Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Associate yourself with men of good quality, if you esteem your own reputation; for ’tis better to be alone than in bad company.”

- George Washington

The Veteran

When I was young and bold and strong,

Oh, right was right, and wrong was wrong!

My plume on high, my flag unfurled,

I rode away to right the world.

“Come out, you dogs, and fight!” said I,

And wept there was but once to die.

But I am old; and good and bad

Are woven in a crazy plaid.

I sit and say, “the world is so;

And he is wise who lets it go.

A battle lost, a battle won –

The difference is small, my son.”

Inertia rides and riddles me;

The witch is called philosophy.

- Dorothy Parker

"We learn from history only that we do not learn from history."

- Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 18

2. Putin heads for Belarus amid fears of new assault on Ukraine

3. China reports first COVID deaths in weeks as official count questioned

4. Military Spending Surges, Creating New Boom for Arms Makers

5. Night-time drone attack hits Kyiv as Putin heads to Belarus

6. China could see nearly a million deaths as it exits zero-Covid, study says

7. IntelBrief: Iran Escalates Crackdown in Latest Attempt to Quell Uprising

8. Key Terrain Cyber: Cyberspace Warfare Reading List

9. FDD’s Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: The Year in Review

10. Key Flaws Hamstring Russia Oil Price Cap

11. Iran says it will launch two satellites into space in coming months

12. Protecting and Securing Data from the Quantum Threat

13. Deterrence and Commitment Across the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy

14. A Russian tank unit deliberately attacked another Russian position in Ukraine, report says, illustrating vicious rivalries within Putin's army

15. EXPLAINER: Why Japan is boosting its arms capability, budget

16. Resist to Deter: Why Taiwan Needs to Focus on Irregular Warfare

17. America Needs More Immigration to Defeat Inflation

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 18

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on December 18:

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Yusov reported that the Russian military received a new batch of Iranian-made drones and continues to negotiate with Iran on the acquisition of ballistic missile systems.[17]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional fighting continued along the Svatove-Kremmina line.[18]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing fighting in the outskirts of Bakhmut and to the northeast and south of the city.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces captured Yakovlivka, Donetsk Oblast, northeast of Soledar.[20]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces dislodged Russian forces from long-held positions near Bakhmut.[21]
A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces are redeploying units from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and that it is too early to tell whether Russian forces are withdrawing.[22] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery and rocket strikes across the Dnipro River.[23]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian force concentrations and two ammunition depots in Zaporizhia Oblast on December 16, injuring 150 personnel and destroying 10 pieces of equipment.[24] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces are placing dragon’s teeth anti-tank defenses in Melitopol.[25]
Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to struggle to address a severe shortage of medical personnel and supplies.[26]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 18

Dec 18, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 18, 2pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, December 18. This report discusses recent efforts by Russian military leadership to address Russian failures in Ukraine, the planned December 19 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and continued efforts by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to legitimize the Wagner Group and bolster his own reputation.

Russian military leadership is engaged in a campaign to present itself as part of an effective wartime apparatus in an effort to address the public perception of Russian failures in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on December 18 reportedly of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on a working trip to the Southern Military District (SMD) and inspecting the Russian force grouping in the combat zone in Ukraine.[1] Shoigu reportedly received briefings from field commanders and spoke directly with personnel on the frontline paying “special attention to the organization of comprehensive support for the troops, the conditions for deploying personnel in the field, as well as the work of medical and rear units.”[2] The Russian MoD posted footage on December 17 of Shoigu attending a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine Sergei Surovikin to discuss near and mid-term proposals for Russian operations in Ukraine.[3] Shoigu’s recent engagements suggest that the Russian MoD is attempting to bolster its reputation as an effective military organ in the face of consistent criticism of its conduct of the war by the pro-war community. The recent concerted efforts by Russian military officials to present themselves as actively engaged in planning and controlling the war effort, especially in the absence of tangible military victories in Ukraine, may suggest that Russia is preparing for a renewed offensive against Ukraine in the coming months. Shoigu’s visit to the SMD—with its focus on sustainment and medical support—is likely part of an effort to show that the military leadership is fixing the Russian military’s devastating failures in those areas that have been the subject of constant angry commentary by milbloggers and protests by soldiers and their families.

Putin’s planned December 19 meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is likely part of the same effort to present proactivity as well as an effort to set information conditions for a new phase of the war. Commander of the Ukrainian Combined Forces Serhiy Nayev commented on the upcoming Putin-Lukashenko meeting and noted that it comes after Putin’s December 17 meeting with the Russian military command to discuss both immediate and mid-term goals for the war.[4] Nayev reported that the Ukrainian government believes Putin will discuss the wider involvement of Belarusian forces in further Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW’s forecast for the meeting.[5] Taken in tandem, Putin’s meeting with the Russian command, Shoigu’s purported frontline visit, and the Putin-Lukashenko meeting suggest a new phase in the presentation, planning, and conduct of the war and may presage renewed offensive operations against Ukraine in the coming months.

The capacity of the Russian military, even reinforced by elements of the Belarusian armed forces, to prepare and conduct effective large-scale mechanized offensive operations in the next few months remains questionable, as other analysts have observed.[6] The manpower Russia is generating from mobilized reservists and from the annual fall conscription cycle will not be sufficiently trained to conduct rapid and effective mechanized maneuver this fall. Russia’s struggles to keep the forces it currently has fighting in Ukraine equipped with tanks, artillery, long-range strike, and other essential materiel are very unlikely to be resolved in time to equip a large new force for offensive operations this winter. Putin may nevertheless order renewed large-scale offensive operations later this winter, but it is important not to overestimate the likely capabilities of Russian or combined Russo-Belarusian forces to conduct them successfully. ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that Lukashenko will commit the Belarusian military (which would also have to be re-equipped) to the invasion of Ukraine.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued efforts to legitimize the Wagner Group as a parastatal armed force and increase his own power base by lobbying for increased state benefits for Wagner Group personnel who fought in Ukraine. Prigozhin complained on December 18 that the local St. Petersburg authorities refused to bury a Wagner Group fighter in burial grounds for participants of the “special operation” and instead intend to relegate private military company (PMC) fighters to a separate section, which Prigozhin called humiliating.[7] Prigozhin released a letter appealing to Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrey Kartapolov to extend combat veteran status to Wagner Group fighters.[8] Some Russian milbloggers expressed support for this measure, claiming that any Russian citizen who fights and dies in Ukraine deserves to be buried with full military honors.[9] Prigozhin’s appeal does not include fighters of other PMCs, however.[10] Prigozhin previously expressed his support for a similar measure on November 8 when the State Duma considered and passed a bill extending combat veteran status to Russian military volunteers.[11] Prigozhin has notably feuded with Russian regional authorities in Belgorod Oblast and St. Petersburg, as ISW has previously reported.[12]

Prigozhin’s bid for increased recognition comes as reports of systematic executions within Wagner forces emerge, suggesting that Wagner leadership is willing to go to great lengths to preserve the Wagner Group’s image as a highly disciplined force.[13] Russian opposition outlet The Insider reported on December 16 that Wagner forces routinely execute deserters and those who refuse to fight, especially those recruited from penal colonies.[14] The Insider reported that Wagner has its own internal security forces to conduct the executions and that one commander—who commanded executed POW Yevgeny Nuzhin—personally witnessed several executions.[15] Prigozhin previously expressed public support for Nuzhin’s execution, as ISW has previously reported.[16] Such reports also indicate that Wagner Group forces struggle with morale and discipline issues among new recruits similar to those of conventional Russian forces but combat it with harsh punishments rather than the obfuscation and attempts to appease dissatisfied recruits that characterize the Russian MoD’s general approach.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on December 18:

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Andriy Yusov reported that the Russian military received a new batch of Iranian-made drones and continues to negotiate with Iran on the acquisition of ballistic missile systems.[17]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional fighting continued along the Svatove-Kremmina line.[18]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing fighting in the outskirts of Bakhmut and to the northeast and south of the city.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces captured Yakovlivka, Donetsk Oblast, northeast of Soledar.[20]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces dislodged Russian forces from long-held positions near Bakhmut.[21]
A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces are redeploying units from the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and that it is too early to tell whether Russian forces are withdrawing.[22] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery and rocket strikes across the Dnipro River.[23]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian force concentrations and two ammunition depots in Zaporizhia Oblast on December 16, injuring 150 personnel and destroying 10 pieces of equipment.[24] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces are placing dragon’s teeth anti-tank defenses in Melitopol.[25]
Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to struggle to address a severe shortage of medical personnel and supplies.[26]

[4] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/18/sergij-nayev-putin-z-kerivnycztvom-bilorusi-obgovoryuvatyme-pytannya-zaluchennya-zbrojnyh-syl-rb-do-operacziyi-proty-ukrayiny/

[13] https://theins dot ru/en/news/257929

[14] https://theins dot ru/en/news/257929

[15] https://theins dot ru/en/news/257929

[17] https://gur dot gov dot ua/content/rosiia-otrymala-novu-partiiu-shakhediv.html

[22] https://t.me/espresotb/50280; https://espreso dot tv/informatsiya-pro-vidstup-rosiyan-z-khersonshchini-mozhe-buti-pastkoyu-nachalnik-obednanogo-prestsentru-sil-oboroni-tavriyskogo-napryamku-eri

understandingwar.org

2. Putin heads for Belarus amid fears of new assault on Ukraine

All warfare is based on deception. Would Putin telegraph an assault from the north? Or is that what he wants us to think?

3 minute readDecember 19, 202212:07 AM ESTLast Updated 6 hours ago

Putin heads for Belarus amid fears of new assault on Ukraine

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

KYIV, Dec 19 (Reuters) - Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin flies to Belarus on Monday amid fear in Kyiv that he intends to pressure the former Soviet ally to join a new ground offensive against Ukraine and reopen a new front.

Putin, whose invading troops have been buffeted and forced into retreats in Ukraine's north, northeast and south, is taking a more public role in the war and visited his operation's HQ to sound out military commanders on Friday about their next steps.

His visit for talks with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko will be his first to Minsk since 2019 - before the pandemic and a wave of Belarusian protests in 2020 that Lukashenko crushed with strong support from the Kremlin.

"During (these talks) questions will be worked out for further aggression against Ukraine and the broader involvement of the Belarusian armed forces in the operation against Ukraine, in particular, in our opinion, also on the ground," Ukrainian joint forces commander Serhiy Nayev said.

Ukraine's top General Valery Zaluzhniy told The Economist last week that Russia was preparing 200,000 fresh troops for a major offensive that could come from the east, south or even from Belarus as early as January, but more likely in spring.

There has been constant Russian and Belarusian military activity for months in Belarus, a close Kremlin ally that Moscow's troops used as a launch pad for their abortive attack on Kyiv in February.

Moscow and Minsk have since set up a joint regional unit of forces in Belarus and held numerous military exercises. Three Russian warplanes and an airborne early warning and control aircraft were deployed to Belarus last week.

Foreign diplomats say Lukashenko, a pariah in the West who relies heavily on Russian support, understands it would be a deeply unpopular step at home for him to commit troops to Ukraine. But he has already supported Russia's war extensively.

MATTERS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Some military analysts see the manoeuvring as a ploy to make Ukraine commit forces to its north so it is more exposed to Russian assaults elsewhere. But there has been a flurry of political activity, too.

Putin's visit was announced on Friday after a surprise Dec. 3 trip to Belarus by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who signed an agreement with the Belarusian defence minister, the details of which have not been disclosed.

Adding to the ominous mood music, Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, one of the few officials in Lukashenko's government with any rapport with the West, died suddenly late last month. No official cause of death was announced.

Lukashenko said he and Putin will hold talks on a long-running effort to integrate their countries into a supranational union State. The talks have gone on for years and are seen by the Belarus opposition as a Trojan horse for a stealth annexation of their country by Russia.

At a government meeting after the talks with Putin were announced, Lukashenko unexpectedly said that any talk of Belarus losing sovereignty would amount to a betrayal of the interests of the Belarusian people.

"Particularly after these large-scale negotiations, everyone will say: 'That's it, there are no longer any authorities in Belarus, the Russians are already walking around and running the country'," Lukashenko said.

"I want to again underline this in particular: No one other than us runs Belarus," he said, adding he would discuss economic cooperation, energy supplies, defence and security.

Ahead of the talks, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists the two leaders would discuss integration, bilateral issues and regional and international problems.

Reporting by Tom Balmforth; Editing by Hugh Lawson

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Tom Balmforth

3. China reports first COVID deaths in weeks as official count questioned

4 minute readDecember 19, 20225:54 AM ESTLast Updated 42 min ago

China reports first COVID deaths in weeks as official count questioned

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

Summary
Companies
Beijing reports two deaths, first since Dec. 3
Comes after Beijing relaxed anti-virus controls
Citizens, analysts question official figures
Virus surge weighs on world's No. 2 economy

BEIJING, Dec 19 (Reuters) - China reported its first COVID-related deaths in weeks on Monday amid rising doubts over whether the official count was capturing the full toll of a disease that is ripping through cities after the government relaxed strict anti-virus controls.

Monday's two deaths were the first to be reported by the National Health Commission (NHC) since Dec. 3, days before Beijing announced that it was lifting curbs which had largely kept the virus in check for three years but triggered widespread protests last month.

Though on Saturday, Reuters journalists witnessed hearses lined up outside a designated COVID-19 crematorium in Beijing and workers in hazmat suits carrying the dead inside the facility. Reuters could not immediately establish if the deaths were due to COVID.

A hashtag on the two reported COVID deaths quickly became the top trending topic on China's Twitter-like Weibo platform on Monday.

"What is the point of incomplete statistics?" asked one user. "Isn't this cheating the public?," wrote another.

The NHC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The low number of deaths since curbs were lifted on Dec. 7 is inconsistent with the experience of other countries after similar moves. Officially China has suffered just 5,237 COVID-related deaths during the pandemic, including the latest two fatalities, a tiny fraction of its 1.4 billion population.

But health experts have said China may pay a price for taking such stringent measures to shield a population that now lacks natural immunity to COVID-19 and has low vaccination rates among the elderly.

Some fear China's COVID death toll could rise above 1.5 million in coming months.

