Quotes of the Day:

"I must lose myself in action, lest I wither in despair." 

– Alfred Lord Tennyson

"There can be no effective control of corporations, while their political activity remains… It is necessary that laws should be passed to prohibit the use of corporate funds, directly or indirectly for political purposes; it is still more necessary that such laws should be thoroughly enforced."

– Theodore Roosevelt.

"Do what you feel in your heart to be right – for you'll be criticized anyway."

– Eleanor Roosevelt

1. Are Japan and South Korea Poised for a Historic Breakthrough? An Unlikely Partnership Could Allow Tokyo and Seoul to Counter China

2. Lee says South Koreans won’t become ‘commies’ from reading North Korean media

3. Kim Jong Un opens more new regional factories, promising a ‘socialist paradise’

4. What AUKUS teaches Seoul about nuclear-powered submarines

5. Believe it or not, the US doesn’t have an Indo-Pacific warfighting HQ

6. North Korean infiltrator caught working in Amazon IT department thanks to lag — 110ms keystroke input raises red flags over true location

7. USFK commander says DMZ should not become 'politicized,' amid bill to ease access

8. Panmunjom tours will no longer enter blue buildings on North Korea border: UNC

9. S. Korea unification ministry's bid to lead North Korea policy raises U.S. friction concerns

10. Seoul's Unification Ministry aims for 'peaceful coexistence' with North Korea in 2026 plan

11. Expert says nuclear submarines are industrial strategy, not a budget drain

12. HD Korea Shipbuilding outlines tech roadmap with MIT-led maritime consortium

13. UN General Assembly adopts resolution slamming North Korean human rights abuses

14. North Korean crypto theft hits new high in 2025 on back of Bybit heist: Reports

15. Lee calls for preemptive efforts to reduce tensions with N. Korea

16. Unification minister pins hopes on Trump's planned visit to China for engagement with N. Korea

17. Introducing the Korean Regional Review

1. Are Japan and South Korea Poised for a Historic Breakthrough? An Unlikely Partnership Could Allow Tokyo and Seoul to Counter China

​Summary:

Ayumi Teraoka argues Japan and South Korea may be edging toward a durable strategic partnership, driven less by sentiment than by China’s coercion and rising doubts about U.S. steadiness. She notes the fragile thaw since 2022, after years of bitter disputes over history that spilled into trade and security. Beijing’s pressure campaign against Japan, and memories of THAAD-era retaliation against South Korea, underscore the need for coordinated resilience. The twist is political: Japan’s conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korea’s progressive President Lee Jae-myung could, precisely because they come from opposing camps, lock in a bargain that survives elections.

Excerpts:

The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate. In particular, Washington’s renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests. Yoon officially embraced Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, an Abe-era strategy for promoting a rules-based regional order that his successors have maintained and that Takaichi seeks to revitalize as the core of her foreign policy vision. Japan can promote South Korean leaders’ efforts to join various minilateral and multilateral platforms, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free-trade pact that emerged from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and, in the long term, the G-7. Japan should also embrace South Korea’s regular participation—even if only as an observer—in the security partnerships between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, known as the Quad, or between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, informally called the “Squad.” Adding South Korea to these coalitions will streamline overlapping partnership-building efforts and boost Tokyo’s and Seoul’s ability to pool resources and collectively build enough military, economic, and technological scale to compete with China and its allies.

Such outcomes are not guaranteed, however. The last time the two countries had a similar combination of leaders was from 2017 to 2020, when the conservative Abe led Japan and the progressive Moon was president of South Korea. Moon entered office determined to reverse his predecessor’s successful efforts to improve ties with Tokyo, which soured relations from the outset and led to further tensions. There is also a risk that a diplomatic contingency, such as renewed disputes over a contested set of islands between the two countries known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, could rile up nationalist sentiment and halt political momentum for cooperation.

But there is reason to believe that the current leadership pairing could herald genuine progress. When world leaders met for sideline meetings at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in October, Takaichi and Lee surprised their domestic audiences with an overwhelmingly positive encounter. The Japanese prime minister, who had expressed fondness for South Korean cosmetics, seaweed, and television dramas days earlier, bowed to the South Korean flag—a move considered respectful that was widely covered in the South Korean press. After the summit, the South Korean president, for his part, told a domestic audience that he was “no longer worried” about having Takaichi as his counterpart, a statement embraced by Japanese media. Lee is reportedly considering traveling to Tokyo to visit Takaichi in January 2026. By deepening cooperation across ideological lines and managing expectations, Tokyo and Seoul have a rare opportunity to construct an alignment resilient enough to withstand the political winds of the future.

Comment; in response to the headline: I certainly hope so. Trilateral cooperation (JAROKUS) is critically important to the national security and national prosperity of all three nations. Yes, the bilateral relationship being strengthened because of Chinese coercion is good. But their concerns about the US commitment should give us pause.

Are Japan and South Korea Poised for a Historic Breakthrough?

Foreign Affairs · More by Ayumi Teraoka · December 19, 2025

An Unlikely Partnership Could Allow Tokyo and Seoul to Counter China

Ayumi Teraoka

December 19, 2025

Japanese and South Korean national flags at Haneda Airport, Tokyo, Japan, March 2023 Issei Kato / Reuters

AYUMI TERAOKA is Assistant Professor of Politics at Brandeis University.

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When the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea last met, in May 2024, observers viewed the meeting with a sense of relief. Japan and South Korea were emerging from one of the darkest periods in their bilateral relationship, when tensions over Japan’s colonial legacy in Korea had become so intense that they derailed traditional areas of cooperation in security and trade. In 2018, leaders in Tokyo reported that a South Korean warship had locked its radar on a Japanese patrol plane, and in 2019 the two countries launched a tit-for-tat escalation, in which Tokyo tightened export controls and Seoul responded by threatening to stop sharing intelligence. The substantive but fragile rapprochement between the two U.S. allies starting in 2022 allowed them to engage a powerful and assertive Beijing in a two-against-one dynamic.

Strengthening the Japanese–South Korean partnership is increasingly important as China flexes its muscle in the region. In November, Beijing launched a pressure campaign against Japan in response to remarks by Sanae Takaichi, the newly inaugurated prime minister, suggesting that Tokyo could get involved militarily if China were to attack or blockade Taiwan. China suspended seafood imports from Japan, canceled Japanese concerts and movie releases, and advised citizens against traveling to Japan. The Japanese Defense Ministry also reported that Chinese fighter aircraft had locked their radar on Japanese planes. It’s a familiar playbook for Beijing, which took many similar actions against South Korea when Seoul agreed to host a U.S. missile defense system, known as THAAD, in 2016–17. South Korea has so far stayed neutral in response to China’s pressure campaign against Japan, which reveals the lengths that Seoul and Tokyo still have to go before they can team up to counter Beijing’s coercion and deal with other pressing regional challenges, including newfound uncertainty about U.S. commitments and a strengthened axis of China, North Korea, and Russia.

The fate of Japanese–South Korean relations at this crucial moment may ultimately rest on the two countries’ new leaders, who, at first glance, do not seem to be natural partners. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who took over in June, has strong credentials on the South Korean left, which traditionally seeks engagement with Pyongyang—and, by extension, better relations with Beijing—and is less focused on strengthening the trilateral security partnership with Japan and the United States. South Korean progressives are also more inclined to call attention to Japan’s mistreatment of Koreans during its colonial rule and are willing to challenge existing bilateral arrangements for reparations. Meanwhile, Takaichi comes from the right wing of Japan’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party and represents the group most resistant to accommodating what it sees as South Korea’s continuous demands to address past injustices. She has visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, the memorial to Japanese soldiers that includes 14 convicted war criminals from World War II, and is a protégé of the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose revisionist views on history inspired deep antipathy among the South Korean public.

But this unlikely duo could be precisely the partnership needed to put the Japanese–South Korean relationship on a more resilient footing. The differing coalitions they represent will allow them to build a partnership with broader and more durable political support at home. Cooperation that takes root under this type of pairing is more challenging than that between two like-minded leaders, of course, but when it succeeds, it is more likely to endure. Takaichi and Lee are thus uniquely positioned to stage what might be called “Nixon goes to China” moments in their countries: because they are not expected to try rapprochement, these two recently elected leaders have the potential to break the cycle of disruption in the Japanese–South Korean partnership and to establish a lasting basis of cooperation.

SQUEEZED FROM BOTH SIDES

Upon Takaichi’s inauguration in October, the South Korean left expressed apprehension about the right-wing policies they expected from her government. Likewise, when Lee won the election in June after President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment, many Japanese observers questioned whether he would cooperate with Japan, given his earlier harsh denunciations of its historical actions and its release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean in 2023. Although Lee moderated his tone and adopted a friendlier posture toward Japan when he assumed office—choosing Tokyo rather than Washington or Beijing as his first foreign destination—many in Japan doubted he would maintain his conciliatory stance when dealing with a conservative politician such as Takaichi.

The mistrust and frustration have deep roots. Both countries have struggled to strike a sustainable bargain over Japan’s colonial legacy in Korea, including whether and how Japan should offer apologies and compensation for its exploitation of “comfort women” and use of forced labor in wartime. South Korean court rulings challenging the 1965 bilateral settlement of historical claims have interrupted the two governments’ diplomatic efforts to advance their strategic partnership. After the South Korean Constitutional Court held the government accountable for not doing enough to seek compensation from Tokyo on behalf of comfort women in 2011, and with his administration facing declining domestic support, the conservative President Lee Myung-bak retreated from his attempts to improve ties with Japan and adopted a more confrontational position. His conservative successor, Park Geun-hye, signed a new compensation package with Abe to support comfort women survivors in 2015, explicitly stating that the issue was resolved “finally and irreversibly.” Yet when the progressive Moon Jae-in took office in 2017, he discredited the deal, shattering Japan’s trust in South Korea as a negotiating partner.

