Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“What the herd hates most is the one who thinks differently; it not so much the opinion itself, but the audacity of wanting to think for themselves, something that they do not know how to do.”

– Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

"The right of nature... is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life."

– Thomas Hobbes

"Reading and writing, like everything else, improve with practice. And, of course, if there are no young readers and writers, there will shortly be no older ones. Literacy will be dead, and democracy - which many believe goes hand in hand with it - will be dead as well."

– Margaret Atwood

1. Irregular Warfare Lessons From the Cold War

2. Privatizing Veteran Health Care is a Betrayal, Not A Solution

3. How Israel Turned the Mideast Around

4. Trump Courts Xi Jinping, Slaps Japan

5. US starts relocating Marines from Japan's Okinawa

6. The Army is too top-heavy

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2024

8. Iran Update, December 14, 2024

9. Key US agency that fights foreign influence in jeopardy after funding snub

10. Has World War III Already Begun?

11. The Hunt for the Assad Dynasty’s Missing Billions Begins

12. CEOs Want Trump to Change Course on Tariffs. He Isn’t Budging.

13. Archduke Ferdinand, blah, blah, blah…What Really Started WWI?

14. Macroscope | Trade protectionist measures by the US and others put world on path to war

15. Assad’s Enemies Are Not Our Friends

16. Dark Eagle: US bares hypersonic claws at China, Russia

17. Commentary: Chinese security companies are putting boots on the ground in Myanmar. It could go disastrously wrong

1. Irregular Warfare Lessons From the Cold War

The Cold War was characterized by political warfare. Today's strategic competition can be characterized as political warfare. Irregular warfare can be described as a military contribution to political warfare but it is political warfare that is the key to strategic competition and being able to protect US interests short of war.

Conclusion:

The Soviet Union's use of irregular warfare during the Cold War offers valuable insights into modern great power competition dynamics. Through a combination of proxy support, ideological commitment, and strategic opportunism, the Soviets could expand their influence globally, often at the expense of the United States. However, the limitations and failures of Soviet irregular campaigns—notably in Afghanistan—also underscore the importance of local legitimacy and the dangers of overreliance on conventional military tactics in an irregular context.

As the United States and Russia continue to vie for influence in the 21st century, the lessons of the Cold War are more pertinent than ever. Both nations must recognize that irregular warfare is not merely a military endeavor but a complex interplay of political, social, and ideological factors. By learning from past successes and failures, the United States can better prepare to counter Russia's modern hybrid warfare strategies, ensuring it remains competitive in an increasingly contested global landscape.

Irregular Warfare Lessons From the Cold War

Shadows of Irregular Warfare in Modern Competition

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/irregular-warfare-lessons-from-the-cold-war

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - December 12, 2024

Introduction

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied on a complex blend of irregular warfare techniques to spread communist influence, subvert Western-aligned governments, and counter the influence of the United States. This strategy was a cornerstone of the Soviet doctrine, built on ideological fervor and a careful understanding of global geopolitics. Unlike the United States, which often employed direct intervention and overt counterinsurgency, the Soviet approach sought to capitalize on asymmetric opportunities and exploit the political fault lines of vulnerable regions. While this method yielded notable successes, it also led to remarkable failures, ultimately shaping the dynamics of modern irregular warfare.

The Foundations of Soviet Doctrine

The Soviet irregular warfare strategy emerged from a doctrinal emphasis on subversion, proxy conflicts, and support for revolutionary movements. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviets believed that global revolution was inevitable and sought to hasten its arrival indirectly. Unlike conventional warfare, which required a heavy commitment of resources and risks, irregular methods provided the Soviet Union with an efficient means to project power in an era of nuclear brinkmanship. Soviet intelligence services, primarily the KGB and GRU, played a vital role in this doctrine, utilizing covert operations to support communist insurgencies, infiltrate enemy states, and undermine political institutions from within.

Moscow's approach involved working through local communist parties and developing clandestine networks to wage psychological, political, and guerrilla warfare against Western powers. Support for revolutionary movements was often concealed, allowing the Soviets plausible deniability. Rather than invading or deploying vast numbers of troops, the Soviet Union offered training, equipment, and economic assistance to sympathetic governments and insurgencies. The support for Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba, the assistance provided to North Vietnamese forces, and involvement in African liberation movements exemplify the widespread, sometimes subtle and sometimes not, nature of Soviet intervention.

Soviet advisors emphasized political education, guerrilla tactics, and organizational training for their client movements. This differed significantly from the American approach, which frequently prioritized technological superiority and firepower. The Soviet model, grounded in communist-leaning ideological alignment, built strong partnerships based on shared revolutionary aspirations, fostering long-term loyalty among client states and groups.

A Regional and Global Approach

Geopolitically, Soviet irregular warfare took place on two fronts: regional and global. In regions like Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the Soviets sought to disrupt Western influence by supporting national liberation movements and anti-colonial insurgencies. In Africa, Soviet backing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the Angolan Civil War symbolized Moscow's broader regional objectives. By leveraging Cuban military support and Soviet weapons, the MPLA prevailed, establishing a socialist-oriented government. This success cemented the Soviet foothold in Southern Africa and demonstrated their ability to expand influence through irregular warfare, diplomacy, and proxy alliances. The Soviets tried this approach in Angola and Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Africa, Namibia, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is a prime example of a major irregular effort during the Cold War that failed. The Soviet Union actively supported the Marxist-leaning Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, as part of its broader strategy to expand socialist influence in Africa and counter Western and Chinese involvement in liberation movements. The Soviets provided ZAPU with military training, arms, and financial aid, including sophisticated weaponry for its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), to fight against Rhodesia’s white-minority regime. Soviet efforts were driven by the desire to establish a Marxist-aligned government in Zimbabwe and promote anti-colonial resistance across the continent. However, the Soviet Union faced competition from China, which backed the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its leader, Robert Mugabe. This rivalry weakened the overall liberation effort and limited Soviet influence after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 when ZANU emerged victorious and pursued non-aligned policies rather than aligning strictly with Moscow.

In Latin America, Cuba served as an intermediary for Soviet ambitions. The Cuban Revolution transformed Havana into a hub of revolutionary export, with Fidel Castro's regime actively spreading Marxist doctrine. The Soviets saw Cuba as a forward operating base for communist expansion across Latin America, with Che Guevara becoming a symbol of regional insurgencies. The United States responded aggressively, using its proximity to assert dominance. The Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, an attempt by U.S.-backed exiles to overthrow Castro, highlighted Washington's willingness to counter Soviet-backed revolutions through direct, albeit sometimes poorly executed, intervention. Despite the invasion's failure, the event underlined the limits of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts when faced with determined local and Soviet-backed resistance.

The global nature of Soviet irregular warfare is most vividly seen in Southeast Asia, where the conflict in Vietnam exemplified a prolonged irregular battle that had implications far beyond the region. Soviet support for North Vietnam—through financial aid, military advisors, and weaponry—enabled the communist insurgency to survive a sustained American assault. Though China was also a key benefactor, the Soviet contribution played a pivotal role in ensuring that North Vietnamese forces were well-armed and capable of continuing the struggle. The eventual American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 marked one of the most significant successes for Soviet irregular efforts during the Cold War, striking a severe blow to U.S. global prestige.

Successes and Failures in Soviet Irregular Warfare

While Soviet support for North Vietnam and the MPLA is emblematic of Moscow's successes, the Cold War also highlighted the limitations and failures of their irregular warfare doctrine. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union found itself embroiled in a quagmire that mirrored the American experience in Vietnam and, later, Afghanistan as well. Initially intending to prop up a faltering communist government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 escalated into a drawn-out conflict against the mujahideen, who the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia supported.

The Soviet effort to pacify Afghanistan relied heavily on brute force and mass repression, an approach that backfired as the mujahideen—fueled by covert American assistance under Operation Cyclone—became increasingly effective. Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA enabled the mujahideen to neutralize Soviet air superiority, and the conflict dragged on until the Soviets withdrew in 1989. Afghanistan thus marked a significant failure for Soviet irregular warfare, demonstrating the limits of relying on conventional tactics to combat a determined irregular enemy with foreign backing.

In Latin America, Soviet efforts were also met with mixed results. Soviet efforts focused on Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela. While Cuba remained a loyal ally and Nicaragua's Sandinista government emerged as a regional partner, efforts to instigate successful revolutions elsewhere often fell short. In Chile, Soviet backing for leftist groups failed to prevent the CIA-supported military coup that ousted President Salvador Allende in 1973, ushering in the authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet. This represented a broader challenge for the Soviets. Despite the ideological commitment and significant investment, they frequently struggled to overcome the entrenched political and economic influence of the United States in Latin America.

Irregular Competition: The Soviet Union vs. The United States

The Cold War irregular competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was characterized by stark contrasts in methods and outcomes. Soviet irregular warfare doctrine emphasized ideological indoctrination and the empowerment of local communist movements, leveraging local discontent against colonial or capitalist powers. In contrast, the American approach centered on containment, using counterinsurgency, economic assistance, and direct military intervention to prevent the spread of communism.

One of the most vivid examples of this competition was the struggle for influence in Angola during the 1970s. The Angolan Civil War pitted the Soviet-supported MPLA against U.S.-backed factions such as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The conflict became a proxy battlefield, with Cuban troops and Soviet advisors fighting against South African forces and CIA-sponsored insurgents. Ultimately, the MPLA emerged victorious, and Angola became a Soviet-aligned state—a significant geopolitical win for Moscow. The U.S. failure to prevent the spread of communism in Angola underscored the limitations of relying on disparate and often fragmented proxy forces without cohesive support.

The irregular warfare battle that stands out as particularly successful for the Soviet Union, however, is Vietnam. Though the Soviet role was indirect, their support played a crucial role in allowing North Vietnam to outlast the United States, leading to the unification of the country under communist rule. The American defeat in Vietnam was a profound moment in Cold War history, affecting U.S. foreign policy and military strategy for decades to come. The success of Soviet-supported irregular forces in Vietnam demonstrated the efficacy of sustained insurgency, combined with robust external backing, in undermining a vastly superior military power.

Lessons for Modern Competition

The lessons of Soviet and American irregular warfare during the Cold War remain highly relevant in today's strategic competition between Russia and the United States. Modern Russia, much like the Soviet Union, continues to employ a hybrid approach that combines elements of irregular warfare, political subversion, and covert operations to achieve its objectives. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine are prime examples of Russia's modern adaptation of Cold War-era tactics.

One key lesson is the importance of legitimacy and local support. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan highlights the difficulties of sustaining an irregular campaign without genuine local backing. Conversely, Soviet support for North Vietnam and the MPLA in Angola was successful in large part due to the strong nationalist underpinnings of these movements. For the United States, countering Russian irregular activities today requires a deep understanding of local dynamics and the cultivation of legitimacy among local populations. While the stark ideological differences in the Marxist and democratic-capitalistic have faded, supporting or influencing autocratic regimes beneficial to Russia remains a primary objective. Supporting autocrats may be expedient; however, merely providing military assistance without addressing the underlying political and social grievances that fuel conflict is unlikely to succeed.

Another lesson is the necessity of plausible deniability and the use of proxies. The Soviet Union's reliance on proxies allowed it to expand its influence without overtly risking direct confrontation with the United States. Modern Russia has embraced a similar approach, using private military contractors like the Wagner Group to project power while maintaining official deniability. The United States must recognize this tactic and adapt by enhancing intelligence capabilities, countering disinformation, and working through allied local forces to undermine Russian influence.

The Cold War also demonstrated the value of sustained support in irregular conflicts. Soviet assistance to North Vietnam was instrumental precisely because it was consistent and tailored to the insurgency's needs. In contrast, the United States has often struggled with maintaining long-term commitments, as seen in Afghanistan and Syria. To effectively compete with Russia today, the U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to engage in sustained support for its partners, particularly those facing Russian-backed insurgencies or political subversion.

Finally, the ideological component of irregular warfare remains significant. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union effectively used communist ideology to rally support and build solidarity among diverse movements. While the ideological landscape has changed, Russia today still uses narratives of anti-Western resistance and national sovereignty to justify its actions and garner support. The United States must, therefore, craft a compelling ideological narrative that emphasizes democracy, rule of law, and economic opportunity—values that resonate with local populations and counter the appeal of authoritarian alternatives.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union's use of irregular warfare during the Cold War offers valuable insights into modern great power competition dynamics. Through a combination of proxy support, ideological commitment, and strategic opportunism, the Soviets could expand their influence globally, often at the expense of the United States. However, the limitations and failures of Soviet irregular campaigns—notably in Afghanistan—also underscore the importance of local legitimacy and the dangers of overreliance on conventional military tactics in an irregular context.

