Greetings from Seoul.

Quotes of the Day:

“The Enlightenment opened the Age of Revolution. To Rousseau, war is revolution’s first step because aggressors will never cede power peacefully. Oppression is itself a form of war; revolutionary war to defeat it is therefore the only path to peace. Revolutionary ideologies reject state borders and sovereignty and are universal in scope. In this sense, every major war of the modern age may be seen as an effort to destroy the established international system and replace it with an alternative world order based on an alternative ideology.”

— Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order by Charles Hill

"Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist."

– Pablo Picasso

"Every word has consequences. Every silence, too."

– Jean-Paul Sartre

1. The Price of American Retreat by Mitch McConnell

2. Mitch McConnell's preemptive strike on GOP isolationism

3. The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call

4. Opinion: What will the military do if Trump gives unconstitutional orders?

5. The New Frontier for Drone Warfare Is Deep Underwater

6. Drones and the Cost of Lost Trust

7. US officials have been in direct contact with the Syrian rebel group that ousted Assad, Blinken says

8. PLA releases electronic warfare ‘kill list’ for US carrier groups

9. “America First”: Neither Cosmopolitan Nor Isolationist

10. Beijing's "Best Friend" To Host U.S. Navy For 1st Time In Nearly A Decade Amid Concerns Over China-Funded Naval Base

11. Why Musk Doesn’t Have Access to SpaceX’s Biggest Government Secrets

12. RAND: A Historical Analysis of a True Invasion of Taiwan

13. The United States Must Revisit the Basics of Geostrategy

14. The West’s Strategic Opportunity in Syria: Forcing Dilemmas on Moscow that Roll Back Russian Power and Influence

15. Defense experts predict Philippines will join future Yama Sakura military drills

16. How to Hold Syria Together

17. Naval Academy ruling shows military strength depends on diversity

1. The Price of American Retreat by Mitch McConnell

Senator McConnell taking a foreign policy stand.

Excerpts:

In January 1934, William Borah, a Republican senator from Idaho and an outspoken isolationist, addressed a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Because peace had prevailed for 15 years following the end of World War I, Borah argued, global military spending was excessive. Tensions between European powers, he insisted, could not be solved by outsiders: “It will be a long time, I venture to believe, before there will be any necessity or any justification for the United States engaging in a foreign war.”

Of course, by the end of the 1930s, the Nazi conquest of Europe had driven a dramatic swing in U.S. public opinion away from Borah’s isolationist daydream. By May 1940, as German forces invaded France, 94 percent of Americans supported any and all necessary investments in national defense. By June, more than 70 percent favored the draft.

The United States saw the light during World War II. But must it take another conquest of a close ally before the country turns its belated attention to the requirements of national defense? Isolation is no better a strategy today than it was on the eve of World War II. Today, in fact, in the face of linked threats even more potent than the Axis powers, a failure to uphold U.S. primacy would be even more catastrophically absurd than was the refusal to assume that responsibility 85 years ago. The last time around, the naive abdication of the requirements of national defense made reviving the arsenal of democracy on a short timeline unnecessarily difficult. As Admiral Harold Stark, then the chief of naval operations, observed in 1940, “Dollars cannot buy yesterday.”

The United States urgently needs to reach a bipartisan consensus on the centrality of hard power to U.S. foreign policy. This fact must override both left-wing faith in hollow internationalism and right-wing flirtation with isolation and decline. The time to restore American hard power is now.

The Price of American Retreat

Foreign Affairs · by Mitch McConnell · December 16, 2024

Why Washington Must Reject Isolationism and Embrace Primacy

Mitch McConnell

January/February 2025 Published on December 16, 2024

A military exercise in Guangdong Province, China, November 2023 Yin Huan / Xinhua / Getty Images

Mitch McConnell is a Senator from Kentucky and served as U.S. Senate Republican Leader from 2007 through 2024.

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When he begins his second term as president, Donald Trump will inherit a world far more hostile to U.S. interests than the one he left behind four years ago. China has intensified its efforts to expand its military, political, and economic influence worldwide. Russia is fighting a brutal and unjustified war in Ukraine. Iran remains undeterred in its campaign to destroy Israel, dominate the Middle East, and develop a nuclear weapons capability. And these three U.S. adversaries, along with North Korea, are now working together more closely than ever to undermine the U.S.-led order that has underpinned Western peace and prosperity for nearly a century.

The Biden administration sought to manage these threats through engagement and accommodation. But today’s revanchist powers do not seek deeper integration with the existing international order; they reject its very basis. They draw strength from American weakness, and their appetite for hegemony has only grown with the eating.

Many in Washington acknowledge the threat but use it to justify existing domestic policy priorities that have little to do with the systemic competition underway. They pay lip service to the reality of great-power competition but shirk from investing in the hard power on which such competition is actually based. The costs of these mistaken assumptions have become evident. But the response to four years of weakness must not be four years of isolation.

Even though the competition with China and Russia is a global challenge, Trump will no doubt hear from some that he should prioritize a single theater and downgrade U.S. interests and commitments elsewhere. Most of these voices will argue for focusing on Asia at the expense of interests in Europe or the Middle East. Such thinking is commonplace among both isolationist conservatives who indulge the fantasy of “Fortress America” and progressive liberals who mistake internationalism for an end in itself. The right has retrenched in the face of Russian aggression in Europe, while the left has demonstrated a chronic allergy to deterring Iran and supporting Israel. Neither camp has committed to maintaining the military superiority or sustaining the alliances needed to contest revisionist powers. If the United States continues to retreat, its enemies will be only too happy to fill the void.

Trump would be wise to build his foreign policy on the enduring cornerstone of U.S. leadership: hard power. To reverse the neglect of military strength, his administration must commit to a significant and sustained increase in defense spending, generational investments in the defense industrial base, and urgent reforms to speed the United States’ development of new capabilities and to expand allies’ and partners’ access to them.

As it takes these steps, the administration will face calls from within the Republican Party to give up on American primacy. It must reject them. To pretend that the United States can focus on just one threat at a time, that its credibility is divisible, or that it can afford to shrug off faraway chaos as irrelevant is to ignore its global interests and its adversaries’ global designs. America will not be made great again by those who simply want to manage its decline.

A FALSE CHOICE

China poses the gravest long-term challenge to U.S. interests. But although successive presidents have acknowledged this reality, their actual policies have been inconsistent. Administrations have failed even to agree on the basic objective of competition with China. Is it merely a race to produce more widgets? An opportunity to sell more American soybeans, semiconductors, solar panels, and electric vehicles? Or is it a contest over the future of the international order? The Trump administration must recognize the gravity of this geopolitical struggle and invest accordingly.

In so doing, it must not repeat the mistakes of President Barack Obama’s so-called pivot to Asia. The Obama administration failed to back up its policy with sufficient investments in U.S. military power. Inverting the traditional relationship between strategy and budgets, it prioritized defense cuts for their own sake, abandoning the decades-long “two-war” construct of force planning. The bipartisan Budget Control Act of 2011 compounded this mistake and harmed military readiness.

Partners in Asia came to understand what the pivot meant for them: that they would receive a larger slice of a shrinking pie of American attention and capabilities. Partners in Europe, for their part, were not happy to see Washington ignore the Russian threat. Republicans who consider Ukraine a distraction from the Indo-Pacific should recall what happened the last time a president sought to reprioritize one region by withdrawing from another. In the Middle East, Obama’s premature withdrawal from Iraq left a vacuum for Iran and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) to fill, and the ensuing chaos there consumed Washington for years. By 2014, as Obama struggled to consummate the pivot to Asia, dithered on the Middle East, and failed to enforce his own “redline” on Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded eastern Ukraine and seized Crimea.

Standing up to China will require Trump to reject the myopic advice that he prioritize that challenge by abandoning Ukraine. A Russian victory would not only damage the United States’ interest in European security and increase U.S. military requirements in Europe; it would also compound the threats from China, Iran, and North Korea. Indeed, hesitation in the face of Putin’s aggression has already made these interconnected challenges more acute. The George W. Bush administration’s failure to respond forcefully to Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was a missed opportunity to nip Russian aggression in the bud. Obama’s “reset” with Russia doubled down on this miscalculation, snuffing out hope for a concerted Western response to Russian aggression. In pursuit of arms control negotiations, he pulled his punches as Putin grew emboldened. This weakness continued in Obama’s tepid response to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

America will not be made great again by those who simply want to manage its decline.

Trump deserves credit for reversing the Obama administration’s limitations on assistance to Ukraine and authorizing the transfer of lethal weapons to Kyiv. During the first Trump administration, the United States used force against Russia’s ally Syria to at last enforce the redline against chemical weapons, killed hundreds of Russian mercenaries who threatened U.S. forces in Syria, and increased U.S. energy production to counter Russia’s weaponization of its oil and gas reserves. But Trump sometimes undermined these tough policies through his words and deeds. He courted Putin, he treated allies and alliance commitments erratically and sometimes with hostility, and in 2019 he withheld $400 million in security assistance to Ukraine. These public episodes raised doubts about whether the United States was committed to standing up to Russian aggression, even when it actually did so.

Despite Biden’s tough campaign rhetoric about Russia, his policy of détente with the Kremlin resembled Obama’s reset. Immediately after taking office in 2021, Biden signed a five-year extension to the New START treaty, giving up leverage over Russia that he could have used to negotiate a better agreement and tying the United States’ hands as nuclear threats from China and North Korea grew. In June of that year, he, too, withheld critical security assistance from Ukraine. And in August, he oversaw the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which no doubt encouraged Russia to further test the limits of American resolve. The Biden administration’s apparent belief that Putin’s imperial ambitions could be managed with arms control and U.S. restraint was not dissimilar to right-wing isolationists’ misplaced interest in accommodating Russia.

As it became clear that Putin would launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I urged Biden to offer meaningful lethal aid to Ukraine and expand the U.S. military footprint in Europe. But the president demurred. Even after the invasion, the Biden administration’s assistance to Ukraine was beset by hesitation, needless restrictions, and endless deliberation. These delays repeatedly ceded the initiative to Moscow and diluted the effectiveness of U.S. aid, prolonging the conflict and diminishing Kyiv’s negotiating leverage. The weakness of the Biden administration’s policies was drowned out by frenzied attention to some Republicans’ objections to supporting Ukraine. Their misguided opposition delayed passage of the “national security supplemental,” but when the chips were down, Senate Republicans overwhelmingly supported the measure, as did many Republicans in the House. Congress passed the supplemental in April 2024. And not a single Republican legislator who voted for Ukraine lost a primary.

Despite legitimate misgivings about Biden’s approach, a majority of my GOP colleagues appreciated that support for Ukraine is an investment in U.S. national security. They recognized that most of the money was going to the U.S. defense industrial base or military and that this security assistance, a mere fraction of the annual defense budget, was helping Ukraine degrade the military of a common adversary. But more work is required. For now, Putin’s indifference to his own people’s suffering has allowed him to increase his defense industrial base’s capacity to pump arms and soldiers into Ukraine. His ability to do this in perpetuity is questionable; Russian victory is inevitable only if the West abandons Ukraine.

THE ALLIED ADVANTAGE

Trump will hear from neo-isolationists who discount the importance of American allies to American prosperity, ignore the need for the United States’ credibility among fence sitters in critical regions, and misunderstand the basic requirements of the U.S. military to deter or win faraway conflicts. Their arguments elide the fact that the enemy gets a vote, too, and may decide to confront the United States simultaneously on multiple fronts, at which point allies become more valuable than ever.

In Europe, Trump will find encouraging progress. After major surges in their defense budgets, U.S. allies on the continent now spend 18 percent more than they did a year ago, a far greater increase than the United States’. More than two-thirds of NATO members now meet or exceed the alliance’s target of spending at least two percent of GDP on defense. This progress is not without exception. One of the West’s most glaring vulnerabilities to the influence of Russia—and China and Iran—is Hungary’s self-abnegating obeisance to those countries.

But aside from this noisy exception, it is not lost on the United States’ European allies that Trump called on them to take hard power and burden sharing more seriously. NATO allies are also buying American, and since January 2022 have ordered more than $185 billion of modern U.S. weapons systems. But Trump will be right to encourage allies to do more. At the next NATO summit, allies should set a higher defense-spending target of three percent of GDP and commit to increasing their base budgets accordingly.

The most inconvenient truth for those calling on Trump to abandon Europe is that European allies recognize the growing links between China and Russia and increasingly see China as a “systemic rival.” During a visit to the Philippines in 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that “security in Europe and security in the Indo-Pacific is indivisible.” U.S. allies in Asia understand the same thing. As Hsiao Bi-khim put it in 2023, when she was Taiwan’s representative in Washington, “Ukraine’s survival is Taiwan’s survival.”

A joint Australia-United States military drill in Shoalwater Bay, Australia, July 2023 Andrew Leeson / AFP / Getty Images

The unwillingness of the “Asia first” crowd to welcome European allies’ progress is curious. They ignore a glaring need to work with allies to counter Chinese threats to shared interests, raising the question of whether they are really interested in contesting China after all. Some even seem to have seized on the need to counter China as a rationale for the United States to abdicate leadership everywhere else, suggesting that “Asia first” is merely an excuse for underlying isolationism.

These critics ignore the growing strategic alignment of China and Russia, Russia’s own influence in Asia (including its increasingly capable Pacific fleet), and the inescapable reality that U.S. competition with both powers is global. In the Middle East, for example, Russia has undermined U.S. interests for years through its intervention in Syria and partnership with Iran. Putin’s use of Iranian attack drones in Ukraine should have come as no surprise: the West’s collective failure to stand up to Iran earlier has allowed it to become a more powerful partner to China and Russia. Beyond embracing Iran, the two countries have also sought to deepen their relationship with traditional U.S. partners in the region.

China has for years sought to drive a wedge between the United States and its partners. It is tragic that the “Asia first” crowd would so obviously play into Beijing’s hands, just as previous administrations that had turned their back on allies in the Middle East opened the door to Chinese influence in that critical region.

HOLIDAY FROM HARD POWER

The U.S. government spends nearly $900 billion annually on defense, but considering the total amount of federal spending, the challenges facing the United States, the country’s global military requirements, and the return on investment in hard power, this is not nearly enough. Defense is projected to account for 12.8 percent of federal spending in 2025, less than the share devoted to servicing the national debt. And each year, a larger portion of the defense budget pays for things other than weapons; nearly 45 percent of it now goes toward pay and benefits.

The situation is grave. According to an estimate by the American Enterprise Institute that rightly incorporates the paramilitary functions of China’s space program and coast guard, China spends $711 billion a year on its military. And in March 2024, Chinese officials announced a 7.2 percent increase in defense spending. The Biden administration, by contrast, requested real-dollar cuts to military spending year after year. If defense budgets cannot even keep up with inflation, how can Washington keep up with the “pacing threat” of China?

Moreover, because its immediate military objectives are focused on countering the United States in the Indo-Pacific, China, unlike the United States, mainly needs to allocate resources to its own backyard. The requirements of global power projection necessarily spread U.S. defense expenditures far thinner. Although bipartisan recognition of U.S. interests in Asia is welcome, it is reckless for U.S. politicians to visit Taipei or talk tough about China if they are unwilling to invest in the capabilities necessary to back up U.S. commitments.

The United States needs a military that can handle multiple increasingly coordinated threats at once. Without one, a president will likely hesitate to expend limited resources on one threat at the expense of others, thereby ceding initiative or victory to an adversary. The United States must get back to budgets that are informed by strategy and a force-planning construct that imagines fighting more than one war at once.

Trump must reject the myopic advice that he prioritize China by abandoning Ukraine.

And yet for years, congressional opponents of military spending absurdly insisted that there be parity between increases in defense spending and increases in nondefense discretionary spending, holding military power hostage to pet political projects. Meanwhile, domestic mandatory spending skyrocketed, and massive expenditures that circumvented the annual bipartisan appropriations process, such as the ironically named Inflation Reduction Act, included not a penny for defense.

Isolationists on both ends of the political spectrum unwittingly validate this artifice when they peddle the fiction that military superiority is cost-prohibitive or even provocative, that the United States must accept decline as inevitable, or even that the effects of waning influence won’t be that bad. Calls for “disentanglement,” “leading from behind,” and “hard prioritization”—amplified by historical amnesia—amount to defeatism. The United States’ security and prosperity are rooted in military primacy. Preserving that decisive superiority is costly, but neglecting it comes with far steeper costs.

Past levels of U.S. defense spending put today’s needs into perspective. During World War II, U.S. defense spending hit 37 percent of GDP. During the Korean War, it reached 13.8 percent. At the height of the Vietnam War, in 1968, it stood at 9.1 percent. The defense buildup under President Ronald Reagan, which followed a low of 4.5 percent of GDP during the Carter administration, peaked at only 6 percent. In 2023, the United States spent 3 percent of GDP on defense.

During this American holiday from hard power, China and Russia have invested in asymmetric capabilities to offset the U.S. military edge. Today, their munitions in many categories can outrange U.S. versions, and their production can outpace the United States’. This is to say nothing of their numerical advantage in key platforms, from missiles to surface vessels. Quantity has a quality of its own. What’s more, the wars of the future may well last longer and require far more munitions than policymakers have assumed, as both Israeli and Ukrainian munitions-expenditure rates suggest. U.S. stockpiles are insufficient to meet such a demand. For years, the military services have shortchanged munitions in favor of new weapons systems and platforms. This is not to downplay the need to modernize major weapons systems but to highlight the harmful tradeoffs imposed by inadequate defense budgets.

If the United States finds itself embroiled in conflict in a far-flung theater, it will also have difficulty resupplying its forces. China, for one, intends to contest U.S. logistical supply lines. This reality, combined with the possibility of being challenged in different parts of the world simultaneously, doesn’t just require building larger inventories of platforms and munitions. It also requires ensuring that such capabilities are pre-positioned in multiple theaters. That, in turn, requires securing basing, access, and overflight rights—yet another argument for strengthening U.S. alliances globally.

Trump speaking at a tank manufacturing plant in Lima, Ohio, March 2019 Carlos Barria / Reuters

Thanks to Republican efforts, the national security supplemental included necessary investments to expand the production capacity of key items, such as solid rocket motors, needed for long-range munitions and interceptors. But my efforts with Susan Collins, the vice chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, to expand this investment beyond the Biden administration’s request faced the same headwinds as our annual campaign to build bipartisan support for greater overall defense spending. In fiscal year 2023, congressional Republicans overcame Democrats’ insistence on parity between defense and nondefense discretionary spending. That was a step in the right direction, but Democrats need to permanently abandon this misguided obsession. The demands of U.S. national security are not political bargaining chips.

