Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Philosophers warn us not to be satisfied with mere learning, but to add practice and then training." 
- Epictetus

“Movements” are what take five or ten percent of people and make them decisive—because in a world where apathy rules, five or ten percent is an enormous number.”
- Bill McKibben

"The Bill of Rights wasn’t enacted to give us any rights. It was enacted so the Government could not take away from us any rights that we already had."
- Kenneth G. Eade, author




1. Kim Jong Un’s decade in power: Starvation, repression and brutal rule – just like his father and grandfather
2. Any change to USFK troop levels will be subject to joint decision with S. Korea: Pentagon
3. U.S. seeks step-by-step approach to denuclearization of N. Korea: Sullivan
4. What Kim Jong Un's decade in power means for North Korea and the world
5. North Korea is like a time-bomb set into motion
6. Kim Yo-jong, sister of N. Korean leader, believed to have been promoted
7. Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing
8. After 10 years, Kim III faces multiple Catch-22s
9. Allies Need More Diplomatic Dialogue To Peacefully Denuclearize The Korean Peninsula – Analysis
10. New Jersey Monk, a Revered War Hero, Is Candidate for Sainthood



1. Kim Jong Un’s decade in power: Starvation, repression and brutal rule – just like his father and grandfather

Professor Sung Yoon Lee provides the best take down of Kim Jong-un of all the 10 year retrospectives we have seen as well as the best summary of the Kim family regime and its evil ways.

Kim Jong Un’s decade in power: Starvation, repression and brutal rule – just like his father and grandfather
theconversation.com · by Sung-Yoon Lee
By the grim metric of fatalities in the first 10 years of a dictator’s rule, Kim Jong Un has yet to match the records set by his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, or father, Kim Jong Il – the two tyrants who reigned by terror in North Korea before him.
For now, the number of people Kim Jong Un has personally ordered killed – such as his uncle in 2013 and half-brother in 2017 – is likely to number in the hundreds.
But his decade in power, which began after his father’s death on Dec. 17, 2011, has proved a disaster for people living in the communist nation. The isolationist state has become even more so, as the northern border to China closed during the coronavirus pandemic – cutting off an escape route for those desperate to flee. Meanwhile, food insecurity means that “an entire generation of children” are undernourished, as the United Nations has reported.
Concrete numbers of how many have died from starvation and malnourishment-related conditions such as diarrhea and pneumonia under Kim are difficult to come by. But as a scholar of Korean history, I believe the young dictator – who turns 38 next January – has the capacity to surpass even the ghastly death tolls of his two familial predecessors.

Three generations of misery
Kim Jong Un’s first decade in power has seen a continuation of the deadly repression and failed policies that have kept North Koreans living in fear and under the threat of starvation for the last 70 years.
The Korean War that the current leader’s grandfather started in 1950, just two years after founding North Korea, claimed upwards of 4 million lives – most were North Korean civilians killed by the United Nations coalition that came to defend South Korea.

Civilians bore the brunt during the Korean War. Keystone/Getty Images
Once his campaign to take South Korea by force was thwarted by the 1953 armistice, Kim Il Sung turned to purging pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese party officials who had dared to criticize him. The North Korean leader went on a killing spree in which thousands of party officials were killed or expelled from the Workers’ Party of Korea.
His son, Kim Jong Il, inherited power in July 1994 and oversaw a devastating famine in which upwards of 2 million people starved to death.
But instead of buying food, Kim Jong Il sought aid, most of which he diverted to North Korea’s military. At the height of the famine in 1997, the U.S. State Department estimated North Korea’s military budget as US$6 billion. During those dark times, Kim spent over a billion dollars a year on his missile programs alone and over $600 million on luxury goods imports.
He also managed to eke out enough money to build an estimated $800 million mausoleum for his dead father – one in which he himself was entombed in December 2011 after succumbing to a suspected heart attack.
Had he spent just $200 million of his wealth each year on grain and distributed it fairly, no one would have died. Instead, as the 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report on Human Rights in North Korea alleges, Kim Jong Il committed the “inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.”
The same claim could be made against Kim Jong Un during his decade in power. Faminelike conditions have been observed in the mid-2010s and have resurfaced during the pandemic.
Even before Kim sealed the border with China in January 2020, North Korea recorded food shortages of around 1.36 million metric tons in 2018 and 2019. His solution has been to rely on aid and, in October, telling his people to eat less until 2025. Meanwhile, during his 10 years in power, Kim has diverted around a quarter of North Korea’s GDP toward the military.
And under Kim Jong Un it has only become harder for North Koreans to escape chronic hunger. During the famine in the 1990s, many North Korean people were able to escape to China in search of food, despite attempts by Kim Jong Il to block them.
In the first year of Kim Jong Un’s rule, the number of escapees who made their way to South Korea dropped in half from the previous year to approximately 1,500.
And in the past nearly two years of lockdown under Kim, border-crossing has become far more difficult. In 2021, the number is expected to be well below 100.
A deadly legacy
When Kim came to power in December 2011, I predicted his rule would be marked neither by reform nor power-sharing but extreme internal repression and strategic threats against neighbors.
Sadly, these projections have been proved right. The past decade has seen a continuation of the atrocious human rights record of Kim’s predecessors and a great leap forward on the despotic dynasty’s missile programs. North Korea has fired off over 130 missiles over the last 10 years, punctuated by three intercontinental ballistic missile blasts in 2017. Of the four nuclear tests, the last in 2017, was a thermonuclear bomb.
[You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors. You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter.]
These lethal weapons are custom made for threatening the U.S. with a nuclear war while Kim dangles the possibility of peace, thus compelling Washington to withdraw U.S. troops and strategic weapons from South Korea – as Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, called for in August.
Kim Jong Un’s apparent goal is to render Washington’s longtime non-nuclear ally, Seoul, vulnerable to his nuclear-armed state bent on completing its “supreme national task” of completing the “great Juche Revolution” – the absorption of the south and unifying the Korean peninsula on North Korean terms.
A nuclear war, even if limited, could cause civilian deaths in the millions – a horrendous feat already achieved under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
What is different under Kim Jong Un is that he has built the capacity to inflict much more carnage on the outside world, including the U.S.
  1. Sung-Yoon Lee
Professor in Korean Studies, Tufts University
theconversation.com · by Sung-Yoon Lee

2. Any change to USFK troop levels will be subject to joint decision with S. Korea: Pentagon
We used to call this consultation. However, I do not recall that we ever gave any implied veto power over US strategic decision making.

However, I would say as a rule of thumb there should be no changes to force levels without the completion and approval of a new plan that factors in the changes to the force levels (and assigned and apportioned forces). Once the OPLAN is approved we should not be making changes to the force structure unless there is a way to effectively offset the potential reduction in capabilities.
Any change to USFK troop levels will be subject to joint decision with S. Korea: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 18, 2021
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- Any future changes to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) including troop levels will be made under joint decisions with South Korea, a Pentagon spokesman said Friday.
"I can assure you that there's no plans, no intentions to change our alliance posture in any way," Department of Defense Press Secretary John Kirby said when asked if there can be any changes to the U.S. troop level in South Korea in the near future.
"And any changes at all, not that I'm predicting any ... will always be done as an alliance decision in lockstep with our South Korean allies," he added.

His remarks come after the U.S. Senate passed the defense budget bill, called the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the fiscal year 2022.
While the bill calls on the U.S. government to maintain USFK troop levels intact, it does not limit the use of defense spending to reduce U.S. troops in South Korea, unlike three previous NDAAs for fiscal years 2019-2021.
U.S. officials earlier said the limit on the use of U.S. defense spending to reduce USFK troops was removed simply because it is no longer needed, noting Congress only began adding a lower limit for USFK troops after former President Donald Trump began to use USFK as a bargaining chip in talks with South Korea over Seoul's share of the cost to maintain U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. currently has some 28,500 forces in South Korea.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 18, 2021





3. U.S. seeks step-by-step approach to denuclearization of N. Korea: Sullivan

But we cannot negotiate with ourselves. Kim Jong-un has to want to do it. The Biden administration is giving Kim the opportunity to act as a responsible member of the international community. The ball is in his court. But if he refuses then we need to proceed with the understanding that he is the one who will not act responsibly (or reasonably). 

U.S. seeks step-by-step approach to denuclearization of N. Korea: Sullivan | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 18, 2021
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- The Joe Biden administration is seeking a "step-by-step" approach to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a compromise between the opposite strategies of two previous U.S. administrations, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Friday.
Sullivan also reiterated that the U.S. remains committed to the 2018 agreement reached between the U.S. and North Korea in Singapore, which calls for complete denuclearization of North Korea in exchange for U.S. security assurances.
"Our approach with North Korea when we came in was to look at the last two administrations," Sullivan said, referring to the administrations of former presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump.

