Quotes of the Day:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
- Robert H. Jackson, Supreme Court Justice
"The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often, and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself."
- Rudyard Kipling, 1935 (this quote is often misattributed to Nietzsche)
"It is a general error to suppose the loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for its welfare."
-Edmund Burke
1. North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal and Prospects for Regional Peace
2. How Kim Jong-un Advanced North Korea’s Military in a Decade
3. Three Kim generations of misery for North Korea
4. N. Korea slams G7 statement urging abandonment of nuclear weapons
5. The Observer view on a decade of North Korea under Kim Jong-un
6. An End of War Declaration in Korea Won’t End the Korean War
7. North Korea: Here's all you need to know about 'the most secretive nation in the world'
8. Kim's decade of rule
9. 10 years after Kim Jong Il's death, North Korea calls for public loyalty to Kim Jong Un
10. North Korea bans laughing for 11 days to mark Kim family anniversary: Report
11. South Korea's boycott rejection unlikely to damage alliance with US: experts
12. Kim Jong-un looks slimmer and miserable in TV appearance after health rumours
13. When will North Korea release my father?
14. Squid Game and the long shadow of American empire
15. Is Kimchi Going out of Fashion?
1. North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal and Prospects for Regional Peace
Soo Kim's recent important analysis.
Her depressing conclusion asks the key question:
It seems North Korea will continue to enhance its nuclear arsenal and missile technology and harbors the intent to use these weapons to endanger the peaceful interests of the U.S., South Korea and the region. This leaves the perennial question: how will Washington, Seoul, and the region respond to a growing North Korean nuclear threat?
中英文評論專欄 - 遠景基金會 The Prospect Foundation - North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal and Prospects for Regional Peace
It seems North Korea will continue to enhance its nuclear arsenal and missile technology and harbors the intent to use these weapons to endanger the peaceful interests of the U.S., South Korea and the region. This leaves the perennial question: how will Washington, Seoul, and the region respond to a growing North Korean nuclear threat? Picture source: 朝鮮中央通訊社,《朝鮮中央通訊社》, <https://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf>.
Prospects & Perspectives 2021 No. 68
North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal and Prospects for Regional Peace
By Soo Kim
December 15, 2021
Nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea have hovered at a standstill since 2019, when then-President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un walked away from the negotiating table in Hanoi with a “no-deal.” To date, there has been no contact between negotiators in Washington and Pyongyang aimed at resuscitating talks over the Kim regime’s nuclear weapons program. And to the consternation of U.S. officials, Pyongyang has continued expanding its suite of missile delivery capabilities and appears to have restarted operations at its main nuclear facility, Yongbyon, to produce plutonium to build nuclear weapons. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to accuse the U.S. of pursuing a hostile policy towards the Kim regime and even warned Washington of a response that could leave the country in a very grave situation.
This surely sounds foreboding. With the door to diplomacy seemingly closed and North Korea marching forward on weapons development and making threatening statements, what are the prospects for Pyongyang’s denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula?
Pyongyang’s Nuclearization and Disinterest in Peace
Nuclear weapons are here to stay in North Korea. Earlier this year, Kim underscored the primacy of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program for the country’s existence by describing it as its “strategic and predominant goal in building our ideal powerful socialist state.” He also announced plans to further develop “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons,” including tactical rockets and ballistic missiles. True to its leader’s word, Pyongyang demonstrated an array of new missile capabilities, including a hypersonic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, a submarine-launched ballistic missile, and a cruise missile.
These developments reinforce North Korea’s unbending position on preserving its nuclear weapons program, reflected in Kim’s bottom-line offer to Trump at the Hanoi summit – shutting down fissile material production facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for Washington’s sanctions relief. Not only would this have allowed Pyongyang to keep its nuclear weapons systems and facilities; the revenue generated from sanctions relief would have likely been funneled back into beefing up the very weapons programs the U.S., South Korea, and the international community is trying to stop. Prospects for the Kim regime’s denuclearization, therefore, are faint at best.
North Korea’s intransigence on its nuclear weapons program has implications for the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Kim’s determination to use these weapons to endanger the security of its most proximate neighbor, South Korea, as well as the stability of the region and U.S. interests, jeopardizes progress for peace and tension-reduction with Washington, Seoul, and the international community. In addition to its nuclear and missile threats, the DPRK also resorts to conventional military provocations to pressure its neighbors.
Pyongyang’s June 2020 demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office – a symbol of the development of inter-Korean cooperation and peace settlement – dashed Seoul’s hopes of fostering inter-Korean cooperation. The DPRK has also violated the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement on several occasions, including conducting artillery drills near the Northern Limit Line and firing gunshots at a South Korean guard post in the demilitarized zone. The DPRK, therefore, appears to not only resist efforts to improve relations with Seoul; in fact, it appears to go the extra mile to convey the message to the international community that it has little appetite for a peace process.
Seoul’s High Bid for an End-Of-War Declaration
Where does Pyongyang’s determination to nuclearize and its low appetite for peace leave the situation? The Biden administration continues to signal its willingness to meet with the North Koreans, anytime, anyplace, without conditions. At the same time, the U.S. appears to maintain its position on the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile threat, including the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It also continues to back the continued presence and role of the U.S. Forces Korea in Seoul to prevent armed conflict on the Peninsula. Though the Biden administration’s North Korea policy has not yet been fully articulated to the public, this suggests that Washington will maintain conditions for an actual agreement with the North Koreans, if and when the time for negotiations resurfaces.
South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration, for its part, has been vigorously pressing for an end-of-war declaration with North Korea. Blue House officials seek to persuade both North Korea and the U.S. to support this proposal, on the grounds that the declaration could help build trust with the North Koreans and lead to a resumption of nuclear negotiations and a restart of the peace process. This proposal, however, has been met with challenges. North Korea has evaluated Moon’s end-of-war declaration proposal as “an admirable idea,” but placed the condition that Seoul end its “hostile policy” towards Pyongyang – likely alluding to the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises which, according to the Kim regime, are aimed at North Korea. Washington also appears wary of signing this accord in light of the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear weapons development and missile provocations and the potential ramifications of an end-of-war declaration on the U.S.-South Korea alliance and regional security.
South Korea has recently sought China’s support in its push for the end-of-war declaration. Beijing expressed willingness to back Seoul’s bid on the grounds that the declaration could contribute to building peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Amid the U.S.’ wary stance on the declaration and rising tensions between Washington and China, Seoul’s bid to rally support from Beijing on this declaration may not only place the U.S.-South Korea alliance on tenuous footing and accentuate the divergence in the allies’ positions on key bilateral concerns. It could also call into question the Moon administration’s position between the U.S. and China in their competition for influence in the region.
It seems North Korea will continue to enhance its nuclear arsenal and missile technology and harbors the intent to use these weapons to endanger the peaceful interests of the U.S., South Korea and the region. This leaves the perennial question: how will Washington, Seoul, and the region respond to a growing North Korean nuclear threat?
(Soo Kim is a Policy Analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.)
Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or the position of the Prospect Foundation.
2. How Kim Jong-un Advanced North Korea’s Military in a Decade
Scott Snyder's analysis and sober conclusion:
With North Korea’s assessment that the United States is unlikely to change its “hostile policy” toward the country and Trump no longer in the White House, the prospects for easing U.S.-North Korea mistrust through substantive negotiations remain bleak.
To me, the regime's holistic pursuit of advanced military capabilities, conventional and nuclear, tactical and strategic) is an indication that it still harbors the intent to be able to attack the South when conditions are favorable or when there is no other option for Kim.
How Kim Jong-un Advanced North Korea’s Military in a Decade
What were the successes and failures of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s first decade in power?
After coming to power in December 2011, Kim consolidated his position by replacing the military and government officials that his father, Kim Jong-il, had appointed to aid his transition to leadership. He brutally eliminated potential rivals such as his uncle and half brother and punished perceived insubordination. Kim also regularized the governing mechanisms of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) by restoring a schedule for plenums and conferences, which are now the main instruments of governance and leadership.
Kim’s primary accomplishments were mostly on the military side, particularly in ballistic missile development. Kim established North Korea’s nuclear program as the principal legacy of his grandfather and father and pursued byungjin, simultaneous military and economic development, as the primary ideological foundation for his rule. He highlighted these military accomplishments more following North Korea’s failed summit diplomacy with the United States and South Korea in 2018 and 2019.
Kim’s primary failure was his struggle to revitalize the economy. Initially, he ushered in economic progress based on what North Korea expert Andrei Lankov describes as “reform without opening.” But North Korea’s economy then faced setbacks due to the combination of external sanctions in response to the country’s military development and internal economic retrenchment in the face of the pandemic, sanctions, and natural disasters.
How have North Korea’s nuclear capabilities changed under Kim Jong-un?
North Korea has established both credible fission and fusion capability and advanced its ability to deliver nuclear weapons at all ranges using a variety of ground-, rail-, and sea-based platforms.
In January 2020, North Korea announced its aspiration to continue its nuclear and missile development. Rather than working toward “complete denuclearization,” as laid out in the 2018 Panmunjom and Singapore Declarations, North Korea has pledged and redoubled its commitment toward “attaining an advanced capability for making a preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike.”
Following the failure of the February 2019 summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi, it has been impossible to reestablish a sustained negotiating process. The administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in has sought to revive U.S.-North Korea negotiations despite difficulties in mending inter-Korean relations.