Progress on this front begins with real increases in defense spending. In 2018, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy—a bipartisan group of defense experts established by Congress—stressed that preserving the United States’ military edge would require sustained real growth in the defense budget of between three percent and five percent. By 2024, the commission, noting the worsening threats, called that range a “bare minimum” and advocated budgets big enough to “support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

The Trump administration must heed the commission’s warning. To pay for increased defense budgets, it should take an axe to extravagant nondefense discretionary spending and tackle the unsustainable level of mandatory spending on entitlements that is driving the deficit. It should also reform an overly burdensome economic regulatory environment to counteract these drags with higher growth and revenue.

THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY

At the same time, the United States must tend to its atrophied defense industrial base. The Pentagon, Congress, and industry all deserve blame for its sorry state. The Defense Department and Congress have sent inconsistent demand signals to industry, which has discouraged companies from investing in expanded production capacities and resilient supply chains. To solve the problem, administrations must submit defense-budget requests that are big enough to meet the United States’ true military needs. Congress must pass appropriations bills on time. If it doesn’t, the resulting “continuing resolutions”—temporary measures to keep the federal government funded—delay contracts and prohibit new program starts.

Congress has given the Pentagon the authority to sign multiyear procurement contracts—which limit the uncertainty sometimes caused by the annual appropriations process—for certain critical munitions. This approach and the money to back it up should both be extended to other long-range munitions and missile defense interceptors for which long-term demand is nearly certain. To expand production capacity, the Pentagon can also use the Defense Production Act, a 1950 law that allows the government to prioritize and steer resources toward the production of goods for national defense. Unfortunately, recent administrations have used this authority for purposes that have nothing to do with national security. Biden, for instance, invoked it for the production of solar panels. It is past time to put the “defense” back into the Defense Production Act.

But industry cannot simply wait for the government to invest. I am sympathetic to companies’ frustrations with a slow federal bureaucracy and an inconsistent Congress, but only to a point. It should be obvious to private-sector leaders that the need for air and missile defense interceptors, long-range munitions, and other critical weapons is steadily rising and unlikely to abate anytime soon. The demand is inevitable. Industry should be leaning forward to meet it. Trump should put the Pentagon and the defense industry on notice about the need to act.

Bureaucracy has also stifled innovation even when its military utility is obvious. The Defense Department is to be commended for its Replicator Initiative, a program designed to hasten the adoption of emerging military technologies, but creating an entirely new acquisition process raises the question of why the Pentagon doesn’t just fix its existing one. The department must figure out how to adopt and integrate disruptive technologies as soon as possible, or else the military will find itself on the receiving end of smarter, cheaper, more autonomous unmanned systems fielded by adversaries moving faster than the speed of bureaucracy.

Tariffs have strained relationships with allies and tested the patience of American consumers.

Just the contracting process for weapons—to say nothing of actually building them—moves unbelievably slowly. For weapons systems that cost more than $100 million, it takes an average of more than ten months between releasing a final solicitation for bids and awarding a contract. Foreign military sales move even slower: it takes an average of 18 months for American partners to get U.S. weapons under contract. The Biden administration made a halfhearted attempt to reform the foreign military sales process, but making it more efficient needs to be a joint priority for the secretary of defense and secretary of state. The arsenal of democracy will not endure if the United States’ own inefficiencies—or the opposition of vocal minorities in Congress—dissuade vulnerable allies from buying American.

The Trump administration should consider dramatically streamlining the process for commonly used munitions or preemptively building up inventories for export. The military should also consider maintaining larger stockpiles of weapons that can be more easily shared with allies and partners in times of crisis. Once the shooting starts, the time to build production capacity has passed.

To build an allied coalition of cutting-edge forces that can work together seamlessly, the United States must also be willing to share more technology. AUKUS, the United States’ security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom, can be a model for greater technology sharing with other trustworthy allies and partners. Defense-technology transfer isn’t an act of charity; increasingly, it is a two-way street, with allies such as Australia, Finland, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and Sweden bringing cutting-edge capabilities to the table. The United States should expand coproduction with its allies and encourage them to produce interoperable capabilities, thereby reducing costs, shoring up inventories, improving supply chain resilience, and enhancing collective capacity to compete with China.

THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT

The United States would be foolish to compete with China by itself. U.S. allies and partners represent a significant share of the global economy. It would be simply unaffordable to replicate all their supply chains domestically.

Obama deserves credit for negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership with U.S. allies in Asia, and I do not regret working with him to overcome the objections of protectionist Democrats in Congress. Beyond lowering trade barriers and expanding market access for U.S. companies, the agreement was designed to establish favorable rules of the road for international trade in a critical region of the world. The parties to the proposed agreement represented 40 percent of the global economy. But rather than strengthen and harness the power of Western economies, the first Trump administration and then the Biden administration sometimes actively antagonized them, including with tariffs that have strained relationships with allies and tested the patience of American consumers. This abdication was an invitation for China to expand its economic influence in Asia at the United States’ expense.

There is plenty of evidence that the globalist optimism of the 1990s was unfounded. Welcoming China and Russia into the World Trade Organization has not transformed their governments or economies, at least not in ways beneficial to the free world. Rather, both countries have exploited and undermined this and other international economic institutions. I am not naive about the downsides of international trade, but there is no question that free markets and free trade have been responsible for much of the United States’ prosperity. That’s why the United States and like-minded free-market economies must work together to reform the international trading system to protect U.S. interests from predatory trade practices—not abandon the system entirely. Without U.S. leadership in this area, there is little question that Beijing will be able to rewrite the rules of trade on its own terms.

Although flagging military primacy is the most glaring impediment to national security, the United States cannot neglect the role of foreign aid, either. As the former chair of the Senate appropriations subcommittee responsible for foreign assistance, I take seriously James Mattis’s admonition when he was head of U.S. Central Command that if Congress shortchanged diplomacy and foreign aid, he would “need to buy more ammunition.” Unfortunately, these important tools of American power are increasingly divorced from American strategic interests. It is past time to integrate foreign assistance more deliberately into great-power competition—for example, by working with allies to present credible alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

NO TIME TO TURN INWARD

In January 1934, William Borah, a Republican senator from Idaho and an outspoken isolationist, addressed a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Because peace had prevailed for 15 years following the end of World War I, Borah argued, global military spending was excessive. Tensions between European powers, he insisted, could not be solved by outsiders: “It will be a long time, I venture to believe, before there will be any necessity or any justification for the United States engaging in a foreign war.”

Of course, by the end of the 1930s, the Nazi conquest of Europe had driven a dramatic swing in U.S. public opinion away from Borah’s isolationist daydream. By May 1940, as German forces invaded France, 94 percent of Americans supported any and all necessary investments in national defense. By June, more than 70 percent favored the draft.

The United States saw the light during World War II. But must it take another conquest of a close ally before the country turns its belated attention to the requirements of national defense? Isolation is no better a strategy today than it was on the eve of World War II. Today, in fact, in the face of linked threats even more potent than the Axis powers, a failure to uphold U.S. primacy would be even more catastrophically absurd than was the refusal to assume that responsibility 85 years ago. The last time around, the naive abdication of the requirements of national defense made reviving the arsenal of democracy on a short timeline unnecessarily difficult. As Admiral Harold Stark, then the chief of naval operations, observed in 1940, “Dollars cannot buy yesterday.”

The United States urgently needs to reach a bipartisan consensus on the centrality of hard power to U.S. foreign policy. This fact must override both left-wing faith in hollow internationalism and right-wing flirtation with isolation and decline. The time to restore American hard power is now.

Mitch McConnell is a Senator from Kentucky and served as U.S. Senate Republican Leader from 2007 through 2024.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mitch McConnell · December 16, 2024

2. Mitch McConnell's preemptive strike on GOP isolationism

Primacy should not mean endless wars. We should be able to square the circle to have primacy and protect the rules based international order but not become overly entangled and engage in endless wars.

Mitch McConnell's preemptive strike on GOP isolationism

Axios · by Hans Nichols · December 16, 2024

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is launching a preemptive strike against the isolationists in his own party, warning of the "price of American retreat" in a new essay for Foreign Affairs.

Why it matters: McConnell is putting Trump — and the entire Republican party — on notice that he plans to be an active combatant in the looming GOP civil war on foreign policy.

• "America will not be made great again by those who simply want to manage its decline," McConnell writes in a 5,000-word piece posted this morning.
• "Trump would be wise to build his foreign policy on the enduring cornerstone of U.S. leadership: hard power."

The big picture: McConnell has said he will feel "liberated" once he leaves leadership to criticize Democrats and Republicans alike. As the chair of the Defense appropriations subcommittee, he'll have a powerful perch to advance his agenda.

• But his essay is full of appeals to Trump, who he once called "stupid" and "despicable." McConnell, a master negotiator, is leaving plenty of room for a productive relationship with the next president.
• He is also unsparing in his criticism of the last two Democratic presidents.
• "Donald Trump will inherit a world far more hostile to U.S. interests than the one he left behind four years ago," he writes. "But the response to four years of weakness must not be four years of isolation."

Driving the news: Congressional support for Ukraine will likely emerge as the first flashpoint between "American First" isolationists and more traditional Republican hawks.

• Trump, who met with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris last weekend, wants to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.
• He used the recent ouster of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad to argue that the time is right for both sides to "make a deal and stop the madness."
• McConnell has been a staunch supporter of sending aid and munitions to Ukraine and was critical in helping to pass a $60 billion package in April.
• The legislation passed, but with only 22 Republican senators supporting it, a minority in the party. "I sort of felt like I was the only Reagan Republican left," he said at the time.

Zoom out: As the longest-serving Senate leader in history, McConnell has long been a champion of the kind of muscular interventionism that defined the Republican party during the Cold War and the post-9/11 aftermath.

• He supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then the 2007 troop "surge" pushed by then-President Bush to defeat an Iraqi insurgency that was inflicting heavy casualties on U.S. troops.
• He has long been a hawk on China, as well as a reliable voice in support of Taiwan. He backed then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi on her visit to Taiwan, in defiance of China's disapproval.
• More recently, he's been deeply critical of his Republican colleagues for supporting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Zoom in: With the Foreign Affairs article, McConnell appears to be writing with an eye on future fights in addition to his own legacy — and is clearly concerned about the number of threats America faces.

• "Standing up to China will require Trump to reject the myopic advice that he prioritize that challenge by abandoning Ukraine," he writes.

The bottom line: He reserves some of his harshest criticism for Democrats in an attempt to convince Trump that isolationism can have consequences.

• "In the Middle East, Obama's premature withdrawal from Iraq left a vacuum for Iran and the Islamic State," he writes.

Axios · by Hans Nichols · December 16, 2024

3. The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call

This is the modern war fight. Yes we must prepare for nuclear war and large scale combat operations to deter our adversaries, but the sustained fight will be in China's unrestricted warfare domain. 

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The warfare landscape is shifting, leaving traditional strategies insufficient to face indirect threats like China’s UW. Evidence shows that cyber operations, economic theft, disinformation campaigns, and other indirect tactics undermine traditional US strength, leaving the country without an effective counterstrategy.

The US must recognize that the rules of engagement have changed. The country must adapt to this new reality to protect its national security and maintain its influence globally. This can be accomplished by focusing on defense, using economic power to its advantage, and protecting innovation in business and academia.

Despite the suggestions unveiled in this article, the true purpose behind publications of this nature is to increase visibility and discussion. The existence of UW tactics and their effects need to be acknowledged through evidentiary support that creates discourse among senior officials at all levels. Awareness must then translate into action.

This action is crucial to protecting the effectiveness of US national security, maintaining global hegemony in critical areas, and minimizing the risk of open aggression between the two superpowers as they navigate their fluid relationship.

The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/16/the-invisible-frontline-the-nature-of-chinas-unrestricted-warfare/?utm

by Dallas Tueller

|

12.16.2024 at 06:00am

“Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more”

― Sun Tzu

Introduction

Imagine you’re playing a game of chess with the assumption that the rules are traditional. Your opponent, however, gets to change the rules at any time, distract you with clever misdirection, and manipulate the audience’s perception of the match. This game is no longer equal; one player has a major advantage. This is the essence of China’s approach to warfare in its Unrestricted Warfare (UW) strategy. Rather than relying solely on traditional military strength and playing by the “rules,” China employs the full spectrum of national power, including cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and spies, to achieve strategic goals. The United States (US) is scouring the rule book for effective responses but is coming up short. These tactics fall outside the typical rules of warfare and are increasingly relevant in today’s interconnected world, effectively creating a new normal. With a traditional mindset on warfare, the US needs to adapt to these changes to keep up with integral changes to the character of war and effectively protect itself from external influence. China’s use of UW is having profound repercussions on core US infrastructure. These effects occur without recognition and proper urgency, putting US national security and hegemony at risk. It’s critical that senior-level policymakers and strategists adequately recognize the impact of China’s UW on the US. This article provides evidence of UW’s occurrence within vital US systems and details possible solutions to mitigate its effects. The primary aim is to increase awareness of China’s ongoing action against the US to stimulate strategic discussion within higher levels of the government.

Brief History of China and Setting the Stage for UW

Tensions between the US and China are well-documented and are anticipated to be a central focus in strategic discourse for the foreseeable future. These tensions are not recent but have deep roots, originating from a complex history that goes back several centuries. Interactions began when disagreements arose between Great Britain and China on the importation of opium into China in 1839. This led to the Opium Wars, which China lost, and the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. This treaty opened Chinese ports and gave access to foreign powers, including the US. Many deemed this signed agreement unequal, granting foreigners privileged access to China while forcing the country to make concessions. This fueled Chinese animosity toward Western powers and imperialism. The exploitation and embarrassment experienced after the Opium Wars led the Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Xianfeng, to realize that a national reassessment was required. This reassessment focused on border fortification, strengthening internal systems, and maintaining the national capacity to influence surrounding entities. Despite these aspirations, internal conflict hindered forward progress. A century of wars within China led to integral changes in leadership and ideology. These include the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the rise and fall of the nationalistic Republic of China, and the revolutionary takeover of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Moa Zedong in 1949. Following the revolution, Moa Zedong stated, “China will never again be an insulted nation. We have stood up…No Imperialist will ever be allowed again to invade our territory”. Mao’s goal was to build China’s economy and solidify national communism. Industrial growth more than doubled under Mao’s leadership, but his ideology created rifts in the population. These rifts came from his Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, which aimed to reinforce communist party ideology through radical policy. These policies led to significant social friction, the persecution of intellectuals, and cultural destruction. This revolution further divided China’s ideology from global powers, affecting its standing in the international community. Following Mao’s complex legacy, China underwent leadership changes with Mao Zedong’s passing and Deng Xiaoping’s rise. Deng brought a level of change and openness to the country while also introducing critical doctrinal ideas. One included the “toa guang tang hui,” meaning “keep a low profile.” This idea prompted China to lay low, “hiding one’s capabilities and biding one’s time.” Deng’s emphasis on patience, practical work, and cautious observation was foundational in guiding China through its initial phase of economic reform and integration into the global economy. His approach was characterized by strategic patience to create a stable environment for China’s growth. This idea benefited the country, and over the last four decades, China’s economic strength has accelerated at surprising rates, allowing it to move towards more assertive goals. China’s bolstered economy and the transition from Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic advice to China’s current strategic ambitions reflect a significant change in the country’s approach to global interactions. China’s current strategy centers on its economy. This strategy involves leveraging its economic power through trade, investments, and technological advancements while engaging in indirect activities to achieve strategic objectives and replace the US hegemon. It also includes efforts to influence international institutions and norms while expanding its arm of influence globally. A primary target of China’s action is the United States. The friction between China and the United States, rooted in ideological differences and competing national visions, has become more pronounced as China’s ambitions grow. The economic symbiosis that once characterized their relationship is now complicated by rivalry and competition for global influence. China’s pivot to UW tactics is vital to understand as it targets the US and navigates the international environment. As both nations continue to maneuver within their relationship, the interplay between China’s rising ambitions and the US’s response will likely shape the future of global geopolitics.

Unrestricted Warfare

A critical component of China’s shift in strategy is the document, Unrestricted Warfare, authored by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.

Effectively broadening the scope of traditional warfare, the UW premise introduced a diverse array of indirect methods of warfare that fall outside the bounds of conventional armed conflict. These methods include lawfare, economic manipulation, disinformation campaigns, and cyber theft and coercion via sabotage, social media platforms, and news outlets.

The introduction of UW at the turn of the century demonstrates a remarkably forward-thinking approach. At that time, the internet was an emerging technology seen as clunky, slow, and rudimentary. Its full potential remained largely speculative. The strategic foresight embodied in UW, which anticipated the profound impact of technological advancements, highlights China’s long-term strategic vision. By recognizing these possibilities, China displayed an approach that used budding technologies in its long-term goals.

Modalities of warfare that were once considered peripheral have become central instruments of manipulation and subversion. Due to their subtle and indirect nature, the repercussions of these UW strategies are frequently underestimated. They are challenging to quantify and often exhibit low levels of observability, resulting in unrecognized areas of influence across multiple domains.

The first step in addressing this issue is uncovering instances of UW tactics used in the US. It is then crucial to determine their severity on core infrastructure and components of national security. Once these are detailed, senior officials should discuss whether a response is warranted or whether the effects of these indirect attacks are inconsequential. The following section showcases examples of UW’s occurrence in critical systems that comprise US infrastructure and national security. These represent a small portion of all documented cases but demonstrate that China actively influences the US without a strategic response. The systems examined for this article include the US economic, political, military, and academic systems.

How UW is Affecting the US?

Economy

Chinese influence on the US economy occurs mainly through economic espionage. China’s Thousand Talents Program (TTP), a program that China uses to “recruit overseas expertise to build up China’s science and technology knowledge and innovation base,” is consistently present in several cases of recorded espionage actions implemented by China.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started a new “Chinese initiative” in 2018 to combat the transfer of information back to China by TTP participants. This initiative found several instances of espionage involving Chinese and US professors, employees, and scientists.

• Gou Zeng, an Ohio State immunologist, was arrested en route to China. He failed to disclose his TTP participation and foreign affiliations after receiving a $4.1 million grant. The FBI found that he was transferring scientific information from his research at Ohio State back to Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China.
• A Harvard scientist, US-born Charles Lieber, was also found to be a TTP participant who failed to disclose financial incentives received from China. These included a $50,000 per month salary, $150,000 annual living expenses, and a $1.5 million grant to create a research lab at Wuhan University in China.
• Hongjin Tan stole $1 billion worth of secrets from his employer, a US-based petroleum company. Another scientist, Shan Shi, also applied to the TTP and stated that he would digest and absorb technology from the US. He ended up stealing synthetic foam trade secrets used in US submarines with a plan to give them to state-owned Chinese companies so they could put the American company out of business (Wray 2020).
• Hao Zhang was convicted of stealing an American wireless device manufacturing process that took 20 years to develop and sent it to China so state-owned businesses could patent the process and return to America to use it as their own.