As the United States and Russia continue to vie for influence in the 21st century, the lessons of the Cold War are more pertinent than ever. Both nations must recognize that irregular warfare is not merely a military endeavor but a complex interplay of political, social, and ideological factors. By learning from past successes and failures, the United States can better prepare to counter Russia's modern hybrid warfare strategies, ensuring it remains competitive in an increasingly contested global landscape.

Bibliography

Collins, John M. America's Small Wars: Lessons for Future Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Kalashnikov, Viktor. "The Afghan Quagmire: Soviet Counterinsurgency Failures." Journal of Military History 57, no. 4 (1993): 105-129.

Prados, John. Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.

Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

2. Privatizing Veteran Health Care is a Betrayal, Not A Solution

Do they think that they can balance the budget on the backs of veterans? I am not sure veterans will want to get health insurance through United Healthcare.

"In times of war and not before,

God and the soldier we adore.

But in times of peace and all things righted,

God is forgotten and the soldier slighted."

-Rudyard Kipling”

16 hours ago7 min read

Privatizing Veteran Health Care is a Betrayal, Not A Solution

Hegseth & DOGE Prioritize Insurance Companies Over Veterans

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/privatizing-veteran-health-care-is-a-betrayal-not-a-solution

Strategy Central

For, By, and With Veterans

By Monte Erfourth – December 14, 2024

Beware The Promise of Privatization!

Introduction

Pete Hegseth and his billionaire compatriots of DOG-E have taken aim at a group they purport to revere: America’s veterans. Hegseth, a Fox News regular and perennial advocate for privatizing government services, has been vocal about his disdain for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), suggesting that veterans “ask for too much” and that privatization is the solution to the VA’s woes. Of course, this push for "choice" in healthcare masks a broader agenda: dismantling the VA system and shifting costs onto veterans while fattening the pockets of private insurers.

Hegseth and his allies claim their crusade is about empowering veterans. In reality, their efforts would unravel the very fabric of a system designed to meet veterans’ unique needs. The VA isn’t perfect—what massive organization is?—but its integrated care model is unmatched in addressing service-related injuries like PTSD, traumatic brain injuries, and complex prosthetic needs. College and vocational skills funding and the VA home loan are staples that have given generations of veterans a leg-up, not a handout. The primary concern in this article is health care. Privatizing these services would not only cost more but would also leave veterans scrambling to find care in a fragmented system ill-equipped to handle their challenges.

Understanding Veterans’ Needs: The Case for the VA

The VA isn’t just a healthcare provider; it’s a lifeline. Many veterans suffer from conditions directly tied to their service, such as exposure to burn pits, shrapnel injuries, or the psychological toll of combat. Private healthcare providers lack the expertise and infrastructure to deliver the specialized care veterans require. For instance, the VA’s focus on prosthetics and mental health services has made it a leader in those fields.

But the VA's mission goes far beyond healthcare. It offers critical support in employment, housing, and education, addressing the broader challenges of reintegration into civilian life. Programs like the GI Bill have provided countless veterans with access to higher education and vocational training, enabling them to build new careers after military service. Similarly, VA-backed home loans have made homeownership attainable for veterans, often under more favorable terms than those available through the private sector. For those transitioning from active duty, the VA's employment assistance programs connect veterans with job opportunities tailored to their unique skills and experiences, ensuring they can contribute meaningfully to the economy.

Of course, as with any system, there are outliers. A small minority of veterans may exhibit unrealistic expectations, aim to defraud the system, or demand the VA meet every possible need, often with little regard for the limitations of the system. These individuals, while vocal, do not represent the vast majority of veterans, who deeply value the services provided by the VA. Most veterans approach the system with a sense of gratitude and pragmatism, recognizing that the resources they receive are both earned and essential to their well-being and success in civilian life.

The narrative that portrays veterans as entitled, pathetically seeking a government handout, or scammers and malingerers with no dignity or pride is a gross exaggeration of reality. This false narrative is often peddled by those with little understanding of the sacrifices made by those who serve. Sometimes it is espoused by “born again hard” veterans who can afford to reject any VA support and look down on those who might need help transitioning to civilian life or living with physical or mental problems linked to their time in service. But usually, it boils down to those who do not give a damn about service and have no problem cutting promised benefits in the name of “efficiency” while ignoring things like “effectiveness.”

The VA’s comprehensive support system—the healthcare, housing, employment, and education programs—reflects a holistic approach to serving those who have served the nation. It is an earned benefit, and an enticement to those considering joining the service. Dismantling or privatizing these services, as Pete, Vivek, and Elon propose, wouldn’t just be a disservice to veterans; it would fundamentally undermine their ability to succeed in civilian life. Veterans don’t need a patchwork of disconnected services; they need a cohesive, centralized system that understands their unique challenges and works to address them at every level. This is the promise of the VA—a promise that must be upheld. If you really care about what the VA does, conduct analysis on the department’s effectiveness, develop ways to improve or sustain services, and from there find efficiencies. The goal is reasonable quality and effectiveness at a sustainable cost

The Earned Contract

Let us drive this last point home a little more. Critics of the VA often portray veterans as entitled, painting benefits as handouts rather than what they are: earned benefits. Let’s not forget the unspoken contract between the nation and its service members. When service members don the uniform, they do so with the understanding that their sacrifices will be met with support upon their return to civilian life. Benefits like healthcare and disability compensation are not perks; they are obligations the country owes its veterans.

Part of the missing piece in the VA discussion is the incredible return on investment America gains from providing healthcare and other services to veterans. After World War II, the GI Bill exploded college graduation rates, ushered in a housing boom, and helped build a thriving postwar economy. Those wounded were in war were healed and enabled to fully participate in civic and economic life. These investments didn’t just help veterans—they helped build an America with a burgeoning middle class, unprecedented economic growth, and global leadership. Today’s veterans continue this legacy, contributing to industry, technology, education, and countless other fields. The VA’s support helps veterans leverage their unique skills and experiences to benefit not just themselves but also their communities and the nation at large. America’s promise of care to its veterans is repaid many times over through the lives they live and the contributions they make.

For veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, even when their service is officially over, they continue to serve the mission. American men and women were sent to fight in conflicts initiated under false premises and perpetuated by poor strategic leadership. When the Taliban reclaimed Afghanistan in 2021, it was veterans—not the Department of Defense or the State Department—who mobilized to evacuate Afghan allies. This was a clear demonstration of their unwavering commitment to service. It should not strike anyone as unusual that veterans recognize fellow travelers in war, especially when those travelers helped them fight it. Veterans honor those who supported them in war and respected them enough to find a way to ensure they were not abandoned. It seems reasonable to ask that our veterans not be abandon to corporate greed.

Hegseth’s Trojan Horse

Hegseth’s rhetoric about "choice" and efficiency bely a more insidious goal: reducing costs at the expense of care. Privatization would funnel veterans into a profit-driven healthcare system where denying claims and cutting corners are standard practices. This approach would decimate the VA’s integrated model, which allows veterans to receive coordinated care for multiple conditions—a critical feature for those dealing with complex injuries.

Moreover, privatizing veterans’ care would be a boon for corporations, but it would come at a steep cost to those who served. If veterans’ healthcare were outsourced to private providers, corporations would inevitably prioritize profits over patient care. Unlike the VA, which operates with a mission to serve, private healthcare companies answer to shareholders. This creates a system where denying care or reducing services becomes a financial strategy. For-profit insurers and healthcare conglomerates could exploit veterans by charging higher premiums, imposing additional fees, and limiting access to specialized care through networks that prioritize cost-saving over quality. Veterans with complex service-related conditions, such as PTSD, prosthetic needs, or toxic exposure-related illnesses, could face denial of services if their care is deemed too costly or outside the expertise of general practitioners

While the VA integrates care tailored to veterans’ unique needs, corporations would likely cherry-pick profitable cases, leaving those most in need to fend for themselves in a fragmented and often predatory system. This shift would represent not just a betrayal of veterans but also a lucrative opportunity for corporations to profit off the sacrifices made by those who served.

Bottom line: Hegseth’s suggestions are based on unsupported opinions. He offers no data and the broader veteran community with decades of experience and evidenced based studies reveal the falsity of his claims. Veterans’ groups have repeatedly voiced opposition to privatization, arguing that it would undermine the very foundation of veteran care. Even Hegseth’s former colleagues at the VA have criticized his lack of understanding of the system’s intricacies.

A Call to Action

Hegseth’s proposals don’t just threaten the VA; they threaten the social contract that binds the nation to its veterans. If we allow these cuts to proceed under the guise of “choice,” we send a clear message: America values its veterans only when it’s politically convenient. Veterans vote more, volunteer more, and are more patriotic than their civilian counterparts. They deserve more than empty platitudes on Veterans Day; they have earned tangible support every day of the year. For those who want to protect veteran's well being, this is a call to reject privatization of the VA.

Cutting government spending is indeed a worthwhile goal, and the VA, like any large institution, should continuously review its processes to identify inefficiencies and reduce costs where it can. Fraud, waste, and outdated systems should never go unchecked, and reform is essential to ensure taxpayer dollars are well spent. However, there is a profound difference between prudent fiscal management and the reckless dismantling of an institution that millions depend on. To make sweeping changes on baseless assumptions, such as the idea that privatization will automatically lead to better outcomes, is the act of a fool, not a patriot.

Let’s be clear: veterans are not asking for handouts. They are asking for what was promised to them in exchange for their service—service that can leave them physically scarred, emotionally burdened, and in some cases, economically disadvantaged. Didn’t our nation learn this lesson in the wake of Vietnam? Does Hegseth really want to cut VA benefits when our leaders lied about the reasons for going to war, lied about the results, and carried on for two decades with strategies that could not achieve the objectives they outlined? The notion that “choice” in healthcare will somehow save money or improve care ignores the realities of the for-profit medical system, where denial of care is a feature, not a bug. Privatizing the VA isn’t a solution; it’s a betrayal.

3. How Israel Turned the Mideast Around

Tough questions on deterrence.

Excerpts:

Back to his point: He asks me to imagine I’m president of the United States and I have to pick one ally for the next half-century. “Just one, strictly in terms of American interest. You want an ally that can defend itself by itself and you don’t have to send in troops to protect it. You want an ally with formidable intelligence capability and cyber capability and all the new forms of warfare. And you want an ally that can develop new weapons.”

He pauses—a rarity for Mr. Dermer. “If you’re honest, you’re down to Britain and Israel. And I think we have a bigger standing army than the Brits.” This argument isn’t about values, he says again, but about raw interest.

Mr. Dermer avoids direct criticism of the Biden administration, though he praises Mr. Netanyahu for not bowing to “international pressure,” meaning from Washington. “One of the most important things for an Israeli prime minister is to say one word: No.”

He thinks Israel has regained the capacity for deterrence it lost on Oct. 7, and it’s hard to disagree. But can the U.S. get back its power to deter? America’s deficit is greater than Israel’s; ours doesn’t involve one failure but a rolling series—the Afghanistan withdrawal, the reluctance to anger Mr. Putin by letting Ukraine go on the offensive, vacillating on Israel’s fight against Hamas for rank political reasons, a seeming inability even to guard the country’s own border.

How to regain deterrence at the end of all that? Mr. Dermer has an answer. “When the U.S. is part of a victory that projects strength”—he interrupts himself. “I’ll be diplomatic and I won’t get into what happens when you are perceived as weak, or how that might affect other theaters. I’ll just say, Israel’s war is a theater in which we are going to win, and America can win with it. So be part of that victory.”

How Israel Turned the Mideast Around

Six months ago, the Jewish state was weakened and demoralized. No longer. Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer discusses what America can learn.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-israel-took-its-own-side-in-a-fight-middle-east-policy-war-a98838dc?mod=opinion_lead_pos5

By Barton Swaim

Dec. 13, 2024 3:49 pm ET

Ron Dermer. Illustration: Ken Fallin

Washington

No one knows whether the new Syrian government will generate fresh trouble or find its way to peace and stability. That the fall of the house of Assad is an inherently good thing, however, is certain—for more than 50 years, first under Hafez al-Assad and since 2000 under his son Bashar, the Syrian government has brutalized the country’s citizens and allied itself with malign regimes around the globe.

Two nations deserve most of the credit for Assad’s fall, and alas they don’t include the United States. They are Ukraine and Israel—Ukraine for preoccupying Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and Israel for preventing Iran’s intervention by degrading Tehran’s military and humiliating its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah.

Just as Ukraine wouldn’t have troubled Russia if Russia hadn’t invaded it, Israel wouldn’t have decapitated Hezbollah, ravaged Iran’s air defenses, and destroyed Tehran’s client in Gaza, Hamas, absent the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks. Unlike Ukraine, however, Israel has been at war with America’s foes since its founding in 1948.

