advanced intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

The conditions also shift as developments on the peninsula shift. The last set of conditions, The Washington Times understands, dates back to the Moon Jae-in administration, in office between 2017 and 2022.

Since then, North Korea has signed a mutual defense treaty with Russia, fought in the Ukraine War and is obtaining Russian military technologies, while also advancing its nuclear stockpile and delivery vehicles.

“The conditions were written for a reason, but we also have to make sure that those conditions are contemporary conditions, because things change,” Gen. Brunson said. “That is, when the conditions were laid out, we had a plan. We now have a new plan. What is going to be required to meet the new plan?”

Seoul controls its own forces in peacetime, but the concept of a wartime command transition from Washington to Seoul was initiated by the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008).

It was subsequently slow-walked by conservative governments.

Customarily, liberal Seoul presidents have sought greater defense sovereignty and autonomy. They include Mr. Lee, who has not only reinvigorated the OPCON Transfer process, but also won approval from U.S. President Trump for the development of a Korean nuclear-powered submarine force during their summit in October.

Conservative Korean presidents, by contrast, have made subordination to the U.S. alliance central to their defense policies — downplaying sovereign capabilities such as nuclear subs and aircraft carriers.

Defense pundits are wary of OPCON Transfer, which would — on paper, at least — make the 28,000 Americans in U.S. Forces Korea subordinate to a Korean general.

At present, the allies’ joint warfighting mechanism, Combined Forces Command, is led by a U.S. four-star general, with a Korean general as his deputy.

Pundits do not believe that Washington would permit U.S. forces to be commanded by a foreign general. They also fret that, if CFC were disbanded, unity of command would be lost.

These factors speak to broader fears: That OPCON Transfer could trigger a downsizing of U.S. forces in Korea and a related dilution of Washington’s commitment to Seoul’s defense.

The other domestic issue that has generated alliance friction stems from Mr. Lee’s wide-ranging probe into the botched attempt by former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s government to install martial law in December 2024.

Mr. Yoon, his wife and several of his senior officials are in jail, pending trials. The investigation has also ensnared religious groups, civil servants and private citizens.

It is being conducted by empowered and zealous prosecutors, who, in July, raided Osan Air Base. South of Seoul. Osan houses major U.S units, including the 7th Air Force HQ, fighter squadrons and intelligence assets, as well as Korean commands.

Leading vernacular media, the Chosun Ilbo, citing informed sources, reported Thursday that the U.S. is taking full control of base access. The Chosun’s exclusive was fleshed out by other media reports, which confirmed the report with U.S. units, who said new gate controls would enhance security.

At the time of the raid, the U.S. controlled two gates to the base, while a third gate, through which the investigators entered, was jointly operated.

Prosecutors were reportedly seeking radar data to confirm suspicions that the Yoon administration deployed drones over Pyongyang in October 2024 to stoke inter-Korean tensions, laying a firm foundation for martial law.

While the early U.S. response was muted, the raid clearly caused ripples.

In October this year, U.S. 7th Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. David Iverson reportedly wrote to South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, stating that the prosecutors’ entry had violated the Status of Forces Agreement between the two allies.

Prosecutors responded that they encountered no U.S. personnel during their raid, had only investigated Korean personnel and records, and did not violate SOFA.

Yang Uk, a security specialist at Seoul think tank the Asan Institute, is critical of what he considers unrealistic expectations surrounding OPCON Transfer.

Under the current plan, “everyone expects the CFC to be led by a Korean four-star, but the hard truth is, we cannot lead U.S. armed forces,” he said. “I am not even sure there would be a U.S. reinforcement from the U.S. mainland if something happened” in terms of combat with North Korea.

If a contingency did break out, and the CFC was defunct, the presidents of South Korea and the United States would have to bilaterally agree on a joint command agreement — hardly an ideal situation amid a security crisis.

“If there is wartime — nobody declares war anymore — what are the conditions?” wondered Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based academic who teaches international relations at Troy and Yonsei universities. “The Korean president and U.S. president would have to agree to stand up war-fighting structures to maintain unity of command.”

Mr. Yang was grateful to Gen. Brunson for his plain talking.

“He is trying to make people see that we are not there yet; he is trying to speak up,” he said. “USFK is a four-star command, but it could shrink to a three-star command.”

He was critical of the Korean investigators.

“These prosecutors thought they could go all the way into restricted areas,” he said. “USFK was kind of offended, and they should have been. It’s absurd!”

Mr. Pinkston, a U.S. Air Force veteran, offered a different view.

“Yoon was trying an autocoup and declared martial law, and any participation in that is unconstitutional, so why would anyone obstruct [an investigation]?” he wondered. “If the prosecutors had tipped anyone off, they could have removed any incriminating evidence.”

He warned that U.S. resistance to a Korean domestic investigation, conducted by lawful authorities, on sovereign soil, would present a very bad optic.

“If the Americans are being oversensitive, what does that signal?” he asked.

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

6. There's a lot in the way of South Korea acquiring nuclear subs

​Summary:

Even if Washington has signaled approval, South Korea faces hard political, legal, and industrial constraints before it can field nuclear-powered attack submarines. The author says nuclear boats offer speed and endurance, but Seoul’s air independent propulsion fleet can already stay submerged for long periods and carry similar weapons, so the marginal operational gain may not justify the cost and proliferation risk. He warns a South Korean program could spur regional reactions from north Korea, China, and Japan, and complicate NPT norms and IAEA safeguards for naval fuel. Practically, a Philadelphia build is depicted as unlikely, and U.S.–ROK civil nuclear “123” terms may require contentious modification.

Comment: Yes, it is a tough road, or should I say rough seas, ahead. It is possible that we have planted our own land mine, or I should say sea mine, that could really blow up in our faces and be a threat to the alliance if we do not get this right. We have to make it happen on a reasonable timeline that the press, pundits, and public can understand and accept. A big part of this effort beyond the technical, strategic, and geopolitical challenges will be the messaging or narratives surrounding this. We need our public diplomacy and information and influence professionals working on this now, both ROK and US hopefully in a synchronized way.

There's a lot in the way of South Korea acquiring nuclear subs - Asia Times

asiatimes.com 

It’s a complex issue that involves a range of technical, strategic, and geopolitical considerations

by George M. Moore

December 12, 2025

https://asiatimes.com/2025/12/theres-a-lot-in-the-way-of-south-korea-acquiring-nuclear-subs/

The recent US decision to approve South Korea’s possession of nuclear-powered submarines may shift the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and affect Asian peace and security generally.

South Korean nuclear submarines could accelerate the arms race in Asia and impact geopolitical relations beyond Asia. They may undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and international norms and agreements discouraging the spread of advanced weapons systems. Both the United States and South Korea should reflect on these concerns before proceeding.

President Trump met South Korean President Lee Jae-myung during his late October 2025 trip to South Korea for APEC. In addition to new trade agreements, the White House said Trump approved South Korean requests to build nuclear-powered attack submarines and the United States agreed to work closely with South Korea on this project, including avenues to acquire nuclear fuel.

On his Truth Social platform, Trump stated that the submarines would be constructed in a former US shipyard in Philadelphia now run by the South Korean conglomerate Hanwa. “I have given them approval to build a nuclear-powered submarine, rather than the old-fashioned, and far less nimble, diesel-powered submarines that they have now,” Trump’s Truth Social posting stated.

Geopolitical, technological, and strategic considerations

South Korea has been interested in developing nuclear-powered submarines for a long time. With the threat of North Korea’s stockpile of nuclear weapons and missile delivery vehicles, South Korea feels that increased naval strength could act as an offset and perhaps minimize reliance on the US “nuclear umbrella.”

South Korea currently operates 21 conventional submarines, including three ballistic missile submarines, with its older submarines purchased from Germany. Since the early ‘90s South Korean submarines have been built in the Daewoo and Hyundai shipyards in South Korea under license from Germany.