Has Kim differentiated his rule from his father’s and grandfather’s?
Kim has gradually moved from ruling under the shadows of his grandfather, North Korean founder Kim Il-sung, and father to claiming the title of central leader (suryong) based on his own accomplishments. The regime has sustained a tradition of requiring political loyalty as an essential condition for internal advancement, and Kim has subordinated the government, WPK, military, and security services to his rule. In this respect, he has extended and reconsolidated Kim family rule—relying on his sister Kim Yo-jong for critical support—rather than deviating substantially from the foundations of North Korea’s governing system. Kim has emulated the policies, leadership style, and fashion of Kim Il-sung, consciously evoking memories of his rule.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un greets military officers in a photo shared by a North Korean news agency in July 2021. KCNA/Reuters
However, both Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il faced a major conundrum; they pursued paths for economic reform despite those efforts being circumscribed by the need to sustain political legitimacy. Reform efforts, such as the designation of fifteen special economic zones around the country and decentralization in the agricultural sector, have ultimately been limited by both regime-sustainability concerns that resulted in retrenchment and reassertion of centralized government control over the economy. To some degree, these parallel approaches illustrate the intractability of the North Korean dilemma: economic reforms are necessary for regime survival but also need to be subordinated to regime survival.
Has Kim’s approach toward the United States evolved over the past decade?
The most dramatic development during Kim’s first decade of rule was his pursuit of summit diplomacy with the United States, China, Russia, and South Korea, including an unprecedented three meetings with Trump. But the impact of Kim’s summit diplomacy has been mixed.
The WPK’s own review of its accomplishments at a conference in January 2020 referenced “a dramatic turn in the balance of power between [North Korea] and the US . . . thereby wonderfully demonstrating the dignity and prestige of our state,” and hailed the “joint declaration that assured the establishment of new [U.S.-North Korea] relations.” But it failed to mention denuclearization. With North Korea’s assessment that the United States is unlikely to change its “hostile policy” toward the country and Trump no longer in the White House, the prospects for easing U.S.-North Korea mistrust through substantive negotiations remain bleak.
3. Three Kim generations of misery for North Korea
I forwarded this article yesterday. The Asia Times republished it today. If you did not read it yesterday please do.
Some will take exception to this statement:
The Korean War that the current leader’s grandfather started in 1950, just two years after founding North Korea, claimed upwards of 4 million lives – most were North Korean civilians killed by the United Nations coalition that came to defend South Korea.
We should remember that while the UN Command did inflict large amounts of casualties UN forces did not deliberately target civilians. The nKPA did deliberately attack civilians in the South. But it was Kim Il Sung who decided to conduct the war and deliberately attack the South. He was the aggressor and therefore the blood of millions of people are on his shoulders and that of the entire Kim family regime which continues to try to achieve his goals.
Three Kim generations of misery for North Korea
Kim Jong Un’s decade in power has been marked by starvation, repression and brutal rule – just as under his father and grandfather
By the grim metric of fatalities in the first 10 years of a dictator’s rule, Kim Jong Un has yet to match the records set by his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, or father, Kim Jong Il – the two tyrants who reigned by terror in North Korea before him.
Fear, repression and starvation
Kim Jong Un’s first decade in power has seen a continuation of the deadly repression and failed policies that have kept North Koreans living in fear and under the threat of starvation for the last 70 years.
The Korean War that the current leader’s grandfather started in 1950, just two years after founding North Korea, claimed upwards of 4 million lives – most were North Korean civilians killed by the United Nations coalition that came to defend South Korea.
Once his campaign to take South Korea by force was thwarted by the 1953 armistice, Kim Il Sung turned to purging pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese party officials who had dared to criticize him. The North Korean leader went on a killing spree in which thousands of party officials were from the Workers’ Party of Korea.
He also managed to eke out enough money to build an estimated $800 million mausoleum for his dead father – one in which he himself was entombed in December 2011 after succumbing to a suspected heart attack.
The same claim could be made against Kim Jong Un during his decade in power. Faminelike conditions have been observed in the mid-2010s and have resurfaced during the pandemic.
And under Kim Jong Un it has only become harder for North Koreans to escape chronic hunger. During the famine in the 1990s, many North Korean people were able to escape to China in search of food, despite attempts by Kim Jong Il to block them.
A deadly legacy
When Kim came to power in December 2011, I predicted his rule would be marked neither by reform nor power-sharing but extreme internal repression and strategic threats against neighbors.
Sadly, these projections have been proved right. The past decade has seen a continuation of the atrocious human rights record of Kim’s predecessors and a great leap forward on the despotic dynasty’s missile programs.
Kim Jong Un’s apparent goal is to render Washington’s longtime non-nuclear ally, Seoul, vulnerable to his nuclear-armed state bent on completing its “supreme national task” of completing the “great Juche Revolution” – the absorption of the south and unifying the Korean peninsula on North Korean terms.
A nuclear war, even if limited, could cause civilian deaths in the millions – a horrendous feat already achieved under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
What is different under Kim Jong Un is that he has built the capacity to inflict much more carnage on the outside world, including the US.
4. N. Korea slams G7 statement urging abandonment of nuclear weapons
Ahh... admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations.
Excerpt:
"Rather than fomenting distrust and confrontation, the G7 should focus more on its original mission of addressing their economic issues," the North said.
I bet the regime would like to be facing the G7's economic problems rather than ones on the peninsula north of the DMZ.
N. Korea slams G7 statement urging abandonment of nuclear weapons | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday slammed a recent G7 statement that called on the country to abandon all its banned weapons and refrain from provocative actions.
In an article uploaded onto its website, the North's foreign ministry said such "remarks constitute an aggressive violation of sovereignty, which tries to deny the exercise of its rights by a sovereign nation, as well as foreign interference and an intolerable act of provocation."
In a chair's statement released after the G7 foreign and development ministers' meeting that ended Sunday, the member nations renewed a call on the North to "refrain from provocative actions."
They also urged the North to "engage in a diplomatic process with the explicit goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment" of all its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs banned under U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"Rather than fomenting distrust and confrontation, the G7 should focus more on its original mission of addressing their economic issues," the North said.
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. The Observer view on a decade of North Korea under Kim Jong-un
How does this tyranny survive?
Excerpts:
So the question must be asked again, but this time of the great powers: how does this tyranny survive? Dating back to the Korean war, China has the most to answer for. While Pyongyang’s erratic behaviour causes problems for Beijing, its base calculation has not changed in 70 years: better a weak, dependent despot in the North than a strong, reunified Korea that, if South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, had his way, would join the western camp.
The US and allies such as Japan have likewise failed to do enough to end this gross affront to international decency and law. For too long, they were content to isolate, sanction and ignore the North. Now that Kim has built nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of hitting an American city – the biggest “success” of his leadership – it may be too late to take him down, politically or otherwise.
Donald Trump, as is his wont, made matters worse with ego-driven summits that boosted Kim and achieved nothing. Now China and Russia tacitly conspire to maintain the status quo, while the US enacts additional, ineffective sanctions and fulminates impotently. For North Koreans, more decades of tyranny beckon.
The Observer view on a decade of North Korea under Kim Jong-un | Observer editorial
How do tyrants survive? History is littered with examples of cruel dictators and despots who dominated their countries for years, oppressing millions of “subjects”, and were never forcibly deposed. Joseph Stalin famously died in his bed at the age of 74. Mao Zedong lasted longer, dying of natural causes in 1976, age 82. Spain’s thuggish dictator, Francisco Franco, seized power in 1939 and was still in office when he died in 1975 at 82.
The obvious answer is fear. Other factors – cunning, chutzpah, charisma – play a role, too. But terror is the tool of choice for your typical tyrant. This is a lesson Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s “supreme leader”, learned at his father’s knee. And when Kim Jong-il died, 10 years ago last week, his then 26-year-old son was propelled willy-nilly to the top of the totalitarian dynasty founded in 1948 by his grandfather, Kim Il-sung.
It was by no means certain in 2011 that young Kim Jong-un was up to the job of oppressing 26 million people. Analysts predicted he would soon be overthrown. Some in South Korea hoped for a democratic revolution. Aping his forefathers, Kim fell back on fear to survive. In 2013, Jang Song-thaek, his uncle and long-time mentor, was arrested and executed.
Purges of other senior officials swiftly followed. Then, in 2017, in a darkly Jacobean plot, Kim’s elder half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, once viewed as heir to the dynasty, was assassinated by two young women wielding a nerve agent at an airport in Malaysia. Since then, no one has dared challenge Kim Jong-un’s rule.
Further evidence of Kim’s habitual, merciless brutality was provided last week by the Transitional Justice Working Group, a human rights organisation in Seoul, which published gruesome details of 23 public executions. Most of the shootings and hangings were not for crimes of murder or rape but for watching or distributing videos from South Korea, it said.
Kim’s own visceral fear – that North Koreans may become “infected” by the superior living standards, democratic politics and public freedoms and media of the South – spurs paranoid behaviour. Restrictions on every aspect of working and personal life have tightened in recent years. To mark the anniversary of his father’s death, North Koreans were reportedly instructed “not to drink alcohol, laugh, or engage in leisure activities”.
