|
Quotes of the Day:
"Societies are composed of individuals and are good only insofar as they help individuals to realize their potentialities and lead a happy and creative life."
– Aldous Huxley
"Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by winding our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty."
– Albert Einstein
“The president is a nationalist, which is not at all the same thing as a patriot. A nationalist encourages us to be our worst, and then tells us that we are the best. A nationalist, 'although endlessly brooding on power, victory, defeat, revenge,' wrote Orwell, tends to be 'uninterested in what happens in the real world.' Nationalism is relativist, since the only truth is the resentment we feel when we contemplate others. As the novelist Danilo Kiš put it, nationalism 'has no universal values, aesthetic or ethical.' A patriot, by contrast, wants the nation to live up to its ideals, which means asking us to be our best selves. A patriot must be concerned with the real world, which is the only place where his country can be loved and sustained. A patriot has universal values, standards by which he judges his nation, always wishing it well—and wishing that it would do better.”
― Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century
1. [INTERVIEW] 'Korean youths hold key to unification'
2. S. Korea, U.S. conduct joint special operations drills amid N.K. threats
3. S. Korea, U.S., Japan launch system to share N.K. missile warning data in real time
4. S. Korean troops allowed to carry guns in truce village of Panmunjom: UNC
5. Seoul Searching: Lessons from South Korea's Experience with Sanctions against Russia
6. Tunnel warfare expert on what she sees in newly-discovered tunnel in Gaza
7. Yoon names new spy chief, foreign minister
8. NK leader says ICBM launch shows what option he has if US makes wrong decision
9. S. Korea to seek more maritime security cooperation in Indo-Pacific strategy: vice FM
10. Explainer: US, Asian allies launch system to track North Korea missiles in real-time
11. Highlights in Korea's 2023 foreign policy
12. Extended nuclear deterrence
13. Shifting Visions of the South Korea-US Alliance
14. United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement
15. N. Korean official confronted by angry ex-employees over unpaid wages
16. Pyongyang Soju Factory ordered to ramp up production
17. Despite a string of missile tests, Kim has not killed a single South Korean
18. How I fell in love with 'baduk' and brought it to the classroom
1. [INTERVIEW] 'Korean youths hold key to unification'
Dr. Moon was actually inspired to make these statements by the brilliant presentation by Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt on economic issues and unification. He wants to bring in more economics experts to show the economic way ahead toward unification and help allay the fears caused by misconceptions and misunderstanding about the costs of unification.
Excerpts:
He explained that the widely-held notion that unification will bring about devastating aftershocks to the Korean peninsula is a misconception caused by misinformation.
“There are so many models of successful transition and successful development that many academics have not really brought into the discussion. I will start to bring them in, but then it's really up to the media to give that truth to the young people,” Moon said.
“So they realize that when I think about my future and I think about the challenges here in South Korea, instead of complaining about it, I can do something about it. Because unification will solve all the issues that I'm currently facing. Unification should be the issue of young people.”
Citing the current economic issues in the country, he added that once the younger generations are properly educated, they will come to understand that unification could provide solutions.
[INTERVIEW] 'Korean youths hold key to unification'
The Korea Times · December 19, 2023
Hyun Jin Preston Moon, the founder and chairman of the non-profit Global Peace Foundation (GPF), speaks during an interview with The Korea Times, held at Manila Marriott Hotel in the Philippines, Dec. 14. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation
Global Peace Foundation chairman urges young people to spearhead efforts to consolidate divided peninsula
By Lee Gyu-lee
MANILA, Philippines – “A dream as a concept means nothing, but if people take ownership over that dream, that's where change comes about.”
Hyun Jin Preston Moon, founder and chairman of the Global Peace Foundation (GPF), a non-profit organization, stressed the importance of the youth and a sense of ownership by each individual to bring peace and unification to the divided Korean peninsula.
The chairman, who founded the organization in 2009 to promote inclusive peacebuilding worldwide, has forged his way into Korea’s unification movement, launching a coalition called Action for Korea United (AKU) in 2012. The coalition brings together about 1,000 non-governmental organizations in Seoul to raise awareness and present a vision for the unification of the two Koreas, particularly among younger generations.
Noting that the younger generations could play crucial roles in solving the unification issue, Moon expressed concerns over how disinterested they are in the issue despite their potential to influence change.
“Young Korean people need to come out of their slumber. I realize that they have been misinformed in many ways, but I'm going to provide you the opportunity to know the truth and the solution to make your future better and brighter,” he said during an interview with The Korea Times at Manila Marriott Hotel in the Philippines, on Dec. 14.
“The young generation has a special opportunity in history where they can fulfill the unfulfilled dreams of their grandparents and their parents and be the architects of developing and building a new nation; a new nation that can live or strive to live up to the tremendously noble ideas … If the Korean young people can take ownership of it, believe me, this works.”
He explained that the widely-held notion that unification will bring about devastating aftershocks to the Korean peninsula is a misconception caused by misinformation.
“There are so many models of successful transition and successful development that many academics have not really brought into the discussion. I will start to bring them in, but then it's really up to the media to give that truth to the young people,” Moon said.
“So they realize that when I think about my future and I think about the challenges here in South Korea, instead of complaining about it, I can do something about it. Because unification will solve all the issues that I'm currently facing. Unification should be the issue of young people.”
Citing the current economic issues in the country, he added that once the younger generations are properly educated, they will come to understand that unification could provide solutions.
Hyun Jin Preston Moon gives a keynote speech during International Forum On One Korea, a part of Global Peace Convention 2023, held at Manila Marriott Hotel in the Philippines, on Dec. 12. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation
“The birth rate (in South Korea) is so low that you have fewer employees and yet you still have such a high unemployment rate that's a huge indictment on the South Korean economy … You need to create greater incentives for people to participate in capital creation. That's what's going to build the engine of growth,” he said.
“If young people really understand the truth and the implications of unification, I know that they will be the greatest advocates for unification because it's about their future.”
Moon's 2016 book, "Korean Dream: A Vision for a Unified Korea," presents his "Korean Dream" framework towards the practical process of reunification, laying out his prospect for a peaceful and united Korea.
In the book, he emphasizes Korea’s deep-rooted ideology of "Hongik ingan," which means to broadly benefit all humankind.
“It’s not just about money at the end of the day, but it's about living for something higher, something that is worth living for a higher purpose. Unification is a moral issue. It's a human rights issue; a reflection on the Korean people in Korean character that we are allowing this to happen, especially people in the South, who are well-to-do and wealthy,” he said, adding the ideology should be reminded again to bring people together.
“Korea was divided by the ideology of the Cold War, but now in Korean society, it's divided by many different factors … That’s why I emphasize the importance of Korean identity and that identity comes from our 5,000 years of history, especially the 'Hongik ingan' providential mandate that the Korean people create an ideal nation that can be the inspiration for all of humanity.”
The Korea Times · December 19, 2023
2. S. Korea, U.S. conduct joint special operations drills amid N.K. threats
Integrated deterrence consists of nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, and unconventional deterrence. Special Operations Forces contribute to unconventional deterrence in various forms.
But how do you quantify deterrence other than we have successfully deferred a resumption of hostilities with an attack on the South? How do you develop data to justify force structure based on deterrence?
S. Korea, U.S. conduct joint special operations drills amid N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 19, 2023
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have staged a joint special operations exercise to enhance interoperability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Tuesday, amid heightened tensions in the wake of Pyongyang's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch.
The combined exercise kicked off Monday at various training grounds, including the Army's Special Warfare School in the Gyeonggi Province city of Gwangju, 33 kilometers southeast of Seoul, as the North fired what it claimed to be a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM the same day.
The drills, joined by troops from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, will focus on sharing special operations combat techniques, such as room clearing tactics, according to the JCS.
"Through such training, South Korea-U.S. special operations units will acquire overwhelming capabilities and posture to end operations in a victory, no matter the mission assigned," it said.
After Monday's ICBM launch, Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said in a local media interview that special operations drills aimed at eliminating the North Korean leadership, known as the "decapitation" operation exercise, could take place as a warning against the North's provocations.
A JCS official, however, said this week's exercise is unrelated to the so-called decapitation exercise.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces Korea on Monday unveiled the allies recently staged a two-week-long exercise, involving U.S. Army Special Forces Green Berets, a U.S. Navy SEAL team and South Korean troops from the Army's Special Warfare Command.
South Korean and U.S. special operations troops take part in a combined exercise at a training ground at the Army's Special Warfare School in Gwangju, 33 kilometers southeast of Seoul, in this undated photo provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Dec. 19, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 19, 2023
3. S. Korea, U.S., Japan launch system to share N.K. missile warning data in real time
We are moving toward integrated missile defense and even a "quasi"- trilateral alliance. This is good.
