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Quotes of the Day:
“The first principle of grand strategy is that one must understand what is going on in the world. The question “What’s happening?” is more than a cheerful greeting. Policies and decisions will follow from such an assessment, and confrontations may emerge from differing views about what is taking place and why. Yet those who are living through great historical events can rarely even glimpse the significance of what is going on all around them.”
– Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order by Charles Hill
"You need chaos in your soul to give birth to a dancing star."
– Friedrich Nietzsche
"The enemy will never realize how much I thank them for taking everything material away from me and reducing me to he point where I didn't have anything but faith in God. I had a chance to look at myself and realize that you can do things you never realized were possible."
– Nick Rowe
1. There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?
2. Seeing Red: A 2024 Guide to Assessing Resiliency and Resistance in Russia
3. The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
4. FBI: Public alarm over drone sightings is ‘a slight overreaction’
5. Ukraine: Plan for the End Now…. So, It Is Not a Surprise
6. Defeat Putin Now, or Watch Him Help a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
7. Are AI defense firms about to eat the Pentagon?
8. Hegseth’s Guard Left the Army After the Beating of a Civilian During Training
9. China’s narrative war with West goes beyond Confucius with focus on other ancient schools
10. America's Long War Against Syria
11. NEWSFLASH: Russian general, notorious for chemical attacks, killed in Moscow
12. China’s Slowdown Has Changed the Trade War
13. An Israeli Order in the Middle East
14. Is the U.S. Answer to China’s Belt and Road Working?
15. Alliance Networking in Europe and the Indo-Pacific
16. INSA Releases Presidential Transition Memo
17. Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher P. Maier's Meeting of the Defeat ISIS Coalition Political-Military Consultations
18. How China is adopting battlefield lessons from Ukraine
19. the new multiplayer games? of allies and partners
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2024
21. Iran Update, December 16, 2024
22. Several Pentagon commands failed to keep good track of classified mobile devices, audit finds
23. Foreign Affairs Experts Foresee Negative Impacts of Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy as Wars Abroad Intensify
24. Most girls do not think they could succeed in the military: DOD data
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1. There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?
The 100 page monograph can be downloaded here.
https://jsouapplicationstorage.blob.core.windows.net/press/502/Identity%20Crisis%20in%20Special%20Forces_Croot.pdf
At the heart of the Green Berets’ identity crisis… is a generation only knowing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the next generation recruited on the promise of door-kicking raids, dynamic entries, and kill/capture methodologies.
—Green Beret1
There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?
https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/255
Authored by:
Col. Edward C. Croot
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Monographs
Published on 12/11/2024
Digital Only
In struggling with the effects of "mission drift" for two decades, Special Forces have drifted away from complex, long-duration partnerships toward more linear, short-term, transactional combat operations. There is subsequently an identity crisis in Special Forces, and it is influencing the culture and behavior of Green Berets. This study earned author Col. Edward Croot the U.S. Army War College Colonel Francis J. Kelley Special Operations Writing Award.
Topics
Global SOF Network Organizational Culture SOF History
AORs
Global
2. Seeing Red: A 2024 Guide to Assessing Resiliency and Resistance in Russia
Acces the entire article on here: https://interpopulum.org/seeing-red-a-2024-guide-to-assessing-resiliency-and-resistance-in-russia/
Seeing Red: A 2024 Guide to Assessing Resiliency and Resistance in Russia
This essay applies a data-driven and human-centric methodology to examine resiliency and resistance aspects in President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It applies a four-phase process to analyze state resiliency, assess resistance to governance, identify various resistance movements, and provide possible options for an external actor to influence Russia’s stability or to support resistance to current Russian governance under Putin. The methodologies utilized in this essay were previously published by Small Wars and Insurgencies and Expeditions with Marine Corps University Press. In analyzing Russia, the data shows that Putin’s Russia retains fragility in resiliency, but opportunities exist for external powers to enhance the regime’s strength if they choose to do so, particularly China. While Russia retains significant potential for resistance, external support to such organizations could prove difficult. Based on available metrics and data, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation stands out as one of the most successful resistance movements analyzed, with potential to inspire resistance against the government.
By
Robert S. Burrell and Arman Mahmoudian
Published
3 days ago
Robert S. Burrell, University of South Florida
Arman Mahmoudian, University of South Florida
CONTACT Robert S. Burrell | robertburrell@usf.edu and Arman Mahmoudian | armanm@usf.edu
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, the University of South Florida, or the Department of Defense. © 2024 Arizona State University
INTRODUCTION
Since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 1999, Russia has witnessed significant civil unrest, demonstrating widespread dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. Putin’s harsh crackdowns have failed to quell the Russian population’s desire for increased transparency, government accountability, and economic equality. In this context, it is crucial to assess the potential for further civil unrest in Russia. This paper utilizes a data-centric methodology to examine Vladimir Putin’s governance, and the opposition to it, in terms of resilience and resistance. It leverages analytical data from top universities, financial institutions, governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations to inform a four-phase process. Phase one measures the Putin regime’s resiliency, as well as Russia’s resistance potential, and then assesses the likely success of external support for either resilience or resistance. Phase two identifies prevalent resistance organizations within Russia, categorizes these organizations along a continuum, and classifies their general nature. Phase three assesses one resistance organization (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) by examining its leadership, motivation, operating environment, organization, and activities. Phase four rationally evaluates the gathered information to make recommendations concerning potential external support for Russia’s intrastate conflict.
3. The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Access the 36 page document HERE
Check out TRADOC’s new The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations — now published as TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92. As such, this new publication serves as TRADOC’s informational publication defining the Operational Environment and is applicable command-wide.
Learn more about the significance of this document in Precursor to Victory: Understanding the Operational Environment and the associated podcast, with Ian Sullivan, TRADOC G-2.
4. FBI: Public alarm over drone sightings is ‘a slight overreaction’
Two bad scenarios:
1) The government does not know what is happening in New Jersey.
2) The government knows what is happening in New Jersey but is not informing the American public.
FBI: Public alarm over drone sightings is ‘a slight overreaction’
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/daily-on-defense/3261358/fbi-no-evidence-of-large-scale-drone-activities-public-alarm-is-a-slight-overreaction/
By
Jamie McIntyreDecember 16, 2024 7:28 am
“You can’t ignore the sightings that have been there, and we are concerned about those just as much as anybody else is. I’m a resident of New Jersey. I live here,” an FBI official told reporters in a phone briefing Saturday. “We’re doing our best to find the origin of those drone activities. But I think there has been a slight overreaction.”
The FBI — which investigates the criminal use of drones — established a tip line, deployed visual observation teams throughout New Jersey, reviewed videos, conducted radar analysis, and overlaid sightings of large objects with the flight patterns over the region’s airports, concluded that “all large fixed-wing reported sightings have been manned aircraft.”
“In overlaying the visual sightings reported to the FBI with approach patterns for Newark-Liberty, JFK, and LaGuardia airports, the density of reported sightings matches the approach patterns of these very busy airports,” the official said. “This modeling is indicative of manned aviation being quite often mistaken for unmanned aviation or UAS [Unmanned Aerial Systems].”
“Without a doubt, there have been UASs flying over the state of New Jersey. With nearly a million registered UASs in the United States, there’s no doubt many of them are owned and operated here within the state,” the official stated. “The national airspace is designed to be as minimally restrictive as possible. And all indications are these UAS operators are operating within the parameters established for their use in that airspace.”
DHS: ‘WE ARE ON IT’: “There are thousands of drones flown every day in the United States, recreational drones, commercial drones. That is the reality, and in September of 2023, the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, changed the rules so that drones could fly at night,” Alejandro Mayorkas, outgoing Homeland Security Secretary, said on ABC. “And that may be one of the reasons why now people are seeing more drones than they did before, especially from dawn to dusk. But I want to assure the American public that we are on it. We are working in close coordination with state and local authorities.”
Under FAA rules, it is perfectly legal to fly drones in U.S. airspace, both day and night, so long as the drones stay below 400 feet and remain in sight of the operator at all times. Along with the million or so registered drones, there are likely another million or more unregistered.
“There’s no question that people are seeing drones,” Mayorkas said. However, to reassure the public, he said state and local governments need additional powers. “Our authorities currently are limited, and they are set to expire. We need them extended and expanded.”
“We want state and local authorities to also have the ability to counter drone activity under federal supervision,” Mayorkas said. “With respect to the ability to incapacitate those drones, we are limited in our authorities. We have certain agencies within the Department of Homeland Security that can do that, and outside our department, but we need those authorities expanded as well.”
FEDERAL AGENCIES WANT MORE AUTHORITY FROM CONGRESS TO DEAL WITH DRONES
DOD: “THIS IS NOT A NEW ISSUE FOR US’: An official from the Pentagon’s Joint Staff also insisted that what’s happening now isn’t anything new or startling. “We have had confirmed sightings at Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle. They’re all visual, but they are by highly trained security personnel,” the official said on the Saturday conference call. “We have electronic means to detect and respond, and we train our security personnel to identify, categorize, and then employ their equipment to deny the drone use over our bases.”
All military bases are “no-drone zones,” and most incursions amount to “low-end” violations of local and state force protection measures. “This is not a new issue for us. We’ve had to deal with drone incursions over our bases for quite a time now,” the official said. “It’s something that we routinely respond to in each and every case when a reporting is cited.”
But while the U.S. military has “no intelligence or observations” that would indicate the drone incursions “are aligned with a foreign actor” or have “malicious intent,” the DOD official admitted they have no way of knowing. “We have not been able to locate or identify the operators or the points of origin. We have very limited authorities when it comes to moving off base … We’re also significantly restricted, and rightfully so — in fact, prohibited — from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance here in the homeland.”
“We don’t know what the activity is. We don’t know if it’s malicious, if it is criminal, but I will tell you that it is irresponsible. And, you know, here on the military side, we are just as frustrated with the irresponsible nature of this activity.”
‘A LOT OF US WHO ARE PRETTY FRUSTRATED RIGHT NOW: “I think Americans are finding it hard to believe we can’t figure out where these are coming from,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), the incoming White House national security adviser, said on CBS. “It’s pointing to gaps in our capabilities and in our ability to clamp down on what’s going on here.”
“When you have sensitive sites like Picatinny Arsenal, you have, of course, President Trump’s residence at Bedminster, and you have other no-fly areas, those need to be enforced. We need to know who’s behind it. How do we enforce these low-level, long-loitering, could-be-dangerous drones?” Waltz said. “It’s not necessarily somebody that’s just on the other end flying it. They could be following prepositioned GPS coordinates. They could be coming from offshore.”
“There’s a lot of us who are pretty frustrated right now. You know, the answer, ‘we don’t know’ is not a good enough answer,” Rep. Jim Himes (D-CT), top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, Congressman said on Fox News Sunday. “When people are anxious, when they’re nervous — and this has been true, you know, since we’ve been a species on this planet — people will fill a vacuum with, you know, their fears and anxieties and conspiracy theories.”
“Just putting information out there to fill that vacuum would be helpful,” Himes said, suggesting the FAA, in particular, should be explaining just how many aircraft fill the skies every day. “Show a picture of the number of aircraft, commercial, and private, and military, that go over New Jersey in any 24-hour period.”
“That doesn’t mean, by the way, and don’t get me wrong, that doesn’t mean that drones can’t be enormously dangerous, right? And there have been case after case of people flying drones into restricted airspace. You know, one of those things gets sucked into a jet engine of a plane on LaGuardia approach. That is a very, very serious thing,” Himes said.
“Ten years ago, none of us ever had heard of a drone. And now it is a very powerful piece of technology that can be misused,” he said. “I guess, what I’m saying is, let’s not jump immediately to Iranians, to Chinese, to Martians. …. I know with confidence. It is not the Iranians. It is not the Chinese. They aren’t Martians. I know that’s very unsatisfying for people who want a Hollywood movie out of this.”
YOUNGKIN COOLS FEARS OVER VIRGINIA DRONE SIGHTINGS BUT MAINTAINS DC’S TRANSPARENCY ‘INSUFFICIENT’
Good Monday morning and welcome to Jamie McIntyre’s Daily on Defense, written and compiled by Washington Examiner National Security Senior Writer Jamie McIntyre (@jamiejmcintyre) and edited by Christopher Tremoglie (@chriswtremo). Email here with tips, suggestions, calendar items, and anything else. Sign up or read current and back issues at DailyonDefense.com. If signing up doesn’t work, shoot us an email and we’ll add you to our list. And be sure to follow me on Threads and/or on X @jamiejmcintyre.
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5. Ukraine: Plan for the End Now…. So, It Is Not a Surprise
"If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war."
--B.H. Liddel-Hart
Conclusion:
Although this way forward might seem like giving up, and giving in to Russian aggression, it provides an opportunity to get on with rebuilding Ukraine. And a strong, functioning, and independent Ukraine will be the best defense against future Russian aggression. The final resolution and total recovery of Ukrainian territory might take longer. After all, it took many years for the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain to fall. Make no mistake, this war is going to end, the only question is how.
Ukraine: Plan for the End Now…. So, It Is Not a Surprise
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/17/ukraine-plan-for-the-end-now/
by Fred Wegner
|
12.17.2024 at 06:00am
“Someday this war’s gonna end.”
Lieutenant Colonel William “Bill” Kilgore, Apocalypse Now (1979)
All wars end, that is what they do. The Korean War might be an exception to this rule. As a result, the Korean War might provide a good example for Ukraine’s situation and how to conclude its war with Russia. That being said, unless Ukraine and its Western supporters want to fight to the last Ukrainian soldier, it is time for the Ukrainians, and their supporters, to prepare the way for a successful transition to a long-term peace. Planning for the eventual end to hostilities now is better than muddling through to an uncertain outcome later down the road.
Make no mistake, this war is a war between Russia and the West. In this use, the West refers to NATO and the European Union (EU). Ukraine is the serving as the West’s proxy force against Russia, conducting nearly all the combat operations against Russia’s military forces, and carrying the brunt of the costs for the destruction, chaos, and societal upheaval within Ukraine.
For these reasons the West should lean hard on both sides to sit down and negotiate the end of the conflict. Because of its leading position in providing funding and material support to Ukraine, the US should maintain a central position in these negotiations. This does not mean, however, that the US should be front and center, and lead the face-to-face negotiations needed to end the conflict.
The West’s primary negotiators should include Ukraine along with Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, and the Czech Republic. These countries best understand the Russians, what it is like to live under Russian domination, and how best to deal with Russians. Other European countries, such as France, Germany, and the non-EU United Kingdom can provide a supporting role during these negotiations.
Russia can have its supporters on its side of the table, if they desire. This would likely include China, Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. Establishing a negotiation framework will be hard work, but only then can the parties start the work to craft a path forward for Ukraine, Russia, and greater Europe. This transition to peace will take time so getting the process started as soon as possible is vital for the belligerents, the EU, and the rest of the world.
A Potential Path to Peace
First, there should be a Korean War type armistice. The armistice ended the hostilities on the Korean peninsula between the belligerents, which included the United Nation’s (UN) forces and the North Korean forces. The UN’s forces consisted of military contributions from 16 states, all led by the US military. The North Korean forces were supported both directly and indirectly by China and Russia. It took two years of negations to get the armistice signed and a demilitarized zone established as the border between North and South Korea. The armistice remains in place today as the two sides continue to work towards a peaceful settlement to the war.
A Ukraine-Russia armistice could lead to stopping the war and ending the killing and destruction devastating eastern and southern Ukraine. If Ukraine does not regain all its occupied territory before negotiations begin, then a “Sunflower Curtain” might be erected across Ukraine. This “Sunflower Curtain” would divide the country into two distinct polities: Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine. Kyiv would administer Western Ukraine, whereas the Kremlin would administer Eastern Ukraine. This “Sunflower Curtain” could facilitate a line of control between Ukraine and Russia. For instance, people on either side of the “Sunflower Curtain” could choose upon which side of the partition they want to live and relocate there, as required.
With an armistice in place, displaced people could return to Ukraine, a defensive line would be established, and additional security measures then could be established. This would also facilitate the repatriation of the Ukrainian diaspora throughout Europe and the world, helping Ukraine regain the population it lost during the war with Russia. This would also help end cross-border attacks and attacks on Russian territory too. The negotiated peace would end drone attacks on Moscow and other cities and stop the military operations by various anti-Kremlin paramilitary groups activities. Further, the negotiated peace would force Ukraine to develop a long-term defense strategy regarding Russia.
A safe and secure Ukraine will be able to rebuild and provide a stabilizing presence in eastern Europe against Vladimir Putin’s proclaimed goal of conquering Ukraine. As needed and agreed upon, there could be United Nations or non-UN peacekeepers deployed along both sides of the “Sunflower Curtain.” These peacekeepers could possibly include non-aligned nations, African forces, and even Chinese could be asked to provide troops. Once the fighting stops, however, reconstruction can begin, and new security structures can be put in place to prevent future conflicts between Russia and Ukraine.
Ukraine still seeks membership in NATO. Yet, that might come later, rather than sooner (if ever at all). This should not be a distractor to stopping the war and starting on the road to recovery. NATO and other non-NATO supporters of Ukraine could and negotiate security guarantees to ensure Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. These agreements could mirror the multi-year security arrangements that Israel and Taiwan have with the West. A long-term security arrangement might work to put a stop to a Russian desire of aggressive expansion into Europe while helping with Ukraine’s integration into western Europe.
Nevertheless, if the “Sunflower Curtain” transpires, a troubling precedent could be set. The recognition of a “Sunflower Curtain” in Ukraine might enshrine in the world’s mind yet again that it is acceptable for one state to illegally take the land of another sovereign country.
Conclusion
Although this way forward might seem like giving up, and giving in to Russian aggression, it provides an opportunity to get on with rebuilding Ukraine. And a strong, functioning, and independent Ukraine will be the best defense against future Russian aggression. The final resolution and total recovery of Ukrainian territory might take longer. After all, it took many years for the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain to fall. Make no mistake, this war is going to end, the only question is how.
Tags: Putin's War, Russia, Ukraine
About The Author
- Fred Wegner
- Fred Wenger III is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who flew the CH-53 and has extensive experience in the Western Pacific and Middle East. His last active assignment was Director of the CMC Safety Division. After the Marine Corps he worked for an international engineering firm providing construction management services to the US military in Seoul, Korea and Iwakuni and Okinawa, Japan.
6. Defeat Putin Now, or Watch Him Help a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Conclusion:
While the oscillating culture wars of U.S. (and European) electoral politics has produced a temporary commiseration with the conservative Russian reaction to gendered modernization, the immediacy of a geopolitical threat may lead to a rapid shift of sentiments. The shocking 1940 fall of France led to an abrupt shift in attitude among U.S. political elites against the threat of Nazi Germany. A Chinese attack on an outlying Taiwanese island, the equivalent of a Pearl Harbor attack, would have a similar effect of countering the isolationist sentiments of the larger American electorate. It would be wise for Washington’s new administration to anticipate that the collective resources of the world’s democracies are not sufficiently overpowering to win a war against a unified coalition of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.
Defeat Putin Now, or Watch Him Help a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
By Julian Spencer-Churchill
December 17, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/17/defeat_putin_now_or_watch_him_help_a_chinese_invasion_of_taiwan_1079035.html
It was worthwhile of U.S. President Barack Obama to attempt to split Russia from China, as Winston Churchill had separated fascist Spain from Nazi Germany in the lead-up to the Second World War. Most of Obama’s critics are seeking a scapegoat, while at the same time recommending no better a solution than a simultaneous confrontation of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is now mobilizing a wartime economy, Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping is not confident Putin will prevail. Giving Putin respite through a ceasefire deal with Ukraine, will leave him vindicated and vengeful. While he may focus on regime consolidation rather than immediately attacking the Baltic States, Finland, Sweden, or Georgia, he will almost certainly exact retribution by supporting China in their bid for Taiwan. Beijing, if isolated, with Moscow embroiled in a forever war in Ukraine, or worse, with a Kremlin that is overthrown by a liberal color revolution, will not risk an invasion of Taiwan.
It is exceeding rare in the last eight hundred years for an attacker to attempt an amphibious attack without full sea control, as observed by British naval theorist Philip Howard Colomb. However, all of the successful exceptions are cases that resemble a beach assault on Taiwan, such as the 1704 British capture of Gibraltar. Beijing may believe that a shock but costly offensive involving its entire air force and navy as escorts, 20,000 of its Marines, and over 200,000 regular troops ferried over on civilian ferries and freighters, may cause Taiwan to collapse, especially given how poorly Taipei has prepared. The payoff may be worth the tremendous risk, as it was for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the 1982 British Falklands campaign. Despite the destruction and damage of 16 Royal Navy warships and freighters, and the deaths resulting from the aerial bombardment of marines caught in their amphibious vessels, the British gamble restored imperial deterrence.