The predictable result of Kim’s 10 years of tyranny is a chronically impoverished, socially and economically backward country. It’s a country where food shortages bordering on famine conditions are common, where most people struggle to make a meagre living, and where state violence, corruption and the ever-present fear of a Stalinist prison gulag have reduced its citizens to terrified silence. North Koreans are Kim’s hostages.
So the question must be asked again, but this time of the great powers: how does this tyranny survive? Dating back to the Korean war, China has the most to answer for. While Pyongyang’s erratic behaviour causes problems for Beijing, its base calculation has not changed in 70 years: better a weak, dependent despot in the North than a strong, reunified Korea that, if South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, had his way, would join the western camp.
The US and allies such as Japan have likewise failed to do enough to end this gross affront to international decency and law. For too long, they were content to isolate, sanction and ignore the North. Now that Kim has built nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of hitting an American city – the biggest “success” of his leadership – it may be too late to take him down, politically or otherwise.
Donald Trump, as is his wont, made matters worse with ego-driven summits that boosted Kim and achieved nothing. Now China and Russia tacitly conspire to maintain the status quo, while the US enacts additional, ineffective sanctions and fulminates impotently. For North Koreans, more decades of tyranny beckon.
6. An End of War Declaration in Korea Won’t End the Korean War
Excerpts:
Proponents speak of the end of war declaration as bringing ‘peace,’ but that is an exaggeration. Peace (via deterrence) on the peninsula is stable and enduring – and when it is broken, it is North Korea who does the breaking with its border provocations. So the core political challenge is to sell the declaration to South Korea’s partners: what do South Korea, the US, Japan, and others get from it? Ahn suggests only US concessions from the declaration – normalized relations, lifting sanctions, revoking the US travel ban, ending military exercises between the US and South Korean militaries, and the dissolution of UNC. That is quite a list, and perhaps we should do all that. But what will North Korea do for the international community in return? Counter-concessions could include a permanent missile and warhead construction freeze, closure of some of the country’s notorious gulags, or retrenchment from the border of Northern artillery pointed at Seoul, the South’s capital.
In the end, the ideological and strategic gaps on the peninsula are deep and real; the status quo is persistent. Without some real movement on those political issues, it is easy to predict that an EoW declaration will either be symbolic – a vanity project for Moon because his actual détente effort collapsed when Kim and US President Donald Trump failed to reach an agreement a few years ago – or will face hawkish opposition in South Korea, the US, and elsewhere over implied, unreciprocated concessions to the North.
Very dangerous proposals from Ms. Ahn. The key question is how does an EOW declaration ensure the security of the ROK and prevent conflict and war? Without conventional force reductions in the north and the elimination of the nuclear program, and an end to the regime's strategy of subversion, conversion-extortion, and use of force. it does not.
An End of War Declaration in Korea Won’t End the Korean War
As South Korean President Moon Jae In enters the final months of his presidency, he has pushed hard for an ‘end of war declaration’ (EoW), ostensibly to conclude the legally unfinished Korean War (1950-53). There has been extensive discussion of this idea, including at this magazine. ‘EoW declaration’ is a curious locution – in Korean too (종전선언) – because wars traditionally end with a treaty (also a different word in Korean – 조약). The Korean War was paused in mid-1953 by an armistice. That armistice has never been upgraded to a treaty. It is unclear if Moon’s declaration is supposed to replace that armistice, supplement it, be a ‘semi-treaty’ of some sort, or is just symbolic.
There is opposition among conservatives and North Korea hawks both in the US and in South Korea. There is anxiety that the declaration will undercut the rationale for the United Nations Command (UNC) and US Forces Korea (USFK). North Korea has long sought their departure and were a treaty signed, UNC and USFK would presumably dissolve as a result of the treaty’s resolution of the outstanding political and military issues on the peninsula. The declaration does not appear to offer that resolution, but it might lead to pressure to wind down those commands anyway. Hence the trepidation on the right.
Before the parties sign this curious document, Moon should clarify the following:
What, exactly, is the legal status of an ‘End of Declaration’?
No one really knows, and this is likely the major reason for the contention over it. An armistice and a treaty are established tools in diplomacy with reasonably shared meanings among states and international relations professionals. An EoW declaration is not. It appears to be a middle step between an armistice and a treaty, but that is a guess. Here, for example, is a defense of the declaration which simultaneously declares it nonbinding and a legal resolution to the war if the parties so wish it. An EoW declaration must be clearer than that if it is to actually reduce or end the inter-Korean stand-off. There have been so many false starts to ‘peace’ in Korea that Moon should put forward at least a working definition.
If it is just symbolic, then what is the point?
If the EoW side-steps the peninsula’s many outstanding strategic issues – which pretty clearly have not been resolved – then what does it do? If it is not a treaty and simply ratifies the already existing diplomatic status quo – that the armistice has effectively morphed into a stable, if cold, peace – then it is unclear why we need a legally vague, not-actually-a-treaty to verify that. This is the core paradox of the debate: the declaration does not appear to oblige either side to any action, so it appears to be just symbolism. Yet Moon has flogged this idea relentlessly for months, suggesting it must have some real value. Moon needs to clear that fog.
Is it binding on future South Korean administrations?
South Korea is sharply divided between hawks and doves regarding North Korea. If Moon does not assuage the concerns of conservatives raised above, his successor – if a conservative wins next March’s presidential election – will probably abandon the EoW declaration. South Korea is a highly presidentialized system, where sharp policy swings are common after a partisan presidential transition. For example, the South Korean right rolled back the ‘Sunshine Policy’ when it retook the presidency in 2008, and it is easy to predict it will do the same to this declaration. Ideally, Moon would submit his EoW declaration to the South Korean legislature for a vote, in order to capture a genuine national, not just left-wing, consensus for this move. But during his presidency he has not submitted any of his agreements with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to the National Assembly, so this is unlikely.
To build a durable, transpartisan consensus, the Moon government should explain the declaration’s impact on the strategic issues which remain between the Koreas, such as North Korea’s forward military presence on the border or its weapons of mass destruction, or the American military presence in the South. Particularly, would the declaration impact the security institutions on the peninsula – UNC, USFK, and the alliances between the US and South Korea, and China and North Korea? Declaration supporter Christine Ahn is admirably clear where Moon has not been; she openly says the declaration entails the dissolution of UNC. If this is so, can Moon win enough support on the South Korean right for this declaration to survive his presidency?
Does this unlock inter-Korean engagement?
A central goal of the Moon administration has been aggressive engagement with North Korea. Moon has variously proposed initiatives like a ‘peace economy’ and South Korean rail or forestry investment. Many of these ideas violate multilateral sanctions on the North – to which South Korea as a UN member is obliged. Does Moon expect this declaration to somehow obviate those sanctions restrictions?
Why would South Korea and its democratic partners agree to an End of War Decleration?
Proponents speak of the end of war declaration as bringing ‘peace,’ but that is an exaggeration. Peace (via deterrence) on the peninsula is stable and enduring – and when it is broken, it is North Korea who does the breaking with its border provocations. So the core political challenge is to sell the declaration to South Korea’s partners: what do South Korea, the US, Japan, and others get from it? Ahn suggests only US concessions from the declaration – normalized relations, lifting sanctions, revoking the US travel ban, ending military exercises between the US and South Korean militaries, and the dissolution of UNC. That is quite a list, and perhaps we should do all that. But what will North Korea do for the international community in return? Counter-concessions could include a permanent missile and warhead construction freeze, closure of some of the country’s notorious gulags, or retrenchment from the border of Northern artillery pointed at Seoul, the South’s capital.
In the end, the ideological and strategic gaps on the peninsula are deep and real; the status quo is persistent. Without some real movement on those political issues, it is easy to predict that an EoW declaration will either be symbolic – a vanity project for Moon because his actual détente effort collapsed when Kim and US President Donald Trump failed to reach an agreement a few years ago – or will face hawkish opposition in South Korea, the US, and elsewhere over implied, unreciprocated concessions to the North.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is now a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
7. North Korea: Here's all you need to know about 'the most secretive nation in the world'
North Korea: Here's all you need to know about 'the most secretive nation in the world'
Last Updated: 18th December, 2021 17:19 IST
From assassinations to illegal drug labs, North Korea defectors have opened up about the “hermit kingdom”, which shares borders with Russia and China.
Written By
Image: AP
Kim Jong-un was not even 30 when he took control of North Korea following his father’s demise in 2011, but now it has been 10 years of the dictator’s rule in the world’s most secretive country. Some information about the isolated nation and its people are known, though most are based on estimates from outside agencies. From assassinations to illegal drug laboratories, North Korean defectors have opened up about the “hermit kingdom”, which shares borders with Russia and China.
North Korea frequently makes headlines across the globe as its government continues to tout its military hardware and make boisterous nuclear threats. The nation has also been linked to several cyber-related incidents, but it has repeatedly denied involvement. Now, the one thing that remains a bit of a mystery is what goes on inside the hermit kingdom. Therefore, here are some of the things we do know about what makes the country tick:
Corruption, population and poverty
North Korea is a confusing mix of communism, dictatorship, tyranny, and monarchy. According to the Corruption index from Transparency Internation, the isolated country is one of the world’s most corrupt nations. North Korea also ranks third for meting out the death penalty, as per Amnesty International’s death penalty statistics.
