Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind.”

– Rudyard Kipling

“The fact is, that the public have an insatiable desire to know everything, except what is worth knowing.”

– Oscar Wilde

“What the herd hates most is the one who thinks differently; it's not so much the opinion itself, but the audacity of wanting to think for themselves, something that they do not know how to do.”

– Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

1. Night of chaos: Inside Yoon’s Cabinet in hours before declaration

2. Indoctrinated, loyal and well trained: Don’t underestimate North Korean soldiers in Russia, experts say

3. Trump mentions Kim Jong Un while skipping over S. Korea

4. How China-North Korea relations frayed in 2024, and what it means for Trump's Korea policy

5. Ukraine's Security Service intercepts conversation between Russians confirming heavy North Korean losses in Kursk Oblast

6. South Korea Is in Constitutional Chaos

7. The South Korea Constitutional Crisis of 2024 Is a Myth

8. Map shows unusual US spy flights near allies

9. Yoon’s impeachment throws future of North Korean human rights policy into doubt

10. DRL Increasing Access to Information in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)

11. Ox carts and smartphones: New video offers rare look at North Korean countryside

12. Yoon’s Political Implosion: Making Pyongyang’s Day

13. The Strange Success of North Korea

14. Acting President Han to hold extraordinary Cabinet meeting on Thursday

15. Constitutional Court orders Yoon to submit martial law decree, Cabinet meeting minutes

16. Sullivan says democratic institutions in S. Korea are 'holding' despite martial law attempt

17. Former, incumbent military intelligence officers planned martial law operations over burgers: police

1. Night of chaos: Inside Yoon’s Cabinet in hours before declaration

A relatively long read from the Korea Herald that is well worth the time to read by all those with an interest in Korea.

A very insightful and detailed look at what happened on the night of december 3d. It appears most of the cabinet members were blindsided. I still cannot figure out who was advising him to take this action. One taxi driver was convinced it was his wife's doing (and no one I talked to likes his wife).

Here is my assessment from traveling around Seoul today:

Today I traveled around Seoul to get a sense of how the city is reacting to the political turmoil. The bottom line is that life goes on. Seoul seemed completely normal and it appeared to be business as usual. I traveled from the downtown area City and the old Blue House. A taxi driver told me that over the past couple of Saturdays the road from Namdaemun gate to Kyungbuk Palace was completely filled with people with the police blocking cars from entering the area but otherwise the police just allowed the protestors to march and chant and there has been no violence. One person on the street told me it was like a festival in the streets and there was no fighting among the people or with the police. I traveled to Youido and drove around the National Assembly building area as close as I could get. It was pretty empty. The streets were lined with Korean flags hanging from the lampposts just like it was 8.15 Liberation Day. There were police barricades but I only found a lone woman standing near the main entrance with her sign. That was the only protestor I found. Again I was told that protests only take place on Saturdays (unlike 1987 the students remain in classes and only attend the protests on Saturday. The Yongsan Presidential Office area was quite different. There were also no protestors but the taxi driver was shocked because on both sides of Itaewon-Ro were flower displays in support of president Yoon all with the words "FIghting" admonishing president Yoon to fight impeachment. The flower displays were along the entire route and circled around the west side of the US Army Garrison Yongsan and then again on the south side of the garrison at the old Ichon Gate which is now an entrance to the Yongsan Presidential Office area. One of the most interesting points I heard from different people is that no one wants Yoon to remain as president. But at the same time no one I talked to from regular people on the street and taxi drivers to the national security professionals I met wanted Lee Jae Myung as president either. Everyone wants someone else to be president, someone new with all the political baggage but no one could say how that person is. Again, my overall assessment is that life is calm, people are going on about their lives, there is no panic, and they are waiting for the political process to play out which could take months.

Here is some additional information and insights from the author, Dagyum Kate Ji, below that she posted on her Facebook page.

What did the members of the state who were in the presidential office do on December 3? I think many foreign readers will have this curious thing, so I reconstructed that night with a public comment.

(In fact, I was very tired because I had to keep writing political and diplomatic analysis articles after my family, and writing this article in English was a lot of trouble. Because I was worried that I couldn't properly convey the feelings of 'Korean' in English. )

This article also contains the meaning of the tribute to Minister Tae-yeol Cho. It's not desirable to fall into the entry point, but the comments made publicly by Minister Joe after the dynasty were deeply reflected in his philosophy and ideology.

I can't personally say that I know Minister Jo well because I've only had two meals together since he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, his image, felt at press conferences or official debates, is remembered as a principledist who does not compromise with a firm philosophy. He never retreated, especially on the red line he set.

In the middle of it, I see that there is a deep belief that any act that goes against the honor of a former friend is unacceptable.

The main thing I want to emphasize in this article is that not only the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Finance voiced their strong opposition to the declaration of the patriotism within a short time, but also the high tension and frustration they felt at a crucial moment in deciding the fate of the country, and that the decision ultimately led to the decision to end their official life, they also wanted to convey an important message to foreign readers through the story of an individual.

When I looked up, Minister Jo's entry into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in 1979.

And if any foreign authorities are reading this article, I understand that the two heads responsible for diplomacy and economy have at least made a strong voice at the moment when the country was in trouble, and I also have a little hope that the positive assessment of the two figures will continue during the existence of this government.

The boss read this article and said, "It's like a movie," but I think the actual scene must have been more tense than that.

Expressing my gratitude to all those who put national interests ahead of personal interests, and I finish writing with the hope that the determination of the moment will shine.

Night of chaos: Inside Yoon’s Cabinet in hours before declaration

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · December 18, 2024

Cabinet members bow their headsin apology at a plenary legislativesession addressing PresidentYoon Suk Yeol’s imposition ofmartial law at the NationalAssembly on Dec. 11. (Yonhap)

Public accounts from Cabinet members at the National Assembly have exposed a troubling picture of President Yoon Suk Yeol's Dec. 3 martial law declaration: One of a clandestine and illegitimate decision that bypassed nearly the entire Cabinet, silenced its opposition, and violated due process.

The hours before Yoon's late-night announcement were chaotic, with most Cabinet members kept in the dark. Below is a look at the time leading up to and after the declaration, based on their accounts.

A brief, five-minute Cabinet meeting took place between 10:17 p.m. and 10:22 p.m. in the presidential reception room, apparently without due process or any official record, according to data from the Ministry of Interior and Safety submitted by the presidential office.

Yoon, who came into the meeting but did not even sit down, abruptly left the meeting. At 10:23 p.m., he began reading his statement -- without the presence of Cabinet members or reporters. The live televised address culminated in the declaration of martial law at around 10:28 p.m.

Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Song Mi-Kyung vividly recounted that some of those present at the five-minute Cabinet meeting on Dec. 3 were completely blindsided, leaving them powerless to intervene or stop him from making it public.

"(The president) briefly entered the room and then left. After he left, those who were seated were taken aback and asked, 'Where did he go?' At that moment, someone played a broadcast on their phone, and his voice came through. That's what happened," Song said during the Dec. 11 plenary session of the Assembly, recalling that the Cabinet meeting never formally concluded -- there was no declaration signaling its end.

"It wasn't even possible to grab hold of him or physically intervene in any way. I am truly sorry for this."

Describing Yoon's martial law declaration as a "completely unimaginable event," Song added, "I never agreed to it. There may have been incompetence in failing to stop it, and helplessness in the face of it, but I was never complicit."

After witnessing armed soldiers storming the National Assembly on television, smashing windows as they forced their way in, all Cabinet ministers submitted their collective resignations to Prime Minister Han Duck-soo on Dec. 4.

"I was personally stunned by the announcement as well. The last time martial law was imposed in Korea was 1979, when I joined the Foreign Ministry," Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said during a press briefing for foreign media in Seoul on Wednesday.

"Never did I imagine that it would be declared again 45 years later, in the Korea of 2024."

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks at a rare joint news conference with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok, addressing foreign media in Seoul on Wednesday. (Joint Press Corps via Yonhap)

Cabinet meeting to buy time

Of the 10 attending Cabinet members besides Yoon, most learned of the plan only upon arriving at the presidential office -- many after 8:30 p.m. and some just before the announcement.

Prime Minister Han stated that he, too, first learned of the situation at around 8:40 p.m. on Dec. 3, upon reaching the presidential office.

Han has repeatedly explained that the reason he convened the Cabinet meeting was not to address procedural flaws in the martial law declaration but to unite Cabinet members to block Yoon from declaring martial law.

"I used the Cabinet meeting to buy as much time as possible to stop the martial law declaration," Han said during the Assembly's Dec. 13 plenary session.

"There was no systematic or procedural framework for convening the Cabinet meeting," Han said. "I believe the Cabinet meeting itself had significant procedural and substantive flaws."

Based on accounts from ministers, it appears that Han and only five others were initially called to Yoon's office: Foreign Minister Cho, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho, Justice Minister Park Sung-jae along with now former Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min, and now former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun.

National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong was also present from an early stage, despite not being a Cabinet member.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok said on Dec. 13 that he arrived at the presidential office at 9:55 p.m. on that day, saying, "I didn’t know why I was summoned, so I went in casual clothes."

Song, who was at the same event as Lee Sang-min until around 5 p.m. that day, along with Minister of Health and Welfare Cho Kyoo-hong and Minister of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Startups Oh Young-ju, were later called individually to the Cabinet meeting.

Others, including Education Minister Lee Ju-ho, who also serves as deputy prime minister for social affairs, were left entirely out of the loop on the Cabinet meeting.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok During speaks during an emergency session of the National Assembly’s Strategy and Finance Committee on Tuesday. (Yonhap)

Among those present in the first batch, Han, Foreign Minister Cho, and Kim Yung-ho have said they expressed their opposition to Yoon's plans, although the intensity of their opposition seemed to vary from person to person.

However, Lee has suggested that he did not oppose the martial law declaration, saying "As for whether I agreed or disagreed, it would not be appropriate for me to say" during the Dec. 5 session of the Assembly’s Public Administration and Safety Committee.

Justice Minister Park Sung-jae, now suspended after the Dec. 12 impeachment vote, answered, "I said a lot of things" when asked if he was in favor of or opposed Yoon’s marital law decision at the session of the Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee on Dec. 9.

During a Dec. 11 Assembly session, when asked which Cabinet members had explicitly opposed martial law in front of President Yoon on Dec. 3, only two raised their hands -- just Foreign Minister Cho and Deputy Prime Minister Choi.

A passerby watches a live broadcast of President Yoon Suk Yeol declaring emergency martial law on Dec. 3 at Seoul Station. (Yonhap)

Yoon said couldn't reverse

Foreign Minister Cho testified that he arrived at the presidential office around 8:50 p.m. and was ushered into Yoon's workspace at around 9 p.m. and saw four or five Cabinet members already gathered.

"As soon as I sat down, the president told me he intended to declare martial law and handed me a single sheet of paper. On it were brief instructions outlining the actions the foreign minister was expected to take," Cho said during the Dec. 13 session,

"I was so shocked that I can now only remember the term 'overseas foreign missions.' ... It wasn't very detailed -- just a few lines of text -- so I can't recall much. I didn't even take it with me."

Cho stated that after he arrived, he led the conversation with Yoon, repeatedly expressing his concerns and strong opposition.

"I repeatedly urged (the president) in earnest, in the presence of my fellow Cabinet members, that this was not only a diplomatic issue but a matter so serious it could destroy all the achievements South Korea has built over the past 70 years in an instant, and I asked for reconsideration," Cho continued to say. "But (Yoon) firmly refused to back down from his insistence that this was a decision based on his own judgment."

Cho said he followed Yoon as he made his way to deliver the public announcement, saying, "I got up from my seat and pleaded, saying 'I sincerely ask you to reconsider.'"

"However, (Yoon) said it was an urgent situation where everything had already been concluded, so it was no longer possible to reverse it, and then proceeded to make the announcement."

Cho explained he had immediately decided to tender his resignation after failing to stop Yoon and this is why he was unable to answer calls from US Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg that night.

"From the moment martial law was declared until it was lifted, I spent several hours grappling with a deep inner conflict between my personal belief in resigning as Foreign Minister and my sense of duty to fulfill the responsibilities of the position."

Soldiers try to enter the National Assembly building in Seoul on Dec. 4 after South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law. South Korea's President Yoon Suk Yeol on Dec. 3 declared martial law, accusing the opposition of being "anti-state forces" and saying he was acting to protect the country from "threats" posed by the North. (FP)

Top economic official blindsided

Deputy Prime Minister Choi said he had less than 30 minutes' notice before Yoon's televised announcement.

Speaking at the Dec. 11 Assembly session, Choi said, "At the time, I joined very late and was unaware of the content, so I didn’t even know it was a meeting. However, after listening to what was said, I was very shocked. It was an unexpected situation."

"I thought it was a highly misguided decision. As the minister overseeing the economy, I anticipated it would have a significant and negative impact on our international credibility and our economy, so I clearly expressed strong opposition."

Choi also confessed, "As I was leaving, I made the decision to submit my resignation, but here I am now" during the Dec. 13 Assembly session.

Choi disclosed that Yoon's aide handed him a paper after Yoon's martial law announcement. However, Choi did not check the paper because he rushed into holding a meeting to take measures to stabilize the market but later realized that the paper outlined the actions the economic and finance minister was required to take in the aftermath of the martial law declaration.

"As far as I remember, the only sentence I recall is, 'In an emergency martial law situation, make sure to secure financial resources, such as liquidity.'"

During Tuesday’s session of the Assembly’s Strategy and Finance Committee, Deputy Minister of Strategy and Finance Yoon In-dae said on the note Choi received, "I don’t remember exactly, but I recall it mentioning 'contingency funds related to martial law' and 'securing related financial resources.'"

Choi revealed that he disregarded the note because, by the time he left Yoon's office, he had already resolved to resign, saying "I had no interest in the materials I was handed at the time and no intention of even looking at them."

"It felt like measures based on the premise of martial law, so I dismissed it, thinking, 'Let’s ignore this,' and set it aside," Choi added.

The Constitutional Court in central Seoul on Tuesday.The court will decide whether to remove President Yoon Suk Yeol. from office or reinstate him. (Yonhap)

Legitimacy of decree

Against that backdrop, it is unsurprising that most Cabinet members were neither briefed on the contents of Martial Law Decree No. 1, which took effect as of 11 p.m., nor involved in its approval through signature -- an essential step required before the decree’s enactment.

