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Quotes of the Day:
"Every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world."
– Arthur Schopenhauer
"History is said to be written by the victors. Fiction, by contrast, is largely the work of injured bystanders."
– Edna O'Brien
"It is usually futile to try to talk facts and analysis to people who are enjoying a sense of moral superiority in their ignorance"
– Thomas Sowell
1. Gen. Brunson to take office as new USFK chief this week: Pentagon
2. Han says S. Korea maintaining watertight readiness posture through alliance with U.S.
3. Acting defense minister, U.S. defense chief reaffirm alliance regardless of politics in phone talks
4. KOREA: Tangled by CONSTITUTIONAL law.
5. Yoon's declaration of martial law and exercise of authority are not 'sedition'
6. North Korean troops fighting in Kursk are picking up bad habits from the Russians
7. N. Korea-linked hackers stole US$1.34 billion from crypto platforms this year: Chainalysis
8. Seung-Whan Choi: If South Korea’s president is impeached, who should replace him?
9. AMCHAM appoints Henry Haggard as new U.S. Senior Advisor
10. Opinion | China should seize the moment to promote peace on Korean peninsula
11. Political Polarization, Factionalism, and Military Influence: A Cautionary Tale from South Korea’s Recent Turmoil
12. South Korea military faces scrutiny amid officer arrests
13. National Assembly's legal team vows to finalize Yoon impeachment trial
14. Investigators seek to quiz Yoon over martial law on Christmas Day
Apologies for my tardiness. There is no wifi on Korean Air flights so I could not get this done sooner while on my way back from Seoul.
1. Gen. Brunson to take office as new USFK chief this week: Pentagon
A helluva time to take command. Welcome to Korea.
I offer him best wishes and the best of luck at this tough time.
He will be living the Chinese cures: "May you live in interesting times."
(LEAD) Gen. Brunson to take office as new USFK chief this week: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS more info in 3rd para)
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Dong-hyun
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- Gen. Xavier Brunson will assume office as the new commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) this week, the Pentagon press secretary said Thursday, reiterating the United States' "ironclad" commitment to the bilateral alliance.
Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder made the remarks, saying U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo will preside over the ceremony on Friday, where Gen. Paul LaCamera will turn over command of the 28,500-strong USFK to Brunson, former commander of First Corps.
The USFK commander also serves as commander of South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command.
"On behalf of Secretary Austin and the entire Department of Defense, we want to extend our thanks to Gen. LaCamera for his leadership and lifetime of service to our nation, and we salute Gen. Brunson as he takes command," Ryder told a press briefing.
"As you've heard us say our commitments to the U.S-ROK alliance remains ironclad," he added. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
Gen. Xavier Brunson speaks during a confirmation hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington on Sept. 17, 2024 in this photo captured from a livestream from the committee's website. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
In September, President Joe Biden nominated Brunson to lead USFK.
During his Senate confirmation hearing in September, Brunson described North Korea's "rapid" advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities as the "single greatest" challenge facing USFK, vowing to maintain a "constant" state of readiness.
His inauguration comes as Seoul and Washington have been stepping up cooperation to sharpen deterrence against evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats, with Pyongyang shunning dialogue and deepening its military cooperation with Moscow.
Brunson has served in various key defense positions with both conventional and special operations forces, according to the Army. His operational assignments included deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
He was commissioned as an infantry officer upon graduation from Hampton University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science. He also earned a Master of Arts degree in human resource development from Webster University and a Master of Science degree in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2024
2. Han says S. Korea maintaining watertight readiness posture through alliance with U.S
"Watertight?"
(LEAD) Han says S. Korea maintaining watertight readiness posture through alliance with U.S. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 20, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with more remarks by Han; CHANGES photo; ADDS byline)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo said Friday that South Korea is ensuring no gaps in its security amid the ongoing impeachment turmoil by maintaining a watertight readiness posture with its ally the United States.
Han made the remark during a meeting of senior government and ruling party officials, which was held for the first time since President Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached by the National Assembly over his short-lived imposition of martial law.
Acting President Han Duck-soo (3rd from L) speaks during a meeting of senior government and ruling party officials at his official residence in Seoul on Dec. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
"Our government is making every effort to ensure not a single gap in our security by maintaining a watertight readiness posture through the ironclad South Korea-U.S. alliance," he said during the meeting at his official residence.
"Our government will establish trust with the U.S., trilaterally with the U.S. and Japan, and with many friendly nations. In addition, we will do our best to prepare for the launch of the new administration in the U.S.," he added.
Han recalled that during his phone call with U.S. President Joe Biden earlier this week the two leaders agreed to firmly maintain the bilateral alliance, while in his phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba he said the two sides reaffirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation with the U.S.
"The Republic of Korea is currently faced with external and internal difficulties it has never experienced before," Han said, citing heightened uncertainties in security, trade and industry ahead of the inauguration of the new U.S. administration and the economic struggles of small business owners and the self-employed.
"Our government will put all of our effort into reviving people's livelihoods to help the vulnerable groups who are suffering in recent difficult circumstances while simultaneously responding preemptively and thoroughly to changes in global external conditions," Han said.
In particular, the government's economic team will work closely together to maintain a 24-hour monitoring system and strengthen its emergency economic response system while frontloading next year's budget spending in the first half to support vulnerable groups, he said.
"Our government is making every effort to quickly resolve the current situation and maintain the nation's security and the people's everyday lives without any wavering," he said. "In order to do that, I believe above all that it is pressing for the government and the ruling party to closely communicate and gather our wisdom and strength."
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 20, 2024
3. Acting defense minister, U.S. defense chief reaffirm alliance regardless of politics in phone talks
Acting defense minister, U.S. defense chief reaffirm alliance regardless of politics in phone talks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 20, 2024
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- Acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reaffirmed Friday that the alliance between their nations remains "ironclad" regardless of political situations, Seoul's defense ministry said, in the wake of the short-lived Dec. 3 martial law imposition.
During their phone talks, they discussed the security situation, their combined defense posture and policy cooperation against North Korean threats while reaffirming the bilateral alliance is a linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ministry said.
Kim thanked Washington for its support of the alliance regardless of the domestic situation and emphasized ongoing efforts by the military to deter North Korean threats in a stable manner on the back of the combined defense posture.
Austin stressed that the U.S. commitment to South Korea's security is ironclad and vowed continued efforts to maintain the alliance.
On the back of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group, as well as trilateral security cooperation with Japan, according to the ministry.
In a separate statement, the Pentagon said the defense chiefs discussed "their shared focus on ensuring the combined U.S.-ROK defense posture remains strong and ready to respond to any external provocations or threats."
"They agreed to remain in close contact and emphasized their shared commitment to the democratic institutions and processes of the ROK and to ensuring communication among defense and military officials at all levels," it added.