Due to a tightly-controlled state media, it is difficult to reveal the concrete numbers of how many people have died from starvation and malnourishment-related conditions such as diarrhoea and pneumonia. However, North Korea scored 25.2 on the 2021 Global Hunger Index, which is a level classed as ‘serious’ by the International Food Policy Research Institute. According to a report by the United Nations World Food Programme, 10 million people living in North Korea - a country with a total population of 25 million - are malnourished.
Food insecurity means that "an entire generation of children" are undernourished, as the United Nations has reported.
Interestingly, according to The Independent, North Koreans born after the Korean War are about two inches shorter than South Koreans on average. The height difference is attributed to the fact that millions of North Koreans are in need of food, and one-third of children are chronically malnourished. Now, experts believe that under Kim Jong-un, the country may surpass even the ghastly death tolls of his two familial predecessors.
Military strength, nuclear capability and capital punishment
As mentioned above, North Korea ranks third for meting out the death penalty. For now, the number of people Kim Jong-un has personally ordered to be killed - such as his uncle in 2013 and a half brother in 2017 - is likely to number in hundreds. In 2011, a former North Korean official revealed that when Kim Jong-un ascended to the political throne, he decided to purge those perceived as a threat. During that time, there had long been suggestions that Kim’s uncle Jang Song-thaek was the de-facto leader of North Korea, as Kim Jong-il's health faded. However, in 2013, the North Korean media announced that Jang has been executed.
North Korea has been an unsafe shelter for its citizens because of the violation of civil rights and brutal federal rule. Sanctions have already been imposed by many countries over reports that thousands of people in the isolated nation have been imprisoned and sent to labour camps because they dissent with the government. The 25 million people of North Korea are tightly controlled, so most have little or no idea of world events, or how their country is thought of by the outside world.
Coming to North Korea’s military strength, according to the IISS Military Balance, the country has nearly two million people on active duty, plus around 200,000 active paramilitary personnel and a further 600,000-700,000 reservists. Even though North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, a major chunk of its resources are used to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
In recent years, under Kim Jong-un, the nation has also stepped up arms testing and now possess threats in the shape of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike most of the mainland United States. Kim has shown little sign that he will ease off the development of the country’s military prowess, however, his future plans for the North still remains unknown. It is to mention that between 2016 and 2018, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and 30 short and long missile launches along with an intercontinental missile launch.
North Korea’s bizarre rules
North Korea is a totalitarian regime that follows different rules from the rest of the world. The nation keeps a lot of secrets and has many unusual laws. For example, listening to foreign music or watching films in a foreign language are considered criminal activities. Back in 2015, Kim issued a decree to scrap all cassette tapes and CDs that had state-banned songs in order to contain dissent.
Falling asleep in a meeting while Kim speaks could fetch capital punishment. Anything that disrespects the family of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean government or the politicians is considered an act of blasphemy and may be met with severe punishment. But unlike the rest of the world, consuming marijuana is accepted and trade and consumption of the drug attract no punishment as per law. North Koreans are not allowed to travel abroad without permission. The Internet can only be accessed through their intranet, which is called "Kwangmyong" or Bright, launched in 2000.
Freedom of religion is a myth in North Korea. The country reportedly cuts power every night due to the energy crisis in the country. It spends 20% of its GDP on the military even when the population is desperate for food. Military service is compulsory for men and women. Alcohol, dancing and smiling on the 8th of June - North Korean President Kim Il-sung death anniversary - are not allowed. North Korean laws say jeans are a symbol of capitalism - the ultimate evil on Earth and therefore must be banned.
8. Kim's decade of rule
The subtitle confuses me. Kim would have to actually want to denuclearize and believe it is in his best interest. I do not think he feels that way.
I do wish the conclusion would resonate with Kim but I fear it does not:
Kim should keep in mind that he could face unpredictable consequences unless he gives up his nuclear ambitions. He cannot guarantee his regime's security with his nuclear arsenal. The North Korean economy shrank 4.5 percent last year due to crippling sanctions and the pandemic. The isolated country may face an economic collapse if it keeps wasting money on the nuclear program. The Kim regime should return to dialogue and take the path of denuclearization before it is too late.
Kim's decade of rule
North Korea should no longer delay denuclearization
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is taking advantage of the 10th anniversary of the death of his father Kim Jong-il to tighten his grip on power. The North held a memorial event for the late Kim in Pyongyang, Friday; and also marked the current leader's first decade of rule, calling for the people's "absolute trust" in him.
Nothing could better reflect Kim's real intention than the Rodong Sinmun, the mouthpiece of the ruling Workers' Party. "All people and soldiers should have absolute trust in the general secretary, have their fate and future completely entrusted to him and guard his safety and authority," the newspaper said in a front page editorial which occupied the whole page with a large picture of Kim Jong-il who died Dec. 17, 2011.
There is no doubt that the commemoration was aimed at justifying the hereditary succession and urging devoted loyalty to Kim Jong-un. In a word, the anniversary was nothing but the North's attempt to perpetuate the Kim dynasty. The Kim regime has been marked by a reign of terror that included the relentless purging of his political enemies such as his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who was abruptly executed for being a counter-revolutionary in December 2013. It also reportedly played a certain role in the assassination of Kim's half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia in 2017.
On Thursday, the United Nations adopted a resolution on North Korean human rights, accusing Pyongyang of systematic and gross human rights violations for the 17th consecutive year. Also, the same day, the United States decided to keep North Korea on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The decision came after the Biden administration imposed its first sanctions on the North for its human rights abuses Dec. 10, blacklisting North Korean Minster of the People's Armed Forces Ri Yong-gil and its Central Public Prosecutors Office.
More worrisome is the North's continued development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Kim regime conducted four of the country's six nuclear tests, possibly including one for its first hydrogen bomb. Kim's pursuit of a nuclear arsenal may have strengthened deterrence against the U.S., but it has deepened his country's isolation from the international community. It has also resulted in economic woes, coupled with the devastating fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Responding to peace overtures by President Moon Jae-in during and after the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, Kim seemed to make efforts for national reconciliation by having inter-Korean summits. Kim also held two summits with then U.S. President Donald Trump, which were brokered by Moon, to discuss denuclearization. However, negotiations have remained stalled since a no deal summit in Hanoi in February 2019.
To the dismay of the international community, Pyongyang has still refused to return to talks with Washington, repeating its demand for sanctions relief and the withdrawal of a U.S. policy of "hostility" toward the North. It has only rebutted Moon's peace initiative and U.S. President Joe Biden's outreach to solve the nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy.
Kim should keep in mind that he could face unpredictable consequences unless he gives up his nuclear ambitions. He cannot guarantee his regime's security with his nuclear arsenal. The North Korean economy shrank 4.5 percent last year due to crippling sanctions and the pandemic. The isolated country may face an economic collapse if it keeps wasting money on the nuclear program. The Kim regime should return to dialogue and take the path of denuclearization before it is too late.
9. 10 years after Kim Jong Il's death, North Korea calls for public loyalty to Kim Jong Un
It is all about demonstrating personal loyalty to Kim Jong-un in order to survive.
10 years after Kim Jong Il's death, North Korea calls for public loyalty to Kim Jong Un
Newsweek · by Lora Korpar · December 17, 2021
On the 10th anniversary of former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's death, state-run media called for increased allegiance to his son and current leader Kim Jong Un.
For three minutes on Friday, citizens of the capital of Pyongyang observed a moment of silence, bowing their heads as a siren blared within the city and cars, trains and ships all blew their horns. Meanwhile, masses climbed Pyongyang's Mansu Hill to place flowers in front of statues of Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung and bowed.
North Korea's main newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, published articles showing reverence for Kim Jong Il, also asking readers to show more loyalty to Kim Jong Un. Though outside experts doubt the Kim family is losing any power in what the Human Rights Watch calls one of the world's most repressive countries.
However, some believe Kim's absolute power could falter if he does not address COVID-19 pandemic-related issues plaguing the country.
North Korea's trade with China, its biggest trading partner, plummeted by about 80 percent last year, and continued to decrease by another two-thirds this year.
South Korean government estimates say the North's grain production is at its lowest point since Kim took his leadership position a decade ago.
And though North Korean officials maintain that their country is COVID-free, many do not believe this claim due to the country's strong travel restrictions and border shutdowns.
North Korean state media called for increased loyalty toward Kim Jong Un on the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Il's death. Above, citizens visit the bronze statues of their late leaders Kim Il Sung, left, and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang, North Korea, on December 16, 2021. Cha Song Ho/AP Photo
During an outdoor ceremony, senior North Korean official Choe Ryong Hae called Kim Jong Il "the parent of our people" who built up the potentials for the North's military and economic might. Under Kim Jong Un, Choe said North Korea's "strategic status" has been boosted and urged the public to "faithfully uphold" his leadership.
In an apparent echo of official propaganda, Pyongyang citizen Won Jong Rim also told the Associated Press Television News that "our great general (Kim Jong Il) went through so much hardship, pushing his way along such an arduous path, to build a paradise here, achieving what the people want."
On previous anniversaries, Kim Jong Un paid respect at a mausoleum where the embalmed bodies of his father and grandfather lie in state. But state media didn't say whether he went there this year too.
Kim Jong Il's 17-year rule was overshadowed by a famine in the 1990s that killed hundreds of thousands of people and international isolation over his nuclear ambitions. North Korea's economy had reported a slight yet gradual growth for the first several years of Kim Jong Un's rule. But the coronavirus pandemic, mismanagement and U.N. sanctions following Kim's nuclear and missile tests have taken their toll.
