Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Patience is waiting. Not passively waiting. That is laziness. But to keep going when the going is hard and slow - that is patience. The two most powerful warriors are patience and time."

- Leo Tolstoy

"The smallest act of kindness is worth more than the grandest intention."

- Oscar Wilde

"The man who gets angry at the right things and with the right people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the right length of time, is commended; so this person will be patient... because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by feelings."

- Aristotle

1. Developing a mastery of irregular warfare

2. Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Is Ordinary People Spying on Russian Forces

3. West Virginia Guard hosts (irregular) warfare planning conference

4. DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS)A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS

5. The Intricate Balance of Protecting Journalism and National Security

6. Ukraine WAR BULLETIN December 13, 6.00 pm EST - The two hundred and ninety-third day of the russian large-scale invasion.

7. Dispatch from Ukraine: What life is really like in Ukraine’s East Under Russian Bombardment

8. Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No

9. China's plan to be the next nuclear superpower

10. A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China

11. Xi's plan to take back control

12. Is This the End of Peace Through Trade?

13. Ten Lessons from the Return of History

14. An Indo-Pacific security network is only now emerging

15. USSOCOM Will Not Execute SOFIC 2023

16. A Green Beret Commander on the War in Afghanistan, “Retrograde” and Those Still Left Behind

17. Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Ban TikTok, Citing National Security

1. Developing a mastery of irregular warfare

We are moving toward ending the intellectual orphan status of irregular warfare.

There are models for the newly established IWC. For example and more specifically, in addition to the recommendations below the Army’s Operations Research Offices might serve as one model. Specifically, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at American University established in 1957 should be considered. This may be an appropriate model because SORO was focused on gaining a deep understanding of revolutions, resistance, and insurgency, phenomena which persist around the world today that we describe as irregular warfare. SORO provided direct intellectual support to strategy development and campaign execution. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has protected the previous work of SORO and in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis Department has updated this work for the 21^st Century in the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies. The newly established IWC could follow in the footsteps of SORO and partner with a premier academic institution.

Developing a mastery of irregular warfare

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3774711-developing-a-mastery-of-irregular-warfare/

BY CHARLES T. CLEVELAND, DANIEL EGEL, DAVID MAXWELL AND HY ROTHSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 12/14/22 10:30 AM ET

Chris Machian/Omaha World-Herald via AP

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin speaks during a change of command ceremony for U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska on Friday, Dec. 9, 2022.

The U.S. military has failed to master irregular warfare above the tactical level.

This is not a new problem, and it is one that has been recognized by leaders at the most senior echelons of government. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this perhaps most clearly when he admonished the Department of Defense (DOD) in his 2008 National Defense Strategy to “display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”

A lack of focus on this form of warfare within the DOD may be to blame. Secretary Gates characterized this challenge in his memoir as the “military services’ preoccupation with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and all other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.”

Previous efforts to address this challenge have struggled to gain purchase. The most noteworthy failure, perhaps, was that highlighted by Sens. Sam Nunn, John Warner, Edward M. Kennedy, and William S. Cohen in a 1989 letter to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. In this letter, the senators highlighted their concern with “deficiencies in U.S. capabilities to engage effectively” in irregular warfare (which they referred to by the then-popular term low-intensity conflict) and that the “Executive Branch has blocked meaningful implementation” of the reforms related to low intensity conflict mandated in the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment that resulted in the formation of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

More recently, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy emphasized the need to institutionalize irregular warfare “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict,” and detailed a plan for doing so. However, it too, seems to have failed: Irregular warfare is only referenced twice (and in passing) in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the intellectually adjacent concept of the “gray zone” is used only to describe adversary approaches. This apparent failure is highlighted by the fact that draft language for the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act once again restates the need for the “institutionalization of irregular warfare as a core competency of the DOD.”

Developing a mastery of irregular warfare may be no small feat. History has shown that the U.S. military relies on the use of conventional force in almost all conflicts, seeking victory through attrition or annihilation of an adversary. In contrast, success in irregular warfare requires approaches that are informed by the enemy and the population around him, their attitudes, beliefs, frustrations, and the geopolitical periphery.

The momentum created by U.S. Congress in authorizing the creation of an Irregular Warfare Functional Center (IWFC) — which we documented previously — offers a unique opportunity at a pivotal moment in U.S. history to develop this mastery. The dual focus of the IWFC in (1) advancing knowledge and understanding of irregular warfare and (2) educating the joint force on the application of irregular warfare could address two of the major challenges that have impeded efforts to develop this mastery. However, we fear that the recent decision to establish this center within the security cooperation enterprise, even initially, could limit the potential of this opportunity.

We believe that there are two steps that the DOD could consider if it hopes to build on this momentum and develop the mastery of irregular warfare that the United States needs:

Consolidate the development of irregular warfare knowledge and irregular warfare education within the DOD: In 1986, the U.S. Congress mandated that USSOCOM would be responsible for “developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics” and “conducting specialized courses of instruction” for many of the core components of irregular warfare – specifying that USSOCOM would be responsible for strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, and counterterrorism among other activities. Thus, while it may be appropriate for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to be involved in activities that involve working with allies and partners, it seems problematic that its new center purports to be the “central mechanism for developing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) irregular warfare knowledge and advancing the Department’s understanding of irregular warfare concepts and doctrine.” Consolidating the development of irregular warfare knowledge and education within USSOCOM by making USSOCOM the executive agent for this newly established Irregular Warfare Center could enhance efforts within the DOD to develop this mastery of irregular warfare.

Ensure that the IWFC is partnered with one or more premier academic research institutions: Historically, formal partnerships with America’s world-class universities have been critical in attracting the brightest minds and developing the foundational understanding necessary for the DOD to respond effectively to emergent national security challenges. This is true of both the physical sciences that underlie U.S. conventional supremacy, but also the social sciences that are at the heart of irregular warfare. Further, the Congressional language that authorized the IWFC directed the DOD to evaluate whether “universities and other academic and research institutions” could reduce the costs of implementing the IWFC.

Several of America’s best universities have already signaled an interest and willingness to commit resources to support the IWFC in defense of the nation. Partnering with one or more of these universities could meet the Congressional intent of reducing the costs of executing the IWFC while giving the DOD access to the brightest minds and educators as it seeks to develop this mastery of irregular warfare.

Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland (Ret.) is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a senior mentor to the Army War College.

Daniel Egel is a senior economist at RAND.

Col. David Maxwell (Ret.) is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Global Peace Foundation and a senior advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.

Col. Hy Rothstein (Ret.) is a recently retired faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School.

2. Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Is Ordinary People Spying on Russian Forces

Functions often performed by the underground and the auxiliary in unconventional warfare.

From FM 3-18 Special Forces Operations:

3-28. The underground is a cellular organization within the irregular movement that is responsible for

subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and other compartmentalized activities. Most underground

operations will take place in and around population centers. As such, the underground must have the ability to

conduct operations in areas that are usually inaccessible to the guerrillas, such as areas under government

military control. Underground members often fill leadership positions, overseeing specific functions that

auxiliary workers carry out. The underground and auxiliary—although technically separate units—are, in

reality, loosely interconnected elements that provide coordinated capabilities for the irregular movement. The

key distinction between them is that the underground is the element of the irregular organization that

operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force.

3-29. The auxiliary is the primary support element of the irregular organization. The structure and

operations of the auxiliary are clandestine in nature and its members do not openly indicate their sympathy

or involvement with the irregular movement. This support enables the guerrilla force, and often the

underground, to survive and function. This support can take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence.

Members of the auxiliary are sometimes characterized as “part-time members” of the irregular

organization, continuing to participate in the life of their community. The populace appears concerned only

with their normal occupations while at the same time engaging in irregular operations to varying degrees.

Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Is Ordinary People Spying on Russian Forces

Locals helped Ukraine target troops occupying Kherson, highlighting one of Kyiv’s advantages in the war

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-secret-weapon-is-ordinary-people-spying-on-russian-forces-11671012147?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow | Photographs by The Wall Street Journal

Dec. 14, 2022 5:30 am ET

KHERSON, Ukraine—During Russia’s occupation of the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson, a large electronics store served Russian forces as a field hospital, barracks and storehouse for food.

One morning last summer, Ukrainian forces struck the store, completely destroying it. It was one of numerous attacks that day on Russian-controlled territory deep inside the Kherson region.

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Before the blast, a small group of local Ukrainian activists had been sending photographs of the location and coordinates of the Russians over an encrypted Telegram channel to the Ukrainian military. That intelligence helped Ukrainian forces target the site, according to a military official who worked with such groups.

The Kherson-based group of Ukrainian partisans made spying on the Russians part of their daily routine, playing a key role in guiding the Ukrainian precision strikes that ultimately forced Moscow to abandon Kherson last month, according to Ukrainian military officials.

Activists sent photos of an electronics store Russian forces used in Kherson to the Ukrainian military, which destroyed the store.

PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

They monitored roads into the city, watched feeds from street cameras trained on key intersections and cycled into fields pretending to tend to livestock while clocking Russian troops.

But the channel’s members soon became a target. Russia’s Federal Security Service raided their homes and those of their relatives. Several remain imprisoned on espionage charges inside Russian-held territory, hoping a prisoner swap will set them free—although civilians, unlike members of the military, are rarely swapped.

Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview that partisans like those in Kherson will assist in Ukraine’s continuing campaign to recapture Russian-held areas.

“It’ll be the same in Donetsk, in Luhansk, and everywhere,” he said, referring to eastern regions occupied by Moscow. “Our guys and girls are everywhere.”

Russian troops abandoned Kherson last month. Residents set fires for cooking in a square in the city.

A spokesman for the military didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on specific partisan activities.

The Kherson Telegram group was launched the day after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24. By early March, Moscow had control of the city of Kherson, pouring in tanks, trucks and armored personnel carriers adorned with the pro-war Z symbol. The group’s name—Ruzzians Go Home—was a play on the military markings.

The group had around 20 members, say those involved. After Russia disabled Ukrainian network connections, they used Russian SIM cards and VPNs to disguise their traffic. Two of them were Ukrainian reconnaissance officers who verified images and coordinates sent to the group and forwarded them to military commanders, who then alerted officers in Kyiv authorized to order a strike.

In Chornobayivka just outside Kherson, one partisan spent his days keeping watch on the surrounding roads from his apartment. He zoomed in on his smartphone if he saw something new. “I didn’t know how to fight, but I knew I could at least help in this way,” he said.

Members of the Kherson Telegram group monitored roads into the city and watched feeds from street cameras trained on key intersections.

Three days into the war, Oleksandr, an IT worker and member of the group, received images of military vehicles on the road near the airport outside Kherson. He sent the coordinates to the group.

The next morning, the commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, Valery Zaluzhny, posted a video showing a set of crosshairs hovering over a line of vehicles outside the airport. After two seconds, an explosion engulfed them in smoke and fire. “Welcome to hell!” Gen. Zaluzhny wrote.

Andrei, a reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade who collected information from the group, said the partisans’ work was “a huge help.”

“These people see Russian tanks moving, they see where troops go for dinner, where they party, where they do their laundry, and they share that information with us,” said a security official familiar with the partisans’ work. “Without them our army would have no way of knowing.”

The work that activists who observed Russian troops did was 'a huge help,' said Andrei, a Ukrainian reconnaissance officer.

It usually took about 15 minutes for the military to act on a tip—less if a Russian Buk or another air-defense system, a priority target, was spotted. A photo or video sent by partisans was treated as evidence of a Russian position if coordinates were given, according to Andrei, who would ask the military to verify the target, sometimes using drones.

Maksym, a car repairman who was a member, took three trips to Russian-occupied Crimea with a Russian officer whose vehicle he had helped fix in Kherson. All the while, Maksym was gathering valuable information for the Ukrainian military.

Maksym took sedatives en route to keep himself calm. “It was very tense,” he said. Once they arrived in the Crimean city of Simferopol on the third trip, he was invited to drink with three other Russian officers. He passed details of the conversation that helped the military confirm that many Russian troops were living not in the city of Kherson but in Tarasivka, a place to the south.

“We spoke before each trip, to discuss what we needed,” Andrei said. “He helped us a lot.”

Shortly after Russian forces withdrew from Kherson, an aid truck drove past a Russian poster promising free healthcare to residents of the city, which suffered damage in the fighting.

Ihor Kotelevich, a wedding performer, said he became part of a 10-person group that planted explosives under the cars of Russian officers in Kherson. “The police fled the city, so we took order into our own hands,” he said.

His claims couldn’t be verified. The security official said partisans regularly carried out such activity behind enemy lines.

On Russian-occupied territory, “things explode here and there,” SBU intelligence agency chief Vasyl Malyuk told Interfax in October. “For now I can’t open a map and explain how this happens and who stands behind it, because this can endanger our involved patriots. There’s a time for everything.”

Russia began tightening the noose. On March 28, FSB agents came to the home of one member and arrested him. Soon after, they arrested two other members of the Telegram group.

“We immediately suspected that someone in our group was reporting on us,” Oleksandr said.

Kherson Retreat: How Russia Lost Control of the Key Ukrainian City

West Virginia Guard hosts warfare planning conference

wvnews.com · by From Staff Reports

KINGWOOD, W.Va. (WV News) — The West Virginia National Guard’s Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Program hosted an initial exercise planning conference Dec. 5-7 at Camp Dawson.

Participants came from nine organizations representing U.S. Army special operations forces, psychological operations, civil affairs, U.S. Marine Corps Advisor Company A and the Polish Territorial Defense Forces.

Ridge Runner is a West Virginia Army National Guard training program that provides various National Guard, active duty, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allied nation’s armed forces training and experience in irregular and asymmetrical warfare tactics and operations.

In June 2023, Ridge Runner will host its first validation exercise for 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group. The goal of the exercise will be to provide U.S. Special Operations Command with the premier irregular warfare training center capable of simulating the most complex special warfare multi-domain environments to exercise and validate special operations forces and to support joint force commanders worldwide.

Partner nation forces from across Europe will participate and train alongside the 5-19th SFG during the exercise, which will be held throughout West Virginia.

During the planning conference, attendees refined scenarios, scope, logistics, timelines and training lanes to meet key objectives for the 5-19th SFG and partner nations who will be participating in the exercise.

According to West Virginia National Guard Sgt. Maj. Jason Smith, deputy director of the Ridge Runner program, West Virginia is the perfect location for training exercises of this type.

“West Virginia is an almost mirror image to the overall terrain and climate throughout Eastern Europe,” he stated. “Hosting the Ridge Runner program here makes perfect sense, allowing U.S. troops the opportunity to operate together with our allies and share in their expertise in as close an environment as possible to our real-world missions. Providing this type of experience prior to deployments will be invaluable moving forward, allowing our operators to validate their training and giving them the very best opportunities to be successful while in theater.”

Along with various U.S. military units’ participation, members of the Polish Territorial Defense Forces, or Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, traveled to West Virginia to participate in the planning, with the purpose of having an element of the POL TDF take part in the June 2023 exercise.

“This has been one of the best relationships the POL TDF has ever established with a partner nation,” said 2nd Lt. Marek Zaluski, executive officer for the POL TDF. “We did not know coming here in 2019 [for Ridge Runner] and building this relationship how real life would verify it. Here we are 10 months into the invasion of our neighbor (Ukraine), and we are getting ready to prevent such things from happening within the NATO territories. We are grateful and proud to be working with the West Virginia National Guard, the 19th SFG and the entire National Guard and U.S. armed forces family on such an important endeavor.”

Additional planning conferences will be held in the coming months to finalize all aspects of the exercise prior to April 2023.

wvnews.com · by From Staff Reports

4. DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS)A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS

From the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle. Not enough attention is paid to Stability Operations.

Download the 48 page comprehensive guide at this link: https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/DSS-Guide-for-Stabilization-Practitioners_112022.pdf

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS)A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS -

pksoi.armywarcollege.edu · by PKSOI · November 15, 2022

This framework, Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS): A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners, was developed over the past two years by PKSOI in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense—Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (OSD-CNSP), and in coordination with a wide-ranging planning team involving members from across the joint force and the interagency.