If Russia is an undistracted ally of China, it may be inclined to host China’s seven or eight Jin class ballistic missile submarines in its Sea of Okhotsk bastion. This is serious because a decisive basis of U.S. deterrence is its conventional option of threatening to destroy China’s nuclear missiles on land and at sea. Russia could also provide artillery ordnance, weaponized drones, electronic warfare transmitters, aircraft parts, and possibly tactical nuclear weapons, as it claimed to have provided Belarus. Russia may deploy maritime patrol aircraft, submarines and surface flotillas, under a non-combatant flag, into the deep Pacific and Atlantic, Panama and the Indian Ocean, to help China track U.S. and Japanese submarines, convoys, aircraft staging areas, and ports. It may launch airborne early warning aircraft from the vantage point of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk to monitor aircraft launching from Alaska to Japan.
Most importantly, the recent construction of the world’s largest pipeline between Russia and China has critically undermined the impact of a U.S. maritime blockade of China’s energy imports. China’s most recent large capital projects and retooling of its entire energy infrastructure has been focused on achieving strategic autarky, plans with which Russia plays a vital part. Ten years ago, a U.S. naval blockade at the Strait of Malacca would have crippled China’s economy and seriously inconvenienced consumers, eroding support for the Communism regime in Beijing. Today, Beijing’s large coal reserves may be sufficient to energize its electric car and commercial vehicle fleet, manufacturing, and provide seasonal heating and cooling.
In 2023, China was the world’s largest importer of crude, at 11.3 million barrels per day, (versus a domestic extraction of 4.26 bpd) with Russia (at 2.05 mbpd, or 19 percent), Saudi Arabia, and Iraq being the largest suppliers, and Iran. Over 1,000 unregistered Russian tankers ship oil and LNG from the West Siberian oil fields, predominantly through Arctic ports, to its customers, but also through an oil pipeline terminal at Kozmino port near Vladivostok. To circumvent a naval blockade and to exploit Russia’s distressed energy exports, China has added 4,000 km in energy pipelines, and filled its strategic reserve. Russia and China have recently completed the Power-of-Siberia pipeline, moving 30 billion cubic meters of gas per day, plus another 10 bcm which are shipped by tanker through the Bering Strait. China is expected to double its natural gas demand by mid-century, and is moving quickly to build an oil pipeline parallel to Russia’s gas pipeline.
A naval blockade of China will drastically cut imports, which will reduce military manufacturing output. However, one detailed discussion argues that a blockade of China will take years to have a political effect, is easily evaded by trade along rail lines in the Eurasian continent, and will have only a limited effect on China’s food supply. The conduct of the blockade itself will be politically complex, because many influential neutral powers, such as China’s largest food supplier Brazil, will refuse to participate. The greatest impact of a blockade will be to interrupt China’s exports, one estimate of whose effects will be to contract China’s economy by 16.7 percent (a catastrophic collapse compared with the sanctioned but internationally less exposed Russian economy). Furthermore, the U.S. would be tempted to strike at Chinese rail and pipeline infrastructure along the Russian border, risking Chinese retaliation into the interior of North America, while risking that this type of infrastructure destruction may not even be cost-effective.
Frontline NATO allies, like the Baltic states, have argued that giving respite to Putin will permit him to rebuild his military, particularly in terms of training and developing technological solutions to lessons learned. However, Russian military bloggers make a symmetrical argument, that a respite will benefit NATO more than Putin, whose domestic support is eroding because of sanctions, to the extent that he will be unable to resume a future war with Ukraine. In either case, Russia will have the spare military manufacturing capacity, electronic warfare technology, energy, food (Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter) and mineral resources to sustain China in a years-long campaign against the U.S. over Taiwan.
Even at current levels of Western military and economic support for Kyiv, Ukraine will not prevail against the persistent onslaught and substantially superior resources of Russia. Once its stored tank inventory is exhausted, Moscow will be incentivized finally to shift to a focus on a qualitative improvement of its army. Kyiv’s strategy is to play for time and wait for an exogenous systemic shock to the Kremlin’s political calculations, such as the revolt of the Wagner mercenaries, or an uprising of discontented conscripts. Ukrainian troops have demonstrated their resilience, despite recent journalistic claims that desertion rates are indicators of an imminent collapse. Temporary desertion, escaping for psychological relief, was common among U.S. troops on the Western front during the Second World War. Neither instance is a sign of an unsustainable decay of fighting capability, such as the 45 percent desertion rate of Chinese KMT soldiers in 1948, or the historically high levels of desertion among Russian or French troops in 1917, due to poor leadership by officers. This author had at one time charged an otherwise exemplary sentry for abandoning his post for just 48 hours, to see his girlfriend 400km away.
If Ukraine suffers a catastrophic loss of territory, with Russians deploying up to the Dnipro River and the outskirts of Kyiv, balance of power incentives may finally push NATO to intervene. Western Ukraine has far more defensible terrain, is closer to European supply sources, and even centrifugal countries like Hungary, Slovakia and Romania may feel compelled to set-up no-go zones across their borders.
While the oscillating culture wars of U.S. (and European) electoral politics has produced a temporary commiseration with the conservative Russian reaction to gendered modernization, the immediacy of a geopolitical threat may lead to a rapid shift of sentiments. The shocking 1940 fall of France led to an abrupt shift in attitude among U.S. political elites against the threat of Nazi Germany. A Chinese attack on an outlying Taiwanese island, the equivalent of a Pearl Harbor attack, would have a similar effect of countering the isolationist sentiments of the larger American electorate. It would be wise for Washington’s new administration to anticipate that the collective resources of the world’s democracies are not sufficiently overpowering to win a war against a unified coalition of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University, and author of Militarization and War (2007) and of Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt, and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer, 3 Field Engineer Regiment, from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11.
7. Are AI defense firms about to eat the Pentagon?
Excerpts:
Perhaps the most significant partnership is between Palantir and Anduril, two companies that offer somewhat competing capabilities related to battlefield data integration. Palantir holds the contract for the Maven program, the seminal Defense Department AI effort to derive intelligence from vast amounts of data provided by satellites, drones, and other sensors. Anduril offers a mesh-networking product called Lattice for rapid collection and analysis of battlefield data for drone swarming and other operations.
...
Beck said the hope is that this approach will induce competition among industry players.
It’s not yet clear how the emerging partnerships will square with that.
One Defense Department official, speaking on background, called Anduril and Palantir the “success stories of the defense-tech movement.” The official said he wouldn’t be surprised if the partnerships signaled “a play to shape the next administration’s approach” to buying defense technology.
That will be even easier under Palantir CTO Shyam Sankar, who has reportedly been picked to lead the Pentagon’s research and engineering efforts under the next administration.
Anduril and Palantir did not respond to requests for comment on this story.
Are AI defense firms about to eat the Pentagon?
Competitors are becoming collaborators in the industry’s hottest segment.
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor, Defense One
December 15, 2024 03:41 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
In an unprecedented wave of collaboration, leading AI firms are teaming up—sometimes with rivals—to serve a Pentagon and Congress determined to put AI to military use. Their growing alignment may herald an era in which software firms seize the influence now held by old-line defense contractors.
“There's an old saying that software eats the world,” Byron Callan, managing director at Capital Alpha Partners, told Investors Business Daily on Wednesday. “It's going to eat the military too."
Over the last week, Palantir, Anduril, Shield AI, OpenAI, Booz Allen, and Oracle announced various partnerships to develop products tailored to defense needs. Meanwhile, the House passed the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act with provisions that push the Defense Department to work more closely with tech firms on AI, and DOD announced yet another office intended to foster AI adoption.
Perhaps the most significant partnership is between Palantir and Anduril, two companies that offer somewhat competing capabilities related to battlefield data integration. Palantir holds the contract for the Maven program, the seminal Defense Department AI effort to derive intelligence from vast amounts of data provided by satellites, drones, and other sensors. Anduril offers a mesh-networking product called Lattice for rapid collection and analysis of battlefield data for drone swarming and other operations.
Just a day earlier, Palantir and Shield AI expanded their own partnership to include the deployment of Palantir’s Warp Speed for integrating data into workflow. Their collaboration has sought to integrate Shield AI's autonomous systems with Palantir’s data-processing platforms to provide commanders with a clearer operational picture. Shield AI also competes against Anduril with its autonomous piloting and drone swarm software for GPS-denied environments.
Anduril also has new team-ups with Oracle, whose cloud infrastructure will support Anduril’s autonomous systems to offer real-time data analysis near the battlefield; and with fellow drone maker Archer, to develop hybrid-propulsion aircraft for defense.
Finally, Palantir announced a partnership with longtime defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton to make AI tools for logistics, autonomous systems, and other applications.
Congress gets behind AI firms
On Wednesday, the House approved a 2025 defense authorization bill that includes several provisions intended to spur military adoption of AI. The bill puts a big emphasis on building out data and cloud computing resources to enable much faster adoption of AI and AI-enabled weapons, areas where companies like Anduril, Palantir, Booz Allen, and Shield AI excel.
One of the most ambitious is Section 1532, which mandates the expansion of secure, high-performance computing infrastructure to support AI training and development.
This infrastructure, which will include partnerships with commercial and hybrid cloud providers, is critical for developing scalable AI models capable of adapting to evolving mission requirements.
Section 236 also presses the Pentagon to deepen partnerships with the private sector and academia, building on commercial expertise to accelerate innovation.
The act also includes stringent reporting requirements intended to ensure accountability and adaptability. From pilot programs in biotechnology to operational testing of cheap, autonomous drones under the Replicator program, the Pentagon must provide regular updates to Congress, demonstrating progress and addressing challenges.
“Annual updates will assess data resources, cybersecurity measures, and the potential for operational use of technologies,” the legislation says.
The Pentagon needs to reshape its acquisition philosophies to accommodate software firms, DIU Director Doug Beck said on Saturday. Instead of buying things via program requirements, the Defense Department must give companies more flexibility to design products that might be useful for defense and then bring those to the Pentagon.
That could be a boon to companies like Anduril, which has found a way to produce and even battlefield-test products before the Defense Department even asks for them.
“If you give exact definitions and just port more money against it, then…you actually don't incent the kind of behaviors that you want,” Beck said Saturday at the Reagan National Security Forum. “Instead, for those major areas of tech change, we should provide a consistent demand signal of the critical areas we'll be buying in, rather than specific programs, areas like AI, autonomy, space, biotech.”
Beck said the hope is that this approach will induce competition among industry players.
It’s not yet clear how the emerging partnerships will square with that.
One Defense Department official, speaking on background, called Anduril and Palantir the “success stories of the defense-tech movement.” The official said he wouldn’t be surprised if the partnerships signaled “a play to shape the next administration’s approach” to buying defense technology.
That will be even easier under Palantir CTO Shyam Sankar, who has reportedly been picked to lead the Pentagon’s research and engineering efforts under the next administration.
Anduril and Palantir did not respond to requests for comment on this story.
New DOD AI cell
Which agency or office in the Department of Defense will spearhead accountability and governance over players that are increasingly coordinating their approach? That falls to the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, better known for its efforts to foster the use of AI.
Just on Wednesday, the CDAO and the Defense Innovation Unit announced that they had created an AI rapid capabilities cell to accelerate the exploration, testing, and adoption of generative AI.
The NDAA also pushes the CDAO to smooth the adoption of AI. Section 1521 tasks the office with increasing and synchronizing the use of modern data formats and sharing standards across the department. This includes defining and implementing a strategy to transition from obsolete data formats to modern ones in weapons, command-and-control systems, and sensors.
Those company partnerships announced last week are directly relevant to that—and to Section 233, which requires “the development of a strategy to invest in advanced technologies, including automated systems and artificial intelligence, to streamline the process of organizing, indexing, and categorizing data.”
CDOA chief Radha Plumb is scheduled to depart in January as the new administration takes over. Her successor will be tasked with implementing those NDAA provisions on data synchronization and strategy development. But they will be overseeing an AI defense contractor community that is increasingly synchronized in their approach to data standards, reporting, and competition.
Scott Nover, writing at GZERO Media, called this an incipient “AI military-industrial complex.”
In November, Palantir passed Lockheed Martin in one closely watched measure: market cap. In a letter to investors that month announcing quarterly revenue, Palantir founder Alex Karp boasted, “A juggernaut is emerging. This is the software century, and we intend to take the entire market.”
Increasingly, Karp and his fellow defense-tech execs are hunting together.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
8. Hegseth’s Guard Left the Army After the Beating of a Civilian During Training
"Personnel is policy"
– President Reagan
Ronald Reagan, 1911-2004, 40th President of the United States (Republican, CA), Quoted in Emily Bazelon, “Lifer”, New York Times Magazine, November 4, 2012
https://quote.org/quote/personnel-is-policy-635647
Hegseth’s Guard Left the Army After the Beating of a Civilian During Training
John Hasenbein, who has escorted Donald J. Trump’s pick for defense secretary to meetings on Capitol Hill, said he was unjustly prosecuted for the 2019 episode.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/us/politics/hegseth-bodyguard-army.html
John Jacob Hasenbein, left, has been a regular presence on Capitol Hill this month, accompanying Pete Hegseth to meet senators.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times
By Dave Philipps and Sharon LaFraniere
Dave Philipps covers the military. Sharon LaFraniere reports on cabinet appointments.
Leer en español
When Pete Hegseth visited senators on Capitol Hill this month in an effort to show that he has the qualifications and judgment to lead the Defense Department, he was escorted by a security guard with a dark episode in his past.
The guard, a former Army Special Forces master sergeant named John Jacob Hasenbein, left the military after a 2019 training event in which witnesses said he beat a civilian role player — kicking him, punching him and leaving him hogtied in a pool of his own blood.
Mr. Hegseth’s choice of Mr. Hasenbein as a security escort is the latest instance in which he has stood by soldiers accused of crimes. He has repeatedly criticized military leaders as being too “woke” and waging a “war on warriors.”
In this case, Timothy Parlatore, Mr. Hegseth’s lawyer, said Mr. Hasenbein was the “victim of unjust treatment by a broken military justice system,” and Mr. Hegseth was proud to work with him. He added, “It is stories like his that demonstrate the change needed in the Department of Defense.”
The Army charged Mr. Hasenbein with aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. A military jury found him guilty of the assault charge in a court-martial in 2020, according to Army records. But the judge overseeing the case declared a mistrial after learning that a friend of Mr. Hasenbein had been talking to a juror throughout the trial, court records show. The Army did not retry the case.
“This guy has real anger issues,” Ahmed Altameemi, the man whom Mr. Hasenbein was charged with assaulting, said in an interview. “He is not a safe man. I don’t know why they gave him this position. Don’t they do any background checks?”
Mr. Hasenbein provided The New York Times with several official records involving his service and the case against him, along with a statement in a text message: “I have no conviction and I was honorably retired after 22 years of service. That’s all you need to know.”
Timothy Turner, senior counsel at the firm that represented Mr. Hasenbein in a defamation case that he filed after the court-martial proceedings, said that Mr. Hasenbein agreed to retire rather than face another trial. Mr. Hasenbein claimed in that case that he was effectively forced out of the military because of false and misleading statements by employees of the independent contractor who conducted the exercise.
It is unclear whether Mr. Hegseth, President-elect Donald J. Trump’s pick for one of the most important cabinet posts, knew of Mr. Hasenbein’s record when he hired him. But some details of his case have been online for years.
Editors’ Picks
Michèle A. Flournoy, an under secretary of defense during President Barack Obama’s first term, said having Mr. Hasenbein as security “is not a good look” for Mr. Hegseth. She said Mr. Hegseth had seemed to display “a pattern of disregard for the military institutional efforts to hold its own accountable.”
Image
It is unclear whether Mr. Hegseth knew Mr. Hasenbein’s record when he hired him.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times
Mr. Hegseth’s path to confirmation as defense secretary has been far from smooth.
He has faced allegations of excessive alcohol use. He has said that he has never had a drinking problem but that he would not drink at all if he becomes defense secretary. In 2017, he was accused of raping a woman, an allegation that he denied and that resulted in no criminal charges but led to an out-of-court financial settlement with the woman. At first some Republican senators appeared to have reservations about Mr. Hegseth, but Mr. Trump has stood by him.
The exercise that preceded the end of Mr. Hasenbein’s military career was held at Fort Knox, Ky., for his Fifth Special Forces Group unit before it deployed overseas. It was organized with a private contractor, F3EA, to simulate a hostage rescue from a terrorist cell. Mr. Altameemi, now 38, was employed by the company to play the role of an ISIS fighter with information about a hostage whom Mr. Hasenbein’s team was supposed to free.
Mr. Hasenbein, now 45, had deployed to Iraq eight times and was awarded two Bronze Stars, and was a senior soldier in a group that detained Mr. Altameemi. The soldiers forced Mr. Altameemi to the ground and held him down, according to a video reviewed by The Times.
Mr. Altameemi, a former member of the Iraqi Army’s elite counterterrorism service who is now an American citizen living in Texas, said he had been a role player in other military exercises and never had any issues, but this one turned inexplicably brutal.
“They were supposed to ask me where the hostage is at,” he said in an interview. “But they didn’t give me a chance. They just started hurting me bad.”
Image
Ahmed Altameemi sustained numerous head injuries after an assault during the 2019 military exercise.Credit...via Ahmed Altameemi
In a memo recounting the episode, a supervisor with F3EA said Mr. Hasenbein rubbed Mr. Altameemi’s face into a concrete pillar, kicked him and delivered repeated “hammer-fist” strikes to his ribs and “knee strikes” to his face.
Another company employee involved in the exercise said, “The other guys realized things were wrong and started to calm down.” But Mr. Hasenbein “didn’t calm down — he never calmed down,” he said.
A third said he found Mr. Altameemi face down and hogtied, moaning in pain, with a pool of blood around his head.
Among other injuries, Mr. Altameemi was left with a broken nose, a broken tooth, a sprained shoulder, a scalp hematoma and blunt facial trauma, according to memos and statements by company employees about the episode. He was taken to the hospital after the exercise.
Mr. Altameemi said Mr. Hasenbein knew that a training exercise was not supposed to happen like that. “He is a man with experience, a master sergeant — he knows this is training on American soil,” Mr. Altameemi said.
During the court-martial that followed, an expert for the defense said that based on Mr. Altameemi’s behavior during the exercise, Mr. Hasenbein’s actions were reasonable. The defense also asserted that a commander had pressured two soldiers to change their statements that nothing wrong had happened during the episode.
The prosecutor’s expert testified that Mr. Hasenbein’s use of “knee strikes” against Mr. Altameemi, who lacked protected gear, amounted to excessive force.
The military jury found Mr. Hasenbein guilty of the aggravated assault charge but acquitted him on a charge of reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to no punishment.
After the court-martial proceeding, the judge discovered that one of Mr. Hasenbein’s fellow Special Forces soldiers, a friend, had repeatedly talked to a juror. Among other advice, he told the juror that physical aggression was “pretty normal” in training scenarios, according to the judge’s decision to declare a mistrial.
In his defamation case against F3EA, filed in December 2020, Mr. Hasenbein accused the firm’s employees of a conspiracy to harm his reputation that effectively forced him out of the military. Mr. Parlatore, Mr. Hegseth’s lawyer, said on Sunday that Mr. Hasenbein voluntarily retired because he would not have been promoted after the criminal case.
The defamation case was dropped in September 2021 with the agreement of both sides.
After leaving the military, Mr. Hasenbein worked for several personal security companies, according to his LinkedIn account and a former employer.
Julie Tate contributed research.
Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon. More about Dave Philipps
Sharon LaFraniere is an investigative reporter currently focusing on Republican candidates in the 2024 presidential election. More about Sharon LaFraniere
A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 17, 2024, Section A, Page 11 of the New York edition with the headline: Hegseth Guard’s Past Includes Court-Martial. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
9. China’s narrative war with West goes beyond Confucius with focus on other ancient schools
Excerpts:
The new institute “is an attempt to find a more detailed and rigorous intellectual basis for arguments that China’s long-standing ways of thought can offer solutions at a time when the liberal world seems less sure of itself.”
Central to the institute’s mission is the “Zizang Project”, an undertaking launched in 2010 to compile classical texts of all schools of thought from the pre-Qin to the late Qing dynasty.