This photo shows acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho on Dec. 14, 2024. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 20, 2024
4. KOREA: Tangled by CONSTITUTIONAL law.
My interview with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang from Seoul this week.
https://audioboom.com/posts/8626316-korea-tangled-by-constitutional-law-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-pacif
KOREA: Tangled by CONSTITUTIONAL law. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, on the latest in South Korea, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill
5. Yoon's declaration of martial law and exercise of authority are not 'sedition'
This is a Google translation of a Donga Ilbo article by a Korean legal scholar. It is a long read but might be helpful to those who. will follow the Constitutional Court as it hears the case. Were the president's acts sedition?
Yoon's declaration of martial law and exercise of authority are not 'sedition'
[A Look at the ‘Crime of Rebellion’ ①] Special Contribution by Constitutional Scholar Lee In-ho
Lee In-ho, Professor, Law School, Chung-Ang University
Entered 2024-12-16 09:00:01
https://shindonga.donga.com/politics/article/all/13/5351383/1?utm
- Constitutional Court impeachment trial is very vulnerable from the perspective of public trust
- In 230 years of U.S. history, there have been '0' cases of presidential impeachment or removal.
- Attaching press articles without evidence for impeachment of the president
- Yoon claims, “The cause of the national crisis lies in the giant opposition party”
- President and majority party in National Assembly engage in 'brawl' over constitutional authority
- The President's share of the first judgment on martial law requirements and exercises
- U.S. Supreme Court recognizes presidential immunity for official acts
- “Impeachment of the President is the Realization of Partisan Dictatorship in Congress”
The reason for the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol is the unconstitutionality and illegality of the 12/3 'martial law'. The mobilization of the military and police to neutralize the National Assembly constitutes sedition, abuse of power, and obstruction of special official duties. In the legal community, the prevailing analysis is that whether or not the crime of sedition is recognized is the core of the impeachment trial. Therefore, there is an outlook that the Constitutional Court will focus on examining the facts of the crime of sedition. To help readers understand whether the crime of sedition has been established,
'
President Yoon Seok-yeol declares martial law on December 3, 2024. [Dong-A DB]
The impeachment bill against President Yoon Seok-yeol was passed in the National Assembly at 7:24 p.m. on December 14, 2024, with 204 votes in favor, 85 votes against, 8 invalid votes, and 3 abstentions. The number of members in favor of impeachment exceeded two-thirds (200 votes) of the 300 members present. This is the third time in the 76-year history of the constitutional government that an unfortunate constitutional history has been repeated, eight years after the impeachment bill against President Park Geun-hye was passed in December 2016. As a result, the presidential powers have been suspended according to the Constitution, and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo will exercise presidential powers in his stead. There are many constitutional issues that will be raised in the future, but first, I would like to clarify how much weight the impeachment trial of the president carries, and what the attitude of the Constitutional Court judges who are conducting the impeachment trial should be.
Constitutional Court impeachment trial vulnerable from the perspective of public trust
The Constitution stipulates that if the National Assembly impeaches the President, the Constitutional Court will conduct an impeachment trial and decide whether to remove him from office. Since this is a procedure in accordance with the Constitution established by the people, there is no problem at all with the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court making a decision to remove him from office. However, from the perspective of public trust, this procedure has a significant vulnerability.
'
Removing the President' means overturning the democratic will of the people, the sovereign, in the presidential election. Therefore, the judicial body that overturns the will of the sovereign should receive at least as much democratic trust. However, the President and the Constitutional Court have different levels of public trust. The democratic trust of the Constitutional Court is much weaker than that of the President. There is a question of whether it is constitutionally sound for the Constitutional Court, which has weak democratic trust, to remove the President, who has full trust from the people. The composition of
our When the Constitutional Court, which enjoys less public trust than the president, exercises its judicial power granted by the Constitution to make a decision to overturn the sovereign will of “impeaching the president,” it must be extremely careful. It must feel a weight that is incomparable to making a decision of unconstitutionality on a single legal provision. This should be especially true when considering the national repercussions of the result of ‘impeachment of the president.’
The Constitutional Meaning and Weight of the Presidential Impeachment Trial
The Constitutional Court justices who decided to impeach President Park Geun-hye in 2017 completely failed to understand the constitutional meaning and weight of the impeachment trial of a president. The three reasons for impeachment that the Constitutional Court stated at the time were: violation of the duty to realize public interest that civil servants generally have, infringement of the freedom and property rights of a specific company, and violation of the duty to maintain confidentiality. It was truly a surprising judgment. Even legal provisions are not easily declared unconstitutional for such reasons. We must remember that in the 230 years of
American “ If a president is removed from office on the basis of insufficient evidence and partisan interests, the presidency will be diminished in authority and ultimately reduced to a subordinate organ of the legislature.” He was a sharp political opponent of the president. Nevertheless, he explained the reason for his decision to dismiss as follows. “ Impeachment of the president is to corrupt our wonderful body politic and establish partisan tyranny in Congress. It is the most insidious danger this country has ever known. If Andrew Johnson had not been acquitted by a nonpartisan vote, the United States would not have escaped the danger of partisan rule, and would have plunged the country into danger itself.” (John F. Kennedy, translated by Bae Cheol-woong, Courageous People, Minyesa, 2001, p. 170) If we do not learn from history
12‧3 Constitutional significance of martial law
After the Martial Law of December 3, the opposition party continued to push for the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-yeol, claiming that he was guilty of sedition, and eventually pushed through. However, it is necessary to examine whether the process is in accordance with the Constitution. To help with an accurate understanding, let’s organize the main events that occurred over the 12 days from the declaration of martial law on December 3 to the impeachment of the president on the 14th in chronological order. Martial law was declared at 10:27 PM on Tuesday the
3rd
A political struggle that stretches constitutional authority to its limit
On December 14, 2024, the National Assembly passed the impeachment motion against President Yoon Seok-yeol. [Reporter Ji Ho-young]
Three days after the first impeachment motion against the president was rejected on the night of the 7th (Sat), the 100-day regular session of the National Assembly ended on the 10th. However, the giant opposition party decided to hold a special session the next day (the 11th) as soon as the regular session ended and set the session to run for 7 days, from December 11th to the 17th. It was for the second impeachment. On the morning of the 12th (Thursday), the president made a national address and explained the background and purpose of declaring martial law. He emphasized that
“ The opposition party continued to claim the crime of sedition and continued its political offensive of impeaching the president even after the lifting of martial law on December 3. The people were swept up in emotions, feeling bewilderment and surprise, anger on one hand, and frustration on the other. The giant opposition party that dominates the National Assembly is fanning the flames of the people's emotions with impeachment and claims of sedition. Public opinion is sharply divided, and they are being swept away by the strong waves of political struggle. This is truly a national crisis. However, we must learn from past experiences. We must not forget the experience of 2017, when a moment of passion led to the impeachment, dismissal, and arrest of President Park Geun-hye, causing national chaos and crisis. For whatever reason, the suspension and dismissal of the president chosen by the sovereign must proceed in accordance with the provisions and procedures of the Constitution. Public opinion must not be divided by a groundless controversy over the crime of sedition. Regardless of political pros and cons, let us analyze several constitutional issues resulting from the current political chaos based on the Constitution. First , the current situation is a political struggle in which the president and the opposition party, which holds the majority in the National Assembly, are engaging in a brawl by pushing their constitutional authority to the limit. However, there is no absolute good in politics. Nevertheless, the president and the ruling and opposition parties are running to the limit, defining themselves as good and the other party as evil. In the midst of this, the ones suffering are the lives of ordinary citizens who are just quietly going about their daily lives. Fortunately, civic awareness is high, so most citizens are currently living their daily lives in an orderly manner. However, there are serious concerns about the impact on external credit ratings and the national economy. Political leaders should smoothly resolve this situation in accordance with the provisions and procedures of the Constitution. If we overcome this situation smoothly, the national system of the Republic of Korea will be upgraded to a higher level. Second , one of the backgrounds to the declaration of martial law this time is the tyranny of the legislative power of the giant opposition party. The opposition party used the majority of votes obtained in the general election as a weapon to impeach and suspend high-ranking government officials, including ministers, prosecutors, the chairman of the Korea Communications Commission, and the chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection, from their duties. It is difficult to find a precedent in Korean political history or even in the history of international parliamentary affairs. Going one step further, the opposition party attempted to virtually neutralize the functions of law enforcement agencies such as the prosecution, police, the Board of Audit and Inspection, and the Office of the President by completely cutting special activity funds and specific business expenses. Although the right to vote on the budget is a right of the National Assembly, it is difficult to view it as a normal exercise of authority. In this situation, it is presumed that the president, as the head of the executive branch, judged that there was a national crisis. So, as the head of state, he took out the martial law declaration card that he had under the Constitution. However, the president folded the martial law card in accordance with the Constitution, as it was blocked by the National Assembly's counterattack card of demanding the lifting of martial law.