Created in fulfillment of Task 1.1.5 of the December 2020 Secretary of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Implementation Plan, this framework serves as a reference guide that outlines how the Department of Defense, in support of U.S. Government (USG) strategy and interagency partners, supports USG stabilization efforts, missions, and activities.

As this is a DoD framework, it begins by highlighting DoD policy for DSS outlined in DoD Directive 3000.05 Stabilization, before providing an overview of US strategy including the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2020 Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and 2019 Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. Following a review of other pertinent policy and doctrine, this framework outlines how the US Government in general, and DoD in particular, is organized to achieve US stabilization goals. The framework then details how the USG implements, and DoD supports, stabilization efforts.

Two appendixes detail the law governing Defense Support for Stabilization Activities (DSSA) and DoD implementation guidance for this important Security Cooperation program. Finally, there are twenty-three annexes of the U.S. strategies, policies, programs, and doctrine that comprise the USG and DoD framework for stabilization.

PKSOI, in coordination with OSD-CNSP, is committed to periodically updating this DSS Guide for Stabilization Practitioners as key strategies, policies, and doctrine are published.

To read or download this guide please click on the links below:

DSS-Guide-for-Stabilization-Practitioners_112022Download

pksoi.armywarcollege.edu · by PKSOI · November 15, 2022

5. The Intricate Balance of Protecting Journalism and National Security

There is a lot to digest and consider in this issue. I was unfamiliar with the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA) until I read this article.

The bottom line for me is the fourth estate is critical to maintaining our federal democratic republic.

The Intricate Balance of Protecting Journalism and National Security

thecipherbrief.com

December 14th, 2022 by Ellen McCarthy, |

Hon. Ellen McCarthy is the Chairwoman and CEO of the Truth in Media Cooperative. She has over three decades of national security service in a variety of leadership roles that span numerous intelligence organizations, most recently serving as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

View all articles by Ellen McCarthy

OPINION — Just a few months after being approved out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the newly amended bipartisan Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA) could be on track to become law before Congress recesses for the year. The intent of the JCPA is to ensure that smaller news organizations are compensated for their online content by allowing them to negotiate with platforms like Google and Meta. This is a wonderful goal and Congress should be engaged in policies that address the local-news crisis and ensure a competitive, thriving, independent press in the United States. The question is whether this bill will reach the goal?

It’s a tough question. The 2018 version of the bill was five-pages long and provided an antitrust exemption for newspapers and online news outlets. Today, it is a 35-page set of requirements for how negotiations are structured and enforced. Groups like the Public Knowledge Org have provided excellent reviews of the history of JCPA to include the jaded history of antitrust exemptions, and how smaller news companies may not see much benefit from compensation deals.

But another area that needs review is the impact that the bill will have on the spread of foreign disinformation. Under the new version of the JCPA, U.S. companies like Google, Facebook and Apple would have to carry and pay any website in scope of the bill, that provides news. Since this requirement would extend to foreign news sources, the “must carry and must pay” provision could potentially enable foreign sources to control the flow of information on news feeds viewed by millions of Americans.

The “must carry” provision is not a novel concept and has a checkered reputation. The Federal Communications Commission first passed the Fairness Doctrine in 1949, requiring broadcasters to present both sides of controversial political arguments. The rule was abolished in 1987, and completely removed from the Federal Register in 2011, as part of a broad erasure of unnecessary post-WWII era media regulations.

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In the era of internet news, the JCPA seems to be an attempt to revive the Fairness Doctrine for online platforms. But unlike when the Fairness Doctrine was passed, foreign nations are now able to leverage online platforms to spread propaganda to international audiences. As written, the bill could unintentionally fund foreign media entities eager to increase influence over U.S. political and social trends.

While there is some language in the JCPA carving out publications controlled by foreign powers, there are obvious concerns about sophisticated nations finding ways to circumvent this by disguising their ownership of or partnering with a U.S. publication to spread propaganda to a wider U.S. audience – and to financially profit for doing so.

Foreign media companies are already pursuing this goal.

In 2021, the Justice Department disclosed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-controlled China Daily spent millions of dollars on advertisements and articles favorable to the PRC government. This content was featured in U.S. publications including Time magazine and Foreign Policy. Many other foreign media companies have used this model to try to influence a U.S. audience.

The Department of Justice’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Unit works to identify and register foreign-owned media and reveal foreign influence efforts. However, U.S. recognition of certain entities as a foreign agent does not necessarily restrict what state-funded, state-directed, or sanctioned international outlets like RT, Sputnik, InfoRos, and others can publish in the U.S.

Entities owned or controlled by the Chinese Communist Party or the Kremlin already produce enough content in multiple languages and devote significant resources to advertising and syndication. U.S. legislation should not serve as another avenue to promote misinformation on issues like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, human rights violations in Xinjiang, or the Taiwan Strait.

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Congress is right to focus on laws that provide Americans with more access to smaller independent media groups and local news, which directly correlates to citizen engagement. Congress should also consider legislation, either in the JCPA or elsewhere, that compels platforms to provide funding for disinformation/misinformation education initiatives, libraries, public-information health organizations, and new innovative solutions to create a world where fact-based information is easily available.

But as Congress debates the merits of JCPA, and it seems that more debate is required, they must ensure at a minimum, that this legislation does not ultimately undermine ongoing efforts to combat foreign and domestic misinformation and disinformation. In its current form, the JCPA risks proliferating and funding the same misleading sources it aims to minimize.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

6. Ukraine WAR BULLETIN December 13, 6.00 pm EST - The two hundred and ninety-third day of the russian large-scale invasion.

(Note: these have been few and far between. My interlocutor tells me the people who produce these have other priorities that are distracting them).

Also posted on small Wars Journal here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-december-13-600-pm-est-two-hundred-and-ninety-third-day-russian-large

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

December 13, 6.00 pm EST

During the day, Russia launched 2 missile strikes on civilian infrastructure of Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv regions, carried out more than 20 attacks from MLRS systems.

We need the Paris Mechanism, which will help give timely responses to the challenges of Russian energy terror - address by the President of Ukraine to the participants of "In solidarity with the Ukrainian People" conference.

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the Russian forces from 24.02 to 13.12:

personnel ‒ about 95260 (+500) killed,

tanks ‒ 2966,

APV ‒ 5930 (+2),

artillery systems – 1931 (+2),

MLRS – 404 (+7),

Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 211,

aircraft – 281,

helicopters – 264,

UAV operational-tactical level – 1617,

cruise missiles ‒ 592,

warships / boats ‒ 16,

vehicles and fuel tankers – 4549 (+5),

special equipment ‒ 170 (+1).

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxMzqoBY69NwxcJwTgDkVcCwezwUuiwUmADGKumyhHXeg4zr8u6gV8Q2k4FVzNbcl

The two hundred and ninety-third day of the russian large-scale invasion.

During the day, the enemy launched 2 missile strikes on the civilian infrastructure of Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv regions, and also carried out more than 20 attacks from MLRS systems.

There remains the threat of the enemy launching air and missile strikes on civilian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

In the Volyn and Poliske directions, the situation remains without significant changes, no signs of the formation of enemy offensive groups have been detected.

On the Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, the enemy shelled the areas of Seredyna-Buda and Ryasne settlements of the Sumy region, as well as Strelecha, Staritsa, Ambarne, Vilkhuvatka, Dvorichna and Krasne in the Kharkiv region.

In the Kupyansk direction, the areas of the settlements of Kupyansk, Kislivka, Kotlyarivka, Tabaivka, Berestov in the Kharkiv region and Stelmakhivka and Myasozharivka in the Luhansk region were hit by tanks and the entire spectrum of artillery.

In the Lymansky direction, the enemy fired tanks and artillery at the areas of populated areas: Grekivka, Ploshanka and Nevske of the Luhansk region, as well as Terny, Yampolivka of the Donetsk region.

In the direction of Bakhmut, the enemy fired at the positions of the Defense Forces from tanks, mortars and rocket artillery in the areas of settlements: Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, Bilogorivka, Vesele, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Opytne, Chasiv Yar, Druzhba, Zalizne of the Donetsk region.

In the Avdiivka direction, the enemy fired tanks and artillery of various types of districts of almost twenty settlements, in particular: Avdiivka, Nevelske, Georgiivka, Maryinka, and Novomykhailivka of the Donetsk region.

On the Novopavlivskyi direction, the enemy shelled areas near the settlements of Vremivka, Vugledar, Neskuchne, and Prechistivka in the Donetsk region with mortars, barrel and rocket artillery.

In the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions, the enemy continues to shell our positions and the civilian infrastructure of the settlements along the right bank of the Dnipro River. It carried out shelling from tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of more than 25 settlements, in particular: Plavni, Gulyaipole, Dorozhnyanka, Olhivske, Zaporizhzhia region, as well as Chornobayivka, Antonivka, Mykilske, Tokarivka, Mylové, Kherson region and the city of Kherson.

For the purpose of replenishing the losses and replenishing the units of the first army corps of the occupying forces, measures of forced mobilization were intensified in the territory of the Donetsk region. Therefore, in the city of Horlivka, men are subject to conscription, in particular those with the "armor" mark on their military tickets.

On December 11, the enemy lost up to 60 servicemen killed and up to 100 wounded in the area of Kadiivka settlement of Luhansk region as a result of the destruction of the personnel deployment point of the russian occupation troops.

The defeat of the enemy by the Defense Forces of Ukraine in the previous days in the Zaporizhia region was confirmed. Thus, in addition to the destruction of the command staff of the 58th Army in the city of Melitopol, three artillery installations, up to 10 units of military equipment of various types were destroyed in the areas of Energodar, Tokmak and Gulyaipole settlements, and about 150 enemy servicemen were wounded.

Units of missile troops and artillery of the Defense Forces of Ukraine hit 2 areas of concentration of personnel of the Russian occupiers.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0odysZNsue1X4xD9DrKrfUXaSXmBtthHEgRwMfAms7xEyvyU6N9MAyRYxgkALR2u5l

POLICY

President of Ukraine

13.12.2022 11:54 CET

I am glad that we are united by such a new format - such a Conference. Because this means that we are united by the ability to defeat Russian energy terror.

I remember how you, Emmanuel, called me on November 1 and offered to organize such a format. There have already been massive missile strikes against our energy sector. The constant terror of Iranian drones has already begun. Russia has opened a new front against us, trying to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe of the scale of our entire country. Russia needs a blackout in Ukraine to use it as an alleged defeat of Europe and all our democratic resistance.

In response, we established a new format of cooperation and do everything for the sake of the country, for the sake of Ukrainians, against blackouts, against energy terror.

What do we have for today?

Ukraine withstood hundreds of Russian strikes of varying intensity at our energy sector. But now most of our power plants are unfortunately damaged or destroyed by shelling. All hydroelectric power plants, all thermal power plants... God forbid, but imagine what this would mean in your countries.

One of the Russian strikes provoked the shutdown of all the nuclear units of our nuclear power plants, automation was activated - fortunately, without incident.

At least one and a half billion euros are needed only for the superficial quick restoration of Ukrainian energy facilities destroyed by Russian strikes.

Every time, after every Russian strike, we try to restore the technical ability to generate and supply electricity. Nevertheless, every day our energy workers have to disconnect millions of Ukrainians from the supply due to a critical shortage of electricity in the general energy system.

Right now, about 12 million people in almost all regions and the capital are disconnected from the supply. Unfortunately, this is a typical situation for us. And we expect new Russian strikes every day, which can dramatically increase the number of shutdowns.

That is why generators and uninterruptible power sources have now become as necessary in Ukraine as armored vehicles and bulletproof vests. This is the only way to protect ordinary people and the social order in the conditions of the Russian bid for blackout. In fact, a decentralized energy generation system parallel to the main one is currently being built in Ukraine. It is being built very quickly, in all regions, by many subjects.

But still, it cannot meet all the needs of Ukraine.

Yes, thousands of Ukrainian enterprises, small and medium-sized businesses, social facilities continue to work thanks to generators.

Yes, hospitals function on generators, hundreds of thousands of jobs have already been saved thanks to generators, the Internet and communications are insured against outages.

More than 5,000 Points of Invincibility have been opened across the country - special facilities where people can warm up, charge equipment and use communications.

And I am grateful to all our partners who are already helping Ukraine with the appropriate equipment to maintain such a level of energy sustainability of our state and society.

But still, the key task is to preserve the main energy system of Ukraine, to guarantee its stable operation despite any Russian efforts to make Ukraine the darkest place in Europe.

That is why such a format is needed.

Here and now we have to agree on specific things that will not only help Ukraine endure the winter. They will also prove as clearly as possible to any anti-democratic and anti-European forces, and primarily to Russia, that Europe has learned to prevent catastrophe and protect its people.

I will be as specific as possible now.

First. We need several categories of equipment - these are transformers, equipment for restoring high-voltage networks, gas turbine and gas piston power units. Ukrainian representatives who are present at the Conference can inform you about all the technical characteristics of this request.

Second. At least until the end of this heating season in Ukraine, we need emergency support from the European energy system. That is, the supply of electricity from the countries of the European Union to Ukraine. The volume is up to two gigawatts.

For this to become possible, a decision of ENTSO-E to increase import capacity is necessary. Again, all the technical details of such a decision will be presented by our government officials who are present at the Conference.

Such electricity supply support could cost around 800 million euros in current prices. This is significant. But significantly less than a blackout in Ukraine could cost us all. Therefore, I urge you to make one of the concrete results of this Conference the approval of all decisions for such support of Ukraine with the supply of electricity from EU countries.

Third. By analogy with the observation missions of the IAEA, which have been agreed to be sent to all nuclear power plants of Ukraine, we call on the European Union to send special missions to the objects of critical energy infrastructure, which are involved in the energy supply of Ukraine and on which the stability of our entire region directly depends. Such EU missions could become a reliable factor in stabilizing the situation and proper international control.

Fourth. Due to the destruction of power plants by terrorists, we are forced to use more gas this winter than expected. As a result, we need support in the purchase of about two billion cubic meters of gas. It is also a necessary element of our stability that needs your leadership.

Fifth. Another practical result of this Conference could be an agreement on the financing of the project, which Emmanuel has already started talking about, on the purchase of LED lamps for Ukraine. This may not seem significant to someone. But 50 million such lamps will save about one gigawatt of electricity. Given that the average deficit in our power system is about two and a half gigawatts, this project could also help significantly.

And sixth. We need a special permanent mechanism for coordinating efforts - the Paris Mechanism. This will make it possible to provide timely and effective responses to every challenge of Russian energy terror. Unfortunately, we do not yet have such a modern air defense system that can shoot down Russian missiles and drones one hundred percent, however we can create such a decision-making system that can one hundred percent make Russia's terrorist tactics meaningless.

When the energy stability of Ukraine is guaranteed for the entire winter period, when it is guaranteed that there will be no new waves of mass migration from our country to your countries, it will also be guaranteed that no strikes, no blackouts, no search for weapons somewhere out there in Iran or elsewhere will help Russia.

Russia will have to think about how to stop aggression. Finally stop.

Energy is one of the keys to this. I believe that this key will be in our hands, in your hands.

Full speech: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/nam-potriben-parizkij-mehanizm-yakij-dopomozhe-davati-vchasn-79825

Andriy Yermak discussed with Jake Sullivan the continuation of security, economic and humanitarian support for Ukraine

As part of the ongoing dialogue, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak had a phone call with U.S. President's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.

The conversation was also joined by Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhny - from the Ukrainian side, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley - from the American side.

The representatives of Ukraine informed the interlocutors about the current situation at the front and the measures taken to counter the Russian aggressor.

The parties discussed the issue of continuing security, economic and humanitarian support for Ukraine. They noted the importance of strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure facilities.