Critics used to complain about the “Israel lobby” and its supposed ability to bend U.S. policy to its will. A saner case could be made that Israel is constantly doing America’s dirty work at immense cost to itself. Its war against Hamas and Hezbollah isn’t some regional conflict over disputed territory but a battle in a worldwide cold war between an alliance of capitalist democracies—badly led at the moment by the U.S.—and a confederation of socialist anti-American dictatorships.

In a noisy corner of the Willard Hotel’s lobby, a block from the White House, Ron Dermer and I exchange pleasantries about the American Southeast—he grew up in Miami Beach, I in South Carolina’s upstate. Mr. Dermer is Israel’s minister for strategic affairs and among his country’s more articulate Anglophone exponents.

I begin by mentioning my view that Israel is fighting America’s war in the Middle East. He doesn’t surprise me by agreeing. “We’re the little Satan,” Mr. Dermer says. “America is the big Satan. And, as the prime minister often says”—he’s referring to his boss, Benjamin Netanyahu—“Europe’s annoyed because it’s only the middle-sized Satan.”

Mr. Dermer, 53, was Israel’s ambassador to the U.S. from 2013-21 and tried to kill the Obama administration’s nuclear agreement with Iran. That effort failed, but his skepticism of the Iran deal has been vindicated a thousand times over. Mr. Netanyahu’s “middle-sized Satan” wisecrack is a good one, but Mr. Dermer notes a serious point. “A lot of people don’t understand,” he says. “They think America is hated because of Israel. I think Israel is hated because of America. We’re seen as an extension of your values. And guess what? They’re right.”

Mr. Dermer is in Washington to meet with members of the outgoing and incoming administrations on Middle East policy. Three weeks earlier, he met the president-elect in Mar-a-Lago. One subject of these meetings is the effort to fashion a deal to release the hostages held by Hamas. Mr. Dermer says he is confident the parties will reach a final agreement to return all the captives, alive and otherwise, and end the war. What’s taking so long? “Hamas wants to end the war and remain in power,” he says, “and we’re not prepared to end it that way.”

Hamas has hoped for the past year to avoid negotiating a deal to give up the hostages by provoking a conflagration across the Middle East. Thanks to the recent cease-fire with Hezbollah, he says, Hamas “understands that this broad regional escalation isn’t going to happen, and that gives us a chance to make a deal over the hostages. . . . I think there’s a greater prospect of that happening than I’ve seen in a long time.”

Israel certainly has more bargaining chips than it did a short while ago. What it has accomplished since the spring must astound even its enemies. Six months ago, global opinion makers and power brokers had all but forgotten the stomach-turning atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, and spoke mainly about the “genocide” perpetrated by Israel in Gaza. The White House, manifestly trying to shore up political support among key domestic constituencies, was slow-walking arms shipments to the Israelis and lecturing them about the impossibility of evacuating noncombatants from Rafah (which the Israelis later did). Protests against Israel on elite campuses cowed many Democratic politicians into sharpening their criticisms of the Jewish state; a few indulged in the “genocide” calumny. Israel itself appeared to have literally shrunk, its north vacated because of Hezbollah shelling from Lebanon. Israeli society seemed half-paralyzed by angst as families of hostages demanded that their government do the impossible—negotiate the release of captives from an organization that at the time had every reason to keep them.

Then came the turnaround. It started with a string of strikes that humiliated Iran and its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza. On July 30, Israel killed Hezbollah leader Fuad Shukr in an airstrike, and early the following morning it killed Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh by detonating a bomb somehow hidden in his hotel room in Tehran. A few weeks later, in an exploit you might dismiss as impossible if you read it in a Robert Ludlum novel, the Israelis detonated the pagers and walkie-talkies carried by thousands of Hezbollah operatives—devices that had been sold to Hezbollah by a fake company set up years earlier by Israel for such a time as this. In late September an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, and two weeks later an Israeli patrol in Gaza killed the legendarily elusive Yahya Sinwar, architect of the Oct. 7 attack.

It occurs to me that no other first-world nation, with the exception of the U.S. in the months after Sept. 11, 2001, possesses the shrewdness and sheer audacity to pull off so many exploits against its enemies. Israel, unlike the 21st-century West, takes its own side in a fight. Why?

“We have no choice,” Mr. Dermer says. He makes the point with a joke: “So I hear you have issues with Canada and Mexico. I’ll tell you what, we’ll take Canada, and you can have Syria. We’ll take Mexico, and you can have any other country in the Middle East.”

The necessity of remaining vigilant, of cultivating a sense of national self-confidence, has kept Israel from developing some of the pathologies of other prosperous liberal nations. “You’re always trying to find the right balance between security and civil liberties,” Mr. Dermer says. “Then, as danger from abroad recedes for a time, you naturally concentrate more on civil liberties and all of these issues.”

The remarkable fact about Israel, he says, is that “we’ve been living Sept. 12 for 76 years. And as somebody born and raised in the United States”—he took Israeli citizenship in 1997 and held U.S. citizenship till 2005—“what amazes me about Israel is that with all of its imperfections, and every society’s imperfect, it still remains a vibrant, thriving democracy that affords its citizens enormous freedoms.”

Plainly, though, the current situation in the Middle East, in which an imminently nuclear-armed Iran devotes itself to Israel’s destruction, can’t continue. For Israel to keep thriving, doesn’t the Iranian regime have to fall?

Mr. Dermer is a diplomat and politician and tends to avoid blunt answers, but he agrees with the premise of my question. “Israel doesn’t have a problem with the people of Iran,” he says. “There’s no question that if and when the regime falls—and it will; estimates say close to 80% of the Iranian population despises the regime—when it falls, I believe Israel will have a partner in Iran.”

The prospect of some level of stability in a future Middle East seems conceivable in a way it didn’t a year ago. Not because of any “peace process,” a phrase deserving of more ridicule than it can ever receive, but because the Iraq war had at least one unintended and underappreciated benefit. The dueling powers Iran and Iraq had dominated the Middle East for decades when the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. For all the bloody miscalculations of that war, a relatively peaceful post-Saddam regime in Baghdad has left Iran as the region’s one belligerent hegemon. The Gulf states have in turn been forced to look for an ally against Iran, particularly after Barack Obama gave Tehran more resources with which to fund terrorist proxies and more time to pursue a nuclear weapon.

The ally those Gulf states found: Israel. Hence the Abraham Accords, of which the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are signatories, and hence the prospect of normal relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. If the Iranian regime falls and the country turns in a nonradical direction, who knows? Anything could happen.

As Mr. Dermer points out, however, the case for optimism has to reckon with Sunni radicalism: “You had al Qaeda, that was 1.0, and ISIS was 2.0. And you’ll have a 3.0. And you might see the beginnings of a 3.0 in whatever comes out of Syria.” But, he says, switching the metaphor, “let’s say you’re one of the Gulf states, and you’re worried about Sunni radical jihadis. You look around and you see the 800-pound gorilla has left the building. So you look around and you see, well, there’s a 250-pound gorilla with a kippah on. Maybe you’ll work with him.”

For the next 10 minutes Mr. Dermer makes the case that Israel is America’s most important ally. He notes the aforementioned claim that the “Israel lobby” persuades the U.S. to act against its own interests. “You don’t hear anyone making that argument anymore,” he says. “Now they attack our values—with all the lies about genocide and apartheid and ethnic cleansing, all of that.” Mr. Dermer constantly interrupts himself with stories and wisecracks, and here’s one: “By the way, the Jews must be the dumbest genocidal force in history. We win Nobel Prizes, but we’re idiots when it comes to genocide—the Palestinian population is about 10 times what it was in 1948.”

Back to his point: He asks me to imagine I’m president of the United States and I have to pick one ally for the next half-century. “Just one, strictly in terms of American interest. You want an ally that can defend itself by itself and you don’t have to send in troops to protect it. You want an ally with formidable intelligence capability and cyber capability and all the new forms of warfare. And you want an ally that can develop new weapons.”

He pauses—a rarity for Mr. Dermer. “If you’re honest, you’re down to Britain and Israel. And I think we have a bigger standing army than the Brits.” This argument isn’t about values, he says again, but about raw interest.

Mr. Dermer avoids direct criticism of the Biden administration, though he praises Mr. Netanyahu for not bowing to “international pressure,” meaning from Washington. “One of the most important things for an Israeli prime minister is to say one word: No.”

He thinks Israel has regained the capacity for deterrence it lost on Oct. 7, and it’s hard to disagree. But can the U.S. get back its power to deter? America’s deficit is greater than Israel’s; ours doesn’t involve one failure but a rolling series—the Afghanistan withdrawal, the reluctance to anger Mr. Putin by letting Ukraine go on the offensive, vacillating on Israel’s fight against Hamas for rank political reasons, a seeming inability even to guard the country’s own border.

How to regain deterrence at the end of all that? Mr. Dermer has an answer. “When the U.S. is part of a victory that projects strength”—he interrupts himself. “I’ll be diplomatic and I won’t get into what happens when you are perceived as weak, or how that might affect other theaters. I’ll just say, Israel’s war is a theater in which we are going to win, and America can win with it. So be part of that victory.”

Mr. Swaim is an editorial page writer for the Journal.

4. Trump Courts Xi Jinping, Slaps Japan

Trump Courts Xi Jinping, Slaps Japan

China’s Communist leader won’t be charmed by an inaugural invitation.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trump-courts-xi-jinping-slaps-japan-0d11864f?mod=opinion_lead_pos2

By The Editorial Board

Dec. 13, 2024 5:37 pm ET

Chinese President Xi Jinping Photo: Huang Jingwen/Zuma Press

The world is trying to figure out how to react to a second Donald Trump Presidency, and that isn’t easy given the President-elect’s often contradictory signals. Take his messages to China and Japan.

Japan is America’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific, a bulwark against Chinese aggression. But Mr. Trump wants to block Nippon Steel’s deal to buy U.S. Steel and invest billions in domestic steel production. This is a slap in the face of an ally, as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notes nearby.

Meanwhile, Mr. Trump invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to his inauguration on Jan. 20. Mr. Xi is reportedly going to decline the invitation, and we’re glad to hear it. There’s something unseemly about a dictator with anti-U.S. designs attending America’s quadrennial ritual of a transfer of democratic power.

Mr. Trump likes to say he gets along famously with Mr. Xi and wants to send that friendly signal. But personal relations don’t matter much to the hard man who runs the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Xi can’t be charmed by Mr. Trump, and he won’t call off his cyber-spies and thieves unless he knows China will pay some price for his aggression.

Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba would be a better guest to invite. Oh, and approve the Nippon Steel deal.

US starts relocating Marines from Japan's Okinawa

14 Dec 2024 07:48PM

channelnewsasia.com

US starts relocating Marines from Japan's Okinawa

Marines boarding a Citation Ultra aircraft at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan on May 5, 2015. (Photo: AFP/USMC/PFC Makenzie Fallon)

14 Dec 2024 07:48PM

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TOKYO: The United States began relocating thousands of Marines from the Japanese island of Okinawa, Tokyo and Washington said on Saturday (Dec 14) after decades of mounting grievances among locals over America's military presence.

In 2012, the United States said it would redeploy 9,000 Marines from the island where communities complain bases are an unfair burden – with objections ranging from pollution to noise and helicopter crashes.

The relocation began with "a small detachment of approximately 100 logistics support Marines" transferred to the US island territory of Guam, Japan's defence ministry and the US Marine Corps said.

"Commencement of relocation to Guam signifies the first phase of relocating Marines to locations outside of Japan," said the joint statement.

There are currently around 19,000 Marines in Okinawa – strategically located east of Taiwan, which has become a flashpoint for tensions between the United States and China.

Beijing claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to bring the self-ruled island under its control.

Washington is Taiwan's most important backer and biggest supplier of arms but has long maintained "strategic ambiguity" about the prospect of backing it with boots on the ground.

The 9,000 relocating Marines are set to be moved elsewhere in the Pacific – to Guam, Hawaii or Australia, the United States has said.

Okinawa comprises just 0.6 per cent of Japan's territory but hosts more than half of the 50,000 US troops posted in the country.

The 1995 gang rape of a 12-year-old girl by three US soldiers in Okinawa also prompted widespread backlash, with calls for a rethink of the 1960 pact allowing the United States to post soldiers in Japan.

Source: AFP/lh

6. The Army is too top-heavy

Conclusion:

In short, the Army should shutter those organizations not deemed essential, reduce the officer-to-enlisted ratio, and streamline its bloated staffs. These measures will increase the number of billets available to operational units, decrease unnecessary reporting requirements on them, reduce personnel costs and increase the productivity and efficiency of those headquarters that remain. Leaner and flatter are watchwords in the private sector—and are clearly priorities for the incoming administration. America’s Army should adopt them as well.