Pioneered by Fang Yong, an ECNU professor who is now director of the new institute, the scale of the project is larger than the Siku Quanshu – imperial China’s largest collection of books that was compiled during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).
...
Chinese philosophers had been turning to other ancient schools to interpret contemporary events for centuries, especially during times of war and turmoil, the historian said. But the endeavour gained added traction after the First Opium War during the Qing dynasty, with the introduction of Western ideologies. This gave rise to a vibrant and evolving discourse with varying focal points over the decades, according to the historian.
“But in today’s context, the study of Zhuzi [various schools of thought] has just become a resource that serves [Beijing’s] purpose of justifying itself as a unified civilisation,” he said.
The new institute also comes as Beijing revisits China’s cultural roots to support its governance, with various “Chinese culture projects” seen to strengthen the image of China as a global power with a long-standing legacy.
...
Scholars from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States sent congratulatory messages on the institute’s opening, according to a report on the ECNU website.
Angle sees the institute as a “hopeful sign” as East-West tensions rise. “Such openness to other perspectives also suggests a further openness to engagement with perspectives from outside China,” he said.
But Mitter at Harvard warned of the need for self-reflection. “To make this effective, Chinese thinkers will need to have space to critique their own society as well as that of others, something which traditional philosophy was very good at doing.”
China’s Communist Party
ChinaPolitics
China’s narrative war with West goes beyond Confucius with focus on other ancient schools
Newly set up Chinese Zhuzi Research Institute seen as latest testament to China’s focus on reclaiming intellectual heritage for governance
Xinlu Liangin Beijing
Published: 12:00pm, 1 Dec 2024Updated: 1:55pm, 1 Dec 2024
China has set up a research institute on early Chinese philosophies, taking the discourse beyond Confucius in its latest effort to win the narrative war with the West on governance values.
The “Chinese Zhuzi Research Institute”, or “institute of early Chinese philosophies” opened earlier this month at the East China Normal University (ECNU) in Shanghai.
It aims to explore the country’s rich philosophical heritage dating back more than 2,000 years and use that ancient wisdom for contemporary governance in China and beyond, scholars attending the inauguration ceremony last month said.
Analysts see the institute as the latest testament to China’s focus on reclaiming its intellectual heritage for modern governance as it fights a narrative war with the West, albeit with a focus on the less popular schools of thought to encourage a more inclusive dialogue.
Any attempt to equate Chinese culture with Confucianism alone is deeply mistaken
Professor Stephen C. Angle, Wesleyan University
Addressing the inauguration ceremony, ECNU vice-president Lei Qili highlighted the institute’s role in revitalising traditional culture in response to the “second combine”.
The term, coined by President Xi Jinping in 2021 during the centenary of the Communist Party, is part of Beijing’s campaign to “Sinicise Marxism” through traditional Chinese culture.
The “first combine” adapted Marxism to China’s unique realities, such as the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 20th century.
Traditionally, Confucianism has been the predominant ideology in Chinese cultural and intellectual contexts, while other philosophical schools were usually sidelined.
According to Stephen C. Angle, professor of philosophy and East Asian Studies at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, the new institute presents “a wider framework for understanding [Chinese] civilisation – which is appropriate.
“Any attempt to equate Chinese culture with Confucianism alone is deeply mistaken.”
Confucianism, which emphasises morality and hierarchy, is one of the diverse, flourishing philosophical schools that arose from social and political upheaval in China’s Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770-256 BC).
Among the other leading schools of thought are Taoism, which advocates for living in harmony with nature; Legalism, which focuses on strict laws and places little faith in ethical persuasion or moral leadership; and Mohism, which promotes universal love and meritocracy.
Others include the School of Names focusing on language and logic, and the School of Yin-Yang, which advocates a balance of opposites.
Confucius makes comeback under communism
Debates among and the integration of various schools have laid the groundwork for thousands of years of Chinese governance.
Chinese traditions were never “exclusivist” in the way that “monotheistic religions” are, Angle said.
“As these traditions developed, they drew on one another’s insights – sometimes critiquing but sometimes co-opting. The new institute is designed to emphasise these connections and interactions.”
According to a Shanghai-based historian who wished to remain anonymous, bringing Confucianism down to “equal status” with other schools reflected a “significant shift in academic perception”.
Chinese philosophers had been turning to other ancient schools to interpret contemporary events for centuries, especially during times of war and turmoil, the historian said. But the endeavour gained added traction after the First Opium War during the Qing dynasty, with the introduction of Western ideologies. This gave rise to a vibrant and evolving discourse with varying focal points over the decades, according to the historian.
“But in today’s context, the study of Zhuzi [various schools of thought] has just become a resource that serves [Beijing’s] purpose of justifying itself as a unified civilisation,” he said.
The new institute also comes as Beijing revisits China’s cultural roots to support its governance, with various “Chinese culture projects” seen to strengthen the image of China as a global power with a long-standing legacy.
Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, highlighted a “narrative competition between the liberal world and China”.
“In the early 20th century, China’s radicals, including the [Communist Party of China], turned away from Confucian thinking, but today they have embraced ancient philosophy as wisdom that has global significance,” he said.
The new institute “is an attempt to find a more detailed and rigorous intellectual basis for arguments that China’s long-standing ways of thought can offer solutions at a time when the liberal world seems less sure of itself.”
Central to the institute’s mission is the “Zizang Project”, an undertaking launched in 2010 to compile classical texts of all schools of thought from the pre-Qin to the late Qing dynasty.
Pioneered by Fang Yong, an ECNU professor who is now director of the new institute, the scale of the project is larger than the Siku Quanshu – imperial China’s largest collection of books that was compiled during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).
A counterpart compilation, the Confucianism canons of “Ruzang”, is being led by Peking University.
As of 2021, Zizang had released six batches of works – involving around 1,016 volumes of books and 2,981 texts from early Chinese philosophical traditions. The project not only preserves important works but also seeks to reinterpret their teachings for modern relevance, Fang has been quoted as saying in media reports.
Sam Crane, a political scientist at Williams College in Massachusetts, acknowledged the academic benefits of the project but expressed concerns that politically it might simply reinforce China’s governance pattern as “Confucianism on the outside, Legalist on the inside”.
The phrase refers to a system where “the moral theory of Confucianism is manipulated to veil the power political reality of Legalism,” according to Crane, who studies ancient Chinese philosophy and its contemporary application in Chinese politics. “[China] is a Legalist state that uses Confucianism to present itself as moral.”
Beyond its borders, China is also revitalising ancient philosophies to position them as viable alternatives to Western-centric models, as exemplified by Xi’s “Global Civilisation Initiative” launched last year.
Chinese Zhuzi Research Institute director Fang Yong (far left) and East China Normal University vice-president Lei Qili (second right) with other scholars at the opening ceremony. Photo: ECNU
At the Zhuzi institute’s inauguration ceremony on November 16, Fang reinforced its aim of using early Chinese philosophy as “a bridge for communication” with Western civilisations and aiding the “advancement of world civilisation”.
Scholars from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States sent congratulatory messages on the institute’s opening, according to a report on the ECNU website.
Angle sees the institute as a “hopeful sign” as East-West tensions rise. “Such openness to other perspectives also suggests a further openness to engagement with perspectives from outside China,” he said.
But Mitter at Harvard warned of the need for self-reflection. “To make this effective, Chinese thinkers will need to have space to critique their own society as well as that of others, something which traditional philosophy was very good at doing.”
Xinlu Liang
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Xinlu Liang joined the Post as a Graduate Trainee in 2021. Previously, she wrote obituaries for lives lost in California as a Covid-19 reporting intern at the Los Angeles Times and intern
10. America's Long War Against Syria
Some interesting perspectives from the Professor.
Excerpts:
When Russia intervened in 2015 to rescue the Syrian government, the US sought to pull Russia into a long war to drain its resources. The US representative to Syria, James Jeffrey, argued that the objective of the US in Syria was to create an enduring conflict to weaken Russia: “My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians”.[14] Dana Stroul, the Democratic co-chair of the Syria Study Group, argued in November 2019 that the US objective was to control Syrian natural resources as a source of influence over any future political settlement, and to obstruct reconstruction aid to ensure that the government-controlled territory remains a “rubble”.[15]
The regime change was eventually successful in December 2024 as Syria had been weakened, Turkey had prepared a jihadist proxy army, Russia was distracted by a long war in Ukraine, and Israel had weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon. While the proxy war has gone through different stages, the media has consistently and diligently sold the narrative of an organic grassroots movement of democratic forces rising against the Syrian dictatorship. The US allegedly represented the “international community”, a reluctant and virtuous defender of the Syrian people.
America's Long War Against Syria
Professor Glenn Diesen
https://glenndiesen.substack.com/p/americas-long-war-against-syria?utm
Glenn Diesen
Dec 17, 2024
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Over the years, the US and NATO have developed a template for regime change under the guise of defending liberal democratic values. Initially, there are efforts to sow divisions within the targeted state and then provide political, economic and military support to opposition groups. If the opposition groups can topple the government, then the US and NATO celebrate it as a “democratic revolution” over an authoritarian government. If the government defeats the opposition groups, the US or NATO can intervene militarily under the justification of preventing the government from “killing its own people”. This model was also applied to Syria in what became a long war.
Dividing and Destabilising Syria
The US began manufacturing ethnic divisions in Syria and laying the foundation for a civil war in the 1980s. A declassified CIA memo from 1986 reveals a strategy for fomenting ethnic divisions in Syria to carry out a regime change:
“We believe that a renewal of communal violence between Alawis and Sunnis could inspire Sunnis in the military to turn against the regime… Excessive government force in quelling such disturbances might be seen by Sunnis as evidence of a government vendetta against all Sunnis, precipitating even larger protests by other Sunni groups. Although the regime has the resources to crush such a venture, we believe brutal attacks on Sunni civilians might prompt large numbers of Sunni officers and conscripts to desert or stage mutinies in support of dissidents, and Iraq might supply them with sufficient weapons to launch a civil war”.[1]
When the Cold War ended in 1989 and the Soviets became passive, the US sought to take advantage by eliminating undefended Soviet allies. After the first Gulf War in 1991, the US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy at the time, Paul Wolfowitz, argued the US had to clean up the region while it was in a dominant position:
“With the end of the Cold War, we can now use our military with impunity. The Soviets won’t come in to block us. And we’ve got five, maybe 10, years to clean up these old Soviet surrogate regimes like Iraq and Syria before the next superpower emerges to challenge us”.[2]
After the September 11 attacks in 2001, Syria was targeted in a string of opportunistic wars. The former highest commander of NATO, US General Wesley Clark, revealed that he was handed a memo that “describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years. Starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and finishing off Iran”.[3]
After the invasion of Iraq, the focus began to shift towards destroying Syria as Iran’s land-bridge to support Lebanon and Palestine. In 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that the “Pressure for regime change in Damascus is rising”, and former Pentagon advisor Richard Perle highlighted the opportunity that “Assad has never been weaker, and we should take advantage of that”.[4] In an interview with President Bashar Al-Assad in 2005, CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour spoke openly about the plans for regime change in Syria:
“Mr. President, you know the rhetoric of regime change is headed towards you from the United States. They are actively looking for a new Syrian leader. They're granting visas and visits to Syrian opposition politicians. They're talking about isolating your diplomatically and, perhaps, a coup d’état or your regime crumbling. What are you thinking about that?”[5]
Washington’s propaganda efforts to exploit ethnic and religious divisions focused primarily on grievances of the Kurdish minority and the fears of Sunni Muslims being subordinated by Shia Muslims due to Syria’s partnership with Iran.[6] A leaked cable from the US embassy in Syria in 2006 recommended to “play on Sunni fears of Iranian influence” even though the fear of Iran is “often exaggerated”, and the US should work with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to “publicize and focus regional attention on the issue”.[7] The US embassy advocated to encourage an uprising, and simultaneously create fears in the government about a coup as it “increases the possibility of a self-defeating over-reaction”.[8] A cycle of violence could thus be instigated and exacerbated.
RAND Corporation, a US think tank aligned closely with the intelligence community, also presented a strategy of dividing Syrian society with “covert action, information operations, unconventional warfare” to pursue a “divide and rule” strategy. RAND advocated that the US should “capitalise on the ‘Sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict’ trajectory by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes against [Iran-allied Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world]”. The report also recognised how terrorists could be used: “The geographic area of proven oil reserves coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi-jihadist network”.[9]
The War Begins
The war against Syria was finally unleashed in 2011 as proxies were activated. A New York Times article confirmed that the CIA had spent more than a billion dollars to arm and train rebels against the Syrian government, with much of the weapons ending up in the hands of the jihadist group Al-Nusra that fought alongside CIA-backed fighters.[10] The media sold the events as the government attacking peaceful protesters.
A Pentagon report from August 2012 confirms that US military planners anticipated that jihadists would seek to establish territorial control in Eastern Syria:
“If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in Eastern Syria (Hasaka and Deir Ezzor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)”.[11]
Roland Dumas, the former Foreign Minister of France, argued that the British contributed to American efforts in 2009 by financing regional “gunmen”, which was motivated by oil interests and as a geopolitical move against Iran.[12] Peter Ford, the former British Ambassador to Syria from 2003 to 2006, similarly criticises his own government for the “incoherent and grotesque” policies towards Syria. Ford argues that the war in Syria was started and perpetuated by a Western regime-change agenda, which resulted in using jihadi terrorists as proxies.[13]
When Russia intervened in 2015 to rescue the Syrian government, the US sought to pull Russia into a long war to drain its resources. The US representative to Syria, James Jeffrey, argued that the objective of the US in Syria was to create an enduring conflict to weaken Russia: “My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians”.[14] Dana Stroul, the Democratic co-chair of the Syria Study Group, argued in November 2019 that the US objective was to control Syrian natural resources as a source of influence over any future political settlement, and to obstruct reconstruction aid to ensure that the government-controlled territory remains a “rubble”.[15]
The regime change was eventually successful in December 2024 as Syria had been weakened, Turkey had prepared a jihadist proxy army, Russia was distracted by a long war in Ukraine, and Israel had weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon. While the proxy war has gone through different stages, the media has consistently and diligently sold the narrative of an organic grassroots movement of democratic forces rising against the Syrian dictatorship. The US allegedly represented the “international community”, a reluctant and virtuous defender of the Syrian people.
[1] Van Wagenen, W., Creative Chaos: How U.S. Planners Sparked the Anti-Government Protests of the So-Called Arab Spring in Syria, The Libertarian Institute, 31 January 2022.
[2] Sachs, J., 2018. Ending America’s War of Choice in the Middle East. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, (11), pp.20-33.
[3] Clark, W., 2007. Interview with General Wesley Clark, Democracy Now, 2 March 2007.
[4] WSJ 2005. Syria Debate Exposes Iraq Fault Lines, The Wall Street Journal, 6 December 2005.
[5] CNN 2005. Al-Assad: 'Syria has nothing to do with this crime', CNN, 12 October 2005.
[6] Hersh, S., 2007. The Redirection, The New Yorker, 5 March 2007.
[7] Wikileaks 2006, Influencing the SARG in the end of 2006, Wikileaks, 6 December 2006.
[8] Wikileaks 2006, Influencing the SARG in the end of 2006, Wikileaks, 6 December 2006.
[9] RAND 2008. Unfolding the Future of the Long War: Motivations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, p.171.
[10] Mazzetti, M., Goldman, A., and Schmidt, M.S., 2017. Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria, The New York Times, 2 August 2017.
[11] Judicial Watch 2015, ‘Defense, State Department Documents Reveal Obama Administration Knew that al Qaeda Terrorists Had Planned Benghazi Attack 10 Days in Advance’, Judicial Watch, 18 May 2015.
[12] Guardian 2013, Syria intervention plan fuelled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concern, The Guardian, 31 August 2013.
[13] Hadjimatheou, C., 2021. Mayday: How the White Helmets and James Le Mesurier got pulled into a deadly battle for truth, BBC, 27 February 2021.
[14] Brennan, D., 2020. U.S. Syria Representative Says His Job Is to Make the War a 'Quagmire' for Russia, Newsweek, 13 May 2020.
[15] CSIS 2019. Syria in the Gray Zone, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 November 2019.
The article contains excerpts from my book “Russophobia: Propaganda in International Politics”
[Many thanks to Matthew Alford for the audio reading of this article.]
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By Glenn Diesen · Hundreds of paid subscribers
Professor of political science with research focus on geoeconomics, Russian foreign policy and Eurasian integration
11. NEWSFLASH: Russian general, notorious for chemical attacks, killed in Moscow
NEWSFLASH: Russian general, notorious for chemical attacks, killed in Moscow
https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/newsflash-russian-general-notorious?utm
Lt. General Kirillov, who ordered chemical weapon attacks on Ukrainian forces, has been killed by Ukraine's Security Service. Here's what we know:
Myroslava Tanska-Vikulova and Mariana Lastovyria
Dec 18, 2024
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Igor Kirillov, head of the Russian Defence Ministry's radiological, biological and chemical protection unit, speaks at a briefing over an alleged chemical attack on the Syrian city of Douma, 2018. (Photo by AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images)
"All enemies of Ukraine will be punished.”
These words have been repeatedly uttered by the Security Service of Ukraine and the Main Intelligence Department.
And now, for one top Russian officer, it has become a reality.
Ukraine has eliminated the top Russian General Igor Kirillov, the man who gave the order to use banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian military.
For paid subscribers:
- Who was behind the mission to kill Kirillov?
- How many chemical attacks is he alleged to have ordered?
- How was he killed?
- Video of the incident
- What do Ukraine & Russia say about the killing?
After the paywall: what methods does Ukraine use to destroy its enemies? How do Russians react to the killing of their fellow citizen and what does Ukraine accuse him of?
A Ukrainian intelligence officer with knowledge of the details of the operation confirmed to The Financial Times that the Security Service of Ukraine was behind the killing.
Kirillov and his assistant were killed by explosives planted in an electric scooter parked at the entrance to the house in Moscow where the late general lived.
Who is Igor Kirillov?
Igor Kirillov has been the chief of the radiological, chemical, and biological troops of the Russian Armed Forces since 2017. He was the one who ordered the use of banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian army in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russia is actively using it to force the Ukrainian soldiers to leave their trenches and to come under direct fire.
The day before the killing, the Security Service of Ukraine charged him in absentia with war crimes.
General Kirillov is notified of suspicion in absentia. Photo by SBU.
According to Ukrainian intelligence, nearly five thousand cases of chemical weapons use against the Ukrainian military have been recorded. In particular, according to the British government, on his orders, the Russian army used сhloropicrin, known as ‘agent PS,’ which is not lethal but has a choking effect. That is why the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Kirillov.
But Kirillov is not just a war criminal. He was one of those who helped spread Russian propaganda, actively appearing before journalists. While the Russian army itself was using banned weapons, Kirillov actively accused Ukraine of having biolabs that the United States was allegedly building in post-Soviet countries.
In addition, he first made the claim two years ago that Kyiv was allegedly making a dirty bomb. According to him, “this development was in its final stage.”
How did the assassination of a top Russian general happen?
At 6 a.m. Moscow time, an explosion occurred near the house where Igor Kirillov lived in Moscow.
At that moment, he and his assistant were leaving the entrance of the building.
An explosive device of high power, presumably attached to (or built into) the handlebars of a scooter parked near the entrance, detonated.
The explosion blew out windows up to the third floor, cracked the facade of the building, and damaged three cars.
The two Russian servicemen died instantly.
The moment of the explosion was caught on video. Source: ASTRA Telegram channel
What does Ukraine & Russia say about his killing?
Russia's Investigative Committee has classified Kirillov's assassination as a terrorist attack and has already opened a criminal case.
At the same time, Russia itself has already declared mourning for the deceased general.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Kirillov worked fearlessly. Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council Kosachev called the general's death an irreparable loss.
The deputy chairman of the Security Council, Medvedev, began with threats. He said Ukraine's top military and political leadership should expect inevitable retaliation.
Meanwhile, ordinary Russians are outraged that Kirillov was killed almost in the center of the Russian capital. Some secretly admire the work of the Ukrainian special services. Most, of course, want revenge.
Text on the screenshot: "Our enemy is attacking from within. Our enemies are on the territory of our country. They don't even need to send American missiles to kill Russian citizens. This is not the first case. Dugina was blown up in the Moscow region, Tatarsky in St. Petersburg, there have been attempts on the military in Moscow and the Moscow region".
Kyiv has not yet formally confirmed its involvement in the assassination of top general Kirillov. But Ukrainians have already begun to rejoice at the news: Ukrainians have started creating memes with a scooter they have nicknamed an agent who kills Russian enemies.