The mistrust between Japan and South Korea has deep roots.

By the time the conservative Yoon became president in 2022 and sought rapprochement with Tokyo, Japanese officials were so fatigued that they initially hesitated to reciprocate. Japanese leaders had learned that deals struck with willing South Korean conservatives often reflected support from only half the electorate and could easily be undone when their political fortunes diminished or progressive successors took office. At the encouragement of the Biden administration, Yoon and then Prime Minister Fumio Kishida eventually restored shuttle diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and chip component exports, culminating in a historic Camp David joint statement in 2023 committing Japan, South Korea, and the United States to consult in the event of a regional contingency, implying that the countries would possibly coordinate to respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Yet many officials and analysts wondered whether these advances would survive another leadership transition or domestic political crisis in Seoul. For Japan, genuine reassurance could only come from someone least likely to offer it: a progressive South Korean leader.

South Korea, meanwhile, also needs a cooperative bargain with a conservative Japanese leader if any deal is to stick. In 1995, to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, a socialist, issued a statement of apology for Japan’s wartime actions and colonial rule. The new generation of conservative politicians, including Abe and Takaichi, openly questioned the necessity of an apology and took issue with its content. Although both leaders ultimately upheld the Murayama statement as cabinet ministers, this backlash from Japan’s right fueled South Korean suspicions about the sincerity of Japan’s apology.

More recently, Kishida, who was prime minister from 2021 to 2024, and his successor, Shigeru Ishiba, who led Japan until he resigned in 2025, represented relatively liberal factions within the Liberal Democratic Party. But because of their liberal image, both faced pressure to appeal to more conservative forces. Kishida accommodated many conservative policy priorities, such as restarting nuclear power plants and expanding the military; Ishiba faced criticism from his right flank for being too conciliatory toward Beijing. When Ishiba met with Lee in August, conservative opinion leaders and Takaichi supporters doubted his willingness to take a firm stance to protect Japan’s national interests, limiting his ability to act decisively to offer concessions to South Korea.

LOW EXPECTATIONS, HIGH REWARDS

Takaichi, unlike her more liberal predecessors, can govern with both the authority and legitimacy to engage Seoul without fear of being undermined by the political right in Tokyo. She is unlikely to offer new apologies or drastic concessions on historical issues beyond what Abe did when he expressed Japan’s “deep repentance for the war” in a statement commemorating the war’s 70th anniversary and proposed a one-time offer to compensate South Korea in the 2015 comfort women agreement. But Takaichi can pursue sustained dialogue with counterparts in Seoul and push to elevate the Japanese–South Korean relationship into a bilateral strategic partnership with the full backing of Japan’s conservative establishment. With her coalition government securing a majority in the lower house of parliament in late November, Takaichi is positioned to gradually build a firmer domestic footing to carry out these efforts.

To govern effectively as a progressive amid increasingly polarized South Korean politics, meanwhile, Lee needs to secure centrist support. Improving the relationship with Japan is among his best options for implementing a pragmatic agenda. The foreign policy positions of his predecessor—especially rapprochement with Japan—were relatively popular among the South Korean public despite Yoon’s troubled presidency and eventual impeachment. The Lee administration has therefore appointed moderates to key diplomatic posts, such as national security adviser, and Lee can further empower them while pushing back against more hard-line forces by demonstrating the tangible benefits of cooperation with Tokyo.

Luckily, Takaichi and Lee do not need to build a relationship from scratch. They can capitalize on the momentum of their predecessors. Kishida and Yoon agreed in 2023 to collaborate in fields of intense geopolitical competition, including quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and supply chain resilience. And after Ishiba and Lee met in August, a joint committee on science and technology cooperation between their two countries convened in November—the first such high-level meeting on the subject in 16 years.

The current leadership pairing of Takaichi and Lee could herald genuine progress.

The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate. In particular, Washington’s renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests. Yoon officially embraced Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, an Abe-era strategy for promoting a rules-based regional order that his successors have maintained and that Takaichi seeks to revitalize as the core of her foreign policy vision. Japan can promote South Korean leaders’ efforts to join various minilateral and multilateral platforms, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free-trade pact that emerged from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and, in the long term, the G-7. Japan should also embrace South Korea’s regular participation—even if only as an observer—in the security partnerships between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, known as the Quad, or between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, informally called the “Squad.” Adding South Korea to these coalitions will streamline overlapping partnership-building efforts and boost Tokyo’s and Seoul’s ability to pool resources and collectively build enough military, economic, and technological scale to compete with China and its allies.

Such outcomes are not guaranteed, however. The last time the two countries had a similar combination of leaders was from 2017 to 2020, when the conservative Abe led Japan and the progressive Moon was president of South Korea. Moon entered office determined to reverse his predecessor’s successful efforts to improve ties with Tokyo, which soured relations from the outset and led to further tensions. There is also a risk that a diplomatic contingency, such as renewed disputes over a contested set of islands between the two countries known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, could rile up nationalist sentiment and halt political momentum for cooperation.

But there is reason to believe that the current leadership pairing could herald genuine progress. When world leaders met for sideline meetings at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in October, Takaichi and Lee surprised their domestic audiences with an overwhelmingly positive encounter. The Japanese prime minister, who had expressed fondness for South Korean cosmetics, seaweed, and television dramas days earlier, bowed to the South Korean flag—a move considered respectful that was widely covered in the South Korean press. After the summit, the South Korean president, for his part, told a domestic audience that he was “no longer worried” about having Takaichi as his counterpart, a statement embraced by Japanese media. Lee is reportedly considering traveling to Tokyo to visit Takaichi in January 2026. By deepening cooperation across ideological lines and managing expectations, Tokyo and Seoul have a rare opportunity to construct an alignment resilient enough to withstand the political winds of the future.

Foreign Affairs · More by Ayumi Teraoka · December 19, 2025

2. Lee says South Koreans won’t become ‘commies’ from reading North Korean media

​Summary:

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung argued that restricting public access to north Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reflects an outdated distrust of citizens’ ability to recognize propaganda. He questioned why journalists and researchers can cite DPRK media while ordinary people cannot, and backed unification ministry efforts to establish a legal basis for access to north Korean websites. Officials cited resistance from agencies and limits in the National Security Act, including Article 7. Lee also raised humanitarian options for unconverted long term prisoners seeking return, and heard briefings on defector reentries, proposed “peace tourism,” nuclear submarine planning, and 2026 OPCON transfer goals.

Comment: I am in complete agreement that the Korean people in the South should have unfettered access to all north Korean propaganda and everything written by and about the Kim family regime and all of north Korea.

I argue that one of the worst things for South Korea has been the national security laws that prevent access to north Korean media. This has prevented Koreans in the South from learning about the north. And for young people, when something is prohibited by authority, it is something that must be pursued. 

Reading. listening to or watching north Korean propaganda is not going to change the minds of Koreans in the South into pro-north supporters. In fact it is the lack of access that turns from Koreans in the South toward the north.. When all access is granted for the first week or month, it will be a novelty and curiosity and many will read or watch it. Then they will learn that the news from Korea is not true. They will quickly get bored with watching the spectacle of north Korean news broadcasts and entertainment and the only effect it will have on Korean people in the South is to expose them to the morally and intellectually bankrupt regime in the north.

I am convinced that the lack of support for human rights in north Korea by those in the South and the lack of support for unification among young people is a result of not being able to learn about the north and not being able to see what the real north Korea is like. 

And yes, we should respect the Korean people in the South and their ability to recognize AND reject the propaganda and lies from the north. When you live a better life in the South, you are not going to trade it to live in slave-like conditions in the north. The Korean people in the South need to be exposed to everything about the north.

I recall the story from a former nKPA soldier who described watching the South Korean rom-com- "Crash Landing On You." I asked him and (6 other nKPA soldiers) who the nKPA soldier on the DMZ feelw ehnthey wathc that and other K-dramas. They said it made soldiers want to come to the South even more. But the one soldier said that when he watched the video it made him feel like the South was a strong and confident country. The reason was that the video portrayed the korean people in the north as human beings and not as bad or as inferior people. It did not portray the nKPA soldiers as the enemy or as "monsters." he said the effect was that it showed that the South Korean government was not afraid of the north or information about the north and they did not have to control the South korean entertainment industry to make them portray the north as the enemy. He said this was obviously the exact opposite of the Kim family regime in the north who always portrayed the South as a porr and decadent courtny living under the jackboot of American control. The point is having a free and open society in the South with a government that does not restrict information to its people has strategic influence effects on the Korean people in the north.

The bottomline in my mind is that South Korea should not restrict any information about the north. But it should also allow Koreans in the South to send information to the north. And the ROK government (and the US government as well) should be aggressively sending the facts, truth, news, practical information, and entertainment to the north.

Lee says South Koreans won’t become ‘commies’ from reading North Korean media

President criticizes limits on access, stating they reflect outdated ideas about citizens’ vulnerability to propaganda

Joon Ha Park December 19, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/lee-says-south-koreans-wont-become-commies-from-reading-north-korean-media/

The Dec. 19 edition of North Korea’s state-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun, and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 2, 2025 | Images: Rodong Sinmun, ROK Presidential Office, edited by NK News

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung criticized restrictions on public access to North Korea’s party-run newspaper on Friday, stating that controls on DPRK media reflect an outdated distrust of citizens’ ability to identify propaganda.

