Quotes of the Day:

“Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind.”

– Rudyard Kipling

“The fact is, that the public have an insatiable desire to know everything, except what is worth knowing.”

– Oscar Wilde

“What the herd hates most is the one who thinks differently; it's not so much the opinion itself, but the audacity of wanting to think for themselves, something that they do not know how to do.” 

– Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

1. The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military

2. How Tucker Carlson Killed Mike Pompeo’s Hopes of Joining the Trump Administration

3. Countering China’s Maritime Narrative: The Role of Journalism in Gray Zone Conflict

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2024

5. Iran Update, December 17, 2024

6. U.S. Collaboration With Pacific Allies Will Deter Aggression

7. Wakeup Call: The U.S. Risks Losing Latin America to China

8. China's Largest Naval Exercise in Decades: Why Send 90 Warships Near Taiwan?

9. Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power

10. Russia Burns Faces of Dead North Korean Soldiers to Hide Losses – Zelensky

11. Army Set to Debut Master Combat Badges in Spring, Memo Says

12. The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific

13. Biden and Trump must work together to deter an attack on Taiwan

14. The Wrong Sort of Power by Sir Lawrence Freedman

15. No runways, no sorties: Chinese missiles threaten US airpower plans

16. Suit Accuses Georgetown, Penn and M.I.T. of Admissions Based on Wealth

17. Killing of Top Russian General Is a Message From Ukraine: You Aren’t Safe—Even at Home

18. Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power

19. Putin’s Point of No Return

20. The Long Telegram of the 1990s: “Whose Russia Is It Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect”

21. The Bolduc Brief: The Crisis in Military Leadership - A Call for Reform in the US Armed Forces

1. The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military

I made a similar point to the one in the excerpt below at a Korean security conference in Seoul this week. I said that South Korea should be considered a partner in the Arsenal of Democracies and that is one of the important capabilities that it can bring to the ROK/US alliance.

Excerpts:

Absent a screaming national emergency, the U.S. has never been good at steering steadily in a clear strategic direction. The system for equipping the war machine is “peacetime designed,” Douglas Bush explained. “The basis of it is not built for war.”

One thing the U.S. should definitely do, he believes, is to stop thinking of America as the arsenal of democracy. Perhaps in theory we could go it alone—could press what’s left of our manufacturing capacity to the single end of self-sufficient military production. But going it alone is not really an option. The task of supplying, running, and maintaining a modern war machine is beyond the capacity of any one nation. Starting from scratch and given three years to do it, the U.S. today could not replicate the achievement of World War II—could not build trucks and tanks and ships and airplanes in such volume. When we spoke, Bush suggested that it might be better to start thinking about an “arsenal of democracies”—that is, multinational partnerships among the major democracies, with America playing the major role. It would be maddening and messy and require immense energy devoted just to muddling through.

He didn’t mention the underlying premise: For the idea to work, we need to have democracies. And they need to stick together.

The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military

The U.S. failed to produce weapons and ammunition fast enough to supply Ukraine. Could it equip its own armed forces in the event of war?

By Mark Bowden

December 17, 2024, 11 AM ET

The Atlantic · by Mark Bowden · December 17, 2024

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I. Supply and Demand

Here, in the third decade of the 21st century, the most sought-after ammunition in the U.S. arsenal reaches the vital stage of its manufacture—the process tended by a young woman on a metal platform on the second story of an old factory in rural Iowa, leaning over a giant kettle where tan flakes of trinitrotoluene, better known as the explosive TNT, are stirred slowly into a brown slurry.

She wears a baggy blue jumpsuit, safety glasses, and a hairnet. Her job is to monitor the viscosity and temperature of the mix—an exacting task. The brown slurry must be just the right thickness before it oozes down metal tubes to the ground floor and into waiting rows of empty 155-millimeter howitzer shells, each fitted at the top with a funnel. The whole production line, of which she is a part, is labor-intensive, messy, and dangerous. At this step of the process, both the steel shells and the TNT must be kept warm. The temperature in the building induces a full-body sweat in a matter of minutes.

This is essentially the way artillery rounds were made a century ago. Each shell is about two feet high and six inches wide, and will weigh 100 pounds when filled with the explosive. At the far end of the production line, after the shells are filled and fitted with a fuse—or, as the military has it, a “fuze”—the rounds, hundreds of them, are loaded on railcars for the first step in their journey to war. Each train carries such a large concentration of TNT that there’s a solid concrete barrier, 20 feet high and 20 feet wide, between the rails and the building. The finished shells are delivered from plant to port by rail and by truck, under satellite surveillance.

The young woman works in the melt-pour building. It is the tallest structure on the grounds of the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, which sits on 30 square miles of prairie, forest, and brush in the southeastern corner of the state, not far from the Mississippi River. Built in 1940, it’s a relic. It’s also currently the only place in America for high-volume production of 155-millimeter artillery shells, the key step of which is known as LAP (for “loading, assembling, packing”)—turning empty shells into live ordnance. The building looks perfectly mundane, like many old factories in rural towns. There’s only one clue to what’s going on inside: giant chutes, like water slides, slope down to the ground from the upper floors. These are for escape, although one doubts that anyone could clear the blast radius of a building where TNT is stored in tons. There hasn’t been a serious accident at the Iowa plant in years, but 70 names are inscribed on a memorial at the entrance for men and women killed on the job, most of them by explosions.

The Iowa production line is at once essential and an exemplar of industrial atrophy. It illustrates why the richest military on Earth could not keep up with the demand for artillery ammunition after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. At that time, the U.S. was manufacturing about 14,000 shells a month. By 2023, the Ukrainians were firing as many as 8,000 shells a day. It has taken two years and billions of dollars for the U.S. to ramp up production to 40,000 shells a month—still well short of Ukraine’s needs. A big part of the reason is that we still make howitzer rounds the way our great-grandparents did. There are better, faster, safer ways. You can watch videos online of automated plants, for example, operating in Europe. Some new American facilities are starting up, but they are not yet at capacity.

The problem isn’t just howitzer shells. And it isn’t only that the U.S. can’t build drones, rockets, and missiles fast enough to meet the needs of Ukraine. America itself lacks stockpiles of the necessary components. A massive rebuilding effort is now under way, the largest in almost a century, but it will not—cannot—happen fast. And even the expanded capacity would not come close to meeting requests the size of Ukraine’s, much less restore our own depleted reserves. Take drones, for instance. In December 2023, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, called for the domestic production of 1 million annually to meet war needs—and Ukraine has met that goal. In the meantime, the supply of drones provided by the U.S. to Ukraine has numbered in the thousands, and many of those have not fared as well on the battlefield as Ukraine’s homemade, often jerry-rigged models and off-the-shelf Chinese drones. Other allies have stepped up with materiel of many kinds—artillery, armored vehicles, aircraft—but fighters in Ukraine are still coping with disabling shortages.

“It’s a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up, ever.”

At stake here is more than the fate of Ukraine. As a new administration prepares to take power—led by a man, Donald Trump, who has been hostile to Zelensky and his country’s cause, and who admires Russia and Vladimir Putin—the future of American aid to Ukraine is at best uncertain. It could very well diminish or even come to an end. But the obstacles the U.S. has faced in trying to supply Ukraine during the past two years have revealed a systemic, gaping national-security weakness. It is a weakness that afflicts the U.S. military at all levels, and about which the public is largely unaware. The vaunted American war machine is in disarray and disrepair.

“Shocking is not overstating the condition of some of our facilities,” said Representative Donald Norcross, chairing a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing on munitions manufacture a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ted Anderson, a retired Army officer who is now a principal partner of Forward Global, a defense consultancy, told me, “You would stay awake all night if you had any idea how short we are of artillery ammo.”

In 2023, the U.S. Army Science Board expressed concern that the nation’s industrial base “may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.” Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and one of the authors of the Science Board’s report, immersed herself in this world of procurement and manufacturing for nearly a year. “When I was done,” she told me, “the only thing I could think was It’s a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up, ever.”

II. What Happened?

This is not just a bump in the road, and it is not just about munitions. The U.S. military, the richest in the world, confronts a deep, institutional deficiency. If that truth is hard to accept, it’s partly because the reality is so profoundly at odds with our history. In December 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called on America to become “the arsenal of democracy.” He had the foresight to gear up the arms industry almost a year before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The war machine then performed astonishing feats. The Navy outbuilt every other country in the world combined, launching more than 1,000 new warships along with fleets of cargo vessels, troop carriers, and tankers. Production of aircraft was even more astonishing. In all the years prior to 1939, only about 6,000 aircraft had been manufactured in America. Over the next five years, American factories rolled out 300,000. They also built 86,000 tanks and more than 2 million trucks. Production of ammunition accelerated so fast that by 1943, there were 2.5 billion rounds on hand, and the volume was creating storage problems. American arms won the war.

A Chrysler factory in Detroit producing M3 tanks rather than cars or trucks, 1941 (Library of Congress)

That mighty manufactory was scaled back markedly when the war ended, then geared up once more during the Korean conflict and the Cold War. By 1961, it was again such a colossus that President Dwight Eisenhower warned about the growing influence of the “military-industrial complex.” This is how many of us think of it still: menacingly big, cutting-edge, professional, vigilant, lethal, and outrageously expensive. The Pentagon’s nearly $1 trillion annual budget is more than the defense spending of the next nine biggest militaries combined. It is a preposterous sum that pays for an industrial infrastructure that includes mining operations, chemical plants, factories, storage depots, arsenals, ships, trains, aircraft, launching pads, and research labs. It is less an industry than an ecosystem. Today it is global and so complex and mutable that it has become nearly impossible to map.

From the April 2023 issue: Jerry Hendrix on the end of American naval dominance

Leaving aside an enormous privatized service sector that supports government operations, the military’s industrial infrastructure has three overlapping parts. The first and oldest is the military’s own organic industrial base: factories, depots, and arsenals scattered all over America. Some of these, particularly those considered most vital or secret, are owned and operated by the military itself. Most, like the Iowa plant, are so-called GOCOs (government owned, contractor operated). This organic industrial base supplies the basics: ammo, vehicles, equipment.

The second part of the industrial war machine is the corporate manufacturing sector, dominated today by the Big Five contractors: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Raytheon. These companies enjoy profitable deals to develop and build sophisticated weapons systems.

The third, and newest, part of the war machine is the tech sector, including Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Palantir, SpaceX, Anduril, and a large number of smaller firms. These are responsible for the software and hardware that have become a crucial element of modern war—drones and associated technology, as well as AI and systems for electronic surveillance, communications, data analysis, and guidance. The rapid evolution of drones in the Russia-Ukraine war, where automated attack and defense strategies change almost daily, illustrates how vital the tech sector has become.

Together these sectors support what remains the most potent fighting force on the planet. But the foundation is crumbling. Much has been written about the Pentagon’s devotion to big, expensive, and arguably outdated weapons platforms: fighter jets, bombers, guided missiles, aircraft carriers. Little notice has been paid to the deterioration of its industrial base, which underpins everything. There are plenty of reasons for what has happened. Strategic planning failed to foresee a sudden demand for conventional arms. The post–Cold War “peace dividend” put most military contractors out of business. Budget wars in Congress have created funding uncertainty that dissuades long-term investment in arms manufacture. As for munitions, much of the dirty and dangerous work of making them has been outsourced overseas, to countries where labor is cheap and regulations—environmental, safety—are few. Meanwhile, in every kind of military manufacture, from the most to the least sophisticated, we depend for raw materials and components—uranium, chemicals, explosives, computer chips, spare parts, expertise—on an expansive global supply chain, in some cases involving the very countries (China, Russia) we are most likely to fight.

III. A Case Study

The howitzer round, a relatively simple munition, illustrates the problems we face. The howitzer itself is a centuries-old weapon, a mobile firing tube bigger than a mortar and smaller than a cannon. It is often mounted on wheels and is usually used in groups. It is convenient for throwing substantial shells over an army’s own forces and into the ranks of a nearby enemy. A 155-millimeter howitzer shell has a blast radius of more than 150 feet, sends fragments even farther, and can damage or destroy vehicles and fortified positions.

Today’s howitzer round has a variety of parts, each requiring its own production process. The steel casing is made with a specially formulated alloy called HF-1 (the initials stand for “high fragmentation”), designed to withstand the tremendous pressure of being shot out of a cannon but also frangible enough to shatter into shards when it explodes at the target. Most of this kind of steel is imported from Japan and Germany, but some of it also comes from China. Into each steel casing is poured explosive material—what the military calls “energetics”—that today is generally TNT: 24 pounds of it per round. Currently, no TNT is manufactured in the U.S. Nearly all of what we use is imported from Poland and is made with chemical precursors from other countries—including, again, China. To increase U.S. production tenfold would require 2.4 million pounds of TNT monthly, which is why the military is shifting to a newer explosive, IMX, that will ultimately replace TNT entirely, but not anytime soon. The U.S. already has stockpiles of this material, and more of it is being made: The Army has nearly tripled its IMX order from the Holston Army Ammunition Plant, in Tennessee.

Then there’s the need for copper, a band of which is wrapped around the base of each shell to seal it tightly inside the firing chamber; this enables the shell to spin out of the rifled tube, improving its accuracy. To propel the round, there is another energetic at its base, nitrocellulose, which is manufactured at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant, in Virginia. Its chemical ingredients are imported from all over the world. To ignite the propellant, each round has a primer, essentially a small brass cup and a copper pin with its own small amount of explosive powder. At the tip of the round is the fuze, which contains a battery that is activated when the round begins spinning. The small mechanical and electronic components of the fuze determine when and where the round explodes, whether on impact or in the air above the target. Each of these components must be mass-produced, and each has its own complex manufacturing story.

Rolls of steel (left) stored at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (right) (Hannah Beier / Getty; Aimee Dilger / SOPA / Getty)

At the Scranton facility, 155-millimeter howitzer shells drying on a conveyor belt (Aimee Dilger / SOPA / Getty)

Making energetics, in particular, is expensive, difficult, and, traditionally, a major source of pollution. In the U.S., old Army-ammunition plants figure prominently in the more than 600 military facilities the EPA has designated as Superfund sites—priority cleanup areas. Today the Iowa plant is clean enough that the land around it is used for recreational hunting and fishing and is considered a haven for some endangered species. But in years past, after the plant was steam cleaned to prevent the buildup of explosive dust and residue, the streams in nearby Burlington ran pink, which is the color TNT turns when exposed to sunlight. The plant is still regularly steam cleaned, but with strict and expensive runoff controls—the cost of environmental stewardship is steep. So, on top of other obstacles that stand in the way of a rapid surge in production—not just of howitzer shells but of any military ordnance and equipment—you can add the legitimate demands of “good government”: environmental regulations, safety regulations, and all the built-in safeguards against waste and fraud.

One more thing: Workers capable of handling jobs at the military’s industrial plants don’t just walk in off the street. “Generally, it takes two years for an average line worker in munitions to be effective,” the Science Board report noted. “For energetics, that timeline is extended to seven years.”

Ramping up existing plants, like the one in Scranton that forges the steel casings for howitzer shells, is done by doubling and then tripling the number of eight-hour work shifts. This has been accomplished in the two years since the invasion of Ukraine; generous overtime benefits and new hires keep plants running around the clock. But the facilities themselves are antiques. A small fire broke out at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in September, forcing the evacuation of the affected building. No one was injured, but the incident raised concerns about vulnerability. Portions of the plant date back to the 19th century. Originally built to maintain rails and railcars—it still sits astride a rail line in the city center—it became a giant steel foundry during the Korean War. Today many of its union workers are long-tenured and are second- and third-generation employees. Its dark and cavernous interiors could be sets for a Hollywood horror movie. Inside are giant vats where heavy billets of HF-1 steel are melted down and stretched into elongated cylinders. Glowing bright orange, they descend on metal rollers one by one to a noisy production line as they gradually cool to a dull gray. Each is then reheated until malleable inside a large device that pounds and tapers the top, creating an aerodynamic, bulletlike contour. To work as intended, the casings must exactly fit the firing tubes, so they are inspected and measured repeatedly along the line. The casings are then buffed to a high sheen. Much of this is hands-on work. Suspended from a wire, each shell passes through a spray-paint station, where the bright surface is coated a dull, army-issue green.

In Iowa, where the casings go for the LAP stage, shells are hoisted one by one onto an assembly line. Workers engrave ID numbers and the initials TNT on each. The shells are then stacked in neat rows on carts that hold about 50. A funnel is placed atop each, and workers guide the carts into a long wooden shed that stretches a few hundred yards to the melt-pour building. On the way, the shells are heated and cooled repeatedly, curing the metal for the TNT pour. One at a time, the carts are rolled into position beneath the melt-pour kettle, two stories above. The slurry flows down through the steel tubes to completely fill each shell. From there, the shells are rolled through a covered walkway to a building where each round is separately X-rayed. Technicians behind computer screens scan each image for imperfections in the pour.

When American ships began striking Houthi targets in Yemen in January, they fired more Tomahawks on the first day than were purchased in all of last year.

This painstaking process is eliminated in newer plants in other countries, where TNT is inserted with a more efficient method called “screw extrusion,” one very thin layer at a time. The process virtually eliminates imperfections. It is not new. The modern form of the process was developed in the 1960s, and is yet another example of how static U.S. production methods have remained. The Army opened part of its first automated shell-production facility in Mesquite, Texas, early this year, and a new LAP plant is under construction in Camden, Arkansas. Crucial expansion of energetics production is under way at Holston, and of propellant production at Radford. Most of these projects are years from being completed. They will require skilled workers and customized new equipment. And once they are all fully operational, which could take years, they will need a lot of energetics. For that, in September 2023, the Army signed $1.5 billion in new contracts. Some of the contracts have gone to companies in the U.S., but others have gone to firms in Canada, India, and Poland.

The Pentagon hopes that this expansion will bring production of 155-millimeter howitzer shells to 100,000 rounds a month by 2026—up from the current level of 40,000 a month. NATO countries are also expanding production. All of this will help, but it will also increase competition for scarce minerals and explosives. Poland, for instance, has its own 144-mile border with Russia, and is engaged in its own military buildup. It may be one of the world’s largest manufacturers of TNT, but it isn’t going to sell all of it.

Ukraine is also desperately in need of missiles (Javelins, Stingers), anti-missile systems, and rocket-launching platforms such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, better known by its acronym, HIMARS. These are far more sophisticated weapons, and for most of them, American manufacture has been at an all-time low. Production of Stingers, chiefly an anti-aircraft weapon, was off and on until 2023, when the manufacturer, Raytheon, called in retired engineers and production was fully resumed. Production of Tomahawks, the Navy’s premier cruise missile, is anemic. When American ships began striking Houthi targets in Yemen in January, they fired more Tomahawks on the first day than were purchased in all of last year. The Navy has stockpiles, but clearly that rate of use is unsustainable. And missiles are far more complex than artillery rounds. They require a greater variety of scarce explosives as well as highly intricate electronics. While one howitzer round draws on about 50 different suppliers, a single missile depends on as many as 500, from dozens of countries.

From the June 2023 issue: Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg on Ukraine’s fight against Russia and the future of the democratic world

Imagine, as the Science Board did, that America was drawn unexpectedly into another significant war. If we are years behind meeting the demands of Ukraine, how would we fare if we had to provide naval support and ground troops to defend Taiwan? Or if a NATO country was invaded by Putin’s Russia? Or if an expanding Middle East conflict draws the U.S. in more deeply? Worried about possible abandonment of Ukraine by Donald Trump, the Biden administration has stepped up deliveries of weapons and equipment—inevitably prompting concerns about the adequacy of our own stockpiles.

A Ukrainian soldier fires a howitzer against Russian troops, 2024. (Tyler Hicks / The New York Times / Redux)

America’s lack of preparedness crept up on the country gradually. Ammo production reached a low after 2001, when the 9/11 attacks shifted the military’s focus to al-Qaeda and other nonstate enemies. Arms manufacture had already slowed. Factories were closing. The brevity of the Gulf War, in 1991, when Saddam Hussein’s army was swept from Kuwait in five days, had reinforced a belief that stocking and maintaining prodigious supplies of weapons and ammunition was no longer needed. Even the years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, after 9/11, mostly involved intelligence, surveillance, and the small mobile infantry units of Special Forces. There was a brief upsurge in the production of heavily armored vehicles to counter mines and roadside bombs in Iraq, but even that long war did not halt the overall downward trend. An official Army history of the American weapons industry, completed in 2010, noted that “the current industrial base is the smallest it has been.” And it has continued to shrink.

IV. The Last Supper

The hollowing-out of America’s arms-manufacturing capacity is partly a granular story about factories and supply chains and the labor force. The size and complexity of the industrial base are important to understand. But the forces that shape manufacturing efforts in Iowa and Pennsylvania and elsewhere trace back to Washington, D.C. They involve politics, policy debates, military doctrine, expert predictions, taxpayer money, and, ultimately, the application of national will.

The way we’ve envisaged—and planned for—future wars has led us down a dangerous path. There were always voices warning of the need to anticipate the possibility of a protracted ground war somewhere—and warning, too, of the strain that such a war would place on U.S. arms production. For instance, in his 2020 book, The Kill Chain, Christian Brose, a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, considered how a U.S. clash with China over Taiwan—“peer competitors fighting with most, if not all, of the same weapons”—could easily erode into a brutal stalemate. Testifying before Congress in 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the retiring head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, cautioned that such a conflict could occur within the next six years—the so-called Davidson window.

But U.S. military doctrine emphatically was not focused on fighting or supporting a major ground war, and the prospect of such a war in Europe in the 21st century seemed especially unlikely. So did the potential need for millions of conventional artillery rounds in an age of missiles. It would be as if, after World War II, there had been a sudden call for mounted cavalry. “There was always some bit of a protracted-conflict scenario,” Bill LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, told me, using strategic jargon for bloody fighting on a massive scale with no end in sight. “But the idea that we would be spending or sending to another country 2 million rounds of 155”—the howitzer shells—“I don’t think was really thought through.” And if someone had raised the possibility, the response would have been: “I don’t see that scenario.”

It is part of the Pentagon’s job to imagine unlikely scenarios.

War always upends expectations. Generals plot for surprise. And once wars begin, they evolve in unexpected ways. “Strategic judgments about future environments are often, one might say predictably, wrong,” wrote Richard Danzig, a former secretary of the Navy, in his influential 2011 monograph, Driving in the Dark. Today he’s an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington think tank. He was previously a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board.

At the Ukraine war’s outset, most analysts in the defense community believed that it would last only days or weeks. Russia would roll over its smaller neighbor, oust Zelensky, and install a compliant regime. Instead, the invasion triggered a valiant defense that rallied the Western world. Two years later, the war has evolved into a stalemate, one that has been called “World War I with technology.” Ukraine’s army has mounted an effective defense in part by the heavy use of artillery, especially howitzers. LaPlante described a recent tour of World War I battlefields and the immediate resonance he felt with the war in Ukraine—the men dug into trenches, the continual bombardment, the relentless attrition. There had been an assumption, LaPlante said, that stealth and precision weaponry would somehow preclude this type of warfare, but “it turns out it didn’t.”

War planning occurs in a political and strategic context bigger than the Pentagon, which is another reason the U.S. finds itself where it is. Much of the reduction in America’s arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate—a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the heads of some two dozen of the military’s biggest contractors were invited to a dinner at the Pentagon by then–Defense Secretary Les Aspin. Details of the meeting eventually emerged in press accounts. Such a gathering was unusual, and no agenda was announced, so the executives were understandably curious as they were shown into a plain, white-walled dining room off Aspin’s office.

As a representative from Wisconsin, Aspin had, in 1990, led efforts in Congress to begin shrinking defense spending. The Berlin Wall had come down in 1989. The Soviet Union was fracturing. It was a heady time. The U.S. was no longer squared off against another superpower. Aspin had called for “a new kind of defense,” and now, with Bill Clinton in the White House, he was charged with shaping it. Everyone at the dinner knew change was coming. No one was sure exactly what it would look like.

Norm Augustine, then the CEO of Martin Marietta and a onetime undersecretary of the Army, was seated next to Aspin at the dinner table. He asked what was going on.