On Dec. 9, the justice minister revealed that he had not signed the martial law decree. Similarly, the health minister stated on Dec. 11 that he was unaware that the decree included punitive measures against trainee doctors and other medical professionals who failed to return to work within 48 hours.

Han expressed their belief that an investigation in the future would uncover the reasons why and how martial law was declared despite Cabinet members voicing their opposition to it.

"However, in the end, we failed to stop it, and I feel a deep sense of guilt and profound regret," Han said on Dec. 11. "I am truly suffering a great deal."

Foreign Minister Cho, however, dismissed criticism over the fact that not a single Cabinet member stormed out of the meeting.

"I hold that those who fell short in fulfilling their responsibilities forfeit the right to speak," Cho said on Dec. 13. "At the time, storming out was the easiest choice. However, I want to make it clear that I believed it to be the most cowardly choice, which is why I stayed until the end in an effort to dissuade them."

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · December 18, 2024

2. Indoctrinated, loyal and well trained: Don’t underestimate North Korean soldiers in Russia, experts say

Yes, but... not a single one is 10 feet tall. Though my north Korean friends who have served in the north Korean People's Army will caution not to overestimate them as well.

The real story I would be writing is that we have seen no credible reporting as to how well (or not) they are fighting and even if they are contacting any significant fighting at all.

I am going to reserve judgment until we can really get credible reporting about their employment and the effects that they can achieve.

Excerpts:

In Russia, their training has included artillery, operating unmanned aerial vehicles and basic infantry operations including trench-clearing, “which are critical skills for frontline operations,” according to the US State Department.

And intelligence assessments suggest the North Koreans are embedding within the Russian military.

Moscow’s success in utilizing the troops “will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military,” the State Department said.

Whether they’ll be digging trenches, guarding posts or actually fighting on the front lines remains unclear.

“When we catch them or see a body, then I’ll know for sure that they’re here,” Oleksandr, a unit commander with Ukraine’s 225th assault battalion, told CNN in early December.

LTG Chun is describing what happened in 1996 with the Sango submarine information. Some were "voluntarily executed" while others committed suicde (one leader killed himself after executing about 10 troops). We think only 1 or 2 may have been able to cross back to the north.

Excerpts:

Some commando units are even trained to take their own lives rather than be captured, he said.

Chun said most North Korean soldiers he encountered during his service would make that fatal choice.

“This is because if you kill yourself, your families are taken care of back in North Korea,” he said. “You would be considered a hero for the rest of eternity.”

Indoctrinated, loyal and well trained: Don’t underestimate North Korean soldiers in Russia, experts say | CNN

CNN · by Helen Regan, Yoonjung Seo, Mike Valerio · December 18, 2024

Footage circulated online on Oct 18, 2024 shows North Korean troops training in Russia. CNN has geolocated the video to a training range in Sergeyevka, Primorsky Krai, Russia.

EyePress News/Reuters

Seoul, South Korea/Hong Kong CNN —

Far from their homes in one of the world’s most isolated and secretive states, about 11,000 North Korean soldiers find themselves at the center of Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II.

Little is known about the North Korean troops deployed to support Russia in its devastating yearslong war in Ukraine – or what exactly they will be ordered to do – and their presence hasn’t even been officially acknowledged by Moscow or Pyongyang.

US, Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence says the North Koreans have already engaged in combat operations, joining a Russian force of tens of thousands to carry out an assault on Ukrainian positions in Russia’s western Kursk region. Speculation has been rife about how these troops will fare.

North Korea has seen “several hundred” casualties — both killed and wounded — in the Kursk region since sending thousands of forces to Russia in October, a senior US official said Tuesday.

According to Ukraine, at least 30 North Korean soldiers were killed or wounded in fighting over the weekend alone near villages in Kursk close to the Ukrainian border. One Ukrainian unit reported that North Koreans – wearing different uniforms from the Russians – had launched infantry attacks using the “same tactics as 70 years ago,” in an apparent reference to the Korean War, where waves of infantry were used.

Pyongyang’s soldiers lack real-world battle experience and will face unfamiliar terrain in a brutal, modern war theater – one that has wrought chaos and horror for both sides as the dead pile up across the front lines.

“If I was going to describe their capability more broadly and not think about the kit that they had, I would tell you that these are not battle-hardened troops, they haven’t been in combat before,” the US official said, adding their assessment was that casualties included “all ranks” including leaders at command-and-control nodes,.

But some analysts have warned against underestimating the North Koreans.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will be sending “the best” from an elite force of highly trained and “indoctrinated” soldiers known as the Storm Corps, according to retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, a veteran of the South Korean army.

Some are special forces, like the US Navy Seals or Rangers, or Britain’s SAS. Others are light infantry and snipers, he said.

The Storm Corps – the 11th Army Corps of the North Korean military – are “better trained, (have) better physique and (are) better motivated than your average North Korean soldier,” Chun said.

North Korean propaganda material released by state media this year has shown Kim overseeing special operations training marked by extreme displays of strength, including the smashing of cinder blocks over the ripped torsos of soldiers stripped to the waist.

Michael Madden, a non-resident fellow in the 38 North program at the Stimson Center in Washington, said this largest deployment of North Korean soldiers since the Vietnam War is equipped with “certain psychological tricks” to persevere.

“These guys are programmed. These guys are indoctrinated,” he said. “But the question is, how well indoctrinated? How well programmed are they?”

“They are probably better positioned than other members of the military, or other members of militaries going into a foreign conflict, in terms of the preparation of their minds.”

Soldiers participate in a demonstration during the training of the Korean People's Army's air and amphibious combat units, in this picture released on March 16, 2024, by the Korean Central News Agency.

KCNA/Reuters/File

‘Fair game’

Mental strength, however, may not be enough to overcome the worst challenges the North Korean soldiers could face.

Drone warfare has transformed the battlefield in Ukraine, bringing new levels of surveillance and destruction to military targets but also civilians and civic infrastructure.

Russia’s “meat-grinder” tactics, particularly in the fighting for eastern Ukraine, have essentially offered Russian recruits to the slaughter.

There is also the very real possibility of US-made weapons killing North Koreans. The White House has said the troops are “fair game” and “fair targets.”

South Korean lawmakers say Russia is teaching the soldiers about 100 basic military terms like “fire” and “in position,” as reports of command and communication issues arise.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un interacts with a soldier during the training of the Korean People's Army's air and amphibious combat units in this picture released on March 16, 2024, by the Korean Central News Agency.

KCNA/Reuters/File

In Russia, their training has included artillery, operating unmanned aerial vehicles and basic infantry operations including trench-clearing, “which are critical skills for frontline operations,” according to the US State Department.

And intelligence assessments suggest the North Koreans are embedding within the Russian military.

Moscow’s success in utilizing the troops “will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military,” the State Department said.

Whether they’ll be digging trenches, guarding posts or actually fighting on the front lines remains unclear.

“When we catch them or see a body, then I’ll know for sure that they’re here,” Oleksandr, a unit commander with Ukraine’s 225th assault battalion, told CNN in early December.

Malnutrition and worms

North Korea is one of the world’s most heavily militarized nations, with an estimated 1.2 million armed forces personnel, according to the CIA World Factbook, and all citizens must complete mandatory military service from age 17.

That stint typically lasts 10 years for men, though recent assessments suggest North Korea has cut the time by half.

While North Korean special forces would likely be prioritized for better food and clothes, according to Chun, regular conscripts have struggled in the past.

Kim Seong-han, a defector who lives in the South, remembers his 12 years in the North Korean army as a time of little food, poor treatment and grueling winter marches with no sleep.

A North Korean defector darts across the DMZ dividing the two Koreas in this screenshot of handout video provided by the United Nations Command.

United Nations Command

In 1989, he joined the military as a soldier in Kaesong, a city near the South Korean border, and served during the catastrophic North Korean famine of the 1990s that killed as many as 1 million people.

“Before 1991, we could still eat meat, but from that year, meat started running out,” said Kim, who requested to use a pseudonym for security reasons. “The rice ration which used to be 800 grams (1.8 pounds) per meal, was reduced to 800 grams per day, and eventually, we were only given corn meal without rice.”

Malnutrition was rife among his comrades, he added.

While training, Kim Seong-han said there were regular accidents “like misfires, soldiers accidentally detonating grenades, and other weapon mishaps.”

“An example of our training would be a winter march – marching 150 kilometers (93 miles) over three days without sleep,” he said.

One bright spot was the decent heating and 24-hour electricity at the barracks, unlike in the homes of many North Koreans, he added.

Kim Seong-han escaped to South Korea in 2017. Though his North Korean military experience ended more than two decades ago, it offers an insight into a world seldom understood by outsiders.

More recent accounts of life as a North Korean soldier also paint a bleak picture.

One soldier, who was shot multiple times as he defected to the South in 2017 by running through the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone, was found with parasitic worms and a chronic liver infection.

Some of the parasites removed were as long as 27 centimeters (more than 10 inches), according to the South Korean doctors who treated him. One type of worm they found typically afflicts dogs.

“Everyone was hungry, even the soldiers,” said another North Korean defector and former army officer, Kang Ri Hyuk, at the time. “There are many soldiers who also die from disease because they’re not given medical treatment.”

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North Korean soldiers filmed training at Russian base

03:17 - Source: CNN

There have also been reports of North Korean soldiers stealing food from rural villages and farms.

North Korea has a long history of serious food shortages and famines. The United Nations’ World Food Programme says more than 40% of the population are undernourished.

But some North Korean military units are well supplied, and “have regular food and logistical supply,” said 38 North’s Madden.

“They have enough to eat. Or, more to eat than the average North Korean citizen,” he said.

“They are well-appointed in terms of clothing. There is heating in the barracks. There is free time or recreational activities, and the military unit itself is well supplied in terms of construction materials, farming materials.”

Loyalty above everything

In North Korean society, a member of the 11th Army Corps would likely hold a relatively privileged position.

The division is held in high esteem, ranking not far below the units that provide North Korean leader Kim’s close security escort – and loyalty to the regime is key to admission.

“They look into your family background to the second degree, which is to say second cousins, and they know who your parents are, they know where you live,” Madden said.

“If you’re doing well in a specific training or training exercise, you might get recruited or reassigned to the 11th Army Corps, but it mainly consists of soldiers that have the physical acuity and the physical abilities, as well as having a certain background.”

Special forces are trained to conduct missions deep inside enemy territory, gather intelligence and launch direct attacks.

“These North Korean units, their main mission is to disrupt,” said Chun, the former South Korean army officer.

Part of the 11th Army Corps is a 10,000-strong commando division that is trained to parachute into or penetrate enemy territory and carry out assassinations, infrastructure damage and sabotage, according to Madden.

A North Korean soldier rests near a guard post along fences on the North Korea border with Russia and China seen from China's Yiyanwang Three Kingdoms viewing platform in Fangchuan in northeastern China's Jilin province on September 12, 2023.

Ng Han Guan/AP/File

Some commando units are even trained to take their own lives rather than be captured, he said.

Chun said most North Korean soldiers he encountered during his service would make that fatal choice.

“This is because if you kill yourself, your families are taken care of back in North Korea,” he said. “You would be considered a hero for the rest of eternity.”

In recent years, Kim has tried to make North Korea’s massive army more efficient.

“He is hand picking his soldiers, he is rotating them through specific weaponry … So, he’s trying to maintain as much proficiency as he can,” Chun said.

“He’s not able to have a kind of military that functions 100%, but he’s got a dedicated military and even with 200,000 men, that’s a sizable number (larger) than most European countries.”

It’s unclear whether the North Korean soldiers sent to Russia had a choice in their deployment, or if they or their families were offered incentives.

But the prospect of cash and the chance to go abroad may be attractive to many.

Russia is “likely paying for all the deployment costs associated with the North Koreans as well as a stipend for the troops themselves,” according to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

South Korean intelligence suggests North Korean soldiers in Russia could be receiving salaries of $2,000 a month.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a key military factory in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on August 14, 2023. KCNA via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. REUTERS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THIS IMAGE. NO THIRD PARTY SALES. SOUTH KOREA OUT. NO COMMERCIAL OR EDITORIAL SALES IN SOUTH KOREA. FACES BLURRED AT SOURCE.

KCNA/Reuters

“The (average) North Korean soldier, he gets $1 a month,” Chun said. “He’s not going to get all of (the Russian money). Kim Jong Un is going to take at least 90%, but (the soldier is) still going to get $300. That’s a lot of money for a North Korean.”

In October, Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” project, which aims to incentivize and help Russian soldiers to defect, posted a Korean-language video promising “three hot meals a day,” medical care and good treatment for North Korean forces who surrender.

But analysts said mass defections were unlikely.

“One thing to know about North Koreans in foreign countries is they’re always paired off. Like, school kids have the buddy system … So a North Korean soldier that’s trying to attempt to defect to Ukraine is going to get shot in the head by his comrade or the other way around,” Madden said.

Chun cautioned that “you never know how soldiers will behave under fire.” And how well they perform will have ramifications far beyond Russia’s war.

“If the North Koreans fail in their missions, if they are a bunch of inexperienced soldiers, that has far more implications to the security of the Korean Peninsula,” he said.

“But if they’re good, if they learn, and they’re already going to learn even through failure, it’s still going to be bad news for us on the Korean Peninsula, and even to the world.”

CNN’s Victoria Butenko and Haley Britzky contributed reporting.

CNN · by Helen Regan, Yoonjung Seo, Mike Valerio · December 18, 2024

3. Trump mentions Kim Jong Un while skipping over S. Korea

I received a question on this yesterday. The concern among Koreans in the South is does this indicate that the US will execute a north Korean policy without consultation and are going to see what many Koreans fear, "Korea passing?"

I said that Koreans should not read too much into this. When talking about many different issues the President -elect cannot cover every aspect of issues and cannot ensure he mentions every country just to ensure they are mentioned just to keep them happy. He does not work by those diplomatic sensitivities.. He likely was focused on describing what he thought was important: north Korea, and was not considering the diplomatic sensitivities of Koreans in the South. He may not have wanted to mention it because of the current political turmoil and he likely does not want to discuss that while it is ongoing. And he likely also assumed everyone knows that there will be consultations among alliance partners unless there is a huge divergence in policy preferences between the ROK and US. But until the political turmoil in South Korea is resolved and new leadership determines a new ROK policy toward the north.

Trump mentions Kim Jong Un while skipping over S. Korea

donga.com

Posted December. 18, 2024 07:43,

Updated December. 18, 2024 07:43

Trump mentions Kim Jong Un while skipping over S. Korea. December. 18, 2024 07:43. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.