The Obama administration, he noted, "really adopted this view of strategic patience, which was essentially, I would call, non-for-none."
"And then the Trump administration in Hanoi pitched all-for-all, the grand bargain," Sullivan said in a forum hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based nonprofit think tank.
"And essentially the thrust and purpose of our policy was to come in between those two -- to be prepared to engage in diplomacy, to make step by step progress towards the ultimate goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he added.
Trump held two historic summit meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un -- in Singapore in June 2018 and in Hanoi in February 2019.
At the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore, the North agreed to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while the U.S. agreed to establish new relations with the North, which, according to many, would provide some security guarantees to the North that remains under various U.S. and U.N. Security Council sanctions.
"We continue to indicate to them (North Koreans) both directly and publicly as I'm doing right now that we are prepared to engage to try to make progress against the basic points that were laid down in the Singapore summit back in 2018," said Sullivan.
North Korea has stayed away from denuclearization talks with the U.S. since 2019.
Sullivan noted the North remains unresponsive to U.S. overtures, saying, "We have not gotten traction in diplomacy with North Korea on that over the course of this year."
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · December 18, 2021


4. What Kim Jong Un's decade in power means for North Korea and the world
My concern is that KJU has created conditions because of the pandemic that potentially make the situation in the north far worse than the Arduous March of the great famine of 1994-1996.It was the support of the South (Sunshine Policy) and the resilience of the Korean people (developing markets when the WPK public distribution system failed).

He is not letting those 400+ markets thrive as they could due to COVID and more importantly due to Kim's closure of the border and crackdown on key activities that support the markets (foreign currency, smuggling and cross border trade, communications and flow of information, internal movement, etc). Without the functioning of the markets the people have now safety valve to ease the suffering.

Excerpt:
But more significant for Kim will be to navigate North Korea out of its post-pandemic crisis and map out a credible path for economic recovery.
"Even if Pyongyang chooses to isolate itself until the pandemic subsides, North Korea has proven before that it is resilient, having survived the harshest of famines in the 1990s, and China will always continue to help keep the country afloat," Duyeon Kim said. "I think we will see Kim Jong-un reign for several more decades if he can keep up his health."


What Kim Jong Un's decade in power means for North Korea and the world | DW | 17.12.2021
Since succeeding his father Kim Jong Il 10 years ago, the dictator has executed enemies, developed nukes, and sat down face to face with an American president. Now he must steer his country out of economic misery.
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
Ten years after his sudden death, the North Korean regime is lavishing praise on former leader Kim Jong Il and playing up the achievements of his son and heir, Kim Jong Un, to further cement the young dictator’s grip over one of the world's most isolated nations.
State-run newspapers published articles venerating Kim Jong Il and his achievements during his 14 years in power before his death in 2011, while art galleries in Pyongyang are showcasing his contributions to the nation.
Friday's commemorations included calls for greater public loyalty toward his son and current leader, who is struggling to pull the country out of pandemic-related economic hardship.
"Economic recovery and modernization will be his biggest challenge going forward," said Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow specializing in security issues at the Center for a New American Security. "But he will likely find ways to give himself political cover for any shortcomings or failures and instill a sense of responsibility and patriotism in his people to work harder."
How did Kim Jong Un rise to power?
Kim Jong Il is reported to have died of a heart attack on the morning of December 17, 2011, as he traveled aboard his personal train. His funeral cortege drove through the snow-blanketed streets of Pyongyang on December 28, with Kim Jong Un walking alongside the hearse.
Watch video 06:10
Are we seeing a new arms race on the Korean Peninsula?
North Korea-watchers at the time commented on the shock that was still evident on the face of the new leader, just 29 years old at the time, adding that while he was being groomed to take over from his father, it was clearly not anticipated that he would have to step into his role so soon.
Kim Jong Un's decade in power has surprised many analysts, with many initially assuming that he was too young and too inexperienced to lead a nation faced with as many challenges as North Korea.
The successor is now described in state media as the "great leader," a title that was previously reserved for his grandfather and founder of the North Korean nation, Kim Il Sung.
Less than two years after taking power, Kim Jong Un had ordered the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek. It is also widely assumed Kim Jong Un set up the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, in Kuala Lumpur airport in February 2017.
The leader then met face to face with Donald Trump, the then president of the United States, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
He has also managed to avoid the fate of many of the world's other dictatorships in recent years, of internal dissent, revolution and violent overthrow, largely due to his unrelenting control of all aspects of daily life within the nation's tightly guarded borders.
How did Kim Jong Un sustain control?
Kim Jong Un has been able to maintain his grip on power "because of a combination of the regime apparatus," says Duyeon Kim.
The leader is, "Keeping the elites who help sustain a Kim family leadership system happy, and employing brutal practices of forced loyalty and eliminating threats through purges and punishments of officials working for him," she told DW.

According to Leif-Eric Easley, an associate professor of international studies at Seoul's Ewha Woman's University, the Kim regime has managed to stay in power for so long by "belittling Seoul, demonizing the United States, and touting national self-reliance."
"But Trump’s meetings with Kim contradicted the American threat theory, South Korea is more successful than ever and Pyongyang is increasingly dependent on China," he told DW. "What little prosperity the North Korean people have tasted correlated with international trade, and that allowed more information to get inside the country.
"After the pandemic abates, the dictator’s dilemma of how to pursue economic growth while maintaining political control is likely to intensify for Kim," he said.
Will the regime come to an end?
Kim has made efforts to move away from his father’s "military-first" policy to improve the country's economy — and potentially stop North Koreans trying to defect for a better life elsewhere — but he has never neglected the armed forces.
Instead of focusing on a military with conventional capabilities, Kim quickly moved on to developing nuclear weapons and advanced missiles with which he could menace far more powerful rivals, including the US.
Kim ordered the regime's third underground nuclear test, on February 13, and then a further three detonations culminating in what Pyongyang claims was its first hydrogen bomb, in September 2017. Analysts estimate that the leader has between 15 and 60 nuclear warheads at his disposal today.
But more significant for Kim will be to navigate North Korea out of its post-pandemic crisis and map out a credible path for economic recovery.
"Even if Pyongyang chooses to isolate itself until the pandemic subsides, North Korea has proven before that it is resilient, having survived the harshest of famines in the 1990s, and China will always continue to help keep the country afloat," Duyeon Kim said. "I think we will see Kim Jong-un reign for several more decades if he can keep up his health."
Watch video 02:36
North Korean defector to run for parliament in South
Edited by: Sou-Jie van Brunnersum
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)


5. North Korea is like a time-bomb set into motion
I know I am like the boy who cried wolf or Chicken Little who said the sky is falling. But I am worried about the situation in north Korea and whether our contingency plans (and our leadership in Seoul and Washington) are ready to respond to the potential catastrophic events that may be on the horizon.

North Korea is like a time-bomb set into motion
Posted December. 18, 2021 07:56,
Updated December. 18, 2021 07:56
North Korea is like a time-bomb set into motion. December. 18, 2021 07:56. .
North Korea marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Jong Il, but it has not changed a bit, still forcing people to swear their loyalty to the Kim family. The present situation of the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” which has been ruled by the Kim family for three generations, is a surreal reality taking place in the 21st century. That is why the UN Resolution on North Korean human rights is an accusation of the harsh reality of North Korea. The Resolution condemns North Korea’s systematic and widespread crimes against humanity and recommends slapping additional sanctions against “the most responsible.”

In fact, Kim Jong Un raised expectations at the beginning of his reign, showing desire for change unlike his grandfather and father. However, measures like revitalizing markets and expanding overseas trade did not last long. North Korea faced stronger sanctions from the international community and drove itself into isolation by speeding up the development of nuclear missiles and revving up provocations. As a result, the North Korean economy has shrunk compared to ten years ago, and the people are in despair.

Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un proclaims himself as a leader of the people by advocating slogans, such as, “the people first” and “our country first.” Such dictatorship of fear cannot last forever. No matter how strong a fortress is built around Kim with loyalists and how much it suppresses the people by force, it cannot hush up the discontent and resentment of the hungry people. The fetishistic ideology the North Korean regime has been promoting, such as nuclear treasures or strategic rockets cannot satisfy the empty stomach of the people.

Ultimately, it is Kim Jong-un, who is at the crossroads of choice after losing the opportunities of the past 10 years. Currently, Kim is busy establishing policy by sector ahead of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. As always, grand slogans created from the meeting will decorate his New Year’s address and he will reveal his treacherous foreign policy, which alternates between provocation and appeasement. Kim has been wasting time all year, refusing to talk with the U.S. In the meantime, the time to disarm the internal bomb is running out. Although belated, it should not miss out the opportunity now.

6. Kim Yo-jong, sister of N. Korean leader, believed to have been promoted
The funny thing may be that she may be allowed to stand anywhere she pleases and she moves around just to give leadership watchers fits as they try to determine status by positions in photos.


Kim Yo-jong, sister of N. Korean leader, believed to have been promoted | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · December 18, 2021
SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's powerful sister, is believed to have been promoted to a higher official position, according to a North Korean media report Saturday.
In the report on a memorial event for late former leader Kim Jong-il held a day earlier, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) listed Kim Yo-jong alongside members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party as having attended the ceremony.
Kim was listed between eight sitting members of the Political Bureau and other alternate members, suggesting she may have been named a member or an alternate member of the organ.
In the airing of the memorial ceremony by the North's state TV on Friday, Kim was also seen standing next to Kim Yong-chol and two other Political Bureau members.
Kim is currently a member of the State Affairs Commission and vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party.
Kim had previously served as alternate member of the powerful political bureau but was demoted at a party congress in January.

pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · December 18, 2021

7. Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing

I think the Secretary is talking about routine consultation about changes that will affect the alliance. I think we may be reading into this more than we should. We will consult on any changes was we should do.