“Well, in about 15 minutes you’re going to find out,” Aspin replied, “and you probably aren’t going to like it.”

After the meal, the group was led to a briefing room, where William Perry, Aspin’s deputy, stood beside a screen and presented the plan: a dramatic reduction in defense spending. Perry explained that there were too many private contractors, and the Pentagon could no longer afford them all. The fallout would be drastic, he said. Charts showed various categories of purchasing. In some, only one contractor would likely be left with enough business to survive.

Augustine paid particular attention to the forecast for the aerospace industry. It showed that out of more than a dozen existing contractors in his field, perhaps only two or three would remain viable. He was stunned. For many of those in the room, it meant their companies were doomed. They would either go out of business or be sold or absorbed by a competitor. Augustine came to refer to the meeting as the Last Supper.

Perry, who would succeed his boss as defense secretary, was not wrong. Within a decade, the number of prime defense contractors—large companies that typically employ scores of subcontractors on big projects—fell from 51 to five. In terms of personnel, the military shrank by 15 percent. The effect on defense manufacturing was drastic: According to Augustine, the aerospace industry alone lost 40 percent of its employees in the 1990s. Of course, Pentagon spending cuts were not the only factor—American manufacturing in general had been in a long decline as lower wages overseas and the effect of free-trade agreements drained jobs away. But the impact of spending cuts was deep.

For the past three decades, the U.S. war machine’s private sector has been dominated by the Big Five, confirming a 1997 prediction by John Mintz of The Washington Post: “By the end of his second term, it may emerge that President Clinton’s most enduring legacy in national security will be his role in creating a handful of extraordinarily powerful defense contractors.” Fewer players meant less competition, and because the five were so big, they undermined one of America’s greatest strengths—its seemingly inexhaustible bounty of bright entrepreneurs with new ideas. The Big Five spent a lot on research and development and had the capacity to rapidly expand if a product took hold, but the galaxy of small entrepreneurial players was diminished. It became harder for start-ups to compete and thus to remain alive.

Some held on by gaming the system. Bill Greenwalt, a defense analyst with AEI, explained to me that many companies became experts at “just getting a couple million dollars doing a science project” floated by the Pentagon, and then, when that speculative R&D project was done, “raising their hand” for another. They were accustomed to the concepts they developed going no further. If they did, the next step, turning the idea into a prototype, needed a steeper level of funding. If the concept cleared that hurdle, an even bigger one loomed: winning the funds to expand production. These obstacles became known as “the valley of death,” because so many promising ideas and even proven prototypes died trying to make the leaps. The Big Five were better positioned to succeed than were smaller upstarts. And the Pentagon, like all large bureaucracies, is inherently cautious. Bigness meant being able to underwrite prototypes and expand production lines quickly. The upshot was both to curtail innovation and to deflect attention away from basic needs.

One of the most famous examples of this dynamic was an unmanned aircraft invented by the Israeli aerospace engineer Abe Karem originally called Albatross, then Amber, and finally the GNAT-750. He won a Pentagon contract in the 1980s to design something better than the drone prototype offered by Lockheed Martin, known as the Aquila. And he delivered, building a machine that cost far less, required just three operators instead of 30, and could stay aloft much longer than the Aquila could. Everyone was impressed. But his prototype vanished into the valley of death. Although it was a better drone, Aquila looked good enough, and Lockheed Martin was a familiar quantity. But Aquila didn’t work out. Neither did alternatives, including the Condor, from another of the Big Five, Boeing. Only after years of expensive trial and error was Karem’s idea resurrected. It became the Predator, the first hugely successful military drone. By then, Karem’s company had been absorbed into General Atomics—and Karem lost what would have been his biggest payday.

“There are hundreds of Abe Karems out there in America today, and they get frustrated by the department,” Greenwalt said. “They move out to the commercial sector. Every one of those companies, I would argue, has probably got someone there who met the valley of death in DoD and is now doing something crazy in the commercial marketplace because that’s where the money is.”

The flow of defense dollars to the Big Five didn’t just stifle innovation. It also concentrated a growing share of available dollars into weapons systems of the costliest and least ordinary kind. If there is one major lesson to be drawn from the war in Ukraine, apart from the need for an ability to produce drones, munitions, and missiles fast, it’s that small and cheap beats big and expensive—which is the opposite of the assumptions that underlie much of America’s military spending. Drone warfare continues to teach that lesson.

The Pentagon has launched expensive programs, still unfolding, to design and build small drone fleets. Meanwhile, Ukraine and Russia have both been using drones that can be bought off the shelf and adapted to military use, all for a tiny fraction of what the U.S. has spent. With its vibrant tech sector, Ukraine has excelled in configuring commercial drones for the rapidly changing conditions of the battlefield. For instance, the Ukrainians have recently made great strides in autonomous terminal guidance—preprogramming drones with target information so that if the weapon encounters electronic jamming, it will remain on course. Stacie Pettyjohn, the director of the defense program at CNAS, explained that the Pentagon has been working on this technology, too—but with a project that has been years in development and has cost hundreds of millions of dollars. “The Ukrainians are doing it for a few thousand dollars in some guy’s garage,” she said.

The same cost disparity is evident in defending against drone attacks—what LaPlante has called “the problem of our time.” Patriot missiles, which cost $1 million apiece, were not intended for this. The Pentagon is pouring millions into developing countermeasures. But the answers are more likely to come from a tech start-up—from someone like Abe Karem. Over the past half century, the Pentagon has become more of a buyer than an inventor, but it remains a notoriously deliberate customer. Acquisition procedures, legal requirements, and funding issues slow to a crawl on the path from concept to production.

A bulletin board near the furnace area of Scranton’s production floor (Michael S. Williamson / The Washington Post / Getty)

V. A Loss of Will

As shocking as the Last Supper may have been to industry leaders, the larger policy impulse made sense—as much sense as a drawdown did when World War II ended. It was painful, but defense spending has always been a roller coaster. The problem was not the drawdown itself but the structure left in place—heavily corporate in terms of major weapons systems, and yet astonishingly thin in terms of basic manufacturing. If some disaster—an accident, an attack—befell the Holston Army Ammunition Plant, the Army would quickly run out of bombs. All American aircraft carriers and submarines today are powered by small nuclear reactors. A single company makes them: BWX Technologies, in Lynchburg, Virginia.

Less money is only part of the issue. Congress controls the funding, and its dysfunction has had a profoundly negative effect on the military’s manufacturing capacity. The decline of the American war machine reflects both corrosive partisanship and a loss of direction and will.

Most of the defense budget—more than 80 percent of it—is essentially allocated before the generals get their hands on it. The budget has, in effect, calcified. Its main expense categories have barely shifted in years. Personnel is the biggest fixed cost, at about 40 percent. The million-person-plus military earns pay and benefits, health first among them. Keeping pace with inflation, those costs steadily grow. More money is spent on health care for military members and their families each year than is spent on building ships. And then there’s competition from private employers. Skilled welders, for instance, who have learned their craft in the Navy, can find ready employment in private shipyards when their tour of service ends—for higher pay and greater benefits. “Staying competitive with the private sector,” Mackenzie Eaglen wrote in a 2022 AEI paper, “means the ‘mandatory’ spending bills get larger every year—whether the overall budget grows or not.” The Pentagon, she reported, “spends almost ten billion more on Medicare than on new tactical vehicles, and more on environmental restoration and running schools than on microelectronics and space launches combined.” The growth in personnel costs is so large that even when the Army has trimmed its ranks, the budget percentage has not gone down.

From the May 2018 issue: Phil Klay on the eroding morale of America’s troops

Another huge chunk of the budget goes to operations and maintenance, which also increases as equipment ages. Keeping aircraft, ships, tanks, and troop carriers combat-ready is not optional.

The relatively small slice of the Pentagon budget available for other kinds of spending—at most 15 percent, and possibly half that amount—is still a lot of money, but competition for it is fierce. The manufacture of munitions, arguably the least sexy budget item, falls prey to the infighting. Would the Pentagon brass rather build a new generation of jets and ships and missiles, or instead notch up production of artillery shells that, under scenarios seen as likely, would never be used? Munitions have become known inside the Pentagon as a “bill payer”—something that can always be cut in order to make the budget balance.

Meanwhile, timely, coherent federal budgeting is no more. Congress routinely fails to pass appropriations bills on schedule, resorting to continuing resolutions. This keeps defense dollars coming but limits their use to existing projects. That would not be a problem if it happened only occasionally, but Congress has given the defense department a fully authorized budget on time only once in the past 15 years. This helter-skelter process constrains the Pentagon from adapting quickly to changing circumstances. New projects are put on hold, and there’s no guarantee that money will eventually come. Private contractors need predictable dollar commitments to invest in new product lines, so they simply don’t invest. As one senior Pentagon official described it to me, the phenomenon is “an own goal that we do to ourselves every year.”

The U.S. today could not replicate the achievement of World War II. It could not build trucks and tanks and ships and airplanes in such volume.

When the demand for conventional ammo soared in 2022, established players in private industry—skeptical that the war in Ukraine would last long enough to make investment profitable—were reluctant to gear up. Some smaller companies have been tempted to step in but are also nervous about the risk. John Coffman, who owns a small munitions company called Armada Ammunition, based in Greensboro, Florida, is currently eyeing an opportunity to begin manufacturing howitzer ammo. He has hedge funds offering millions for him to begin making the rounds. He knows how to do it and has even lined up suppliers for the raw materials. The demand is clearly there—for the moment. But what happens if it suddenly isn’t? Wars do end, or at least subside. “Then you have all this machinery and all this product that you just ordered,” he says. And no guarantee that Washington will keep your company whole.

Coffman’s situation is a microcosm of the one faced by any private manufacturer with military contracts. If Congress wanted to get serious about sustaining the military-industrial base, measures could be devised to give companies a cushion, a guarantee of security. Manufacturers nationwide faced the same dynamic during World War II, and the federal government stepped in and smothered the problem with dollars—efficiency or penny-pinching was not as important as getting the job done. The problem today is not the scale of global war. The way Congress works today would not just cripple arms and ammunition supply in a global war; it would cripple it in war on any scale.

VI. Driving in the Dark

John Quirk, a former Army officer who is now a senior staffer with the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been tracking the shortage of howitzer shells in particular. He told me that the military has made some progress: “What they have done, I would say with large success in the Army and the acquisition community, is the work of a guy by the name of Doug Bush.”

Bush appears to be, in the words of one of his friends, “the perfect nerd for the job.” Slender, prim, graying hair gone white at the temples, he is obsessively smart about abstruse things—a bureaucrat’s bureaucrat. He is also the official who made that “own goal” remark.

Bush is the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisitions, logistics, and technology. It is a mouthful of a title that is usually dispensed with in favor of the spoken acronym ASA(ALT)—rhymes with basalt—an important but little-known position in the upper echelons of the Pentagon hierarchy. Bush is also the Army’s science adviser and senior research and development official. The job is more than just building or buying what he is ordered to supply. It also means obtaining funding from Congress, which is hardly automatic.

Bush knows the Army (he is a West Point graduate and served for five years as an army officer in an infantry unit), and—perhaps more important—he knows Congress (he was a longtime staff member of the House Armed Services Committee). He became ASA(ALT) two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine. When war came, he and his team began asking the basic questions: How much ammo would Ukraine need? Of what we had, how much would we need to hold back? Could we make more? How fast? Could we keep up with the demand? The answer to every one of these questions was either “We don’t know” or, simply, “No.”

Bush worked with Congress on “special authorities” for emergency contracts and helped persuade his old colleagues on Capitol Hill to pass, rapid-fire, a series of supplemental funding bills. One of the biggest challenges was just finding enough explosives. “We’re going to use all the TNT capacity in the world we can get access to,” Bush told me when we spoke at length this summer. But that addresses only short-term requirements. For the longer term, there needs to be major new energetics production—primarily of TNT and IMX—here in the United States. “So that’s going to be hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of investment that we are going to build out as fast as we can,” he said. In November, the Army awarded a contract to build a TNT plant in Kentucky. The U.S. has promised Ukraine more than 5 million artillery rounds, 500 million small-caliber ammo rounds, and much more. It has also committed billions of dollars to replenishing stockpiles for American forces. For all their accomplishments, what Bush and others have done is merely stabilize the patient in the ER. Systemic dysfunction remains.

Bill LaPlante, looking at the future from a different angle than Bush does, sees even more to be concerned about. If the U.S. finds itself on a back foot when it comes to 19th- and 20th-century technology, how will it confront challenges that are even more sophisticated? In his role as undersecretary of defense, he is tasked with making the kinds of predictions he knows not to trust. How does a huge institution that spends billions and employs millions make sound plans if its assumptions are consistently wrong? How do you prepare to be unprepared?

Today the most obvious threat is “high-volume fire”—large numbers of small, cheap kamikaze drones attacking all at once, swarming and overwhelming defenses. This isn’t some futuristic scenario. It is happening in Ukraine. Imagine if the Iranians or Houthis could send 300 drones and missiles against one or two American ships in the Persian Gulf. The Defense Department is at work on ways to defeat such attacks—by means of AI-assisted targeting for rapid-fire weapons, for instance, or by directing a strong electromagnetic pulse to destroy the drones’ robotic controls. Other potential threats include hypersonic missiles, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks—and these are only the threats that are known. “Just get over the fact that you’re not going to predict everything,” LaPlante told me. Rather, he advised, we need to “plan for adaptability.”

LaPlante cited Danzig’s Driving in the Dark as a blueprint. He said that its prescriptions for coping with uncertainty are guiding the Pentagon’s thinking, at least for now. Metaphorically, Danzig’s approach departs from the traditional fortress concept—a hardened wall of defenses—to embrace a more immunological strategy, more like the way the body defends itself against pathogens. New viruses appear, and the body adapts to counter them. Translating that into national defense means preparing to be surprised and prioritizing weapons systems that can, like antibodies, be altered and mass-produced swiftly. It means leaning on software, particularly AI, that can weigh alternatives and repurpose existing assets faster than people can. To counter the effects of the Last Supper, it means emphasizing shorter-term contracts with a more numerous variety of smaller companies, thereby encouraging both competition and innovation. (Cellphones offer an example of this dynamic; they’re designed for the short term because they can so quickly become outmoded.) It means adopting manufacturing methods that can be rapidly repurposed when the need for some product suddenly ends. All of this, taken together, would radically alter the Pentagon’s status quo and redraw the military-industrial map. Doing so will not be easy. It will require extraordinary cooperation among Congress, the Pentagon, and the private sector.

“I think we could, I really do,” said General Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, and the person charged with making these decisions, when I asked him this spring if the U.S. was truly capable of pursuing a new strategy and way of doing business. “I think it would be painful. People would feel it. But I still am a believer in American ingenuity.”

General Randy George (center, seated) at the Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, 2024 (Eric Thayer / The Washington Post / Getty)

One experiment George mentioned is the Replicator initiative, which is as much an innovation in process as it is in war-fighting. It draws significantly upon what military experts have learned from Ukraine. As Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks explains, it will rapidly produce “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems, including relatively small, inexpensive drones. These will also have a modular structure capable of being adapted in the field to a variety of ends. Using existing and planned Pentagon funds, the project will rely on a number of small producers to achieve the volume needed. The idea is to enable a faster jump over the steepest obstacle in the valley of death, the one from proven prototype to mass production.

Creating a more varied and competitive field of military contractors means investing in many that will fail—a high-risk game. Anyone who spends big on arms production needs predictable budgets and certainty of sales. So the Pentagon will have to shoulder some of that risk. And if the government is underwriting the effort, a lot will ride on who is leading the government.

The current push will take a decade or more to become fully functional, and will cost a lot more than even the generous sums Congress has been shelling out piecemeal over the past few years. The costs and risks of the direction LaPlante defines will meet resistance. The Big Five are a powerful lobbying force and will have allies in Congress and possibly in the new administration, whose plans and ambitions, and basic competence, are question marks. As always, there will be a strong penchant to stick with the familiar.

VII. The Choice

Even if the current experiments do morph into something permanent, they will represent a change in only one part of the procurement system. They will do nothing to address the fact that our national politics, which traditionally have united around issues of national defense, don’t reliably do so any longer. They will not cure congressional dysfunction. They will not change our reliance on foreign supply chains. They will not obviate the need for environmental and safety regulations that add costs and slow down manufacturing. They will not alter the fact that war always confounds expectations, or that people will continue to balk at spending billions based on the proposition “What if?”

Absent a screaming national emergency, the U.S. has never been good at steering steadily in a clear strategic direction. The system for equipping the war machine is “peacetime designed,” Douglas Bush explained. “The basis of it is not built for war.”

One thing the U.S. should definitely do, he believes, is to stop thinking of America as the arsenal of democracy. Perhaps in theory we could go it alone—could press what’s left of our manufacturing capacity to the single end of self-sufficient military production. But going it alone is not really an option. The task of supplying, running, and maintaining a modern war machine is beyond the capacity of any one nation. Starting from scratch and given three years to do it, the U.S. today could not replicate the achievement of World War II—could not build trucks and tanks and ships and airplanes in such volume. When we spoke, Bush suggested that it might be better to start thinking about an “arsenal of democracies”—that is, multinational partnerships among the major democracies, with America playing the major role. It would be maddening and messy and require immense energy devoted just to muddling through.

He didn’t mention the underlying premise: For the idea to work, we need to have democracies. And they need to stick together.

The Atlantic · by Mark Bowden · December 17, 2024

2. How Tucker Carlson Killed Mike Pompeo’s Hopes of Joining the Trump Administration

This is a former Army officer (Armor/Cavalry Captain I believe) who would have been very well qualified (and better suited than the current nominee) to be SECDEF and for a run for POTUS in 2028.

The allegations by Carlson that Pompeo plotted to assassinate Julian Assange seems one of the most preposterous things Carlson has ever spouted.

How Tucker Carlson Killed Mike Pompeo’s Hopes of Joining the Trump Administration

Former Fox News host and Donald Trump Jr. led a campaign to prevent Pompeo from getting an administration job

https://www.wsj.com/politics/trump-tucker-carlson-cabinet-pompeo-683d9150?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Vivian Salama

Follow

Updated Dec. 17, 2024 11:09 pm ET

Donald Trump and Tucker Carlson at an event in Phoenix. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—Shortly before the election, Tucker Carlson approached Donald Trump with an urgent plea: Mike Pompeo had to go.

Many in Trump’s inner circle believed that Pompeo, who served as secretary of state during Trump’s first term, was the clear front-runner to be the next defense secretary. The day before the election, Trump praised Pompeo during a campaign rally, marveling at his recent weight loss and twice calling him handsome.

But to Carlson—the former Fox News host who continues to have deep influence in conservative circles—Pompeo was a risky pick. Carlson argued that he is a warmonger. He highlighted to the president-elect a list of grievances he holds against Pompeo, including what he said was an alleged plot by the then-secretary of state to assassinate WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, according to multiple people with knowledge of Carlson’s efforts. Carlson went public with the allegations about Pompeo and Assange in an April interview on Joe Rogan’s podcast, without providing evidence.

Trump transition team spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt said that the president-elect’s “cabinet picks reflect his priority to put America first,” adding that he “will continue to appoint highly-qualified men and women who have the talent, experience, and necessary skill sets” to fulfill his agenda.

In October, Pompeo told Australia’s the Nightly that the U.S. has laws that make it illegal for the government to carry out assassinations and he complied with that law for “every moment” that he was CIA director.

Carlson and Donald Trump Jr., the president-elect’s oldest son, outlined what they said were the dangers of bringing neoconservatives into the administration—men and women, they claimed, who seek to control him, not serve him. They also argued that Pompeo had proven himself to be disloyal, the people said, pointing to Pompeo’s decision to distance himself from false claims that the 2020 election was stolen, and comments he made that the Jan. 6, 2021 riot at the Capitol by Trump supporters was “unacceptable.”

Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July. Photo: brian snyder/Reuters

Within days of the election, Pompeo was out of the running. The president-elect posted on Truth Social that Pompeo and Nikki Haley, Trump’s former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, wouldn’t be landing jobs in his administration.

The effort to bar Republicans such as Pompeo from the incoming administration is the latest chapter in the remaking of the party since Trump rose to power in 2016. Several officials who served in the first term, and were hoping to serve once again, were blocked by Trump allies, including Carlson and Trump Jr., who felt they didn’t meet the test of loyalty demanded of officials in Trump 2.0.

Officials such as Haley, who challenged Trump during the Republican primary, and former national security adviser Robert O’Brien were passed over for jobs as Trump and his team looked to stock his cabinet with “fresh blood,” as one transition official put it, who have roots in the MAGA movement. 

The perception among some within Trump’s inner circle is that appointees such as Pompeo would follow a more conventional GOP approach to national security policy by supporting U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts, such as Ukraine, or icing out traditional adversaries, such as Russia. Pete Hegseth, a military veteran and former Fox News host whom Trump chose to lead the Pentagon, has criticized U.S. involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, and has touted a controversial view that women should be barred from combat. But Hegseth’s path to confirmation has been fraught with challenges because of a number of personal controversies. 

Trump himself has bashed what he refers to as “RINOs”—short for “Republicans in Name Only.” In cementing his second term in office and a sweeping victory for Republicans across the country, Trump and his staunchest supporters have managed to reshape the party of Ronald Reagan, purging many from office who failed to meet the criteria of Trump and his MAGA faithful. 

Trump Jr. told The Wall Street Journal in October that, as co-chair of his father’s transition team, his priority was “preventing the bad actors from getting in” to the next Trump administration. “There’s a lot of people that put the ‘R’ next to their name, but then they do whatever the swamp wants, because they are looking for the next consulting gig or something such as that,” he said. 

That effort heavily factored into the shaping of Trump’s future cabinet. A number of prospective administration officials who have interviewed with the transition team said that in addition to the questions they were asked about their vision for respective agencies, they were asked about their views on the events of Jan. 6 and whether the 2020 election was rigged, according to several people involved in the process.

Carlson has aired a litany of grievances against Pompeo, who also served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He has told advisers to Trump that Pompeo’s lawyer threatened him after he said on his show that a source informed him that the CIA was somehow involved in the death of President John F. Kennedy, the people familiar with the discussions said.

Following Trump’s social-media post declaring that his former secretary of state wouldn’t be returning for the second term, Pompeo wrote on X that he was proud to work with Trump, adding “you and I built the plan that made the world safer and led to no new wars.”

Trump has instead leaned in on selecting nominees who will shake things up in Washington and adhere to his unorthodox vision for reshaping the government. Hegseth’s nomination will be a test of the loyalty of Senate Republicans. Hegseth is facing allegations of sexual misconduct and excessive drinking, which he has denied. 

Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), whom Trump nominated for secretary of state, is expected to win bipartisan support in the Senate. But the selection of Rubio over a number of other officials viewed as closer to the MAGA movement, including former acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, was viewed with skepticism among Trump loyalists who see Rubio as too mainstream. 

Over the weekend, Trump named Grenell his presidential envoy for special missions. In that role, he will focus on Venezuela and North Korea, Trump said.

The State Department is among the agencies that is home to the so-called “deep state,” according to many Trump allies, who have accused agency staff of working against Trump’s agenda in the first term.  

Rubio, Trump’s onetime political opponent and critic, has grown close with the future president and has embraced some of his more controversial views, while steering clear of others. Last year, he released a report titled “‘Diversity Over Diplomacy’—How Wokeness is Weakening the U.S. State Department,” which said that the State Department gave priority to diversity, equity and inclusion over building international relationships and protecting America’s national security—echoing the sentiments of Trump and many MAGA Republicans.

Still, people close to the transition said Rubio’s job would be a target of MAGA Republicans, some of whom hope Trump will eventually replace him with someone whom they view as more aligned with the president-elect’s vision. The people added that Rubio’s senior staffing choices will also be heavily scrutinized if he doesn’t hire Republicans who adhere to Trump’s policy priorities.

Rubio didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Keach Hagey contributed to this article.