The Army is too top-heavy

Surplus generals, swollen staffs, and excess headquarters drain headcount and resources from warfighting units.

By R.D. Hooker, Jr.

Senior Associate, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center

December 10, 2024

Commentary

Army

defenseone.com · by R.D. Hooker, Jr.

Lt. Gen. Omar Jones, commander of Installation Management Command, and IMCOM Command Sgt. Maj. Jason Copeland, visit U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz in Baumholder and Kaiserslautern, Germany, on July 31, 2024. U.S. Army / Linda Lambiotte

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Ideas

Surplus generals, swollen staffs, and excess headquarters drain headcount and resources from warfighting units.

December 10, 2024

By R.D. Hooker, Jr.

Senior Associate, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center

December 10, 2024

With its many missions, the U.S. Army is hard-pressed to meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy at its current authorized end strength. A major part of the problem is that the Army is awash in staffs, many of which did not exist during World War II, or even in the 1990s. After 9/11, the Army Staff grew by 60 percent, while headquarters and staffs Army-wide ballooned. All of these headquarters consume resources withheld from the warfighting Army. Nor can it be shown that Army functions are being executed more effectively or efficiently because multiple large headquarters have been created to run them.

A case in point is the Army Installation Management Command, or IMC, created in 2006 and chartered to “reduce bureaucracy, apply a uniform business structure to manage U.S. Army installations, sustain the environment and enhance the well-being of the military community.” IMC is headed by a lieutenant general, with a major general as deputy and brigadier general as chief of staff. IMC includes a workforce of 30,000 soldiers and 70,000 civilians. Formerly, Army installations were managed by garrison commanders reporting to local commanding generals, with an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation Management. In theory, centralizing the installation management function promised common standards and greater expertise. In practice, results have fallen far short, with the Army experiencing a “crisis” in installation management in recent years.

Another compelling example is the Army Acquisition Corps, created in 1989 and today employing 1,600 commissioned officers plus many more senior civilians. Since its creation, the Army has failed badly with major program acquisitions, squandering billions on programs like the Crusader Field Artillery System, the Future Combat System, the Ground Combat Vehicle, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter and the XM1299 Extended Range Cannon Artillery system, among others. No major Army program has been successfully fielded since the 1980s, a trend described by one Secretary of the Army as a “tale of failure.” In 2018, the Army doubled down by creating Futures Command, adding another large 4-star headquarters to supervise an existing, labyrinthine set of acquisition headquarters which includes the Army Futures and Concepts Center, the Army Combat Capabilities Development Command and its associated battle labs, the Army Research, Development and Engineering Command; and the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, among others. Despite this massive infrastructure, the Army has not improved performance in this key sphere.

Growth in staff size and the proliferation of unneeded headquarters is accompanied by a strong tendency to “over-officer” the force, one factor in the explosion of personnel costs since 9/11. In 2024, one in six soldiers is a commissioned officer (a 21 percent increase since 2000). About one-third of the Army's personnel budget goes to officer pay and allowances. Between 1965 and 2018, the number of general and flag officers in the U.S. military as a percentage of the total force increased by 46 percent; of 4-stars by 114 percent; and of 3-stars by 149 percent. Such deliberate rank-inflation and over-staffing contributes to a bureaucratic culture that demands constant reporting from junior commanders, so much so that one authoritative Army War College study found a “suffocating amount of mandatory requirements” they are “literally unable to complete…forcing them to resort to dishonesty evasion.” Almost certainly, this environment contributes to an exodus of young officers who are frustrated by crushing administrative burdens they cannot reconcile with their duty to train their soldiers for war.

In short, the Army should shutter those organizations not deemed essential, reduce the officer-to-enlisted ratio, and streamline its bloated staffs. These measures will increase the number of billets available to operational units, decrease unnecessary reporting requirements on them, reduce personnel costs and increase the productivity and efficiency of those headquarters that remain. Leaner and flatter are watchwords in the private sector—and are clearly priorities for the incoming administration. America’s Army should adopt them as well.

Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a Senior Fellow with The Atlantic Council and a Senior Associate with the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center. He previously served as The Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University and as University Professor at NDU’s National War College.

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military had deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Russian military is incorporating "a significant number" of North Korean soldiers into Russian units operating in Kursk Oblast and that North Korean soldiers have already sustained "noticeable" losses. Zelensky noted that Russian forces have only deployed North Korean soldiers to offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but may use them in other unspecified areas of the frontline in the future. This is the first time a Ukrainian official has reported that North Korean forces are conducting assault operations since Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged that North Korean forces are involved in assaults in Kursk Oblast and claimed on December 12 and 13 that North Korean soldiers participated in the seizure of Plekhovo (south of Sudzha) on December 6. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that North Korean special forces seized Plekhovo with no assistance from Russian forces, but one milblogger characterized the assault as a joint Russian-North Korean operation. Geolocated footage published on December 14 shows roughly 40 infantry personnel conducting an assault east of Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), and some sources claimed that the footage shows North Korean troops, although ISW cannot independently verify if the footage shows North Korth or Russian personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 14 that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized element of the Russian Territorial Troops) advanced near Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) with support from North Korean personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), and "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) trained North Korean personnel operating in Kursk Oblast for "many weeks." Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi amplified several Ukrainian sources on December 14 claiming that North Korean soldiers conducted infantry assaults across open terrain in groups of 20 to 30 personnel in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast. ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims, however. ISW previously noted that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors. The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases. Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya. Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS. Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing. A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria. It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group. It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military has deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast.

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue.

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely to result in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast on the night of December 13 to 14.

The new Georgian Dream-dominated parliament and other government bodies elected Georgian Dream's candidate, Mikheil Kavelashvili, as Georgian President on December 14.

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Torestk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.

Ukrainian forces regained lost positions near Vovchansk within the past several weeks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exalt the "Time of Heroes" veteran program and use it to militarize the Russian government and society.

8. Iran Update, December 14, 2024

Iran Update, December 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-14-2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. HTS-led forces assumed control of Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room on December 14. Jolani and Southern Operations Room leaders met on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs. It is notable that these Syrian groups have agreed to cooperate with HTS despite historical animosity with HTS’s predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s.

Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. Jolani met with Nour al Dink al Zink commander Ahmed Rizk on December 14 to discuss the role of “revolutionary cadres” in the future Syrian government and the restructuring of the Syrian Defense Ministry. Rizk and his group have long fought alongside HTS in northwestern Syria. Syrian media reported on December 10 that the HTS-controlled interim government also plans to reorganize the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Reorganization within the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Ministry supports reconciliation with former regime elements but also creates opportunities to appoint HTS loyalists and gain control over the government bureaucracy.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime. Abdi argued that Kurdish unity was critical to address threats currently facing their community. Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and calling for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas. The combination of these events threaten to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish. Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG). Abdi added that unity and dialogue among the Kurds is critical for participating in the development of the new Syrian government. CTP-ISW assessed that Abdi intends to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.

HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.” IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reiterated on December 14 that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or ”ruling” Syria. Halevi added that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel. An IDF company commander in the 603rd Combat Engineering Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) stated that the IDF advanced 10 kilometers into Syria.

Key Takeaways:

HTS Consolidates Power in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. The HTS-led interim government also appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system.

Syrian Democratic Forces: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.

Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime.

Israel in Syria: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”

Russia in Syria: The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.

Hezbollah in Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.

9. Key US agency that fights foreign influence in jeopardy after funding snub

Key US agency that fights foreign influence in jeopardy after funding snub

Global Engagement Center targeted by Republicans skeptical of alleged censoring of conservative viewpoints

The Guardian · by Joseph Gedeon · December 10, 2024

The Global Engagement Center (GEC), a state department unit critical to combating foreign disinformation, will not receive a multiyear extension in the latest National Defense Authorization Act, putting its future operations in jeopardy.

The next chapter of the GEC – which only addresses foreign influence operations outside the United States – now relies on Congress to come up with an extension some other way by 24 December, or the United States will face a potential gap in its international disinformation response capabilities.

In response to the NDAA snub over the weekend, a state department spokesperson told the Guardian: “As our adversaries continue to ramp up their efforts globally, it’s counterintuitive – and dangerous – to weaken or worse yet dismantle, the US’s leadership in this critical mission.”

The GEC is the latest institutional target to get hit by congressional Republicans, who have grown increasingly skeptical of the center and other US agencies for allegedly censoring conservative viewpoints. Last year, the Republican-led House judiciary committee labelled the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as “the nerve center” of a social media censorship apparatus of the government.

Former US officials alarmed over Tulsi Gabbard’s alleged ‘sympathy for dictators’

The GEC has been instrumental in exposing significant disinformation campaigns in Latin America and Moldova, including a complex Russian operation in Africa called the “African Initiative” this year. This campaign sought to undermine US and western influence by spreading conspiracy theories about US-funded health programs through social media, websites and Telegram channels.

Bipartisan supporters, including Chris Murphy, a Connecticut senator, and John Cornyn, a Texas senator, had proposed an amendment to extend the center’s mandate through 2031, but the effort ultimately failed to make it into the final NDAA text.

“I’m pursuing every avenue to ensure the GEC authorization does not expire and their critical work can continue,” Murphy said.

Marco Rubio, a Florida senator and Trump’s pick for secretary of state, has long been vocal about his concerns about foreign influence operations by way of China and Russia. His office did not respond to a request for comment on whether it would back the state’s GEC entering a new era.

Several prominent Republican lawmakers, including the outgoing House foreign affairs chair Michael McCaul, have criticized the GEC for allegedly overstepping its mandate. Those lawmakers argue that the center, through its connection with the UK-based Global Disinformation Index, has been complicit in labeling conservative media outlets as high risk for spreading disinformation.

“A win for free speech and Main Street America!” the House Committee on Small Business posted on X on Tuesday. “The shuttering of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center means there is one less way for unelected bureaucrats to violate Americans’ First Amendment rights.”

According to the center’s own assessment, countries like China have invested “billions of dollars” to exert global information control through disinformation and propaganda.

The Guardian · by Joseph Gedeon · December 10, 2024

10. Has World War III Already Begun?

While we are thinking about strategic competition and potential large-scale combat operations in multiple theaters of operation, we should not forget that some of these members of the axis of upheaval and quartet of chaos (if not all) are also dealing with internal threats and trying to sustain their power among their own people. We must not overlook their internal efforts to maintain power by suppressing their populations to do so.

They are in part challenging the democratic world because the values and the very ideas of the democratic world are a threat to their power. Those ideas are a threat, they illuminate regime vulnerabilities, and this provides opportunities to defeat the quartet of chaos or the Dark Quad (as Christopher Ford named them) if we are willing to implement a superior political warfare strategy..

An axis of autocracies led by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea is challenging the democratic world order

https://www.wsj.com/world/has-world-war-iii-already-begun-16fb94c9?mod=hp_featst_pos5

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

Dec. 13, 2024 9:00 pm ET

As Syrian rebels approached Damascus last weekend, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s main Arab ally, as a minor episode in a planet-wide struggle.

The West, Lavrov said, clings to America’s decaying hegemony but is inexorably losing ground to the “free world”—his Orwellian term for the axis of autocracies led by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. “The fight of these two worlds, one phasing out and another emerging, is not going without clashes,” he remarked at a conference in Qatar.

Though leaders in the West may scoff at Lavrov’s attempt to downplay Moscow’s geopolitical setback in Syria, they broadly agree with his view that the world is increasingly split into two rival camps. With Russia’s war on Ukraine nearly three years old, the Middle East ablaze on multiple fronts and tensions building up in East Asia, conflicts once thought to be disconnected have merged into what could be the opening shots of a third world war.

“It’s the era of global confrontation,” Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský said. “The violence happening right now in the world proves one thing: We don’t have anymore the conflicts that are separated from each other and that could be handled separately. There is one common effort to destroy the international order, and we have to do everything to prevent that.” The recent arrival of North Korean troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, he added, has made this linkage clear.

Just a decade ago, Russia and China cooperated with the U.S. and Western allies to contain the rogue regimes of Iran and North Korea, voting for a U.N. Security Council resolution on Tehran’s nuclear program in 2015 and sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017. Since then, however, all four countries have been brought together by their separate conflicts with the West.

Ukrainian soldiers use Swedish-made artillery to fire on Russian positions in Donetsk, Jan. 20, 2024. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The Autocratic Axis

A turning point for a closer partnership among these autocracies came in 2014, when the West responded to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine only with mild sanctions, convincing Putin of the democracies’ weakness. The following year, Russia and Iran joined hands in Syria to rescue the Assad regime from a looming collapse. Cut off from some Western technologies, Russia also became increasingly dependent on China.

