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Quotes of the Day:
"Every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world."
– Arthur Schopenhauer
"History is said to be written by the victors. Fiction, by contrast, is largely the work of injured bystanders."
– Edna O'Brien
"It is usually futile to try to talk facts and analysis to people who are enjoying a sense of moral superiority in their ignorance"
– Thomas Sowell
1. Special Operations Chief Details Irregular Warfare Place in Defense Strategy
2. Special ops leaders eye alarming levels of adversary collaboration
3. How Memoirs by American Officials Leave the CIA Out of U.S. Policy in Burma
4. 2024 China Military Power Report
5. What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and Consequences
6. Regional Basing of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)
7. Army will trim 5% of general-officer jobs in coming years, chief’s spokesman says
8. What’s at risk if Congress doesn’t fund the government by Friday night
9. Countering Chinese Deception in Modern Military Operations
10. The US defence industrial base can no longer reliably supply Europe
11. Trump Signals Jones Act Policy Will Stay the Course
12. State Department 'censor' office finds lifeline
13. Congress demands answers on low testosterone issues among special operators
14. China’s Mosaic Warfare
15. The US military is sending counter-drone systems to New Jersey bases. Here's how the Dronebuster works.
16. Imagining a US Army Drone Corps
17. The Long Range Desert Group and the birth of special operations around the world
Apologies for my tardiness. There is no wifi on Korean Air flights so I could not get this done sooner while on my way back from Seoul.
1. Special Operations Chief Details Irregular Warfare Place in Defense Strategy
Sigh... we love to see how many terms we can use to describe the same phenomena in different ways. Why can't we just come out and say it. Our adversaries are conducting political warfare very closely aligned with how Geroge Kennan defined it. We are not. But we need to conduct a superior form of political warfare and the military can contribute to a national level political warfare through the application of irregular warfare. You can wrap up all the other buzzwords in this: gray zone, hybrid, asymmetric, etc., etc, because as Mr. Maier said, "these are sort of variations on a theme." But as I have been told a number of times from people inside the Pentagon, Political Warfare will never ever be used in the building.
If we put as much effort into designing strategy and developing and executing campaign plans (and developing irregular warfare competency to include irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters as well as irregular warfare professional military education) as we put into coming up with new terms and arguing over definitions we might be able to better support US national security. Even yesterday, the question was asked of Mr. Maier about the irregular warfare definition. (which is not defined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and currently there are two definitions and a description of IW) (See below).
Excerpts:
Special operations forces are nimble, they have a culture of innovation, and that fits in with great power competition.
It wasn't always that way.
Maier said that irregular warfare was covered in an annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy. "For those of you who have been in the federal government, you know what annex means — it was an afterthought. It didn't make the main show," he said.
...
In the 2022 iteration of the strategy, irregular warfare was integrated into the main strategy. "It's really a key part of integrated deterrence," he said. Asymmetric and nonconventional operations are side by side with the conventional aspects of the strategy, he said.
"I think an indication of the road we still have to travel is the number of synonyms we use to describe this space," he said. "It may be irregular, it may be unconventional, it may be hybrid, it may be gray zone, it may be asymmetric. These are all sort of variations on a theme."
By the way in the 2022 National Defense Strategy irregular is used 3 very brief times. There is no description of any US irregular warfare concept. There Is no definition of irregular warfare.
However, in defense of the NDS there are a lot of words to talk about the gray zone (which is used 12 times). But in point of fact the discussion is all about the competitor's use of gray zone activities and for the US military reactive and defensive. It is not about seizing the initiative, conducting superior gray zone activities, or winning in the gray zone. We don't inculcate a winning mindset in the gray zone. The two major sections on the gray zone describe "Competitor's Gray Zone Activities" (page 6), and "Campaigning to Gain Military Advantage, Enhance Deterrence, and Address Gray Zone Challenges" (page 12). I do very much like the idea of campaigning in the gray zone but again we need to shift our emphasis from simply addressing or countering our adversaries' gray zone activities. We need to conduct a superior offensive political warfare strategy at the national level that is supported by irregular warfare campaigns to create dilemmas for our adversaries and that seek to coerce or disrupt adversaries who seek to do us harm while our campaigns create the conditions for winning in strategic competition.
In the 80 page 2022 National Defense Strategy these are the only three excerpts that specifically use irregular and irregular warfare.
Page 6: The PRC employs state controlled forces, cyber in space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its allies and partners. Russia, employees, disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and our allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries. Other state actors, particularly North Korea and Iran, use similar, if currently more limited means.
Page 9: Direct cost imposition approaches also include a broad range of other means, including conventional long range, fires, offensive cyber, irregular warfare, support for Ford, internal defense, and inter-agency instruments, such as economic sanctions, export, controls, and diplomatic measures.
Page 15: The Department will prioritize cooperation with our regional and global partners that results in their increased ability to determine and defend against potential aggression from a run, for example, by working to advance integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and irregular warfare capabilities.
Here is the Joint Definition, the Army Definition, and the Congressional Description of Irregular Warfare:
Joint Definition of IW JP –1 Warfighting(August 2023)
IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
Army Definition of IW – FM 3-0 Operations (October 2022)
Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
Congress in the 2017 NDAA: Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
And lastly integrated deterrence is not a strategy of winning or even of seizing the initiative.
Special Operations Chief Details Irregular Warfare Place in Defense Strategy
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4012795/special-operations-chief-details-irregular-warfare-place-in-defense-strategy/
Dec. 19, 2024 | By Jim Garamone, DOD News |
Special operations forces have been crucial in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, but they also have a place in what is also known as a great power competition, said Chris Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
Maier spoke at the Center for a New American Security, yesterday and highlighted the various roles special operations forces play in competitions with China and Russia.
He said special operations forces work in the context of a whole-of-government approach, but they can play a major part in those efforts. "We are, particularly as we look at some of our special operations enterprise, in a lot of different places," he said. This gives special operators a chance to reassure allies and partners and also a chance to give a heads-up when they see things going amiss.
Special operations forces are nimble, they have a culture of innovation, and that fits in with great power competition.
It wasn't always that way.
Maier said that irregular warfare was covered in an annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy. "For those of you who have been in the federal government, you know what annex means — it was an afterthought. It didn't make the main show," he said.
In the 2022 iteration of the strategy, irregular warfare was integrated into the main strategy. "It's really a key part of integrated deterrence," he said. Asymmetric and nonconventional operations are side by side with the conventional aspects of the strategy, he said.
"I think an indication of the road we still have to travel is the number of synonyms we use to describe this space," he said. "It may be irregular, it may be unconventional, it may be hybrid, it may be gray zone, it may be asymmetric. These are all sort of variations on a theme."
The myriad of names shows that there is some confusion about the dividing line between conventional and unconventional warfare and forces. Whatever it is called, it has a place at the table, Maier said.
"As a department, we think about fighting large scale combat operations," he said. "And much of the early years of the 2022 [National Defense Strategy] were focused on that. The progress I think we've made in recent years is in expanding that aperture to really look at the aspects of competition and crisis as part of warfighting challenges."
Maier said the reason the strategy defines China as the pacing challenge "is because they have such a range of tools and considerable leverage that they can draw on. So, it is rare [the Chinese] operate … exclusively in kind of the gray zone or the regular space."
There are conventional aspects to their operations. They engage in hybrid operations. The Chinese use the diplomatic Belt and Road Initiative as a part of their security strategy.
The U.S. strategy is evolving to ensure deterrence across all domains and in all theaters.
"At the end of the day, this is about deterrence," he said. Taiwan is a flashpoint, and the United States stands by all the understandings with China and the Taiwan Defense Act. Essentially, this boils down to no country changes the status quo by force. "I think we're carefully calibrating what we're doing at any given time to as much as possible, establish that deterrence, dissuade from a military operation into Taiwan."
The other flashpoint with China is their excessive claims in the South and West China Seas. China has their own irregular warfare arm of maritime militias challenging other countries in the region — most notably the Philippines. The Chinese maritime militias are not a conventional military force, but they have "a lot of ability to compel and coerce," Maier said.
The partnerships with the Philippines and others in the region are important to the United States in putting Chinese actions on the record. "At the end of the day, a lot of this type of activity is dissuaded with the ability to put it in the open," he said. "If it's allowed to exist in the shadows, it's going to continue and the coercive effects will be felt."
2. Special ops leaders eye alarming levels of adversary collaboration
I think convergence is an apt description:
Furthering that sentiment, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, head of Special Operations Command, highlighted the “convergence” of adversaries in multiple geographic regions during a Dec. 7 discussion at the Reagan National Defense Forum.
Special ops leaders eye alarming levels of adversary collaboration
militarytimes.com · by Todd South · December 18, 2024
Adversaries of the United States have ramped up partnerships, both in combat and influence operations, in ways that may require the unique intervention abilities of the special operations community to avoid conflict.
Christopher Maier, the outgoing assistant secretary for Special Operations-Low-Intensity Conflict, said today at a Center for a New American Security event that SOF troops have recently increased work in the competition and crisis phases that often precede an armed conflict.
RELATED
The fate of Army Special Operations Forces
The most likely combat is irregular warfare. The Army may cut its lead forces for that kind of fight.
“Progress in recent years has been expanding that aperture to look at competition and crisis as warfighting challenges as opposed to what was often the case in an exercise or tabletop, where we ... fast-forward through [and say], ‘A bunch of things happen, there were some diplomatic things, a little bit of SOF things and that’s war,’” Maier said.
Furthering that sentiment, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, head of Special Operations Command, highlighted the “convergence” of adversaries in multiple geographic regions during a Dec. 7 discussion at the Reagan National Defense Forum.
In the public sphere, these unions have taken shape in the form of more than 12,000 North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine, or Iranian military personnel training Russian troops on munitions the Middle Eastern nation has supplied to Moscow.
“This is not just Russia fighting Ukraine,” Fenton said. “It’s Russia, backed by Iranian drones, North Korean personnel and indirect Chinese contributions.”
Additionally, nation-state adversaries are teaming with non-state actors to achieve goals. That’s been the case for decades between Iran and militias like Hamas and Hezbollah. It’s also true for the Iranians and the Houthis, who have continued to fire on U.S. and civilian ships in the Red Sea over the past year.
“We’re in a decisive decade,” Fenton said. “The convergence of threats demands a convergence of our own capabilities.”
Military Times reported in 2023 on a West Virginia Army National Guard exercise that brought together personnel from all military branches, local law enforcement, government officials and SOF personnel.
The “Ridge Runner” exercise sought to drop participants into a scenario that would mirror what such forces might face in a European theater now. In some ways, it looked a lot like what forces in Ukraine have encountered since Russia invaded the country in 2022.
The SOF personnel involved in the exercise — mostly Army Green Berets — connected local forces with U.S. military capabilities and other government services as their counterparts in the field assisted those local elements in a simulated fight against an “invading force.”
That exercise is indicative of the larger shift in irregular warfare, a practice that has been given a host of labels in recent decades — “gray zone” conflicts, for example. The Pentagon adopted and redefined the term following a shift in the National Defense Strategy to focus military efforts on countering adversaries rather than counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
Combinations of psychological operations, civil affairs and special operations personnel now work closely in smaller teams to assist allies in competing with and deterring Russia, China and Iran in their respective areas.
Deterrence is where much of the SOF work will take place in the years ahead, Maier added. And that, he said, will involve SOF “campaigning,” which has not traditionally been the role of the 70,000-strong U.S. special operations community.
A 2023 CNAS report by Becca Waser, a senior fellow in the CNAS Defense program who served as the moderator at the Dec. 18 event, outlined how the think tank’s experts see SOF and conventional forces evolving.
The campaigning approach links civil government resources with military assets and personnel to respond to challenges from Russia or China, or other events that require military action, such as regional conflicts or natural disasters, according to the report.
The CNAS report advises the Pentagon to develop a more tailored campaigning approach specific to the geographical region where forces are operating.
That gives U.S. planners the chance to build military forces in key areas of the Indo-Pacific and Europe. It also lets military forces showcase new capabilities, weapons and tactics to discourage adversaries from initiating conflict.
Lastly, Waser wrote that campaigning in this region-specific way allows U.S. forces to already be in the area when a crisis arises.
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
3. How Memoirs by American Officials Leave the CIA Out of U.S. Policy in Burma
"America's Rambo Problem"
Excerpts:
The four books reviewed here were all written about by Americans who were trained by the CIA, US military, and the State Department, i.e. “official America.” They share a world view, cultivated on “The Farm” in northern Virginia and in the initiation rituals of the US military and State Department. This world view cultivated consistently puts the lone American at the center of the fight with Soviet Communists, Nazis, Muslim terrorists, Colombian drug dealers, and of course, Burmese generals. It is a Manichaean world in which the Americans are good and their enemies evil, or as President George W. Bush put it after 9/11, “you are either with us or against us.”
,,,
But ultimately, hubris is how a hegemonic globe-straddling empire works. This is not a uniquely American quality, even today. The Chinese are implementing an ambitious plan for building railways across Burma and the rest of Asia. The Burmese generals today share the hubristic idea that they can rule the whole territory inherited from British Burma, despite chronic revolt by the Kachin and many others in what is now known (hubristically perhaps) as the world’s longest on-going civil war.
How Memoirs by American Officials Leave the CIA Out of U.S. Policy in Burma
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/19/how-memoirs-by-american-officials/
by Tony Waters
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12.19.2024 at 06:00am
Burma/Myanmar is a remote corner of the world for American foreign policy. The United States only became involved during World War II, when the Japanese-occupied British colony was a battleground between British India, and China on one side, and Japan on the other. As allies of the British and Chinese, the United States played a significant role in organizing local military units of Kachin, Karen, and others to fight against the Japanese through the work of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On the side of the Japanese from 1942-1944 was the Burma National Army, dominated by ethnic Burmese and led by General Aung San, father of now-imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counselor of Myanmar from 2016-2021. Notably, the Burma National Army switched sides in 1945 and eventually helped drive the Japanese from Burma. In the end, British Burma suffered some of the highest death rates of any British colony during World War II, with 250,000-1 million dead.
After World War II, the OSS dissolved and its remnants later became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Burma shifted from being a battleground against the Japanese to being a front-line against the Chinese Communists, who in 1949 drove out the former Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai Shek. The bulk of the Nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan to establish a Chinese government in exile. Less well-known is that the Nationalist armies from southern China retreated into northern Burma. With the support of CIA-coordinated supply flights from Taiwan and Thailand, these Nationalist Chinese armies would harry the Chinese Communists for another 20 years. At the same time, the Nationalist Chinese armies developed a side-show in the cultivation of opium and the refining of heroin, a program to which the CIA turned a blind eye because of their larger interest in battling Communism in China. The heroin itself found a ready market among the US soldiers in Vietnam, who in turn would introduce the drug to the inner cities of the United States by the 1970s.
Permitting the emergence of heroin labs in northern Burma was of course a strategic mistake by the CIA. President Nixon in response established the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1972, which was assigned the task of eradicating the heroin labs in northern Burma, Laos, and Thailand, which were supplying much of the world’s heroin supply. Clandestine DEA agents were assigned to Thailand and Burma to counter the new trade in heroin which the CIA, while focused on anti-Communism, had let thrive in Burma. The DEA battles in northern Burma would go on for decades more—in fact, they are undoubtedly on-going today. Despite the efforts of the DEA, through a surfeit of arrest warrants and sanctions against Burmese drug dealers and generals, drug production was not eliminated. Rather, it shifted from heroin to methamphetamine in the 1990s.
The involvement of American clandestine services, both the CIA and DEA facilitated by the State Department, in the suppression of both Communism and drug production are hardly unknown stories. Journalists, academics, and retired agents have for decades written about the involvement of the CIA and DEA, particularly in northern Burma. Movies as spectacular as Rambo IV, and the Free Burma Rangers Movie dramatized the role of Americans in Burma battling for righteousness. CIA and DEA agents are known, and many named in print, including three of the four authors reviewed here. All four were deeply involved with the CIA, DEA, and State Department in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. To make the American exceptionalism story-line work, in all four books, the Burmese military is cast as the villains, while the “highland tribes” are the victims. The Americans and their aid programs, of course, are rescuers. This is despite the fact that a former British police officer in the 1920s Burmese Colonial service, George Orwell, shows that hegemony is not always what the powerful say it is.
Barry Broman—Trawling for Traitors
Barry Broman. Risk Taker, Spy Maker: Tales of a CIA Case Officer. Casement Books. 2020.
Barry Broman’s final gig was as a CIA operative in Yangon, Burma, from which he retired in 1996. Broman had an unusual history in Southeast Asia, which makes for an interesting and engaging autobiography. In the early 1960s as a 19-year-old, he spent a year or so as an AP photographer in Bangkok. He then returned to the United States to attend the University of Washington. On graduation with a master’s in Asian studies, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the US Marine Corps, and sent to Quantico for Marine officer training where he learned to “fire every weapon organic to a Marine infantry battalion” including a napalm flame thrower which at one point to his chagrin literally backfired on him. In 1968 he was sent to Vietnam where there were indeed swell adventures, and learned the skills of a Recon Unit whose motto was “Swift, Silent, and Deadly.” His 7-month tour of duty on the battle front was full of helicopters, explosions, firefights, jungle patrols, bombing and adrenaline. And judging from his writing, he liked it! Lucky to survive, he was moved to back offices, and to Thailand where he dealt with “R and R” for American soldiers, which presumably involved making sure young soldiers did not get into too much trouble with drugs and prostitutes.
From Thailand, Broman was sent back to California, where he was recruited by the CIA. He rushed toward the opportunity, requesting that he be assigned to “operations,” which is the directorate where foreign spies are recruited. Broman trained at “The Farm,” the secretive but not-so-secret CIA training facility in northern Virginia. There he learned how to get foreign nationals to spy on behalf of the United States with appeals to ideology, money, and threats. Broman claims that the CIA was scrupulous in following American law, but he points out that the methods need not be legal under local law, which often put “informants” at risk. The CIA used carrots of cash and a visas to the United States to entice foreign nationals. Broman was proud that so far as he knew, none of the informants he recruited were ever caught, imprisoned, or executed, a claim that few of the Cold War CIA recruiters could make.
(Note: Compare Scott Anderson who quotes CIA sources claiming that all of the agents infiltrated into the former Soviet Union or China in the 1950s and 1960s were captured, and Patrick Winn’s account of the torture of DEA confidential informant Saw Lu by both Burmese and Wa forces in Myanmar during the 1990s and 2000s.)