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan launch system to share N.K. missile warning data in real time | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 19, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details from para 5; REPLACES photo; ADDS byline)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan on Tuesday launched a system to share North Korean missile warning data in real time, the defense ministry said, in the latest effort to bolster trilateral security cooperation against the North.
The three sides also jointly established a multiyear plan for trilateral military drills as agreed by their defense chiefs in a three-way meeting in November as they seek to better counter evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
"The three countries established the system to detect and evaluate missiles launched by North Korea in real time to ensure the safety of their citizens and enhance related capabilities," the ministry said in a release.
The system's activation comes just a day after North Korea launched what it claimed to be a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the regime's fifth ICBM launch this year. Leader Kim Jong-un said the launch showed what option the North would take "when Washington makes a wrong decision."
This file photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Feb. 22, 2023, shows South Korea's ROKS Sejong the Great destroyer (front), the USS Barry destroyer (C), and Japan's JS Atago destroyer staging missile defense drills in the international waters of the East Sea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The ministry did not provide details on the type of data to be shared by the three sides, but Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said in a media interview Monday they would include the missile's presumed launch point, flight path and expected point of impact.
As the U.S. has bilateral alliance treaties with South Korea and Japan, it has had a data sharing system with each ally, but there has not been a direct data linkage between the two Asian neighbors that have long been in historical feuds stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
The ministry said the three countries have also approved the multiyear exercise plan, starting next year, noting that they plan to regularize military drills and stage them in a more systematic and efficient manner.
"Today's progress in cooperation ... will advance a new era of South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation," it said. "The three countries will continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation to respond to regional challenges and ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula, and beyond."
In November last year, President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed to share the missile warning data in real time in a joint statement at their Phnom Penh summit.
The three leaders also agreed to operationalize the system by the end of this year and to hold "annual, named, multi-domain" trilateral exercises on a regular basis to enhance cooperation at their Camp David summit in August this year.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 19, 2023
4. S. Korean troops allowed to carry guns in truce village of Panmunjom: UNC
If the enemy carries guns, we have to carry guns. To do otherwise would be irresponsible and put the troops and civilians lives at risk.
(LEAD) S. Korean troops allowed to carry guns in truce village of Panmunjom: UNC | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 19, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with ministry spokesperson's remarks in paras 9-10)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korean troops in the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom have been allowed to carry guns in response to North Korea's redeploying of weapons in the Joint Security Area (JSA), the United Nations Command (UNC) said.
The two Koreas had agreed to pull back firearms in the JSA in accordance with a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, but North Korean military personnel in the area have begun carrying guns since late November after it vowed to restore all military measures halted under the accord.
The move came after South Korea partially suspended the military tension reduction deal and resumed aerial surveillance near the border in protest of Pyongyang's Nov. 21 spy satellite launch.
South Korean soldiers stand guard in the Joint Security Area at the truce village of Panmunjom on March 3, 2023. (Yonhap)
"Given the KPA's current armed security posture, the UNC has authorized trained and qualified members of the guard forces on the UNC side of the JSA to re-arm to protect both civilian and military personnel," UNC spokesperson Col. Isaac Taylor told Yonhap News Agency over the phone, referring to the Korean People's Army (KPA), the North Korean Army's official name.
"This action is being taken out of an abundance of caution, but UNC has also informed the ROK government and KPA of its position that a disarmed JSA is safer and more peaceful for the Korean Peninsula and that this can be achieved by reimplementing the previous UNC-KPA agreements," Taylor added.
ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
Despite the recent decision, the UNC said it remains committed to its role of overseeing the Korean War armistice agreement.
"The United Nations Command has reassured Korean People's Army counterparts that it intends for the JSA to remain a place for dialogue and armistice agreement implementation," Taylor said.
The defense ministry said South Korean personnel in the JSA have been carrying arms since early December as part of countermeasures against the North's rearmament in the area.
"The UNC has taken the action to protect civilians and military personnel," ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyu said in a regular press briefing.
South Korea has bolstered military readiness after North Korea test-fired a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Monday, the fifth ICBM test this year.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said the missile launch was conducted to "take a powerful warning measure under the grave situation" and ordered the military to "take more offensive actions" against threats by enemies, according to the North's state media.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 19, 2023
5. Seoul Searching: Lessons from South Korea's Experience with Sanctions against Russia
For researchers and real academics. The 136 page report can be accessed here: https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/seoul-searching-.pdf
Seoul Searching: Lessons from South Korea's Experience with Sanctions against Russia - Foreign Policy Research Institute
fpri.org · by @taehwa_hong December 18,2023
By Maximilian Hess and Taehwa Hong
Introduction
Russia and the West have found themselves enmeshed in an expansive economic war as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While the conflict on the ground in Ukraine is undoubtedly—and tragically—the primary front of Russia’s aggression, and where its aggression reaps its most dramatic horrors, Western powers have joined with a wide swathe of the international community to support Ukraine’s resistance and hold the Kremlin to account.
But as with the kinetic war in Ukraine, the conflict did not begin one evening last February. It was first launched by Russia in response to Ukraine’s pro-Western, anti-corruption Maidan Revolution that raged through the winter of 2013–2014, ultimately resulting in the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych after he sought to capitulate to the Kremlin and refuse protesters’ and the wider Ukrainian public’s demands for continuing the country’s pro-European and pro-Western agenda. Russia was the first power to use sanctions and trade restrictions in the conflict, namely against Ukraine in 2013. Russia also first sought to use Ukraine’s future to bring the international economic order into the scope of its fight even before Yanukovych’s ouster. However, economic and technology restrictions on Russia have been at the core of the wider West’s strategy of support for Ukraine throughout that period. The target of these tools has changed significantly, initially aimed at deterring Russia from further aggression after 2014 to seeking to restrict its state capacity and ability to wage the war since 2022. But their global impact and Putin’s attempts to undermine the international order through his own weaponization of Russia’s economy and its commodities base have left the world in a new era of international economic competition, and other powers, great and small, are being impacted in ways unforeseen. States are, in turn, also learning lessons from this new era of economic warfare for the future, and the risks they might face from such conflict.
This paper examines the impact on one often overlooked but deeply affected country, the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). Seoul has a unique position in the economic war in that it was arguably the largest Western ally that did not join the sanctions regime against Russia after Putin’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014. In fact, as we will see, a number of crucial economic ties between Russia and South Korea grew significantly thereafter; although this was also the case for a number of countries that induced sanctions—Germany’s gas linkages with Russia in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are perhaps the best known example. This paper will examine Seoul’s strategic considerations in doing so, and the reasons that the West did not put substantial pressure on South Korea to join the sanctions regime at the time. Seoul did, however, join the sanctions regime fully in 2022. The domestic political considerations in South Korea played a key role in that shift and will also determine how the policy’s effectiveness is judged and, in turn, how South Korea may be positioned for future similar economic conflict between the West and China.
6. Tunnel warfare expert on what she sees in newly-discovered tunnel in Gaza
This short video has the tunnel expert comparing the Hamas tunnels to the tunnels north Korea built under the DMZ in Korea. This is the first reporting by a major news outlet (that I have come across) that discusses Hamas tunnels in the north Korean context.
https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/12/19/gaza-tunnel-warfare-expert-sot-ebof-vpx.cnn
Tunnel warfare expert on what she sees in newly-discovered tunnel in Gaza
Erin Burnett Out Front
Tunnel warfare expert Daphné Richemond-Barak tells CNN's Erin Burnett what she sees in the tunnel the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) say is "the biggest Hamas tunnel" found in Gaza so far.
01:31 - Source: CNN
7. Yoon names new spy chief, foreign minister
Cho Tae-yong is a good man. Though not a career intelligence professional, I think this will be good for US-ROK intelligence liaison.
Excerpts:
Yoon is also apparently looking to start afresh with a new lineup of aides in his upcoming third year in office and recently replaced seven Cabinet ministers, including those for finance and industry.
All Cabinet nominees are subject to a parliamentary confirmation process.
Speaking at the same press briefing, Cho, the NIS chief nominee, said if confirmed he will strive to unite the hearts of the agency's workforce and develop it into one of the world's leading intelligence institutions.
(LEAD) Yoon names new spy chief, foreign minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 19, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with details; ADDS photo)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol on Tuesday tapped his national security adviser to become the new spy chief and a former ambassador to the United Nations as the new foreign minister, his office said.
National Security Adviser Cho Tae-yong was named to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director Kim Kyou-hyun last month, presidential chief of staff Kim Dae-ki said during a press briefing.