Kim refuses to return to talks with Washington and Seoul. He has called for building a stronger, self-reliant economy while keeping tough virus restrictions including two years of border shutdowns. Analysts say Kim fears that his country's broken public health system could not afford a major virus outbreak—though he maintains a questionable claim that North Korea is coronavirus-free.
"Unless North Korea accepts offers for denuclearization talks with the U.S., it cannot stay away from powerful international sanctions. Without international cooperation, North Korea must continue to seal off its borders due to concerns about the spread of COVID-19. And this is a North Korean dilemma," analyst Cheong Seong-Chang at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea said in a recent paper.
The North's advancing nuclear arsenal is the core of Kim's rule, and he's called it "a powerful treasured sword" that thwarts potential U.S. aggressions.
During his 10-year rule, North Korea has performed 62 rounds of ballistic missile tests, which are banned by multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, according to Seoul's Unification Ministry. The number is compared to an estimated nine rounds of tests during Kim Il Sung's 46-year rule, and 22 rounds during Kim Jong Il's 17-year rule. Four of the North's six nuclear tests and its three intercontinental ballistic missile launches all occurred under Kim Jong Un's rule.
"North Korea marked the 10-year memorial of Kim Jong Il with public ceremonies and state propaganda. More significant will be Kim Jong Un's attempt, after a decade in power, to map out a credible path for post-pandemic diplomacy and economic recovery," said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Sirens blared for three minutes in Pyongyang on the 10th anniversary of former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's death. Above, citizens lay bouquets of flowers at the bronze statues of their late leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang, North Korea, on December 16, 2021. Cha Song Ho/AP Photo
Newsweek · by Lora Korpar · December 17, 2021
10. North Korea bans laughing for 11 days to mark Kim family anniversary: Report
No laughing. What regime has tried to impose greater control over people than the Kim family regime?
North Korea bans laughing for 11 days to mark Kim family anniversary: Report
Newsweek · by Fatma Khaled · December 18, 2021
North Korea has banned its citizens from laughing for 11 days as the country commemorates the death of Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, according to Radio Free Asia's Korean Service.
An unnamed Sinuiju city resident told RFA this week that North Koreans are not allowed to drink alcohol, "laugh or engage in leisure activities" during the mourning period that started Friday.
The resident also said that grocery shopping was banned on December 17, the day Kim Jong II died in 2011.
"In the past many people who were caught drinking or being intoxicated during the mourning period were arrested and treated as ideological criminals," the resident said. "They were taken away and never seen again."
"Even if your family member dies during the mourning period, you are not allowed to cry out loud and the body must be taken out after it's over. People cannot even celebrate their own birthdays if they fall within the mourning period," the resident added.
Another resident who requested anonymity told the news outlet that law enforcement officials are ordered to "crack down" on those who violate the rules.
"It's a month-long special duty for the police. I heard that law enforcement officials cannot sleep at all," the unnamed resident of the southwestern province of South Hwanghae told RFA.
Citizens in Pyongyang on Friday observed a moment of silence for three minutes and bowed their heads as a siren blared across the city in remembrance of Kim Jong II. Cars, ships and trains all blew their horns.
The former strong man's son, current leader Kim Jong Un, was present with hundreds of officials at the ceremony, held outside the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the bodies of Jong II and his father lie under glass, Reuters reported.
During the ceremony, senior North Korean official Choe Ryong Hae called Kim Jong II "the parent of our people" who helped develop the military. He added that under Kim Jong Un, North Korea's "strategic status" has grown.
North Korea has banned laughing during an 11-day mourning period as the country commemorates the death of Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, according to Radio Free Asia. Above, the statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang on December 16. Photo by KIM WON JIN/AFP via Getty Images
Newsweek · by Fatma Khaled · December 18, 2021
11. South Korea's boycott rejection unlikely to damage alliance with US: experts
It does damage the ROK reputation among those political factions who think the US should make every ally march in lockstep with the US.
South Korea's boycott rejection unlikely to damage alliance with US: experts
President Moon Jae-in speaks during a press conference following a summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in Canberra, Dec. 13. Yonhap
Olympic decision may not affect China's role in Korean Peninsula
By Kang Seung-woo
In the wake of President Moon Jae-in's decision not to join the U.S.-led diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, concerns have been rapidly mounting that the decision may harm the nation's strategic partnership with the United States.
But diplomatic observers said the rejection of the boycott will not have a negative impact on the longstanding alliance and ongoing negotiations to declare an end to the Korean War ― although the U.S. government may not be pleased about it.
However, they also believe that China will not live up to South Korea's expectations of playing a role in improving inter-Korean relations and supporting Moon's proposal to end the war as a reward for refusing to participate in the boycott.
During a press conference following a summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in Canberra, Dec. 13, President Moon said South Korea was not considering joining the diplomatic boycott, citing the need for China's help in his push to end the war.
"I think the U.S. will understand and accept President Moon's decision not to have a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics," said Joseph DeTrani, a former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea.
"Some in the U.S. government and Congress may be critical of the ROK decision, but it should not negatively affect bilateral relations between Seoul and Washington."
The ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
Robert Manning, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, echoed DeTrani's view.
"Obviously, the U.S. will not be happy with Moon's decision not to join the diplomatic boycott. But the decision shows that nations have interests as well as values, and they are based on geography, economics, culture and history," he said.
"In any case, the U.S.-ROK alliance and strategic partnership are too important to both nations for the Olympic decision to have a major impact."
Daniel Sneider, a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University, also said, "It is really a symbolic gesture and one made more for domestic political reasons in the U.S. than a serious attempt to punish China. After all, who really cares whether Jill Biden shows up at the Games or not."
They said that talks between the allies over the "end-of-war" declaration will be not affected as well.
The South Korean government believes that the declaration could jump-start stalled North Korean denuclearization talks, while building confidence with Pyongyang. But experts are reluctant to buy into that theory.
"An end-of-war declaration would be a historic feel-good and meaningless gesture without any tangible benefits, and would do nothing to improve the security situation on the Korean Peninsula," said Bruce Klingner, a former CIA analyst and senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation.
"It would not reduce the North Korean military threat to the allies or alleviate distrust and suspicion on either side. It would only provide an amorphous hope that it would improve relations and lead Pyongyang to undertake undefined positive actions."
Sneider said despite South Korea's desperate desire to have some kind of declaration ending the war before President Moon leaves office next May, it will remain a hopeless and empty goal.
"As President Moon made clear in his recent remarks, the North Koreans are demanding an end to hostilities, defined effectively as an American military withdrawal from South Korea and even from the entire region. That merely reveals the North Korean goal ― it is not an end to the war but a surrender to North Korean nuclear blackmail," he said.
"If President Moon wants to unilaterally declare an end to the war, as perhaps he will be compelled to do, it will be a totally empty statement."
Manning also said, "By itself, the declaration is just a piece of paper. In any case, given Pyongyang's conditions of ending the U.S.' hostile policy, it has little chance of succeeding."
gettyimagesbankSome experts even said the Joe Biden administration's cooperation in discussing the declaration was due to its efforts to maintain its alliance with South Korea.
"As for the Biden administration, it understands perfectly well that there can be no real end to the war under the current circumstances, but the U.S. is also trying its best to maintain the alliance with Seoul. So they are not rejecting the idea and keeping the door open to talks," Sneider said.
Klingner said, "Despite the Moon administration's repeated claims of a U.S. agreement to an end-of-war declaration, Washington has made clear it has no interest in a simplistic non-binding document merely as an inducement to get North Korea to resume dialogue."
"Instead, Washington advocates that any peace initiative needs to be part of a comprehensive agreement that addresses the North Korean weapons of mass destruction and conventional forces threat. Washington eventually felt it necessary to issue politely-worded statements pointing out the policy differences," he added.
According to Cheong Wa Dae, the government has not ruled out the possibility of Moon traveling to Beijing for the Winter Games in February 2022, hoping that China will play a constructive role in efforts to denuclearize North Korea. China is regarded as the only country that can exert influence on North Korea as the chief diplomatic protector and economic benefactor of the reclusive state.
But experts remain skeptical that a decision to attend the Games by Korean officials will have any impact on China's role on the peninsula or in North Korea issues.
"Given the tense U.S.―China bilateral relationship, it appears unlikely that China will do much to get North Korea back to negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue with the North," DeTrani said.
"China may help South Korea in the South's efforts to move forward with inter-Korean humanitarian and economic cooperation with the North. I doubt, however, that China's assistance to the ROK will deal with the denuclearization issue, for which the U.S. currently has the lead."
Manning also said, "China's position on North Korea has been consistent for 30 years, prioritizing stability above all. Moreover, China usually punishes, but rarely displays gratitude to other nations."
Sneider said, "If North and South Korea want to issue some kind of statement about the state of their relations, however, that is their business but it need not involve the U.S., or China."
12. Kim Jong-un looks slimmer and miserable in TV appearance after health rumours
Kim Jong-un looks slimmer and miserable in TV appearance after health rumours
KIM Jong-un appears to have shed more weight after reappearing following a month-long absence — sparking fresh speculation about his health.
The North Korean dictator returned to host a large national memorial service to mark 10 years since the death of his father, former leader Kim Jong-il.