Broman’s relevance to Burma accelerated in the 1990s, when he was assigned to manage spies in Yangon. It was a tough time to collect information—The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was at the height of its most repressive powers. It must have been tough to recruit American spies in a city which was paranoid, and itself specialized in black arts of spying, torture, and imprisonment. From what can be gleaned from Broman’s writing, as well as that of Bertil Lintner and Patrick Winn, it seems that the American CIA and DEA, with the focus on China and anti-drug policing, were deeply involved with the regime, despite official sanctions from the State Department to protest major human rights abuses.
New York warrants for the arrest of drug lords Khun Sa, and Lo Hsing Han were issued in the early 1990s which Americans like Broman presumably tried to serve. This of course never quite happened, as both of the drug lords from the north retired to Yangon as old men, under the protection of SLORC and its successor military regime. Khun Sa moved with his fortune to Yangon and with four young Shan mistresses in 1996 and died at age 73 in 2007. Lo Hsing Han did the same, passing away in 2012. Both merited an obituary in The Economist. Broman’s view is different of course—he repeats CIA dogma and claims that Khun Sa died under carefully supervised house arrest. The fact of the matter is that the indictments were never served like they were on Panama’s President Manuel Noriega in 1990. The United States has not been quite as powerful in Burma, as in Central America.
As for Burma’s drug trade itself, it has survived and thrived in the chaos of the North. Started after World War II with CIA help, northern Burma transformed itself from the world’s greatest producer of heroin to the greatest producer of methamphetamine. About this longer-term context, though, Broman does not comment. But Broman himself apparently did quite well. After retiring from the CIA in 1996, he took up a new career as a photographer and travel writer. He specialized in Burma and used his contacts with the ruling junta to gain access to areas normally off limits to tourists and journalists. He took fantastic photos of remote mountain tribes for National Geographic while protected by the Burmese military. In the end of this section, one is left wondering about what was actually going on between the CIA and the Burmese generals in the 1990s. The State Department publicly was imposing sanctions for human rights abuses and toppling a democratically elected government in 1990-1991, but apparently Broman curried enough favor to get special treatment after transitioning to a career as a travel writer.
Erin Murphy—The CIA Organizes Humanitarianism, the Seventh Fleet, and Hillary Clinton’s Visit
Erin Murphy. Burmese Haze: The US and Myanmar’s Opening and Closing. Columbia University Press. 2022.
Erin Murphy had a more conventional career at the CIA, having degrees from Tufts and Johns Hopkins Universities, two years in Japan as an English teacher, followed by positions in Washington area consultancies. From there she was hired by the CIA, where she was the desk officer for Burma from 2007-2011, and later reassigned to Hillary Clinton’s State Department for a brief time in 2011-2012 when Burma was transitioning from strict military control to a semi-democratic regime.
Murphy’s first major concern as the CIA desk officer was Typhoon Nargis which emerged in late April 2008 from the Bay of Bengal, just as she took over the Burma desk in Washington. Her account of how the typhoon was dealt with is interesting, not just for the logistics involved which were impressive, but also for how the American diplomatic regime viewed the problem. To recap, just as Burma was getting ready for elections scheduled for May 2008, Typhoon Nargis arrived in Myanmar on April 27. Nargis would remain until May 7, causing unprecedented destruction and death in the densely populated Irrawaddy River Delta.
As is well-documented, the response of the military government to Typhoon Nargis was weak; the military lacked the resources and legitimacy to undertake even the most basic survey and rescue work. Ever-wary of foreigners, the military did not seek the assistance of the United States or the other nations proffering resources.
In hopes of being invited to deliver relief supplies, President George W. Bush, with the advice of Burma analysts like Erin Murphy, sent the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, and offered to use American military assets to provide humanitarian relief. The Burmese military government, paranoid about foreign involvement after decades of interference from the British, Japanese, Americans, and Chinese, was hesitant about inviting the American military into Burma, particularly given the reputation of the Seventh Fleet. Besides supporting operations in America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Seventh Fleet is remembered well in Southeast Asia for having supported Pakistan during Bangladesh’s Revolution in 1971, as well as the American operations in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
The story of American-Myanmar relations in 2008 became particularly strange, as Murphy relates how the Myanmar military government finally relented and allowed American relief flights to land at the Yangon airport. The capacity of the air control staff was inadequate she writes, for the suddenly increased flight schedule, and the large American military planes. Murphy boasts that this problem was quickly addressed when US embassy personnel rushed in to take charge of flight operations at the Yangon Airport, facilitating the arrival of humanitarian relief. Why the US Embassy had flight controllers on staff, Murphy never says—or perhaps the reason was redacted by the CIA censors of her book.
The rest of Murphy’s time on the CIA’s Burma desk was spent watching rapidly unfolding events, some of which led to the happier result of a “democratic transition” which underpinned freer elections in the 2010s. She tells the story well of the rather strange election in May 2008, which approved the new Constitution. This election was notable due to implausibly massive voter turnout, even in the flooded Irrawaddy River Delta. This was followed by the 2010 election in which the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted. The military parties easily won, but also released NLD’s leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the country’s founder General Aung San, after their victory.
The 2010 election and the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were opportunities the United States needed to reset relations. In November-December 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited both the new military leader General Thein Sein and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on the first visit by an American Secretary of State to Myanmar. Murphy was deeply involved in planning this visit and provides detail about the logistics involved, including the film and book library carried on Clinton’s plane, and the fact that Nay Pyi Taw’s airport was too small to receive Clinton’s plane safely (the Americans suggested that one of Nay Pyi Taw’s roads be cleared instead). The talks of course were formal and diplomatic. Murphy describes with pride how smart Clinton was in dealing with her Burmese counterparts, including bringing dog toys for Daw Aung San Kyi’s canine friends. Murphy was particularly pleased that Myanmar’s Parliamentary Speaker Shwe Mann refrained from a long lecture on Burmese-American history, which would have presumably been about CIA involvement in northern Burma. Speaker Mann also seemed responsive, Murphy writes, to Clinton’s demands for American-style financial accountability.
The by-election of April 1, 2012, was the first open election in Myanmar for decades and the NLD swept 43 of 45 available seats, so General Aung San’s daughter entered Parliament as the new leader of the opposition. Justifiably, this was viewed as a triumph of western diplomacy. Americans and others proudly (and prematurely) pointed to the successful transition to open markets and democracy. As for Murphy, she resigned from government service in 2013 and set up a consulting company in Washington to help funnel US aid to Burma, particularly with respect to joint ventures between American and Myanmar companies. But then on February 1, 2021, the results of the elections of 2012, 2015, and 2020 were annulled in a coup. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was again imprisoned, and the military resumed control.
Scot Maciel—Official America’s See No CIA Policy?
Scot Macial. Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia. Stanford: Rowman and Littlefield. 2023.
Scot Maciel was not with the CIA, but the State Department. He had a diplomatic career, starting in The Philippines in 1985-1986, and in the early 1990s, he helped establish the US Embassy in Hanoi (1993-1996) after the two countries established diplomatic relations. He then moved on to Hong Kong and was present during the handover from Great Britain to China in 1997.
Maciel eventually moved on to senior positions, mostly in Southeast Asia and/or in Washington DC. From 2008-2010 he was Ambassador to ASEAN based in Washington, then Ambassador to Indonesia (2010-2013), and Ambassador to Burma (2016-2020). As Ambassador to Burma, he was in charge of the ten buildings of the new US Embassy built on ten acres on Inya Lake completed in 2007, the same place that Erin Murphy would claim air traffic controllers popped out of during the Typhoon Nargis relief operation in 2008. According to leaked documents, this building is the site of a major intelligence gathering operation for the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA).
Maciel’s book is primarily about why the US view of the “partnership” with often-times authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia are so difficult. The Southeast Asians are “imperfect partners,” for the United States because of long-term anti-democratic practices including military rule, thwarted elections, authoritarianism and human rights abuses in countries like Burma. But really, this is only one side of the “imperfection.” The other side is long-term American policies of siding with the same authoritarianism which Maciel ironically critiques.
The United States has a deep history in Southeast Asia, having fought its first war in 1898-1902 in order to become the colonizer in the Philippines (1898-1946). The United States was also the protagonist in what Vietnamese call “The American War” (1954-1975), and based troops throughout the region before and after their war in Vietnam. As a world power, the United States often chose sides in coup-prone region, selecting “partners” in The Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar.
Given America’s central role in the region for the last century, and the fact that the OSS and CIA were early participants in the Cold War, it would be expected that a book called Imperfect Partners would put the CIA at the center. But the CIA (and OSS and DEA) do not even merit an index entry in Maciel’s book. For scholars of Southeast Asia, this is a gaping lacuna. I would presume that as a US ambassador with a deep knowledge of Southeast Asia, Maciel knew Erin Murphy, and Barry Broman, but they too are missing from the book. As is Amaryllis Fox, and of course Sylvester Stallone’s Rambo. The statues of the World War II-era OSS officer and his Kachin guide erected on the grounds of the massive US compound in Yangon are also not mentioned. Such omissions are glaring in a book sub-titled Imperfect Partners.
Amaryllis Fox—Lone Hero Serving Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Resistance
Amaryllis Fox. Life Undercover: Coming of Age in the CIA. Random House. 2019.
Amaryllis Fox has perhaps the most fantastical Burma story of the three CIA officials reviewed here. She claims to have gotten her start in spycraft as a freelance 19-year-old volunteering in Mae Sot, Thailand, on Burma’s border for a dissident magazine, after having done a high school report about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s record as a non-violent activist. In Mae Sot, the young idealist became a “pigeon,” i.e. a courier, smuggling contraband for the resistance. On a tourist trip to Yangon she claims she taped a personal interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi which, she smuggled out in a body cavity. Arrested on her way out of the country, she spent a brief time in custody where she heard prisoners being tortured, before flying back to Bangkok. The police did not apparently discover the well-hidden interview tape. Amaryllis Fox’s book is criticized by reviewers as being implausible—the details in places are sometimes wrong and it seems highly unlikely that an inexperienced 19 year old would have been granted the level of trust by dissidents, the NLD, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself.
On the basis of such work, Amaryllis Fox went to Oxford receiving a Bachelor’s degree, and followed onto Georgetown University to study National Security Studies. Here the idealist was recruited by the CIA. She was sent for training as a CIA undercover operative at “The Farm.” She briefly worked for the CIA near Washington DC where she interviewed prisoners from the Global War on Terror, and helped identify targets for “rendition” to CIA prisons. Later she worked undercover as an art dealer mostly in the Middle East and China for seven years, seeking assets willing to betray their country during the War on Terror. After finishing her CIA work she wrote this book, and became a radio and television personality campaigning for peace. She also married Robert F. Kennedy III and in 2024 was the Campaign Director for her Father-in-Law, Robert F. Kennedy II in his campaign for US President.
Of the memoirists reviewed here, Fox is the only one to have a moral imagination when it comes to the foreign policy of the United States and the practices of the CIA. She left the CIA questioning how damaged the reputation of the United States abroad became as a result of its policies that value American life over all others. An exchange she recalled during her assignment at CIA headquarters is telling. She had identified how the CIA routinely kidnapped (renditioned) innocent people in the Global War on Terror due to systematic translation errors.
“Okay,” [Fox’s supervisor] says, eyes still glued to her screen. “You’re authorized to fix it.”
I’m at a loss for what to say. I’m a first-year trainee. How am I supposed to fix it? For a second, there’s just the clicking of her fingers on the keys.
“Fine,” I reply, “but you need to stop the renditions until I do.”
Now she looks at me. “Are you out of your goddamned mind?”
“We’re kidnapping random, innocent people—”
She interrupts me: “You want to answer to Congress, kid? Come another 9/11, I’d rather say we rendered a hundred innocent assholes than tell them we let one fucking terrorist go free.”
“I think you have it backward,” I mumble.
“What?”
“The quote. It’s Benjamin Franklin. ‘Better one hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.’”
She locks eyes with me and says, “He was talking about Americans.” (pp. 86-87).
America’s Rambo Problem and the CIA
John Rambo is a fictional character and Sylvester Stallone is a movie maker, not an American intelligence agent. The film franchise is about a veteran of the Vietnam War who feels betrayed by the incompetence of the desk bound policymakers (like Murphy and Maciel). These policies were viewed as ones that put so many perfect American youth in danger, and then abandoned them and their Vietnamese allies to evil Asian enemies. The only solution is to go rogue. Rambo concludes, write your own rules, break local laws, and triumph in the end. In other words, to be as Barry Brogan learned in the Marines, “swift, silent, and deadly.”
The fourth film of the Rambo franchise is about an operation to rescue kidnapped American Christian missionaries living in Burma. Rambo being Rambo, he goes in guns blazing and by some counts kills 400 Burmese soldiers almost singlehandedly. He then rescues the family with the help of Christian Karen rebels. As an American archetype, the story is well, archetypical. An American hero is at the center who shoots straight, fairly, and always wins against the bad guys. As for the Burmese military they do not shoot straight, fight unfairly, and in the end lose.
The Rambo movie was not so popular in official Myanmar and was banned by a government embarrassed about the fictional incompetence of the ferocious Tatmadaw. (Which of course made the film even more of a delight for the Karen National Army soldiers, who enjoyed watching the demise of the hated Burmese army, even in fiction.) In other words, Rambo IV is a movie version of the Kachin-OSS statues on the grounds of the US Embassy in Yangon.
I bring up the Rambo tale told by Sylvester Stallone because in an exaggerated way (after all it is a movie!), the archetype is reflected in the writing of the three CIA agents in particular. The CIA’s “Farm” creates an illusion that foreign policy can be steered through the work of secret agents, people who are able to monopolize information that others do not have, and cleverly dominate in the name of a perfect American righteousness, be they John Rambo, Amarylis Fox, or Barry Broman. The problem is that the analysts like Erin Murphy and Scot Maciel get caught up in the belief in America’s exceptional righteousness and come up with the fiction that the Seventh Fleet and the CIA are effective tools to deliver humanitarian relief, or that American-style elections will provide enough political legitimacy to avoid a coup. As in Rambo’s fictional world the individual hero is central, which is perhaps why the Rambo franchise sells so well with American audiences who dream of a righteous world.
American Policy Toward Myanmar: The Imperfect American Partners
Sometime in 2003, American OSS veterans visited the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina in northern Myanmar. There they found a memorial to the defeated Japanese soldiers killed during World War II. They resolved to build a monument to American OSS Detachment 101. They supported the Kachin military units’ fight against the Japanese alongside the colonial British Army.
The American OSS agents commemorated had parachuted in to work with the Kachin and were known for their stealth, bravery, and skill. From 1942-1945 they helped organize espionage and sabotage operations against the Japanese and Japan’s ally, the Burma National Army (BNA), which was led by General Aung San. Their war with Japan and their allies was indeed swift, silent, and deadly, and both Japanese soldiers and Burmese civilians died in great numbers.
Following the Allied victory, the Kachin units were re-integrated into the British Colonial army. By the end of 1945, the British wrested control over the colony from both the Japanese and General Aung San’s independence forces, with the assistance of their swift, silent, and deadly American allies.
General Aung San, former Minister of Defense in the Japanese-led government, was of course disappointed. He sought independence from first the British (1930s-1942), but also the Japanese (1944-1945). Despite a brief alliance with the Allies in 1945, he wanted independence from all foreign powers. As for the Kachin soldiers, they remained a unit of the British military after World War II, before being briefly folded into the new Burma Army after independence in 1948. Remnants of these forces would return to Kachin State, where they cooperated with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) starting in the Burmese Civil War (1948-1950) and again when the Kachin revolt restarted in the 1960s in cooperation with the BCP.
Elements of this revolt continue today, which is why the statue intended for erection in Myitkyina, was instead flown to Yangon where it was eventually installed at the massive new US Embassy compound then under construction. As for the second statue, the police showed up at the artist’s studio one day, seized the statue (which is rumored to still be at the bottom of the Irrawaddy River), and arrested the artist. The artist fortunately escaped and was granted asylum by the United States. A smaller version (6” tall “maquette”) of the statue was eventually found at the bottom of the Irrawaddy, and now has an honored place at Washington’s CIA headquarters. The US embassy of course asserts the statue is a symbol of United States-Burmese cooperation.
This is a round-about way of saying that relations with the United States and Burma are complicated, and very imperfect. From the Burmese perspective. This goes back to World War II when the clandestine OSS, renamed as the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, began picking and choosing allies in pursuit of American geo-political goals. An early choice made during World War II was to support the British against the Japanese invaders and their Burmese allies. I suspect from the Burmese military perspective the statue reflects a story of division, and betrayal. After all, the Kachin soldier was not only allied with the American OSS spy, he was also a tool of British colonialism. Since at least 1961, he has also been a symbol of the revolts in the north of Burma against the central government which continue today.
Hubris is how Hegemonic Empire Works
The four books reviewed here were all written about by Americans who were trained by the CIA, US military, and the State Department, i.e. “official America.” They share a world view, cultivated on “The Farm” in northern Virginia and in the initiation rituals of the US military and State Department. This world view cultivated consistently puts the lone American at the center of the fight with Soviet Communists, Nazis, Muslim terrorists, Colombian drug dealers, and of course, Burmese generals. It is a Manichaean world in which the Americans are good and their enemies evil, or as President George W. Bush put it after 9/11, “you are either with us or against us.”
And this of course is the ethic that moves consistently throughout the books reviewed here. It is seen in the actions of the former OSS agents who commissioned the statues, the policies in America’s War on Drugs, and filmmakers like Sylvester Stallone. Only Amaryllis Fox began to question such assumptions, wondering how her supervisor could misuse the Benjamin Franklin quote to justify the kidnapping of innocent people. None of the four books acknowledge the substantial public literature about CIA involvement in Myanmar since World War II even though ironically, Broman himself gave interviews to Patrick Winn for his book Narcotopia, describing CIA/DEA turf fights in Burma, which go unremarked upon in Broman’s own book. (Note: Winn p. 341 n. 23 for mention of Broman. See also Alfred McCoy’s The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia and Bertil Lintner’s Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 for extensive histories of the CIA and DEA activity in northern Burma.)
George Orwell is perhaps the greatest English writer Burma ever produced. He was a colonial officer in Burma who knew something about the hubris of the powerful outsider and used it to write an important essay, “Shooting an Elephant,” about the folly of being a powerful man with a gun in colonial Burma. As Orwell emphasizes in his essay, even though you have the biggest gun and you shoot the elephant to please the crowd, the crowd still hates you because you represent the outside colonizer. The same applies to the Americans with their Seventh Fleet and long arm of the CIA. You can deliver humanitarian aid from the Seventh Fleet, but the Seventh Fleet is, by its very nature, an existential threat.