President-elect Donald Trump said on December 16 that he "got along well" with Kim Jong-un while referring to the North Korean leader. This follows his earlier remark in an interview with Time magazine, where Trump claimed to be "the only one to have properly dealt with Kim." Trump mentioned Kim again during his first press conference since the November 5 election. However, there was no mention of South Korea throughout the entire event. Concerns are growing that as the Trump administration's second term begins next month, the U.S. may bypass South Korea, which is currently facing a leadership vacuum due to the president’s impeachment crisis, and instead engage directly with North Korea on nuclear negotiations.

During the press conference at his Mar-a-Lago Resort in Palm Beach, Florida, Trump expressed his intent to quickly meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to facilitate a swift end to the war. He also hinted at a possible meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba before his January 20 inauguration. Trump referenced Chinese President Xi Jinping as well, noting they "got along well" until the COVID-19 outbreak.

Notably, Trump held a joint press conference with SoftBank CEO Masayoshi Son, a Japan-based businessman of Korean descent, emphasizing that SoftBank would invest 100 billion U.S. dollars (approximately 140 trillion KRW) in the United States over the next four years and create at least 100,000 jobs.

한국어

donga.com

Unfortunately, while this is a good application of traditional international relations theory thinking, I do not think Xi or Kim will be moved by such policies. I do strongly agree with the importance of trilateral cooperation (ROK, Japan, US) is critical to mutual security.

Unfortunately, China has failed for decades to influence the Kims to make Chinese style economic reforms. It simply cannot do so and maintain regime legitimacy.

Second, it seems the objective of this policy is coexistence with a denuclearized north that remains under the CHinese sphere of influence. Do we really want to advocate a policy that leaves 25 million Koreans enslaved in the north (while "co-existing" with the South)? Kim must deny human rights of the Korean people in the north to remain in power.

Lastly, the only way to end the nuclear threat and the human rights abuses is through achievement of a free and unified Korea. That must be the policy objective and strategic end state.

Excerpts:

While a second Trump term is likely to exacerbate U.S.-China economic tensions, it could also present a unique opportunity to secure Beijing's cooperation on the North Korea issue. The current dynamics offer favorable conditions for advancing U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the Trump administration should adopt a dual strategy.

First, it should work with China to strengthen and enforce sanctions on North Korea while making relief contingent on Kim's adoption of Deng Xiaoping-style economic reforms, allowing Beijing to take the lead in advocating for these changes.

Second, it must maintain U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral security cooperation and continue to pressure North Korea on its human rights record. North Korea has always sought to leverage historic disputes between U.S. allies while opportunistically rebalancing its engagement between China and Russia. The trilateral security cooperation severely limits the regime's ability to diplomatically maneuver in this regard and to continue its repressive domestic policies without enacting substantial reforms.

This policy approach offers a pragmatic path forward and tangibly advances U.S.-China shared interests. Ultimately, it will set the conditions to achieve denuclearization while allowing the northern half of the Korean Peninsula to remain within China's sphere of influence. Such a strategy, balancing U.S. objectives with China's regional priorities, holds promise for advancing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Voices Dec. 17, 2024 / 4:00 PM

How China-North Korea relations frayed in 2024, and what it means for Trump's Korea policy

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2024/12/17/china-north-korea-relations-frayed-2024-trump-korea-policy/4381734456292/

By Seohyun Lee & Michael Donmoyer

Chinese president Xi Jinping (pictured in 2023) first met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018. File Photo by Jemal Countess/UPI | License Photo

Dec. 17 (UPI) -- On New Year's Day, Chinese president Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un jointly designated 2024 as the "China-DPRK Friendship Year" to mark the 75th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic relations. Despite this declaration, China-North Korea relations have significantly cooled this year. Kim's growing ties with Russia represent a deliberate effort to reduce North Korea's dependency on China, a strategy that aligns with his broader ambitions to modernize the country's missile and weapons systems. This foreign policy shift is rooted not only in pragmatic national interests but also in personal motivations, including Kim's complicated relationship with Xi.

Kim and Xi first met in March 2018, a remarkable delay of nearly six years after Xi became the head of state of the People's Republic of China (PRC). According to insiders, Xi's discomfort with Kim began early in his tenure. Shortly after becoming Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary in November 2012, Xi advised against North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013. When Kim went ahead with the test, Xi was deeply dissatisfied. This tension became glaringly apparent in 2014 when Xi chose to visit South Korea -- North Korea's adversary -- before ever meeting Kim, a move that openly signaled his discontent.

Though the two leaders eventually held their first meeting in 2018, primarily to mend ties amid growing U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea, their relationship never fully warmed. The recent 2024 Russia-North Korea Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has only deepened the rift, bringing China-North Korea relations back to a frosty state.

In late 2023, there were indicators that China would reinvest in its ties with North Korea. A flurry of Chinese diplomatic activity ensued following the summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim in Russia's Far East during which Putin indicated willingness to provide North Korea technical support for its satellite program.

Ultimately, the only high-level exchange of the Friendship Year occurred in April 2024 when Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the PRC's National People's Congress, traveled to Pyongyang to meet with his North Korean counterpart Choe Ryong Hae, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. The meeting between Zhao and Choe reportedly initiated discussions of a loan agreement in which China would provide North Korea raw materials and food in exchange for priority access to minerals and investments in natural resource development projects, but such an agreement has failed to materialize.

For decades, China has pressured North Korea to emulate its path of economic reform, offering substantial aid to keep the regime afloat. However, this support has never been sufficient to address North Korea's systemic shortcomings. Unlike China, where a party-state governs, North Korea's hereditary leadership system creates unique vulnerabilities. Economic reforms pose an existential threat to Kim's regime, potentially destabilizing his rule by exposing his family's repressive legacy, inviting external influence, and undermining his justification for nuclear development as a means of safeguarding his long-term power.

This fear explains Kim's preference for aligning with Russia over China. Moscow exerts no pressure on Pyongyang to reform, and Putin lacks the personal grievances that have marred Kim's relationship with Xi. For Kim, Russia offers a safer and more convenient partner.

China has responded to this pivot with subtle but telling signals of diplomatic cooling. The removal of the commemorative copperplate from the 2018 summit between Xi and Kim, along with replacing photos at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing with images of Kim Il Sung, indicate Beijing's unease with Pyongyang's evolving alliances. The photo replacement, almost certainly directed by Pyongyang, appears intended to remind Beijing of the historical strength of the China-North Korea alliance under Kim Il Sung's leadership while subtly critiquing its current lack of full support for Kim Jong Un's regime.

Additionally, China's recent denial of visa renewals for North Korean athletes in its domestic leagues, signaling a reversal of the sports exchange protocol signed in January, underscores the increasingly strained relationship.

A less noted area of cooperation in which China has curtailed its engagement with North Korea is the repatriation of North Korean escapees. Since North Korea reopened its border to foreign nationals in late September 2023, China has repatriated over 700 North Korean escapees. China considers these individuals to be illegal migrants, and its refusal to grant them refugee status supports Kim's political legitimacy.

However, since the Putin-Kim summit in June, China appears to be holding them in limbo, with public security officials reportedly having warned North Korean escapees living in China to lay low while substantially increasing surveillance of these vulnerable communities. Considering that public security cooperation between China and North Korea in this area has long been stable, the current delay becomes even more significant, signaling Beijiing's considerable dissatisfaction with Pyongyang.

Additionally, Chinese state media did not mention the "Friendship Year" designation when reporting on the exchange of congratulatory messages between Xi and Kim, and no Xi-Kim summit was held this year despite some analysts' prior expectations. Through these signals, China has not hesitated to demonstrate its willingness to target the Kim regime's ideological legitimacy if pushed far enough.

In recent years, China has dramatically increased its economic influence over both Russia and North Korea. While the "no-limits" friendship with China has benefitted Russia, particularly in its invasion of Ukraine, it is unlikely that Putin will settle for being the subordinate partner indefinitely.

More notably, China now accounts for approximately 95% of North Korea's total trade. Kim understands that if Beijing fully leveraged this economic weight, it could compel Pyongyang to alter its security policies and abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Beyond the immediate technical support and revenue that Russia can provide North Korea to fuel its weapons program, their alliance is also likely aimed at achieving long-term strategic autonomy from China. Given that Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine and previously engaged in summit diplomacy with Kim, North Korea's deployment of soldiers to Russia could be an effort to involve itself in a potential settlement, one that might bring it sanctions relief. Therefore, Putin and Kim are well aware that engagement with the new U.S. administration, one composed of prominent China hawks, could help to move them out from underneath China's thumb.

This would be a nightmare scenario for China. China has repeatedly condemned the overlapping system of partnerships and alliances that the United States has spearheaded in recent years, particularly AUKUS, the Quad and, more recently, NATO and its Indo-Pacific Partners. If Russia and North Korea were to engage with the United States independent of China, such a move would substantially increase its long-standing fear of a U.S.-led encirclement by disrupting its relatively secure northeastern flank.

It has long been U.S. practice to urge China to exercise its influence over North Korea. However, the incoming U.S. administration should carefully reconsider this assumption in its diplomatic approach.

For Xi, Kim is an unpredictable liability. Kim's refusal to embrace China's model of reform and opening, combined with his relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons, has consistently transformed Northeast Asia into a flashpoint for regional arms competition. Despite North Korea's strategic importance to China, Kim's actions suggest a degree of independence from Beijing, complicating China's ability to exert control.

While a second Trump term is likely to exacerbate U.S.-China economic tensions, it could also present a unique opportunity to secure Beijing's cooperation on the North Korea issue. The current dynamics offer favorable conditions for advancing U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the Trump administration should adopt a dual strategy.

First, it should work with China to strengthen and enforce sanctions on North Korea while making relief contingent on Kim's adoption of Deng Xiaoping-style economic reforms, allowing Beijing to take the lead in advocating for these changes.

Second, it must maintain U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral security cooperation and continue to pressure North Korea on its human rights record. North Korea has always sought to leverage historic disputes between U.S. allies while opportunistically rebalancing its engagement between China and Russia. The trilateral security cooperation severely limits the regime's ability to diplomatically maneuver in this regard and to continue its repressive domestic policies without enacting substantial reforms.

This policy approach offers a pragmatic path forward and tangibly advances U.S.-China shared interests. Ultimately, it will set the conditions to achieve denuclearization while allowing the northern half of the Korean Peninsula to remain within China's sphere of influence. Such a strategy, balancing U.S. objectives with China's regional priorities, holds promise for advancing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Seohyun Lee is a North Korean defector, human rights advocate, and aspiring security expert currently serving as a Research Intern at the Hudson Institute. She holds a Master's degree in international security policy from Columbia University and has presented on esteemed platforms, including the UN Security Council in 2023. Her work focuses on East Asian geopolitics, human rights, and cybersecurity.

Michael Donmoyer worked as a research fellow for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Foreign Military Studies Office and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. He is currently a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and is an alumni of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He is an Army veteran and spent over two years stationed in South Korea.

The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

5. Ukraine's Security Service intercepts conversation between Russians confirming heavy North Korean losses in Kursk Oblast

This was flagged by a friend who included this comment which I think is instructive.

Fyi, I’ve tracked RU losses in Ukraine everyday since summer of 2022.

Very briefly, we can pretty accurately state that the Russian KIA:WIA ratio has held steady at an almost Medieval 1 : 2.5-3.0.

Despite the nurse’s claim below of North Korean soldiers getting better treatment, anyone can do the math.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/12/18/7489638/

Ukraine's Security Service intercepts conversation between Russians confirming heavy North Korean losses in Kursk Oblast

A conversation intercepted by the Security Service of Ukraine has revealed that the Ukrainian defence forces have inflicted serious losses on Russian and North Korean units in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

Source: press service of the Security Service of Ukraine

Details: A new call interception, in which a nurse at a hospital in Moscow Oblast communicates with her husband who is fighting against Ukraine in Kharkiv Oblast, has revealed that more than 200 wounded North Korean soldiers were taken to a Russian hospital near Moscow in just a few days.

"Yesterday there was a train with about 100 people. Today, 120 others, making 200. How many more are there? God only knows," complains the nurse.

In the next conversation, she says that wards in Russian hospitals are being given over to North Korean soldiers, and wounded Russians are being treated in worse conditions.

Advertisement:

The Russian woman also complains that the wounded North Koreans do not speak Russian, medical staff are not allowed to speak to them in English, and an online translator translates with errors and distortions.

The Security Service of Ukraine noted that its investigators had already opened a criminal case over the North Korean military's participation in the war against Ukraine. The pre-trial investigation is being carried out under Article 437 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (the crime of aggression).

6. South Korea Is in Constitutional Chaos

This is one view. Others (that I will share) assess that the Constitutional process is playing out as designed.

South Korea Is in Constitutional Chaos

After the short-lived martial law, nobody knows who’s in charge.

By Michelle Kim, a U.S. lawyer based in Seoul.

Foreign Policy · by Michelle Kim

Politics
Elections
South Korea

December 9, 2024, 3:09 PM

Last Tuesday, South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, plunged the country into political chaos by declaring—and then withdrawing—martial law. This was the first time that martial law had been imposed since 1980, when President Chun Doo-hwan staged a coup and massacred thousands of democratic protestors at the Gwangju Uprising. For South Koreans, Yoon’s declaration was a rude awakening to the reality that the dark era of military dictatorship might not be a relic of the past.

On Saturday, tens of thousands of protestors gathered outside the National Assembly in Yeouido, calling for Yoon’s impeachment. But the opposition party’s motion to impeach Yoon fell through. Yoon’s conservative People Power Party boycotted the vote, denying the two-thirds quorum needed to pass the motion. While many of the party’s members, including leader Han Dong-hoon—a protege of Yoon who later became a staunch critic—publicly condemned Yoon, they feared impeaching him would hand over the presidency to the Democratic Party.

The party’s reluctance to impeach the president stemmed from a painful lesson learned in 2016. When President Park Geun-hye was impeached over a sprawling corruption scandal, the party collapsed and lost the presidency to Democratic Party leader Moon Jae-in. They battled for years to regain public support. “If we impeach another president we put in power, how could we ever ask the people for their votes again?” said Kim Gi-hyeon, a member of the party.

Outraged by the boycott, protestors bombarded the party members with text messages and phone calls. Lee Jae-myung, leader of Democratic Party, announced that his party will push for another impeachment vote this coming Saturday. As the opposition parties control 192 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly, they would need to win over at least eight members of the People Power Party to pass the motion.