3
Kim Jong-un appeared at a memorial service to his dad looking much thinner than the pastCredit: EPA
3
A more portly Kim Jong-un has a smoke while visiting a military base last yearCredit: Reuters
Kim’s dad ruled North Korea for 17 years until his death in December 2011, passing the reins of power to his son.
The memorial took place outside the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.
The despot was seen bowing before a large portrait of his father, standing on a platform overlooking what appeared to be thousands of people on the grounds of the palace.
Photos of Kim show him looking miserable and noticeably thinner after being absent from public appearances for a month.
His weight loss this year has sparked speculation about his health.
In November he appeared for a visit to a “utopian model rural city” project in the north of the country.
Before this appearance, he had not been seen since a huge missile exhibition 30 days ago — his longest disappearance from public life for seven years.
Some observers have wondered whether he was battling some form of illness.
His family has a long history of heart disease and diabetes, and his father officially died of a heart attack.
But there has been some speculation whether Kim — known for enjoying copious amounts of wine and cheese — has deliberately shed pounds because of the food shortage being suffered in his stricken country.
Covid and sanctions imposed on his nation because of his nuclear bomb programme have been taking their toll.
Kim himself has admitted there are hardships and warned people to prepare for the "worst-ever situation".
While there was a lot of speculation about Kim's health, his weight loss may well have been a statement of humility
Tom FowdyNorth Korea and China analyst
Tom Fowdy, a North Korea and China analyst at The Chollima Report, told Newsweek: "While there was a lot of speculation about Kim's health, his weight loss may well have been a statement of humility in recognising this environment.
“It coincides with a lot of rhetoric that the state economic situation is poor, and Kim's own efforts to improve it have largely been unsuccessful."
Sleuths pointed to slight differences in Kim's nose, wrinkles, teeth, cupid's bow, hairline and ears.
The latest body double claims come after it was reported North Korea is hunting for a Kim successor amid fears the tyrant's health is failing after his sudden weight loss.
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Kim Jong-un is known for his love of cheeseCredit: AFP
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visits new city in first public outing in over a month
13. When will North Korea release my father?
Just another example of the evil nature of the Kim family regime.
When will North Korea release my father?
Hwang In-cheol speaks about his father detained in North Korea near Imjingak's Freedom Bridge, Dec. 11, the 52nd anniversary of North Korea's hijacking of KAL YS-11.
On Dec. 11, 1969, a North Korean agent hijacked a South Korean airplane and redirected it to North Korea. Of the 50 passengers and crew, 11 were detained in North Korea, including Hwang Won. For the past two decades, his son, Hwang In-cheol, has been campaigning to have his father released from North Korea. He is deputy of the 1969 KAL Abductees' Families Association. ― Ed.
By Hwang In-cheol
I cannot express my gratitude enough to Freedom Speakers International, which made the campaign "Bring My Father Home" possible. Without their support, I would probably be standing alone at the back gate of the government complex, calling for the repatriation of my father and making a scene by weeping in distress.
Now I am not alone. We as a team have started to let the international community know about hijacked Korean Air Lines flight YS-11. We have raised our voices to bring my father home. Over the past five years, the United Nations Human Rights Council has learned about the hijacking and requested North Korea to repatriate the abductees in accordance with international principles and order.
It was 52 years ago today. I was two years old then. My father, an MBC producer, went aboard the plane for a business trip. Ten minutes after take-off, the plane was hijacked by a North Korean agent named Cho Chang-hee, above Daegwallyeong, a high-mountain pass in eastern South Korea. Fifty South Koreans, including crew members, were abducted.
As the international community condemned North Korea's hijacking and abduction, the North Korean regime promised to send all the abductees back to South Korea on Feb. 4 1970. But it broke its promise: Only 39 of them were repatriated on Feb. 14.
The 39 passengers witnessed that the 11 others, including my father, remained forcefully detained in North Korea.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) immediately requested North Korea to return the 11 South Koreans. But North Korea claimed they were remaining in North Korea of their own free will.,
The ICRC wanted to independently confirm this through third party sources and countries. But North Korea refused to allow this.
The international community continuously protested. In June 1970, the?International Civil Aviation Organization asked North Korea to repatriate the 11 abductees. In September 1970, the U.N. Security Council made the same request. In December 1970, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution on the hijacking of aircraft. An international convention on the prevention and suppression of aircraft hijacking was followed. It was all aimed at remembering the 11 abductees.
The fight still isn't over. I invite you to join in helping to end the journey of Korean Air Lines flight?YS-11. I would urge you to ask your family members and friends to sign the online petition "When will North Korea release my father?"
Thank you very much.
Casey Lartigue Jr., co-founder of Freedom Speakers International and co-chair of the Bring My Father Home coalition, edited this text for publication. Ha Du-lyeon translated Hwang's speech from Korean into English.
14. Squid Game and the long shadow of American empire
An anti-American view.
Conclusion:
In Sang-woo’s final moments, he tells Gi-hun, “Big brother, when we used to play like this as kids, our moms would call us in for dinner. But no one will call us anymore.” The American empire has stolen Korea’s past and mortgaged its future.
Whether in Squid Game or real life, speaking to the VIPs means speaking English. You meet the VIPs where they are. But perhaps American viewers of Squid Game can meet Koreans where they are. Americans have power over Korea, but that power is bidirectional. They can maintain their belief in American empire in Korea, or they can cast away its long shadow. But for now, Korean children will play squid and its many variations. One of the most popular being squid unification.
Squid Game and the long shadow of American empire
The dystopian survival drama Squid Game has a bidirectional relationship with the history of modern Korea—just as Korea’s historical context suffuses the plot and characters of Squid Game, Squid Game as an allegory bleeds backwards onto Korea’s historical material reality. Understanding Korea and Korean history, particularly the second half of the 20th century, can help viewers better understand the show; similarly, the show can help viewers better understand Korea’s history and the blood-soaked shadow of American empire that hangs over it.
And yet, for the most part, the latter has been curiously absent from the torrents of discourse surrounding the series since it became a global sensation. In the show itself, we get an unflinching look into VIP secrets, we see “where all the bodies are buried.” In this article, I hope to show you how those bodies got there; put them on the slab for examination, and I’ll show you the tentacle marks left on their throats and arms by America’s occupation in Korea.
The Imperial Squid
Before Japan’s surrender in 1945, US military planners at the Potsdam Conference took a map and broke the Korean people in half. According to Dean Rusk, this geopolitical gerrymandering was a compromise between the State Department, which wanted Korea, and the Department of Defense, which did not. No Koreans were consulted.
The colonized world saw the end of World War II as an opportunity for independence. Of this, we Koreans dreamed, too.
The colonized world saw the end of World War II as an opportunity for independence. Of this, we Koreans dreamed, too. After all, the Allies promised a “free and independent” Korea in the Cairo Declaration of 1943. Following the end of Japanese occupation on Aug. 15, 1945, Koreans demanded their sovereignty. However, on Sept. 8, the American occupation of Korea officially began. One year later, Korean workers waged a general strike—in response, the American “liberators” sent their police to attack. The next month, October, the Uprisings began.
In Squid Game, created by director Hwang Dong-hyuk (which, as of this writing, is Netflix’s most-watched series ever), players are forced by dire economic circumstances into a game with such horrific costs that they can only refer to it as a numerical sum: “45.6.” To certain ears, that number will resonate with a distinct echo from history. The Korean War is known to Koreans by a numerical date, “6.25,” the start of our deadliest squid game. Whether we consciously acknowledge it or not, it haunts everything we do. And whether viewers—or Hwang Dong-hyuk, for that matter—consciously recognize it or not, the shadow of American empire haunts everything and everyone in Squid Game.
The Korean War is known to Koreans by a numerical date, “6.25,” the start of our deadliest squid game. Whether we consciously acknowledge it or not, it haunts everything we do.
Squid is Korea’s most violent childhood game. It is a fratricidal territory game in which players are divided into two groups: One side tries to keep the squid-shaped territory intact; the other tries to sever it. The secret inspector is the player who successfully cleaves the squid in half, which then gives the inspector more advantages. Similar to Korea, the split is uneven. Once divided, the goal is to keep your side alive and kill the other side.
Squid Game begins with a flashback of Seong Gi-hun and Cho Sang-woo as children playing the titular game. During the game, Gi-hun lies to Sang-woo and tears his own shirt to win—he does whatever it takes. The background is perfumed with music from a recorder, a Western instrument taught in Korean public schools, and traditional Korean percussion. This entanglement of the traditional and the foreign is a running theme. Gi-hun narrates the scene, telling the viewer he was happiest when winning squid because that’s when he felt the most in control.
The main antagonist in Squid Game is the Front Man, a former police chief who serves his new masters with a fascistic sense of duty. However, just as his ominous voice speaks through a dark humanoid mask, monsters from Korea’s past speak through the figure of the Front Man. After all, the “new” post-Japan Korean leadership—and the police forces who attacked, imprisoned, and massacred Korean workers and liberationists—were the very collaborators and compradors the Japanese colonizers had left in charge. Since the Japanese occupiers staunchly opposed Marxism and national liberation, Cold War Americans trusted these collaborators to run Korea from the inside, inflicting a double injury on the Korean people who were re-subjugated by the very traitors they believed they had overthrown. Loyal servants to their new masters, these collaborators would become the new Korean ruling class. For my father, born in 1926, this was an unspeakable betrayal by the Americans.