Approximately half of South Korean submarines use some form of air independent propulsion (AIP). Conventional submarines use AIP to stay submerged for protracted periods, such as 30 days, without needing to surface or snorkel.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has a long-term expansion plan to expand its conventional submarine force. Since 2017 the ROKN has looked at arming new attack submarines with Tomahawk-like cruise missiles and considered building prospective KSS-3 attack submarines with nuclear power plants.

South Korea may be driven to acquire nuclear submarines by the vessels’ perceived military prestige. They may also view nuclear-powered submarines as a potential counterbalance to North Korea’s nuclear weapons. However, compared with conventional AIP submarines, the main advantage of nuclear-powered attack submarines is speed. Conventional AIP attack submarines can carry the same weapons systems as the far more expensive nuclear-powered submarines.

Joining the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, India, and potentially Brazil (with its indigenous program) and Australia (via the joint AUKUS program) would put South Korea in a prestigious group. Yet at the same time, it might increase the desires of North Korea, Pakistan, Japan and even Iran to expedite their expressed interests in nuclear-powered submarines.

Although South Korea’s interest in nuclear submarines is quite high, non-nuclear submarine options might work best for Seoul. In addition, despite little current interest, South Korea might be better served by an AUKUS-like agreement with the United States or perhaps a leasing arrangement like that used by India to acquire nuclear submarine technology. India leased two nuclear-powered submarines, the first from the Soviet Union and the second from the Russian Federation.

South Korea has the technology to build naval propulsion reactors. Technical guidance from the United States, such as reactor core designs, would be helpful but not necessary. South Korea might look to follow the French and Chinese examples, which use low enriched uranium (LEU) as reactor fuel. These fuels may be a better option for South Korea instead of following the US/UK model of using weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel or the Russian and Indian use of HEU in the range of 40% to 60% enrichment fuel.

South Korea should carefully consider the impact that nuclear-powered submarine construction could have on escalating an arms race with North Korea. North Korea will certainly view any such efforts as a provocation by South Korea as well as the US and may respond in ways that upset the regional balance of power. China could have serious concerns and react negatively to the South Korean plan, and Japan might also worry about elevating conflict possibilities in the region.

The impact on global norms and the NPT

As a non-nuclear weapons state under the NPT, South Korea is allowed to use what in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) parlance is “special fissile material for military purposes” that are not related to nuclear weapons. It is also allowed under the NPT to enrich uranium.

However, materials within South Korea must still be under safeguards and the IAEA has yet to develop a safeguards methodology to deal with material in non-nuclear weapons states, such as Brazil, that are put into military use. An additional question is whether US support of such states’ nuclear-powered submarines will be viewed as undercutting and weakening the NPT. China, Russia, and their partners will argue that it does.

US support of nuclear-powered submarines, either in Australia or South Korea, may weaken US safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. For the United States, doing so will need to be a risk-benefit calculation. The addition of nuclear-powered submarines in Australia and South Korea may provide some counterbalance to China’s growing People’s Liberation Army Navy. But it is unclear if these benefits will outweigh the risks of undercutting nonproliferation efforts and weakening the NPT.

Barriers to actual construction

The use of the old US Navy shipyard in Philadelphia to build South Korea nuclear-powered submarines seems to be a non-starter, or at least a difficult path. It has never been a nuclear shipyard, and it would be necessary to acquire all the permits and technological expertise to make the Philadelphia shipyard nuclear capable. Even if pushed hard by the Trump administration, it undoubtedly would take years before the yard could be approved to begin construction.

So, it appears likely that any construction of South Korean nuclear-powered submarines would be in South Korea, where submarine construction capable shipyards could add staff and expertise to carry out nuclear construction.

A second potential barrier would be the United States’ current 123 agreement with South Korea (one of 26 such agreements the United States has with specific countries for civil nuclear cooperation under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act). Transfer of fuel materials and potential transfers of technology to South Korea would require its modification.

The current agreement only focuses on peaceful uses and there could be an internal US political battle over modification of the current South Korean 123 agreement. While 123 agreements are negotiated by the Department of State, Congress effectively blocked a previous 123 effort in Saudi Arabia.

While these barriers may be overcome under the current US administration, the US 2026 midterm elections or subsequent US elections might result in reversals of any decisions made now on these issues.

George M. Moore, PhD, JD, PE (gmoore@middlebury.edu) is scientist in residence at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. From 2007-2012, Moore was a senior analyst in the Office of Nuclear Security at the International Atomic Energy Agency. He worked with the Incident and Trafficking Database and served as scientific secretary for the Director General’s Advisory Group on Nuclear Security.

asiatimes.com · George M. Moore · December 11, 2025

7. South Korea's Lee steps up as Asia peacemaker

​Summary:

President Lee Jae-myung is casting South Korea as a regional peacemaker amid rising China Japan tensions, a confrontational Beijing Washington relationship, and an unpredictable north Korea. Lee says he will support U.S. north Korea talks and has offered to mediate between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan frictions. Analysts note this is a familiar progressive tradition linked to Kim Dae-jung and Moon Jae-in, but they doubt results because denuclearization is off the table for Pyongyang and Seoul has limited leverage on Taiwan. Lee is considering scaling back allied exercises as a confidence-building step.

Comment: It is also in keeping with South Korea as a global vital state, that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, that is a partner in the arsenal of democracies that supports inthe rules based internal order.

However, scaling back exercises does not build confidence. It only shows and actualizes weakness. Exercises are not a bargaining chip Kim wants - yes he wants exercises to end. But it is not because they are a threat to him and their end will not make him feel more secure. Ending them will not cause him to negotiate responsibly. He wants them to end because it will weaken the military forces and drive a wedge in the alliance and will ultimately lead to removing US troops from the peninsula. This will then give him a perceived military advantage for greater coercion of the South and eventually the capability to use force to achieve his objectives to dominate the Korean peninsula. 

South Korea's Lee steps up as Asia peacemaker – DW – 12/11/2025

DW

Julian Ryall

12/11/2025December 11, 2025

President Lee Jae-myung is positioning South Korea as a mediator in Northeast Asia, aiming to ease tensions between North Korea, the US, China and Japan as rivalries deepen.

https://www.dw.com/en/south-koreas-lee-steps-up-as-asia-peacemaker/a-75113360?maca=en-RSS_en_Flipboard-9487-xml-media

With tensions rising between China and Japan, the Beijing-Washington relationship confrontational, and North Korea something of a wild card in the worsening geopolitical and security situation in Northeast Asia, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is putting himself forward as a peacemaker.

Lee told reporters in Seoul last week that he would "do everything possible to support US-North Korea talks."

The same day, he offered to mediate between Beijing and Tokyo to ease tensions that have risen over the issue of Taiwan and has made it clear that he intends to restore communication channels with Pyongyang in order to achieve "peaceful coexistence."

Lee, who has only been in office since June, has offered to act as a mediator in the various bilateral and multilateral disputes that threaten to boil over into outright conflict.

Some analysts say that despite his best intentions, however, the rifts appear to be so deep and intractable that it would be difficult for any statesman to bring the rival sides together.

"It has been a kind of tradition for progressive parties in South Korea to try to be the broker for peace in tense situations in the region, going back to the time of Kim Dae-jung," said Choo Jae-woo, a professor of foreign policy at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.

Taiwan minister to DW: 'You cannot be naive' with China

'Sunshine Policy' to North Korea

Kim Dae-jung served as South Korea's president between 1998 and 2003 and was famous for the "Sunshine Policy" towards North Korea. That effort at detente earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000, although Choo says much has changed since.

President Moon Jae-in came close to achieving a breakthrough in relations between the US and North Korea, Choo points out, helping to set up historic in-person meetings between Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump in Singapore and Hanoi during the US leader's first term in office. The effort ultimately failed.

"The situation is very different today, and that is why I am skeptical," said Choo.

"Detente between the US and North Korea is almost impossible mainly because the issue of denuclearization is no longer on the agenda for North Korea."

"Kim has flat out stated that he will not negotiate away his nuclear weapons for the vague promise of security," Choo told DW, adding that "he no longer cares about sanctions because he has formed a security and trade alliance with Russia."