The remarks come as a group of ruling Democratic Party lawmakers have proposed legislation that would allow ROK citizens to visit North Korean websites, reopening a debate over access that surfaced during the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

Speaking during a joint policy briefing by the foreign and unification ministries, Lee questioned why ordinary citizens remain barred from directly accessing DPRK state media while journalists and researchers are routinely allowed to quote, analyze and circulate the same material.

Limiting disclosure treats the public “not as autonomous citizens but as people presumed vulnerable to propaganda,” he said.

“By accurately seeing the reality of North Korea, people might think, ‘This is not something that should be emulated,’” Lee said during the briefing. 

Lee’s remarks followed the unification ministry’s briefing, during which officials said they would seek to establish a clearer legal basis to expand public access to North Korean websites and publications, including the party daily Rodong Sinmun. 

The president acknowledged that such proposals could ignite political backlash, asking whether easing access would once again prompt accusations that the administration is trying to turn South Korea into a “pro-North Korea society.”

Hong Jin-suk, director-general of the unification ministry’s Peaceful Exchange Bureau, explained at the briefing that existing law does not permit real-time public access to the Rodong Sinmun. But he noted that South Korean media outlets regularly cite the newspaper and that scholars rely on it as a primary source for analyzing North Korean politics and ideology.

“We will work toward reasonable improvements,” Hong said.

Unification minister Chung Dong-young said the ministry supports expanding access in principle but faces resistance from other government bodies, including the National Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Justice.

Any change would also require revisions to National Archives guidelines governing the handling of classified and special materials related to North Korea, he said.

Lee questioned whether the opposition stems from fears that exposure to DPRK propaganda could radicalize the public. If officials believe access could turn citizens into “commies” (빨갱이), he said, “that would be a serious problem and an underestimation of the public’s level of awareness.”

The previous Yoon administration announced similar plans in Jan. 2023 to ease these restrictions on state media.

At the time, the unification ministry said it would expand access to the Rodong Sinmun at designated physical locations, such as DPRK information centers and ministry facilities. It presented the plan as part of a broader effort to update unification policy, improve transparency on North Korean affairs and strengthen public awareness of Pyongyang’s political and human rights realities. 

However, the initiative never took off.

As tensions with Pyongyang escalated, the conservative Yoon administration gradually retreated from easing access and the unification ministry grew increasingly noncommittal through 2023. 

By early 2024, officials and South Korean media reports indicated that the ministry had effectively shelved the proposal, with security concerns outweighing arguments that the ban was outdated and inconsistent with Seoul’s stated commitment to online freedom.

Article 7 of the National Security Act bans the production, possession or distribution of deemed to praise an “anti-state organization,” including North Korea, and South Korean regulators actively block DPRK websites and limit access to state media to journalists and researchers.

Former North Korean soldier Ahn Hak-sop attempts to cross the DMZ with the help of his committee members on Aug. 20, 2025. | Image: Screenshot from People’s Democracy Party’s YouTube

OTHER REMARKS

During Friday’s unification ministry policy briefing, Lee said the government should allow non-converted long-term prisoners to return to North Korea on humanitarian grounds if they wished.

“It would be best to hand them over at Panmunjom in consultation with North Korea, but since there is no response, let’s send them that way anyway, from a humanitarian perspective,” he said. 

The president suggested issuing passports so individuals could attempt to travel independently, potentially via China, adding that the choice and risks “should be borne by the individuals themselves.”

Minister Chung said the government had reached “that stage,” but stressed that “the problem is that the North has to accept them.” 

The ministry also briefed Lee on defector trends, reporting that 31 people who had settled in South Korea later returned to the North. 

Of roughly 34,500 defectors who entered South Korea, about 31,000 currently reside in the country, with most of the others believed to have migrated onward to other countries. Officials said the whereabouts of 462 defectors are unknown, including 327 believed to have left South Korea outside official monitoring systems.

Lee’s statement came as Ahn Hak-sop, an unconverted North Korean POW living in the South, has repeatedly demanded since August that Seoul facilitate his return to the DPRK.

Chung said in a press briefing Thursday afternoon that he aims to pursue a phased “peace tourism” to North Korea’s Wonsan Kalma beach resort, starting with overseas Koreans and transit tourism linking China, North Korea and South Korea, before ultimately allowing ROK citizens to travel there. 

During the foreign ministry’s briefing to the president, minister Cho Hyun said Seoul plans to hold a U.S.-ROK summit next year to review progress on bilateral agreements — especially on nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear cooperation and shipbuilding — while pursuing an early state visit to China early 2026, continuing shuttle diplomacy with Japan and maintaining necessary communication with Russia.

Separately, the defense ministry on Thursday reaffirmed longer-term goals in its own policy briefing, including plans to finalize a basic blueprint for a domestically developed nuclear-powered submarine and complete safety and regulatory frameworks for submarine reactors. 

Defense minister Ahn Gyu-back also called 2026 a “turning point” for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington, while reiterating his intent to “proactively and gradually” restore the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement and prioritize stability and accident prevention.

Edited by Bryan Betts

3. Kim Jong Un opens more new regional factories, promising a ‘socialist paradise’

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un inaugurated new light industry factories in Jangyon County on north Korea’s west coast, promising a “socialist paradise” through self reliance and regional development, according to KCNA. The visit was his second factory tour this week under the 20×10 initiative launched in 2024 to build modern plants in 20 counties each year for a decade. Kim praised the Korean People’s Army’s 124th Regiment for construction and urged local officials and workers to sustain high output, showcasing goods like soy sauce, fermented soybean paste, and beer. The push comes as authorities rush to finish projects before year end and ahead of the Ninth Party Congress.

Comment: So how is the Socialist Workers Pardies project coming along. Let's have a complete status report after 7 decades. At least they have beer.

Kim Jong Un opens more new regional factories, promising a ‘socialist paradise’

Ceremony on west coast comes as authorities race to finish projects for 20×10 rural development initiative by year’s end

Shreyas Reddy December 19, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/kim-jong-un-opens-more-new-regional-factories-promising-a-socialist-paradise/

Kim Jong Un cuts the ribbon to inaugurate new factories in Jangyon County. | Image: KCNA (Dec. 19, 2025)

Kim Jong Un promised to build a “socialist paradise” while inaugurating new factories in a coastal county on Thursday, the second time this week he toured new industrial facilities for his signature regional development initiative.

At a ceremony in South Hwanghae Province’s Jangyon County, the North Korean leader highlighted the significance of ongoing efforts toward “bringing about a radical transformation in the regions and improving the living standards of the people across the country,” the state-owned Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday.

“When we strenuously explore the path toward development and prosperity in our own way and make courageous efforts under the uplifted banner of self-reliance, there will be no unachievable ideal and a socialist paradise can be surely built on this land,” the agency cited Kim as saying.

Kim Jong Un with a child at the inauguration of new factories in Jangyon County | Image: KCNA (Dec. 19, 2025)

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Construction began on Jangyon’s new light industry factories in late February as part of the 20×10 regional development program launched by the leader in early 2024 to develop modern factories in 20 counties every year over the course of a decade.

As he did at the inauguration of factories and a leisure complex in Kangdong County earlier this week, Kim in his remarks on Thursday emphasized the need to advance the initiative to improve the economies of North Korea’s less affluent regions.

“It is the desire of our Party and the primary goal of its regional development policy to turn all cities and counties of the country into self-supporting and well-off ones by firmly consolidating the foundation of regional development and radically improving the material and cultural living standards of the regional people,” he said, according to KCNA.

Kim praised the efforts of the Korean People’s Army’s 124th Regiment, which led the construction of the new factories, and called on local officials and factory workers to maintain production at a high rate to serve the people’s needs.

Following the inauguration ceremony and fireworks, the leader and other officials toured the new factories and inspected local products such as soy sauce, fermented soybean paste and bottled beer.

Kim Jong Un samples soy sauce at a new factory in Jangyon County. | Image: KCNA (Dec. 19, 2025)

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The opening of the new facilities in the southwestern county comes as North Korean authorities race to complete multiple 20×10 projects before the end of the year.

While Kim initially emphasized the need to elevate the economies of under-developed areas through the scheme, the regime appeared to shift course this year by launching new projects in regions that already have key military facilities and economic sites.

Jangyon adheres to this pattern, as it has hosted multiple missile tests and new houses were constructed last year as part of Kim’s nationwide housing program announced at the ruling party’s Eighth Congress in 2021. It also has ore mining facilities and is an important agricultural region, underscoring its importance for North Korean authorities over the years.

By shifting the 20×10 initiative’s focus to regions with existing infrastructure, Kim appears to be prioritizing regions with a greater chance of immediate and visible success ahead of the Ninth Party Congress early next year.

Jangyon residents with fermented soybean paste produced at one of the county’s newly opened factories | Image: KCNA (Dec. 19, 2025)

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On Thursday, Ri Il Hwan, a secretary of the ruling party’s Central Committee, reinforced this message by hailing Kim’s efforts to “eliminate the centuries-old backwardness of the regions and realize the cherished desire of the regional citizens.”

“Saying that the strong trend of the great era is rapidly transforming the whole country, he noted that modern hospitals, leisure complexes and other entities of transformation that match those in the capital city are being erected in cities and counties,” KCNA reported.