A meme says "The next Russian general should die from an exploding fingerboard"
A meme that shows how a scooter becomes a part of the Ukrainian army
At the same time, Great Britain does not mourn the death of the Russian commander Igor Kirillov. This statement was made by the spokesman for the Prime Minister.
"Of course, we will not mourn the death of a man who promoted an illegal invasion and caused suffering and death to the people of Ukraine," the statement said.
The British government stressed that Ukraine has the right to defend itself against Russia's illegal war.
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12. China’s Slowdown Has Changed the Trade War
Excerpts:
THE LONG VIEW
Ultimately, economic trends are working in favor of U.S. efforts to limit global supply chains’ dependency on China. Beijing may still be able to increase the market share of its exports for another year or two, but even if China reaches this objective, widespread international opposition to its trade practices will follow. These discontented countries are among those Washington needs on its side in order to effectively diversify global supply chains, as the economics of new investment only work if there is sufficient demand in critical industries to make the necessary outlays worthwhile.
And even as securing policy alignment with partner countries on tariffs and other trade restrictions gets easier, this cannot be the end of the United States’ strategy. Imposing high tariffs and rewiring supply chains away from China are inherently disruptive. Even though Beijing is in a far weaker position than in the past, it can still retaliate. To manage the inevitable costs of a de-risking strategy, Washington should opt for relatively moderate tariffs and be prepared to quickly expand its own and its partners’ investment in the industries that will take the place of Chinese firms in global supply chains. How the restructuring of the global economy pans out will depend on how committed the Trump administration will be to the long-term goals of building a more secure manufacturing base and arranging more sustainable patterns of global trade. Creating a broader base of demand in this way will be more effective than trying to imitate China’s approach of claiming a larger share of a shrinking pie.
China’s Slowdown Has Changed the Trade War
Foreign Affairs · by More by Daniel H. Rosen · December 17, 2024
America Now Has the Upper Hand—but Trump’s Maximalist Tariffs Would Still Carry Risks
Daniel H. Rosen, Reva Goujon, and Logan Wright
December 17, 2024
At the Yangshan deepwater port in Shanghai, October 2024 Casey Hall / Reuters
Daniel H. Rosen is a Founding Partner of Rhodium Group and the head of its China practice.
Reva Goujon directs the corporate advisory practice at Rhodium Group.
Logan Wright is a Partner at Rhodium Group and leads its China financial markets research.
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The China that President-elect Donald Trump will face in 2025 is fundamentally different than the one he encountered when his first administration began in 2017, or even the one with which he negotiated a trade deal near the end of his term. Now, for the first time in more than four decades, China’s share of the world economy is shrinking—it peaked at just above 18 percent of global GDP in 2021 and stands at around 16 percent today.
China’s growth has slowed significantly since the property sector collapsed in 2021 and COVID-related restrictions impeded all types of economic activity in 2022. Domestic demand and household consumption made only a limited rebound after those restrictions were lifted at the end of 2022. Official Chinese GDP growth rates showed just a minor blip, but rising trade imbalances and falling domestic prices tell a grimmer story. China remains an investment-led economy: it is the world’s largest source of investment (around 28 percent) and gross manufacturing output (35 percent), but it represents only around 12 percent of global consumption. China’s domestic economy cannot generate nearly enough demand to absorb everything China produces. To create growth, therefore, Beijing has come to rely even more on exports of excess industrial output that cannot be absorbed in the domestic market. But China can only make further relative gains if other countries reduce their manufacturing investment or if Beijing expands its share of global exports.
This weakening economic outlook in China gives the United States new ways to constrain Beijing. Washington can leverage the influence of U.S. consumer and capital markets, offering its allies and partners a better alternative to being crowded out by Chinese exports. Given rising concerns about China’s dominance of global manufacturing supply chains, U.S. allies and partners may now be more likely than they were a few years ago to align their own policies, including tariffs and technology-related controls, with Washington’s as part of a broader “de-risking” strategy—an effort to reduce the exposure of Western economies to China.
If the incoming Trump administration is to manage such a strategy effectively, though, it will need to think hard about its tariff plans. Trump has floated tariffs as high as 60 percent on all Chinese imports and ten percent tariffs on goods from everywhere else. But applying high tariffs to all U.S. trading partners risks setting off a harmful chain reaction in Western economies, with rising costs, cratering demand, and a slowing of supply chain diversification. A better option would be to apply tariffs selectively to critical sectors where Chinese exports threaten the competitiveness of Western industries, and to combine this with a proactive investment strategy to build and scale critical supply chains that exclude China. The United States and its partners have an opportunity to build on the current momentum to rewire the global trading system in line with their national security goals. No matter how Washington proceeds, economic disruption is inevitable, and China will surely retaliate. But the scope of the second Trump administration’s tariff strategy could determine just how painful the process will be.
FADING ATTRACTION
The Chinese economy today is hardly the juggernaut it was just a few years ago. Since the crisis in the country’s property sector in 2021, the floor space of annual new real estate construction has shrunk by 66 percent. This in turn has caused other segments of the economy, including steel, cement, furnishings, and home appliances, to suffer follow-on effects, including a significant decline in consumer spending. Local government investment in infrastructure, constrained by high debt levels, has slowed considerably in recent years, as well. The damage will be felt for years to come both within China and in countries that relied on strong Chinese demand to export their cars, commodities, and services. China itself relies far more on foreign markets to sell its manufactured goods than it did in the past, a dynamic that contributes to its current vulnerability to tariffs and other types of export restrictions.
China’s situation is likely even more dire than official GDP data suggest. Inconsistencies in reported economic statistics have always been an issue in China, as with other developing countries, but since 2022, it has become even more difficult to take Beijing’s claims at face value. China’s official data suggested that, during the period when COVID-19 lockdowns were enforced across the country, growth slowed by only two to three percentage points below pre-pandemic rates, reaching three percent in 2022 and rebounding strongly to just over five percent in 2023. But considering that Beijing has not instituted the reforms necessary to secure such a positive growth outlook, the more likely reality is that the Chinese economy contracted in 2022 and barely recovered in 2023.
The Trump administration will need to think hard about its tariff plans.
Such a dramatic slowdown would explain why Beijing introduced more aggressive economic stimulus measures in late 2024, including interest rate cuts, trade-in subsidy programs to drive domestic consumption, new bonds to reduce the constraints of local government debt on investment, and promises of even more fiscal policy support next year. Chinese officialdom has also pivoted from insisting that nothing is wrong with domestic demand to assuring that it recognizes the seriousness of the shortfall, especially in household consumption. But shifting China’s economy away from investment-led growth will not happen quickly, and the support offered to households so far appears unlikely to raise incomes and drive more sustainable spending growth.
In the past few years, China has expanded its exports to new markets, particularly in Southeast Asia—a move that ostensibly makes it less vulnerable to tariffs or trade restrictions imposed by any single country, including the United States. But a good deal of China’s diversification is superficial: its goods are simply shipped through third countries before reaching the same U.S. and European consumers as before. Washington is wise to this tariff evasion method, and its efforts to stop it could include blunter restrictions, such as import bans on specific products, in the years ahead. To prepare for such U.S. measures—and to seek more promising markets than they find at home—Chinese firms are investing abroad, building factories in third countries such as Mexico and Vietnam so that they can export to the United States without being subject to tariffs. It is far from certain, however, that this workaround will remain viable as U.S. trade restrictions evolve further. And, adding to Beijing’s problems, many foreign-invested firms within China, which currently produce 30 percent of the country’s exports, are planning to shift production overseas in response to the weakness of China’s domestic demand.
Washington has also made gains on Beijing in the race for technological leadership in key industries. The United States has been building up its domestic capacity in advanced technologies since the 2022 passage of the CHIPS Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, while also taking more aggressive steps to reduce China’s access to U.S. technologies via export and investment controls. When Trump was last in office, his administration introduced whack-a-mole policies targeting Chinese telecom companies and sent mixed signals around provisions for U.S. firms’ access to Chinese markets in the Phase One trade agreement it signed with Beijing in early 2020. Multinational companies interpreted the inconsistency as evidence that a full decoupling of U.S. and Chinese technology supply chains was highly unlikely. Now, after multiple rounds of detailed export controls, restrictions on information and communications technology supply chains, and additional limits on outbound investment under both the Trump and the Biden administrations, as well as sweeping U.S. enforcement of these rules, those firms are recalculating—and directing their investment away from China.
A BUMPY TRANSITION
This shift is just one facet of the world’s reaction to China’s trade policies. Many countries today do not need to be cajoled by Trump’s negotiators to align with U.S. de-risking initiatives; China’s economic slowdown and rising national security concerns about reliance on Chinese-centric supply chains provide incentive enough. China’s growth strategy is inherently confrontational and zero sum: China is not adding to global demand but rather competing more aggressively in overseas markets. Advanced manufacturing countries whose industries are threatened by cheap Chinese goods and countries in the global South that are fighting to move up the value chain all have clear reasons to restrict Chinese exports. This shared interest simply did not exist during Trump’s first term.
China’s economic slowdown has not just made its market less attractive to trading partners and international investors. It also gives other countries, particularly developed European economies, more reason to align with the United States on tariffs and other controls on Chinese exports because, if they don’t, U.S. tariffs on Chinese exports will cause spillovers of those exports into their own markets. Some G-7 countries are already considering tariffs and preemptive safeguards to avoid such import surges from China.
The Chinese economy today is hardly the juggernaut it was just a few years ago.
Even as these trends compel them to readjust supply chains away from China, however, the United States and its partners must contend with a global economy that is increasingly imbalanced. As the economist Brad Setser has argued, the G-7 and other developed economies now collectively run a trade deficit, whereas China, Russia, and many commodity-dependent countries run trade surpluses. This makes a U.S.-led de-risking strategy a challenging prospect. The United States and its partners will need to build the manufacturing capacity that will make it possible to reduce imports from their geopolitical rivals.
Attempts by G-7 countries to force a rapid shift in this macroeconomic structure by sharply cutting imports of goods will be highly disruptive. In the near term, these measures will affect standards of living across developed economies in politically consequential ways. Substantial tariffs on Chinese goods will make them less competitive in U.S. markets and, absent alternative suppliers for those goods, raise the prices of everyday products for U.S. consumers and of intermediate components for U.S. manufacturers. The American public will either pay higher prices, driving up inflation, or simply reduce household consumption.
Scale matters here. If the Trump administration were to adopt a maximalist strategy of universally high tariffs, the resulting large-scale reduction in U.S. domestic demand would probably produce recessions in G-7 economies. New manufacturing ventures would become less attractive to investors, making it more difficult for these same countries to de-risk their supply chains and serve developed markets. Relatively moderate tariffs, such as the additional ten percent levies on Chinese goods that Trump proposed more recently, would still be costly but would generate smaller disruptions. Even better would be tariffs that are designed specifically to advance a strategy to restructure global supply chains, rather than starting with a tariff plan and adjusting the strategy to fit it. With any tariff increases there would be a rocky adjustment period as prices rose and supplies became strained, but those problems would subside as alternative suppliers to replace Chinese products eventually emerge.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Despite its economic problems, Beijing has considerable ability to thwart U.S.-led efforts to reorient the global economy away from China. Under most circumstances, China’s rapidly rising trade surplus would cause its currency to appreciate, weakening the competitiveness of its exports over time. But it is actually more likely that China’s currency will depreciate over the next few years, the result of a combination of factors including the rapid expansion of China’s financial system and domestic money supply since the 2008 financial crisis and the relative decline of Chinese interest rates compared with those in the United States, which have produced persistent capital outflows from China. All this means Beijing can still choose to make Chinese exports even cheaper by simply reducing the interventions its central bank regularly makes to prop up the renminbi.
As the prices of Chinese goods fall, it will become less attractive to the United States and its partners to invest in new manufacturing supply chains to replace Chinese sources. Beijing has already shown it is prepared to use currency intervention to retaliate against U.S. tariffs and protect Chinese manufacturers: as of this writing, the renminbi has depreciated more than two percent since the U.S. election. It is dangerous for China to allow the renminbi to depreciate too quickly, because doing so could drive even more capital outflows, but there is no doubt that Beijing can use the currency as a tool to retaliate against tariffs in the short term.
Beijing can still thwart U.S.-led efforts to reorient the global economy.
China will also try to use U.S. partners’ frustration with potential Trump administration policies to unravel the network of allies the Biden administration has nurtured. These countries are preparing for Trump’s return, drawing lessons from what worked and what irked in his first term, and may choose to adopt more forceful measures against China to appeal to the incoming administration. But Beijing will counter with offers of investment pledges, technology partnerships in areas where Chinese firms lead (such as electric vehicles), tax incentives, tariff reductions, visa exemptions, relief from export controls, and other carrots. If this does not work, Beijing may resort to sticks, retaliating against U.S. and allied trade barriers with expanded export controls of its own. It could, for instance, restrict the export of critical inputs for clean technologies and semiconductor manufacturing (as China is already doing with export controls on gallium, germanium, graphite, and antimony), which could effectively hamper U.S. and allied production in critical sectors. Beijing could also apply punitive, countrywide export controls to products with minimal Chinese content, such as by banning the export of all Chinese-processed graphite to the U.S. market, where it is used in battery manufacturing.
Even if Beijing is selective in issuing threats and imposing restrictions, taking action against some U.S. partners but not others, the same chill will be running through capitals across the world, from Brussels to New Delhi. Governments not just in the West but across the world will have to ask whether their countries’ dependence on China for critical inputs is sustainable or whether it poses an unacceptable threat to their national security. If the answer is the latter, it will be easier for the United States to convene a global coalition to de-risk manufacturing supply chains from China. Such efforts are already underway in the defense industrial sector through initiatives such as the Pentagon-led Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, which aims to foster cooperation on defense acquisition. Beijing has a playbook for retaliating against Trump’s policies but not for managing the consequences of the steps U.S. partners may take in response.
THE LONG VIEW
Ultimately, economic trends are working in favor of U.S. efforts to limit global supply chains’ dependency on China. Beijing may still be able to increase the market share of its exports for another year or two, but even if China reaches this objective, widespread international opposition to its trade practices will follow. These discontented countries are among those Washington needs on its side in order to effectively diversify global supply chains, as the economics of new investment only work if there is sufficient demand in critical industries to make the necessary outlays worthwhile.
And even as securing policy alignment with partner countries on tariffs and other trade restrictions gets easier, this cannot be the end of the United States’ strategy. Imposing high tariffs and rewiring supply chains away from China are inherently disruptive. Even though Beijing is in a far weaker position than in the past, it can still retaliate. To manage the inevitable costs of a de-risking strategy, Washington should opt for relatively moderate tariffs and be prepared to quickly expand its own and its partners’ investment in the industries that will take the place of Chinese firms in global supply chains. How the restructuring of the global economy pans out will depend on how committed the Trump administration will be to the long-term goals of building a more secure manufacturing base and arranging more sustainable patterns of global trade. Creating a broader base of demand in this way will be more effective than trying to imitate China’s approach of claiming a larger share of a shrinking pie.
Daniel H. Rosen is a Founding Partner of Rhodium Group and the head of its China practice.
Reva Goujon directs the corporate advisory practice at Rhodium Group.
Logan Wright is a Partner at Rhodium Group and leads its China financial markets research.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Daniel H. Rosen · December 17, 2024
13. An Israeli Order in the Middle East
Excerpts:
ON THE SAME PAGE
It is in the interests of both Israel and its regional partners that the incoming Trump administration remains committed to the Middle East and willing to use force to guarantee the security of its allies and deter shared adversaries. This commitment to defending the region may face opposition from factions within the administration that have advocated for reducing U.S. international involvement. Trump has signaled that the United States would not intervene in Syria and has indicated a desire to complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria at a time when Russia’s and Iran’s positions have weakened.
Hamas’s shock attack on October 7 appeared to prove that Israel had far less control over the trajectory of its region than it had imagined. And for almost a year, Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza suggested the same. Over the past three months, Israel has reasserted its ability to shape Middle Eastern politics and security. Without brave leadership, however, Israel’s opportunity could slip away. Aspirations of extreme members of Netanyahu’s coalition to annex parts of Gaza and the West Bank, impose military rule in Gaza, or pursue a polarizing domestic agenda that weakens democratic institutions will severely hinder this progress.
An Israeli government that advances the proposed vision will garner the support of the majority of its citizens and is more likely to strengthen Israel’s regional standing. Conversely, a government that does not curb its own extremist rhetoric and actions will only pave the way for an expanded regional conflict with no realistic end game—and play into the hands of the Iranian regime.
Sinwar and Iran’s leaders recognized the war’s potential to reorder the Middle East. Israel should settle for nothing less. But it must use its power swiftly and wisely. Only a vision for the region that addresses the threats posed by Iran, advances regional integration, and establishes a political horizon for the Palestinians, supported by a coordinated plan backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, can leverage Israel’s military success against Iran to accomplish a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Middle East and capitalize on the opportunities that will emerge in the war’s wake.
An Israeli Order in the Middle East
Foreign Affairs · by More by Amos Yadlin · December 17, 2024
A Chance to Defeat the Iranian Vision for the Region—and Improve on the American Vision
Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov
December 17, 2024
Israeli military vehicles in the Golan Heights, December 2024 Jamal Awad / Reuters
Amos Yadlin is Founder and President of MIND Israel. He is a retired Major General in the Israeli Air Force and served as the head of Israel’s Defense Intelligence from 2006 to 2010.
Avner Golov is Vice President of MIND Israel. From 2018 to 2023, he was a Senior Director on Israel’s National Security Council.
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What is happening in the Middle East today is best understood as a struggle over a new regional order. Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, three competing visions for that order have emerged and then faltered: the Hamas vision, the Hezbollah-Iranian vision, and the American vision. Hamas sought to ignite a multifront war aimed at destroying Israel. Iran, along with its proxy Hezbollah, aimed for a war of attrition that would cause Israel to collapse and push the United States out of the region. The United States, which stood firmly behind Israel, hoped for regional stability built on new political possibilities for the Israelis and the Palestinians, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a defense pact between Washington and Riyadh.
None of these visions, however, proved tractable: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran misjudged the strength of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israeli society, and the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The United States overestimated its capacity to influence Israel’s approach to the war in Gaza and did not sufficiently contend with the regional threat posed by Iran.
The failure of these three visions creates an opening for a more realistic fourth one: an Israeli vision. Over the past three months, Israel has begun to exert its power to reshape the Middle East. It eliminated Hamas’s military capabilities and—shattering its own long-standing approach to deterrence—decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership and compelled the Lebanon-based group to accept cease-fire terms it had long resisted, leaving Hamas isolated and Iran without its most capable proxy. Israel has also carried out sophisticated strikes inside Iran. The opportunistic toppling of the Assad regime in Syria at the hands of rebel forces can be understood, in part, as an attempt to take advantage of Israel’s undermining of Iranian regional power. As a result, Iran has lost the land corridor stretching from its borders to Israel’s, a corridor that Iran had devoted significant resources to establishing over the past four decades.
These developments mark a dramatic shift: for nearly a year after the October 7 attack, Israel’s vision for the region’s future was unclear. It was defending itself and, by extension, fighting to preserve a status quo that would never be reestablished. Although its operations were aggressive, Israel refrained from disrupting the existing deterrence dynamics with Hezbollah and Iran. Moreover, it hesitated to impose a new order while it was viewed as an instigator internationally and while divisions weakened Israeli society domestically.
Israel is now reshaping the Middle East through military operations, but it would benefit from asserting itself politically, too. It has both the opportunity and the responsibility to steer the region’s trajectory toward a new, more peaceful and sustainable reality. Currently, Israel’s ability to force regional changes militarily outpaces its readiness to articulate and enact a cohesive strategic vision; its operational successes do not, as of yet, have clear strategic ideas to go along with them. Israel should push for a political framework to match its battlefield successes. An Arab-Israeli coalition backed by the United States could repel threats from Shiite and Sunni radicals, provide the Palestinians with a realistic political future, safeguard Israel’s security interests, secure the return of the Israeli hostages still in Gaza, and prevent another attack on Israeli soil.
Israel must not seek to impose its vision of a new regional order alone. It needs buy-in from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Germany and the United Kingdom, even as U.S. foreign policy undergoes its own realignment under President-elect Donald Trump. The situation is delicate. But for the first time since the October 7 attack, Israel has the opportunity to seize the moment.