Emma Larkin in her literary biography of Orwell, Finding George Orwell in Burma recalled what one wise Burmese man told her about Orwell, hubris, and Burma. The man said Orwell was The Prophet for predicting the catastrophe of twentieth century Burmese history. Orwell’s first book was Burmese Days, which was about the futility of British colonialist hubris. The next was Animal Farm, which was about the Burmese army would emerge from 1962-1990 to rule as an authoritarian dictatorship isolated from the broader world. The third was the most terrifying of all. 1984, which predicted the totalitarian police state known by its Orwellian acronym SLORC in the 1990s when Barry Broman was in Yangon. This was the Burmese military government which developed its totalitarian police apparatus to its most perfect level.
But ultimately, hubris is how a hegemonic globe-straddling empire works. This is not a uniquely American quality, even today. The Chinese are implementing an ambitious plan for building railways across Burma and the rest of Asia. The Burmese generals today share the hubristic idea that they can rule the whole territory inherited from British Burma, despite chronic revolt by the Kachin and many others in what is now known (hubristically perhaps) as the world’s longest on-going civil war.
Tags: Burma, CIA, Foreign Policy, Myanmar
About The Author
- Tony Waters
- Dr. Tony Waters is a Visiting Professor at Leuphana University in Germany. He is a Sociologist who in recent years has written about Southeast Asian issues. His latest book is General Ne Win’s Legacy of Burmanization in Myanmar. Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan. Before that he was the translator and editor for the Thai writer Rong Wongsavun’s book The Man from Bangkok: San Francisco Culture in the 60s (Thailand: White Lotus Books).
4. 2024 China Military Power Report
The entire 182 page report is at this link: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
The 2 page Fact Sheet is at this link: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF
2024 China Military Power Report
defense.gov
2024 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
The Department of Defense publicly released its annual report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), commonly known as the China Military Power Report (CMPR), on December 18, 2024.
This congressionally mandated report charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic and military strategy, and offers insights into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. The CMPR illustrates why the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the Department’s top pacing challenge.
Read the full China Military Power Report (CMPR)
Key Takeaways
The PRC aims to accrue national power through political, social, economic, technological, and military development to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. With this power, the PRC seeks to revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests.
Since late 2023, the PLA reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of U.S. platforms compared to the previous two years, though it continues to conduct unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.
The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and has advanced its development of both conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies over the past 20 years. Similarly, the PRC is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, weapons, and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.
In 2023, the PRC increased diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout the year, the PRC continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and Air Defense Identification Zone, and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.
In 2023, the PRC maintained robust support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. It promoted Russian narratives blaming the United States and NATO for the war, buoyed Russia’s economy against international sanctions, and sold Russia dual use inputs that Russia’s military industries rely on. The PRC almost certainly is applying lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine toward its own strategic objectives and coercive activities
In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DOD requests for communication; then, in November 2023, President Biden and PRC leader President Xi Jinping agreed that the United States and the PRC would resume military-to-military communication at all levels. DOD is committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict.
PLA Trends in the Indo-Pacific Region
Special Topic: Impacts of Corruption on the PLA. In 2023, the PLA experienced revelations of a new wave of senior leader corruption, which may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward its stated modernization goals. This wave of corruption touches every service in the PLA, and it may have shaken Beijing’s confidence in high-ranking PLA officials. Rooting out corruption in the military had been a major focus for Xi Jinping since 2012.
Special Topic: Political Training in the PLA. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) extends control of the PLA at every level of command using a dual-command structure, by which each PLA unit at or above the regimental command is headed by a military commander and political commissar. The military commander and political commissar are considered equals and share joint leadership in issuing orders and daily tasks.
Special Topic: PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power across multiple domains in the international system. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.
In 2023, PRC leaders continued to call on the PLA to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate. In this context, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for itself.
One key part of this defense policy is the PRC’s approach to counter-intervention, which aims to restrict lawful U.S. presence in the East and South China Sea regions and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the PRC is strengthening its reach farther into the Pacific Ocean and beyond.
At the end of 2023, PRC leaders claimed their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an international environment favorable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.
The PLA made uneven progress toward its 2027 capability milestone for modernization, which, if realized, could make the PLA a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.
In 2023, the PRC continued the development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PLA’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy.”
DOD estimates that the PRC possessed more than 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid-2024. DOD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue growing its force through at least 2035.
The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or if ordered defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain.
Read the full China Military Power Report (CMPR) Read the DOD Fact Sheet
defense.gov
5. What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and Consequences
Excerpts:
In sum, nothing revealed in the report suggests problems sufficient to frustrate Xi’s pursuit of his top-priority target: military modernization to help assert control over Taiwan first and foremost. The purging of former Central Military Commission vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong in 2014 and 2015, respectively, was far more significant than Miao’s fall as a lower-ranking commission member. Yet in the decade since, China has attained the most dramatic military buildup since World War II, with definite improvements in organization and human capacity in addition to the “designer clothes” hardware that all but overflows from the report’s data-packed pages. The best explanation for all that the Pentagon, and we readers, can see is that Xi is accepting political and organizational risk up front to maximize his system’s strengths and his own ability to advance his larger goals perhaps somewhat further down the road.
This is the bigger picture that we lose sight of at our own risk. Revealing China’s weaknesses to deter and buy time is part of the strategy we need, but only part; we must not fool ourselves into complacency. The other part is recognizing that Xi is a man on a mission with a military to match and urgently shoring up defenses and deterrence while we still have time.
What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and Consequences - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Andrew Erickson · December 19, 2024
China’s military is both corrupt and increasingly capable. Yesterday, the Pentagon released its 24th China Military Power Report since Congress initiated its mandate in 2000, offering revelations unavailable elsewhere. The document reveals new details of the most dramatic military buildup since World War II, ongoing challenges that Chairman Xi Jinping and his party army are addressing with determination, and context to interpret what it all means. The bottom line: endemic corruption and lingering personnel and organizational weaknesses must be weighed against the Chinese Communist Party’s unrivaled ability to marshal resources and its ongoing production and deployment of advanced military systems on an unmatched industrial scale. Xi commands a system riven by brutal elite power struggles, but he is determined to pursue control over Taiwan with an increasingly potent toolkit. With deadly seriousness, he continues to advance sweeping organizational reforms to maximize relevant warfighting capabilities in fulfillment of his Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027, even at the cost of short-term churn and challenges.
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Dramatic Developments: Nuclear Weapons, Manifold Missiles, Operational Options
Nothing looms larger than China’s determined advancements in nuclear weapons — arguably the ultimate military capability. By the report’s suspense date of “early 2024,” China already had more than 600 operational nuclear warheads, a surge from the more than 500 tabulated in last year’s edition. All of China’s roughly 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach the continental United States.
China will likely have more than 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, most fielded on systems capable of ranging America’s homeland, many deployed at higher readiness. Stockpile growth will continue through 2035, which the Pentagon’s 2023 report projected “in line with previous estimates” and by which time the 2022 edition anticipated 1,500 warheads. Additional advanced nuclear delivery systems likely under development include strategic hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment systems, the latter at least partially demonstrated in a 2021 test. These frontier efforts draw on potent dynamics, with the report judging that China “has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.”
Three new silo fields add 320 silos for solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles. China is also more than doubling its DF-5 liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile force to likely 50 silos. As part of an effort to upgrade older intercontinental ballistic missile families, including with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, at least 30 new silos will hold the DF-5C. The Pentagon also anticipates possible silo and rail deployment of DF-41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, which have up to three warheads each.
Already, China’s rocket force keeps some nuclear forces on heightened alert. New silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, at least three early warning satellites, and Russian assistance portend movement toward “early warning counterstrike” posture — what the United States terms “launch on warning.” In 2023, China test-launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles from training silos in western China. This suggests at least some new silo-based units will assume a launch on warning posture.
As the second leg of China’s nuclear triad, Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines conduct near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols. They can deploy the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which can reach the continental United States from South China Sea or Bohai Gulf bastions. Type 094 production continues beyond today’s six deployed hulls, even though the improved Type 096 — to employ a submarine-launched ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles — is slated to begin production in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon allows for the possibility of 096 delays motivating the 094’s continued production, while alternatively positing “an effort to accelerate [China’s] sea-based nuclear capability as Xi has directed.” Xi’s rush to prepare for possible war over Taiwan on his watch supports the latter explanation. Rounding out China’s nuclear triad, the H-6N bomber can carry an air-launched ballistic missile, while an H-20 stealth bomber with a range of more than 10,000 kilometers is under development.
To rapidly build additional nuclear warheads, China needs copious plutonium. Moscow is literally fueling Beijing’s nuclear weapons production. Russia has provided highly enriched uranium nuclear fuel assemblies to China’s two fast breeder reactors, the first already completed. In one of countless fabrications that the Pentagon documents, Chinese officials insist CFR-600 reactors are for peaceful and civilian purposes. This belies the amount of Russian-provided highly enriched uranium China has received for these reactors, which is “more than the entire amount removed worldwide under U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices in the last three decades.”
Beijing’s nuclear buildup reflects determination to have usable military options on every rung of the escalation ladder. The urgency to do so is amplified by perceptions that China faces military competition, crisis, and possibly even conflict with America — the last most likely regarding Taiwan. Accordingly, China seeks to deter American and allied intervention in a Taiwan-related scenario if possible and control escalation if necessary: “The [People’s Liberation Army’s] expanding nuclear force will enable it to target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than ever before in a potential nuclear conflict.” That overriding priority is the only sufficient explanation for the dramatic departure under Xi from previous relative numerical restraint in nuclear weapons.
Beyond the nuclear weapons backstop, Beijing’s “counter-intervention” strategy and multi-domain precision warfare operations overwhelmingly emphasize multifarious missiles capable of delivering a full range of conventional payloads to all conceivable targets. For example, China has simulated “Joint Firepower Strike Operations” against Taiwan, in part by live-firing PCH191 close-range ballistic missiles in its 2022 exercises, and drilling with the missile in its 2023 exercises. This precision missile system would play a critical role in joint fires during a Taiwan campaign. These drills similarly showcased significant maritime force readiness and surge capacity. Additionally, China’s four Type 093B Shang III guided-missile nuclear attack submarines, three of which may be operational by some time next year, may have land-attack cruise missiles — a trend likely to spread to major warships.
Given concerns about U.S. Navy and allied forces’ involvement, China has leveraged decades of emphasis on ballistic missiles into five different types of anti-ship ballistic missiles. China’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, is capable of rapid in-field reloading. The DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile variant can rapidly be swapped with conventional and nuclear land-attack alternatives—the DF-26 is capable of nuclear precision strikes, potentially with low-yield optionality. In addition to conventional anti-ship and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads, China’s numerous DF-17s have a hypersonic glide vehicle to evade U.S. and allied radar and ballistic missile defense.
DF-27 ballistic missiles with a 5,000- to 8,000-kilometer range are newly deployed. In addition to their conventional anti-ship mode, they can carry hypersonic and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads. Potential targets include Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii.
Finally, the YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile has been test-fired from a Type 055 Renhai cruiser. China’s eight massive carrier-escorting Renhais merit special emphasis, with their advanced sensors and communications, as well as 112 vertical launch tubes accommodating multifarious missiles: land-attack, anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine.Across the Board: Pushing Frontiers in Power Projection
While Taiwan and other disputed sovereignty claims within the First Island Chain are clearly China’s primary military focus, it is simultaneously pursuing a “world-class” military — equal or superior to the U.S. military — in keeping with its 2035 and 2049 development goals. This inherently requires global reach and cutting-edge operations in all domains. For further details regarding China’s dramatic launch rates, orbited systems including satellites and space planes, and ground- and space-based counterspace capabilities of concern, readers should consult the U.S. Space Force’s “Space Threat Fact Sheet.”
The world’s second largest defense budget, which the Pentagon estimates at $330 to $450 billion, offers sufficient resources for comprehensive progress. China’s status as the world’s fourth largest arms supplier provides additional revenue. At more than 2 million active, 510,000 reserve, and 500,000 paramilitary personnel, the world’s largest military force has the people to cover its comprehensive missions.
China’s navy already has more than 370 ships and submarines (including more than 140 major surface combatants) — not counting the 22 Type 056 Jiangdao corvettes it transferred to the coast guard or the approximately 60 Type 022 Houbei missile catamarans it retains. The Pentagon forecasts 395 battle force ships by 2025, including 65 submarines, and 435 by 2030, including 80 submarines. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s continued lack of an update to its 2015 report on China’s Navy is a glaring omission that one hopes will be rectified soonest.
Rapidly approaching American technology standards, and finally powered by workable indigenous engines, China’s air force has 51 Y-20A heavy lift transports, whose up to 2,400-nautical-mile range may be extended by 16 Y-20U tankers. In addition to its base in Djibouti, where China stations 400 marines, it seeks bases and access points to extend its forces’ reach.
Conclusion: Corruption, Competence, Capabilities
One of the most important questions that emerges from the Pentagon’s new report is: “How good is China’s military, and what does it all mean?” Part of the answer lies in the first and second of its three “Special Topics,” respectively covering the impacts of corruption in China’s military and political training in the force. The report’s early 2024 suspense date precludes it from including the latest personnel details, most dramatically the recent fall of Adm. Miao Hua from the Central Military Commission. However, the report provides ample context for understanding these important issues writ large.
In its dedicated section on corruption, as elsewhere across its many pages, the Pentagon document does an admirable job of explaining what many all too often confuse if not actively misrepresent — “2027” is absolutely not a U.S. government construction or estimate per se, but rather Xi’s own grand plan: the Centennial Military Building Goal, a capabilities development deadline requiring China’s armed forces, inter alia, to give Xi a full toolbox of military operational options against Taiwan by 2027. The report rightly highlights the corruption-related investigations and removal of 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives between July and December 2023. It speculates that this could have disrupted China’s 2027 modernization goals.
That statement should be understood in light of the tremendous military progress that the Pentagon documents throughout, which is clearly ongoing despite the impact of politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs on China’s military to the extent that some “dirty laundry” occasionally emerges — but they are fundamentally a speedbump, not a showstopper. With some of the world’s greatest military resources at his command, Xi is pressing ahead with determination. If Xi were not safely in command of China’s military, he would not have visited Spain, Brazil, Peru, and Morocco — or anywhere abroad—in November 2024. If there were prohibitive concerns about their disloyalty or disarray, China’s armed forces would not have been directed to conduct extensive operations around Taiwan just now. If the imprisonment of former China State Shipbuilding Corporation chairman Hu Wenming, who oversaw China’s aircraft carrier development program, and his general manager Sun Bo reflected fundamental defects in naval shipbuilding, we would not be facing the formidable armada hitting the waters today.
Despite all the drama and “palace intrigue,” we must never lose sight of an important paradox: China has the world’s largest bureaucracy to propagandize its greatest strengths while hiding (or at least dismissing) its greatest weaknesses. America, by contrast, ultimately bares all for all to see. It is an elementary analytical error to confuse the respective great powers’ “dirty laundry” with their “designer clothes.”
China’s “designer clothes” include some of the world’s most numerous and diverse missile systems, whose frontier technologies include some of the world’s most advanced hypersonic glide vehicles — a force to be reckoned with, by any measure. The relentless development and deployment of the impressive hardware documented throughout the report would be simply impossible if corruption and executive removals left China’s defense industry in disarray.
China’s “dirty laundry” includes endemic graft, pay-to-play, and other influence peddling, and its periodic weaponization in brutal elite political struggles, sometimes with direct impact within its party army. It’s not a bug — it’s an enduring feature of a system in which the party is inherently above the law. Admiral Miao Hua’s fall is but the latest example. There have been many others, and there will be many more. Indeed, given the way investigations tend to unravel personal patronage networks, some big new shoes may be dropping soon.
On the one hand, Xi undoubtedly faces elite power competition, particularly when he makes decisions that turn out to be unsuccessful or controversial (such as his longtime support of his former loyalist Miao). But on the other hand, Xi clearly continues to engage in ambitious military restructuring efforts that prioritize improvements in warfighting capabilities. These efforts would only be possible and desirable for a leader reasonably secure in his position and thus able to impose some of the most demanding requirements conceivable on China’s armed forces. A weak and vulnerable leader, by contrast, would be far more likely to “go along to get along” with superficial military showcasing and coddling of prominent military stakeholders, or a more “hands-off” approach akin to that of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao.
The most sweeping, telling recent element of Xi’s continued defense reforms, as discussed throughout the report, is arguably his disestablishment of the Strategic Support Force on 19 April 2024 — the very force he created in 2015. He has reassigned its subordinate forces, the Aerospace Force and the Cyberspace Force, directly under the Central Military Commission. To these, he has added a new Information Support Force. These reforms are challenging, as the Pentagon explains in detailing their complex nature, but are required to give China’s military the best possible network and communication systems management to enable the successful prosecution of high-end warfare against the most capable opponent(s). The last is clearly what Xi is prioritizing.
Another revealing element of ongoing military reforms under Xi documented in multiple sections of the report is the transfer in 2023 of many shore-based units, including 300 fighter aircraft (e.g., all JH-7 maritime strike fighter-bombers) as well as all H-6J maritime strike bombers, from the navy to the air force so that the former can focus on carrier aviation, the latter on command and control as well as integrated air defense. China’s air force thus acquired fixed-wing combat aviation units, radar and air defense units, and related facilities that had long belonged to its navy, which surely opposed relinquishing them. Only a powerful, warfighting-focused leader would have the capability and intention to kick the hornet’s nest of interservice rivalry in the service of advancing unforgiving combat power.
In sum, nothing revealed in the report suggests problems sufficient to frustrate Xi’s pursuit of his top-priority target: military modernization to help assert control over Taiwan first and foremost. The purging of former Central Military Commission vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong in 2014 and 2015, respectively, was far more significant than Miao’s fall as a lower-ranking commission member. Yet in the decade since, China has attained the most dramatic military buildup since World War II, with definite improvements in organization and human capacity in addition to the “designer clothes” hardware that all but overflows from the report’s data-packed pages. The best explanation for all that the Pentagon, and we readers, can see is that Xi is accepting political and organizational risk up front to maximize his system’s strengths and his own ability to advance his larger goals perhaps somewhat further down the road.