Ri said additional facilities, including a modern hospital and leisure complex, will be built in Jangyon County in the future, continuing the 20×10 program’s focus on developing the region.

Edited by Bryan Betts

4. What AUKUS teaches Seoul about nuclear-powered submarines

​Summary:

Jihoon Yu argues Seoul should treat AUKUS less as a blueprint than a cautionary guide as it pursues nuclear-powered submarines with US support. AUKUS shows three predictable traps. First is time: SSNs arrive over decades, so Seoul should set expectations accordingly and build a broader undersea strategy with conventional boats, uncrewed systems, and seabed infrastructure protection. Second is industrial ambiguity: Korea’s strong shipbuilding base matters only if Washington and Seoul define early who builds what, how reactors are supplied, and who handles maintenance and end-of-life work. Third is nonproliferation politics: Seoul should prioritize transparent safeguards, favor LEU options where feasible, and set firm red lines to avoid fueling regional arms-race dynamics.

Comment: Remember it takes three to make one - to keep one submarine deployed. How long will it take to build 3 or 6 or 9 submarines to keep 1, 2, or 3 operationally deployed?

What AUKUS teaches Seoul about nuclear-powered submarines | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Jihoon Yu · December 19, 2025

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-aukus-teaches-seoul-about-nuclear-powered-submarines/

Seoul should treat AUKUS less as a model to copy and more as a cautionary guide as it shapes the terms of Washington’s support for the South Korea’s own nuclear-powered submarine program.

South Korea’s deal with the United States offers a prestige capability, but it also opens many of the same challenges Australia has confronted: long-term costs and contentious non-proliferation politics. The core question for Seoul is not whether it can get nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), but on what terms and to what strategic effect.

It is tempting to view AUKUS as proof that a non-nuclear-weapon state can obtain SSNs under an upgraded alliance framework. But AUKUS is less a template than a stress test. It shows how quickly ambitious submarine plans meet hard constraints: limited US and British shipyard capacity; stretched budgets; and growing scrutiny from non-proliferation experts. For Seoul, AUKUS should function as a warning label—highlighting which questions must be answered early and which traps to avoid—rather than a simple ‘Australia did it, so can we’ certificate.

The first trap is time. Political messaging around AUKUS created a sense of momentum, but detailed planning has underlined that the program will unfold over decades, with submarines entering service from the early 2030s and operating well into the 2050s. If SSNs are presented as a near-term fix, expectations will be disappointed and public support could sour when voters realise that meaningful capability arrives only over the long term. Seoul should therefore anchor expectations in decades rather than electoral cycles. It should frame SSNs as one pillar of a broader undersea strategy alongside conventional submarines, uncrewed systems and protection of undersea infrastructure.

The second trap is industrial ambiguity. So far, public debate on AUKUS has focused mainly on cost, program deliverability and, to a lesser extent, nuclear proliferation. Official information about how work will be divided among Australian, US and British shipyards, and how production will be sequenced remains limited. However, it is precisely these industrial questions—how to expand capacity without overloading already stressed US and British SSN programs, and what workshare Australia can realistically absorb—that will shape the program’s execution.

South Korea starts from a stronger industrial base: its shipyards build some of the world’s most advanced commercial and naval platforms. But that advantage will matter only if roles are clearly defined early with Washington. Seoul and Washington need to decide whether South Korean shipyards will build full hulls or only non-nuclear sections, whether the US will provide sealed reactor modules or contemplate licensed production, and how maintenance, refits and decommissioning will be handled. These choices will determine not only efficiency and cost, but also where skilled jobs and sensitive know-how reside. Experience in defence-industrial partnerships shows that vague language about ‘industrial cooperation’ quickly becomes politically sensitive once workers and local communities focus on who gets which long-term jobs.

The third and most sensitive trap is non-proliferation. AUKUS has already raised questions about whether naval nuclear propulsion, especially using highly enriched uranium, weakens the Non-Proliferation Treaty by placing weapons-usable material in the hands of non-nuclear allies. For Seoul, this issue is sharper because it lives next to a nuclear-armed North Korea and periodically sees domestic calls for its own bomb. Some treaty states will therefore view a Korean SSN program with suspicion even if it is technically compliant.

Seoul should respond by building safeguards into the program from the start, working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and partners on a regime that is as transparent as possible while preserving operational security. Choices about fuel will be central: low-enriched uranium designs may be harder and costlier but are easier to defend politically than highly enriched uranium arrangements that resemble the AUKUS model.

Clear red lines—no reprocessing, no diversion and robust end-of-life management for reactor cores and spent fuel—should be at the heart of Seoul’s regional diplomacy.

AUKUS also offers alliance management lessons. Canberra has had to sustain domestic support for a multi-decade, multi-hundred-billion-dollar project and reassure regional neighbours that it is not dragging them into a submarine arms race. Seoul faces at least as complex a political geometry. It will need bipartisan support at home and continuity of backing in Washington if the program is to survive leadership changes. It will need to reassure Japan that its SSNs are a stabilising addition to allied deterrence rather than a new source of rivalry, and to keep Southeast Asian and European partners onside by emphasising safeguards, alliance embedding and regional stability rather than national prestige.

Ultimately, the key question is not whether South Korea can technically field SSNs, but what strategic effects they produce. In a best-case scenario, Korean nuclear-powered submarines strengthen integrated deterrence by complicating Chinese and North Korean planning and support coalition efforts to monitor chokepoints and protect critical undersea infrastructure.

In a worst-case scenario, a poorly handled program accelerates a regional arms race, justifies further nuclear and missile advances in Pyongyang, and fuels domestic arguments that if Seoul can manage naval nuclear propulsion, it can manage nuclear weapons as well—undermining both non-proliferation and the alliance.

AUKUS is a reminder that the line between these futures is thin. The South Korea–US deal has opened a historic door, signalling that Washington is willing in principle to extend naval nuclear propulsion cooperation to a second non-nuclear ally. For Seoul, the safest way forward is to treat AUKUS not as a blueprint to copy but as a warning to study and adapt. If it uses that warning well—by setting realistic expectations, clarifying industrial roles, taking non-proliferation politics seriously and managing alliance communications with discipline—South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program can strengthen both regional stability and the country’s alliance with the US.

Jihoon Yu is an associate research fellow and the director of external relations at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and was the main author of a 2010 policy document for the South Korean navy’s development up to 2045.

aspistrategist.org.au · Jihoon Yu · December 19, 2025

5. Believe it or not, the US doesn’t have an Indo-Pacific warfighting HQ

Summary:

The article argues the United States lacks a true Asia-Indo-Pacific theatre warfighting headquarters and remains organized for peacetime shaping, not major combat. It urges Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to direct the Chairman, Gen. Dan Caine, to establish a dedicated theatre-level Joint Task Force inside USINDOPACOM, properly staffed and empowered for operational planning, logistics, and C2 for high-end conflict. The author cites China’s rapid modernization and Taiwan invasion timelines from war games as drivers for rapid reprioritization of forces and tighter multinational integration. A visible wartime HQ, like CENTCOM’s origins, would strengthen deterrence and reassure allies.

Comment:  EUCOM/Europe/NATO is different than the Asia-Indo-Pacific and INDOPACOM. My view is different from COL Lyons. We need a Northeast Asia Commend in Seoul (with a Tokyo Fusion Node).

Northeast Asia Command needed to support U.S. National Security Strategy

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/17/perspective-northest-asia-0combatant-command/5441765973062/

When Korea's next war will not stay in Korea

Here's why the Republic of Korea--U.S. alliance needs a Northeast Asia combatant command.

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/21/perspective-new-military-command-proposed/7291763740526/

Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/

Believe it or not, the US doesn’t have an Indo-Pacific warfighting HQ | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Marco J Lyons · December 18, 2025

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/believe-it-or-not-the-us-doesnt-have-an-indo-pacific-warfighting-hq/

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth should decisively direct the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, to establish a dedicated theatre-level headquarters within the US Indo-Pacific Command. In doing so, Hegseth would promote the objectives of rapid reprioritisation of military resources, improved planning and revitalised alliances.

The strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific has undergone dramatic transformation, with China rapidly modernising its military and adopting an increasingly aggressive posture towards Taiwan and neighbouring US allies. Since January, the second administration of President Donald Trump has issued interim national security guidance prioritising the Indo-Pacific and the challenge posed by China. Under Hegseth, emphasis has shifted decisively towards the warfighter, enhancing readiness for high-end conflict and cultivating a warfighting ethos.

But even as prospects of an invasion across the Taiwan Strait become increasingly plausible, the United States lacks an Indo-Pacific command structure designed for a major theatre war. The secretary of defense should immediately rectify this with a dedicated theatre-level Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters within the Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to ensure robust operational planning and effective multinational coordination. This would shift US posture from peacetime engagement to wartime readiness.

The new JTF must be resourced with sufficient staff from the various armed services and be empowered to drive the operational, logistical and command-and-control preparations required for high-end conflict.

A thoughtful observer of US national defence might assume such a thing exists, but it does not.

In fact, US command organisation in the Indo-Pacific is set up for a peacetime posture. Establishment of the JTF is what’s needed to instead meet the demands of modern war.

The threat posed by China is no longer speculative; it’s immediate. The Chinese military has significantly advanced its capabilities for large-scale amphibious operations, airborne assaults, and urban combat—forms of action that would all plausibly be used in an invasion of Taiwan. While some analysts maintain that Taiwan’s rugged terrain and logistical challenges would deter China, others insist that US security assurances to Taiwan may prove hollow without robust arrangements for military interoperability.