Excerpts;
Q: All right.
And the restriction on the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea has been removed. So are you going to keep the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea at the current level?
MR. KIRBY: So the -- you're right: It passed the Senate. The president hasn't signed it into law, so I'm not going to get ahead of the president.
But I can assure you that there's no plans, no intention to change our alliance posture in any way. And -- and the secretary said as much, as you know, when we were in Seoul just a couple of weeks ago.
Q: That's what I was trying to ask you about.
MR. KIRBY: Yes.
Q: You already answered.
MR. KIRBY: And any changes at all -- not that I'm predicting any. We're committed to this alliance and to keeping our force posture there. You saw that that was referenced in the Global Posture Review.
But any changes whatever will always be done as an alliance decision in lockstep with our South Korean allies.
Q: So any numbers not changing in the 28,000 --
MR. KIRBY: I -- I'm not here to announce or to signal or to in any way provide an indication that there's going to be a change in posture on the Korean Peninsula.
And again I point you back to the secretary's comments when we were in Seoul.

Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing
PRESS SECRETARY JOHN F. KIRBY: Good afternoon, everybody. Thanks for your patience in starting a little bit late on a Friday afternoon. I do have a few things to start out with.
So I think you saw this morning that Secretary Austin spoke during a Hall of Heroes induction ceremony that was conducted over at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall. That ceremony honored the recent Medal of Honor recipients, Army Master Sergeant Earl Plumlee, Army Sergeant First Class Alwyn Cashe and Army Sergeant First Class Christopher Celiz. We echo, of course, President Biden in saying that we are grateful for all that these three soldiers have done, and we certainly honor their courage and -- and bravery under exceptional circumstances.
As I mentioned previously, the Defense Policy Board met this week for the first time since completing -- since we've completed Secretary Austin's zero-based review process. That board, which is chaired by Madeleine Albright, received classified briefings on China military modernization, the National Defense Strategy priorities and strategic approach, integrated deterrence, the Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile Defense Review. Secretary Austin joined the meeting yesterday to receive an out-brief from the board on their findings after reviewing a draft version of the still-classified 2021 National Defense Strategy. The secretary thanked the members for their continued dedication to the nation and their sound advice and counsel as the department continues to refine the NDS.
As you know, the Defense Policy Board is chartered to provide independent advice and recommendations on matters concerning defense policy in response to specific tasks from the secretary, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary of defense for policy. A full readout will be posted on defense.gov later today.
Also on the Secretary's plate today -- this morning he spoke by phone with German Federal Minister of Defense Christine Lambrecht this morning to congratulate her on her new appointment to the role. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strong U.S.-German defense cooperation, both bilaterally and of course within the NATO alliance.
They discussed their commitment to work together on a full range of challenges, including addressing Russia's destabilizing actions in Eastern Europe, ensuring NATO alliance unity, maintaining positive trajectory on defense investments, and of course increasing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. A -- a full readout of that should be posted, if not now, certainly very soon on our website.
I'm sure that some of you have also been tracking some recent confirmation hearings. We were very pleased to see the confirmations of John Sherman, the Chief -- new Chief Information Officer, and Nickolas Guertin, the new Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and of course Admiral Chris Grady, the new Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We welcome them all to their new roles, welcome some of them back into public service, and the Secretary's looking forward to -- to working closely with all three of them.
As I think you know, December 18th is National Wreaths Across America Day. It will kick off tomorrow at 8 am at Arlington National Cemetery, as wreaths will be placed at each marker by volunteers. Chairman Milley plans to attend that ceremony. The event has grown over the past 30 years to include now nearly 3,000 participating locations all across the country. And of course if anyone would like to volunteer, you can go to their website at wreathsacrossamerica.org.
And then lastly, later today, the -- this afternoon, U.S. Air Forces Central will release their Airpower Summary Reports covering February 2020 through November 2021. These reports will provide an overview of air operations, to include strikes, conducted in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan under Combined Forces Air Component Commander authorities.
As you know, the public release of airstrikes in Afghanistan was paused in March of 2020 due to sensitivity surrounding the implementation of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. It is important to remember that during this time, DOD continued to -- I'm sorry -- continued to collect and analyze the data and provided it to Inspectors General for inclusions in -- in their regular reports to Congress.
Seeking to remain as transparent as possible, the Secretary directed that this data again be made publicly releasable. These reports will be available, as I said, later today on U.S. Air Forces Central's website at afcent.mil. And again, they'll go back to February 2020 and then they'll continue going forward.
With that, we'll take questions. Lita?
Q: One quick thing on that. Are those monthly reports that are just going to all be shoved out or is there one big report on that time span?
MR. KIRBY: I don't know what it's going to look like when you click on the website but there'll be the monthly summaries going back to February 2020, and then going forward, every month, as it used to be.
Q: Okay. And then just another question on vaccines. Since the services are now starting to release some of their discipline -- and you addressed this a little bit the other day -- is there any concern by the Secretary and have there been discussions between him and some of the service chiefs and secretaries about discipline and any effort to ensure that it's equal across the services, such that if you're treated one way by the Marine Corps, you're going to largely be treated the same way, given similar circumstances, by the Army or the Air Force?
MR. KIRBY: Lita, I -- I think in general, that will most likely be the case. I mean, you've -- you've already heard the services talk about the fact that they are, even as deadlines have lapsed, offering their troops even more time to get vaccinated before taking any administrative action. And administrative discharges generally occur the same -- in the same process across the services. Now there might be slight differences, but an administrative discharge, that process is not so unique among the services.
So the secretary is not overly concerned that there will be vast differences between one service over another as they process these individuals for administrative separation. And it is administrative. It's not -- you know, it's not as a result of a legal proceeding in that -- you know, like a court martial. And, again, this is -- administrative discharges, as you know, are a fairly common practice so that the processes are pretty similar across the services.
Yes, Jen?
Q: So, John, let me get your reaction to the fact that 60,000 Afghan interpreters who had applied for SIV visas remain behind in Afghanistan, 33,000 of them are cleared for vetting. This is based on The Wall Street Journal article that quotes State Department officials. Will the U.S. -- will the U.S. military be helping with evacuating those people? And 60,000 interpreters being left behind is pretty significant.
MR. KIRBY: Yes, I've seen the press reporting and I certainly would refer you to the State Department for validation of the numbers, Jen. As you know, that program is not administered by DOD. That said, the secretary continues to believe strongly that we have a moral obligation to help those who helped us, especially, you know, interpreters and translators and people that -- that literally put their lives on the line with our men and women in uniform. He feels very strongly about that. That's why he continues to work closely with Secretary Blinken, and we, as a department, continue to work closely with State Department's task force to help identify and facilitate the movement out of Afghanistan of all those who have helped us. So as I've said many times, while the military mission in Afghanistan is over, the mission to help get our allies out and safely out of the country is not over.
And then to your second question, I do not foresee a U.S. military role in terms of facilitating the physical relocation of these individuals. We have been -- well, we as a government have been doing this through commercial and industrial aircraft, not using military aircraft. I don't see that changing.
Q: I'd also like to get your reaction to the former national security adviser to President Ghani, Hamdullah Mohib, who has given an interview in which he blames the Doha agreement for the fall of the Kabul government. So he's essentially blaming Zalmay Khalilzad's agreement under the Trump administration for the fall of the Afghan government.
MR. KIRBY: I haven't seen those comments. As you know, we're doing our own after-action review here. I certainly won't get ahead of the work that they're doing. As you've heard the secretary say, I mean, certainly the Doha agreement sent a powerful signal to our Afghan allies and the Afghan government that -- that the United States was leaving. There is no question about that. And we do believe it had -- it definitely had an impact on the morale of the ANDSF.
But, Jen, and without getting ahead of the after-action review, obviously, we've been talking a lot over the last several months about what happened in Afghanistan and I suspect we're going to learn there was a lot that led to the events of mid-August, a lot. And I -- I think we'd be reticent at this place in time to pin it on, you know, one thing, one -- one decision, one agreement, one meeting, one factor. I think it would be imprudent for us to do that right now.
Q: And just one last question. What has the Pentagon done to patch the Log4J software vulnerability?
This is the new -- that CISA put out the warning, federal government agencies are affected by this software vulnerability. They're -- Jen Easterly gave an interview yesterday. I mean, they're really sounding alarm bells. What has the Pentagon done to protect itself?
MR. KIRBY: So, US Cyber Command, the NSA and DOD Cyber Crime Center are taking rapid action right now to identify and mitigate the Log4j vulnerabilities by monitoring for malicious cyber activity and directing mitigation against potential exploitation. We continue to work with Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, on a whole-of-government response and sharing information with our interagency -- interagency and defense industrial base partners.
We reinforce the guidance and information that CISA has released and we strongly encourage everyone to follow their guidance to upgrade and patch accordingly.
I think you can understand for operations of operational security I'm not going to be able to get into the status of our network operations or information systems at this time.
Janne?
Q: Thank you, John.
On the NDAA, National Defense Authorization Act, and that the fiscal year 2022 Defense Authorization Act passed the U.S. Senate this week, and --
MR. KIRBY: I'm sorry, has what?
Q: Passed -- has passed this week.
MR. KIRBY: Passed through the Senate, yes.
Q: You want me to take off?
MR. KIRBY: You can take it off if you like.
Q: All right.
And the restriction on the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea has been removed. So are you going to keep the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea at the current level?
MR. KIRBY: So the -- you're right: It passed the Senate. The president hasn't signed it into law, so I'm not going to get ahead of the president.
But I can assure you that there's no plans, no intention to change our alliance posture in any way. And -- and the secretary said as much, as you know, when we were in Seoul just a couple of weeks ago.
Q: That's what I was trying to ask you about.
MR. KIRBY: Yes.
Q: You already answered.
MR. KIRBY: And any changes at all -- not that I'm predicting any. We're committed to this alliance and to keeping our force posture there. You saw that that was referenced in the Global Posture Review.
But any changes whatever will always be done as an alliance decision in lockstep with our South Korean allies.
Q: So any numbers not changing in the 28,000 --
MR. KIRBY: I -- I'm not here to announce or to signal or to in any way provide an indication that there's going to be a change in posture on the Korean Peninsula.
And again I point you back to the secretary's comments when we were in Seoul.
Q: Thank you.
MR. KIRBY: Yeah. Abraham?
Q: Thank you, John.
Two questions related there. I wondered if you could update us on the situation of the Russian troop build up on the border of Ukraine. Is there anything different there?
And then also Secretary Austin, of course, completed the Global Force Posture Review, but there have been no announcements about movements in some of the NATO eastern flank allies that're obviously interested in bolstering up the eastern flank. Are there going to be any announcements about possible new troop rotations anywhere in the world?
MR. KIRBY: No. Next question.
I'm just kidding.
We continue to monitor the situation in Russia and Ukraine of course. I don't have -- as I have tried not to do to get into intelligence assessments here from the podium. I'm not going to do that. But we haven't seen any -- we haven't seen any significant changes in the posture of Russian forces arrayed around the Ukrainian border. They are still there in large number, and that's as far as I think I'm going to go.