Equally, it will be extremely difficult for Lee to insert himself in the debate over the future of Taiwan as South Korea is geographically more distant from the self-ruling island, which Beijing sees as a renegade province and has vowed to "reunite" it with the mainland, by force if necessary.

There is also a degree of political and public resistance to South Korea becoming embroiled in what could quickly spiral into a military confrontation, particularly as the South already has a serious threat on its northern border.

Lee aims to avoid 'hot war'

Despite the obvious challenges, President Lee appears to be intent on pushing ahead with efforts to ensure the deepening "cold war" in Northeast Asia does not turn hot.

Chinese, Russian and North Korean leaders meet in Beijing

Lee's most immediate concern appears to be North Korea, an issue he addressed in a roundtable interview with journalists earlier this month. Asked about his plans to act as a "pacemaker" in moving the Washington-Pyongyang alliance forward, Lee was optimistic.

"North Korea sees regime preservation as its most critical goal, and it believes the US — not South Korea — is the key player capable of guaranteeing that," The Korea Herald quoted Lee as saying.

"But in reality, the direct stakeholders in the situation on the Korean Peninsula are South and North Korea, unfortunately. So we can't just stand by and do nothing."

Trump "has a strong will for peace," he said, emphasizing the need for communication, cooperation and negotiation between North Korea and the US.

"We will do our best to support the necessary conditions for North Korea-US dialogue in every way we can," he said.

Simply expressing that ambition could be helpful in moving the relationship forward, he suggested. He is also considering scaling back joint US-South Korean military exercises as a confidence-building measure.

Lee has also addressed the relationship between China and Japan, which has become increasingly fraught in the weeks since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in the Diet that any Chinese aggression against Taiwan would inevitably be a matter of national security for Japan.

Why are China and the US so fixated on Taiwan?

'Role of mediator'

Lee said Seoul would not take sides in the dispute and that his administration would try to "play the role of mediator" in order to ease the tensions, which have seen heated diplomatic exchanges and ramped up activity by the Chinese military in areas close to Japan.

That has included operations by an aircraft carrier fleet off Japan and Chinese fighters locking their missile radar systems onto Japanese aircraft.

"Lee is trying to be more proactive in regional diplomacy and I think that reflects the pragmatism of this current administration, but most people feel that the Taiwan issue is not one that South Korea should be involved in," said Lim Eun-jung, a professor of international studies at Kongju National University.

"Nobody is against Lee trying to play this role and I think everyone agrees that it is necessary and important, but we realize that it is going to be very difficult to actually achieve anything," she said.

"Lee wants South Korea to be a 'good global citizen' and a partner to everyone and an enemy to no one," she added.

"But in reality, getting these countries to agree is too much to expect."

Edited by: Keith Walker

DW

8. US General Says Drills ‘Absolutely’ Needed as Korea Floats Shift

​Summary:

Bloomberg reports Gen. Xavier Brunson, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, said combined spring and summer drills are absolutely necessary to preserve peace, even as Seoul officials float adjusting exercises to encourage dialogue with north Korea. Brunson argued deterrence and pressure come from sustained allied training and timely investments, and warned Russia north Korea collaboration is real and shaping tactics. In Washington, the Nuclear Consultative Group reaffirmed extended deterrence, including nuclear capabilities. POTUS paused some drills during summit diplomacy, but Brunson said the alliance cannot trade readiness for hope. He cautioned OPCON transfer must meet updated conditions, not deadlines.

Comment: It is good that more media is picking up the ROK/US Combined Forces Command Commander's remarks.

As an aside we should remember that in 1993 we conducted the last Team Spirit and later we shifted the fall exercise Foal Eagle to the late winter/spring and combined it with RSO&I which is now one exercise of Freedom Shield. And at one time we had Ulchi Focus Lens in August followed by Ulchi Focus Clear in January. Thus we had four annual exercises rather than the two. (Ulchi Focus Lens (August after the conclusion of the north Korean Summer Training Cycle- and to train the new ROK and US theater staff after summer transition); Foal Eagle (October - a special operations and rear area defense exercise); Ulchi Focus Clear (a theater exercises built non UFL in August to continued advanced theater command and control training); and then Team Spirit (in March to coincide with the end of the north Korean Winter training Cycle after which north Korean forces were brought to their highest state of readiness at the optimal attack time of the South when the ground was still frozen. Team Spirit was the largest exercise in the free world and combined massive ROK military mobilization with the largest reinforcement of US forces to the peninsula).  What the reduction to two annual exercises resulted in: A greater hostile policy from the north.

US General Says Drills ‘Absolutely’ Needed as Korea Floats Shift

General Xavier BrunsonSource: AFP

By Soo-hyang Choi

December 11, 2025 at 10:17 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-12/us-general-says-drills-absolutely-needed-as-korea-floats-shift?utm

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

• The top US commander on the Korean peninsula said regular exercises between the allies are “absolutely” necessary to maintain peace and impose pressure on North Korea.
• General Xavier Brunson said “Russian-DPRK collaboration is real” and that the allies need to conduct their activities to provide the deterrent effect that’s born of the alliance.
• The US reaffirmed its commitment to provide extended deterrence to South Korea “utilizing the full range of US defense capabilities, including nuclear” during a nuclear consultative group meeting in Washington.

The top US commander on the Korean peninsula said regular exercises between the allies are “absolutely” necessary to maintain peace and impose pressure on North Korea after officials in Seoul floated adjusting the drills to facilitate dialogue with the nuclear-armed neighbor.

“Russian-DPRK collaboration is real. It is not a quid-pro-quo relationship. It is real,” General Xavier Brunson, the commander of US forces in South Korea, said in a webinar on Thursday. DPRK stands for the North’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“Whenever someone talks about, I don’t care who it is, talks about exercising less or exercising differently, and they need to understand that there are two times in a year where we absolutely need some support,” Brunson said. He was apparently referring to the allies’ regular drills in the spring and summer that involve some 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea.

The general’s remarks appeared to take a different stance to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, who said over a week ago he’s open to reviewing Seoul’s joint military drills with the US if it would help America resume talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Lee’s national security adviser later said Seoul is not considering drills adjustment as an option right now but the country’s point man on North Korea, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, told reporters this week that they should be able to discuss the issue to start negotiations with Pyongyang.

Read more: Top US Admiral Says Korea’s New Sub Should Keep China in Check

When President Donald Trump pursued talks with Kim during his first term, Washington paused some of the drills which North Korea has long bristled at. Trump and Kim met three times, but those talks failed to persuade the North Korean leader to abandon his nuclear ambitions.

“The only way we can get about solving that is pressure, is provided by our ability to conduct our activities and make the right investments in time now so that we provide the deterrent effect that’s born of this alliance,” Brunson said, calling peace on the peninsula among the “most fragile.”

• Read more on North Korea and regional security:Kim Sent Russia Millions of Artillery Shells, South Korea Says
• North Korea Fires Multiple Missiles as Trump Prepares APEC Trip
• South Korea Scrambles Jets as Chinese, Russia Warplanes Near
• Trump Approves US-Built Nuclear-Powered Sub For South Korea

In an episode highlighting that fragility, South Korea and Japan scrambled jets on Tuesday as Russian and Chinese warplanes flew around their territory. Just hours after the joint flight near the peninsula, North Korea fired multiple rockets off its western coast, South Korea’s military said.

“There are things that we know that are happening right now that give me pause as I look at what might face us down the road by virtue of some of the things that are going on — whether that be training, whether that be tactic techniques and procedures that they’re learning from the front, whether that be things going on in the winter training cycle that we see right now,” Brunson said, referring to the partnership between North Korea and Russia.

In Washington, the US held a nuclear consultative group meeting with South Korea on Thursday and reaffirmed its commitment to provide extended deterrence to the Asian ally “utilizing the full range of US defense capabilities, including nuclear.”