Martial law enforcement, difficult to meet constitutional requirements
Third, the president’s exercise of martial law seems unlikely to meet the requirements of the Constitution. Article 77 of the Constitution stipulates that “wartime, incidents, or a state of national emergency equivalent thereto” is a requirement for the exercise of martial law. The Martial Law Act, a subordinate law, stipulates that “when social order is severely disturbed and the performance of administrative and judicial functions is significantly difficult” is a requirement for declaring martial law. Perhaps the president judged that the opposition party’s legislative and budgetary recklessness made the performance of administrative and judicial functions significantly difficult, but it is highly likely that he misjudged it. In addition, the martial law troops’ act of entering the National Assembly can be seen as exceeding the limits of martial law authority.
Fourth
, the logic that the president should be punished simply because the president’s exercise of martial law is an unconstitutional act that does not meet the requirements does not hold up. The primary judgment on the requirements and exercise of martial law is the responsibility of the president, who has the authority. That judgment may be wrong. However, the Constitutional Court has the authority to confirm the error (unconstitutionality) retroactively and invalidate the exercise of authority. The Constitutional Court does not punish the person who exercised the authority even if it is declared
unconstitutional or Fifth , the president's declaration of martial law and exercise of authority do not meet the requirements of the crime of sedition. The crime of rebellion under Article 87 of the Criminal Act is “an act of rioting with the purpose of excluding state power from all or part of the territory of the Republic of Korea” or “disrupting the Constitution” in a similar manner. Even if the exercise of the President’s authority is unconstitutional, the exercise of authority cannot be considered a “riot.” For example, if the police suppressing a demonstration illegally use police force, the police’s use of force is not considered a “riot.” The Special Warfare Commander testified in the National Assembly However, it is difficult to see that an illegal order constitutes a 'riot'. In addition, a riot under the crime of rebellion must have the purpose of destroying the constitutional order of the Republic of Korea. In the crime of purpose, 'purpose' does not mean a vague intention, but 'a clear result to be achieved through criminal acts'. This time, the president accepted the National Assembly's request to lift martial law in accordance with the Constitution. And the martial law army withdrew from the National Assembly 10 minutes after the request to lift martial law was passed. It is difficult to see that there was a 'purpose of destroying the constitutional order'. From this Sixth , on July 1 of this year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled by a vote of 6 to 3 that the president's official acts are immune from criminal prosecution. This ruling has implications regarding the president's declaration of martial law. The Supreme Court's ruling came in a case in which former President Trump was accused of attempting to overturn and deny the results of the 2020 presidential election. At the time, violent clashes broke out as Trump's zealous supporters used force to enter the Capitol, resulting in the deaths of five protesters and police officers and injuries to 140 others. The Congress was also in the process of certifying the results of the presidential election at the time, but the riot forced the emergency session to be suspended and lawmakers to evacuate. Trump was later Later, the Biden administration indicted Trump on similar charges, and during the trial, the president claimed immunity and filed a motion to dismiss the charges. In this application, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in favor of the president, granting him immunity from criminal prosecution for his official acts.
Martial law, emergency powers granted only to the President by the Constitution
In its decision, the Supreme Court distinguished between three concepts: First, the president’s conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority is “absolute immunity.” Second, all his official acts are “presumptive immunity.” The opposing party can overturn the presumption. Third, “unofficial acts” that are not related to the president’s official duties are not immune.
The Supreme
Court explained why the president should be immune:
“
To prosecute the president criminally for his official acts would be far more dangerous to the powers and functions of government than would be the case if the mere discovery of evidence were to be made of him. If the president were to hesitate to exercise his official duties without fear and impartiality under the potential risk of prosecution, it would create “a special danger to the effective functioning of government.” President
Yoon Seventh , there are many arguments that compare the May 17, 1980 martial law, which was punished as sedition, to this martial law declaration using the same logic. However, the military forces that actually led martial law at the time were not presidents. In addition, military force was used during the martial law enforcement process at the time, and many people were sacrificed. Simply comparing this situation with the current martial law declaration by the president is forcibly mixing incomparable things. I think it is confusing language. Even if there was an error in judgment and an act that did not properly meet the requirements in the current Eighth , when the president said in his speech on the 7th, “I will entrust the task of stabilizing the political situation to our party (People Power Party),” we should read it as a request to prepare a recovery plan including the term of office. It is a ‘delegation of recovery measures’, not a ‘delegation of state affairs’ or a ‘delegation of presidential authority.’ That is not possible under the Constitution. The current president is not in a vacancy or a state of death. No one can currently assume the president’s authority. However, the ruling party leader’s mention of the president’s resignation and his declaration that “the president will not intervene in state affairs” is a mistake that unnecessarily causes another constitutional controversy. Ninth , when the Speaker of the National Assembly announced the results of the vote on the first impeachment motion against the president, he declared that “the vote was not valid due to insufficient quorum.” However, this distorts an important constitutional procedure. The impeachment motion was put to a vote by a majority of the members present, and the total number of votes was 195, which did not exceed the constitutional requirement of “two-thirds (200 votes) of the members present.” If so, this is a “rejection of the motion,” not a “vote not valid.”