South Korea now faces a prolonged battle of political uncertainty and constitutional chaos.

Yoon’s declaration of martial law sent shockwaves through the country. But members of the Democratic Party had raised the alarm that Yoon might make such a move. At a Democratic Party Supreme Council meeting held in August, Kim Min-seok—an influential figure in the party who was an avid student protestor during the country’s democratization movement and a protege of President Kim Dae-jung—said he had a “well-founded conviction” that Yoon was plotting to declare martial law. Still, other lawmakers dismissed his claims as conspiracy theories. In September, Kim introduced an amendment to martial law to prevent “a coup disguised as martial law.”

The amendment proposed that, except in wartime, the president must secure prior approval of the National Assembly to declare martial law. It also guaranteed the rights of lawmakers who are arrested or detained by martial law troops to vote on the president’s declaration. As chaos unfolded overnight, these proposals turned out to address the very loopholes that Yoon tried to exploit to upend constitutional safeguards.

This isn’t the first time that a president has turned to martial law amid growing political scandal. In 2016, Kim Min-seok discovered evidence that President Park Geun-hye was preparing to declare martial law to avert charges related to her corruption scandal. In July 2018, an internal document from the Defense Security Command revealed that Park had planned to deploy soldiers and tanks to suppress protestors and arrest opposition lawmakers. Ironically, Yoon was the prosecutor general who spearheaded the corruption case that precipitated Park’s impeachment.

Yoon, who rose to fame as prosecutor general under President Moon Jae-in, won the presidency by a margin of less than 1 percent—a result widely seen as a referendum on Moon’s government rather than an endorsement of Yoon. Since taking office in May 2022, Yoon has served a term plagued with political gridlock and a series of scandals involving him and his wife, including allegations that she accepted a luxury handbag as a bribe and conspired to manipulate Deutsche Motors’ stock prices. In the past several months, accusations that the couple engaged in influence-peddling during a parliamentary by-election made headlines. Yoon’s approval ratings plummeted, and calls for his impeachment intensified.

Declaring martial law was a desperate move by an unpopular president mired in crisis—“a frantic last-ditch effort.” Leader of the New Reform Party Lee Jun-seok, who was once a close ally to the president, said the indictment of a key figure in the influence-peddling scandal, just hours before Yoon’s declaration, may have been the last straw.

Motivated purely by his domestic political agenda, Yoon had no constitutional grounds for declaring martial law. Article 77 of the South Korean Constitution authorizes the president to declare martial law to maintain public safety and order during “war, armed conflict or similar national emergency.” None of the reasons offered by Yoon in his televised address—the impeachment motions against his cabinet members or attempts to cut his budget—amount to a national emergency similar to a war. In Yoon’s case, “the requirements for martial law cannot possibly be met,” wrote Han In-sup, a law professor at the Seoul National University School of Law.

Yoon’s order was also fraught with procedural violations of the constitution. Within an hour after Yoon’s televised address, martial law commander Park An-soo issued a proclamation banning all political activities, including those of the National Assembly. This was an unprecedented decree. No proclamation issued under any martial law order in the nation’s history had ever banned the National Assembly from exercising its legislative authority.

When lawmakers rushed to the National Assembly to rescind Yoon’s order, police officers blocked them from entering the building, while martial law troops stormed the chambers to stop them from voting. Hong Jang-won, a deputy director of the National Intelligence Service, said he was ordered by Yoon to collaborate with the Defense Counterintelligence Command to arrest and detain prominent political figures, including Lee Jae-myung and Han Dong-hoon, on charges of being “anti-state forces.”

Yoon’s myriad efforts to block or subvert the legislature’s emergency vote overstepped the constitutional boundaries of his presidential powers. In a national emergency, Article 77 authorizes the president to restrict the powers of the executive and the judiciary, but not the legislature. “The constitution does not allow the president take any measures against the legislature,” said Jeon Hak-seon, a law professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Martial law grants the president significant powers during an emergency, but it also designates the legislature to serve as a check on those powers.

Yoon’s attempts to derail the legislature’s authority to check on his powers unequivocally violated the constitution.

His declaration of martial law might also amount to an insurrection. In a ruling on the Gwangju Uprising, the Supreme Court of Korea articulated that using force to render a state institution incapable of exercising its constitutional powers constitutes a subversion of the constitution. The court cited President Chun Doo-hwan’s deployment of troops to blockade the National Assembly and prevent lawmakers from convening as a clear example of disabling the legislature’s constitutional functions. Yoon’s actions closely resemble those of Chun, who was ultimately convicted of treason and insurrection.

Following complaints filed by opposition parties, bar associations, and civic organizations, the police and prosecutors have started investigating insurrection charges against Yoon. While the constitutionality and criminality of Yoon’s martial law remain separate questions, experts predict that if Yoon is impeached, he will also be prosecuted for insurrection. If convicted, Yoon could face life imprisonment or the death penalty.

After the impeachment motion failed to pass, Han Dong-hoon reassured the public that Yoon would make an “orderly resignation.” He said that even before he resigns, the president would be excluded from state affairs, including diplomacy. Instead, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo would run the government in close consultation with the People Power Party.

Lee Jae-myung criticized Han Dong Hoon’s bid to take over the presidency, accusing him of staging “a second coup.” The constitution does not authorize the ruling party or the prime minister to assume the executive duties of the president while he remains in office, he said. The presidency may be vacated through impeachment or resignation, but it cannot be delegated to another person outside constitutionally enumerated procedures.

Critics said Han was trying to delay Yoon’s exit to buy time to position himself as the next head of state.

With a paralyzed president unwilling to step down, a party leader vying for power, and an opposition determined to impeach him, South Korea may be on the verge of a new constitutional crisis.

Foreign Policy · by Michelle Kim

7. The South Korea Constitutional Crisis of 2024 Is a Myth

Another (and more helpful I think) assessment. I remain as optimistic as Dr. Kelly.

Excerpts:

South Korea has surmounted bad, abusive presidents in the past. In 2016-17, it impeached another president. That process was completed itself peacefully and constitutionally. All appropriate steps were followed. Law, due process, and democracy were retained. That is happening once again now, and that is a testament to the robustness of South Korea’s democracy.

Democracies cannot stop individual politicians from misbehaving or outside the law. However, they can act to defend democratic institutions when abuses occur. That is what is happening now in South Korea.

This is not a crisis but a democracy performing correctly.

The South Korea Constitutional Crisis of 2024 Is a Myth

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · December 18, 2024

On December 3, South Korean President Yoon Seok Yeol declared martial law. This was a huge surprise. South Korea has been a stable democracy since 1987. There has never been a martial law declaration in that period, and the South Korean constitution foresees martial law only in extreme circumstance such as a North Korean invasion. To prevent the abuse of the martial law executive authority – because South Korea had military dictators before 1987 – South Korea’s constitution requires the country’s legislature, the National Assembly, to ratify a martial law proclamation.

The National Assembly did not, less than three hours after Yoon’s declaration. A few hours after that, Yoon rescinded his declaration. The military, briefly deployed around the legislature, returned to base. No one was injured. Aside from scuffles inside and in front of the legislature for a few hours, there was no rioting.

If the closest example to Yoon’s strange power grab is the assault on the US Congress of January 6, 2021, then this was far less violent.

Yoon Must Go, but South Korea is Not in Crisis

Public opinion quickly turned against Yoon. Even Yoon’s own party, the Conservatives, quickly realized that martial law was a wild overreaction to Yoon’s grievances – that the opposition party made it too difficult for him to govern.

Yoon-aligned parliamentarians dithered initially, but when it became increasingly clear that Yoon had no good reason for his extreme move, they turned against him. On Saturday, when the opposition launched an impeachment vote in the legislature, with broad public support, enough conservatives broke ranks and voted to impeach. Yoon is now a suspended president. The nation’s prime minister is the acting president until South Korea’s high court, the Constitutional Court, rules definitively on the impeachment. It must ratify the legislature’s decision.

This entire process is playing out as required. The legislature did its job as required, both on the night of the martial law declaration and in the impeachment vote. The high court has scheduled its first hearing on the issue for December 27. It is moving with appropriate alacrity, given the gravity of the situation. There are street protests, but no rioting, violence, terrorism, and so on.

The protestors even pick up their trash when they finish and go home. Even Yoon backed down when confronted with the enormous public and legislative backlash. He accepted the National Assembly’s vote against martial law just a few hours after his declaration. He later apologized and accepted the impeachment vote.

Indeed, he has not resigned – as he probably should – but is within his presidential-constitutional rights to stay in office until the Constitutional Court hands down final judgment.

In short, this is not a crisis. South Korea’s democracy is not near collapse. The country is not on the verge of dictatorship or a coup. North Korea and China are not about to gain strategic superiority in peninsular affairs, and so on. Instead, the system is responding appropriately and nonviolently to a challenge. The challenge was indeed substantial. If South Korea were still under martial law, then we could genuinely speak of a constitutional, democratic crisis.

But it is not. If the challenge to South Korean democracy was dramatic, so was its defensive response. The public mobilized peacefully. The legislature asserted its rights and defended the Constitution. Even the president’s party abandoned him to protect basic democratic principles.

That is not a crisis or breakdown; it is a stress test successfully overcome.

By contrast, the US performed poorly on its own January 6, 2021, stress test. Former President Donald Trump, who stirred up that day’s assault on Congress, faced no accountability and was even re-elected president. Yoon, by contrast, will probably go to jail.

South Korea has surmounted bad, abusive presidents in the past. In 2016-17, it impeached another president. That process was completed itself peacefully and constitutionally. All appropriate steps were followed. Law, due process, and democracy were retained. That is happening once again now, and that is a testament to the robustness of South Korea’s democracy.

Democracies cannot stop individual politicians from misbehaving or outside the law. However, they can act to defend democratic institutions when abuses occur. That is what is happening now in South Korea.

This is not a crisis but a democracy performing correctly.

About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · December 18, 2024

8. Map shows unusual US spy flights near allies

Map shows unusual US spy flights near allies

Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · December 17, 2024

What's New

A United States missile-tracking aircraft was tracked flying above the waters between Japan and South Korea, two of Washington's security treaty allies in East Asia, for eight consecutive days as of Tuesday, according to data captured by aircraft tracking service Flightradar24.

Newsweek reached out to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the U.S. Forces Korea, the U.S. Forces Japan, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., via email for comment.

Why It Matters

The flights were conducted by one of the three U.S. Air Force RC-135S reconnaissance aircraft, also known as Cobra Ball, capable of collecting optical and electronic data on ballistic missiles. The fleet is mainly used to monitor missile movements and launch events in North Korea.

While North Korea did not conduct missile firings in the past week, the continuous daily flight of the Cobra Ball came after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived attempt to impose martial law on December 3, which the country's parliament voted to impeach him for.

What To Know

On Saturday, South Korea's MBC News reported, citing open-source flight data, that two Cobra Ball aircraft were dispatched from their forward operating site at Kadena Air Base on the Japanese southwestern island of Okinawa to the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea, on December 10.

An open-source intelligence analyst on X (formerly Twitter), @MeNMyRC1, said, "This is the first time I have seen two CB [Cobra Ball] aircraft flying against a presumed NK [North Korea] launch window." One of the aircraft arrived at Kadena from its home base in the U.S. mainland on December 5.

High priority tasking for Cobra Ball fleet vs North Korean ballistic missile testing.

Approximately 7 hours ago, Cobra Ball 62-4128 as Cosmo-97 was noted Northbound across Japan. This is the third flight for 128 since arriving December 5th.

61-2662, the other Cobra Ball at… pic.twitter.com/hjqKVHxAFz

— MeNMyRC (@MeNMyRC1) December 10, 2024

Regarding the Cobra Ball's flights, an expert told MBC News that they could be used for surveillance of the South Korean military, as the aircraft can track locations of missiles and rocket launchers.

The report also cited another expert that unconfirmed intelligence showed the "Chungam faction" that remained in the South Korean military was planning an artillery attack on domestic targets, which was in line with the possibility of imposing a second martial law after the first attempt.

The faction refers to a group within Yoon's inner circle, composed of alumni from Chungam High School in the capital city of Seoul, including the president and his defense chief, Kim Yong Hyun.

"Personally, I do not believe there is any connection to South Korea," @MeNMyRC1 told Newsweek via direct message on X on Monday. "There is just no reason for them to do that. The [Cobra Ball's] daily flights have continued, and the target is still going to be North Korea."

A U.S. Air Force RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft in California on May 23, 2020. The Cobra Ball is capable of collecting optical and electronic data on ballistic missiles. A U.S. Air Force RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft in California on May 23, 2020. The Cobra Ball is capable of collecting optical and electronic data on ballistic missiles. Senior Airman Amy Younger/U.S. Air Force

What People Are Saying

In an emailed response to Newsweek, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces saidthe Cobra Ball "was conducting planned, routine operations off the coast of Japan, unrelated to current events in the Republic of Korea," referring to South Korea's official name.

"Pacific Air Forces remains committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific focused on fostering regional security and stability throughout the region," the statement said.

Kim Min Seok, Aviation Week Korea correspondent, told MBC News: "The RC-135S (Cobra Ball) can track the trajectories and locations of missiles and multiple rocket launchers, and these flight trajectories can detect various launches and artillery fire not only in North Korea but also in South Korea. It [the flights] could be for the purpose of monitoring the South Korean military."

@MeNMyRC1 told Newsweek: "I believe the U.S. has other intelligence (satellite type) that there is equipment positioned for a launch, and that is why we are seeing the increased flight activity. It is likely this test is one of the newer, larger missiles the North Koreans have been developing, and that would be a high priority to collect intelligence on. Since pictures don't tell you when a test will take place, you have to send the airplane so it can be on station if the launch occurs."

What Happens Next

President-elect Donald Trump will be sworn into office on January 20, 2025. North Korea may try to send a signal to the upcoming Trump administration by launching ballistic missiles.

Update 12/18/24, 1:30 a.m. ET: This article has been updated with comment from the U.S. Pacific Air Forces.

Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · December 17, 2024

9. Yoon’s impeachment throws future of North Korean human rights policy into doubt

My concern is that when the opposition comes to power what is likely to be most impacted is the 8.15 Unification Doctrine. Of course human rights (and information) are key to unification.

Here is one of my slides from a presentation I gave at a security conference in Seoul this week. What I told them is that it is imperative that Koreans adopt the 8.15 unification doctrine as theirs and not just President Yoon's.