Having learned so much of the Korean history that haunts Squid Game through the stories my father and his friends told me, it was strange to see that Korean fatherhood is conspicuously missing from the series. Fathers in Squid Game are either inexplicably absent, dead, or they figure as surrogates who work with Americans. This is consistent with the fact that fatherhood—and, for that matter, masculinity—in Korea are inextricably caught in that same historical Möbius strip of imperial domination and subjugation. In Western Orientalist depictions, for instance, Korean men are often portrayed as being both feminine and abusive—a seeming justification for Korea’s “need” for American paternalism and white masculine intervention.
Enter the VIPs, the game’s unseen fathers, who watch their children perish in deadly childhood games, all from the comforts of their Victorian parlor as nude women serve as furniture. Yet their predatory masks, silk robes, and naked bodies indicate a dangerous sort of intimacy. Imperialism in Korea demands both political and sexual submission. “What pretty eyes you have,” says the VIP as he claims sexual ownership over Hwang Jun-ho.
Americans back home heard they had brought freedom to Korea, a fiction they were allowed to believe because Koreans, like children, could be seen but not heard.
Likewise, Korea’s unseen fathers, the Americans, established the Republic of Korea in 1948 from their own vaunted parlors thousands of miles away. Three months later, the National Security Act was enacted: Koreans were now being watched, not just by the Americans and their newly appointed puppet government, but by fellow Koreans sniffing with their eyes for any “left-wing” activity or criticisms of the government. (Like the Japanese, whom the Americans had prohibited from speaking about the nuclear bombs, Koreans expressed their imperial suffering through art—a legacy that lives on in Squid Game itself.)
Americans back home heard they had brought freedom to Korea, a fiction they were allowed to believe because Koreans, like children, could be seen but not heard. Americans cherish free speech, sovereign independence, and democratic governance. Americans call the systematic repression of those things fascism. What, then, do Americans think they brought to Korea?
At the time it was instituted, any Korean could be deemed in violation of the National Security Act and punished (this still happens to artists and union activists today). Who got to decide what constitutes left-wing activity? The Americans, the US-appointed Korean government, the police, fascist youth groups, a neighbor holding a personal grudge. Under the broad National Security Act, fascism became the legal framework. In a matter of years after America’s arrival, Korea was cleaved and plunged into a fratricidal war. No longer fighting settlers, it was sibling vs. sibling—neighbors became enemies. Not as simple as north vs. south, villages and towns throughout the south had their own civil wars and massacres—sometimes involving Japanese collaborators turned pro-Americans who were back in power.
Expanding imperialism, however, takes more than squashing dissent—you also need recruiters, and God.
The Recruiting Game
Expanding imperialism, however, takes more than squashing dissent—you also need recruiters, and God. Like previous Western empires, the US employed religion as a technology of conversion and imperial subjugation. Instead of Catholicism, though, with its central figurehead and particular historical ties to Europe and Latin America, the US uses Protestant Christianity. It’s more American, friendlier to capitalism, and its decentralization simultaneously magnifies imperial hegemony and plausible deniability.
Starting with Korean-American Syngman Rhee, Protestantism’s anticommunism, prosperity gospel, Puritanical morals, and pro-Americanism—including an entire exceptionalist mythos wrapped up in the American Dream—formed the cornerstone of Korea’s rightwing, US-backed dictatorships. But rather than accepting this invasive American theology as a fixture of contemporary Korean culture, Squid Game highlights its foreignness. When the Salesman tries to recruit Gi-hun, for instance, Gi-hun mistakes him for a Protestant evangelist and asserts his heritage and dignity by telling him, “Don’t bother, I’m a Buddhist.”
The Salesman proposes to Gi-hun a game of ddakji. Ddakji is a folded-tile-flipping game where all that’s required to play is paper. (Since they were developed for post-war children, traditional Korean games are inexpensive and simple.) Squid Game’s use of blue and red tiles makes the game an unavoidable allegory for the two Koreas.
The Salesman asks Gi-hun to pick a tile. To understand the paternalism of this scene, consider a parent giving their child the opportunity to choose which of their two socks to put on their left foot and which to put on their right foot. This choice gives the child a sense of autonomy without real freedom—they ultimately still have to do what the parent wants. This paternalism intertwines players who can vote to leave the game but cannot exit the system that creates the game. Korean citizens, likewise, can vote for a president but can’t vote for reunification, for America to leave, or vote to stop US military action. This sham freedom is what the Salesman brings to Gi-hun, much like what the US brought to Korea.
But who is Gi-hun—and, for that matter, Korea—being saved from?
The Host, the mastermind behind Squid Game, ends up being one of Korea’s biggest moneylenders. One way or another, most, if not all, of the players’ debts are owed to him. This reveal makes the secret inspector a painfully apt metaphor: The Salesman, as a proxy for the Host, appears with a solution when, in fact, the Host is the producer of the players’ debt problems.
There is a Korean proverb that goes like this: “byeong jugo yak junda” (“give you the disease, then give you the cure”). This is the Salesman’s con and the con of America’s “exceptional” empire: pretending to save you from the problems they secretly caused; appearing as the hero when they’re actually the villain—the secret inspector. What better example is there than the US supporting the Japanese occupation of Korea (Taft-Katsura agreement, 1905) then appearing as Korea’s liberators decades later? In American foreign (and domestic) policy, “freedom” and “opportunity” amount to sales talk.
By 1946, a year into the American occupation and four years before the Korean War, the detention of Korean liberationists began again. Japan’s legacy continued under the oppressive guise of Americans bringing “freedom.” For Gi-hun, taking the Salesman’s offer meant waking up in a concentration camp modeled after Korea’s haunted past.
In Squid Game, “mugunghwa flower bloomed” serves as an allegory for Korea’s militarized border, its history of stop-start liberation, and the bloodshed and sacrifice of all the Koreans who dreamed of a unified and free Korea.
The Mugunghwa Flower Bloomed
The first official game, “mugunghwa flower bloomed,” is similar to America’s “red light, green light” game. Rather than drawing its inspiration from American traffic laws, however, the mugunghwa flower symbolizes freedom. In Squid Game, “mugunghwa flower bloomed” serves as an allegory for Korea’s militarized border, its history of stop-start liberation, and the bloodshed and sacrifice of all the Koreans who dreamed of a unified and free Korea.
There’s nothing allegorical, though, about what happened at Jeju Island. In 1948, USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) and Rhee forces massacred 30,000 Jejuans—10% of the population—with another 4,000 fleeing to Japan. (Let that sink in: Koreans felt safer in Japan.) Some estimates run as high as 60,000 islanders killed, with soldiers and fascist youth groups raping and torturing countless others and burning down hundreds of villages. Like Hawaii, Jeju Island is an Indigenous culture that the mainland annexed. The brutality unleashed on Jejuans was nothing short of genocidal. But for north Korean migrant Sae-byeok, Jeju Island is the only place in the world she would like to go.
Ppopgi
The second official game is ppopgi, which is actually a cheap candy made of sugar and baking soda that was gamified due to sugar shortages during post-war Korea. Rather than buying a bag of candy, you can spend up to ten minutes eating one ppopgi. If you can carve out the embedded shape, you win a prize. For the players in Squid Game, the prize is living.
Gi-hun, who ends up with the most difficult shape—the umbrella—comes up with the idea of licking his way to victory. Again, Gi-hun will do whatever it takes. The drama then juxtaposes Gi-hun’s gratuitous licking with player 119’s resistance. 119 (also Korea’s emergency number) fights back and takes a masked worker hostage. But when the authorities come, they massacre the remaining players. There is no help nor salvation for worker or player. This hopelessness is a feeling many Korean elders know all too well.
By 1950, the Rhee regime had 300,000 Koreans in concentration camps, known as Bodo Leagues, and 30,000 more in jails. Additionally, US and Rhee forces executed tens of thousands of Korean civilians. This violence preceded the war, though some would argue that it was this violence that prompted the war. As northern forces advanced on June 25, 1950, retreating US and southern forces executed as many prisoners as they could. Korea is still uncovering these mass graves. Perhaps this is why in Squid Game, the oppressors burn the bodies of their victims. No evidence.
The American policy at the time was to “contain” communism anywhere it seemed to be occurring, regardless of the cause or cost. The long shadow cast by that policy still frames north Koreans as invaders of their own land and Americans as rightful defenders of their perceived property. In accordance with their sense of righteous entitlement to claim Korea, the US launched a large-scale military campaign without an official declaration of war. President Harry Truman chalked it up to a “police action.”
Tug-of-War
The third official game is tug-of-war, where powerful outsiders divide Korean civilians, migrants, and refugees in two, then force them to directly kill their other half. A guillotine then severs the tie that binds. Koreans already describe the Korean War as a scorched-earth tug-of-war, with one side doing most of the damage. There were at least 215 incidents of civilian and refugee killings involving US and allied forces during the war. A south Korean commission conservatively estimates over 100,000 civilians executed, with No Gun Ri being the worst massacre by US ground troops (with an estimated 300 people murdered) until the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. There are even rumors about the use of experimental biological weapons.