Separately, the interlocutors paid attention to ways of achieving a just peace in Ukraine, which would be based on the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter and would envisage accountability for the aggressor state.

The Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine thanked the United States, President Joseph Biden, both houses of the U.S. Congress and the entire American society for supporting Ukraine and the invaluable contribution to the protection of the values of freedom and democracy in Europe and the whole world.

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-obgovoriv-z-dzhejkom-sallivanom-prodovzhennya-79833

Prime Minister of Ukraine

By the results of the conference in Paris, Ukraine attracted USD 1 billion worth assistance from partners, says Denys Shmyhal

Ukraine has mobilized about USD 1 billion of assistance from international partners for the winter period. Half of these are grants, the other half - goods, works, loans, most of which the state will receive in the current year.

This was announced by Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal and Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France Catherine Colonna following the International Conference Standing With the Ukrainian People held in Paris.

"The initiative to consolidate all our partners to support the citizens of Ukraine during the winter period is vital for us. Especially now, when russia is trying to ruthlessly destroy the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, committing terror against the civilian population," said Denys Shmyhal.

He noted that the result of the conference was quite concrete support for Ukraine to get through the winter with the minimum losses.

Apart from attracting USD 1 billion in funds and resources, it involves the creation of an effective and efficient platform of solidarity with Ukraine. It will summarize information about the needs of Ukraine and provide a mechanism for instant response of partners.

In addition, the conference triggered a large-scale energy saving program.

"We have initiated a comprehensive program to replace 50 million outdated lamps with new LED lamps. The European Commission will finance the purchase of 30 million of them. Thus, we will save 1 GW of electricity and reduce the deficit in the network. The aggressor will not be able to plunge us into cold and darkness. We will survive with the support of our friends. I am sincerely grateful to France and personally to President Emmanuel Macron for bringing partners together to help Ukraine," the Prime Minister of Ukraine emphasized.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/za-rezultatom-konferentsii-v-paryzhi-ukraina-zaluchyla-1-mlrd-dolariv-dopomohy-partneriv-denys-shmyhal

Grain Initiative: 8 vessels with 238,600 tonnes of agricultural products for Asia and Europe left the ports of Greater Odesa

8 vessels carrying 238,600 tonnes of agricultural products for Asia and Europe left the ports of Greater Odesa.

Currently, 23 vessels are under processing in the ports. They are being loaded with 690,000 tonnes of Ukrainian agricultural products.

Since August 1, 550 vessels have left the ports of Greater Odesa, exporting 13.8 million tonnes of Ukrainian food to Asia, Europe and Africa.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/zernova-initsiatyva-z-portiv-velykoi-odesy-vyishly-8-suden-z-2386-tys-tonn-ahroproduktsii-dlia-azii-ta-ievropy

7. Dispatch from Ukraine: What life is really like in Ukraine’s East Under Russian Bombardment

Dispatch from Ukraine: What life is really like in Ukraine’s East Under Russian Bombardment

holliesmckay.substack.com · by Hollie McKay

BAKHMUT, Ukraine – The sky is steadily dimming, deepening from the smoky gray of a sunless morning to stark black. Two small children wander through the heavy debris, untouched chocolate bars in each hand. Bearded men and black-eyed women with cracked hands and cigarettes dangling from their lips light small fires for some warmth.

There is no power, no heat, no water, and few signs of the vibrant life that once existed here.

Other locals ride their rusty bicycles along frozen, artillery-gouged, and shattered roads before going home to pray. I say home loosely. There is no single dwelling in the now thinly populated, rocket-ravished city that has not burned, blistered, or blown apart since Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, an expansion of its already six-year conflict targeting the country’s East.

While Bakhmut is hauntingly barren, it also has the creepy feeling of being watched. Russian forces are barely a mile or two away, so that unnerving gut hit is likely not a figment of a paranoid imagination. Nobody knows where the surveillance drones lurk. Nobody can say for sure that civilians left lingering in burned buildings do not filter information to the other side.

Nevertheless, one of the most sobering things for me is how many of those who remain have accepted death. For some, leaving is the last resort. For others, it is not even an option.

“Why are you still bothering me? I will die here,” laments a 93-year-old blind woman who lives alone in her charred home on the East side of Bakhmut. “I want to be left to die here.”

Artillery rumbles seem to never end. The wild soundtrack is often amplified by the unnerving whistle of an incoming missile. Then the whistle goes silent, followed by the uncomfortable two-second wait to comprehend where it landed, affirmed by a mammoth eruption and the sense that another building has been brought to its knees, another life or lives lost to the senseless violence. Yet, the civilians left inside the abandoned city barely bother to look up each time a mortar cracks the air or a Howitzer missile burrows itself into muddy earth close by.

Tucked in the Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, Bakhmut was once a city of 71,000 people. Just months ago, it was noted for its maze of salt mines and sculptures carved in the salt rock by savants, for its Artemivsk Plant of sweet sparkling wines, and the time-worn, wooden Church of St. Nicholas, the Wonderworker complete its three-tiered bell tower chiseled from ancient stone.

Now, all that is left in the frontline city are chilling remnants of human life and a spattering of the stubborn – mostly the very elderly – who refuse to walk away from everything they have ever known and loved.

And as the elastic band of this war stretches on against a backdrop of embarrassing fumbles and losses on behalf of the once feared and revered Russian forces, Putin’s planners have directed their attention toward this wedge of the eastern Donbas region. Specifically, a daunting Russian Private Military Company (PMC) known as the Wagner Group has been assigned the task of firing and fraying Bakhmut in Moscow's effort to push forward toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two strategic hubs in Donetsk.

A victory for the Russians, even one that resembles the apocalypse, is a very real and very jarring possibility. For the Kremlin, securing Bakhmut – one of the few places it is not in retreat – represents the frenzied feat needed to change the narrative of their losing “special military operation.”

Yet to counter the Wagner assault (also inspired by a classical composer's name, albeit without weapons), is a group of mostly retired western military professionals known as The Mozart Group (TMG). The NGO, founded by former MARSOC Marine Colonel Andy Milburn, sprang to life in the Spring with a small but resolute team that travels deep into dangerous territory, to the voids where no other aid organization or government outfit dares venture.

However, even Andy worries that the moving chronology of David defeating Goliath has warped some of the on-ground realities.

“What is less understood (in the media) are some of the more sophisticated aspects of what is happening here. Morale might be the strongest weapon (Ukrainians) have, but it is not enough by itself,” he cautions. “This can lead to complacency, and that is very damaging.”

Martin Wetterauer, also a retired U.S. Marine Colonel and Mozart’s Chief Operating Officer (COO), concurs that much of the “real world has been sheltered from the brutality of what has gone on.”

“There is not a lot of coverage like what you might have seen in Iraq or Afghanistan, a lot of the areas the press is not allowed in,” he notes. “But out East, you see villages’ total – absolute – destruction. When the Russians are looking to occupy a city, they flatten it with artillery, with rockets. Everyone left lives underground. There is not a single structure that has not been hit in some capacity or another. So, there is a lot of this that people don’t see.”

Squished into one of their mud-slathered Jeeps, I am in awe of how the Mozart team maneuvers (in unarmored vehicles, mind you) through the madness, swerving past the ambulances marked with the number of dead and wounded inside, through a daily grind replete with close calls. TMG collects bags of food from a local charity kitchen whose employees are prohibited from driving deeper into the bloodshed zone.

Mozart personnel consider it going the extra mile, filling the critical gap that no other non-military group can fill. While survival chances are increasingly slim for those who remain under the escalating assault, nobody in the TMG team wants to stop trying.

The season’s first snowfall flutters into the masticated ground; temperatures wither below freezing. One old woman decides she will finally leave, as she realizes she cannot shovel the dense snow alone and is not yet ready to perish barricaded in her broken home. Others boldly announce they have made a painful peace with whatever comes next in the harrowing chapter of a nonsensical war.

I watch helplessly as missiles whirl above and slam into civilian infrastructure. Certainly, Moscow’s targeting of non-combatant dwellings has been well-documented throughout the war. However, what I also observe is that Ukraine’s military often sets up posts directly outside humanitarian headquarters, hospitals, and homes. It is for self-protection or because there are no longer conventional sandbagged frontlines and delineations between the armed and the unarmed. Nevertheless, it makes the scenario uncomfortable and makes every inch a pronounced target.

On another frosty morning in Kramatorsk, embattled community and government leaders gather in a basement office for a string of meetings about what to do next and how to repair the more recently “de-occupied” towns and villages from which Russians have retreated. But perhaps more urgently, they discuss with Andy and the Mozart team leaders how to convince those still left in places like Bakhmut that remain in the firing line.

“Do you have team members who are qualified or have experience, in a psychological sense, to talk to these people – to explain to them why it is better to leave than stay?” one local official named Yuri asks.

This is largely what TMG already does. No one else I see or hear of winds through the labyrinth of destruction dropping food boxes, filling up diesel canisters, bringing water bottles, delivering medication, or offering to transport the weary and war-worn to safety once they finally make the searing decision to leave.

For those without family to take them in, there are few choices for long-term, cost-free places to stay. People in Donbas fret that their government will not be there to care for them.

One woman with fluff bursting through her torn pink jacket, enormous eyes, and a heavy breath that peals mournfully in the twilight points to the rocket remnants in her overgrown front yard.

“We evacuated and were told we would have a place to stay rent-free, but we learned it wasn’t true,” she explains tearfully. “We have no money, so we had to come back.”

Then just days later, the Russians hit their home, and her husband was gravely wounded. As he fights for his life in a distant hospital, she ponders helplessly what she will do.

Nearby, I learn of an old man who eventually agreed to leave his tiny home with a rocket-wracked roof and one side concave. For a moment, he forgot the war. Rather, he locked the front door of his fragmented house and double-checked the analog radio was switched off.

TMG’s vehicles guide another weeping wife and her husband from their chewed-up-and-spat-out abode, their belongings stuffed into their ailing vehicle. Another day passes. Nobody wants to go. Some say that wood and rainwater are all they need to survive. Still, the days of no evacuations feel like failed missions that weigh heavy on the team’s shoulders, no matter which way one slices it.

Of course, you can’t force people to abandon what is theirs. But you also know you may never see them alive again.

Beyond Bakhmut, Ukraine faces a somber winter that will undoubtedly spiral into an even more profound humanitarian crisis. Ongoing attacks on the energy infrastructure mean much of the country is routinely plunged into frozen darkness. The lack of energy then hinders access to clean water. And no matter how much humanitarian aid pours into the country, it seems never enough, as thousands are forced to queue for hours for small rations.

For the likes of Mozart, which is not financially supported by any government, their ability to sustain such critical operations is mainly dependent on public donations. Each day operating in the trenches itself marks something of a triumph.

Nobody knows when the war will be over. No one knows how it will be won. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians – including children – have already lost their lives. Sadly, the book of the dead will only climb as the days melt into months.

“Putin wants to intimidate and coerce Ukraine in the West into a deal to freeze the conflict until he is ready to continue, because things are not going his way. Militarily, and to do that, he is resorting to terrorism, plain and simple. His idea is that if Ukraine is dark and cold, it will make the situation unbearable for the people, and a humanitarian catastrophe will lead to a freeze of the conflict,” Igor Novikov, a former senior adviser to Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky, tells me bluntly. “Without power and connectivity, logistical chains will break down. Food production will break down. So, we need generators. We need humanitarian food supplies; we need medicines.”

Igor pauses, reflecting on the sad state of his beloved homeland.

“We need to ensure that the millions of people left without electricity, heat and water have somewhere to go and survive. It is a huge effort,” he continues. “And it has to be down on many levels of government cooperation, but also at the civil society level.”

One can only hope that war wounds will soon be stitched up, but the painful truth I fear is that the scars will never heal. The homes that no longer existed would never be again. However, perhaps most Ukrainians don’t want them to heal. Instead, they want the world to see – or, most importantly, remember – what their neighbors, their brothers, have done to them.

Under the thud of Wagner’s bombardment one morning, I strain my neck into the gloomy sky to determine if it is incoming or outgoing. It is then that I notice a bone-thin man. He is on crutches, held up by only one remaining leg, rummaging through a pile of trash. This war will continue to claim many lives and limbs long after the ammunition runs out.

“That is the other important thing, the antipersonnel mines and unexploded ordinance devices. I have seen spots where the Russians did not pull the pin and are sticking up from the ground,” adds Jim Lechner, a 27-year veteran of the U.S. Army-turned TMG trainer and operative. “So de-mining is the next thing we need to tackle.”

Battles rise and fade, but their ramifications never die away. Wars cannot be undone. From the outside, all we can do is support those to stop the bleeding.

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8. Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No

Counterpoint:

All warfare is based on deception

And I would refer to the same Chinese general above: never assume your enemy will not attack. Mke yourself invincible.

Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Timothy R. Heath · December 14, 2022

Is China preparing to invade Taiwan within the next two decades? In the past year, fears that war could break out in the Taiwan Strait have grown palpable, owing in large part to the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Conflict scenarios that once seemed inconceivable have become a frightening reality. Commentators warn that Beijing could be tempted to follow Moscow’s example and attack a neighbor which it has long regarded as illegitimate.

U.S. military commanders have issued grim warnings about the possibility of such an attack in the near future. In March 2021, Adm. Philip Davidson, Pacific Fleet commander, warned that China could take military action against Taiwan by 2027. Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations, added that he could “not rule out” a Chinese attempt to invade as early as 2023. Top specialists on China have lent support to the alarming assessment. In a recent poll, 63 percent of respondents believed an invasion to be “possible within the next 10 years.”

These fears have spurred striking political responses in Western capitals. To dissuade Beijing, President Joseph Biden has issued multiple statements clarifying U.S. willingness to help Taiwan defeat Chinese aggression. U.S. military leaders, dismayed by the results of war games that suggested U.S. forces could suffer devastating losses in a cross-strait conflict, have vowed major overhauls of the armed forces. Allied governments have stepped up preparations as well. Japan has increased defense spending amid fears of a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan and Australia has inked a deal with the United States and the United Kingdom for nuclear submarines to patrol farther from its shores.

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China’s demands for unification are not new, of course. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing has insisted on the goal of unification. But for many years the risk of war seemed low because either the Chinese military was too weak or because Beijing was too distracted by other priorities, such as rapid economic growth. However, in the past year, three pieces of evidence have, for many, dramatically elevated the likelihood of war. The first consists of intelligence reports regarding the preparation of Chinese military options for Taiwan by 2027. The second consists of statements by senior officials that stress the imperative of unification. The third consists of growing Chinese military advantage over U.S. forces near Taiwan.

Although the collective evidence appears persuasive, a closer examination shows that their significance has been seriously overstated. Moreover, there is a conspicuous lack of evidence that the government has decided to pursue a military solution to the island. China might someday choose to attack the island, but the most compelling evidence of that possibility would consist of indications that the government had prioritized Taiwan unification above other policy goals. The United States should continue to maintain its deterrence posture but refrain from overstating the threat and thereby misjudge the cross-strait situation.

Chinese Military Preparations by 2027

The first and perhaps most striking piece of evidence consists of intelligence reports that Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to prepare military options against Taiwan by 2027.There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the intelligence reports. However, the significance of the instructions passed by Xi is far from clear. Where and how did Xi pass these instructions? What do they mean?

The context for such remarks matters a great deal. In China’s political system, the most important decisions regarding national strategy are made by the top leaders in the Politburo Standing Committee. A decision to change the country’s current prioritization of peaceful development in favor of a more militarily aggressive strategy to conquer Taiwan would certainly merit such a meeting, if only to promote the illusion of consensus behind such a radical departure from the current strategy. However, there is no evidence that such an exceptional meeting ever took place. Bolstering this point, CIA Director David Cohen clarified that Xi “had not made the decision” to attack Taiwan.