•The President was impeached – “unification was not”

•Distraction yes – but also an opportunity

•Pursuit of a free and unified Korea remains as relevant and necessary as ever

•The fundamental question for all Korean people:

Do the Korean people prefer the challenges of a messy democracy or the suffocating control of a dictatorial regime?

•Martial law crisis shows democracy prevents tyranny – Korean people in the northand South will choose democracy over dictatorship

Yoon’s impeachment throws future of North Korean human rights policy into doubt

South Korean leader presented himself as ally to cause, and now activists fear reversal of his policies following ouster

https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/yoons-impeachment-throws-future-of-north-korean-human-rights-policy-into-doubt/

Ifang Bremer December 18, 2024

Yoon Suk-yeol delivers a speech on Dec. 12, 2024. | Image: Office of the President of the Republic of Korea, edited by NK News

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment has cast a shadow over the future of North Korean human rights policies in South Korea, placing question marks over initiatives that many activists hoped would bring renewed focus to their cause.

When Yoon took office in 2022, advocates welcomed his plans to prioritize human rights in North Korea after his progressive predecessor Moon Jae-in sidelined such issues while pursuing diplomacy with Pyongyang.

As part of these efforts, the Yoon administration openly criticized DPRK human rights abuses at the U.N. and other forums and allocated state funds to support conferences and initiatives aimed at drawing attention to the issue. While some events drew criticism for their lavishness, advocates say they have provided valuable opportunities to discuss strategies and network with government officials.

Now, as Yoon waits for the Constitutional Court to decide his fate, those same advocates face uncertainty about the future of Seoul’s approach to North Korean human rights after a brief period of welcome government support.

IMMEDIATE IMPACT

The political turmoil following Yoon’s ill-fated declaration of martial law almost immediately began to disrupt government initiatives on North Korean human rights, even before the National Assembly voted to impeach him on Saturday.

Last week, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) reportedly moved to cut funding for an array of Yoon initiatives in response to the president’s “insurrection,” including North Korean human rights programs.

The cuts have been put on hold after Acting President Han Duk-soo called on the DP to help prevent more chaos in the government, but the proposal is likely a harbinger for how the DP will look to overhaul DPRK human rights policy when things settle down.

Meanwhile, a Ministry of Unification seminar to discuss policy recommendations for increasing North Koreans’ access to information was also abruptly canceled last week in the wake of Yoon’s martial law declaration.

Sokeel Park, South Korea country director for Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), was scheduled to speak at the seminar but noted the futility of continuing such discussions amid the political crisis.

“Even if they did go through with it, what would have been the meaning of policy recommendations to a government in this state?” he told NK News.

Park had previously been encouraged by the administration’s commitment to improving information access, lamenting that Yoon’s actions have now set back human rights advocacy.

“It does feel like a missed opportunity for better efforts for North Korean people and for promoting change in North Korea.”

A North Korean man at the Kumgangsan Hotel | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)

MARTIAL MATTERS

Yoon’s declaration of martial law has been widely condemned as anti-democratic, and his actions have left the North Korean human rights movement in an uncomfortable position after he previously presented himself as an ally to the cause.

“He preached liberal democracy at home and abroad without understanding, let alone practicing, its basic tenets,” Ethan Shin of the Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group told NK News. “Nothing makes plain the petty tyrant’s deranged state of mind than the promise of meeting out ‘punishment’ for those who defied his policies.”

But some conservative voices in North Korean human rights circles have expressed understanding, if not outright support, for Yoon’s actions.

Henry Song, a Washington-based human rights activist at One Korea Network, noted that many in the field, particularly defectors, believe “Yoon had to do what he had to do, considering the actions of the Democratic Party.”

Euntaek Lee, a Jeju-based escapee active in the DPRK human rights movement, wrote on social media that “President Yoon Suk-yeol has consistently sought to empower defectors as self-reliant contributors to society.”

“The Democratic Party, which accuses Yoon Suk-yeol’s government of being a dictatorship, are themselves the true dictators,” he wrote. “What kind of dictator in the world is unable to spend the nation’s budget without the opposition’s approval?”

People Power Party lawmaker Park Choong-kwon, the only defector currently serving in parliament, notably criticized Yoon’s martial law decree as lacking “legitimacy” but said he opposes impeachment, slamming the main opposition for also “throwing the country into chaos.”

When he declared martial law, Yoon accused the main opposition party of paralyzing state affairs through a “legislative dictatorship,” justifying the move as necessary to counter “anti-state” and “pro-North Korea” forces. Experts have widely dismissed Yoon’s rationale as groundless, while acknowledging that the Democratic Party takes friendlier policy stances toward Pyongyang.

For now, few activists appear willing to publicly voice support for Yoon amid domestic outrage. But the situation highlights the dangers of the North Korean human rights movement being perceived as aligned with a party or leader, particularly when their political fortunes fall.

WHAT COMES NEXT?

Now that Yoon has been impeached, it falls to the Constitutional Court to review whether to uphold the decision. If it does, a new presidential election must be held within 60 days, with DP leader Lee Jae-myung the current runaway favorite to win.

Activists expressed concern about a potential return to the policies of the previous Moon administration if the DP takes the presidency, citing the party’s past reluctance to support and even outright opposition to initiatives that promote North Korean human rights.

“Over the past two decades, a conspicuous pattern has emerged: recurring cuts to North Korean human rights programs whenever the Democratic Party wields its power, followed by purposeful targeting of the North Korean human rights and victims’ associations once they secure the presidency,” Joanna Hosaniak, deputy-director general of the Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, told NK News.

Song of One Korea Network raised particular concern about the potential impact of a Lee presidency.

“I worry we will revert back to the Moon days, or worse,” he said. “This fear is magnified in the defector community.”

One incident that lingers in the memory of many escapees is the Moon administration’s decision to forcibly repatriate two North Korean fishermen to the DPRK, with some fearing that the next president could take similar steps to reject defectors, according to Hanna Song of the Seoul-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB).

The expert noted that the Yoon administration emphasized support for the escapee community and gave government positions to defectors, anticipating that many escapees will feel like they’ve been empty-handed after Yoon’s impeachment.

One of the two North Korean fishermen forcibly repatriated via Panmunjom in 2019 | Image: Ministry of Unification

WEATHERING THE STORM

Despite the current uncertainty, activists emphasized that North Korean human rights efforts will continue, noting that many organizations have weathered similar political storms before.

“A lot of the legacy organizations, the ones that have been around for a while, have been through different administration changes and are resilient to it,” Song explained. “That’s why a lot of the large organizations actually don’t take that much funding from the South Korean government.”

At times, the Yoon administration’s active involvement in promoting North Korean human rights also caused tensions within the NGO community.

For instance, private actors greeted the government’s plan to open up a DPRK human rights museum with skepticism, warning that political changes could jeopardize the project. Some activists have also said that Seoul’s human rights initiatives often overlapped with those of private groups, which then had to compete with the government for attention.

And while Yoon’s government may have been more receptive to their cause, his dramatic fall from grace has highlighted the need for more sustainable approaches to advancing North Korean human rights, Song noted.

“More work needs to be done on de-politicizing the issue regardless of what administration is in office.”

Even though the ROK government still has an important role to play, she argued that the situation shows that civil society should lead efforts to advance the rights of people in North Korea.

“We should ask: What are the ways we can build that support from South Korean society, not the government?”

Edited by Alannah Hill

10.

It is good to see this. I am especially gratified to see the requirement for the north Korean diaspora to be involved.

The one point about all of this is who is ensuring that all these activities are sufficiently orchestrated and most importantly ensuring how they fight into a US and Alliance information campaign. There should be an overt unclassified information campaign that all activities must be in support of. This needs to be shared and the US agency for orchestrating the information campaign against north Korea must be able to judge these activities and determine what supports the strategy. There are many elements within this document that are elements of an information campaign but there should be a coherent information campaign that all the proposed grantees must support.

Excerpt:

All proposed activities under this category must be led by or include consultation and/or engagement with the North Korean defector and escapee community as experts or partners. Such engagement could include conducting defector-led feedback mechanisms; sub-granting or sub-contracting to defector content creators; and/or including defector-made content in curation efforts. SOIs that do not include this requirement may be deemed technically ineligible.

I think for the most part this fits into the concepts I have long advocated. Here are some of the points I made this week in Seoul.

Information Campaign

Highlight regime's resource misuse (e.g., ~$560M on missiles in 2022 versus ~$415M food shortage)

Establish dedicated organizations for information dissemination

North Korean Diaspora Information Institute (NKDII)

Use technology to bypass censorship and reach North Korean citizens

•The five principles of information:

1) massive quantities of information from news to entertainment;

2) practical information from market activity to organization for collective action;

3) facts and the truth about north Korea and the outside world;

4) understanding of the universal human rights for all people;

5) voices from the north Korean diaspora to tell their stories of success

•Major theme: Kim’s strategy has failed to achieve his objectives

A human rights-focused, information-driven strategy is key

Unification is the only sustainable solution to denuclearization

The “Korea question” must be solved by the Korean people (para 60 of the Armistice)

The U.S must support ROK-led efforts for a free and unified Korea

But change in north Korea is required to protect the American homeland

DRL Increasing Access to Information in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)

Funding Opportunity Announcement

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

December 16, 2024

Public Notice

I. Requested Objectives for Statements of Interest

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) seeks Statements of Interest (SOI) from organizations interested in implementing programs to increase the free flow of objective, independent information into, out of, and within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).

PLEASE NOTE: Applicants should immediately access MyGrants or www.grants.gov to set up a username and password. For instructions on how to register with MyGrants for the first time, please refer to the Proposal Submission Instructions for Statements of Interest at: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.

The SOI process, which is a two-step process, allows applicants to submit program ideas for DRL to evaluate before requiring a full proposal. As a first step, applicants must submit a brief, three-page concept note that clearly explains a program idea and its objectives before developing a full proposal application. After reviewing eligible SOIs, DRL will invite selected applicants to expand on their program ideas by submitting a full proposal application. Full proposals will go through a second review before funding recommendations are submitted to the DRL Assistant Secretary for approval, depending on funding availability.

This solicitation includes two (2) categories under which applicants may submit SOIs. Each organization may submit a maximum of two (2) SOIs, limited to one per category. Organizations must clearly identify the category to which the SOI is responding on the first page of the SOI. If a category is not clearly identified, the SOI may be deemed technically ineligible and not forwarded to the review panel for consideration.

All SOIs must be grounded in ‘Do No Harm’ principles. For DRL, this means that applicants demonstrate a strong understanding of the current operating environment and describe measures that may be taken to mitigate risks to project implementation, staff, and beneficiaries, including Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA)[1] policies and enforcement mechanisms or standard operating procedures (SOPs). Applicants must also demonstrate an ability to localize project activities by leveraging the expertise of North Korean human rights organizations, activists, and defector communities.

SUPPORTING FREEDOM OF INFORMATION. Projects under this category must support the following objective: North Koreans have improved understanding of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, including increased awareness of how their individual rights and freedoms are inhibited by the DPRK government. Projects that do not include content dissemination activities will not be deemed competitive. Project activities may include:

Creating or curating content on concepts or themes of democracy, human rights, including fundamental freedoms; practical guidance on safeguarding against digital threats and surveillance; analysis of domestic and international developments; and/or highlighting the comparative lack of rights and freedoms in the DPRK through the experiences and stories of North Korean defectors and escapees living in democratic societies. All new content must be tailored to North Korean audiences and developed to foster critical thinking and gradual changes in perceptions and/or encourage discourse among trusted contacts on individual rights and freedoms. Competitive applications will propose new or curated content in line with the categories under the “Human Rights and Accountability” RSOI.
Supporting timely, fact-based, and independent local reporting on political and social developments, including human rights abuses, in the DPRK.
Increasing access to objective, independent information among North Korean audiences through safe, secure, and proven approaches, such as radio broadcast transmissions or other tested methods. Applicants must clearly demonstrate existing capacity and experience to carry out activities safely and effectively.
Cultivating a new generation of content creators, particularly among the North Korean defector community, by strengthening their technical content creation skills and operational sustainability. Such efforts must include small grants to individuals or nascent content creation organizations.

All proposed activities under this category must be led by or include consultation and/or engagement with the North Korean defector and escapee community as experts or partners. Such engagement could include conducting defector-led feedback mechanisms; sub-granting or sub-contracting to defector content creators; and/or including defector-made content in curation efforts. SOIs that do not include this requirement may be deemed technically ineligible.

Competitive SOIs under this category will:

Describe activities or partnerships to deliver any produced or curated content to North Korean audiences and explain why the applicant is confident in the safety and success of the proposed dissemination approach. SOIs that do not include dissemination activities or partnerships will not be deemed competitive.
Identify which audience group(s) would be targeted through content creation, curation, and dissemination efforts. Clearly explain why the selected groups would be interested in the proposed content and whether the proposed content would be considered sufficiently beneficial and/or safe for redistribution among North Korean audiences.
Describe how proposed content topics or themes complement the proposed media format, taking into account how North Koreans may alter their media consumption habits in response to the risks associated with different mediums, methods for access, and topics or themes.

DIVERSIFYING MECHANISMS FOR INFORMATION ACCESS. Projects under this category must support the following objective: North Koreans have a greater diversity of proven context-specific and secure mechanisms through which they can safely and reliably access and/or share objective, independent information. Projects that only include research activities will not be deemed competitive. Project activities may include:

Supporting efforts to circumvent existing tactics or technologies used by the DPRK government to inhibit access to outside information. Applicants may propose ways to leverage, improve, and/or amplify hardware and/or software solutions that are new or already used by North Koreans; however, any proposed technologies, programs, and/or applications must have been identified or verified as still active and/or relevant to the DPRK context within the last two years.
Scaling up or improving tailored, proven technologies to facilitate the free flow of information into, out of, and within North Korea. This may include technologies to securely and safely communicate, share, or consume information and/or external media content. Applicants must clearly justify the proposed technical approach and claims; articulate whether the proposed technology is demand-driven and applicable within the DPRK’s information control environment; and demonstrate existing capacity and experience to carry out the project safely.

All proposed projects under this category must include partnership with South Korean organizations, entities, or individuals, including those representing the North Korean defector community. Partnerships could include sub-grants or sub-contracts to organizations, consultancies with individuals, focus groups and/or feedback mechanisms with North Korean defectors or other experts, or other means of engagement. Explanations of partnerships must exemplify that the primary applicant has the context-specific knowledge, expertise, and relationships to implement a tailored, safe approach. SOIs that do not include this requirement may be deemed technically ineligible.