Read more: South Korea Scrambles Jets as Chinese, Russia Warplanes Near

On South Korea’s long-standing wish to bring back the wartime operational control from the US, the general said meeting conditions is more important than meeting a timeline. The Lee administration has been pushing for the OPCON transfer by the end of his five-year term.

“We cannot say we’re gonna slide away from the conditions just so that we can get this done in time,” the commander said. “The conditions were written for a reason, but we also have to make sure that those conditions are contemporary conditions because things change.”

Soo-hyang Choi is a reporter for Bloomberg News in Seoul.

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9. How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea

​Summary:

South Korea’s nuclear submarine push risks becoming a proliferation on-ramp. Nuclear boats carry prestige, range, speed, and stealth, but they are far costlier than advanced diesel submarines and may not fit Seoul’s near seas mission as well as anti submarine warfare investments. The sharper concern is the reported U.S. opening to South Korean uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for “peaceful uses,” which would create a latent weapons option and weaken long standing efforts to limit those technologies. Seoul can cite spent fuel management and export competitiveness, but the authors note dry cask storage and a saturated enrichment market. Process choices and safeguards will determine whether the deal stabilizes or destabilizes Asia.

Comment: So far, South Korea has chosen to be a peaceful nuclear power.

How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea

thebulletin.org  · December 12, 2025

By Sharon Squassoni | December 12, 2025

https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/how-nuclear-submarines-could-pave-the-way-for-nuclear-weapons-in-south-korea/

The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky (SSBN 737) pulls into port in Busan, South Korea, on July 18, 2023. A recent deal will allow South Korea to build its own nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the United States. (Credit: Michael Chen/US Navy)

The mystique of nuclear-powered submarines has been captured by at least half a dozen popular Hollywood films. Some have centered on the drama of undersea warfare and the risk of global nuclear apocalypse should the nuclear-tipped missiles aboard most of them be launched. Others confront the issues of rogue submarine commanders or the dilemmas of decision-making when out of communication with national leadership. One or two, including Kathryn Bigelow’s K-19 Widowmaker, portray real-world disasters of a reactor meltdown aboard submarines. (Bigelow is also the director of the new film, A House of Dynamite, which depicts the last 20 minutes before a nuclear-armed missile of unknown origin falls on an American city.)

The underlying message of these fictional works is that nuclear submarines—powered by reactors and armed with atomic missiles—are a tightrope act. One misstep could endanger many, many lives.

The United States’ recent nuclear submarine deal with South Korea is a tightrope act for a different reason. Lost in the noise about nuclear submarines, the Trump administration has agreed to let South Korea enrich uranium and reprocess commercial nuclear spent fuel. This step—which could give South Korea a virtual or latent nuclear weapons capability—is needlessly destabilizing.

US nuclear technology exports. In the last five years, the United States has made deals with Australia and South Korea to hasten the day when some countries will deploy nuclear-powered submarines that don’t carry nuclear missiles. Under the 2021 AUKUS deal (a partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Australia will build nuclear-powered submarines using UK reactors and US highly enriched uranium fuel at the latest estimated cost of $368 billion. And in October, South Korea scored a political coup in convincing US President Donald Trump to allow its pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines.

South Korea has sought nuclear-powered submarines for more than 30 years. Sparked by the first international crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Seoul has dabbled in the relevant technologies in an on-again, off-again fashion. Past forays included a 1994 directive to the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute to design a nuclear-powered submarine (cancelled in 1998) and the so-called “362” covert task force formed in 2003 that reportedly utilized Russian help to design a submarine reactor. This task force was disbanded in 2004 after South Korean officials revealed that scientists had enriched uranium without declaring it to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

More recently, Moon Jae-in campaigned on South Korea acquiring nuclear-powered submarines in 2017, and Korean officials since 2020 have suggested that their next generation of submarines would be nuclear-powered. Speculation persists over whether South Korean efforts to develop small modular reactors fueled with 19.5 percent high-assay low-enriched uranium could be adapted or modified for naval applications.

Many details about South Korea’s nuclear submarines are still unknown— when, where, and how they will be built. Those details will matter a great deal in terms of the proliferation implications. Allowing South Korea to indigenously produce its own nuclear submarines could be riskier than if South Korea were to purchase US subs or the reactors that go into these subs.

Nuclear-powered vs. nuclear-armed. Nuclear-powered submarines make total sense to nuclear weapon states, which weigh the risks and costs of these vehicles against the benefits of stealth, range, and having a platform for assured, nuclear retaliation. (In theory, such submarines can enhance stability because they provide assured destruction in case an opponent seeks advantage by striking first—the so-called delicate balance of terror.) Already engaged in high-cost and high-risk nuclear projects, nuclear-powered submarines are not a huge step up for countries with nuclear weapons.

For countries without nuclear weapons, however, the costs far outweigh the benefits.

Per unit, a single modern diesel-electric attack submarine with air-independent propulsion costs between $500 million and $900 million. A modern nuclear-powered attack submarine will cost between $3 billion and $4 billion each, based on the current cost of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines in the United States, a country with experience in building such ships. This is on top of the considerable investment in shipbuilding that countries like South Korea and Australia would have to make. For instance, South Korea has vowed to invest $350 billion in the United States, of which half will be spent on US shipbuilding.

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The benefits of nuclear-powered submarines are well-known, including unlimited range, stealth, and speed. But a closer look at South Korea’s requirements suggests that those benefits are ill-matched to South Korea’s strategic challenges. South Korean officials have stated they need nuclear-powered submarines to counter North Korea’s missiles and nuclear weapons. North Korea does not yet have a nuclear-powered submarine, but it can operate in the relatively shallow West Sea (Yellow Sea), where large, nuclear-powered subs cannot. In the East Sea, North Korea has demonstrated it can deploy 50 or more submarines simultaneously—an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) nightmare for South Korea. According to one US naval analyst, South Korea would be much better off devoting its resources to ASW in coordination with the United States.

This brings us to the second major point about the US-South Korea nuclear deal. Lost in the noise about nuclear submarines was the quieter agreement for the United States to allow South Korea to enrich uranium and reprocess commercial nuclear spent fuel. The White House fact sheet issued in November declared US support for “the process that will lead to [South Korea]’s civil uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for peaceful uses.”

South Korean officials long have lobbied the United States to grant this approval, which the United States has only rarely granted to countries without nuclear weapons and certainly not to countries that do not already have such capabilities. Since the mid-1970s, the United States has actively sought to discourage the spread of these technologies to additional countries—renouncing reprocessing itself—and persuaded all other countries to adopt similar policies.

South Korea signed the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which stated that North and South Korea would not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. Of course, North Korea subsequently used both of those processes to make fissile material for weapons. Although some observers maintain South Korea’s desire for such capabilities is aimed at cultivating a latent nuclear weapons capability to match Japan’s and to signal to North Korea, South Korean officials have suggested they need such capabilities for civil nuclear purposes.

For reprocessing specifically, South Korean officials have argued that it is necessary to manage its spent nuclear fuel for political, psychological, and physical reasons, including the fact that its spent fuel cooling pools are running out of space. South Korea has been developing and advocating pyroprocessing, an electro-reduction process which it claims is more proliferation-resistant than the aqueous process (called PUREX) developed to separate plutonium for bombs from nuclear waste. But a 2008 study by the Energy Department found that pyroprocessing is not more proliferation-resistant than reprocessing. South Korea does not yet have a geological repository for the permanent disposal of radioactive waste, but it does have dry cask storage for spent nuclear fuel, which can store fuel for at least 100 years.

To gain US approval to enrich uranium, South Korean officials have argued that its nuclear exports would be more attractive if it offered a more complete range of fuel cycle services. However, the uranium enrichment services market has been saturated, particularly after fuel demand dropped in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. It is hard to see how a new uranium-enriching country like South Korea could compete with well-established companies like Urenco. Moreover, only Russia has a vertically integrated nuclear sector, and its success in nuclear export markets can be tied clearly to preferential financing agreements, rather than better and cheaper enrichment or reprocessing technology. France also possesses and uses these capacities, but they have not helped its attractiveness as a nuclear reactor exporter.

Indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities, however, would be quite useful for naval reactors, because such applications are prohibited by many peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements between countries.

Process is everything. A strict reading of the White House fact sheet suggests that the nuclear submarine program and US consent for South Korea to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel are two separate issues. In other words, this deal is not providing a green light for South Korea to enrich uranium for its own naval fuel program precisely because naval propulsion, by definition, is a military purpose, albeit non-explosive.

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Although international nuclear safeguards allow for withdrawal of naval fuel from inspections (under paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153 agreements, so-called full-scope safeguards agreements), US peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements prohibit all military purposes. Any assistance on enrichment or reprocessing provided from the United States to South Korea could not be applied to the nuclear submarine program. This is ironic because military uses of enrichment and reprocessing are perhaps the strongest rationales to engage in these activities that are, by and large, unprofitable for the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. (Countries with advanced enrichment programs can make it profitable, but not newcomers.)

It is not clear where South Korea could acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology. It has developed small-scale laser enrichment and pyroprocessing, but neither of these processes has been proven on an industrial or commercial scale. In theory, South Korea could receive commercial enrichment or reprocessing technology from any member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group since it meets all of the restrictive criteria under paragraphs 6 and 7 of the group’s guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Rev 1). However, supplying South Korea with enrichment or reprocessing technology—or both—would set a precedent for the group, which has not approved such transfers in the past, precisely because of the proliferation risk these technologies pose.

Next steps. The current 2015 US-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement allows for the possibility of the United States consenting to South Korean enrichment of up to 20 percent uranium 235 and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel of US origin. Therefore, the agreement itself does not require amendment to allow South Korea to enrich. Instead, negotiators will design so-called “subsequent arrangements,” which will detail how all the US nonproliferation requirements (section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act) will be fulfilled in the facilities where these activities take place. Presumably, any actions would be preceded by a meeting of the High-Level Bilateral Commission set up under the 2015 agreement.

For a subsequent arrangement, the Energy Secretary must demonstrate that the arrangements are not inimical to the common defense and national security and publish notice in the Federal Register. After 15 days, the arrangements will take effect unless challenged by Congress. In the case of the US-India deal, for instance, it took five years between the conclusion of the nuclear cooperation agreement and the entry into force of reprocessing subsequent arrangements.

For sale: Nuclear proliferation technologies. President Trump’s propensity to make deals is well-known, and his October trip to Asia was described by his White House staff as an opportunity to “close major trade deals, secure huge investments and dramatically advance peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.”

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung seemed to handily pluck the most coveted fruit from the White House’s nuclear orchard—the technologies that could allow South Korea to resuscitate a long-dormant nuclear weapons program and a secure platform to deliver any nuclear weapons it might develop in the future. And all this for a few hundred billion dollars. But instead of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, Trump’s moves are likely to advance nuclear weapons proliferation and instability.

The more Seoul insists on building nuclear submarines itself, the more likely it may find it expedient to develop its own enrichment technology for that purpose. After all, it has been working on such technologies for decades on a small scale. While South Korea would be viewed as a preferred buyer in light of its current nonproliferation credentials, it will still be bound by other countries’ restrictions on peaceful uses for enrichment.

Any enrichment and reprocessing facilities will, of course, be subject to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency because South Korea is a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But indigenous development—particularly in contrast to an approach wherein the technology would be “black-boxed” (or, made inaccessible)—could facilitate a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

The Trump administration’s blessing of South Korean enrichment and reprocessing is akin to bestowing latent nuclear-weapon-state status upon South Korea. In a region that is already bristling with tactical, medium-range, and long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, such a step is needlessly destabilizing.

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thebulletin.org · François Diaz-Maurin · December 12, 2025

10. Rookie Minister Gets $7 Billion to Catch US, China in AI Arena

​Summary:

South Korea’s Lee administration is betting on AI to restart growth and compete with the US and China. New Science and ICT Minister Bae Kyung-Hoon, now deputy minister, targets Korea as a top three AI power. AI spending will more than triple to 10.1 trillion won ($6.9 billion) next year. Priorities are compute and infrastructure: renewable data centers with BlackRock and procurement of Nvidia GPUs, including 50,000 accelerator chips within a 260,000 GPU supply. A national program backs competing foundation models, narrowing to two finalists. Next phase pursues physical AI with Nvidia and Hyundai and recruits 2,000 researchers by 2030.

Comment: South Korea has a history of capturing or coming to dominate industries: Shipbuilding, steel production, consumer goods, electronics, technology, cell phones, chips, EV batteries, and more. It will likely play a dominant role in AI as well.

Rookie Minister Gets $7 Billion to Catch US, China in AI Arena

Bae Kyung-HoonPhotographer: Woohae Cho/Bloomberg

By Yoolim Lee

December 11, 2025 at 5:00 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/science-minister-seeks-to-turn-korea-into-a-global-ai-powerhouse?sref=hhjZtX76

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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• Bae Kyung-Hoon was named South Korea's new science minister in July and is charged with transforming the country into a global AI superpower.
• The Lee administration is counting on AI to help reboot economic growth and has decided to more than triple its AI spending to 10.1 trillion won next year.
• Bae has moved quickly to invest in AI infrastructure, including a deal with Nvidia Corp. to purchase accelerator chips and a plan to attract top engineers and researchers from overseas.

Until he was named South Korea’s new science minister in July, Bae Kyung-Hoon was largely unknown in political circles, having spent his career focused on computer science.

Now, the surprise pick by President Lee Jae Myung is charged with an ambitious agenda: transforming the country into a global AI superpower.

Specifically, Lee wants Bae to help secure the country’s spot among the world’s top three AI powers. With the US and China now locked in a race for dominance, Bae thinks it’s possible for Seoul to chart its own course.

“There are several countries vying to be No. 3, but we don’t see ourselves as just another contender in that pack,” Bae, Science and ICT Minister, said in an interview with Bloomberg News. “We believe we have a real shot at becoming a serious global player — one capable of challenging the top two.”

The Lee administration is counting on AI to help reboot economic growth after months of political turmoil under former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was ousted following a botched attempt to impose martial law. Its decision to more than triple its AI spending to 10.1 trillion won ($6.9 billion) next year also comes as Korea’s traditional growth engines in manufacturing and exports, such as semiconductors and autos, are facing intensifying competition from China.

Since taking the job, Bae has moved quickly. Working with senior presidential secretary for AI Ha Jung-Woo, Bae agreed with BlackRock Inc. Chief Executive Officer Larry Fink to jointly invest in renewable energy-powered, large-scale data centers in Korea.

The government also struck a deal with Nvidia Corp. CEO Jensen Huang to purchase 50,000 of the company’s sought-after accelerator chips for the use of AI computing. It was part of more than 260,000 of its graphics processing units Nvidia agreed to supply to the ministry and Korea’s leading companies including Samsung Electronics Co.

Huang said the deal would help make Korea one of the leading nations in AI infrastructure. “Korea has a great chance to be a regional AI hub and one of the largest AI hubs in the world,” he told reporters after the move was announced in October.

Bae Kyung-Hoon, far left, next to Jensen Huang, Lee Jae Myung, and Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun in Oct. 2025.Photographer: Jung Yeon-je/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

Bae, whose mandate was expanded in October when he was also named deputy prime minister, hadn’t planned on working in government. In fact, he said, he thought he was being pranked when he first received a call about the job.

The 49-year-old earned a doctorate in computer vision from Seoul’s Kwangwoon University and spent years at affiliates of Samsung, SK and LG before becoming the inaugural head of LG AI Research in 2020. At LG’s research arm, he led the development of the group’s large language model, Exaone — an initiative he proposed and won backing for from LG Group Chairman Koo Kwang-mo.