Though the TTP is an integral part of the Chinese strategy to manipulate US economics, it also has other state-run programs that accomplish this. China uses its Overseas Chinese Scholars program, which has roughly 2.21 million participants worldwide. This program aims to send Chinese nationals to study abroad at foreign universities and companies to gather knowledge. China incentivizes them to return to China to use this knowledge or send it back to China for national broadening in the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields.

• These transfers were found to be primarily theft. This technological theft cost the US roughly $300 billion in revenue leading to the loss of 2 million jobs (Levine 2020, 10). China also takes advantage of foreign companies that want to do business in the country. With roughly 350 million people living in first-world conditions, it creates an attractive advantage for foreign businesses. These companies are required to enter agreements with Chinese firms that mandate the sharing of technology and expertise. These agreements extend into long-term arrangements that mandate foreign manufacturers to educate Chinese companies on how to produce similar products and the associated infrastructure to do so. These agreements are part of the technology transfer found in China’s strategy.
• China’s use of UW tactics to steal economically advantageous technology and proprietary practices has profound repercussions in the US. An FBI report determined that China is the world’s leading intellectual property thief and found that the cost to the US economy of counterfeit goods, stolen trade secrets, and pirated software ranged between $225 billion and $600 billion.

Politics

China’s indirect tactics for manipulating US politics include funding, incentives, technological manipulation, and foreign agents. These findings come from FBI reports and independent investigations on Chinese action in US politics.

• Fang Fang, a Chinese intelligence agent, was arrested in California for her involvement with state and federal politicians. She participated in campaign fundraising and networking activities and was involved in romantic and sexual relationships with two Midwestern mayors. She also involved herself in the re-election campaign for the US Representative of California, Eric Swalwell, and was actively engaged in his office.
• Linda Su and her husband, Chris Hu, were recently arrested in 2024. Linda Su worked as the deputy chief of staff for New York Governor Kathy Hochul and the deputy diversity officer for Governor Andrew Cuomo. Linda was arrested for acting as an agent of the Chinese government and was charged with advancing Beijing’s agenda in various ways. She blocked Taiwanese officials from accessing the governor’s office and “shaped New York governmental messaging to align with the priorities of the Chinese government.” Additionally, she was charged with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which mandates that individuals working on behalf of foreign entities register with the Department of Justice (DOJ). She entered the US illegally, helped people commit visa fraud, and laundered money. As an agent for the CCP, she and her husband received hefty financial incentives from the Chinese government, totaling several million dollars.

China also prioritizes cyber capabilities and financial incentives to influence US politics.

• The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment Report found that China used cyber capabilities to influence politics within the US. This was demonstrated by the PRC’s use of TikTok accounts that targeted both political party candidates during the US midterm election in 2022.
• Intelligence agencies found evidence that Chinese hackers interfered in the 2016 and 2018 elections and mentioned that there were signs that China-allied hackers engaged in “spear-phishing” attacks on US politicians before the 2020 vote.
• A well-known pro-CCP network known as “Spamouflage” is altering its influence tactics to manipulate politics via social media. Spamouflage created radical right-wing social media accounts that exploit domestic divisions by targeting controversial issues circulating in politics. Changes to Spamouflage tactics since 2017 have increased engagement from real US users, which generated between 16,000 and 20,000 views.
• Financial favors and incentives were also used as manipulation tools in US politics. US-based groups closely tied with the United Front Work Department, a CCP-operated organization, donated to leading New York politicians. Investigations found that these donations span decades and include influential politicians such as a former New York senator and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

Military

The main form of subversion in the military system is theft through foreign agents or cyber hacking. Targets of this theft include personnel information and technology. The evidence of cyber hacking is far too abundant for this article. Hacking puts all innovative military technology and practices at risk.

• In 2007, 2009, and 2011, investigations found that China successfully hacked the Pentagon’s servers. They gained access to massive amounts of data, including the blueprints of US stealth fighters and supporting technology.
• In 2014, Su-Bin, a Canadian aerospace company owner with US contracts, assisted two PLA hackers in stealing roughly 630,000 files from Boeing concerning details on the C-17 cargo plane and the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) found that Su-Bin informed the hackers of specific individuals and technologies to focus on and helped draft reports that were sent back to the PLA’s General Staff Headquarters.

• Reports found that China purchased technology from the Department of Defense (DOD) when it attempted to eliminate excess. PRC companies used American names to avoid suspicion and bid on American technology and military equipment to acquire it. An example of this was the purchase of a tool profiler used to build components of the F-14 jet for $25,000 when it was initially priced at $3 million.
• One of the largest hacks related to the military was the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) hack, which resulted in the theft of background information, fingerprints, addresses, social security numbers, and other personal records of 21.5 million federal employees.

Academics

China’s goal to reinvigorate its science, technology, and innovation base creates a prime opportunity for UW tactics. These tactics are especially effective in academics because of the US tradition of academic openness. China uses state-run programs, discreet funding, and student spies to gain access to research in US academics.

• A Department of Education investigation found that multiple American universities failed to report financial ties to foreign entities such as the PRC. This report determined that “these financial incentives may have been used to influence or control teaching and research at several universities, with additional risks of property theft, espionage, and propaganda operations.” At the initiation of this investigation, academic institutions rushed to report anonymous donations, which totaled $1.14 billion when unveiled. These funding sources were deemed hostile to the US by targeting investments to “project soft power, steal sensitive and proprietary research, and spread propaganda.” Academic institutions that accepted these anonymous donations included the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Georgetown, Cornell, Yale, and Harvard. China also uses personnel in US academic institutions to support its use of financial incentives. Reports indicate an increased use of student spies to collect information and return it to the CCP.
• Glenn Duffie Shriver was recruited by three PRC intelligence officers posing as students. He agreed to take money in exchange for sharing classified national defense information. This was ultimately caught by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interviewers but demonstrates China’s use of student spies.
• A University of Tennessee professor, John Roth, who worked under contract for the United States Air Force on drone technology, gave Chinese national students access to his data and equipment. He was arrested while attempting to travel to China with a laptop containing sensitive information.

China’s use of Confucian Institutes also includes economic espionage. These institutes are government-funded Chinese cultural, language, and education programs that place centers abroad in numerous countries.

• In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Congress, studies on Confucian Institutes found that board members of the institutes directly or indirectly pressured professors, administrators, and guests at US universities to avoid statements or public events that the PRC deemed politically sensitive.
• The CCP paid the teachers in Confucian Institutes to avoid sensitive topics such as human rights violations and negative impressions of China. Universities housing Confucian Institutes were identified as subservient to the Chinese government through its financial backing. Columbia University canceled talks “it feared it would upset Chinese officials,” and North Carolina State University canceled a visit by the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s religious leader because the university administration said that China is a key trading partner with North Carolina.

China uses financial incentives, student spies, and Confucian Institutes as tools of academic espionage within US academia. Evidence of Chinese involvement in the US is abundant. Whether you agree or disagree that this is a significant concern for the US is beside the point. The fact is that China is mounting influence and manipulation campaigns in several US systems.

Why Does it Matter?

Do these instances of Chinese subversion and manipulation matter? The US is already dealing with many domestic issues that politicians and the public are collectively calling to be addressed.

While these issues are crucial, it’s also important to acknowledge that China views these internal tensions as opportunities to push its agenda indirectly. The sinister nature of UW is that its effects are often intangible, creating the out-of-sight, out-of-mind effect. There are three main reasons why the US needs to pay attention to China’s use of UW.

1. It’s a Threat to National Security

This may seem like a dramatic statement, but let’s examine the necessary components of national security in general. It includes military defense to respond to threats worldwide, intelligence and surveillance agencies to identify and eliminate internal and external threats, law enforcement to maintain order, cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure, and international alliances to minimize conflicts that could upset global order. From the documented instances of coercion mentioned previously, it’s factually evident that military technology is being stolen, hacks are occurring in government agencies, cybersecurity is sidestepped by Chinese cyber capabilities to steal economic information, and social media is used to cause strife in US politics, leading to increased disorder in the country. While Chinese action may not bring the country to its knees, a slow erosion is occurring that absolutely plays a role in how effective US national security is and where it will be in the future.

2. It Puts US Hegemony at Risk

The US still holds the edge in critical areas of national power. It’s still the world’s most robust economy, has the most potent conventional military power, and has pervasive influence in economic and cultural realms. These essential components dictate the US’s international standing. While this is true for now, many speculate on the failing nature of US hegemony and the degradation of these areas. China’s UW strategy puts US hegemony at risk, and I’ll explain why. China has a Military-Civilian Fusion (MCF) strategy. This strategy aims to fuse the private sector, including any innovation therein, with the military to create increased power projection through an “intelligent military.” The goal is to create a technologically advanced force through any means available, both direct and indirect. The US has historically had the most technologically advanced military in the world. It’s consistently known for its mobility, lethality, and strength, and the technology embedded in the services is crucial to this reputation. As detailed previously, China consistently steals military and private sector technology. If the F-22, F-35, B-2, or B-21 stealth technology and associated capabilities are unveiled, the US loses the advantage in using them. This same principle can be applied to conventional weapons, ICBM and submarine technology, nuclear development, cyber security procedures, and other aspects of military or national strength. This doesn’t only apply to military technology, either. If China can steal proprietary business information, patent it in China, and return it to the US for use, those private, innovative companies could go out of business. This economic manipulation hurts the US economy, as China uses stolen secrets to grow its global trading network. These are just examples, but China is using the US as a springboard to further its global reach economically and ideologically through theft. Retrieving innovative practices and assets from other countries can save them enormous amounts of time and money while impeding adversary progress. China’s focus on fusing advanced technology into various aspects of its national power poses a problem for the US and ultimately threatens US hegemony in multiple areas.

3. It can Deter Future Aggression

War with China is one of the last things that would benefit the US. However, strategic conversations on the ongoing US-China friction point toward possible cooperation rather than inevitable war. While this may or may not be true, it’s crucial to work toward avoiding any war scenario with China. The US can accomplish this by focusing on China’s indirect actions first. This situation reminds me of the phrase, “Give someone an inch, and they take a mile.” If the country allows indirect attacks to continue unhindered, they may increase in severity, even leading to overt conflict when the US finally decides to respond. China is also a nuclear-capable country, which invites elevated tension to the conversation regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction. This flashpoint must be avoided, which means focusing on the indirect, sometimes intangible areas of influence first. Identifying and deterring these effects early on, especially in the United States, can quell future aggression and it’s strategically beneficial to nip this problem in the bud. While it may be a monumental task to identify and counter areas of influence, the effects wrought on the US warrant attention, resources, and time. This takes us to the possible solutions that both military and academic professionals offer.

Possible US Solutions

The problem with identifying mitigation strategies is that UW tactics are inherently obscure. They’re challenging to observe, making them even harder to engage. Although countering the effects of UW isn’t prominently featured in US policy and military doctrine, existing research and literature do propose solutions. Unfortunately, these have not been fully considered, and most have yet to be implemented in significant ways. Out of sight, out of mind, right? The “lost decade” from roughly 2010 to 2020 is a large contributor to the lack of US counterstrategy. This period exemplifies US assumptions on Chinese predictions, ultimately leading to a strategic lag, leaving the nation considerably behind in its understanding and response to Chinese policies and strategies. This delay has hindered the development and deployment of comprehensive countermeasures against the indirect nature of UW. It’s critical that the US government acknowledge this lapse. When examining possible solutions to catch up strategically, I suggest three focus areas.

Focus on Defense

The first is a focus on national defense. This idea comes from author and US Air Force General Robert Spalding, one of the leading military professionals focused on UW. General Spalding offers several solutions to impede the effects of indirect strategies. One of his proposals focuses on changing from strategic offense to defense . In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan created the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG). The AMWG was a committee that operated for eleven years during the height of the Cold War. It consisted of members from the Department of State (DOS), DOD, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, DOJ, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the US Information Agency (Abrams 2016). This group was tasked with identifying and exposing Soviet disinformation and reported that it successfully established and executed US policy in response to Soviet action. It accomplished this by exposing covert operations and raising political costs by sharing this information with foreign and domestic audiences. It also worked to build alliances that made the Soviet Union “pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus.” This highly respected committee was solely tasked with the Soviet Union. A counter-UW interagency organization could accomplish these same objectives with similar results if specifically tasked to China. This organization would fit the need to focus on national defense. While some US intelligence agencies are tasked with identifying Chinese action, their resources and manning are spread thin with other investigative priorities. UW covers the spectrum of power, calling for a composite response force comprised of military and non-military specialists. This counter-UW organization would cover the spectrum of systems by incorporating professionals specializing in the economic, agriculture, business, academic, military, and technology domains. Their main task would be to identify and expose. A vital component of the AMWG was sharing evidence with international allies. This open flow of information is essential to ensure allies can also produce calls to action for China.

Focus on the Economy

For decades, China has been reluctant to participate fully in the international economic community, which has prompted speculation from peer nations. While China is a member of prominent organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, it remains hesitant to fully adopt the responsibilities and roles typically associated with developed countries. There’s evidence that China does this to avoid the associated obligations that come with developed economy status, specifically in the WTO. By sidestepping these commitments, China can operate under less stringent standards while still progressing along its economic goals . Calls for greater transparency have become increasingly common, yet China often struggles to respond clearly to these inquiries. As international demands grow and China pursues further economic expansion, it has been forced to become more involved in organizations that necessitate increased visibility and accountability. If pressured to be fully involved, Chinese actions can be more effectively scrutinized when integrated into these global economic organizations. Having a voice at the table may entice China to take on more responsibility, leading to a higher visibility among developed countries that could decrease their use of UW around the globe. Another way economic manipulation can be used to influence China is to exclude them from economically beneficial treaties and pacts in response to exposed UW tactics. An example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which aimed to create economic positives for all signatories while excluding China. A mainstay of this partnership was to decrease trade dependency on China while bringing allies closer to the US. Though this partnership never came to fruition, it represents an avenue that can check China’s influence through exclusion.

Focus on Protecting US Innovation

China focuses on the theft of innovation to bolster its economy and MCF policy. While this is not exclusive to the US, the US is a primary contributor to advanced technology research and design, making the country a prime target for China’s UW tactics. It is imperative to protect US innovation. When China steals innovative processes or technology, US companies lose money and are forced to contract, leading to less financial flow in the research and development sector. This financial restriction slows innovation. When companies contract work, they also downsize, losing engineers and scientists vital to creating and testing critical, advanced technology and innovative processes. The twofold effect of this downsizing includes a decreased desire from younger generations to pursue STEM-related occupations and a loss of technological advantage over adversaries. If US companies aren’t protected from cyber theft, the US will lose its position as one of the world’s most technologically advanced countries. Forms of protection that US companies would benefit from are protectionist policies implemented by state and federal politicians.

A robust system of protection through policy for US businesses could slow the amount of proprietary information retrieved by China. These policies shield the economy by protecting the companies that spend time and money on innovation. Innovation doesn’t reside in privatized companies or investments alone, however. The Chinese government also targets academic institutions, taking advantage of American tendencies toward cooperation in research. This is a tricky situation, though. While protecting proprietary information is critical, it’s important to maintain the historically inclusive and collaborative atmosphere in US universities. Policies or academic restrictions may be necessary to protect this environment, such as in the business and innovation sector. Despite these suggestions, discussions on UW must occur at higher levels of politics and defense institutions to increase familiarity. One of the latest discussions on UW in official political environments occurred in March of 2024 in a House Oversight Committee when a Grand Old Party (GOP) representative brought the increasing threat of China to the committee’s attention. The representative mentioned that he noticed UW was a term that senior homeland security officials “seemed puzzled by,” indicating unfamiliarity with an ongoing threat to US national security that requires immediate attention.

Conclusion

The warfare landscape is shifting, leaving traditional strategies insufficient to face indirect threats like China’s UW. Evidence shows that cyber operations, economic theft, disinformation campaigns, and other indirect tactics undermine traditional US strength, leaving the country without an effective counterstrategy.

The US must recognize that the rules of engagement have changed. The country must adapt to this new reality to protect its national security and maintain its influence globally. This can be accomplished by focusing on defense, using economic power to its advantage, and protecting innovation in business and academia.

Despite the suggestions unveiled in this article, the true purpose behind publications of this nature is to increase visibility and discussion. The existence of UW tactics and their effects need to be acknowledged through evidentiary support that creates discourse among senior officials at all levels. Awareness must then translate into action.

This action is crucial to protecting the effectiveness of US national security, maintaining global hegemony in critical areas, and minimizing the risk of open aggression between the two superpowers as they navigate their fluid relationship.

Tags: China, South China Sea, Unrestricted Warfare

About The Author

• 
  
• Dallas Tueller
• Dallas "Sully" Tueller is an active-duty United States Air Force Nuclear and Missile Operations Officer with an MA in Military Studies concentrated on strategic leadership. The opinions expressed are his and do not reflect those of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

4. Opinion: What will the military do if Trump gives unconstitutional orders?

An easy fix is just do not issue unconstitutional orders.

Opinion: What will the military do if Trump gives unconstitutional orders?

Los Angeles Times · by ML Cavanaugh Dec. 15, 2024 3 AM PT · December 15, 2024

Every American in the armed forces, and any veteran who has served, hopes and prays for peace and stability under the recently reelected, incoming commander in chief. Political leanings are no factor here. We salute and serve because that’s who we are — even as our oaths may soon be tested as the next frontline in the war for America’s soul.

Everyone in the military takes an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Enlisted service members also swear to “obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Given Donald Trump’s threats to use the military against his own enemies, some wonder with dread: What will the military do if the president gives unconstitutional orders? While nobody would ever want such a challenge, I am fully confident that Americans in uniform will honor the highest duty we swore, which is to the Constitution.

My introduction to the oath came at West Point, when a Vietnam War veteran and professor put it to me straight: “Just who do you want to be? An employee? Or a professional, self-abnegating servant of the nation?” It was an admonition and expectation that, decades on, may be the most consistent North Star I’ve known. I fought with better men than me who died in Iraq, I spent years and years overseas missing birthdays and everydays with my young daughters, and my final act in uniform was to give away a kidney at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. I wouldn’t have done those things if I hadn’t meant the words spoken at my commissioning ceremony, pledging my “true faith and allegiance,” which means more to me than my next breath even now that I’ve retired from active service.

I’m not alone. Millions of others put that same oath at the center of their lives. I liken it to a baptism; instead of joining a faith community, we pledge our lives to the ideals of the United States.

These aren’t just words. They’re practical; they’re our common ground regardless of where we’re from or what political differences we might have. They build trust for cohesion to function amid terrifying and violent circumstances. And these oaths that power American national security will likely be tested in coming years.