Abandoning the essence of the National Assembly as a political forum
There are two concepts that must be distinguished here in terms of law. The 'quorum' and the 'number of votes' must be distinguished. The impeachment motion against the president is proposed by a majority of the members present, and is passed with the approval of two-thirds of the members present. Here, 'two-thirds of the members present' is not the quorum, but the number of votes. Let's look at another example. A bill is passed with 'a majority of the members present and a majority of the members present in favor' (Article 49 of the Constitution). Here, 'a majority of the members present' corresponds to the quorum. If the vote had been held without a majority of the members present, then the vote would not have been passed.
Perhaps
the Speaker of the National Assembly wanted to avoid the political burden of declaring the result of 'impeachment motion rejection'. Article 92 (double veto) of the National Assembly Act states that "a rejected bill cannot be proposed again during the same session." Of course, the regular session ended on Tuesday, December 10. Since the opposition party held a special session and proposed a new bill, there is no issue of violating the National Assembly Act. However, the fact that they are immediately changing the session and re-voting the impeachment bill, which was once rejected, shows how lightly the National Assembly (opposition party) regards this important constitutional procedure called impeachment. In addition, the decision to suspend the president’s duties by attaching a few press articles as reference materials without any evidence proving the unconstitutionality or illegality is giving up the essence of the National Assembly, which is supposed to function as a political forum.
Here,
let’s look at the case of the United States, which has a similar impeachment procedure to ours. In the case of President Nixon’s impeachment, the Watergate scandal broke out in June 1972, and the Senate Special Investigative Committee began investigating the scandal on February 7, 1973. Exactly one year later, on February 6, 1974, the House of Representatives passed a resolution granting the Judiciary Committee the authority to investigate whether there were sufficient grounds for impeachment. Accordingly, the House Judiciary Committee reported to the House on July 27, 1974, that it recognized only three of the five articles of impeachment discussed (obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress). In short, after the Watergate scandal broke, the Senate Special Investigative Committee conducted a one-year investigation and the House Judiciary Committee conducted a six-month process of confirming and approving the articles of impeachment. President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, just before the House voted to impeach. In
the United States, In short, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the opposition party must understand the meaning and impact of this strict constitutional procedure, and hold an investigation hearing for at least 20 days, or even 10 days. No matter how urgent it is, if procedural legitimacy is not secured, no political action will be valid. The essence of the National Assembly as a political forum must be restored.
6. North Korean troops fighting in Kursk are picking up bad habits from the Russians
North Korean troops fighting in Kursk are picking up bad habits from the Russians
Mass infantry assaults against outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainians teach the wrong lesson
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/12/18/north-korea-troops-kursk-human-wave-deaths-ukraine/?utm
David Axe
Related Topics
18 December 2024 5:59pm GMT
Russian Ka-52 ‘Alligator’ attack helicopters take off to fight Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. North Korean troops are engaged against the Ukrainians on the ground there Credit: Russian Defense Ministry
Two months after deploying to Kursk Oblast in western Russia to reinforce Russian troops battling the then two-month-old Ukrainian invasion of the oblast, a 12,000-person North Korean army corps finally went on the attack last weekend.
For Russia, the North Korean deployment was a critical boost to Russia’s costly effort to eliminate the 250-square-mile Ukrainian salient in Kursk ahead of the January inauguration of the US president-elect Donald Trump – an event that could signal a chaotic new phase of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine.
For North Korea, it was an opportunity to learn. The army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea hasn’t fought a major land war in seven decades. And yet North Korean strongman Kim Jong Un expects it to be capable of defeating the exceptionally well-equipped South Korean army in the event the tensions across the Korean Demilitarised Zone ever escalate into open warfare.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is, for North Korea, a schoolhouse teaching lessons in 21st-century warfare. The lessons are brutal and bloody ones. In 34 months of grinding warfare, the Russians have learned to trade enormous numbers of human beings for incremental territorial gains. It’s a horrific strategy, but not always an ineffective one.
The big question for the North Koreans is whether that approach to land warfare will work 4,700 miles away on the Korean Peninsula.
After losing 10,000 armoured vehicles in the first couple of years of the war, and struggling to replace those losses with new production and the restoration of old Cold War vehicles, the Russian ground forces shifted tactics. Large coordinated mechanised assaults involving potentially scores of vehicles became rarer. Small haphazard attacks by infantry, marching on foot, became more common.
“Russian forces are now deploying tiny units, sometimes as few as two soldiers, to probe for weaknesses in Ukrainian lines,” explained Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analysis group. “When they identify a vulnerability, they signal for larger reinforcements, often platoon- or company-sized units. Until such gaps are found, however, these small groups, sometimes using motorcycles, continue their repetitive efforts, probing for openings and exhausting defenders.”
The probes are risky. Many if not most of the infantry assault groups fail in their missions – and die or get hurt in the process. But “Moscow can afford to lose these small units daily, as the steady influx of new soldiers ensures that the pressure never lets up,” Frontelligence Insight noted.
For the Kremlin, people are still a cheap and expendable resource, even as Russian casualties in Ukraine possibly exceed 700,000 killed or wounded.
Are people as cheap for North Korea? So far, yes. The initial North Korean assaults in Kursk copied Russian tactics. Infantry attacked Ukrainian positions on foot. If mines, drones and artillery dashed one wave of infantry, a second and even third wave rolled in. In Kursk last weekend, three waves each with 150 or more North Korean infantry succeeded in capturing the village of Plekhove from 100 dug-in Ukrainian troops.
But as many as half of the North Koreans died, Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko reported.
Whether the bloody, infantry-first tactics might work along the Demilitarised Zone between the two Koreas is an untested question. It’s worth noting the differences between the conflict in Ukraine and the possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
In Ukraine, the Russians enjoy a massive advantage in people. In some sectors, the attacking Russians outnumber the Ukrainian defenders five to one. And the Ukrainians often struggle with shortages of the most important munitions, especially artillery shells. And perhaps most critically, Russian air power dominates, meaning Russian jets can bomb with impunity, wearing down Ukrainian defences.
Conditions would be different along the DMZ, where the North Korean troops outnumber South Korean troops – but only two to one. The South Koreans with their extensive and modern arms industry are unlikely to suffer munitions shortages. And the cutting-edge South Korean air force is vastly superior to the decrepit North Korean air force.
In joining the war on Ukraine, the North Korean army is learning important lessons. But are they the right ones? And when the survivors of the DPRK corps in Kursk return home and teach attritional tactics to their peers, will they also doom these peers to die in pointless attacks on numerous, well-armed South Korean forces?
We won’t know unless and until North Korea invades across the DMZ. But anyone expecting that war to look like the war in Ukraine is probably in for a shock.
7. N. Korea-linked hackers stole US$1.34 billion from crypto platforms this year: Chainalysis
N. Korea-linked hackers stole US$1.34 billion from crypto platforms this year: Chainalysis | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- Hackers linked to North Korea stole more than US$1.3 billion from crypto platforms this year, marking the largest ever annual amount that they have raked in from hacking activities, a report from a blockchain analysis firm showed Thursday.