Exaone 4.0, the newest version of that model, was highlighted in Microsoft Corp.’s 2025 AI Diffusion Report as Korea’s leading frontier model, just 5.9 months behind OpenAI’s GPT-5. Bae said one reason the research arm was so successful was that he replaced the organization’s rigid hierarchy and compensation with more merit-based systems, allowing it to attract and retain top engineering talent.

Despite his early reservations, Bae accepted the role after realizing that he could have a far greater impact by pushing for policies such as securing GPUs at scale for South Korean researchers and tech companies.

Since his appointment, the ministry has launched a national project to select Korea’s foundational AI models. Five teams — led by Naver Cloud, Upstage, SK Telecom Co., NC AI and LG AI Research — were chosen in August to compete to come up with the best model. Under the program, one team will be eliminated roughly every six months until two finalists remain.

“We don’t have the capital or talent pools of the US or China,” Bae said. “The idea is to concentrate resources through competition.”

In October, he also signed a three-party agreement with Nvidia and Hyundai Motor Co. to jointly develop physical AI, in which the technology is used for robotics and autonomous vehicles. The following month, he announced a plan to attract around 2,000 top engineers and researchers from overseas in key fields including AI by 2030.

Bae said the current investment in AI infrastructure will lay the groundwork for physical AI. This, he said, will be as critical for Korea’s economy as the internet was decades ago.

“There’s a real sense of urgency that if we don’t get this right, our economy could be put at risk,” he said.

Follow all new stories by Yoolim Lee

11. A top South Korean shipbuilder is arming the Philippines with a new fleet of warships built for tougher Pacific fights

​

Summary:

South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries built two HDF-3200 guided-missile frigates for the Philippine Navy, with BRP Diego Silang commissioned in December after BRP Miguel Malvar entered service. The ships add capability: 16-cell vertical launch systems for VL MICA surface-to-air missiles and eight C-Star anti-ship missiles, giving Manila air defense and sea-denial options in the South China Sea. The $550 million 2021 deal extends a broader Korea-Philippines naval partnership, with more patrol vessels under construction. Paired with expanded exercises with the US and partners and planned submarines, these upgrades raise the costs of Chinese gray-zone coercion while requiring escalation management.

Comment: A partner in the arsenal of democracies.

A top South Korean shipbuilder is arming the Philippines with a new fleet of warships built for tougher Pacific fights

Business Insider · Chris Panella

Dec 12, 2025, 8:06 AM ET

https://www.businessinsider.com/top-south-korean-shipbuilder-arming-philippines-with-new-frigates-2025-12

The Philippine Navy commissioned the BRP Diego Silang frigate earlier this month. Philippine Navy

2025-12-12T13:06:01.279Z

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• The Philippine Navy has two new guided-missile frigates built by South Korean shipbuilder HD Hyundai.
• The Philippines is pursuing a massive military modernization initiative.
• The frigates and other upgrades better arm the Philippines to counter China in the South China Sea.

One of South Korea's top shipbuilders is turning out new warships for the Philippines as Manila accelerates its naval modernization.

The new frigates mark a major upgrade for the Philippine fleet, offering the country a more credible defense as China turns up the pressure in the South China Sea.

The historically obsolete Philippine naval force is now modernizing to meet current and future threats. "The Philippine Navy is professional and getting stronger," Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute, told Business Insider. He said that "adding two guided-missile frigates to their very small fleet means that China's no longer running alone in the arms competition in the South China Sea."

South Korean shipbuilder HD Hyundai Heavy Industries has built two HDF-3200 Hybrid frigates for the Philippines. The second vessel, BRP Diego Silang, was commissioned earlier this month, over six months after the first-in-class BRP Miguel Malvar entered service.

Both vessels bring added firepower to the Philippine Navy. They're the first Philippine warships to have vertical launch systems for missiles, a modern capability that allows the Philippines to carry and fire VL MICA surface-to-air missiles made by MBDA, a European missile company. The frigates also carry eight SSM-700K C-Star anti-ship missiles made by South Korea.

Ted ALJIBE/AFP

Warship vertical launch systems can be refreshed with new weapons over time. They shoot missiles straight upward before they arc toward their targets, a design that works well in all conditions. Each frigate has 16 cells, allowing the Philippines to tailor its missile loadouts for different missions.

The $550 million contract for the two frigates dates to 2021 and is the latest in a string of deals between HD Hyundai and Manila. The premier South Korean shipbuilder is also constructing six offshore patrol vessels and has discussed additional projects. In all, it has built 10 ships for the Philippine Navy.

"As we strengthen our defense industry network with the Philippines and other key Southeast Asian countries, we plan to identify additional potential demand and continuously expand our business competitiveness in the region," the company told Business Insider in a statement.

As Manila races to modernize its military, new warships give its navy much-needed heft in a region where China now fields the world's largest fleet and increasingly throws its weight around.

The South China Sea has been a hotbed of Chinese aggression, accidents, and close-calls in recent years, with Beijing's navy, coast guard, and maritime militia vessels frequently harassing Philippine fishing boats, spraying them with water cannons, chasing them down, and even ramming into them.

Within the contested region, the Philippines' new frigates and firepower now pose a potential challenge for China.

"They would be taking a very big chance of being sunk or knocked out of the sky if they start to push around these frigates," Cronin said of China's ships and planes. Strategies on both sides of this long-running dispute will, however, need to be managed carefully to avoid escalation and a shift from gray-zone aggression to conflict.

Anadolu/Anadolu via Getty Images

China fields a huge coast guard, backed by some of the world’s largest cutters, and typically relies on it for confrontations in the South China Sea while its navy hangs back. In a recent encounter, a Chinese navy destroyer joined in the chase of a Philippine patrol ship. Its unsafe maneuvering at sea led to it slamming into one of China’s own coast guard vessels.

"It is part of China's standard operating procedure to intentionally engage in unsafe behavior and create risks of collision at sea and in the air," Gregory Poling, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Business Insider at the time.

The Philippines has been investing in other military might to counter China as well.

Manila's Archipelagic Defense Concept, for instance, has included the acquisition of more missile systems and better intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to monitor its waters. Additionally, more military exercises and deeper cooperation between the Philippines, US, Australia, and other Pacific parnters is also helping better prepare Manila.

The Philippines is also planning for a fleet of submarines, with another South Korean shipbuilder, Hanwha Ocean, pitching an offer to build diesel-electric submarines earlier this year, as well as construct a submarine base, with support for local maintenance, repair, overhaul, and training.

Newer submarines would provide the Philippine Navy with additional ways to patrol and monitor activity within its waters and deter foes.

Business Insider · Chris Panella

12. Leaving Too Much to Chance (South Korea Policy)

​

Summary:

President Lee Jae Myung’s E.N.D. policy (Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization) largely repackages prior progressive sequencing and underestimates how much north Korea’s posture has changed since 2019. Pyongyang no longer treats denuclearization as a negotiable horizon, has codified the South as a separate hostile state, and dismantled inter Korean institutions, so old formulas and new slogans will not shift behavior. Lee’s outreach to POTUS as a “peacemaker” risks talks that define “peace” on terms that marginalize Seoul. Seoul’s priority should be tight U.S.–ROK alignment, clear red lines, and agenda shaping before any U.S.–DPRK talks.

Comment: We cannot deal with north Korea as we thought it was in the past or what we wish it to be, but rather as it really is based on shared assumptions of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Leaving Too Much to Chance

By Jenny Town

Senior Fellow and 38 North Director, Stimson Center

December 12, 2025

koreaonpoint.org · KOREA ON POINT

https://koreaonpoint.org/articles/article_detail.php?idx=517

Key Takeaways:

- President Lee’s E.N.D. policy repackages familiar progressive sequencing—exchange, normalization, then denuclearization—but does little to reflect how fundamentally North Korea’s posture has changed since 2019.

- Pyongyang no longer accepts denuclearization as a negotiating horizon and has redefined inter-Korean relations in ways that old formulas and new slogans cannot reverse.

- As Lee encourages Trump’s “peacemaker” instincts, Seoul’s most urgent task is not rebranding policy but shaping U.S.–ROK alignment ahead of any U.S.–DPRK talks, lest peace be negotiated on terms that marginalize South Korea’s core interests.