Respected Chinese news outlet Caixin on Friday reported that two state media journalists had died after contracting COVID, and then on Saturday that a 23-year-old medical student had also died. It was not immediately clear which, if any, of these deaths were included in official death tolls.

"The (official) number is clearly an undercount of COVID deaths," said Yanzhong Huang, a global health specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. think tank.

That "may reflect the lack of state ability to effectively track and monitor the disease situation on the ground after the collapse of the mass PCR testing regime, but it may also be driven by efforts to avoid mass panic over the surge of COVID deaths," he said.

The NHC reported 1,995 symptomatic infections for Dec. 18, compared with 2,097 a day earlier.

[1/7] A man takes a rapid antigen test for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) at an entrance of a hospital, as the outbreaks continue in Shanghai, China, December 19, 2022. REUTERS/Aly Song

But infection rates have also become an unreliable guide as far less mandatory PCR testing is being conducted following the recent easing. The NHC stopped reporting asymptomatic cases last week citing the testing drop.

China's stocks fell and the yuan eased against the dollar on Monday, as investors grew concerned that surging COVID-19 cases would further weigh on the world's second-largest economy despite pledges of government support.

The virus was sweeping through trading floors in Beijing and spreading fast in the financial hub of Shanghai, with illness and absence thinning already light trade and forcing regulators to cancel a weekly meeting vetting public share sales.

Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics Corp (6723.T) said on Monday it had suspended work at its Beijing plant due to COVID-19 infections.

A survey by World Economics showed on Monday China's business confidence fell in December to its lowest since January 2013. China's economy is expected to grow 3% this year, its worst performance in nearly half a century.

SPREADING FAST

China's chief epidemiologist Wu Zunyou on Saturday said the country was in the throes of the first of three COVID waves expected this winter, which was more in line with what people said they are experiencing on the ground.

"I'd say 60-70% of my colleagues...are infected right now," Liu, a 37-year-old university canteen worker in Beijing, told Reuters, requesting to be identified by his surname.

Beijing city official Xu Hejian told reporters on Monday COVID was spreading fast in the capital, putting pressure on medical resources. Still, more restrictions will be lifted, with previously-closed venues located underground, from bars to internet cafes, allowed to re-open, Xu said.

Xu made no comment on any fatalities.

Beijing will speed up imports of COVID medicines amid shortages in the city's pharmacies, another official said. read more

While top officials have been downplaying the threat posed by the Omicron strain of the virus in recent weeks, authorities remain concerned about the elderly, who have been reluctant to get vaccinated.

China's vaccination rate is above 90%, but the rate for adults who have received booster shots drops to 57.9%, and to 42.3% for people aged 80 and above, government data shows.

In the Shijingshan district of Beijing, medical workers have been going door-to-door offering to vaccinate elderly residents in their homes, state news agency Xinhua reported.

Reporting by Liz Lee, Martin Quin Pollard, Eduardo Baptista, Ethan Wang and Ryan Woo in Beijing and David Kirton in Shenzhen; Writing by John Geddie and Marius Zaharia; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

4. Military Spending Surges, Creating New Boom for Arms Makers

Excerpts:

Spending on procurement would rise sharply next year, including a 55 percent jump in Army funding to buy new missiles and a 47 percent jump for the Navy’s weapons purchases.

On Friday, Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, put the buildup in strategic terms, saying the war in Ukraine had exposed shortfalls in the nation’s military industrial base that needed to be addressed to ensure the United States is “able to support Ukraine and to be able to deal with contingencies elsewhere in the world.”

Lockheed Martin, the nation’s largest military contractor, had booked more than $950 million worth of its own missile military orders from the Pentagon in part to refill stockpiles being used in Ukraine. The Army has awarded Raytheon Technologies more than $2 billion in contracts to deliver missile systems to expand or replenish weapons used to help Ukraine.

“We went through six years of Stingers in 10 months,” Gregory J. Hayes, Raytheon’s chief executive, said in an interview earlier this month, referring to 1,600 of the company’s shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles sent by the U.S. government to Ukraine. “So it will take us multiple years to restock and replenish.”

But those contracts are just the leading edge of what is shaping up to be a big new defense buildup. Military spending next year is on track to reach its highest level in inflation-adjusted terms since the peaks in the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars between 2008 and 2011, and the second highest in inflation-adjusted terms since World War II — a level that is more than the budgets for the next 10 largest cabinet agencies combined.

Military Spending Surges, Creating New Boom for Arms Makers

msn.com · by 1 day ago

By Eric Lipton, Michael Crowley and John Ismay

WASHINGTON — The prospect of growing military threats from both China and Russia is driving bipartisan support for a surge in Pentagon spending, setting up another potential boom for weapons makers that is likely to extend beyond the war in Ukraine.

Congress is on track in the coming week to give final approval to a national military budget for the current fiscal year that is expected to reach approximately $858 billion — or $45 billion above what President Biden had requested.

If approved at this level, the Pentagon budget will have grown at 4.3 percent per year over the last two years — even after inflation — compared with an average of less than 1 percent a year in real dollars between 2015 and 2021, according to an analysis by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments for The New York Times.

© Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times Firefighters climbing across rubble at an apartment block that was damaged overnight by Russian bombardment in the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv in November.

Spending on procurement would rise sharply next year, including a 55 percent jump in Army funding to buy new missiles and a 47 percent jump for the Navy’s weapons purchases.

On Friday, Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, put the buildup in strategic terms, saying the war in Ukraine had exposed shortfalls in the nation’s military industrial base that needed to be addressed to ensure the United States is “able to support Ukraine and to be able to deal with contingencies elsewhere in the world.”

Lockheed Martin, the nation’s largest military contractor, had booked more than $950 million worth of its own missile military orders from the Pentagon in part to refill stockpiles being used in Ukraine. The Army has awarded Raytheon Technologies more than $2 billion in contracts to deliver missile systems to expand or replenish weapons used to help Ukraine.

“We went through six years of Stingers in 10 months,” Gregory J. Hayes, Raytheon’s chief executive, said in an interview earlier this month, referring to 1,600 of the company’s shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles sent by the U.S. government to Ukraine. “So it will take us multiple years to restock and replenish.”

But those contracts are just the leading edge of what is shaping up to be a big new defense buildup. Military spending next year is on track to reach its highest level in inflation-adjusted terms since the peaks in the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars between 2008 and 2011, and the second highest in inflation-adjusted terms since World War II — a level that is more than the budgets for the next 10 largest cabinet agencies combined.

Even more orders are coming in to military contractors from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, as they too have concluded they must do more to arm themselves against rising global threats. Japan moved this month to double its spending on defense over the next five years, putting aside a pacifist stand it has largely maintained since 1945.

And none of this counts an estimated $18 billion of planned but now delayed weapons deliveries by the United States to arm Taiwan against a possible future attack by China.

The combination of the Ukraine war and the growing consensus about the emergence of a new era of superpower confrontation is prompting efforts to ensure the military industrial base can respond to surges in demand. The issue has become urgent in some cases as the U.S. and its NATO allies seek to keep weapons flowing to Ukraine without diminishing their own stocks to worrisome levels.

The Ukrainian military has run through years’ worth of the missile production capacity of Western suppliers in a matter of months. At the same time, contractors remain concerned about investing to meet growing demand for weapons that could dry up again when the war ends or politics shifts course.

“The difficulty of starting a production line back up, that doesn’t come for free,” Tom Arseneault, president of BAE Systems, which is now considering restarting its M777 howitzer manufacturing line, which the company had been in the process of shutting down. The M777 is a highly accurate, towed gun that fires 155-millimeter artillery shells, which are also in diminishing supply.

The annual military authorization bill that passed the Senate on Thursday prevents the Air Force and Navy from retiring aging weapons systems that the military would like to take out of service, including certain C-130 transport planes or F-22 fighter jets. At the same time, it includes billions of dollars in extra money to build even more new ships and planes than the Pentagon itself asked for, including $2.2 billion alone for an extra Navy-guided missile destroyer, according to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

And there is $678 million to expand ammunition plants in spots such as Scranton, Pa.; Middletown, Iowa; and Kingsport, Tenn., where contractors work with the Army to manufacture the ammunition that Ukrainian artillery crews have burned through at an alarming rate. (The money for these programs is expected to be included in a massive appropriations bill that appears to be on track to pass Congress and signed into law by Mr. Biden by the end of the week.)

Spending could be even higher, as Congress is also considering a request for an extra $21.7 billion for the Pentagon, above the already expanded 2023 annual budget, to allocate more money to resupply materials used in Ukraine.

In an indication of how government policy is shifting to rebuild industrial capacity for the military, Congress this year has moved to allow the Defense Department to more broadly make multiyear spending commitments for certain weapons systems and shipbuilding operations. That is a provision that industry lobbyists have long pushed for, arguing it gives companies certainty that investments they make to start production will see continued returns in future years.

“We have to make a commitment with the industry,” said Senator Deb Fischer, Republican of Nebraska and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who supported the change. “Then the industry will step forward to restart or grow their production lines.”

That move alone suggests $73 billion in additional munitions orders could be on the way in the next three years, contracts that will largely benefit the big players like Lockheed and Raytheon, according to an analysis by Myles Walton, a military industry analyst at Wolfe Research, a Wall Street research firm.

These trends help explain stock market performance of the major military contractors — a small group of which control the bulk of sales to the Pentagon. Lockheed and Northrop Grumman both have seen their stock prices jump more than 35 percent so far this year in a market whose main indexes are down overall for the year.

Opponents of higher military budgets say they are frustrated.

Military contractors are “riding high again, and Ukraine just gives them another argument as to why things need to continue onward and upward,” said William D. Hartung, a fellow at the non-interventionist Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

“The trillion-dollar defense budget — that is where we are headed,” said Lawrence J. Korb, who served as an assistant defense secretary during the Reagan administration and was once a vice president at Raytheon. “Nobody seems to want to make the tough choices. Even the Democrats now seem to be afraid to be seen as being soft on defense.”

The biggest barrier for growth for major military contractors — the list includes Lockheed, Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, BAE, Northrop Grumman and Huntington Ingalls Industries — is finding sufficient supplies of key components, such as microelectronics and missile warheads, as well as a steady supply of new employees to assemble all these items.

“You cannot throw much more money at the seven shipbuilders that build U.S. warships in the United States of America right now,” Adm. Michael M. Gilday, the chief of naval operations, said this month during the Reagan National Defense Forum in California, referring to a $32.6 billion shipbuilding budget in the military authorization bill that is $4.7 billion more than the Pentagon requested. “Their capacity is about at max. And Congress is helping us max them out.”

Raytheon, which has 180,000 workers, has hired 27,000 new employees so far this year, its chief executive said in October. But even with that, it is still running into bottlenecks in terms of available parts and labor shortages that are slowing sales, its executives said.

The sheer scale of the munitions and missiles sent to Ukraine illustrates just how much matériel a war can consume.

That includes more than 104 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, at least one million rounds of 155-millimeter artillery shells, 46,000 anti-tank weapons, more than 1,600 Stinger antiaircraft missiles and 8,500 Javelin anti-armor missiles, according to a Pentagon tally.

The resupply challenge is not just a matter of money. Military contractors have nearly stopped manufacturing Stingers — Raytheon’s last contract from the U.S. government was in 2002, Mr. Haynes said. And while Javelins are still being made jointly by Raytheon and Lockheed — in September they were awarded a $311 million contract to deliver more of them — historically they have only been able to make about 2,100 a year, or about a quarter of what Ukraine has burned through since the outbreak of the war in February.

In total, the Pentagon as of early December had awarded at least $6 billion to military contractors to resupply these and other items sent to Ukraine.

“We’re going to ramp up,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said this month. “We’ve really been working closely with industry to both increase their capacity and also the speed at which they’re able to produce.”

The overall spending on national defense still remains relatively low as a percentage of the nation’s economy: about 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product this year, compared to 37 percent during World War II and 13 percent during the Korean War, according to Pentagon records.

Still, companies are scrambling to avoid or resolve bottlenecks caused by the increase in demand.

Lockheed, for example, spent more than $60 million of its own money in advance of getting Pentagon contract commitment to build more of its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System vehicles, or HIMARS, which fire guided rockets carrying 200 pounds of explosives that can hit targets nearly 50 miles away. The vehicles have been much sought after by Ukraine, which has used them to devastating effect against the Russians.

Traditionally, Lockheed has been able to build 60 of these trucks per year, but it is now shifting production to 24 hours a day and seven days a week in an effort to bring that annual total to 96 units. It also now has a new $430 million contract to deliver more HIMARS, along with a new $521 million contract to build more of the rockets, called GMLRS, that these vehicles can fire.

These resupply orders, while large in terms of many other contracts the federal government issues, are still relatively small for the biggest contractors. At Lockheed, for example, about 70 percent of sales come from the U.S. government, and most of the rest from other governments worldwide. Supply chain and labor shortage problems are cutting into sales and profits, including at Lockheed, which expects to see annual sales decline this year to $62.3 billion from $67 billion.

“The clutch is engaging but into some lower gears initially,” James Taiclet, Lockheed’s chief executive, said in October, adding that higher sales might not show up for another year.

But there are more of the big-ticket orders coming. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Switzerland and Germany have both moved in recent months to finalize orders for the F-35 fighter jets, collectively worth $16 billion. Overall foreign military sales notifications to Congress so far in 2022 have totaled $81 billion, the third highest figure in the last 25 years, with an increasing share of these sales going to European and Asian nations.

Next year’s military budget also includes major investments in new hypersonic weapons that are also being aggressively pursued by China. Raytheon and Northrop Grumman in September won a $1 billion contract just to build prototypes for the Air Force.

Other companies want to replace older equipment sent to Ukraine with newer models. BAE, for example, intends to sell the Army more armored vehicles called AMPVs, in place of the more than 200 of BAE’s Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carriers sent to Ukraine, which it no longer makes.

“Nothing’s cheap, right?” said Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro earlier this month at the conference in California, as he ran through many new investments the Navy is making. “Nothing’s free.”