Cho Tae-yul, a former second vice foreign minister and ambassador to the U.N., was tapped to replace Foreign Minister Park Jin, he said.
This compilation image shows Cho Tae-yong (L), nominee for director of the National Intelligence Service, and Cho Tae-yul, nominee for the foreign minister, speaking to reporters at the presidential office in Seoul on Dec. 19, 2023. (Yonhap)
"(Cho Tae-yong) is a foreign policy strategist who has served in various key roles from first vice foreign minister and principal deputy national security adviser to ambassador to the United States," Kim told reporters at the presidential office. "In particular, he is well-versed, with abundant experience, in relations with the U.S. and on the North Korea security issue."
Kim said Foreign Minister nominee Cho is a seasoned diplomat with a wealth of experience in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and extensive knowledge on economic and trade issues.
The nominations come as part of a broader Cabinet reshuffle prompted by the expected departures of ministers planning to run in next April's parliamentary elections.
Yoon is also apparently looking to start afresh with a new lineup of aides in his upcoming third year in office and recently replaced seven Cabinet ministers, including those for finance and industry.
All Cabinet nominees are subject to a parliamentary confirmation process.
Speaking at the same press briefing, Cho, the NIS chief nominee, said if confirmed he will strive to unite the hearts of the agency's workforce and develop it into one of the world's leading intelligence institutions.
Cho Tae-yul, the foreign minister nominee, told reporters he would do his best to strengthen the nation's diplomatic position and widen its "strategic space."
A presidential official said the new national security adviser will be announced at a later time.
He also said the presidential office will establish a new position of third deputy national security adviser to handle economic security issues.
Currently, the first deputy handles foreign policy, while the second deputy is in charge of national defense.
The presidential office in Seoul (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 19, 2023
8. NK leader says ICBM launch shows what option he has if US makes wrong decision
north Korean political warfare. (which is failing - it is not achieving the desired effects).
What is an "evolutionary way?" I still need to send the Propaganda and Agitation Department a new thesaurus to help them with their word selection.
Excerpts:
Kim also stressed the need for the North to strongly counter the military threats of the enemies "with more offensive actions by adopting a more evolutionary and threatening way when the enemies continue to make a wrong choice," the KCNA said.
NK leader says ICBM launch shows what option he has if US makes wrong decision
The Korea Times · by 2023-12-19 10:44 | Defense · December 19, 2023
North Korea fires a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 12 in this file photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap
North Korea confirmed Tuesday it test-fired a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) the previous day, with leader Kim Jong-un saying the launch showed what option he would take "when Washington makes a wrong decision."
The missile launch was conducted to "take a powerful warning measure under the grave situation, in which the hostile forces' anti-DPRK military threat ... is getting evermore undisguised and dangerous," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, referring to the North by its official name.
The ICBM flew 1,002.3 kilometers for 4,415 seconds at a maximum altitude of 6,518.2 km before "accurately" hitting the East Sea, the KCNA said.
Experts said the missile would have flown more than 15,000 km, long enough to strike any part of the continental United States, had it been fired on a normal trajectory.
Kim expressed great satisfaction with the launch, saying it was "a practical demonstration of the actual condition and reliability of the formidable striking capabilities and absolute nuclear war deterrent possessed by the DPRK's armed forces," the KCNA said.
"Noting that it was an occasion to clearly show what action the DPRK has been prepared and what option the DPRK would take when Washington makes a wrong decision against it, he appreciated that the drill once again and strikingly displayed the DPRK's will for toughest counteraction and its overwhelming strength," it said.
Kim also stressed the need for the North to strongly counter the military threats of the enemies "with more offensive actions by adopting a more evolutionary and threatening way when the enemies continue to make a wrong choice," the KCNA said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects the launch of a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, Dec. 18., in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap
Photos released by state media showed Kim observing the launch alongside his daughter, known as Ju-ae, who had appeared in ceremonies celebrating the North's spy satellite launch last month.
Also among the photos were images of Earth, presumed to be taken from the Hwasong-18, and a transporter erector launcher carrying the missile ahead of its launch.
The North made clear the latest ICBM launch was a show of force against strengthened efforts by Seoul and Washington to advance their nuclear strategy against Pyongyang's threats.
"The U.S. and the military gangsters of the Republic of Korea held a nuclear war confab called the second meeting of the 'Nuclear Consultative Group' in Washington and openly revealed their intention to conduct large-scale joint drills under the simulated conditions of an actual war of 'nuclear retaliatory strike' at the DPRK," the KCNA said.
During the NCG meeting last week, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to complete the establishment of guidelines on a shared nuclear strategy by the middle of next year and conduct joint military exercises simulating nuclear attacks from the North.
The KCNA also lashed out at the arrival of the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine USS Missouri in Busan, 320 km southeast of Seoul, as an "extremely provocative action" to turn the Korean Peninsula "into an assembly base for all the U.S. nuclear strategic assets."
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, and his daughter Ju-ae, second from L, inspect the launch of a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Dec. 18, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap
The national security advisers of South Korea, U.S. and Japan have condemned North Korea's ICBM launch as a "flagrant" breach of U.N. Security Council resolutions and underscored the importance of their work to share missile warning data, which the three countries have pledged to put into operation by the end of this year.
Earlier Tuesday, South Korea's defense ministry said the three countries have activated the real-time system and jointly established a multiyear plan for trilateral military drills as they seek to better counter evolving North Korean threats.
On Monday, South Korea's military said the North's missile flew about 1,000 kilometers at a lofted trajectory before landing in the East Sea.
It marked the North's fifth ICBM launch this year, the highest number ever recorded in a single year and the third Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM launch following those in April and July.
Solid-fuel missiles are faster to shoot and harder to detect ahead of a launch. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · by 2023-12-19 10:44 | Defense · December 19, 2023
9. S. Korea to seek more maritime security cooperation in Indo-Pacific strategy: vice FM
Excerpts:
In December last year, the Yoon Suk Yeol government unveiled the strategy committed to promoting freedom, peace and prosperity through the establishment of a rules-based order under the principles of inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity.
It seeks to pursue nine core tasks related to building a rules-based regional order and comprehensive security cooperation, enhancing economic security through cooperation in science technology, and climate change cooperation, and engaging in development cooperation partnerships.
Chang said the government also plans to launch various types of Indo-Pacific consultative bodies with major partner countries to promote democracy and a rules-based order.
South Korea will offer to forge "tailored" development cooperation partnerships with countries in need and double its official development assistance to the Pacific island countries by 2027 to help build a foundation for sustainable growth.
A new regional cooperation fund for the South Asia and Indian Ocean region will be created to achieve these goals, among other plans, Chang said.
"Our action plan will serve as a cornerstone, anchoring a strategic and robust footing. This is a long exhaustive list of the ROK's commitment to the Indo-Pacific," he said.
S. Korea to seek more maritime security cooperation in Indo-Pacific strategy: vice FM | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 19, 2023
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will seek to expand maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific as part of efforts to implement its own Indo-Pacific strategy crafted to contribute to regional peace and stability, a senior foreign ministry official said Tuesday.
First Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin made the remarks at a forum, highlighting South Korea's "unwavering commitment" to doing its part for a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
"Over the last 12 months, government ministries and agencies have put their heads together to design the action plans (for the Indo-Pacific strategy)," Chang said at the pan-government forum held to mark the launch of the strategy a year ago.
First Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin delivers a keynote speech during a forum on South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Dec. 19, 2023. (Yonhap)
"In pursuit of peace in the Indo-Pacific, the ROK will expand comprehensive security cooperation, including in maritime security ... We plan to establish a maritime domain awareness platform, which will boost information sharing among regional countries," Chang said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
Such efforts will help "eradicate illegal fishing" by supporting capacity building for Southeast Asian and Pacific island countries, Chang said.
In December last year, the Yoon Suk Yeol government unveiled the strategy committed to promoting freedom, peace and prosperity through the establishment of a rules-based order under the principles of inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity.
It seeks to pursue nine core tasks related to building a rules-based regional order and comprehensive security cooperation, enhancing economic security through cooperation in science technology, and climate change cooperation, and engaging in development cooperation partnerships.
Chang said the government also plans to launch various types of Indo-Pacific consultative bodies with major partner countries to promote democracy and a rules-based order.
South Korea will offer to forge "tailored" development cooperation partnerships with countries in need and double its official development assistance to the Pacific island countries by 2027 to help build a foundation for sustainable growth.
A new regional cooperation fund for the South Asia and Indian Ocean region will be created to achieve these goals, among other plans, Chang said.