If there’s one thing Korean politics does well, it’s catchy phrases and loaded acronyms. President Lee Jae Myung’s encouragement of US President Donald Trump to be the “peacemaker” on the Korean Peninsula and offering to be the “pacemaker” to the process was a clever turn of phrase, appealing to Trump’s self-perceptions while trying to preserve a place for South Korea in any potential US-North Korea interactions.

Lee’s later announcement of his E.N.D. policy toward North Korea was a convenient sound bite to describe his “Exchange, Normalization and Denuclearization” roadmap. But there is little new to the approach from what previous progressive administrations have pursued. While this sequencing might have worked in the past to varying degrees of success, the geopolitical conditions have fundamentally changed since the last round of inter-Korean and US-North Korea talks ended. Recycling this old formula is unlikely to move the needle with Pyongyang and is more likely to end with Seoul getting sidelined – or side swiped – if Trump and Kim Jong Un resume talks in the future.

Lee seems to be already recalibrating, especially retooling how denuclearization fits into the equation, to account for this reality. However, renaming the policy will only go so far. Given how North Korea’s vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula appears to be shaping up, more work needs to be done to build mutual understanding within the US-ROK alliance to help shape the agenda of any future US-DPRK talks.

The New Operating Environment

The END initiative is premised on the idea that sequencing is the key to success. Rather than the previous Yoon Seok-yul administration’s assertion that North Korea’s denuclearization could lead to normalized relations and robust benefits, Lee has laid out a path where gradual improvement of relations is possible in the near term, through exchange and peacebuilding, creating the conditions where denuclearization is possible in the long term.

This approach, however, is far from new. Past progressive administrations followed this familiar pattern, starting with exchanges such as family reunions and economic cooperation while working to lower the risks of war and build the foundations of a sustainable peace regime. Denuclearization would be part of that peace regime, with the prospects of unification sometimes more or less prominent as the long-term measure of success.

While this sequencing makes sense and was once endorsed by North Korea, it requires having a willing partner in Pyongyang and international cooperation to achieve. In 2018, Kim Jong Un was, in fact, willing to negotiate around his nuclear weapons program to accommodate broader security and economic goals. Moon Jae-in also found Trump to be an unexpected partner, breaking the historic refusal of a sitting US president to engage a North Korean leader directly to try to leapfrog negotiations forward.

That combination of personalities, with general support for the negotiation process from China and Russia as well, created a unique window of opportunity to engineer a breakthrough in relations. But even under those conditions, the US and North Korea couldn’t agree on what a mutually acceptable first step should be and the process ended almost as abruptly as it started. At the same time, inter-Korean exchange cooperation were severely hampered by sanctions, unable to move forward with the commitments made in the Panmunjom Declaration as well. Moreover, there seemed little support from the US, despite its improving relations with Pyongyang, or the international community to give Seoul space to maneuver within the sanctions regime without first securing concrete actions on North Korean denuclearization.

One lesson Kim Jong Un appears to have learned from that experience is that there is no longer an inter-Korean agenda that can be pursued independent from North Korea’s relations with the US or international community – relationships that are largely contingent on the nuclear issue. Kim had urged Moon multiple times in 2018 and 2019 not to let external actors interfere in inter-Korean affairs, but Moon’s hands were tied without sanctions exemptions and the goodwill eventually led to disappointment and North Korean resentment.

Since 2019, North Korea has severed ties with the South, denounced a shared goal of peaceful unification, disbanded institutions that managed North-South relations, denied shared kinship still exists, and codified into law South Korea as a separate and hostile state. This is not just a policy shift, but a fundamentally new stance on peninsular relations – one that is not going to be reversed by an old approach dressed up in a new catchphrase.

Furthermore, even in potential dealings with the United States, North Korea has made clear that any negotiation process contingent on denuclearization – whether at the beginning or the end – will be rejected. While Kim Jong Un has said there is a reason for two states with nuclear weapons not to have confrontational relations, he appears to be in no rush to resume talks with Trump, and especially not about his nuclear weapons program. This raises important questions about what future talks between the US and DPRK would focus on. This should be especially concerning to Seoul, as they encourage Trump to follow his so-called peacemaking instincts with Kim Jong Un.

What Next?

Lee has shown a willingness to modify the language of his E.N.D. policy away from the term denuclearization, which is politically charged and has historically implied the unilateral disarmament of the North, to a more neutral term of “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” to accommodate a potential diplomatic opening. This is not a new term in inter-Korean relations, as it was used in the Panmunjom Declaration as well, as the end goal of denuclearization.

This recalibration of language might have been useful under past conditions, but it is unlikely to be particularly compelling in the present. Not only is North Korea seemingly uninterested in negotiating about its nuclear program, but the term seems disconnected to South Korea’s own actions these days. Since 2018, the US and South Korea have deepened alliance cooperation on nuclear planning and conventional nuclear integration, as delineated in the Washington Declaration, to the extent it is touted as a “nuclear alliance” with growing discussion of further measures such as nuclear sharing. More recently, South Korea’s push for nuclear latency—including nuclear powered submarines, and enrichment and reprocessing rights—appears to be making slow progress. These actions seem at odds with a policy what would be expected from a country working toward a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”

More importantly, Lee’s encouragement of Trump to be the “peacemaker” for the Korean Peninsula creates a real possibility that future US-DPRK talks will focus on defining that peace. North Korea is undoubtedly learning from current Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations and planning accordingly. Should Kim resume talks with Trump, he is liable to come to the table with his own plan, one that naturally caters to North Korean interests and presents a very different vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula. This is unlikely to be the symbolic “end of war” declaration request from past negotiations but will probably push for something more substantial that endorses the permanent division of the Korean Peninsula, permanent sovereignty, North Korean-defined borders, and potentially even the dissolution of legacies of the Korean War such as the DMZ. This kind of an agenda will fundamentally call into question the legitimacy of South Korea’s territorial claims at the very least and could even impact how the US or international community views South Korea’s continued push for unification.

Therefore, changing the name of the policy may be useful for facilitating potential diplomatic opportunities, if the final formulation conforms with broader policy aims and actions. But the more urgent task for the Lee administration seems to be building a deeper mutual understanding within the US-ROK alliance ahead of any US-DPRK talks, establishing some parameters of what should (and shouldn’t) be negotiable, and helping shape what Trump’s “peacemaker” vision for the Korean Peninsula should be.

koreaonpoint.org · KOREA ON POINT

13. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un lauds troops sent to fight overseas, vows to root out ‘evil’

​

Summary:

Kim Jong Un used a Dec. 11 ruling party central committee wrap up to tighten internal discipline and legitimize overseas combat deployments. He condemned “wrong ideological viewpoints” and “evil practices,” signaling another anti corruption and loyalty drive as Pyongyang prepares its first party congress in five years, expected in January. He praised north Korean troops fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine, framing them as defenders of “international justice,” which suggests the deployment will continue. Reporting cites heavy casualties and assesses Pyongyang is trading manpower for Russian financial support, food and energy, and military technology, and may seek a post war reconstruction role. He also highlighted defense modernization amid geopolitical change.

Comment: If Kim wants to root out evil he should turn against Putin! (note sarcasm).

North Korea’s Kim Jong Un lauds troops sent to fight overseas, vows to root out ‘evil’

straitstimes.com · December 12, 2025

Published Dec 12, 2025, 05:53 AMUpdated Dec 12, 2025, 06:17 PM

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-lauds-sending-troops-overseas-in-2025-kcna-says

SEOUL – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has vowed to root out “evil” and lauded his troops fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine, the state media said on Dec 12, as Pyongyang capped a major meeting of its ruling party top brass.

The three-day meeting of the North Korean central committee discussed key policy issues as well as plans for an upcoming congress of its ruling party – North Korea’s first in five years and expected in January.