Chainalysis released its analysis on North Korea-affiliated hackers' activities, saying that they stole $1.34 billion across 47 incidents, marking a significant jump from roughly $660.50 million across 20 incidents recorded last year.
"Hackers linked to North Korea have become notorious for their sophisticated and relentless tradecraft, often employing advanced malware, social engineering, and cryptocurrency theft to fund state-sponsored operations and circumvent international sanctions," Chainalysis said in the report.
"U.S. and international officials have assessed that Pyongyang uses the crypto it steals to finance its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programs, endangering international security," it added.
The rise in North Korean hackers' activities came despite stepped-up efforts by Seoul and Washington to curb and prevent their cyber activities that they believe are designed to help bankroll Pyongyang's advancing weapons programs.
This file graphic depicts a North Korean during a hacking attempt. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2024
8. Seung-Whan Choi: If South Korea’s president is impeached, who should replace him?
Seung-Whan Choi: If South Korea’s president is impeached, who should replace him?
Chicago Tribune · by Seung-Whan Choi · December 18, 2024
Last weekend, South Korea’s Congress passed an impeachment bill for President Yoon Suk Yeol.
While the constitutional court of Korea is expected to deliver a final verdict within 180 days, the odds are not in the president’s favor due to his imposition of martial law and adverse public opinion. Following the court’s ruling, South Koreans will have 60 days to elect their next president.
American interests must assess whether the incoming president will continue the policies of Yoon, who was a staunch supporter of U.S. foreign initiatives in East Asia. This includes forming a security alliance among South Korea, Japan and the U.S. to counter threats from North Korea, China and Russia.
Gallup Korea’s opinion poll on Dec. 6 indicates that Korean voters will likely choose from four candidates: Han Dong-hoon and Oh Se-hoon from the conservative ruling party and Lee Jae-myung and Kim Dong-yeon from the progressive opposition party.
Since Yoon holds conservative views, candidates such as Han or Oh may be inclined to continue aligning with U.S. leadership within the triad alliance. Conversely, Lee or Kim might be reluctant to maintain this alignment due to anti-Japanese sentiments.
Among the four candidates, only Lee or Kim realistically stands a chance of winning, as the political fallout from Yoon’s administration has dramatically diminished the prospects for the two conservative candidates.
Lee, the leader of the largest opposition party, is currently the front-runner. He is known for his willingness to negotiate and compromise to achieve effective policy outcomes, even though that entails risks. Lee once stated, “Even if I might have to experience a political loss, I push forward on the right things to bring about results.”
Lee has played a significant role in the impeachment process against Yoon.
President-elect Donald Trump should be concerned about a potential Lee presidency, especially if Lee attempts to engage in secret dialogues with North Korea to revive the unification movement without consulting the White House. Conservative Koreans have criticized Lee’s amiable stance toward Pyongyang.
To maximize Korea’s national interests, Lee would likely prioritize economic cooperation with China while maintaining a security alliance with the U.S., which is central to the progressive party’s foreign policy. As of November, China is South Korea’s largest trading partner. Lee’s approach could undermine the America First policy in several areas, as he may opt not to support U.S. efforts to counterbalance China’s economic rise.
Daniel DePetris: How South Korea’s martial law and impeachment saga affects the US
However, Lee’s aspirations for the presidency may be jeopardized if he is convicted of violating the Public Offices Election Act, which would bar him from running for office. The ruling party is trying to expedite the upcoming trials to ensure that Lee cannot enter the race.
If Lee cannot run for president due to a criminal conviction, the opposition party likely would replace him with Kim, the current governor of Gyeonggi province, an office Lee previously held.
Kim is a self-made bureaucrat and politician. Although he does not have a prestigious background, his extensive experience and knowledge in economic policymaking and development set him apart from other presidential candidates. Given the challenges facing the national economy, many Koreans may view him as the ideal candidate to revitalize economic growth.
Trump would not need to raise concerns with Kim, as Kim has maintained a neutral stance toward North Korea. However, he would be displeased if Kim initiates economic rapprochement with China.
Another strength of Kim is that he was born in Chungcheong province, a region often considered a political swing area. Many Koreans support presidential candidates from their hometowns, regardless of their qualifications.
One of Kim’s weaknesses is that he is relatively new to the political stage, having primarily built his career as a civil servant and university chancellor. His party must actively promote him to the public as soon as possible.
Han from the conservative party is expected to run against two progressive candidates. He has followed in Yoon’s footsteps, having a lengthy legal career before being appointed as the leader of the ruling party in December 2023. Yoon regarded Han as his junior partner, influencing his decision to appoint him.
However, the relationship between Han and Yoon has deteriorated since Han began to distance himself from Yoon’s policy positions and criticize Yoon’s scandal-ridden wife. Han’s actions were driven by his ambition to become the next president.
On Dec. 3, during martial law, Yoon ordered his soldiers to arrest and detain Han, the only targeted member of the ruling party. Han escaped arrest with assistance from an opposition party member.
Despite Han’s acclaimed legal expertise, he remains unpopular among his conservative colleagues and conservative members of the Korean community due to his opposition to Yoon. If Han is elected president, he would likely adopt a friendly approach toward the White House, similar to Yoon.
Oh is an alternative candidate to Han. He is a lawyer and politician who served as a member of the National Assembly from 2000 to 2004. Additionally, he has been the mayor of Seoul four times.
Although Oh has an impressive record, his popularity among Koreans is only 3%, according to a recent Gallup Korea survey.
However, Oh likely would consider Trump’s political requests, as his policies consistently align with the conservative party’s foreign policy platform.
Overall, Trump would prefer to work with a conservative South Korean president as a political partner. However, widespread public discontent toward Yoon and the conservative party — stemming from the political and economic fallout following the imposition of martial law and subsequent impeachment — suggests that a progressive president is more likely to be elected.
A conservative South Korean president would likely be more cooperative and friendly toward Trump, while a progressive president may be less willing to collaborate, as they tend to prioritize the sovereignty of their nation and the interests of their people.
Seung-Whan Choi teaches Korean politics and international relations at the University of Illinois Chicago. A retired Army officer, he is the author of four books and dozens of journal articles.
Submit a letter, of no more than 400 words, to the editor here or email letters@chicagotribune.com.
Chicago Tribune · by Seung-Whan Choi · December 18, 2024
9. AMCHAM appoints Henry Haggard as new U.S. Senior Advisor
AMCHAM appoints Henry Haggard as new U.S. Senior Advisor
https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/12/19/OUCZA46LV5HPTALJYFWTBBDPPY/
By Lee Jae-eun
Published 2024.12.19. 15:04
Henry Haggard was named AMCHAM’s new U.S. Senior Advisor on Dec. 19.
The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) said on Dec. 19 that it appointed Henry Haggard as its new U.S. Senior Advisor. Once he officially assumes his role on Jan. 2 next year, he will provide strategic advice and guidance on key issues affecting the U.S.-Korea business community.