"Our action plan will serve as a cornerstone, anchoring a strategic and robust footing. This is a long exhaustive list of the ROK's commitment to the Indo-Pacific," he said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 19, 2023
10. Explainer: US, Asian allies launch system to track North Korea missiles in real-time
Useful summary.
Explainer: US, Asian allies launch system to track North Korea missiles in real-time
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-asian-allies-launch-system-track-north-korea-missiles-real-time-2023-12-19/?utm
By Soo-Hyang Choi
December 19, 20233:53 AM ESTUpdated 3 hours ago
[1/2]North Korean leader Kim Jong Un views the launch of a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile during what North Korea says is a drill at an unknown location December 18, 2023 in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS Acquire Licensing Rights
SEOUL, Dec 19 (Reuters) - South Korea, the United States and Japan said on Tuesday they have activated a new system to detect and assess North Korea's missile launches in real-time.
The announcement comes after North Korea said it had tested the isolated state's newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Monday to gauge the war readiness of its nuclear force against mounting U.S. hostility.
Here is what we know about the new missile warning data sharing system:
WHAT INFORMATION IS BEING SHARED?
Under the new mechanism, the three countries will share information on the launch site, flight trajectory and hitting point of North Korean missiles around the clock, South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik said.
The United States had until now shared such information separately with South Korea and Japan.
"We will have warning data on North Korean missiles much faster, and be able to secure enough time to respond effectively," Shin said in an interview with broadcaster MBN on Monday.
WHY IS IT BEING SHARED?
Washington and its allies call the new mechanism a milestone that will advance their trilateral security cooperation and improve the ability to ensure the safety of their people.
The information sharing is expected to help them to respond more quickly to North Korea's growing nuclear and missile threats.
Monday's missile launch marked the North's fifth ICBM test this year in what Pyongyang described as a demonstration of the nuclear-armed state's "will for toughest counteraction and its overwhelming strength."
"This is a significant expression of just how far trilateral cooperation has come, in no small part due to the growing threat from North Korea," said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"In practical terms, this will enhance the fidelity with which both Japan and South Korea can assess missile events originating in North Korea," he said.
WHY WAS SUCH DATA NOT SHARED BEFORE?
Relations between the two Asian U.S. allies had been strained over historical issues and other disputes.
But South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has made it a priority to mend ties since taking office in May 2022 as North Korea ramps up development of its weapons programs and openly threatens the South.
"There have always been people opposed to information sharing between South Korea and Japan, in both countries. But with the threats from North Korea we are seeing now, when Japanese people are taking shelter (due to the missiles), who would say no?" said Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense & Security Forum.
Japan's chief cabinet secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said on Tuesday real-time missile information sharing started a new chapter for defence cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States, which was "essential" for regional security.
Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said the new mechanism was a safeguard against politics blowing cooperation off course.
"The institutionalisation of this mechanism will also make it more robust against possible domestic political changes in South Korea or Japan that could pose headwinds for trilateral cooperation in the future," said Panda.
HOW HAS NORTH KOREA RESPONDED?
North Korea has slammed the new information sharing system as part U.S. efforts to incite confrontation and boost its military edge in the region.
"Such a scheme for a tripartite data-sharing mechanism led by the U.S. is evidently a dangerous military action to drive the regional situation to a more serious phase of confrontation," the North's state media said last week.
Reporting by Soo-hyang Choi, Josh Smith and Ju-min Park Editing by Ed Davies and Louise Heavens
11. Highlights in Korea's 2023 foreign policy
A useful roll-up from Ambassador Ahn.
Highlights in Korea's 2023 foreign policy
The Korea Times · December 19, 2023
By Ahn Ho-young
It has been a challenging year for Korea’s foreign and security policy. The war in Ukraine continued to drag on. A new war broke out in the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, and North Korea’s development of, and threats to use, nuclear weapons continued to aggravate. Each of these events was related to each other and posed serious challenges for Korea. The Korean government responded with bold and timely responses throughout the year.
Concerning security challenges, President Yoon Suk Yeol took full advantage of April’s state visit to the U.S. to further strengthen the security ties with the U.S. In August, he visited Camp David for a trilateral summit with President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida, where the three leaders opened a new chapter in the relations among the three countries.
During the April visit to the U.S., Presidents Yoon and Biden issued the Washington Declaration, through which they agreed to launch the Nuclear Consultation Group (NCG) between the two countries. The reason why South Korean citizens had not been sufficiently assured by the U.S.' extended deterrence was because it was perceived as a one-way offer from the U.S., which Korea did not have any say in. The Washington Declaration made it clear that it would now operate through joint planning and joint implementation, significantly removing the concerns widely held in Korea.
We have to understand that the NCG is a work in progress. The Defense Ministers of Korea and the U.S. met for the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul in November and amended the Tailored Deterrence Strategy between the two countries. On that occasion, Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik vowed that the strategy would be further elaborated to the operational level, for which the NCG would have to work hard.
On the occasion of the 55th SCM meeting, Shin also hosted the inaugural U.N. Command Member States’ Defense Ministerial Meeting involving 17 countries. The U.N. Command has to continue to work as a key mechanism to deter and defeat another aggression by North Korea.
Turning to economic and technology issues, U.S.-China tensions began to rise in 2018 with the tariff war, impacting strongly on the world economy. The COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 added to the difficulties. Given Korea's highly open economy, it was structurally vulnerable to these developments.
In addition, the U.S.' CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act and equivalent acts in the EU, created acute difficulties for Korean manufacturers of semiconductors, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs). The Korean government worked closely with those companies to remove some of the difficulties.
Another huge challenge has been the bottleneck in the supply chain of minerals and materials. The Korean government has responded by actively participating in such international institutions as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Mining Security Partnership.
President Yoon’s hands-on efforts as “the first salesman” were noteworthy as well. On the last day of his visit to Saudi Arabia in October, Yoon was preparing to speak at an investment forum. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, made an unplanned visit to President Yoon and offered to drive Yoon to the venue of the forum. On the way, MBS was reported to have said to President Yoon that he wished to drive Yoon next time in an EV manufactured by Hyundai in Saudi Arabia. It seems that MBS observed and appreciated Yoon’s salesmanship.
The Korean government, along with these efforts to address the difficulties it faced, also made steady efforts to explore and promote new areas for future growth. President Yoon made a point of meeting with a large number of people working in science and technology during each of his visits abroad, giving a personal push to promote cooperation among scientists and engineers.
One issue that has taken a huge amount of Korea’s diplomatic effort this year has been the aim of hosting the World Expo in 2030 in Busan. Korea lost the bid to Saudi Arabia. However, as Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said, the global diplomatic network that we have woven during the campaign must be utilized as an important asset to further expand Korea’s national interests in the days to come.
The Korean business community has been at the forefront of the efforts to host the Expo. A leader of a business group visited no less than 50 countries. Business leaders say that these efforts allowed them to raise recognition of their brand names, develop new markets and supply chains and acquire new business opportunities. Korea had to face failures several times before it eventually acquired an opportunity to host the Summer and Winter Olympic Games. Korea’s failure this time must not discourage its efforts to turn the failures into future opportunities.
Ahn Ho-young is chair professor of North Korean studies at Kyungnam University. He served as Korean ambassador to the U.S. and vice foreign minister.
The Korea Times · December 19, 2023
12. Extended nuclear deterrence
Excerpts:
The current NCG agreement does not necessarily mean the possible mutual use of nuclear weapons by the two sides. It signifies a more proactive participation by South Korea in a potential nuclear war in case the U.S. attempts a counteroffensive against a North Korean nuclear attack. Yet it is certain that South Korea’s anti-nuclear posture will be further boosted through joint military exercises combining the U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear assets paired with the conventional military prowess of the South's Armed Forces.
However, it is improper for the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to excessively resort to the U.S. umbrella and extended deterrence. Concerns have been growing that Washington's umbrella pledge and the South Korea-U.S. alliance will be undermined should Donald Trump win the next U.S. presidential election. During his first presidency, Trump threatened to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea.
Only emphasizing the need to build up preemptive attacks against the North will only nudge Pyongyang to strengthen its nuclear prowess, thus heightening the possibility of a war on the peninsula. Strengthening nuclear deterrence based on the U.S.-South Korea alliance should also seek diplomatic approaches to ease nuclear threats and military tensions. Improving ties with China will be one of the key solutions toward that end.
Extended nuclear deterrence
The Korea Times · December 18, 2023
Proactive yet prudent approaches needed to handle NK
North Korea fired what is presumed to be a long-range missile into the East Sea on Monday, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. If confirmed, it would be the fifth inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch this year. The North’s launch of the suspected ICBM, although long anticipated, will likely further heighten regional tensions, prompting tougher retaliatory measures from the allies.