And then as to your second question, I have no new rotational deployments to speak to in terms of our -- our NATO allies. We have a lot of capability in the region. That capability's still there. Some of it is fixed, some of it is rotational. And as you heard Jake Sullivan, the national security advisor say, you know, if there's an incursion, another incursion, and if some of our NATO allies ask for additional capabilities or rotational elements, we will be positively disposed to consider that, but I have no such requests to speak to and no movements to speak to today.
Tara?
Q: Thanks, John. On the Airpower Summary Reports, going forward, will the department commit to continuing to release airstrike data in Afghanistan? And in that vein, have there been any U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan since the withdrawal was complete?
MR. KIRBY: There have been no airstrikes in Afghanistan since the withdrawal is complete, and yes, we are committed to providing summaries, should -- should that be the case. Just, that's why we're trying to get back to these -- these Airpower Summary Reports, which would -- they -- they're published by AFCENT, and -- and so Afghanistan would still fall within their writ.
Q: Will those strikes include DOD-conducted strikes only, or would, if there's a -- if there's a strike conducted by another government organization, would it -- would those also be counted in the data?
MR. KIRBY: My understanding -- and I will check this after the briefing, but my understanding is its U.S. only. We're responsible for our, you know, for our missions, so it would be U.S. only, but I'll -- I will just double check that.
Yeah, Rio.
Q: Thank you. Yesterday, the Biden administration had the Chinese study of military … for helping the Chinese military to get hold of brain-controlled weapons. But could you give us a sense of the DOD's assessment on what such weapons might do in greater detail? And how much is the DOD concerned about the Chinese military using such weapons in the battlefield in the future?
MR. KIRBY: I'm sorry, I missed the first part of your question. What weapons are we talking about?
Q: The brain-controlled weapons.
(CROSSTALK)
MR. KIRBY: Brain-controlled weapons?
Q: Brain-controlled weapons?
MR. KIRBY: Okay. I'll tell you what, Rio, I don't have control of my brain today, so I'm going to take the question and -- and -- and we'll get back to you on that one. That's a very specific question that I was not prepared for, so we'll -- we'll take it and get back to you. Let me --
(CROSSTALK)
MR. KIRBY: What's that?
(CROSSTALK)
MR. KIRBY: Brain-controlled weapons, all right. Okay. We can do both. I can take it and send it out and if you want, I can read it out on Monday, as well. But I wasn't -- I -- I don't have anything for you on that one.
Let me go to the phones. Sylvie?
Q: Hello, John. My question was asked. Thank you.
(Laughter.)
MR. KIRBY: Brain-controlled weapons. All right.
David Martin?
Okay, Dave, we'll come back to you. We missed you.
Oren from CNN?
Q: John, there are now seven Republican governors -- that includes Oklahoma's governor -- who are -- who are asking for a withdrawal or a retraction or an exemption from the National Guard vaccine mandate. Obviously, he's already responded to Oklahoma. When might you respond to the other governors? And is there any indication or suggestion that for any reason, the -- the response would be any different?
MR. KIRBY: We have not responded to those letters yet. We just got them. In fact, I think the latest one came in last night. Obviously, we will respond appropriately to -- to the governors regarding their concerns. I would just say that as we said to the Oklahoma governor, this is a valid military medical requirement, the vaccine. It makes for a more ready force and it is in the secretary's authorities to set those mandatory military readiness requirements.
Do you have one? Yeah, go ahead.
Q: Yeah. In follow up, the governor of Texas said something -- something to the effect of he will -- he was accusing the federal government of trying to defund Texas if they made them enforce the mandate. To your knowledge, has the Pentagon ever said anything about defunding?
MR. KIRBY: No, and I think as you probably recall in our response to Governor Stitt in Oklahoma that what -- what we said was that failure to get the vaccine could put you, as the individual Guardsman, your participation in the National Guard at -- at -- in jeopardy because your -- your -- your pay, your ability to train, your ability to go on, you know, to -- to -- to get military-funded education -- it's really about your individual participation. There was never a -- a threat to -- to defund the National Guard in any state.
Tony?
Q: Couple questions in a couple different areas. The United Arab Emirates F-35 issue, did that come up in the discussions with Dr. Kahl on -- in joint military dialogue?
MR. KIRBY: I would tell you, Tony, that it was not a focus of the discussions.
Q: Right. Yesterday, you said, "We're always concerned about technology transfer to nations that have an adversarial view of our commitment to a rules-based international order." What nations were you talking about there? China and the United Arab Emirates relationship, or Iran, or Saudi Arabia? Which nations --
MR. KIRBY: There are -- there -- there are -- there are -- are several nations that would fall into that category, Tony.
Q: Would -- would China and the UAE relationship fall into that category?
MR. KIRBY: We -- we -- you don't have to look far to see evidence that -- that China continues to challenge the international rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Q: Is -- is the U.S. concerned, then, that China might have the access to F-35 technology to respond?
MR. KIRBY: I'm -- I'm not going to go beyond what I said yesterday.
Q: Okay. A little closer to home, on Monday, the Pentagon inspector general put out a report on TransDigm, the -- one of the Pentagon's top sole-source providers of spare parts. 2019 there was a -- an I.G., similar I.G. report came out, and it concluded that TransDigm was getting excess profits. On Monday, they reported that they got -- TransDigm got excess profits of one -- or 2.- -- $20.8 million. What steps has the Pentagon taken since that earlier I.G. report to arm its contracting people with better information or better tools to extract information from TransDigm that could lead to cheaper parts? And potentially --
MR. KIRBY: Well, I think you -- you saw that the -- the DOD I.G. offered some recommendations on this, of -- three of them in particular were -- we've accept -- accepted all three, including trying to, you know, work on a refund to improve alternate contracting policies and -- and several others.
So without going into more detail than that, I mean, we appreciate the work that the -- that the I.G. did. And -- and -- and we're going to accept and follow the recommendations.
Q: Well, just to press -- in layman's language the recommendation is to get a -- extract a refund from TransDigm of $20.8 million. Does DOD intend to do that, to ask TransDigm for a refund?
MR. KIRBY: Yes, so -- I mean, again we appreciate the work of the -- the I.G. It did highlight challenges that contracting officers now experience procuring parts, including their ability to obtain data to determine fair and reasonable prices.
As noted, they recommended that we seek a voluntary refund. And we're going to -- we're going to do that.
And then, like I said, the other two recommendations that we're going to pursue, one is to have the Defense Pricing and Contracting director review the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation's information for the current policy as it pertains to this issue and then to also identify alternative options for purchasing items from countries --
Q: Ok.
MR. KIRBY: -- from companies -- sorry.
Q: Thank you. Do you have any updates for upcoming U.S.-Japan 2+2? What -- what's going to be your – kind of - the top line for DOD?
MR. KIRBY: We're looking forward to the discussion. I will have more to say as we get closer to it. Obviously, Japan is a key ally in the region. And that's why it was right on the front end of the secretary's first international trip, to go to Tokyo.
I won't get ahead of the agenda specifically, but you can imagine there is an awful lot to discuss. Security -- common security challenges in the Indo-Pacific will be chief among them, including the aggressive behavior that China continues to demonstrate, the threat continuing to be posed by -- by North Korea and their missile program. Lots to talk about, yes.
Let me get back to the phones here. Luis Martinez, are you there?
Q: Hey, John. I have a couple of COVID questions if I could, please. You've mentioned that there are active discussions about whether to mandate a booster. Does that include -- as part of that discussion, are you gathering data about how many personnel have actually received a booster shot?
MR. KIRBY: I'm not aware of any active effort to gather that data, Luis. But I'll take your question and just check and make sure that -- that I'm right about that. There are still discussions about whether or not to make it make it mandatory. No decision has been made.
Q: Thanks. And my other question has to do with -- Omicron is -- we're seeing these, you know, large, increasing numbers in magnitude of cases nationwide.
Does the military undertake sequencing so that they can determine whether the number of cases that they're experiencing may be Omicron versus Delta? And are you seeing a surge? And is that leading to concerns that you may have to tighten the restrictions on bases?
MR. KIRBY: We have seen a -- we did see a surge in Delta. I'm not aware of a surge in Omicron. Again, I will go back and look and see if we've got data on that. As you know, we had already tightened up what -- you know, we averted to more tight -- more tight restrictions across the department because of Delta and the effect it was having on our own workforce.
I'm not aware of any -- well, let me put it this way: the -- across the department, we are complying with CDC guidelines and continue to do that.
Obviously, we respect installation commanders and their ability to moderate -- as long as they don't go below CDC guidelines -- moderate appropriately, given the conditions where they are because the -- the conditions in local communities can be different.
So I -- I don't -- I'm not aware of any uniform mandatory changes of late, but again, let me -- let me go back and -- and take a look at the -- the status of omicron in the department before I -- before I say anything more.
Q: Does the Pentagon view sequencing as an option?
MR. KIRBY: Yeah, I -- I -- I'm going to check. I don't know, Jen -- I -- I don't know the answer to that.
Yeah?
Q: John, thank you. There's reporting now about exhaustion among a lot of the civilian healthcare workforce, as well as hospital capacity issues on the horizon. So against that backdrop, the question of immunization for the Reserve, the National Guard, does that take on another dimension of importance or do you have any comment on that -- is there planning underway, for instance, looking ahead, in case there is another wave of COVID with the omicron variant?
MR. KIRBY: I'm not completely sure I understand the question.
Q: -- as COVID has become a wave across the country, there -- the Guard was activated to try to provide relief for some of the civilian hospital overflow.
MR. KIRBY: Yeah.
Q: And so I'm looking ahead and thinking, you know, if -- if the wave that they're looking at now in -- which has been in sort of some reporting, as well, combined with the accumulated exhaustion among the healthcare population -- the civilian healthcare population – who are reporting, you know, crisis level -- levels among their workforce in some areas.
MR. KIRBY: I mean, the -- the -- I think we've talked recently in -- in Michigan -- the Governor asked for Guard support to help out with some hospitals, and certainly, governors can -- can -- can pull upon that capability, if -- if they need to.
I'm not -- I'm not aware of any plans at the federal level to mobilize the Guard across the country due to omicron -- nothing -- nothing that we're actively planning for right now -- but, I mean, obviously we've -- we've done it in the past, back in the spring, mobilized both active duty and additional Guardsmen to assist communities all over the country with vaccinations.
But again, I -- I don't have anything to speak to today.
Q: If I can ask just a quick follow up on that -- the omicron variant seems to be spreading pretty quickly. Maybe it's just a burst right now. But within people who are vaccinated, even people who have boosters, is the department considering options in case of workforce shutdowns? Are you planning for the case that maybe there's an omicron outbreak on a carrier, for example, even if you have a fully vaccinated force?
MR. KIRBY: Well, certainly, the services would be the best place to go for those kinds of contingency plans but we are obviously watching this closely and we want to be ready for any eventuality. So we will do what we need to do for the protection of the force and the -- the readiness of the force, as -- as it require -- as it's -- as it's required out there with the -- with what's going on with the pandemic, but I don't have any -- again, I don't have anything specific today to -- to -- to talk to.
We have been -- we've done this before, we have been through this before, and we have had to adjust ship schedules and training exercises and telework and all manner of -- of -- of personnel policies based on surges in the pandemic in the past.
We -- we don't believe that we can take a -- a -- a -- an eye off of that going forward and that it -- it -- you know, depending on where omicron goes, it could have an impact on the force and on the way we train, resource and -- and -- and operate.
I don't, again, have anything to speak to today -- and each of the services will have a heavy voice in this because they know their operational requirements best -- but we're -- we're watching it closely.
I already got you.
Q: Well, just a follow up? So because the boosters do offer some protection against severe disease, I'm wondering if the specter of a rising omicron wave might lend additional urgency to the need for Reserve personnel to get boostered -- get vaccinated, get boostered and all of that?
MR. KIRBY: I -- again, we've talked about this. The Secretary, right now, fully encourages people who are eligible to get the booster shot, absolutely, and there are discussions here at the Pentagon about whether or not it -- it should be made mandatory. I don't have a decision to talk to today but for those who are eligible, we absolutely want to see them get the booster shot. The science proves that the booster shot can -- can absolutely help in preventing the disease, and if not in full out preventing, certainly minimizing the effects of it.
Okay, thanks, everybody.