Emily Cochrane contributed reporting.

msn.com · by 1 day ago

5. Night-time drone attack hits Kyiv as Putin heads to Belarus

Excerpts:

Analysts say the Kremlin might look again for some kind of Belarusian military support for its Ukraine operations. But the winter weather and Russia’s depleted resources mean any attack probably won’t come soon, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank in Washington.

“The capacity of the Russian military, even reinforced by elements of the Belarusian armed forces, to prepare and conduct effective large-scale mechanized offensive operations in the next few months remains questionable,” the think tank said in an assessment published Sunday.

It also concluded that “it is unlikely that Lukashenko will commit the Belarusian military (which would also have to be re-equipped) to the invasion of Ukraine.”

Night-time drone attack hits Kyiv as Putin heads to Belarus

AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA and VASILISA STEPANENKO · December 19, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Multiple explosive drones attacked Ukraine’s capital before dawn Monday, local authorities reported, as Russian President Vladimir Putin prepared to visit ally Belarus, which provided the Kremlin’s forces with a launch pad for its invasion of Ukraine almost 10 months ago.

The drone attack came three days after what Ukrainian officials described as one of Russia’s biggest assaults on Kyiv since the war started and as Moscow presses on with its effort to torment Ukraine from the air amid a broad battlefield stalemate.

Russia launched 23 self-exploding drones over Kyiv while the city slept, but Ukrainian forces shot down 18 of them, the Kyiv city administration said on Telegram. No major casualties were reported.

Monday was St. Nicholas Day, an occasion that marks the start of the Christmas holidays in Ukraine and is when children typically receive their first gifts hidden under pillows.

“This is how Russians congratulated our children on the holiday,” Serhii Kruk, the head of Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, wrote on Telegram, attaching photos of firefighters barely distinguished amid the flames of an infrastructure facility that got hit.

“In the night when everyone is waiting for a miracle, the terrorist country continues to terrorize the peaceful Ukrainian people,” Ukraine’s human rights chief, Dmytro Lubinets, said.

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Bits of wreckage from the downed drones damaged a road in the central Solomianskyi district and broke windows in a multi-story building in the Shevchenkyvskyi district of Kyiv, city officials said.

One drone struck the home of Olha and Ivan Kobzarenko, ages 84 and 83, in the outskirts of the capital. Ivan sustained a head injury.

Their garage was completely destroyed and their dog, Malysh, was killed. Olha, speaking in her bedroom where shattered glass and blood covered the floor, said the blast flung the front gate into the couple’s house.

“I know that I am not alone,” Olha said. “Everyone is suffering. Everyone.”

Nina Sobol, a 59-year-old clerk working at one of the city’s power companies, was on her way to work when the strikes happened. Like many of her colleagues, she waited outside while emergency services inspected damage.

“I feel really anxious,” she said. “Anxious because you never know at which moment there will be an incoming missile.”

Authorities said a critical infrastructure point was also hit, without giving more details.

Although the capital appeared to be the main target of the latest Russian attack, the armed forces said other places in the country were also targeted.

Kyiv region Gov. Oleksii Kuleba said on Telegram that some infrastructure facilities were damaged across the Kyiv region, as well as private houses, and at least two people were injured.

Ukraine’s air force said on Telegram that its personnel were able to destroy 30 of at least 35 self-exploding drones that Russia launched across the country from the eastern side of the Azov Sea on Ukraine’s southeast coast. Russia is on the other side of the sea.

The Ukrainian military has reported increasing success in shooting down incoming Russian missiles and explosive drones.

Moscow has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including in Kyiv, since October as part of a strategy to try to leave the country without heat and light during the bitterly cold winter. It has kept up that effort despite Western sanctions and the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukrainian forces.

On Friday, Ukraine’s capital was attacked as part of a massive strike from Russia. Dozens of missiles were launched across the country, triggering widespread power outages.

Putin was set to travel Monday to Belarus for talks with its authoritarian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, who allowed Russian forces to use Belarusian territory for invading Ukraine and has close defense links with Moscow.

It was to be a rare trip to Minsk by Putin, who usually receives Lukashenko at the Kremlin. Belarus is believed to have Soviet-era weapons stockpiles that could be useful for Moscow, while Lukashenko needs help with his country’s ailing economy.

Analysts say the Kremlin might look again for some kind of Belarusian military support for its Ukraine operations. But the winter weather and Russia’s depleted resources mean any attack probably won’t come soon, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank in Washington.

“The capacity of the Russian military, even reinforced by elements of the Belarusian armed forces, to prepare and conduct effective large-scale mechanized offensive operations in the next few months remains questionable,” the think tank said in an assessment published Sunday.

It also concluded that “it is unlikely that Lukashenko will commit the Belarusian military (which would also have to be re-equipped) to the invasion of Ukraine.”

___

Renata Brito in Kyiv contributed.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA and VASILISA STEPANENKO · December 19, 2022

6. China could see nearly a million deaths as it exits zero-Covid, study says

China could see nearly a million deaths as it exits zero-Covid, study says | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Cheng Cheng · December 19, 2022

Editor’s Note: A version of this story appeared in CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.

Hong Kong CNN —

China’s abrupt and under-prepared exit from zero-Covid could lead to nearly 1 million deaths, according to a new study, as the country braces for an unprecedented wave of infections spreading out from its biggest cities to its vast rural areas.

For nearly three years, the Chinese government has used strict lockdowns, centralized quarantines, mass testing and rigorous contact tracing to curb the spread of the virus. That costly strategy was abandoned earlier this month, following an explosion of protests across the country against stringent restrictions that have upended businesses and daily life.

But experts have warned that the country is poorly prepared for such a drastic exit, having fallen short on bolstering the elderly vaccination rate, upping surge and intensive care capacity in hospitals, and stockpiling antiviral medications.

Under the current conditions, a nationwide reopening could result in up to 684 deaths per million people, according to the projections by three professors at the University of Hong Kong.

Given China’s population of 1.4 billion people, that would amount to 964,400 deaths.

The surge of infections would “likely overload many local health systems across the country,” said the research paper, released last week on the Medrxiv preprint server and which has yet to undergo peer review.

Simultaneously lifting restrictions in all provinces would lead to hospitalization demands 1.5 to 2.5 times of surge hospital capacity, according to the study.

But this worst case scenario could be avoided if China rapidly rolls out booster shots and antiviral drugs.

With fourth-dose vaccination coverage of 85% and antiviral coverage of 60%, the death toll can be reduced by 26% to 35%, according to the study, which is funded partly by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Hong Kong government.

A health worker waits for people to take swab samples to test for Covid-19 in Shanghai on December 19, 2022.

Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images

On Monday, Chinese health authorities announced two Covid deaths, both in the capital Beijing, which is grappling with its worst outbreak since the start of the pandemic.

They were the first officially reported deaths since the dramatic easing of restrictions on December 7, although Chinese social media posts have pointed to a surge in demand at Beijing’s funeral homes and crematoriums in recent weeks.

An employee at a funeral home on the outskirts of Beijing told CNN they were swamped by the long queues for cremation, and customers would need to wait until at least the next day to cremate their loved ones.

On Baidu, China’s dominant online search engine, searches for “funeral homes” by Beijing residents have hit a record high since the pandemic began.

CHONGQING, CHINA - DECEMBER 14: People purchase snacks at a night market on December 14, 2022 in Chongqing, China. Life and production is returning to normal in Chongqing, with further optimized COVID-19 response measures in place. (Photo by He Penglei/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images)

He Penglei/China News Service/VCG/Getty Images

'One extreme to the other': Chinese megacity Chongqing says people with Covid can go to work

Other major cities are also facing a surge in infections. In the financial hub of Shanghai, schools have moved most classes online starting from Monday. In the southern metropolis of Guangzhou, authorities have told students that are already taking online classes and pre-schoolers not to prepare for a return to school.

In the megacity of Chongqing in the southwest, authorities announced on Sunday that public sector workers testing positive for Covid can go to work “as normal” – a remarkable turnaround for a city that only weeks ago had been in the throes of a mass lockdown.

It is difficult to judge the true scale of the outbreak by official numbers. China stopped reporting asymptomatic cases last week, conceding it was no longer possible to track the actual number of infections. These asymptomatic cases used to account for the bulk of the country’s official caseload. But the rest of the case count has been rendered meaningless too, as cities roll back mass testing and allow people to use antigen tests and isolate at home.

Chinese experts have warned that the worst is yet to come. Wu Zunyou, the chief epidemiologist at the Chinese CDC, said the country is being hit by the first of three expected waves of infections this winter.

Residents queue at a fever clinic in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, December 13, 2022.

Stringer/Bloomberg/Getty Images

Why people in China are panic buying canned yellow peaches as Covid surges

Speaking at a conference in Beijing on Saturday, Wu said the current wave would run until mid-January. The second wave is expected to last from late January to mid-February next year, triggered by the mass travel ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday, which falls on January 21.

Every year, hundreds of millions of people who have left their hometowns to build a life in China’s fast growing cities pour into trains, buses and planes to see their family – a weeks-long travel rush known as the largest annual human migration on Earth.

For three consecutive years, these homecoming trips have been discouraged by authorities under the zero-Covid policy. And experts warn that with domestic travel restrictions lifted, the virus could sweep through China’s countryside, where vaccination rates are lower and medical resources are lacking.

A third wave of cases would run from late February to mid-March as people returned to work after the week-long holiday, Wu said.

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Cheng Cheng · December 19, 2022

7. IntelBrief: Iran Escalates Crackdown in Latest Attempt to Quell Uprising

IntelBrief: Iran Escalates Crackdown in Latest Attempt to Quell Uprising - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 19, 2022

December 19, 2022

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IntelBrief: Iran Escalates Crackdown in Latest Attempt to Quell Uprising

AP Photo/Middle East Images

Bottom Line up Front

Iranian leaders are considering the possibility of offering concessions while simultaneously escalating their crackdown against protesters in an effort to quell the three-month-old uprising.
Hardliners in the regime believe that executing protesters will cause the woman-led unrest to subside.
Regime moderates have criticized the executions and seek to end enforcement of some of the restrictions that triggered the uprising.
Iran’s escalating crackdown is increasing the government’s international isolation, exemplified by its December expulsion from a United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.

Suggesting the existence of significant divisions within Iran’s regime, Iranian officials are altering their responses to try to quell a three-month long uprising that began with the mid-September death of a 22-year-old woman, Mahsa Amini, while in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The unit enforces the country’s strict public dress code for women. The uprising is still led by women demanding greater freedoms, but since September it has expanded to encompass many additional segments of Iranian society, clamoring for an outright end to the Islamic Republic. By all accounts, regime leaders have become increasingly frustrated that the standard “playbook” used in past uprisings – deployment of security forces, incarceration of protesters, and interruption of social media channels – has failed to quell the unrest. Far from subsiding, the protests now feature, in addition to widespread demonstrations, extensive strikes among workers in several economic sectors, including the all-important bazaar (merchant community). The death toll among protesters exceeds 450 as of mid-December, and at least 14,000 have been arrested.

The uprising has brought to the fore longstanding cleavages among regime elites – divisions that have appeared in national elections and policy disputes. Hardliners in the regime reject offering concessions to protester demands, and instead advocate escalating the crackdown. According to this view, imposing stricter punishments will deter Iranians from joining protests. Bowing to hardline pressure, in December the Iranian judiciary executed two protestors convicted of separate attacks on members of the Basij, an internal security force controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They were convicted by Iran’s Revolutionary Courts of committing “enmity against God.” Yet, the executions appear to have only fueled, rather than suppressed, further protests, while at the same time triggering a backlash among key institutions who question the execution tactics. A coalition of scholars and senior Shia clerics from the theological schools in the city of Qom criticized the legitimacy of the trials that resulted in the convictions of those executed. Still, judicial officials indicate that additional death sentences against protesters will be carried out.

Sensing that the hardliners are on the defensive over the unrest, regime moderates – long in eclipse, particularly since the 2021 election of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi – have become more vocal. Some have criticized the extensive use of force against protesters and advocate addressing the demands of demonstrators. Former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, largely silenced by the hardliners since he left office in 2005, has appealed for a public referendum to address the unrest. His Reform Front political faction has demanded “immediate, courageous and innovative changes” to launch a national dialogue with “disappointed, dissatisfied and angry citizens.” In October, former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani – who often took hardline positions on major issues – warned that the use of extreme measures to end the protests would only generate additional backlash. Several members of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s family have denounced the regime for excessive use of force. Some security force members have questioned orders to use live ammunition and brute force against demonstrators, particularly against women.

Reflecting the view that some concessions to protester demands are warranted, in early December, a key justice official, Attorney General Mohammad Javad Montazeri, stated that the morality police “was abolished by the same authorities who installed it.” However, subsequent comments by other government leaders suggested that decisions to abolish the morality police or repeal female dress code laws had not been finalized but remained under review. Prominent women and other opposition activists dismiss government statements about possible relaxation of dress code enforcement, asserting that the regime seeks only to quiet protests without implementing meaningful changes. One activist explained that disbanding the morality police would not bring significant change because “[the requirement that women cover their hair] is still compulsory and enforced by other means such as expulsion from university or school.” On the other hand, some experts note that the demonstrations have achieved significant results insofar as many Iranian women, particularly in Tehran and other major cities, have stopped abiding by the dress code.

The international community has progressively sharpened its responses to Iran’s crackdown on protesters, hoping to empower the demonstrators and discredit regime hardliners. In September, the United States imposed sanctions on the morality police, and U.S. officials have also sanctioned several Iranian law enforcement entities and commanders for their role in the crackdown. In late November, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted overwhelmingly to set up a fact-finding investigation into human rights abuses in Iran. On December 14, the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution to remove Iran from the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) for the remainder of its four-year term ending in 2026. The 45-member CSW meets annually and aims to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women. Although some regime insiders are sensitive to multilateral and U.N. action against Iran’s crackdown, there are no clear indications, to date, that Iran’s hardliner-dominated senior leadership is ready to abandon the harsh tactics that have helped them contain past episodes of unrest.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 19, 2022

8. Key Terrain Cyber: Cyberspace Warfare Reading List

May be of interest.