Write to Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com

3. Countering China’s Maritime Narrative: The Role of Journalism in Gray Zone Conflict

Excerpt:

This should be an opportunity for reflection by journalists and editors. What is the tipping point after which the media begins to highlight the injustices being done by China against an American ally? When will the media begin to pressure US politicians to secure our allies and partners in the region and uphold international commitments? Now is the time for journalists to bring awareness to the American people regarding China’s new attempts at norm building while there is still an opportunity to influence US leaders and build cohesion among partners.

Countering China’s Maritime Narrative: The Role of Journalism in Gray Zone Conflict

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/18/countering-chinas-maritime-narrative/

by Jay Heisler, by David Geaney

|

12.18.2024 at 06:00am

The free press has done little to hold Western elected leaders accountable for their complacence and negligence in their duty to provide for the common defense. Allies and partners are critical to the security of Western nations and the values and interests they uphold, but this fact is often taken for granted. Allies and partners need to know they will be supported against belligerent actors like China, but too often Western political leaders are reticent to take substantive action due to fears of escalation. As a consequence, allies and partners begin to question Western commitment to their defense and resort to hedging strategies that erode the relationship.

Challenges and Solutions

Western press does not emphasize the importance of strong relationships with allies and partners on deterrence against adversaries, thus our risk-averse leaders feel no pressure to hold authoritarian countries accountable for undermining the rules-based international order and the free and open societies it promotes. Journalists have a sacred responsibility in this defense endeavor, which involves informing the public about threats to their way of life, highlighting the shortfalls of Western political and military leadership, and also making politicians answer for their inaction on national security matters.

For over a decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has employed gray zone tactics to assert apocryphal claims of sovereignty over vast swathes of territory on its periphery with no regard for the territorial claims of its neighbors. Despite a 2016 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal that ruled against China’s excessive territorial claims, China published a map in 2024 with a ten-dash line encapsulating territory in the South and East China Sea. China has since disguised various diplomatic, economic, and military intimidation tactics as domestic policing initiatives to disrupt other claimants’ operations and activities.

The CCP’s territorial subterfuge employs riot-control tactics akin to those used in locations like Tiananmen and Hong Kong. The CCP accompanies these actions with messaging similar to the narrative used for internal policing matters, juxtaposed with claims of securing claimed sovereign territory. The penetration of this messaging can be seen in Western media’s continued reference to “disputed areas”, “competing claimants” and “highly contested” claims, which places China’s assertions of sovereignty on par with those of the Philippines and Vietnam, even though the territory in question is well within the internationally recognized exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the latter countries.

This Chinese strategy is not new, or even reserved to enforcement of South China Sea claims. During a series of incidents along the Line of Actual Control between India and China from 2020 to 2023, Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed with melee weapons, resulting in at least two dozen deaths. This followed years of infrastructure buildup on the Chinese side of the border, which had induced a security dilemma for India and resulted in reciprocal buildup. While the culminating violent confrontations were covered in Western media, they were treated as isolated events and not part of a larger CCP strategy to intimidate neighbors through military buildup and employment of gray zone tactics. By failing to tie the clashes with India to the CCP’s grandiose assertions of sovereignty elsewhere, the media allowed Western officials to respond with perfunctory condemnations and offers of mediation, but no real action to deter future aggression.  This decision to employ rhetoric over action has empowered the CCP to accelerate escalation with countries along its periphery.

Since 2023, China’s military gray zone strategy has been especially pernicious within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) , all in an attempt to dissuade Philippine activity in areas claimed by China. In the last couple years, Chinese Navy and Coast Guard vessels have employed water cannons, sonar, and even swords to intimidate and deter Philippine sailors resupplying a military outpost on Scarborough Shoal. While Western officials have condemned these attacks, they have not done anything to counter them. This toothless response has encouraged the CCP to escalate harassment in areas like Sabina Shoal, which is only 75 miles away from Palawan and well within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In every instance, China is careful to keep provocations just below the level of modern armed conflict, whilst still pushing the envelope to elicit a reaction. Lethality in encounters with the Philippines would risk triggering the 1951 US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. However, China has successfully transferred the riot tactics it used along the border with India as well as in quelling domestic unrest to the internationally recognized EEZ of the Philippines.

This is one of the most tenuous and consequential conflicts in the world which coincides with a substantial deployment of US troops to the Philippines. Yet, if asked about the dispute most Westerners would likely get several key facts wrong about it. For one, they might assume that the South China Sea belongs to China simply due to its name. The media could reshape this public perception by following the Philippine naming convention for the sea within their 200 nautical mile EEZ, identifying the area as the West Philippine Sea instead of the South China Sea. This is especially relevant because China’s claims to the territory were invalidated by a 2016 ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration of UNCLOS. Further, many underestimate how intentional of a conflict this is because it is generally framed as fishing boats ramming each other. This obfuscates the reality that China is utilizing large Coast Guard vessels and maritime militia fleets to intentionally endanger smaller Philippines vessels and crews operating in Scarborough and Sabina Shoal.

Chinese actions in the waters of the Philippines have proven a little too easy to play down for Western journalists owing to the seemingly crude nature of the violence used by the Chinese side. Journalists and academics have lumped employment of this violence into the catch-all category of “gray zone” tactics, which includes anything that falls short of war. As recently at 4 December 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels “side-swiped” and used water cannons on a smaller Philippine vessel near Scarborough Shoal, only 140 nautical miles from the Philippines’ Luzon Island, but coverage continued to present both sides as potentially legitimate. China is treating problems in claimed territory of the South China Sea as domestic issues, demonstrated by the obvious parallels to their authoritarian approach with domestic dissidents in places like Tiananmen and Hong Kong. Western media’s determination not to take sides helps elevate China’s invalid claims and drives the narrative of a legitimate territorial dispute, rather than what it is: an attempt at forcible annexation from China.

The Philippines is a democracy on the frontlines against authoritarianism and has had a lasting relationship with the West, which over the decades has included joint military bases as well as economic and disaster relief cooperation. If such a steadfast partner as the Philippines can be subject to authoritarian intimidation tactics without facing consequences, then why would other countries have confidence in the West’s commitment to their security?

The US and its allies must demonstrate they are steadfast and reliable partners willing to take risks to uphold commitments to allies, partners, and the rules-based international order. Unfortunately, when the media plays down the CCP’s attempt to enforce a Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics in the Indo-Pacific, it reduces pressure on Western political leaders to establish and enforce red lines. If confidence in the USU.S. led international system crumbles, alternative values and norms promoted by authoritarian regimes like the CCP will endanger the free and open society that enables journalism to thrive and serve the people.

Conclusion

This should be an opportunity for reflection by journalists and editors. What is the tipping point after which the media begins to highlight the injustices being done by China against an American ally? When will the media begin to pressure US politicians to secure our allies and partners in the region and uphold international commitments? Now is the time for journalists to bring awareness to the American people regarding China’s new attempts at norm building while there is still an opportunity to influence US leaders and build cohesion among partners.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or the U.S. Government.

Tags: China, INDO-PACIFIC, INDOPACOM, Maritime Aggression, Maritime Security, South China Sea

About The Authors

• 
  
• Jay Heisler
• Jay Heisler is a freelance journalist published in CNBC, the Washington Examiner, US Naval Institute Proceedings, and most frequently Voice of America, where he has been a regular Canada reporter since 2020. His work has focused on media criticism, immigration issues and mental health advocacy. He currently teaches part time at a university in Halifax, Canada.
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• David Geaney
• Major David Geaney is an Air Force Logistics Readiness Officer who has had multiple assignments and deployments to the Middle East and Pacific region. His articles on China have been published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Foreign Policy, Task & Purpose, and Defense News. He has also been a featured panelist for the International Studies Association and a guest on Air University's Indo-Pacific Visions.

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2024

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17. SBU sources confirmed to various Ukrainian and Western outlets that the SBU carried out a "special operation" to kill Kirillov, whom the SBU sources described as a "legitimate target" for his war crimes and use of banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian military. Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Representative Svetlana Petrenko announced that Sledkom's Main Investigative Department for Moscow launched an investigation into Kirillov's and Polikarpov's deaths after an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a scooter remotely detonated near a residential building on Ryazansky Prospect. Russian sources released later geolocated footage of the IED attack and its aftermath, showing a badly damaged entrance to the building and blown out windows. The SBU notably charged Kirillov in absentia on December 16 for being responsible for the mass use of banned chemical weapons in Ukraine and reported that Russian forces carried out over 4,800 attacks with chemical weapons in Ukraine under Kirillov's command.

The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine. Petrenko announced that Sledkom designated Kirillov's and Polokarpov's deaths as a terrorist act, and Russian officials such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized Kirillov's prominent role in spreading numerous (false) narratives about Ukraine's and NATO's alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. Kirillov spread several false narratives over the years, such as nonsensically claiming that the United States established "biolabs" in Ukraine and other countries around Russia and that the Pentagon deliberately destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) to spread contagious diseases via insects. The Kremlin notably used the false claims of Ukrainian use of biolabs as a pretext for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Federation Council Committee of Defense and Security Member Vladimir Chizhov among other Russian officials and propagandists claimed that Western and Ukrainian security officials hated Kirillov for "exposing" Western provocations in Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17.

• The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine.

• The Russian ultranationalist information space overwhelmingly called on the Kremlin to retaliate against Ukraine by targeting its military-political leadership and indirectly criticized the Kremlin's decision to not recognize the war in Ukraine as a full-scale war that also impacts the Russian rear.

• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed on December 16 that North Korean forces are engaged in combat operations and suffering losses in Kursk Oblast as Russian official sources continue to avoid reporting on or confirming the deployment of North Korean forces to combat in Russia.

• Neither the Kremlin nor the interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian bases in Syria, likely accounting for Russia's continued visible preparations at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus to withdraw forces despite claims and reports that the interim Syrian government might extend Russian basing rights.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin is scaling up the intended effects of its "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government officials, by tasking Russian regional governments to create more localized analogues.

5. Iran Update, December 17, 2024

Iran Update, December 17, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-17-2024

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) agreed to extend their temporary ceasefire in northeastern Syria “to the end of the week.” The ceasefire was originally meant to last from December 12 to 16. The SNA and Turkey deployed artillery and fighters to the front lines around Kobani on December 17 before the ceasefire extension  SDF elements under the Manbij Military Council engaged the SNA on Tishreen Dam for several hours on December 17, but fighting was mostly contained to the area

The SNA and Turkey may launch an offensive to capture Kobani and other SDF-held territory after the ceasefire expires. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Turkish military buildup near Kobani includes special operations forces and resembles preparations ahead of previous Turkish incursions into northern Syria. Local sources reported on December 16 that Turkey has dismantled the border wall near Kobani, further indicating that Turkish forces are preparing for offensive operations in the area. These possible preparations come shortly after the Turkish foreign affairs minister said on December 13 that a Turkish strategic objective is to “eliminate” the SDF.

The SDF wants to negotiate a permanent ceasefire under which it would establish “a demilitarized zone in Kobani” under US supervision. The SDF General Command released a statement accusing Turkey of wanting to seize and annex all Syrian territory. The possibility of an SNA-Turkish offensive comes as SDF is facing widespread defections from its ranks. The SDF called for Arab and Kurdish youth to ”join the ranks of the SDF” in a statement and has reportedly called up SDF fighters on break to help manage these defections.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: The US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA agreed to extend their temporary ceasefire in northeastern Syria “to the end of the week.” Turkey and the SNA appear to be preparing to launch an offensive to capture SDF-held Syrian territory after the ceasefire expires.

• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara announced that the HTS-led interim Syrian government will dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them under the new Defense Ministry. This announcement is part of Shara’s effort to rebuild the Syrian security sector.

• Syria: HTS leader Ahmed al Shara suggested that elections and the drafting of a new Syrian constitution are unlikely to occur in the near term. It is unclear therefore what will proceed after the term of the interim Syrian government expires in March 2025.

• Russia: Neither Russia nor the HTS-led interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian basing in Syria. Syrian reporting and visual evidence continue to suggest that Russian forces are preparing draw down significantly or even fully from Syria, however.

• Israel: Israel and Saudi Arabia may normalize relations during the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas, according to Israeli media. This report comes amid indications that Hamas has softened its maximalist position in talks with Israel. 

6. U.S. Collaboration With Pacific Allies Will Deter Aggression

But deterrence is no longer sufficient. Our alliances must help us win.  

Excerpt:

The United States is not seeking war with China. The United States should increase its options for peaceful means to reduce the likelihood of military conflict. Further military, economic, cultural, intelligence, and technological collaboration between the United States, Japan, and other Pacific allies will increase deterrence. Our unity and strength will keep the Pacific and the world at peace.

U.S. Collaboration With Pacific Allies Will Deter Aggression

By Kevin Ho

December 18, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/18/us_collaboration_with_pacific_allies_will_deter_aggression_1079406.html?mc_cid=8f01d8cb69

Economic interdependence between industrial countries will prevent war. So stated: The Great Illusion, a book published in 1909 predicting war will not happen in Europe. This is the belief we held before Russia invaded Ukraine. This is also the belief we are holding now in the face of China’s vocal challenges. War was not inevitable in the 20th century and must not become inevitable in the 21st century.

War with China should always be the last resort. The United States must utilize all peaceful means to prevent such a military conflict. The United States must collaborate with Japan and other Pacific allies to deter against Chinese aggression. Peace in East Asia is the goal that we can achieve together.

In 2017, Shinzo Abe, then Japanese prime minister, first voiced the idea of a: “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” China’s island-building in the South China Sea provides it with a strategic advantage. 21% of global trade transits in the South China Sea. Japan heavily depends on oil transports through the Malacca Strait. If China violates the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, it can disrupt global trade lanes and create a devastating blow to Japan’s economy and defense capability.

Since 2006, North Korea conducted 6 nuclear tests and fired numerous ballistic missiles over South Korea and Japan. On January 10, 2024, Kim Jong Un declared that “South Korea is the principal enemy of North Korea”. China has been providing political support to North Korea since the ceasefire of the Korean War. North Korea has also sent more than 10,000 troops to Russia to aid Putin’s invasion. The unpredictability of Kim’s intentions creates a volatile and precarious situation in East Asia.

On October 14th, 2024, China deployed a record 34 naval vessels and 125 aircraft in a so-called military drill surrounding the island of Taiwan. President Xi repeats the irredentist dream and destiny of China to “reunify” with Taiwan by 2049. If the island of Taiwan falls under China’s control, it would pose a significant threat to the U.S. national interest. It would also jeopardize the national security of America's democratic allies such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea. Finally, Taiwan produces 60% of the global share of semiconductors. The invasion of Taiwan would disrupt the global supply chain of high-tech products, and China would gain a substantial technological advantage.

President-elect Trump should revive the close relationship he established with Japan during his first term. Japan hosts 54,000 U.S. military personnel and is the U.S. closest ally in East Asia. In 2014, Japan passed a law to ratify collective self-defense with the United States. Our countries share the same values. President-elect Trump should encourage more military collaboration with Japan to guarantee freedom of navigation and protect the independence and sovereignty of Taiwan.

President-elect Trump should also provide more military training and defense weaponry to Taiwan so that it can defend itself. Taiwan's national security directly impacts Japan's national security, as well as our own. While the United States has no formal defense agreement with Taiwan and does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, the United States has a moral obligation to assist Taiwan in defending its freedom and democratic lifestyle. President-elect Trump should broker the creation of Japan-Taiwan military collaboration to enhance regional deterrence. He should also incentivize technological collaboration with Taiwan. The United States should become an alternative manufacturing hub to stabilize the supply chain of semiconductors in case of an outbreak of armed conflict in East Asia.

In 2007, the United States, Japan, Australia, and India created the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The dialogue creates an Asian Arc of Democracy and deters authoritarian ambitions. President-elect Trump should deepen the military, economic, cultural, intelligence, and technological ties between the Quad nations. Military power should not be the sole pillar to defend democratic values. The United States should tighten ties through exchanges as well.

President-elect Trump should also revive dialogue with Kim Jung Un and establish a direct communication channel with the hermit kingdom. The United States should strive to understand Kim’s intentions to steer North Korea away from Russian and Chinese influence and to mitigate his belligerent behavior. At the same time, the United States should strengthen collaboration with South Korea and Japan to establish a robust defensive alliance capable of deterring potential aggression from North Korea and China.

The ambivalent foreign policy of the British Empire invited the aggression of the German Empire in World War I. Relying solely on economic interdependence between the two empires did not prevent war from happening. The complete decoupling of the U.S. and China would be destructive to both countries and to the world economy. At the same time, the U.S. must protect and secure a steady supply chain of essential goods in case of a diplomatic fallout or war with China. Unlike the British before World War I, the United States must also present a strong stance demonstrating its commitment to defend democratic allies and the freedom of navigation. Peace through strength is not warmongering.

The United States is not seeking war with China. The United States should increase its options for peaceful means to reduce the likelihood of military conflict. Further military, economic, cultural, intelligence, and technological collaboration between the United States, Japan, and other Pacific allies will increase deterrence. Our unity and strength will keep the Pacific and the world at peace.

Kevin Ho is a graduate student at George Washington University pursuing Master's Degree in International relations.

7. Wakeup Call: The U.S. Risks Losing Latin America to China

Again, does our regional organization and do our combatant commands limit or hinder our focus against adversaries who operate globally?

Excerpt:

Washington cannot afford to sit on its hands and watch Beijing gradually take control of its traditional sphere of influence. Though the U.S. lacks the capacity to compete one-on-one in infrastructure development, by integrating its approach with allies and partners throughout the world, it can do what is needed to reassert its leadership over this critical region. But it must start acting now.

Wakeup Call: The U.S. Risks Losing Latin America to China

By Michael Cunningham

December 18, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/18/wakeup_call_the_us_risks_losing_latin_america_to_china_1079404.html?mc_cid=8f01d8cb69

When U.S. officials are asked about China, the discussion usually defaults to Taiwan or tariffs. But another threat from Beijing has been growing for years, and it can be found much closer to home—in Latin America. Case in point: the deep-sea mega-port that just opened in Chancay, Peru.

A port opening hardly looks like something that should worry the United States. But this port is 60 percent-owned by the Chinese state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, which has exclusive operating rights.

Chancay Port is a huge win for Beijing. It’s expected to slash roughly 10 days off the time it takes to ship goods between China and South America, making it easier and more cost-effective for Beijing to exploit the continent’s resources and flood the region with its exports, from solar panels to electric vehicles. These benefits will further multiply after a planned rail link connects Chancay to Brazil, China’s biggest South American trading partner.

Peru’s government hopes the new port will enable it to capitalize on China’s increasing trade with the region and become, in the words of one Peruvian official, “the Singapore of Latin America.”

However, this gamble carries risks. Some in Peru fear their government gave China too much leverage. It’s unclear how COSCO managed to get exclusive operating rights in violation of Peru’s National Port System Law. Earlier this year, the law was amended to legalize the arrangement after Lima’s attempts to annul the exclusivity clause resulted in COSCO threatening to pull out of the nearly-completed project.

This isn’t good for Peru or for the United States, which is hemorrhaging influence in its own backyard. But it’s not like Washington gave Lima a better alternative. Peruvian officials reportedly spent years trying to procure financing for Chancay Port before a consortium of Chinese banks agreed to help in 2019.

It's easy to dismiss Beijing’s infrastructure development under the Belt and Road Initiative as “debt-trap diplomacy.” COSCO’s exclusivity clause lends credence to this view. However, the initiative is an effective diplomatic tool, because it delivers what developing countries need. Governments are under pressure to close infrastructure gaps and deliver economic opportunities to their citizens. They often distrust China and would rather engage with American counterparts, but the U.S. isn’t fulfilling their needs, and China is all too eager to fill the vacuum.

A recent estimate by AidData identified over $286 billion worth of Chinese infrastructure projects in Latin America, ranging from metro lines to hydroelectric dams. This figure is rapidly approaching the value of the country’s investments in Africa.

U.S. defense analysts fear China could exploit this infrastructure to collect intelligence and, in the case of the Chancay Port, host Chinese naval vessels.

These fears are not misplaced, but equally concerning is the leverage and influence these projects give Beijing in America’s backyard. China is in a struggle to win hearts and minds as it seeks to delegitimize U.S. global leadership. It’s gaining considerable goodwill among governments desperate for economic development and political backing on the international stage, neither of which Washington has been eager to provide.

Latin America may not rank as high as China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors on its list of priorities, but the region’s unmet demand for infrastructure makes it ripe for the picking, and its proximity to the U.S. gives it strategic value Beijing would love to exploit.

If China amasses enough influence in the region to create serious threats America must grapple with in its own backyard, it will have greater freedom to pursue its ambitions in Asia, to the detriment of U.S. economic and security interests.

Threats posed by extra-regional powers led the U.S. to adopt the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. With China’s meddling now increasing, Washington would be wise to resurrect the spirit of that doctrine by engaging more effectively in the Western Hemisphere.

Washington can’t compete with Beijing by continuing to lecture Latin American countries about “diversity, equity, and inclusion” ideologies that do nothing to feed or employ local residents. Nor will it suffice to simply harangue them about the dangers of doing business with China or try to force them to choose sides. America needs to revamp its economic engagement with the region to meet the needs that are causing countries to reluctantly turn to Beijing in the first place.

This is not a call for charity—China doesn’t give handouts, and neither should the U.S. The U.S. is already the largest source of foreign investment into Latin America. It just needs to channel more of this investment into infrastructure and other areas that will help advance the region’s economic and social development.

Washington can’t direct private investment to the extent China can. But U.S. policy played a significant role in encouraging firms to flock to China in the 1990s and 2000s, and no similar effort appears to be underway in this hemisphere.

To be sure, Latin America is not an easy place to do business, but neither was China when multinationals started moving there. Now, as firms seek to decouple from China and calls for “nearshoring” and “friendshoring” supply chains proliferate, the region seems poised to play a major role. China apparently thinks so, and some of its companies, like electric vehicle manufacturer BYD, are already building plants in the region.

Washington cannot afford to sit on its hands and watch Beijing gradually take control of its traditional sphere of influence. Though the U.S. lacks the capacity to compete one-on-one in infrastructure development, by integrating its approach with allies and partners throughout the world, it can do what is needed to reassert its leadership over this critical region. But it must start acting now.

Michael Cunningham is a research fellow in the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.

8. China's Largest Naval Exercise in Decades: Why Send 90 Warships Near Taiwan?

Conclusion:

As President Trump prepares to take office in January, last week’s activity is only a precursor of what’s coming without forceful American leadership. As such, this recent military demonstration serves a reminder of the urgent necessity to bolster a united front against the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic aspirations.

China's Largest Naval Exercise in Decades: Why Send 90 Warships Near Taiwan?

19fortyfive.com · by Brent Sadler · December 17, 2024

Why the Secrecy Surrounding China’s Recent Naval Exercises Near Taiwan? – Amid the hysteria over unknown drone swarms sweeping the U.S. mid-Atlantic, a massive and very unusual Chinese naval operation was conducted near Taiwan.

What China Did Near Taiwan

Between December 9-11, over 90 Chinese warships and dozens of aircraft participated in the largest Chinese naval exercise in decades. The drills were made more remarkable by the fact that Beijing made no public statement before, during, or after the operation to explain it.

The first public notice of this unprecedented military operation was the establishment on December 9 of seven airspace exclusion zones stretching from the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Straits and into the South China Sea. That same day, Taiwan defense officials stated large number of warships and significant numbers of aircraft had been engaged in the most widespread Chinese military operation since the third Taiwan crisis (1995-1996). Importantly, Chinese aircraft carriers Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian remained in port during the operation.

Adding to the intrigue was the lack of any public statement before this massive military operation. Typically, Beijing has signaled such activities as an act of protest against something Taipei or the U.S. did. The only official comment from Beijing on the December operation came from a Chinese military spokesman:

“The PLA (China Communist Party’s military) will decide whether and when to conduct military exercises in accordance with our needs and the situation across the (Taiwan) Strait.”

What do we know about the operation? Originally, many China watchers thought this would be the third Joint Sword exercise. The first exercise, Joint Sword 2024A, came in response to the new Taiwanese President’s inauguration speech. Joint Sword 2024B followed the October 10 founding day speech by President Lai Ching Te.