This is the bigger picture that we lose sight of at our own risk. Revealing China’s weaknesses to deter and buy time is part of the strategy we need, but only part; we must not fool ourselves into complacency. The other part is recognizing that Xi is a man on a mission with a military to match and urgently shoring up defenses and deterrence while we still have time.
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Andrew S. Erickson, PhD, is a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and visiting scholar at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. In 2024 he received the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Andrew Erickson · December 19, 2024
6. Regional Basing of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)
I mean no disrespect to the SFABs, their soldiers, and the important work they are doing. But before we think about stationing SFAB s in regions (specifically in foreign countries) we really need to consider that we need at least 1 Special Forces battalion permanently stationed in each region and better yet 2. I would put the 1st and 4th battalions of each Special Forces Group with elements of PSYOP and Civil Affairs battalions permanently stationed in each region (understanding the difficult political challenges in each region and especially Africa).
In the proposal below the only overseas location recommended is Poland. The others are CONUS based and Hawaii which is fine.
But another question we should be asking is who is orchestrating and synchronizing the entire comprehensive IW campaign in each theater, ensuring the right force for the right missions (SOF, SFABs, FAOa, and conventional forces) and measuring the effects to reshape the campaign as required? Where is the IW proficient campaign HQ? I fear we are still executing "random acts of touching" (as we used to call JCETs back in the day) not ensuring every activity is nested in the campaign to contribute to achieving the desired effects in support of the country team strategy, the regional strategy and national security strategy.
Conclusion:
Renee Novakoff’s article focuses on the IW practitioner and what the Army should do to develop and refine their skills, including regional expertise. Though the SFABs’ combat advisors are not IW specialists, their tasks and purpose often rhyme with those of SOF personnel. This includes the requirements for language proficiency and cultural knowledge. Basing SFABs in the regions in which they are aligned can build a cadre of regional aces. Doing so can provide insight into areas of the world that the Army needs to unlock its potential when working with regional allies and partners.
Furthermore, this cadre of regional aces, armed with their understanding of their particular region or country, could reinforce the efforts of IW practitioners and other SOF regional experts. Additionally, the Army has Foreign Area Officers (FAO) stationed at US embassies around the world. These FAOs should be leveraged in coordination with SFAB specialists, and SOF personnel to enhance host-nation defense and host-nation security capabilities. Personnel with regional expertise, whether they come from a conventional or SOF background, can only serve to enhance our understanding of key areas of the globe as we continue to engage in those areas as well as plan for more robust forms of engagement. It’s an idea worth considering.
Regional Basing of Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/19/regional-basing-of-security-force-assistance-brigades-sfabs/
by Morgan Smiley
|
12.19.2024 at 06:00am
In a recent Small Wars Journal article by Renee Novakoff titled Irregular Warfare: Back to Basics, Novakoff cites regional expertise as one of the areas irregular warfare (IW) practitioners need to reinvigorate. While IW experts certainly need this experience, the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) also require this expertise. The SFABs are regionally aligned brigades born out of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the demand that the GWOT placed on the Army for security force assistance (SFA) and combat advisors. Nevertheless, the SFABs can gain and maintain regional expertise by permanently basing each of the brigades in their respective regions of alignment.
Novakoff points out that one of the ways in which forces can achieve IW success is through “knowledge of a people’s attitudes, beliefs, frustrations, and geopolitical culture.” SFAB troopers, like their IW counterparts in the Army’s unconventional units, are combat advisors who partner with friendly foreign militaries, and non-state security forces. SFAB soldiers, just as their Special Operations Forces (SOF) counterparts, can enhance Army readiness and the Army’s capacity for SFA and combat advising by being culturally immersed as residents in their particular country or region of alignment.
Recommendations
Considering the potential benefit to Army readiness and the Army’s capacity for SFA and combat advising, the following recommendations for regional alignment and basing are suggested. 1st SFAB should be remain aligned to US SOUTHCOM, but be relocated from Fort Moore, Georgia to Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. 2nd SFAB should maintain its alignment with US AFRICACOM and remain located at Fort Liberty, North Carolina. 3rd SFAB should stay regionally aligned to US CENTCOM and remain at Fort Cavazos, Texas. 4th SFAB should maintain aligned to US EUCOM, but relocate from Fort Carson, Colorado to Camp Kościuszko, Poland. Finally, 5th SFAB should remain regionally aligned to US INDO-PACOM, but relocate from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, to either Fort Shafter, Hawaii or Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
Justifications for each recommendation are required. For 1st, 4th, and 5th SFABs, relocating to the proposed locations would help with cultural emersion and regional expertise by putting SFAB soldiers and their families in the areas in which they work. By virtue of being emersed in those places, the soldiers would gain valuable regional and cultural expertise.
For 1st SFAB members, they could live in and around San Juan, the capital of Puerto Rico. This would enable them to strengthen their understanding of the culture pervasive throughout parts of the Caribbean and much of Central and South America. Furthermore, this would also reinforce their language skills which, despite some dialect differences, will be applicable throughout the region.
For 4th SFAB, they could live in proximity to the vibrant and culturally rich city of Poznan. This would afford the soldiers, and their families, the ability to immerse themselves in the Polish culture and language. This stationing would also provide a springboard for 4th SFAB soldiers to quickly and easily access other European destinations, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, helping further round out their regional expertise. Additionally, positing 4th SFAB here would align with the Poland-United States Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which supports the goals of developing defense capabilities, defense planning, and defense cooperation, areas that SFABs are suitable to reinforce.
Basing 5th SFAB would afford unit members a degree of immersion in their regionally-aligned cultures and languages, yet not to the same level as the SFABs previously mentioned. But given the prevalence of various communities of East Asian descent located in Hawaii, particularly on Oahu, SFAB members should find it fairly easy to experience a higher degree of cultural and linguistic authenticity in this location as well as opportunities to pursue language proficiency.
Depending on the steadily increasing levels of cooperation between the US and The Philippines, opportunities may arise to allow 5th SFAB, or its subordinate units, the Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT), to be permanently based here. Additionally, growing concerns about activities in the South China Sea may find other countries in the region open to stationing SFABs, or the SFATs, within their countries. Considering that an SFAB or SFAT would represent a rather small US footprint, US allies and partners, and their respective citizens, may find this option more agreeable than allowing the permanent assignment of a large US contingent, like an Army division or naval base. These opportunities would reinforce US support to allies and partners within this region and should be seriously considered if presented.
Currently, basing SFABs and their family members in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas presents security-related challenges that outweigh the benefits of the idea being presented. Hence 2nd and 3rd SFABs should remain stationed in the continental US, though some degree of cultural immersion could be pursued. As mentioned in an older Small Wars Journal article, this can be accomplished by placing unit members in ethnical diverse areas within the US for extended periods of time to improve their culture familiarity. For example, areas around Dearborn, Michigan and the Twin Cities area in Minnesota have sizeable communities of people with Middle Eastern, North African, and eastern African origin. Time spent in those areas might not be as authentic as other alternatives, but it is better than doing nothing and it is a cheaper alternative.
Conclusion
Renee Novakoff’s article focuses on the IW practitioner and what the Army should do to develop and refine their skills, including regional expertise. Though the SFABs’ combat advisors are not IW specialists, their tasks and purpose often rhyme with those of SOF personnel. This includes the requirements for language proficiency and cultural knowledge. Basing SFABs in the regions in which they are aligned can build a cadre of regional aces. Doing so can provide insight into areas of the world that the Army needs to unlock its potential when working with regional allies and partners.
Furthermore, this cadre of regional aces, armed with their understanding of their particular region or country, could reinforce the efforts of IW practitioners and other SOF regional experts. Additionally, the Army has Foreign Area Officers (FAO) stationed at US embassies around the world. These FAOs should be leveraged in coordination with SFAB specialists, and SOF personnel to enhance host-nation defense and host-nation security capabilities. Personnel with regional expertise, whether they come from a conventional or SOF background, can only serve to enhance our understanding of key areas of the globe as we continue to engage in those areas as well as plan for more robust forms of engagement. It’s an idea worth considering.
Tags: bilateral partnerships, irregular warfare, partner military training, Partnered operations, regional basing, Security Force Assistance, SFAB
About The Author
- Morgan Smiley
- Mr. Morgan Smiley is a civil servant and member of the Security Cooperation Workforce. He retired from the U.S. Army after 20+ years of service which included tours as an advisor in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
7. Army will trim 5% of general-officer jobs in coming years, chief’s spokesman says
The real lesson from this is that the Army leadership listens to and responds to contricism (especially constructive criticism). I do not think this is an isolated incident. I have heard many anecdotes from people who have written thought provoking articles (often in Small Wars Journal :-) ) and then received calls or messages from senior leaders (not always the CSA) who have asked for further input to examine and possibly implement new ideas. The Army (and all the military ) may be a bureaucracy but it is made up of people who care and who think. critically. I think this illustrates why the CSA places great emphasis on writing (e.g., the Harding Project - HERE and HERE. Writing makes a difference.
One thingI have wondered about is statutory requirements that require General officer approval. Obviously there are some things that must be a general officer responsibility (and some are Congressional mandated). But how many times have you been faced with the requirement to get the approval of the "first general officer in your chain of command" from a personnel action to approval for a CONOP? Is it always necessary to have a general officer level decision? I bet we could reduce a lot of extra work if we identified all the areas that could have lower level decision making (approval authorities at the correct lowest level). Think about how that would improve efficiency. Maybe this should be a DOGE initiative.
Army will trim 5% of general-officer jobs in coming years, chief’s spokesman says
Gen. Randy George agrees the Army is “too top-heavy.”
defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers
More than a dozen Army general officer positions will get the axe in the coming years, a spokesman for Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George tells Defense One.
The revelation comes a week after Defense One published an opinion piece calling the Army “too top-heavy.” As it turns out, the service’s top officer agrees.
“There are general officer billets across the Army that Gen. George, in collaboration with the secretary and staff, has determined are not essential for the Army,” said Col. Dave Butler, George’s spokesman.
George isn’t ready to announce the exact positions, Butler said, but he has been reviewing possibilities since he stepped into his job in September 2023. The Army is authorized a total of 219 general officer positions, so declining to fill 12 of them would represent more than a 5 percent cut.
Butler said he got in touch with the piece’s author, R.D. Hooker, Jr., to let him know that the service’s most senior officer agrees that there are too many generals on staff at the Pentagon, and too many staff organizations in the Army.
“I was pleasantly surprised to hear from Butler that he was thinking along the same kind of lines,” Hooker said. “Now, whether getting after this in a meaningful way in the tenure of a single chief—who's already, you know, at least a year in—is doable or not is an interesting question.”
George is very much working on the issue, Butler confirmed. Not only among the general officer corps, but down to the field-grade level.
There are, for example, brigades in the Army that have only one battalion under them and maybe two companies under that, necessitating four headquarters staff for two operational units.
One such brigade, the Germany-based 18th Military Police Brigade, has just the 709th Military Police Battalion under it.
“We as an Army have to ask ourselves, you know, is that the most effective use of organizational bureaucracy?” Butler said.
Some of the Army’s general-officer creep might be a consequence of a glut of midgrade officers, Butler suggested.
The Army recruits thousands of lieutenants each year to fill its most junior officer roles. At the same time, a phenomenon called “grade plate increase”—where responsibilities previously held by staff captains are increasingly being done by major and lieutenant colonels—has required the Army to promote more junior officers than it traditionally has.
And in the meantime, those junior officers are languishing in their first assignments.
“This happened to my older son. His first year as a lieutenant was spent working in an [operations] shop, instead of being a platoon leader,” Hooker said. “So that essential development opportunity is lost. And everywhere you go in the Army, you've got six lieutenants sitting around on the battalion staff, which is just crazy, right?”
There isn’t a specific plan to get that creep under control, but it’s on the radar, Butler said.
“And you know, the number of majors has increased over the years for reasons we can't specifically identify, but that's just what's happened,” he said. “And so Gen. George's intent is to get back to where we're trusting captains to do the jobs of captains.”
The second Trump administration has an opportunity to do some trimming across the services, said Hooker, who argues that bloated three- and four-star ranks are not just an Army problem.
“I expect all kinds of chaos to be coming out of the incoming administration, but one way to get after it would be to sell whoever the new secretary is on this idea that we're just really overweight,” he said.
defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers
8. What’s at risk if Congress doesn’t fund the government by Friday night
There is disruption and then there are self-inflicted catastrophic sounds.
We are where we are with so many critical government functions. We have to deal with the world as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.
And these actions just make the government more inefficient and more wasteful.
What’s at risk if Congress doesn’t fund the government by Friday night | CNN Politics
CNN · by Tami Luhby, Katie Lobosco · December 19, 2024
Haberman on the question that Trump’s criticism of spending deal raises
02:14 - Source: CNN
CNN —
Facing intense pressure of the federal government potentially shutting down within days and disaster aid coffers that need replenishment, lawmakers are racing to cobble together a temporary government funding plan after President-elect Donald Trump torpedoed their last package on Wednesday.
The now-dead agreement would have kept the federal government operating through March 14, as well as provided nearly $100 billion in disaster aid and economic relief for farmers in rural communities. The deal would have also provided lawmakers with their first pay raise since 2009.
Here’s what Americans could soon face if Congress doesn’t reach a deal by midnight on Friday:
Aid for disasters and farmers
The bipartisan deal struck earlier in the week would have provided nearly $100 billion to help Americans trying to recover from multiple natural disasters in 2023 and 2024.
Every state in the nation was set to get a portion of the funds. States like North Carolina and Florida, which were hit hard by Hurricanes Helene and Milton earlier this year, were expected to get some largest amount of funding, according to a breakdown provided by Rep. Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut, the top Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee.
Some $29 billion would help replenish the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Disaster Relief Fund, which has dwindled after contending with the two hurricanes, as well as other disasters.
The package also included $21 billion in disaster relief for farmers – a big sticking point in negotiations earlier this week. Lawmakers from agricultural-focused states have argued that the help is desperately needed as America’s farmers are facing lower commodity prices and higher costs for supplies.
The spending agreement would have also extended the farm bill – a sweeping package that governs many agricultural and nutrition assistance programs. Typically, the bill is renewed every five years, but the most recent version was passed in 2018 and the extension lapsed at the end of September.
Government shutdown looms
Lawmakers have until midnight Friday to fund the federal government – at least temporarily – to avoid a shutdown. Since Congress has not approved appropriations for any agencies, all would be affected.
The White House Office of Management and Budget is sending additional guidance to federal agencies on shutdown preparations, an administration official told CNN.
Every department and agency has its own set of plans and procedures for a shutdown. The plans include how many employees would be furloughed, which employees are considered essential and would work without pay, how long it would take to wind down operations in the hours before a shutdown and which activities would come to a halt. Those plans can vary from shutdown to shutdown.
The impact of a shutdown differs each time, but the consequences could be felt early. About 875,000 civilian federal workers will be furloughed, while another 1.4 million employees are considered essential and will have to continue working – most of them without pay, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center, which looked at data from September. (They will receive their missed paychecks once the impasse ends.)
“A government shutdown would deliver a devastating blow to hardworking federal employees and the millions of citizens who rely on essential government services,” said Everett Kelley, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents more than 800,000 civilian federal employees.
“These patriotic civil servants are the backbone of our nation — they inspect our food, protect our borders, ensure safe travel during the holidays, and provide relief to disaster victims,” Kelley continued. “Over 642,000 of them are veterans of our armed services. Allowing them to go without a paycheck over the holidays is unacceptable.”
Federal employees are “rattled” by the sudden threat of a shutdown, said Doreen Greenwald, national president of the National Treasury Employees Union, which represents 150,000 workers in three dozen federal agencies and offices. But the move would also have broader consequences.
“Shutdowns waste taxpayer money, harm the economy and jeopardize the paychecks and essential services that hardworking Americans and their families depend on every day,” Greenwald said.
Previous shutdowns have closed national parks and museums, wreaked havoc on the Internal Revenue Service just before the start of the tax filing season, and delayed some federal lending to homebuyers and small businesses, among other impacts. Though air traffic controllers have to remain on the job, many called in sick during the most recent shutdown, snarling flights.
However, some agencies can continue certain operations – and keep paying their employees – from other sources of funding.
Also, some essential government functions continue even if the government shuts down. Notably, Social Security recipients would receive their monthly payments, and Medicare and Medicaid benefits would continue.
Government agencies had to prepare multiple times for a shutdown during the last fiscal year since Congress repeatedly punted on approving a full funding plan before finally passing one in March.
Trump’s extended shutdown
Trump presided over the longest government shutdown in four decades during his first term. The 35-day impasse, which shuttered part of the government just before Christmas in 2018, ended in late January when Trump agreed to a temporary funding measure that did not include billions of dollars for a border wall.
However, the shutdown wreaked havoc on many Americans and federal employees, including causing flight delays, canceling immigration hearings and making it harder for some families to obtain student loans.
This story has been updated with additional developments.
CNN’s Betsy Klein contributed to this report.
CNN · by Tami Luhby, Katie Lobosco · December 19, 2024
9. Countering Chinese Deception in Modern Military Operations
Conclusion:
The US faces an adversary that prioritizes ambiguity and manipulation in every domain of warfare. While the US has historically excelled in projecting overt strength, this approach must evolve to counter deception-focused adversaries like China. Integrating deception detection into IPB, exercises, professional education, and joint planning processes is critical to addressing this asymmetry. By institutionalizing deception detection, US forces can not only counter adversarial misdirection but also ensure more informed operations across allied and joint domains. Such integration would enhance strategic resilience and provide a competitive edge in multi-domain operations. Failure to adapt to this new age of deception risks ceding advantage to adversaries who exploit our blind spots.
Countering Chinese Deception in Modern Military Operations
irregularwarfare.org · by Cole Herring · December 19, 2024
The United States’ pivot from counterinsurgency to peer conflict over the past decade has exposed a critical vulnerability: a diminished focus on detecting deception by operational and tactical level practitioners.
Throughout history, US military strategy has adapted to specific threats. During the Cold War, the AH-64 Apache helicopter was developed to counter a potential Soviet armored offensive through the Fulda Gap. Today, the threat posed by China’s advanced deception tactics demands a similarly targeted response. Yet, while the US has spent two decades honing precision strikes against insurgents, China, the pacing threat, has been refining its doctrine of deception for over two millennia, building on principles dating back to 300 BCE.
To effectively counter China’s deception-based approach, the US military must undergo a cultural shift that elevates deception detection to a core competency. This requires embedding deception awareness at every level of planning and execution. This article examines how China’s deeply entrenched deception strategy creates an asymmetric advantage, contrasts it with the US approach, and presents steps for integrating deception detection into military planning frameworks such as the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. By doing so, we can close this gap and bolster US strategic resilience against a threat that thrives on ambiguity and misdirection.