Recent US war games underscore the urgency of the situation, as they suggest the Chinese armed forces could achieve their objectives in Taiwan within days, potentially outpacing any feasible US military response from distant bases, such as Hawaii. This daunting prospect highlights the necessity for rapid reprioritisation of resources—switching them to the Western Pacific from elsewhere—improved operational planning and revitalised multinational partnerships. These are objectives that Mike Gallagher, former member of the US House of Representatives and member of the House Armed Services Committee, called for in 2022.

Yet no US theatre-level wartime headquarters dedicated to the Indo-Pacific has been established. USINDOPACOM’s existing component commands—such as the 5th, 7th and 11th Air Forces, the Third and Seventh Fleets and, in South Korea, the Eighth Army—are primarily structured for bilateral security cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Their focus reflects a legacy mindset attuned to a more benign security environment. While combatant command doctrine assigns responsibility for campaign planning and wartime integration at the highest levels, the demands of daily shaping activities, such as multinational exercises and security cooperation initiatives, tend to eclipse comprehensive war planning. Geographic unified combatant commands (such as USINDOPACOM, combining elements of all the services) and component commands (the service-specific elements within the geographic combatant commands, such as Pacific Air Forces) are similarly encumbered by non-wartime missions. This leaves actual warfighting preparation underdeveloped.

This inertia is evident in how senior commanders frame their missions. For example, official Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) strategy and senior commander statements appear to integrate partnership-building with warfighting goals. But the PACAF campaign approach has also been described in terms of partnership-building, interoperability and conceptual development for great power competition, while excluding explicit wartime considerations. PACAF is characterised as an ‘operating force’ focused on agile basing and tactical support rather than as a warfighting headquarters. Such a stance may have sufficed in a less contested era, but it is no longer adequate given the immediacy of the Chinese threat.

Critics may argue that establishing a dedicated wartime headquarters would destabilise the region or provoke escalation. However, historical precedents and strategic theory suggest otherwise. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980—later transformed into US Central Command—demonstrated the value of credible, forward-leaning military posture for deterrence and crisis response. Effective deterrence requires not simply the existence of military power but its visible organisation and readiness for combat.

A new theatre-level JTF would enable USINDOPACOM to conduct focused planning and preparation for a range of conflict scenarios, not solely a Taiwan contingency. This headquarters could integrate major service components, such as a reestablished 10th Army, the Seventh Fleet, and the 11th Air Force, to achieve unity of command and effort. Past recommendations, such as operationalising the Third Fleet as a South Asian and Indian Ocean command, further support the feasibility and necessity of such an arrangement.

The Indo-Pacific is now the primary theatre of strategic competition and potential conflict for the United States. China’s accelerating military modernisation and the increasing risk to Taiwan demand a decisive shift in American defence organisation and planning. Establishing a dedicated, theatre-level wartime headquarters is not a provocation but a prudent adaptation to new realities—one that would promote deterrence, prepare for major combat operations and reassure allies. The time to organise for Pacific theatre warfighting is now.

Marco J Lyons is a US Army colonel and deputy chief of staff of V Corps (Forward) in Poland. His former three-year duty position was as assistant chief of staff (G-5) for plans with US Army Pacific, where he worked closely with USINDOPACOM, PACFLEET, MARFORPAC and PACAF. The views expressed here are personal.

aspistrategist.org.au · Marco J Lyons · December 18, 2025

6. North Korean infiltrator caught working in Amazon IT department thanks to lag — 110ms keystroke input raises red flags over true location

​Summary:

A north Korean imposter working as a systems administrator at Amazon was exposed when security software flagged keystroke lag. U.S. based remote workers usually send inputs within tens of milliseconds, but this account showed delays above 110 ms, suggesting the Arizona laptop was being controlled elsewhere. Amazon’s CSO said the company has blocked more than 1,800 DPRK infiltration attempts since April 2024 and is seeing a 27% quarter over quarter increase. Investigators linked the case to a U.S. facilitator who hosted equipment and was later sentenced. Language tells, like awkward idioms and article use, can also trigger scrutiny in hiring.

Comment: We must fight and defeat the Kim family regime's all purpose sword of cyber.

North Korean infiltrator caught working in Amazon IT department thanks to lag — 110ms keystroke input raises red flags over true location

News

By Mark Tyson published 23 hours ago

A barely perceptible keystroke delay was the smoking gun that led to the uncovering of a malign imposter.

https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/north-korean-infiltrator-caught-working-in-amazon-it-department-thanks-to-lag-110ms-keystroke-input-raises-red-flags-over-true-location?utm

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A North Korean imposter was uncovered, working as a sysadmin at Amazon U.S., after their keystroke input lag raised suspicions with security specialists at the online retail giant. Normally, a U.S.-based remote worker’s computer would send keystroke data within tens of milliseconds. This suspicious individual’s keyboard lag was “more than 110 milliseconds,” reports Bloomberg.

Amazon is commendably proactive in its pursuit of impostors, according to the source report. The news site talked with Amazon’s Chief Security Officer, Stephen Schmidt, about this fascinating new case of North Koreans trying to infiltrate U.S. organizations to raise hard currency for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and sometimes indulge in espionage and/or sabotage.

Schmidt says that Amazon has foiled more than 1,800 DPRK infiltration attempts since April 2024. Moreover, the rate of attempts continues apace, with Amazon reckoning it is seeing a 27% QoQ uplift in North Koreans trying to get into the Amazon corporation.

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You have to look for them, to find them

However, Amazon’s success can be almost entirely credited to the fact that it is actively looking for DPRK impostors, warns its Chief Security Officer. “If we hadn’t been looking for the DPRK workers,” Schmidt said, “we would not have found them.”

With this company policy explained, a blip on the Amazon security radar was caused earlier this year when a new sysadmin’s Amazon laptop monitor alerted security personnel about unusual behavior.

Amazon security experts took a closer look at the flagged ‘U.S. remote worker’ and determined that their remote laptop was being remotely controlled – causing the extra keystroke input lag. Schmidt emphasizes that good-quality security software was key to this investigation.

It turns out that the DPRK had access to this Amazon laptop located in Arizona. A woman found to be facilitating this fraud on behalf of North Korean imposter workers was sentenced to several years in prison earlier this year.

As well as red flag computer network symptoms, the fumbling use of American idioms and English-language articles continues to be a giveaway when conversing with such impostors.

Tip of the iceberg

The problem of North Koreans infiltrating U.S. corporations for profit, mischief, and more is undoubtedly a serious one. We’ve covered sizable FBI seizures of equipment recently, perhaps showing just the tip of the iceberg. More successful infiltrations by the DPRK, as well as hostile nations like Iran, Russia, and China, are likely to be ongoing.

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7. USFK commander says DMZ should not become 'politicized,' amid bill to ease access

​Summary:

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea and the U.N. Command, warned that the DMZ should not be politicized as Seoul debates legislation to place non-military access under South Korean government control. Brunson stressed the 1953 Armistice remains the governing legal instrument and that UNC authority to approve or deny DMZ access flows from that agreement. He supported Seoul’s proposal for inter-Korean military talks to clarify the Military Demarcation Line, but only within armistice standards. On OPCON transition, Brunson said Washington is not trying to delay it, yet conditions must be met. He also urged South Korea to widen its role across the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

Comment: Good statements from the CINC. (I wish we would return to that terminology - CINCUNC/CFC/USFK)

World News Dec. 19, 2025 / 5:47 AM

USFK commander says DMZ should not become 'politicized,' amid bill to ease access

By Lee Minji, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/19/korea-General-Brunson-DMZ-access-Korea-not-politicized-USFK/7331766139355/

USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson said Friday that the DMZ should not be "politicized," as debate swirls around a South Korean bill calling for government control of non-military access. In this July photo, Brunson speaks at a ceremony in Goyang marking U.N. Forces Day. Photo by Yonhap

The commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said Friday that the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) should not be "politicized," voicing opposition to a bill in South Korea that seeks to grant the government control of non-military access to the buffer zone.

The remarks by USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, who also doubles as commander of the U.N. Command (UNC), followed a recent UNC statement in opposition to the pending bill.

He said the armistice agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War should remain the barometer governing behavior. Under the armistice, the UNC currently has the authority to approve or deny access to the DMZ.

"What we want to try to make sure that we do is, number one, we don't allow that area to become politicized ... we signed an agreement to say that we will maintain this buffer here," Brunson said in an episode of security-focused podcast series "War on the Rocks."

Brunson noted that South Korea recently proposed military talks with North Korea to discuss how to clarify the Military Demarcation Line in the DMZ in a bid to prevent possible clashes near the inter-Korean border, but emphasized that all actions should be based on the armistice agreement.

"What governs our behavior is the armistice, and we've got to adhere to the standards put forward in the armistice. And as long as we do that, there won't be any challenges," he said. "What we can't do is seek to change the way we do business in abrogation of a legal document, which is the armistice."

The USFK commander's call urging the need to adhere to the armistice came just days after the UNC issued a rare statement underscoring its role as the "administrator" of the DMZ, which stretches about 250 kilometers in length and 4 km in width, and has served as a buffer between the two Koreas since the end of the Korean War.

Speaking on Seoul's plan to seek a conditions-based handover of wartime operational control from Washington within President Lee Jae Myung's five-year term ending in 2030, Brunson said the United States has no intention to "hold this up at all."