During his first administration, Trump threatened use of the Insurrection Act (of 1807). At one point he suggested the military should shoot protesters in the legs, which clearly would have been illegal. More recently, he’s said he would invoke the Alien Enemies Act (of 1798) and may use the military to detain and deport noncitizens. If either order came to pass — for the 1st Armored Division to roll into Cincinnati or the 82nd Airborne to drop on D.C. — it would immediately pose a can’t-fail test for the American military.

What will the troops do? Must members of the U.S. military blindly obey their commander in chief? Or should these individuals always defy orders they consider unconstitutional?

Unfortunately, the answers aren’t straightforward.

The U.S. military oaths counsel thoughtful loyalty, not unthinking fealty — and the law treats each troop as responsible for making the right choice. There’s no respondeat superior (“let the master answer”), no “just following orders” defense, a principle discredited since World War II when the international community held middlemen and foot soldiers responsible for their war crimes that were ordered by Nazi commanders. Thus the military’s first duty is to obey legal orders (and disobey illegal orders). Our generals and JAGs (military lawyers) must lead the institution through the ethical minefields ahead. They, and everyone in camo, must stand their moral ground with courage indistinguishable from the battlefield. Because their oaths expect they “should be prepared not only to die for [their] country, but to be fired for it,” in the words of John Silber.

There’s another bedrock obligation for military members, a principle that has made the uniformed services among the last remaining trusted institutions in the nation. To preserve American democracy as it exists, the armed forces must always remain politically neutral and not side with any politician or party. This is where things get even messier.

If a president ordered the military to shoot protesters, or to become substantially involved with wholesale domestic detentions, what the military must do — obey or defy — depends heavily on the situation’s specifics and any actual violent threat. To issue an advisory opinion without that context would be malpractice. The world is as gray and complex as our oaths are pure and simple.

Because there could be constitutional circumstances for military engagement on U.S. soil. We just can’t know yet whether controversial orders will come, and if so what the situation will be.

What we can know is that the U.S. military is a house with good bones. It’s an institution that’s prepared for dire circumstances like these for quite some time. A century ago, a chaplain at West Point penned the “Cadet Prayer,” which advises: “Make us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong.”

Let’s hope that our next president does not attempt to abuse his authority as commander in chief. But if he does, Americans in uniform will choose the harder right — so help us God.

ML Cavanaugh recently retired after 25 years in the U.S. Army. He co-founded the Modern War Institute at West Point. @MLCavanaugh

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Los Angeles Times · by ML Cavanaugh Dec. 15, 2024 3 AM PT · December 15, 2024

5. The New Frontier for Drone Warfare Is Deep Underwater

The New Frontier for Drone Warfare Is Deep Underwater

New larger autonomous vessels, with evocative names like Ghost Shark and Manta Ray, are aimed at gathering intelligence and countering new threats at sea

https://www.wsj.com/tech/underwater-sea-drones-ghost-shark-manta-ray-7e22e140?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Alistair MacDonald

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Dec. 16, 2024 5:30 am ET

BAE Systems is testing the Herne drone in the U.K. CREDIT: BAE Systems

Drones have revolutionized modern warfare in the sky. Now defense companies and navies are betting they can do the same underwater.

The new underwater drones, with names such as Ghost Shark, Herne and Manta Ray, can typically dive thousands of feet below the surface and operate largely without human interaction for days on end. That ability makes them ideally suited to gather intelligence, protect undersea infrastructure and counter potential threats in the Pacific, advocates say.

“This is an opportune moment for these vehicles,” said Cynthia Cook, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank. “Submarines are fantastic, but they are expensive.”

Perfecting the technology isn’t an easy swim. Maintaining communications deep underwater is more difficult than in the sky, and conditions below the sea’s surface can be harsh. 

Northrop Grumman’s Manta Ray resembles the sea creature of the same name. Photo: Northrop Grumman

Underwater drones have been used by academics and offshore energy companies for decades. An underwater drone found Titanic in 1985, for example. Navies have also long used smaller—typically remote-controlled—underwater vessels for mine clearance and other tasks. 

Now, defense companies are developing larger, more autonomous vessels that can travel longer distances and do more.

Boeing BA 1.13%increase; green up pointing triangle is set to deliver five of its Orca extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicles to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year. Up to 85 feet long, the Orca can travel the equivalent of almost 7,500 miles with little human intervention.  

Adm. Lisa Franchetti, chief of naval operations, has said developing robotic and autonomous systems is one of the U.S. Navy’s top priorities in preparing for a possible war with China.

“Unmanned systems have an enormous potential to multiply our combat power,” Franchetti said at a conference earlier this year.

Elsewhere, Australia is working with defense startup Anduril on an underwater drone called Ghost Shark. The project is part of a $4.65 billion investment the country is making in subsea warfare capabilities and new autonomous and uncrewed maritime vehicles.

Other underwater drones include BAE Systems’ BA 0.50%increase; green up pointing triangle Herne, which is being tested in the U.K., and Northrop Grumman’s NOC -0.31%decrease; red down pointing triangle Manta Ray, which has a similar shape to the giant flat fish. 

France, South Korea and Germany are also working on new unmanned underwater vessels. Ukraine is testing an underwater attack drone called Marichka.

One factor aiding the development of this new class of underwater drones is improving technology. Batteries can last longer, sensors are more accurate and electronics are smaller. These advancements mean the vessels can be more autonomous, travel for longer and do more.

The improvements come at an opportune time for Western navies. China has built the world’s largest surface naval fleet and its own large autonomous underwater vehicles. 

In Europe, cases in which fiber-optic cables were cut have raised concerns that Russia and others could target crucial lines that move energy and data over ocean floors. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently conducted a training exercise off Finland’s coast in which underwater drones were used to protect undersea infrastructure. 

European navies that would counter such threats have shrunk in size, while the U.S. has struggled to build large ships on time. Britain’s Royal Navy, once the world’s largest, now has fewer than 20 destroyers and frigates, and around 10 submarines.

The British Navy is “struggling to do everything they want to do in the manner they want,” said Tim O’Neill, a business development manager at BAE’s maritime services division. “This is where autonomy comes in.”

Herne can tell the difference between military and civilian vehicles. Photo: BAE Systems

BAE’s Herne is based on an underwater drone already produced for the energy industry by Cellula Robotics, a Canadian company. BAE added computer systems, cameras and sensors that allow the vessel to operate autonomously as well as gather and analyze intelligence.

Herne, which looks like a mini-submarine, guides itself at sea by using sensors that match its surroundings with preloaded maps. It analyzes vessels it sees by comparing them to a database, allowing it to distinguish between military and civilian craft. Data it collects can be transmitted via a periscope-like mast that rises from its back.

On a recent morning on Britain’s south coast, a crane lowered the 8-metric-ton, 40-foot vessel into the water before it set off on a preprogrammed training mission. During a test, Herne rose out of the water, correctly identified two Naval vessels and then silently slipped back beneath the waves.

Using a drone to conduct routine surveillance makes it unnecessary to put an expensive submarine and its crew at risk, said O’Neill, a former officer in Britain’s Royal Navy. The drone’s smaller size also allows it to operate in shallower waters.

BAE has been developing Herne for roughly 11 months and aims to have the vessel battle-ready within the next year and a half.

Herne’s battery lasts up to three days. Cellula is experimenting with hydrogen cells that could allow the vessel to operate for 45 days and give it a range of around 3,000 miles—roughly the distance between Ireland and New York. 

While Herne is primarily designed for reconnaissance, BAE is exploring the addition of torpedoes and mines.

Adding deadly force to autonomous vessels could raise ethical concerns. Western rules of engagement insist on having a human being pull the trigger in the so-called kill chain.

BAE’s O’Neill said Herne would use lethal force only at the direction of a human.

Communicating with underwater drones is harder than with those in the air because radio waves can’t travel through deep water. The vessels can, though, surface to receive instructions.

While cheaper than submarines, which can cost billions of dollars, the new vessels are more expensive and harder to produce than most of the drones used in Ukraine. 

The U.S. Navy, for instance, originally agreed to pay around $379 million for five Orcas and a test prototype, though by 2022 the project was years behind schedule and the cost had ballooned to $620 million, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. A GAO report cited challenges with the vessel’s battery and difficulty securing materials. Boeing said any over-contract costs were borne by the company.

The vessels must withstand huge pressure deep underwater and be reliable out at sea—if something goes wrong, there is nobody on board to fix it.

“The ocean is a real harsh environment,” said Duane Fotheringham, president of uncrewed systems at shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries HII 0.68%increase; green up pointing triangle, which has its own range of underwater drones. “Sending something to the deep ocean is like sending something to space.”

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

6. Drones and the Cost of Lost Trust

Drones and the Cost of Lost Trust

Conspiracy theories fly and public anger builds when Americans don’t believe their government.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/drones-and-the-cost-of-lost-trust-ufos-government-swarm-new-jersey-3bc5e936?mod=hp_opin_pos_0

By The Editorial Board

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Dec. 15, 2024 5:15 pm ET

Points of light in the evening sky near Lebanon Township, N.J, Dec. 5. Photo: Trisha Bushey/Associated Press

The loss of public trust in U.S. institutions is well-chronicled, and for an example of its cost consider the national mini-panic over unidentified aerial objects. No one in America seems to believe what anyone in authority says about them, and unproven claims are filling the vacuum.

Thousands of Americans who aren’t cranks have seen drones or what they think are drones overhead. New Jersey of all places is a hotbed of sightings, for reasons no one has been able to explain. But sightings have occurred across the Northeast, as well as in California. Military facilities and critical infrastructure sites seem to be targets, if the eyewitnesses are right.

Yet no one in Washington seems to be able to convincingly explain the sightings. A joint statement Thursday by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security said: “We have no evidence at this time that the reported drone sightings pose a national security or public safety threat or have a foreign nexus.”

The statement added that “Historically, we have experienced cases of mistaken identity, where reported drones are, in fact, manned aircraft or facilities. We are supporting local law enforcement in New Jersey with numerous detection methods but have not corroborated any of the reported visual sightings with electronic detection. To the contrary, upon review of available imagery, it appears that many of the reported sightings are actually manned aircraft, operating lawfully.”

Yet the unexplained sightings persist. One caused Stewart International Airport in New York’s Hudson Valley to shut down its runways for an hour on Friday night. Gov. Kathy Hochul demanded answers from the Biden Administration. Former Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan, not known as a show-boater, says he saw a flurry of aerial objects above his home in Davidsonville, Md.

Members of Congress are demanding answers or offering their own theories. Rep. Jeff Van Drew, a New Jersey Republican, thinks the drones may have come from an Iranian “mothership” off the coast. The Pentagon rejects the claim.

Jon Bramnick, a GOP state Senator in New Jersey, told NewsNation that, “It must be something going on that they can’t tell us because they are so fearful of what the public’s gonna do when they hear what the drones are doing.” This is how deep the suspicion runs.

And when that happens, conspiracy theories fill the air as much as drones do. One Twitter account with some 192,000 followers posted on X that “WE ARE F—. THE DRONES ARE PROJECT BLUE BEAM.” We admit to not being fluent on this theory, but apparently Project Blue Beam refers to a plan by governments and the military to stage celestial events as a pretext to impose authoritarian rule. Don’t beam us up, Scotty.

***

We’d ignore this stuff, except millions of people might believe it. That’s the world we live in. And sorry to say, the reason isn’t merely the result of conspiracists or crackpots who will exploit doubt for attention.

The Biden Administration has squandered its credibility to the point that it’s rational not to believe what it says. Remember the Chinese spy balloon that traveled across the continental U.S.? The Administration downplayed its importance while it was courting better relations with Beijing, only to shoot it down over the Atlantic Ocean. It also downplayed Rep. Mike Turner’s warning, based on solid intelligence, about the danger from a potential Russian nuclear blast in space.

The Administration failed for months to be candid about its migrant flights from the border to the U.S. interior. And for months it covered up the truth about President Biden’s declining mental and physical fitness, only to have it exposed in a debate. The government’s attempt to censor alternative views about Covid shutdowns during the Trump Administration also spread mistrust. The more Americans don’t trust their government, the more panic or protests are possible.

On Sunday New York Gov. Hochul said the feds are deploying high-tech detection gear to her state to help with the drone swarms. The feds need to explain to Congress and the public with more specificity what is really going on. But the larger need is for a government Americans can trust.

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Journal Editorial Report: Hegseth and Gabbard sit down with key Senators. Photo: Tom Williams/Zuma Press/Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Appeared in the December 16, 2024, print edition as 'Drones and the Cost of Lost Trust'.

7. US officials have been in direct contact with the Syrian rebel group that ousted Assad, Blinken says

US officials have been in direct contact with the Syrian rebel group that ousted Assad, Blinken says

By MATTHEW LEE

Updated 6:14 AM GMT+9, December 15, 2024

AP · December 14, 2024

AP · December 14, 2024

8. PLA releases electronic warfare ‘kill list’ for US carrier groups

EW is a key element of modern warfare.

PLA releases electronic warfare ‘kill list’ for US carrier groups

A Chinese report has revealed a catalogue of US naval targets including radars and sensors to be attacked in any future conflict

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3290477/pla-releases-electronic-warfare-kill-list-us-carrier-groups?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage

Stephen Chenin Beijing

Published: 12:00pm, 16 Dec 2024

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) electronic warfare unit has produced a list of targets for a coordinated attack against US aircraft carrier strike groups.

In a potential conflict, these precisely labelled US military radars, sensors and communication systems are likely to take concentrated fire from China’s electronic warfare weapons, according to a researcher involved in the project.

This unprecedented revelation was made in the latest issue of Defence Industry Conversion in China, a magazine supervised by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence. The publication aims to encourage civilian institutions and companies to participate in research on military technologies and weapon production.

“This information can provide references for the development of electronic countermeasures technology and related equipment in China’s future naval battlefields,” Mo Jiaqian, an electronic countermeasures expert with the PLA’s 92728 Unit, wrote in the report.

Her report delved into the workings and advantages of the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system, which is a vital component of the aircraft carrier fleet’s air defence and early warning network.

The system enables the entire fleet to share air defence resources, allowing ships to launch ship-to-air missiles for interception even if their own sensors do not detect an incoming target.

However, the CEC has a fatal weakness.

“It is formed through the networking of phased array radars, which relies on wireless communication links. When the opposing force employs electronic interference, the wireless links are prone to disconnection or disruption,” she wrote.

The primary focus of the PLA’s electronic warfare attacks is the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar on Aegis ships. This radar, manufactured by US aerospace company Lockheed Martin and in service for over four decades, may struggle to withstand the onslaught of various new technologies.

China says Fujian carrier is world’s largest conventionally powered warship

Emerging platforms, such as drones, can approach the radar and create noise and false targets, “significantly reducing its detection accuracy and impacting the overall effectiveness of the CEC system”.

Another major target for the PLA is the E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft, a powerful information collection platform capable of operating from aircraft carriers. This aircraft plays a crucial role in the coordination of the entire US fleet.

Additionally, the PLA has identified some US military signal transponders as key targets, which they believe can be exploited to gain access to the US military network and cause damage.

“If the opposing force obtains accurate network access information and mimics a friendly response with the correct signalling method, they can infiltrate the CEC network as a cooperative unit and launch attacks,” Mo wrote in the report.

“Alternatively, continuous access requests can be made to overwhelm one of the CEC nodes with identification tasks, disrupting its operation.”

China is the world’s largest producer of electronic devices, with many of these products not only being cost-effective but also incorporating more advanced and complex technologies than those used by rival Western counterparts.

A recent study has revealed that China has the ability to convert over 90 per cent of its new civilian technologies into military applications.

In response, the US has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 Chinese enterprises, with the number growing significantly over the past decade.

But the study found that these sanctions have inadvertently accelerated the integration of China’s military and civilian industries.

Stephen Chen

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Stephen Chen is the SCMP's science news editor. He investigates major research projects in China, a new power house of scientific and technological innovation, and their impact to

9. “America First”: Neither Cosmopolitan Nor Isolationist

The PDF is at this link: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/IS-609.pdf

Do not conflate America First with isolationism. 

Excerpt:

In summary, the “America First” movement’s opposition to cosmopolitan U.S. behavior should not be conflated with isolationism, as seems to be the expectation of so much allied and domestic commentary. The populist movement behind President-elect Trump wants a powerful United States involved in the world—a United States that deals with opponents from a position of great strength. Recognizing that Trump voters and his “America First” agenda are not cosmopolitan, but also are not isolationist, is important to understanding the political movement behind Trump and the likely broad-brush strokes of an “America First” agenda. While all speculation of the political future is inherently less than certain, it is safe to say that the new Trump Administration is highly unlikely to fold the extended nuclear umbrella or withdraw from NATO. More likely is a real increase in U.S. defense budgets and the strengthening of U.S. capabilities needed for deterrence, including extended deterrence, for allies who come to terms with the reality that the years of free riding are over.

Keith B. Payne, “America First”: Neither Cosmopolitan Nor Isolationist, No. 609, December 16, 2024 – Nipp

nipp.org

“America First”: Neither Cosmopolitan Nor Isolationist

Dr. Keith B. Payne

Dr. Keith B. Payne is a co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, Professor Emeritus at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and former Senior Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

It is remarkable how often foreign audiences misunderstand American political leaders and voters. As an extreme example, at an academic conference organized by a prominent British university, sophisticated academics in attendance went on about how then-President George W. Bush, given his apparent religious leanings, might find the possibility of a nuclear war acceptable because it would usher in the Apocalypse and the Second Coming in Christian eschatology. Several academics in attendance were fully willing to set aside the complete absurdity of that proposition and discuss it as serious commentary on U.S. leadership.

Perhaps such misunderstandings of U.S. politics should be unsurprising when sophisticated domestic polling organizations and the most prestigious domestic news organizations appear not to understand the American electorate, particularly the “America First” populist movement. For example, just days before the 2024 election, one of the most highly regarded American pollsters announced a three-point advantage for presidential candidate Kamala Harris in the state of Iowa. The actual election result was a 13-point advantage for candidate Trump. This was a breathtaking 16-point error shortly before the election. It remains unclear how a highly experienced domestic polling team could get results so wrong.

The problem, of course, is that mistaken perceptions and expectations about America, whether by allies, commentators, or pollsters, can lead to conclusions that otherwise would not be considered reasonable. What may be seen in numerous foreign press reports regarding the incoming Trump Administration is a fear that it will pursue an isolationist foreign policy that will end U.S. alliances and close the extended nuclear umbrella for America’s allies. For example, a post-election National Public Radio broadcast included a prominent British journalist who said that the existing “…world order, I think, is now fundamentally coming to an end with the reelection of Donald Trump, because Donald Trump doesn’t really believe in alliances.” The journalist added, “the reelection of Donald Trump probably serves [China’s] purpose … which is that a United States that turns inward and no longer wishes to be, you know, leader of the – a [sic] world order leaves much more room for China to kind of shape the world as it sees fit.” Such predictions understandably alarm allies.