Bonds among the four countries were cemented by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine—a war that Russia is fighting with indispensable Chinese support and weapons from North Korea and Iran. A Russian veto last March essentially ended the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea that Moscow itself once endorsed, and the two nations signed a mutual defense treaty months later. Russia’s cooperation with Iran also turned more strategic, with Moscow and Tehran putting finishing touches on a “comprehensive” treaty that includes defense cooperation.

As political inhibitions and concerns about a Western reaction faded away, members of the axis started sharing sophisticated military technologies to fill gaps in each other’s strategic capabilities—moves that have made each of them a more dangerous adversary in their own neighborhood.

“Big-power rivalry is accelerating and driving the world apart,” said Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank in Beijing and a former Chinese government adviser. “We are probably on the brink of World War III. You have a spillover of the Russia-Ukraine war, of the Gaza war, and Syria is just another domino. We need to be really careful not to have more dominoes.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit meeting in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024. Photo: maxim shemetov/press pool

Divided Democracies

Today, Russia and China are revisionist powers dreaming of past imperial glories, seeking to build or restore their spheres of influence and redress what they perceive as historical injustices, such as the loss of Ukraine or Taiwan. To this axis, and to its lesser clients from Venezuela to Belarus, the so-called “rules-based international order” is merely a tool to disguise American domination. They believe that rolling back Western political and economic influence, and Western-promoted norms such as liberal democracy, is only natural given the shrinking share of Western democracies in the global economy and population.

President-elect Donald Trump, who takes office on Jan. 20, has promised to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine and to impose “peace through strength” elsewhere in the world, deterring rivals like China. Trump’s first-term attempt to strike a deal with North Korea ended in failure, however, and it’s far from certain that he will be able to find common ground with Moscow.

Still, American allies in Europe are increasingly alarmed that a Trump effort to reach a grand bargain with Russia may come at the expense of their own security. America’s partners are also worried about being hit with tariffs that could seriously hurt their economies.

“The unity of the autocracies is perhaps stronger than the unity of democracies at this moment,” said Gen. Onno Eichelsheim, the Netherlands chief of defense. “There is a fight between autocracies and democracies, and the autocracies have a winning hand.”

China’s leader Xi Jinping highlighted the crumbling of the post-World War II international system during his October meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian city of Kazan. “The world today is facing momentous transformations unseen in a century,” Xi said. The summit was attended by many world leaders and the secretary-general of the U.N., illustrating Western failure to isolate the Kremlin.

Some norms that applied throughout the Cold War have already been broken: The territory of one global power is being struck with missiles provided by another. Ukraine in recent months repeatedly hit military installations inside Russia with American ATACMS missiles, in an attempt to repel a Russian invasion that has used artillery, drones and missiles from North Korea and Iran.

Since 2022, Putin has successfully resorted to nuclear blackmail to intimidate the U.S. and its allies into throttling support for Ukraine. At the same time, Russian agents have engaged in a fast-expanding campaign of violence across Europe, attacking military industries and communications infrastructure on a scale that Western governments describe as unprecedented.

In Damascus, Syrians celebrate the fall of Bashar al-Assad by toppling a statue of his father, late president Hafez al-Assad, Dec. 8, 2024. Photo: afp contributor#afp/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“Russia’s destabilizing attacks inside NATO countries—including sabotage, assassination plots and arson—are at levels we have never seen, at least since the end of the Cold War,” said James Appathurai, NATO’s assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid and cyber threats. “And they are getting even more effective at using new tools, like cyberattacks and ransomware, to disrupt our societies.”

War by Proxy

Despite this escalation, the major powers are not fighting one another directly—at least not yet. “It’s not a world war by any stretch of imagination. It’s still a proxy war,” said Sen. James Risch, a Republican from Idaho, who is slated to become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next month.

The spectacular collapse of Assad’s tyranny in Syria showcased just how interconnected different theaters of conflict have become. In 2015, Russia intervened militarily in Syria’s civil war to rescue the regime. This time, the Russians were too weakened by their losses in Ukraine to gather a force that could repel the Syrian rebels’ surprise offensive. Iran and its proxies were also unable to help Assad, having been battered by more than a year of fighting with U.S.-backed Israel.

Now the future of Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria, which are indispensable for Russian military operations in several African nations, is uncertain at best. For Iran, the fall of Assad also means the breakup of its own “axis of resistance,” which stretched through Iraq and Syria to the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon.

Mourners in Tehran carry the coffin of Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike, Oct. 15, 2024. Photo: Rouzbeh Fouladi/Zuma Press

“There is no axis without access,” said Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. “And the loss of credibility to defend allies has a contagious effect on the ones who are still standing.”

But Assad’s fall represents only a tactical loss for the converging autocratic powers. On the front that matters most, in Ukraine, momentum has shifted to Moscow’s side in the past year, in large part because of ammunition and weapons supplied to Russia by North Korea and Iran—and, since October, an infusion of some 12,000 North Korean troops.

While those forces may provide an immediate boost to the embattled Russian military on the Ukrainian front, the lessons they are currently learning about modern warfare against American weapons pose a much greater danger to South Korea in the medium term, according to a senior South Korean military official.

Still more important for Russia’s war is the backing provided by China. “China didn’t just help the Russian economy, it also helped rebuild the Russian military, which is becoming more and more advanced because of Chinese technological support,” said Nury Turkel, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a prominent campaigner for the rights of China’s Uyghur minority. “The more chaos the West and the United States get dragged into, the better it is for Russia and China.”

U.S. officials estimate that some 90% of semiconductors and 70% of machine tools used by Russian military industries currently come from China. So far, Beijing has stopped short of directly supplying lethal weapons, though it is shipping large quantities of dual-use goods, they say.

An Anti-American Alliance

Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute at Fudan University in Shanghai, argued that Beijing and Moscow are coming together as a defensive reaction to American hostility. “Because of the hawkish policy adopted by the U.S. towards Russia and towards China, of course China and Russia have become closer to each other. This is only natural,” he said. “And by the way, the two countries also have lots of domestic support for good relations between them, and economically they are complementary. Who is to blame? The United States is to blame.”

The same logic applies to Iran, added Seyed Emamian, co-founder of the Governance and Policy Think Tank in Tehran. “The military-security complex in Washington is strategically directed towards containing and to some extent isolating the three important powers—China, Russia and Iran—from each other,” he said. “Joint cooperation is needed, to contain the threats that come from NATO as a whole and from the U.S. security and military establishment in particular.”

Taiwan Air Force fighter jets prepare to take off during a war-preparedness drill, Dec. 10, 2024. Photo: ritchie b tongo/epa/Shutterstock

The fact that Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have different political systems and ideologies, and aren’t joined by a formal alliance like NATO, had lulled Western governments into complacency, said Andrew Shearer, Australia’s chief of national intelligence.

“We have collectively perhaps underestimated the magnitude of this emerging axis and the strategic impact it’s having on us all,” he warned in remarks at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada last month. “We fell into the trap of looking at each component in isolation, and not seeing the linkages between them and the deep connectivity between one theater and another…We haven’t adjusted our mindset and taken on board the scale of their strategic ambitions.”

Indeed, Western planners hadn’t taken into account the simple fact that a railroad runs all the way from Pyongyang to Russia’s border with Ukraine, making it possible to ferry North Korean troops, artillery, missiles and ammunition deep into Europe.

Shearer pointed out that the Axis powers during World War II—Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan—also disagreed on key issues. For instance, Japan didn’t share Hitler’s desire to exterminate Jews and didn’t join his attack on the Soviet Union. Yet acting together, these nations came frighteningly close to overrunning Europe and Asia. They were defeated largely because the U.S. possessed the planet’s mightiest industrial base.

Is the U.S. Prepared?

That is no longer the case. As China builds up its military might, the U.S. is already hard-pressed to keep supplying weapons to its partners in Ukraine and the Middle East. Orders for Taiwan are getting delayed. Though U.S. military output increased after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the growth lagged far behind the rapid expenditure of munitions and concentrated on particular products such as 155mm artillery shells.

“We are in no way prepared, from an industrial standpoint, to compete effectively absent radical change,” said Robert Greenway, director of the Allison Center for National Security at the Heritage Foundation and a former senior official in the Trump White House. “We have to look at industrial capacity and output as a function of national security, first and foremost.”

In a report released in July, the congressionally mandated Commission on the National Defense Strategy found that China is outpacing the U.S. when it comes to military production and that America’s defense-industrial base is unable to meet the needs of the U.S. and allies. “The U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” the report warned.

Three of the four revisionist autocracies—Russia, China and North Korea—already possess nuclear weapons, while the fourth, Iran, is only weeks away from a nuclear breakthrough should it choose to obtain the bomb, according to U.S. government estimates.

“There is a certain transactional symbiosis among them, where each fulfills the needs of the other,” said U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, the commander of the Indo-Pacific command. “To think that we will be able to drive a wedge between them is a fantasy.”

The U.S. military, he said, has already been forced to rethink its strategy because it expects Russia to provide China with submarine technology that could erode American undersea dominance and to supply North Korea with missile and submarine technology that would allow Pyongyang to threaten American territory.

“This is an axis of evil that is working together and for a long time now,” said Ukraine’s deputy minister of defense, Sergiy Boyev. “This global alliance is currently furthering the aggression against Ukraine. But it also has many additional targets.”

Yaroslav Trofimov is chief foreign-affairs correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.

Appeared in the December 14, 2024, print edition as 'Has World War III Already Begun? Fighting the Next World War'.

11. The Hunt for the Assad Dynasty’s Missing Billions Begins

Charts, maps, and graphics at the link.

The Hunt for the Assad Dynasty’s Missing Billions Begins

On the back of its brutal rule, the House of Assad built an international real-estate empire

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-hunt-for-the-assad-dynastys-missing-billions-begins-715e7052?st=SAtRt1&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Benoit FauconFollow

and Rory JonesFollow

Updated Dec. 15, 2024 12:01 am ET

With the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, a global hunt is now beginning for the billions of dollars in cash and assets the family stashed away over half a century of despotic rule.

The chase will likely be long, if the yearslong attempts to recover the wealth secreted overseas by Saddam Hussein and Moammar Gadhafi are anything to go by.

The Assad family has built a broad network of investments and business interests over the decades since the patriarch, Hafez al-Assad, seized power in 1970. Among the international purchases made over the years by close kin of his son, the deposed leader Bashar al-Assad, are prime real estate in Russia, Viennese boutique hotels and a private jet located in Dubai, according to former U.S. officials, lawyers and research organizations that have investigated the former ruling clan’s fortunes. Human-rights lawyers say they are planning to track more assets, hoping to recover them for the Syrian people.

“There will be a hunt for the regime’s assets internationally,” said Andrew Tabler, a former White House official who identified assets of Assad family members through work on U.S. sanctions. “They had a lot of time before the revolution to wash their money. They always had a Plan B and are now well equipped for exile.”

Assad fled Syria to Russia on Dec. 8 as opposition rebels rapidly advanced on the capital, Damascus, ending his 24-year dictatorship, which followed nearly three decades of rule by his father. Both leaders used relatives to hide wealth abroad in a system that enriched family members but also caused broader tensions within the Assad clan.

The Assad family tree

married

Rifaat

brother

Hafez

Anisa Makhlouf

Mohammad Makhlouf

Anisa’s brother

Majd

Maher

Bassel

married

Hafez

Lhab

Eyad

Rami

Bushra

Assef Shawkat

Asma Al-Akhras

Bashar

al-Assad

Hafez

Zein

Karim

Note: Individuals marked with black circles are deceased.

Photos: Clockwise from top: Associated Press; AFP; EPA; Reuters (4); Getty Images (2); AFP

Source: "Assad or We Burn the Country," Sam Dagher (2019), Little Brown

The exact size of the wealth of the Assad family and which family member controls what assets isn’t known. A report by the State Department in 2022 said a figure was hard to determine, but estimated businesses and assets connected to the Assads could be worth as much as $12 billion, or as low as $1 billion.

The assessment said the money was often obtained through state monopolies and drug dealing, especially the amphetamine captagon, and partly reinvested in jurisdictions out of reach of international law.

The wealth of the Assad clan continued to grow as regular Syrians struggled with the impact of the country’s civil war, which began in 2011. The World Bank calculated that in 2022 almost 70% of the population lived in poverty.

Many of the heavily militarized regime’s most powerful figures were business-minded, notably Bashar al-Assad’s British-born wife, Asma, a former banker at JPMorgan.

Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, in Paris in 2010. Photo: Miguel Medina/AFP/Getty Images

“The ruling family was as much an expert in criminal violence as it was in financial crime,” said Toby Cadman, a London-based human-rights lawyer with Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers, who has investigated Assad’s assets.