The Role of Deception Detection in American Military Strategy
For this analysis, deception detection refers to the process of identifying and countering adversaries’ deliberate efforts to mislead or misinform friendly forces. This can include activities such as concealing true intentions, operational feints, or presenting false narratives to disrupt decision-making and gain a strategic or tactical advantage.
Throughout American military history, both deception and deception detection have played critical roles in achieving strategic objectives. For example, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, US Special Operations Forces executed a sophisticated deception campaign in northern Iraq. By coordinating with Kurdish Peshmerga forces and using false signals and communications, they created the illusion of a large-scale US attack. The Iraqi military’s inability to detect the deception tied down significant Iraqi forces in the north, diverting them from the main offensive coming from the south and west.
The Battle of Midway during World War II is another example, one which highlights the importance of detecting enemy deception. In the lead-up to the battle, Japanese forces feinted an attack on the Aleutian Islands to obscure their true objective. However, US Navy cryptanalysts had broken key Japanese codes, enabling them to monitor enemy plans. To confirm Japan’s real target, US forces transmitted a false message from Midway about a water shortage. When Japanese communications confirmed “AF” (the code for Midway) was experiencing a water shortage, analysts identified Midway as the target. Armed with this information, the US preempted the attack, turning the tide of the Pacific War and demonstrating the power of detecting deception at the onset.
After WWII, the focus of US deception detection efforts shifted with the introduction of nuclear weapons during the high-stakes environment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union relied heavily on ‘maskirovka’—a comprehensive doctrine of military deception that included misinformation and concealment. Deception detection during this period was primarily focused on uncovering nuclear arsenals and geopolitical maneuvers rather than combat operations.
In contrast, countering Chinese deception today requires addressing a broader, multi-domain approach. Unlike the Soviet Union’s centralized and doctrinally rigid methods during the Cold War era, China’s strategy is far more pervasive, leveraging ambiguity across strategic narratives, tactical operations, and emerging domains like cyber and information warfare. This shift underscores the urgency for deception detection to evolve and become a core competency across all phases of modern conflict.
Today, much of the US emphasis on deception detection in combat operations appears to have diminished. Notably, US military doctrine does not formally define ‘deception detection,’ a gap that reflects the limited institutional emphasis on countering adversarial deception as a structured capability.
As General Charles Q. Brown Jr., now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in 2019, the US military’s emphasis on deception has waned. Reflecting on past successes, such as those in World War II, he noted, “We’ve done some of these things in the past. [Deception]’s not something that we think about as much anymore.” In the same discussion, General Brown underscored the critical need to revive deception efforts, particularly to create strategic and operational dilemmas for China in the Pacific. His call to action reflects the urgency of integrating deception into military training and doctrine to preserve a competitive edge in an era of intensifying great-power competition.
The Role of Deception in the Chinese Military
In contrast to the US, China has been refining deception tactics for centuries, dating back to the “Warring States Period” (475–221 BCE). It was against that backdrop that Sun Tsu famously wrote “All warfare is based on deception”—a philosophy still deeply embedded in Chinese military thought today. This principle is not merely tactical; it is strategic, influencing China’s long-term planning and operational art.
In Sun Tzu’s view, victory is achieved by outthinking the opponent, often by misleading them into making fatal errors. This aligns with the Daoist principle of wuwei (无为), or “non-action,” where the most effective actions are those that go unnoticed or appear effortless. Modern Chinese theory echoes these principles, emphasizing misdirection. For example, the Science of Military Strategy, a core text from the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Academy of Military Science, highlights the use of information warfare to shape enemy decisions through false narratives. Another example is the “Three Warfares” (三战) doctrine—psychological, public opinion, and legal warfare—which highlights China’s view of warfare as a broad spectrum with deception woven throughout every aspect of that continuum.
This enduring focus on deception in Chinese military thought is not confined to theory but is deeply embedded in modern doctrinal texts, which outline specific tactics designed to manipulate adversaries across various domains. A good example of this is Chinese joint doctrine, which promotes feints, false signals, and misinformation, ensuring adversaries remain uncertain about PLA intentions. Similarly, the PLA Air Force and Navy manuals stress camouflage, decoys, and false communications to mislead adversaries.
Moreover, China’s recent actions illustrate its active application of these doctrines in real-world scenarios. In the South China Sea, for example, China has employed deceptive tactics by deploying maritime militia vessels disguised as fishing boats to assert territorial claims. These vessels, though ostensibly civilian, are coordinated by the Chinese government to support military objectives—a strategy that warrants continued scrutiny.
The foundational texts above, along with China’s active application of their principles, reveal a clear insight: China uses deception at all levels of conflict—tactical, operational, and strategic—to achieve its objectives. This underscores the urgent need to prepare, both to counter such tactics and to deter their use through proactive measures.
The Evolving Role of Deception Detection in LSCO: Lessons from the 2024 SOF-Only JRTC Rotation
The gaps in deception detection doctrine, training, and application have become increasingly evident as the US military refocuses on large-scale combat operations (LSCO) to prepare for peer conflict. This issue was underscored in March 2024 when the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) participated in the first SOF-only rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). While the exercise marked a significant step in aligning SOF training with LSCO objectives, it also highlighted the persistent shortfalls in deception detection across doctrine, training, and practice.
During the rotation, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) conducted missions designed to divert adversarial resources, facilitating joint force entry—a strategy reminiscent of SOF operations during the 2003 Iraq invasion. While the rotation demonstrated the offensive potential of deception in LSCO, it also highlighted a critical vulnerability: the lack of emphasis on detecting and countering adversarial deception in military planning.
During the exercise, the simulated enemy employed tactics mirroring the Russian invasion of Ukraine. After a rapid invasion of a neighboring ally, the adversary established a defensive front and claimed the occupied territory as their own. As NATO and conventional forces mobilized, US Army Special Forces teams infiltrated behind enemy lines. Exploiting their knowledge of US doctrine, the enemy devised a sophisticated deception plan: they left a seemingly unguarded helicopter landing zone large enough for a battalion air assault while repositioning air defense assets to suggest a frontal attack was their primary concern.
From conventional intelligence sources—such as aerial reconnaissance—the air assault seemed the optimal course of action. However, US Special Forces teams identified the trap, determining that the enemy’s true intent was to ambush US troops in transport. This analysis, provided by SFODAs, averted a potentially disastrous outcome for the joint force entry. Yet, this success revealed a significant gap: detecting the enemy’s deception relied solely on the ingenuity of the SFODAs rather than on a structured, institutionalized deception detection process.
The Necessity of Integrating Deception Detection in US Planning
The above analysis of Chinese doctrine and observations from recent events make it clear that deception is a fundamental element of today’s threat environment. Despite this, US military planning frameworks, such as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and the Joint Planning Process, lack structured mechanisms for integrating deception detection into operational planning and decision-making. Integrating deception detection as a core competency across the broader force is essential for maintaining strategic advantage in multi-domain conflicts.
While US military intelligence and reconnaissance efforts include elements of deception detection, large portions of the joint planning process lack the structure and prioritization required to counter sophisticated and culturally ingrained tactics employed by adversaries like China. Integrating deception detection doesn’t abandon other priorities but rather enhances existing capabilities, making the force more resilient and adaptable. By embedding it within established processes like the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the US can improve decision-making efficiency, ensuring commanders are better informed without added complexity.
IPB is a systematic process that identifies and analyzes the operational environment to support decision-making. The process consists of four steps: defining the operational environment, describing environmental effects, evaluating the adversary, and determining adversary courses of action. Throughout this process, practitioners should systematically assess potential adversarial deception indicators, such as inconsistencies in intelligence reporting or anomalies in adversary behavior, which are then turned into intelligence collection requirements to later confirm or deny if deception is occurring.
In the first step of the IPB, defining the operational environment, planners can inject counter-deception measures by identifying areas or domains where adversarial deception is most likely to occur such as cyber networks or contested maritime regions. Planners should also asses the adversary’s historical use of deception to anticipate potential strategies. While evaluating environmental effects, planners can assess how adversaries might manipulate terrain, weather, and infrastructure to obscure their intent, such as using complex terrain for ambushes or electronic warfare to disrupt communications.
Evaluating the adversary’s tactics and doctrine allows for identifying deception patterns or vulnerabilities. Planners can employ analytical tools to detect inconsistencies in intelligence reports, such as sudden changes in enemy force dispositions that don’t align with known capabilities or logistics constraints. Determining adversary courses of action should include analyzing which actions might serve as deceptive feints versus genuine threats. Techniques like red-teaming and war-gaming can simulate adversary deception tactics, helping to validate or challenge assumptions.
Lastly, deception detection should be incorporated into existing education and training frameworks. For example, exercises should include scenarios where planners identify adversarial deception indicators, such as conflicting intelligence patterns or falsified communications. Moreover, professional military educators should train future leaders in identifying deception tactics, with specific modules on adversaries like China, similar to how Russian tactics were previously taught during the Cold War Era.
Conclusion: Adapting to the New Age of Deception
The US faces an adversary that prioritizes ambiguity and manipulation in every domain of warfare. While the US has historically excelled in projecting overt strength, this approach must evolve to counter deception-focused adversaries like China. Integrating deception detection into IPB, exercises, professional education, and joint planning processes is critical to addressing this asymmetry. By institutionalizing deception detection, US forces can not only counter adversarial misdirection but also ensure more informed operations across allied and joint domains. Such integration would enhance strategic resilience and provide a competitive edge in multi-domain operations. Failure to adapt to this new age of deception risks ceding advantage to adversaries who exploit our blind spots.
Cole Herring is a seasoned professional with 19 years of experience, including a distinguished career in the United States Army Special Forces. With a Master of Science from King’s College London and a Master of Business Administration from Anglia Ruskin University, Cole combines academic excellence with extensive practical experience.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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10. The US defence industrial base can no longer reliably supply Europe
Graphics at the link: https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/us-defence-industrial-base-can-no-longer-reliably-supply-europe
The US defence industrial base can no longer reliably supply Europe
Europe has long relied on US weapons but the US military industrial base faces constraints and its production may be redirected elsewhere
Publishing date
18 December 2024
Authors
Alexandr Burilkov Juan Mejino-López Guntram B. Wolff
bruegel.org · by Alexandr Burilkov
The United States under the outgoing Biden administration has supported the transatlantic relationship, both through NATO and by providing support to Ukraine. At the same time, the Biden administration has generally positioned itself against European attempts to reduce reliance on foreign arms. For example, the US ambassador to NATO criticised the EU’s aim of buying more home-produced weapons Stuart Lau, ‘US envoy to NATO questions EU’s ‘buy local’ strategy on weapons’, Politico, 22 October 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-envoy-to-nato-questions-eus-buy-loca…. , as set out in the EU defence industrial strategy, proposed by the European Commission in March 2024 European Commission press release of 5 March 2024, ‘First ever defence industrial strategy and a new defence industry programme to enhance Europe’s readiness and security’, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1321. .
Now, with President Trump soon returning to office, US policy towards European security could be at a turning point. Leading figures around Trump argue that US security policy should focus on the Pacific as the US defence industrial base is too small to cater for all threat theatres For example, Trump’s former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge Colby. See Piotr Smolar, ‘Elbridge Colby, ex-secrétaire adjoint à la défense américain : « Nous ne voulons pas être le gendarme du monde »’, Le Monde, 18 July 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/07/18/elbridge-colby-…. See also https://x.com/ElbridgeColby/status/1750658274662236247. . Implicitly, there is thus support for the idea that Europe should become more self-sufficient in military terms. Whether this view will become US policy or whether the current policy driven by the defence industry’s interests to sell to the attractive European market will continue to dominate is to be seen.
Meanwhile, some in Europe see defence equipment purchases from the US as a strategic tool to fend off tariffs For example, European Central Bank president Christine Lagarde has raised this point. Roula Khalaf, Patrick Jenkins and Olaf Storbeck, ‘Christine Lagarde interview’, Financial Times, 28 November 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/c4ddf3ab-94c6-41b3-95c1-1afd38d23704. . But this strategy would need sufficient capacity in the US military base and timely delivery or, rather than procuring modern equipment fit for its eastern flank, the EU would risk overpaying for late and second-rate products, entrenching dependence through long-term contracts for maintenance and supply.
We assessed non-US demand for US military industrial capacity by analysing US foreign military sales (FMS), compiling a database from US Defense Security Cooperation Agency data, as reported by the Pentagon The data covers FMS contracts since 2008. We restrict the military sales agreements to those signed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (February 2022). See https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date. . We show that large shares of US-produced weapons, such as shells for tanks and artillery and air defence missiles and their components, are sold currently to Europe and Israel. If Trump wants to re-calibrate US defence sales, for example to increase domestic stockpiles or to increase supplies to allies in Asia, then Europe could face shortages in arms availability.
This raises two immediate consequences. First, Europe will need to increase domestic production of weapons systems, and this is in line with US interests. Second, the EU cannot rely on arms purchases as a negotiating tool with the incoming US administration to obtain a favourable deal on tariffs. US production is insufficient for Europe to meaningfully buy, let alone increase, its weapons purchases.
The US military industrial base: production and readiness concerns
The US military industrial base is not suited for high-intensity conflict against other major powers (see for example Jones, 2023). Much of the US’s own demand for arms in recent decades has been for military operations against relatively small and weaker opponents. This has likely left the US military industrial base ill-equipped for conflict with a peer of similar military strength. For example, in a scenario of conflict over Taiwan, the US would run out of some key munitions in less than a week (Cancian et al, 2023).
To better understand US capacities, we examined specifically the production and sales of two major weapons systems: Patriot air defence missiles and F-35 fighter jets. We chose these two systems because they represent high-end capabilities that are central to NATO’s and Europe’s deterrence of Russia. Russia is a peer competitor with large land forces, a sizeable air force including the most modern (fifth generation) fighter jets, an integrated air defence network and a vast arsenal of long-range precision munitions (Wolff et al, 2024). High-end capabilities are essential for NATO and Europe to meet the Russian challenge.
The US FMS data documents a total of 1119 Patriot missiles sold under five contracts since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (up to time of writing; Table 1). This number is separate from and does not include all the missiles sent from US stockpiles to Ukraine as these can be provided through emergency aid procedures Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, ‘U.S. to Send Another Patriot Missile Battery to Ukraine’, The New York Times, 11 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/11/us/politics/patriot-missiles-ukraine…. .
Source: Bruegel. Note: most of the contracts include more goods and/or services in addition to Patriot missiles included in the purchase agreement. In the Dutch contract, the Patriot missiles are the main item, allowing the unit cost to be estimated. Not reported here are missiles sent by the US to Israel, which are not Patriot missiles, but David’s Sling missiles produced by the same company RTX, which shares components and production lines with the Patriot. However, they could affect the Patriot missile production numbers.
The total of 1119 contracted missiles must be compared to the US defence industrial base’s current production of missiles. The current production rate per year is below 740 See Lockheed Martin press release of 14 November 2024, ‘U.S. Army Awards Lockheed Martin Contract to Increase PAC-3 MSE Production Capacity’, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2024-11-14-us-army-awards-lockheed-mart…, and Jen Judson, ‘How companies plan to ramp up production of Patriot missiles’, Defense News, 9 April 2024, . The stated aim is to scale up to 1070 by 2027 Numbers are derived from current production capabilities of Lockheed Martin (500 missiles annually) and Raytheon (240 annually), and planned future annual production of 650 annually (Lockheed) and 420 (Raytheon). Armyrecognition.com, ‘Lockheed Martin to increase PAC-3 MSE missile production by 30 percent with new US Army contract’, 15 November 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/lockheed-…. . Actual production capabilities are currently thus just meeting foreign demand.
The FMS data also allows the pricing of Patriot missiles to be estimated. While most contracts include several goods and additional services in the purchase agreement, the contract with the Netherlands includes almost only missiles. Even though prices vary across contracts, we estimate that a Patriot missile can cost up to $13 million. Concerns around inflated prices charged by defence contractors to the US and its allies exist Bill Whitaker, ‘Weapons contractors hitting Department of Defense with inflated prices for planes, submarines, missiles’, CBS News, 21 May 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/weapons-contractors-price-gouging-pentagon…. .
It is worth contextualising this production by looking at Patriot usage rates in Ukraine. Patriots are used for defence against Russian cruise and ballistic missiles, of which Russia has fired over 10,000 in the conflict. Typically, at least two interceptor missiles are used against each incoming missile – more as the sophistication of the incoming missile increases. Patriots are not used for every interception, being reserved typically for high-end Russian missiles, especially ballistic and hypersonic, but the data suggest that demand for air-defence missiles is substantial. Current US production capacities and prices are clearly not compatible with a long-lasting war in which allies would rely primarily on US production.
Purchase data on F-35s, the flagship of the US and allied air forces, also demonstrates the problems faced by the US military industrial base. Costs have increased considerably, and delays continue to occur (GAO, 2024a). Lockheed-Martin started the F-35 development programme in 2001, with a goal of producing 2866 F-35s over 40 years Paul Barrett, ‘Is the F-35 a Trillion-Dollar Mistake?’ Bloomberg, 4 April 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-04-04/is-the-f-35-a-trilli…. . This target subsequently dropped to 2470, while costs have increased by more than 50 percent (GAO, 2024a). An important indicator is the availability rate, meaning the percentage of aircraft in inventory that are operational and mission-capable at any time. For at least the past five years, F-35 availability rates have been well below 50 percent (GAO, 2024b), meaning most F-35s are stuck in hangars.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Lockheed Martin has been contracted under FMS agreements to produce around 150 new F-35s, out of which more than 75 percent correspond to contracts with European nations The number includes purchase agreements with Romania (32 aircraft), Greece (up to 40), Czechia (24), Germany (35) and South Korea (up to 25). . Before 2022, contracts to supply F-35s to other European nations, such as Switzerland, often saw delays Larissa Rhyn and Beni Gafner, ‘Kommt die F-35 zu spät, bezahlt die Schweiz’, Tages Anzeiger, 14 August 2023, https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/kommt-die-f-35-zu-spaet-bezahlt-die-schwei…. . The delays have tended to become longer, with Lockheed Martin delivering 91 percent of the aircraft late in 2023, versus 41 percent in 2014 (Figure 1). Furthermore, none of the engines (supplied by Pratt & Whitney) were delivered on time in 2023.
Figure 1: % of F-35s delivered late
Source: GAO (2024c).