Key Terrain Cyber: Cyberspace Warfare Reading List - Key Terrain Cyber

keyterraincyber.com · by Broadsword6 · December 18, 2022

Key Terrain Cyber: Cyberspace Warfare Reading List

Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It April 10, 2010 by Richard A. Clarke

Former presidential advisor and counter-terrorism expert Richard A. Clarke sounds a timely and chilling warning about America’s vulnerability in a terrifying new international conflict. Cyber War is a powerful book about technology, government, and military strategy; about criminals, spies, soldiers, and hackers. It explains clearly and convincingly what cyber war is, and how vulnerable we are as a nation and as individuals to the vast and looming web of cyber criminals. Every concerned American should read this startling and explosive book that offers an insider’s view of White House ‘Situation Room’ operations and carries the reader to the frontlines of our cyber defense. Cyber War exposes a virulent threat to our nation’s security.

Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War – March 28, 2017 by Fred Kaplan

From the 1991 Gulf War to conflicts in Haiti, Serbia, Syria, the former Soviet republics, Iraq, and Iran, where cyber warfare played a significant role, Dark Territory chronicles a little-known past that shines an unsettling light on our future. Fred Kaplan probes the inner corridors of the National Security Agency, the beyond-top-secret cyber units in the Pentagon, the “information warfare” squads of the military services, and the national security debates in the White House to reveal the details of the officers, policymakers, scientists, and spies who devised this new form of warfare and who have been planning—and (more often than people know) fighting—these wars for decades.

Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media – October 8, 2019 by P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking

Two defense experts explore the collision of war, politics, and social media, where the most important battles are now only a click away.nThrough the weaponization of social media, the internet is changing war and politics, just as war and politics are changing the internet. Terrorists livestream their attacks, “Twitter wars” produce real-world casualties, and viral misinformation alters not just the result of battles, but the very fate of nations. The result is that war, tech, and politics have blurred into a new kind of battlespace that plays out on our smartphones.

@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex – November 3, 2015 by Shane Harris

The wars of the future are already being fought today. The United States military currently views cyberspace as the “fifth domain” of warfare (alongside land, air, sea, and space), and the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the CIA all field teams of hackers who can, and do, launch computer virus strikes against enemy targets. As recent revelations have shown, government agencies are joining with tech giants like Google and Facebook to collect vast amounts of information, and the military has also formed a new alliance with tech and finance companies to patrol cyberspace. Shane Harris offers a deeper glimpse into this partnership than we have ever seen before, and he explains what the new cyber security regime means for all of us who spend our daily lives bound to the Internet—and are vulnerable to its dangers.

War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century – November 14, 2017 by David Patrikarakos

Modern warfare is a war of narratives, where bullets are fired both physically and virtually. Whether you are a president or a terrorist, if you don’t understand how to deploy the power of social media effectively you may win the odd battle but you will lose a twenty-first century war. Here, journalist David Patrikarakos draws on unprecedented access to key players to provide a new narrative for modern warfare. He travels thousands of miles across continents to meet a de-radicalized female member of ISIS recruited via Skype, a liberal Russian in Siberia who takes a job manufacturing “Ukrainian” news, and many others to explore the way social media has transformed the way we fight, win, and consume wars-and what this means for the world going forward.

How to Lose the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of Conflict – September 23, 2021 by Nina Jankowicz

Since the start of the Trump era, the United States and the Western world has finally begun to wake up to the threat of online warfare and the attacks from Russia. The question no one seems to be able to answer is: what can the West do about it?

How to Lose the Information War takes the reader on a journey through five Western governments’ responses to Russian information warfare tactics – all of which have failed. She journeys into the campaigns the Russian operatives run, and shows how we can better understand the motivations behind these attacks and how to beat them. Above all, this book shows what is at stake: the future of civil discourse and democracy, and the value of truth itself.

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon – November 11, 2014 by Kim Zetter

Top cybersecurity journalist Kim Zetter tells the story behind the virus that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear efforts and shows how its existence has ushered in a new age of warfare—one in which a digital attack can have the same destructive capability as a megaton bomb.

Zetter shows us how digital warfare developed in the US. She takes us inside today’s flourishing zero-day “grey markets,” in which intelligence agencies and militaries pay huge sums for the malicious code they need to carry out infiltrations and attacks. She reveals just how vulnerable many of our own critical systems are to Stuxnet-like strikes, from nation-state adversaries and anonymous hackers alike—and shows us just what might happen should our infrastructure be targeted by such an attack.

Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath – October 18, 2016 by Ted Koppel

Ted Koppel reveals that a major cyberattack on America’s power grid is not only possible but likely, that it would be devastating, and that the United States is shockingly unprepared. With urgency and authority, one of our most renowned journalists examines a threat unique to our time and evaluates potential ways to prepare for a catastrophe that is all but inevitable.

Rhet Ops: Rhetoric and Information Warfare – October 15, 2019 by Jim Ridolfo and William Hart-Davidson

In this edited volume, authors seek to document and analyze how state and non-state actors leverage digital rhetoric as a twenty-first-century weapon of war. Rhet Ops offer readers a chance to focus on the human dimension of rhetorical practice within mobile technologies and social networks: to reflect not only on the durable question of what it means to conduct oneself ethically as a speaker or writer, but also what it means to learn the art of rhetoric as a means to engage adversaries in war and conflict.

Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous Hackers – October 20, 2020 by Andy Greenberg

In 2014, the world witnessed the start of a mysterious series of cyberattacks. Targeting American utility companies, NATO, and electric grids in Eastern Europe, the strikes grew ever more brazen. They culminated in the summer of 2017, when the malware known as NotPetya was unleashed, penetrating, disrupting, and paralyzing some of the world’s largest businesses—from drug manufacturers to software developers to shipping companies. NotPetya spread around the world, inflicting an unprecedented ten billion dollars in damage — the largest, most destructive cyberattack the world had ever seen. The hackers behind these attacks are quickly gaining a reputation as the most dangerous team of cyberwarriors in history: a group known as Sandworm. Working in the service of Russia’s military intelligence agency, they represent a persistent, highly skilled force, one whose talents are matched by their willingness to launch broad, unrestrained attacks on the most critical infrastructure of their adversaries.

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century – January 22, 2009 by P. W. Singer

Blending historic evidence with interviews from the field, Singer vividly shows that as these technologies multiply, they will have profound effects on the front lines as well as on the politics back home. Moving humans off the battlefield makes wars easier to start, but more complex to fight. Replacing men with machines may save some lives but will lower the morale and psychological barriers to killing. The warrior ethos, which has long defined soldiers’ identity, will erode, as will the laws of war that have governed military conflict for generations. Paradoxically, these new technologies will also bring war to our doorstep. As other nations and even terrorist organizations start to build or buy their own robotic weapons, the robot revolution could undermine America’s military preeminence.

The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World – February 13, 2018 by Pedro Domingos

A thought-provoking and wide-ranging exploration of machine learning and the race to build computer intelligences as flexible as our ow. In the world’s top research labs and universities, the race is on to invent the ultimate learning algorithm: one capable of discovering any knowledge from data, and doing anything we want, before we even ask. In The Master Algorithm, Pedro Domingos lifts the veil to give us a peek inside the learning machines that power Google, Amazon, and your smartphone. He assembles a blueprint for the future universal learner–the Master Algorithm–and discusses what it will mean for business, science, and society. If data-ism is today’s philosophy, this book is its bible

China combines financial firepower-currently the world’s second largest economy-with a clear intent of fielding a modern military capable of competing not only in the physical environments of land, sea, air, and outer space, but especially in the electromagnetic and cyber domains. This book makes extensive use of Chinese-language sources to provide policy-relevant insight into how the Chinese view the evolving relationship between information and future warfare as well as issues such as computer network warfare and electronic warfare. Written by an expert on Chinese military and security developments, this work taps materials the Chinese military uses to educate its own officers to explain the bigger-picture thinking that motivates Chinese cyber warfare. Readers will be able to place the key role of Chinese cyber operations in the overall context of how the Chinese military thinks future wars will be fought and grasp how Chinese computer network operations, including various hacking incidents, are part of a larger, different approach to warfare.

The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats – July 16, 2019 by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake

This is a book about the realm in which nobody should ever want to fight a war: the fifth domain, the Pentagon’s term for cyberspace. Our guides are two of America’s top cybersecurity experts, seasoned practitioners who are as familiar with the White House Situation Room as they are with Fortune 500 boardrooms. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake offer a vivid, engrossing tour of the often unfamiliar terrain of cyberspace, introducing us to the scientists, executives, and public servants who have learned through hard experience how government agencies and private firms can fend off cyber threats.

The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage – January 1, 2005 by Cliff Stoll

Cliff Stoll was an astronomer turned systems manager at Lawrence Berkeley Lab when a 75-cent accounting error alerted him to the presence of an unauthorized user on his system. The hacker’s code name was “Hunter” — a mysterious invader who managed to break into U.S. computer systems and steal sensitive military and security information. Stoll began a one-man hunt of his own: spying on the spy. It was a dangerous game of deception, broken codes, satellites, and missile bases — a one-man sting operation that finally gained the attention of the CIA…and ultimately trapped an international spy ring fueled by cash, cocaine, and the KGB.

This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race – February 9, 2021 by Nicole Perlroth

For decades, under cover of classification levels and non-disclosure agreements, the United States government became the world’s dominant hoarder of zero days. U.S. government agents paid top dollar―first thousands, and later millions of dollars― to hackers willing to sell their lock-picking code and their silence. Then the United States lost control of its hoard and the market. Now those zero days are in the hands of hostile nations and mercenaries who do not care if your vote goes missing, your clean water is contaminated, or our nuclear plants melt down.

Social Engineering: The Science of Human Hacking by Christopher Hadnagy

Social Engineering: The Science of Human Hacking reveals the craftier side of the hacker’s repertoire―why hack into something when you could just ask for access? Undetectable by firewalls and antivirus software, social engineering relies on human fault to gain access to sensitive spaces; in this book, renowned expert Christopher Hadnagy explains the most commonly-used techniques that fool even the most robust security personnel, and shows you how these techniques have been used in the past. The way that we make decisions as humans affects everything from our emotions to our security. Hackers, since the beginning of time, have figured out ways to exploit that decision making process and get you to take an action not in your best interest. This new Second Edition has been updated with the most current methods used by sharing stories, examples, and scientific study behind how those decisions are exploited.

Hacking: The Art of Exploitation by Jon Erickson

Hacking is the art of creative problem solving, whether that means finding an unconventional solution to a difficult problem or exploiting holes in sloppy programming. Many people call themselves hackers, but few have the strong technical foundation needed to really push the envelope. Rather than merely showing how to run existing exploits, author Jon Erickson explains how arcane hacking techniques actually work. To share the art and science of hacking in a way that is accessible to everyone, Hacking: The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Edition introduces the fundamentals of C programming from a hacker’s perspective.

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity – January 22, 2021 by Christian Espinosa

In The Smartest Person in the Room, Christian Espinosa shows you how to leverage your company’s smartest minds to your benefit and theirs. Learn from Christian’s own journey from cybersecurity engineer to company CEO. He describes why a high IQ is a lost superpower when effective communication, true intelligence, and self-confidence are not embraced. With his seven-step methodology and stories from the field, Christian helps you develop your team’s technical minds so they become better humans and strong leaders who excel in every role. This book provides you with an enlightening perspective of how to turn your biggest unknown weakness into your strongest defense.

Wireless Wars: China’s Dangerous Domination of 5G and How We’re Fighting Back – September 28, 2021 by Jonathan Pelson

In Wireless Wars: China’s Dangerous Domination of 5G and How We’re Fighting Back, author Jon Pelson explains how America invented cellular technology, taught China how to make the gear, and then handed them the market. Pelson shares never-before-told stories from the executives and scientists who built the industry and describes how China undercut and destroyed competing equipment makers, freeing themselves to export their nation’s network gear—and their surveillance state. He also reveals China’s successful program to purchase the support of the world’s leading political, business, and military figures in their effort to control rival nations’ networks.

Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars – March 1, 2009 by Norman Friedman

This book explains what network-centric warfare is, and how it works, using concrete historical naval examples rather than the usual abstractions. It argues that navies invented this style of warfare over the last century, led by the Royal Navy, and that the wars of that century, culminating in the Cold War, show how networked warfare worked – and did not work. This approach is probably the only way a reader can get a realistic feeling for what the new style of war offers, and also for what is needed to make it work. Although it concentrates on naval examples, this book is of vital importance to all the services. It is the first book about network-centric warfare to deal in concrete examples, and the first to use actual history to illuminate current operational concepts. It also offers considerable new light on the major naval battles of the World Wars, hence ought to be of intense interest to historians.

Disclosure of Material Connection: Some of the links contained on this site are “affiliate links.” This means if you click on the link and purchase the item, I will receive an affiliate commission. This revenue is used to offset costs associated with maintaining this site. I only recommend products or services I use personally and believe will add value to my readers. I am disclosing this in accordance with the Federal Trade Commission’s 16 CFR, Part 255: “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising.”

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keyterraincyber.com · by Broadsword6 · December 18, 2022

9. FDD’s Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: The Year in Review

Access the tracker here:

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/12/16/fdds-biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-2022-the-year-in-review/

December 16, 2022 | FDD Tracker: 2022

FDD’s Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: The Year in Review

Biden's Foreign Policy: A Midterm Assessment

By David Adesnik and John Hardie

Midterm grades are in for President Joe Biden’s performance as commander-in-chief. The verdict from FDD scholars is that Biden’s foreign policy has often worked against both American values and American interests. On China, there is no clear policy. North Korea is firing off ballistic missiles at an unprecedented rate. The Iranian people are revolting against their oppressors, yet the administration is still offering sanctions relief in exchange for a fatally flawed nuclear deal. The Taliban have tightened their grip on Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda now finds sanctuary. Only when it comes to Russia and Ukraine has Biden stood firmly against aggression and for democracy and human rights — after spending his first six months in office attempting to build what he called a “stable and predictable relationship” with Russia under Vladimir Putin.

In FDD’s monthly Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker, our contributors assess whether the trendline in their area of expertise is very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative. In this end-of-year edition, we asked them to assess the trendline for the year as a whole. There are four areas, out of 17, where the administration earned positive marks: Defense, Europe, Russia, and Cyber. The first three all stem from the consistency Biden has shown in rallying international support for Ukraine while providing Kyiv with the weapons it needs to defeat Moscow’s aggression. Progress on the cyber front has resulted from cooperation across partisan lines and between Congress and the executive branch. Funding has grown for cybersecurity initiatives, while the White House is working to secure government networks.