The North’s provocation came just after South Korea and the United States held the second Nuclear Consultative Group (NSG) meeting in Washington D.C. Friday (local time). They agreed to map out a joint guideline regarding the planning and operation of nuclear forces by mid-2024. They also agreed to carry out joint military exercises under the scenario of a possible nuclear attack from the North.
Fresh from the meeting, South Korea’s First Deputy National Security Advisor Kim Tae-hyo said the newly agreed steps will be applied from the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint drills slated for next year. Under contingency circumstances, the heads of the two countries will hold talks immediately via a hotline and will be equipped with necessary portable devices, Kim said. The participants in the NCG meeting also discussed ways of forming a separate consultative body attended by Japanese representatives.
North Korea has continued to escalate military tensions on the Korean Peninsula by persistently building up its missile and nuclear capabilities. It has threatened to target the South with its own tactical nuclear weapons since last year, conducting military exercises to back up its rhetoric. While fortifying military cooperation with Russia, it launched a military surveillance satellite. Against this backdrop, it has become essential for South Korea and the U.S. to take diverse measures designed to extend deterrence abilities and prevent a potential nuclear war.
In a related context, a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine arrived in South Korea on Sunday. The Navy said the USS Missouri, a Virginia-class attack submarine docked at a naval base in Busan. The Navy expressed hopes that deploying the submarine would help reinforce the combined defense posture with the U.S. while bolstering naval cooperation and exchanges between the two allies.
The United States has underlined the concept of a nuclear umbrella featuring counterattacks for allies when they become vulnerable to nuclear attacks. But it has maintained that the U.S. president has the sole authority regarding the possible use of such an umbrella. Even under the concept of nuclear sharing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, the non-nuclear states of Europe are supposed to provide the U.S. with only fighter jets, while the U.S. president is given exclusive rights over the use of nuclear weapons.
The current NCG agreement does not necessarily mean the possible mutual use of nuclear weapons by the two sides. It signifies a more proactive participation by South Korea in a potential nuclear war in case the U.S. attempts a counteroffensive against a North Korean nuclear attack. Yet it is certain that South Korea’s anti-nuclear posture will be further boosted through joint military exercises combining the U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear assets paired with the conventional military prowess of the South's Armed Forces.
However, it is improper for the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to excessively resort to the U.S. umbrella and extended deterrence. Concerns have been growing that Washington's umbrella pledge and the South Korea-U.S. alliance will be undermined should Donald Trump win the next U.S. presidential election. During his first presidency, Trump threatened to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea.
Only emphasizing the need to build up preemptive attacks against the North will only nudge Pyongyang to strengthen its nuclear prowess, thus heightening the possibility of a war on the peninsula. Strengthening nuclear deterrence based on the U.S.-South Korea alliance should also seek diplomatic approaches to ease nuclear threats and military tensions. Improving ties with China will be one of the key solutions toward that end.
The Korea Times · December 18, 2023
13. Shifting Visions of the South Korea-US Alliance
The major issue with the Defense Vision is that ROK and US defense leaders failed to heed the orders of their presidents and include the acceptable durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance ROK and US interests in Northeast Asia: the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. I know that many in the defense community will argue that it is a political issue and not a military one but I would argue they are wrong. Both Presidents (and the Japanese Prime Ministers) have stated that they seek a free and unified Korea. The military should support that and it should factor into their vision statement.
If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.
--B.H. Liddel-Hart
If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.
--Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army, Revue Des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1900
War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.
--John Keegan in A History of Warfare
Shifting Visions of the South Korea-US Alliance
thediplomat.com · by Clint Work
Changes in the official “Defense Vision” documents show clearly how conceptions of the alliance have evolved from 2019 to 2023.
By and Joo Young Kim
December 18, 2023
President Joe Biden delivers remarks at the Official State Arrival Ceremony for President of the Republic of Korea Yoon Suk-yeol on the South Lawn of the White House, Apr. 26, 2023.
Following the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul, U.S. and South Korean defense officials released the Defense Vision of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance. It is the second such document, following the 2019 release of the Public Summary of the Future Defense Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance after the 51st SCM. A comparison of both is revealing.
Both the 2019 and 2023 defense visions – like most SCM Joint Communiques and South Korea-U.S. leader-level joint statements – ground the alliance in a shared history going back to the Korean War and establishment of the alliance and in shared values and mutual trust.
Additionally, both defense visions are clearly situated in the 2009 Joint Vision Statement’s commitment to broaden the scale and scope of the alliance. This includes going beyond traditional military and security cooperation to include deeper political, economic, cultural, and social ties, as well as expanding the geographic aperture of the alliance beyond the Korean Peninsula to the region and globe. And, while the 2019 and 2023 documents are technically the only two formal “defense visions,” they build upon the earlier 2010 Guidelines for ROK-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were meant to develop the future direction of the defense relationship based upon the 2009 Joint Vision Statement.
Yet the two defense visions also reflect very distinct geopolitical contexts, a significant shift in inter-Korean relations, and notably varying levels of alliance cohesion. Alongside a quickly evolving international environment, the differences between the documents are driven by the divergent policy priorities and worldviews of the Moon and Trump and Yoon and Biden administrations, respectively. Furthermore, comparing the defense visions highlights persistent and potential future challenges complicating alliance transformation.
From Engagement to Deterrence and Greater Rhetorical Alignment
When viewed side-by-side, the most obvious distinction between the two defense visions is their length. The 2019 document is half the size of the 2023 version. Moreover, the 2019 version includes far less substantive detail. This difference is partly the result of the Biden administration’s tendency to include more detail in such statements to signal the strengthening and broadening of alliances. Yet the 2010 defense guidelines and 2023 defense vision are very similar in length, format, and content, so in this respect the 2019 defense vision deviated from the norm. Therefore, the difference between the 2019 and 2023 documents is also a function of shifting geopolitical circumstances, significant variation in alliance cohesion, and the distinct priorities of the U.S. and South Korean administrations in office at the time of their respective release.
The 2019 version, released in summary form just after the 51st SCM, emerged amid tensions over alliance burden sharing and Seoul’s threat to terminate its bilateral military intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan. Several weeks later, U.S. officials reassured wary observers that alliance fissures were not developing. At that time, U.S. and South Korea policymakers were struggling to navigate then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly transactional and dismissive approach toward Seoul – whether in ongoing negotiations surrounding the SMA or the recently renegotiated KORUS free trade agreement – and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s search for greater autonomy within and outside the alliance. Moreover, with North Korea-U.S. diplomacy increasingly stalemated, the Trump and Moon administration’s divergent priorities, never far beneath the surface, came to the fore.
The 2023 defense vision, on the other hand, capped off the year-long celebration of the 70th anniversary of the alliance, marked by a number of historic documents. Furthermore, from the outset, the Biden administration has quickly moved to resolve cost-sharing disputes and stabilize alliance relations. Initially overlapping with Moon (during which alliance cohesion improved), U.S. President Joe Biden ultimately shared more priorities with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, whose campaign platform called for strengthening the alliance on multiple levels. The shifting contexts and more shared priorities are evident in comparing the two defense visions.
First, while all defense-related alliance statements contain a balance between engagement and deterrence regarding North Korea, the pendulum often swings and sometimes severely. The 2019 vision clearly emphasizes diplomacy and engagement. Despite the failed Hanoi Summit in February 2019, Pyongyang’s restart of short-range ballistic missile tests that spring, and the breakoff of working-level North Korea-U.S. talks in Stockholm in September (the month before its release), the 2019 defense vision remains firmly grounded in the policy of inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. détente.
Alliance defense coordination would, according to the 2019 document, aim to “support the establishment of complete denuclearization in a verifiable manner and a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.” Despite negative trends, such engagement-oriented framing still made sense. It matched the Moon administration’s steadfast commitment to engagement. The Trump administration, too, remained officially committed to negotiations if unwilling to meet Pyongyang’s demands. Also, at that time North Korean officials stated denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was still possible.
The contrast with the 2023 version couldn’t be starker. The 2023 document does not mention denuclearization. Furthermore, while the 2023 document mentions peace, it overwhelmingly emphasizes deterrence. Compared to the 2019 document, which mentions deterrence twice in a generalized manner, the 2023 vision mentions it 12 times, and the object against which deterrence is directed (i.e., North Korea) is much clearer.