Trump has indeed sharply criticized many wealthy allies for their continuing low level of defense spending in a time of unprecedented security threats to the West. But it should be obvious that the sharpness of Trump’s language is part of his negotiating repertoire. U.S. presidents since Eisenhower have attempted, with limited success, to get NATO allies to increase their “burden-sharing” for the West’s collective defense. Given the perpetually asymmetrical level of costs borne by the United States, Trump’s frustration with allies is as unsurprising as are his efforts to get allies to do more. Washington should not be expected to care more for allies’ security than do the allies themselves.

Comparing national spending levels is an imperfect method of measuring defense efforts to be sure. But the new administration is likely to find intolerable that NATO Europe and Canada have a combined GDP nearly equal to that of the United States, with per capita defense spending at $669 per year, while the annual per capita defense spending by the United States, at $2,239, is over 300 percent greater. In addition, it appears that more than a few wealthy NATO members, including Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain, still spend fewer than two percent of their respective GDPs on defense, after first committing in 2006 to meet that minimalist threshold. Allies who believe that, in an era of unprecedented threats and crises, a new Trump Administration will continue Washington’s pattern of benignly overlooking such allied “free riding” are likely to be deeply disappointed. There is a disturbing contradiction in some wealthy allies calling on the collective defense of the NATO Alliance but not contributing seriously to the cost of collective security capabilities.

As a result of Trump’s sharp language regarding this imbalance in burden-sharing, some U.S. allies long accustomed to relying heavily on Uncle Sam for their ultimate security now fear U.S. withdrawal from NATO and their consequent vulnerability to a looming entente of aggressive, authoritarian powers, notably China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Russia and China fan this fear by casting doubt on U.S. reliability in their attempts to divide the United States and allies. Some German observers now conclude, for example, that Berlin will have to find alternatives for the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent against nuclear coercion and attack. This German commentary ranges from Berlin’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to the “Europeanization” of the French and British nuclear arsenals. Neither of these options appears highly practicable, at least in the near term. In South Korea, surveys now consistently show majority public support for the acquisition of an independent nuclear arsenal.

Given these manifest allied fears and discussions, it is important to point out the material difference between the “America First” agenda’s obvious rejection of cosmopolitan U.S. policies and the feared U.S. adoption of isolationist policies. The former does not equate to the latter, as so many commentaries at home and abroad seem to assume.

The populist movement behind President-elect Trump most assuredly is not cosmopolitan, in the sense that has occasionally characterized Washington’s behavior in the past. Trump populists generally reject the cosmopolitan canon that the world can be a cooperative, harmonious community if only freed from the stifling, antiquated notion of nationhood—that national borders and identities are artificial constructs and archaic impediments to global governance and harmony. The motto “America First” has meaning. Trump voters consider sovereign borders and national identity as foundational to proper U.S. governance and spending. They do not see themselves first as “global citizens” with a priority obligation to some concept of a “global community”; they do not have an associated mild or sharp disdain for American patriotism, borders, power, and sovereignty. They do not favor Washington spending their tax dollars to advance a globalist agenda and institutions at the expense of American jobs, security and prosperity. When trade-offs must be made, they do not support the U.S. Government sacrificing their well-being to advance globalist ideals, institutions or causes célèbres. Particularly galling to these voters were the recent images of Biden handing out a billion dollars in Angola, while some citizens in North Carolina were still living in tents and NGO-provided campers following an October hurricane.

While there clearly has been an overarching cosmopolitan strain in U.S. behavior for decades, under a new Trump Presidency, adversaries are likely to find a robust U.S. parry to their thrusts. There also will not likely be any “going abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” as previously advanced by Republican neo-conservatives. There is unlikely to be support for UN organs that are manifestly hostile to the United States and U.S. interests, no global “apology tour” as in the Obama Administration, and no fast-track citizenship for the millions of migrants who illegally crossed the southern U.S. border.

However, it is critical to understand that the populist movement behind Trump also is not isolationist in the sense that seems to inspire allied fears. Some illustrations of this point were found in the recent Reagan National Defense survey:

• A large majority of Trump voters believes the United States should be more engaged in the world and take the lead on the world stage;
• A supermajority of Americans wants the United States to spend more on national defense;
• A large majority wants the US to be prepared to win two foreign wars simultaneously;
• A majority wants to continue sending weapons to Ukraine, but a majority also wants a negotiated settlement;
• A large majority supports defending NATO allies if attacked; and
• A large majority favors continuing military aid to Israel.

These are not isolationist views.

It is helpful to recall that the first Trump Administration exhibited none of the isolationist agenda now so concerning to some allies and domestic commentators. In addition to orchestrating the historic Abraham Accords, the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) attributed high value to extending credible deterrence and assuring allies. It also initiated a new nuclear capability, the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N), for the purpose of strengthening extended deterrence in the face of Russia’s manifestly hostile designs and expanding theater nuclear forces. These were not the actions of an administration seeking to withdraw from international engagement and to close the nuclear umbrella in the face of mounting nuclear threats. In contrast, the subsequent Biden Administration sought, unsuccessfully, to cancel SLCM-N.

The Trump Administration’s 2018 NPR’s emphasis on sustaining extended deterrence and assuring allies essentially recognized the fact that U.S. withdrawal to an isolationist “Fortress America” would likely leave the “rimlands” of Eurasia vulnerable to aggressive, authoritarian regimes that are more powerful than America’s allies individually, and will be so for the foreseeable future. Protecting those allied rimlands, of course, entails risk and financial burden for the United States. However, leaving them to their fate also would entail considerable risk and financial burden, including the potential nightmare of aggressive, hostile powers consolidating much of the human, material and technological resources of Eurasia. Two vast oceans and distance no longer provide American security; isolationism as an organizing policy is more than a century out of date.

In summary, the “America First” movement’s opposition to cosmopolitan U.S. behavior should not be conflated with isolationism, as seems to be the expectation of so much allied and domestic commentary. The populist movement behind President-elect Trump wants a powerful United States involved in the world—a United States that deals with opponents from a position of great strength. Recognizing that Trump voters and his “America First” agenda are not cosmopolitan, but also are not isolationist, is important to understanding the political movement behind Trump and the likely broad-brush strokes of an “America First” agenda. While all speculation of the political future is inherently less than certain, it is safe to say that the new Trump Administration is highly unlikely to fold the extended nuclear umbrella or withdraw from NATO. More likely is a real increase in U.S. defense budgets and the strengthening of U.S. capabilities needed for deterrence, including extended deterrence, for allies who come to terms with the reality that the years of free riding are over.

See for example, “An update from the editor: What a review of the pre-election Iowa Poll has found,” Des Moines Register, November 17, 2024, available at https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/from-the-editor/2024/11/17/editors-update-what-a-review-of-the-pre-election-iowa-poll-has-found/76300644007/.

Quoted in, National Public Radio, Fresh Air: World, hosted by Dave Davies, “From high tariffs to isolation, what a 2nd Trump term might mean for foreign policy,” November 13, 2024, available at https://www.npr.org/2024/11/13/g-s1-34010/from-high-tariffs-to-isolation-what-a-2nd-trump-term-might-mean-for-foreign-policy.

As candidly observed by then-Secretary of Defense Mattis. See, Helene Cooper, “Defense Secretary Mattis Tells NATO Allies to Spend More, or Else,” The New York Times, February 15, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/europe/jim-mattis-nato-trump.html.

See, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Press Release, Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024), p. 12, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf.

See, Keith Payne and Michael Rühle, “President-Elect and Extended Deterrence: Whither Germany?” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, No. 605, November 6, 2024, available at https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-and-michael-ruhle-president-elect-trump-and-extended-nuclear-deterrence-whither-germany-no-605-november-6-2024/. See also Michael Rühle, and Keith Payne, “Die Kultur des Trittbrettfahrens ist Vorbei,” Welt am Sonntag, July 21, 2024, p. 9.

See Michael Rühle, “German Musings About a Nuclear Deterrent,” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, No. 571, January 3, 2024, available at https://nipp.org/information_series/michael-ruhle-german-musings-about-a-european-nuclear-deterrent-no-571-january-3-2024/.

See for example, Shi Jiangtao, “Why Japan and South Korea are Debating Joining the Nuclear Club,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 7, 2024, available at https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3273440/could-japan-and-south-korea-join-nuclear-club-cold-war-fears-put-prospect-play.

For a commentary illustrating a cosmopolitan allegiance vice a national allegiance, see, Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” Boston Review (October-November 1994). See also, Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in, Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, eds., For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 3-20.

See, Lee Harris, “The Cosmopolitan Illusion,” Policy Review (April/May 2003), available at https://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/april-may-2003; see also the discussion in, Adda Bozeman, “War and the Clash of Ideas,” Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 76-102.

The famous phrase by then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. See, Patrick Garrity, In Search of Monsters to Destroy (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2012).

See Reagan National Defense Survey Shows Strong, Growing Support for U.S. Leadership in the World, December 5, 2024, available at https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/363281/2024-survey_press-release_final.pdf?srsltid=AfmBOoqUFwPdrma3Nbf-dS72KJcpi-cnO87SDWQmHnsqrWI96ZcwiIO_.

Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018), pp. viii, 22-23, 34-37, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf.

Ibid., pp. xi-xiii, 52-55.

For an excellent, concise elaboration of geopolitics, heartlands and rimlands see, Colin S. Gray, Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy, or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750, Fairfax, VA 22031, (703) 293- 9181, www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

© National Institute Press, 2024

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10. Beijing's "Best Friend" To Host U.S. Navy For 1st Time In Nearly A Decade Amid Concerns Over China-Funded Naval Base

Strategic competition.

Beijing's "Best Friend" To Host U.S. Navy For 1st Time In Nearly A Decade Amid Concerns Over China-Funded Naval Base

eurasiantimes.com · by Ashish Dangwal · December 14, 2024

For the first time in eight years, a US Navy warship is set to visit Cambodia, a very ‘close ally’ of China, according to an official statement from Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense.

The USS Savannah, a Littoral Combat Ship carrying a crew of 103, will dock at the port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand from December 16 to 20.

The Cambodian government stated that the visit, initiated by a US request, aims to “strengthen and expand the bonds of friendship as well as promote bilateral cooperation” between the two nations.

Although the United States has yet to officially confirm the visit, it marks a significant step forward in the historically turbulent relationship between the two nations.

The ship will not dock at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, a location that has been a point of US criticism due to concerns that it may be used by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as a military outpost.

However, the visit will include a working meeting with Ream’s commander, interactions with local officials, and cultural exchange activities such as a friendship sports competition between the US and Cambodian navies.

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“The planned action plan includes a working meeting with the Commander of the Ream Sea Base, a working meeting with the Sihanoukville Provincial Administration, a friendly sports program between the crew of the United States Navy and the Cambodian Navy in order to promote Intimacy and group solidarity, as well as a number of friendly programs,” said Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense.

Since 2007, 27 US Navy vessels have visited Cambodia, but this marks the first time in nearly a decade that a US warship will dock in the country.

On December 11, Cambodia’s foreign ministry also acknowledged the “positive momentum of bilateral ties and cooperation,” noting the “reinvigoration” of military-to-military relations.

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The visit follows US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s June trip to Cambodia, where he met with Prime Minister Hun Manet and other senior officials. During that visit, Austin also met with Cambodian alumni of US military training programs.

USS Savannah (LCS-28) – Wikipedia

China’s Role In Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base Continues To Concern The USA

The announcement of the USS Savannah’s port call in Cambodia is part of the United States’ broader strategy to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia.

Just last month, the US Navy’s USS Abraham Lincoln—a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier—visited Port Klang, Malaysia, marking the first such visit in 12 years. These efforts aim to counter China’s growing influence in the region.

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The US has expressed concerns over the upgrading of Cambodia’s naval base near Sihanoukville, fearing it could be used by Chinese vessels to further Beijing’s strategic interests.

The potential establishment of a Chinese naval base at Ream would grant China easier access to the Malacca Strait, a critical shipping route between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Ream Naval Base, located near Sihanoukville, became a focus of controversy in 2019 when reports suggested that Cambodia might allow China to use the base for 30 years, station military personnel, and berth warships.

However, Cambodia has consistently denied such claims and said that its constitution prohibits foreign military bases.

In October 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol reaffirmed Cambodia’s stance, stating that the base would not be used by China or any other military against another country. He clarified that once upgrades are complete, the base will be open to any navy but only for humanitarian, disaster recovery, or joint military exercises.

“The Ream Naval Base is not for the Chinese. The Chinese provided us with the assistance to expand the Ream Naval Base for our national defense, not to be used by the Chinese or any military against another country,” Sun said.

Before the commencement of upgrading works, Cambodia’s defense partners, including Japan, Russia, and the United States, frequently used Ream Naval Base for joint military exercises with the RCN.

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A recent report by the Lowy Institute also suggests that China is unlikely to gain full control of the base due to limited strategic value and domestic political constraints in Cambodia.

The report pointed out, “It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states.”

Despite this, China has continued to support the base’s redevelopment and even sent warships there in 2023, which has increased US concerns about Beijing’s influence in the region.

• Contact the author at ashishmichel(at)gmail.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

eurasiantimes.com · by Ashish Dangwal · December 14, 2024

11. Why Musk Doesn’t Have Access to SpaceX’s Biggest Government Secrets

Why Musk Doesn’t Have Access to SpaceX’s Biggest Government Secrets

Executives haven’t sought higher security clearance for the CEO to avoid questions about his drug use and contact with foreign officials; the answers might no longer matter

https://www.wsj.com/tech/musk-spacex-security-clearance-secrets-b9774346?utm_medium=social

By Joe Palazzolo

Follow, Emily Glazer

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Dec. 15, 2024 9:00 pm ET

The payloads SpaceX launches into the heavens for the U.S. military and spy agencies are usually treated as a government secret, shared only with select employees at the rocket company who hold special security clearances. 

Elon Musk, its founder and chief executive, isn’t one of them.

As SpaceX deepened its ties with the national-security agencies in recent years, the company’s lawyers advised senior executives not to seek a higher security clearance for Musk that would give him access to details about sensitive programs SpaceX is involved in, according to people familiar with the matter. 

The reason, these people said, was that Musk would have had to answer questions from the government about his contacts with foreign nationals and drug use previously reported by The Wall Street Journal. In internal discussions, the lawyers and executives posited scenarios in which Musk might inadvertently disclose secrets to foreign officials with whom he regularly speaks, the people said. The Journal reported in October that Musk has been in regular contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin since late 2022.

His current “top-secret” clearance took years for him to obtain following his public use of marijuana on a 2018 podcast. SpaceX’s national-security business was rapidly growing at the time.

The SpaceX lawyers began analyzing the risks of seeking a higher security clearance for Musk after the Journal reported in June of last year about Musk’s use of ketamine, according to one person familiar with the review. The lawyers and executives concluded that if SpaceX sought a higher security clearance, it would risk Musk being turned down, or worse, losing the top-secret clearance he already has.

Those concerns could soon become irrelevant. President-elect Donald Trump appointed Musk, who spent about $200 million in support of his presidential run, to lead a new Department of Government Efficiency, which will advise the incoming administration on cutting spending and regulations. As president, Trump will have the power to give Musk and others working for DOGE broad access to classified information as they search for cuts.

President-elect Trump and Musk watching a test flight of SpaceX’s Starship rocket in Texas on Nov. 19. Photo: brandon bell/Reuters

Although Trump hasn’t indicated publicly whether he intends to do that, SpaceX already has been scouting locations for a secure facility where Musk and other DOGE staffers could review highly classified information.

Representatives for Musk, SpaceX and the Trump transition team didn’t respond to requests for comment. A spokeswoman for the Pentagon’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency said a federal privacy law prevented her from commenting on the details or status of an individual’s security clearance.

Hundreds of thousands of private defense contractors have access to government secrets as part of their jobs. Their security clearances are the same as those held by government employees and generally have three levels: confidential, secret and top secret.

Musk’s current top-secret clearance gives him access to some national-security secrets, but he lacks special authorizations that the government requires of most SpaceX employees who work on classified programs, according to the people familiar with the matter. Those employees—more than 400—have permissions for what is known as “sensitive compartmented information,” the government’s term for need-to-know secrets about how intelligence is collected and where it comes from, one of the people said. A smaller number of SpaceX employees have access to secrets the government deems even more sensitive called special access programs. 

Musk’s top-secret clearance, without those authorizations, doesn’t entitle him to access certain information about SpaceX’s spy satellite program, called Starshield, which offers satellite hardware and services to national-security agencies, the people said. He isn’t allowed to enter most SpaceX facilities where classified work is done and discussed, and he rarely is privy to classified elements of cargo that his rockets blast into space, such as sensors and other hardware attached to spy satellites.

A SpaceX rocket launch from Florida’s Cape Canaveral on Feb. 14. Photo: Associated Press

The CEOs of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and their rocket joint venture, United Launch Alliance, have authorizations for sensitive compartmented information, according to people familiar with their clearances.

Musk had a secret-level clearance before he secured the top-secret clearance in 2022, a process that took years, according to people familiar with his clearance. The unusually long government review of his application was believed within SpaceX to have been the result of Musk’s 2018 podcast interview with Joe Rogan in which he smoked marijuana, which is illegal under federal law, the people said.

“Most of the stuff that I’m aware of…the reason to keep it top secret is it’s so boring,” Musk said in October at a town hall meeting in Pennsylvania in which he disclosed that he had a top-secret clearance. “We don’t want to give exact instructions on how to make a nuclear bomb or something like that, but unless there’s a genuine risk to the country, all the information in the government should be public.”

SpaceX, which Musk founded in 2002, has worked with national-security agencies since its early days. It won a launch contract in 2005 with an unnamed U.S. intelligence agency. Later, the company began handling regular launches for military and spy agencies. More recently, it entered into a $1.8 billion classified contract with the National Reconnaissance Office, a spy agency that operates satellites, according to people familiar with the matter and company documents viewed by the Journal.

The company’s Starshield unit is the military outgrowth of its better-known Starlink business, which uses thousands of satellites in low-Earth-orbit to power high-speed internet connections for consumers and businesses. Employees who work on Starshield generally have the kind of enhanced clearances that Musk doesn’t.

Starshield won an initial $70 million order from the military in August 2023 to provide communications services to the Pentagon. 

SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne, Calif. The company has worked with national-security agencies since its early days. Photo: patrick t. fallon/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Around that time, SpaceX lawyers and executives were discussing whether Musk should have greater access to the company’s classified work. It couldn’t be determined Musk was aware of the discussions, prompted by the Journal’s June 2023 story that highlighted his ketamine use, or whether he had expressed an interest in having a higher clearance.