Regarding China, Biden seems incapable of driving his own administration toward a consensus on whether to engage in a full-throated competition with Beijing. The president has repeatedly pledged to defend Taiwan from invasion, contradicting his administration’s official policy of strategic ambiguity. The administration says it is ready to engage with North Korea on nuclear issues, but the enforcement of sanctions has atrophied, reducing U.S. leverage in potential negotiations. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un tested a record number of missiles in 2022.

Biden’s weakest performance was clearly in the Middle East, where he earned a very negative rating on Iran and Lebanon, along with negative ratings for policy toward Syria, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and Sunni Jihadism. The White House made clear from day one that it wanted to reach a nuclear deal with Tehran, yet the clerical regime only accelerated its enrichment of uranium while obstructing the work of nuclear inspectors. Ironically, the people of Iran lost patience with their rulers long before Biden did. The administration proclaims its solidarity with Iranian protesters yet is still offering Tehran a deal that would entail $275 billion of sanctions relief in the first year alone.

Each section of this tracker includes specific recommendations for how the administration can improve its performance in the third year of its term. Yet the broader lesson of the past two years is that America should finally put an end to wishful thinking about the readiness of our adversaries to moderate their behavior when the United States holds out an open hand.

Trending Positive

CYBER

By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Jiwon Ma

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

CHINA

By Craig Singleton

GULF

By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi

NONPROLIFERATION AND BIODEFENSE

By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker

Trending Very Negative

IRAN

Behnam Ben Taleblu and Richard Goldberg

10. Key Flaws Hamstring Russia Oil Price Cap

Key Flaws Hamstring Russia Oil Price Cap

fdd.org · by John Hardie Russia Program Deputy Director · December 16, 2022

The G7, European Union (EU), and Australia formally adopted a mechanism to “cap” the price of Russian oil exports earlier this month, aimed at squeezing the Kremlin’s coffers while avoiding a spike in oil prices. However, the mechanism’s high price ceiling and its inability to compel Russia’s top customers to respect the cap undermine its ability to deprive Moscow of substantial revenue to fund its aggression against Ukraine.

In June, the EU decided to ban both seaborne imports of Russian oil and the provision of services facilitating Russian oil shipments, most notably insurance and reinsurance, industries which EU and British companies dominate. The Biden administration, which had already banned direct imports of Russian oil, feared the EU ban would cause oil prices to skyrocket by shutting in large volumes of Russian exports.

Instead, Washington proposed a ban on the provision of services facilitating seaborne exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products — unless the purchasers paid a price below a predetermined ceiling. As originally devised, the idea was to set the cap high enough to incentivize continued Russian oil exports while minimizing Moscow’s oil revenue, the backbone of Russia’s federal budget. Although Moscow threatened to cut supplies to participating countries, the cap’s proponents argued Russia was bluffing, pointing to its dependence on oil revenue.

In the weeks and months before the cap came into effect, the U.S. and UK governments released guidance on how to comply, and the EU followed suit on December 2. The mechanism’s prohibitions took force with respect to crude oil shipments on December 5 and will extend to petroleum products beginning on February 5.

While even a well-constructed price cap would be challenging to execute, the Western coalition has hamstrung its plan’s chances of success. First, the scheme lacks a mechanism to compel participation by China, India, and Turkey, Russia’s top three oil customers, which are not part of the price-cap coalition.

Seeking to solve that problem, Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Pat Toomey (R-PA) proposed legislation in September authorizing sanctions against foreign individuals or entities that knowingly facilitate shipments of Russian oil sold above the price ceiling. But the Biden administration ruled out use of such secondary sanctions. Meanwhile, Moscow and its customers have pursued alternatives to Western insurance, reinsurance, shipping, and other services.

Another key flaw is the price itself. Some countries, including Ukraine, pushed for a ceiling of $30 to $40 per barrel. That would be well below the price Moscow needs to balance its budget but above Russia’s estimated average cost of production (excluding taxes). But the EU, with the Biden administration’s blessing, ultimately settled on $60 per barrel. That was just below the then market price of approximately $62 per barrel for Urals crude, which has been selling at a significant discount since early in the war and is now going for around $58.50 per barrel — meaning the cap is above the actual price.

The Biden administration and EU have pledged to review the price ceiling regularly to ensure it actually reduces Russia’s revenue. Market conditions permitting, Washington should encourage the EU to substantially lower the ceiling during its next review, set for mid-January.

At the same time, the administration, in coordination with Congress, should revisit its stance on applying sanctions or other restrictive measures to oil cap violators. Washington could also take a page from its Iran sanctions playbook and develop a mechanism to restrict Russia’s access to hard currency earnings from oil exports. For example, it could require Russia’s oil customers to deposit Russia’s proceeds, in whole or in part, into special accounts denominated in local currency that Moscow could use only to purchase trade goods.

Making Russia oil sanctions work will no doubt be difficult, but defeating Putin’s aggression is worth it. The Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and their freedom. The West should provide all the help it can.

John Hardie is deputy director of the Russian Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power. For more analysis from John, the Russian Program, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by John Hardie Russia Program Deputy Director · December 16, 2022

11. Iran says it will launch two satellites into space in coming months

My questions: Are Iran and north Korea coordinating their actions? Or are their actions simply a coincidence? Or if not coordinating, are they making their own independent decisions to conduct based on what the other is doing?

Iran says it will launch two satellites into space in coming months

Such launches spur concerns among Western powers over Iran’s ballistic missile technology, which could extend to the potential delivery of nuclear warheads

timesofisrael.com · by AFP Today, 6:03 pm Edit

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran prepares to launch “at least two satellites” into space by late March, Telecommunications Minister Issa Zarepour said Sunday, just over a month after successfully testing a launcher.

The United States has repeatedly voiced concern that such launches could boost Iran’s ballistic missile technology, extending to the potential delivery of nuclear warheads.

But Iran insists it is not seeking nuclear weapons and that its satellite and rocket launches are for civil or defense purposes only.

“Nahid 1 and Nahid 2 satellites are being prepared,” Zarepour was quoted as saying by the official news agency IRNA.

Nahid is the name given to a series of telecommunications satellites developed by the Iranian Space Research Center.

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According to Zarepour, “we will have launches by year’s end,” March 20 in the Persian calendar.

Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the head of the Revolutionary Guard’s aerospace division, stands in front of an Iranian rocket carrying a satellite in an undisclosed site believed to be in Iran’s Semnan province, April 22, 2020. (Sepahnews via AP)

In early November, Iranian state television announced the “successful suborbital launch of the satellite launcher named Ghaem-100.”

The Ghaem-100 rocket was manufactured by the aerospace organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and it is the country’s first three-stage solid-fuel satellite launcher, the channel added.

Iran successfully put its first military satellite into orbit in April 2020, drawing a sharp rebuke from Washington.

In August this year, another Iranian satellite, named Khayyam, was launched by Russia on a Soyuz-2.1b rocket from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.

Iran’s space agency said the device was constructed by Russia under Iran’s supervision.

The US alleged at the time that the Khayyam would enable “significant spying capabilities” and that a deepening Russia-Iran alliance amounted to a “profound threat” to the world.

Iran’s space agency rejected those allegations, countering that the purpose of Khayyam was to “monitor the country’s borders,” and help with the management of natural resources and agriculture.

timesofisrael.com · by AFP Today, 6:03 pm Edit

12. Protecting and Securing Data from the Quantum Threat

Download the TCIL technical note here: https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/fdd-ccti-protecting-and-securing-data-from-the-quantum-threat.pdf

Protecting and Securing Data from the Quantum Threat

fdd.org · December 16, 2022

December 16, 2022 | TCIL Technical Note

Dr. Georgianna Shea

CCTI and TCIL Chief Technologist

Annie Fixler

CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow

Download TCIL Technical Note

Executive Summary

Over the next decade, quantum computing will unlock new technological advances and upend the current security landscape. Quantum computers of sufficient size and sophistication could “jeopardize civilian and military communications, undermine supervisory and control systems for critical infrastructure, and defeat security protocols for most Internet-based financial transactions,” the White House cautioned in May. “In short,” warned a separate report from the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “whoever wins the race for quantum computing supremacy could potentially compromise the communications of others.”

Once a quantum computer becomes sophisticated and large enough to be considered a threat to modern-day encryption, it is called a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer, or CRQC. Some experts expect quantum computing will become a risk to modern-day encryption within three years, although others put the number in the high twenties.

There are two ways to provide security against the quantum threat. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been taking a “computational infeasibility” approach, which aims to develop encryption of such great complexity that no amount of computing power is realistically sufficient to breach it. To that end, NIST has been researching and testing new algorithms and developing post-quantum encryption standards that should be available by 2024. Once they are available, NIST expects it will take another five to fifteen years for organizations to migrate to the new standards. Yet if the migration takes that long, many users will become vulnerable to cyber breaches if CRQCs emerge in the next several years.

To help prepare for this risk of ineffective encryption, FDD’s Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab (TCIL) explored an alternative approach that government agencies and private companies can implement more quickly so they are prepared to face the quantum threat.

The alternative TCIL tested is based on the principle of information-theoretic security, which remains effective even when unlimited time and computing power are available to the adversary. Working with the data security experts at Cyber Reliant — a company specializing in data security — TCIL walked through onboarding an enterprise-wide security strategy we have dubbed augmented improbability of access (AIA), which applies the principles of information-theoretic security to defend against CRQCs.

AIA strategies also mitigate the risk that adversaries will steal encrypted data today and wait to decrypt it until CRQCs are available. AIA strategies prevent the adversary from collecting sufficient components to decrypt stolen data, even if victims are not using post-quantum encryption.

This pilot project’s goal is to better inform organizations how to enhance security and mitigate the diminishing lifespan of current encryption algorithms without having to wait for NIST’s new encryption standards. TCIL’s research findings conclude that the U.S. government and private entities should pursue AIA solutions.

Download Technical Note

Download

Protecting and Securing Data from the Quantum Threat

The White House, Briefing Room, “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” May 4, 2022. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/)
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Protecting Critical and Emerging U.S. Technologies from Foreign Threats,” October 2021, page 5. (https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/FINAL_NCSC_Emerging%20Technologies_Factsheet_10_22_2021.pdf)
The White House, Briefing Room, “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” May 4, 2022. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/)
Michele Mosca and Marco Piani, “Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2020,” Global Risk Institute, January 2021, page 30. (https://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/quantum-threat-timeline-report-2020/)
“Computer Security Resource Center: Post-Quantum Cryptography PQC,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, accessed November 28, 2022. (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/workshops-and-timeline)
William Barker, William Polk, and Murugiah Souppaya, “Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploring Challenges Associated with Adopting and Using Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Resource Center, April 28, 2021, page 2. (https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=932330)
Ueli Maurer, “Information-Theoretic Cryptography,” Department of Computer Science, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, August 1999. (https://crypto.ethz.ch/publications/files/Maurer99.pdf); For additional research on information-theoretic security, visit https://crypto.ethz.ch/~maurer/publications.html
“Cyber Reliant,” Cyber Reliant, accessed November 28, 2022. (https://www.cyberreliant.com)

Issues:

Cyber

fdd.org · by Dr. Georgianna Shea CCTI and TCIL Chief Technologist · December 16, 2022

13. Deterrence and Commitment Across the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy

Conclusion:

Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy’s policies demonstrate the value of clarity on the defense of Taiwan, limits on Taiwan’s ambitions, and preserving a cushion for tactical flexibility. Truman’s efforts to keep the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait separate issues, Eisenhower’s geographic limits on what the United States would defend, and Kennedy’s restraints on Taiwan and reassurance to China all represent efforts to preserve flexibility. In each case, deterrence and commitment had limits or restraining conditions that provided a cushion for tactical and diplomatic maneuver — bargaining and signaling — designed to prevent escalation. As Beijing increasingly stresses unification as a fundamental duty for the Communist Party and an integral part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” all while building its capacity to attempt reunification through force, deterrence becomes both more difficult and more urgent. These developments also threaten to eliminate the cushion that Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy employed. Today the commitment issue pivots on a Taiwanese declaration of independence. In response, the United States should design a strategy with three elements. First, strategic clarity on the defense of Taiwan, rather than a mix of clarity, ambiguity, and backtracking. Second, careful and precise language on support for “one China” and rejection of Taiwanese independence. Finally, a focus on where cushions for maneuver and tactical flexibility might exist.

For both domestic and foreign policy reasons, Beijing will vent at what it sees as provocations or interference in its internal affairs. For similar reasons, as well as for the reassurance of allies, the United States will feel compelled to respond. This means that while additional strategic clarity is essential in today’s environment, it should not be so rigid that it ties the hands of both sides. Preserving flexibility helped Cold War presidents to reduce the pressure of escalation and communicate intentions, allowing Beijing and Washington to avoid a war they did not want.

Deterrence and Commitment Across the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by William W. Newmann · December 19, 2022

Instead of embracing either strategic clarity or strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, the United States has now ended up with a very non-strategic form of ambiguity. Facing the dual challenge of deterring a Chinese invasion without encouraging Taiwanese leaders to engage in political risk-taking, successive administrations have only muddied the waters with a series of conflicting statements and policies.

In articulating a better approach, Washington would do well to look at the ways in which Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy handled China and Taiwan during the early Cold War. Each president’s approach had three elements: First, strategic clarity about America’s willingness to defend Taiwan; second, explicit limits on what Taiwanese policies they would support; and third, a commitment to preserving tactical flexibility and diplomatic maneuver. While their policies leaned toward strategic clarity, that clarity left space for Beijing to vent and signal and for Washington to calibrate its deterrent and levels of reassurance to Taiwan as each crisis might dictate. All three presidents hoped that they could find a balance to ensure that U.S. actions in the Taiwan Strait were determined by decisions made in Washington, not in Taipei or Beijing.