“We are thrilled to welcome Henry Haggard to our team,” said AMCHAM Chairman James Kim. “With the incoming Trump Administration, Henry is perfectly suited to advance AMCHAM’s mission in the United States and Korea.”
Henry Haggard held numerous senior positions in both the public and private sectors. He served at the State Department for 25 years and was the director of the National Security Council under both the Trump and Biden administrations. He also held positions as the Political Minister Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and directed energy diplomacy for Asia and the Middle East.
Since retiring from the State Department as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, Haggard has focused on supporting U.S.-Korea relations through his affiliation with leading think tanks such as WestExec Advisors, Rice University’s Baker Institute, and the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance. He speaks fluent Korean.
AMCHAM
10. Opinion | China should seize the moment to promote peace on Korean peninsula
Really? What makes anyone think China wants to take such an initiative?
This sounds like it should have been written (but wasn't) by wishful thinking Americans who think China will do things along the lines of American logic.
Diplomacy
OpinionAsia Opinion
Chan Young BangandAnar Shaikenova
Opinion | China should seize the moment to promote peace on Korean peninsula
The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, political change in South Korea and Trump’s return create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks
Chan Young BangandAnar Shaikenova
Published: 5:30am, 19 Dec 2024Updated: 6:00am, 19 Dec 2024
China is at a crossroads as the most important player on the Korean peninsula. It must either tolerate continuous belligerent escalations from North Korea backed with nuclear weapons or promote peace and stability through denuclearisation of the peninsula and diminish US influence in the region.
During the past two months, a whirlwind of profoundly important political events has occurred with far-reaching implications for the global order.
US president-elect Donald Trump’s return to power has ignited intense speculation and pre-emptive action regarding his promise to broker peace following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In South Korea, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment has thrown the nation into political chaos. In Syria, rebel forces toppled president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, sending shock waves through the Middle East and Moscow. As a consequence of these events, five strategic variables mark a turning point for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and how China can act on it.
First, Trump’s second term will result in a political shift for the US. President Joe Biden’s objective in northeast Asia has been primarily to check China’s rise by forging alliances, such as the trilateral partnership with South Korea and Japan, and the Aukus defence pact with Australia and the UK. Trump’s regional policy will not be burdened with the rules-based order advocated by his predecessor.
In addition, Trump’s relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might lead to renewed talks. Most importantly, this shift could push South Korea and Japan to take more responsibility for their defence. Leaders of both countries have expressed an interest in joining the nuclear club to deter North Korea, and increased militarisation and nuclear expansion are not in China’s best interests.
Second, to sustain its war of attrition in Ukraine amid heavy economic sanctions and increasing isolation, Russia sought support from North Korea and the two sides have forged a closer alliance with this year’s signing of a mutual defence treaty. Pyongyang’s support for Moscow’s war recently transformed from the provision of ammunition and equipment to the dispatching of troops on the ground in the Kursk region.
Ukraine releases video purportedly showing North Korean soldiers in Russia
However, relying on security guarantees from Russia was a serious misjudgment by Kim. Any alliance between the two countries holds limited economic value, with bilateral trade at just US$34.4 million in 2023. This transactional alliance is not based on ideological affinity but rather on strategic benefit, meaning its security guarantees are limited and will eventually end.
The third variable is Syria’s upheaval and the overthrow of Assad, who is seeking asylum in Russia. Moscow has lost a valuable ally and conduit in the Middle East. Compared with North Korea, Russia had made considerable military and economic investments in Syria, totalling US$27.5 billion over nine years – including two Russian military bases.
Moscow’s decision not to back up its security commitments to Assad has seriously eroded its image as a trusted ally. This has considerably shaken Iran and the so-called axis of resistance. Kim might see his Russian ally as unreliable in guaranteeing his regime’s security and could evaluate alternatives to ensure his survival.
Assad’s fall sends a clear message to Kim. Russia is caught up in its war with Ukraine, its economic performance has been undermined and it cannot provide a security umbrella to North Korea.
South Korean President Yoon impeached over martial law debacle
Fourth, Yoon’s proclamation of martial law in South Korea will also significantly affect the North’s future. Yoon’s days as president are numbered. The likely return of the Democratic Party in 2025 could improve South Korean and Chinese relations.
Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, emphasised fostering peace and trying to ease tensions with Pyongyang and Beijing, in contrast to the security-centric, alliance-driven strategies of the Yoon administration. It should be noted that Moon’s Democratic Party has not been in favour of improving South Korea’s relationship with Japan and may not wish to continue Yoon’s initiative but instead choose to appease North Korea.
Finally, among the five variables, China’s positioning and strategic objectives play some of the most important roles. Beijing’s primary objectives are to secure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and to reintegrate Taiwan. It cannot afford for the North Korea-Russia alliance to jeopardise its one-China principle.
Furthermore, China will not support or participate in a trilateral alliance, particularly given the erosion of Russian power following the events in Ukraine and Syria. China has been dealing with economic stagnation for several years. Its central economic work conference last week set the tone for 2025 as the government attempts to deal with persistently weak consumer demand, a years-long property crisis, weak investor sentiment and the looming threat of a second Trump administration continuing its trade war.
In that context, bringing about the denuclearisation of North Korea would require China to initiate rapprochement with South Korea and discourage Seoul’s involvement in any alliance with the US and Japan. It is a positive sign that China included South Korea among the nine countries whose citizens were last month granted visa-free entry for up to 15 days.
President Xi Jinping should embrace denuclearisation as the best strategic decision to optimise China’s position in the region. The weakening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, changes in the South Korean government and Trump’s second term create a conducive environment for denuclearisation talks.
The upending of the status quo presents an opportunity for renewed action. The interplay of these strategic variables will shape the future of diplomatic and denuclearisation efforts on the Korean peninsula.
Chan Young Bang
FOLLOW
Chan Young Bang, PhD is the founder and president of KIMEP University, principal investigator at its DPRK Strategic Research Centre, and a former economic adviser to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first president of Kazakhstan. His current research focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and the economic development of the DPRK (North Korea). He is the author of more than 60 articles and several books on prospects for achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. His latest book, A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development, was published in December 2023.
Anar Shaikenova
FOLLOW
Dr Anar Shaikenova is a senior researcher in the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University, Kazakhstan, and an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration. Before joining the PhD programme, she worked with USAID, the Asian Development Bank and the US Department of State EXBS Programme on strategic trade controls in Kazakhstan and in
11. Political Polarization, Factionalism, and Military Influence: A Cautionary Tale from South Korea’s Recent Turmoil
Political polarization?. Check. Factionalism? Check.
Military influence? The jury is still out over who was advising and influencing President Yoon and his decision to implement martial law. Were there individual members of the military influencing the President? Probably. But should the military be painted with a broad brush? Another way to look at this was the military that ended up ensuring the National Assembly was able to execute its responsibilities and the military respected and executed the decision of the National Assembly. This is not 1979-1980 or 1986-1987.
Conclusion:
The nation is left to confront an uncomfortable question: who is truly leading the country, and can South Korea’s democracy endure the weight of a political system where political factionalism and military elites’ influence remain so entrenched?