He still emphasized that the bilaterally agreed-upon conditions should be met for the transfer.

"We've got to make sure that we've met all those conditions whether they be operational, whether they be material based, whether it might be something as simple as protection that those things are all in place before we go and do this," he said.

Against such a backdrop, Brunson touted how South Korea's "thriving" defense industry and participation in multinational drills like Talisman Sabre, held in Australia, have strengthened its capabilities as well as role in the wider Indo-Pacific region and called on the country to further "pull away from the Peninsula and become more engaged."

"I've talked a lot about the centrality and importance of the Republic of Korea to the entirety of the Indo-Pacific by virtue of their economy, by virtue of the size of their military, by virtue of their ability to continue to develop technologies," he said, referring to South Korea by its formal name.

"They are just preeminently important to peace in the Indo-Pacific."

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

8. Panmunjom tours will no longer enter blue buildings on North Korea border: UNC

​Summary:

U.N. Command has redesigned Panmunjom Joint Security Area tours so visitors will no longer enter the iconic blue conference buildings that straddle the Military Demarcation Line, ending the long-standing practice of briefly stepping onto the north Korean side. UNC deputy commander Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay told NK News the new route will take visitors to the rooftop of Freedom House on the southern side, offering wider sightlines into the north, including its JSA headquarters area, the propaganda village, and flagpole. Access to the metal observation tower has been removed, and entry to the central T2 meeting room is now largely limited to rare VIP delegations. The shift reflects heightened risk assessments after the Travis King incident and today’s threat environment.

Comment: I wonder what indications and warnings are causing this decision. Are we simply concerned with more Travis Kings? What is the atmosphere like in the Joint Security Area? Do we fear some kind of action by the nKPA? It has been a long time since 1976 (and the execution of Operation Paul Bunyan).

I have been in the blue conference building many times but I have never been to the roof of Freedom House. While it is a novelty to be able to technically cross into north Korea inside the blue conference building, I suspect the view from atop Freedom House will be much better and more impressive (and useful). Unfortunately, I fear some Koreans in the South will interpret this as an attempt to assert UNC control and a reminder that the UNC is in charge which may further inflame the ire of national assembly members.

Panmunjom tours will no longer enter blue buildings on North Korea border: UNC

Deputy commander tells NK News that tourists will instead visit roof of Freedom House amid heightened security concerns

Jeongmin Kim December 19, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/panmunjom-tours-will-no-longer-enter-blue-buildings-on-north-korea-border-unc/

Then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the 2018 Panmunjom summit, standing next to the T2 building | Image: Inter-Korean Summit Press Corps (April 2018)

The U.N. Command has fundamentally redesigned its Joint Security Area (JSA) orientation tour to remove access to the blue conference buildings that straddle the border, ending the decades-old practice of allowing visitors to take a few steps onto the North Korean side.

UNC’s deputy commander confirmed the overhaul in an interview with NK News, marking the most significant structural change to the program since it opened to foreign visitors.

“We’ve changed the orientation. You don’t go onto Conference Row anymore … and in fact we go to the top of Freedom House instead,” Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay said.

The redesigned route takes visitors to the rooftop of Freedom House on the southern side of the JSA, a location historically used by officials rather than civilian groups. Macaulay said the elevated position provides a broader view of operations on the northern side.

“You look down at their headquarters, and you can see back into their rear area a little bit,” he said. “You can see into the propaganda village, and you can see the flagpole. You can see way more of the contextual area.”

He described the geography as clearer from above, calling the Joint Security Area “a peninsula on the peninsula.”

But the UNC has also removed VIP access to a metal tower overlooking the JSA, which was reportedly installed in the mid-2010s with CCTV cameras. 

Entry to the Military Armistice Commission’s T2 room — the centermost blue building on the Military Demarcation Line — is now restricted almost entirely to high-level delegations.

“There are still a few VIPs that get to go in,” he said, “but even that is really minimal.”

However, several high-level diplomatic delegations that toured Panmunjom in recent weeks did not enter the building, informed sources told NK News. 

The Freedom House (back) behind the blue conference buildings at the JSA | Image: Ministry of Unification

1

2

The change to the tour program comes over two years after U.S. soldier Travis King dashed across the border and into North Korea custody while on a tour of the JSA, requiring a monthslong, multinational diplomatic effort to secure his release.

Macaulay said the redesign reflects interagency risk assessments and the current threat environment, seeking to reduce unnecessary exposure while preserving the education function of the tours.

“When it eventually opens … you’ll see how it’s actually [a] different tour,” he said.

But Macaulay said public tours remain suspended until UNC and the ROK defense and foreign ministries agree conditions are acceptable for resumption.

“Everybody has to be comfortable with the risk that still exists, because it still exists,” he said. 

Macaulay said UNC had been “on a trajectory” toward reopening until Dec. 3 last year — the day when now-impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol set off a domestic crisis by briefly declaring martial law. While South Korea resumed limited tours to Panmunjom earlier this year, the program is only available to government officials, journalists and members of educational programs, not the general public.

In the past, the highlight of JSA tours was the visit to the iconic blue buildings on Conference Row, right on the MDL dividing the two Koreas.

Inside the center T2 building, visitors could actually cross the MDL into the North Korean side of the JSA and take photos next to ROK soldiers who stood guard.

The tour format survived periodic suspensions after high-risk incidents, including during the pandemic.

But increasing tensions following North Korea’s declaration that it would treat the South as a “hostile enemy state,” the collapse of the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement and Travis King’s border crossing all contributed to a review of ground-level visits to the JSA.

Edited by Bryan Betts

9. S. Korea unification ministry's bid to lead North Korea policy raises U.S. friction concerns

​Summary:

South Korea’s Unification Ministry is pressing to lead north Korea policy, but the move is colliding with two hard constraints: Pyongyang’s “hostile two states” line and the reality that alliance coordination with the United States anchors denuclearization, sanctions, and crisis management. Asia Today reports the ministry has resisted joining Foreign Ministry follow-up talks tied to the recent ROK U.S. summit fact sheet and has challenged U.N. Command objections to a bill expanding Seoul’s authority over civilian DMZ access. Officials warn this posture could be read in Washington as a bid for autonomy, risking friction and mixed messaging. Critics also question whether north Korea would even treat the ministry as a relevant counterpart as it recasts ties as state-to-state.

Comment: Is the POTROK going to reign in the Minister of Unification? Or is he going to let this friction fester?

Please Minister Chung: focus on in-depth and comprehensive unification planning and not on foreign and national security and military affairs.

World News Dec. 19, 2025 / 4:36 AM / Updated at 4:36 AM

S. Korea unification ministry's bid to lead North Korea policy raises U.S. friction concerns

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/19/korea-unification-ministry-us-un/6051766136626/

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young delivers opening remarks at the Northeast Asia Peaceful Coexistence Forum at the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 12. Photo by Asia Today

Dec. 18 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's Unification Ministry is seeking a larger role in shaping North Korea policy, but critics and officials say the push may be unrealistic as Pyongyang moves to define inter-Korean relations as "hostile two states" and as policy coordination with the United States remains central.

The debate has sharpened as expectations grow that North Korea will formalize the "hostile two-state" line in amendments to its party charter and constitution at a party congress expected next year.

In recent weeks, the Unification Ministry said it would not participate in follow-up consultations led by the Foreign Ministry on the South Korea-U.S. summit joint fact sheet, viewing the talks as tied to denuclearization and sanctions policy, according to the report.

The ministry has also pushed back against the U.N. Command's opposition to proposed legislation that would expand Seoul's authority over civilian access to parts of the Demilitarized Zone, saying the Armistice Agreement does not prohibit the peaceful use of the DMZ and backing the bill.

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Democratic Party lawmaker Chung Cheong-rae backed the Unification Ministry's stance, warning that requiring U.S. approval for every step could tighten constraints on efforts to resolve inter-Korean relations, the report said.

A senior Unification Ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the ministry's current actions are likely to be misunderstood in Washington and warned that as arguments for greater autonomy grow stronger, "cracks" could surface in the South Korea-U.S. relationship.

The official also questioned whether North Korea, which has reorganized agencies handling South Korea policy and frames ties as state-to-state, would recognize the Unification Ministry's traditional role. The official said an approach centered on the Foreign Ministry and the United States is the most realistic given that denuclearization remains the core issue.

Foreign Ministry officials signaled an effort to prevent the dispute from escalating. A senior official said criticism from former unification ministers should be taken seriously and addressed to avoid misunderstandings, and added that the Unification Ministry could provide explanations to the U.S. side as needed, calling it the ministry with which the Foreign Ministry maintains the closest cooperation and communication.

Some observers said tensions between ministries could weaken Seoul's negotiating leverage with Washington, particularly as the Foreign Ministry handles practical North Korea policy coordination as well as security and tariff negotiations.

Cho Han-beom, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the dispute reflects methodological differences, with one side emphasizing progress through inter-Korean engagement and the other prioritizing movement in U.S.-North Korea talks before inter-Korean steps. He said the Unification Ministry's intent to break the deadlock is understandable, but constraints tied to the South Korea-U.S. relationship and the U.N. Command structure must be weighed.

- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

10. Seoul's Unification Ministry aims for 'peaceful coexistence' with North Korea in 2026 plan

​Summary: 

South Korea’s Unification Ministry unveiled a 2026 work plan that brands the year the “first year of peaceful coexistence” on the peninsula, despite north Korea’s silence and years of frozen ties. Briefing President Lee Jae Myung, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young set priorities that include jump-starting U.S.–north Korea and inter-Korean talks, expanding humanitarian cooperation, and preparing economic and connectivity projects such as reopening Kaesong, border peace zones, and rail links via China. The plan urges new envoys in Seoul and Washington and argues sanctions have lost leverage. It also deemphasizes public human-rights pressure, proposing to replace the record center with an engagement-focused “peaceful coexistence” center.

Comment: The "work plan" is a fantasy (unless it is part of a real political warfare plan that focuses on achieving real transformation inside north Korea that will result in a free and unified Korea). 

I will not stop repeating this. It is moral bankruptcy to seek peaceful co-existence and abandon 26 million Koreans in the north and sentence them to a life of continued servitude and suffering.

And it is the height of naivete and irresponsibility to believe that Kim Jong Un seeks peaceful co-existence. An understanding of the nature, objectives and strategy of the Kim family regime reveals that KJU only seeks domination of the entire Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

World News Dec. 19, 2025 / 3:51 AM

Seoul's Unification Ministry aims for 'peaceful coexistence' with North Korea in 2026 plan

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/19/Unification-Ministry-2026-work-plan-year-of-peaceful-coexistence-North-Korea/9501766131323/

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a briefing to President Lee Jae Myung on the ministry's 2026 policy plan on Friday. The ministry called for a "year of peaceful coexistence" with North Korea. Photo by Yonhap

Dec. 19 (UPI) -- South Korea's Unification Ministry on Friday said it aims to make 2026 the "first year of peaceful coexistence" on the Korean Peninsula, outlining plans to revive stalled diplomacy with North Korea despite a lack of response from Pyongyang and years of frozen inter-Korean ties.

The ministry presented its annual work plan to President Lee Jae Myung, setting out five core priorities for the coming year, including reviving U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean talks, expanding humanitarian cooperation, promoting cross-border economic projects, supporting border communities and broadening public participation in peace and unification policy.

"To make 2026 the first year of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, the Ministry of Unification will boldly pursue preemptive and practical peace-building measures," Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said in a statement.

At the center of the plan is Seoul's intention to act as a diplomatic "pacemaker" for renewed U.S.-North Korea talks. Measures include appointing a special envoy for peace on the Korean Peninsula and urging Washington to name a dedicated representative to oversee North Korea policy.

South Korean analysts have pointed to a planned visit to China by U.S. President Donald Trump as a potential opportunity to revive momentum for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

"The period leading up to U.S. President Trump's visit to China next April is crucial for the success of our North Korea policy," Chung said.

In a separate policy briefing to President Lee, Chung called for easing international sanctions imposed on North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs, saying they no longer make a significant impact.

"In order to buttress inter-Korean and multilateral exchanges and cooperation, (the ministry) plans to discuss and seek the relaxation of sanctions," Chung said. "There are some arguments calling for the strengthening of sanctions on North Korea, but, realistically, sanctions against Pyongyang have lost their effectiveness."

The ministry said it would seek to reopen inter-Korean communication channels, including military and civilian hotlines, and pursue confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the risk of accidental clashes along the heavily fortified border.

The work plan also outlines a range of cooperation initiatives, including preparations to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex if talks restart, the creation of special peace economic zones near the border and multilateral railway projects linking the Koreas with China.

The eventual resumption of tourism to North Korea is on the agenda as well, with initial proposals focusing on overseas Koreans visiting their family hometowns before expanding more broadly, the ministry said.

The ministry pledged to address humanitarian concerns by pursuing phased solutions for separated families and exploring realistic options for resolving long-standing cases involving abductees and detainees.

At the same time, the plan signals a shift away from public pressure on North Korean human rights. It calls for scrapping the Center for North Korean Human Rights Record project -- described by the ministry as a symbol of confrontational policy -- in favor of a new "peaceful coexistence center" focused on engagement and shared history at sites such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang.

The agenda builds on President Lee's efforts since taking office to pivot away from confrontation, including suspending propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts and halting civilian leaflet launches across the border.

Those moves have so far drawn little public response from Pyongyang, which continues to define the two Koreas as hostile states.

Despite the uncertainty and nearly seven years of suspended inter-Korean relations, the ministry said it would continue pursuing engagement and focus on "piercing even a needle hole" through the wall of division created by the long-running stalemate.

Read More

11. Expert says nuclear submarines are industrial strategy, not a budget drain

​Summary:

Moon Geun-sik of Hanyang University argues South Korea should stop treating nuclear-powered submarines as a defense “black hole” and instead frame them as a national industrial and energy strategy. He says an SSN program is a high-end convergence project spanning reactor design and safety, fuel-cycle management, radiation control, advanced shipbuilding, materials, and ICT and AI automation. Citing the USS Nautilus, he claims early criticism missed spillover benefits that accelerated U.S. nuclear power and manufacturing. He points to France and Brazil as models and says nuclear propulsion could unlock icebreakers, polar research ships, LNG carriers, and deep-sea platforms while improving deterrence.

Comment: But they are enormously expensive not only to build but also to maintain. It will also take a lot of resources to develop the crews and support personnel and of course in the long run the deactivation of nuclear reactors. 

That said, I think Dr. Moon is onto something here: nuclear propulsion could unlock icebreakers, polar research ships, LNG carriers, and deep-sea platforms while improving deterrence. I think our Korean allies are thinking big. What if the long term strategy is to develop a nuclear propelled commercial shipping capability?

Reference the USS Nautilus. As a kid in the 1960s I recall school trips to the New London sub base and visiting the Nautilus (my father worked at Electric Boat and we used to go watch the submarine launches). The visits to the Nautilus had a strategic effect on me: it is why I joined the Army because I did not want to ever be confined in a steel tube like that!

World News Dec. 19, 2025 / 4:06 AM / Updated at 4:06 AM

Expert says nuclear submarines are industrial strategy, not a budget drain

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/19/korea-nuclear-submarines/5481766134550/

Moon Geun-sik, a special professor at Hanyang University’s Graduate School of Public Policy, appears on Ato TV’s live program “Koo Pil-hyun’s Military” on Nov. 12. Photo by Asia Today

Dec. 18 (Asia Today) -- Nuclear-powered submarines should be viewed as an industrial, technology and energy strategy before they are treated as a defense procurement project, Hanyang University public policy professor Moon Geun-sik said, arguing that South Korea risks losing ground in future maritime industries if it delays an SSN program.

Moon, a special professor at Hanyang University's Graduate School of Public Policy, said the public debate often starts from a flawed premise: that nuclear-powered submarines are simply expensive weapons systems and therefore a "black hole" for defense spending.

Below is an edited Q&A from an interview with Moon.

Q: You have said the "question itself is flawed" in South Korea's nuclear submarine debate. Why?

Related

• North Korea increasingly uses Kim's Workers' Party title, report says
• Seoul's Unification Ministry aims for 'peaceful coexistence' with North Korea in 2026 plan
• N. Korean troops crossed inter-Korean land border 10 times in Nov.: lawmaker

A: The debate evaluates nuclear-powered submarines only as "expensive weapons." If you look only at the price of a single vessel, it naturally feels burdensome. But a nuclear submarine is not merely a combat platform. It is a national convergence project of the highest complexity, combining reactor design and safety technology, nuclear fuel cycle management, radiation safety, advanced shipbuilding, welding and new materials, along with automated control and digital technology. Once it is defined as a defense budget black hole, its ripple effects disappear from the discussion.

Q: You say similar arguments have appeared before. What do you mean?

A: Look at 1954, when the United States built the world's first nuclear submarine, the USS Nautilus. At the time, criticism also raged that it was a massive waste of budget. The arguments were almost identical to those being repeated today.

Q: What changed after the Nautilus in the United States, in your view?

A: The Nautilus did not just create one naval asset. That project contributed to the construction of the world's first commercial nuclear power plant, the Shippingport plant. After that, the United States made a major leap in nuclear power, energy, electricity, metals, welding and new materials. It was a turning point where military technology expanded into civilian energy and industrial innovation.

Q: How do you respond to those who say today's debate is simply about cost?

A: Repeating "it costs too much" misses the essence. The real question is not the size of the budget, but what future industries that budget will create. Nuclear submarine development costs are not only defense spending. They are strategic national investments that cultivate advanced technical talent, expand future energy infrastructure and build ecosystems for shipbuilding, nuclear power, ICT and AI industries.

Q: France and Brazil are sometimes cited as examples. Why?

A: France placed nuclear submarines at the center of its national industrial strategy. Reactor, fuel, shipbuilding, electronics, defense and energy industries form a single ecosystem. Brazil is also trying to expand nuclear fuel, reactor and deep-sea structure technologies into civilian industries through its low-enriched uranium nuclear submarine project. These show that nuclear submarine technology is not only for defense.

Q: How does nuclear propulsion translate beyond submarines?

A: The United States, Russia and China apply nuclear propulsion in fields such as icebreakers, polar research vessels and Arctic energy platforms. Russia operates the world's only commercial nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet and uses it to secure Arctic shipping logistics. That capability is a strategic asset in its energy supply chain.

Q: What could change for South Korea if it secures nuclear propulsion technology?

A: New maritime markets would open, including polar research vessels, icebreakers, LNG carriers and deep-sea resource exploration ships. South Korea has world-class shipbuilding, but it faces a constraint at the final hurdle: propulsion technology. Nuclear propulsion could overcome that hurdle and elevate shipbuilding, energy and logistics to the next level.