BEST-LAID PLANS
When Yahya Sinwar, the late Hamas leader, ordered an invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, he did so with a calculated vision for the Middle East: immediately after Hamas’s attack, he anticipated a coordinated assault from all Iranian-backed militant groups in the region, which would in turn inspire Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank to launch a new intifada. Sinwar’s plan relied on the participation of Hezbollah and other members of the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance” and even of Iran itself, ultimately leading to the complete military defeat of Israel.
But Sinwar severely misjudged regional dynamics. On October 8, although Hezbollah declared its support for Hamas and began shelling Israeli towns, its actions were limited. Shiite militias from Iraq and Syria launched rockets and drones to disrupt Israel’s advanced air defense systems, but these efforts posed no significant threat to them. The Houthis in Yemen joined the assault by targeting ships in the Red Sea and launching missiles at Israeli cities. The Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad facilitated Iranian arms transfers to Lebanon but notably stopped Iranian militias from attacking Israel from Syrian territory and did not involve the Syrian army in the conflict, despite facing pressure to do so from Iran. Hezbollah did not invade Israeli territory, focusing instead on distracting the IDF in the north to divert its attention away from Gaza. Additionally, Sinwar’s hoped-for Palestinian uprising did not materialize, in part due to the IDF’s rapid and effective deployment to areas of the West Bank with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad presences. Meanwhile, Israel applied intense force in Gaza, killing thousands of Hamas fighters and, eventually, Sinwar himself.
Israel’s decision to engage in a prolonged war initially emboldened Iran and Hezbollah. They saw the conflict as an opportunity to assert their regional hegemony. Unlike Hamas, whose goal was Israel’s outright destruction, Iran sought, more modestly, to improve its regional standing. By sustaining a multifront war of attrition against Israel, Tehran aimed to increase the pressure on Israeli society and amplify the costs of the war. With the United States focused on its strategic competition with China and the war in Ukraine, Iran anticipated that Washington would further withdraw from the region.
Sinwar severely misjudged regional dynamics.
The initial Israeli response to the Hezbollah-Iranian strategy appeared cautious. Israel evacuated northern communities to create a security buffer instead of invading Lebanon to directly counter Hezbollah’s missile attacks, effectively allowing Hezbollah to continue its strikes. Additionally, although the United States publicly backed Israel, Western governments largely failed to impose significant costs on the Iranian-backed axis of resistance. Their inability to stop the militant Houthis in Yemen from interfering with Red Sea maritime traffic emboldened the group to escalate its attacks on Israel. International pressure constrained Israel’s ability to decisively defeat Hamas and fueled Sinwar’s hope that Israel would not be able to sustain the fighting for long. These factors combined to create the perception among Iran and its allies that Israel might eventually find itself isolated, economically drained, and exhausted. This idea was reinforced when, in April, Iran launched an unprecedented missile and drone attack directly from its own territory against Israel. Iranian leaders celebrated Israel’s measured response—and the ongoing political turmoil inside Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government pursued policies that prolonged the war, strained the economy, and intensified polarization, giving the upper hand to Israel’s enemies.
Meanwhile, the United States continued its pursuit of a Middle East strategy built on the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. After October 7, Washington pressed Saudi Arabia to finalize a defense pact tied to normalization with Israel and reasserted its belief in a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Biden administration sought to leverage the war to create a stronger pro-American coalition in the Middle East, shoring up Washington’s influence and creating a more integrated regional economic hub linking Europe and the Indo-Pacific in its competition with China.
But the U.S. plan failed to adequately address the threat from an emboldened Iran or assuage the concerns of the United States’ junior partners. Saudi Arabia declined to normalize ties with Israel as the war in Gaza persisted, particularly as Israel refused to commit to a two-state solution—a move that would be interpreted by Israel’s enemies in the region as a victory for Hamas. Netanyahu, for his part, chose to delay ending the war’s intense phase, waiting instead for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in the hope of a Republican victory. Trump’s election, he believed, would lessen U.S. oversight over its campaign against Hamas. With the Democrats’ loss in November, the United States’ strategy in the Middle East has been thrown into doubt. Despite all of Washington’s power and leverage, the American vision for a new regional order, reasonable though it may have seemed, has proved similarly infeasible to those of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.
EMPTY THRONE?
In September, the prevailing winds in the Middle East began to shift. After 11 months in which the Israeli government set no objectives in the northern theater, the Israeli cabinet added the safe return of Israel’s northern residents to their homes as a formal war objective. The war had already begun to shift northward, provoked by Hezbollah’s late July rocket attack on a soccer field in the Golan Heights, which killed 12 children and injured over 40. In response, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, Fuad Shukr, and targeted Hezbollah’s command structure with a humiliating operation. Explosives planted in the organization’s pagers ignited simultaneously, killing and maiming scores of operatives. Then Israel launched a series of airstrikes that destroyed approximately 3,000 rockets and cruise missiles, and killed Hezbollah’s leadership, including Nasrallah. These acts restored some of the IDF’s lost prestige.
To retaliate, Iran launched a direct attack on Israel on October 1, firing 181 ballistic missiles. But this hail of munitions caused only limited damage to three Israeli sites: the Mossad compound in Glilot and two Israeli air force bases in the south. This time, Israel organized a larger response than it had in April, deploying 150 aircraft to strike 20 significant targets in Iran. The strikes showcased the asymmetry in the two countries’ military capabilities: Iran launched many missiles with limited results, but the IDF accurately hit high-value targets, including Iran’s S-300 antiaircraft systems and a nuclear weapons research facility in Parchin. The campaign demonstrated the vulnerability of Iran’s most valuable energy and nuclear sites, should the Iranian regime choose to escalate further. Since then, despite repeated threats, Iran has not launched another direct attack on Israel.
On November 24, Israel and Lebanon, with the approval of Iran and Hezbollah, signed a cease-fire agreement, which has largely held. That same day, Syrian rebels backed by Turkey initiated a military operation against the Assad regime. In less than two weeks, the rebels reached Damascus and declared a new government, with minimal resistance from Syrian, Russian, or Iranian forces or from Hezbollah. Instead of consolidating Iran’s hegemony, the war has dealt a significant blow to its regional standing.
The cease-fire in Lebanon and the unfolding situation in Syria have created a leadership vacuum in the Middle East. Israel’s military achievements present an opportunity to form a new coalition capable of reshaping the region’s future and to offer an alternate reality of peace, stability, and prosperity.
COALITION OF THE WILLING
Israel must build on its operational triumphs by clarifying and pursuing a coherent strategic vision of a moderate regional alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia. It must address key security threats, foremost among them Iran, and present a unified front against Turkey’s and Qatar’s attempts to bolster the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in the Arab world, a task made all the more urgent following the collapse of the Assad regime. Lastly, the coalition must offer the Palestinians a political future while safeguarding Israel against future terrorist attacks.
Israel is now in a strong position to make real progress on bringing this outcome to fruition. But it cannot do so alone. It needs the United States to lead the complex effort and an Arab partnership to provide legitimacy in the Middle East and transform its vision into an effective regional force. The first step: Israel should convene a summit with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and any actors aspiring to help reshape the Middle East, including Palestinian representatives, in a leading Middle Eastern capital such as Riyadh. Its objectives would include establishing an American-Arab-Israeli alliance based on a shared regional vision; advancing the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia (and, ideally, additional countries such as Oman and Indonesia); creating a new regional security framework; and establishing a roadmap for a Gaza free of Hamas through a deradicalization campaign. The plan should also aim to increase the Gulf states’ footprint in Syria to reduce the influence of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in the country.
The regional vision must also include a Palestinian component, following an agreement on a cease-fire in Gaza that facilitates the return of all Israeli hostages. The summit must establish a political future for the Palestinians distinct from past approaches taken by Arab states and the United States, which focused on a two-state solution. Instead, the alliance should emphasize a flexible, long-term transition in which the Palestinians demonstrate effective governance and actively work to eliminate the influence of the most radical factions from Palestinian society.
Israel is now in a strong position to make real progress on bringing this outcome to fruition.
Furthermore, Arab leaders must agree that Gaza’s reconstruction by the alliance will proceed only after the territory is fully demilitarized, at which point Israel must commit to withdrawing the IDF. Before then, the IDF must retain the ability to establish a security buffer zone within Gaza along the border with Israel to prevent any potential Hamas military buildups.
The United States should oversee a well-monitored transition to effective governance in Gaza by an Arab-led Palestinian committee that recognizes Israel as a Jewish state, eliminates terrorism, ceases payments to terrorists, and promotes deradicalization within Palestinian society as well as in international forums. It should also work with Egypt to devise a strategy for securing the Gaza-Egypt border to prevent Hamas’s rearmament.
These Israeli conditions would align with U.S. and Arab interests, particularly those of the Gulf states, which seek an end to the war in Gaza and understand that a viable Palestinian state is currently unrealistic, but recognize the importance of providing the Palestinians with a political horizon to advance regional goals, such as countering Iran, combating the Muslim Brotherhood, and enhancing economic and technological cooperation with Israel.
The summit should aim to accelerate the development of a permanent regional defense architecture. Dedicated task forces led by U.S. Central Command, the IDF, and the militaries of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates would address air and missile defense, secure maritime navigation, counter terrorism from Shiite and Sunni extremists, and enhance intelligence sharing. Israel and the United States must work especially hard to align their strategies to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is increasingly crucial that credible deterrence be established, because the weakening of Iran’s proxy network makes nuclearization a more attractive option.
ON THE SAME PAGE
It is in the interests of both Israel and its regional partners that the incoming Trump administration remains committed to the Middle East and willing to use force to guarantee the security of its allies and deter shared adversaries. This commitment to defending the region may face opposition from factions within the administration that have advocated for reducing U.S. international involvement. Trump has signaled that the United States would not intervene in Syria and has indicated a desire to complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria at a time when Russia’s and Iran’s positions have weakened.
Hamas’s shock attack on October 7 appeared to prove that Israel had far less control over the trajectory of its region than it had imagined. And for almost a year, Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza suggested the same. Over the past three months, Israel has reasserted its ability to shape Middle Eastern politics and security. Without brave leadership, however, Israel’s opportunity could slip away. Aspirations of extreme members of Netanyahu’s coalition to annex parts of Gaza and the West Bank, impose military rule in Gaza, or pursue a polarizing domestic agenda that weakens democratic institutions will severely hinder this progress.
An Israeli government that advances the proposed vision will garner the support of the majority of its citizens and is more likely to strengthen Israel’s regional standing. Conversely, a government that does not curb its own extremist rhetoric and actions will only pave the way for an expanded regional conflict with no realistic end game—and play into the hands of the Iranian regime.
Sinwar and Iran’s leaders recognized the war’s potential to reorder the Middle East. Israel should settle for nothing less. But it must use its power swiftly and wisely. Only a vision for the region that addresses the threats posed by Iran, advances regional integration, and establishes a political horizon for the Palestinians, supported by a coordinated plan backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, can leverage Israel’s military success against Iran to accomplish a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Middle East and capitalize on the opportunities that will emerge in the war’s wake.
Amos Yadlin is Founder and President of MIND Israel. He is a retired Major General in the Israeli Air Force and served as the head of Israel’s Defense Intelligence from 2006 to 2010.
Avner Golov is Vice President of MIND Israel. From 2018 to 2023, he was a Senior Director on Israel’s National Security Council.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Amos Yadlin · December 17, 2024
14. Is the U.S. Answer to China’s Belt and Road Working?
My thoughts on countering the One Belt On Road (or Belt and Road) Initiative. Can resistance to Chinese malign activities be developed in countries where OBOR is being used to expand Chinese influence?
• What is the resistance potential against OBOR?
• Is it supportable and exploitable?
• How to develop a supporting campaign plan to support the new US Strategic Approach to China;
• Promoting American Prosperity
• Advancing American Influence
• Preserving Peace Through Strength.
• Is there a role for an adapted Resistance Operating Concept to counter malign influence and contribute to unconventional deterrence?
• How to Support the GEC?
• Information and Influence Activities
• 1st SFC’s Information Warfare Center
• USSOCOM’s Trans Regional Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
• How to Support State?
• Blue Dot Network
• Economic Prosperity Network
• Is there a role for the 2 SOF “trinities?”
• Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Support to Political Warfare
• The Comparative advantage of SOF: Governance, Influence, Support to indigenous forces and populations
Is the U.S. Answer to China’s Belt and Road Working?
The International Development Finance Corporation has put the United States more on the map, but China remains king of global infrastructure.
By Lili Pike, a reporter at Foreign Policy, and Christina Lu, an energy and environment reporter at Foreign Policy.
Foreign Policy · by Lili Pike, Christina Lu
December 16, 2024, 1:32 PM
U.S. President Joe Biden combined two of his passions during his much-delayed trip to Africa last week: U.S. foreign policy and trains. At the Lobito port on the Angolan coast, “Amtrak Joe” surveyed new train cars on an 800-mile railway that his administration has touted as its flagship project in Africa and as a symbol of the United States’ new international development model.
“We’re building railroad lines from Angola to the Port of Lobito, in Zambia and the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] DRC, and, ultimately, all the way to the Atlantic—from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. It’ll be the first trans-continental railroad in Africa and the biggest American rail investment outside of America,” Biden said in a speech during his trip.
U.S. President Joe Biden combined two of his passions during his much-delayed trip to Africa last week: U.S. foreign policy and trains. At the Lobito port on the Angolan coast, “Amtrak Joe” surveyed new train cars on an 800-mile railway that his administration has touted as its flagship project in Africa and as a symbol of the United States’ new international development model.
“We’re building railroad lines from Angola to the Port of Lobito, in Zambia and the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] DRC, and, ultimately, all the way to the Atlantic—from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. It’ll be the first trans-continental railroad in Africa and the biggest American rail investment outside of America,” Biden said in a speech during his trip.
The reality is slightly less grandiose than the speech: Currently, a U.S. loan is helping to refurbish an existing rail line from the DRC border to the Lobito port, reducing shipping time to the United States. Separately, the Africa Finance Corporation, a Nigeria-based development bank, is backing a new rail line from Zambia to Angola, which is expected to break ground in 2026. A final leg to the Indian Ocean is still on the drawing board. In total, though, the United States has now invested a significant sum, $4 billion, in the Lobito Corridor.
U.S. involvement in large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa, where China has been dominating headlines and balance sheets for decades, represents a notable shift. That change has been facilitated, in large part, by a new U.S. development bank: the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
Speaking at the DFC’s fifth-anniversary conference last week, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described the impetus for the bank’s creation: “[W]e were entering this new era of geopolitics, one defined by strategic competition. Ad hoc investments, grants, and loans were not going to cut it. The old way of doing business was not going to cut it.”
As an answer to that challenge, Congress established the DFC in 2018, combining existing agencies into one bigger bank. Central to the bank’s mission: countering China. Congress directed the bank to follow the playbook of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative—using development finance to further U.S. foreign-policy goals, including reducing dependence on China in critical supply chains, and, as the 2018 bill put it, to “provide countries a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments and United States strategic competitors.”
“I think part of the reason DFC was created was a recognition that we’ve been a little bit absent from the playing field in many of these countries,” Scott Nathan, CEO of DFC, told Foreign Policy.
That has started to change. In its first five years, the bank has built a nearly $50 billion portfolio across 114 countries. But competing with China—a behemoth state-led economy that has specialized in overseas infrastructure development for more than two decades—is no easy task.
As the DFC seeks reauthorization from Congress next year, is it meeting its mission?
U.S. officials say that outspending China isn’t the yardstick for measuring the DFC’s performance, but it’s certainly on their minds. At the DFC’s anniversary conference, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) administrator Samantha Power, who is also on the bank’s board, compared its $12 billion in new commitments in 2024 to the decline in lending from China’s two main development banks to $3.7 billion in 2021.
The DFC and Chinese development banks do seem to be on inverse trajectories—with DFC lending more than doubling since 2020.
But comparing the DFC with Chinese development finance is like comparing “apples to oranges,” Rebecca Ray, a senior academic researcher at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, said. For one, the DFC focuses on lending to the private sector, while Chinese development banks often lend directly to governments and state-run banks—or China’s own state-owned enterprises operating overseas.
More fundamentally, China’s BRI spending is something of a black box, rendering comparisons difficult. Of all of China’s different types of overseas lending, researchers have the best grasp of the scale of China’s sovereign lending because recipient governments often have to publicly report their debt. Boston University’s latest numbers indeed show that China’s lending in that category has fallen significantly from its peak of $87 billion in 2016 to less than $4 billion in 2021 (the last year for which data is available).
However, Ray notes that those numbers don’t account for the loans these banks provide to Chinese firms doing business overseas, which remain opaque.
Derek Scissors, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, offers a window into the volume of that business through his tracking of China’s overseas construction—the heart of Belt and Road. In a recent report, he found that construction activity had jumped 40 percent in the first half of 2024 after a pandemic slump—with $35 billion in contracts recorded so far this year.
The hand-in-glove relationship between Chinese state-owned banks and construction firms is a key factor in how China has become such a giant in global development.
“The ability to build infrastructure in Chinese firms is unparalleled. … [U.S. firms] have short-term profit motivations, and infrastructure tends to pay off over a very long horizon,” Ray said. The DFC can lend to non-U.S. companies from partner countries, too, but ultimately, without a fleet of state-owned companies that have mastered the art of bulldozing on every continent, the United States is at a disadvantage when it comes to its global presence.
Even as the DFC creates a more streamlined process for U.S. companies to take advantage of, they face “all kinds of other impediments,” including labor, safety, and environmental standards that Chinese competitors aren’t bound by, said Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Many African markets are also seen as risky environments to operate in, he added. “I think it’s still a hard sell to make to U.S. companies, and this is what the DFC is struggling to do,” he said.
“Unlike the Chinese, we can’t direct U.S. companies to go into these markets,” he added. “It’s sort of like you can lead the horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.”
Even if the United States can’t match China dollar for dollar, digger for digger, U.S. officials say the DFC has proved its value in the strategic competition with China, particularly in the effort to derisk essential supply chains.
China has long used its development banks to access mineral resources across the world. Through the DFC, the United States has started to do the same.
Take the Lobito rail line, a key pillar of Washington’s effort to secure new supply chains for critical minerals such as copper and cobalt that underpin the world’s clean energy technologies and advanced weapons systems. The project is strategically situated in a region rich in the coveted minerals: Zambia is known for its aptly named Copperbelt, while the DRC produces some 70 percent of the world’s cobalt.
That push has taken on new urgency in recent months as China, which overwhelmingly commands the supply chains of many of the world’s critical minerals, has used its dominance against Washington. Last week, Beijing tightened its grip on its exports of gallium and germanium, two key chipmaking inputs, as well as antimony, with new export bans in retaliation against U.S. export controls targeting the Chinese semiconductor industry.
If all goes according to plan, the Lobito Corridor will help Washington plug those vulnerabilities, all while advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region.
“The Chinese have created impact over 20 years of investment, large and small, and we’re coming in and we’re trying to play catch up in a very short period of time with this very big project,” said Hudson, the CSIS expert.
Since the U.S.-backed consortium of European companies took over the Lobito Atlantic Railway last year, the first U.S.-bound shipments of DRC copper were loaded onto the railway in August—and Washington hopes that’s just the beginning.
With the DFC’s new $553 million loan to the project, the bank aims to further expand the railway line’s capacity, a DFC spokesperson told Foreign Policy. The DFC has also awarded U.K.-based Pensana a $3.4 million grant to conduct feasibility studies for a rare-earth mine in the Lobito Corridor. Meanwhile, U.S. company KoBold Metals has agreed to be the anchor client of the next phase of the Lobito rail line in Zambia, shipping copper from its mine in the country.
In neighboring Tanzania, the DFC has also expressed interest in the Kabanga Nickel Project, which would provide a new key source of the mineral—used in electric car batteries—outside of Indonesia, where the mines are dominated by Chinese companies. A nickel mine in Brazil is also on the bank’s potential-projects list for early next year.
And it’s not just critical mineral supply chains that the bank is focused on—the DFC has also supported clean energy manufacturing, which China currently dominates. In one recent case, the DFC provided a U.S. company with a $500 million loan to build a solar panel factory in India.
U.S. officials have also wielded the DFC in a global reputational battle with China. They point out that the bank’s focus on the private sector means its projects don’t add to a country’s sovereign debt, in contrast with the significant debt burden many countries face from Chinese projects—debt bombs that exploded during the pandemic. The DFC has also focused on ensuring projects meet environmental and social standards, which has not been a priority for Chinese banks (although it is worth noting that climate advocates have also criticized the DFC’s support for fossil fuel projects).