After that 2023 article, Musk said in an X post that ketamine is a better way to deal with depression than more widely prescribed antidepressants, and he later posted that he had a prescription for it.

In January of this year, the Journal reported that Musk used illegal drugs including LSD, cocaine, ecstasy and psychedelic mushrooms. His lawyer said there were unspecified “false facts” in the article, and that Musk is “regularly and randomly drug tested at SpaceX and has never failed a test.” 

Were Musk denied a higher clearance, SpaceX lawyers told company executives, it could have had broader implications for SpaceX, according to the people familiar with his clearance.

The government could have revoked Musk’s existing top-secret clearance if he failed the security vetting, and SpaceX might have needed to seek a waiver from the government to continue to do some of its national security work because Musk is SpaceX’s senior management official. The company also might have had to create extra layers of security to wall Musk off from a growing part of its business.

SpaceX was prepared to answer questions from government officials about Musk’s drug use after the Journal reported on it, but the Pentagon didn’t ask, and SpaceX executives decided the company didn’t need to self-report to the government based solely on news accounts, said the people familiar with his clearance.

The federal questionnaire for contractors and employees seeking a security clearance instructs applicants to disclose whether in the past seven years they have used any of a variety of listed drugs, including ketamine. Government contractors can lose their security clearances over drug abuse, a term broadly defined in federal regulations as the use of an illegal drug or of a prescribed drug “in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.” 

The questionnaire also requires applicants to report “close and/or continuing contact with a foreign national.” 

The federal questionnaire for contractors and employees seeking a security clearance includes questions about contacts with foreign nationals. Musk met with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban at Trump’s estate in Palm Beach, Fla., on Dec. 9. Photo: zoltan fischer handout/Shutterstock

Musk would have had to fill out a new questionnaire and likely undergo a polygraph examination to receive a higher clearance through traditional channels. 

As president, Trump will have the power to authorize access to government secrets and could waive security requirements. The Supreme Court has ruled that the president’s authority to control the flow of national-security information stems from his role as commander in chief.

Trump has said DOGE will exist outside the government and serve in an advisory rather than a decision-making role. Already, Musk and his co-head, biotech company founder Vivek Ramaswamy, have identified the Pentagon as a potential target for spending cuts.

They likely will need special clearances to view sensitive information as they pick through military spending on classified programs, looking for efficiencies. Trump will be in a position to provide them. 

Sharon Terlep contributed to this article.

Write to Joe Palazzolo at Joe.Palazzolo@wsj.com, Emily Glazer at Emily.Glazer@wsj.com and Micah Maidenberg at micah.maidenberg@wsj.com

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12. RAND: A Historical Analysis of a True Invasion of Taiwan

​Excerpt:

Despite the tremendous advances in military technology over the last 140 years, it is worth revisiting lessons from the French invasion of Taiwan. The physical geography remains largely the same, though Taiwan’s expansive urban terrain may influence the calculus of would-be invaders from the mainland. The utility of naval mines and obstructions, the defensibility of Taiwan’s physical environment, the permeability of blockades, the importance of the Penghu Islands, the fragility of front-line C4ISR, and the risks of overconfidence remain formidable threats to any invading force.

RAND: A Historical Analysis of a True Invasion of Taiwan - Naval News

navalnews.com · by Peter Ong · December 2, 2024

Few geopolitical subjects are as important as the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Observers around the globe are anxiously analyzing the probability that an invasion would succeed and the closely linked question of how Beijing can be effectively deterred from attempting it. In this context, valuable lessons can be learned from an earlier failed invasion of the island by a power with overwhelming naval superiority. France’s attempts to occupy parts of Taiwan in 1884-85 were stymied by a series of clever defensive actions. Despite the immense technological and other differences between today’s battlespace and that of 140 years ago, the successful defense of Taiwan can provide insights into how to protect it today.

By way of context, Taiwan was only one front in a wider Sino-French War, whose impetus was France’s desire to expand its control from southern Vietnam to the northern part of that country. Northern Vietnam, despite its history of resistance to Chinese power, was a tributary of China. French efforts to take over northern Vietnam were being parried by a Chinese force—the “Black Flag Army”—led by Liu Yongfu, an independent warlord, but one whom China did not try to rein in as he fought the French. The Sino-French War of 1884-85 began after a series of battles and unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives. Although the key prize was Vietnam, France also used its naval superiority to attack both mainland China and Taiwan, primarily as a way of exerting pressure on China to enable a favorable settlement in Vietnam. France’s goal was not to permanently occupy Taiwan but to seize important parts of it so so that France could trade at the negotiating table.

Given the state of China in the late nineteenth century, it would have seemed that France should have been able to easily defeat Chinese forces, at least in any coastal location. The Sino-French War was only one of many instances between the 1830s and 1940s when China was ravaged and insulted by foreign forces. At the time of this particular conflict, the decrepit Qing Dynasty had already lost a couple of wars to Britain and to a British-French coalition. As a result, China had been forced to yield treaty ports where the foreigners could trade opium and other goods, while “extraterritoriality” put those foreigners beyond the reach of Chinese law. Russia had seized a Chinese territory as large as France, which it continues to control today, including the key port of Vladivostok. Moreover, just two decades before the Sino-French War, China had been weakened by the devastating Taiping rebellion, a protracted civil war with one of the highest death tolls of any conflict in history. French forces were confident of winning easy victories, though that excessive confidence would plague their efforts in Taiwan and elsewhere. Chinese ground forces were surprisingly tenacious in Vietnam, even as French naval superiority enabled their warships to effectively bombard coastal locations across mainland China.

The French invasion of Taiwan

The initial French attack on Taiwan was launched against the northern port of Keelung in August 1884. The plan was to destroy the port’s defenses and then to conduct an amphibious assault to seize it, as well as nearby coal mines. The French bombardment destroyed the Chinese guns ashore, and they staged a landing the same day. However, the next day, unexpectedly large and effective Chinese forces managed to drive the landing force back to the sea. The French, frustrated at their failed invasion, staged a second attempt in October. Their marines landed west of Keelung, and were able to seize the town and several elevated positions. However, they could not advance beyond this, and the coal mines exceeded their grasp. In any case, the coal mines were no longer as desirable a prize. The Chinese commander, Liu Ming-chuan (no relation to the previously mentioned Liu Yongfu) had flooded the mines, destroyed mining machinery, and burned 15,000 tons of recently mined coal to forestall French use of these resources.

Liu Ming-chuan correctly anticipated that Tamsui—a port at the mouth of a river by the same name, twenty miles to the west of Keelung—would be the focus of the next French attack. In addition to moving forces from Keelung to Tamsui, he bolstered them with Chinese frontiersmen who lived in the “hill country” at the edge of Taiwan’s mountains, where they regularly clashed with the Taiwanese aborigines who had been driven into the highlands. These frontiersmen were armed with relatively primitive guns, but they were skilled at using any landscape to fire from concealed positions.

Map of the action at Tamsui, 8 October 1884 (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Liu also had the wisdom to find ways to thwart French naval power from intruding up the Tamsui River. He used the ancient naval tactic of blockships: sinking vessels (in this case, by filling them with stones) to obstruct traffic. He also had a number of naval mines that were emplaced, like the blockships, close to the mouth of the river. The mines were remotely controlled via cables that linked to a command post ashore. The initial obstructions and minefields were later bolstered by large baskets full of stones that were sunk to prevent passage. The French were cognizant of these threats, and found their warships’ movements stymied by a ground force without a navy.

The French began their amphibious assault with a bombardment against the two forts of Tamsui; many of the shells missed their targets or failed to explode. The French warships also sent small boats to conduct a minehunting operation: they visually scouted for the small buoys that maintained the mines near the top of the water column. On finding some of these, they located and tried to sever the undersea cables linking the mines to the command post, but without success. They retreated when the Chinese forces detonated one of the mines near them.

The French forces then prepared to land a group of marines who would seize the forts and the command post controlling the mines. Unfortunately for them, they had done insufficient reconnaissance, and were unaware that they would be approaching an area with dense tree and bush cover, as well as Chinese trenches. This environment not only enabled their opponents to readily shoot at them from concealed positions, but also limited the ability of French forces to move as coherent units through the brush. They frequently could not see one another or the enemy, and could not see visual signals to coordinate action. The early death of the marines’ bugler prevented communication and coordination using sound, except over the short distances within which French officers were able to shout over the din of battle. The French fired aimlessly into the trees and brush, unable to locate the enemies who were continually shooting at them from multiple directions. Vanquished, they stumbled back to the shore and re-embarked their ships the same day that they had arrived.

The stymied French shifted their attention back to Keelung, where they maintained a foothold. Over the next month, they hastily constructed various forts, and repaired some Chinese ones that they had attacked and captured. French forces fought off a couple of attempts by Chinese infantry to launch surprise attacks against these forts, and attacked both a Chinese fort and a village hosting a logistical base. The situation was largely a stalemate, in which French forces destroyed a couple of villages and the Chinese killed a few French foragers, but neither side could decisively advance. This stalemate worked to the Chinese forces’ advantage: the stymied French were succumbing in great numbers to disease, with up to half their ground forces incapacitated at any given time, and many dying.

French forces might be incapable of movement on land, but they still dominated at sea. During the last months of 1884, they sought to bring this advantage to bear by blockading three of Taiwan’s key ports: Tamsui, Tainan, and Kaohsiung. They captured or sank a number of merchant ships; however, Chinese forces and merchants readily evaded the porous blockade, particularly by the clever expedient of sailing at night. China was able to move tens of thousands of mainland troops onto the island, as well as substantial quantities of materiel, including German-made cannons. Liu Ming-chuan further bolstered his strength with personnel gathered from Taiwan itself. These included both additional frontiersmen and the people those frontiersmen had fought for centuries: select groups of Taiwanese aborigines, who were renowned for their ferocity in battle. French forces also increased their numbers, drawing on units from elsewhere in Asia and beyond.

Taiwan mountains (Source: Wikimedia commons)

In this case, French training French forces launched a couple of offensives around Keelung during January through March of 1885, making sixty miles of forward progress and taking additional fortifications. There were occasional Chinese tactical successes that exploited the terrain, such as rolling large rocks down on an ascending French force, and inflicting heavy casualties while hiding behind tree cover. However, the situation on the ground returned to a stalemate during March. Under these circumstances, French commanders began to develop plans for withdrawing from Keelung, feeling that the cost was not worth the benefits of remaining. At the end of March, French forces had an unequivocal success in seizing the Penghu Islands (also known as the Pescadores), a small archipelago just west of Taiwan. Aside from the fact that France could trade those islands at the negotiating table, they provided a base for ships, and seizure of them at an earlier date might have strengthened French warships’ ability to effectively blockade Taiwan.

The French never had to conduct their planned evacuation from Keelung under fire, since the two sides came to a peace agreement in early April. The most important aspect of the peace settlement was that France acquired control over the whole of Vietnam. To ensure that Chinese forces pulled out of Vietnam, French troops remained in Keelung and the Penghu Islands until they had done so. Taiwan and the Penghus were, as they had been throughout the war, only a means for France to achieve its ultimate goals in Vietnam. Meanwhile, Japan looked covetously on Taiwan, and compelled the Qing dynasty to surrender the island to Japan a decade later, in the wake of China’s catastrophic defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. As a codicil, Liu Yongfu, leader of the Chinese Black Flag Army in Vietnam, tried to resist Japan’s takeover of Taiwan. He briefly became president of the self-proclaimed and swiftly terminated “Republic of Formosa” before being compelled to flee.

Lessons for today

A few key points emerge from the above narrative. First, in Taiwan as elsewhere, a hostile navy’s movements can be hindered by the use of naval mines or inert obstacles. The Qing defenders of Taiwan only had enough mines, spare vessels, and time to block the entrance to the Tamsui River. However, the rim of shallow water stretching along Taiwan’s northern, western, and southern coasts facilitate larger-scale mining and obstruction operations. Emplacing inexpensive artificial reefs in peacetime could impede any potential Chinese landing force, while also having ecological benefits. China could divert resources to bombard those reefs, but that would reveal where they planned to land, and the difficulty of doing rapid battle-damage assessment would likely result in chunks of reef strewn about in pathways that the invasion force planned to use. Taiwan could also deploy numerous mines that sit on the seabed, and are much harder to hunt than those used during the Sino-French War. Such mines can use technology that dates back to the mid-twentieth century, and be readily made in vast quantities; the main constraint is ensuring that they can be loaded and distributed during a short timespan on the eve of war. The result would be a fierce gauntlet that would menace Chinese ships and landing craft, while also channelizing, delaying, and disrupting traffic in ways that would degrade operations and render ships more vulnerable to other forms of attack.

Republic of China Navy ship Lan Yang (FFG-935), morning in Keelung Harbour (Wikimedia Commons)

Second, the importance of the Penghu Islands should not be underestimated in any campaign involving Taiwan. Those islands represent a useful base for blockading Taiwan and a stepping-stone that can enable attacks on it; the key French error lay in not seizing them earlier. Their physical isolation from Taiwan increases their vulnerability. In case China invades the Penghu Islands as part of an overall campaign against Taiwan, Taiwan needs to have enough forces on the islands to inflict both casualties and delays, while quickly destroying all port, air, and other facilities that might aid the invaders.

Third, seemingly menacing blockades of Taiwan can be quite permeable, as the French experience shows: tens of thousands of troops and vast quantities of materiel bypassed it. Despite today’s China having the advantages of greater sensor capabilities and numbers, as well as aircraft and missiles, it may not be able to hermetically seal off Taiwan from the world. Decoys, distractions, and electronic disruption of sensors could limit the effectiveness and responsiveness of Chinese ships and aircraft. Meanwhile, numerous small, low-signature blockade-runners could sneak past Chinese patrols to deliver goods to piers or beaches along the island’s thousand-mile coastline. Like any smugglers, they will benefit from the high financial rewards available to those who brave the blockade, and such incentives will likely induce many to participate. In some cases, they might try to oversaturate the ability of blockaders in any one area to respond, like a herd of zebras rushing past a lion and creating confusion with their various signatures while doing so. The result is that while some goods may be in short supply, and improvised logistical chains will be needed to distribute goods from beaches to where they are needed, China should not anticipate that Taiwan will need to meekly and rapidly surrender in the face of a blockade.

Fourth, Taiwan’s physical environment can work to the great advantage of defenders. The hill country of Keelung, and especially the thick cover of trees and bushes, enabled Chinese forces to defeat the initial landing and to greatly impede the second. While Taiwan is less wooded than it was, the growth of urban environments creates a forest of metal and concrete from which defenders can effectively target the advancing enemy. As in any urban warfare, the defender has superior knowledge about how to remain both effective and invisible.

Fifth, the failed landing at Tamsui underscores the importance and vulnerability of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Inadequate knowledge of the physical environment contributed mightily to the French defeat. Excessive dependence on a single, critical communications node—the sole bugler—exacerbated the disaster. While moderns might dismiss these problems as belonging to another age, any deployed communications system being used in an expeditionary environment is likely to be somewhat fragile. Should a Chinese force land in Taiwan, its communications capabilities may be strained and can be readily fractured by targeting key nodes in combination with electronic warfare to degrade, disrupt, and delay signals. Necessary workarounds in the face of broken communications may potentially enable Taiwanese forces to better deceive the enemy with false electronic and voice communications, exploiting shared languages to induce frustration and fratricide. This threat can also contribute to deterrence to the extent that the PLA and China’s leadership may be hesitant to launch an invasion until they think they have communications that are thoroughly reliable and secure.

Finally, overconfidence was a key factor that limited the effectiveness of French forces. As was noted above, they might have begun by seizing the smaller, more isolated Penghu Islands, and then used that archipelago as a base for an effective blockade of Taiwan, followed by invasion in a favorable location. Instead, they began by launching attacks against two locations in northern Taiwan, areas with considerable cover and where the defenders could draw on the resources of a large island. Contrary to expectations, the defenders were unable to be scattered with a few volleys of modern weapons, and the French were driven back to the sea twice before achieving stalemated control over a small area. The Qing dynasty was weak, but not dead, and French underestimation of its capabilities was paid for with failed operations and loss of life. This is one area where human beings have not advanced alongside our technologies: we are still susceptible to overestimating our knowledge and hubris that only briefly masks our incompetence. Today, mainland China may be apt to underestimate a small nation whose population outnumbers more than sixty to one. However, Taiwan’s personnel, like those of Ukraine, may have more skills and motivation than are perceived by the potential aggressor. Disabusing China of its illusions of easy victory—the type of delusions that led Putin’s vanguard to pack dress uniforms for the parade in Kyiv—may aid in deterrence.

Closing remarks

Despite the tremendous advances in military technology over the last 140 years, it is worth revisiting lessons from the French invasion of Taiwan. The physical geography remains largely the same, though Taiwan’s expansive urban terrain may influence the calculus of would-be invaders from the mainland. The utility of naval mines and obstructions, the defensibility of Taiwan’s physical environment, the permeability of blockades, the importance of the Penghu Islands, the fragility of front-line C4ISR, and the risks of overconfidence remain formidable threats to any invading force.

Principal sources for this essay include The Island of Formosa: Past and Present by James W. Davidson (1903), Maritime Taiwan by Shih-Shan Henry Tsai (2009), L’Expedition Française de Formose 1884-1885 by Eugène Garnot (1894), and Modern Chinese Warfare 1795-1989, by Bruce A. Elleman (2001).

Dr. Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation. He has led numerous studies for the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and other services on diverse subjects such as naval mine warfare, the effective use of uncrewed vehicles, non-lethal weapons, and Arctic operations. He earned his bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from Yale University, as well as a master’s degree and PhD in the same field from the University of Pennsylvania.

navalnews.com · by Peter Ong · December 2, 2024

13. The United States Must Revisit the Basics of Geostrategy

The United States Must Revisit the Basics of Geostrategy

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · December 16, 2024

It has become something of a cliché in Washington policy debates that the world today is more unstable and dangerous than at any time since the end of the Cold War. But even this statement doesn’t fully capture the gravity of the situation, for the reality is that at no point during the post-Cold War era have we witnessed a surge of direct and proxy great power conflicts comparable to what we have seen in the past decade. Nor has deterrence failed so often in such a short period of time.

A Challenging Time in Global Affairs

In only the past three years, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time, Hamas attacked Israel – the closest US ally in the Middle East – while Iran proceeded to launch an unprecedented direct attack on Israel. Today, the North Korean military is deployed in Ukraine – an Asian power and officially a non-combatant fighting in the largest war Europe has seen since 1945, with Washington seemingly at a loss as to how to respond.