8. After 10 years, Kim III faces multiple Catch-22s

Don't Catch-22s drive people mad?

After 10 years, Kim III faces multiple Catch-22s
The North Korean leader fails on the secondary issues, but succeeds on the key priorities
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 17, 2021
SEOUL – A decade after the death of his father, Kim II, the crown rests heavy on the head of North Korea’s Kim III.
The country is silent today, as it remembers December 17, 2011, the day Kim Jong Il died from a heart attack. That left his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, holding the helm of one of the world’s most unusual nations: A tightly insulated, post-communist, semi-capitalist, semi-socialist, ultra-militarized de facto monarchy.
The third generation of that monarchy holds power in a state established under Soviet auspices in 1948 with the first member of the ruling dynasty, Kim Il Sung, at its head. Since then, no non-Kim has held power – nor looks likely to.

Despite his youth at accession, the latest Kim, now 37, is firmly entrenched.
Kim Jong Un spent the first seven years of his reign establishing his governance and eliminating domestic rivals, while upgrading the nuclear arms he had inherited from his father, and adding the delivery systems – intercontinental ballistic missiles – that can convey them to the United States.
The price? A massive investment of scarce economic resources and a regimen of international sanctions that gained significant teeth in 2016.
Then, in 2018, Kim reversed course as he stormed, beaming, onto the world stage in a diplomatic charm offensive that saw him summiting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Moon Jae-in before – in a show unprecedented in diplomatic history – he sat down with a sitting US president, Donald Trump.
These diplomatic fireworks sputtered out after Trump exited a 2019 summit with Kim, leaving engagement in tatters. The descent of Covid-19 added ever-greater woes to an already sanction-battered economy as the country retreated into bunker mode, closing its borders to a tighter and longer degree than at any time previous.

This may explain why, as of early this year, Kim was pushing a new ideological/policy line.
After inheriting songeun (military first) from his father, he promoted byungjin (dual track development of the economy and nuclear arms). But early this year, immin jeil jui (putting people first) was gaining increasing traction.
Few observers would agree that Kim is truly prioritizing the welfare of his people – who are among the poorest in the region when it comes to prosperity, rights and freedoms. But when it comes to handling the key problems facing his regime, Kim has chalked up significant wins.
Successes and failures
His nuclear arms program would appear to effectively deter the US from military adventurism, while also granting him relevance on the global stage. Likewise, watertight border controls and internal state security appear to be keeping ideological pollution from South Korea – a society far freer and more prosperous than the North – at manageable levels.
And experts believe the measures his medically challenged state deployed against Covid-19 have likely been highly effective.

But Kim has also suffered policy failures.
Ambitions to raise prosperity have been stymied by both those sanctions and pandemic containment. And as the rest of the world applied sanctions, North Korea’s ever-heavy economic dependence upon China increased.
South Korea, joined at the hip to America, is unable to break sanctions, while caution about Southern influence limits Kim’s acceptance of assistance. And Southern investment – non-existent now, but at its height in the noughties – never expanded beyond sanitized border zones.
These are major Catch-22s which – absent a seismic shift in policy – are likely to plague the remainder of Kim’s reign.
However, that reign will – on previous form – conclude with his peaceful death, with his reform-resistant regime intact.