“We’re not asking countries to renounce any ties they have. …We’re very specifically not doing that. And when I travel or speak to foreign leaders, I think there’s a real hunger for choice, for having an alternative, ” Nathan, DFC’s CEO, told Foreign Policy. “We’re offering what we offer. We’re not competing dollar for dollar. And I think many of the projects that [China does] are ones that we don’t think are appropriate for the countries where they operate.”
That kind of framing may strike a chord in Angola, which has been one of the biggest recipients of Chinese loans in Africa in recent decades. Over a 20-year period, the country has been the destination of a whopping one-third of all Chinese lending to the continent, borrowing some $45 billion from Chinese creditors in exchange for oil.
Angola is still struggling to pay off those bills. Today, Luanda owes Chinese creditors an estimated $17 billion, or nearly 40 percent of the country’s external debt—a staggering figure that has fueled frustration and unease in the country.
“The Chinese have a big footprint here in Angola,” said Florindo Chivucute, the founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, an advocacy organization. “It almost doesn’t matter where you turn.”
It’s against this backdrop that Angolan President João Lourenço has welcomed, and even courted, Washington’s recent investment in the country. Since taking office in 2017, Lourenço has spent much of his presidency deepening ties with the United States and in 2022 spurned a Chinese bid to revive the railway in favor of a U.S.-backed European consortium. Asked by the New York Times in November about the debt his country owes China, he said, “We are paying off the debt. If you would ask me now if I had to take a new loan under the same conditions, I would say no.”
At the same time, Lourenço has publicly balked at the notion that Angola must choose between Washington and Beijing, a framing that is often used by policymakers and commentators. “The way they put it, is like either you are with the one or with the other. If you choose one, you have to preclude the other one,” Lourenço told the New York Times. “That’s not the case. That’s not how we see it.”
Chivucute said that he welcomed the U.S. investment effort in Angola and hoped to see more transparency with U.S. lending. That’s “something that we haven’t seen with the Chinese investment in Angola, and so that’s the biggest hope, because the corruption is a big issue,” he said.
In Tanzania—where the DFC recently announced a $320 million loan to the country’s largest commercial bank to support small businesses in both Tanzania and Burundi, with a focus on those run by women—officials are similarly weighing how to best balance U.S. and Chinese investment. “As these geopolitical tensions can increase, it makes us a bit more nervous about limiting ourselves to one side of the equation,” Elsie Kanza, the Tanzanian ambassador to the United States, told Foreign Policy. Tanzania is looking for partners that meet the country’s standards, she said, as well as investment in projects that aren’t solely focused on extracting the country’s natural resources.
“We don’t want to have any exclusivity, because that is detrimental to national security,” Kanza said.
As the U.S.-China competition continues, the United States’ pacing challenge may not be as significant as it once seemed. The future of Chinese overseas lending is murky. China’s domestic economic slowdown has contributed to the documented decrease in overseas lending by its development banks, which also have to support domestic projects. But it has also contributed to Chinese firms seeking business in hotter markets abroad.
On the U.S. side, when Trump takes office in January, backed by a new Republican-held Congress, a big question looms: Will the DFC even stay in the game?
The DFC was created under the first Trump administration with Republican backing and was seen by Republicans in Congress as a more palatable alternative to foreign aid.
But when asked about reauthorization prospects, Democratic Sen. Chris Coons, one of the original co-sponsors of the bill that established the bank, told the DFC conference this week, “It’s impossible to get anything good done in Congress these days, so let’s just presume a stumbling block. I think not allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good and coming to a relatively swift resolution early next year, when there’s a new majority in the Senate and some changes in the House—getting moving quickly, I think, is important.”
If all goes according to plan, the bank is hoping that its investment cap will be doubled to $120 billion so it can take on more projects. That’s money observers of the bank in developing countries say is needed for it to make a clearer impact. “The DFC is going to have to provide much more money to different kinds of projects in Africa and elsewhere in the global south to be really perceived as a tool that can compete with what the [Belt and Road Initiative] has been able to do all over the world,” said C. Géraud Neema Byamungu, an expert in China-Africa relations at the China-Global South Project.
Trump and the Republican Congress share the current administration’s appetite for competition with China, so the DFC may get that chance. “It would be a real shame to take all of the good work that’s happened over the last five years and fail to be reauthorized and have to put pencils down. I think that would hurt our reputation, both DFC’s and the United States’,” said Nathan.
Foreign Policy · by Lili Pike, Christina Lu
15. Alliance Networking in Europe and the Indo-Pacific
A lattice work is weak. We should be describing our multiple relationships with friends, partners, and allies as a silk web which is flexible and strong. I hope the Trump administration can take the silk web structure and adopt it as its own and apply it in ways to help the US win in strategic competition with China. I think allies know what to expect from the Trump administration; therefore, President Trump is more likely to gain their cooperation in strategic competition, in deterrence, and if necessary in warfighting that will all be focused on the main Trump objective: winning.
Excerpts:
Given the centrality of the United States in the networking of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances, questions remain as to the sustainability of these trends. With its emphasis on multilateralism and a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, the Biden administration has encouraged cross-regional cooperation between U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and pursued a “latticework” strategy in the Indo-Pacific so as to meet the challenges posed by China and North Korea. In Europe, the first Trump administration encouraged greater bilateralism, while urging NATO and individual allies to take China more seriously. For its part, the Biden administration has continued to push for greater trans-Atlantic coordination on China while pushing for a revival of multilateral cooperation through NATO and greater U.S.-E.U. ties.
As a second Trump administration takes office in January 2025, a significant recalibration of U.S. global priorities and policies may affect the way in which cooperation among U.S. allies takes shape. Trump’s instinct may be to favor bilateral cooperation over minilateral and multilateral initiatives, as his first term in office attests to. Trump may also be less inclined than Biden to foster cross-regional linkages. Moreover, a more decisive focus on the China threat in the Indo-Pacific (as opposed to Biden’s efforts to cast China as a global and normative challenge) could lead the incoming Trump administration to de-prioritize Europe and tell Europeans to focus squarely on their own region.
That said, a China-centric focus on the part of the Trump administration could also incentivize further cross-regional cooperation among U.S. allies. After all, the United States put much emphasis on getting NATO and Europeans to take China seriously already during Trump’s first administration. Moreover, many of the cross-regional processes that have been put in place over the last few years will have their own bureaucratic rhythm, which may incentivize a second Trump administration to find ways to leverage them as it focuses on competition with China. Besides, a not-insignificant share of cross-regional initiatives takes place with limited or no U.S. involvement, including the next-generation fighter jet program between the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy; the bilateral cooperation taking place between South Korea and Poland or Romania; or the Indo-Pacific outreach by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In fact, America’s European and Indo-Pacific partners may seek greater spoke-to-spoke and cross-regional connections as a way to mitigate Trump-related abandonment concerns and transactional approach to alliances.
An “America First” policy could thus cut two ways for alliance networking. On the one hand, it may undermine cooperation amongst U.S. allies within and across regions, as a result of a focus on bilateralism and regional tradeoffs. On the other, its emphasis on competition with China could incentivize the Trump administration to look for ways to leverage within- and cross-regional networking, even if emphasizing bilateralism and U.S. centrality. Yet given the structural drivers underpinning the transformation of intra- and cross-theater alliance cooperation, the alliance networking in Europe and Asia may well be here to stay.
Alliance Networking in Europe and the Indo-Pacific - War on the Rocks
Lotje Boswinkel, Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka, and Hugo Meijer
warontherocks.com · by Lotje Boswinkel · December 17, 2024
Will Donald Trump’s return to the White House lead to an unraveling of the security ties that the United States has cultivated in and between Europe and the Indo-Pacific? U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have cultivated closer security ties with each other in recent years, as illustrated by NATO’s efforts to expand cooperation with its four Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand), growing bilateral ties between individual European and Indo-Pacific allies, and various high-profile defense-industrial projects such as the AUKUS submarine deal or the development of a next-generation fighter jet between the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy. Interestingly, such growing cross-regional security cooperation among U.S. allies in distant regions is gaining ground at a time when the U.S.-led regional alliance systems in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are themselves exhibiting important changes, and evolving towards more nodal or flexible patterns of bilateral and “minilateral” defense cooperation. The 2023 Camp David agreements between the United States, Japan, and South Korea are a case in point.
These ongoing transformations challenge two longstanding assumptions about U.S.-led alliances. The first has to do with the United States organizing its alliances around regionally defined threats and priorities, and with the notion that U.S-led regional alliance systems barely interact with each other. The second relates to the contrasting approach to structuring alliances in Europe and Asia. The first is the quintessential example of a multilateral alliance structure, while the latter is typically characterized as a “hub-and-spokes” model, in that the United States enjoys a series of bilateral alliances with countries that have limited defense linkages with each other and are connected only indirectly, through the U.S. “hub.”
As President Joe Biden leaves office, Donald Trump returns to the White House, and key allies in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and France turn their attention inwards, the future of cooperation within and between U.S. alliance systems in Europe and the Indo-Pacific is in question. Yet, more structural drivers like China’s strategic rise, Russian revisionism or growing cooperation between Russia, China, and North Korea are also at play and may point towards continuity.
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Archetypal Types of Alliance Structures
Both the notion that defense cooperation was organized around regions and that the European and Asian alliance architectures exhibited radically different features are part real and part myth.
For one thing, we saw important instances of cross-theater cooperation and engagement during the Cold War, as illustrated by the involvement of multiple European allies in the Korea War; Britain’s Five Power Defence Arrangements with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore; French engagement in Vietnam; or Japan’s (unsuccessful) bid to establish informal ties to NATO in the early 1980s. Despite these instances, however, the bulk of security cooperation remained regional.
For another, multilateralism and hub-and-spokes are ideal-type concepts. Even in Cold War Asia, there were instances of spoke-to-spoke and minilateral cooperation, notably involving Japan and South Korea. Similarly, within Cold War NATO, meaningful divisions of labor existed alongside sub-regional clusters or minilaterals. One example is the cooperation between Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom to track Soviet submarines in the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Still, even if alliance structures were never purely bilateral or multilateral, the basic distinction between Europe’s multilateral and Asia’s bilateral alliance architectures remained largely intact throughout the Cold War period.
Co-Evolution
Over the past three decades, the region-centric and mirror-image assumptions have become increasingly blurred. In Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union led different allies to turn their attention to more localized challenges and cluster around bilateral and minilateral nodes of cooperation focusing on different threats and tasks. Eastern and northeastern European states tailored and coordinated their defense efforts around Russia’s residual threat, which became more prominent after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. Western and southern European states largely configured their defense policies around such challenges as regional instability and terrorism. Although NATO always provided some unifying coherence, throughout much of the 2000s and the early 2010s, the center of gravity of European defense cooperation shifted to bilateral and minilateral nodes focusing on sub-regional or local threats, as illustrated by the launch of Nordic Defense Cooperation, the Franco-British Lancaster House Agreements, or the development of the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force.
To be sure, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 revitalized NATO and multilateral cooperation in Europe, particularly following the alliance’s decision at its 2016 summit in Warsaw to deploy four multinational battalions to the eastern front. That said, NATO allies still held divergent threat perceptions, and it was mainly central and eastern European countries that led efforts to strengthen deterrence, both in a NATO context and through bilateral and sub-regional cooperation. Wary of such intra-European divergences, allies along the northern and eastern flanks have been particularly eager to strengthen bilateral ties with the United States — a tendency that was embraced by the first Trump administration. While Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022 spurred greater multilateral defense cooperation within NATO, bilateral and sub-regional defense cooperation has broadly persisted across different U.S. administrations.
In the Indo-Pacific, an opposite trend has emerged. China’s increasingly assertive behavior has catalyzed greater strategic cooperation among previously disconnected U.S. allies and partners. Japan has emerged as a key regional node, having strengthened bilateral ties with countries like Australia and the Philippines, and becoming involved in various trilaterals (notably with South Korea and the United States) and quadrilaterals. Meanwhile, New Zealand and the Philippines recently signed a mutual logistics support agreement, and worked to expand defense cooperation more broadly. Other examples of spoke-to-spoke interaction include the Philippines-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement or the South Korea-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. While the Biden administration’s “latticework” approach stimulated greater spoke-to-spoke ties, these same efforts can be traced back to the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy as the Trump administration’s focus on China paved the way for a more networked security architecture in Asia.
Cross-Regional Interconnectivity
Alongside the ongoing transformation of respective alliance systems in Europe and Asia challenging the notion of mirror-image alliance architectures, the two regions are becoming increasingly interconnected, resulting in enhanced cooperation between otherwise traditionally separate alliance ecosystems. The context here is the gradual but certain cross-theater threat convergence among U.S.-led alliances, spurred by three distinct but closely interrelated concerns related to China’s rise. First, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific and — increasingly — Europe view China as posing a sustained and multidimensional challenge to international order. Second, growing political, economic, military, and technological cooperation between Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang is linking the European and Indo-Pacific theatres in tangible ways. Third, China poses a significant challenge to Indo-Pacific security, and to U.S. military power more generally. Although the latter trend affects Indo-Pacific allies more directly, it also has a significant impact for Europeans given the global importance of the Indo-Pacific in terms of trade, security and technological innovation, and, critically, the potential impact of an Indo-Pacific contingency on U.S. global force allocation.
These shared concerns over China’s rise have spurred the recognition in both alliance systems that more cross-regional cooperation is necessary. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has been a key accelerator in this regard. Surely, European wariness about the strategic challenges associated with China’s rise predate the Ukraine war, as indeed demonstrated by NATO’s references to China in its 2019 London Declaration or, even more clearly, in the alliance’s 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué, which devoted two full paragraphs to China. Yet it has been Beijing’s “decisive enabling” of Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine and fast-expanding military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang — most recently illustrated by 10,000 North Korean troops joining Russia in combat — that is tying the two alliance systems ever more closely together.
In Asia, U.S. allies worry that Russian technology transfers and military cooperation with North Korea and China might complicate their respective threat environments. In this regard, South Korea has even considered supplying weapons to Ukraine in addition to the more indirect military support that other Indo-Pacific countries have already provided. Additionally, the Biden administration’s emphasis on connecting like-minded allies to push back against the global challenge posed by an authoritarian axis has been an important factor behind growing cross-regional cooperation.
Thus, while U.S. allies in NATO and the Indo-Pacific may differ when it comes to their main threat referents and areas of responsibility, their strategic and operational priorities appear to increasingly align. Each respective alliance system grapples with the question of how to strengthen deterrence in the face of great-power revisionism and related anti-access and area-denial challenges, and how to generate the forces, operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies required to that end. Additionally, NATO countries’ concern about U.S. resource diversion towards the Indo-Pacific necessitates an improved understanding as to how an Indo-Pacific contingency may affect U.S. military resources and planning. To this end, the two regional alliance systems increasingly benefit from mutual learning in operational planning or the development of joint capabilities and technologies.
Indeed, cooperation between U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific has picked up considerably in recent years. An important milestone in this regard was NATO’s new Strategic Concept, approved during the alliance’s 2022 summit in Madrid, which underlined how “developments in the Indo-Pacific can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security” and called for strengthening dialogue and cooperation. Against this backdrop, NATO has recently concluded individual partnership agreements with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand and launched joint projects on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cyber security.
At the bilateral level, countries like France, the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, Germany have developed and diversified their security and defense partnerships across the Indo-Pacific with focus areas such as logistics support, maritime security, information exchanges, space cooperation, military exercises, and arms sales. For its part, Warsaw has turned to Seoul for the delivery of tanks, howitzers, and rocket launchers as a result of South Korea’s defense-industrial capacity and greater openness to technology sharing and co-production. In a similar vein, South Korea and Romania concluded a defense cooperation agreement in the spring of 2024 and announced Romania’s acquisition of K-9 howitzers, with more sales to follow.
U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have also intensified their cooperation through various cross-regional minilateral initiatives, either with or without U.S. involvement. The AUKUS trilateral security partnership between the United States, Britain, and Australia arguably stands out. AUKUS includes the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia and cooperation in emerging technologies, accompanied by a force posture agreement that will see U.S. and British submarines begin rotational deployments to Australia’s HMAS Stirling naval base in 2027. Another prominent cross-theater defense-industrial partnership tying the two regions together is the U.K.-Japanese-Italian sixth-generation fighter jet program.
In short, we are witnessing growing synergies between the two regions, crystalizing through variable formats and nodes of cooperation (primarily bilateral and minilateral) involving the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners. Growing cooperation between Russia, China, and North Korea on the back of the Ukraine war has surely raised awareness amongst NATO and America’s Indo-Pacific allies about the two regions’ strategic interconnectedness, spurring greater cross-regional cooperation — and so has the Biden administration’s emphasis on countering the Sino-Russian threat to global order. Nevertheless, the seeds for greater cross-theater cooperation were already planted during the first Trump administration, which went to great lengths to get Europeans to take China seriously, thus paving the way for greater cooperation between NATO and Indo-Pacific partners.
Into a Convergent Future?
Growing cross-regional cooperation between European and Indo-Pacific allies has coincided with a transformation of defense cooperation patterns within regions, with Europe seeing more initiatives below the NATO level and the Indo-Pacific witnessing greater spoke-to-spoke cooperation. Against the backdrop of these twin developments, the myths about U.S.-led alliances being framed exclusively in regional terms and following a multilateral versus bilateral logic appear to be eroding.
The convergence between traditionally separate alliance systems has been driven by widespread awareness about the return of great-power competition, the strengthening of political-military cooperation between revisionist powers China and Russia, and shared concerns about maintaining credible deterrence as the United States faces two great-power adversaries simultaneously. In this regard, the Russo-Ukrainian war has underscored both the necessity of and the challenges associated with increased cooperation within and between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Given the centrality of the United States in the networking of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances, questions remain as to the sustainability of these trends. With its emphasis on multilateralism and a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, the Biden administration has encouraged cross-regional cooperation between U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and pursued a “latticework” strategy in the Indo-Pacific so as to meet the challenges posed by China and North Korea. In Europe, the first Trump administration encouraged greater bilateralism, while urging NATO and individual allies to take China more seriously. For its part, the Biden administration has continued to push for greater trans-Atlantic coordination on China while pushing for a revival of multilateral cooperation through NATO and greater U.S.-E.U. ties.
As a second Trump administration takes office in January 2025, a significant recalibration of U.S. global priorities and policies may affect the way in which cooperation among U.S. allies takes shape. Trump’s instinct may be to favor bilateral cooperation over minilateral and multilateral initiatives, as his first term in office attests to. Trump may also be less inclined than Biden to foster cross-regional linkages. Moreover, a more decisive focus on the China threat in the Indo-Pacific (as opposed to Biden’s efforts to cast China as a global and normative challenge) could lead the incoming Trump administration to de-prioritize Europe and tell Europeans to focus squarely on their own region.
That said, a China-centric focus on the part of the Trump administration could also incentivize further cross-regional cooperation among U.S. allies. After all, the United States put much emphasis on getting NATO and Europeans to take China seriously already during Trump’s first administration. Moreover, many of the cross-regional processes that have been put in place over the last few years will have their own bureaucratic rhythm, which may incentivize a second Trump administration to find ways to leverage them as it focuses on competition with China. Besides, a not-insignificant share of cross-regional initiatives takes place with limited or no U.S. involvement, including the next-generation fighter jet program between the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy; the bilateral cooperation taking place between South Korea and Poland or Romania; or the Indo-Pacific outreach by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In fact, America’s European and Indo-Pacific partners may seek greater spoke-to-spoke and cross-regional connections as a way to mitigate Trump-related abandonment concerns and transactional approach to alliances.
An “America First” policy could thus cut two ways for alliance networking. On the one hand, it may undermine cooperation amongst U.S. allies within and across regions, as a result of a focus on bilateralism and regional tradeoffs. On the other, its emphasis on competition with China could incentivize the Trump administration to look for ways to leverage within- and cross-regional networking, even if emphasizing bilateralism and U.S. centrality. Yet given the structural drivers underpinning the transformation of intra- and cross-theater alliance cooperation, the alliance networking in Europe and Asia may well be here to stay.
Become a Member
Lotje Boswinkel is a Ph.D. researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, a non-resident associate fellow at NATO Defense College, and a Hans J. Morgenthau fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center.
Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute.
Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo.
Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, Deputy Director for Scientific Affairs, and the Founding Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies.
This paper was completed with the support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. It is part of a project looking at the future of the Indo-Pacific region and NATO, and the authors wish to thank the participants of a conference organized under the project on February 9, 2024 in Paris, France, which was hosted by Sciences Po.