Assad and his immediate family couldn’t be reached for comment.

Finding and freezing the assets will likely be difficult. The U.S. mounted a lengthy sanctions campaign against the Assad regime, forcing its moneymen to hide wealth outside the West and via tax havens. Investigators who led the hunt for billions stashed away by Hussein and Gadhafi spent years pursuing people connected to the dictators, navigating shell companies and filing international lawsuits to recover the money with limited success. Out of an estimated $54 billion in assets accumulated by the former Libyan regime, for instance, very few—including a $12 million London property, and $100 million in cash in Malta—were recovered, a Libyan official said last year.

Legal teams have already managed to secure some asset freezes related to the Assads’ wealth. A Paris court in 2019 froze 90 million euros worth of property—equivalent to $95 million—held in France by Rifaat al-Assad, an uncle of Bashar al-Assad who oversaw a brutal opposition crackdown in 1982. The tribunal ruled the assets were obtained through organized laundering of embezzled public funds.

William Bourdon, the human-rights lawyer who filed the case in Paris, said money in tax havens such as Dubai and Russia would be much harder to recover. Investigators need to seek court orders freezing assets and then enforce their recovery, and it is also not clear who would receive the funds. After the fall of Assad, Syria’s government is in disarray, with Islamist rebels seeking to fill a power vacuum.

The Assad clan started accumulating a fortune soon after Hafez al-Assad took control of Syria following a bloodless coup.

SWITZERLAND

Anisa and Mohammad* Makhlouf

Accounts at Credit Suisse bank

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Hafez Makhlouf

$22.3 million of luxury skyscrapers

VIENNA, AUSTRIA

Rami Makhlouf

Hotels and bar (no longer owned)

FRANCE

Rifaat al-Assad

Nearly 90 million euros in real estate (confiscated)

ROMANIA

Rami Makhlouf

Real estate

EUROPE

Akhras family

Illicit networks

DUBAI, U.A.E

Rami Makhlouf

Real estate, $43 million private jet

CAYMAN ISLANDS &

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

Rami Makhlouf

18 accounts at HSBC’s tax haven branches

PERSIAN GULF

Akhras family

Illicit networks

SYRIA

Rami Makhlouf

Controlled Syriatel (mobile operator) and

Cham Wings (private airline), 50% stake in Cham Holding,

exclusive contracts to run duty-free markets

(largely lost in 2020)

Anisa and Mohammad* Makhlouf

Commissions on tobacco imports, director of the

Real Estate Bank, partner of Al Furat Petroleum company

Maher al-Assad

Involved in drug smuggling

CUBA

British Virgin

Islands

Cayman

Islands

*Deceased

Sources: State Department (Akhras family); OCCRP; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Global Witness; Sherpa; C4ADS; GovInfo; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists; U.S. diplomatic cables (Wikileaks); Syrian government adviser; European official; advertising by Mohammad Makhlouf

Hafez put his brother-in-law Mohammad Makhlouf, then a modest airline employee, in charge of the country’s lucrative tobacco-import monopoly, said Ayman Abdel Nour, a university friend of Bashar al-Assad.

Makhlouf took large commissions on the booming construction sector, said Abdel Nour, who was also later an unpaid adviser to Bashar al-Assad. When Bashar succeeded his father as leader in 2000, Makhlouf passed the business empire to his own son, Rami.

The Makhloufs were expected to make money on the behalf of the president and bankroll the regime and its ruling family when needed, said Bourdon, the Paris lawyer who has investigated Assad’s assets. “The Makhloufs are the chamberlains to the Assads,” said Bourdon.

Rami Makhlouf later became the regime’s primary financier with assets in banking, media, duty-free shops, airlines and telecommunications, becoming worth as much as $10 billion, according to the State Department. The U.S. government sanctioned Makhlouf in 2008 for benefiting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.

Seized furniture belonging to Rifaat al-Assad was put up for auction in Paris. Photo: Blondet Eliot/Abaca/Zuma Press

A Paris court froze 90 million euros’ worth of property—equivalent to $95 million—held in France by Rifaat al-Assad, Bashar’s uncle. Photo: Blondet Eliot/Abaca/Zuma Press

The eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011 ushered in new opportunities for the Assad clan. Bashar al-Assad’s younger brother Maher commanded Syria’s Fourth Armored Division, which engaged in smuggling captagon to the rest of the Middle East, according to the State Department.

The proceeds from the drug for years helped the regime offset punishing Western economic sanctions, bringing in an annual average of about $2.4 billion between 2020 to 2022, according to the Observatory of Political and Economic Networks, a Syrian and Arab research organization that tracks the captagon trade.

The former rebel group now working to set up an interim government in Syria says it will ban the traffic and has posted footage revealing the discovery of industrial quantities of captagon after the regime fell, some of them at facilities controlled by Maher.

Maher began investing abroad before the civil war and his assets included a farm in Argentina, according to a former European intelligence official and an adviser to the defunct regime. The ex-adviser said the Argentine asset was a tea plantation.

The Makhloufs also invested overseas, buying real estate in Dubai worth roughly $3.9 million, including mansions on the emirate’s palm-shaped island, according to a 2018 study by Washington-based think tank Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which examined property data provided by confidential sources.

Properties connected to the Makhloufs are on the Palm Jumeirah in Dubai. Photo: Christophe Viseux for WSJ

The Makhlouf family also purchased 20 million euros’ worth of boutique hotels in Vienna and a franchise connected to Buddha Bar, the high-end lounge originally from Paris, Rami Makhlouf said in an application for Austrian citizenship obtained by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, an anticorruption nonprofit organization.

According to a 2019 investigation by anticorruption group Global Witness, members of the Makhlouf family also owned roughly $40 million worth of property in luxury skyscrapers in Moscow. The Kremlin didn’t return a request for comment.

Then in 2020, the economic relationship at the heart of the Syrian regime frayed. Bashar al-Assad publicly sidelined Rami Makhlouf. The circumstances of their falling out remain murky. But the Syrian leader was tightening control over the levers of the failing Syrian economy.

Makhlouf was placed under house arrest and Syrian authorities put many of his business interests into state receivership, The Wall Street Journal has previously reported.

Syria’s Many Factions

The groups contending to shape Syria's future

Part of the reason for the shakedown could have been bad optics: While Syrians suffered the costs of civil war, Rami Makhlouf’s two sons posed on social media in swanky nightclubs in Dubai, where their father based some of his businesses.

They drove Ferraris, brandished bottles of Champagne and posed bare-chested in Dubai gyms. In paid-for advertisements on media websites, the oldest, Mohammad, said he used $43 million to customize a private jet in Dubai, complete with two living rooms and an en suite shower.

Mohammad, in a statement Friday on social media, said he had been exiled from Syria for more than five years and that he didn’t publicly criticize Assad’s regime because of concerns for his father. Mohammad said he hadn’t seen his father for six years and called Assad’s demise “a dream come true.”

His father posted to Facebook on Dec. 5 saying the loss of the city of Aleppo to opposition forces was “shameful,” adding that he had offered millions of dollars to Col. Suhayl al-Hasan, a Syrian commander sanctioned by the U.S. for barrel bombings on civilians, including with toxic gas, during a battle for the control of Aleppo a decade ago.

The whereabouts of Rami Makhlouf and Maher al-Assad, who didn’t return requests for comment, couldn’t be determined following the fall of the Assad regime.

After Rami Makhlouf’s shakedown, Asma al-Assad oversaw the takeover of his assets inside Syria then run by her associates, including the control of a major telecom operator, according to an adviser to the now-defunct regime and a European diplomat.

In 2020, the State Department sanctioned her, claiming she and family members had become some of Syria’s “most notorious war profiteers.”

Asma al-Assad and her family accumulated “ill-gotten riches at the expense of the Syrian people through their control over an extensive, illicit network with links in Europe, the Gulf, and elsewhere,” the State Department said.

“We have the duty to recover the money for the Syrian people,” said Bourdon, the Paris human-rights lawyer.

Some are taking matters into their own hands. In recent days, Syrians looted an ornate palace of the Assads, carting away furniture and artwork. Some took videos of themselves in a garage full of sports cars, including Aston Martins and a Lamborghini.

The Assads’ palace in Damascus was ransacked in the days after the regime fell. Photo: Chris McGrath/Getty Images

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Rory Jones at Rory.Jones@wsj.com

12. CEOs Want Trump to Change Course on Tariffs. He Isn’t Budging.

Once imposed it will be nearly a political impossibility to reverse or remove them. This is the President-elects; significant and singular economic and foreign policy action. He is building his entire political and economic strategy around the implementation of tariffs. So once implemented we are going to have to learn to live with them because regardless of the effects (good or bad) they are not going away.

CEOs Want Trump to Change Course on Tariffs. He Isn’t Budging.

Companies mount a campaign to soften the president-elect’s trade policies, but Trump’s team tells consultants he is serious

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-tariff-plan-business-lobbying-8f02ccea?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Brian Schwartz

Updated Dec. 15, 2024 12:01 am ET

Companies are considering the possibility that Donald Trump will follow through on many of his campaign-trail warnings. Photo: mandel ngan/AFP/Getty Images

Donald Trump’s tariff threats have triggered a behind-the-scenes lobbying campaign to soften or alter the president-elect’s plans. But the effort faces a potentially insurmountable roadblock: Trump isn’t budging.

That has left business executives scratching their heads about how to lobby for exemptions from the steep tariffs Trump has promised on imports from China, Canada, Mexico and other countries.

So far, executives are facing setbacks as they canvass Trump’s aides for advice on how to influence the president-elect’s next steps. Trump is largely acting on his own, leaving his incoming team of advisers with few opportunities to shape his thinking. His recent late-night social-media statements about tariffs have come with little warning even to some of his closest allies, according to people familiar with the matter.

Trump’s team has told corporate consultants there is no waving the president-elect off his plans to make liberal use of tariffs once he gets into office, the people said.

With Inauguration Day less than two months away, companies based in the U.S. and around the world are weighing the possibility that Trump will follow through on many of his campaign-trail warnings, potentially triggering a multifront trade war that economists warn could increase prices for consumers. Across-the-board tariffs would have major implications for businesses, potentially raising costs for U.S.-based companies that import products from abroad.

Late last month, Trump said in a Truth Social post that he would place a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico if the countries didn’t do more to stem the flow of migrants and drugs across the border. He raised the prospect of imposing an additional 10% levy on goods coming from China because, he said, Beijing hadn’t done enough to prevent fentanyl from coming into the U.S. Days later, Trump warned that he could place 100% tariffs on Brics countries, which include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, if they try to replace the U.S. dollar as the main global currency. That is on top of his pledge during the presidential campaign to impose across-the-board tariffs of as much as 20% on all U.S. imports.

Widespread tariffs would have major implications for U.S. companies that import products. Photo: Mario Tama/Getty Images

The warnings have unleashed a flurry of diplomacy, including hurried conversations with world leaders. After he spoke with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum last month, Trump claimed victory, writing on social media that she had agreed to stop the flow of migrants through Mexico and into the U.S., “effectively closing our Southern Border.” But Sheinbaum appeared to dispute his characterization, writing on X that “Mexico’s position is not to close borders.”

Trump discusses his tariff ideas with his advisers, including Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), his secretary of state pick, and the investor Scott Bessent, selected last month to lead the Treasury Department. But his team received little warning Trump would go public with his plans on social media, people familiar with the discussions said.

One of the people said Rubio was given a heads up by Trump before he published his social-media post about Brics countries, but received little notice when it came to Trump’s public tariff threats against Mexico, Canada and China.

“Now comes the hard part. Rough,” a Bessent ally wrote in a text message to The Wall Street Journal the night Trump went public with his pledge to hit Mexico, Canada and China with tariffs. A lobbyist who worked in the first Trump administration said that he now warns clients to take what Trump says about his use of tariffs at face value and that there is little consultants can do to dissuade him from using these tactics.

A spokesman for Bessent said the Treasury secretary pick and Trump are “in daily communication on economic and geopolitical matters affecting the U.S.,” adding, “Trump creates the strategies, and Mr. Bessent implements them in the most effective manner.”

A spokesman for Rubio said the Florida senator shares “Trump’s vision of restoring America’s place on the world stage and working to bring about greater trade fairness for American families and businesses.”

Trump with business leaders and officials of his first administration at the 2018 signing of a memorandum regarding tariffs on high-tech goods from China. Photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

The Trump transition senior adviser Brian Hughes said the president-elect would “implement economic and trade policies to make life affordable and more prosperous for our nation.”