Muddying the Waters

Briefly consider the recent history of U.S. Taiwan policy. With head-spinning rapidity, President Donald Trump first challenged but then committed to a “one China” policy in 2016 and 2017. Republican-sponsored legislation, like the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act of February 2021, preauthorized the use of force in response to attacks by China on Taiwan. But this is a hollow gesture when it comes only after Republicans have lost control of the White House and Congress.

Become a Member

President Joe Biden seemed to make the full jump to strategic clarity, announcing in August and October 2021, and May and September 2022, that the United States would defend Taiwan. His administration, however, added ambiguity, perhaps even confusion, into the mix by walking back some of the statements and insisting that U.S. policy had not changed. Even Biden’s National Security Strategy of October 2022 tilted toward strategic ambiguity. It stated that the United States would “maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.” But “we can” is not quite the same as “we will.”

The question of U.S. support for Taiwan’s independence was also briefly muddied. The State Department eliminated the sentence “we do not support Taiwan independence” from its Fact Sheet on Taiwan in May 2022 and then restored it one month later. Speaker Nancy Pelosi added her own spin in July 2022 before her trip to Taiwan, saying the issue of independence was “up to Taiwan to decide.” Both her trip and the shifts in language have angered China and exacerbated the already deteriorating U.S.-Chinese relationship. Some analysts now believe that the “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” is already here.

Truman Learns on the Job

From 1945 to 1947, Truman’s immediate post-war policy on China was a bid, led by Gen. George Marshall, to broker a power-sharing arrangement between Mao Zedong’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. As negotiations failed and China’s civil war escalated, the administration concluded that the Nationalists could not win and ended military aid in January 1949. Eight months later, Mao’s forces captured Beijing, while Chiang’s Nationalists established their de facto government-in-exile on Taiwan.

The Nationalists, however, had deep support in the United States and kept their cause alive. A well-funded China Lobby and its allies in Congress haunted and taunted the Truman administration, asking “Who Lost China.” The administration defended itself in a historic 1949 White Paper, arguing that not even direct U.S. intervention could have saved the Nationalists.

Defiant, but feeling the pressure, the administration tried to thread the needle on deterring China and committing to the defense of Taiwan. On Jan. 5, 1950, Truman gave a statement at the White House formally announcing that his administration would neither establish military bases on Taiwan nor give military aid or advice, as he considered Chiang’s military to be sufficient to defend itself. Truman emphasized that he would “not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” While that seemed to be an invitation to China rather than a deterrent, and a clear end to any commitments to the defense of Taiwan, Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech of Jan. 12, 1950 tried to clarify Truman’s statements and internal administration thinking. Acheson argued that although an attack on Taiwan would not lead to U.S. intervention, it would trigger “the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.” Tired of shouldering the entire burden and frustrated with the Nationalists, Truman sought to make the defense of Taiwan a multilateral task.

Rhetorically and politically the statements failed miserably. What Acheson saw as a burden-sharing issue was perceived as abandonment of allies. Critics charged that the administration was giving up the defense of Taiwan and Korea. Administration policy ultimately followed Acheson to the letter: When North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, the Truman administration did not hesitate. It organized a U.N.-based multilateral effort within two hours of receiving confirmed reports of North Korean hostilities, and decided to use U.S. air and sea power in support of South Korean forces within days.

At this point, Truman was fine-tuning the balance between deterrence and commitment. He moved to deter China, ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait in case Beijing contemplated using the Korean conflict as a cover for military action against Taiwan. At the same moment, Truman made a commitment to Taiwan that had clear limits. While Truman’s June 27 public statement on the war and Acheson’s private telegram to Chiang obligated the administration to defend Taiwan from China, the telegram also asked Chiang to end his attacks on the mainland, fearing that he might use the Korean crisis as a diversion for a large-scale attempt to retake it. Truman instructed the Seventh Fleet to both protect Taiwan from China and to discourage Taiwanese operations against the mainland. When Chiang volunteered his military forces for use in South Korea, the administration declined the offer, nervous about the implications of a Nationalist foothold on the continent. For Truman and Acheson, this was just the kind of help that it did not need — a linkage of the Korean and Chinese conflicts. In effect, while deterring China and committing to Taiwan’s defense, Truman built in a cushion for maneuver intended to insulate the Taiwan Strait from the Korean War.

Still a Lot to Like About Ike

Eisenhower inherited a policy of deterrence against Chinese attacks on Taiwan, but clear limits on U.S. commitments to Taiwan. Initially, he loosened Chiang’s bonds a bit, announcing in his 1953 State of the Union speech that the Seventh Fleet would no longer have orders to prevent Nationalist attacks on the mainland, which he suggested “required the US Navy to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.” Ultimately, he added clarity and cushion to U.S. policy by institutionalizing it in written agreements as he dealt with two Taiwan Strait crises.

The first Taiwan Strait crisis began on Sept, 3, 1954 with Chinese shelling of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), which were closer to the mainland than to Taiwan. While the administration debated whether to use force — and the Nationalists retaliated against Chinese positions on the coast — Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Taiwan. The deal he struck with the Nationalists was a commitment with limitations. Even as Chiang lobbied for greater U.S. action, Eisenhower drew a line between how his administration would respond to attacks on Taiwan and how it would respond to strikes against Quemoy and Matsu. During National Security Council meetings on Sept. 9 and 12, 1954, Eisenhower reminded all involved that they were debating whether to commit to war with China. In the United States-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, signed on Dec. 2, 1954, the administration agreed to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghus), but not Quemoy, Matsu, or the Tachen Islands. In a secret side agreement — that was eventually leaked by administration officials in order to restrain Chiang — Washington and Taipei agreed that the United States would not help the Nationalists retake the mainland. Retaliation against Chinese attacks was allowed, but any offensive action against the mainland required Washington’s approval.

Eisenhower then asked Congress for formal authority to defend Taiwan. The Formosa Resolution, passed in late January 1955, gave Eisenhower the authority to use force, but again, only in defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. In Eisenhower’s eyes, a firm response could deter a larger attack by China, but the loss of Quemoy and Matsu would not lead to “a collapse of the free world position.” The distinction between what the United States would defend and what it would not gave Eisenhower his geographic cushion.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, triggered by renewed Chinese shelling of Quemoy and Matsu in August 1958, tested the U.S. ability to limit that commitment. Chiang had redeployed roughly one third of all Nationalist forces to Quemoy and Matsu, creating an invitation for Beijing and a dilemma for Eisenhower. Significant attacks on the offshore islands might become a tripwire, requiring the United States to use, in Eisenhower’s words, its “full military power” to prevent a catastrophic defeat for Taiwan. Even while recognizing Chiang’s manipulation, the administration considered both threatening to use and actually using nuclear weapons. Pressure from Congress and from allies restrained the administration, particularly as it was clear to Dulles that the use of nuclear weapons might seriously damage U.S. relations with Japan. As the United States and Taiwan continued to resupply the islands into October, Chinese shelling tailed off. In the end, neither side chose to escalate. Eisenhower then made it clear to Chiang that he wanted a reduction in Taiwanese military operations against the mainland and a redeployment of troops out of the offshore islands. A joint communique, released after an October meeting between Dulles and Chiang, explicitly renounced the use of force as a means for Taiwan to retake the mainland.

Not Another Bay of Pigs for Kennedy

Kennedy’s challenge was preventing Chiang from using the political instability in China caused by the Great Leap Forward as a pretext for expanding attacks against the mainland. Deterrence was not the issue: Restraining Taiwan and limiting U.S. commitments were the tricky parts.

Chiang saw the new administration and China’s domestic turmoil as an opportunity to start a Taiwanese-led insurrection that might lead to the overthrow of the Communist regime. The administration, however, saw this as wishful thinking. Mao’s grip was not weakening, and a Taiwanese invasion of the mainland would be perceived as having Kennedy’s support, even if he had opposed it. The result might be a healing of the Sino-Soviet split, if not a larger war.

The administration reminded Taiwan that U.S. policy was still based on the 1954 understanding that “the use of force will be a matter of joint agreement.” The shadow of the Bay of Pigs debacle defined the administration’s thinking. Kennedy’s support for Cuban exiles in 1961 had been based on the belief that they could secure a beachhead and launch a counterrevolution overthrowing Fidel Castro. The plan failed miserably, and the administration faced considerable political fallout for both supporting the Cuban forces and not supporting them enough. Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman summed up the administration’s view of Chiang’s plans, calling them “an even grander Bay of Pigs.”

And yet, against its own judgment, in March 1962 the administration approved the planning and preparation for a potential airdrop of a maximum of 200 men onto the mainland. Chiang set a date of Oct. 1 for the operation, even as administration officials reminded him that he had not been granted approval. While Kennedy worked on discouraging Chiang, Beijing responded to Taipei’s preparations. In June, an estimated half a million Chinese troops redeployed to positions on the mainland coast.

On June 20, Kennedy met with his key advisors and made the same choice that Truman and Eisenhower had by imposing clear limits to what he would do in support of Taiwan. Military operations against the mainland that could pull the United States into a larger war were out of bounds. Having failed to discourage Chiang, the administration moved to outflank him by publicizing its decision as widely as possible, in effect undermining Chiang’s ability to manipulate it into supporting offensive attacks against the mainland. For political cover, officials briefed Eisenhower and received his support on June 21. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averill Harriman met with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin on June 22, telling him that the administration hoped to deter Chinese action against Taiwan, and prevent Taiwanese action against the mainland. A similar message was sent to Beijing: “the US Government had no intention of supporting any GRC [Government of the Republic of China] attack on Mainland under existing circumstances.”

Finally at a June 27 press conference, Kennedy tried to shut the door on Chiang’s ambition, referencing Eisenhower’s policy several times, the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and even quoting Dulles for further political cover. Kennedy used strategic clarity here to define the limits of U.S. commitments to Taiwan in hopes of providing a deterrent to China and a cushion for maneuver that might prevent Taipei from instigating a war. He emphasized that the United States still had a veto over any Taiwanese attacks on the mainland, and that its policy “is defensive,” working toward “a renunciation of the use of force.” In private to Chiang, Washington repeated its opposition to large-scale attacks on the mainland, even as Chiang continued to lobby through 1963 and into the Johnson years. Chiang would have to be content with studies of possible action against the mainland by the joint U.S.-Taiwanese Blue Lion Committee.

Conclusion

Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy’s policies demonstrate the value of clarity on the defense of Taiwan, limits on Taiwan’s ambitions, and preserving a cushion for tactical flexibility. Truman’s efforts to keep the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait separate issues, Eisenhower’s geographic limits on what the United States would defend, and Kennedy’s restraints on Taiwan and reassurance to China all represent efforts to preserve flexibility. In each case, deterrence and commitment had limits or restraining conditions that provided a cushion for tactical and diplomatic maneuver — bargaining and signaling — designed to prevent escalation. As Beijing increasingly stresses unification as a fundamental duty for the Communist Party and an integral part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” all while building its capacity to attempt reunification through force, deterrence becomes both more difficult and more urgent. These developments also threaten to eliminate the cushion that Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy employed. Today the commitment issue pivots on a Taiwanese declaration of independence. In response, the United States should design a strategy with three elements. First, strategic clarity on the defense of Taiwan, rather than a mix of clarity, ambiguity, and backtracking. Second, careful and precise language on support for “one China” and rejection of Taiwanese independence. Finally, a focus on where cushions for maneuver and tactical flexibility might exist.

For both domestic and foreign policy reasons, Beijing will vent at what it sees as provocations or interference in its internal affairs. For similar reasons, as well as for the reassurance of allies, the United States will feel compelled to respond. This means that while additional strategic clarity is essential in today’s environment, it should not be so rigid that it ties the hands of both sides. Preserving flexibility helped Cold War presidents to reduce the pressure of escalation and communicate intentions, allowing Beijing and Washington to avoid a war they did not want.

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William W. Newmann is an associate professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University. His research and teaching focuses on U.S. foreign and national security policy, presidential decision-making, and East Asian security. He is the author of Isolation and Engagement: Presidential Decision Making on China from Kennedy to Nixon, University of Michigan Press, 2022.

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warontherocks.com · by William W. Newmann · December 19, 2022

14. A Russian tank unit deliberately attacked another Russian position in Ukraine, report says, illustrating vicious rivalries within Putin's army

A Russian tank unit deliberately attacked another Russian position in Ukraine, report says, illustrating vicious rivalries within Putin's army

Business Insider · by Alia Shoaib

An abandoned Russian military tank left in the Ukrainian city of Balakliia after Russian Forces withdrew from the Kharkiv region on September 15, 2022.

Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

A Russian tank unit attacked another Russian position in Ukraine following an argument, the NYT said.
The incident demonstrates the vicious in-fighting that has plagued Vladimir Putin's military.
There has been open sparring among the leaders of different splinters of Russian forces.

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A Russian tank commander deliberately attacked another Russian position in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine this summer following a battlefield argument, a major new report said.

The incident, part of a sweeping investigation by The New York Times, is one of the clearest examples of the vicious in-fighting that has plagued President Vladimir Putin's military throughout the war.

A Russian drone operator who said he witnessed the episode told the paper that a Russian tank commander drove his T-90 tank toward a group of Russian national guard troops, fired at their checkpoint and blew it up.

"Those types of things happen there," the soldier said, adding that he has since fled Russia.

The national guard, or Rosgvardia, is not part of the Russian armed forces, and reports to Putin directly.

That rift was one of several at play in the Russian war effort. Other power centers include the mercenary Wagner group, led by Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the forces led by Ramzan Kadyrov, the warlord who leads Russia's semi-autonomous region of Chechnya.

The Russian military appears to have limited coordination with any of them, officials said, according to the paper.

"There was no unified command, there was no single headquarters, there was no single concept and there was no unified planning of actions and command," retired Russian General Leonid Ivashov told the paper. "It was destined to be a defeat."

The friction between these factions has spilled out into the open at times, including when Kadyrov and other Putin allies criticized the Russian military's retreat from a city in Ukraine in October.

Kadyrov said at the time that the "incompetent" general that should be "sent to the front to wash his shame off with blood," per The New York Times.

Prigozhin echoed the sentiment, the paper said, commenting about Russian military generals: "Send all these pieces of garbage barefoot with machine guns straight to the front."