For main battle tanks, a similar picture emerges. Current annual production numbers of the US M1A2 Abrams are between 60 and 120, with investment ongoing to ramp up supply Precious Grundy, ‘Major improvements coming to Lima’s tank plant’, The Lima News, 20 May 2024, https://www.limaohio.com/top-stories/2024/05/20/major-improvements-comi…. . Delays to planned initial operational capacity, meanwhile, are also being seen in US submarine production (such as AUKUS SBS News, ‘AUKUS revamped: Australia to indemnify US and UK against ‘any liability’ from nuclear risks’, 12 August 2024, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/aukus-revamped-australia-to-indemni…. ) and other military programmes (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Delay (in months), selected US military programmes
Source: GAO (2023).
Conclusions
European countries should continue defence procurement from the US, especially for high-end and high-demand systems, munitions and enablers, for which Europe lacks domestic alternatives. However, production and readiness concerns about the US military industrial base, together with the changing US foreign policy, should highlight the need for further investment in the EU.
The war in Ukraine is also testimony to the rapidly changing nature of wars, with drones and other technologies playing greater roles. This is a further reason for Europe to invest substantially in new capacities and agile production sites where commercially available components can easily be upgraded using military components. Reliance on foreign partners is critical for cutting-edge technology in areas such as long-range missile defence interceptors or fifth generation aircraft (Draghi, 2024). Yet, where the supply from the US might face difficulties, the need for long-term investments in Europe is particularly great.
Ukraine’s military industrial capacity could also play a key role in Europe’s security because of Ukraine’s unique experience and expertise, economies of scale, innovation and R&D and competitive costs. The United Kingdom’s industrial base should also be seen as part of the EU defence industrial base. Relying on the US defence industrial base is unlikely to be sufficient and may not even be an asset in negotiations with the US on trade because the US wants to redirect weapons to different threat arenas. Most importantly, the EU needs to boost its single market for defence and strengthen the European defence industrial base for its own security and for better cost effectiveness (Mejino-Lopez and Wolff, 2024).
References
Cancian, M.F., M. Cancian and E. Heginbotham (2023) The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, Center for Strategic and International Studies, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan
Draghi, M. (2024) The future of European competitiveness, European Commission, available at https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en
GAO (2024a) Weapon Systems Annual Assessment, Report to Congressional Committees, US Government Accountability Office, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106831.pdf
GAO (2024b) ‘Military readiness, Actions Needed for DOD to Address Challenges across the Air, Sea, Ground, and Space Domains’, Statement of Diana Maurer, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, US Government Accountability Office, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-107463.pdf
GAO (2024c) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Program Continues to Encounter Production Issues and Modernization Delays, Report to Congressional Committees, US Government Accountability Office, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106909.pdf
Jones, S.G. (2023) Empty bins in a wartime environment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/empty-bins-wartime-envirotnment-challenge-us-defense-industrial-base
Mejino-Lopez, J. and G. Wolff (2024) ‘A European defence industrial strategy in a hostile world’, Policy Brief 29/2024, Bruegel, available at https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/european-defence-industrial-strategy-hostile-world
Wolff, G.B., A. Burilkov, K. Bushnell and I. Kharitonov (2024) ‘Fit for war in decades: sluggish German rearmament versus surging Russian defence production’, Analysis, 16 September, Bruegel, available at https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/fit-war-decades-sluggish-german-rearmament-versus-surging-russian-defence-production
bruegel.org · by Alexandr Burilkov
11. Trump Signals Jones Act Policy Will Stay the Course
While I normally support American manufacturing, it is obvious that shipbuilding in the US is in a terrible condition and therefore it is obvious that the Jones Act has failed to ensure that the US industrial base can build ships in sufficient time to support US national security.
I was asked this question this week in Korea - can the Jones Act be changed to allow Korean shipbuilding in the US. I would certainly hope Congress would revise the Jones Act or create exceptions for an ally like Korea who could build sufficient ships that would enhance US national security and make up for the deficiencies in US shipbuilding.
Trump Signals Jones Act Policy Will Stay the Course
gcaptain.com · by Mike Schuler · December 18, 2024
FILE PHOTO: Republican presidential nominee and former U.S. President Donald Trump takes the stage following early results from the 2024 U.S. presidential election in Palm Beach County Convention Center, in West Palm Beach, Florida, U.S., November 6, 2024. REUTERS/Callaghan O'Hare/File Photo/File Photo
Mike Schuler
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December 18, 2024
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President-elect Donald Trump has reignited the debate over the Jones Act, sharing a pro-Jones Act article that underscores the century-old law’s significance to America’s maritime industry and national security. The article in question was shared by @realDonaldTrump on Truth Social with no accompanying text or message.
The move signals what some believe will be continued support for the legislation in Trump’s upcoming administration.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, better known as the Jones Act, mandates that goods transported between U.S. ports be carried on ships that are American-built, American-owned, and American-crewed. Critics argue the law stifles competition and drives up costs, but supporters hail it as a cornerstone of U.S. national security, job creation, and the domestic maritime industry.
“For over a century, the Jones Act has required that goods transported between U.S. ports are carried on ships that are American-built, American-owned, and American-crewed,” states the American Thinker article shared by Trump. “While that might sound like a small regulatory detail, its impact is huge, touching everything from U.S. job creation to national security to our growing offshore wind industry.”
The article continues: “The re-election of Trump signals a continued commitment to the Jones Act, supporting a uniquely American industry that spans jobs, innovation, and security. In choosing Trump, the American people voted for a leader who recognizes that policies like the Jones Act aren’t outdated relics but vital pillars of U.S. prosperity and safety. For American workers, communities reliant on the maritime industry, and anyone invested in a strong, secure America, this election outcome is a win—plain and simple.”
While Trump’s first administration underscored the importance of the Jones Act, it also faced criticism for issuing waivers that some stakeholders argued undermined the law’s protections. In 2017, a limited Jones Act waiver was issued following Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, allowing fuel shipments—including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel—to reach ports in the U.S. Southeast. Weeks later, after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico and amid mounting criticism over the federal response, the Administration issued a 10-day waiver eight days after the storm’s landfall.
As Trump prepares to take office for a second time, the U.S. maritime industry is closely watching how his administration will navigate Jones Act policy. For now, Trump’s tweet seems to send a clear message: The Jones Act is here to stay.
12. State Department 'censor' office finds lifeline
Sure the GEC has had some challenges. But what does Congress what to do about all the information threats we face?
State Department 'censor' office finds lifeline - Washington Examiner
Washington Examiner · December 18, 2024
The bill text, which was released on Tuesday before the House and Senate adjourn for Christmas, Hanukkah, and New Year’s holidays, includes a provision that would reauthorize the State Department’s Global Engagement Center. Founded in 2016, the GEC has come under immense public and congressional scrutiny following reports from the Washington Examiner on it granting taxpayer dollars to the Global Disinformation Index and other outside groups working to suppress right-leaning voices online.
STATE DEPARTMENT NOTIFIES CONGRESS OF PLANS TO SHUTTER ‘CENSORSHIP’ AGENCY
The reversal is significant, since the State Department sent a notification to Congress earlier this month that it had planned to soon terminate the GEC after losing support from Republicans. The GEC, which had an eight-year mandate in 2016 and requires funding to reauthorize, was at the center of investigations in the House Judiciary Committee and House Small Business Committee. There, Republicans issued subpoenas and accused the GEC of orchestrating a speech suppression campaign against conservatives alongside left-wing nonprofit groups and social media companies.
Moreover, the reversal has struck a nerve with conservative Republicans, who view the provision being slipped into the bill text by congressional leaders as a “stunning betrayal,” in the words of one senior Republican aide who was involved with the investigations into the GEC.
“It should have never come to this,” the GOP aide, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Washington Examiner.
A second Republican aide close to GEC investigations told the Washington Examiner: “This is literally tearing down the work and wins of Republican-led committees that investigated the GEC. Are we going to add the cost of that investigation to the total cost of this bill?”
TRUMP CABINET PICKS: WHO’S BEEN TAPPED TO SERVE IN THE PRESIDENT-ELECT’S ADMINISTRATION
On social media, Republicans expressed their frustrations on Tuesday and Wednesday, with Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) writing on X, “This CR funds the censorship of conservative speech for the entire first year of the Trump administration. Unacceptable!”
Banks recently launched an investigation into the State Department over the GEC appearing to try to link him to Russia falsely. The GEC circulated internal press guidance, leaked and reported on by the New York Post, that sought to discredit reporting from the Washington Examiner and independent journalist Matt Taibbi on the GEC’s ties to speech suppression.
“Bad,” Rep. Chip Roy (R-TX) said in response to the release of the provision in the continuing resolution, or CR, bill text.
“Brazen,” said Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC), whom Trump tapped for a high-ranking role in the Office of Management and Budget. The powerful agency plans to work in conjunction with Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy’s Department of Government Efficiency to cut wasteful federal spending.
Brazen https://t.co/Xo8Irau0nI
— Rep. Dan Bishop (@RepDanBishop) December 18, 2024
“A vote for the Christmas Cramnibus is a vote for taxpayer-funded censorship. Unbelievable,” Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-GA) said.
DEMOCRATS SEARCH FOR ANSWERS AS BARACK OBAMA’S INFLUENCE WANES
In a statement shared with the Washington Examiner, House Speaker Mike Johnson’s (R-LA) office defended the GEC provision.
“Speaker Johnson has killed multiple efforts to pass a 5-year reauthorization of the GEC during the past year, including as recently as the National Defense Authorization Act last week,” a spokesperson for Johnson said. “This bill ensures the incoming Trump Administration has the maximum ability and authority to determine how to handle the office, its authorities, and funding.”
According to a congressional source familiar with the matter, the GEC provision was a demand from Senate Democrats in exchange for Republicans getting a provision aiming to protect small businesses from certain fines approved by the Biden administration under a bill called the Corporate Transparency Act.
The State Department had previously briefed Congress on its plans to absorb the GEC’s functions, which the source said would make it hard to kill the agency, rather than the Trump administration investigating it and having broad discretion.
The State Department declined to comment.
BIDEN’S ‘TRUMP-PROOFING’ FOREIGN POLICY REVOLVES AROUND UKRAINE AND NATO
‘The CR should be called Make America Sick Again’
Still, Republican senators also joined in on the chorus, taking aim at the GEC provision and the House speaker. The Tuesday legislation would extend government funding levels until March 2025 and comes after weeks of congressional negotiations. It is expected to be voted on this week.
“With Republicans who vote for this, who needs Democrats?” Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) asked.
“But we couldn’t possibly help Americans poisoned by their own government’s nuclear radiation. The CR should be called Make America Sick Again,” Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) said, referencing his efforts to pass funding for people sick from radioactive waste exposure. Hawley’s bill on the matter was left out of the must-pass government funding bill.
“The speaker’s been an embarrassment from beginning to end, and the CR is the latest example of this. The CR is a total disaster. Why he continues to be elected as speaker is beyond me,” Hawley also said, according to congressional reporter Max Cohen.
Meanwhile, Ramaswamy also pointed out the GEC provision in a Wednesday social media post, writing on X that the agency is “a key player in the federal censorship state.”
VOTERS SEND HISTORY-MAKING CANDIDATES TO CONGRESS
“We’re grateful for DOGE’s warm reception on Capitol Hill,” Ramaswamy said. “Nearly everyone agrees we need a smaller & more streamlined federal government, but actions speak louder than words. This is an early test. The bill should fail.”
Musk is also, as a whole, opposed to the spending bill.
“This bill should not pass,” Musk wrote on X Wednesday morning.
This bill should not pass https://t.co/eccQ6COZJ4
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) December 18, 2024
The GEC is facing a lawsuit from the Federalist, the Daily Wire, and the State of Texas for funding the Global Disinformation Index and a New York-based company called NewsGuard.
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
The plaintiffs say GEC facilitated “one of the most egregious government operations to censor the American press in the history of the nation,” according to a complaint.
“Mike Johnson is the best speaker Democrats have ever had. And the best part for them is they didn’t even need to win elections to get all the power he’s given them,” Sean Davis, the CEO of the Federalist, posted on X on Wednesday.
Washington Examiner · December 18, 2024
13. Congress demands answers on low testosterone issues among special operators
Who would have thought? I wonder if this would be added to the conditions for VA disability.
Congress demands answers on low testosterone issues among special operators
A range of health issues in the special operations community caused by low testosterone, dubbed "Operator Syndrome," has drawn congressional attention.
Patty Nieberg
Posted Yesterday
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg
The Defense Department is being directed by Congress to look into incidents of special operators reporting low levels of testosterone, a deficiency leading to a range of physical and mental health effects that this community has been dealing with on their own for years.
The health effects of lowered testosterone among special operations veterans have become so well-known in the community that many refer to it as “Operator Syndrome.”
First defined in a 2020 research paper by Dr. Christopher Frueh, Operator Syndrome considers the unique lifestyle of special operators and low testosterone levels as a result of chronic stress. By 35 years old, many special operators have the same testosterone levels of 80-to-90-year-old men, Frueh told Task & Purpose.
The Secretary of Defense is directed to brief members of Congress next year on available treatments for low testosterone in the military health system and current protocols for testing and screening. The briefing will look closely at how “high-stress operating environments are linked to low testosterone among servicemembers.”
The congressional measure that calls for the briefing is included in the fiscal year 2025 national defense bill which passed the House and is headed to the Senate for a vote this week.
The measure is a long time coming, according to special operations veterans and experts. Many SOF veterans have established nonprofits and non-traditional treatment plans to help former service members dealing with a host of physical and mental health issues linked to low testosterone levels: Sleep disruptions, emotional numbing, feelings of detachment, decreased sense of worth and loss of motivation.
Former special operations personnel and medical experts interviewed by Task & Purpose said they welcomed the idea of studying testosterone, but cautioned that it’s just the tip of the iceberg for common health problems among current and former special operators.
Frueh said the syndrome is a way to address “a complex set of injuries and impairments” and describe “interrelated” physical conditions that special ops vets are vulnerable to such as traumatic brain injuries, hormonal dysfunction, sleep problems, psychological difficulties like depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, social difficulties and relationship problems.
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As men age, testosterone levels naturally decrease. The decline can lead to symptoms like sexual dysfunction, depression, concentration issues, sleep problems and metabolic effects. But research indicates a strong connection between stress and low levels of testosterone, even in younger men. The connection between testosterone and its corresponding health impacts are well understood. A Department of Veterans Affairs website page for “Improving Low Testosterone Naturally” even advocates for avoiding excessive stress.
Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-Calif.) originally proposed a five-year study of the problem in the 2025 Pentagon budget. The House-originated measure called for the Defense Department to look at training and deployment impacts on testosterone levels and the long-term health impacts for those assigned to special operations units. But that study was dropped in the final language of the bill passed this month, with the Congressional briefing included as a compromise. The original amendment focused on the impacts of low testosterone on special operations service members but the briefing could be broadened to include health effects across the broader military.
“Despite surveys of both veterans and active duty servicemembers indicating a potential link between the stress of military service and decreased testosterone levels, we still lack comprehensive data on this issue,” Panetta said in a statement to Task & Purpose. “This is especially true for our Special Forces, whose work requirements can place them under extreme stress, long periods of sleep deprivation, enduring starvation, and high-intensity training that can lead to testosterone depletion.”
Panetta added that the congressionally directed briefing “is an important step forward for our overall understanding of this issue.”
Low testosterone impacts on special operators
Panetta’s original policy focused on soldiers in Special Forces, but low testosterone levels are impacting troops across the special operations community. The Warrior Health Foundation, an organization established by former Navy SEAL Sean Rosario, helps connect current and former SEALs with medical providers to treat low testosterone levels. Rosario said that the issue impacts overall military preparedness.
“At a tier one level of special operations, you’re literally on the all-star team playing in the World Series every single day,” Rosario said. “You have to bring that energy and you have to bring that commitment every single day, whether in training or deployed overseas. And guys are having to do that basically at a deficit.”
Ryan Ziegler held two different special operations jobs during his career, first as an Air Force Tactical Air Control Party Specialist, or TACP, and then as a Green Beret in the Army. He left the military after an injury on a 2017 deployment to Afghanistan. When he left the service and went to school to become a physician’s assistant, Ziegler found himself mixing up information, getting lost on test questions, losing sleep and feeling disconnected. After going through a few months of treatment to regulate his hormones, he felt instantly better.
“Three months later, I’m getting A’s on my tests. I’m passing everything. I’m actually teaching other students,” Ziegler said. “It was a complete transformation.”
Ziegler’s treatment was designed by Dr. Mark Gordon, who studies neuroendocrinology and translates research into clinical treatments at his own practice. Like other non-traditional medical practices that veterans turn to, Gordon does not take insurance but has self-funded or used donations to cover veteran hormone treatments in the past. Using funds from the Special Operations Association of America, Gordon created a blood panel that tests for 28 biomarkers which helps give patients predictive treatments and recommendations for follow-up procedures.
“In endocrinology, you’ll see low testosterone and the knee-jerk response will be ‘let’s just shove in some testosterone’ as opposed to what we’ve been doing, which is, we don’t mask the causation,” Gordon said. “We don’t give testosterone. What we do is we fix the reason for it being deficient.”
Immediately providing testosterone, Gordon said, through injectable, oral or topical means, can put providers “on the hook for the rest of that person’s life” with testosterone supplementation.
Gordon will provide testosterone-based treatment plans for patients where options are limited, he said, but he advocates for using supplements like Clomid, the brand name for clomiphene citrate, a medication typically used to treat female infertility but has been studied as a way to stimulate the brain’s pituitary gland or in Gordon’s words, can help “restart their system” and help re-regulate the body’s brain signals and endocrine system by “fixing the cause for the deficiency.”
Experts said that testing for testosterone is a good first step to treating conditions that are common among current and former special operators but that there’s still a lack of understanding or willingness to look at the larger role hormones play.
“They’re looking at only one of the four tires on the car that’s deflated. You need to look at the broader picture and it’s not just testosterone. That is the problem,” Gordon said. “It could be Operator Syndrome. It could be blast trauma over-pressure. It could be chronic stress. They all lead to inflammation in the brain.”
Geoffrey Dardia, a former Special Forces soldier and current functional medicine coach, pointed to the Army’s Holistic Health and Fitness System which has contracts with lifestyle medicine professionals and look at optimizing hormones, but said that it’s still limited to certain groups. Ultimately Dardia said this approach is a cost saver as opposed to addressing symptoms like erectile dysfunction or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, ADHD, with expensive medications.