If confirmed, Rubio and Bessent would play central roles in shaping and defending Trump’s tariffs, alongside the businessman Howard Lutnick, Trump’s pick to lead the Commerce Department, and Jamieson Greer, whom the president-elect has chosen as his U.S. trade representative. Trump has said Lutnick will help oversee his trade agenda with Peter Navarro, a longtime adviser to the president-elect who is a proponent of sweeping tariffs. The team will have to deal with the concerns of foreign allies and adversaries alike, as well as companies and lawmakers.

Some companies and Republicans are holding out hope that Trump’s promises to impose stiff tariffs won’t translate into action because they are being used as a negotiating tactic to extract concessions from other countries.

Sen. Tom Cotton (R., Ark.), a Trump ally, said at The Wall Street Journal’s recent CEO Council Summit in Washington that the president-elect might be open to negotiations with Canada and Mexico that could ultimately result in his holding back on tariffs. But Cotton said Trump will take a harder line with China, which he called “a horse of a different color,” because of the economic and national security threat Beijing poses to the U.S.

Cotton warned lobbyists not to oppose legislation that would reverse the 2000 law that extended to China the low-tariff status that comes with membership in the World Trade Organization. “I’ll just say, if you get in the ring on China’s behalf, you should expect to be punched,” Cotton said.

None of these warnings have stopped companies from trying to have a say in the process.

A day after Trump announced that he had chosen Navarro as a senior trade adviser, a Journal reporter received an email from H.O. Woltz III, the chief executive of Insteel Industries, with a request: How can he get in touch with Navarro to discuss Trump’s tariff policies?

Woltz’s company is the country’s largest manufacturer of steel wire products used to reinforce concrete for construction projects. When Trump imposed tariffs on steel imports during his first term, the price of the raw material used to make the company’s products rose “to the highest level in the world,” Woltz wrote.

Key Aspects of Autarky

Economic Isolation: Autarkic economies aim to minimize external economic influences and reduce participation in global trade1.

Self-Reliance: The focus is on producing goods and services domestically rather than relying on imports2.

Political Motivations: Autarky can be driven by various political ideologies, including nationalism, socialism, and populism3.

Historical Examples: Nazi Germany and North Korea are often cited as examples of nations that have pursued autarkic policies1.

It's important to note that true autarky is extremely difficult to achieve in today's interconnected global economy. Even the most isolated nations typically engage in some level of international trade or receive external support1.

US-China relations

Opinion World Opinion

Anthony Rowley

Macroscope | Trade protectionist measures by the US and others put world on path to war

National leaders seem to have forgotten that autarky is incompatible with the high levels of prosperity enjoyed in the post-war era

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3290340/trade-protectionist-measures-us-and-others-put-world-path-war?utm_source=rss_feed

Anthony Rowley

Published: 4:30pm, 14 Dec 2024Updated: 6:00pm, 14 Dec 2024

US president-elect Donald Trump’s tariff threats are making headlines, but they are among the least of the problems facing the global economy and could end up having the opposite effect to that which they are intended. The international trade and economic systems are in danger of degenerating into chaos.

Trump’s proposed trade protection measures, directed chiefly against China but also against Mexico and Canada, are being copied to an extent in Europe and are being considered by China itself.

Meanwhile, Trump’s threat of sanctions against the Brics bloc of nations if they attempt to reduce their reliance on the US dollar seems more likely to provoke greater diversification from the world’s leading currency.

As for his suggestion that the United States could use bitcoin to repay its government debt, that could create panic in financial markets when the US bond market is currently the biggest and most liquid in the world.

All this can only end in disaster. Economic prosperity in recent decades has been predicated on free access to other nations’ markets for goods. In turn, this has resulted in low import prices and low inflation.

Relatively cheap Chinese-manufactured goods in particular have helped to keep inflation down in Western countries. However, that advantage is now about to be squandered.

Trump threatens new anti-drug tariffs on ‘day 1’ for China, Canada, Mexico

Yet despite all of this and the fact that economic growth is slowing globally, asset prices have been inflating dramatically, particularly in stock markets. It is as if they are in celebration of booming economic conditions.

This is a product of the abundant financial liquidity that has been pumped into many economies by central bank monetary injections and by government fiscal stimulus to stave off earlier recession threats. This stimulus is now being steadily withdrawn, and that will lead to economic recession.

Here there are strong echoes of the 1920s and 1930s, when stock prices soared despite an intensive series of national efforts to preserve markets by imposing import tariffs, eventually resulting in national conflict and the outbreak of World War II. It would not be unreasonable to expect such physical clashes among nations once again.

However, this time it will not be Germany’s territorial ambitions that spur conflict but those of Russia and China, or so will go the attempts at justification for conflict which is in reality based on economic frictions. This is likely to be the case unless Trump proves to be so transactional upon assuming office in January that he is willing to cut deals with China, Russia and others which restore their access to US markets and tolerate their territorial expansion ambitions.

China restricts critical metal exports following Western semiconductor curbs in latest trade war

Unwinding the US protectionist measures being put into place will be far from easy, especially in the technology sector where these measures are most intensely focussed.

For example, two years ago, the Biden administration passed the US Chips and Science Act, allocating US$52 billion to promote semiconductor manufacturing in the US. It also imposed broad restrictions on the export of chip-related technologies to China to thwart the latter’s quest to surpass the US. But neither country has yet achieved self-sufficiency in the relevant sectors and is likely to do so any time soon.

The US also recently announced new restrictions on China’s access to vital electronic components used in AI applications. It has curbed the export to China of US-origin as well as foreign-made high bandwidth memory chips and has expanded controls on chipmaking gear, including products made by US firms at foreign facilities.

Protectionist networks are becoming more complex, which does not augur in favour of an early relaxation of tensions. Many of these sanctions are aimed at limiting China’s access to technologies which have potential military applications and are thus particularly sensitive.

Trump’s stated determination to thwart the proposed takeover of US Steel by Japan’s Nippon Steel is another symbol of national hostility towards foreign transactions. Free international capital movement, including mergers and acquisitions, has coexisted alongside free international trade for decades. If both are now to become the object of national restrictions, then the post-war liberal international economic order appears to be approaching an end.

US Steel Corporation workers rally outside the company’s headquarters in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in support of the takeover by Japan’s Nippon Steel on September 4. Photo: AFP

Trump has even gone so far as to pressure other major powers on the currencies in which they should transact. “There is no chance that the Brics will replace the US dollar in international trade, and any country that tries should wave goodbye to America,” he posted on social media. This displays sheer arrogance on his part and an exaggerated idea of his country’s own importance in the world of finance, trade and economy.

Apprehension over China’s military and economic ambitions has led the US to rely increasingly on financial sanctions and export controls on Beijing. But the complexity of sanctions and controls makes it difficult to account for their magnitude or effectiveness, according to a Peterson Institute for International Economics report.

What national leaders seem to have lost sight of is that fact that autarky is not a viable form of economic existence, except at a much lower level of prosperity than most advanced nations have enjoyed for most of the post-war decades.

Without the prop of prosperity and relatively high employment levels, people could be more likely to tolerate the idea of going to war in the belief that it is competition from other nations that is provoking declining economic conditions and rising unemployment in their own countries when it is actually the breakdown of international commerce. National leaders need to wake up to reality, and soon.

Anthony Rowley

Anthony Rowley is a veteran journalist specialising in Asian economic and financial affairs. He was formerly Business Editor and International Finance Editor of the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review and worked earlier on The Times newspaper in London

15. Assad’s Enemies Are Not Our Friends

Assad’s Enemies Are Not Our Friends

The United States shouldn’t make allies out of terrorists.

https://www.thebulwark.com/p/assads-enemies-are-not-our-friends

Bill Roggio and Will Selber

Dec 13, 2024

Anti-regime fighters pose for a picture with an army helicopter on the tarmac at the Nayrab military airport in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on December 2, 2024. Islamist-led rebels on November 30, seized most of Aleppo, along with its airport and dozens of nearby towns, the war monitor Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. (Photo by AAREF WATAD / AFP) (Photo by AAREF WATAD/AFP via Getty Images)

THE FALL OF BASHAR AL-ASSAD’S brutal regime is a moment for celebration. He is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the immiseration of millions more. Like his late Baathist co-partisan, Saddam Hussein, Assad used the state to torture, kill, and maim innocent civilians for decades. He will now join Edward Snowden in exile in Russia, where he will almost certainly try to be a player in Syria’s future.

American government officials should be eager to seize this opportunity, but wary about rehabilitating enemies for the sake of creating false allies. Over the last twenty years, American officials have fooled themselves that some terrorists could be made statesmen, only to watch them slaughter more innocents. We’ve emboldened the Taliban and al Qaeda by treating Sirajuddin Haqqani as a statesman. We’ve repeatedly released terrorists in custody, only to see them return to the battlefield stronger and deadlier.

As President Biden and President-elect Trump look at the battlefield, it will be tempting to tip the scales for one group. Some of that instinct may be borne of a desire to undo the mistakes of the early years of the Syrian Civil War, in which the United States did too little to empower the democratic forces that may have been aligned with American values and interests. However, it’s important to remember that all the players in this sordid drama are drenched in blood; and some of that blood is American. After thirteen years of war, everyone’s hands are stained. Both Biden and Trump should be steely-eyed about the Syrian battlefield. Supporting any government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or the Syrian National Army would be a catastrophic mistake that would encourage similar groups across the globe.

Currently, the Biden administration is considering removing HTS from the list of foreign terrorist organizations to ease the way to engaging with the terror group. That would be a mistake.

HTS LED THE FIGHT THAT BROUGHT DOWN Assad and is forming a government. Before the group’s leader, specially designated global terrorist Aby Mohammad al Jolani, launched a public relations campaign to recast himself as a moderate, he was a major Islamist militant. He entered Iraq in 2003 to fight for Al Qaeda in Iraq against U.S. forces. He was subsequently captured and spent five years at Camp Bucca. Upon his release, he returned to Syria, where he became the head of Al Qaeda. He reported to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the future leader of the Islamic State, while Baghdadi was still part of Al Qaeda. After a dispute between the two over who would control the jihad in Syria, Al Qaeda Emir Ayman al Zawahiri sided with Julani.

Julani purportedly broke with al Qaeda in 2016. However, he never denounced al Qaeda or renounced his oath to Zawahiri. He stated that his group would have “no affiliation to any external entity”—a statement so vague as to be meaningless. In fact, this decision not to affiliate with an external entity came after Jolani consulted with representatives of al Qaeda’s central leadership, including Abu Khayr al Masri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command at the time.

Julani’s statement that what would become HTS has “no affiliation to any external entity” is false. Numerous “external entities” are affiliated with HTS to this day, and many of them helped Julani’s forces seize Damascus. Among them are the Turkistan Islamic Party, a Uighur jihadist group whose leader sits on al Qaeda’s central council and is based in Afghanistan, and Katibat Imam al Bukhari, an Uzbek terror group that swears allegiance to the head of the Afghan Taliban. These groups have thousands of fighters who operate under the banner of HTS. Those pinning their hope on Julani suddenly becoming Syria’s next great hope would do well to look at Julani’s past activities and present allies.

Other anti-Assad groups include the Syrian National Army, which is backed by Turkey and includes jihadist organizations that fight in its ranks, and the ironically named, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is dominated by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), another U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. The United States backed the SDF despite its terrorist roots precisely because there are no good actors in Syria, and American policymakers were desperate for an ally to battle the Islamic State. Turkey backs the Syrian National Army in part because its enemy, the PKK, which is responsible for killing thousands of civilians in Turkey, holds significant territory in northern and eastern Syria.

THERE’S AN UNDERSTANDABLE URGE to help the people of Syria, who are rejoicing at the fall of a brutal authoritarian regime. But the danger hasn’t passed. First, the United States, Israel, and allied NATO’s intelligence communities should be scouring Syria for any chemical weapons. This is a crucial race against time, and if HTS or any other group gets its hands on these weapons, they could use them against the United States.

After securing Syria’s WMD, the United States must help its allies defend their borders. We should be assisting Israel and Jordan in ensuring they don’t suffer any blowback from the fall of Assad. Israel has its hands full fighting a war that spans Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Yemen. Jordan already hosts American forces. The United States has likely been feeding Israel targeting packages of Syrian targets, and the American intelligence community has an excellent relationship with the Jordanian General Directorate of Intelligence.

Our relationships with Iraq and Turkey, two of Syria’s other neighbors, are more complicated. The Iraqi government, which is majority Shia, has a tense, highly complex relationship with its Shia-majority neighbor, Iran. Over the last year, the Biden administration has been preparing the ground to leave Iraq. While this is an understandable urge, considering America’s 35-year struggle with Saddam Hussein and what came after, it would be a catastrophic mistake. The Islamic State remains potent in Iraq. While Iraq’s special operations forces are highly competent, they’re not enough to fight the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and Iranian proxy groups like Kataib Hizballah, Asaib al-Haq, or Muqtada al-Sadr’s groups. A small, continued American presence in Iraq would help strengthen the country against both Sunni Islamists and Iranian proxies.