Kim’s development of both nuclear arms and long-range ballistic missiles provide a powerful deterrent against US military action. Photo: AFP / KCTV
Man of mystery, diplomatic star
“In the beginning, he was an unknown, mysterious young leader,” Moon Chung-in, a noted South Korean academic who has advised three separate South Korean administrations on North Korean policy, told Asia Times.
Indeed, very little was known of Kim Jong Il’s youngest son, though astute Pyongyangologists in Seoul had identified him as successor before his name was mentioned in North Korean state media. It was known that he had been partly educated at a Swiss boarding school and gone on to tertiary studies at the Kim Il Sung Military Academy.
The early appearances of this unknown quantity marked him as very different from his father, who only ever spoke once in public and who operated mostly behind closed doors.
State media showed Kim grinning as he met troops, workers and children during “on the spot guidance” visits nationwide. His hefty weight – which he has shed in recent months – and idiosyncratic wardrobe, many believe, were modeled on his illustrious grandfather, who initiated the Korean War.
Many also believe his trusted younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, was his key image manager.
Accession was no bed of roses.
“For him, the major problem is survival,” Andrei Lankov, a North Korea specialist at Seoul’s Kookmin University, told Asia Times. “When he became leader without a political base of his own, it was expected that he would be pushed aside by the old heavyweights, but he was not purged. He purged.”
In 2013, Kim had his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, executed for reasons which remain shadowy, but are likely tied to the latter’s economic power base and possibly his ties to power players in China.
In 2017, Kim’s older, semi-exiled half-brother Kim Jong Nam was killed by nerve gas in an extraordinary assassination in Kuala Lumpur.
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea’s nuclear and ICMB programs expanded by leaps and bounds. All this impacted Kim’s image.
“In 2017, he was portrayed almost as a madman, which Trump used, calling him ‘rocket man,’” Moon said. “Then in 2018 he abruptly changed, becoming a darling of world mass media.”
An astonished globe watched as a man previously painted as an obese, murderous dictator was seen charming the socks off the South Korean and US presidents. (Perhaps tellingly, his meetings with China’s Xi Jinping looked less chummy.)
“He showed off his talent, maturity and diplomatic savviness,” Moon, possibly the only South Korean who has attended all inter-Korean summits, said. Moon admits he was personally impressed by Kim, who he considers respectful, shewed and pragmatic, with a strong priority on not just signing, but implementing agreements.
While North Korea certainly has a well-earned reputation for defying the international community and for endlessly breaching trust, neither South Korea nor the United States has kept its commitments to North Korea.
Others who have met Kim told Asia Times he was charismatic, charming and well briefed.
Pyongyangologists are broadly divided on the Kim-Trump dalliance.
The antis say the mission was doomed from the start, as North Korea would never, under any circumstances, meet the US demand that it denuclearize. The pros say that Kim put a workable plan on the table in 2019, which could have led to a process of trust-building and a mutual, step-by-step processs, and Trump was mistaken in walking away.
Either way, it looks over. US President Joe Biden has evinced little interest in meeting Kim, nor has he prioritized policy toward North Korea.
This raises the question of whether Kim’s efforts with Trump – widely reported in North Korean state media – led to a loss of face among his people.
“His record in diplomacy is a mixed bag, but I don’t think North Koreans are disappointed with Kim, as he surpassed his father and grandfather by having meetings with a US president,” Go Myong-hyun, a North Korea expert at Seoul’s Asan Institute, told Asia Times. “The overall view of the US in North Korea is one of skepticism.”
Still, the failure of engagement, and the subsequent pandemic, have pushed Kim back into his bunker. “Since 2019 he has become a ‘hermit king’ again,” said Moon. Even so, he is working on his image.
Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un shake hands in the first meeting between a US president and a North Korean leader in Singapore in 2018. The fleeting promise of this unprecedented partnership evaporated in 2019. Photo: AFP / Saul Loeb
Market forces, political ‘normalization’
“At home, he has been trying to project an image as a people-loving leader,” Moon said. “He has moved to people-first policies from military-first policies.”
North Korea does not publish economic data and overseas assessments are problematic. Even so, most believe the economy improved during the early years of Kim’s term.
Survival markets, or jjangmadang, became a feature of North Korea under his father, when they were permitted by the state as a mechanism to counter the famines of the 1990s. Post-famine, these genies could not be put back into the bottle.
They became key loci of economic intercourse as they shifted from food and medicines to all manner of consumer goods, a process that upped cross-border trade with China.
A new class of investors – donju (“money masters”) – appeared.
Under Kim Jong Un, the donju have shifted from markets and trade to public-private partnerships and to light manufacturing of goods for local sale. This is revitalizing chunks of North Korea’s moribund state industrial sector, while providing a new source of consumer goods for a heavily sanctioned economy.
Kim was behind the trend of improving lifestyles. His wife, Ri Sol Ju, is believed to be a donju, and Kim has promoted the building of ski courses, water parks, sauna resorts, new apartments and the like – projects aimed at upgrading the lives of his core elite.
While all these developments have been taking place in open sight, and Pyongyang has clearly permitted them, they fall into a legal gray area, offering the state heavy leverage.
But since the imposition of the 2016 sanctions, foreign investment, barely a trickle to begin with, has almost entirely dried up. With one exception: Chinese penetration of the economy, notably in natural resource extraction, from coal to seafood, has increased.
Meanwhile, in terms of governance style, Kim has shifted authority away from the generals, and back toward the party, holding a much wider number of meetings and plenums than his secretive father ever did. Moon considers this process a “normalization” of government function.
An app store in Pyongyang. Customers pay at the kiosk, download the app via cable, then authenticate it on their smartphones, which are synched with the local Intranet, but not the world wide web. Photo: NK News
Covid successes, ongoing crackdowns
An unexpected force has fortified closure and further restricted freedoms in what was already a closed, oppressive, society: Covid-19.
Though few doubt that North Korea – which has not yet declared a single case of the novel coronavirus – is Covid-free, pandemic control is one area where the tightly controlled North Korean system might be more effective than the free and open South Korean system.
“North Koreans have been arguing that their quarantine is better than South Korean quarantine,” Moon said. “Though North Korea has very poor infrastructure [that limits transport and interaction], which is one of the best preventative measures.”
Lankov told Asia Times last year that while North Korea may lack medicine and medical equipment, it has a very high ratio of doctors to population, and that police states can close any area and contact trace aggressively with no popular pushback.
Even so, containment measures came “at a huge cost to quality of life,” Moon said. “North Korean media admits they are in very extreme difficulties.”
It is not only state media. Specialist South Korean and Japanese media that supply smartphones to North Koreans in border areas report enormous hardships.
Yet a return to the murderous famines of the 1990s looks unlikely, thanks to an across-the-border lifeline of fuel and food.
“China has come in and provided basic survival means,” said Lankov. “It is enough to prevent famine, and without famine the country will remain stable, and stability is what the Chinese want – the last thing they want is a famine and maybe a revolution inside North Korea.”
This increased dependence upon China, “is not good,” in Kim’s eyes, Lankov reckons. “But it is tolerable.”
Meanwhile, at the state level, there have been new policies on the private sector in recent years. Again, Pyongyangologists are divided on Kim’s motives.
Moon is of the opinion that the moves to reign in some donju are designed to remove older, and often corrupt, management, noting that – contrary to TV images of ancient, be-medalled generals – many key players in North Korea are now in their 30s and 40s.
Chad O’Carroll,the publisher of Seoul-based specialist media NKNews, believes Kim is turning the clock back to a more authoritarian era.
The combination of sanctions and Covid containment, as well as crackdowns on some donju, has likely had an impact even on the elite whose favors Kim has wooed with waterparks and seafront apartments. But as Lankov notes, Kim’s elite is tied to his regime.
“The elite can live on soju without Hennessy cognac. What is their choice?” he asked. In the event of any overthrow or rebellion, “the elite will be executed, or imprisoned or end up cleaning toilets They are all cornered.”
The failure of US engagement; ongoing sanctions; and the economic woes created by Covid containment; may be encouraging a creeping process of state re-control.
“Recentralization has been going on since the eighth party congress in January,” O’Carroll told Asia Times. “They are trimming back the power of state-owned enterprises and making them much more responsive to state goals, rather than following their instincts on what business demands.”
A general view of the Pyongyang city skyline on June 15, 2018. Many analysts say few will want to put money into one of the highest-risk business environments in the world. Photo: AFP / Ed Jones
O’Carroll notes that Kim’s early “experimentations” – inviting US basketball star Denis Rodman, having a popular band play the “Rocky” theme – have ceased; international media visits dropped off, and under Covid, have dried up completely. And more sinister machinations may be in play.
“He has gone back to a more classical Korea Workers’ Party ideology, and there has been a huge resurgence in the power and influence of the Ministry of State Security,” he said. “Defections, since Kim Jong Un arrived, have dropped off the face of the earth.”
Goh reckons that next year will see a return to ever-simmering peninsula tensions.
“I think next year, he will upgrade provocations,” he said. “I think they are making preparations to face a very hostile situation next year.”
For a regime that leverages external enemies to justify its rule, tensions are hardly bad news.
Moon, too, is concerned about the situation on the peninsular next March. Then, in the South, a presidential election will be fought out at the same time joint that South Korean-US military drills are expected to take place – drills that infuriate the North, which considers them invasion preparation.
Winning here, losing there
In a world in which many believe – even expect – dictatorial states to tumble, this may all make uncomfortable reading. But the stability of one-party communist states in China and Vietnam, and the ongoing existence of the rather more complex nation that is North Korea give the lie to this simplistic contention.
Kim has clearly been successful at ensuring the survival of his family, his regime and his elite.
America is deterred. South Korea is kept at arms’ length. And his people are insured against famine thanks to China, which supplies bare minimums of fuel and foodstuffs.
Granted, the ongoing sanctions regime means that the lives of the North Korean public look unlikely to improve in terms of their personal prosperity. (Not to mention in terms of their rights and freedoms.) Moreover, Pyongyang has no choice but to rely on Beijing – a humiliating dependency.
But these latter issues are not mission critical for Kim, suggesting he will occupy his familial/national throne for the foreseeable future.
“What he has not succeeded in is the cake, but he has succeeded with the bread and butter,” Lankov said. “I think we are on a long plateau that will last for years – even decades.”
This undated file picture released by the Korean Central News Agency on October 16, 2019, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un riding a white horse through the snow at Mouth Paektu. Photo: AFP / KCNA
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · December 17, 2021