Image: The European Commission via Wikimedia Commons.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Lotje Boswinkel · December 17, 2024
16. INSA Releases Presidential Transition Memo
The eight page memo can be downloaded here: https://www.insaonline.org/docs/default-source/uploadedfiles/2025/insa_presidentmemo.pdf?sfvrsn=b531216_1
INSA Releases Presidential Transition Memo
December 17, 2024
https://www.insaonline.org/detail-pages/news/2024/12/17/insa-releases-presidential-transition-memo
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Key Recommendations to Strengthen the IC in the Administration's First 100 Days
Arlington, VA (December 17, 2024)—The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) today released its Presidential Transition Memo: Building a Secure Tomorrow, offering actionable recommendations for the incoming Administration to address within its first 100 days to strengthen the Intelligence Community (IC).
Developed with input from INSA’s policy councils, thought leaders, and subject matter experts, the memo outlines practical steps to improve workforce readiness in AI and cybersecurity, streamline security processes, and enhance collaboration between government, industry, and academia. By focusing on achievable improvements, the recommendations aim to position the IC for greater efficiency, innovation, and agility in meeting national security challenges.
“These recommendations provide a clear, actionable framework to help the Administration deliver immediate impact while supporting long-term success for the IC,” said Suzanne Wilson Heckenberg, President of INSA.
INSA, a nonpartisan nonprofit dedicated to advancing public-private-academic collaboration to address national security priorities, stands ready to work with the Administration in building a resilient, efficient, and future-ready intelligence and national security workforce.
Download the memo
17. Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher P. Maier's Meeting of the Defeat ISIS Coalition Political-Military Consultations
We cannot take our eye off the ISIS target.
Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher P. Maier's Meeting of the Defeat ISIS Coalition Political-Military Consultations
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4005820/readout-of-assistant-secretary-of-defense-christopher-p-maiers-meeting-of-the-d/
Dec. 16, 2024 |
Pentagon Spokesman Lt. Col. Bryon McGarry provided the following readout:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Christopher P. Maier hosted the Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) Coalition Political-Military Consultations (PMC) at U.S. Africa Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, Dec. 10. Representatives from 24 member nations of the defense component of the Coalition reinforced the commitment of all partners to maintaining regional stability and security, showcasing the strength of unity and cooperation in facing shared challenges.
The meeting, initially scheduled as a follow-up to implement decisions made at the Coalition Defense Ministers' meeting in Brussels in mid-October, also enabled Coalition partners to review and discuss the evolving situation in Syria. Key discussions centered around how these developments might impact collective efforts to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
“Our longstanding and trusted relationships with Coalition partners, and our ongoing communication with one another, help us collectively navigate rapidly changing dynamics in the region,” said W. Alan Matney, U.S. Defense Coordinator for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. “This meeting provided a timely opportunity for Coalition partners to discuss the situation in Syria and determine how it is likely to impact our work to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.”
This PMC highlighted the continued pressure exerted by the Coalition on a global scale. The discussions addressed how ongoing communication and collaboration are vital in navigating rapidly changing dynamics in the region with a growing focus on West Africa, a priority highlighted during NATO discussions in October.
The situation in Syria introduces new dynamics to the Coalition's efforts, creating both challenges and opportunities to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. Senior defense leaders emphasized the importance of recurring engagements to maintain close communication in this dynamic environment.
The PMC also focused on adapting the Coalition's defense component to support civilian-led efforts against ISIS affiliates. Members reiterated the importance of whole-of-government approaches, with multilateral participation from experts in law enforcement, border security, and stabilization. This collaborative framework positions the Coalition to effectively counter ISIS affiliates while emphasizing regional leadership in addressing localized threats.
Moreover, Coalition members emphasized that regional efforts must be led by local partners, who have the best insights into ISIS affiliates and how to counter them effectively. Much of the discussion centered on strategies for engaging and supporting these partners.
Finally, the exceptionally close relationships of trust and respect among Coalition partners, built over more than a decade of unprecedented accomplishments, remain a foundational strategic asset. ISIS seeks to exploit the vulnerabilities of individual governments—a challenge best countered through collective action. The Coalition's unique ability to pool resources and apply them strategically has been central to its enduring success.
18. How China is adopting battlefield lessons from Ukraine
Excerpt:
Conclusion
From unmanned systems and counter-drone defenses to EW, these adaptations highlight a calculated strategy to use battlefield lessons and integrate them into an evolving military doctrine. To be sure, questions remain about the PLA’s ability to operationalize these innovations effectively, particularly under the constraints of centralized command structures and the limited real-world testing of new tactics. Yet they do indicate a serious intent to learn from others’ wars, the historic hallmark of successful military change programs.
How China is adopting battlefield lessons from Ukraine
A drone-assisted ambush of a Ukrainian tank drew particular notice by PLA analysts.
By Tye Graham and Peter W. Singer
December 16, 2024 04:13 PM
defenseone.com · by Tye Graham
The Ukraine conflict is more than a distant spectacle to China’s People’s Liberation Army; it offers a real-time battlefield laboratory to study for its own strategic needs. From drone swarms to electronic warfare, its lessons are being methodically analyzed and adapted to reshape the PLA’s own approach to conflict—whether in Taiwan, the Himalayas, or beyond.
The Ukraine conflict has underscored the game-changing role of UAVs in modern warfare, particularly for gathering intelligence, precision targeting, and overwhelming enemy defenses. The PLA is responding by seeking to develop and improve various types of drones, including:
- Cost-effective, expendable drones for saturation attacks.
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Drones that can mimic Russian and Ukrainian successes at defeating adversary air defenses through scaled, coordinated assaults, according to a Chinese reporter at the recent Zhuhai Airshow.
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First-person-view drones, which have demonstrated tactical advantages in Ukraine, particularly for reconnaissance and close-range strikes. Analysis from PLA National Defense University’s Joint Operations College officers highlights China's push to develop FPVs.
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Ultra-low-cost drones. The PLA Air Force recently announced a nationwide competition to design cheap UAVs capable of autonomous navigation, precision targeting, electronic warfare integration, extended-range reconnaissance, swarm coordination, and logistical support.
Chinese military commentators note that the military impact of these structured innovation efforts will be amplified by the country’s industrial strength. Many ultra-low-cost drones deployed by Ukraine originated from Shenzhen's Huaqiangbei electronics hub. China's dominance in commercial drone manufacturing helps give the PLA cost-effective reconnaissance and precision-strike solutions, and sets it up to dominate small drone-enabled asymmetric warfare.
This strategy aligns with Beijing’s broader goals of achieving technological superiority and operational readiness for high-stakes engagements. In particular, it supports the PLA push for "intelligentized warfare," emphasizing drones' role in creating a cohesive network of real-time data sharing across units. PLA UAV strategy discusses AI-driven coordination systems that will enable drones to collaborate on precision targeting and area denial without direct human input. The PLA also aims to use drones for sustained surveillance, battlefield mapping, and extending the reach of indirect fire capabilities. These efforts demonstrate a transformative approach to tactical warfare.
By demonstrating the decisive role of integrated networks in managing drone operations, electronic warfare, and precision targeting, the Ukraine war shaped the PLA’s April reorganization of its Strategic Support Force into three co-equal forces: the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force. The PLA aims to create a cohesive, real-time information ecosystem to increase operational agility and joint force effectiveness. Chinese leader Xi Jinping himself recently inspected the information-support force, signaling China's intent to align its military modernization with emerging trends in data-driven, high-tech warfare.
Some lessons come not from Ukraine but Russia, which has reportedly provided tactical insights into countering advanced Western systems, such as neutralizing precision munitions via electronic warfare. And joint technological initiatives, such as the development of Shahed-style drones, show Beijing’s ability to use Russian and Iranian innovations to refine its arsenal and tactics.
On the ground
The PLA views UAV integration as key to ground forces’ lethality and survivability. This is seen in Chinese reports about the Russian ambush of a Ukrainian Leopard 2 tank; they emphasized how the situational awareness provided by drones enabled precision strikes against a numerically superior convoy. It is also seen in the VT4A1 main battle tank unveiled at this year’s Zhuhai Airshow. The tank’s vertical-takeoff-and-landing drone, with optical and infrared sensors and a 10-kilometer range, highlights the PLA's push to for better situational awareness.
Inspired by Ukraine's use of unmanned ground vehicles for logistics, reconnaissance, and combat, the PLA has introduced logistics UGVs whose modular payloads can haul materiel, evacuate casualties, and provide close-combat support. It is also testing armed UGVs with AI targeting systems for urban warfare and perimeter defense. Reports emphasize giving UGVs advanced sensors and communication gear so they can be integrated into broader operations with UAVs and manned assets.
An October exercise under the Western Theater Command used small UAVs and UGVs for ISR and targeting. Illustrating PLA efforts to build them into field operations. It might also signal a doctrinal shift toward asymmetrical and high-tech solutions.
When Russia turned to stand-off armor—also known as “slat armor” or “cope cages”—to fend off Ukrainian drone attacks, PLA strategists took note. Some of China’s Type 15 light tanks have been equipped with similar gear. Others, such as the VT4A1 and the Type 99A, are being upgraded with advanced active protection systems such as the GL-6, which uses radar and infrared sensors to spot and intercept drones and anti-tank missiles. This underscores the PLA's intent to equip its armored platforms with a multi-layered defense system that combines reactive and stand-off armor, active protection systems, and integrated soft-kill defenses.
PLA commenters have suggested the PLA’s new lightweight 120mm mortar, equipped with a digital fire control system and precision-guided munitions, could be used to target drone operators—especially when paired with portable electronic-warfare devices. This proposal to combine traditional firepower with EW also reflects a broader PLA shift toward integrated defense operations.
The Ukraine conflict has drastically reinforced the importance of EW—as have India’s advancements in kamikaze drones, which have raised alarms within the PLA. China is deploying EW systems such as the J-16D electronic warfare aircraft and ground-based EW units to disrupt drone communications and GPS signals along its border with India.
Conclusion
From unmanned systems and counter-drone defenses to EW, these adaptations highlight a calculated strategy to use battlefield lessons and integrate them into an evolving military doctrine. To be sure, questions remain about the PLA’s ability to operationalize these innovations effectively, particularly under the constraints of centralized command structures and the limited real-world testing of new tactics. Yet they do indicate a serious intent to learn from others’ wars, the historic hallmark of successful military change programs.
defenseone.com · by Tye Graham
19. the new multiplayer games? of allies and partners
Some unique analysis of alliance relationships (and their domestic problems that impact all of our national security) that you will not read anywhere else.
South Korea
Germany
Canada
UK
the new multiplayer games?
of allies and partners
https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/the-new-multiplayer-games?utm
Cynthia Watson
Dec 18, 2024
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What we figure was the final visiting sailboat for the 2024 season stealthily set sail yesterday. We rue that because we love looking out to feast our eyes on boats replete with visitors but, invariably, the winter draws them elsewhere. Both the last sailboat and the one that shoved off last week moored for extended periods but we understood they were highly likely to go somewhere for the winter. So, the sky cried last night—but we needed the rain.
It’s a busy time of the year, of course, particularly as one administration transitions out for the next to come in. Most people are either wrapping their Chanukkah or Christmas gifts while school kids yearn to sleep in for a week and a half.
A school shooting at a Christian school in Madison, Wisconsin, and a massive cyclone hit the western Indian Ocean yesterday. The Ukrainians, apparently not going down without a fight, killed a prominent Russian general. It’s been a busy day and a half around the world.
Are we paying sufficient attention to the fall of not one but two treaty allied-governments in three days, with another nearby looking considerably less secure today than yesterday morning? It’s easy to miss these events but they strike me as worthy our appreciation got a few minutes.
I observed week before last (has it only been fourteen days since Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law in South Korea?) that I did not believe the Korean president could survive following the public’s demand that democracy perpetuate in that East Asian nation. The South Korean leader survived but of two impeachment votes in the parliament, effectively neutering him as president of the country. He isn’t even able to travel on his own as investigations of the coup dynamics continue.
This wouldn’t matter as much if it were Malawi or perhaps Burundi, both African states, but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is menace north of what remains technically an active conflict on the peninsula. Because we have a mutual defense treaty with Seoul, we are committed to fighting along side the South Koreans should anyone attack that country. As proof of our continuing commitment since the 25 June 1950 initiation of the Korean War, we actually still station 24,000 U.S. forces as a “trip wire”, a message to the unpredictable Kim dynasty in Pyongyang, that we are serious should they reinvade the south. In short, the prospect of a weakened Chief Executive in the Blue House in Seoul actually matters to us; it’s not merely an abstract “oh, gee, they impeached a guy”. If the DPRK moved, we would be obligated to move so instability in Seoul is not desirable.
Our interest goes beyond the North Koreans to include our informal security architecture undergirding the Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at preventing China’s intimidation of neighbors across that vast area. South Korea with a competent, active military is key to supporting us whether it’s as a base for our forces or the moral support of a major Asian nation allied with us. And, they are a major trading partner for the United States, despite tensions at times over domestic preferences in either Washington or Seoul. The Republic of Korea ranks sixth in the vast array of states with whom we export and import so much. U.S.-South Korean bilateral trade, always stronger when both countries are relatively stable, constitutes almost $70 billion, is important for many U.S. jobs, although we do have a deficit in that relationship.
South Korea matters to us a great deal as we matter to that nation.
Yesterday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost a confidence vote in Germany, the European Union’s and Europe’s largest economic engine. The country will hold new elections in 2025 but Scholz’s vulnerability raises serious questions the future of Europe with prospects for far less U.S. involvement following Donald Trump’s inauguration 34 days from now. The no-confidence vote wasn’t even close as Scholz has not proven nearly as determinative in his country as his predecessor, though it’s rare that anyone follow the likes of Angela Merkel with any ease. She was truly dominant in Europe for a decade.
But, Europe is in the midst of real prospective upheaval as the Ukraine war with Russia grinds on at the same time as European growth is not matching that of the United States. Europe, including Germany, is aging.
Why does this matter as much as Korea? Simply because, regardless we might seek to withdraw from the world, the past three quarters of a century of peace in Europe rested on a substantial, enduring German commitment to join in partnership with NATO allies rather than pursue nationalist tendencies. To see that role end, the world we would inhabit could be radically different. Russia’s long-feared dominance of Europe would be much closer to reality, if not a certainty. Like it or not, Germany’s centrality geographically and economically for Europe is difficult to dispute.
Maybe we don’t need be the World’s policemen but we do need be on the field with the rest of the team.
Britain is no longer formally part of the European Union, one of the two multinational pillars of the post-1945 continent. Westminster appears hardly willing to lead NATO unilaterally without U.S. support. France is undergoing internal navel-gazing as Immanuel Macron continues fighting the ultra-nationalists of the LePen variety, ideas appearing simultaneously in Italy, Hungary, occasionally in the Netherlands, and elsewhere. Whatever Germany’s problems of not spending to suit us in NATO, its preponderance as a democracy in the EU is essential to preventing a resurrection of the horrors of the 1930s and 40s. Those nationalist tendencies remain under control in the German republic but the Nazi vision for the future reappears on the radar every once in a while in what the world ought see as worrisome blips. Reappearance of long-term disruption or profound hopelessness, far worse (though not impossible) from what we currently see, could invite back simplistic, mindless solutions and racist blame with deadly intentions and consequences.
While we cherish our “special relationship” with Britain, the heart of the European peace has been Washington’s military might in conjunction with Bonn, then Berlin cooperating for the future. An unstable Germany would affect U.S. interests in incalculable ways across this continent as well as in relations with China. So while many Americans don’t think the world matters, the world in fact cares a great deal that we are involved as a bulwark protecting a system we built for our own needs as much as anyone else’s.
Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau seemingly has worn out his welcome with his voters and most definitely his erstwhile Finance Minister who resigned yesterday. Accusing the PM of stunts rather than seeking steps to confront Trump’s announced punitive tariffs, Trudeau’s nearly decade in power seems much closer to its end than its beginning. Most Americans have no idea that the world’s longest unarmed border is actually between our two countries, with our two nations trusting each other through most any and all matters. To see a more nationalist regime in Ottawa would not guarantee things went our way in bilateral affairs but it would certainly indicate that each of the North American countries (and likely Mexico) would pursue their own concerns far above shared approaches to improve conditions for the whole of North America. It’s hard to fathom that leading to armed conflict but many things are hard to grasp of late.
In sum, these three relationships alone are under significant stress; we assume we retain unhampered ability to dictate terms in each case. But, politics is always about satisfying one’s voters rather than partners abroad, regardless of memes to the contrary. Of course power politics (defined as measuring relative power based on economic statistics, military force under arms, population, or some other empirical trait) is one of the oldest stories in the world yet it also characterizes a by-gone era when water wasn’t as scarce, resource imbalances were not as common, and global telecommunications were not instantaneous. Those days of simply exerting our will strike me as fairly quaint in an era of globalization.
So, the old phrase “You may not be interested in world affairs but world affairs are interested in you” seems to apply here. Perhaps not but the evidence of interdependencies strikes me as rather more relevant than even a quarter century ago.
Buckle up, buttercup. We are in for quite a ride.
How would you assess the importance of what’s at play in these three different nations, each of whom is important, if not vital, to us? I genuinely seek to hear your analyses as mine could be completely wrong. Bring it on so we can discuss!
If there is enough interest, I would love to hold a virtual chat the first week in January for subscribers and readers. Let me know, please.
Thank you for your time today. I hope you will provide rebuttals, questions, comments, historic corrections, and anything further. I appreciate your time reading Actions any day but especially in this busy season. I also deeply thank the subscribers who provide help financially for these efforts. A 2025 subscription goes a long way to providing greater discussion of actions, consequences, and differing views.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Christopher F. Schweitzer, “How to Understand the Collapse of Germany’s Government, and What’s Next”, NewYorkTimes.com, 16 December 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/europe/germany-government-collapse-olaf-scholz.html
Marina Stevis-Gridneff and Ian Austen, “Top Canada Minister Resigns, Threatening Trudeau’s Hold on Power” NewYorkTimes.com, 17 December 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/canada/chrystia-freeland-resigns-canada-finance-minister.html
Jim Tankersley, “Behind Germany’s Political Turmoil, a Stagnating Economy”, NewYorkTimes.com, 17 December 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/17/world/europe/germany-government-collapse-economy.html
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative. Putin addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board on December 16 and discussed Russian military developments in 2024 and Russia's military goals for 2025. Putin stated that Russia is developing military capabilities and technologies alongside its nuclear triad and emphasized that the Oreshnik ballistic missile is Russia's "latest powerful weapon," of which Russia will soon serialize production. Putin also notably claimed that if Russia were to use the Oreshnik in a "complex manner" in tandem with other non-nuclear munitions, the resulting strike would be "comparable in power to the use of nuclear weapons." Putin noted that the Oreshnik does not have a nuclear payload and therefore does not create nuclear contamination, emphasizing that the Oreshnik's non-nuclear nature "is a very important element when deciding what means of armed struggle" Russia will employ. Putin has previously lauded the technical specifications of the Oreshnik ballistic missile, including by comparing it to a nuclear weapon or a meteorite in terms of the damage it can cause.
Putin's recent emphasis on the purported power of Oreshnik is notable and suggests that the Kremlin may seek an off-ramp from the intense nuclear saber-rattling it has employed thus far in the war. Putin's December 16 MoD address, his statements at the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28, and his speech to the MoD on November 22 all appear to be trying to establish the Oreshnik as the bastion of Russia's non-nuclear deterrent. Russia has repeatedly invoked the threat of nuclear retaliation in order to force Ukraine and the West into self-deterrence, but Ukrainian and Western actions have challenged Kremlin's nuclear narrative every time the Kremlin has employed it, constantly undermining Russia's self-defined thresholds for nuclear use. ISW has previously assessed that there is nothing particularly new about the Oreshnik's capabilities, so Putin is likely extolling its technical specifications in order to create fear and uncertainty about the damage the Oreshnik can inflict and to pressure Ukraine's partners to push Ukraine to limit its strikes against Russia out of fear that he will actually conduct retaliation. Putin likely introduced the Oreshnik as a new element in the Kremlin's wider reflexive-control toolkit as the Kremlin increasingly comes to terms with the fact that Putin's unwillingness to follow through on hints of nuclear threats is devaluing them such that he must find a rhetorical off-ramp in order to maintain its credibility in the international information space.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative.
- Putin once again reiterated the false Russian narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate—firmly establishing that the deposition of Ukraine's legitimate, democratic government is one of the Kremlin's prerequisites for a negotiated settlement to the war.