According to previous Heritage analysis, Beijing has in recent years conducted military demonstrations focused on blockading and conducting missile attacks on Taiwan with little notice (typically several days in advance), but this recent massive operation was different. To date, no exercise name has been given nor an explanation of the event responsible for triggering it.

Second, at its peak, over 90 Chinese Navy and Coast Guard vessels were involved along with historically high numbers of warplanes, with many provocatively crossing the Taiwan Strait median line. While recent PLA operations have practiced envelopment of Taiwan, this event was fundamentally different, with warships forming two lines ostensibly to interdict shipping to the east of Taiwan. It has also been reported that this operation was in planning for 70 days.

Why Create So Much Tension?

So what was Beijing’s point of doing this exercise now, and at such a massive scale and scope?

Military preparation and training would seem to be the most plausible explanation. However, this event occurred when such activity is typically subdued, the Chinese military not readied for large scale operations, and when weather conditions are often problematic.

Another potential Beijing goal is to shape the political environment of the electorates in Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and the U.S. But if that was the primary goal, one would have expected tailored political messaging from Beijing.

Aircraft Carrier from China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Most likely, Beijing was unsure its military could execute such a large military operation successfully. If so, then this would explain keeping its public messaging on it quiet. At the same time, Beijing knows nearby militaries would note the activity and duly report it. The timing says a lot more.

As President Trump prepares to take office in January, last week’s activity is only a precursor of what’s coming without forceful American leadership. As such, this recent military demonstration serves a reminder of the urgent necessity to bolster a united front against the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic aspirations.

About the Author: Brent D. Sadler

Brent D. Sadler is a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation covering naval warfare and advanced technologies.

19fortyfive.com · by Brent Sadler · December 17, 2024

9. Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power

Excerpts:

In conclusion, as our research shows, high financial costs and other barriers to entry made it difficult for countries to compete with the United States in precision strike systems for decades. These dynamics helped explain the initially slow proliferation of precision strike technology and justified Washington’s focus on exquisite systems at the expense of mass. But the strategies of yesterday will not necessarily work tomorrow. To adjust to the realities of the present, the Department of Defense should not go all in on just quality or quantity, but focus on both stealth and scale. For the United States, growth by defense technology firms, the launch of a new Pentagon office focused on scaling artificial intelligence adoption, and Congressional support for innovation means there is an opportunity now to build effectively for the future. The incoming Trump administration, given its interest in new and innovative approaches to defense technology, has an opportunity to build on initiatives like Replicator and make this a reality.

Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Horowitz · December 18, 2024

From strikes by uncrewed aerial systems launching precision Hellfire missiles in Afghanistan and Iraq to U.S. Navy ships firing missiles against Houthi targets in the Middle East over the last few years, the United States has led the world in precision strike capabilities for decades. For more than a generation, the United States maintained a healthy lead in the most sophisticated military technologies, especially those that enabled precision strike, and its large advantage arguably deterred many potential rivals from symmetric competition. With the focus on precision, given the accuracy benefits and larger costs of systems, came a decision to prioritize quality over quantity in military capabilities. However, technological change over the last decade has eroded the binary between scale and sophistication. It has also accelerated the proliferation of key elements of the precision strike complex. Even relatively weak actors, such as Iran and militant groups like the Houthis in Yemen, can acquire and even produce these capabilities. For example, the Houthis use Iranian technology like the Shahed-136 one-way precision attack system — and derivatives they produce themselves — to attack shipping in the Red Sea, generating billions of dollars in costs to commercial shipping companies and the U.S. Navy. This is to say nothing of more capable rivals like the People’s Republic of China, which can deliver advanced weapons and platforms on par with the United States in many areas.

The global proliferation of precision strike means we now live in an era of “precise mass,” where comparatively cheap uncrewed systems — that can be deployed at scale — are also highly advanced and deadly accurate. The proliferation of low-cost precise mass means that the United States can no longer comfortably rely upon the edge in precision strike it cultivated over decades. Moreover, the cost-exchange ratio of competing solely with exquisite, expensive systems is likely to lead to failure over time, especially as lower-cost alternatives become more capable and manufacturing lead times for more exquisite systems grow (like in the case of the F-35). These dynamics suggest a strong logic for the United States and others in pursuing a mix of capabilities, emphasizing mass at the lower end and stealthy capabilities at the higher end that can survive in this era of warfare.

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The Strategy of the Past

In the latter part of the Cold War and beyond, the U.S. military largely dedicated itself to gaining a qualitative edge over its adversaries. For example, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States adopted the second offset strategy to counter the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority in Europe with an advantage in expensive, high-tech, and exquisite systems. This meant investing in a suite of technologies that would enable the U.S. military to accurately and swiftly attack Soviet forces deep behind their lines before they could bring their forces to bear against the American military or Western European territory. The Soviets termed this new military concept the “reconnaissance strike complex” (from the Russian pекогносцировочный yдарный комплекс) and quickly recognized its revolutionary potential.

The reconnaissance strike complex, also known as the precision strike complex, is the integration of surveillance assets (such as satellites and reconnaissance aircraft), strike platforms (such as bombers and submarines), and munitions (such as missiles and “smart” bombs). This system of systems enabled the United States to strike its adversaries more quickly, from greater distances, and with much higher levels of precision than ever before. For example, while less than 20 percent of bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their targets in World War II, modern precision-guided munitions are deadly accurate. The effectiveness of the precision strike complex was illustrated in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, as the United States and its coalition partners vastly exceeded initial expectations and routed the large, well-equipped, and battle-tested Iraqi military with fewer than 200 American deaths. Laser-guided smart bombs used in this conflict inflicted a disproportionate amount of damage against Iraqi targets relative to their unguided counterparts, and satellites proved critical for desert navigation and communications.

However, acquiring a sophisticated precision strike capability was extremely challenging during the Cold War and early post–Cold War period for at least three reasons. First, it involved acquiring several key technologies rather than a single technology. Surveillance platforms that locate and track potential targets, strike platforms that deliver munitions against targets, and munitions that can destroy the target are all required to have a sophisticated capability. Second, many of the underlying systems were of the exquisite type and thus quite expensive. As a result, the United States made a conscious decision to reduce the scale of its military and rely on quality instead. Third, successfully adopting the precision strike complex requires highly trained personnel and the doctrine and concepts of operation designed to take advantage of the capabilities. Not all countries have sufficient levels of organizational capital to integrate this system of systems.

These barriers combined to reduce the proliferation of the precision strike complex. As Barry Watts writes, “Not widely foreseen in the mid-1990s was that nearly two decades later long-range precision strike would still be a virtual monopoly of the United States military.” This conclusion is supported by a novel dataset we created measuring countries’ precision strike capabilities when it comes to eight key technologies: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, precision-guided munitions, and satellites. Our data, which measures the sophistication of a country’s capabilities in these areas (e.g., by coding factors like range, payload, and speed) rather than the quantity of systems countries have, reveals that the United States has maintained a strong advantage over other countries since at least the late 1980s. Furthermore, despite the predictions of some prominent realist theorists, few countries have been able to successfully emulate the United States and compete when it comes to quality.

In fact, a statistical analysis we conducted shows that the United States’ large advantage in exquisite systems had a major benefit: it likely deterred some countries from competing symmetrically. This has long been a key element of American strategy. As Stephen Cambone, the then-principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a close advisor to Donald Rumsfeld, articulated: “[I]t’s important that potential adversaries understand … that these are not going to be winning efforts. So don’t bother going down that course. Stay out of that area because you cannot succeed there.”

Because the United States maintained such a significant lead, many potential rivals realized they could not effectively match or eclipse the quality of American capabilities, and thus did not try to. Instead, many invested in more asymmetric strategies. For example, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from 2007 to 2019, said, “Asymmetrical warfare … is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities of the enemy. … Since the enemy has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind.” There was thus a strong rationale for America’s focus on quality over quantity in the past.

The Realities of the Present

Times have changed due to technological advancements that are reshaping the character of war. Improvements in manufacturing, the diffusion of know-how about precision guidance and access to commercial satellites, and growth in autonomy and AI mean the basics of precision strike are now readily available to state and non-state actors.

Consider the Russian-Ukrainian War, where Ukraine — a country whose gross domestic product per capita ranks about 135th in the world and whose gross domestic product ranks 57th in the world— now has the capacity to produce four million drones annually and is reportedly losing ten thousand drones per month. The scale of airpower being utilized by Ukraine is unprecedented. In contrast, the United States only produced around three hundred thousand military aircraft during the entirety of World War II, and it currently has less than five thousand total military aircraft in its inventory.

Iran, which the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded in 2019 is “lacking a modern air force” and is a middle-tier power at best, has also become a major player in the drone space. For example, thousands of their Shahed one-way attack systems have been used by Russia to conduct attacks against Ukraine. Even though a high percentage of them have been shot down, their low cost means even a 10 or 20 percent success rate is financially sustainable. That is especially the case since the missiles Ukraine has used to shoot them down are often many times more expensive than the munition itself.

The Houthis in Yemen, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, have wreaked havoc on the global economy by using Iran’s Shahed one-way attack systems, cheap drones, and other tools, including uncrewed surface vessels, to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

These examples illustrate that precise weaponry is now much more widely available to weak powers than it was in the past, and the low cost of many of these systems enables actors to deploy precision technology at scale (i.e., precise mass).

Consequences for U.S. Defense Strategy

As the technological landscape evolves, so should U.S. defense strategy. Even if current and potential U.S. adversaries initially invested in precise mass capabilities because they could not compete at the higher end with more exquisite U.S. capabilities, technological advances in manufacturing, AI, autonomy, and the diffusion of knowledge have changed the game. Now, precise mass capabilities have proven their worth on the battlefield in their own right, even as combined arms warfare remains key to success.

There is a temptation, of course, to think about precise mass as simply a supplement to U.S. capabilities that is necessary in the short term given the struggles the U.S. defense industrial base is having producing ships, submarines, fighters, missiles, and artillery at scale and reasonable prices. Although increasingly large outlays to revive the defense industrial base by the Trump and then Biden administrations are poised to pay off, it may be years or even decades before the impact of investments in areas like the submarine industrial base or the manufacturing of high-end weapons like the long-range anti-ship missile becomes clear.

Therefore, continuing to invest only or mostly in quality, meaning exquisite, systems at the expense of platforms that can leverage precise mass would be risky. Adversaries now have a greater ability to utilize a large quantity of relatively cheap — but precise — systems to try and destroy a single exquisite asset. Currently, the financial burden is often greater for the defending force than the offensive force when it comes to large-scale attacks, as Iran’s assault against Israel in April 2024 illustrates. Using million-dollar missiles to destroy one-way attack systems that cost tens of thousands of dollars or less is a losing proposition over time.

Washington should therefore revise its defense approach to invest more in attritable systems, and cost-effective defensive technologies in general. The Replicator initiative is an excellent start, but it should be built upon and expanded. After all, the Department of Defense is only currently investing an extremely small fraction of its overall budget into precise mass. A key advantage of investing more in precise mass is speed of scaling and deployment. Systems like attritable drones can be produced relatively quickly to meet the increasingly fraught geopolitical landscape, whereas exquisite systems like Virginia-class submarines take much longer to produce, even though they are absolutely vital for U.S. military power.

Thinking about precise mass as merely a short-term supplement while longer-term investments in the defense industrial base come on line would also be a mistake. A mix of higher-end and lower-end capabilities will be necessary to succeed in future wars, particularly against nation-states. Even an extremely wealthy country like the United States can only afford a certain number of joint air-to-surface standoff missiles when they cost up to $2 million per missile. The cost of hypersonics, which are now entering the U.S. military arsenal and are already deployed by China and Russia, are even higher per missile. It is therefore not an either/or between expensive and attritable systems, just as it is not an either/or between newer and older technologies.

Precise mass capabilities therefore will complement rather than fully substitute for existing capabilities. For example, at least some exquisite systems — such as submarines and stealthy aircraft — can survive even in an era of precise mass with ubiquitous sensing. If they cannot be located, then precision and mass are not sufficient to destroy them. A future U.S. military arsenal with both attritable systems that can be deployed at scale and a suite of expensive, high-end, and stealthy systems that can survive the rigors of modern warfare would be a strong force. There is synergy between exquisite and attritable systems, as the latter can be employed to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses or strike them precisely in the absence of defenses, and the former can be utilized to strike and destroy the principal target with a high degree of confidence, even in the face of sophisticated defenses.

In conclusion, as our research shows, high financial costs and other barriers to entry made it difficult for countries to compete with the United States in precision strike systems for decades. These dynamics helped explain the initially slow proliferation of precision strike technology and justified Washington’s focus on exquisite systems at the expense of mass. But the strategies of yesterday will not necessarily work tomorrow. To adjust to the realities of the present, the Department of Defense should not go all in on just quality or quantity, but focus on both stealth and scale. For the United States, growth by defense technology firms, the launch of a new Pentagon office focused on scaling artificial intelligence adoption, and Congressional support for innovation means there is an opportunity now to build effectively for the future. The incoming Trump administration, given its interest in new and innovative approaches to defense technology, has an opportunity to build on initiatives like Replicator and make this a reality.

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Michael C. Horowitz is the Richard Perry professor and director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2022 to 2024, he served as the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for force development and emerging capabilities.

Joshua A. Schwartz joshis an assistant professor of international relations and emerging technology at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology. From 2021 to 2023, he was a Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft fellow at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The views in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, its components, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Sgt. Perla Alfaro via DVIDs.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Horowitz · December 18, 2024

10. Russia Burns Faces of Dead North Korean Soldiers to Hide Losses – Zelensky

Another atrocity if true.

Russia Burns Faces of Dead North Korean Soldiers to Hide Losses – Zelensky

President Zelensky accused Russian forces of using North Korean soldiers for assaults on Ukrainian positions and attempting to burn their faces after death to conceal evidence of their involvement.

by Kyiv Post | December 18, 2024, 1:44 pm

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · December 18, 2024

North Korea Zelensky HUR

President Zelensky accused Russian forces of using North Korean soldiers for assaults on Ukrainian positions and attempting to burn their faces after death to conceal evidence of their involvement.

by Kyiv Post | December 18, 2024, 1:44 pm

Screenshot from video

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Russian forces are attempting to burn the faces of deceased North Korean soldiers to conceal their losses.

According to Zelensky, Russia not only uses North Korean troops for assaults on Ukrainian positions but also tries to hide their casualties.

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Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.

“While they were being trained, they were forbidden even to show their faces. Any video evidence of their presence was erased by Russian forces. And now, after battles with our troops, the Russians are even trying to... literally burn the faces of the killed North Korean soldiers,” Zelensky wrote on his Telegram channel.

“Even after years of war, when it seems that Russian cynicism can’t get any worse, we still witness something even more horrifying.”

He added that Ukraine’s Defense Forces and intelligence are working to uncover the full extent of the losses suffered by Russian units, including those involving North Koreans from the DPRK.

Even after years of war, when we thought the Russians could not get any more cynical, we see something even worse.

Russia not only sends the North Korean troops to storm Ukrainian positions, but also tries to conceal losses of these people.

They tried to hide the presence of… pic.twitter.com/KYyGF1rxP8

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) December 16, 2024

The President emphasized that such actions by Russian forces demonstrate “the contempt that now reigns in Russia – contempt for all things human.”

“There is no reason for Koreans to fight and die for Putin. Even after death, they are met only with mockery from Russia. This madness must be stopped – stopped with a reliable and lasting peace and with Russia being held accountable for this cynical war,” he added.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Must Join the Joint Expeditionary Force, and the UK Should Lead the Way

The UK has been a leader in helping Ukraine. But as inertia sets in and with Western support wavering, efforts must be redoubled. The JEF is a natural bridge to NATO.

Earlier last week Kyiv Post reported that the North Korean command in Russia had been ordered to coordinate with Russian units currently operating in the region, with their direct involvement in assault operations anticipated in the near future.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) also reported that North Korean soldiers had recently received additional food supplies. On Dec. 13, the troops were placed on alert and instructed to prepare for further orders, with some covertly transported to the front lines in civilian trucks disguised as water delivery vehicles.

Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Defense Council, commented on the HUR’s report, posting on Telegram: “As of now, it is not worth exaggerating the presence of DPRK fighters in the Kursk region.”

He clarified that North Korean soldiers were indeed being prepared for combat alongside Russian forces, but primarily to increase troop numbers. Kovalenko said that rumors of North Korean fighters being unstoppable were exaggerated, stating that they “end up like everyone else.”

Some Ukrainian servicemembers claim that North Korean troops began fighting over a week ago. Stanislav Bunyatov, a junior sergeant in the 24th Aidar Assault Battalion, wrote on his Telegram: “About the [North] Koreans. They went into battle more than a week ago.”

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · December 18, 2024

11. Army Set to Debut Master Combat Badges in Spring, Memo Says

Army Set to Debut Master Combat Badges in Spring, Memo Says

military.com · by Steve Beynon · December 17, 2024

The Army is set to begin awarding Master Combat Badges, which will combine expert and traditional combat badges, next spring, according to an internal service memo reviewed by Military.com.

For decades, troops have been limited to wearing only one badge at a time, with most opting for the combat badge to showcase their wartime bona fides. The new Master Combat Badge will blend the Combat Infantryman Badge, Combat Medical Badge or Combat Action Badge with their expert counterparts.

Service planners expect the badges to be available forcewide in April, the memo says. The new badges will share much of the same design as their combat counterparts but will have a gold wreath -- both for the dress and, more strikingly, the camouflage uniform -- marking a significant departure from all-black badges.

The plan comes after Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer initially announced the badges in October as part of a slew of uniform-related announcements, including new physical training uniforms -- which he later walked back.

The news also comes as combat badges are slowly becoming more rare among the rank and file. The scarcity of the once commonplace accolades is a sign that combat abroad has largely died down after two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"I did look to the Panama guys," Weimer said at the Association of the United States Army conference in October, reflecting on his early career in special operations. "I did look to the Grenada guys, and we even still had a few Vietnam guys in my formation at that point in time. Whoever had a mustard stain on their jump wings, who had a Ranger scroll on their right shoulder, who had a CIB, it was motivating."

Soldiers with mix-and-match badge types, such as a Combat Infantryman Badge and an Expert Medical Badge, will wear the master badge aligned with the combat badge. Service planners intend to incorporate that into Army regulations, according to the memo.

The Combat Infantryman Badge dates back to World War II and was introduced to elevate the infantry's prestige. It also came with a $10 monthly bonus -- roughly $185 today -- until the incentive was discontinued in 1948.

In 1945, the Combat Medical Badge was established to recognize medics who provide care under fire.

The Expert Infantryman Badge was also introduced in the same time period as an accolade awarded for demonstrating a high level of proficiency in marksmanship, physical fitness and other combat tasks. In effect, the combat and expert infantryman badges were meant for infantrymen to stand apart from the rest of the Army.

The Expert Medical Badge was created in 1965.

In 2005, the Combat Action Badge was introduced, effectively the same award as its infantry counterpart, but for soldiers in all other occupations, spurred after cavalry and tank units played a key role in the invasion of Iraq and saw significant casualties.

Expert badges have been a greater priority across units in recent years, particularly after the introduction of the Expert Soldier Badge in 2019, which opened up that prestigious type of badge to troops from all occupations. The test to earn it is the same as for the decades-old Expert Infantryman Badge, but allows soldiers outside of the infantry or medical field to receive a badge.

The service doubled the number of promotion points those expert badges are worth in 2022, signaling the priority for unit commanders to have their soldiers test for them.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · December 17, 2024

12. The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific

Excerpts:

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific — Global Security Review

globalsecurityreview.com · by Joe Buff · December 9, 2024

Recently, Japan and South Korea began discussing the need for their own indigenous nuclear arsenals. Either or both might yet decide in favor of fielding their own nuclear forces. Australia has not openly talked about pursuing nuclear weapons, but as an American ally in Asia such a move may become necessary.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

13.

Excerpts:

Their joint warning to Xi should also include a promise to recognize Taiwan’s political and diplomatic independence if China commences hostilities. Biden and Trump should declare that war means Taiwanese independence, reversing Beijing’s perpetual threats that “independence means war.” They should remind Beijing that the Taiwan Relations Act states, “[E]stablish[ing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” 

Finally, to reinforce the message, Biden or Trump should send a carrier battle group through the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 2007, which would only be the second such transit since 1995. China, which had no carriers when it blocked the U.S. in 1996, now has three, which treat the international waters of the strait like a Chinese lake.

Official reports of strait passages by smaller U.S. combatants — Freedom of Navigation Operations — seem to have fallen off in recent months. The time for realistic and credible deterrence by both Biden and Trump is at hand, before Xi concludes the presidential transition gives him a green light on Taiwan. 

Biden and Trump must work together to deter an attack on Taiwan 

by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor - 12/17/24 1:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5043882-china-taiwan-trump-biden/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/korea

China-U.S. relations are entering potentially the most dangerous period in decades — going even as far back as their bloody confrontation in the Korean War. 

An increasingly unsettled Xi Jinping may decide that the remaining month before the presidential transition is his last opportunity to take advantage of an extremely risk-averse Biden administration and make a military move against Taiwan. Despite his public declarations that he would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, Biden is likely to decide that the question of war and peace should now be left to his successor. 

Chinese action against Taiwan would also present the incoming Trump administration with a fait accompli and a strategic dilemma — especially if Beijing eschews a full-scale invasion and goes with a blockade or seizes Kinmen (Quemoy) or another Taiwanese island. Xi may calculate that a returning President Trump will be reluctant to start his second term fighting to reverse “moderate” Chinese aggression, just as Biden was willing to accept “a limited incursion” of Ukraine in 2022. In his first term, Trump failed even to try to unwind Vladimir Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, which the Obama-Biden administration had meekly accepted — perhaps fulfilling Obama’s 2012 promise to Putin of post-reelection “flexibility.” 

The prospects of Xi acting precipitously against Taiwan have increased as a result of recent developments in China. After Xi spent more than a decade of ostensible anti-corruption purges placing Xi loyalists in key positions throughout the Chinese Communist political and military establishment, he continues to unearth officials he deems incompetent, corrupt or personally disloyal to him. The two latest to fall are his minister of Defense, Dong Jun, and Admiral Miao Hua.

Some respected Western scholars believe the high-level personnel disruptions are raising doubts about the reliability of China’s military and its ability to pull off a successful Taiwan operation. But Washington cannot afford complacency, given the critical role of deception and surprise in Chinese strategy. The fact that conventional wisdom sees a diminished prospect of action against Taiwan makes it precisely the propitious time for a preemptive Chinese strike.

Presenting the world with fait accompli is what Beijing successfully did in the Korean War, Tibet, East Turkestan, Vietnam, India, Tiananmen Square, Hong Kong and the South China Sea. It includes the myriad incremental offenses against Taiwan’s sovereignty and international law, such as closing off the international waters of the Taiwan Strait to every country’s aircraft carriers except China’s.

Each Chinese action created a new version of the status quo, placing the onus of disturbing it on the U.S. and others in the West. This is not unlike the predicament of the football or soccer player who retaliates against an egregious but unseen offense and then alone absorbs the penalty.

It is a burden Western governments are congenitally reluctant to bear because of an exaggerated fear of escalation. The paralyzing inhibition inevitably leaves the initiative with the aggressors. Their psychological warfare manages to convince Westerners that Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang and Tehran do not fear a major war, when it actually would end several, if not all, of their regimes. 

Biden and Trump have a historically unique opportunity to upend and reverse that destructive dynamic. They could declare jointly that any Chinese aggression against Taiwan, whether under a waning Biden administration or an incoming second Trump term, will bring a decisive kinetic response by either Biden or Trump, strongly and publicly supported by the other. This would reflect a united America.  

The time for a credible U.S. warning to Beijing is now, not after hostilities have begun. China has long been preparing for an overt move against Taiwan and is presently conducting extensive new military exercises around the island. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reports China is massing the largest number of warships since Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996 when, according to a traumatized Clinton administration, China and the U.S. almost came to blows. 