Wrapping up the meeting on Dec 11, Mr Kim condemned “the wrong ideological viewpoint and inactive and irresponsible work attitude” of some officials, the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. He called on officials to have “greater confidence in and courage for the future of our cause and struggle”.

He also “pointed out the shortcomings and evil practices that must be corrected”, KCNA said.

The state media did not offer any specifics, though it did say the ruling party had revealed numerous recent “deviations” in discipline – a euphemism for corruption.

But he reserved praise for the North Korean soldiers fighting against Ukraine alongside Russia, at least 600 of whom have died and thousands more wounded, according to South Korean estimates.

Their work, he said, “demonstrated to the world the prestige of our army and state as the ever-victorious army and genuine protector of international justice”.

Analysts say Pyongyang is receiving financial aid, military technology, and food and energy supplies from Russia in return for sending troops.

Mr Kim’s mention of the troops “signalled Pyongyang’s intention to maintain that deployment”, Mr Ahn Chan-il, a researcher originally from North Korea, told AFP.

“North Korea is also highly likely to seek a role in post-war reconstruction in Russia once... the conflict ends,” he added.

Mr Kim also hailed efforts in 2025 in “modernising” the country’s defences in the face of great “global geopolitical and technological changes”.

Pyongyang’s central committee began meeting on Dec 9, the same day North Korea fired a salvo of artillery from a multiple rocket launcher system, which analysts say could strike the South.

Last week, the South’s dovish President Lee Jae Myung said he felt an apology was due to the North over his predecessor’s alleged order to send drones and propaganda leaflets across the border.

Pyongyang has not responded to the overture from Mr Lee, who has sought to mend fractured ties with the North.

And Dec 12’s readout made no mention of South Korea or the US, whose leader Donald Trump had hoped to meet Mr Kim during a visit to Asia in October.

The pair – who Mr Trump once famously declared were “in love” – last met in 2019 at Panmunjom in the Demilitarised Zone separating the two Koreas after the US leader extended an invitation to Mr Kim on Twitter.

But analysts now say the North Korean leader, increasingly emboldened by his growing ties with Russia, had few good reasons to join the photo op. AFP

straitstimes.com · December 12, 2025

14. Korea’s English Exam Was So Hard It Prompted an Apology. How Would You Do?

Comment: Please go to the link for the proper format. These seem like questions that could be on US advanced placement tests. 

Why does Korea give hearder English tests to its students than US schools give to American students? Perhaps we should be questioning our education system (note sarcasm)

I am going to recommend that our daughter (who teaches 10th grade advanced English and 12th grade advanced placement literature) give these test questions to her students.

Korea’s English Exam Was So Hard It Prompted an Apology. How Would You Do?

South Korea has a notoriously grueling college entrance exam. This year’s English portion was so difficult that it led to a resignation. Could you answer some of the questions correctly?

By Pranav Baskar

Dec. 13, 2025, 5:02 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/13/world/asia/korea-english-exam-how-would-you-do.html?unlocked_article_code=1.8U8.R8Y9.R1I7M_pOJiTh&smid=url-share

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Students waiting for the start of the annual college entrance exam, known as the Suneung, at an exam hall in Seoul in November.Credit...Kim Hong-Ji/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The head of South Korea’s notoriously grueling college entrance exam resigned after apologizing for creating an English-language test so difficult that it prompted a public outcry.

The 2026 English test “did not meet the appropriate difficulty level,” read a statement from the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation, the organization that administers the exam and which had been led by Oh Seung-keol. “We deeply apologize for causing concern to test takers and their parents.”

Each year, hundreds of thousands of students sit for the eight-hour college entrance exam, known as the Suneung, to compete for seats at the country’s elite universities.

The exam is a decades-old tradition that disrupts the rhythm of the entire nation. Flights are grounded, construction is halted and traffic restrictions are enforced, and the public is urged to keep noise at a minimum so the students can concentrate. In addition to English, the exam tests students’ knowledge of Korean, math and other subjects.

This year, just over 3 percent of students earned the highest marks in the English section — compared to 6 percent the year before.

Here are some questions from the 2026 paper. Could you pass?

How Will You Do?

Take the quiz.

1 of 4

What is the most appropriate title for the following passage?

The economic benefit of culturtainment makes it attractive to politicians and policy makers alike. A potential increase in inbound visitor numbers coupled with their demand for related goods and services (travel, accommodation, retail) is an incentive for those within governments and authorities to work with cultural groups in order to develop celebrations and commemorations into larger and more high-profile events. However, such commercialization risks culturtainment becoming homogeneous and losing its original ‘message’ that could lead to a dilution of audiences. This could also lead to smaller non-commercial independent events being set up that would only serve to divide audiences further. This is something that planners and stakeholders will need to balance against potential financial gain. Changing political, social and religious landscapes will lead to the emergence of new cultures, and with them new culturtainment experiences. Overall this is a healthy growth sector of the entertainment industry, but one that by its very nature is delicate in the face of exploitation.

The Commercialization of Culture and Its Unexpected Benefits

Cash or Soul? When Culture Couples with Entertainment

New Cultures! The Poisonous Fruit of Culturtainment

Culturtainment: An Ambition of Entertainment to Be a Culture

Why Balanced Investments Matter in the Entertainment Industry

2 of 4

Select the most appropriate expression to fill in the blank.

Kant was a strong defender of the rule of law as the ultimate guarantee, not only of security and peace, but also of freedom. He believed that human societies were moving towards more rational forms regulated by effective and binding legal frameworks because only such frameworks enabled people to live in harmony, to prosper and to co-operate. However, his belief in inevitable progress was not based on an optimistic or high-minded view of human nature. On the contrary, it comes close to Hobbes’s outlook: man’s violent and conflict-prone nature makes it necessary to establish and maintain an effective legal framework in order to secure peace. We cannot count on people’s benevolence or goodwill, but even ‘a nation of devils’ can live in harmony in a legal system that binds every citizen equally. Ideally, the law is the embodiment of those political principles that all rational beings would freely choose. If such laws forbid them to do something that they would not rationally choose to do anyway, then the law cannot be .

regarded as reasonably confining human liberty

viewed as a strong defender of the justice system

understood as a restraint on their freedom

enforced effectively to suppress their evil nature

accepted within the assumption of ideal legal frameworks

3 of 4

Choose the most appropriate order of sentences following the given passage.

We usually think of a clock as a physical thing, like an alarm clock or a wristwatch. But a clock is really a process embodied in a machine, and the nature of that process is repetitive.

(A) Indeed, it is almost impossible to think of a clock that does not depend on a repetitive cycle of events. The only example that comes to mind readily is a candle marked in hours. But here too there is iteration — the repeated burning of molecules of wax — so this too is an iterative process, although at first masked.

(B) The use of radiocarbon dating is another, much longer scale clock that also appears to be like this. It seems to yield a smooth time scale but in fact does not: the decay of atoms of carbon-14 is repetitive, although on a large scale it gives the appearance of being continuous.

(C) A clock can be almost any process that repeats itself over and over again for an indefinite period. Water clocks drip at a steady pace; quartz crystals vibrate regularly.

A – C – B

B – C – A

C – B – A

B – A – C

C – A – B

4 of 4

Choose the most appropriate place for the given sentence in the logical flow of the passage.

The difference is that the action in the game world can only be explored through the virtual bodily space of the avatar.

A video game has its own model of reality, internal to itself and separate from the player’s external reality, the player’s bodily space and the avatar’s bodily space. (1) The avatar’s bodily space, the potential actions of the avatar in the game world, is the only way in which the reality of the external reality of the game world can be perceived. (2) As in the real world, perception requires action. (3) Players extend their perceptual field into the game, encompassing the available actions of the avatar. (4) The feedback loop of perception and action that enables you to navigate the world around you is now one step removed: instead of perceiving primarily through interaction of your own body with the external world, you’re perceiving the game world through interaction of the avatar. (5) The entire perceptual system has been extended into the game world.

1

2

3

4

5

Pranav Baskar is an international reporter and a member of the 2025-26 Times Fellowship class, a program for journalists early in their careers.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com