“I’m a huge advocate for functional performance-lifestyle medicine where it’s precise. They look at all these things and they go for the root-cause dysfunction, and then they resolve it and they don’t have to spend billions of dollars every year on prescription drugs,” Dardia said. “There’s a reason why a lot of the tier one units are contracting performance lifestyle medicine docs to do this because they understand the implications.”
Acceptable testosterone levels
The health issues associated with “low T” levels are not limited to veterans, but accessing hormone replacement therapy can be difficult for active duty troops because prescriptions for injectable testosterone could make them non-deployable because of the medication’s refrigeration requirements, experts said. While there are topical and oral testosterone replacements, injectables can provide more reliable levels and only need to be administered once every few weeks.
Joey Fio, a former SEAL and chief program officer for the SEAL Future Foundation, another nonprofit that helps provide resources to SEAL veterans for hormone and endocrine treatments, said regular physical assessments and hormone tests “should be a protocol” and part of a better standard of care. He said for his exit physical, he had to beg his provider to give him a blood test.
The levels of testosterone that are considered acceptable or normal can vary across health systems. In order to qualify for testosterone replacement therapy, military providers use American Urological Association guidelines to diagnose low testosterone or hypogonadism. Patients have to have two separate instances of total serum testosterone measurements below 300 nanograms per deciliter of blood, an active duty physician assistant told Task & Purpose. Before making a formal diagnosis, however, providers also look at other reported symptoms like fatigue, hair loss, cognitive dysfunction, irritability and sex drive.
With differing standards around acceptable measurements and the fact that hormone levels can be highly individualistic, Dardia advocates for baseline assessments of new recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations, or MEPS. Dardia said there has to be “context to the number” regarding testosterone levels since hormone measurements can present differently in people.
“If I had a 200 testosterone level and I wanted to kill myself and if someone else had a 200 something and they were at the top of the world, we can’t say that number is good or bad,” Dardia said.
People who join the military with adverse childhood experiences, for example, might have lower baseline testosterone levels because of their lifetime adaptations to stress, he said. With a baseline assessment, “you would be able to trend over time,” Dardia said. “Instead of telling them ‘you fell within the reference range, you’re normal,’ you can see what’s normal for them at the beginning and then when they drop, you can do an intervention,” Dardia said. “That’s where we’re failing.”
Low testosterone levels are not only a special operations issue but across the broader military and even the U.S. broadly. One study indicated a steady decline in adolescent and young men’s testosterone levels since the 1990s.
“There’s gonna be a point in time where if we stress people out, stress-inoculate them, sleep deprive them and keep their op-tempo high, and then we pump them full of energy drinks and nicotine in PXs and commissaries to keep them going, something’s gonna fail,” Dardia said. “When you get to the point of exhaustion, low testosterone is guaranteed.”
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg
14. China’s Mosaic Warfare
Excerpts:
Ultimately, a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would test the limits of both Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare. While Mosaic Warfare’s emphasis on adaptability and decentralization provides a counterbalance to the centralized vulnerabilities exploited by System Destruction Warfare, its reliance on advanced technology and information systems presents exploitable weaknesses (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020; Engstrom, 2018). Conversely, while System Destruction Warfare is highly effective against traditional, centralized systems, its success against a distributed and adaptive approach like Mosaic Warfare is far from assured (Engstrom, 2018).
The outcome of such a confrontation would likely hinge on each side’s ability to exploit the other’s vulnerabilities while mitigating their own. For the U.S., this would involve ensuring the resilience and redundancy of Mosaic forces, as well as countering the PLA’s cyber and electronic warfare capabilities (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). For China, it would require overcoming the challenges posed by a distributed and adaptive adversary, while maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of its own operational systems (Engstrom, 2018). In this high-stakes competition, the interplay between Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare would not only shape the course of the conflict but also provide critical insights into the future of military strategy in the 21st century.
China’s Mosaic Warfare
By Matthew P. Arsenault
December 19, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/12/19/chinas_mosaic_warfare_1079710.html?mc_cid=231614ddf0&utm
Clashing Strategies: Mosaic Warfare and China's System Destruction Warfare in a Taiwan Conflict
The potential for conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan has been a central focus of contemporary military strategy. Both nations have developed distinct approaches to modern warfare that emphasize innovation, adaptability, and the exploitation of technology to gain operational advantages. The United States' Mosaic Warfare, which prioritizes distributed, composable systems and AI-driven decision-making, contrasts sharply with China’s System Destruction Warfare, which seeks to paralyze adversary systems through multi-domain disruption (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020; Engstrom, 2018). If such a conflict were to occur, these strategies would inevitably collide, creating a complex and unpredictable battlefield shaped by divergent military philosophies.
Mosaic Warfare is fundamentally about flexibility. It envisions a disaggregated force structure composed of smaller, highly specialized units that can operate independently or as part of a larger system (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). These units are connected by advanced communication and AI systems, enabling rapid reconfiguration based on battlefield needs. By decentralizing decision-making, Mosaic Warfare aims to accelerate operational tempo, outmaneuver adversaries, and overwhelm traditional command structures. This strategy is designed to exploit technological superiority and ensure the resilience of U.S. forces in the face of concentrated enemy attacks.
China’s System Destruction Warfare, as outlined by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is predicated on the belief that modern warfare is a confrontation between operational systems rather than individual forces. The PLA aims to achieve victory not by annihilating enemy forces but by paralyzing their ability to function as a cohesive system (Engstrom, 2018). This involves targeting an adversary’s critical information, command and control (C2), and operational systems through a combination of kinetic strikes, cyber-attacks, electronic warfare, and other disruptive methods. System Destruction Warfare is designed to dismantle the interconnected frameworks that enable adversaries to coordinate and execute operations, leaving them unable to respond effectively (Engstrom, 2018).
In a potential conflict over Taiwan, these strategies would intersect on multiple levels. The decentralized nature of Mosaic Warfare could pose a direct challenge to the PLA’s focus on targeting centralized systems. By design, Mosaic Warfare minimizes single points of failure, spreading operational capabilities across numerous smaller units (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). This would make it more difficult for the PLA to achieve the system-wide paralysis central to its approach. However, the reliance of Mosaic Warfare on advanced communication and information systems creates vulnerabilities that align with the PLA’s strengths in cyber and electronic warfare. The PLA’s ability to disrupt or degrade these systems could significantly hamper the effectiveness of Mosaic Warfare, potentially forcing U.S. forces to operate in a degraded information environment (Engstrom, 2018).
The integration of AI and machine learning into Mosaic Warfare introduces another critical dynamic. AI systems enable rapid decision-making and force adaptability, but they also represent high-value targets for the PLA (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). Cyber-attacks designed to manipulate, disable, or deceive these AI systems could neutralize the advantages of Mosaic Warfare. For example, by attacking data networks or injecting false information, the PLA could compromise the situational awareness and operational coherence of U.S. forces. This aligns with the PLA’s emphasis on achieving "information dominance," a cornerstone of its System Destruction Warfare doctrine (Engstrom, 2018).
Similarly, the PLA’s reliance on tightly integrated operational systems presents opportunities for Mosaic Warfare. The modular and adaptable nature of Mosaic forces could allow the United States to exploit gaps in the PLA’s defenses. By deploying small, highly specialized units capable of targeting critical components of the PLA’s operational framework, the U.S. could disrupt the PLA’s ability to maintain system integrity (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). This could involve precision strikes on key nodes in the PLA’s communication networks, command centers, or logistical hubs, effectively countering the PLA’s reliance on centralized coordination.
A key battleground for these strategies would likely be the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare place significant emphasis on controlling this domain. For the U.S., dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is essential to maintaining the connectivity and functionality of Mosaic forces (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). For China, disrupting the U.S.’s electromagnetic capabilities is a priority, as it aligns with its broader strategy of system paralysis (Engstrom, 2018). In such a conflict, electronic warfare operations, such as jamming, spoofing, and anti-radiation attacks, would play a critical role in determining which side gains the upper hand.
Another critical aspect of the confrontation between these strategies would be hybrid warfare. Both Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare extend beyond traditional battlefields into cyberspace and information domains. The PLA’s emphasis on integrating cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns with conventional military operations would challenge Mosaic Warfare’s reliance on accurate, real-time information (Engstrom, 2018). Conversely, the distributed nature of Mosaic Warfare could allow U.S. forces to maintain operational effectiveness even in contested or degraded information environments, presenting a significant obstacle to the PLA’s hybrid warfare tactics (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020).
The geographic and operational context of a Taiwan conflict would further shape the interaction between these strategies. Taiwan’s proximity to China and the PLA’s robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities give China an inherent advantage in terms of logistics and force projection. Mosaic Warfare, however, could provide the United States with the flexibility needed to penetrate these defenses. By deploying modular forces that can adapt to evolving battlefield conditions, the U.S. could mitigate the PLA’s geographic advantages and sustain operations within contested areas (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020).
Ultimately, a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would test the limits of both Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare. While Mosaic Warfare’s emphasis on adaptability and decentralization provides a counterbalance to the centralized vulnerabilities exploited by System Destruction Warfare, its reliance on advanced technology and information systems presents exploitable weaknesses (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020; Engstrom, 2018). Conversely, while System Destruction Warfare is highly effective against traditional, centralized systems, its success against a distributed and adaptive approach like Mosaic Warfare is far from assured (Engstrom, 2018).
The outcome of such a confrontation would likely hinge on each side’s ability to exploit the other’s vulnerabilities while mitigating their own. For the U.S., this would involve ensuring the resilience and redundancy of Mosaic forces, as well as countering the PLA’s cyber and electronic warfare capabilities (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). For China, it would require overcoming the challenges posed by a distributed and adaptive adversary, while maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of its own operational systems (Engstrom, 2018). In this high-stakes competition, the interplay between Mosaic Warfare and System Destruction Warfare would not only shape the course of the conflict but also provide critical insights into the future of military strategy in the 21st century.
Matthew P. Arsenault holds a PhD in political science and has worked on issues of political violence across academia, government, and the private sector.
15. The US military is sending counter-drone systems to New Jersey bases. Here's how the Dronebuster works.
The US military is sending counter-drone systems to New Jersey bases. Here's how the Dronebuster works.
Business Insider · by Jake Epstein
Military & Defense
Jake Epstein
2024-12-18T17:24:04Z
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A US Army soldier uses a Dronebuster to neutralize an enemy drone during a training exercise in Indiana in February 2024. US Army photo by Spc. Jonathan D. Vitale
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- The US military has confirmed recent drone activity around bases in New Jersey.
- The Pentagon said this week that it sent counter-drone technology to two installations.
- One of these systems has been identified as the Dronebuster, a hand-held electronic warfare tool.
The Pentagon is arming two military installations in New Jersey with counter-drone technology, giving them extra tools to better defend their airspace from any unauthorized drone incursions. One of the systems the Pentagon mentioned by name is the Dronebuster.
The US military confirmed drone sightings at Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle this month, as well as multiple sightings at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, with drones at one point forcing the base to close its airspace. A spokesperson for the Joint Staff said last weekend that drone activities over bases are not a new issue but criticized some of the recent incidents as "irresponsible."
Amid recent drone drama, there have been repeated calls to shoot down unidentified aircraft, particularly those near military bases.
The Pentagon said this week that "if a determination is made that unauthorized drones are conducting any malign or malicious activity, commanders are authorized to take appropriate action to mitigate and counter these unmanned systems," but the military is not going to be engaging anything kinetically, a spokesperson added, unless it is a "clear and present danger."
Military bases have some existing capabilities to deal with drone incursions, but the Pentagon acknowledged that sending more technology will help them mitigate potential threats.
Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary, said that the military is providing "active and passive detection capabilities" and "counter-drone capabilities" to Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle.
Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Ryder identified one of these tools as the Dronebuster, a newer piece of counter-drone tech that "employs non-kinetic means to interrupt drone signals" and affects the aircraft's ability to operate. Picatinny did not confirm any of the specific systems it is obtaining but said that it is "strengthening its counter-UAS capabilities to detect and mitigate drone incursions." BI was unable to reach Naval Weapons Station Earle.
A US Army soldier uses a Dronebuster to disrupt enemy drones during an exercise in Croatia in April 2023. US Army photograph by Sgt. Mariah Y. Gonzalez
The Dronebuster device is a hand-held electronic warfare system developed by the American company Flex Force. When a user points the lightweight device that first came online in 2016 at a drone, the weapon emits a signal that cuts the connection between the drone and its operator. It's in use with various military services.
The US Army trains service members to counter drones using the Dronebuster in tandem with a Smart Shooter system — a rifle with a special optic that tracks the drone, calculates its trajectory, and tells the user when they have a good chance of hitting it with a bullet. BI observed this training firsthand at the Joint C-sUAS (Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System) University, or JCU, which is a new US Army initiative based at Fort Sill.
Beyond the US military, security personnel and first responders can also use the Dronebuster as a portable jammer system when facing a threat. The radio frequency jammer has evolved over the years, becoming several times more powerful than the earlier models and more rugged for a range of counter-drone operations.
Ryder said that the device is "a methodology that we have that is able to essentially bring drones down non-kinetically should we need to do that."
Related stories
For the military, maintaining a robust counter-drone capability is becoming essential as drone technology becomes more prolific. The low cost of these systems makes them readily available for hobbyists and malign actors alike. Terrorists and insurgencies have weaponized small drones in Middle East combat, and in the Ukraine war, cheap, off-the-shelf hobby-style drones easily bought for a few hundred dollars are engaging in everything from surveillance to precision strike.
Drone activity over and around US bases has long been an issue for the military and is not limited to the New Jersey and Ohio incidents.
In recent weeks, suspected drones have also been spotted at US bases overseas. Such activity presents a growing problem for the military, as drones can spy on its assets, like aircraft, or hazard its operations. As drone usage continues to proliferate, the Pentagon is seeking out ways to better its approach to countering unmanned systems.
"I think we've all recognized the fact that unmanned systems are here to stay," Ryder said this week. "They're a part of modern warfare, and whether it's here in the homeland or overseas, we want to make sure that we're doing due diligence to protect our forces and protect our equities from a national security standpoint."
It can be a challenge to respond stateside, though.
"When we're here in the homeland, the authorities that the US military has to detect and track these kinds of things is much different than it would be if we were in a combat zone. In other words, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that we can employ outside the United States are much different, for very good reasons," Ryder said.
The drone activity at Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle comes amid a flurry of reported drone sightings across the East Coast over the past few weeks. A range of federal agencies have determined that the sightings are not nefarious, despite speculation to the contrary, and include commercial drones, hobbyist drones, law enforcement drones, manned aircraft, helicopters, and even stars.
White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters Monday that "we have not identified anything anomalous or any national security or public safety risk over the civilian airspace in New Jersey or other states in the Northeast." The FBI, Homeland Security, and Department of Defense have argued the same.
Drones New Jersey
Business Insider · by Jake Epstein
16. Imagining a US Army Drone Corps
Every time I hear "drone" I recall Plato and Socrates.
Democracy is divided into three classes: drones, traders and — the people. A drone is a human who is neither a ruler nor a servant of the city but a spender of his means. Those would be outsiders, people on the margins, from beggars to criminals
Apologies for the attempt at humor.
More seriously is this conclusion:
New weapons and platforms routinely drive change in the character of warfare. The introduction of tanks and planes came with great consternation as to how they should be used. The incorporation of drones is no different: they are a powerful asset that must be managed by dedicated professionals, similar to fires and aviation branches. The drone corps, even if established with a built-in R2S2 concept, is not the final step, but the first in a continual process of improvement and transformation. In a resource- and personnel-constrained environment, the Army cannot afford to mismanage its drone force. It must fundamentally reconceptualize what it considers maneuver branches, and how it organizes and fights maneuver formations. Drones will remain a major feature of the near-future battlefield. To be prepared for that battlefield, the Army needs a drone corps and its subject-matter expertise.
Imagining a US Army Drone Corps - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joshua Suthoff · December 19, 2024
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In February 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces. It is no secret that the Ukrainian military has used drones to great effect. Its units continue to innovate with drone tactics, techniques, and procedures and effects in the air, land, and maritime domains. Both belligerents in the Russia-Ukraine War have pledged to build over a million aerial drones each year to fill the skies. Even with the extremely innovative use of the drones (mine laying, incendiary delivery) already observed in Ukraine, history will show that the most important attribute of drones has been their ability to serve as economy-of-force systems. In a grinding war of attrition, drones have allowed the Ukrainian military to protect its limited combat power and threaten a much larger combat force across multiple domains.
The Unmanned Systems Forces that Zelenskyy announced amount, effectively, to a drone corps. US policymakers have taken note of the effectiveness of drones in the conflict and a drone corps may also be coming to the US Army. A draft 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) from the US Congress directed the Army to establish such a corps as a basic branch. The language did not make the US Senate’s version of the NDAA—however, it is an understatement to say that drones and their effects are here to stay on the battlefield. Drones may not be revolutionary in their impacts, but they are a creditable and enduring enabler—an enabler that continues to threaten the hegemony of traditional branches like artillery and the once dominant mass of infantry and armor. The Army and DoD more broadly are striving to innovate with drones, but standardization, training, and tactics vary. The DoD Replicator program’s primary mission is to increase the available drone inventory, but how effective is a deep magazine of drones without subject matter experts to operate and employ? This trend of drones’ growing impact will likely continue as they are paired with AI and other technologies. But in an imagined near future where the NDAA has passed with the drone corps language intact, what form should such a corps take?
The Needs Statement
It is no secret that the US Army (and other services) faces recruiting challenges. The force would certainly struggle to quickly fill and train its ranks for a mass mobilization. This problem is compounded by the increasing speed with which the character of war is changing—which means the Army would not just need a sufficient number of people in the event of a large-scale conflict, but people whose knowledge grows at a pace commensurate with battlefield evolution. A case in point is the war in Ukraine’s repeated demonstration of actions and counteractions as both sides seek to ensure drone primacy. The most recent example is fiber-optic tethered drones largely immune to electronic warfare effects.
Drones, if managed appropriately, are a quick, cheap, economy-of-force capability, but one evolving rapidly enough that it requires a focused and professional stewardship—a drone corps. As the Army closes most of its cavalry squadrons there also remains the requirement for reconnaissance and security operations. These are historically an economy-of-force mission and drones are well suited for it when supported with traditional enablers. In a cavalry squadron, the planning, collection, and dissemination of the intelligence requirements was a primary focus of the squadron staff. Now the task is spread across multiple headquarters with no real unified ownership. A drone corps would help to fill this gap.