President Clinton had sent the USS Nimitz and USS Independence carrier battle groups toward the Taiwan Strait but abruptly turned them away when Beijing threatened a “sea of fire” if they entered. Kurt Campbell, then-assistant Defense secretary, has repeatedly called the episode “Our own Cuban missile crisis. …We had stared into the abyss.” Now deputy secretary of State, he and other Clinton and Obama veterans are unlikely to endorse the kind of robust Biden-Trump collaboration suggested here as the most effective deterrent against Chinese adventurism. 

Biden should repeat, strongly and clearly, that his administration will intervene militarily if China attacks or blockades any part of Taiwan — this time without any diluting “clarification” from his administration. Trump should endorse the statement and commit to continue the deterrent policy after Jan. 20. 

Their joint warning to Xi should also include a promise to recognize Taiwan’s political and diplomatic independence if China commences hostilities. Biden and Trump should declare that war means Taiwanese independence, reversing Beijing’s perpetual threats that “independence means war.” They should remind Beijing that the Taiwan Relations Act states, “[E]stablish[ing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” 

Finally, to reinforce the message, Biden or Trump should send a carrier battle group through the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 2007, which would only be the second such transit since 1995. China, which had no carriers when it blocked the U.S. in 1996, now has three, which treat the international waters of the strait like a Chinese lake.

Official reports of strait passages by smaller U.S. combatants — Freedom of Navigation Operations — seem to have fallen off in recent months. The time for realistic and credible deterrence by both Biden and Trump is at hand, before Xi concludes the presidential transition gives him a green light on Taiwan. 

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute and member of the advisory board of The Vandenberg Coalition. 

14. The Wrong Sort of Power by Sir Lawrence Freedman

Excerpts:

One argument is that the setbacks of the past year will leave Iran even more determined to complete its nuclear weapons programme. Yet incoming president Trump has threatened ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran if it moves in that direction, and for now the regime needs less rather than more than pressure. Also Israel, having taken out Iranian air defences earlier in the year, might welcome a chance to have a go at Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

A belligerent rhetoric that outreached its capacity has left Iran at a crossroads. In 2011 Bashar Assad had an opportunity to reconstruct his regime, accepting the need for more democracy and openness. Instead he chose more repression and fighting, leading to immense death and destruction, and still in the end his regime collapsed. He relied on the wrong sort of power - brute force with little underlying legitimacy. Whether Iran can or should stick to its current course will be hotly debated in Tehran. It can trade military capabilities with Russia, but Moscow is struggling to cope with its own problems and has no spare capacity to help Tehran, especially in the economic sphere.

With Iran as with Syria, as they try to find a new way forward, the West should not be watching passively, reflecting on the unpredictability of events, waiting to see what turns up. This is an opportunity for significant engagement.

Less than a month ago, following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, I asked, without quite answering, the question of whether Trump could do a deal with Iran. The sudden fall of Assad provides the new administration with even more of an opportunity. I concluded this piece with the observation that: ‘The optimists can point to the positive benefits of a grand project of peace-making; the pessimists can point to the likely pitfalls along the way.’ Of course much depends on the extent to which Trump’s team sees the possibilities opening up in the region, and its ability to work with Europeans and Arab governments, as well as Israel, to take advantage. Will it even be bothered to try? This remains a region where chaos seems always around the corner. But for once, as ceasefire agreements are signed, and a brutal dictatorship falls, we can at least allow ourselves a moment of optimism.

The Wrong Sort of Power

Iran, Syria, and the Vulnerability of Autocracies

https://samf.substack.com/p/the-wrong-sort-of-power

Lawrence Freedman

Dec 18, 2024

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Syrian rebel fighters by the burning grave of former President Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar al-Assad (Photo by AAREF WATAD/AFP via Getty Images)

‘Ye have ploughed wickedness, ye have reaped iniquity; ye have eaten the fruit of lies: because thou didst trust in thy way, in the multitude of thy mighty men.’

- Hosea, 10:13

There is a clear line from the 1979 Iranian Revolution to the 2024 Syrian Revolution, which leaves open the question of whether there is a potential line to yet another Iranian revolution, this one overthrowing the victors of 45 years ago.

The sudden collapse of the Assad regime is one of those ‘in retrospect it was inevitable but no one saw it coming’ moments. Exactly where it leaves Syria is still unclear, so it is also one of those ‘the future is uncertain, but one thing is for sure, things will never be the same again’ moments.

As Russia and Iran were Bashar al-Assad’s most vital backers, we can be reasonably confident that for now both are the big losers. After a decade of substantial investment in Syria, Russia has nothing to show for it other than Assad himself, now taking up residence in Moscow. It is abandoning its air base in Syria, probably its naval base, and in practice its aspirations to be a major player in Middle Eastern affairs, with only its position in Libya to cling on to.

Iran’s investment goes back even further, and its setback is even greater. This comes at the end of a disastrous year for the defining feature of its foreign policy – its ‘axis of resistance’ drawing on radical Shi’ite groups throughout the region, including in Iraq and Yemen, but with Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Assad in Syria as the key components.

This post opens by looking back at the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and then at how the ‘Axis of Resistance’ developed and fell apart. It concludes by looking at what the future holds for Syria and whether revolution could prove contagious given the vulnerabilities of the current Iranian regime.

The Iranian Revolution

In the summer of 1976 I was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London when the Iranian Ambassador to the UK came to visit. Parviz Radji was tall, urbane, and spoke impeccable English. He represented an immensely strong, rich, and ascendant power, buoyed by the surge in oil prices. But he also represented the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah had come to power in 1941, succeeding his father. He was an absolute ruler who occasionally experimented with a bit of democracy. As he was close to the West criticism was muted, not least because he was recycling his oil wealth through huge purchases of western military equipment. Iran’s military budget rose from $1.4 billion in 1972 to $9.4 billion by 1977.

The impact of these purchases was one of the topics for discussion when Radji visited. The key findings of a staff report published that summer by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were that Iran was turning itself into a regional superpower with these purchases but it lacked the technical and industrial capacity, along with the personnel, to absorb the new weaponry. We quizzed the Ambassador about whether Iran had spent wisely. Had it gone for a form of conspicuous military consumption leading to capabilities that looked more impressive on paper than they would be in battle? The Ambassador refused to concede the point, dismissing the criticisms as Western condescension, although he did add ‘anyway, we are only going to be fighting the Iraqis.’

Just two years later the situation in Iran looked a lot different. The oil price was still high but the Shah’s regime was not. The oil wealth had distorted the economy, aggravating corruption and inequalities. Hundreds of thousands of expatriates, many there to look after the many military programmes, along with the decadence of the elite, challenged the Islamic character of the society. The Shah’s experiments with democracy and human rights were tentative and left the middle classes dissatisfied and strengthened rather than calmed dissent.

The Shah’s experimentation had begun in 1976 in anticipation of Jimmy Carter becoming US President. Carter was campaigning on a progressive foreign policy – opposed to excessive arms sales and promoting human rights. Once in office he was persuaded that the Shah was on the right track and deserved encouragement rather than undue pressure. At the end of 1977, Carter and his wife attended a banquet in Tehran. Unaware of the discontent gripping Iran, which would overwhelm the regime over the coming year, the President observed to his delighted host:

‘Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and admiration and love which your people give to you …’

(One is reminded in terms of timing of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s statement of late September 2023: ‘The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades.’)

Instead of stability, 1978 was marked by regular demonstrations, strikes in the oilfield, and occasional acts of violent repression. The Shah’s progressing cancer left him uncertain and indecisive - about whether and how to deploy the army to crush the gathering insurrection or to try a more liberal and conciliatory approach. He oscillated between the two so that neither approach had a chance to succeed.

When the Shah eventually fled Tehran in January 1979 I thought back to the earlier conversation with the Ambassador (who stayed in London, never to return to Iran). The regime had appeared so powerful. Yet it turned out that the Shah had a lot of the wrong sort of power – he had great wealth, ubiquitous secret police, and a formidable military, with the best kit that money could buy. But at the crudest level it was the wrong sort of power for crowd control and dealing with angry protests, and at the most fundamental level, there was the political problem common to all autocracies. They can never be sure of the state of public opinion and the forces arraigned against them, and the only constitutional changes they can imagine still leave them exactly where they were before, completely in charge. There were always reformers who might be prepared to govern more liberally and competently, but for the Shah’s most bitter foes he could never be legitimate. The 1953 overthrow of a popular, nationalist Prime Minister in a US-UK operation (about which they unwisely boasted) meant that he was seen as a foreign imposition. The modernising, secular aspects to the Shah’s rule appalled the Islamic clergy while the inequalities were exploited by the communist Tudeh party.

The Ayatollah Khomeini provided the public face of the revolution. A long opponent of the regime he had moved to exile in Iraq. From there he delivered fiery sermons, offering an uncompromising Islamism with a leftist slant. These were circulated in cassette form in Iran’s Mosques. After the Shah lobbied the Iraqi government to expel him, Khomeini moved to Paris which gave him access to the world’s media. Khomeini was widely assumed to be a figurehead and so was consistently underestimated. He knew exactly what he wanted. After the revolution religious leaders, under his direction, took control of the country’s supreme levers of power. The other, more secular, elements of the coalition that overthrew the Shah, from the moderate reformers to the communists, were purged and marginalised.

The big crisis came in October 1979 when Carter agreed to allow the Shah to come to the US for medical treatment. This led to huge pro-revolution and anti-American demonstrations in Tehran. On 4 November some 300 militants occupied the US Embassy compound. They took hostage 66 diplomats and marines. Attempts by the Foreign Minister to defuse the crisis quickly were thwarted by Khomeini. The crisis defined the final year of Carter’s presidency and help lead to Ronald Reagan’s victory in November 1980 – the hostages were not released until the day of his inauguration.

Since then there have been periods when possibilities opened up for a rapprochement, but US-Iranian relations have never fully recovered. Even less so have Israel-Iranian relations. Before the revolution, Israel’s second largest embassy after Washington was in Tehran. The Embassy was handed over to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the new regime made anti-Zionism a centrepiece of its foreign policy.

The Rise and Fall of the Axis of Resistance

The year of the revolution – 1979 - was full of incident and turbulence, including the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein becoming President of Iraq. Each of these events helped shaped Iran’s course: the Israel-Egyptian treaty left a gap for new anti-Zionist leadership; the Soviet intervention against Jihadists in Afghanistan was condemned by Khomeini so Moscow lost the chance to replace the US as Iran’s superpower friend; the next year Saddam saw an opportunity to avenge past humiliations while Iran was in post-revolutionary disarray and so launched an invasion, resulting in an eight year war.

The war with Iraq helped the regime consolidate its power. Other wars then helped it expand its influence. Hezbollah was a radical Shi’ite group formed to fight back against Israel’s ill-fated invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which it did successfully. The Syrian regime was a natural ally because of a shared antipathy to Saddam’s Iraq and because of its roots in the minority Shi’ite Alawites. When the American-led coalition overthrew Saddam in 2003 radical Shi’ite groups, backed by Iran, were soon harassing coalition forces. The Arab Spring of 2011 and the subsequent upheavals saw Iran back the anti-Saudi Houthis in Yemen and then move sharply, with Hezbollah, to keep Assad in power as the deadly civil war began. Here, however, it required Russian intervention, beginning in 2015, to defeat the rebels.

Hamas’s membership of this axis was less obvious. Its roots lie in the Sunni Moslem Brotherhood. The leadership could not operate in Palestine and so had been based in Damascus until 2012 when they left because Assad would not accept it taking a neutral position in the developing civil war. He saw them as too sympathetic to the local Sunni groups with their own roots in the Moslem Brotherhood. So the leaders went to Qatar where they worked to improve relations with the Gulf states. Yahya Sinwar, even before he became leader of Hamas in Gaza in 2017, disagreed with this path. He cultivated ties with Iran as the best source of weapons with which to threaten Israel and promote the armed struggle.

There were basic problems with the idea of an ‘axis of resistance.’ It is like the old Soviet Comintern, which coordinated communist parties around the world, ostensibly so that they could promote class struggle better in their own countries but in practice to serve as instruments of Soviet foreign policy, even at its most cynical. In the same way Iran’s ‘axis’ was there to serve the security interests of Iran, even while in principle backing the individual members in their own national struggles.

Anti-Zionism was presented as the glue which held this axis together but the overriding priority for the Iranian regime was its own security. With ample supplies of rockets and other weapons, Hamas and Hezbollah demonstrated on occasions a real ability to resist the Israeli military. But they had no obvious means of going beyond resistance, and when Hamas tried in October 2023 the result was disastrous for both the movement and the Palestinian people on whose behalf they acted.

Sinwar assumed that the Iranians took their slogan of ‘Death to Israel’ as seriously as he did, so that when Hamas took the initiative the whole axis would follow. To a degree they did, at least sufficient to demonstrate solidarity with Hamas, but not sufficient to put Israel into real difficulty. Iran wanted to keep capabilities in reserve, especially those of Hezbollah, for its own security needs. It might have hoped that the international outrage at the sufferings of the Palestinians would result in Israel coming to terms with Hamas, as it had done in the past.

But the ferocity of the original Hamas attack propelled it into an even more ferocious response, which kept on coming. Not only was Hamas dealt body blows, and its leadership, including Sinwar, killed off, but Hezbollah suffered the same fate, to the point where it had to agree a ceasefire even while Hamas wanted it to continue with the fight. Now Hamas is ready to accept a ceasefire without its core conditions having been met.

And then, as if this was not enough, Assad fell. Just a few weeks ago he had been at an Arab-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia , walking among other leaders who had earnestly sought his downfall, his rehabilitation almost complete. But his power had relied on external props, and these were being eroded – Russia because of the war in Ukraine and Iran because of the wars with Israel. Turkey, always keen to assert itself in the lands of the old Ottoman Empire, saw an opportunity to unleash Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group it had been supporting in Syria’s Idlib province, to make a dash towards the city of Aleppo, the city of some of the most bitter fighting of the civil war. Syrian army defenders were caught by surprise and gave way quickly.

The HTS offensive then moved on to Homs, another symbolic place, which turned out to be the regime’s last stand. The fighting here was tougher, and the Russians were still joining in with air strikes, but defeat here left the Syrian army demoralised and it began to crumble. Russia and Iran concluded that there was no point in committing more resources to a doomed regime. Assad went to the Russian base at Latakia, he claims to oversee operations against the rebels, but, on his account, once the base came under drone attack, the commander advised evacuation, which is how he ended up in Moscow and his regime came to an end, well over 50 years since his father had first seized power.

What Happens Next in Syria

For now HTS provides the closest thing to an interim government in Syria, although a variety of militias who played some part in the struggle against Assad are knocking at the door. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has yet to make up its mind as to whether it wants to encourage a relatively stable Syria, in which it should enjoy considerable influence, or take the opportunity to use another proxy force, the Syrian National Army, to undermine the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by the US. This would be entirely for internal Turkish reasons. Erdoğan still has the capacity to spoil the party he helped to organise. Israel has taken the opportunity to prevent a new Syria turning into a serious threat by striking numerous weapons sites, including those linked with chemical weapons, and seizing border territory.

As an offshoot of al Qaeda, with a vicious past, HTS has, shall we say, a reputational problem as well as being under western sanctions, which also makes conversations difficult although not impossible. To overcome this handicap it claims to be reformed and points to its relatively restrained administration of Idlib as evidence. The leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has abandoned his nom de guerre and reverted to his original name of Ahmad al-Sharaa. He is currently engaged in a sort of Gerry Adams tribute act as he seeks to demonstrate that he is a born-again moderate.

In this he has made an impressive start. He does not deny his attachment to Islamic law, but promises to respect minorities, including Christians, and not to pick unnecessary fights with Israel. For now the first priority of the neighbouring Arab governments, along with the Europeans and US, is to prevent the country being consumed with more fighting, start on the path of reconstruction and economic recovery (with less of the narcotics that kept the Assad regime funded), get refugees back home, and develop a new constitutional arrangement, which hopefully would involve a more inclusive government and even democracy. There is no obvious current alternative to Jolani/Sharaa and if he can find a way to form an inclusive government then more resources and assistance should flow towards Syria.

There are many armed factions in Syria and the risks of more violence will be present for some time. But while Iranian revolution of 1979 had a long gestation period its active period was relatively brief and the violence, although not trivial, was contained, Syria has been at war since March 2011 in by far the deadliest of modern Middle Eastern wars. By March of this year, after 13 years, the death toll was put at around 620,000. Wars brutalise but they also exhaust. HTS wants all the militias to dissolve and put their fighters under the control of the new Ministry of Defence. We wait to see how it will cope with those that insist on keeping their weapons and their independence. But the people will want and deserve some respite from violence.

What Happens Next in Iran

Are revolutions contagious?

It is a thought that must be crossing the minds of the Iranian elite. Can Hamas and Hezbollah reconstitute themselves in much more forbidding settings, with Gazans and Lebanese angry with them for involving them in wars which they then failed to win, and with military resupply far more difficult than it has been in the past? What do these events means for the militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen?

Since 1979 the Iranian regime became even more repressive and parasitic as the one it had replaced. As Ali Ansari noted in a guest post for Comment is Freed two years ago:

‘The current regime sees the success of the revolution as consequent on the weakness of the Shah and the central lesson they draw is that one must always show ‘strength’ – here interpreted crudely as force – in the face of protests. To do otherwise is to invite ridicule and collapse for in the absence of affection, fear must hold sway.’

But he added that weakness can also be manifested in ‘a stubborn determination not to change one’s ways – on the pretext that this reflects strength.’ The regime has repeated the ways of the past ‘in the belief that brute force will compensate for corrupt governance.’ This, Ali warned, might buy the regime some time but not long-term stability. He was then looking at the protest movements in the county – against both strict religious rule and economic mismanagement.

Now a directly elected and reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, offers one route to a more legitimate government. But what he can achieve remains circumscribed by the Supreme Leader, currently the Ayatollah Khamenei. He has been in power since 1989, but his health is poor, and the regime over which he presides is vulnerable. The question of succession looms large, and behind that question is one about the future direction of the regime. Does it continue on its current path of defiance or does it look to rebuild relations with the West if only to ease its economic predicament?

Over the coming months the regime must decide on two issues, both of which could trigger mass protests. The first, and the hardest to avoid, concerns petrol prices. Sanctions and regime dysfunctions have left the oil industry starved of investment and electricity production so low that there are regular blackouts and people are being asked to survive the winter at lower temperatures. The currency has lost almost half its value this year, which means that they can no longer afford to subsidise petrol prices. But the last time they were raised there were intensive and violent protests throughout the country.

The second issue concerns the determination of the hard-line Islamists, who currently dominate the parliament, to prescribe appropriate dress for all women. A bill has passed to this effect, a response to the popular protests following the detention of a woman for not wearing a suitable hijab. President Pezeshkian is holding back on implementing the law, on the grounds that he has enough problems with a failing energy sector and a failing foreign policy. But the more it appears that the regime is reluctant to crack down on shows of dissent the bolder the dissenters may become.

One argument is that the setbacks of the past year will leave Iran even more determined to complete its nuclear weapons programme. Yet incoming president Trump has threatened ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran if it moves in that direction, and for now the regime needs less rather than more than pressure. Also Israel, having taken out Iranian air defences earlier in the year, might welcome a chance to have a go at Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

A belligerent rhetoric that outreached its capacity has left Iran at a crossroads. In 2011 Bashar Assad had an opportunity to reconstruct his regime, accepting the need for more democracy and openness. Instead he chose more repression and fighting, leading to immense death and destruction, and still in the end his regime collapsed. He relied on the wrong sort of power - brute force with little underlying legitimacy. Whether Iran can or should stick to its current course will be hotly debated in Tehran. It can trade military capabilities with Russia, but Moscow is struggling to cope with its own problems and has no spare capacity to help Tehran, especially in the economic sphere.

With Iran as with Syria, as they try to find a new way forward, the West should not be watching passively, reflecting on the unpredictability of events, waiting to see what turns up. This is an opportunity for significant engagement.

Less than a month ago, following the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, I asked, without quite answering, the question of whether Trump could do a deal with Iran. The sudden fall of Assad provides the new administration with even more of an opportunity. I concluded this piece with the observation that: ‘The optimists can point to the positive benefits of a grand project of peace-making; the pessimists can point to the likely pitfalls along the way.’ Of course much depends on the extent to which Trump’s team sees the possibilities opening up in the region, and its ability to work with Europeans and Arab governments, as well as Israel, to take advantage. Will it even be bothered to try? This remains a region where chaos seems always around the corner. But for once, as ceasefire agreements are signed, and a brutal dictatorship falls, we can at least allow ourselves a moment of optimism.

15. No runways, no sorties: Chinese missiles threaten US airpower plans

No runways, no sorties: Chinese missiles threaten US airpower plans

Defense News · by Kelly A. Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum · December 17, 2024

American air bases “can no longer be considered a sanctuary.” That is the sobering conclusion of the U.S. Air Force’s new Installation Infrastructure Action Plan, released last week. Unlike the last 30 years, when U.S air bases were largely safe havens from enemy attacks, the document continues, “adversaries now possess high-end capabilities” that can threaten such installations.

This warning is correct, but it understates the threat.

In our new Stimson Center report, “Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific,” and co-authored with Jonathan Walker, we conclude that Chinese missile strikes could keep U.S. military runways and taxiways in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific islands closed in the critical first days — and even weeks — of a war between the United States and China. Even if the United States undertook massive investments in a mix of active and passive countermeasures, runways and taxiways would remain closed for at least the first several days of any conflict.

Specifically, the United States would not be able to operate fighter aircraft from U.S. air bases in Japan for close to the first two weeks of a conflict, including from Kadena Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, located closest to the Taiwan Strait. These are the only two locations from which U.S. fifth-generation fighters would be able to complete their missions and return to base without requiring aerial refueling. Most importantly, Chinese missiles could keep U.S. military runways in Japan closed to aerial refueling tankers — and the aircraft which depend on them for in-flight fuel — for over a month.

China’s growing reach could also keep U.S. air bases in Guam and other Pacific locations closed to tankers and bombers for at least the first four days of a conflict, and thereafter the United States would face other significant operational problems. For example, low-flying and slow-moving tankers are already vulnerable to Chinese air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, but they would be especially easy for China to detect and shoot down when flying predictable flight routes from Guam and a handful of other Pacific bases.

Unfortunately, no single countermeasure — or even a combination of countermeasures — will be sufficient to counter runway attacks by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Our results validate the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept of dispersing U.S. aircraft and personnel more widely across multiple locations. If the United States were to disperse to civilian airfields in the Pacific, as well as Japan Self Defense Force bases and civilian airfields in Japan, assuming it had the necessary political permissions, the shortest closure time would decline by over 70% in Japan, or three days for fighter operations and nine days for tanker operations. Within the Second Island Chain, closure times would drop only by about 10%, with runways opening on the fourth day.

These results, however, assume all personnel, equipment, and repair materials are available and ready for use at these other operating locations, which is not the case. Even if Washington and Tokyo made these substantial investments, Chinese missiles would still keep aircraft grounded in the critical first days of a war, when the U.S. Air Force might be expected to quickly set up a combat air patrol or sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait.

Recently, senior Air Force leaders have emphasized the need to protect U.S. air bases in the Indo-Pacific with more robust missile defense capabilities, with Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall going so far as to suggest his service should take over this mission from the Army. Our findings suggest that even a massive buildup of U.S. missile defense capabilities is likely to fall short, however, even when combined with other countermeasures.

For example, even if the United States grew its Patriot missile defense force — expanding to 20 Patriot batteries and deployed them all to protect runways in Japan — China could still deny the use of these runways by fighters in the first two days of a war, and thereafter fighters would have to operate without any tanker support for another week. Without tankers, these fighters would have to fly fewer sorties each day. The operational gains hardly seem to justify the costs, especially because China could easily offset these investments by increasing its missile stocks.

Instead, the United States will need to outthink — not outspend — China. Doing so requires the Air Force to prioritize the air denial mission within the First Island Chain, including building an inside air force around large numbers of runway-independent platforms and drones of various types and different ranges. Over time, as the Chinese missile threat dissipates, the United States could bring forward more traditional crewed aircraft, including advanced fighters and the tankers required to support them, and transition to air superiority and offensive strike missions. To make that happen, however, the Air Force will need to move more rapidly toward uncrewed and autonomous systems, preposition equipment and munition stockpiles, and prepare to prioritize air denial in the initial air war.