The 2019 document mentions threats on a general level, as security, nontraditional, and transnational threats or traditional yet non-descript chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, but never mentions North Korea. The 2023 vision mentions the DPRK (the abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name) five times, calling it the alliance’s “foundational and most pressing threat,” reflecting the Yoon administration’s reintroduction of the designation “main enemy” for North Korea, a designation his progressive predecessors adjured.
Second, there is clear divergence regarding extended deterrence. While the 2019 vision mentions strengthening extended deterrence and ensuring it “remains credible, capable, and enduring,” such anodyne language is in reference to non-descript CBRN threats. The document doesn’t mention North Korea and leaves out any consultative mechanisms, such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG). The latter was suspended after only its second meeting in 2018 due to the Moon administration’s drive to promote inter-Korean rapprochement.
The 2023 vision, however, emerged following Pyongyang’s official rejection of denuclearization and its termination of a self-imposed moratorium on ICBM testing. In a context of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and more aggressive nuclear policy law, increased discussion in Seoul of South Korea’s own nuclear armament or return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula, and amid concerns about U.S. credibility and capacity, extended deterrence figured much more prominently in the 2023 vision.
The 2023 document contained a U.S. commitment to uphold its extended deterrence commitment based upon the Washington Declaration and strengthened through consultation in the reactivated EDSCG and newly established Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG); joint efforts to tighten South Korean conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations; revision of the more than decade-old Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS); and increased scale and scope of combined exercises, training, and live-fire drills (which had been canceled or scaled down under Trump and Moon). Furthermore, the 2023 document notes all these efforts upheld “the importance of deterring strategic attacks and aggression from hostile actors in the region, including the DPRK,” which indicated other potential threats beyond Pyongyang.
These efforts reflected the return of Washington’s longstanding balance between reassuring yet restraining Seoul, especially in the context of a conservative South Korean administration taking a hardline stance toward North Korea and speaking openly about indigenous nuclear armament. Therefore, one should not read the increased prominence of extended deterrence – upheld by the new consultative structure such as the NCG – as evidence of alignment. The need to craft the Washington Declaration and establish the NCG actually reflected disagreement regarding the adequacy of the alliance’s existing consultative architecture and U.S. extended deterrence measures, as well as Washington’s distinct concern about increasing discussion of South Korean nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the effort to forthrightly address these issues and clearly share vocabulary on threats was a clear shift from 2019.
Third, while both documents highlight alliance cooperation in science and technology, the 2023 vision frames collaboration in space, cyber, and cutting-edge technologies in a notably more cohesive manner as part of a larger effort to “strengthen the combined defense architecture of the alliance.” This includes a “systematic and stable” OPCON transition; enhancing defense industrial cooperation and supply chain resiliency both for interoperability and interchangeability of defense systems and economic security in the region; and upgrading South Korea’s 3K Defense System (and by implications South Korea’ fledgling strategic command or ROK STRATCOM) and combined consultation around those capabilities and their operation.
The 2019 document mentioned the combined defense posture in broad terms but without mentioning these other issues. In fact, the detailed rundown in the 2023 document reflects an effort to move past the previous disagreements on these issues in 2019, including over South Korea’s defense acquisitions, push for a more time- versus conditions-based approach to OPCON transition, and effort to create a more autonomous rather than combined 3K defense system (the name of which Moon changed to mute its more aggressive undertones). To be sure, questions remain about the degree to which the reenergized 3K Defense System will be tied into combined operations, but the 2023 vision indicates that effort is underway.
Fourth, both the 2019 and 2023 defense visions broaden the aperture of alliance cooperation, consistent with the 2009 Joint Vision’s comprehensive strategic alliance framework. Both documents clearly delineate the bilateral commitment to ensure the peace, security, stability, and prosperity of the peninsula, region, and world. This includes a commitment to cooperate, as an alliance, with other regional states: the 2019 document commits to “build regional partner capacity” and the 2023 version to “cultivate a well-networked region.” The alliance, in other words, is part of a larger regional and global order, according to both visions.
An additional continuity related to the broader scope of alliance cooperation involves China. Neither the 2019 nor 2023 document explicitly mentions China nor its core interests by name. Interestingly, this runs contrary to other bilateral documents issued in 2023, including the 55th SCM Joint Communique and the Leaders’ Joint Statement from Yoon’s state visit to the United States in April. However, this seeming continuity between the 2019 and 2023 defense visions should not be overstated. While the absence of language touching on China’s core interests indicates hedging by both the Moon and Yoon administrations, such hedging manifests to notably different degrees.
The two visions clearly differ in their strategic orientation and key terminology. Although the 2019 defense vision spoke of harmonizing Seoul’s New Southern Policy and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy under common principles, Moon had abjured the Indo-Pacific framework in favor of his own New Southern Policy not only to gradually reduce South Korea’s economic dependence upon Beijing but also maintain a degree of strategic autonomy regionally. The New Southern Policy shared principles with but stood apart from the Indo-Pacific concept first annunciated by Tokyo and later enhanced by Washington. By 2023, however, the Yoon administration had embraced the concept and established its own Indo-Pacific Strategy, purportedly its first ever such regional strategy.
While the 2023 defense vision’s language about synergies in the U.S. and South Korean Indo-Pacific strategies may appear a superficial change in language from the 2019 document, other aspects of the 2023 version set it apart. For one, its language on U.S. support for South Korea’s “vision to increase its contributions to the Indo-Pacific as a Global Pivotal State” signals an acknowledgement of Seoul’s shift and use of the Yoon administration’s own language to tighten alignment with U.S. strategic preferences.
Furthermore, while alliance cooperation on regional security issues with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries was a constant across both 2019 and 2023, the language on “defense cooperation” with these countries is new. So, too, is the language on protecting “the values of freedom,” “promoting democracy,” and “maintaining a rules-based international order.” Such language implicates China, without mentioning it by name. It represents a qualitative rhetorical shift the Moon administration was unwilling to make.
Most notably, the 2023 vision frames the alliance’s broader role alongside “trilateral security cooperation with Japan… which will preserve stability and defend against threats in the region.” While “threats” connotes a range of traditional and non-traditional or state and non-state threats, the later use of the expression “mitigating threats posed by adversaries,” unmistakably denotes multiple state-level actors. Like the earlier use of the plural expression, “hostile actors in the region,” this consists of a short list beyond North Korea. In conjunction with the Spirit of Camp David Joint Statement, which reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and called out China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior” in the South China Sea (the first time Seoul publicly made such a statement), the shift in signaling from 2019 to 2023 is unmistakable.
Persistent Challenges and Future Trends
The 2019 and 2023 defense visions are meant to serve as future-oriented frameworks for defense cooperation, a “blueprint for the future” as the 55th SCM Joint Communique states. That there are changes between them is not necessarily remarkable. To be fair, blueprints can change. Alliance managers are properly accounting for substantive progress – built upon earlier guidelines – as well as shifting geopolitical and security conditions.
However, the notable variance in what is meant to be a guiding framework or vision for the alliance’s overall defense relationship – driven not only by rapidly shifting external threats and geopolitical conditions but also highly variable domestic perspectives – indicates there is no one vision but multiple contested visions. In fact, repeated efforts to craft a shared strategic outlook may indicate a lack thereof.
The similarities between the 2019 and 2023 defense visions – invoking shared history and values, mutual trust, and a comprehensive strategic alliance framework – provide continuity and guardrails across different administrations both in Washington and Seoul. Yet, given the significant differences between the 2019 and 2023 documents, it is apparent they do not prevent substantive differences from arising. And, depending on the course of “America First” politics and future undulations in Korean nationalism (both within and between conservative and progressive camps), such difference could potentially undermine those guardrails.
Authors
Contributing Author
Clint Work
Clint Work, Ph.D., is Fellow and Director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI).
View Profile
Guest Author
Joo Young Kim
Joo Young Kim is a research intern at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI).
thediplomat.com · by Clint Work
14. United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement
United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement
defense.gov
An official website of the United States Government
Here's how you know
Release
Immediate Release
Dec. 19, 2023 |×
Share
Today, the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea announce that they have fully activated a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism and jointly established a multi-year trilateral exercise plan. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Minister of Defense Kihara Minoru, and Minister of National Defense Shin Wonsik recently agreed to finalize the two initiatives by the end of 2023 at the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in November.
Following the historic 2023 Camp David Summit and the 2022 Phnom Penh Summit, today’s milestones will further advance a new era of trilateral security cooperation under the leadership of President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon.
Following recent tests that verified the full operational capability of the DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, the mechanism is now active. The three countries established this mechanism to improve their ability to ensure the safety of their peoples by trilaterally detecting and assessing missiles launched by the DPRK in real-time.