The creation of a drone corps is the next evolutionary step in the critical management of these warfighting systems. The training, maintenance, and implementation cannot be the secondary duty of a brigade aviation officer or a proactive noncommissioned officer or officer in a battalion. A drone corps will ensure development of systems and branch professionals along avenues across the DOTMLPF spectrum (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities). Infantry, sustainment, and fires battalions are all led by professional officers and noncommissioned officers from those branches. Drones and their employment have evolved to the point where those domain systems need the same stewardship. The Army cannot afford a disjointed implementation of drone doctrine or of tactics, techniques, and procedures. The systems need a champion to drive progress inside the Army and refine requirements for industry.
Waypoints to Follow
So, what would a professional drone corps look like? Among US special operations forces (SOF), the SOF truths provide a critical baseline understanding of purpose and a north star for the special operations community’s culture. A drone corps would be well served by replicating this model and building itself around a fundamental set of drone truths.
- Drone warfare will be an enduring capability and threat on the future battlefield. Drones are cost-efficient, simple, and quickly mass-produced. They allow individuals and states the ability to compete with larger adversaries. People will find a way to keep drones in the fight.
- Drones do not replace the warfighter. Even with drones on the battlefield, manned maneuver forces will still be needed to retain ground and fight. Humans must still be on the loop for maximum efficiency. AI is efficient, but—because it does not precisely replicate the cognition of humans—insufficient.
- Drones are a powerful economy-of-force capability and constant enabler. Drones don’t need to rest. Instead, they allow manned forces to rest, refit, and transition to the next fight. A cheap drone can always be sent forward, preserving combat power and saving lives.
- Drone professionals, effects, and synchronization are not created instantly, but require training, planning, and time. Drone systems are relatively cheap and it does not take long to train an operator. However, it does take time to achieve synchronization and effects. Additional-duty operators found in maneuver battalions vary in quality, flight time, and capability. Regardless of operators’ skill, they will eventually leave their units. Subject-matter experts and repetition are required to ensure drones are well positioned and the data they provide is appropriately analyzed.
If these truths form the basis on which to establish a drone corps, that corps should also be constructed with several foundational principles in mind. First, the drone branch is responsible for the operations, training, and testing of the systems. This includes air, ground, offensive, defensive, unattended sensor, and resupply drones.
Second, the drone branch is fundamentally a maneuver branch with a focus on targeting and synchronization. It does not replace the existing maneuver branches, but works to enable and support their traditional offensive and defensive characteristics. The lethality and agility of drones (especially in mass) dictate that drones move from the intelligence warfighting function to maneuver. It made sense only a few years ago to align drones under military intelligence when they were primarily intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. Drones in their current multirole configurations, however, are more comparable in function to a main battle tank moving forward, engaging targets, positioning wingmen, and developing the situation. Sensing is now potentially only one aspect of a drone. Maneuvering air and ground drones and planning their effects follows along the same lines as doing so with infantry and maneuver formations. Drones require a maneuver mindset.
Third, recruiting for the branch should focus initially on maneuver and intelligence officers and noncommissioned officers. In the longer term, public awareness of—and interest in—drones means that the creation of a drone corps could increase overall recruiting and retention.
Fourth, the drone corps operates within maneuver formations or in drone-specific units.
And fifth, the drone branch is not a subset of the aviation branch, but works in concert with it to deconflict and simplify airspace management. Drones now operate across all domains, well beyond the air littoral where they were once almost exclusively found.
A Tactical Formation, Not a Niche Specialty
There are ways of meeting the letter of the draft NDAA language while stopping short of establishing a drone corps—simply creating the branch, for example, by changing the military occupational specialty of a few soldiers in maneuver formations. This would be similar to some of the Army’s lower-density military occupational specialties, like electronic warfare. The easiest path would be to rebranch soldiers in formations like the human-machine integration platoons. Individual subject-matter experts might be gathered on select headquarters staffs where other small-density specialties are consolidated. Maneuver companies would maintain organic drones to provide local situational awareness and strike capabilities. These operators could be either soldiers designated by the new drone military occupational specialty or additional-duty operators. Focusing drones only at the maneuver battalions is limiting the true potential of drones.
This simple and straightforward course of action, however, would not help with the imperatives of standardization and training. Moreover, the Army would be missing an opportunity to build a small lethal, formation that can enable other maneuver units or operate itself as a unit of action. Expanding task organization for drone use is the true spirit of the NDAA’s draft language.
As an Army we are at a critical inflection point and have an opportunity to build a lethal enabling force. A more expansive course of action would involve creating drone units that can operate independently or augment brigade formations to fully leverage the situational awareness and strike capability of the systems. In a zero-growth environment with no major budgetary reallocations, the ready solution is the consolidation of the human-machine integration platoons across a division to build a robotics recon strike squadron (R2S2). An additional manning solution could incorporate the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance company in the intelligence and electronic warfare battalion. An R2S2 would be small formation task-organized under a division headquarters, commanded by a lieutenant colonel.
There would be two primary missions of the R2S2. The first is to standardize training, maintenance, and equipping across a division, ensuring that the additional-duty operators within maneuver formations are proficient. This would be similar to a DIVARTY (division artillery) concept, and in fact the fires enterprise more broadly is an excellent model for a drone crops. Fires professionals in maneuver battalions, brigades, and separate fires battalions ensure that the warfighting function is appropriately trained and leveraged.
The second mission is to deploy human-machine integration platoons or companies in front of or supporting maneuver battalions to conduct targeting and reconnaissance and surveillance operations for supported brigades or divisions. This provides an economy-of-force element that creates decision space for commanders at echelon.
An R2S2 assigned to a division headquarters would be uniquely positioned to sense with robots, coordinate the intelligence picture with the adjacent intelligence and electronic warfare battalion, and strike with division, corps, and joint assets. More importantly, establishing a headquarters to manage the data provided by drones in all domains ensures that critical data can be translated into intelligence requirements or strikes. This headquarters would close a critical gap created with the deactivation of traditional cavalry squadrons. US Navy senior leaders in the Indo-Pacific region have advanced a vision, which they describe as a “hellscape” and which acknowledges drones’ rapid economy-of-force potential to their ability to provide time and space for the joint force commander in the event of a Chinese incursion into Taiwan. An R2S2 would provide the Army with a deployable land- and air-based “hellscape” option at the next conflict zone.
The R2S2 does not need to be a large formation and should leverage other sustainment functions within division headquarters formations to reduce overall manning requirements. For example, the R2S2 could receive routine S-1 or S-4 support from the established headquarters battalion, intelligence and electronic warfare battalion, or DIVARTY. The R2S2 headquarters should be designed to focus primarily on sensing and striking for supported divisions or brigades. Human-machine integration platoons and companies within the RS2 would be equipped with infantry squad vehicles, multiple drones, and secure but unclassified communications systems to allow them to rapidly integrate and support maneuver battalions. A light package would ensure the platoons and the R2S2 can reposition or deploy quickly in support of economy-of-force missions and support to lodgments. Besides sense-and-strike missions, an R2S2 could also support mine emplacement and critical resupply operations for a division headquarters.
A third course of action would involve consolidating both human-machine integration platoons and battalion scouts under an R2S2 headquarters. This would further increase the reconnaissance and strike capability of the unit and ensure brigades and divisions have the best cued and mixed intelligence picture. It would provide a true all-weather sense-and-strike formation.
Completing the Kill Web
Establishment of a drone corps and R2S2 units would provide a key link in the Army’s evolving kill web. A well-positioned R2S2 with drones forward in all domains would establish a clear threat picture for a higher headquarters. While providing immediate kinetic effects with drone munitions, it would also provide strike recommendations and sensing for key shaping formations like multi-domain tasks forces and rocket battalions. Establishing subject-matter experts and utilizing the fire support model reduces cognitive load and training requirements for maneuver battalions. The training, maintenance, and use of drones within maneuver battalions are absolutely critical, but these activities come at the cost of time and distract from those battalions’ mission-essential tasks. Drone professionals and a focused R2S2 headquarters would ensure drones and operators are ready when needed. Having an R2S2 look forward while a brigade or division deploys or transitions would ensure that tempo is maintained. One can find multiple examples of Russian armored and infantry attacks being disrupted and destroyed by waves of drones with minimal or no friendly maneuver support. Pairing the use of drones with a combined arms mentality of the US Army increases overall lethality and maximizes drone effects. An R2S2 would also provide a continuous layered and joint defense, as well as a sense-and-strike capability for a division.
In short, the R2S2 would provide a small drone–focused package to tie together the Army’s kill web. Small and agile units would move and hide on the battlefield while pushing drones forward. Equipped with one-way drones and linked to the fires network, an R2S2 would punch above its weight and buy time for a higher headquarters.
The Next Evolutional Step
New weapons and platforms routinely drive change in the character of warfare. The introduction of tanks and planes came with great consternation as to how they should be used. The incorporation of drones is no different: they are a powerful asset that must be managed by dedicated professionals, similar to fires and aviation branches. The drone corps, even if established with a built-in R2S2 concept, is not the final step, but the first in a continual process of improvement and transformation. In a resource- and personnel-constrained environment, the Army cannot afford to mismanage its drone force. It must fundamentally reconceptualize what it considers maneuver branches, and how it organizes and fights maneuver formations. Drones will remain a major feature of the near-future battlefield. To be prepared for that battlefield, the Army needs a drone corps and its subject-matter expertise.
Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Suthoff recently served as the commander of 3-4 Cavalry. He resides in Colorado with his wife and five children.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Brahim Douglas, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joshua Suthoff · December 19, 2024
17. The Long Range Desert Group and the birth of special operations around the world
The Long Range Desert Group and the birth of special operations around the world
Military History, Special Operations
By Stavros Atlamazoglou
sandboxx.us · December 18, 2024
Not many people know about the small British special operations unit known as the “Long Range Desert Group” (LRDG). Although it may be small in size, it is proven to be big in impact, as it pioneered several special operations mission sets and played a significant part in the Allied victory over the German and Italian forces in North Africa during World War II.
But the LRDG and the rest of the British special operations units had a lasting effect on the U.S. military too.
The British factor
Nowadays, every military that respects itself has a special operations capability. In the U.S. military, special operations units have been elevated to the top of the food chain, becoming the go-to choice for almost every contingency, proving their worth time and again.
A handful of Army Green Berets partnered with CIA officers to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 in just a few weeks. Delta Force and the 75th Ranger Regiment led an industrial and highly effective counter-terrorism campaign against al-Qaida in Iraq during the Iraqi insurgency.
Army Green Berets toppling the Taliban and al-Qaeda on horseback in the early days of the war in Afghanistan. The Long Range Desert Group had a similar swashbuckling spirit. (Wikimedia Commons)
But America didn’t always have a potent special operations capability. And when it came time to create one, the U.S. military drew inspiration from a nation America has long kept close ties with: The United Kingdom.
Despite the media attention garnered by American operators in recent years, the British are the pioneers of modern special operations. In fact, America’s main elite special mission units were modeled after British units; Delta Force after the Special Air Service (SAS), the Naval Special Warfare Development Group – formerly known as SEAL Team 6 – from the Special Boat Service (SBS), and so forth.
And everything began in the deserts of North Africa when World War II was going very badly indeed for the Allies. Nazi Germany had occupied West Europe and was moving fast against Russia. German and Italian forces were on the cusp of victory in North Africa – a victory that would have led them to the vast oil reserves of the Middle East with unknown consequences for the Allies.
There, in the endless Sahara, with its scorching heat and scant water, Western modern special operations were born.
The Long Range Desert Group
Created in 1940 by Major Ralph Bagnold, a Royal Engineers officer, geologist, and desert explorer, the LRDG specialized in three main mission sets: strategic reconnaissance, direct action, and infiltration and exfiltration of other special operations units.
It was the intelligence the LRDG gathered during its strategic reconnaissance missions that were the most important. Patrols employed the “Road Watch” approach, where they bivouacked close to a German or Italian road and counted every vehicle that passed, noting its type. Once this intelligence was transmitted back to the Middle East Command, British commanders were able to gauge the German Afrika Korps’ intentions.
Long Range Desert Group patrols were packed. Deep behind enemy lines, the troopers had to rely on their own firepower to survive. (Wikimedia Commons)
Another important – but secondary – function of the unit was map-making. The treacherous nature of the desert environment and the mechanized nature of modern warfare necessitated accurate and reliable maps. Foot soldiers and horses could manage without good roads, but trucks and tanks weighing dozens of tons could not afford to stray away from them. The previous topographic experience of many LRDG men made the unit uniquely suitable for reconnoitering avenues of approach that could then be used by the regular army.
It was the reconnaissance skills coupled with mapmaking capabilities that brought the LRDG its greatest success when they found a hidden path around the formidable Mareth Line that blocked the Eighth Army’s entrance into Tunisia. Had the LRDG not found that path, the Allies would have had to break through the Line’s formidable defenses first established by the French and then expanded upon by the Germans and Italians. It would have taken weeks, if not months, and cost thousands of lives without the small but capable LRDG.
A Special Operations melting pot
‘R’ Patrol Chevrolet WB radio truck; the rod antenna can be seen on the right. The man at the rear is manning a Boys anti-tank rifle. (Wikimedia Commons)
“Only men who do not mind a hard life, with scanty food, little water and lots of discomfort, men who possess stamina and initiative, need apply.”
That was the advertisement that Bagnold sent to Allied units in North Africa when he started recruiting. And many answered the call.
The LRDG was extraordinary because it contained men from across the British Empire. The standard in the British regular army was to have distinct units based on nationality, for example, the 2nd New Zealand division was comprised of Kiwis, the 6th Australian division of Aussies, and the list goes on. In some cases, British officers led imperial units, for instance, Indian troops, but they were outliers.
The LRDG, however, was an imperial melting pot, with soldiers from across the British Empire. There were fourteen patrols. Four were comprised of British troops, with two from the Guards divisions (G1 and G2) and two from the Yeomanry and other units (Y1 and Y2); four were manned by New Zealanders (R1, R2, T1, and T2); two were comprised of Rhodesians and South Africans (S1 and S2), and the final four (I1, I2, I3, and I4) belonged to the Indian Long Range Squadron (ILRS) and were attached but not assigned to the LRDG. The Indian patrols were divided according to ethnicity and religion: there were Punjabi, Rajput, Jat, and Sikh patrols.
The typical LRDG patrol had five or six Chevrolet 30cwt wide-body unarmored trucks, also known as 30-hundred-weighters, plus an American-made Willy Jeep for the patrol commander. The trucks had ten-inch sand tires with reduced pressure for improved traction, enabling them to traverse the desert with as few bog-downs as possible. The trucks could carry approximately two tons each, which amounted to about three weeks’ worth of rations and water, and had an effective range of 1,100 miles without refueling.
The Long Range Desert Group. Vehicles of ‘G’ Patrol preparing to leave Siwa. ‘G’ Patrol was formed in 1940 from volunteers from the Coldstream and Scots Guards. ‘G’ and ‘Y’ Patrols routinely operated from Siwa. (Imperial War Museum)
Windshields, doors, and hoods were removed to lessen the trucks’ weight and make them more sustainable in the field. The unit also had organic aircraft for the swift transportation of key personnel (e.g., the commanding officer visiting a forward-deployed patrol), medical evacuations of wounded soldiers (both friendly and enemy), communications, and limited resupply. To facilitate the work of friendly aircraft, LRDG patrols often manufactured landing strips in various parts of the desert but also close to their forward-deployed headquarters that the unit established in Siwa and Kufra, both of which were deep behind enemy lines.
The average LRDG patrol packed impressive firepower for its small size. Their trucks were outfitted with an assortment of Boys anti-tank rifles, Vickers Ks and .50 caliber machine guns, Browning 0.30 and 0.50 caliber machine guns, and Bofors and Bredas 20mm cannons. On top of all that, the LRDG troopers carried their personal firearms, grenades, and explosives. Their arsenal made LRDG patrols a formidable foe for any Axis unit that encountered them by accident or design.
A U.S.-made Willy Jeep converted for missions with the Long Range Desert Group. That meant lots of guns and fuel cans. (Wikimedia Commons)
The immense physical demands required of an LRDG trooper made proper and sufficient nutrition essential. Captain Kenney Shaw, the unit’s Intelligence Officer, created the LRDG ration scale in consultation with military doctors. It prescribed for a daily intake of 5,000 calories and proved to be so effective that the newly established SAS adopted it. The operating environment, however, made stable resupply tricky at the best, and troopers often had to make do with what they had available. LRDG patrols covered thousands of miles on each mission, and patrols covering from 3,500 to 4,300 miles were not unheard of. An indirect benefit of the unit’s raiding operations was the capturing of enemy supplies, including rations and precious gas.
Piracy on the high seas
Trying to convince the military bureaucracy about the merits of his unit, Bagnold told his commanders that if they couldn’t find anything of note during their reconnaissance operations, they would carry “some piracy on the high seas against enemy convoys.” To do so, they had to be excellent navigators in a very strange sea indeed.
The peculiarities of the desert environment, such as the lack of distinct landmarks and the similarity of the terrain, meant that LRDG patrols had to navigate like sailors. During the inter-war period, Major Bagnold had managed to develop a special sun compass (the Bagnold Sun Compass) that worked by matching its disc to the azimuth of the sun at regular intervals.
Speaking about the compass, Major General David Lloyd Owen, a veteran of the LRDG, said that “the advantage that it gave us over the sun-compasses used by the rest of the Army lay in the fact that it showed the true bearing of the course followed at any moment.”
Greek Sacred Company troops in North Africa. LRDG worked with the special operations units of many countries and influenced their operation and development. (Wikimedia Commons)
This allowed LRDG patrols to navigate the desert, which was packed with sand dunes and rough country, without getting lost—a lifesaving feat considering the unforgiving terrain they were operating in. It was also a key technological advantage over their foe. Among the terrain features that LRDG patrols had to navigate through were the Great Sand Sea, the Calanshio Sand Sea, the Rebiana Sand Sea, and the Qattara Depression. Consequently, the job of the navigator was probably the most important in a patrol, with that of a signaller coming a close second given the LRDG’s reconnaissance duties and the necessity to transmit intelligence to headquarters quickly and securely.
Following the end of the North Africa campaign, the LRDG fought in the Balkans and Italy, distinguishing itself time and again. When the war ended, LRDG troops of different nationalities took their lessons learned back to their countries and influenced the creation of the Australian Special Air Service and New Zealand Air Service. In the U.K., the desert skill sets of the LRDG still live to this day in the British special operations community.
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in February 2022. It has been edited for republication.
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sandboxx.us · December 18, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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