Business Insider · by Alia Shoaib

15. EXPLAINER: Why Japan is boosting its arms capability, budget

EXPLAINER: Why Japan is boosting its arms capability, budget

AP · by MARI YAMAGUCHI · December 17, 2022

TOKYO (AP) — Japan this week adopted a new national security strategy that includes determination to possess “counterstrike” capability to preempt enemy attacks and double its spending to gain a more offensive footing and improve its resilience to protect itself from growing risks from China, North Korea and Russia. The new strategy marks a historic change to Japan’s exclusively self-defense policy since the end of World War II. Here is a look at Japan’s new security and defense strategies and how they will change the country’s defense posture.

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COUNTERSTRIKE CAPABILITY

The biggest change in the National Security Strategy is possession of “counterstrike capability” that Japan calls “indispensable.” Japan aims to achieve capabilities ”to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance” within about 10 years.

This puts an end to the 1956 government policy that shelved capability to strike enemy targets and only recognized the idea as a constitutional last-ditch defense.

Japan says missile attacks against it have become “a palpable threat” and its current interceptor-reliant missile defense system is insufficient. North Korea launched missiles more than 30 times this year alone including one that overflew Japan, and China fired ballistic missiles into waters near southern Japanese islands.

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Japan says the use of counterstrike capability is constitutional if it’s in response to signs of an imminent enemy attack, but experts say it is extremely difficult to conduct such an attack without risking blame for striking first. Opponents say strike capability goes beyond self-defense under Japan’s pacifist constitution.

″(Japan’s) exclusive self-defense policy is hollowed,” the liberal-leaning Asahi newspaper said.

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DOUBLING DEFENSE SPENDING

Japan aims to double its defense spending to about 2% of its GDP to a total of about 43 trillion yen ($320 billion) through 2027. The new spending target follows the NATO standard and will eventually push Japan’s annual budget to about 10 trillion yen ($73 billion), the world’s third biggest after the United States and China.

Kishida said his government will need an extra 4 trillion yen ($30 billion) annually and proposed tax increases to fund a quarter of it. His tax-raise request backfired and the five-year defense buildup plan had to be released without full funding plans while the governing party continued discussing how to pay for the shortfall.

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LONG-RANGE MISSILES

Over the next five years, Japan will spend about 5 trillion yen ($37 billion) on long-range missiles, whose planned deployment begins in 2026. Japan will purchase U.S.-made Tomahawks and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, while Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industry will improve and mass-produce a Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missile. Japanese defense officials said they are still finalizing Tomahawk purchase details.

Japan will also develop other types of arsenals, such as hypersonic weapons and unmanned and multi-role vehicles for possible collaboration with the F-X next-generation fighter jet Japan is developing with Britain and Italy for deployment in 2035.

Several standoff missile units are underway at undisclosed locations.

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CYBERSECURITY

Japan, lacking sufficient cybersecurity and intelligence capability, will have to heavily rely on the United States in those areas in launching long-range cruise missiles at intended targets, experts say.

“Without cybersecurity, Self-Defense Force superiority or Japan-U.S. interoperatibility is difficult to achieve,” according to the five-year defense program also adopted Friday, acknowledging the need to ensure cybersecurity at the SDF and Japanese defense industry.

This is a welcome development for the United States as the Japanese government’s weak cybersecurity has been “a critical impediment to deeper alliance cooperation and expanded information-sharing,” according to Christopher Johnstone, senior advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Japan will spend 8 trillion yen ($58 billion) over the next five years on cross-domain defense including cybersecurity and space.

___

CHINA AS ‘GREATEST STRATEGIC CHALLENGE’

Fear of a regional security environment described as “the severest and most complicated” in the postwar era has been a driving force behind the revision to Japan’s strategy.

China, with its rapid arms buildup, increasingly assertive military activity and rivalry with the U.S., presents “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to the peace and security of Japan and the international community, the strategy states.

Russia’s war on Ukraine sparked fears of a Taiwan emergency, accelerating the move to bolster Japan’s deterrence within the next five years. While North Korea keeps advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities, the main threat is still China, for which Japan has had to prepare “by using North Korea’s threat as a cover,” said Tomohisa Takei, a retired admiral in Japan’s navy.

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STILL EXCLUSIVELY SELF-DEFENSE?

Because of its wartime past as aggressor and devastation after its defeat, Japan’s postwar policy prioritized the economy over security by relying on American troops stationed in Japan under their bilateral security agreement, in a division of roles known as “shield and dagger.”

Prospects for even closer operation with the U.S. military under the new strategy has prompted concerns that Japan would take more offensive responsibility.

Japan says it will keep its pacifist principle of high standards for arms equipment and technology transfer. But some easing is planned to allow currently restricted exports of offensive equipment and components, including those of the next-generation F-X fighter jet, as a way to strengthen the country’s defense equipment industry.

AP · by MARI YAMAGUCHI · December 17, 2022

16. Resist to Deter: Why Taiwan Needs to Focus on Irregular Warfare

Sigh... There is only one US military force that is organized, trained, equipped, educated, and optimized for the conduct of unconventional warfare (and "guerrilla warfare" and resistance). But it is not mentioned in this article. That is probably an indication of a lack of understanding of our nation's irregular warfare capabilities or the belief that "everyone" can conduct irregular warfare.

I will ask where are our nation's irregular warfare capable campaign headquarters?

Excerpt:

Aiding Taiwan’s Resistance Forces

The United States, Japan, and others can aid in increasing the potency and the persistence of Taiwan’s resistance efforts, in addition to the other deterrence efforts. The US Marine Corps theoretically is well positioned for such aid post-invasion, via physical operations to destroy key command and communication nodes and through cyber and information operations that would enable resistance forces to operate without surveillance and monitoring by the occupying Chinese.

The United States and Taiwan should make available (by translating, publishing, printing, and distributing) US doctrine manuals, both current and past, on subjects such as guerrilla warfare, improvised munitions, and unconventional warfare. These key manuals should be further updated for the digital era and shared widely within Taiwan.

Resist to Deter: Why Taiwan Needs to Focus on Irregular Warfare - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Aidan L. P. Greer, Chris Bassler · December 19, 2022

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Taiwan and the United States appear to have reached the decade of maximum danger with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While Taiwan has mostly accepted the need to shift to a “porcupine strategy” to deter a potential Chinese invasion—an approach that emphasizes asymmetric capabilities and weapons like antiship missiles and mines—implementation has been slow. And Taiwan has neglected to cultivate the guerrilla-style resistance forces that will be necessary to counter an occupation. With the help of allies like the United States, Taiwan should be doing all it can to prepare for a lethal insurgency, the threat of which may deter Chinese invasion in the first place.

In any conflict with China, Taiwan should play to its strengths and China’s weaknesses. Taiwan should develop a devoted resistance force capable of deploying irregular warfare tactics, separate from the Ministry of National Defense and the reserve forces. Resistance fighters and insurgents have succeeded against large occupying forces with advanced capabilities, and Taiwan could use such principles to take full advantage of its home-field advantage against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While it remains unclear if or when the CCP will attempt an invasion of Taiwan, Taiwan must examine all options that may bolster its defense capabilities and deterrence posture—and irregular warfare should play a central role among those options.

As Mao Zedong wrote, guerrilla warfare “is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.” Writing in 1937, Mao was referring to a Japanese imperialist invasion of mainland China. Today, however, this ethos is just as relevant for Taiwan.

Deterring an Invasion

Were China to attempt to invade Taiwan, it likely would be met with staunch resistance from the population. According to a July 2021 poll, 73 percent of Taiwanese support independence or the status quo, as opposed to unification or “don’t know.” A December 2021 poll found that 72.5 percent of Taiwanese are willing to fight against China in the event of an invasion. More recently, another poll found that 90 percent of Taiwanese reject China’s threats of force, the suppression of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and the CCP’s view of a “one country, two systems” model. The more China-friendly KMT party has been steadily losing support from Taiwanese voters. The Taiwanese view themselves as a distinct people and entity from China and have expressed their will to fight for their sovereignty.

There is newfound private sector support for a civilian defense force in Taiwan. Robert Tsao, founder of one of Taiwan’s leading semiconductor manufacturers, recently announced his plans to spend more than $30 million of his own money to fund the training of three million “civilian warriors” over the next three years with Kuma Academy, a civilian defense organization. Enoch Wu, an American-educated politician in the Democratic Progressive Party and a former soldier in Taiwan’s special operations forces, has founded Forward Alliance, a national security and civilian defense organization. Forward Alliance has held “resilience training” workshops to train civilians in situation awareness and personal safety.

Taiwan has also moved to reconsider its military readiness, recently announcing a 14 percent increase in defense spending. And it has created a system of underground bases and tunnels, safe houses, hide sites, shelter areas, and mountain refuges, not to mention bunkers along the coastlines. But Taiwan can do more to leverage its mountainous and rugged geography, ideal for guerrilla bases, and urban environments, ideal for guerrilla fighting.

The national government and military commands should supply what they can, but decentralized command and operations will be key for resistance forces. Taiwan’s reserve forces activation plan could be reinforced by further expansion to resistance forces. Reservists could be assigned to defend their home regions where they can blend into local towns and villages, enhancing guerrilla warfare capabilities and strategic interoperability with Taiwanese military forces.

Reports have highlighted US special operations forces and Marines who may have been training military forces in Taiwan, as part of broad defensive measures in the event of a Chinese invasion. Weapons sales from the United States of billions of dollars’ worth of F-16s and howitzers are intended to help deter an invasion. But training for defensive measures against a potential amphibious landing and small-boat exercises are also necessary, and Taiwan would be wise to continue focusing its arms purchases on highly asymmetric capabilities. Refocusing on cost-imposition capabilities as well as resistance (or guerrilla warfare) principles would strengthen Taiwan’s actual defense in case of conflict, as well as enhancing deterrence.

Resisting an Occupation

If an initial invasion were to succeed, China would then seek to fully occupy Taiwan. At this point, China could seek to leverage its economic ties to Taiwanese political leaders to stabilize a PRC-friendly portion of the populace, which could fracture the political landscape and divide the people.

Alone, Taiwan is clearly overmatched militarily by China. Taiwan must therefore continue to play to its strengths: island and maritime geography, the desire of the people to exist separately from China, integration into international economic and technological systems, and defensive orientation. Taiwan should learn from the Ukrainians, who intentionally flooded their own villages to prevent Russian tank advances, or from the Swiss, whose defensive capabilities can reportedly lock down the few mountain passes permitting transit in and out of the country, to leverage its natural environment to slow an invasion. Taiwan’s military command has considered the thirteen-kilometer-long Hsuehshan Tunnel as a backup joint operations command center in the event that the Hengshan Military Command Center in Taipei is destroyed.

While China may not yet have the capacity to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, it is clearly building its amphibious operations capabilities to enable it to execute future operations. Taiwanese resistance forces should not be a frontline force meeting the PLA on beachheads. Rather, the utility of such resistance forces is maximized when, upon invasion, they amass supplies, gather in bases and villages, and wait for the invading vanguard to pass through. The resistance forces may then engage enemy forces, attacking and then disappearing into urban and forest environments.

It would be a significant challenge for Chinese forces to locate and neutralize all of Taiwan’s underground, mountain, and urban bases and tunnels. Taiwanese guerrillas could probably operate from such installations for weeks, if not longer, after an invasion, providing Taiwan critical options to engage in a Fabian campaign strategy. Deconfliction with Taiwan’s regular military forces is vital, as guerrilla forces can harass the enemy and hinder transportation by destroying infrastructure and operating from small, temporary, forward bases. They can also gather intelligence and use small unmanned systems for both surveillance and attacks, as well as defense. For example, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology has developed its own indigenous drone defense system (composed of unmanned aerial vehicles) that will be deployed beginning in 2023. Rapidly striking and then dispersing is key, as is careful planning by command that is “centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes.”

As Taiwan is at an insurmountable quantitative disadvantage compared to China, regaining lost territory would be difficult. For example, were China to encircle and take the Kinmen or Matsu islands, which are as little as six kilometers and nine kilometers, respectively, from the Chinese coastline, it would be nearly impossible to regain them; the US Department of Defense already believes that China’s amphibious force has the capabilities for such medium-sized island operations, and even Taiwanese officials have acknowledged that “Taiwan may not have the military capabilities to retake them [Kinmen and Matsu].” Assuming the PLA began operating from parts of Taiwan, overcoming Chinese antiaccess/area-denial capabilities would be costly and time-consuming. But with significant support, it might still be possible to regain territory on the main island of Taiwan, if Taiwanese operations can coordinate and provide critical targeting and intelligence to allies’ strike platforms.

Taiwan could again look to the Swiss for a model of how to destroy infrastructure to make it useless to occupiers, especially when considering the value of semiconductor foundries. Paired with an Operation Paperclip–style effort that would temporarily relocate key swaths of the Taiwanese workforce to places such as Japan, the United States, South Korea, and Australia, this could keep vital technology and knowledge out of the hands of the CCP, while minimizing economic and strategic impacts to allied countries. Later, Taiwan would likely be able to reconstitute its domestic capabilities more quickly.

Surviving Pacification

A likely scenario in which all of Taiwan would peaceably capitulate to China is difficult to imagine. The CCP could attempt to further divide the Taiwanese people along partisan lines and weaken the will of the people, co-opting some key leaders and forcing them to choose between their countrymen and the invaders. Taiwanese resistance forces would likely remain in mountainous and urban hideouts, continuing to wage irregular warfare. These resistance forces would rely on local communities for supplies and would be at a severe materiel disadvantage.

China might then turn to its own counterinsurgency playbook, parts of which it has already applied in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet. In Xinjiang, in the 1990s and early 2000s, China enforced a policy of assimilation by targeting immigration and economic and cultural integration. This included extensive human intelligence collection and targeting of specific and influential individuals. According to one study, China’s ethnic nationalism and vertical coordination and hierarchy of its security system bias it toward tactics of hard power and imposition, resulting in brutal administration of occupied areas.

Taiwan needs to anticipate this brutality. If and when Chinese troops overreact, the resistance force must be ready to document, disseminate, and publicize those actions. Propaganda and social media will play a crucial role in garnering international support, as they have done in the Ukraine war, and Taiwanese forces should be trained in social media and information operations. Today’s printing presses are cell phones, computers, and an internet connection.