Although Cohen did not provide details, his comments suggest that Xi probably gave the instructions at the annual Central Military Commission work meeting. This makes sense because Xi annually convenes a senior military leadership meeting at which he provides security guidance for the coming year. This is traditionally considered the most important meeting of the year for the military’s leadership. At these meetings, the Central Military Commission Chair typically provides directions to the military on how to support the country’s national strategy. Sample tasks include actions to reform the command structure and improve the quality of training. But, crucially, the Central Military Commission is empowered only to prepare and execute strategies and policies consistent with those determined by the supreme civilian leadership — namely, the Politburo Standing Committee. Thus, in the meeting Xi apparently directed the military to carry out preparations for a Taiwan contingency by 2027 but to otherwise operate in accordance with the current Taiwan strategy that prioritizes peaceful methods. This interpretation is consistent with Cohen’s public observation that Beijing still “intends to get control” of Taiwan through “non-military means.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley’s characterization of Xi’s remarks lends support to that interpretation. Milley commented that Xi’s instructions appear to be about “capability, not an intent to attack or seize.”

Dates and Goals for PLA Modernization

Both Cohen’s and Milley’s interpretations support the view that Beijing currently prioritizes peaceful methods to achieve unification. However, their comments hint at the possibility that Xi’s intentions could change over time. Many observers have in fact put forward the suggestion that Xi may adopt aggressive options once the military completes its preparations by 2027. Some analysts have cited this possibility in arguing for robust deterrence posture now as a way to dissuade Xi from considering military action by that date. But why would China announce a deadline for military preparations? Commentators linkThe 2027 date is said to point to Xi’s hopes that he can achieve unification before turning too old or before he concludes his third term as General Secretary. But that is not the only possible interpretation. It is not even the most plausible for four reasons. First, there is no evidence to support the claim that the timeline is driven by Xi’s personal considerations. Second, Chinese leaders routinely direct the military to prepare for Taiwan contingencies. Third, setting dates for modernization goals is an exceedingly common practice. And fourth, Chinese leaders have a variety of reasons for setting dates for modernization goals that do not have anything to do with an intent to attack.

First, despite predictions to the contrary, there is no evidence to support the speculation that the “prepare military options by 2027” goal is tied to either Xi’s age or the end of his third term in office. The reasoning is also specious given that, to date, Xi has proven extremely cautious in his use of the military. It is true that Xi has overseen the expansion of “gray zone” operations against rival claimants in the First Island Chain. China and India also clashed in a lethal brawl under Xi’s watch, although Beijing subsequently sought to deescalate tensions. However, although Xi has been repressive and brutal in many ways, he has not engaged in any of the type of combat operations that Russia undertook in Georgia, Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine’s Crimean region prior to invading Ukraine in 2022. It would be unprecedented, risky in the extreme, and frankly bizarre for a major power like China to refrain from testing its military in even a limited combat operation before launching an attack that could escalate into a major war with the world’s premier military, that of the United States.

Second, it is not by itself especially noteworthy that Xi directed the military to prepare for a Taiwan contingency — or any other contingency for that matter. One of the military’s most important jobs, after all, is precisely to prepare for contingencies. Nor is it unusual for the military leadership to regard Taiwan as a top security threat. Taiwan has been the People’s Liberation Army’s top security challenge for over two decades. Moreover, all militaries plan for contingencies with designated potential adversaries in mind. U.S. defense strategy documents make clear that the U.S. military, for example, regards China, Russia, and others as potential threats and plans for contingencies accordingly. This does not mean the United States has any intention of attacking either China or Russia, of course.

Third, the linking of modernization goals to dates is an exceedingly common Chinese practice. Reflecting a legacy from the era of a planned economy, Beijing regularly sets dates for modernization goals. China sets goals for national modernization efforts in regular increments in its five-year plans, for example. But it also sets development goals that coincide with special anniversaries, in part to bolster the Chinese Communist Party’s prestige and authority. For example, China’s development goals for the “China Dream” coincide with the centennial of the nation’s founding in 2049. In the early 2000s, reports surfaced that suggested Chinese leaders had “secret plans” to invade Taiwan by 2020. Yet the reports proved inaccurate because Western experts misunderstood the meaning of the date. In fact, the 2020 date for military modernization was tied to broader development goals that coincided with the centennial of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding in 2021. China did not invade Taiwan in 2021, but it did hold a lavish parade to showcase the military’s achievements in modernization and whip up patriotic enthusiasm. Analysts may be committing the same mistake about the reports of military modernization goals set for 2027. The significance of 2027, as Chinese military news websites explain, lies in the fact that it will be the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army’s founding. It’s a pretty safe bet that Beijing will hold an extravagant military parade in 2027.

Fourth, the military’s modernization goals serve a variety of political and military purposes, none of which imply any intent to actually start a war. Deterrence of a potential secession move by Taiwan remains one compelling reason. But there are others. Although experts focus almost exclusively on official statements regarding Taiwan, Chinese leaders have placed equal emphasis on the goal of building a strong military as a sign of a powerful and successful China. Annually, China holds many lavish military parades and exercises, all of which receive extensive coverage in Chinese media. This practice, which has continued since the country’s founding by Mao Zedong, serve an important role in bolstering patriotism and legitimizing Communist Party rule.

Building a powerful military is also an important source of political power for the country’s supreme leader. Xi’s power hinges, in part, on his command of the military, which helps explain why he is often photographed in military uniforms or settings. Responsible primarily for foreign policy and the military, China’s central government actually controls a far smaller share of overall government spending than is the case for Western governments. The overwhelming majority of government revenue and spending is handled by the provincial governments, who thus have access to the most lucrative sources of revenue and extensive patronage networks. Xi thus has a strong political incentive to improve the gleaming appearance of an impressive military in part as a way to underscore his authority, bolster public support, and cow rival elites who are flush with wealth and supporters.

Yet one more important purpose of such modernization goals is to keep the military focused on its goal of becoming more professional and resist tendencies of slipping into corruption and lethargy. Xi’s instructions to remain focused on its military duties takes place within the context of a broader effort to improve the overall modernization, competence, and effectiveness of the government, which authorities regard as critical to realizing the country’s goals of national revival. Consistent with this broader imperative, Xi has repeatedly called on the military to improve its combat readiness, which is another way of saying the military should become more competent at its job.

The point is not to dismiss as trivial Xi’s instructions to the People’s Liberation Army as insignificant. The instructions are noteworthy, but nothing about the instructions themselves tell us anything about Chinese intent to attack Taiwan. What is required is clearer evidence of leadership intent to finally conquer the island.

Chinese Statements on Taiwan

This raises the second widely cited piece of evidence: government statements that emphasize the imperative of unification. Xi stated in 2019, for example, that Taiwan “must and will be reunited with China.” At the 20 th Party Congress held in 2022, Xi described “China’s complete reunification” as a “natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Under Xi, China also issued a white paper on Taiwan that refused to renounce the use of force.

Once again, the fact that Xi and the Chinese government made these statements cannot be doubted. The quotes are available for anyone to read in publicly available media reports. But what do they mean? Top China specialists have claimed that the statements show Xi aims to “complete unification by 2049.” Such statements certainly appear compelling on the surface, but a closer look suggests their significance is overstated for several reasons.

The first point to note is that all Chinese leaders since Mao have regularly issued such uncompromising proclamations. Jiang Zemin declared at the 16 th Party Congress in 2002, “The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely” and pledged that the “complete reunification of the motherland” will be achieved at an unspecified “early date.” Hu Jintao stated at the 18 th Party Congress in 2012 that the “complete reunification of China is an irresistible historical process.” He added that “any separatist attempt for Taiwan independence” is “doomed to fail.” Consistent with the recent white paper, previous versions also refused to rule out the use of force to resolve the issue. If the tone of statements issued by Xi’s government departs from his predecessors, the difference is slight.

Second, what the government did not say or do is equally or even more noteworthy. There is nothing in the 20th Party Congress report or any of Xi’s speeches that expresses the notion that China had reached the “limits of its forbearance” or that demand some sort of immediate steps towards unification. Nor is there any evidence that the government had begun taking practical steps to prepare for military conquest.

As best as outsiders can tell, Beijing has not directed studies by relevant government ministries to plan for the occupation and administration of Taiwan. Nor have central leaders begun to indoctrinate cadres on the imperative of gaining Taiwan through military efforts if necessary. Such indoctrination is essential for cadres to understand what and why they must adjust their duties to prepare for a potentially catastrophic war situation. Neither has Beijing made any effort to rally public sentiment in favor of war against the island. Central leaders need to socialize people to the importance and potential dangers of war to gain public support for a course of action that would very likely shock the public, lead to severe economic disruption, and expose many people to serious harm or death. National unification may be a popular idea among Chinese citizens, but war isn’t. Data on popular views are of course difficult to come by given the controlled political environment, but available surveys by Western scholars show an overwhelming preference for peaceful methods to achieve unification with Taiwan. For Beijing to launch a war without bothering to cultivate the public’s support would risk throwing the country into utter turmoil.

Above all, there is no evidence that the government is seriously contemplating abandoning its peaceful unification strategy. Such a reprioritization would be necessary because the current approach has essentially paid lip service to the imperative of Taiwan unification while prioritizing other goals such as economic growth and the maintenance of a stable international environment to facilitate national development. Xi has rebranded the pursuit of a national rejuvenation as the “China Dream,” but his vision shares considerable continuity with that of his predecessors. As with the previous governments, Xi’s demands for unification have coincided with tolerance for the island’s de facto independence as he pursued other more pressing goals such as reenergizing a flagging economy, grappling with corruption, managing unrest over the country’s “Zero Covid” restrictions, and implementing geo-economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Given these higher priorities, Xi, like his predecessors, has to date made little effort to force the matter of unification.

China’s Military Advantage Near Taiwan

The absence of evidence that China has revised its national strategy to prioritize unification is especially critical because the third widely cited piece of evidence — that of an increasingly powerful Chinese military — remains unpersuasive without it. In recent years, China has developed an immense inventory of advanced aircraft, warships, missiles, and ground forces that outclassed in every way Taiwan’s stagnant military. China’s improved capabilities also pose an increasingly lethal threat to U.S. forces that might intervene in a Taiwan conflict. In the past two years, war games that tested how U.S. forces might fare against the revamped People’s Liberation Army yielded grim results. Numerous iterations held at different think tanks showed that China could inflict massive losses on U.S. forces in a war over Taiwan and in some cases defeat a U.S. intervention. There is no reason to doubt the warnings by U.S. military leaders that China poses an increasingly formidable threat in any Taiwan contingency.

Yet here, too, the significance of these trends may be overstated. Despite its growing military strength, it is impossible for Beijing to know with any certainty what would happen once war began. Even if we assume China has gained the upper hand militarily in the area near Taiwan, that provides far less advantage than it appears. As Russia is learning in the Ukraine, the United States learned recently in Afghanistan, and military historians have long noted, w war waar involves so many factors that how fighting might progress or conclude is impossible to predict. Underscoring this point, the wargames favored at U.S. think tanks typically explore the devastating first few days of conflict but rarely consider what might happen afterwards. Analysts scarcely explored how a U.S.-China conflict could evolve into a much broader systemic war. In short, war with the United States remains such a high-risk, potentially catastrophic development, that even with China’s military advances, only a radical shift in risk tolerance and policy prioritization could possibly justify Beijing’s willingness to consider this possibility.

The evidence to date remains weak that China is seriously considering an attack on Taiwan, but that does not preclude the possibility that future Chinese leaders might change their mind. How could we tell if Beijing had begun to seriously contemplate an attack on Taiwan? The most important indicators would be those related to a political decision to pursue unification through military options and prepare the nation accordingly. Evidence that top leaders had agreed to prioritize unification above the myriad domestic and foreign policy goals that currently comprise the core of the “China Dream” would be of the highest importance. Indications that the leaders had made such a decision would be evident in steps that the government had taken to prepare for war. Central and provincial government ministries would probably, for example, begin stockpiling, improve defenses, and take measures to insulate the country’s economy to external shocks. Party cadres would likely undergo extensive indoctrination on the importance of reunification and on their duties to support a war effort accordingly. Propaganda, mass rallies, and fiery speeches by top leaders would aim to bolster public support and prepare the populace psychologically for the hardships to come. The political preparations would need to equal, at the very least, the very similar types of activity that characterized Chinese preparations for its last major, large-scale conflict — that of the Korean War. After all, the danger of mass civilian death and economic disruption today is much higher than was the case in the Korean War, owing to the realities of global economic interdependence and advent of modern military technologies such as long-range missiles capable of striking many targets along China’s densely populated coast, to say nothing of the disruptive potential of cyber warfare or the perils of nuclear weapons.

Vladimir Putin, whose attack on Ukraine has inspired much of the angst about a potential Chinese attack, provides a case study of how an autocrat like Xi or a successor could behave in the lead up to war. Although Western analysts may not have understood their significance, Putin for years carried out an escalating series of increasingly shrill tirades and rants about Ukraine. Putin’s government listed numerous grievances and issued dire warnings about developments regarded as unacceptable, including the expansion of NATO and the aiding and abetting of “terrorist activities” against Russian nationals in the Ukraine. He also directed the Russian military to carry numerous attacks against neighbors starting in 2008. In short, Putin sent clear and unambivalent signals about Russia’s intent and willingness to attack for years and months prior to invasion. China under Xi has made no such gestures regarding Taiwan.

For some, the possibility of war, however remote, is reason enough to enhance the U.S. deterrence posture. There is no question that a strong U.S. deterrent posture can help incentivize Beijing to avoid ever contemplating an attack. But accurate assessments of Chinese intentions do matter. Underestimating an adversary, as the United States and the West did with Putin, can lead to inadequate preparations and potential disaster for the victim of aggression, as nearly happened to Ukraine. But overestimating a rival state’s willingness to risk conflict carries its own drawbacks. An exaggerated sense of danger can exacerbate tensions and aggravate perceptions of hostile intent. This could in turn incentivize a rival to adopt more aggressive behavior and thereby accelerate a security dilemma. Moreover, the United States could grant China more leverage in the relationship than is warranted. Out of a desire to reduce a risk of war that is perceived to be higher than it really is, Washington may grant concessions that may not be necessary. And finally, the opportunity costs incurred by an exaggerated fear of war might be considerable. Given the competing demands for military resources and tightening budget constraints, this is not an insignificant point. Massive investments in deterrence capabilities near Taiwan will have to come at the cost of resources that could have been allocated elsewhere.

Despite China’s growing military power, there remain formidable disincentives for China to ever consider going down this route. The risks and uncertainties of great power war remain immense and the potential gains of conquering Taiwan debatable especially given the potential for a war to escalate to catastrophic levels. It is important to closely monitor Chinese military developments and ensure appropriate deterrence. But it is also important not to overstate the threat and thereby misjudge the situation. A more accurate grasp of the meaning and logic of Chinese statements and behavior can help the United States and its allies to make well-informed and reasonable responses to developments in the Taiwan Strait.

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Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international and defense researcher for the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Image: China Military

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Timothy R. Heath · December 14, 2022

9. China's plan to be the next nuclear superpower

Excerpts:

On top of this, in several countries in East Asia, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, faith in the ability of America’s military capabilities to deter Chinese expansionism is wavering and, at least in some quarters, there are calls for these nations to develop their own nuclear deterrents.

The world has managed to avoid nuclear catastrophe since 1945 — though not without a number of close calls — even as the number of states with their own atomic weapons has grown. But nuclear expansion in one country tends to encourage them in other countries, and the task of preventing anyone from actually using one of these weapons is only getting trickier. China is unlikely to be welcomed to the nuclear superpower club with open arms.

China's plan to be the next nuclear superpower

Beijing’s nuclear strategy has long been surprisingly modest. So why did it just double its nuclear arsenal?

Joshua Keating

Global Security Reporter

December 13, 2022

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

There are currently nine nuclear powers in the world, but arguably only two nuclear superpowers. The United States and Russia account for around 90 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, with around 4,000 warheads each in their military stockpiles.

There may soon be a third.