Kelly Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center, an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and a nonresident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center of the Marine Corps University.

Hunter Slingbaum is a junior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.

16. Suit Accuses Georgetown, Penn and M.I.T. of Admissions Based on Wealth

Suit Accuses Georgetown, Penn and M.I.T. of Admissions Based on Wealth

The schools were accused of giving special treatment to wealthy students who might not otherwise have been admitted.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/17/us/lawsuit-georgetown-wealthy-students-admissions.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

A lawsuit claims that Georgetown University and 16 other schools considered applicants’ family wealth and donation potential when choosing who to admit. Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

By Stephanie Saul

Dec. 17, 2024

For years, Georgetown University’s longtime president, John J. DeGioia, flagged 80 students to be added to a special admissions list — but not, apparently, for their academic or athletic prowess, documents in a lawsuit claim.

Those on Dr. DeGioia’s president’s list were virtually assured of admissions simply because of their family’s wealth and donation potential, according to a motion filed on Monday in a long-running lawsuit against a set of 17 selective universities, including the University of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Notre Dame, Cornell, Johns Hopkins and Caltech.

The new motion argues that the universities were supposed to be “need blind” and not take into account a family’s income when they decided who to admit and how much financial aid to offer. The plaintiffs argue that the schools gave preference to wealthy students in a way that violated provisions of a now-expired law permitting them to agree on financial aid formulas.

Defendants argued that considering student wealth in admissions was not a violation of the law, which required instead that universities would not discriminate against poorer students because they needed financial aid, and that the plaintiffs are attempting to redefine it.

At M.I.T., two children recommended by a wealthy banker with ties to a university board member got special treatment, according to the documents. In a deposition, the school’s director of admissions said the two children, who appeared on a “cases of interest” list, were among those who “we would really have not otherwise admitted.”

At the University of Pennsylvania, some students designated “B.S.I.,” or bona fide special interest, had a dramatically higher rate of admission than other applicants, according to expert testimony filed in the lawsuit.

More on America’s College Campuses

• Black Student Enrollment at Harvard Law: The number of Black students entering Harvard Law School dropped sharply this fall after the Supreme Court’s decision banning affirmative action in college admissions.
• Admissions at Military Academies: An anti-affirmative action group filed a lawsuit challenging racial preferences in admissions at the Air Force Academy. The suit came after another challenge failed against the Naval Academy.
• D.E.I. Official at Michigan Is Fired: The University of Michigan fired an administrator who worked on diversity initiatives over accusations that she made antisemitic comments, her lawyer said. The lawyer said she planned to sue.

Penn’s former associate dean of admissions, Sara Harberson, testified last year in a deposition in the case that a B.S.I. tag meant the student’s family was a big donor or had connections to the board. Those students “were untouchable,” Ms. Harberson said, and “would get in almost 100 percent of the time.”

Ms. Harberson said the admissions office was powerless to deny the student “even if the student was incredibly weak, even if the student had a major issue in the application.”

In an emailed statement, Penn said it saw “no merit in this lawsuit,” arguing that the case was intended to “embarrass the university about its purported admission practices on issues totally unrelated to this case.”

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“The actual evidence in the case makes clear that Penn does not favor in admissions students whose families have made or pledged donations to Penn, whatever the amount,” the statement added. “In fact, the University takes great precaution to ensure that no such preference is given. As a result, only qualified candidates are admitted.”

M.I.T. also issued a statement on Tuesday denying any history of “wealth favoritism in its admissions,” adding that after years of discovery and millions of documents released in the case, the plaintiffs could cite “only a single instance in which the recommendation of a board member helped sway the decisions for two undergraduate applicants.”

"Contrary to what the plaintiffs claim,” Kimberly Allen, an M.I.T. representative, said, “the potential for philanthropic gifts had no bearing on these isolated cases, and in fact our records reflect that the children of wealthy individuals routinely receive disappointing news from M.I.T.”

In an emailed statement, a spokeswoman for Georgetown, Meghan Dubyak, said the documents in the lawsuit “provide a limited and inaccurate view of Georgetown admissions.”

She said the school admitted only “students who will thrive in, contribute to and further strengthen our community," adding that the university “does not knowingly solicit or accept gifts from individuals who have or may soon have a relative or person of close personal interest applying for admission to the university.”

Georgetown officials also pointed to court documents in which they have disputed the claims, including the lawsuit’s contention that the universities ever shared a financial aid formula.

The motion on Monday is part of an ongoing case that accuses schools of cheating students out of millions in financial aid money over more than two decades.

The plaintiffs contend that the schools violated an antitrust exemption that allowed them to share financial aid formulas and methodology as long as they admitted students without factoring in their individual financial needs. The group of 17 schools formed a group to share formulas under this exemption.

The plaintiffs dubbed the schools a “cartel” and accused them of driving up students’ costs by banning universities in the group from reducing a family’s expected financial contribution below an agreed-to financial aid formula.

The universities have disputed the claims.

Ten of the original 17 universities have already settled and paid $284 million to the plaintiffs, a group of students who formerly attended the universities and received financial aid. Some 200,000 students are estimated to have been affected over a period of more than 20 years.

As a result of the settlements by several of the universities named in the case, some students who attended the schools already are eligible to apply for up to $2,000 to reimburse them for financial aid they otherwise would have received.

Robert Gilbert, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, issued a statement saying that the newly filed documents revealed how the schools displayed a “pattern of favoring students from wealthy backgrounds.”

The case has been pending in federal court in Chicago since 2022, but the documents filed on Monday provided more details about the behavior of the schools.

At Georgetown, according to the documents, Dr. DeGioia, who stepped down as president this year after a stroke, met with a student at the annual Allen & Company conference in Sun Valley, Idaho. Few college applicants would have access to the event, known as “mogulfest,” where billionaires arrive by private jets, according to the suit. But this was a special case.

The student’s early action application had been deferred, the lawsuit says, but after the Sun Valley meeting and a subsequent exchange of emails between Dr. DeGioia and the girl’s father, she was admitted from Georgetown’s president’s list. In a deposition, Dr. DeGioia explained that the applicant had been admitted because of “obstacles overcome” — her parents had been divorced.

In 2020, Penn withdrew from the group of universities, which had agreed on standardized financial aid formulas under a 1996 statute exempting them from antitrust regulations. Penn said it needed more flexibility in offering financial assistant to students, according to the lawsuit.

Since then, the group has been disbanded because the provision permitting the universities to exchange information has expired.

Stephanie Saul reports on colleges and universities, with a recent focus on the dramatic changes in college admissions and the debate around diversity, equity and inclusion in higher education. More about Stephanie Saul

17. Killing of Top Russian General Is a Message From Ukraine: You Aren’t Safe—Even at Home

​Excerpts:

Earlier this year, Russian helicopter pilot Maksim Kuzminov, who had defected to Ukraine for a $500,000 reward and publicly encouraged others to do the same, was assassinated in Spain. Spain hasn’t identified a suspect, although investigators believe the murder was ordered by the Kremlin, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

His killing followed a string of other mysterious deaths of prominent Russians, as Russia’s intelligence apparatus has become more aggressive in silencing opponents abroad, increasingly blurring lines between different spy agencies and using foreign nationals to carry out operations. 

Moscow has also escalated an often violent campaign of sabotage and subterfuge in Europe, including an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned property in London and disruption of critical infrastructure such as data cables and pipelines.

Killing of Top Russian General Is a Message From Ukraine: You Aren’t Safe—Even at Home

The aim of Kyiv’s campaign is to bring the fight to Russia, raising the immediate costs of the war for Moscow’s leaders

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/ukraine-russia-war-targeted-assassinations-kills-eca4c50f?mod=latest_headlines

By James MarsonFollow

 and Georgi KantchevFollow

Dec. 18, 2024 6:32 am ET

Just after 6 a.m. Tuesday, an explosion shattered the morning quiet on a residential street in Russia’s capital. A bomb hidden in a scooter detonated, killing a senior military officer. Photos of the aftermath showed him face down in bloodstained snow.

It was a message from Ukraine: You aren’t safe—even at home.

The attack on Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov was part of an escalating campaign by Ukraine’s security and intelligence services to kill high-profile figures in Russia’s war effort. Its aim is to bring the fight to Russia, raising the immediate costs of the war for Moscow’s leaders.

Increasingly, the focus has been on important military targets including a senior naval officer and a missile scientist. Coupled with long-range strikes on installations such as strategic bomber bases, it is part of a drive to use asymmetric measures to disrupt and demoralize the Russian war machine.

Ukrainian security officials say the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, is modeling itself on Israel’s Mossad, renowned for its relentless pursuit of enemies abroad.

“Such an inglorious end awaits all those who kill Ukrainians,” said an SBU official. “Retribution for war crimes is inevitable.”

On Wednesday, Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, said it had detained a 29-year-old citizen of Uzbekistan who was allegedly recruited by Ukraine to plant the bomb. He was allegedly promised $100,000 and a new life in a European Union country, the agency said.

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Ukraine said it had killed Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, after a device planted in a scooter exploded outside a residential building in Moscow. Photo: Associated Press

The execution of Kirillov was the most brazen yet in the Ukrainian killing campaign, part of an effort to bring the war to Russia and raise the cost of a conflict that the Kremlin had initially believed it could wrap up in days. Outmatched in manpower and equipment by its giant invader, Ukraine has sought to strike deep inside Russia using long-range drones, U.S.-provided missiles and covert operations.

“Kyiv sent a message that even the highest-level officials responsible for Russia’s war effort and crimes cannot feel safe, even in Moscow,” said Andrius Tursa, Central and Eastern Europe adviser at consulting firm Teneo.

Still, observers said Kyiv’s campaign is unlikely to fundamentally change the military and political calculus for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who sees the war as a matter of personal legacy and an existential struggle against the West.

“Such actions can only enrage the regime and give additional incentives to continue fighting,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a Moscow-based columnist for Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. “In addition, it is a gift for propaganda—look at the dirty methods of the enemy.”

Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday that Kirillov’s assassination by Ukraine “proves the correctness of our actions” during the war.

One of the earliest and highest-profile operations targeted Russian war blogger Vladlen Tatarsky last spring. At an event he was hosting at a St. Petersburg cafe one evening, a young blonde woman handed a small but weighty box to Tatarsky, whose real name was Maksim Fomin.

“Nastya, Nastya, come sit here,” Tatarsky urged her, gesturing to a front-row seat in the cafe before pulling a bronze-colored bust of himself from the box. “Wow!” he exclaimed. “What a handsome guy!”

Seconds later, as Tatarsky packed the bust back into the box, it exploded, killing him and leaving the cafe a mangled wreck.

A police officer at the scene of an explosion in St. Petersburg. Russian blogger Vladlen Tatarsky, whose funeral was in Moscow, was killed last spring. Peace activist Darya Trepova, shown in court in 2023.

Anatoly Maltsev/EPA/Shutterstock; Anton Velikzhanin/Moscow News Agency/AP; Dmitri Lovetsky/AP

Russian security services quickly identified the blonde woman as Darya Trepova, a Russian opposition activist and pacifist. She had inveigled herself into Russian pro-war circles as an activist known as Nastya and said later in court that she had been tasked by a contact in Kyiv with delivering a bust that she believed contained a listening device to Tatarsky.

“It did have a microphone inside,” insisted a person familiar with the operation. “That’s how the operative knew when to blow it up.”

With the killing of Tatarsky on April 2, 2023—and apparent disregard for the Russian who delivered the bomb—the SBU demonstrated a ruthlessness and skill in the dark arts of killing on enemy territory that stunned Russia and Ukraine’s own Western backers.

Since then, the SBU and Ukraine’s military-intelligence agency, known as HUR, have carried out a series of killings in Russia that have increasingly focused on high-profile military targets. 

The SBU emerged from its Soviet predecessor, the KGB, after Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In Soviet Ukraine, the KGB and its forerunners had targeted anyone who promoted the idea of an independent nation, including assassinations in Western Europe that employed innovative weapons such as a poison gun and an exploding box of chocolates.

As independent Ukraine took an increasingly authoritarian turn from the late 1990s, the SBU’s efforts were often directed against pro-democracy activists, political opponents or businessmen ripe for a shakedown.

Then, after a revolution installed a pro-Western government in Kyiv, Russia invaded and seized Crimea and covertly sent paramilitaries into eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Ukrainian operatives had an urgent new target and soon set to work. They carried out several brazen attacks in occupied eastern Ukraine, blowing up local commanders installed by Moscow. One was killed in a cafe, another in the elevator of his apartment block.

Ukrainian Col. Maksym Shapoval, head of HUR’s special forces, was blown up in his car. Photo: Zuma Press

Russia struck back. Ukrainian Col. Maksym Shapoval, head of HUR’s special forces, was blown up in his car. A former Russian prosecutor and parliament member who had fled to Ukraine for protection was shot dead in central Kyiv.

Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 increased the stakes—and Kyiv’s willingness to strike.

In occupied areas of the east and south, Ukraine can count on large and willing partisan networks that regularly target local collaborators and military officers in car bombings.

In November, the SBU killed Russian Capt. Valery Trankovsky, a naval commander, in a car bombing in Sevastopol in Crimea, according to officials in the agency. The SBU said he was responsible for giving orders to launch cruise missiles that struck and killed civilians. The former head of a Russian prison camp in occupied Ukraine where Kyiv says dozens of prisoners of war have been killed and tortured was killed in a car bombing earlier this month.

Operations in Russia largely rely on guns for hire, according to Ukrainian security officials. Ukrainian handlers use Telegram or the dark net to find a hit man, usually from the criminal underworld, often for money or using threats, said a person involved in such operations. 

“Often the executors don’t know exactly what it is they are doing,” the person said, as several may be involved in one hit with different tasks.

Targets have included war propagandists, former Ukrainian officials who switched sides and military officers.

In one recent operation on Dec. 12, a top Russian missile scientist, Mikhail Shatsky, was shot dead in a forest near Moscow, according to Ukrainian security sources.

Sometimes, the SBU and HUR end up tracking the same target, according to the person involved in the operations. Late last year, teams from each were after Ilya Kyva, a former Ukrainian lawmaker who had fled to Russia and been convicted of treason. After Kyva was shot dead outside Moscow in December, the agencies weren’t immediately clear whose team had carried out the hit, the person said. But then the killer sent proof of the execution, including a photo of Kyva lying motionless in the snow.

“There’s healthy competition over who can complete the mission first,” the person said.

Unlike Kyiv, Russia hasn’t been able to mount a similar campaign of targeted assassinations inside Ukraine since the invasion. That suggests that, in contrast to the preinvasion period when its security services were shot through with Russian spies, Ukraine now possesses superior intelligence and operational capabilities within Russia.

Still, the SBU said in May that it had foiled a Russian plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as the heads of the SBU and HUR.

Moscow has resorted to targeting its opponents abroad. 

Russian helicopter pilot Maksim Kuzminov was assassinated in Spain earlier this year. Photo: Rafa Arjones/Informacion.es/REUTERS

Earlier this year, Russian helicopter pilot Maksim Kuzminov, who had defected to Ukraine for a $500,000 reward and publicly encouraged others to do the same, was assassinated in Spain. Spain hasn’t identified a suspect, although investigators believe the murder was ordered by the Kremlin, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

His killing followed a string of other mysterious deaths of prominent Russians, as Russia’s intelligence apparatus has become more aggressive in silencing opponents abroad, increasingly blurring lines between different spy agencies and using foreign nationals to carry out operations. 

Moscow has also escalated an often violent campaign of sabotage and subterfuge in Europe, including an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned property in London and disruption of critical infrastructure such as data cables and pipelines.

Serhii Bosak, Nikita Nikolaienko and Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com and Georgi Kantchev at georgi.kantchev@wsj.com

18. Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power

​Conclusion:

Department of Defense should not go all in on just quality or quantity, but focus on both stealth and scale. For the United States, growth by defense technology firms, the launch of a new Pentagon office focused on scaling artificial intelligence adoption, and Congressional support for innovation means there is an opportunity now to build effectively for the future. The incoming Trump administration, given its interest in new and innovative approaches to defense technology, has an opportunity to build on initiatives like Replicator and make this a reality.

Stealth and Scale: Quality, Quantity, and Modern Military Power - War on the Rocks

Michael Horowitz and Joshua Schwartz

warontherocks.com · by Michael Horowitz · December 18, 2024

From strikes by uncrewed aerial systems launching precision Hellfire missiles in Afghanistan and Iraq to U.S. Navy ships firing missiles against Houthi targets in the Middle East over the last few years, the United States has led the world in precision strike capabilities for decades. For more than a generation, the United States maintained a healthy lead in the most sophisticated military technologies, especially those that enabled precision strike, and its large advantage arguably deterred many potential rivals from symmetric competition. With the focus on precision, given the accuracy benefits and larger costs of systems, came a decision to prioritize quality over quantity in military capabilities. However, technological change over the last decade has eroded the binary between scale and sophistication. It has also accelerated the proliferation of key elements of the precision strike complex. Even relatively weak actors, such as Iran and militant groups like the Houthis in Yemen, can acquire and even produce these capabilities. For example, the Houthis use Iranian technology like the Shahed-136 one-way precision attack system — and derivatives they produce themselves — to attack shipping in the Red Sea, generating billions of dollars in costs to commercial shipping companies and the U.S. Navy. This is to say nothing of more capable rivals like the People’s Republic of China, which can deliver advanced weapons and platforms on par with the United States in many areas.

The global proliferation of precision strike means we now live in an era of “precise mass,” where comparatively cheap uncrewed systems — that can be deployed at scale — are also highly advanced and deadly accurate. The proliferation of low-cost precise mass means that the United States can no longer comfortably rely upon the edge in precision strike it cultivated over decades. Moreover, the cost-exchange ratio of competing solely with exquisite, expensive systems is likely to lead to failure over time, especially as lower-cost alternatives become more capable and manufacturing lead times for more exquisite systems grow (like in the case of the F-35). These dynamics suggest a strong logic for the United States and others in pursuing a mix of capabilities, emphasizing mass at the lower end and stealthy capabilities at the higher end that can survive in this era of warfare.

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The Strategy of the Past

In the latter part of the Cold War and beyond, the U.S. military largely dedicated itself to gaining a qualitative edge over its adversaries. For example, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States adopted the second offset strategy to counter the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority in Europe with an advantage in expensive, high-tech, and exquisite systems. This meant investing in a suite of technologies that would enable the U.S. military to accurately and swiftly attack Soviet forces deep behind their lines before they could bring their forces to bear against the American military or Western European territory. The Soviets termed this new military concept the “reconnaissance strike complex” (from the Russian pекогносцировочный yдарный комплекс) and quickly recognized its revolutionary potential.

The reconnaissance strike complex, also known as the precision strike complex, is the integration of surveillance assets (such as satellites and reconnaissance aircraft), strike platforms (such as bombers and submarines), and munitions (such as missiles and “smart” bombs). This system of systems enabled the United States to strike its adversaries more quickly, from greater distances, and with much higher levels of precision than ever before. For example, while less than 20 percent of bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their targets in World War II, modern precision-guided munitions are deadly accurate. The effectiveness of the precision strike complex was illustrated in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, as the United States and its coalition partners vastly exceeded initial expectations and routed the large, well-equipped, and battle-tested Iraqi military with fewer than 200 American deaths. Laser-guided smart bombs used in this conflict inflicted a disproportionate amount of damage against Iraqi targets relative to their unguided counterparts, and satellites proved critical for desert navigation and communications.

However, acquiring a sophisticated precision strike capability was extremely challenging during the Cold War and early post–Cold War period for at least three reasons. First, it involved acquiring several key technologies rather than a single technology. Surveillance platforms that locate and track potential targets, strike platforms that deliver munitions against targets, and munitions that can destroy the target are all required to have a sophisticated capability. Second, many of the underlying systems were of the exquisite type and thus quite expensive. As a result, the United States made a conscious decision to reduce the scale of its military and rely on quality instead. Third, successfully adopting the precision strike complex requires highly trained personnel and the doctrine and concepts of operation designed to take advantage of the capabilities. Not all countries have sufficient levels of organizational capital to integrate this system of systems.

These barriers combined to reduce the proliferation of the precision strike complex. As Barry Watts writes, “Not widely foreseen in the mid-1990s was that nearly two decades later long-range precision strike would still be a virtual monopoly of the United States military.” This conclusion is supported by a novel dataset we created measuring countries’ precision strike capabilities when it comes to eight key technologies: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, precision-guided munitions, and satellites. Our data, which measures the sophistication of a country’s capabilities in these areas (e.g., by coding factors like range, payload, and speed) rather than the quantity of systems countries have, reveals that the United States has maintained a strong advantage over other countries since at least the late 1980s. Furthermore, despite the predictions of some prominent realist theorists, few countries have been able to successfully emulate the United States and compete when it comes to quality.

In fact, a statistical analysis we conducted shows that the United States’ large advantage in exquisite systems had a major benefit: it likely deterred some countries from competing symmetrically. This has long been a key element of American strategy. As Stephen Cambone, the then-principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a close advisor to Donald Rumsfeld, articulated: “[I]t’s important that potential adversaries understand … that these are not going to be winning efforts. So don’t bother going down that course. Stay out of that area because you cannot succeed there.”

Because the United States maintained such a significant lead, many potential rivals realized they could not effectively match or eclipse the quality of American capabilities, and thus did not try to. Instead, many invested in more asymmetric strategies. For example, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from 2007 to 2019, said, “Asymmetrical warfare … is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities of the enemy. … Since the enemy has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind.” There was thus a strong rationale for America’s focus on quality over quantity in the past.

The Realities of the Present

Times have changed due to technological advancements that are reshaping the character of war. Improvements in manufacturing, the diffusion of know-how about precision guidance and access to commercial satellites, and growth in autonomy and AI mean the basics of precision strike are now readily available to state and non-state actors.

Consider the Russian-Ukrainian War, where Ukraine — a country whose gross domestic product per capita ranks about 135th in the world and whose gross domestic product ranks 57th in the world— now has the capacity to produce four million drones annually and is reportedly losing ten thousand drones per month. The scale of airpower being utilized by Ukraine is unprecedented. In contrast, the United States only produced around three hundred thousand military aircraft during the entirety of World War II, and it currently has less than five thousand total military aircraft in its inventory.

Iran, which the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded in 2019 is “lacking a modern air force” and is a middle-tier power at best, has also become a major player in the drone space. For example, thousands of their Shahed one-way attack systems have been used by Russia to conduct attacks against Ukraine. Even though a high percentage of them have been shot down, their low cost means even a 10 or 20 percent success rate is financially sustainable. That is especially the case since the missiles Ukraine has used to shoot them down are often many times more expensive than the munition itself.

The Houthis in Yemen, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, have wreaked havoc on the global economy by using Iran’s Shahed one-way attack systems, cheap drones, and other tools, including uncrewed surface vessels, to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

These examples illustrate that precise weaponry is now much more widely available to weak powers than it was in the past, and the low cost of many of these systems enables actors to deploy precision technology at scale (i.e., precise mass).

Consequences for U.S. Defense Strategy

As the technological landscape evolves, so should U.S. defense strategy. Even if current and potential U.S. adversaries initially invested in precise mass capabilities because they could not compete at the higher end with more exquisite U.S. capabilities, technological advances in manufacturing, AI, autonomy, and the diffusion of knowledge have changed the game. Now, precise mass capabilities have proven their worth on the battlefield in their own right, even as combined arms warfare remains key to success.

There is a temptation, of course, to think about precise mass as simply a supplement to U.S. capabilities that is necessary in the short term given the struggles the U.S. defense industrial base is having producing ships, submarines, fighters, missiles, and artillery at scale and reasonable prices. Although increasingly large outlays to revive the defense industrial base by the Trump and then Biden administrations are poised to pay off, it may be years or even decades before the impact of investments in areas like the submarine industrial base or the manufacturing of high-end weapons like the long-range anti-ship missile becomes clear.