Competitive SOIs under this category will:

Describe activities or partnerships to deliver the proposed technologies, mechanisms, programs, and/or applications to end users. SOIs that do not include dissemination activities (e.g., projects solely focused on research) or partnerships will not be deemed competitive.
Clearly explain why the applicant is confident that the proposed technology, mechanism, program, and/or application will be effective, safe, and relevant for the DPRK context. Explanations should cite research or testing data to support claims.

Applicants may contact DRL-EAP-Programs@state.gov for guidance on how to share sensitive information, such as partner names or specific dissemination routes.

All programs should aim to have impact that leads to reforms and the potential for sustainability beyond DRL resources. Programs should be driven by local needs and led by local communities to the extent possible.

DRL will entertain applications for continuation grants funded under these awards beyond the initial budget period on a non-competitive basis subject to availability of funds, satisfactory progress of the program, and a determination that continued funding would be in the best interest of the U.S. Department of State.

Activities that are not considered competitive include, but are not limited, to:

Activities that repeat or significantly overlap with existing activities without providing a clear, additional benefit to program beneficiaries;
Provision of humanitarian aid;
English language instruction;
Purely academic exchanges or fellowships;
External exchanges or fellowships lasting longer than six months;
Activities conducted outside the target country that are not clearly connected to local initiatives and impact, or are not necessary due to security concerns;
Theoretical studies of human rights or democracy issues, including programs focused mainly on research and evaluation without training or capacity-building for local civil society;
Micro-loans or similar small business development initiatives.

II. Eligibility Information

The following organizations are eligible to apply:

Foreign-based non-profit organizations/nongovernment organizations (NGO);
U.S.-based non-profit organizations/NGOs with or without 501(c)(3) status;
Public International Organizations;
Private, public, or state institutions of higher education;
For-profit organizations or businesses.

Applicants should have, or be able to develop, active partnerships with thematic or local partners, entities, and relevant stakeholders, including private sector partners and NGOs. Applicants should also have proven experience in managing successful and preferably similar projects. DRL encourages applications from foreign-based NGOs located in the regions or countries relevant to this Request for Statements of Interest (RSOI).

Applicants may form consortia to combine different expertise into one comprehensive proposal. However, only one organization can be designated as the prime applicant, while the remaining organizations must be designated as partners or sub-awardees. The prime applicant must meet the eligibility criteria listed above. DRL may ask for more background information from applicants without previous federal grant experience, and these applicants might receive limited funding on a trial basis.

DRL is committed to an anti-discrimination policy in all its programs and activities. DRL welcomes applications regardless of race, ethnicity, color, creed, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or other status. DRL looks for applications that show the recipient does not discriminate against any beneficiaries when implementing a potential award. This means not withholding, negatively affecting, or denying equitable access to the benefits of the award based on any factor not stated in the award. This includes race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran status. The recipient should insert this provision, including this paragraph, in all sub-grants and contracts under a potential award.

Any applicant listed on the Excluded Parties List System in the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) (www.sam.gov) or who has a current debt to the U.S. government is not eligible to apply for an assistance award, according to OMB guidelines at 2 CFR 180 that implement Executive Orders 12549 and 12689, “Debarment and Suspension.” Additionally, no entity or person listed on the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov can take part in any activities under an award. All applicants are strongly encouraged to review the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov to make sure no ineligible entity or person is included in their application.

Organizations do not need a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) or an active SAM.gov registration to apply for this solicitation in MyGrants. However, if a SOI is approved, they will need to get these before submitting a full application. Therefore, we recommend starting the process of obtaining a UEI and SAM.gov registration as soon as possible. Please note that there is no cost associated with UEI or SAM.gov registration.

III. Application Requirements, Deadlines, and Technical Eligibility

All SOIs must follow DRL’s posted Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for Statements of Interest, as updated in December 2024, available at https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.

Complete SOI submissions must include:

Completed and signed SF-424 and SF-424B forms, as directed on MyGrants or Grants.gov (refer to DRL’s PSI for SOIs for guidance on completing the SF-424); and,
A program statement (no more than three pages in Microsoft Word) that includes:

A table listing:
Name of the organization;
Target country/countries;
Total amount of funding requested from DRL, total amount of cost-share (if any), and total program amount (DRL funds + cost-share); and,
Program length;
A brief summary of the program, including how it will have a demonstrated impact and engage relevant stakeholders. Identify local partners if appropriate.
A clear breakdown of the program’s objectives, activities, and expected results for each objective.
A brief description of the applicant(s) that shows their expertise and ability to implement the program and manage a U.S. government award.

Primary applicants can submit two (2) SOIs in response to the RSOI, limited to one per category. If an applicant chooses to submit more than one application, they must demonstrate that each application is competitive and unique. SOIs that request less than $100,000 or more than $1,000,000 may be deemed technically ineligible.

Technically eligible SOIs must:

Be submitted electronically via MyGrants or Grants.gov by 11:59 PM EST on January 10th, 2025 under the announcement titled “DRL Increasing Access to Information in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea),” funding opportunity number DFOP0017067;
Be in English; and,
Follow all instructions and not break any guidelines stated in this solicitation and the PSI for Statements of Interest.

Please ensure:

All pages are numbered;
All documents are formatted to 8 ½ x 11 paper; and,
All documents are single-spaced, 12-point Calibri font, with 1-inch margins.

DRL is not responsible for disqualification due to applicants not being registered before the due date, system errors in MyGrants or Grants.gov, or other errors in the application process. Applicants must save a screenshot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully. DRL encourages organizations to submit applications during normal business hours (Monday – Friday, 9:00 AM-5:00 PM EST).

IV. Review and Selection Process

The warranted Grants Officer will determine technical eligibility for all applications. A review panel will evaluate all eligible SOIs based on the same criteria: quality of program idea, program planning/ability to achieve objectives, institution’s record and capacity, and addressing barriers to equal participation. DRL may also take into consideration the balance of the current portfolio of active projects, including geographic or thematic diversity, if needed.

In most cases, the DRL review panel includes representatives from DRL policy and program offices. All panelists must sign non-disclosure agreements and conflicts of interest agreements. Once a SOI is approved, selected applicants will be invited to submit full proposal applications based on their SOIs. Unless directed otherwise by the applicant, DRL may also refer SOIs for possible consideration in other U.S. government funding opportunities.

DRL’s review panel may give conditions and recommendations on SOIs to improve the proposed program. These must be addressed in a full proposal application. To use DRL funds effectively, conditions and recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, or justify costs and program activities. DRL’s Front Office has the final determination on all funding decisions, depending on the availability of funds.

Review Criteria

Quality of Program Idea

SOIs should align with the program framework and policy objectives in the NOFO; be suitable for the country/region; and show originality, substance, precision, and relevance to DRL’s mission of promoting human rights and democracy. Programs should aim for immediate impact leading to long-term, sustainable reforms. DRL prefers new approaches that do not duplicate efforts but will consider programs that improve or expand existing successful programs in a new way. In countries where similar activities are already happening, explain how new activities will not duplicate or just add to existing ones and how these efforts will be coordinated. Proposals that offer creative solutions to ongoing challenges are encouraged. DRL prioritizes programs with inclusive approaches for advancing these rights.

Addressing Barriers to Equal Participation

DRL aims to advance the rights and dignity of all persons. As the U.S. government’s lead bureau dedicated to promoting democratic governance, DRL requests program approaches dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies. Discrimination, violence, inequity, and inequality targeting any members of society undermines collective security and threatens democracy. DRL prioritizes programs that assess and address barriers to access for individuals and groups based on race, ethnicity, religion, income, geography, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability. The proposal should show how the program will further engagement in underserved communities and with individuals from these communities. This approach should be included in the program concept and design, as well as in implementation of all proposed activities, objectives, and monitoring. Strong proposals will provide specific analysis, measures, and targets to enhance programmatic impact by including all people in society. The goal of this approach is to bring communities and those in power together in support of more stable and secure societies.

Program Planning

A strong SOI will show how the proposed activities contribute to the overall program goal and objectives, with each activity included. Objectives should be ambitious yet measurable, results-focused, and achievable within a reasonable timeframe.

SOIs should address how the program will engage relevant stakeholders and should identify local partners as appropriate. If local partners are identified, applicants should describe the division of labor among the prime applicant and any local partners.

Institution’s Record and Capacity

DRL will consider the past performance of prior recipients and the demonstrated potential of new applicants. SOIs should show a record of successful democracy and human rights programs, responsible fiscal management, and compliance with reporting requirements. Programs should have potential for continued funding beyond DRL resources.

For additional guidance, please see DRL’s posted Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for Statements of Interest, as updated in December 2024, available at https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.

V. Additional Information

DRL will not consider SOIs that include support for any member, affiliate, or representative of a designated terrorist organization. For more information, refer to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

Program activities that directly benefit foreign militaries or paramilitary groups or individuals will not be considered for DRL funding due to funding restrictions.

According to Department of State policy on terrorism, applicants are advised that successful passing of a vetting process to evaluate the risk that funds may benefit terrorists or their supporters is a condition for receiving an award. If selected for an award, applicants will need to provide information required by DS Form 4184, Risk Analysis Information about their company and its principal personnel. Vetting information is also required for all sub-award performance on assistance awards identified by the Department of State as having a risk of terrorist financing. Vetting information may also be requested for program beneficiaries and participants. Failure to provide the requested information or to pass the vetting process may result in the proposal being rejected.

The Leahy Law prohibits Department of State foreign assistance funds from supporting foreign security force units if the Secretary of State has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Per 22 USC §2378d(a) (2017), “No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter [FOREIGN ASSISTANCE] or the Arms Export Control Act [22 USC 2751 et seq.] to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Restrictions may apply to any proposed assistance to police or other law enforcement. Among these, pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), no assistance provided through this funding opportunity may be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country when there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. In accordance with the requirements of section 620M of the FAA, also known as the Leahy Law, program beneficiaries or participants from a foreign government’s security forces may need to be vetted by the Department before the provision of any assistance. If a proposed grant or cooperative agreement will provide assistance to foreign security forces or personnel, compliance with the Leahy Law is required.

Applicants should be aware that DRL understands that some information contained in SOIs may be considered sensitive or proprietary and will make appropriate efforts to protect such information. However, applicants are advised that DRL cannot guarantee that such information will not be disclosed, including pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or other similar statutes.

Organizations should also be aware that if ultimately selected for an award, DRL requires all recipients of foreign assistance funding to comply with all applicable Department and Federal laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Guidance for Grants and Agreements in Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations (2 CFR), as updated in the Federal Register’s 89 FR 30046 on April 22, 2024, and the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

The information in this RSOI and “Proposal Submission Instructions for Statements of Interest” is binding. Explanatory information provided by DRL that contradicts this language will not be binding.

Issuance of this RSOI does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the U.S. government, nor does it commit the U.S. government to pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission of proposals. Further, the U.S. government reserves the right to reject any or all proposals received.

Background Information on DRL and DRL Funding

Background information on DRL and its programs can be found on https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/.

VI. Contact Information

For technical submission questions related to this NOFO, please contact DRL-EAP-Programs@state.gov.

Except for technical submission questions, during the RSOI period U.S. Department of State staff in Washington and overseas shall not discuss this competition with applicants until the entire proposal review process has been completed and rejection and approval letters have been transmitted.

For assistance with MyGrants accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://afsitsm.servicenowservices.com/ilms. Customer support is available 24/7.

For assistance with Grants.gov accounts and technical issues related to using the system, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov. The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays.

Additional information on Do No Harm and PSEA can be found in DRL’s Proposal Submission Instructions, available at: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/ ↑

11. Ox carts and smartphones: New video offers rare look at North Korean countryside

The contradictions of north Korea.

Ox carts and smartphones: New video offers rare look at North Korean countryside

Footage captured by Russian tourist in October shows the steep challenges DPRK faces in developing rural areas

https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/ox-carts-and-smartphones-new-video-offers-rare-look-at-north-korean-countryside/

Ifang Bremer December 18, 2024

An ox pulls a cart in the countryside of northeastern North Korea | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

New footage of the North Korean countryside captured by a Russian tourist provides a rare glimpse into life beyond the relative affluence of Pyongyang, showing that ox-drawn carts often outnumber vehicles and unpaved roads still dominate the landscape.

The video published on the YouTube channel PoletMe Aviation was recorded in October from a tourist bus traveling along the DPRK’s east coast, starting from Mount Chilbo and traveling some 30 miles north to an airport in Orang, near the city of Chongjin.

The footage offers one of the only looks at rural life since the DPRK closed its borders during the pandemic, and its release comes as leader Kim Jong Un pushes new policies to modernize areas outside the capital that he admits to previously neglecting, promising to make farmers “materially affluent” and resolve the nation’s persistent food challenges.

The poverty evident in the video suggests that this initiative faces steep odds.

Shot in October following the fall harvest, the footage shows corn and other grain drying wherever there is a relatively flat surface, from roadways and public squares to rooftops.

Corn is cheaper than rice and a dietary staple for millions of North Koreans. But its price has surged to a rate higher than rice this year, suggesting that people are consuming more corn because it is less costly and that incomes are down.

The YouTube video also shows how North Koreans use every available plot of land for growing crops, even right next to roads, between apartment blocks and beside rivers.

Such small-scale, household-level farming took off during the devastating famine of the 90s, when the state food distribution system broke down and North Koreans could no longer rely on government rations.

This private farming often takes place on small hillside plots, and experts believe such activity is responsible for an important — but unknown — percentage of food production, helping to supplement people’s diets.

Grain laid out to dry | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

Meanwhile, scenes of daily life visible from the tourist bus paint a picture of technological sparseness: women wash clothes in rivers, ox-drawn carts and bicycles serve as primary means of transportation and unpaved roads stretch for miles, except around the city of Orang. The footage suggests that the tourists experienced a bumpy ride to the airport, the bus shaking for a good portion of the trip.

North Korea’s undeveloped road network has long been a major impediment to travel within the country. Buses are known to get stuck in potholes and mud, at times requiring tourists to help push them out. There have also been deadly tour bus accidents.

A cart pulled by an ox | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

Despite the often primitive technology, the video does show exceptions. Several locals ride electric bicycles, possibly imported from China, while small solar panels appear on some homes.

Many North Korean households have adopted solar panels over the last decade because the state cannot provide reliable power supplies. Authorities have expressed their intent to remove solar panels from individual homes in favor of building community solar farms, but the countless small panels visible in the Russian tourist video suggests such plans have not been widely implemented.