A Pentagon report on Chinese military power released at the end of November estimated that China’s nuclear arsenal has now exceeded 400 operational warheads, double the estimate from just two years ago. At current rates of construction, the report suggested, the Chinese nuclear stockpile could reach 1,500 warheads by 2035.

This doesn’t mean China will definitely build these weapons. “No one actually knows that answer,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “China is taking a step-by-step approach in response to the strategic environment.”

What is clear is that as China seeks to boost its influence and stature on the global stage, it is now pouring resources into its nuclear program and thinking about a new nuclear strategy. And Washington won’t be the only world capital raising alarm about the implications.

A nuclear late bloomer

China joined the nuclear club in 1964, when it tested an atomic bomb at Lop Nur, a dried lake in Xinjiang, in western China. At the time, the prospect of such a destructive weapon in the hands of Mao Zedong’s communist regime prompted a level of American alarm comparable to the response to North Korea’s nuclear program in recent years. Several years before the Lop Nur test, President John F. Kennedy had suggested that the Chinese would be less likely than Russians or Americans to avoid a nuclear war because of the “lower value they attach to human life.”

But if anything, China’s nuclear ambitions since then have been more cautious and restrained than its rivals. While the U.S. and Soviet Union grew their nuclear arsenals at a breakneck pace during the Cold War, China maintained a small, “lean and effective” force, which tended to grow more slowly than the estimates of Western experts. It was only about two years ago that China’s nuclear arsenal overtook France’s to become the world’s third largest.

China was also much slower than other nuclear powers to build intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). And it remains the only nuclear power that publicly maintains an unconditional “no first use” policy” regarding nuclear weapons.

Lately, however, along with an overall military expansion and modernization, China has been stepping up its nuclear ambitions. In 2016, China elevated what is now known as the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which controls China’s land-based missile arsenal, to the status of fourth service branch, alongside the army, navy and air force — a signal of the growing prioritization of the country’s nuclear deterrent.

In 2021, satellite imagery revealed what experts believed to be more than 100 new silos for ICBMs in the desert near the northwestern city of Yumen. It’s widely thought that some of these may be decoys — a revival of America’s Cold War-era “shell game” strategy, in which a large number of silos were left empty in order to confuse and sap the resources of an adversary in the event of an exchange of nuclear missiles.

Also last year, China tested a new hypersonic missile that circled the world before cruising toward its target, and featured a design meant to confound missile defense systems. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the test as very close to a breakthrough “sputnik moment” for China.

The recent Pentagon report also notes that China is “investing in and expanding the number of its land-, sea- and air-based nuclear delivery platforms.” This includes a bomber capable of firing a nuclear-capable, air-launched ballistic missile and a new class of operational submarine-launched ballistic missiles that “represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”

The strategy

So what exactly would 1,500 nuclear warheads do for China that its current arsenal can’t? The answer may have to do with what nuclear strategists call a “survivable second strike.”

“They went from 200 to 400 warheads in the last year or so, but we have 10 times that,” said Raymon Kuo, an expert on Chinese strategy at the Rand Corporation. “So, if there were a U.S. nuclear first strike, there’s a possibility that we could just wipe out all of their nuclear weapons at one go.” A larger, more dispersed arsenal gives China a greater chance of surviving a U.S. first strike with the ability to fire back. Kuo said China’s thinking is informed by its reading of American strategic doctrine in the Indo-Pacific which, at least in Beijing’s view, merges conventional capabilities, new capabilities like cyberwarfare, and nuclear weapons in a way that makes it more likely that a conventional conflict would go nuclear.

Meanwhile, even if nuclear war never comes, these weapons also serve a political purpose for Xi Jinping’s government.

“First and foremost, the thing that’s motivating China’s buildup is its changing domestic situation,” Jeffrey Lewis, a professor and nuclear analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told Grid. “It’s not that China’s security situation got a lot worse. China’s richer and stronger than it’s ever been in the past. You have a Chinese government that has a different view of things. They are coming to talk about nuclear weapons in much the way that we and the Russians do.”

In other words, China sees itself as a global superpower now. And while in the past China viewed a relatively minimal nuclear deterrent as sufficient for its defense, now it sees nuclear weapons as a tool to help accomplish its global ambitions. Several experts suggested China may also be taking lessons from how Russia has used the implied threat of nuclear weapons use to limit the type and amount of military assistance that Western countries have provided to Ukraine.

“You don’t even have to threaten nuclear use,” said Zhao. “You can do things like hold nuclear exercises or make reference to your capabilities. Those things can create concern in China’s enemies about the risk of escalation and that could deliver some core benefits.”

Lewis suggested that this type of intimidation is only possible with a large arsenal. “If you have 1,500 instead of 300 [warheads], you can engage in the kind of signaling that Vladimir Putin has engaged in Ukraine,” he said.

And of course, this signaling comes amid rising military and political tensions between China and the United States, and growing speculation about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan — a conflict that many experts fear could end up involving the use of nuclear weapons.

For what it’s worth, after a recent meeting between Biden and Xi in Bali, Indonesia, in which Putin’s potential nuclear use in Ukraine was discussed, the White House issued a statement saying that the two leaders agreed that a “nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won.”

How real is ‘no first use’?

China rejects the notion that there’s anything aggressive about its nuclear buildup — echoing its response to suggestions that its regional ambitions are aggressive in any way.

In a statement responding to the recent Pentagon report, defense ministry spokesman Tan Kefei accused the U.S. of being the main military aggressor in the world and said, “What needs to be emphasized is that China firmly pursues the nuclear strategy of self-defense and defense, always adheres to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and maintains its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security.”

U.S. officials have often treated the Chinese no-first-use policy with incredulity. Adm. Charles Richard, chief of U.S. Strategic Command, testified to the Senate in 2020 that he could “drive a truck through that no-first-use policy,” suggesting it was vague enough that China would be able to find pretexts to ignore it.

Most experts aren’t quite so cavalier, but others have doubts about how strongly such a policy would hold up a in a crisis. Zhao said that his reading of Chinese military planning documents suggests that “at least at the military level, the Chinese missile force is ready to lower the nuclear threshold during a crisis if necessary.” This doesn’t mean they actually have lowered the threshold, but that they may be readying for a scenario in which political leaders would decide that was necessary.

“I don’t think they’re lying when they say, ‘No, we really will not use nukes first,’” Kuo added. “But when things go really badly, how much is that policy really worth? I don’t think there are really institutional checks. If Xi Jinping says ‘go,’ they’re still going to launch.”

Hope for diplomacy?

The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals may still dwarf China’s, but on the other hand, we at least know a good deal about them. Thanks to a series of arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union — and after that, with Russia — there are limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads that both sides possess and provisions to verify those numbers. The most recent of these agreements, the New START treaty, was signed in 2010 and extended for another five years in 2021: it was one of the last diplomatic breakthroughs between the U.S. and Russia before the invasion of Ukraine.

China’s nuclear program is not subject to any comparable agreement. The Trump administration, which let several major arms control agreements with Russia lapse (the argument was that the deals would allow China’s nuclear forces to grow unchecked while America’s were limited), had pushed for trilateral nuclear arms talks among the U.S., Russia, and China — an idea that Beijing rejected. The Biden administration has moved away from the trilateral approach, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken has suggested that something comparable to New START could be negotiated between the U.S. and China. U.S. officials say China also has expressed little interest in this idea. China’s embassy in Washington did not respond to Grid’s request for comment on the feasibility of nuclear diplomacy.

Kuo says the radio silence from Beijing shouldn’t be surprising. He summarized the Chinese view: “We’ve got 400 warheads. You’ve got 3,800. If anyone needs ‘New START’, it’s you guys.”

A new nuclear world

Arms control involving two nuclear superpowers is hard enough. Case in point: The U.S. accused Russia last week of expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, just as Putin has discussed formally adding first use of nuclear weapons to his country’s military doctrine. The U.S., for its part, is set to spend about $2 trillion on nuclear weapons over the next 25 years. Talks on extending New START past 2026 have stalled amid tensions over Ukraine. We’re a long way from the dramatic 2009 speech in which Barack Obama promised “concrete steps” toward a world without nuclear weapons. And the situation may be about to get much harder and more complicated.

In physics, a “three-body problem” refers to the confoundingly difficult task of calculating the movements of three, rather than two, objects reacting to each other’s gravity. (It’s also the title of an apocalyptic Chinese sci-fi novel that became an unexpected global sensation several years ago.) The addition of a third nuclear superpower could have a similar destabilizing effect on the already unstable world of nuclear brinkmanship.

Arms races happen because one country builds and modernizes its arsenal to improve its defensive deterrent, and the other side considers that an act of aggression, and feels the need to respond in kind. Concerted diplomacy can sometimes break the cycle of escalation, but, said Lewis, “at three, it just becomes insoluble. The U.S. will have to do things to respond to the Chinese, and that in turn will make the Russians feel more insecure. It’s just exponentially harder to get three countries to agree to something.” The Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage in arms control negotiations with Russia under the pretext that it would embolden China was an illustration of this dynamic.

On top of this, in several countries in East Asia, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, faith in the ability of America’s military capabilities to deter Chinese expansionism is wavering and, at least in some quarters, there are calls for these nations to develop their own nuclear deterrents.

The world has managed to avoid nuclear catastrophe since 1945 — though not without a number of close calls — even as the number of states with their own atomic weapons has grown. But nuclear expansion in one country tends to encourage them in other countries, and the task of preventing anyone from actually using one of these weapons is only getting trickier. China is unlikely to be welcomed to the nuclear superpower club with open arms.

Thanks to Dave Tepps for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

10. A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China

Excerpts:

Some China watchers are also skeptical that Xi wants dialogue. At the Harvard conference, Weiss was on a panel with several people who were asked what they thought of her article in Foreign Affairs. Andrew Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a visiting professor at Harvard, said he’s seen no evidence that China wants to reciprocate, citing China’s refusal to discuss meaningful arms control. “I don’t see a basis for deep coöperation” with Xi’s China, Erickson said. “I’m sad to say that.”

Although she chooses to speak out, Weiss carefully calibrates how she talks about her concerns. She has seen how other Asian American voices have been targeted for racial attacks and so tries to keep her argument as factual and policy-based as possible. Although she doesn’t feel that she is a victim of racism, she is concerned that rhetoric and attacks in the United States could escalate. She limits her use of social media, for example, having seen how other Asian Americans have been attacked and accused of dual loyalty and a lack of patriotism. And, of course, her mother’s fears remain on her mind.

“I don’t want to become roadkill, but the stakes are too high to remain on the sideline of this conversation,” she said. “Although I’m an academic, I’m also a citizen, and I fear very much for the direction of this country and the growing enmity and confrontation with China. I’m not seeking that tension, but I want the ideas to take flight.”

A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China

Jessica Chen Weiss argues that Biden Administration policy is contributing to an “action-reaction spiral.”

December 13, 2022

The New Yorker · by Ian Johnson · December 13, 2022

Two years ago, Jessica Chen Weiss made a phone call to her mother that changed her career. Her mother, a cancer researcher who lives in Seattle, told her that rising violence against Asian Americans was making her fearful of going outside.

“She just didn’t want to walk around the streets,” Weiss said. “I was just shocked. It’s still something on her mind when she weighs whether to walk around downtown.”

Weiss wondered what was happening to her own country. “Growing up in Seattle, half Asian and half white, I never felt that my ethnicity or her ethnicity were an issue,” she said. A political scientist and professor of government at Cornell, Weiss had previously studied how China had risen in prominence as a campaign topic in the 2010 midterm elections, especially in terms of blue-collar jobs leaving the U.S. But she felt that this new wave of concern about China was of a different quality: it had become an obsession that could warp U.S. society.

“We can’t agree on what we stand for; that’s part of the problem,” she said. “We are risking our vibrancy as a democracy and our ability to attract talent.”

That was the beginning of Weiss’s new role as a public intellectual. She wrote for the mass media and spoke out in public. She was due a sabbatical year and sought out a fellowship that would allow her to spend it as a senior adviser on the policy-planning staff at the U.S. Department of State in the Biden Administration, helping to shape U.S. policy toward China.

She is quick to say that the twelve months were a terrific learning experience, and that the Administration was open to her ideas. “The words are there, and the instinct is there,” she said. “But there is the outcompete-and-beat-China muscle and the what-do-we-stand-for muscle. I think that second muscle is weaker in this Administration.”

In August, the forty-one-year-old published her concerns in a Foreign Affairs article that catapulted her to the front ranks of the growing number of China experts concerned that U.S. foreign policy suffers from an unhealthy focus on China as a threat. Called “The China Trap,” her piece details her worries that every interaction with China is now seen as a zero-sum game. Part of this is driven by China’s own actions, for example, in militarizing the South China Sea, threatening the democratic island of Taiwan, and failing to open its economy. “But a complete account,” she wrote, “must also acknowledge corresponding changes in U.S. politics and policy.”

That includes a barrage of punitive measures that grows by the year, including tariffs, sanctions on Chinese officials, and restrictions on cultural exchanges. Some of those policies began in the Trump Administration, but few have been changed under the Biden Administration, which has added new restrictions.

Most worrying to Weiss, President Biden also appears to be drifting away from a decades-long policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan, which many in both parties now see as deserving almost unreserved U.S. support. On four occasions, Biden has spoken of the U.S. responsibility to defend it, which has been explicit U.S. policy since relations were normalized with China in 1979. Each statement was walked back by the White House, which has said that U.S. policy has not changed, but the repetition has made it hard to believe that Biden is simply misspeaking. “I think we are in an action-reaction spiral,” Weiss told me, with each side feeling the need for ever-tougher measures to signal its seriousness. “We’re heading toward a crisis and a catastrophe that will devastate the global economy.”

Weiss has emerged as a kind of loyal and measured opposition to a rare case of bipartisan consensus in Washington—that China must be countered at all costs. Just a decade ago, this view was limited to a small number of right-wing commentators and analysts, but, in one of the most dramatic about-faces in U.S. foreign policy, it is now the dominant way of seeing China. As Weiss noted in her Foreign Affairs article, “ever more vehement opposition to China may be the sole thing that Democrats and Republicans can agree on.”

In many ways, the shift is understandable. China has militarized the South China Sea. It is building up a blue-water navy. It is flooding global institutions with its diplomats. It is threatening Taiwan. It has launched coercive campaigns to assimilate ethnic minorities, such as through brutal reëducation camps in the western region of Xinjiang. And it has cracked down on peaceful protesters seeking an end to nearly three years of coronavirus lockdowns.

Many other countries have also downgraded relations with China, suggesting that the problem is not a creation of Washington groupthink. But the explanation that China has changed isn’t entirely persuasive. As Susan L. Shirk documents in her meticulously researched new book, “Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise,” China’s aggressive foreign policy and domestic crackdown can be traced to 2006, when it began militarizing islands and implementing what became a permanent stifling of dissent, but the change in U.S. policy took flight only more than a decade later.

As Weiss points out in her Foreign Affairs article, the United States began to react in the Obama Administration, which in 2011 announced a “pivot” from the Middle East to Asia. Still, relations with China remained largely unchanged even after Trump took office. He used extreme language to describe China—saying it was out to “rape” the United States—but didn’t unleash truly hawkish policies until after he took a drubbing in the 2018 midterms.

Trump’s measures intensified when the coronavirus threatened his reëlection. After initially praising Xi Jinping’s handling of the virus, Trump turned on China, using crude language that seemed to drive anti-Asian hate. His Administration also took steps to cut points of contact with China, such as killing the Fulbright academic-exchange program and the Peace Corps program in China, reducing the number of Chinese journalists, and closing a Chinese consulate. All invited retaliatory actions. “In speeches,” Weiss has noted, “senior U.S. officials hinted at regime change, calling for steps to ‘empower the Chinese people’ to seek a different form of government and stressing that ‘Chinese history contains another path for China’s people.’ ”

Many thought that Biden’s election would change U.S. policy, but two things torpedoed that. One was China’s own belligerence. In 2020 and 2021, China became embroiled in renewed disputes with its neighbors: border skirmishes with India, incursions into Taiwan’s airspace, and the sending of armed ships into Japanese territorial waters. But the Biden Administration also shunned direct contacts, preferring to restore U.S. alliances before talking substantively with China. The new Administration’s first meeting with Chinese officials was a seemingly stage-managed spat between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, in Anchorage, Alaska—Blinken launched a verbal attack on China, which prompted a furious response, all in front of the international media.