Aiding Taiwan’s Resistance Forces

The United States, Japan, and others can aid in increasing the potency and the persistence of Taiwan’s resistance efforts, in addition to the other deterrence efforts. The US Marine Corps theoretically is well positioned for such aid post-invasion, via physical operations to destroy key command and communication nodes and through cyber and information operations that would enable resistance forces to operate without surveillance and monitoring by the occupying Chinese.

The United States and Taiwan should make available (by translating, publishing, printing, and distributing) US doctrine manuals, both current and past, on subjects such as guerrilla warfare, improvised munitions, and unconventional warfare. These key manuals should be further updated for the digital era and shared widely within Taiwan.

The United States and its allies can also provide mission-specific training and capabilities, including loitering munitions, drone swarms, Stinger antiaircraft missiles, Javelin antitank missiles, and surveillance systems, all designed to enable irregular units to be small, lethal, mobile, and many. Training resistance units could include approaches similar to Finland’s, tailored to three groups: the best-trained and best-equipped operational units, regional forces, and local units from the general population.

Resistance forces should be able to draw from stockpiles and caches of munitions, missiles, drones, and launchers, but also have some capacity for organic force reconstitution, especially during the period when Taiwan is likely to be cut off from outside aid. They can use digital approaches and stockpiled raw materials to print weapons and munitions on the island. Units should be well versed in using large quantities of asymmetric weapons and capabilities, underpinned by communications capabilities with low probability of detection and interception, disconnected operations, and network-optional warfare concepts. Resistance forces can use covert and overt blockade-running capabilities, by sea and by air, using autonomous ships, unmanned aircraft systems, disguised platforms, and other smuggling techniques. As much as possible, such resistance forces must be organized to match civilians with existing skills from day jobs to relevant specialized units.

The goal of Taiwan’s bolstered irregular warfare capabilities (in concert with the conventional active-duty military) should be delaying and hindering a PLA invasion and occupation as long as possible, in order to provide the United States and other partners the time needed to mass forces in the region, break through any sort of blockade, and provide support to Taiwan.

To do this, Taiwanese resistance force operations and irregular warfare capabilities, along with significant capacities of munitions, will be imperative. Taiwan must establish sufficient weapons caches and supporting countries must prepare for contested resupply operations. By replacing “China” with “Taiwan” and “Japan” with “China,” one of Mao’s own insights offers wise counsel to Taiwan today: “These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war. . . . [Taiwan’s] cause is righteous [and] countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the invader. . . . This is perhaps the most important reason why [China] will lose and [Taiwan] will win.”

Aidan L. P. Greer is a research assistant and Dr. Chris Bassler is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Chien Chih-Hung, Office of the President of Taiwan

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mwi.usma.edu · by Aidan L. P. Greer, Chris Bassler · December 19, 2022

17. America Needs More Immigration to Defeat Inflation

Excerpts:

The sharp increase in inflation and its stubborn persistence have commanded the attention of economic policymakers worldwide. Although there is little agreement over who is to blame, there is widespread acceptance that central bankers will be the ones to slow price increases now. Yet just as the pandemic has exposed new vulnerabilities in the labor market, it has highlighted the need for more expansive policy solutions to resolve supply bottlenecks and labor shortages.

Immigration policy should be part of the anti-inflation toolkit. Expanding the H-1B and H-2B visa programs would immediately ease U.S. labor shortages, which make it more costly to produce goods and provide services—cost increases that companies pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices. The exact extent to which this dynamic is driving the current inflationary trend is difficult to quantify, but there is no question that it is playing a major role and that addressing labor shortages would help. The U.S. government needs to fight inflation with everything it has. More immigration can be part of the solution—if policymakers let it.

America Needs More Immigration to Defeat Inflation

Only Foreign Workers Can Alleviate U.S. Labor Shortages

By Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter

December 19, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter · December 19, 2022

Consumer prices in the United States rose at an annualized rate of 7.7 percent in October, the ninth straight month above seven percent, thanks to still surging demand and stumbling supply. All eyes are fixed on the U.S. Federal Reserve to cool demand by hiking interest rates. But monetary policy has always worked with long and variable lags, which makes the Fed’s job of trying to shape the decisions of the country’s 122.4 million households, 164.5 million workers, and 35.1 million businesses even more daunting.

There is something else that U.S. policymakers could do to battle inflation, however. They could expand immigration for both skilled and less skilled workers to boost the supply capacity of the U.S. economy. More immigration would help meet today’s excess demand for labor, which over time would limit wage and price growth. In October, there were an astonishing 10.3 million job openings in the United States, 4.3 million more than the total number of unemployed Americans. In the short term, expanding the number of H-1B visas for skilled professionals and H-2B visas for seasonal nonagricultural workers would help employers overcome this acute labor shortage. In the longer term, doing so would also help cool inflation.

THE GREAT IMMIGRATION SLOWDOWN

Despite the sensational headlines about chaos along the U.S.-Mexican border, immigration to the United States has been effectively flat for the last decade. Between 2011 and 2021, the share of the U.S. population that was foreign born nudged up only slightly, from 13.0 percent to 13.6 percent, reflecting a dramatic falloff in foreign labor inflows. Whereas net immigration to the United States was 890,000 arrivals per year during the first decade of the millennium, that number fell by nearly half to 480,000 per year in the succeeding decade.

The immigration slowdown was caused in part by the Great Recession that began in 2007 and the sluggish recovery that followed, which deterred some foreign workers from coming to the United States. But U.S. immigration policy also made it harder for aspiring migrants to enter the country. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States cracked down on undocumented immigration but kept the supply of temporary work visas fixed. Because each new cohort of temporary visa holders replaces a previous cohort, and because the U.S. economy grows every year, a constant supply of visas is a recipe for an increasingly native workforce.

In 2019, the United States issued roughly the same number of H-1B and H-2B visas as it did a decade earlier. The same is true of J-1 visas for sponsored foreign visitors, many of whom end up working at U.S. universities or research facilities. The only visa category that has grown substantially since 2010 is the H-2A, which grants temporary admission to agricultural workers. After the outbreak of COVID-19, all these programs were temporarily halted as U.S. embassies around the world paused most consular services. Today, most U.S. embassies are slowly restoring their visa-processing efforts, but consular staffing has yet to reach pre-pandemic levels.

The rapid decline in immigration has made it harder for U.S. labor markets to function properly. In addition to offsetting the long-term decline of U.S. birthrates, foreign-born workers have the virtue of being much more mobile than native-born workers. When job growth picks up in one region or drops off in another, workers born abroad are the first to respond, helping reduce regional misallocations in the U.S. labor supply. Without these workers, the U.S. economy can find itself tied in knots, as it has during the pandemic.

The U.S. hospitality industry is a case in point. In 2019, 22.0 percent of job holders in entertainment, accommodation, and food services were foreign born. The pandemic has been particularly hard on businesses in these sectors, making it difficult for them to find workers. And because the supply of U.S. visas has remained stagnant, these businesses have not been able to rely on immigrants to fill their vacancies. By the end of 2021, the share of entertainment, accommodation, and food service workers who were foreign born had slipped to 18.4 percent—a drop of more than 3.5 percentage points. Meanwhile, the job vacancy rate in the hospitality industry has increased markedly; in October 2022, 9.2 percent of jobs in accommodation and food services were vacant, well above the economy-wide rate of 6.3 percent.

WHERE ARE THE WORKERS?

Expanding the H-2B visa program, which authorizes the temporary employment of nonagricultural foreign workers for up to nine months, would be an obvious solution to this problem. Common jobs for H-2B visa holders include restaurant worker, meat processor, and construction laborer—precisely the jobs for which U.S. companies are desperate to hire and for which American workers seem to be chronically scarce.

Yet Congress has set a limit of just 66,000 H-2B visas per year—a tiny fraction of the current 1.8 million job openings in construction and food services alone. For the 2021 fiscal year, an additional 22,000 visas were made available to U.S. employers willing to attest that no American workers were “willing, qualified, or able” to perform the jobs they wished to fill. But with millions more jobs sitting vacant than there are unemployed Americans, this one-time supplement was a drop in the bucket. A much higher cap, as much as ten times the current one, should be authorized for 2023.

Increasing the number of H-2B visas will not crowd out U.S.-born workers. According to research by the economists Michael Clemens and Ethan Lewis, firms that win the H-2B visa lottery and hire foreign workers tend to also slightly increase the number of American workers they employ—and boost their revenues. In other words, foreign workers on H-2B visas complement, rather than replace, U.S.-born workers in less skilled jobs. This finding resonates with a larger body of research showing that immigrant workers have at most a modest effect on the wages of native-born workers.

Why not congratulate every foreign-born graduate with the gift of a visa?

The United States should also dramatically expand the H-1B visa program, which allows U.S. companies to create new jobs for highly educated foreigners for three to six years. Right now, the United States caps the number of new private-sector visas at 85,000—65,000 for workers who possess a bachelor’s degree or higher and 20,000 for workers with at least a master’s degree. For decades, demand for H-1B visas has far exceeded supply. In the 2022 fiscal year, 308,613 people sought H-1B visas before the U.S. government stopped accepting applications.

The low cap on H-1B visas constrains not just the U.S. labor supply but also U.S. productivity growth. Highly skilled immigrants boost innovation in several ways. They generate more patentable ideas and technologies than do U.S.-born workers, and they are more likely to found companies. Companies that scale up their hiring of skilled immigrants also tend to scale up their hiring of native-born workers, underscoring once again that the two categories of workers complement each other. Moreover, skilled immigrants tend to boost the wages not just of skilled native-born workers but also of less skilled native-born workers.

Expanding the number of H-1B visas issued each year would increase U.S. supply capacity by both addressing labor shortages and spurring productivity growth. Perhaps one of the simplest ways to do this would be to give more H-1B visas to foreign-born individuals who have already self-identified as both highly skilled and willing to live in the United States: foreign-born students enrolled at U.S. colleges and universities. Last academic year, there were 914,095 such international students in the United States. This coming spring, why not congratulate every one of these foreign-born students who graduates with the gift of a new H-1B visa?

A POLITICAL WINNER

Given how politically divisive immigration is in the United States, any plan to expand visa programs may seem unrealistic. Critics will inevitably ask how the United States can consider admitting more foreigners when it appears to have lost control of its borders.

But the flow of migrants across the U.S.-Mexican border is hardly unrestrained. Although the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended or expelled a record number of migrants in 2021 and 2022, these numbers give a highly misleading impression of how many people are actually entering the country. In the 2022 fiscal year, for instance, the Border Patrol recorded 2.4 million “encounters” on the U.S.-Mexican border. But of these, 1.1 million resulted in the deportation of migrants to Mexico under Title 42, a provision that the United States has used to summarily expel migrants during the pandemic. Ironically, because Title 42 expulsions leave no record of an entry attempt—and therefore no legal repercussion that might prevent a migrant from trying to cross the border again or even applying for a U.S. visa—its use may have encouraged migrants to rush to the border. The number of encounters therefore likely substantially exceeds the number of individual migrants who have attempted to cross into the United States and, by an even larger margin, the number who have succeeded. Expanding H-2B visas would create an alternative legal entry route.

Those Border Patrol encounters that did not result in expulsion (1.3 million of them in the 2022 fiscal year) largely involved migrants seeking asylum, which the United States grants to those with a credible fear of persecution at home. Some applicants are now in the United States awaiting immigration hearings, which are likely years away; many others have already been denied entry and remain abroad. In another irony, the United States’ success in impeding illegal entry has left asylum as the only viable option for many would-be migrants, probably contributing to the recent surge in asylum applications. For this reason, increasing the number of H-1B and H-2B visas could have the additional benefit of unburdening the asylum system.

Perhaps surprisingly, expanding immigration could also be a political winner. Most Americans are broadly supportive of immigration, although Democrats are more supportive than Republicans. In a national survey in July 2022, Gallup asked respondents, “On the whole, do you think immigration is a good thing or a bad thing for this country today?” Seventy percent said “a good thing.” This positive sentiment was widely shared by men (71 percent) and women (68 percent); across major age groups (especially the young—83 percent of those aged 18 to 34); and across all educational cohorts, even among those without any college education (64 percent). Republicans were close to evenly split on the question (46 percent said immigration was a good thing and 45 percent said it was a bad thing), whereas large majorities of independents (75 percent) and Democrats (86 percent) had a positive view. But much of this partisan difference seems to stem from Republican worries about illegal immigration, not legal immigration through channels such as the H-1B and H-2B visa programs.

Support for allowing highly skilled immigrants to enter the United States is even greater and more bipartisan. An August 2022 survey by the Economic Innovation Group found that 71 percent of registered U.S. voters supported more skilled immigrants coming to the country—including 83 percent of Democrats, 60 percent of Republicans, and 72 percent of independents. And a majority of Americans from both parties—82 percent of Republicans and 78 percent of Democrats—said that immigration reform should be a top priority in the next 12 months. Expanding the H-1B and H-2B visa programs should be at the center of any such reform.

EVERY TOOL IN THE TOOLKIT

The sharp increase in inflation and its stubborn persistence have commanded the attention of economic policymakers worldwide. Although there is little agreement over who is to blame, there is widespread acceptance that central bankers will be the ones to slow price increases now. Yet just as the pandemic has exposed new vulnerabilities in the labor market, it has highlighted the need for more expansive policy solutions to resolve supply bottlenecks and labor shortages.

Immigration policy should be part of the anti-inflation toolkit. Expanding the H-1B and H-2B visa programs would immediately ease U.S. labor shortages, which make it more costly to produce goods and provide services—cost increases that companies pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices. The exact extent to which this dynamic is driving the current inflationary trend is difficult to quantify, but there is no question that it is playing a major role and that addressing labor shortages would help. The U.S. government needs to fight inflation with everything it has. More immigration can be part of the solution—if policymakers let it.

GORDON H. HANSON is Peter Wertheim Professor in Urban Policy at Harvard Kennedy School.
MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER is Paul Danos Dean and Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College. He served as a member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers in 2005–7.
This article draws from an analysis by Matthew J. Slaughter and Matthew Rees published by Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business.

Foreign Affairs · by Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter · December 19, 2022

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EVERY TOOL IN THE TOOLKIT