At a structural level, an alliance hostile to the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia has coalesced, with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea forming a new “Axis of Dictatorships” to support and enable each other at speed and scale, with Russia benefitting both economically and in terms of weapons and munitions supplies – and of late, also manpower – to press for advantage in Ukraine. Our world is unraveling before our eyes, with regional power balances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia on the verge of imploding.

The Rules-Based-Order Dilemma

So, the question must be asked: How did we get here? How did the United States fritter away so much power and influence in just one generation?

While the Cold War accustomed Western national security analysts to thinking in terms of systemic polarities, the post-Cold War decade led some to believe that American primacy meant that the “rules-based-order” steeped in neo-liberal economic orthodoxies that undergirded globalization would last.

German Army Cpl. Vadim Ganshi, assigned to 2nd Company, Infantry Battalion 291, French German Brigade, awaits orders to fire a Panzerfaust 3. Vaziani, Republic of Georgia, Aug. 5, 2017. Noble Partner 17 supports Georgia in conducting home station training of its second NATO Response Force (NRF) contribution. Noble Partner will further enhance NFR and Operational Capabilities Concept interoperability and readiness in order to support regional stability. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Hayley Gardner).

Some believed that since we offered Moscow a seat at the table after the Cold War, so to speak, that Russia would become a status quo power, with China postured to assume its future role as a “responsible stakeholder in the international system.” What these assertions missed – especially post-9/11 – was the historic verity that what a revanchist imperial power wants above all is to have its own table back, and that every rapidly modernizing and industrializing power invariably becomes geostrategically assertive, first in its region and then beyond.

As the United States took a detour into secondary theaters to pursue the Global War on Terror, our adversaries built up their forces and prepared to press for advantage in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and beyond. Instead of shoring up deterrence in key theaters, we kept preaching “emergent multipolarity,” as though de facto appeasement could induce the revisionists to change course.

A Return to the Past in Geopolitics

And so, today we find ourselves in an environment increasingly reminiscent of the late 1930s, where the overarching balance of power is becoming ever-less stable, and where the difference between peace and a multi-theater system-transforming war will likely hinge on whether the United States and its allies can sustain the ever-more tenuous regional balances.

While historians like to assign precise dates to when previous wars erupted, the reality is that the Second World War did not start when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939. It had a rolling start when precarious regional balances – from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Spanish civil war, the Anschluss of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia – began to unravel at an ever-faster pace.

Today, much like in the run up to that global conflict, we find ourselves in a world of protracted systemic instability. Repeated failures of deterrence make it harder to undo the damage done by the last two decades of appeasement, starting with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia after Germany and France blocked President George W. Bush’s push to extend an invitation to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.

President Putin watches the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercises of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

Over the past decade, Western leaders appear to have forgotten that appeasement is the flipside of deterrence. Deterrence rests on two fundamental principles: 1) having the capabilities to respond if a red line is crossed, and 2) and most importantly, having the political will to do so. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly resorted to naked military power – first when he seized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, then in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and severed it from Ukraine, a year later when he sent his forces into Syria, and then in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Each time, he scored a political win, suffering only marginal consequences until 2022, when the United States and NATO finally reacted, but with no strategy for victory in place and with escalation management as our overarching priority.

The Path Forward

We are at a critical juncture, one which will require us to restore the regional power balances so as to avoid an all-out war. The incoming Trump administration needs to set aside the normative language of the past three decades and return to the founding principles of hard power and geopolitics. We need a new national security strategy that communicates to the electorate what is at stake if the regional balances unravel and, most of all, how what happens “out there” impacts our homeland security and our prosperity at home. We need to articulate the irreducible interests of this nation in terms that speak directly to the security and well-being of the American people.

It’s time to return to realism in American national security policy, putting hard power considerations and geopolitics front and center. There is no time to waste.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Michta

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow and Director of the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · December 16, 2024

14. The West’s Strategic Opportunity in Syria: Forcing Dilemmas on Moscow that Roll Back Russian Power and Influence

​Excerpts:

A narrow strategic window of opportunity exists for the United States to exploit: forcing Russia into difficult choices in the Mediterranean and Ukraine. By harnessing the shifting dynamics in Syria and Libya, Western leaders can pressure Putin to make painful decisions between maintaining his military foothold in the Mediterranean or negotiating peace in Ukraine favorable to Kyiv and its supporters. This approach not only weakens Russia’s strategic positioning but also aligns with broader Western goals of reducing authoritarianism, while promoting human rights and democratization to facilitate long-term stability.

The moment is ripe for decisive action. Supporting rebel forces in both Syria and Libya will create additional dilemmas for Moscow, compelling Putin to either relinquish its only overseas bases outside of the former Soviet Union or face sustained pressure on multiple fronts. This strategy reinforces Western influence across the Mediterranean, curtails Russian adventurism, and addresses humanitarian crises that drive instability and migration. By acting now, Washington can reshape the strategic landscape, diminish Putin’s regional ambitions, further limit his reach, and foster a more stable and democratic order in the Middle East and North Africa.

The West’s Strategic Opportunity in Syria: Forcing Dilemmas on Moscow that Roll Back Russian Power and Influence - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek · December 16, 2024

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The rapid fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has created a strategic inflection point that US leaders—in both the current administration of President Joe Biden and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump—may be missing. President Biden has stated that his administration “will work with our partners and the stakeholders in Syria to help them seize an opportunity to manage the risk,” and will continue supporting partners in neighboring countries and make use of US personnel in the region to prevent the Islamic State from taking advantage of the situation. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is meeting with allies and partners in Jordan to discuss potential ways ahead, before heading to meet with leaders in Turkey, arguably the strongest actor in Syria. Contrarily, President-elect Trump posted on social media right before the fall of Assad that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!”

Unfortunately, both approaches miss an opportunity to amplify key ramifications of Assad’s fall—namely, the weakening of Russia, Iran, and their proxies. The collapse of the Syrian regime presents a timely opportunity for the United States and its allies and partners to tip the scales in not just the Middle East, but Africa and Eastern Europe, as well. The power vacuum in Syria demands swift and decisive action, challenging the conventional wisdom that effective strategies must play out over long time horizons and require patience to see them come to fruition. In this case, Washington and like-minded capitals can advance measures to impose strategic dilemmas on Russia.

The collapse of Assad’s government was precipitated by a cascade of events. First, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine resulted in a military quagmire that has limited its ability to prop up Syria. Second, Iran probably approved the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel, provoking major Israeli reactions. Subsequent Israeli operations weakened Iranian proxies like Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, forcing many Hezbollah fighters to return to Lebanon, and abandoning their support for Assad. Iran struck Israel in response, which led to a large-scale series of Israeli “precise strikes on military targets in Iran” and elsewhere in the region. Such events reduced support for and weakened the Syrian regime. Combined with determined rebel offensives, mostly spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham alongside widespread uprisings, pro-regime forces disintegrated and stopped supporting Assad.

We contend Western leaders can push an agenda that forces Moscow and Iran into difficult choices. The United States can easily incentivize the new Syrian government—likely to be led by many rebel commanders—to put at risk Russia’s control of its military bases inside. Meanwhile, it can also motivate rebels in eastern Libya—led mainly by the strongman Khalifa Haftar—to similarly put Russian bases in Libya at risk. These Russian bases in Syria and Libya form the backbone of Russian military power projection in the Mediterranean and throughout Africa and the Middle East. The United States can leverage the weakened position of Russian President Vladimir Putin by forcing a painful dilemma: the Mediterranean or Ukraine.

The West can seek to convince rebel leaders in both countries to let Russia have its bases in Libya and Syria in exchange for Russian concessions, like a favorable peace deal in Ukraine. Otherwise, the United States, with the help of allies and partners, can easily lobby and incentivize rebels with sufficient economic and military support to seize all Russian bases in Libya and Syria, thus removing Russia’s ability to operate across the region completely. Without quick action on either front, however, Russia may negotiate new long-term basing rights and access inside both countries.

The Opportunity at Hand

By assisting the various rebels in Libya and Syria, Russian bases can be put at risk, forcing Putin to choose between making concessions in Ukraine or losing crucial Mediterranean bases. This approach not only provides leverage against Russia but also supports the incoming Trump administration’s goals of reducing the American military presence in Syria and Iraq.

Russia’s military presence in Syria is centered around two key installations: Tartus naval base on the Mediterranean coast and the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia. These bases are critical for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean and its operations in Africa. The Tartus facility, in particular, provides Russia with its only direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, allowing it to conduct naval exercises, station warships, and host nuclear submarines. Besides these two main bases, Russia has at least eighty military outposts scattered throughout Syria, and emerging reports suggest that most Russian forces are encircled across the country. Supposedly, Syrian opposition leaders have pledged to protect Russian military bases and diplomatic facilities in Syria, but this fragile guarantee is precarious and could easily be disrupted by savvy Western leaders offering a better deal. In spite of this guarantee, the new Syrian government should be reluctant to host a long-term Russian presence as Russian attacks after its 2015 intervention had killed 6,969 civilians, including 2,055 children, 1,094 women, and 70 medical personnel at schools, markets, and medical facilities, by June 2023. Worse, there is speculation at one abandoned Russian base in Deir Ezzor that Russian forces had been conducting false flag operations (provokatsia), given that the base was littered with Islamic State uniforms and flags.

The West must also consider Russia’s recent military expansion in eastern Libya and cooperation with Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, with airbases at Brak al-Shati, al-Jufra, and al-Qardabiya. Additionally, Russia may have already established a de facto naval base in Tobruk, given numerous Russian port calls and deliveries at this port. Such development suggests Putin likely hedged his bets, potentially accepting losses in Syria while attempting to consolidate his position elsewhere in the region. Western capitals must take this into account when formulating their strategy, as it could either provide additional leverage or complicate negotiations. Regardless, Western governments must accept the necessary risk of deepening engagement with Haftar for the larger strategic purposes of pushing Russia out of Libya as well.

The potential loss of these strategic bases would severely undercut Russian military capability and credibility in the Mediterranean and Africa. It would also severely limit Russia’s ability to deploy private military companies across the African continent, where their influence and access have advanced Kremlin goals as the two Syrian bases support Russian bases in Libya, which in turn support other Russian deployments throughout the continent. Russia maintains 800–1,200 troops permanently in eastern Libya, serving “as the crucial hub for Moscow’s mission in Africa due to its geographical location and political instability.” The European Council on Foreign Relations reports that, although the Russian Africa Corps “has perhaps 1,000 men in Mali; a hundred or so in Burkina Faso; an unclear number in Niger and Sudan; and about 2,000 in the [Central African Republic],” they are “deeply overstretched and losing credibility.” This overextended situation for Russia must be exploited by the Americans and Europeans. Shutting down Russian bases in Syria makes supporting forces inside Libya more difficult, and in turn makes it even more difficult to deploy Russian personnel deeper into Africa. By the West shutting down this logistical pipeline, the Russians would expend significantly more resources deploying into Africa, leading them divert even more scarce resources from their Ukraine fight, in particular strategic airlift, to support their African adventures if they are kicked out of Syria, and eventually Libya.

Navigating the Risk and Reward of Engaging Rebels

The situation in Syria will be complicated and difficult. In the coming months, numerous domestic and international actors and strongmen will likely vie for influence and power. The main Syrian rebel group, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led most military operations that toppled the Assad regime. While HTS has expressed a willingness for a peaceful resolution and criticized Iran’s involvement in Syria, the group’s past association with extremist ideologies requires careful handling. Any attempt by the West to engage with these leaders in the new Syrian government will require most governments and the United Nations to remove the terrorist designation, which UN leaders have already been suggesting. Further legitimization will require the opening of embassies and consulates inside Syria and providing Western technocrats to help jumpstart Syrian institutions. As an example, the US government could support the development of an inclusive political system by deploying resources from both the State Department and the US Agency for International Development as well as facilitating assistance from nongovernmental organizations. Although the US embassy in Syria has suspended operations since February 2012, Secretary of State Blinken says that the United States is in direct contact with HTS. Still, there appears to be little American engagement at all in Damascus at the moment—something Moscow will keenly exploit if Western inaction in Syria continues.

Other key players include Turkey, whose aims include repatriating the three million Syrian refugees there and marginalizing Kurdish forces, and which will likely have the most external influence in a new Syria; European countries, which also want to repatriate refugees back to Syria; Iran, which likely seeks to preserve its land bridge to Hezbollah and influence in Syria; and Israel, which desires to cut off Hezbollah from Iran and make a longstanding enemy into a friendly neighbor. Within this context, Israel must be pressured into wrapping up airstrikes and other military operations in Syria, which are meant to destroy remaining regime weapon systems and munition storage sites, to effectively neuter the military capabilities of the new Syrian government and prevent proliferation. If Israeli operations, such as its Golan Heights expansion, continue much longer, it will create renewed resentment against Israel and the West. Hence, the United States must navigate these competing interests while pursuing its objectives of a free Syria that is not a threat to its neighbors, is free from Iranian and Hezbollah influence, avoids Islamic fundamentalism and repression of non-Sunni groups, and includes all legitimate Syrian actors. Above all, tight coordination among US actors, allies, and partners is vital to the success of this venture. No one actor can do it alone, but there should be enough shared consensus that the continued presence of Russian military bases in the Mediterranean is a cancer on the region: Russian bases must be cut out of the region altogether to achieve long-term stability.

Forcing a Grand Bargain?

Western powers need to view Syria and Libya through a strategic competition lens when determining their next steps: Should they assist the new Syrian government and Libyan rebels in capturing Russian bases or permit Russia to retain these assets as leverage during peace negotiations regarding Ukraine? Presently, Putin faces little pressure. However, Washington could easily rally a coalition of like-minded capitals to force Moscow into a decision between two alternatives: lose critical Mediterranean bases or negotiate a deal in Ukraine—both of which carry significant repercussions for Putin’s regime. Western powers must put both options on the table and seek a win in either region. Continued Western inaction and apathy only cedes the decision-making space to Russia.

By acting decisively now, the United States along with its allies and partners can reshape the strategic landscape in Syria, Libya, and beyond. Assuming Putin is unwilling to make concessions on its war against Ukraine, then helping newfound proxies in Syria and Libya force Russia out of its bases would cause repercussions for Putin with his domestic audience and undercut the perception of Russian military power across the Mediterranean. Additionally, it would strengthen American and European influence across the region at the expense of Iran. Resolving internal strife in Syria and Libya by helping remove Russian bases and influence would also alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis in both countries, reducing the flow of refugees into Europe—a flow that has led to the rise of right-wing populist parties and fractured domestic politics across the continent. Finally, dismantling Russian military power in the Mediterranean and Africa would remove pressure from the southern flank of NATO and would facilitate an increase in democratization, as Russian money and weapons would no longer corrupt and empower strongmen across the region.

A narrow strategic window of opportunity exists for the United States to exploit: forcing Russia into difficult choices in the Mediterranean and Ukraine. By harnessing the shifting dynamics in Syria and Libya, Western leaders can pressure Putin to make painful decisions between maintaining his military foothold in the Mediterranean or negotiating peace in Ukraine favorable to Kyiv and its supporters. This approach not only weakens Russia’s strategic positioning but also aligns with broader Western goals of reducing authoritarianism, while promoting human rights and democratization to facilitate long-term stability.

The moment is ripe for decisive action. Supporting rebel forces in both Syria and Libya will create additional dilemmas for Moscow, compelling Putin to either relinquish its only overseas bases outside of the former Soviet Union or face sustained pressure on multiple fronts. This strategy reinforces Western influence across the Mediterranean, curtails Russian adventurism, and addresses humanitarian crises that drive instability and migration. By acting now, Washington can reshape the strategic landscape, diminish Putin’s regional ambitions, further limit his reach, and foster a more stable and democratic order in the Middle East and North Africa.

G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther, PhD, is a retired US Army strategist and is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He has published in a number of formats and locations since 2005 on a variety of national security issues.

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “Franky” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College, fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, and fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy. He has published two books and over one hundred articles on strategy and warfare.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the Department of the Air Force and the US Naval War College. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.

Image: Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu inspected Russian Navy exercises in the Mediterranean Sea during a visit to Syria in February 2022. (Credit: Russian Ministry of Defense, via Wikimedia Commons)

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek · December 16, 2024

15.  Defense experts predict Philippines will join future Yama Sakura military drills

​Our silk web of alliances is growing stronger.

Defense experts predict Philippines will join future Yama Sakura military drills

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · December 13, 2024

Philippine marines visited Camp Asaka, Japan, Dec. 7-8, 2024, to observe the annual Yama Sakura exercise. (Philippine Marine Corps)

The Philippines will soon become a full participant in annual Yama Sakura warfighting drills involving U.S., Japanese and Australian ground forces, according to defense experts.

The Philippine navy, on Thursday, posted photos on social media of Filipino marines in Japan observing the weeklong exercise, which kicked off Dec. 6.

The drills involve 1,500 U.S. personnel, 5,000 Japanese troops and 300 Australian soldiers doing a range of training, including simulated missile strikes, from locations across Japan, Alaska, Hawaii and Australia, according to a Dec. 5 Army news release.

It’s the first time U.S. Marines have joined the command post exercise and the second year Australians have participated, the release said.

Philippine marines or soldiers will likely join Yama Sakura as full participants next year or in 2026, according to retired Marine Col. Grant Newsham, a senior researcher with the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo.

“Philippine military leaders have been visiting Japan over the last few years and the overall Japan-Philippine defense relationship has been developing steadily, he said by email Thursday.

The U.S. will welcome the cooperation, which shows four governments committed to mutual defense, Newsham said.

Philippine marines visited Camp Asaka, Japan, Dec. 7-8, 2024, to observe the annual Yama Sakura exercise. (Philippine Marine Corps)

The Philippines and Japan signed a reciprocal access agreement in July. Australia, which signed a similar agreement in 2022, joined Yama Sakura for the first time last year. Such agreements facilitate the movement of forces and equipment into signatory countries for training.

The agreement between the Philippines and Japan will promote joint exercises and disaster relief, said Carlyle Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales and a lecturer at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

The agreement notes how the Philippines is at a strategic juncture on the sea lanes with Japan, he said by email Thursday.

“The participation of Marines from the Philippines as observers at this year’s Exercise Yama Sakura and the inaugural involvement of U.S. Marines, clearly signals the Japan welcomes their presence and is likely to expand their participation in relevant military exercises alongside Australia which has already commenced reciprocal training with Japan,” he said.

The trend line seems clear, Thayer said.

“There will be increased bilateral military exercises, an expansion of bilateral exercises to include other security partners, and larger scale multilateral exercises involving Australia, Japan, and the Philippines in each other’s countries plus the United States in coming years,” he said.

Coast guards from Japan and the Philippines have been working closely for five years, according to Patricio Abinales, a professor at the University of Hawaii’s School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

“These are good moves given that we do not know what [President-elect Donald] Trump will do with the West Philippine Sea issue once he comes to power,” he said by email Thursday, using the Philippines’ name for South China Sea waters inside the country’s exclusive economic zone.