Initially, the US and its south Korean regime blamed north Korea and communism for these atrocities, along with the destruction of most of the peninsula. Any and all arguments to the contrary were denounced as communist propaganda. Many Americans, including Korean-Americans, are unaware that only the US dropped bombs on Korea. This was a fact I was always aware of, though, because a US bomb fell on my mother’s house. Had it detonated, my mother would have never met my father, and I would not exist. According to the chief architect of the US bombing campaign in Korea, General Curtis LeMay, the US “burned down every town in north Korea and south Korea, too.” This trauma caused south Korea to build bunkers up until the 1970s. Previously deemed uninhabitable for housing, these bunkers now serve as housing for the poor. This is where Gi-hun and his mother live.
Ssangmun-dong, where Gi-hun and Sang-woo grew up, is one of the poorest areas in Seoul. In the aptly titled episode “Hell,” Gi-hun and Sang-woo return to Ssangmun-dong. “Hell” is also where Sang-woo, in a nondescript hotel room, attempts to kill himself (carbon monoxide poisoning). However, the game intervenes with a second “opportunity” to play, only to put him back at the same crossroads of despair and self-harm. The site of Sang-woo’s final game is also the site of the very first game: “mugunghwa flower bloomed.” In the end, Sang-woo wanted someone to see the flower bloom, even if it wasn’t him—to make all the sacrifices mean something. In 1953, despite all the dead Koreans waiting for the mugunghwa flower to bloom, Korea ended up back at the line conjured up at Potsdam: the 38th parallel.
In the end, Sang-woo wanted someone to see the flower bloom, even if it wasn’t him—to make all the sacrifices mean something.
But just as the Host eventually dies, Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship finally came to an end in 1960. Despite the police and military killing 186 people, the April Revolution successfully ended Rhee’s 13-year rule. However, as protesters converged on the Presidential residence, the CIA smuggled Rhee out of Korea, allowing him to escape any punishment for his crimes. The extension of US tentacles in Korea is why an outsider became Korea’s first President and Franziska Donner, a white Austrian woman, became Korea’s first First Lady—a fact not mentioned even by Korean rightists. But just as Squid Game continued under VIP-backed Front Man, General Park Chung-hee, a former Japanese collaborator who pledged his allegiance to Imperial Japan, replaced Rhee as the new US-backed dictator, to be then succeeded by General Chun Doo-hwan.
Marbles
The fourth official game is marbles, where players are each given a bag with ten marbles and divided into pairs. The goal is to take over your opponent’s marbles however you can. Put simply, it’s a coup d’état game.
The Chun regime sent many of the Gwangju protesters to Samchung concentration camp, where over 100,000 civilians were unlawfully arrested and held. Yet what’s closest to Squid Game is Brothers’ Home. Starting under Park Chung-hee and continuing under Chun Doo-hwan, Brothers’ Home was one of the largest concentration camps in Korean history. These US-backed regimes rounded up children, orphans, students, elders, street vendors, the unhoused, and other marginalized groups, all on the behest of capitalism and the 1988 Olympics. Brothers’ Home enslaved, tortured, and abused even children. Sexual assault, murder, and death games were standard practices there. Though for the survivors and their families, there was no life-changing money, only scars.
As Han Mi-nyeo explains, even Squid Game follows “a beautiful rule: not abandoning the marginalized.” As bad as the fictional world of Squid Game is, the show is making a critique that the real-life example of Brothers’ Home was even worse.
Stepping Stones
The fifth official game is “stepping stones.” Since Korea is a peninsula, streams and creeks were plentiful until south Korea’s mass development. The goal was to cross a stream without falling between the cracks and into the water. One misstep and you could seriously injure yourself, or for some children, even drown.
Squid Game started in 1988, coinciding with the Seoul Olympics and increased fascistic arrests, and the economic downturn of 1987’s Black Monday. With south Korean residents already disappearing and falling through the cracks, no one would notice Squid Game. For those barely surviving on stepping stones, Squid Game was a better alternative than the state-sanctioned “social cleansing” programs.
There is no sure footing for most Koreans today, only drowning and injury. The average Korean household debt in 2019 was 190.6% of income. In 2021, the household debt was over 100% of the gross domestic product. The US patted itself on the back for Korea’s “economic miracle,” yet how did so many Koreans fall through the cracks? In Squid Game, the first game records we see come from 1998, the year after the IMF Crisis in Korea. What appeared to be the “growth” of the economy was really the growth of the ruling class. This growth was fueled by borrowing mostly from American VIPs. But when the VIPs came to collect, the Korean ruling class couldn’t pay them back—leaving the Korean working class to carry most of the burden, fueling a significant Squid Game turnout for ’98. This worked out well for the Americans because now they could lend Korea more money through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) while consolidating more power.
Local loan sharks from Squid Game exist because the IMF is the ultimate predatory loan shark that puts blood in the water. The small dormitory living space we see in the show, gosiwon, became a fixture of Korean society because of IMF austerities. The “IMF period,” as it’s known to Koreans, also kicked off Korea’s declining birth rates and suicides. Austerities, like sanctions, are murder. Period.
The Squid Game
This brings us to the final game and how Gi-hun ended up in “hell.” Gi-hun was once an autoworker at Dragon Motors. During a labor strike to protest unfair terminations that resulted from IMF measures, Gi-hun saw police brutally murder his close friend (further highlighting 119 as a literary device). This fictional strike was inspired by the SsangYong Motors strike, where workers were attacked, blackballed, sued, and had their assets seized. More than 30 workers and family members died from the fallout.
Lack of work prospects and debt pushed Gi-hun, and many other Koreans, into self-employment—despite having no business experience. Unfortunately, this meant more borrowing. Consider trying to start a business during a financial crisis with everyone else you know also starting similar businesses. There isn’t enough money or customers to go around.
Now for Squid Game players and workers, consider the double injury of borrowing from the ruling class to survive the debt caused by the ruling class. Just as in 1945, only the US-made Korean ruling class benefited from the American VIPs’ IMF policies. These compradors feed off the workers, like the Host who lends money, while providing only 10% of the jobs.
Japan couldn’t betray Korea because their colonialism was upfront. As we see in the final episode, “One Lucky Day,” the secret oppressor hides their actions while turning Koreans against themselves. The sixth official game bookends with Gi-hun and Sang-woo, as adults, playing squid again. Since the oppressor is both hidden and out of reach, these metaphorical brothers have no place to direct their rage other than to each other. Gi-hun batters Sang-woo and tells him, “You killed them. You killed everyone.” Scarcity, austerity, division, and sanctions put Koreans at odds: north against south, workers against players, neighbor against neighbor, and family against family.
In Sang-woo’s final moments, he tells Gi-hun, “Big brother, when we used to play like this as kids, our moms would call us in for dinner. But no one will call us anymore.” The American empire has stolen Korea’s past and mortgaged its future.
Whether in Squid Game or real life, speaking to the VIPs means speaking English. You meet the VIPs where they are. But perhaps American viewers of Squid Game can meet Koreans where they are. Americans have power over Korea, but that power is bidirectional. They can maintain their belief in American empire in Korea, or they can cast away its long shadow. But for now, Korean children will play squid and its many variations. One of the most popular being squid unification.
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15. Is Kimchi Going out of Fashion?
I doubt it. The amount of people I know who claim they love Kimchi should sustain its popularity.
Is Kimchi Going out of Fashion?
December 18, 2021 08:18
"Kimjang" is the traditional practice of pickling kimchi for the cold winter months, now protected on UNESCO's intangible heritage list, but fewer and fewer households are actually bothering to make their own kimchi nowadays. More surprisingly, many Koreans no longer eat their most famous dish.
One double-income couple in their 30s say they rarely eat kimchi because they do not eat at home much, and when they do, they buy meal kits that just need to be heated up.
"We used to get kimchi and other side dishes from our parents just after we got married, but we ended up throwing a lot of it away and decided not to accept any more food," the wife said. "Of course we buy small portions of kimchi when we eat instant noodles or maybe make kimchi stew at home sometimes."
Kimchi consumption has declined as western food is being embraced here. The Korea Health Industry Development Institute studied the nutritional intake of Koreans and found that the average daily intake of kimchi fell from 79.43 g per person in 2008 to 59.87 g in 2019, down 24.6 percent.
The trend has also led to a steady decline in sales of special kimchi refrigerators, which were once hugely popular. To remain appealing, home appliance makers have begun to add new functions to their kimchi fridges.
LG's Dios now has tailored storage conditions for readymade kimchi from different food makers, while Winia's kimchi fridges can also store wine, beer and soju in optimum temperatures.
The older generation still prevail on their children to make kimchi together, but many younger people think the annual ritual of kimjang is fusty and outdated. One 37-year-old office worker said, "We don't eat that much kimchi nowadays and I don't understand why I have to sacrifice a whole weekend every year to make it. My mother-in-law goes to see a doctor for her back pain after every kimjang season, and I just don't understand why she keeps making kimchi."
Kim Jung-sook, the head of the Gwangju Kimchi Academy, said, "The decline is inevitable because a growing number of young people have grown accustomed to western food and more and more women have jobs. If the older generation who know how to make kimchi die or are no longer capable of making it, we could end up seeing the tradition disappear."
Kim added, "We need to make kimchi-making kits that reflect the unique tastes of different regions of the country available at the market and train experts so that kimchi will continue to be made at home. Kimchi is getting more and more popular outside Korea due to its health benefits, so we should really be able to hold on to our status as a home of kimchi and kimjang."
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