9. Allies Need More Diplomatic Dialogue To Peacefully Denuclearize The Korean Peninsula – Analysis
But if that diplomatic dialogue is only talking amongst themselves we will not get anywhere. Kim Jong-un must want to negotiate. 

Excerpts:
China’s lack of cooperation in denuclearising North Korea will be likely to meet a thickening web of allied security cooperation around the Korean peninsula. Security cooperation, such as maritime surveillance to prevent ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels, serves as a good area whereby to mobilise multilateral efforts. This has already seen individual action taken by Japan, Canada, New Zealand, France and Australia.
Denuclearising North Korea requires more than shoring up deterrence, which might harden its resolve and increase tension on the peninsula. The United States and South Korea need to keep open opportunities to engage North Korea’s ruling elites in the long term. Engagement does not have to involve a bold peace offensive, nor does it necessarily have to be in sync with the progress of denuclearisation negotiations. But it does need to persuade the North’s elites that maintaining a nuclear state will isolate their country and limit its potential for future economic growth.
This engagement should include an opportunity for reciprocation by the North, based on the confidence-building measures agreed upon during the Moon administration, such as dismantlement of guard posts along the Demilitarized Zone or restoration of cross-border hotlines. Establishing a liaison office between the two Koreas and the United States would further institutionalise reciprocity and reduce unnecessary tension.
Peaceful denuclearisation is still plausible, but only in the long term. ‘Peaceful’ indicates the progress of denuclearisation in a strategic environment in which nuclear coercion and militarised crisis escalation become costly for the North. Shaping such a strategic environment is the precondition in conducting nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. Consistently sustaining an opportunity for reciprocation will not only reduce tension but also provide North Korean elites with exposure to the world and narrow the alternatives within which they can reorient national strategy to survive.


Allies Need More Diplomatic Dialogue To Peacefully Denuclearize The Korean Peninsula – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by East Asia Forum · December 18, 2021
By Kuyoun Chung*
Although only a few months remain before the end of Moon Jae-in’s presidential term, Seoul is relentlessly pursuing a declaration of an end to the Korean War between Washington and Pyongyang and attempting to revitalise momentum for a denuclearisation dialogue. But the United States and South Korea seem to perceive the tactical value of this declaration differently and are not on the same page over the scenarios they might confront once they issue the declaration.
As a step towards a peace agreement, the Moon administration intends to build trust between the United States and North Korea with the declaration and restart a denuclearisation negotiation. Critics stress the significance of legal enforcement nested in the declaration. Without legal enforcement that ’ends the Korean War,’ as President Moon has suggested, the declaration will not reduce the threat perception in Pyongyang of US ‘hostile policies’ or catalyse the momentum for a nuclear dialogue.
Legal enforcement, on the other hand, requires discussion of the dissolution of United Nations Command, withdrawal of US forces from the Korean peninsula and revision of the South Korea–US Mutual Assistance Treaty. These are scenarios that allies a not ready to countenance yet.
It is one thing, of course, for South Korea and the United States to agree on issuing the end-of-war declaration. It is another to persuade the North to accept it. North Korea has already declared itself as a nuclear state in its constitution, while China, one of North Korea’s few benefactors, prioritises the stability of the Korean peninsula over the denuclearisation of North Korea. The North tactically aligns with China whenever US–North Korea talks fail and even more in a time of US–China rivalry.
Seoul and Washington must take those attitudes as the premises on which they can devise a more realistic strategy for denuclearising North Korea. Contrary to the Moon administration’s thinking, the end-of-war declaration is unlikely to linearly lead to a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. US President Joe Biden needs to accept that denuclearisation is a long-term goal that requires a focus on strengthening deterrence to adapt the North’s ever-developing nuclear and missile capabilities in the region while reassuring allies about that approach.

Conservatives in South Korea have serious concerns about the North’s potential nuclear coercion and nuclear-backed military adventurism. This has even led the conservative People’s Power Party’s presidential candidate, Yoon Seok-youl, to support redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula to maintain the ‘balance of terror’ vis-à-vis North Korea. This long-term investment to strengthen a deterrence posture on the Korean peninsula is intended to change the strategic calculation of the North and China and be more effective than signing a revocable declaration in forging the structure of collective action in which no one has the incentive to deviate.
Increasing joint military exercises to maintain seamless coordination between allies and improving defence infrastructure with technological innovation would reduce the risk of a North Korean miscalculation based on its nuclear and missile capabilities. Strengthening deterrence on the peninsula will signal to China that the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities will not be tolerated as a fait accompli.
China’s lack of cooperation in denuclearising North Korea will be likely to meet a thickening web of allied security cooperation around the Korean peninsula. Security cooperation, such as maritime surveillance to prevent ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels, serves as a good area whereby to mobilise multilateral efforts. This has already seen individual action taken by Japan, Canada, New Zealand, France and Australia.
Denuclearising North Korea requires more than shoring up deterrence, which might harden its resolve and increase tension on the peninsula. The United States and South Korea need to keep open opportunities to engage North Korea’s ruling elites in the long term. Engagement does not have to involve a bold peace offensive, nor does it necessarily have to be in sync with the progress of denuclearisation negotiations. But it does need to persuade the North’s elites that maintaining a nuclear state will isolate their country and limit its potential for future economic growth.
This engagement should include an opportunity for reciprocation by the North, based on the confidence-building measures agreed upon during the Moon administration, such as dismantlement of guard posts along the Demilitarized Zone or restoration of cross-border hotlines. Establishing a liaison office between the two Koreas and the United States would further institutionalise reciprocity and reduce unnecessary tension.
Peaceful denuclearisation is still plausible, but only in the long term. ‘Peaceful’ indicates the progress of denuclearisation in a strategic environment in which nuclear coercion and militarised crisis escalation become costly for the North. Shaping such a strategic environment is the precondition in conducting nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. Consistently sustaining an opportunity for reciprocation will not only reduce tension but also provide North Korean elites with exposure to the world and narrow the alternatives within which they can reorient national strategy to survive.
*About the author: Kuyoun Chung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Kangwon National University, Gangwon-do.
Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum. A version of this article appear in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘The Korean Way’, Vol 13, No 4.
eurasiareview.com · by East Asia Forum · December 18, 2021