Several residents are also visible calling or texting on what look like relatively new smartphones. Mobile phones have proliferated in the DPRK over the years and are available to anyone who can afford them. North Korea even upgraded to a 4G network recently, though little is known about the quality of mobile networks outside Pyongyang.

A man rides an electric bike while talking on his smartphone. | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

Community farming dominates North Korean rural life, and the recent footage shows walls with crop production charts that pit villages against each other in harvest competitions. The state uses such content to motivate farmers in lieu of other incentives in the collectivized agricultural system

While recent analysis by NK Pro suggests this year’s harvest was strong, the country still grapples with significant food security challenges. Poor infrastructure leaves farms vulnerable to natural disasters, while a lack of modern farming tools and incentives to increase production limit output. Leader Kim Jong Un has sought to address these problems by promising new houses to farmers, though it remains to be seen whether this will be effective.

For many rural residents, the passing tourist bus likely represented their first glimpse of foreigners since North Korea sealed its borders in 2020. Some could be seen pointing at the bus, or curiously looking at the rare visitors. The country only began allowing limited visits from Russian tourists at the start of this year.

People working in a field | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

One of the most telling details in the video is the electrified fencing that lines the coastline, visible as tourists made their way toward the Orang airport. “The whole coastline is fenced,” according to a caption in the video.

NK Pro previously revealed that the DPRK has significantly expanded fencing and security infrastructure along both of its coastlines since the start of the pandemic, in a likely attempt to make it harder for residents to escape by sea.

The barrier serves as a stark reminder of the restrictions faced by ordinary North Koreans, who unlike the Russian visitors mostly cannot travel freely in the country or go abroad.

A fence along the east coast of North Korea | Image: PoletMe Aviation Videos, edited by NK News

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. Yoon’s Political Implosion: Making Pyongyang’s Day

While the conclusion is a cautionary note (and we should be concerned with the axis of upheaval or quartet of chaos) The auto-coup attempt by President Yoon and the response to it can be used to educate the Korean people in the north about the messy democracy of the South. It can help inform their choice - democracy or continued dictatorship.

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Despite domestic disturbances, semi-insurrections and coups in South Korea, North Korea has never seized these opportunities to renew civil war. Nevertheless, Yoon’s failed attempt to consolidate power will give Kim confidence to continue on his chosen path of joining what decades ago Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski called the nightmare coalition for the US of China, Russia and Iran. The North’s chilly relations with Beijing are likely to become more tepid, while Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing will all welcome and be grateful for the postponement and cancellations in Seoul’s further integration into NATO, the Quad+ or any kind of East Asian Security framework, and the early prospects of a progressive presidency in the South.

Yoon’s Political Implosion: Making Pyongyang’s Day

By: Glyn Ford
December 15, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/12/yoons-political-implosion-making-pyongyangs-day/?utm

The pantomime that has been South Korean politics for the past fortnight has brought swift smiles to the lips of both Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. For Kim, in particular, this is the perfect gift and validates the strategic choices made in his last New Year’s Address. The South may outgun the North by a factor of ten and more, but the fiasco that was an on-off martial law declaration merely made public that the South’s military leadership is ill-disciplined, insubordinate and confused, and the dithering of Seoul’s governing party was worse. What’s not to like in Pyongyang? The North’s much lauded secret weapon, ‘single minded unity,’ has never looked more powerful in the face of Seoul’s indecision and incompetence.

This did not just happen overnight. Recent reports reveal early stages of this plan have been in play for several months as Yoon tried to hide his domestic woes by raising tensions on the Peninsula. This includes the provocative use of the South’s drones to spread propaganda leaflets in Kim Il Sung Square. When that did not elicit a military response, Yoon ordered the South’s military to fire on the sites of the North’s ‘trash’ balloons launches, directions that were apparently refused.

The term ‘leaderless resistance’ is normally applied to the tactics of terrorist groups fearful of infiltration by the state. In Seoul, the term is stood on its head with a state structure inchoate and incompetent. Now with the National Assembly, at the second time of asking, voting for impeachment, the South’s decision making goes into limbo for up to 180 days as the Constitutional Court ponders the legitimacy of the vote. All this makes Kim’s day as it confirms his strategic pivot while comprehensively sidelining Seoul in any future talks with Trump.

The Backstory

After the car-crash in Hanoi in 2019, Kim Jong Un abandoned the family’s forty-year-long venture to normalize relations with Washington. Across four decades—after the fall of the Soviet Union—American presidents proved immune to any deal, but in 2017, Trump seemed different. Gently coaxed by Pyongyang’s foreign affairs establishment, Ri Su Yong in the International Department of the Party and Ri Yong Ho in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kim was convinced a deal was possible that would see cross-recognition under the protective covering of punctuated progress over a decade and more of slow step-by-step initial freezing and incremental backtracking of the North’s nuclear program.

But 2017 turned out to be a false dawn. Kim viewed the failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit as the Republican establishment encircling Trump sabotaging the process and preventing the conclusion of any deal. Concluding Washington’s willing were unable to make meaningful changes, Kim purged the doves within his regime in favor of hawks and began to change the course of the country’s external affairs.

Subsequent global events reinforced Kim’s view of the world and shifting power dynamics. The chaotic US retreat from Afghanistan demonstrated the vulnerability of American military might to the wrong warfare, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed spineless decision makers among Ukraine’s partners, and Israel’s devastation of Gaza proved that Washington’s allies could now slip the leash.

Mixed Messages for Kim

No longer the only game in town, Kim saw Washington’s loss of control and reaction to China’s challenge as the opening encounters in a second Cold War—a lens through which Kim Jong Un now views the world. The crass and chaotic failed coup d’état by President Yoon in Seoul confirms his analysis and strengthens his hand. Yet there are spots on the sun. First, Kim needs to massage and spin the events in Seoul for the readers of Rodong Sinmun. Pyongyang has never been enthusiastic over advertising the world’s color revolutions; wary the North’s own citizens might be infected with similar gaudy ideas. Here and now it is possibly worse. Kim started the year designating the South as the “most hostile state”. It replaced the previous portrayal of the South Korean citizenry as misguided and misled, intimidated under the thrall of Washington and its domestic dupes with a picture of monochrome malevolence. But the fierce resistance to martial law and overwhelming outcry for impeachment over the last two weeks is clearly at odds with Kim’s propaganda created to help sell why unification should be abandoned.

As second challenge is the ouster of Assad from Syria. The Assad regime had been a Russian proxy propped up by Moscow and Tehran. Its house of cards collapse suggests a fragility to that support and an inability and/or unwillingness for Moscow to fight a two-front war, even in the long shadow of a threatened Trump-inspired ceasefire in Ukraine. It must strike Kim that were the Peninsula’s mutual provocations to turn to skirmishes and threaten escalation to war, like in 1950, Russian engagement could turn out to be coaching from the sidelines with the heavy lifting of mutual assistance sub-contracted to Beijing, which is likely to limit help to the minimum for survival, far short of the resources for victory.

Conclusion

Despite domestic disturbances, semi-insurrections and coups in South Korea, North Korea has never seized these opportunities to renew civil war. Nevertheless, Yoon’s failed attempt to consolidate power will give Kim confidence to continue on his chosen path of joining what decades ago Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski called the nightmare coalition for the US of China, Russia and Iran. The North’s chilly relations with Beijing are likely to become more tepid, while Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing will all welcome and be grateful for the postponement and cancellations in Seoul’s further integration into NATO, the Quad+ or any kind of East Asian Security framework, and the early prospects of a progressive presidency in the South.

13. The Strange Success of North Korea

"Rusty unification rhetoric?" The 8.15 unification doctrine is not rusty. And the only way there will be peace and prosperity and an end to the nuclear threats and human rights abuses on the Korean peninsula is through unification. There must be change in the north that will seek peaceful unification. But the possibility of regime collapse is also very real. As sturgeon we some think Kim is, the regime is brittle.

Excerpts:

In the past, North Korea saw the South as a source of aid, but now it has sufficient aid from other sources to sustain its economy. It is also ready to jettison the rusty unification rhetoric, which ceased to be realistic decades ago. As Pyongyang sees it, a more straightforward, confrontational approach has greater benefits, since it justifies keeping North Korea’s population isolated from the dangerously rich South and hostile toward potentially subversive South Korean cultural influences.

Trump seems to harbor some positive feelings toward Kim.

With China and, for the time being, Russia behind it, the Kim family has more confidence about its own future in power than at any other time in the past three decades. The domestic elite seems to be sharply under its thumb, too. The spread of dangerous knowledge about the outside world among North Korea’s youth remains an issue, but North Korea’s borders are more tightly controlled than ever.

Over the past two years, Kim’s daughter—her name, never mentioned in the official publications, is believed to be Kim Ju Ae, and she is now in her early teens—has frequently appeared at the North Korean leader’s side at official events. It seems possible she will eventually inherit his power, perhaps remaining at the helm for years to come. For the moment, at least, North Korea and the Kim dynasty may be among the clearest beneficiaries of an increasingly fractured world.

The Strange Success of North Korea

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrei Lankov · December 18, 2024

China and Russia Have Warmed Up to a More Dangerous Kim Jong-Un—and America Might, Too

Andrei Lankov

December 18, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un chairing a party meeting in Sinuiju, North Korea, July 2024 KCNA / Reuters

Andrei Lankov is a historian of North Korea at Kookmin University, Seoul. He is the author of The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia.

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In 2017, the highly militarized regime of Kim Jong Un of North Korea found itself confronting a rare coalition of China, Russia, and the United States. In response to North Korea’s successful test of its first intercontinental ballistic missile and thermonuclear device, the usually gridlocked UN Security Council had unanimously enacted a series of tough sanctions. Initiated by Washington and supported by both Beijing and Moscow, these punitive measures had the potential to devastate the North Korean economy. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump, who had recently entered the White House, was openly discussing the possibility of a preemptive strike, promising to unleash “fire and fury” against North Korea.

Today, things look considerably different. First, as the rivalry between the United States and China has intensified, Beijing cannot afford to pressure North Korea in ways that might create instability on China’s doorstep and has taken steps to buttress the Kim regime. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea’s large military complex has become indispensable to Moscow, with Pyongyang supplying vast quantities of ammunition, and now thousands of troops, to the Russian war machine.

Finally, with Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election in November, Kim may have an opportunity to further cement his gains in the international arena. Despite the menacing rhetoric early in his first term, the president-elect seems, in contrast to his Democratic opponents, to harbor some positive feelings toward Kim, and he has said he hopes to reach some kind of deal with the North Korean leader. Not even the test of a new intercontinental ballistic missile—one that can hit any point in the continental United States— on the eve of the U.S. election, or Pyongyang’s embrace of a more hostile doctrine toward South Korea, has caused much difficulty for Kim: unlike in 2017, the UN Security Council has not responded to these challenges.

Although it is difficult to predict how future events will affect his rule, Kim has been a distinct beneficiary of the growing antagonism between the United States and both China and Russia. Perversely, even as North Korea becomes more threatening to its neighbor in the south and poses a greater military challenge to the West, it has gained more economic stability and become less vulnerable to outside pressure. This new situation suggests that during Trump’s second term the Kim regime may become even more assertive, continuing to advance its nuclear and missile programs with even less concern about internal and external threats.

BEIJING’S BOUNTY

At the heart of North Korea’s shifting fortunes is the dramatic improvement of its relations with China. For a long time, despite loudly proclaimed statements of mutual affinity—so-called friendship rhetoric—relations between Beijing and Pyongyang were far from idyllic. On the one hand, Chinese leaders valued North Korea as a buffer against the West and sometimes even maintained the fiction of close solidarity with what they called one of the few remaining fellow “socialist” countries. On the other hand, they were irked by the Kim regime’s refusal to emulate China’s market-oriented economic reforms and viewed North Korea’s nuclear ambitions as a threat to the nonproliferation regime that Beijing favored and supported. China also worried that Pyongyang’s provocative behavior gave the United States an additional pretext for its continued military presence in the region. Sometimes North Korean actions—including, above all, its nuclear tests—led to friction between Beijing and Pyongyang.

As China’s rivalry with the United States has grown, however, North Korea’s strategic value to Beijing has come to outweigh all other considerations in Chinese thinking. Heavily armed North Korea offers some depth for China’s defenses, while also creating a buffer between China and U.S. bases and listening stations in South Korea. On top of that, China cannot afford instability or chaos in a neighboring country with nuclear weapons. A West German‒style absorption of the impoverished North by the wealthy, pro-American South is now a nightmare scenario for Beijing—and it is clear that the collapse of the Kim regime might lead to such an outcome, even if Seoul is no longer enthusiastic about the prospect of assuming responsibilities for the North.

The remains of a North Korean missile used in a Russian strike in Kharkiv, Ukraine, January 2024 Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy / Reuters

Thus, around 2019, China began to increase its aid to Pyongyang significantly, embarking on a policy aimed at keeping the North Korean regime afloat. China is now shipping undisclosed but large amounts of free fuel, food, and fertilizer to North Korea and turning a blind eye to North Korean violations of the 2017-‒19 UN sanctions regime, as long as these violations remain relatively small-scale and deniable. This aid keeps North Korea from sliding into famine and instability, but, given the size of China’s economy, it does not cost China much. (North Korea’s population is less than 2 percent of China’s, and its GDP is a minuscule 0.2 percent of China’s.) Among other things, Chinese aid allowed North Korea to navigate the uneasy COVID-19 period, when its borders were virtually closed and its overseas trade came to a complete standstill.

Moreover, despite this influx of aid, China has not gained more control over North Korean actions. China may be able to extract some minor concessions: for example, it seems likely that Chinese pressure has prevented North Korea from conducting a nuclear test thus far. At the same time, China’s backing has limits: Beijing is not lavish in its support and is not committed to funding a broader economic transformation of its neighbor. Nevertheless, the aid has been enough to compensate for the chronic inefficiencies of North Korea’s economy and the impact of sanctions. And the Kim regime also knows that Beijing needs a stable and manageable North Korea and will not risk penalizing it for actions China is unhappy about. Therefore, China is highly unlikely to apply the kind of pressure that could produce a tangible change in its neighbor, and North Korea can expect to receive shipments of Chinese aid more or less unconditionally, probably for years to come.