- Russian Defense Minister Belousov also used the December 16 Russian MoD board meeting to reiterate Putin's previously stated territorial objectives in Ukraine as another Kremlin prerequisite to a negotiated settlement to the war.
- Belousov also used his December 16 address to posture as an effective and innovative manager—sharply contrasting his leadership of the MoD with that of former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.
- Putin ordered the MoD to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as part of continued efforts to centralize control over Russian irregular drone units.
- Belousov's statements confirm that the Russian military is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates, but intensified offensive operations have and will likely continue to strain the efficacy of Russia's cryptomobilization efforts.
- Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag.
- Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
- The Russian government appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov as the Chairperson of the Supervisory Board of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Construction Company, likely as part of ongoing anti-corruption efforts within the Russian MoD.
21. Iran Update, December 16, 2024
Iran Update, December 16, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024
The HTS-controlled interim government is continuing to reconcile with former members of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). The Russian-backed SAA 5th Corps in Lattakia is reportedly negotiating with the interim government to “merge its forces” into the new Syrian army. Integrating members of other armed groups, including the SAA, into the new army could reduce insecurity and instability during the transition period. Syrian media separately reported on December 16 that the interim government is negotiating with the Iraqi federal government to “recover” over 2,000 former SAA soldiers who fled to Iraq during the Syrian opposition offensive. Around 2,150 SAA soldiers and high-ranking officers are currently staying at a camp in western Anbar Province near the Iraqi border with Syria. The mayor of Rutba District, Anbar Province, told Iraqi media on December 16 that the majority of soldiers at the camp wish to return to Syria since HTS granted a general amnesty to SAA soldiers whom the Assad regime conscripted under compulsory service. HTS leader Ahmed al Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammad al Jolani) stated on December 15 that he will end mandatory conscription in Syria. It is unclear how the interim government will generate enough income to support a volunteer army.
The HTS-controlled interim government is also continuing to signal that it will reform the Syrian security establishment. The interim government Interior Minister, Mohammed Abdul Rahman, stated in an interview with al Araby on December 16 that the interim government has a “ready plan” to reform the security establishment. Rahman stated that the security establishment needs “major reforms,” including in the fields of “procedures, internal work regulations, and laws.” Rahman added that the interim government will dissolve security institutions that were previously “a source of terror” for the Syrian people. The Interior Ministry has begun recruiting police officers in Damascus, Hama, and Homs in recent days as part of a “comprehensive plan to ensure access to a safe society.” Syrian media previously reported that the interim government would "conduct an assessment” and reorganize the SAA.
Key Takeaways:
-
HTS and the Syrian Security Sector: The HTS-controlled interim government is continuing to reconcile with former members of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).
-
Syrian Transition: HTS has not suggested it will implement key elements of UNSCR 2254 and is attempting to change the resolution’s guidance to account for Syria’s “new reality.” HTS leader Ahmad Shara (Jolani) noted on December 16 that Syria is not ready for elections, and the interim government has so far failed to outline any process for generating a constitution. HTS-selected officials within the transitional government would presumably be relied upon to establish a method to write a constitution, including the selection of various powerbrokers across the country and in different minority groups to attend negotiations.
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Northern Syria: A four-day ceasefire between the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Manbij area expired without an extension on December 16. The Turkish-backed SNA is reportedly seizing private and government property in Manbij. Local media reported that at least some of these seizures target Kurds, “under the pretext of [the Kurds] belonging to the SDF.
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Syrian Democratic Forces: Arab elements continue to defect from the Syrian Democratic Forces. The head of internal security for the al Busayrah and Dhiban region in SDF-controlled Deir ez Zor Province announced he and “hundreds” of his fighters would join the HTS-led Military Operations Department.
- Israel in Syria: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in southern Syrian towns near the Jordanian border on December 16.
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Israel’s October 25 Strike on Iran: Israel’s large-scale aerial attack on Iranian missile production sites on October 25 significantly damaged Iran's missile production capability, including its ability to export Iranian-made missiles to partners like Russia and the Houthis.
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ISIS: US Central Command (CENTCOM) is continuing to conduct airstrikes in previously regime-held areas to disrupt ISIS operations.
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Iranian Information Space: Some Iranian media outlets appear to be engaged in an information campaign to stoke sectarian tensions and promote a hardline approach toward the new HTS-led interim government.
-
Russia-HTS Negotiations: Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag.
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Russia in Syria: Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month. UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16 that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month.
22. Several Pentagon commands failed to keep good track of classified mobile devices, audit finds
Several Pentagon commands failed to keep good track of classified mobile devices, audit finds
IG criticizes SOCOM, EUCOM, DISA.
By David DiMolfetta
Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW
December 16, 2024 05:00 PM ET
defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta
December 16, 2024 05:00 PM ET
By David DiMolfetta
Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW
December 16, 2024 05:00 PM ET
A number of U.S. military commands failed to keep a complete and accurate inventory of mobile devices used to store and transmit classified information, according to a heavily redacted Defense Department oversight report.
The findings from the DOD Office of Inspector General also say that the defense entities did not list all technical requirements in their devices’ user training programs or user agreements, nor did they annually review or approve mobile phone incident response plans.
Several other findings from the audit are redacted due to their classified nature, but indicate the DOD has identified several problems with how the U.S. military and intelligence nexus handles the security of its servicemembers’ mobile phones.
The DOD audit scanned dozens of devices active between January 2020 and December 2021. It included phones used in the Defense Information Systems Agency and three DOD combatant commands. Investigators visited bases in Germany and Florida, as well as DISA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland.
The examiners made 40 recommendations to technology officials at the DOD and Pentagon, including chief information officers. One unredacted recommendation advises them to “immediately revalidate and document the user justification for their devices and recall the devices if the user no longer has a valid mission need” and “revise existing access policies to require detailed written justifications for obtaining classified mobile devices.”
Officials, think tanks and academics have grown increasingly concerned about cyberspies tethering onto U.S. mobile devices and exploiting them to track the locations of servicemembers.
Cybersecurity officials are investigating Salt Typhoon, a Chinese espionage group believed to still be inside U.S. telecommunications and wiretap systems, as its reach has been slowly uncovered in headlines since October. In response, a pair of senators earlier this month called on the DOD’s watchdog agency to examine the military’s efforts to secure unclassified voice, video and text communications.
A 2023 oversight report said the Defense Department “does not have a comprehensive mobile device and mobile application policy” and that device security programs available to the armed forces “also vary widely in the operational and cybersecurity risk they pose to the DOD.”
According to Monday’s oversight report, the DOD issues secure mobile devices to certain personnel to handle classified information, following strict technical standards set by the National Security Agency.
These guidelines — called “capability packages" — aim to ensure devices are configured for secure use. Key packages include Mobile Access for secure connections outside facilities, Multiple Site Connectivity for classified networks, Campus Wireless for secure on-site communications and Data-at-Rest for storing classified data.
Some devices, depending on their purpose, are also programmed to not have any internal storage capabilities, or are restricted to use only in certain settings.
The Department of Defense may soon be required to conduct a broad assessment into the cybersecurity of internal mobile devices used by servicemembers and analysts, under a provision of a sweeping must-pass defense policy package the Senate is likely to vote on early this week. The sweeping defense bill also includes a measure that aims to shield military servicemembers and diplomats from ensnarement by commercial spyware programs.
23. Foreign Affairs Experts Foresee Negative Impacts of Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy as Wars Abroad Intensify
Every country puts their country first. I told my Korean friends today at a conference in Seoul that they should not be afraid of America First just as we should not be afraid of South Korea's "Korea first" policy because like all countries Korea puts its interests first, always. The only difference is that President Trump says the quiet part out loud.
Perhaps some tweaks to "America First."
America First. Allies Always.
America FIrst. Allies With Us.
America First. Allies Always With Us.
Foreign Affairs Experts Foresee Negative Impacts of Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy as Wars Abroad Intensify
Post-Tribune, Merrillville, Ind. | By Alexandra Kukulka
Published December 16, 2024 at 10:30 am
military.com · December 16, 2024
President-elect Donald Trump will come into the White House amid an international environment where multiple major conflicts around the world have greatly intensified, according to two Indiana University foreign affairs experts.
"He's entering an environment in which U.S. credibility and consistency are in doubt and therefore one of many sources of uncertainty in international relations," said John Ciorciari, Dean of the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies.
When it comes to foreign policy, Trump faces three categories of foreign policy issues: national security, allies and economic policy, said Pierre Atlas, a senior lecturer at the Indiana University Paul O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs.
National security issues include Russia's war in Ukraine and the multiple hot spots in the Middle East, including Israel's war in Gaza, Atlas said.
When it comes to allies, Trump will have to decide which countries he would like to maintain alliances with, Atlas said. Trump will also have to consider the impact of his proposed tariffs and how that will impact the U.S. economy, Atlas said.
If the U.S. were to stop supporting other countries within their wars or conflicts, Atlas said the long-term impact would be the U.S. relationship with its allies. While the U.S. has been the world's greatest superpower, it needs allies, he said.
One danger of another Trump presidency will be Trump's willingness to partner with U.S. adversaries, like Russia, China, and North Korea, rather than the U.S. allies, Atlas said.
"Our democratic allies are essential in the Pacific, in Europe, around the world. If this sort of an America first pull-back, economic tariffs against our allies, it could diminish America's power, America's influence in the world," Atlas said. "If America's influence and power diminishes, it makes America less safe."
Ukraine and Russia
As Russia's war in Ukraine heads into its third year, a sensible starting point for the Trump administration would be to think about how U.S. action would help Ukraine defend itself and maintain negotiating leverage with Russia, Ciorciari said.
"Unfortunately, things that Trump has said and done already -- both as a past president and as a candidate in this cycle -- call into question the reliability of U.S. support for Ukraine. Nobody knows exactly what Trump has in mind as a way to resolve the conflict quickly," Ciorciari said.
The war in Ukraine isn't just a war between Russia and Ukraine but also a war between the democratic west and authoritarianism where Ukraine is the battleground, Atlas said. Russia has received support from North Korea, Iran, and China, all authoritarian regimes, and Ukraine has received support from the U.S. and Europe, Democratic countries, he said.
"That's the setting ... which Donald Trump walks into," Atlas said. "I question whether Trump sees the conflict in those terms. He does not have sympathy for Ukraine. He has a very unusual sympathy for Russia and a very strong relationship with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin."
Atlas said he doesn't believe that Trump would end U.S. aid to Ukraine immediately because Trump would hold that as a bargaining tool to make sure Ukraine and Russia negotiate an end to the war.
But, if Trump decided to end aid to Ukraine, Ciorciari said it's difficult to imagine the Ukrainian war effort sustaining itself at the level needed to ward off Russia's advances. As a result, Ukrainian officials would be forced to the negotiation table with Russia with an unfavorable outcome for Ukraine, he said.
If Russia were to walk away with substantial Ukrainian territory, Ciorciari said Europe and NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would have to prepare for a stronger Russian presence. Europe and NATO would face an even more challenging situation if the U.S. exited NATO, which Trump tried to do in his first term, Ciorciari said.
"Any weakening of those institutions would be deeply detrimental to the United States' national security interests," Ciorciari said.
While Trump has made statements about ending the war in Ukraine on his first day in office, Atlas said that is very unlikely. The only way he could try to do that, Atlas said, would be to have Ukraine surrender to Russia, but that won't happen because Ukraine has shown it will continue fighting the war.
"Nobody will be able to end it in one day. That's not possible," Atlas said.
Most recently, North Korea has sent troops to support Russia in the war, which points to North Korea solidifying its relationship with Russia but also its effort to give soldiers battlefield experience, Ciorciari said.
On the whole, while countries in Asia aren't current hotspots, Ciorciari said leaders of those countries are likely worried that the U.S. will return to its position in the early 2000s, where U.S. officials were so consumed with the Middle East that it focused less on the long-term challenges in Asia.
Middle East
When it comes to the Israel and Hamas war in Gaza, Ciorciari said Trump has made it very clear that his priority would be to advance Israeli interests, particularly the interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
While President Joe Biden's administration has privately pressured Netanyahu to moderate its tactics in Gaza against the Palestinian people who live there, Ciorciari said it's unlikely that Trump would do the same.
"Trump is more likely to take the approach of providing the Israelis what they request by way of defense support and other forms of support so that Israel can prosecute the conflict on its own terms," Ciorciari said.
Trump has made statements about Israel doing whatever it needs to do to end the war, Atlas said.
"Trump will probably give Israel more leeway in taking military actions in Gaza," Atlas said.
On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacked Israel, Atlas said, but the next day Hezbollah, an Iran-supported Lebanese Shia militia, attacked Israel. Since then, Israel has been in a war with Hezbollah as well, which forced Iran, which backs Hezbollah, to begin fighting with Israel.
In Syria, President Bashar Assad was able to stay in power amid the country's 13-year civil war because Hezbollah, along with Iran and Russia, was supporting his efforts, Atlas said. Iran and Hezbollah grew weaker amid their fighting with Israel, and Russia has needed its troops for the war in Ukraine, he said.
But with the diminishing of Hezbollah, rebels were able to take over Syria, which neighbors Lebanon, and forced Assad to flee to Moscow on Dec. 8, Atlas said.
"Trump is going to inherit a new Middle East that didn't exist a week ago," Atlas said. "What Trump has been sort of signaling ... is this 'America First,' hands-off approach where he really doesn't want to get involved in things and let things happen however they happen. It could potentially lead to more chaos if we don't play a role."
The rebel takeover, which shocked many foreign affairs analysts, stems from the Syrian civil war between the Assad regime and rebel forces that began in 2011, Ciorciari said.
The United States supported Syria at the start of the war, Ciorciari said, but the support was limited because former President Barack Obama did not want to enter another war in the Middle East amid the Iraq War, Ciorciari said.
Until the rebel takeover, Ciorciari said intelligence agencies believed the Assad regime had secured the country and that rebel groups did not have enough resources to challenge the Assad regime.
"The fact that that was all wrong both points to the apparent limits of our intelligence in Syria and also the dynamism of the conflict there," Ciorciari said. "This will be a turbulent period for the country, and the United States, at present, doesn't have a close relationship with the new government."
After power consolidation in Syria, the new government will likely be at odds with Israel, Iran and Iraq, Ciorciari said. In that instance, it's unclear how Trump will orient the U.S. within that dynamic, he said.
"There's a lot of uncertainty both about what will happen in Syria in general, from a Syrian perspective, but also how the United States will react to that under Trump," Ciorciari said.
Trade Wars
Trump's position on foreign affairs relies heavily on threats of sanctions and tariffs, Ciorciari said.
"Trump's rhetoric has suggested a readiness to dramatically escalate on the economic front," Ciorciari said.
While not a military challenge, China presents an issue for the U.S. amid Trump's proposed tariffs, Atlas said. China has been a trading partner with the U.S., Atlas said, but also has been an aggressor in Asia, particularly with U.S. allies Japan and South Korea.
Tariffs will increase the prices of goods in America, Atlas said. For example, 40% of shoes sold in the U.S. are made in China, so if Trump puts a tariff on goods from China then the cost of shoes for Americans will increase, he said.
Trump has proposed a 25% tariff on items coming from Canada, so construction goods like lumber and cement will increase for the American consumer, Atlas said. Trump has mentioned tariffs for goods from Mexico, which would include an increase in costs for parts in American manufacturing, he said.
Trump has never understood tariffs, Atlas said. Trump believes that tariffs are paid for by the foreign country, but tariffs are taxes on imports, the cost of which has been passed on to the consumer, he said.
"We as consumers will pay the costs of the increase. You actually may have an increase in inflation, increase in prices, and things like that," Atlas said.
If the U.S. institutes tariffs, then other countries will respond with tariffs that will impact American exported goods, Atlas said. That would mean that American manufacturing and agriculture businesses would suffer if export goods decrease in quantity, he said.
"Nobody ever wins a trade war. Everybody loses in a trade war," Atlas said. "The cost of ordinary products for Americans will go up. American exports will go down. It can have a very negative impact on the economy."
© 2024 Post-Tribune (Merrillville, Ind.).
Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
military.com · December 16, 2024
24. Most girls do not think they could succeed in the military: DOD data
Not good data.
Most girls do not think they could succeed in the military: DOD data
militarytimes.com · by Hope Hodge Seck · December 16, 2024
Youth interest in military service is in a long plummet, and teenage girls are dramatically less confident than boys that they have what it takes to be successful in uniform. That’s according to a new data compilation from Joint Advertising Market Research & Studies, or JAMRS, the Defense Department’s internal polling agency.
But amid a torrent of bad news for military recruiting, officials are sounding one note of optimism: better understanding of younger generations’ barriers to service, real or imagined, provide the chance to counteract misconceptions and speak more effectively to the recruitable population.
At a brief to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services on Dec. 10, JAMRS director Jeremy Hall showed that a significant drop in interest in military service following the COVID-19 pandemic was quickly becoming the new normal for recruiting.
From 2012 to 2019, 13% of young people aged 16-21 said they saw themselves “definitely” or “probably” serving in the military in the next few years, but that average dropped to just 10% from 2020 to 2023. That 3% change, he added, represents about a million American youth.
Moreover, data shows, women in particular lack the confidence to pursue military aspirations, even if they have them. According to surveys completed in the fall and spring of 2023, 26% of young men say they’re probably or definitely sure they could fight in a war, compared to just 8% of young women.
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Some 53% of young men say they believe they could make it through boot camp, while just 27% of young women say they could. Young men and women show the most confidence that they have what it takes to hack it in the Army, at 37% and 17%, respectively, and the least confidence they could make it in the Marine Corps, at 26% and 11%.
Both men and women are becoming less confident in their ability to serve, DOD data shows. Overall, young men rate confidence at 43%, compared to 51% in 2018; while young women rate confidence at 26%, down from 33% in 2018.
Regardless of reality, perception matters, Hall said.
“Vibe is a KPI,” he said, using the business term for “key performance indicator.”
“[Young people] draw things from their perceptions and associations,” he added, “and those are typically good enough for what it means to serve in uniform.”
Top influencers in young peoples’ lives — their parents, aunts, uncles, coaches and other adults — aren’t doing much to push them toward service, JAMRS data shows.
Specifically, parents with daughters are dramatically less likely to encourage their children to serve than parents with sons, 42% versus 32%. While that gap appeared to be closing in the early and mid-2000s, it widened again in 2020 to its greatest-ever disparity, with 45% of parents with sons saying they’d encourage service compared to just 30% of parents with daughters.
Hall did not name specific cases, such as the disappearance and murder of Army Spc. Vanessa Guillen in 2020 that drove national headlines and outrage, but noted that the summer of 2020 had “several instances” of military sexual assault and harassment in the news.
“We’ve seen this topic stay on the radar for female youth and particularly parents, this idea of the possibility of sexual assault and harassment,” he said.
Beyond fears and concerns based on recent events, JAMRS knowledge surveys show teens have an outdated or off-base idea about the military in general. Only one in five boys and one in 10 girls can name all six military services, and only 38% of young people, on average, said they knew the difference between an enlisted person and an officer.
Hall said he found it humorous that a number of survey takers reported believing that members of the Marine Corps served, not in amphibious environments, but on submarines.
Some 32% of girls and 26% of boys cited a fear of possible injury or death as a significant concern preventing them from joining the military, which Hall pointed out was based on a caricature of what military members did.
“You know, the general view is, you live in the barracks, you get up first thing in the morning, you march around, you shoot things, you go to bed, and you deploy to places that are brown and dusty and live in tents,” he said.
Media portrayals don’t help things, Hall added.
“How service and service members are portrayed in popular media is that noble yet damaged warrior haunted by their military experience,” he said. “Because the military does not have a presence in many communities.”
So, where do military recruiters, already challenged by a population less qualified for service than any before it, go from here?
Hall said he believes the solution is engaging earlier and heading off misperceptions at the pass with accurate and contemporary pictures of military service.
“What we’ve talked about with the services since we’ve come out of the pandemic is really a need to reconnect with American communities, to connect with those communities that don’t have a large veteran population or military installation,” he said.
“Because what we see, day in and day out, is … about 40% of accessions in any given year are from young people who did not think about the military until the year that they joined. They were once not propensed, and that engagement with a military member, particularly when we see young women joining the military today, is a combined result of that market outreach and that recruiter interaction.”
The Defense Department, Hall said, is now developing five new advertising spots targeted to young adults that emphasize the military as a transcendent path, rather than a career choice of last resort.
In February, he said, the new campaign will go live: “You have a calling; we have an answer.”
.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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