Therefore, continuing to invest only or mostly in quality, meaning exquisite, systems at the expense of platforms that can leverage precise mass would be risky. Adversaries now have a greater ability to utilize a large quantity of relatively cheap — but precise — systems to try and destroy a single exquisite asset. Currently, the financial burden is often greater for the defending force than the offensive force when it comes to large-scale attacks, as Iran’s assault against Israel in April 2024 illustrates. Using million-dollar missiles to destroy one-way attack systems that cost tens of thousands of dollars or less is a losing proposition over time.

Washington should therefore revise its defense approach to invest more in attritable systems, and cost-effective defensive technologies in general. The Replicator initiative is an excellent start, but it should be built upon and expanded. After all, the Department of Defense is only currently investing an extremely small fraction of its overall budget into precise mass. A key advantage of investing more in precise mass is speed of scaling and deployment. Systems like attritable drones can be produced relatively quickly to meet the increasingly fraught geopolitical landscape, whereas exquisite systems like Virginia-class submarines take much longer to produce, even though they are absolutely vital for U.S. military power.

Thinking about precise mass as merely a short-term supplement while longer-term investments in the defense industrial base come on line would also be a mistake. A mix of higher-end and lower-end capabilities will be necessary to succeed in future wars, particularly against nation-states. Even an extremely wealthy country like the United States can only afford a certain number of joint air-to-surface standoff missiles when they cost up to $2 million per missile. The cost of hypersonics, which are now entering the U.S. military arsenal and are already deployed by China and Russia, are even higher per missile. It is therefore not an either/or between expensive and attritable systems, just as it is not an either/or between newer and older technologies.

Precise mass capabilities therefore will complement rather than fully substitute for existing capabilities. For example, at least some exquisite systems — such as submarines and stealthy aircraft — can survive even in an era of precise mass with ubiquitous sensing. If they cannot be located, then precision and mass are not sufficient to destroy them. A future U.S. military arsenal with both attritable systems that can be deployed at scale and a suite of expensive, high-end, and stealthy systems that can survive the rigors of modern warfare would be a strong force. There is synergy between exquisite and attritable systems, as the latter can be employed to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses or strike them precisely in the absence of defenses, and the former can be utilized to strike and destroy the principal target with a high degree of confidence, even in the face of sophisticated defenses.

In conclusion, as our research shows, high financial costs and other barriers to entry made it difficult for countries to compete with the United States in precision strike systems for decades. These dynamics helped explain the initially slow proliferation of precision strike technology and justified Washington’s focus on exquisite systems at the expense of mass. But the strategies of yesterday will not necessarily work tomorrow. To adjust to the realities of the present, the Department of Defense should not go all in on just quality or quantity, but focus on both stealth and scale. For the United States, growth by defense technology firms, the launch of a new Pentagon office focused on scaling artificial intelligence adoption, and Congressional support for innovation means there is an opportunity now to build effectively for the future. The incoming Trump administration, given its interest in new and innovative approaches to defense technology, has an opportunity to build on initiatives like Replicator and make this a reality.

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Michael C. Horowitz is the Richard Perry professor and director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2022 to 2024, he served as the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for force development and emerging capabilities.

Joshua A. Schwartz joshis an assistant professor of international relations and emerging technology at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology. From 2021 to 2023, he was a Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft fellow at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The views in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, its components, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Sgt. Perla Alfaro via DVIDs.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Horowitz · December 18, 2024

19. Putin’s Point of No Return

​Conclusion:

There is no easy resolution to the West’s confrontation with Russia. Russian revisionism and aggression are not going away. Even if the current war in Ukraine is settled via an armistice, without some kind of security guarantee for Ukraine, another war is likely. Ignoring Russia or assuming that it can be easily managed as the United States turns its attention to China would only allow the threat to grow. It would be far better for the United States and its allies to take the challenge from Russia seriously today than to let another conflict become a more costly proposition tomorrow.

Putin’s Point of No Return

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrea Kendall-Taylor · December 18, 2024

How an Unchecked Russia Will Challenge the West

Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman

January/February 2025 Published on December 18, 2024

Diego Mallo

Andrea Kendall-Taylor is Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From 2015 to 2018, she was Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council.

Michael Kofman is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

• More by Michael Kofman

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On August 6, 2024, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk region—the biggest foreign incursion into Russian territory since World War II. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response was telling. Days after Ukraine’s offensive, Putin railed against the United States and Europe. “The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians,” he said, reiterating his view that Russia’s war in Ukraine is in fact a proxy battle with the West. But he initiated no immediate military counterattack. Putin was unwilling to divert substantial numbers of troops away from their operations in eastern Ukraine even to recover territory back home. Three months later, with Ukrainian forces still in Kursk, Moscow instead brought in North Korean troops to help push them out—the first time in more than a century that Russia has invited foreign troops onto its soil.

Moscow’s actions underscore how, after almost three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor, Putin is now more committed than ever to the war with Ukraine and his broader confrontation with the West. Although the conflict is first and foremost an imperial pursuit to end Ukraine’s independence, Putin’s ultimate objectives are to relitigate the post–Cold War order in Europe, weaken the United States, and usher in a new international system that affords Russia the status and influence Putin believes it deserves.

These goals are not new. But the war has hardened Putin’s resolve and narrowed his options. There is no turning back: Putin has already transformed Russia’s society, economy, and foreign policy to better position the Kremlin to take on the West. Having accepted the mantle of a rogue regime, Russia is now even less likely to see a need for constraint.

The stage is set for the confrontation with Russia to intensify, despite the incoming Trump administration’s apparent interest in normalizing relations with Moscow. The war is not going well for Ukraine, in part because the limited assistance the West has sent to Kyiv does not match the deep stake it claims to have in the conflict. As a result, Russia is likely to walk away from the war emboldened and, once it has reconstituted its military capacity, spoiling for another fight to revise the security order in Europe. What’s more, the Kremlin will look to pocket any concessions from the Trump administration for ending the current war, such as sanctions relief, to strengthen its hand for the next one. Russia is already preparing the ground through the sabotage and other special operations it has unleashed across Europe and through its alignment with other rogue actors, including Iran and North Korea. European countries are only slightly more prepared to handle the Russian challenge on their own than they did three years ago. And depending on how the war in Ukraine ends, the possibility of another war with Russia looms.

The question is not whether Russia will pose a threat to the United States and its allies but how to assess the magnitude of the danger and the effort required to contain it. China will remain the United States’ primary competitor. But even with much of its attention called to Asia, Washington cannot ignore a recalcitrant and revanchist adversary in Europe, especially not one that will pose a direct military threat to NATO members.

The Russian problem is also a global one. Putin’s willingness to invade a neighbor, assault democratic societies, and generally violate accepted norms—and his seeming ability to get away with it—paves the way for others to do the same.The Kremlin’s provision of military equipment and know-how to current and aspiring U.S. adversaries will amplify these threats, multiplying the challenges that Washington will face from China, Iran, North Korea, and any other country that Russia backs.

The United States and Europe, therefore, must invest in resisting Russia now or pay a far greater cost later. The incoming Trump administration, in particular, does not have the luxury of shoving Russia down its list of policy priorities. If Putin sees Washington doing so, he will grow only more brazen and ambitious in his efforts to weaken the United States and its allies, both directly and through the axis of upheaval that Russia supports. To prevent that outcome, Washington and its allies must help Ukraine strengthen its position ahead of negotiations to end the current war. The United States is right to prioritize China, but in order to effectively compete with Beijing, it first needs to set European security on the right path. Washington must remain the primary enabler of that security for now, while making sure that Europe ramps up the investments required to better handle its own defense in the years ahead. By taking the steps necessary to counter Russia today, the United States and Europe can ensure that the threat they face tomorrow will be a manageable one.

IN TOO DEEP

Putin has changed Russia in ways that will ensure it remains a challenge to the West as long as he is in power and likely well beyond. Confrontation is now the hallmark of Russia’s foreign policy, with Putin citing his country’s “existential struggle” with the West to justify his regime and its actions. This idea of a Russian civilization in constant conflict with its Western foes strengthens the ideological foundation of his rule—a source of legitimacy he now needs to safeguard his hold on power.

Putin’s increased reliance on repression has generated risks to the stability of his regime. Political science research shows that repression is effective in the sense that it increases autocrats’ longevity in office. But depending too heavily on it, as Putin has done, can raise the prospect that leaders will make destabilizing mistakes. Heavy-handed tactics compel people to mask their private views and avoid sharing anything but what the government wants to hear, which means the autocrat, too, loses access to accurate information. High levels of repression also create a rising reservoir of general dissatisfaction, so that even a small outburst of discontent can quickly spiral into trouble for the regime. To mitigate these risks and reinforce his hold on power, Putin has used his control over the information environment to convince the Russian people that their country is at war with a West that wants to break it apart.

The war has hardened Putin’s resolve and narrowed his options.

Putin has also reoriented the Russian economy around his war. Russia’s defense spending is set to reach its highest point since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with $145 billion allocated in the 2025 budget—the equivalent of 6.3 percent of GDP and more than double the $66 billion Russia budgeted for defense in 2021, the year before the invasion. And the true amount of such spending will likely be higher, possibly exceeding eight percent of GDP, once other, unofficial forms of defense-related expenditures are accounted for. (When also adjusting for considerable differences in purchasing power parity between Russia and the United States, Russia’s actual defense spending is much higher than $145 billion, exceeding $200 billion.) Russian factories producing military equipment have added shifts to increase production; workers have moved from civilian to military sectors, where the wages are higher; and payouts for military service have skyrocketed. The war has become a wealth transfer mechanism channeling money to Russia’s poor regions, and many economic elites have moved into the defense sector to cash in on lucrative opportunities. Elites have, by now, adjusted to the system’s current configuration, enabling them not just to survive but to profit from it.

Having gone through the pain of shifting the economy to a wartime footing and feeling the pressure of new vested interests, Putin is unlikely to undo these changes quickly. After the fighting in Ukraine ends, he will probably instead look to justify the continuation of the wartime economy. Such was the inclination of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who, after the Allied victory in World War II, soon began to speak of Moscow’s new five-year plans as necessary preparation for the next inevitable war.

Russian foreign policy is also transforming in ways that will be difficult to undo. The invasion of Ukraine has made it impossible for Russia to build ties with the West, and Moscow has had to look for opportunities elsewhere. Its deepening partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea may have been driven largely by necessity: Russia needs their help to sustain its economy and warfighting machine. But Moscow also understands that by working with these countries, it is in a better position to sustain a long-term competition with the United States and its allies. Not only does their support make Russia less isolated and less vulnerable to the United States’ tools of economic warfare; Russia also benefits from having cobelligerents working in tandem to weaken the West. The Kremlin has gone all in on these partnerships, having abandoned caution in cooperating with North Korea, overcome its concern with overdependence on China, and elevated relations with Iran beyond transactional engagement. All of this amounts to a new strategy for Moscow, one that will not simply disappear after the fighting in Ukraine subsides or ends.

RUSSIA RELOADS

Russia’s military threat is not going away, either. The question of Russian military reconstitution is not an if but a when. Even if Russia cannot sustain its current wartime spending, the defense budget is likely to remain substantially above prewar levels for some time to come. The Russian military, too, is unlikely to shrink back to the relatively small army Russia fielded before the war. One lesson that Russia’s military brass took from Ukraine is that the Russian army was not “Soviet” enough in that it lacked mass and the capacity to replace losses. In reality, the Russian military was stuck in a halfway state, having acquired some advanced or modernized capabilities but also retaining some Soviet-era characteristics, including conscription and a culture of centralized command that discouraged initiative. Now, Russia is likely to maintain a large overall force with an expanded structure and greater manpower allocation, although it will still depend on mobilization in the event of war to reduce the cost of its standing army.

Reconstitution is about not just materiel but also the capacity to conduct large-scale combat operations.The Russian military has shown that it can learn as an organization; it is capable of scaling the deployment of new technology such as drones and electronic warfare systems onto the battlefield, and it will be a changed force after its experience in Ukraine. Despite its initial poor showing, the Russian military has demonstrated staying power and the ability to withstand high levels of attrition.

Russia’s military reconstitution will face headwinds, especially from the country’s limited defense industrial capacity and skilled labor shortage. Russian industry has not been able to significantly scale the production of major platforms and weapons systems. Labor and machine tools remain major constraints because of Western sanctions and export controls. Russia has still been able to significantly increase the production of missiles, precision-guided weapons, drones, and artillery munitions, and it has set up an effective repair and refurbishment pipeline for existing equipment. But it is also drawing from aging stocks that it inherited from the Soviet Union for much of its land force equipment. Thus, as it expands its forces and replaces losses, it is depleting its resources.

Military drills in the southern Krasnodar region, Russia, December 2024 Sergey Pivovarov / Reuters

From now on, the Russian military will have a duality to it, with areas of strength but equally prominent weaknesses. On the one hand, it has become much better at dynamic targeting, precision strikes, the integration of drones in combat operations, and more sophisticated methods of employing long-range precision-guided weapons. Russia has adapted to—and in some cases developed effective tactics to counter—the Western capabilities it confronted in Ukraine. Over time, Russian forces reorganized logistics and command and control, coming up with ways to reduce the efficacy of Western equipment and intercept Western munitions, and they have learned to operate with the presence of Western long-range precision-guided weapons, intelligence, and targeting.

For NATO, this ought to set off alarms. Some analysts argue that the way Ukraine is fighting now is not the way NATO would fight in a potential future war with Russia.They contend specifically that NATO would quickly earn and maintain air superiority, changing the nature of the conflict. Although this may be true, airpower will not solve every battlefield challenge NATO might face. And most European air forces lack munitions for a sustained conventional war. The time it would take to deplete their arsenals can best be measured in weeks and in many cases days.

On the other hand, a substantial percentage of the Russian ground force will likely continue to field dated Soviet equipment, and it will take years to rebuild force quality and replace the officers lost in Ukraine.The outlook for Russia’s defense capacity will also depend on whether its economy is running flat out and the defense sector has already maximized production or if there is still room for production to increase as new and refurbished plants and facilities come online. Overall, the Russian military will remain a patchwork, with some parts more advanced and capable than they were at the start of 2022 and other parts still using equipment from the middle of the Cold War, if not earlier. But the chances of the Russian armed forces being decisively knocked out and unable to pose a major threat for a prolonged period are low.

A GROWING GAP

The risks from the reconstitution of Russia’s military are compounded by the West’s lackluster response to rising Russian aggression. Europe still has a long way to go before it is prepared to handle the threat from Russia on its own. European defense production is insufficient to meet rearmament goals, despite Europe’s advantages in capital, machine tools, and labor productivity. European countries have substantially depleted their stocks by transferring older equipment to Ukraine, limiting their militaries’ mobilization potential. These countries will soon face the dual pressure of funding Ukraine’s war effort and recovery while replacing their own expended war materiel. Given how limited their arsenals were to begin with, if they want to be equipped to handle Russian belligerence, they will need to build well beyond 2022 levels—not just restore what was lost.

Current trends suggest that although European defense spending is likely to rise, the increases may not be enough to significantly expand military capability. There are exceptions, such as Poland and the Baltic states. But many countries with large budgets, such as Italy and Spain, are lagging behind. Many have yet to meet the commitment made by all NATO allies to spend the equivalent of two percent of GDP on defense. Across Europe, defense production is constrained by industrial capacity, the slow pace of finalizing contracts, and competing budgetary imperatives. All these issues can be overcome with sufficient political will, but European leaders first have to be clear-eyed in their assessment of the security environment. The United States is not going to significantly expand its presence in Europe; at best, Washington’s commitment to European security will remain constant as it pushes Europe to do more, and there is a real risk that it will turn its focus elsewhere. Europe must prepare to foot more of the bill to ensure that Ukraine is in a position to defend itself and to deter future Russian aggression against both Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

American leaders, for their part, will have to be realistic about Europe’s capabilities. Even those countries that are now investing heavily in equipment and procurement are still having issues recruiting, retaining, and training sufficient forces. And defense spending does not easily translate into the ability to conduct large-scale combat operations. Modern operations are complex, and European countries generally cannot execute them without U.S. support. Most militaries on the continent have coevolved to complement the U.S. military rather than to operate independently.

European militaries and NATO have made some progress matching their defense investments with the requirements of regional defense plans. But the forces active on the continent are not capable of handling a large-scale war on their own. They would find it difficult to agree on who would lead such an operation and who would provide the necessary supporting elements. European militaries would struggle to defend a fellow NATO member, or Ukraine, without U.S. help—a dependence that Washington has, to some extent, perpetuated. Thus, although the United States should continue to press its European allies to take on more of the security burden, Washington must appreciate that it will take a long time for Europe to get there.

THE RISING RISK OF WAR

Europe and the United States are not preparing for some far-off threat. Moscow is already waging an unconventional war against Europe. Within the past few years, suspected Russian-backed actors have set fire to warehouses in Germany and the United Kingdom that were full of arms and ammunition for Ukraine, tampered with water purification centers in Finland, pushed migrants from the Middle East and North Africa crossing through Belarus and Russia to the borders of Poland and Finland, targeted railway infrastructure in the Czech Republic and Sweden, assassinated a Russian military defector in Spain, and even plotted to assassinate the German head of a major European arms manufacturer. The Kremlin’s goal with these measures is to show European governments and citizens that Russia can retaliate for their support for Kyiv.

Yet once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia’s efforts won’t subside. Moscow’s broader aim in pursuing these tactics is to degrade the West and its ability to counter Russia. It wants to weaken Western societies, drive wedges between the United States and Europe, reduce Europe’s capacity for collective action, and convince Europeans that it’s not worth the trouble to push back against Moscow. Part of its strategy is to use nuclear intimidation, such as the recent changes to Russian nuclear doctrine that seem to lower the threshold for nuclear use, to heighten Western fears of confronting Russia.

The stage is set for the West’s confrontation with Russia to intensify.

Russia is not in a position to challenge NATO directly. The current low-scale conflict with NATO countries is likely to persist until the Russian military rebuilds—a process that could take years. But the Kremlin will then be looking for opportunities to further undermine NATO. Moscow will still have reason for caution, not least because it considers the alliance to be a superior force, but it may be tempted if it becomes clear that the allies—the United States the most important among them—lack the resolve for collective defense. The Kremlin would be most prone to make this calculation if the United States is engaged in a major conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, which Washington has deemed its highest national security priority. Should the Kremlin calculate that Washington would not or could not come to Europe’s defense and that Europe alone would not be capable of victory, then Moscow could target a country on NATO’s eastern flank, daring NATO to respond.

The picture is further complicated by the Kremlin’s propensity for both risk-taking and miscalculation. Already, Moscow has seriously misjudged its ability to rapidly defeat the Ukrainian military and to shake Western resolve. Personalist autocrats such as Putin are the type of leader most inclined to make mistakes, in part because they surround themselves with yes men and loyalists who tell the leaders what they want to hear. Washington and its allies should thus not sleep comfortably even if NATO forces are well equipped to defeat the Russian military. Having confidence that NATO would prevail in the end is not enough, especially having observed what Ukraine is experiencing now: cities destroyed, tens of thousands killed, millions made refugees, and areas under prolonged Russian occupation. Even if Russia were defeated today, a future war with Russia could be devastating for the country it invades and for the NATO alliance. The imperative for the United States and NATO is to make sure Moscow never tries.

AIDING AND ABETTING

The confrontation with Russia will remain most intense in Europe, but the challenge from Moscow is global. Although the United States and Europe levied significant costs on Russia in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has circumvented Western sanctions and export controls and defied predictions of international isolation. In October, Russia hosted the annual summit of BRICS (whose first five members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), with dozens of world leaders in attendance, demonstrating a growing interest in the group’s role as a platform for challenging Western power and influence.

The more that Putin clashes with the United States and its allies and is perceived to get away with it, the more other countries will be emboldened to issue challenges of their own. Russia’s war in Ukraine is exposing not only a gap between the West’s rhetoric and its practical commitment but also the limits of Western military capacity.This is not to say that a seeming Russian success in Ukraine would automatically prompt Chinese leader Xi Jinping to invade Taiwan; other factors, such as the military balance of power in the region and political imperatives in Beijing, will be more decisive in shaping Xi’s calculus. Yet China is taking notes, as are onlookers around the world. Would-be Western adversaries are assessing the price of using force and considering what they might expect were they to launch a similar gambit. Likewise, the inadequate response to Russian sabotage in Europe might encourage other potential foes to get in the game.

Not content to simply inspire, Moscow is also actively aiding opponents of the West. Russia has lent support to rogue actors across the Sahel region of Africa, dispensing materiel and diplomatic backing that enabled military officials to forcibly seize power in Mali in 2021, in Burkina Faso in 2022, and in Niger in 2023 and subsequently curtail ties with the United States and Europe. Russia is also sending arms into Sudan, prolonging the country’s civil war and the resulting humanitarian crisis, and has lent support to the Houthi militias in Yemen, who have attacked vessels in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade, and have fired missiles at Israel, a close U.S. ally.

After a Russian drone strike in Kyiv, Ukraine, November 2024 Valentyn Ogirenko / Reuters

Although the consequences for the United States of any one of these developments may be limited, in aggregate, Russia’s actions are magnifying the challenges facing Washington. In Niger, Russian support eased the new government’s decision to force the United States to abandon a base it used to launch counterterrorism missions in the Sahel. If Russia were to ramp up its support for the Houthis and provide them with antiship missiles, the militant group would be better able to strike commercial vessels in the Red Sea and raise the threat to the U.S. and European warships defending them. Once the fighting in Ukraine ends, Russia could devote significantly more resources and attention to the Houthis and other groups or countries that threaten U.S. interests.

Some observers have held out hope that China’s concern for its economic interests will induce it to rein in Russia. But Beijing’s actions so far indicate no such effort. China did not object to Russia’s support for the Houthis, despite the risks to global shipping. Even if Beijing is wary of Russia’s deepening relations with North Korea, it is unlikely to intervene, not least because it does not want to spoil its long-standing relationship with Pyongyang. Instead, China seems content to let Russia roil the international system and take advantage of the resulting disorder to further its own rise. If there is to be any check on Russia’s destabilizing activities, then, it will have to come from the West.

THE AXIS OF UPHEAVAL

Russia’s effort to support China, Iran, and North Korea is among the most pernicious problems posed by Moscow. Russia’s war in Ukraine has spurred a level of cooperation among those countries that few thought was possible, and the Kremlin has operated as the critical catalyst. The arrival of North Korean troops in Russia is a worrisome reminder that with highly personalized authoritarian regimes at the helm in Russia and North Korea and with the regimes in China and to a lesser extent Iran moving in this direction, cooperation can evolve rapidly and in unpredictable ways.

A body of political science research shows that this particular type of regime tends to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies. Countries with personalist authoritarians at the helm are the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts, the most likely to fight wars against democracies, and the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons. Russia’s growing military and political support for China, Iran, and North Korea will only facilitate these tendencies. And Moscow, by now having shed its concern with its international reputation, is likely to become even less constrained in its willingness to aid even the most odious of regimes.

Russian support for fellow members of this axis of upheaval, therefore, could bring disorder to key regions. Take the Chinese-Russian relationship. Although Moscow has supplied Beijing with arms for years—including advanced fighter aircraft, air defense systems, and antiship missiles—their defense ties have deepened at an alarming rate. In September, for example, U.S. officials announced that Russia had provided China with sophisticated technology that will make Chinese submarines quieter and more difficult to track. Such an agreement was hard to imagine just a few years ago, given the sensitive nature of the technology. With Beijing and Moscow working together, the U.S. military advantage over China could erode, making a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific more likely if China believes it has the upper hand.

The costs of resisting Russia will only rise.

Russia’s support for Iran is similarly troubling. Moscow has long sent tanks, helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles to Tehran, and it is now supporting the Iranian space and missile programs. Since Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 to shore up the rule of President Bashar al-Assad—joining Iran in that effort—Moscow and Tehran’s increased interaction has enabled them to overcome a historic distrust and build the foundations of a deeper and more durable partnership. A decade ago, Russia participated (if warily) in the international negotiations that led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. But today, Moscow seems far less interested in arms reduction or nonproliferation. As the wars in the Middle East degrade Iran’s proxies and expose the limits of its ability to deter Israel, Tehran’s interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon may grow—and it may turn to Russia for help. That help could be overt, with Moscow offering the expertise needed for weapon miniaturization, for example, or it could be indirect, with Russia shielding Tehran from UN action. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, in turn, could send other countries in the region, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, scrambling to nuclearize, effectively ending the current era of nonproliferation in the Middle East.