MANNING UP FOR MOSCOW

Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought its own windfall to the North Korean elite. Initially, Moscow’s invasion of its Western neighbor seemed distant and irrelevant to Pyongyang, but as the conflict devolved into a prolonged war of attrition, with trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, artillery and manpower became crucial. Before long, the Kremlin discovered that North Korea was not only a major producer of the weapon Russian soldiers need most—heavy artillery shells—but also the only country willing to sell such ammunition to Russia in large quantities. Since early 2023, North Korea has shipped millions of shells, along with some other weapons and ammunition, to the Ukrainian front. The revenue from this deal in 2023 alone is conservatively estimated at $540 million—adding almost 25 percent to North Korea’s overall trade volume.

Then, in 2024, the Kremlin’s increasingly acute manpower shortages paved the way for even greater North Korean participation in the war, likely finalized during Putin’s meeting with Kim in North Korea in June: Pyongyang agreed to send troops—11,000 soldiers so far—to Russia in exchange for money, food, and likely, some advanced military technologies. In addition to filling Russia’s manpower gap, the deal allows Russia to sustain the war at a significantly lower cost: North Korean troops are far less expensive than Russian volunteers, who now receive up to $30,000 as a bonus when they enlist, plus a salary of at least $2,000 a month. The deal also reduces pressure on Putin to impose a second mobilization, whose implementation might trigger more public discontent in Russia. (For now, North Korean forces have been deployed in the Kursk region of Russia, where Ukrainian forces have taken a small patch of territory, rather than in Ukraine itself.)

For Pyongyang, the deal brings, along with substantial revenue, important strategic benefits. Among other things, it might give North Korea access to various advanced Russian military technologies—including for missile engines and reconnaissance satellites—that had been difficult or impossible to obtain. Moscow may also be more willing to engage in nonmilitary cooperation projects, potentially even subsidizing such joint ventures. Meanwhile, North Korean ground forces, which have not seen combat since 1953, are gaining valuable battlefield experience. And with new Russian diplomatic support, North Korea is less isolated internationally, with the UN Security Council unlikely to take further action against it.

If Russia loses interest, Kim will still have China to fall back on.

The arrangement is not without risks. If North Korean troops perform poorly on the battlefield, it will make Pyongyang look more vulnerable. During their deployment, North Korean soldiers are also likely to have some access to the Internet and tunable radios (both media are banned in North Korea), so they might be exposed to uncensored information about the world, especially from South Korea. However, these risks seem minor compared with the likely gains.

Significantly, the sudden influx of Russian money seems to have encouraged Kim to move further away from China. Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing have cooled noticeably since the deals with Russia were made. However, despite North Korea’s continued economic dependency on China, the Kim regime has little reason to be concerned by the mood in Beijing. Despite its current frustration with its neighbor, China has little choice but to continue backing Pyongyang, and North Korea knows that tighter relations can be restored almost instantly if needed. If, for example, the war winds down in Ukraine and Russia loses interest in dealing with North Korea—quite a likely outcome, despite talk of a new “dictators’ alliance”—Pyongyang will still have China to fall back on.

Domestically, the Kim government has reacted to its new relations with China and Russia in a predictable way. Following the 2017 sanctions, the government could not advance the market-oriented economic reforms, somewhat similar to those of the 1980s’ China, that Kim and his advisers had initiated and implemented, with noticeable success, between 2012 and 2018. Now, having secured Chinese and Russian money, the North Korean government has made a full U-turn, reviving the command economy model and further building its surveillance state. Although this neo-Stalinist approach is economically inefficient, it does allow the government to maintain total control of the population. Tighter surveillance is what Kim and the elite have always wanted, but it is the growing support from Moscow and Beijing that has made it possible to strengthen their control of the economy and society. (And the introduction of the super-tough sanctions regime in 2017‒2019 also made any export-oriented policy—a vital ingredient of the erstwhile reformist policy—untenable.)

BACK TO HANOI?

A final, if less certain, dimension of North Korea’s resurgence is Donald Trump’s return to the White House. For the Kim regime, Trump’s first term was both a threat and an opportunity. For a brief period at the beginning of his administration in 2017, Trump seemed prepared to use force against the North, but despite his open threats, such plans, if they ever existed, were soon abandoned. Instead, the president suggested that he would be willing to discard the long-held, but increasingly unrealistic U.S. policy goal of “CVID”—complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea—and negotiate a deal based on accepting North Korea as a nuclear power, but with limitations.

The contours of such a deal emerged at the 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi: if North Korea agreed to dismantle a significant portion of its nuclear facilities—ideally, all known facilities—the United States would lift a number of major sectoral sanctions targeting the country’s economy. Such a deal would have allowed North Korea—whether explicitly or implicitly— to retain the nuclear devices it had produced, along with their delivery systems. It is also likely that Pyongyang would manage to hide at least some nuclear R & D and manufacturing facilities and secretly keep them operational. Although the 2019 Hanoi negotiations broke down because of both sides’ inability to agree on certain technical issues, they provide a template for what Trump might attempt in his second term.

U.S. President Donald Trump with Kim at the North Korean border, June 2019 Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

For the United States, the primary advantage of pursuing a Hanoi-style deal would be to slow down the rapid advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile technologies. Although Pyongyang might eventually break its promises and walk away, it would take significant time and resources to rebuild its nuclear facilities once they are dismantled. If instead the United States continues the Biden administration’s policy of essentially doing nothing while repeating the old mantra of total denuclearization, the only plausible outcome is North Korea’s deployment of ever more advanced nuclear weapons.

It has been suggested that, alternatively, the Trump administration might revive its “fire and fury” approach. That kind of maximum pressure, however, is unlikely to succeed in the world of 2025. With Russia and China behind it, North Korea is less likely to be intimidated, and the Trump administration is in any case likely to be distracted by a far larger number of challenges worldwide.

On the other hand, the renewed possibility of a U.S.-North Korean deal raises concerns in South Korea, since it could threaten South Korea’s own security. There are widespread fears in Seoul that the Trump administration might use a compromise with Pyongyang as a pretext to justify the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the peninsula, leaving South Korea to face a nuclear-armed adversary on its own. Trump’s negative attitude to overseas commitments is widely known, and he has specifically criticized the U.S. military presence in South Korea a number of times.

For Kim, however, such a deal would offer many benefits. It would implicitly recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear power and might even lead to some kind of normalization with Washington. With the partial lifting of UN sanctions, North Korea would become less dependent on China while retaining Beijing’s support should the need arise. Still, it would be a mistake to think that Kim and his advisers are desperate to negotiate with Trump. From 2017 to 2019, in the run-up to the Singapore and Hanoi summits, they felt cornered and had far more incentive to seek a compromise. Now they know that they can manage without it.

KIM’S NEW KINGDOM

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Pyongyang is not a pariah state and has reliable foreign backers—great powers driven not by some nebulous ideology but by cold, pragmatic, long-term calculations. The Kim regime’s December 2023 decision to reclassify South Korea as a “different and hostile state,” thus breaking with a decades-old policy of regarding it as a partner in unification efforts, is another sign of growing assertiveness.

In the past, North Korea saw the South as a source of aid, but now it has sufficient aid from other sources to sustain its economy. It is also ready to jettison the rusty unification rhetoric, which ceased to be realistic decades ago. As Pyongyang sees it, a more straightforward, confrontational approach has greater benefits, since it justifies keeping North Korea’s population isolated from the dangerously rich South and hostile toward potentially subversive South Korean cultural influences.

Trump seems to harbor some positive feelings toward Kim.

With China and, for the time being, Russia behind it, the Kim family has more confidence about its own future in power than at any other time in the past three decades. The domestic elite seems to be sharply under its thumb, too. The spread of dangerous knowledge about the outside world among North Korea’s youth remains an issue, but North Korea’s borders are more tightly controlled than ever.

Over the past two years, Kim’s daughter—her name, never mentioned in the official publications, is believed to be Kim Ju Ae, and she is now in her early teens—has frequently appeared at the North Korean leader’s side at official events. It seems possible she will eventually inherit his power, perhaps remaining at the helm for years to come. For the moment, at least, North Korea and the Kim dynasty may be among the clearest beneficiaries of an increasingly fractured world.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrei Lankov · December 18, 2024

14. Acting President Han to hold extraordinary Cabinet meeting on Thursday

Acting President Han to hold extraordinary Cabinet meeting on Thursday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 18, 2024

SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo will convene an extraordinary Cabinet meeting on Thursday, which is expected to decide whether to veto contentious bills.

The meeting is set to review the six bills passed by the main opposition Democratic Party last month -- four agricultural bills, the National Assembly Act and the National Assembly Testimony Appraisal Act.

If Han does not demand that the National Assembly reconsider the bills by Saturday, they will be enacted into law.

One of the key bills under review is the Grain Management Act, which would require the government to purchase surplus rice to stabilize prices during market fluctuations.

A similar bill was vetoed by President Yoon Suk Yeol in March 2023 and was scrapped in a revote.

The National Assembly Act seeks to prevent the automatic submission of the following year's government budget to the plenary session after the legal deadline, while the testimony appraisal act would make it mandatory for companies to submit data requested by lawmakers.

The ruling People Power Party has opposed the bills, expressing concerns about the financial burden of the mandatory rice purchase and potential risks of trade data leaks during parliamentary testimonies.

Acting President Han Duck-soo speaks during a Cabinet meeting held at the government complex in Seoul on Dec. 17, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 18, 2024

15. Constitutional Court orders Yoon to submit martial law decree, Cabinet meeting minutes

(LEAD) Constitutional Court orders Yoon to submit martial law decree, Cabinet meeting minutes | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 18, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- The Constitutional Court said Wednesday it has ordered President Yoon Suk Yeol to submit the martial law decree he issued on Dec. 3, as well as the minutes of two Cabinet meetings held before and after martial law was declared.

Lee Jin, a court spokesperson, told reporters the order was sent electronically Tuesday as the court gathers evidence for his impeachment trial. Yoon was asked to also submit his plans for defending himself and a list of evidence.

Police officers stand guard outside the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Dec. 18, 2024, amid strengthened security due to President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial. (Yonhap)

The deadline for submission is next Tuesday.

Rep. Jung Chung-rai of the main opposition Democratic Party, the plaintiff in the impeachment trial as chair of the National Assembly's legislation committee, was separately ordered to submit plans to support parliament's case and a list of evidence.

The Cabinet meetings in question have been a source of controversy as they allegedly skipped due procedures. The interior ministry earlier said minutes of the meetings did not exist.

Whether the court order will be delivered to Yoon remains uncertain.

The court's earlier attempts to deliver papers related to the impeachment trial failed after either the presidential office or the Presidential Security Service was marked absent or refused to receive the mail.

Lee said the court's hearings will be open to the public and the press, though they will not be broadcast live in order to "prevent disturbances and maintain order in court."

Previous impeachment trials involving former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye were also not broadcast live, except for the sentencing hearings.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 18, 2024

16. Sullivan says democratic institutions in S. Korea are 'holding' despite martial law attempt

This is an important message. The Korean people are calm and it is business as usual.

Sullivan says democratic institutions in S. Korea are 'holding' despite martial law attempt | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 18, 2024

By Song Sang-ho and Cho Joon-hyung

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Tuesday that democratic institutions in South Korea are "holding" in the aftermath of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol's botched martial law attempt, while noting "dramatic" events can happen even in highly advanced democracies.

Sullivan made the remarks during a forum hosted by 92NY, a cultural organization in New York, as he addressed a question about the ongoing political turmoil in South Korea.

"We had January 6. I think it's important for us to recognize that dramatic events happen even in highly advanced, consolidated democracies," he said, referring to the 2021 attack on Capitol Hill by President Donald Trump's supporters. "The real test is can the democratic institutions hold at the end of the day even if they bend."

He added, "The institutions in South Korea are holding."

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan speaks during a press conference in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Dec. 12, 2024, in this photo released by AFP. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Sullivan recalled "dramatic moments" in South Korea earlier this month when protesters pushed aside the guns of martial law troops that were dispatched to the National Assembly to block lawmakers from going into the legislature to vote to repudiate the martial law declaration.

"If you look at the fact ... actually now, the processes are working. They're going through their paces," he said. "It was quite a moment, and something that I think we're not entirely out of the woods because there are still more chapters in this play until everything is worked through the courts and so forth."

He predicted that the world will see more "surprises" in the future as it is a "new era," given that the post-Cold War era is over and a competition is under way for "what comes next."

"From my perspective, what the United States has to do is try to strengthen its fundamental hand so it can deal with whatever comes next, and there will be surprises," he said.

On Saturday, the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon over the martial law attempt, suspending him from presidential duties until the Constitutional Court decides whether to reinstate or unseat him from office.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 18, 2024

17. Former, incumbent military intelligence officers planned martial law operations over burgers: police

Burgers, beer, and soju?

(LEAD) Former, incumbent military intelligence officers planned martial law operations over burgers: police | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 18, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with Noh's arrest in paras 5-7)

SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- Former and incumbent military intelligence officers discussed martial law operation plans while having burgers at a fast-food restaurant two days before the plans were executed, police investigating the case have said.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. Noh Sang-won, former commander of the Defense Intelligence Command (DIC), shared the plans with Maj. Gen. Moon Sang-ho, the incumbent DIC chief, and two other colonels from the same command, at a Lotteria in Ansan, southwest of Seoul, on Dec. 1, according to the National Office of Investigation (NOI).

Police have reportedly obtained the surveillance footage of the four men talking while eating burgers.

Noh and Moon are under investigation over their alleged roles in the botched martial law imposition by President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Noh was placed under formal arrest late Wednesday after the Seoul Central District Court issued a warrant for him, citing the possibility of Noh tampering with evidence and attempting to flee.

Earlier in the day, Noh waived a court hearing that would have reviewed whether to issue the warrant.

Meanwhile, the NOI and the anti-corruption body took Moon into custody the same day.

Noh Sang-won, former commander of the Defense Intelligence Command (Yonhap)

"It has been confirmed that former Commander Noh had discussions related to martial law with former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun and associates linked to the Intelligence Command," the NOI said in a notice to media on Tuesday.

One of the two colonels reportedly admitted during police questioning that Noh handpicked the officers to send them to the National Election Commission to seize the network servers as evidence for what Yoon alleges to be election rigging by the opposition. Moon is accused of carrying out Noh's orders.

Police believe that Noh has played a key role in the martial law attempt, including drafting the martial law decree and discussing action plans with then Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun. Noh is known as a close aide to Kim.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 18, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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(LEAD) Former, incumbent military intelligence officers planned martial law operations over burgers: police | Yonhap News Agency