Turkey is a NATO ally, but its president, Recep Erdoğan, is an occasional friend of Vladimir Putin and is providing material support to Hamas. At the same time, Turkey is home to the critically important Incirlik Airfield, a joint Turkish-American base home to the 39th Air Base Wing, which provides critical humanitarian support throughout the region and has as its mission to “defend NATO’s southern flank.”

Turkey has a right to defend its borders against Kurdish terrorist groups like the PKK. Erdoğan has chosen its favored terrorists in the Syrian Civil War, which happen to be fighting the United States’s favored terrorists. If the United States is going to de-list any of these groups as terrorists, it should be the PKK, who don’t have extensive links to international Islamist networks (they’re predominantly Marxist Kurdish nationalists) and are related to other Kurdish groups that have long cooperated with the United States. When we play nice with former enemies, as we’re currently doing with the Taliban/al Qaeda leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, it makes our promises and assurances seem suspect. Our allies take notice, as do our enemies.

Whatever this administration or the next one does, it would be an error to legitimize HTS, as recent reporting suggests this is being heavily debated in D.C. and London. Julani is a terrorist with American blood on his hands.

Instead, the United States and a coalition of concerned nations should take this opportunity to destroy HTS and its followers, as they did with its Islamic State forebears, and is currently doing in Syria. There’s an opportunity to rid the world of a blossoming terror state.

American involvement in Syria will continue because Syria will demand American attention. Rather than searching for saints—or pretending devils are saints—American policy should serve America’s overall interests of defeating radical Sunni and Shia Islamic terrorism in whatever form or name it takes. These men are not our allies. They’re murderers, rapists, torturers, and tyrants. We mustn’t forget this, as we have done so many times in the past.

16. Dark Eagle: US bares hypersonic claws at China, Russia

Dark Eagle: US bares hypersonic claws at China, Russia - Asia Times

US finally fires back in hypersonic race with milestone missile test, putting China and Russia on long-range, precision-strike notice

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 14, 2024

With a thunderous launch, the US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile has just blazed past years of delays, signaling a bold new surge in America’s race for long-range precision firepower against China and Russia.

This month, The War Zone reported that the US Army successfully test-fired its Dark Eagle hypersonic missile from a trailer-based launcher at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. The test marks a significant milestone after years of delays due to launcher issues.

The test, conducted by the US Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) and the US Navy Strategic Systems Programs, involved the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also known as the common All Up Round (AUR) missile.

The report notes that the missile, which the US Navy plans to deploy on Zumwalt-class destroyers and Block V Virginia-class submarines, achieved hypersonic speeds exceeding Mach 5.

The War Zone says that various aircraft, including NASA’s WB-57F and the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) HALO jets, observed the test, demonstrating the missile’s capability to reach target distances at hypersonic speeds.

The report also notes that US Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro highlighted the test’s importance in advancing the US military’s hypersonic capabilities.

The report states this successful launch signifies progress toward fielding the Dark Eagle system, with the first complete LRHW battery expected by fiscal year 2025. It adds that developing hypersonic weapons is crucial for maintaining US military superiority, particularly in potential conflicts in the Pacific.

As the US Army transitions from drawn-out counterinsurgency missions in the Middle East to countering Russia in Europe and China in the Pacific, it faces the daunting task of reinventing itself to address the near-peer challenges. Capabilities providing long-range precision fires (LRPF), such as LRHW, are critical to this transformation.

The US Army’s push for LRPF capabilities, notably hypersonic weapons, is driven by the need to counter adversaries like China and Russia, who have developed advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. These capabilities allow for standoff strikes beyond the range of these systems.

In the Pacific, Asia Times has reported that the US is building a missile wall across the Pacific to counter China’s military rise, focusing on LRPF from land-based missile systems like the Typhon.

Capable of launching Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles with ranges from 500 to 1,800 kilometers, the Typhon bridges a gap between the shorter-range Precision Strike Missile (482 kilometers) and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (2,776 kilometers).

The initiative seeks to establish a network of missile launch sites in the First Island Chain, encompassing Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, to reinforce counter-A2/AD capabilities vis-à-vis China.

However, the plan faces significant hurdles, particularly ally resistance to hosting US missile systems. While Japan appears most willing, other nations, including the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, are wary of possible political backlash and economic retaliation from China.

Despite these challenges, the US has begun stationing Typhon launchers in the Philippines, albeit under the guise of training exercises, to avoid triggering regional escalations. This approach reflects a shift toward a “lily pad” strategy of rotational, scalable force deployments rather than fixed bases.

Critics argue the initiative risks destabilizing the Pacific by provoking a missile arms race with China, whose formidable missile arsenal, including the DF-26 “Guam Killer,” underscores the growing intensity of the US-China strategic rivalry.

Apart from building a Pacific missile wall, Asia Times mentioned this month that the US Navy is transforming the USS Zumwalt, a US$4 billion guided-missile destroyer, into a hypersonic weapon platform to counter China’s growing naval capabilities.

The ship is being retrofitted with missile tubes to replace its inactive gun system, enabling it to launch hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) at seven to eight times the speed of sound.

This modernization effort, part of the US Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program developed with the US Army, aims to enhance the Zumwalt’s operational utility by allowing fast, precision strikes from greater distances.

The initiative reflects the urgent need to address rising threats from China’s Type 055 cruisers and Russia’s tactical nuclear-armed vessels. Despite Zumwalt’s advanced technologies, including electric propulsion and stealth design, the class has faced criticism for its high costs and potential vulnerabilities.

The US Navy plans to test the hypersonic system aboard the Zumwalt by 2027 or 2028. The move is part of a broader strategy to maintain naval superiority amid delays and cost overruns in other programs.

However, a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report this month mentions several critical challenges for the US in developing, producing, testing and deploying hypersonic weapons.

According to the report, one significant hurdle is technological complexity as hypersonic systems require cutting-edge materials that can withstand extreme temperatures and pressures. Manufacturing these advanced materials at scale poses production bottlenecks.

The CRS report states that the precision required for aerodynamic shaping and integrating guidance, navigation and control systems represent further complications.

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Additionally, it mentions that testing constraints have hindered progress. Hypersonic flight tests are costly, logistically complex, and limited by the availability of specialized test ranges and facilities. This bottleneck restricts the pace of development and the ability to iterate designs.

Further, the CRS report says these weapons must be integrated into existing military infrastructure, requiring storage, handling, and launch system modifications. It points out that delays in these areas have pushed back deployment timelines further.

The report also mentions that budgetary and bureaucratic hurdles have compounded the technical and logistical challenges, as funding approvals and interagency coordination have caused slow decision-making. Collectively, these factors create a protracted timeline for the operational deployment of US hypersonic capabilities.

In contrast to the US, Josh Luckenbaugh mentions in a July 2024 article for National Defense Magazine that China’s lead in hypersonic weapons development is due to its focused investment over the past two decades in infrastructure for developing and testing these systems.

Luckenbaugh highlights China’s extensive research and development infrastructure, including numerous wind tunnels dedicated to hypersonic systems. He contrasts this by noting that US facilities and expertise have degraded since the Cold War, with most testing capabilities now in academia.

While Luckenbaugh mentions efforts are underway to rebuild this expertise through collaborations between academia and the US Department of Defense (DOD), the US, to date, has yet to deploy a single hypersonic weapon.

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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · December 14, 2024

17. Commentary: Chinese security companies are putting boots on the ground in Myanmar. It could go disastrously wrong

Strategic competition opportunities? Creating dilemmas for China?

Commentary: Chinese security companies are putting boots on the ground in Myanmar. It could go disastrously wrong

China has decided to unequivocally back the junta after years of hedging its bets, but its support opens the door for various complications, says this international studies lecturer.

Adam Simpson

15 Dec 2024 06:00AM

channelnewsasia.com · by Adam Simpson

ADELAIDE, Australia: Just as the legal noose tightens on the leader of Myanmar’s military junta, with a request for an arrest warrant from the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Chinese government seems to be extending a hand of support.

In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar for his first meeting with Myanmar’s junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, since the February 2021 military coup plunged the country into civil war.

Then, last month, Min Aung Hlaing reciprocated with his first visit to China as head of the junta.

Reports in recent weeks have also indicated the Chinese government and Myanmar’s military junta are establishing a joint security company to protect Chinese projects and personnel from the civil war. This development is extremely concerning and does not bode well for any of the players involved.

The move comes after a string of significant military victories by the opposition, including the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s successful Operation 1027 over the past year. These rebel groups captured large swathes of territory near the China-Myanmar border, at least initially with China’s tacit support.

While much is still unclear about the deployment of these private Chinese security guards in Myanmar, one thing is certain: China has decided to unequivocally back the junta after years of hedging its bets.

FILE - Myanmar government troops stand on a rooftop on the Myanmar side, near a Chinese flag from the Chinese border town of Nansan in southwestern China's Yunnan province, Aug 30, 2009. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan. File)

CHINA’S INCREASING USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY CORPORATIONS

Private security corporations and private military corporations are increasingly employed by a wide range of governments as a way of projecting influence and power in other countries without the diplomatic complexities that come with deploying traditional military forces.

Private security corporations provide basic security services for a country’s personnel or assets.

Private military corporations, on the other hand, offer more in-depth military services for governments or other actors. This can include augmenting counterinsurgency or combat operations and military training.

China was rather late to the game of overseas private operators, but it has plenty of recent models to follow, such as Russia’s Wagner Group and the Blackwater company from the United States.

Legislative changes in China in 2009 resulted in an expansion of the private security industry, with thousands of domestic operators helping to protect private assets in China and dozens operating abroad from Central Asia to Africa.

Chinese private security corporations generally avoid combat roles and focus on safeguarding infrastructure projects, personnel and investments linked to the country’s Belt and Road Initiative.

There are reportedly already four Chinese private security corporations operating in Myanmar, but the new joint security company is likely to expand the scope and numbers of these operations.

What would they seek to protect? China’s key strategic project is the Myanmar-China Economic Corridor, which includes a proposed railway and twin oil and gas pipelines that connect Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province to Kyauk Phyu in Rakhine State on Myanmar’s western coast. China is also building a port there.

These pipelines run through territory controlled by a range of different armed groups in Shan State and Mandalay Region. The powerful Arakan Army, a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, also controls the area around Kyauk Phyu.

In addition, opposition groups have already seized a Chinese-owned nickel processing plant in Sagaing Region and a China-backed cement factory in Mandalay Region.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS?

While private security corporations are nominally separate from China’s People Liberation Army (PLA), there is little to stop the PLA from infiltrating these organisations and influencing their operations on the ground.

Having Chinese private security firms in Myanmar also creates a high likelihood of Chinese nationals being caught up in the fighting and possibly killed.

In addition, as the recent stunning fall of the Assad regime in Syria demonstrates, authoritarian regimes facing widespread militant opposition can sometimes fall quickly.

Russia and Iran are now discovering that backing a brutal regime against popular opposition can leave military and economic assets stranded when the tide turns unexpectedly. China should consider these ramifications carefully.

For Myanmar’s junta, the involvement of Chinese security forces would be an embarrassing recognition that it is unable to provide even rudimentary security for its chief ally’s economic and strategic interests.

It also makes the junta even more reliant on China than it already is. While Russia has been the main supplier of weapons since the coup, China remains a key source of military and economic engagement to the junta.

For the opposition forces, the Chinese security operations further complicate their attempts to secure control over key economic and population centres.

And it could mean China will now restrict its support for some of the ethnic armed groups fighting against the junta, such as the successors to the Communist Party of Burma, which have ethnic Chinese roots. This may force the opposition to consolidate its shift towards domestic production of small arms.

The opposition may also look to diversify its economic activity beyond smuggling or trading routes into China, potentially reducing China’s leverage over these groups in the long run.

Lastly, the Chinese security forces may further entrench anti-China sentiment throughout the country. In October, for example, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack.

MYANMAR'S NEIGHBOURS WILL BE CONCERNED

India will no doubt be watching these developments with concern. If the plans go ahead, there will be increasing numbers of Chinese security forces stationed in Rakhine State, just down the road from India’s own massive investment projects in the country.

Two of Myanmar’s other neighbours – Bangladesh and Thailand – will no doubt be concerned about having Chinese forces on their doorstep and potentially sitting in on meetings with Myanmar officials.

While China’s newfound support has provided a lifeline for the junta, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will also continue to insist on a more inclusive political resolution to the conflict. They are unlikely to view increased Chinese security operations in Myanmar favourably.

Adam Simpson is senior lecturer in international studies at the University of South Australia. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

channelnewsasia.com · by Adam Simpson

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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