10. New Jersey Monk, a Revered War Hero, Is Candidate for Sainthood

Another amazing story.  
New Jersey Monk, a Revered War Hero, Is Candidate for Sainthood
njmonthly.com · by Kevin Coyne · December 10, 2021
Father Samuel Kim, the prior of St. Paul’s in Newton, visits the grave of Brother Marinus La Rue. Photo by John Emerson
For decades, at a Catholic monastery tucked into the hilly northwest corner of New Jersey, the first monk to arise each day was Brother Marinus La Rue. He walked the dark and silent halls with a handbell, rousing his fellow monks for morning prayer in the chapel, the start of another day whose rhythms and rituals have changed little in the 1,500 years since the founding of the Benedictine order.
“He rang with such vigor that he kept breaking them,” recalls Father Justin Dzikowicz, the former abbot of St. Paul’s Abbey in Newton, who finally ordered a sturdier bell from a company that made them for handbell choirs. “I wanted something professionally made that wouldn’t break.”
As he rang, Brother Marinus also loudly called out a Latin phrase: Benedicamus Domino (“Let us bless the Lord”). Brother Marinus died in 2001 at age 87, but Father Justin can still hear the distinctive voice that awakened him for so many years.
Brother Marinus had other jobs at the monastery, too. He was the night porter, answering the door and the telephone after hours. He ran the gift shop on Route 206 for so many years—tending a coffee bar and selling religious articles, plus fruit and honey from the monks’ 430 acres—that he wore a long path through the grass from his room to the shop.
He also helped prune the Christmas trees the monks have been growing and selling since soon after the monastery opened in 1924. With 90 acres of their land planted in orderly ranks of evergreens, Christmas is an unmistakable presence at the monastery, as it was in the life of Brother Marinus. He was admitted to St. Paul’s as a novice, the first formal step in joining the monastery, on Christmas Eve in 1955, at 41 years old. He took his simple vows—his first vows as a monk—on Christmas Day in 1956. He took his solemn perpetual vows on Christmas in 1959, committing himself to spend the rest of his life in this secluded community of Bendictine priests and brothers devoted to prayer and work.
La Rue is seen aboard the Meredith Victory. Courtesy of Father Sinclair Oubre
But what Brother Marinus rarely told anyone was what he had done at Christmastime in 1950, during some of the darkest days of the Korean War. He was Captain Leonard P. La Rue back then, at the helm of the Meredith Victory, a U.S. Merchant Marine cargo ship that had been shuttling military supplies from Japan to Korea. Somehow, it managed to cram into its holds and onto its decks an estimated 14,000 refugees fleeing the advancing North Korean and Chinese forces and then deliver them safely to South Korea. “The greatest rescue by a single ship in the annals of the sea,” the U.S. Maritime Administration called it. “The miracle of Christmas,” those of a more spiritual bent have said.
Brother Marinus was often called a hero after that, but this year, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops formally approved an effort to determine whether he was something more. A long quest is now underway to decide if he should also be called—literally, canonically, eternally—a saint.
***
Leonard La Rue had sailed some harsh seas after joining the Merchant Marines upon graduating from the Pennsylvania Nautical School in his native Philadelphia in 1934. He had dodged German U-boats in the frigid and perilous North Atlantic during World War II, but he had never seen anything like what he saw when he guided his ship into Hungnam harbor on the eastern coast of North Korea three days before Christmas in 1950.
“It was like a scene of Dante’s Inferno,” he said in 1955 when receiving a medal in Washington. China had entered the war weeks earlier, overwhelming the United Nations forces in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, and the city was frantic with the chaos of retreat. The 190 ships in the harbor were there to evacuate 100,000 troops and war material, but their mission soon expanded. “Refugees thronged the docks,” La Rue once wrote. “With them was everything they could wheel, carry or drag. Beside them, like frightened chicks, were their children.”
North Korean civilians desperate to escape the onslaught of Communist forces flocked to the harbor the way Afghans flocked to the airport at Kabul last summer. There was no way out by land; the sea was their only hope. Five Army colonels came aboard La Rue’s ship and asked if he would take on refugees. The Meredith Victory was a 455-foot-long floating warehouse, built to carry tanks, trucks and barrels of fuel, with enough accommodations only for its crew and a handful of passengers. “No hesitation,” Bob Lunney, the then 22-year-old purser who was standing beside La Rue that day, once recalled of La Rue’s actions.
For more than 12 hours, guided by a crew that spoke no Korean, refugees who spoke no English were loaded onto the ship. “Finally, as the sun rode high the next morning, we had 14,000 human beings jammed aboard,” La Rue wrote later. “It was impossible, and yet they were there. There couldn’t be that much room—yet there was.”
With little food and water and no heat or sanitation, they sailed 450 miles to Pusan in South Korea. They arrived on Christmas Eve, but there was no room for them there. “The nearness of Christmas carried my thoughts to the Holy Family—how they, too, were cold and without shelter,” La Rue wrote that evening.
The ship was detoured to an island 40 miles away, where finally, on December 26, all 14,000 of them, plus the five babies born during the three days at sea, disembarked. No one had died. A total of 91,000 Koreans were evacuated by sea from Hungnam in what was considered, until the recent exodus from Afghanistan, the largest rescue of wartime refugees in U.S. history. The Meredith Victory had been the last to leave and carried the largest load. “I think often of that voyage,” La Rue later wrote. “The clear, unmistakable message comes to me that on that Christmastide, in the bleak and bitter waters off the shores of Korea, God’s own hand was on the helm of my ship.”
La Rue—a slender, quiet, unmarried man who prayed daily and went to Mass, not taverns, when in port; who pointedly did not swear like a sailor; who was described by one crewman as both a “born seaman and a saint”; who had had been impressed by some Benedictines he met and moved by Thomas Merton’s book about becoming a monk, The Seven Storey Mountain—left the sea at the age of 40 and joined the monastery, where he took the name Brother Marinus and stayed for the next 47 years.
***
One of the few times Brother Marinus left St. Paul’s—reluctantly, and only on the orders of the abbot—was to receive the Merchant Marine Meritorious Service Medal, its highest honor. The Meredith Victory was also awarded by Congress the rare designation of Gallant Ship. But for decades, the story of the Christmas rescue was far better known in Korea than in the United States. A memorial was built in Korea, and commemorations were staged; Bob Lunney, who went on to Cornell Law School and was an assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York before entering private practice, went to Korea several times. But not Brother Marinus. “Everybody else knew about it, but he never spoke about it,” Father Justin says.
A 2000 book, Bill Gilbert’s Ship of Miracles, told the story at length for the first time and eventually caught the attention of a priest in Texas, Father Sinclair Oubre, who has the sea in his blood. (A more recent book, Philip Lacovara’s The Mariner and the Monk, tells the story in more detail.) “I’m reading it, and I’m going, Why don’t I know this?” says Father Sinclair, who worked as a merchant seaman during summers while in seminary and on vacations as a priest, and who serves in his diocese as director of Stella Maris, the Catholic ministry to mariners. (“If it’s wet, I deal with it,” he says.)
“Here’s a guy who rescued 14,000 people who would have died if they weren’t taken from there, and then he turns around and chooses to be literally the servant of his brother monks so that he can live in a house of prayer for the rest of his life,” Father Sinclair says. “If this was on a ship, he went from the master of the ship to being the steward’s assistant.”
Some monks are ordained as priests after completing several years of theological studies; Brother Marinus chose to remain a brother monk, without the sacramental powers a monk who is an ordained priest would have.
In 2017, Father Sinclair wrote to Bishop Arthur Serratelli of the Diocese of Paterson, which includes St. Paul’s, suggesting Brother Marinus as a candidate for sainthood. In 2019, Bishop Serratelli formally opened the cause and appointed Father Pawel Tomczyk as the postulator to oversee it, the first step in a long and complex process that could take decades.
Last June, the rest of the nation’s bishops endorsed the cause. “In these days, when a lot of people are fighting for position and power and authority, here we have a man of simplicity who, when God called him to do this heroic thing, he did, and then when God called him to this humble service as a monk, he accepted that, too,” Father Pawel says. “That’s what inspires me the most.”
There are only a handful of American-born saints in the Catholic church, and no New Jerseyans. One other New Jerseyean—Blessed Miriam Teresa Demjanovich, a Bayonne-born Sister of Charity who was beatified in 2014—is one step closer to sainthood than Brother Marinus. If the Vatican attributes one more miracle to her, she will be canonized as a saint.
While Lunney, who often attended Mass with Captain La Rue and later visited Brother Marinus at St. Paul’s, thinks the honor is deserved, he knows his friend would have said, “‘Maybe we were trying to do some good things, but we were not saints.’ …He certainly wasn’t looking for sainthood.”
When Brother Marinus came to St. Paul’s, it was bursting out of its granite home, filled with so many monks that it built a new complex across the road. By the time he was too infirm to ring the morning bell, there were so few monks that it was about to close. But a few days before his death, a Benedictine abbey in South Korea agreed to take it over. Two months after he died, the first six monks arrived to save it. “I do not think it is a coincidence that Captain La Rue saved 14,000 Korean refugees and, decades later, Brother Marinus’s abbey is saved from closing by the arrival of Korean monks,” Bishop Serratelli wrote when supporting the cause for sainthood.
The prior of St. Paul’s now is Father Samuel Kim, whose father was among those rescued from Hungnam. “He died when I was 15, and he never told me what ship he was on,” he says. “Maybe it was Brother Marinus’s ship, I don’t know.”
***
Ten monks live at St. Paul’s now, most of them from Korea; the only one who knew Brother Marinus is Father Justin, who joined in 1966. Before Covid-19, the monastery hosted retreats that were popular with Korean Catholics from Queens and Bergen County, and plans to do so again.
In 2018, the Korean ambassador to the United States came to St. Paul’s to plant a hawthorn tree and dedicate a small monument to Brother Marinus beside the chapel on behalf of South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-In, whose parents were on the Meredith Victory. Brother Marinus’s old friend Bob Lunney was there, too. Then Father Samuel led them back to the small cemetery where Brother Marinus is buried, his marker flanked by American and Korean flags. The cemetery was once overgrown with scraggly blue spruce and old yew hedges, but Father Samuel, who has been at St. Paul’s since 2003, cleared it out.
“This area was so dark and wet, people didn’t want to come here,” he says. “It was kind of scary. I wanted to open it up and make it lighter, so people will come.”
Kevin Coyne, a longtime contributor to New Jersey Monthly, teaches at Columbia Journalism School.
njmonthly.com · by Kevin Coyne · December 10, 2021






V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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