“There is an ebb and flow of global enemies,” Weiss said. “This Administration came out of the gate saying it was China but then had to revise National Security Strategy to reflect Ukraine. So now we have an acute and a long-term threat.”

The harder line isn’t entirely surprising given the team that Biden assembled. These include Kurt M. Campbell, the National Security Council’s coördinator for the Indo-Pacific, who has argued that competition with China could help avert U.S. decline. Campbell and Ely Ratner, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, in 2018 co-authored an article arguing that engagement with China was a flawed strategy. Another key member of the team is Rush Doshi, the National Security Council’s China director, who authored an influential book arguing that China has been plotting to overtake the United States for decades.

These are key members of a group of China-policy experts whom the sociologist David M. McCourt calls “strategic competitors.” McCourt, a professor at the University of California, Davis, identifies three other groups. One is the old “engagers” of years past who helped shape the dominant school of dealing with China from the nineteen-seventies to the twenty-tens; another is the “new cold warriors,” who have long agitated for a tougher line on China.

It’s the last group, the “competitive coexisters,” from which Weiss and the new thinking stem. McCourt told me that he originally wanted to call them the “new engagers,” but members begged him not to, so tarnished is the word “engagement” in Washington. Instead, they acknowledge that the United States is competing with China, but also that it must find a way to live peacefully with the emerging superpower. And they unapologetically argue for more contact with China.

A piece from November, co-authored by three fellows at the Brookings Institution, asserted that “it is a mistake to view the relationship solely through the lens of rivalry.” That month, Harvard University held a conference, called Coexistence 2.0, that featured Weiss and others who, to varying degrees, call for a new approach to managing China-U.S. relations.

In the world of these skeptical voices, Weiss has become something of a star. She is invited to conferences around the world, appears on podcasts and in Twitter spaces, and regularly pens commentaries. “Jessica is giving voice to this newer, younger, policy-focussed China-watching voice,” McCourt said. “It’s a new kind of group. It’s not the old China hands.”

On November 14th, President Biden and Xi Jinping met in person for the first time since Biden took office. By the low expectations of the current moment, the meeting was a success, with Biden declaring that he saw a low risk of an imminent conflict over Taiwan. The two sides also agreed to meet further, with Blinken due to travel to China in early 2023.

But in the longer term, signs point to deteriorating relations. The flipping of the House of Representatives to Republican control is expected to unleash investigations and hearings into China on, for example, whether one of its laboratories was the cause of the COVID pandemic. That will likely invite countermeasures by China, keeping ties between the two countries contentious, with neither willing to make concessions for fear of looking weak.

“There is a growing effort to talk to the Chinese,” Weiss said. “But so much time is spent on how to do so and how not to give the impression that we’re giving an inch.”

Weiss is careful not to single out the Biden Administration, where she hopes that her work may be read. The Foreign Affairs article, she says, was meant to encourage people in the Administration who have had a hard time making a case for a more measured approach because of the consensus to get tough. “I felt that oftentimes the private discussions were taking place in the shadow of a public discussion that made it hard to get things accomplished,” she said. “One goal was to make it possible to have this discussion.”

Specifically, Weiss thinks that the Administration should take steps to de-escalate the tensions. It should oppose efforts under way in Congress to raise Taiwan’s diplomatic status, and discourage visits to Taiwan by senior officials, such as the recent trip by the outgoing Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. More broadly, the United States should be willing to offer rewards for better Chinese behavior, rather than solely a series of punishments, and set up more regular contact between Washington and Beijing.

While acknowledging China’s actions, Weiss says the risks of a catastrophic conflict are too high not to make a full-court diplomatic press. “Those who take that fatalistic approach have to ask themselves what kind of world they see,” she said. “I think it’s too catastrophic not to test the proposition that there is an alternative.”

For those who broadly share her views, Weiss is a welcome change from those who don’t dare say what they think for fear of being seen as weak or soft on China. “She’s extremely brave,” said Susan Thornton, a retired senior U.S. diplomat and now a visiting lecturer at the Yale Law School. “It’s really hard to criticize Biden knowing what else is out there, but the problem is you can’t do nuanced policymaking because anything you do will be ammunition for the other side.”

Some China watchers are also skeptical that Xi wants dialogue. At the Harvard conference, Weiss was on a panel with several people who were asked what they thought of her article in Foreign Affairs. Andrew Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a visiting professor at Harvard, said he’s seen no evidence that China wants to reciprocate, citing China’s refusal to discuss meaningful arms control. “I don’t see a basis for deep coöperation” with Xi’s China, Erickson said. “I’m sad to say that.”

Although she chooses to speak out, Weiss carefully calibrates how she talks about her concerns. She has seen how other Asian American voices have been targeted for racial attacks and so tries to keep her argument as factual and policy-based as possible. Although she doesn’t feel that she is a victim of racism, she is concerned that rhetoric and attacks in the United States could escalate. She limits her use of social media, for example, having seen how other Asian Americans have been attacked and accused of dual loyalty and a lack of patriotism. And, of course, her mother’s fears remain on her mind.

“I don’t want to become roadkill, but the stakes are too high to remain on the sideline of this conversation,” she said. “Although I’m an academic, I’m also a citizen, and I fear very much for the direction of this country and the growing enmity and confrontation with China. I’m not seeking that tension, but I want the ideas to take flight.”

The New Yorker · by Ian Johnson · December 13, 2022

11. Xi's plan to take back control

Excerpts:

Of course, the CCP is banking on the fact that the West still relies on it. If the party can reinvigorate the Chinese economy and hold onto the reins of power, it will be a lifeline for ailing Western economies. If China can say that their minorities are exploited but happy, that their peasants are over-worked but with cash in hand, that the Uyghurs are denied rights but have decent pay and conditions, will Western leaders really condemn it? Tapping into Western relativism, China says: “There is no fixed model of human rights protection in the world. Different countries have different national conditions, histories, cultures, social systems and economic and social development levels. A proper path of human rights development should be explored to suit national conditions and the needs of the people.”

China, then, appears to be regrouping, and a weakened West is giving it the time and space that it needs. Beijing says that it wants to bring “novel ideas, measures and practices in terms of how to respect and protect human rights (as) a refreshing addition to the global human rights cause and to the diversity of civilisations”, as well as offering “inspiration for the rest of the world, especially for developing countries”. In other words, Beijing might be in a weaker-than-normal position, but it is still trying to export its social and political model overseas. It knows it cannot afford to be completely defensive. Whether Xi can get away with this in the fragmented international community is one thing — but as the past month has shown, whether the Chinese Communist Party can convince people at home is quite another story altogether.

Xi's plan to take back control

A weakened CCP is rewriting China's national story

unherd.com · by Austin Williams · December 13, 2022

For a country that prides itself on 5,000 years of unbroken history, it is remarkable how often China has reinvented itself. Since Mao established the People’s Republic in 1949, there has been war, famine, isolation, brutality, communism and state capitalism. Within living memory, the country has gone from peasantry to urbanity, and moved from bicycles to luxury cars in little more than a generation.

These social, political and economic shocks might have traumatised a lesser nation, but China has managed to maintain relative stability. Indeed, the Communist Party has ruled over the country for three-quarters of a century — a product not merely of its authoritarianism but also, as Kerry Brown has argued, its ability to provide ordinary Chinese with a unifying national narrative around “which the Communist Party relates to their daily lives”.

When Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 2012, this unifying story became known as “The Chinese Dream”, a slogan that was plastered over billboards and hoardings across the country. Through the Chinese Dream rhetoric, Xi confirmed that the country would become “moderately prosperous”, employment opportunities would improve, and individuals would thrive. Xi was laying the foundations, as he put it, for the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.

The Chinese Dream was symbolised by social engagement, as opposed to the American Dream, which reflected Western individualism. To demonstrate the seriousness with which he took this notion of communal solidarity, Xi directed the authorities to clamp down on corruption and personal aggrandisement within the ranks of the CCP. For him and the country, social improvement was to be a collective effort, and all would reap the benefits. These included the promise that GDP per person would double within Xi’s original term of office, that citizens would have access to massively improved welfare provisions, and that China would start to develop a military “capable of fighting and winning wars”.

It was all going so well — until Covid-19 hit. Even when China was initially building a consensus for lockdown, the restrictions were sold as a selfless, patriotic duty. While the Covid-related fatality statistics remained low — perhaps implausibly low — people bought the narrative of a paternalistic party protecting its people. But over the last few years, China’s lockdowns have done untold damage to people’s families, their businesses, and their health. As time dragged on and Chinese citizens gradually realised that the government had no Plan B, they slowly began to withdraw their loyalty.

Until recently, demonstrations of frustration with the state and its armed goons have been curiously middle-class affairs, like the tang ping (lying flat) movement of students who refused to get out of bed. That was a form of passive resistance, and therefore fundamentally unthreatening. The real attack on Chinese authority came when striking workers broke out of the Foxconn plant, and then unemployed youth united with ordinary people and began tearing down Covid barriers and demanding freedom.

During the course of the demonstrations in November, many shouted slogans insisting that Xi Jinping step down, called for an end to CCP rule, and demanded greater civil rights — a direct challenge to the Communist Party. China has responded by becoming the only country to have overturned Covid policy in response to popular anger, which is ironic given the caricature of Chinese people as passive subjects of their rulers.

The problem now facing the CCP is how to rebuild its popular legitimacy — and rewrite its national narrative — as nearly three years of Covid policy end in disastrous failure. What kind of narrative will Xi turn to in order to explain all this away?

For a hint, we can look at the “For a Life of Contentment” report, published last week by the state media’s think tank, New China Research. It sets out a strategy to recapture “harmonious” public order by outlining China’s place in the world. The document has been a long time in production, but its release has clearly been rushed out after the shock of the anti-Party disturbances. It tells a new narrative — one that is more strident, authoritative, and decisive than the Chinese Dream. And, in a bold move for China, it puts human rights centre stage.

China has long held pretensions of challenging America’s hegemonic role in world affairs. The party’s concept of Chinese rejuvenation — dubbed the “New Era” — was always premised on developing sufficiently to rival America. In 2017, for example, China was insisting that it was prepared to “take centre stage in the world”. Five years later, Beijing is sounding a more defensive, pessimistic note. It says: “the Cold War mentality as well as the hegemonic practices of putting one’s own country’s interests above the interests of others and even the international community at large, and pointing fingers at other countries are not welcome.”

This is not to say that China no longer has global pretensions — only that it is a little more circumspect. It seems that the street protests have rocked the confidence of the ruling party, and Xi needs a new narrative. Faced with widespread popular anger, for instance, the idea that the Chinese state “cares for its people” is clearly not going to work as it has over the last seven decades. Xi is going to have to earn some trust.

And so to “human rights”. China’s conception of human rights is a pragmatic (and self-serving) one. The CCP clearly believes that it can improve its image at home by advancing the lot of Chinese people; when in doubt, the party has long fallen back on giving people more money. It claims that happiness is the ultimate basis for human rights and thus, by providing material benefits to the population (better infrastructure, jobs, pay and conditions), the regime is also promoting human rights. Ironically, China appears to be tapping into the “happiness agenda” beloved of Western environmentalists by turning the “abstract concept of human rights into a set of tangible rights”.

Of course, the CCP is banking on the fact that the West still relies on it. If the party can reinvigorate the Chinese economy and hold onto the reins of power, it will be a lifeline for ailing Western economies. If China can say that their minorities are exploited but happy, that their peasants are over-worked but with cash in hand, that the Uyghurs are denied rights but have decent pay and conditions, will Western leaders really condemn it? Tapping into Western relativism, China says: “There is no fixed model of human rights protection in the world. Different countries have different national conditions, histories, cultures, social systems and economic and social development levels. A proper path of human rights development should be explored to suit national conditions and the needs of the people.”

China, then, appears to be regrouping, and a weakened West is giving it the time and space that it needs. Beijing says that it wants to bring “novel ideas, measures and practices in terms of how to respect and protect human rights (as) a refreshing addition to the global human rights cause and to the diversity of civilisations”, as well as offering “inspiration for the rest of the world, especially for developing countries”. In other words, Beijing might be in a weaker-than-normal position, but it is still trying to export its social and political model overseas. It knows it cannot afford to be completely defensive. Whether Xi can get away with this in the fragmented international community is one thing — but as the past month has shown, whether the Chinese Communist Party can convince people at home is quite another story altogether.

***

Order your copy of UnHerd’s first print edition here.

unherd.com · by Austin Williams · December 13, 2022

12. Is This the End of Peace Through Trade?

I think we all so badly want Norman Angell's theory to be true. But alas.... it is all a "great illusion."

Is This the End of Peace Through Trade?

nytimes.com · by Paul Krugman · December 13, 2022

Credit...Illustration by Sam Whitney/The New York Times; photographs by Holloway and LightFieldStudios, via Getty Images

In the early 20th century the British author Norman Angell published a famous book titled “The Great Illusion,” which declared that economic progress and growing world trade had made war obsolete. Nations, he argued, could no longer enrich themselves through conquest: Industrial workers couldn’t be exploited like peasants, and even small nations could prosper by importing raw materials and selling their wares on world markets. Furthermore, war between economically interdependent nations would be immensely costly even to the victors.

Angell wasn’t predicting the immediate end of war, which was good for his credibility, since the carnage of World War I was just around the corner. He was, however, hoping to persuade politicians to abandon their dreams of military glory. And an implication of his logic was that closer economic links among nations might promote peace.

Indeed, the idea of peace through trade was to become a cornerstone of Western statecraft in the aftermath of World War II.

In my most recent column, I talked about the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has governed world trade since 1948. This trading system owes its origins in large part to Cordell Hull, Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, who saw world trade as a force for peace as well as prosperity. The road to the European Union began with the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, one of the goals of which was to create so much interdependence between France and Germany that a future European war would be impossible.

But now, as I wrote in the column, the United States, which largely created the world trading system, is imposing new restrictions on trade in the name of national security and bluntly asserting that it has the right to do so whenever it chooses. When the Trump administration did this, it could be dismissed as an aberration: Donald Trump and those around him were crude mercantilists with no sense of the historical reasons behind existing trade rules. But you can’t say that about Biden officials, who understand both the economics and the history.

So is this the end of peace through trade? Not exactly — but it’s a doctrine that has lost a lot of force lately, for several reasons.

First, the idea that trade fosters peace may be true only for democracies. The United States briefly invaded Mexico in 1916 in an unsuccessful attempt to capture Pancho Villa; such a thing would be hard to conceive nowadays, with Mexican factories such integral parts of the North American manufacturing system. But are we equally sure that the similarly deep integration of Taiwan into China’s manufacturing system rules out any possibility of invasion?

And unfortunately, authoritarianism has been rising in many countries around the world for quite a while. That’s partly because some fragile democracies have collapsed, partly because some autocracies — especially China — have opened up economically although not politically and partly because some of these autocracies (again, especially China) have experienced rapid economic growth.

What about the idea that growing integration with the world economy would itself be a force for democratization? That idea was a key pillar of economic diplomacy in some Western nations, notably Germany, which bet heavily on the doctrine of Wandel durch Handel — transformation through trade. But even a glance at Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Xi Jinping’s China shows that this doctrine has failed: China began opening up to international trade more than 40 years ago, Russia 30 years ago, but neither shows any signs of becoming a democracy or even a nation with strong rule of law.