Manila has butted heads regularly with Beijing over disputed territory on the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Japan has clashed with China over disputed territory in the East China Sea.

“A decade ago the idea of any foreign troops training in Japan — other than the Americans — was political dynamite,” Newsham said. “Nowadays, nobody remembers what they were complaining about.”

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · December 13, 2024

​16. How to Hold Syria Together

​Excerpts:

Assad will not be missed. Under Assad and his father, Hafez, the Syrian government did heinous things to maintain power, brutalizing and immiserating Syria’s people. The relief of most Syrians at Assad’s departure is clear from the celebrations that have filled the streets of Damascus and other cities, and from the outpouring of emotion at the opening of the government’s network of prisons and the liberation of its detainees.

Now all parties need to ensure that the darkest predictions about Assad’s fall do not come to pass, and that what replaces Assad is not just chaos and violence. Syrians themselves will undoubtedly play the lead role in deciding the country’s future. Yet outside countries can also help by encouraging HTS and other Syrian groups to pursue a peaceful, maximally inclusive political transition. In parallel, donor countries should advance a large program of humanitarian and economic assistance for Syria, including aid for vulnerable Syrians and support for essential services nationwide. They should provide immediate relief from sanctions imposed on the previous Assad government, including waivers or licenses neutralizing sanctions on state institutions such as Syria’s central bank and on whole economic sectors. Outsiders should strongly discourage any new factional conflict and resist the temptation to advance their own interests by supporting one group over another.

Although some countries may have understandable reservations about HTS, they should still want Syria’s transition to succeed, and they absolutely should not interfere and make it fail. The disintegration of Syria will be worse, for Syrians and for the region. And if Syria sinks into chaos, it won’t just be a human disaster—it will mean that the case for the Assad dictatorship has been vindicated.

How to Hold Syria Together

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sam Heller · December 16, 2024

In the Wake of Assad’s Fall, the Biggest Threat Is Chaos

Sam Heller

December 16, 2024

Celebrating the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Latakia, Syria, December 2024 Umit Bektas / Reuters

Sam Heller is an Analyst and a Fellow with Century International, the Century Foundation’s center for international research and policy.

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Until Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, on December 8, few countries actually wanted the Syrian dictator’s government to fall. This was not because foreign governments liked Assad or approved of the brutal way in which he reigned over Syria. Rather, they were afraid of what might replace him: rule by extremist militants, sectarian bloodletting, and chaos that could engulf not just Syria but much of the Middle East.

That fearful vision was also the Assad government’s argument for itself, that its continued survival kept anarchy and carnage at bay—and many people, including foreign policymakers, were convinced of it. In 2015, when opposition militants came close to toppling Assad, U.S. officials regarded the possibility of outright rebel victory and regime collapse as tantamount to “catastrophic success.”

Now Assad is gone. Syrians are celebrating in the streets of Damascus, opposition groups are attempting to organize a political transition, and the world is about to find out what comes after the fall. Assad remained ruthless and cruel to the end, even as he presided over an increasingly impoverished and dysfunctional state. He leaves a shattered country in his wake, and any new government—never mind a coalition of fractious armed opposition groups—would struggle in these circumstances. But the poor record of Syrian rebel groups when they have ruled significant stretches of territory also makes it difficult to be optimistic.

Still, it is in everyone’s interest that Syria succeed. Syrians do not want to endure further strife and devastation, and the international community cannot afford to see Syria come apart. Interested countries now need to do everything they can, including encouraging a peaceful, inclusive transition and providing ample humanitarian and economic assistance, to ensure that the worst fears about a post-Assad Syria do not come to pass.

THE FALL OF ASSAD

In 2011, the Assad government attempted to crush a nationwide protest movement. Those protests became an armed rebellion, which Assad met with ferocious, escalating violence. At several points in the ensuing war, Assad’s government seemed in real danger of being overrun by opposition militants. Interventions by Syrian allies Iran and Russia, however, stabilized the government militarily and enabled it to regain ground. Between 2015 and 2020, Assad bombed opposition-controlled enclaves across Syria into submission and retook most of the country.

The war then entered an extended stalemate. Turkey secured several remaining opposition-held pockets in Syria’s north, while the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, controlled Syria’s east, including the country’s most valuable agricultural and petrocarbon resources. Thanks in part to new U.S. sanctions and neighboring Lebanon’s economic meltdown, the whole of Syria—but government-held territory most of all—was plunged into a deep economic crisis. Syria’s state institutions and military progressively weakened, and the government proved too resource-starved to stabilize and rebuild opposition-held areas it had recaptured.

But this year, with Iran and Russia entangled in other conflicts, what remained of Syria’s armed opposition seized the opportunity. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—the Syrian Liberation Group, or HTS—and other opposition factions had been organizing for years in a Turkish-protected bastion in Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib. On November 27, these groups launched an offensive on the northern city of Aleppo. When they broke through the Syrian army’s defenses and seized the city, that set off the cascading failure and collapse of Syria’s military nationwide. HTS-led forces pushed south from Aleppo toward the capital, Damascus, as Syrians in the country’s center and south—including in formerly opposition-held areas—also rose up. On December 8, as opposition factions closed in on Damascus from both north and south, Assad fled to Russia. After more than 13 years of grinding civil war, the Assad government had crumbled in less than two weeks.

Now, in a post-Assad Damascus, HTS has taken the reins in attempting to manage an orderly political transition. HTS has installed the interim Syrian Salvation Government, which it created in Idlib, as a national transitional authority. It has also deployed its security forces in the capital, established checkpoints on key transport nodes across the country, and repeatedly warned triumphant opposition militants against abusing civilians and looting.

REBELS IN CHARGE

Many in Western media and policy circles now evidently assume that HTS will govern Syria. Yet there are reasons to doubt that things will be that simple. Until a few weeks ago, HTS controlled two-thirds of a province on Syria’s rural periphery. Running all of Syria will present a different challenge.

HTS is the latest incarnation of the al-Nusra Front, originally the Syrian vanguard of the Islamic State in Iraq and then al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. The group publicly broke ties with al Qaeda and transnational jihadism in 2016, although it still includes some veteran militants and foreign fighters in its ranks. It has been designated a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council, the United States, and other national governments.

In recent years, HTS has worked persistently to rehabilitate its image and secure its removal from international terrorist lists. As opposition forces marched on Damascus, HTS and its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, attempted to project an image of seriousness and moderation. HTS issued statements reassuring Syria’s diverse ethnic and sectarian constituencies and various international stakeholders, while Jolani gave interviews to Western media affirming Syria’s history of coexistence and committing to institutional governance.

As HTS swept to Damascus, its fighters appear to have remained relatively disciplined. Reports of summary executions and sectarian reprisals were limited, perhaps due, in part, to the way much of the Syrian army ceded territory without a fight. To be sure, some retributive violence has clearly taken place, and thousands of Syrians fearful of militant control have fled to Lebanon. But for the time being, the victorious opposition has not unleashed a vengeful campaign against its former foes, or against communities widely associated with the old regime.

The international community cannot afford to see Syria come apart.

Unfortunately, HTS’s record at the local level does not augur well for the construction of a national government that accommodates Syria’s religious, ethnic, and political diversity. In governing Idlib, the group has not shown any real commitment to political pluralism. HTS stage-managed some legitimating exercises to establish its Salvation Government in Idlib, including an ostensibly inclusive constitutional conference. Yet these were never open, participatory democratic processes. Jolani was always in control, even though he did not hold an official government portfolio; he was just understood to be the boss of Idlib. Just months ago, HTS’s security apparatus violently put down protests in Idlib demanding the release of detainees held by HTS and an end to Jolani’s rule.

HTS did manage to create order and relative stability in Idlib. Yet it seems unlikely that HTS will be able to reproduce its control over Idlib across the whole of Syria. The consolidation of HTS control in Idlib was a years-long, frequently violent process, in which HTS crushed rival opposition factions and eliminated its own dissidents and defectors. It seems plausible that HTS could have extended its administrative and security apparatus from Idlib to nearby Aleppo after it seized the city. Scaling that model to cover the whole of Syria, however, seems impossible. Syria is much larger geographically, has around ten times as many people as Idlib, is more diverse, and is now teeming with armed men outside HTS’s effective control. Although HTS may have fostered a strong culture of internal discipline, the group, by one recent count, commands only 30,000 men. That seems insufficient to govern Syria, or to control the many armed groups that may swim in HTS’s wake.

HTS is not the totality of Syria’s armed opposition. It was not even the whole of the armed opposition in Idlib, where HTS marshaled allied factions that functioned as its auxiliaries. HTS cannot control all the armed groups now active across the country. Certainly, the factions that remobilized in the country’s center and south over the past few weeks do not answer to Jolani.

When Syrian opposition groups previously captured other parts of the country—including in southern Syria, the countryside around Damascus, and in sections of northern Syria captured by Turkish-backed groups—the result was typically arbitrary militia rule and fratricidal infighting. Attempts to consolidate local factions and build unifying institutions repeatedly failed. HTS only succeeded in Idlib with a lot of time, persistence, and deadly coercion.

Many are now looking to Turkey to use its sway over HTS and other opposition groups to help steer Syria’s transition. But although Turkey has some influence over HTS, it does not seem to control the group, which, for example, previously rankled the Turkish government by seizing territory held by Turkish-backed groups in Aleppo. And among opposition factions in northern Syria that are more wholly Turkish-owned—on Turkey’s payroll, operating in Turkish-occupied areas that are administered by Turkish-linked institutions—Ankara has demonstrated no ability to impose discipline or curb abuses. Turkey has mainly just loosed these factions on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which Ankara considers an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a proscribed Kurdish militant group. Even after the fall of Assad, Turkish-backed factions have continued to attack the SDF in northern Syria.

There are reasons to doubt the sincerity of HTS’s moderate turn. But the more immediate danger to Syria is not Islamist extremism but the chaos that opposition victory might unleash. There is a real risk that the situation in post-Assad Syria will spin out of control, and that the country will devolve into not only open conflict between armed groups but also myriad individual acts of revenge and bloody score-settling.

SET UP TO FAIL

Whatever dispensation replaces Assad, this new government will not face auspicious conditions for stability and recovery. Syria’s already crushing socioeconomic crisis seems likely to deepen further. According to the UN, 16.7 million Syrians needed humanitarian assistance in 2024, more than 70 percent of the country’s population and the highest figure since the start of Syria’s war. Some 12.9 million Syrians are believed to be food insecure. State services had already broken down prior to Assad’s toppling. In areas held by the Assad government, in particular, electricity shortages had disrupted daily life and the provision of public services such as education and running water.

HTS has limited resources of its own. The group was able to maintain social stability in Idlib thanks largely to internationally supported humanitarian assistance delivered via Turkey. It remains a designated terrorist organization—it may now assume power in an economically ruined Syria that was already extensively sanctioned. It is not clear how a Syrian state apparatus and economy subject to numerous overlapping sanctions regimes will work, or whether a necessary influx of donor support will materialize. Assad’s longtime allies cannot be expected to keep Syria afloat; already, Iran has apparently halted shipments of oil that were critical for power generation. Humanitarian agencies have reported shortages of essential goods and dramatic increases in food prices in major cities across the country.

Some observers have suggested that the fall of the Assad government could pave the way for the return of Syrian refugees. The result, however, may be the opposite: new flows of migration out of Syria. It was always an oversimplification to claim that refugees who left Syria after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 were all fleeing the persecution of the Assad government; many were, but many others were trying to escape general insecurity and violence, Syrian military conscription, or socioeconomic collapse. For refugees to return in a meaningful, sustainable way, Syria needs to be a place where people can actually live—somewhere that is safe, with public services and reliable jobs. Even Syrian refugees overjoyed at the fall of Assad will be unable to return home if law and order breaks down, or if they cannot find ways to support their families.

Economic privation could further encourage violent competition between Syrian armed groups over territory and revenues. After more than a decade of war, these groups have developed their own independent interests and needs. And the black markets of Syria’s war economy will not just go away now that Assad is gone. For example, Assad-linked actors—including groups that once opposed him—had been making hundreds of millions of dollars trafficking illicit amphetamines. Control of that trade now may stoke violence between competing factions.

New migration from Syria and the resumption of internal conflict will have destabilizing effects on Syria’s neighbors—even as those neighbors may themselves play a destabilizing role inside Syria. Turkey has kept up a hard rhetorical line on SDF “separatist terrorists” in Syria and has encouraged continued attacks by its local proxies on Kurdish-led forces. Israel has bombed and destroyed Syrian military facilities across the country and seized additional territory along the Golan Heights. Some countries in the region, including Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, are likely alarmed by the prospect of a militant Islamist group taking power in Damascus. There is a real risk now that regional countries could recruit local factions to secure their equities in Syria, potentially by seizing territorial buffers along Syria’s borders. All of these circumstances are unlikely to be conducive to a successful political transition.

AVERTING DISASTER

Assad will not be missed. Under Assad and his father, Hafez, the Syrian government did heinous things to maintain power, brutalizing and immiserating Syria’s people. The relief of most Syrians at Assad’s departure is clear from the celebrations that have filled the streets of Damascus and other cities, and from the outpouring of emotion at the opening of the government’s network of prisons and the liberation of its detainees.

Now all parties need to ensure that the darkest predictions about Assad’s fall do not come to pass, and that what replaces Assad is not just chaos and violence. Syrians themselves will undoubtedly play the lead role in deciding the country’s future. Yet outside countries can also help by encouraging HTS and other Syrian groups to pursue a peaceful, maximally inclusive political transition. In parallel, donor countries should advance a large program of humanitarian and economic assistance for Syria, including aid for vulnerable Syrians and support for essential services nationwide. They should provide immediate relief from sanctions imposed on the previous Assad government, including waivers or licenses neutralizing sanctions on state institutions such as Syria’s central bank and on whole economic sectors. Outsiders should strongly discourage any new factional conflict and resist the temptation to advance their own interests by supporting one group over another.

Although some countries may have understandable reservations about HTS, they should still want Syria’s transition to succeed, and they absolutely should not interfere and make it fail. The disintegration of Syria will be worse, for Syrians and for the region. And if Syria sinks into chaos, it won’t just be a human disaster—it will mean that the case for the Assad dictatorship has been vindicated.

Sam Heller is an Analyst and a Fellow with Century International, the Century Foundation’s center for international research and policy.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Sam Heller · December 16, 2024

​17. Naval Academy ruling shows military strength depends on diversity

​I am sure this will be a topic of the confirmation hearings.

Naval Academy ruling shows military strength depends on diversity

militarytimes.com · by Leah Watson · December 13, 2024

The 1989 movie “Glory,” which earned Denzel Washington his first Oscar, tells the Civil War-era story of one of America’s first all-Black military regiments and the racism they had to overcome on their path to victory. At one point, recognizing the importance of soldiers ready to step up if the unit’s flag bearer should fall, the colonel asks, “If this man should fall, who will lift the flag and carry on?” Now, as we face the newest battle in the fight for racial equality — this time in military academy admissions — Black women veterans are leading efforts to protect opportunities for the next generation of military leaders.

In last year’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina, the court struck down affirmative action policies used at the two schools, but confirmed that they may lawfully “consider … an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise.” The court also explicitly carved out military academies from the decision “in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies may present.” Soon after, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) filed new lawsuits attacking racial diversity in the military academy admissions at the U.S. Naval Academy and West Point.

Last Friday, a federal judge ruled in favor of maintaining the U.S. Naval Academy’s affirmative action policies, allowing the continued consideration of race in its admissions process. This decision reinforces the importance of diversity in shaping a leadership corps equipped to tackle the complex global challenges of our time. It also unequivocally rejects the SFFA’s effort to extend the Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling banning affirmative action at colleges to military academies.

Applying to a military academy is more like applying for entry to a job than a traditional college. If the students admitted to military academies are not racially diverse, it can impact the pool of potential officers. Decades of evidence show that Black people are overrepresented in the enlisted ranks of the military, but they still face incredible obstacles to reach the officer ranks, especially at the highest levels of military command. For example, in the Navy, Black sailors make up almost 20% of enlisted service members but less than half of that — just 9% — of the officer ranks. In fact, only 10 admirals of the 268 in the Navy were Black as of 2020. Military academies have an oversized impact in filling the most senior officer positions. For instance, 90% of the Navy’s chiefs of operations are graduates of the Naval Academy.

The impact of the lack of diversity in the Navy’s officer corps was hotly contested during the trial. The government argued that a racially diverse officer corps was a “national security imperative,” presenting evidence and testimony about its practical and strategic benefits. For example, racial diversity in the officer corps improves retention and recruitment.

In an ACLU amicus brief on behalf of the National Association of Black Military Women (NABMW) and others, the NABMW described disparities in the promotion of service members of color, noting that they had fewer role models for professional development, lacked social capital and were underexposed to career-broadening opportunities. Officers of color provided mentorship and were more attuned to addressing discrimination within the military.

Additionally, the government identified strategic benefits of a racially diverse officer corps, including unit cohesion, which makes missions more effective and strengthens legitimacy in our country and abroad. Captain Jason Burch, a former Navy SEAL, testified that his presence as a Black officer made Black service members more comfortable reporting harassment and enhanced the Navy’s legitimacy in China and Bangladesh.

SFFA attempted to rewrite the past and present realities of discrimination in the military. In support of their misrepresentations, SFFA relied on testimony from retired Brig. Gen. Christopher Walker that he never experienced racism in the military in his over 40 years of service and that racism in the military ended after the Vietnam War. However, Walker’s opinions were contradicted at every turn. For decades, defense secretaries and military leaders across presidential administrations from both parties have sought to increase racial diversity, describing it as a “unique strength of the military” and a “strategic imperative critical to mission readiness, accomplishment, and a leadership requirement.” Further, an independent racial disparity review conducted by the Air Force confirmed that racism in the military is not dead. Fifty percent of Black airmen reported that they experienced racial discrimination from other airmen. Walker’s conclusions simply weren’t credible in light of the evidence.

Last week’s ruling reaffirmed that the military’s strength lies in its diversity and that a diverse leadership corps is essential to fostering an environment where all service members can thrive. Black armed forces veterans and their allies have carried the flag in this fight for opportunity and access to military academies.

Now, with this victory, we must remain vigilant in protecting diversity in military institutions. However, just days later, a new lawsuit was filed against the U.S. Air Force Academy, challenging its race-conscious admission policies. While last week’s ruling was a crucial victory, it is clear we must remain vigilant in protecting diversity in both military and civilian institutions. Together, we can ensure that America’s strength continues to rest in the diversity that drives innovation, resilience and justice.

Leah Watson is a senior staff attorney with the ACLU’s Racial Justice Program.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com