Additionally, the three countries have established a multi-year trilateral exercise plan that will begin in early 2024. The three countries have made significant progress on improving the quality and quantity of their exercises over the past year, and this plan will regularize trilateral exercises and execute them more systematically and efficiently moving forward.
These achievements and other ongoing efforts demonstrate the unprecedented depth, scale, and scope of trilateral security cooperation by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. The three countries will continue to build upon their cooperation to respond to regional challenges and ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond.
Indo-Pacific partnerships Japan South Korea Missile Defense Training
Subscribe to Defense.gov Products
Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox.
Subscribe
The Department of Defense provides the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation's security.
defense.gov
15. N. Korean official confronted by angry ex-employees over unpaid wages
Control and corruption. Where is the tipping point?
N. Korean official confronted by angry ex-employees over unpaid wages
In the Kim Jong Un era, managers of overseas workers hand over the entirety of workers' pay once they return home
By Jeong Tae Joo - 2023.12.19 4:50pm
dailynk.com
N. Korean official confronted by angry ex-employees over unpaid wages | Daily NK English
North Korean workers in Russia. (Kang Dong Wan)
An official who once worked at a North Korean construction company in Russia is now embroiled in conflict over unpaid wages with workers formerly under his charge, Daily NK learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Monday that “a man surnamed Kim, who had been a manager at a North Korean construction company in Russia, recently received orders to return to North Korea. After he returned to his home in Pyongyang’s Mangyongdae District, however, the construction workers who had also returned alongside him began gathering outside his house every day to pressure him into paying [their overdue wages].”
After Kim Jong Un gained power in 2012, his government instructed managers of overseas laborers to keep records of monthly wages and hand over the entirety of workers’ pay once they return home, replacing the previous practice of paying workers on a regular basis.
The source said that this lump-sum-upon-return policy was put in place out of concern that workers may try to defect when they get paid or might resist doing their assigned work in favor of pursuing more lucrative outside jobs.
Kim, the manager, also adhered to the policy of keeping his workers’ wages until their return home. When it came time for Kim to return to North Korea, however, he continued making excuses to push off making payments and returned to Pyongyang without paying his workers. These same workers then sought him out in Pyongyang and have been kicking up a fuss to demand their unpaid wages.
“Kim’s home in Mangyongdae has been utterly destroyed. Instead of returning to their own homes, the workers went to Kim’s house and kicked up a huge fuss. They robbed his house in an effort to blackmail him into paying their overdue wages, even if he had to sell his house to do it. Word is going around that Kim has actually put the house up for sale.
“Kim is saying that he ‘turned over the ledger and all of the money to the next manager [in Russia],’ but many people suspect that he lined his own pockets with the workers’ wages instead.”
The fight between Kim and the unpaid workers caused Kim’s wife to faint from the shock. Local government and law enforcement authorities have drawn a line between themselves and the problem, saying it is an “issue between [private] individuals” – this despite the “anti-socialist” nature of the workers’ extortion of the Kims’ private property and the sale of a residence. Locals have criticized the indifference of the authorities as just “standing by and watching a capitalist spectacle unfold.”
“People are saying that the incident is ‘clearly capitalistic’ and ‘you have to arrest people who act that way.’ Neighborhood offices and local police are aware of the matter, but have been asserting that ‘[this is a conflict] between individuals and not an affair where government officials should intervene.’ People in the area have been unimpressed with the response of the authorities, saying ‘even if it is a personal matter, it’s happening in their jurisdiction, so how can they act like it’s none of their business?’”
One observer expressed their sympathies and frustration with the incident: “[It’s sad to see] people who had once lived and slept under the same roof turn their claws on each other.”
Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
16. Pyongyang Soju Factory ordered to ramp up production
More attempts to control but with the ever present corruption.
I guess if you cannot keep the peoples' bellies full, you can at least give them soju to keep their minds cloudy.
Pyongyang Soju Factory ordered to ramp up production
Pyongyang authorities have warned they will heavily punish those who distribute fake Pyongyang Soju for committing "non-socialist acts"
dailynk.com
Pyongyang Soju Factory ordered to ramp up production | Daily NK English
An advertisement for Pyongyang Soju (Taedonggang Foodstuff Factory pamphlet)
Pyongyang authorities recently ordered the Pyongyang Soju Factory to produce “high-quality soju for the people” ahead of the solar New Year holiday, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in Pyongyang said last Thursday that the factory is ramping up production after Pyongyang’s city authorities ordered it last month to “produce high-quality soju to provide the people, given how little time remains until the solar New Year.”
Pyongyang municipal authorities have also suddenly started calling Pyongyang Soju the “national liquor” — something they were not doing previously — while ordering the factory to maintain the alcohol’s “unique quality befitting Korea’s national liquor,” the source said.
“Pyongyang [city officials] stressed that [the factory] must enable people to drink with patriotism and pride by promoting the national liquor far and wide for the solar New Year, noting that Pyongyang Soju hasn’t enjoyed the popularity befitting a national liquor.”
The city also called on factory managers to supervise product quality more thoroughly than ever, explaining that Pyongyang Soju must maintain top levels of quality for the beverage to enjoy overseas renown.
“Pyongyang Soju Factory sometimes slapped its label on ordinary soju because it couldn’t produce its product on time, and there’s been markets and shops selling fake Pyongyang Soju, so the city demanded an absolute end to such phenomena,” the source said.
Pyongyang authorities have warned they will heavily punish those who distribute fake Pyongyang Soju for committing “non-socialist acts.”
City officials have ordered households in neighborhood watch units to collect empty bottles and send them to Pyongyang Soju Factory to ease liquor production. They also warned that officials would stop pilfering or surpluses by taking daily comparative measurements of the number of empty bottles sent and the amount of liquor produced.
“Pyongyang authorities are threatening to severely punish factory officials or workers who secretly steal liquor to take home or sell to markets for the crime of embezzling state property and non-socialist acts,” the source said.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Jong So Yong
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
17. Despite a string of missile tests, Kim has not killed a single South Korean
Kim Jong Un's bloody record is internal (as well as the use of a chemical weapon on a family member in KL).
Excerpts:
In 2013, Mr. Kim ordered the execution of his uncle, longtime senior regime official Jang Song-thaek. Experts believe Mr. Jang’s relations with power brokers in Beijing, personal empire-building within North Korea and possibly disrespect of his nephew led to his death.
In 2017, Mr. Kim’s exiled half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, was poisoned with a deadly nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Some believe Kim Jong-nam was meeting U.S. officials or plotting to defect to the West.
All this, Mr. Chun said, makes Pyongyang’s leader genuinely fearsome.
“He is smart, patient and confident enough that he is not rushing into things,” he said. “Once ready, he will present us with a great challenge that will be very difficult to stand up to.”
Fear may be a factor in Mr. Kim’s behavior. Washington has warned Pyongyang that it will be annihilated if it ever uses its nuclear arms.
Mr. Chun worries about the credibility of the current leadership in Washington.
“We have become soft, and I often ask myself: ‘Where are the [Curtis] LeMays of the 21st century?’” he said, citing the late U.S. Air Force bomber general noted for his ruthlessness. “That is the only kind of person these monsters really fear.”
Despite a string of missile tests, Kim has not killed a single South Korean
North Korean leader seen as threat, but lacks bloody record of his predecessors
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
Video
By - The Washington Times - Monday, December 18, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea’s test-firing of its latest intercontinental ballistic missile early Monday captured headlines across Asia.
Predictably, the launch ignited indignant protests from Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.
As ever, questions were raised over whether the launch sent a political message or whether the intent was an upgrading of Pyongyang’s weapons engineering skills. The test was conducted a day after the USS Missouri, a nuclear-capable cruise missile submarine, arrived in South Korea.
Experts are poring over the huge missile’s trajectory, range and likely fuel source, but the capability is not new.
North Korea has been ICBM-capable since 2017. This year alone, Pyongyang carried out four other launches of the missile class, including solid-fuel launches in April and July. It has also conducted multiple tests of different missiles, including shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and multiple launch rocket artillery systems.
The dense smoke clouds lingering after these spectacular events obscure an overlooked fact.
PHOTOS: North Korea's Kim threatens 'more offensive actions' against US after watching powerful missile test
Despite his defiance of the international community, his endless weapons of mass destruction tests, his regime’s bellicose rhetoric and its woeful human rights record, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has not killed a single South Korean.
That makes him different from his immediate predecessors — his father and grandfather. His continual thumbing of a well-worn weapons test playbook while declining to shed blood raises a question: Is Mr. Kim reluctant to get his hands dirty?
Bloody history
Mr. Kim is the third-generation Kim to rule in Pyongyang, after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011.