In fact, international interdependence may have made the ongoing war in Ukraine more likely. It’s not obviously silly to suggest that Putin expected Europe to accept the conquest of Kyiv because of its dependence on Russian natural gas.

Again, I’m not suggesting that the idea of peace through trade is completely wrong. War in the heart of Europe (although, unfortunately, not on its periphery) has become hard to imagine thanks to economic integration; wars to secure access to raw materials seem far less likely than they once were. But the dream of a “commercial peace” has definitely lost much of its force.

That matters a lot. We live in a world of very open markets, but that didn’t have to happen, and it doesn’t have to persist. We didn’t get here because of inexorable economic logic: Globalization can and has gone into retreat for extended periods when it loses policy support. Nor did we get here because economists persuaded politicians that free trade is good. Instead, the current world order largely reflects strategic considerations: Leaders, especially in the United States, believed that more or less free trade would make the world more amenable to our political values and safer for us as a nation.

But now even relatively internationalist policymakers, like officials in the Biden administration, aren’t sure about that. This is a very big change.

Quick Hits

The slave trade and the Industrial Revolution.

Facing the Music

nytimes.com · by Paul Krugman · December 13, 2022

13. Ten Lessons from the Return of History

Some very useful food for thought in this very succinct essay.

Ten Lessons from the Return of History

As 2022 comes to a close, there are important lessons from the year that we ignore at our peril.

Article by Richard Haass

Originally published at Project Syndicate

December 13, 2022 12:38 pm (EST)

cfr.org · by Richard Haass

Few will miss 2022, a year defined by a lingering pandemic, advancing climate change, galloping inflation, slowing economic growth, and, more than anything else, the outbreak of a costly war in Europe and concerns that violent conflict could soon erupt in Asia. Some of this was anticipated, but much of it was not – and all of it suggests lessons that we ignore at our peril.

First, war between countries, thought by more than a few academics to be obsolete, is anything but. What we are seeing in Europe is an old-fashioned imperial war, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin is seeking to extinguish Ukraine as a sovereign, independent entity. His goal is to ensure a democratic, market-oriented country seeking close ties to the West cannot thrive on Russia’s borders and set an example that might prove attractive to Russians.

Of course, rather than achieving the quick and easy victory he expected, Putin has discovered that his own army is not as powerful, and that his opponents are far more determined, than he – and many in the West – had anticipated. Ten months later, the war continues with no end in sight.

Second, the idea that economic interdependence constitutes a bulwark against war, because no party would have an interest in disrupting mutually beneficial trade and investment ties, is no longer tenable. Political considerations come first. In fact, the European Union’s heavy dependence on Russian energy supplies likely influenced Putin’s decision to invade, by leading him to conclude that Europe would not stand up to him.

Third, integration, which has animated decades of Western policy toward China, has also failed. This strategy, too, rested on the belief that economic ties – along with cultural, academic, and other exchanges – would drive political developments, rather than vice versa, leading to the emergence of a more open, market-oriented China that was also more moderate in its foreign policy.

None of this happened, although it can and should be debated whether the flaw lies with the concept of integration or with the manner in which it was executed. What is clear, however, is that China’s political system is becoming more repressive, its economy is moving in a more statist direction, and its foreign policy is growing more assertive.

Fourth, economic sanctions, in many instances the instrument of choice for the West and its partners when responding to a government’s violations of human rights or overseas aggression, rarely deliver meaningful changes in behavior. Even aggression as blatant and brutal as Russia’s against Ukraine has failed to persuade most of the world’s governments to isolate Russia diplomatically or economically, and while Western-led sanctions may be eroding Russia’s economic base, they have not come close to persuading Putin to reverse his policy.

Fifth, the phrase “international community” needs to be retired. There isn’t one. Russia’s veto power in the Security Council has rendered the United Nations impotent, while the recent gathering of world leaders in Egypt to contend with climate change was an abject failure.

There is, moreover, little in the way of a global response to COVID-19 and few preparations in place to deal with the next pandemic. Multilateralism remains essential, but its effectiveness will depend on forging narrower arrangements among likeminded governments. All-or-nothing multilateralism will mostly result in nothing.

Sixth, democracies obviously face their share of challenges, but the problems authoritarian systems face may be even greater. Ideology and regime survival often drive decision-making in such systems, and authoritarian leaders often resist abandoning failed policies or admitting mistakes, lest this be seen as a sign of weakness and feed public calls for greater change. Such regimes must constantly reckon with the threat of mass protest, as in Russia, or the real thing, as we have seen recently in China and Iran.

Seventh, the potential for the internet to empower individuals to challenge governments is far greater in democracies than in closed systems. Authoritarian regimes such as those in China, Russia, and North Korea can close off their society, monitor and censor content, or both.

Something closer to a “splinternet” – multiple, separate internets – has arrived. Meanwhile, social media in democracies is susceptible to dissemination of lies and misinformation that increase polarization and make governing far more difficult.

Eighth, there is still a West (a term based more on shared values than geography), and alliances remain a critical instrument to promote order. The United States and its transatlantic partners in NATO have responded effectively to Russian aggression against Ukraine. The US has also forged stronger ties in the Indo-Pacific to address the growing threat emanating from China, principally through an invigorated Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US), and increased trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

Ninth, US leadership continues to be essential. The US cannot act unilaterally in the world if it wants to be influential, but the world will not come together to meet shared security and other challenges if the US is passive or sidelined. American willingness to lead from the front rather than behind is often required.

Lastly, we must be modest about what we can know. It is humbling to note that few of the preceding lessons were predictable a year ago. What we have learned is not just that history has returned, but also that, for better or worse, it retains its ability to surprise us. With that in mind, onward into 2023!

cfr.org · by Richard Haass

14. An Indo-Pacific security network is only now emerging

An Indo-Pacific security network is only now emerging | ORF

By integrating its formal allies to enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the US is setting a new networked security architecture

orfonline.org · by Manoj Joshi

The recent United States (US)-Australia “2+2” meeting, also known as the AUSMIN, has taken the decision to invite Japan “to integrate into our force posture initiatives”. It is layered on the hub-and-spoke architecture of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific (aka Indo-Pacific) and the manner in which this system is giving way to a new networked security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, helmed largely by the US. This also caps a development initiated by the Australia-Japan Security Declaration of 2007 and the 2021 creation of AUKUS, the Australia-UK-US military alliance.

Over the years, Australia-Japan cooperation had involved the sharing of classified intelligence. In January this year, Japan and Australia signed an agreement that allows military forces from each country to train at each other’s bases and to collaborate on humanitarian missions. In October, visiting Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and his Australian counterpart Anthony Albanese issued a joint declaration which said that their bilateral partnership “reinforces our respective alliances with the United States”. Adding that this trilateral cooperation was “critical to enhancing our strategic alignment, policy coordination, interoperability and joint capability.”

Australia-Japan cooperation had involved the sharing of classified intelligence. In January this year, Japan and Australia signed an agreement that allows military forces from each country to train at each other’s bases and to collaborate on humanitarian missions.

In the Indo-Pacific, the US is the hub, with spokes linking it to its formal allies Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. And there is a somewhat nebulous relationship with Taiwan and a “strategic partnership” with Singapore and India.

The “2+2” format involving joint meetings of foreign and defence ministers is an important instrument for shaping these relationships. The first US-Australia AUSMIN dates to 1985 and the first Japan “2+2”, also known as the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee took place in September 2000. India had its first “2+2” with the US in December 2018.

Since the 2000s, a Trilateral Security Dialogue began to link the US, Japan, and Australia. The spokes, too, began to connect with each other as evidenced by the Australia-Japan Security Declaration of 2007 and the 2009 Australia-South Korea Security Declaration and the continuing effort to link South Korea and Japan in security ties to create a new kind of security architecture that linked Australasia to North-east Asia. These security declarations were a cautious response to the rise of China and they have so far remained non-binding and provided for cooperation in a host of areas such as transnational crime, terrorism, counter-proliferation maritime and aviation security, and HADR.

In 2016, the Obama Administration conducted a twin-track initiative to revitalise US ties to the region. On one track, the US, through the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) sought to rewrite the economic rules of the region. On the other, the US wanted to transform its hub and spoke approach by creating what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called a “principled security network”.

The US walked out of the TPP and the President began a trade war with China that mutated into a strategic competition between the two countries.

The key tier of this network was the trilateral mechanisms which brought together countries that had earlier cooperated only bilaterally. This involved the continuing emphasis on the US-Japan-Australia ties and those between the US-Japan-South Korea partnership focused on the missile and WMD threat from North Korea. India was a new element in the US equation but it followed the trilateral logic when Japan re-joined the India-US bilateral Malabar exercise in 2015.

Speaking at the 15 th Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Carter said that security cooperation could possibly even result one day in a US-China-India maritime exercise. This was the era of US-China engagement and Beijing’s participation in the RIMPAC exercises.

A year later, Donald Trump came to office as the US President and shook things up in his characteristic style. The US walked out of the TPP and the President began a trade war with China that mutated into a strategic competition between the two countries. Trump also demanded that allies like Japan and South Korea pay more for the US participation in their security and reached out to try and make peace with North Korea. But his efforts eventually served to firmly cement the US role in the region.

The US also now clearly defined its attitude to the Indo-Pacific region. in a policy document declassified in January 2021, the administration said that the goal of US policy was “to maintain U.S. strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region.” It would do this by promoting a “liberal economic order” while preventing China from establishing “illiberal spheres of interest.”

An important goal for the US was to “enhance the credibility and effectiveness” of its alliances. From a loose trilateral framework, efforts were made to create a quadrilateral one with the revival in 2017 of the Quadrilateral Grouping or the Quad—US, Japan, Australia and India—now viewed as the “principal hubs” of the new security architecture for the region.

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy revealed in February 2022 has emphasised the importance of promoting regional prosperity along with security and the importance of “democratic resilience.”

The Biden administration largely doubled down on the Trump initiatives. A new trilateral military alliance called the AUKUS, again helmed by the US, emerged in September 2021 to bind Australia, the US, and UK together. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy revealed in February 2022 has emphasised the importance of promoting regional prosperity along with security and the importance of “democratic resilience.”

It said that for a “free and open Indo Pacific”, there is need for a network of alliances, organisations and rules. The efforts would involve the treaty allies of the US as well as countries such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and others. Importantly, it notes that the US would “encourage our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with each other”.

In fact, the document notes that a particular target of this was to promote trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea and added that “Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context.” The economic leg of the new American approach also led to the enunciation of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a somewhat poor substitute for the TPP.

Just how things are working is evident from the fact that the US-Australia AUSMIN was followed up by the first in-person Japan-Australia 2+2 meeting that began on Friday. The two had had a virtual meeting in June 2021 as well. The aim of last week’s meeting is to build upon the joint declaration on security cooperation signed on January 2022.

Perhaps the most consequential changes are occurring in Japan. This month, Tokyo will unveil its National Security Strategy (NSS), its National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), and the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP). The NSS is likely to clearly identify China as a priority. The country is expected to acquire “counter-strike” capabilities to target enemy bases and facilities. Kishida wants Japan to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defence by 2027.

Tokyo will unveil its National Security Strategy (NSS), its National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), and the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP). The NSS is likely to clearly identify China as a priority.

India

India is not a formal treaty ally of the US and neither is its security dependent on the Americans. Yet all recent US statements and documents like the National Security Strategy assign a high place to New Delhi in the Washington’s scheme of things. The January 2021 Indo-Pacific document saw India as a key country to “counter-balance” China.

India is very much part of the process of building up the security network in the Indo-Pacific.

This has roots in two important initiatives in the mid 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. India needed to show that it had not been any kind of a Soviet ally and to build confidence with the US, it began the Malabar exercises and in the same measure, it initiated the MILAN naval exercise in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands to reassure countries of South-east Asia. Over the years, both exercises have expanded and established their strategic rationale.

India is a charter member of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) initiated by the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2007 based on the democratic credentials of the four members—Japan, India, Australia, and the US. For a variety of reasons, the first Quad became defunct and had to be revived in 2017 and New Delhi was very much a part of the process.

The first India-Japan 2+2 was held in November 2019 in New Delhi and the second was held in September 2022 in Tokyo. The two countries based their dialogue on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the 2009 Action Plan to advance that cooperation. Following the elevation of the India-Australia relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in June 2020, the two countries initiated their first 2+2 dialogue in September.

India is a charter member of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) initiated by the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2007 based on the democratic credentials of the four members—Japan, India, Australia, and the US.

The India-Japan or India-Australia relationship is unlikely to move as fast as the Japan-Australia one. Yet, the ongoing dialogue processes, whether in the 2+2 format, or the quadrilateral and bilateral one, generate important incremental advances in foreign and defence relations which at some point can take a qualitative turn, just as the Australia-Japan relationship seems to be doing.

In geopolitical terms India is sui generis. It is not a treaty ally of the US and unlike the case with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, the Americans are not its principal security providers. Whatever the US may have desired, the Indian side has been quite clear in drawing some lines in their security ties with the US. Neither does India fully subscribe to the notion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as its Quad partners do.

In recent years, the US, too, seems to have realised that India’s value stems from its unique status. Today, US leaders say that India is perhaps the most important bilateral relationship of the US. This is the reason why the US continues to cut India considerable slack when it comes to areas where our views diverge, such as Iran, and now Russia.

An economically prosperous India, dominating the Indian Ocean, will itself be a factor in the balance against China. Speaking at a recent Aspen Security Forum, Kurt Campbell, the White House Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific put it clearly—India would not be a formal ally of the US, but be another great power, but for a variety of reasons, it was likely to be strategically aligned to the US.

orfonline.org · by Manoj Joshi

15. USSOCOM Will Not Execute SOFIC 2023

I think there will be something new in place of this and co-sponsored with the Global SOF Foundation.

USSOCOM Will Not Execute SOFIC 2023 | Joint Forces News

joint-forces.com · by Editor · December 13, 2022

NDIA, the US National Defense Industrial Association, has announced that USSOCOM has informed they will not execute SOFIC in 2023.

NDIA Announcement, Arlington VA: USSOCOM has informed NDIA they will not execute SOFIC in 2023.

NDIA is extremely proud of our strong partnership with USSOCOM and the exceptional conferences we presented over the past 12 years, including our very successful 2022 Conference.

NDIA will continue to work with all stakeholders to promote collaboration between government and industry to deliver innovative capabilities to our warfighters.

We are extremely grateful for all your support to NDIA and SOFIC over the years.

Editor’s Footnote: NDIA manages SOFIC, the Special Operations Forces Industry Conference, for US Special Operations Command. In the past the conference and exhibition was scheduled to run annually in Tampa, Florida, and although the May 2020 event was cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the May 2021 event was conducted virtually, SOFIC 2022 was held as normal and was reported to have been a success. Regrettably JOINT-FORCES has been unable to attend past conferences in Tampa as dates clashed with the peak of the spring exercise season and a couple of key defence expos on our side of the Atlantic.

joint-forces.com · by Editor · December 13, 2022

16. A Green Beret Commander on the War in Afghanistan, “Retrograde” and Those Still Left Behind

A Green Beret Commander on the War in Afghanistan, “Retrograde” and Those Still Left Behind

LTC Matthew A. Chaney is featured in a searing new National Geographic documentary

insidehook.com · by Charles Thorp

Green Beret Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A. Chaney had no idea when he took over the 3rd Battalion, 10 Special Forces Group, that he’d command the last special forces unit of the War in Afghanistan.

Despite an an active career with the Green Berets, and a military service that began before the attacks on 9/11, this was Chaney’s first deployment to the country. Roughly four months into operations, while coordinating special forces teams in the region and running a school house program to train the embattled Afghan National Army, word came down from command in April that U.S. forces would leave Afghanistan before September.

The months that followed were extremely challenging, with Chaney having to close eight military bases (most of which had been the size of small cities at one point or another) while trying to run missions against the unyielding Taliban. Filmmaker Matthew Heineman was there on the ground to experience this time through the eyes of Chaney’s Green Berets, who feature prominently in his National Geographic documentary Retrograde. It’s named after the military term for the removal of tactical equipment from a forward operating location.