Political Polarization, Factionalism, and Military Influence: A Cautionary Tale from South Korea’s Recent Turmoil
thediplomat.com · by Jin Kai
The central role of Yoon’s defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun, in the recent martial law declaration highlights concerns about military influence in South Korean politics.
By
December 18, 2024
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun conducts a joint press briefing with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (not pictured) at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 2024.
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The recent arrest of former South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Yong-hyun – the first person taken into custody over President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law, which Kim allegedly proposed – has brought into sharp focus the unsettling intersection of political power, factionalism, and the enduring influence of military elite in South Korea’s domestic politics. Kim’s arrest has amplified concerns about the role of the military in governance. More broadly, Yoon’s shocking declaration of martial law may also trigger wider debate about the vulnerability of democratic processes.
Kim, a seasoned figure in South Korea’s military establishment, rose through the ranks from platoon leader in the 21st Infantry Division of South Korean Army to the head of the Presidential Security Bureau and then to minister of defense under Yoon. His career trajectory reflects not only his personal ambition but also the growing prominence of military figures within the country’s political elite. Kim’s approach, shaped by his military background, was decisively hardline – his suggestion of martial law to resolve escalating political tensions may speak to the enduring influence of the military in South Korea’s domestic politics. This incident is a stark reminder of the risks that such entrenched military power may pose to the domestic political and social order in South Korea.
Kim’s personal history contains other reasons for concern. A senior to Yoon during their high school years at Chung-Yam High School, Kim was the leader of the school’s “Student National Defense League,” known for its militant nationalism. Claims that Kim may have been a fan of Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” only deepen concerns about his political inclinations. These revelations add to the suspicion that Kim, having risen to such a powerful position within both the military and the government, may have been driven by darker instincts than a sense of duty to national security.
Kim’s suggestion of martial law came at a time when South Korea’s political environment was increasingly polarized. With the opposition camp holding majority in the National Assembly, it was able to question the administration’s policies and present a direct challenge to Yoon’s leadership. The ruling camp found itself in a precarious position, especially when Yoon’s approval rate dropped to 17 percent by early November as a Gallup poll showed. Repeated calls for special investigations into Yoon’s wife and close associates further added to the president’s frustrations.
In this context, Kim’s proposal to impose martial law – not only to quell dissent but also to label some political opponents as “pro-North Korean forces” – highlighted the dangerous potential for military elites to exert influence over political outcomes, bypassing the democratic process in the name of national security.
However, the fallout from Kim’s actions was immediate and dramatic. Some soldiers on the scene were not very cooperative with the martial law order, and the progressive camp quickly took resolute actions. Lawmakers gathered at the National Assembly in the middle of the night to urgently vote to overturn the martial law declaration – a development Yoon reportedly sought to preempt by ordering the arrest of key political figures.
Critics were quick to accuse Kim of making impulsive, undemocratic decisions, driven by an unchecked military mentality rather than consultation or transparency. Although Kim defended his actions as necessary for national security, many South Koreans see them as an abuse of power by a military elite that has long wielded disproportionate influence over the country’s political system. His suggestion to deploy martial law was not just a breach of democratic norms – it may be viewed as a reminder of the military’s hidden but persistent influence in South Korean political affairs.
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, South Korean society has been very cautious about military involvement in politics, deeply scarred by the country’s past under military dictatorship. Despite decades of efforts to civilianize the military and reform its leadership structure, the military elite remain a powerful force in South Korean politics. Most South Korean defense ministers have had very long and deep ties to the military, with only a few exceptions in 1951 and 1960-1961.
By contrast, since the end of World War II, the U.S. secretary of defense has generally been a civilian or a person with very limited military experience, ensuring civilian oversight of the military as per the 1947 National Security Act. There are only three exceptions among the 28 defense secretaries to have held the office since the position was established in 1947 (in place of the former secretary of war).
The persistent military influence in South Korea, despite reforms, may stir unease among those who lived through the era of authoritarian rule, when the military effectively controlled the whole government and nation. Viewed in that context, the declaration of martial law this month underscores the enduring potential of South Korea’s military elite to disrupt domestic governance.
That said, Yoon cannot escape responsibility for these events. Many viewed his approval of Kim’s martial law proposal not as a defensive measure but as a deeply anti-democratic move. The progressive opposition, in particular, decried it as a blatant attempt to suppress dissent and reintroduce authoritarian tactics reminiscent of South Korea’s past military regimes. For them, this incident may have evoked uncomfortable parallels to the country’s authoritarian period when military leaders dictated the political landscape with little regard for democratic processes. In a nation that has fought hard to distance itself from military rule, the specter of such measures by the president and his top adviser under the guise of national security is terrifying.
Kim’s proposal to impose martial law – and Yoon’s acceptance – not only revealed the military’s lingering power but also exposed the fragility of South Korea’s democratic institutions. Back in 2021, Kyung-Pil Kim of Korea University noted that “The military is likely to pledge its allegiance to the regime instead of citizens because the former has control over personnel affairs, which has frequently led to unofficial private groups of military officers and their political interference.”
In the end, this event highlights serious concerns about leadership, accountability, and the separation of military and civilian authority in South Korea. Kim’s military-driven approach, combined with his disregard for the civilian implications of his actions, likely contributed to the political crisis that followed. Yoon surely takes a major responsibility, and his approval of the measure further raises questions about the role of military elite in shaping key decisions.
Many South Koreans may claim that democracy has been achieved at a painful price. This time, the National Assembly – bolstered by spontaneous mass protests – successfully overturned martial law after just six hours. However, we should not be complacent about the risks this episode revealed. South Korea’s political landscape, especially its top infrastructure, remains fragile, as it is caught between factionalism, personal ambition, and the long shadow of military influence. As this recent turmoil illustrates, when these elements collide, the consequences can be both tragic and farcical. Some even joked after the events of the past few weeks that the plot changes in South Korea’s domestic politics are faster than those in Korean dramas.
The nation is left to confront an uncomfortable question: who is truly leading the country, and can South Korea’s democracy endure the weight of a political system where political factionalism and military elites’ influence remain so entrenched?
Authors
Contributing Author
Jin Kai
Jin Kai is a non-resident scholar at Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
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thediplomat.com · by Jin Kai
12. South Korea military faces scrutiny amid officer arrests
South Korea military faces scrutiny amid officer arrests – DW – 12/18/2024
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ConflictsSouth Korea
Julian Ryall
12/18/2024December 18, 2024
Despite fears that the nation's armed forces are rudderless after President Yoon's martial law declaration was swiftly reversed, observers tell DW that the rule of law has shown resilience and the military remains ready.
https://p.dw.com/p/4oITV
Park An-su, named as the officer in charge of the martial law operation, faces investigation and is barred from leaving South KoreaImage: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP
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The highest-ranking officer in the South Korean military visited the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean Peninsula on Tuesday, ostensibly to confirm the readiness of the South's troops as they face their North Korean adversaries.