Kim Jong-il’s reign, which started in 1994, encompassed the sinking of a South Korean corvette that killed 46 and the shelling of a front-line island that killed four. He is also believed to have overseen deadly operations during his father’s term in office.
His father, Kim Il-sung, ignited the 1950-1953 Korean War, a cataclysm that killed 2 million to 4 million. Thereafter, he unleashed multiple deadly attacks: border clashes, commando raids, a bloody hit on the South Korean Cabinet and even the bombing of a civilian airliner.
Mr. Kim the grandson looks far more cautious by comparison. Though two South Korean soldiers were maimed in a land mine ambush in the Demilitarized Zone in 2015, not a single South Korean has died at North Korean hands during his 12 years in power.
Mr. Kim possesses deadlier assets than his predecessors. North Korea conducted its first underground test of an atomic device in 2006 and married that capability to an ICBM capable of striking the contiguous United States in 2017.
“In order to send a deterrence message, he does not need to engage in low-level skirmishing and the active use of violence to cow adversaries,” said Mason Richey, an international relations professor at Seoul’s Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. “Now North Korea has a different set of capabilities — maybe it just does not need to engage in that behavior anymore.”
A nuclear arsenal generates a different level of deterrence but also different levels of risk.
“I think any leader, all things being equal, would prefer to take risk off the table if they can,” Mr. Richey said. “The more you have a nuclear arsenal, the more careful you have to be that conventional provocations do not turn into escalations.”
One expert who has met Mr. Kim agrees but said he also fears a situation in which unforeseen circumstances fracture the status quo.
“[Boxer] Mike Tyson said he had a plan until he was hit — but that when he was hit, the plan was gone,” said Moon Chung-in, a leading South Korean thinker on unification matters who joined all the South Korean presidential delegations that visited North Korea. “I don’t think there will be a war by plan like in 1950. When Kim tests ICBMs or nuclear weapons, he does not kill innocent civilians, but if war starts, there will be enormous collateral damage.”
Mr. Kim has been reluctant to spark direct clashes on the DMZ or the ill-defined maritime borders flanking the peninsula. Yet Mr. Moon fears an accidental clash could spiral into something far worse.
“We can assume that [the Kims] are rational actors who minimize risk and maximize benefits,” he said. “But once you are hit, you lose your reason.”
More open but still ruthless
As a boy, Mr. Kim spent time in the West and studied at a Swiss school. He adopted a more upbeat, open public persona than his father. Unlike his grandfather, he has summited with South Korean and U.S. presidents.
None of this makes him warm and cuddly.
“We’ve seen him put the screws on dissenters in his regime, and he has not wound down the gulag system,” said Mr. Richey. “I don’t think he is more genteel or that North Korea has mellowed.”
His privileges, his power and his relentless expansion of a nuclear armory may make him the most dangerous Kim of all.
“He is a natural-born ruthless personality type, close to a psychopath — a person who cannot relate to the sufferings of other people,” said Chun In-bum, a retired general who led South Korea’s crack Special Warfare Command. “He has not killed South Koreans directly but has killed his own uncle and God knows how many others. This is not a man who is risk-averse about taking a life.”
In 2013, Mr. Kim ordered the execution of his uncle, longtime senior regime official Jang Song-thaek. Experts believe Mr. Jang’s relations with power brokers in Beijing, personal empire-building within North Korea and possibly disrespect of his nephew led to his death.
In 2017, Mr. Kim’s exiled half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, was poisoned with a deadly nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Some believe Kim Jong-nam was meeting U.S. officials or plotting to defect to the West.
All this, Mr. Chun said, makes Pyongyang’s leader genuinely fearsome.
“He is smart, patient and confident enough that he is not rushing into things,” he said. “Once ready, he will present us with a great challenge that will be very difficult to stand up to.”
Fear may be a factor in Mr. Kim’s behavior. Washington has warned Pyongyang that it will be annihilated if it ever uses its nuclear arms.
Mr. Chun worries about the credibility of the current leadership in Washington.
“We have become soft, and I often ask myself: ‘Where are the [Curtis] LeMays of the 21st century?’” he said, citing the late U.S. Air Force bomber general noted for his ruthlessness. “That is the only kind of person these monsters really fear.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
Click to Read More and View Comments
Click to Hide
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
18. How I fell in love with 'baduk' and brought it to the classroom
I do not feel so bad. I have never beaten my computer at baduk or Go. I guess I should start playing against humans.
How I fell in love with 'baduk' and brought it to the classroom
The Korea Times · December 18, 2023
By Phoebe Rowbottom
I first encountered "baduk," a strategy board game known as "Go" in English, around three years ago while watching the Korean drama “Empress Ki.” I was intrigued by the way this board game was used as a metaphorical battlefield to show the pitfalls of an overly aggressive approach in both the game and the pursuit of power. One of the characters even gained the trust of his enemy by defeating him in a game of baduk. Seeing the respect for the game and its players inspired me to learn more about it.
As a British-Australian teacher living in London, I discovered that baduk has been the object of strategic gaming for thousands of years. From ancient China to Korea’s Joseon period, it was one of the four cultivated arts required of scholars. As I delved deeper into all things Korea as a “Koreaphile,” my Korean language teacher introduced me to an old proverb: “There are no meaningless stones on the baduk board.” This resonated with me because I think that much like in baduk, every move and the choice we make in life, contributes to our overall journey and we gain valuable lessons from all our experiences.
The “stones” in the proverb refer to the game’s coin-sized black and white pieces. Played on a 19 by 19 grid, baduk is a turn-based game in which players strategically place their stones to control more territory. I learned the basic rules via a smartphone app but quickly realized that the sheer volume of possibilities in baduk makes it a game that requires a profound understanding of strategy, deep foresight and the ability to navigate an unparalleled range of possible outcomes. By comparison, chess has many of these traits but its smaller board and more constrained rules make it easier for players to analyze and anticipate moves within a game.
As I took on online opponents via my phone, I gained an appreciation for the achievements of baduk master, Lee Se-dol, who was the subject of much global interest in 2016 when he competed against an artificial intelligence counterpart, AlphaGo. While Lee lost the series 4-1, he is the only person to have beaten AlphaGo in a game of baduk. Furthermore, his win demonstrated how humans’ strategic thinking could develop ways to beat even an advanced AI counterpart.
By the time I moved to Korea in August 2021 to teach at a foreign school in Seoul, I was very much a budding baduk fan. When I asked young students in my primary school class if they had ever heard of baduk, none of them had. I thought that was quite a shame because it is one of the oldest board games in the world and Korea has one of the highest rates of baduk players per capita in the world.
Education may have changed considerably since Joseon times, but the benefits of learning and playing this board game remain as relevant as ever — proponents insist it fosters strategic creativity, patience and discipline while forcing players to expand the way they think, solve problems and weigh up risks. I can see why that would be the case because baduk is not the sort of game where you can haphazardly place stones without thought. Hoping to have my own school’s students reap those rewards, I set about providing baduk classes as one of the many extracurricular activities (ECAs) they offered.
We started the baduk ECA last year and are now into our second consecutive academic year offering it to 7- to 11-year-old students from all over the world. Because I am teaching it in English, I’ve built the curriculum using materials provided by the British Go Association. We start every lesson by working together to solve different puzzles and it’s been excellent practice for their verbal reasoning and prediction skills. I have also found baduk to be great for teaching students to look beyond their next move and see the bigger picture, which is valuable in all areas of the curriculum.
Moreover, I have seen children who knew nothing about baduk become enthusiastic about the game, improving every week as they are excited to try out the new techniques that they’ve learned. As we have new students join the ECA each term, it is lovely to see the more experienced players help the newer students learn the rules. One student even told me that he’s played a few games of baduk with his grandfather.
Given how valuable my experience has been, I was saddened to learn about the possible closure of Korea’s only university department teaching baduk due to its waning popularity. I would like to see more educational institutions tap into how useful the game is as a teaching tool and as a skill in its own right.
Korea’s recent success in the Go competition at the Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, is a reminder of how vibrant the game still is — the men’s team won gold and the women took silver last October. This was only the second time Go was part of the Asian Games since debuting in 2010, but it sparked renewed interest in the game in Korea.
It’s great to see baduk players representing Korea pick up medals, and I would also love to see their success fuel more momentum in classrooms and society at large. If you’ve never sat at a baduk board before or downloaded a baduk app, you could join me in discovering a mind-expanding world that might just inspire you to unlock problems in innovative ways. I’m confident that you, your children and your family and friends will find it enormously enjoyable and stimulating.
Phoebe Rowbottom is a teacher at Dulwich College Seoul.
The Korea Times · December 18, 2023
| 