In the case of North Korea, Russia’s support raises the risk of instability on the Korean Peninsula. According to South Korean officials, Pyongyang has requested advanced Russian technologies to improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles and to expand the range of its submarines in return for North Korea sending its troops, ammunition, and other military support to Russia. And it is not just advanced equipment that could make North Korea more able and, perhaps, more willing to engage in a regional conflict. North Korean troops deployed to Russia are now gaining valuable battlefield experience and insight into modern conflict. Moscow and Pyongyang also signed a treaty in November establishing a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and calling on each side to come to the other’s aid in case of an armed attack—an agreement that could potentially bring Russia into a fight between North Korea and South Korea.

It is tempting to imagine that if the United States presses Ukraine to end the war and pursues a more pragmatic relationship with Russia, Moscow’s cooperation with members of this axis could lessen. Yet this is wishful thinking. The growing ties among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are driven by incentives far deeper than the transactional considerations created by the war in Ukraine. If anything, concessions made to Russia to end the war would only enhance the Kremlin’s ability to help its partners weaken the United States.

ORDER OF OPERATIONS

Russian ambitions may not stop at Ukraine, and in the absence of Western action today, the costs of resisting Russian aggression will only rise. Russia is a declining power, but its potential to stir conflict remains significant. Thus, the burden of deterrence and defense against it is not going to lighten in the near term. And because changes to defense spending, procurement, and force posture require significant lead times, Washington and its allies must think beyond the current war in Ukraine and start making investments now to prevent Russian opportunistic aggression later on. Europe must channel its rising defense spending into expanding the organizational capacity and logistical support necessary to make independent action possible if the U.S. military is engaged elsewhere. Giving in to Russia’s demands will not make it any easier or cheaper to defend Europe—just look at the events of the past two decades. At every turn—the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and its deployment of troops to Syria in 2015—Putin has grown only more willing to take risks as he comes to believe that doing so pays off.

Washington undoubtedly has competing priorities that will shift its focus away from the Russian threat—China foremost among them. But to effectively address China, Washington must first set European security on the right path. The United States cannot simply hand off European security to a Europe that is not yet capable of managing the Russian threat. If Washington downsized its commitment to Europe prematurely, Moscow could take it as a sign of growing U.S. disinterest and use the opportunity to press ahead.

A Ukrainian soldier in Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine, December 2024 Stringer / Reuters

The prioritization of U.S. policies is important, but so is the sequencing. The Trump administration will first have to manage the war in Ukraine. Helping Ukraine achieve an end to the war on favorable terms is the clearest way to reduce the threat of aggression from Russia and the axis of upheaval that supports it. This agreement would need to be embedded in a larger strategy to contain Russia and preserve Ukrainian security. NATO should do away with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which prohibits permanent deployments of allied forces near Russia, and station troops on NATO’s eastern flank. The alliance should also raise its members’ defense spending targets, increase its readiness, and improve its ability to deploy forces to defend threatened member states. Western countries should maintain and better enforce sanctions and export controls on Russia for at least as long as Putin remains in power. Western countries must also invest in Ukraine’s defense sector and ensure that Ukraine can sustain its own armed forces to deter Russia from invading again. Although these measures would not end the confrontation with Russia, they would blunt Moscow’s ambitions and its capacity to both stir conflict in Europe and strengthen its partners in other parts of the world.

The Trump administration must also preserve the United States’ role as the primary enabler of European security while working to reduce the burden of its maintenance. European states must become more capable of collective action that does not require U.S. aid. They may still rely on the United States in some circumstances, but the extent of their dependence can be significantly reduced. Over time, the United States will become freer to focus on China as it shifts more defense responsibilities to Europe. And in the meantime, it will avoid an overly hasty, chaotic pivot that would only encourage and embolden Moscow and could result in Russia eventually launching a reckless war, either against NATO or once again against Ukraine.

There is no easy resolution to the West’s confrontation with Russia. Russian revisionism and aggression are not going away. Even if the current war in Ukraine is settled via an armistice, without some kind of security guarantee for Ukraine, another war is likely. Ignoring Russia or assuming that it can be easily managed as the United States turns its attention to China would only allow the threat to grow. It would be far better for the United States and its allies to take the challenge from Russia seriously today than to let another conflict become a more costly proposition tomorrow.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor is Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From 2015 to 2018, she was Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council.

Michael Kofman is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrea Kendall-Taylor · December 18, 2024

20. The Long Telegram of the 1990s: “Whose Russia Is It Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect”

The Long Telegram of the 1990s:

“Whose Russia Is It Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect”

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2024-12-18/long-telegram-1990s-whose-russia-it-anyway-toward-policy?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=ce7cec72-bdd7-4b3d-8bb0-823d5a5eeb99

U.S. Embassy DCM James Collins and head of the political-internal section E. Wayne Merry in Moscow. 

Courtesy of Wayne Merry.

Embassy dissent argued against U.S. push for radical economic reform

Top political officer predicted U.S. focus on markets over democratic institution-building 

would turn Russia anti-American and “adversarial”

National Security Archive wins release of long-withheld cable through FOIA lawsuit

Published: Dec 18, 2024

Briefing Book #

879

For more information, contact:

202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Subjects

NATO

Policy Making and Diplomacy

Russia-U.S. Relations

Regions

Central/Eastern Europe

Russia and Former Soviet Union

United States and Canada

Events

End of the Cold War, 1989-1991

Project

Russia Programs

E. Wayne Merry as a young analyst. Courtesy of Wayne Merry.

Russian president Boris Yeltsin at Camp David receiving cowboy boots from President George H.W. Bush and U.S. Ambassador to Russia Robert Strauss, February 1, 1992. (George H.W. Bush Presidential Library)

The blackened top of the Russian “White House,” home of the Russian parliament that was shelled by order of President Yeltsin to suppress violent opposition to his autocratic rule and shock therapy. Photo by E. Wayne Merry, 1993.

The empty plinth that once supported the statue of Felx Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet secret police, in front of the KGB headquarters at Lubyanka in Moscow. Photo by E. Wayne Merry.

E. Wayne Merry in Red Square, on August 22, 1991, the evening after the anti-Gorbachev coup crumbled. Courtesy of Wayne Merry.

Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia during 1993 and 1994, signer of many Wayne Merry-drafted cables to Washington.

James Collins, Wayne Merry’s supervisor as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow in the early 1990s, and subsequently U.S. Ambassador to Russia in 1997 to 2001.

Larry Summers, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs from 1993 to 1995 (and later Treasury Secretary and President of Harvard), widely seen as the architect of U.S. policy in favor of radical economic reform in Russia. Treasury and economics attaches in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow refused to clear Wayne Merry’s long telegram, saying “it would give Larry Summers a heart attack.”

Washington, D.C., December 18, 2024 – A now-legendary but long-secret 70-paragraph telegram written by the top political analyst at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in March 1994, E. Wayne Merry, criticizing the American policy focus on radical economic reform in Russia, was published in full today for the first time by the National Security Archive.

Merry could not get the critical message cleared for government-wide distribution at the time in 1994 because of Treasury objections (“It would give Larry Summers a heart attack”) and ultimately resorted to the Dissent Channel instead, according to Merry’s retrospective commentary, which was also published today by the Archive together with the actual “long telegram” and other declassified documents.

Reminiscent of George Kennan’s Long Telegram of 1946 in the depth and scope of its analysis of Russian realities and almost as prescient in its prophecies, the Merry cable only reached the public domain as the result of a National Security Archive lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The State Department denied a copy to Merry himself, claiming public release of dissent messages would provide the wrong incentive for future Foreign Service Officers.

Titled provocatively “Whose Russia Is It Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect,” the Merry long telegram argued that radical market reform was the wrong economic prescription for Russia, with its history of statist direction of the economy, uncertainty of political transition and extreme challenges of geography and climate. The message described “shock therapy” as so visibly Washington’s program that the devastating austerity already evident in 1994 was blamed on the U.S., and the long-term consequences would “recreate an adversarial relationship between Russia and the West.” Plus, Merry warned, “we will also fail on the economic front.”

The one-page official response from the State Department, required by State regulations to come from the Policy Planning Staff, did not even reach Moscow until Merry had already left the Embassy that summer. Merry read the formal response for the first time only this year, after the National Security Archive obtained both his original Dissent Channel cable and the State response as part of a FOIA lawsuit. The State response, signed by then Director of Policy Planning Jim Steinberg, commended Merry for his constructive use of the Dissent Channel, accepted some of his criticisms of U.S. aid programs in Russia, but, in a tone-deaf passage displaying no knowledge of Russia, told him he was wrong to separate markets from democracy as policy goals, because the former were essential to the latter.

“In my experience, Washington seeks to understand other countries by looking in the mirror (a common human failing),” comments Merry in his contextual essay. He describes American policy toward Russia in the 1990s, emphasizing market reforms rather than building democratic institutions and the rule of law, as an “especially virulent case of Washington institutions trying to ram a foreign square peg into an American round hole.”

The Merry long telegram provided Washington with a detailed dissection of the political forces at work in Russia, the weakness of the radical reformers both electorally and going forward, the rationale behind Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s firing of key reformers (not at all welcomed in Washington), and an extended economic history lesson on Russian realities.

Russians were baffled by the American “double helix” concept of markets and democracy as mutually dependent and leading to a “higher moral and material state of being,” wrote Merry in 1994. “Very, very few Russians impart positive ethical content to market forces, and unfortunately more of these are Mafia than economists.” Merry warned Washington that the radical reformers deserved to lose the December 1993 elections, “lost it badly, and lost it fair and square.” After all, “the only way to know what the people want, and don’t want, is to ask them.”

One particularly critical passage of the long telegram eviscerated U.S. aid programs. “Sadly, very few of the multitudes of American ‘advisors’ in Russia since the Bolshevik demise acquainted themselves with even the most basic facts of the country whose destiny they proposed to shape… Even the most progressive and sympathetic of Russian officials have lost patience with the endless procession of what they call ‘assistance tourists’ who rarely bother to ask their hosts for an appraisal of Russian needs….” And since “our aid programs are often of benefit mostly to domestic contractors” – particularly so in this case – “much of the assistance money never left our shores or ever entered Russian hands.”

Other declassified documents included in today’s Electronic Briefing Book provide evidence of Merry’s flair for writing and colorful analysis, often appreciated by his superiors, especially Ambassadors Robert Strauss and Thomas Pickering, and DCM’s James Collins and Richard Miles, whom Merry singles out for praise in his contextual essay. 

For example, Merry wrote the briefing to Washington just before Yeltsin came to Camp David to meet George H.W. Bush in January 1992. The cable bearing Strauss’s signature (standard practice) reported, “Yeltsin will continue to struggle with the results of the imperial breakup he helped bring about and with the garrison state he inherited.” But the Russian people don’t want another Lenin, just “a tsar with a common touch.” At the bottom of this cable, Strauss added a comment: “While this analysis may be overdrawn a bit at the margins, we wanted to make the points vividly and responsibly.” This phrase describes almost all of Wayne Merry’s reporting from Moscow in the 1990s.

The Documents

Document 1

Wayne Merry Dissent Channel Cable from American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, “Whose Russia is it Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect”

Mar 28, 1994

Source

Source

This cable, written by Wayne Merry as a Dissent Channel message, reminds one of the famous Long Telegram written by George Kennan in 1946 in its analytical power and predictive precision. He expresses his disapproval of the U.S. attempts to impose its vision of radical economic reform on an unwilling Russia. The cable analyzes Russian political landscape after the Duma elections of December 1993, where, in Merry’s description, “the radicals lost a general election, lost it badly, and lost it fair and square.” He gives vivid portraits of leading Russian economic reformers Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov, explains the success of anti-Yeltsin forces, the pain of reforms, and the growing “frustration tonged with animosity” toward the West on the part of the population. Merry warns his government that if the present U.S. policy to Russia continues, it will “assist Russian extremists to undermine the country’s nascent democracy and will encourage a renewal of Russia’s adversarial stance toward the outside world.”

Document 2

Cable from Department of State to U.S. Embassy Moscow, S/P Steinberg Response to Dissent Channel Message from Head of Political Internal Section Embassy Moscow Wayne Merry

Sep 6, 1994

Source

Department of State, National Security Archive FOIA Lawsuit

Almost six months after the dissent message is written and almost three months after Wayne Merry left the Moscow Embassy, comes a one-page polite response from Director of Policy Planning Jim Steinberg . The author of the dissent cable would never receive it. Steinberg expresses his general agreement with the cable but then actually rebuts Merry’s criticisms of U.S. policy. He insists on the linkage between free markets and democracy, seeing economic reform as the only path to democracy in post-communist states. He denies that the United States “pressed Russia for radical economic reform,” insisting that it was simply what “political circumstances would permit.” In the end, he concludes that, although some deficiencies in U.S. policy would be corrected, support for economic reform should continue.

Document 3

Cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, Subject: Boris Nikolayevich Yel’tsin: A Mid-Range Political Assessment, January 30, 1992

Jan 29, 1992

Source

Source

Department of State, National Security Archive FOIA

On the eve of Yeltsin’s visit to Washington, U.S. Embassy Moscow offers a perceptive assessment of the Russian leader signed by Ambassador Robert Strauss but written by the head of the political-internal section Wayne Merry. He emphasizes Yeltsin’s impressive popularity even as his economic reform is producing real hardships. Merry concludes that “Yeltsin’s popular mandate is real” and that he “see[s] no credible substitutes” to the current leader. The cable notes how the lack of communication between the president and the parliament had resulted in “a degree of resentment in the parliament of the dominating—and often domineering—figure of the Russian president” but not real organized opposition. Moscow is not the real center of everything any longer. To the contrary, “[m]ost reformers in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union are looking abroad rather than to Moscow for guidance, for models, for partnerships,” and so the fate of reform will be decided in the provinces.

The U.S. diplomat notes that the only force in Russia capable of removing Yeltsin and reversing the reform is the Army—"Yeltsin’s most difficult domestic challenge is the future of the armed forces.” The Russian president is keenly aware of the “deeply dissatisfied officer corps” lamenting the “loss of empire and mission.” Some of his nationalist and militant statements were directed at precisely this audience. The cable mentions the artificial nature and the fragility of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which in Merry’s opinion, “is not a successor union to the former USSR; it is little more than a legal framework.”

The cable offers an unusually candid portrait of Yeltsin’s personality, describing it as “cyclonic,” and Yeltsin as someone who is “at his best when standing on a tank” not dealing with daily governing tasks. While calling for the U.S. to fully support Yeltsin, the reformer, Merry concludes that “[b]y background and temperament, Yeltsin seems curiously unsuited to the job of leading an autocratic society toward a democratic future, but he seems determined that the job be done and be done by none other than himself.” And yet, he is most likely to succeed because, as the cable states, “[t]he Russian people do not want another Lenin at their head; they want a tsar with a common touch. In Yeltsin they have one.”

Document 4

Cable from American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, Secretary's Visit to Moscow: Domestic Political Dynamics

Oct 19, 1993

Source

Department of State Declassification, Date/Case ID; 6 MAR 2003 200001030

The Embassy sends Secretary Christopher a briefing cable in advance of his visit to Moscow where he is expected to meet with Yeltsin and other government officials. The cable is signed by Chargé d'Affaires and future Ambassador to Russia James Collins but written by head of the political-internal section Wayne Merry. This is the first visit of any Western senior official to Moscow after Yeltsin's dissolution of the Parliament and the October 3-4 bloodshed in the center of Moscow. In the cable, Merry describes the pre-electoral landscape in Russia on the eve of Christopher's visit. Although 92 parties are registered for the election, that in itself does not guarantee free and fair elections.

The cable describes Yeltsin's decision to push through the new “half-baked” Constitution, which concentrates the “preponderance of authority in the hands of the chief executive.” Merry points out that “even many reformers worry about establishing a new Russian democracy so heavily tilted toward presidential power.” The cable describes the split within the reformist camp into “radical” and “cautious” reformers, the confusion at the regional levels regarding whether the elections would be held for regional legislatures, and the continuing ban on nationalist and right-wing parties and their newspapers.

Merry notes the personal nature of the confrontation: “Boris Yeltsin's face during his October 6 speech was proof the Russian President had cast his hardline opponents into a personal anathema.” He also raises concern about the methods used by Moscow police and city government in implementing the state of emergency, such as “systematic police cleansing of non-Russian people from Central Asian and Caucasian states,” and racist remarks about dark-skinned people by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. In the end of the cable, Merry cautions that although the actual voting is likely to be fair, “the question will be the democratic content of the entire electoral process.”

Document 5

Wayne Merry Essay, 1994 MOSCOW EMBASSY DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT.

Dec 18, 2024

21. The Bolduc Brief: The Crisis in Military Leadership - A Call for Reform in the US Armed Forces

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

The crisis in military leadership poses a significant threat to the US military’s ability to effectively carry out its mission. The shift toward prioritizing social issues over operational readiness has undermined the effectiveness of senior leadership and created an environment where political considerations often overshadow strategic imperatives.

To address these challenges, the incoming administration must take bold actions to reassess and reform military leadership, prioritizing meritocracy, operational focus, and an environment that encourages innovation. Only by making these changes can the US military reclaim its position as a premier fighting force capable of meeting the challenges of modern warfare and ensuring national security.

The time for reform is now, and with decisive action, the military can once again fulfill its solemn duty to protect and defend the nation.

The Bolduc Brief: The Crisis in Military Leadership - A Call for Reform in the US Armed Forces

sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · December 17, 2024

1 day ago

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Brigadier General Don Bolduc, a decorated leader and a symbol of commitment and service to the nation

The United States military has long been regarded as one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world. However, a crisis in military leadership threatens to undermine its capability and capacity to effectively engage in modern warfare. Over the past two decades, particularly during the Obama and Biden administrations, the military’s increasing focus on social issues and political correctness has detracted from its primary mission: to fight and win wars.

The responsibility for this shift lies with the senior leadership—specifically, three and four-star generals—who have allowed political considerations to overshadow strategic imperatives. To rectify this situation, significant reforms are necessary, including a reevaluation of leadership at the highest levels.

Historical Context

The military’s current predicament is not without precedent. During World War II, General George C. Marshall recognized that the leadership structure of the Army was inadequate for the challenges ahead. Faced with the need for a more effective military command, he sought out younger, more dynamic officers who could better navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Marshall’s decisive actions were instrumental in reshaping the military leadership and ultimately led to America’s success in the war.

In contrast, the contemporary military establishment appears to have strayed from these principles, prioritizing social agendas over tactical readiness.

The Shift Toward Political Correctness

In recent years, the US military has increasingly embraced initiatives aimed at promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion. While these principles are important in fostering a fair and just society, their implementation within the military has often come at the expense of operational effectiveness. The focus on social issues has diluted the military’s core mission, leading to a culture that prioritizes compliance with political narratives over combat readiness. This shift raises concerns about the ability of military leaders to make critical decisions in high-pressure situations, as the fear of backlash or political repercussions may inhibit their judgment.

The Role of Senior Leadership

The responsibility for this crisis lies predominantly with senior military leaders—those holding three and four-star ranks—who have perpetuated a culture that favors political correctness over military effectiveness. The so-called “good old boy system” has fostered an environment where loyalty to personal connections often trumps merit-based advancement. This insular environment stifles innovation and discourages younger officers from rising through the ranks based on their capabilities and potential.

As a result, the military has become increasingly disconnected from the realities of modern warfare, struggling to adapt to evolving threats.

A Marine recites the oath of office to a ranking officer during promotion ceremony. (US Marine Corps/DVIDS)

A Path Forward: Reforming Military Leadership

To restore the US military’s effectiveness and combat readiness, the upcoming administration must confront the systemic issues affecting military leadership.

The United States military has long been regarded as one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world. However, a crisis in military leadership threatens to undermine its capability and capacity to effectively engage in modern warfare. Over the past two decades, particularly during the Obama and Biden administrations, the military’s increasing focus on social issues and political correctness has detracted from its primary mission: to fight and win wars.

The responsibility for this shift lies with the senior leadership—specifically, three and four-star generals—who have allowed political considerations to overshadow strategic imperatives. To rectify this situation, significant reforms are necessary, including a reevaluation of leadership at the highest levels.

Historical Context

The military’s current predicament is not without precedent. During World War II, General George C. Marshall recognized that the leadership structure of the Army was inadequate for the challenges ahead. Faced with the need for a more effective military command, he sought out younger, more dynamic officers who could better navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Marshall’s decisive actions were instrumental in reshaping the military leadership and ultimately led to America’s success in the war.

In contrast, the contemporary military establishment appears to have strayed from these principles, prioritizing social agendas over tactical readiness.

The Shift Toward Political Correctness

In recent years, the US military has increasingly embraced initiatives aimed at promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion. While these principles are important in fostering a fair and just society, their implementation within the military has often come at the expense of operational effectiveness. The focus on social issues has diluted the military’s core mission, leading to a culture that prioritizes compliance with political narratives over combat readiness. This shift raises concerns about the ability of military leaders to make critical decisions in high-pressure situations, as the fear of backlash or political repercussions may inhibit their judgment.

The Role of Senior Leadership

The responsibility for this crisis lies predominantly with senior military leaders—those holding three and four-star ranks—who have perpetuated a culture that favors political correctness over military effectiveness. The so-called “good old boy system” has fostered an environment where loyalty to personal connections often trumps merit-based advancement. This insular environment stifles innovation and discourages younger officers from rising through the ranks based on their capabilities and potential.

As a result, the military has become increasingly disconnected from the realities of modern warfare, struggling to adapt to evolving threats.

A Marine recites the oath of office to a ranking officer during promotion ceremony. (US Marine Corps/DVIDS)

A Path Forward: Reforming Military Leadership

To restore the US military’s effectiveness and combat readiness, the upcoming administration must confront the systemic issues affecting military leadership.

One of the most critical steps is the reassessment of the senior leadership ranks, particularly the three and four-star generals and admirals across all branches of the military. By resigning or replacing those who have contributed to the current culture of political correctness, the administration can initiate a much-needed transformation in military command.

Reinstating Meritocracy and Operational Focus

The military must return to a meritocratic system where promotions and leadership opportunities are based on demonstrated competence, strategic acumen, and the ability to lead troops effectively in combat. This requires a rigorous evaluation of current leadership, with an emphasis on operational performance rather than adherence to social agendas.

New leaders should be selected based on their ability to think critically, adapt to rapidly changing battlefield dynamics, and make tough decisions without fear of political ramifications.

Encouraging Open Dialogue and Innovation

Another essential reform involves fostering an environment that encourages open dialogue and innovation among all ranks. Lower-ranking officers should feel empowered to voice their concerns and propose new strategies without fear of reprimand or ostracism.

A culture that values diverse perspectives—rooted in tactical experience rather than political alignment—will promote creativity and adaptability, essential traits for any military force facing complex global threats.

Focusing on Training and Readiness

To ensure military preparedness, training must be prioritized over social initiatives. This includes revisiting training programs to emphasize realistic combat scenarios, joint exercises, and mission readiness. The military must cultivate a mindset that prioritizes operational excellence and recognizes that the primary objective is to prepare for and win wars. This focus on readiness will require resources and commitment at all levels of command.

Conclusion

The crisis in military leadership poses a significant threat to the US military’s ability to effectively carry out its mission. The shift toward prioritizing social issues over operational readiness has undermined the effectiveness of senior leadership and created an environment where political considerations often overshadow strategic imperatives.

To address these challenges, the incoming administration must take bold actions to reassess and reform military leadership, prioritizing meritocracy, operational focus, and an environment that encourages innovation. Only by making these changes can the US military reclaim its position as a premier fighting force capable of meeting the challenges of modern warfare and ensuring national security.

The time for reform is now, and with decisive action, the military can once again fulfill its solemn duty to protect and defend the nation.

Donald C. Bolduc

As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.

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sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · December 17, 2024

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