We spoke with Chaney about his experience in Afghanstan, reliving those months through Heineman’s doc and his continuing efforts to help the Afghan allies we left behind.

Matthew Heineman discusses his new documentary at the SCAD Savannah Film Festival this fall. His team got back into Afghanistan after the evacuation, and captured scenes of the Afghan Army fighting Taliban forces.

Getty Images for SCAD

How did your military career begin and what drew you to become a Green Beret?

I was commissioned into the Army two months before 9/11, so my whole career has been in a post-9/11 environment. I started off as a deep-sea dive officer, which led to operations underwater all over the Pacific. I enjoyed that work. I started to get a lot of recommendations from colleagues to join the special forces around 2005. I went through selection and passed my special forces training, arriving in my unit around 2007. I was deployed immediately to Iraq, where I ended up going a couple of times. In my younger years I was shot at, shot up, blown up, wounded. Following those tours I was shipped out to Africa, Eastern Europe, and Syria for counter-ISIS missions. I found power in the unique way that the Green Berets operate, partnering closely with regional forces and focusing more on those relationships than other special forces.

When did you first hear that you would be deploying to Afghanistan?

I was never sent to Afghanistan during my earlier years in the special forces. I was sent just about everywhere else. That changed when I took over the 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, which became the core of the task force in the area. By the time I headed out to Afghanistan, it was the very beginning of January 2021. The was a change in presidential administrations in the United States at that time, as you may remember, and there was already an agreement in place with the Taliban that we were going to withdraw our forces. This was looming on the horizon, but the exact timeline was still very unclear. The Department of Defense was raising different opinions on whether or not we should keep some presence there. So we were still running combat missions, even if it was to a reduced degree. Our school house program was a large focus, which we were running in order to train up the Afghan forces.

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Can you explain what your force was comprised of, and the goals of the school house program you mentioned?

The Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan, or SOTF-A, was comprised of 16 different countries and roughly 1,400 people. Despite the consolidation of some of the forces, I was still running eight bases with special forces teams that touched all four corners of the country. Our forces were aligned with our NATO partners and others to run the school house program to train the Afghan forces for combat. The training was based off of our own special forces training, but by the end it had been edited down quite a bit based on the need. The Afghan special operations were losing roughly 1,200 people a month. We were doing our best to help get their forces as ready as possible before they showed up on the front lines.

What was it like first meeting with the Afghan forces that you would be working with and training?

I was new to Afghanistan, but I had all of the credibility and relations that had been built by the task forces before us. Being a Green Beret meant a lot to many people who lived in the area and worked with the United States. The Afghan special forces soldiers had gone through our own training and a lot of them had adopted our DNA, to a degree, on the military side. These guys walked and talked like us. I was invited to many a wedding in Kabul, even if I wasn’t always able to make it, and the respect was mutual. My primary partner was the young Afghani general Haibatullah Alizai, part of this next generation of Afghan leaders being put in place who had come up with U.S. Military. I may not have had as much history as others in the country, but as a commander I saw the losses they were suffering and how it affected him. That bonded us very quickly.

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What were the challenges you were dealing with as a commander in that situation?

There was definitely challenges that came with the fact we could be leaving at any point. Local relations had already been difficult to maintain during the pandemic. We hadn’t been able to spend as much time in the room with our allies and locals as we had previously. So every room that I was going in for the first time, there was always this lingering threat that one of the locals had been turned by the Taliban. There had been cases of the Taliban threatening locals, or pushing them to kill Americans under the threat of mortal danger to their families. These situations were amplified by the looming eventuality that we would be leaving the country, and taking all the support that we provided with us.

What was it like when you and your team first heard that the president would move forward with pulling US forces out of Afghanistan?

There were operators on my team who had spent their entire military careers in Afghanistan and with the Afghan people. They had made friends in the country, they had lost friends in the country. As you can imagine, the news about the retrograde hit them harder than it hit me. Perhaps that helped me focus a bit more on our country’s priorities when it came to the withdrawal, as I had less history with that soil. Despite the fact I had less history with Afghanistan, it didn’t block me from being affected by the reality as a human being. I think we all realized that our partner forces were going into a very difficult situation without us there, no matter how well we had prepared them.

I had a strong relationship with my primary partner, the general, and I saw the hurt he experienced when his force suffered casualties. We knew that more of that was coming. There were nights when we were able to provide medivacs for men of his that were injured, and that wasn’t going to a possibility anymore. The other fact you have to realize is it wasn’t just one definitive announcement made, which everyone in Afghanistan instantly accepted. Our partner forces were hearing different things from different channels, and some were still hearing that we were going to be staying behind in some capacity. From social media to news outlets, there were so many sources that they were looking at and hoping to believe in some capacity.

Once the retrograde was officially ordered, how did you start the process of shutting down operations?

There were eight bases that we needed to close down, and at various points in time these bases had been as big as small cities. Our forces were being reduced throughout the process, and I also had the charge of maintaining security through this process, which was a huge responsibility. There were a lot of resources on the ground, and there were very clear protocols for what we were to do with each piece of gear. Some equipment needed to come back home, some needed to be destroyed, the rest we were able to hand over to the Afghan forces. There were hundreds of tons of ammunition, televisions, computers, and water. There were some wild claims about how much we left behind, but there was a lot that we took home with us. We carried our own weapons out, as much as I am sure they would have liked to have them. For the vehicles that we could leave, there was official paperwork to sign them over.

The majority of the bases were named after fellow soldiers who had died in the line of duty, which added an element of emotion to closing each one. We had a little ceremony for the fallen when we lowered the flag down the pole. I’ve since delivered those flags to the families of those fallen soldiers, the last one being dropped off just a few months ago. The last base we closed was the one I had spent the most time on, and it was the toughest. I was still running operations to the very last minute. In the haste of everything we had almost forgotten a plaque that was drilled into a rock there on the base, and I had to hold the helicopters while we chiseled the plaque from that rock, so we could get it to his family.

Do you remember your last night in Afghanistan?

I had dinner with the Afghan general the night before we left, at his place in Kabul. There was about a dozen of us reflecting over grilled lamb. Everyone was on the verge of tears. There was a lot of respect in that room. The general said he looked forward to welcoming me back into the country as a contractor. He would hire me to keep our mission going. He pointed out the apartment that he would put me up in and the office that I would have. That was how we had to think about it, because it was too difficult to talk about any other option. We were all hopeful that the Afghan forces would be able to take over effectively, even if that didn’t match the intel we had. We gave our hugs goodbye.

My team’s actual departure from the airport was anticlimactic. It was two o’clock in the morning, there was about 35 of us there to lower the last flag at Kabul International Airport where we had a small compound. That was the last special forces flag to leave that operation. It was very somber. There was no band. There was no fanfare. There was no crowd. Just a lot of people exhausted from doing the best we could for the country and its people.

Everyone has seen those saddening images from the airport in Kabul of people trying to get on those last planes that were leaving. Being someone who had worked with Afghans, and had entire bases full of people who probably wanted to fly out with you, how difficult was it to experience?

In a perfect world, we would have a lot longer to prepare for the retrograde, but we still felt like we did as well as possible. There was very little sleep during those weeks. That’s what made the chaos what happened at the airport so heart wrenching, because of all of the effort that we’d made to prevent anything like that happening. But it was hard not to sense the desperation in the people when we were closing our bases. During those final days, every person working on the base was asking to be taken with us. No bureaucracy was going to be able to figure out how to get them out of there in seven days. Once the people on the base began to realize that we couldn’t bring everyone, no matter what we wanted, things started to feel a little desperate. The next step was them asking us for recommendation letters for their access to the airport.

They all thought that if they had a personal note from Lieutenant Colonel Matt Chaney it could be a golden ticket onto a transport plane. They wanted something that they could hold up to the military personal at the entrance to help get through the crowds. But that’s not how it worked. I didn’t even have the ability to bring anyone I wanted through the gate in person. I had a female interpreter who had worked with the special forces for years, whose family I tried to walk through the gate. I was speaking with the Marine on the other side, explaining who I was, and there was still nothing he could do. It was a tough position for him, and it broke my heart. I was eventually able to get her out five months later.

Since evacuating Afghanistan, LTC Matthew A. Chaney has worked with organizations like NMRG Rescue Project to support the partner forces left behind.

AFP via Getty Images

Once you had left, what was it like hearing how quickly things started to fall apart in the Afghanistan government and after that, the military?

Nobody predicted how rapidly things would decline from the inside out on the political side. The Afghans were still fighting when their president left the country, and that news made its way to all of the fighters on the front lines. They started to ask what they were even fighting for, if there wasn’t a government anymore. It wasn’t that they didn’t want to fight for their country, but their government wasn’t providing any kind of security for what they were fighting for. I think a lot of people missed that fact.

There were also challenges that the Afghan National Army were facing, which we would help them handle when we were around. The country of Afghanistan is huge, and even though they had the gear that they needed to fight the war, they couldn’t get everything where it needed to be. There were reports that they were running out of ammo, but the real issue was they couldn’t get the ammo where it needed to go. They had limited aircraft and the Taliban were cutting off all of the major highways. I don’t want to be just another senior leader in the military saying that we just needed another year to get them ready, but it’s hard not to wonder what we might have done for them with more time.

Given how profoundly complicated your mission was in Afghanistan, how was it having an award-winning filmmaker like Matthew Heineman following your unit?

I had my concerns about having cameras around, so I’ll start by saying I am grateful that Matt was able to make the documentary that he did. When I first heard rumors of a film team wanting to work with 10th Group, I made an argument against it. There was a lot of reasons I didn’t want that kind of distraction around my men as we prepared to go into the country, and especially while we were in the country. I was told that command wanted to do it regardless, so like any order I embraced it and went about trying to make it work. As you can imagine, there was a lot of initial resistance from my special forces operators. Most of them don’t even have social media and we were asking them to take part in a film project. I held quite a few town halls with my team, fielding questions from the soldiers and their families, where I had to answer a lot of tough questions. They were really difficult conversations, but I can say now I am truly glad that Matt was there and captured what he did. There are moments in the footage that even I hadn’t been able to see personally, and I think it serves as an important document to the relationships we made with the people of Afghanistan. I am glad that I have Matt’s movie to show to my kids at some point, so they can understand what I do.

What were the discussions around having cameras in the room when you were discussing operations and sensitive material?

Matt, his producer Cailin [McNally], and the rest of the team were very good about working with us, given the situation. They understood that even though they had a lot of access, we had to be able to tell them to shut off the cameras and audio at any time. That being said, they were in the room a lot and had a lot of insight into procedures that had never been seen before. Heineman’s style is about being there as much and often as possible. In certain circumstances we also had to deal with the security protocols for our partner countries if they were involved, so those were more difficult to negotiate. On occasion there was a lot of tension, and perhaps other film crews might have quit dealing with what they had to. There were constant security threats that we were dealing with, and they had to consider those as well.

What did you think of the footage that Heineman captured of the Afghan Army and one of their generals Sami Sadat?

I am very glad they got that footage. The Green Berets are unique in the way that we work with the regional forces, and the film shows that. We live, eat, and train with our partner forces. I had trepidation at the fact that once we were leaving Matt and his cameramen were going to try to stay in Afghanistan to continue filming with the Afghan Army. I couldn’t personally let them stay, because I was afraid that they could end up dead, so I made them fly out with me. They were able to get back into the country after we left and I’m glad they did, because they were able to capture scenes of the Afghan forces fighting as best they could against the Taliban. People will see the blood that was spilled and the sacrifices made in defense of their country.

Have you stayed in contact with your partners in the Afghan Army since the retrograde?

Part of me feels like I haven’t really left Afghanistan. I have an Afghan phone with a local number and an Afghan alias so that I can communicate with my contacts over there safely. Every single day I am working with some nonprofit in some capacity, trying to help the people we haven’t been able to get out yet. I have about 35 Afghan families that I am working to keep safe and fed while we work on their individual visa cases alongside a number of charities. The primary organization I am working with is the NMRG Rescue Project. NMRG stands for National Mine Reduction Group. These guys were founded to clear bombs for special operators as we were going on missions. Many of them worked with us for over 10 years. They worked with every Green Beret who came through there. There are about 300 left in the country still. They have a legitimate visa pathway into the United States.

They didn’t work for Afghanistan, they worked for the U.S. forces. So the goal of the rescue project is to keep their immediate families safe until we can get them over here. We are asking for the US government to prioritize their paperwork. These guys saved our lives and in some cases were wounded while trying to protect our forces. All told, about 3,000 people are looking to support. I also work with Operation North Star, which is meant to help the people who supported our American forces. These are people who have been screened or we personally know. These aren’t random people that we are trying to bring into America. These are people who worked and sacrificed on behalf of our country and their own.

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insidehook.com · by Charles Thorp

17. Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Ban TikTok, Citing National Security

Who is preparing for the blowback that will occur in the face of perceived government overreach? Again, have we done a good job of explaining the threats?

And whether China intended this or not, the internal domestic problems this is very likely to cause will certainly be welcomed by China. Create dilemmas fo the US. TikTok has proven to be quite a dilemma on so many levels.

Watch for Chinese (and Russia) covert support to organizations that will protest this and that will stir up dissension throughout the US.

Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Ban TikTok, Citing National Security

Bipartisan bill follows FBI warnings about Beijing's sway over the world's largest social-media platform.

defenseone.com · by Frank Konkel

Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida, on Tuesday introduced bipartisan legislation that would ban the popular app TikTok from operating within the United States over national security concerns.

Rubio’s bill—the Averting the National Threat of Internet Surveillance, Oppressive Censorship and Influence, and Algorithmic Learning by the Chinese Communist Party, or ANTI-SOCIAL CCP Act—already has bipartisan support in the House, with Reps. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., and Raja Krishnamoorthi, D-Ill., authoring companion legislation.

“The federal government has yet to take a single meaningful action to protect American users from the threat of TikTok,” Rubio said in a statement. “This isn’t about creative videos—this is about an app that is collecting data on tens of millions of American children and adults every day. We know it’s used to manipulate feeds and influence elections. We know it answers to the People’s Republic of China. There is no more time to waste on meaningless negotiations with a CCP-puppet company. It is time to ban Beijing-controlled TikTok for good.”

TikTok is owned by Chinese parent company ByteDance. Numerous federal officials, including FBI Director Chris Wray, have testified that the Chinese Communist Party has authority over all Chinese companies, which “allows them to manipulate content, and if they want to, to use it for influence operations.”

“At a time when the Chinese Communist Party and our other adversaries abroad are seeking any advantage they can find against the United States through espionage and mass surveillance, it is imperative that we do not allow hostile powers to potentially control social media networks that could be easily weaponized against us,” Krishnamoorthi said in a statement..

This year, TikTok overtook Google as the most popular website in the world, despite concerns over the app’s ability to track users. Because of its connections to China, several federal agencies have banned the use of the video application over security concerns, and Congress has pressed the company’s leaders about the spread of extreme content on its platform. Recently, several states moved to ban TikTok from state agencies and employees that use work devices.

TikTok contends that the lawmakers' concerns are not rooted in fact. The Chinese government exercises influence over the platform “in no way, shape or form,” TikTok Chief Operating Officer Vanessa Pappas told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Sept. 14.

Lawmakers, however, aren’t buying it.

“TikTok is digital fentanyl that’s addicting Americans, collecting troves of their data and censoring their news,” Gallagher said. “Allowing the app to continue to operate in the U.S. would be like allowing the U.S.S.R. to buy up the New York Times, Washington Post and major broadcast networks during the Cold War. No country with even a passing interest in its own security would allow this to happen, which is why it’s time to ban TikTok and any other CCP-controlled app before it’s too late.”

TikTok is currently in negotiations with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States over such national security concerns.

defenseone.com · by Frank Konkel

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d [email protected]

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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