The visit by Admiral Kim Myung-soo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also served to communicate that despite the turmoil in South Korean politics — which has also engulfed top military commanders — the nation's armed forces are not as brittle and unprepared as some have suggested.
Sending a message that South Korea's armed forces remain on alert comes at a critical time for the republic, with some of the nation's top military commanders under arrest, dismissed from their positions, or the subject of investigations in connection with President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of martial law on December 3 — which remained in place for only six hours.
Many South Koreans were shocked to see armed troops in full combat gear descending on the National Assembly and attempting to storm the Parliament in support of Yoon's declarationImage: Cho Da-un/Yonhap/AP/picture alliance
Military links to martial law
To many South Koreans, the botched putsch was an uncomfortable reminder of the often harsh rule exercised by a series of military dictatorships in Seoul during the 1970s and '80s.
With Yoon sidelined after an impeachment vote on Saturday and now under formal investigation, questions are being asked about how much the military knew in advance of his plan.
On Monday, former head of the Special Warfare Command Kwak Jong-geun, and former head of the Capital Defense Command Lee Jin-woo were arrested on charges of deploying military personnel to the parliament.
Former chief of the Defense Counterintelligence Command Yeo In-hyung has been accused of orchestrating the implementation of martial law, and army chief Park An-su has been suspended from his role.
Yoon's former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who stepped down immediately following the aborted martial law declaration, and former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min also face investigations.
To worsen the alarm in some circles that the military is effectively rudderless, Kim Yong-hyun has been replaced by his former deputy, Kim Seon-ho, who is now serving as the acting defense minister.
Yoon's impeachment has "sparked concerns over the readiness of the military against North Korean threats as it now faces an unprecedented gap in its top leadership," according to an article by the Yonhap News Agency.
South Korean leadership in limbo after martial law fiasco
Changes in US military leadership in South Korea, too
It added that the situation is further complicated by the head of US forces in South Korea also undergoing a change, with Gen. Paul LaCamera scheduled to be replaced next week by Gen. Xavier Brunson.
In a press briefing on Monday, a Defense Ministry spokesman replied to a question about the military's readiness and the impact of the political crisis by saying there is "no insufficiency" in the different arms' operational and readiness postures.
Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general in the Republic of Korea Army and now a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, supported the belief that despite the dismissal of some of the most senior officers in the military, the institution has stood firm.
"Through my personal contacts and relationships in the Korean armed forces, I know that at the tactical level, they know very well what their mission is and they are focused on their jobs," he told DW.
"What has happened is very unfortunate, but my position is that politicians dragged the military into this situation and I am thankful that the soldiers' hearts were not in it and it ended quickly," he said.
"The tragedy is that the senior officers who should have shielded the rest of the military from the politicians failed to do that and it seems that some of them participated in the planning of the declaration of martial law," Chun said.
"But the ranks below have all stepped up and filled the gaps, showing that the system is in place and works," he added. "And while I do not say I have no concerns, I want to emphasize that everyone in the military is fully focused on doing their job."
Chun also said he has not been surprised by North Korea's relatively muted response to the political crisis in the South, along with its failure to try to provoke its neighbor with some sort of action on the border.
South Korean lawmakers vote to impeach president
Uniting the nation
"The North knows that we are experiencing a political fight domestically, but they also realize that if they tried to do something then that would only serve to unite South Koreans against this external threat," he said.
"And it might even give the US a reason to beef up its own military presence on the peninsula, and Pyongyang does not want that."
Park Jung-won, a professor of law at Dankook University, agrees that the nation appears to have weathered the immediate instability caused by Yoon's declaration and that the fundamentals of the republic have held firm in the face of serious challenges.
"The principles of respect for the law have been followed and we have to applaud that because they worked as they were designed to," he said. "In the dictatorships of the past, the military was in control, but that is no longer the case."
"Of course, this is still a volatile and unpredictable situation, but the nation is following a process and I do not fear that the security situation will worsen because of this," he said. "It may have made some good headlines for a few days, but the rule of law is resilient."
Edited by: Keith Walker
Julian Ryall Journalist based in Tokyo, focusing on political, economic and social issues in Japan and Korea
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13. National Assembly's legal team vows to finalize Yoon impeachment trial
National Assembly's legal team vows to finalize Yoon impeachment trial | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · December 20, 2024
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- A group of parliamentary members that would serve as "prosecutors" in President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court held their first meeting Friday, expressing their commitment to finalize the impeachment.
Yoon was impeached and suspended from his presidential powers last Saturday over his Dec. 3 failed attempt to impose martial law on the nation's democracy.
"We have gathered here to achieve the historic mission of Yoon's impeachment," said Rep. Jung Chung-rae, chair of the National Assembly's legislation and judiciary committee that heads the impeachment team.
Rep. Park Beom-kye of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) warned of potential resistance from Yoon.
"(Yoon) is attempting a massive counteroffensive," Park said. "He is even trying to change the course of history, on top of his lies, hypocrisy and lack of conscience."
The impeachment panel consists of nine DP lawmakers, including Jung, and two other lawmakers from minor opposition parties.
A team of legal experts that represents parliament in Yoon's case also voiced concerns over "attempts" to distort the facts from Yoon's side.
"There are continuous attempts to belatedly make excuses for the situation and to fight back by distorting some parts," Song Doo-hwan, the head of the legal team, said. "We must prepare thoroughly to address these challenges."
The National Assembly's impeachment team for President Yoon Suk Yeol's trial at the Constitutional Court and a group of legal representatives hold a meeting at the National Assembly on Dec. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · December 20, 2024
14. Investigators seek to quiz Yoon over martial law on Christmas Day
I guess it will not be a very Merry Christmas for President Yoon.
(LEAD) Investigators seek to quiz Yoon over martial law on Christmas Day | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 20, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS details throughout, byline)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- A joint law enforcement team investigating the martial law case said Friday it has requested impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol appear for questioning next week over his involvement in the botched martial law imposition.
The team sent the summons to Yoon to appear for questioning at the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) building in Gwacheon, just south of Seoul, at 10 a.m. next Wednesday, its official said.
It was the second summons request the investigation team has delivered to Yoon after he refused to cooperate with the first summons earlier this week.
President Yoon Suk Yeol delivers a national address, in this Dec. 7, 2024, file photo. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The CIO appears to have taken into account security issues for choosing the public holiday to question Yoon.
The CIO said it sent the summons via express mail and electronically to Yoon's residence and the presidential office in Yongsan.
It chose not to deliver them in person this time after Yoon's office refused to receive them during the first summons request.
The probe team plans to question Yoon over his role regarding the imposition of the martial law order on Dec. 3, which he rescinded following a National Assembly vote to overturn the order.
The CIO plans to consider filing for a court warrant to detain the president for up to 48 hours should he continue to ignore the summons without valid grounds.
The probe team is looking at charges of insurrection and abuse of power against Yoon.
Yoon was impeached by the parliament Saturday and has been suspended from duties pending a Constitutional Court decision on whether to unseat him from office or reinstate him.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 20, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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