Q: What about the military impact?

A: Nuclear submarines are not only platforms that can stay submerged for long periods. They change deterrence. Their endurance and stealth can secure strategic initiative even in an anti-access and area denial maritime environment. That translates into stronger bargaining power in diplomacy and security. It strengthens industry and security at the same time.

Q: How should the project be structured, in your view?

A: A nuclear submarine is a national mega-scale convergence project integrating reactor technology, fuel cycle management, radiation safety, shipbuilding, welding and new materials, deep-sea sensors and electronic warfare, ICT and AI automation and defense and diplomatic strategy. It is a foundational project for future competitiveness, not only defense.

Q: What kind of governance structure do you believe is needed?

A: A nuclear submarine project is unlikely to succeed as a standalone Defense Ministry initiative. Like the United States and France, a national nuclear submarine project team directly under the presidential office should be established. In the longer term, it should expand into a project management office overseeing nuclear-powered vessels, uniting defense, industry, nuclear energy, science and technology, diplomacy and finance.

Moon is scheduled to appear on Ato TV's "Koo Pil-hyun's Military" at 3 p.m. on Dec. 24 to discuss the topic further, according to the program.

- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

12. HD Korea Shipbuilding outlines tech roadmap with MIT-led maritime consortium

​Summary:

HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering says it has laid out a shipbuilding technology roadmap and briefed first-year results from the MIT-led Maritime Consortium, a partnership launched in March with MIT, Capital, and the American Bureau of Shipping focused on innovation and decarbonization. At a workshop at HD Hyundai’s Seongnam R&D Center, the consortium highlighted AI-enabled autonomous navigation, cybersecurity tools, additive manufacturing, and early research on small modular reactor powered vessels. Planned next steps include selecting ships to trial Avikus’ HiNAS Control system and validating fuel-efficiency gains, plus refining an AI cyber threat detection prototype.

World News Dec. 19, 2025 / 4:19 AM / Updated at 4:19 AM

HD Korea Shipbuilding outlines tech roadmap with MIT-led maritime consortium

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/19/korea-shipbuilding-mit-roadmap/2361766135220/

The future USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) sails on its own power for the first time out of Newport News, Virginia on April 8, 2017. File U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ridge Leoni/UPI | License Photo

Dec. 18 (Asia Today) -- HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering said Thursday it presented a "shipbuilding technology roadmap" and first-year research outcomes from an MIT-led maritime consortium focused on innovation and decarbonization, including autonomous navigation, cybersecurity and small modular reactor research.

The company, HD Hyundai's intermediate holding firm for shipbuilding, said it recently held a workshop at the HD Hyundai Global R&D Center in Seongnam, south of Seoul, to share results from the first year of the MIT Maritime Consortium.

The consortium, launched in March, is led by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Greek shipping company Capital and the American Bureau of Shipping, with the stated goal of exploring shipbuilding technology innovation and decarbonization solutions. HD Korea Shipbuilding said about 180 participants attended, including consortium members and industry and academic experts.

The company said this year's key research achievements included AI-based autonomous navigation solutions, cybersecurity solutions, advanced development work related to SMR-powered vessels and manufacturing technologies using 3D printing.

Related

• Expert says nuclear submarines are industrial strategy, not a budget drain
• North Korea increasingly uses Kim's Workers' Party title, report says
• Seoul's Unification Ministry aims for 'peaceful coexistence' with North Korea in 2026 plan

It said the consortium plans to select vessels to install Avikus' "HiNAS Control" autonomous navigation system - developed by HD Hyundai's autonomy subsidiary - and verify potential fuel-efficiency gains. It also said a prototype AI model for detecting cyber threats has been developed.

The company said the consortium participated in producing an "SMR Propulsion Ship Safety Handbook" published by MIT in October, describing it as a step toward establishing standards for commercialization of marine nuclear technology.

Jang Kwang-pil, head of the Future Technology Research Institute at HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, said the company will expand consortium R&D efforts, including establishing standards to verify fuel savings from AI-integrated autonomous navigation solutions.

He said the company aims to contribute to technological innovation and decarbonization through global cooperation in shipbuilding.

HD Hyundai said it is broadening cooperation with overseas universities beyond MIT through education partnerships and industry forums. It said it signed an education cooperation memorandum last July with the University of Michigan and Seoul National University to foster shipbuilding talent and hosted a Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation expert forum at its Seongnam R&D Center in June.

- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

13. UN General Assembly adopts resolution slamming North Korean human rights abuses

​Summary:

The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning north Korea’s human rights abuses for the 21st straight year, passing it by consensus with 61 co-sponsors including the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The measure urges Pyongyang to repatriate abductees, detainees, and POWs, allow humanitarian access, and halt abuses tied to forced repatriation such as forced abortions and infanticide. It criticizes the regime’s diversion of resources to the military over public welfare and notes findings that the death penalty has expanded. Notably, the Lee Jae Myung administration co-sponsored despite expectations it might avoid the step to protect engagement.

Comment: It is gratifying to see the ROK support this. This is one part of a human rights upfront approach. I hope the ROK (and the US) will do more. Much more. We must never abandon the pursuit of human rights in north Korea. But the only way to solve the human rights abuses is by transforming the peninsula into a free and unified Korea.

News

UN General Assembly adopts resolution slamming North Korean human rights abuses

US, South Korea among 61 nations to back measure criticizing DPRK’s use of resources on military rather than people

Jooheon Kim December 19, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/un-general-assembly-adopts-resolution-slamming-north-korean-human-rights-abuses/

The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Dec. 18, 2025 | Image: Screenshot from UN Web TV

The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights abuses for the 21st consecutive year, with the U.S., South Korea and Japan among the 61 countries that sponsored the measure.

The resolution, passed by consensus on Thursday, calls on DPRK authorities to immediately repatriate abductees, detainees and prisoners of war, as well as the remains of those who have died. 

It also urges an end to forced abortions and infanticide involving pregnant North Korean defectors who are forcibly repatriated, and it demands that North Korea grant access to international organizations to assess humanitarian needs.

The resolution expresses concern over Pyongyang’s excessive allocation of resources to military spending at the expense of the welfare of its people and requests that North Korea submit its fourth periodic report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee.

U.N. member states must comply with international anti-trafficking standards in handling North Korean refugees and asylum seekers, the resolution states, while calling for greater support for civil society groups working on DPRK human rights issues.

It also praises an update to the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) report, which found that North Korea has significantly expanded its use of the death penalty over the past decade.

Ahn Chang-ho, the chairman of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, welcomed Seoul’s participation as a co-sponsor of the resolution.

“And we hope that, unless there is a significant improvement in the human rights situation in North Korea, it will continue to take part as a co-sponsor in the future,” he said in a statement on Friday.

The progressive Lee Jae Myung administration sponsored the resolution despite expectations that it would avoid doing so to support diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Other sponsor countries included Britain, Australia and France.

Seoul previously withdrew its support for annual U.N. resolutions on North Korean human rights from 2019 to 2021 under the Moon Jae-in administration, but returned as a co-sponsor in 2022 under the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol government.

Ethan Shin of the Seoul-based NGO Transitional Justice Working Group called the Lee administration’s support for the resolution an encouraging move, but said there are still troubling signs about the government’s commitment to human rights.

He cited the decision to stop releasing North Korean human rights reports, the reorganization of a team working on abductee issues and the president’s ignorance about South Koreans detained in the DPRK at a press conference earlier this month.

“President Lee should reconsider some of his policies and also take forward-looking steps like meeting with the families of abductees, detainees and POWs to comfort them and explain the government’s efforts, and to send a clear message to Pyongyang that we take these issues seriously,” Shin told NK News.

Kim Chol-song, a former DPRK diplomat in Russia, said the U.N.’s adoption of the resolution could help encourage North Korean diplomats to consider defection. 

The defector, who previously used the pseudonym Kim Kang, added that “DPRK officials aside from Kim Jong Un’s family are technically high-ranking slaves” and that exposure to international criticism can change their view of the regime.

Pyongyang strongly rejects criticism of its human rights record. Last year, its foreign ministry denounced the U.N. resolution as a provocation aimed at tarnishing “the image of the dignified DPRK.”

Edited by Bryan Betts

14. North Korean crypto theft hits new high in 2025 on back of Bybit heist: Reports

​Summary:

Blockchain security firms report that north Korea drove cryptocurrency theft to a new peak in 2025, largely due to the $1.46 billion Bybit hack in February. Chainalysis estimates DPRK-linked actors stole about $2.02 billion this year, nearly 60 percent of the roughly $3.4 billion stolen globally, and pushing Pyongyang’s cumulative haul since 2016 above $6.75 billion. TRM Labs offers a lower estimate of over $1.5 billion, reflecting attribution differences. Researchers say the regime is shifting from smaller bridge hacks to high-value strikes on major exchanges, then laundering through DeFi, mixers, and “Chinese laundromat” OTC networks to cash out.

Comment: More on KJU's all purpose sword.

North Korean crypto theft hits new high in 2025 on back of Bybit heist: Reports

Researchers say DPRK actors stole up to $2B this year, accounting for over half of all global crypto theft

Shreyas Reddy December 19, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korean-crypto-theft-hits-new-high-in-2025-on-back-of-bybit-heist-reports/

Bitcoin and Tether price fluctuations | Image: sergeitokmakov via Pixabay (Aug. 13, 2021)

North Korean cybercriminals took their already prolific cryptocurrency theft to new highs in 2025 despite carrying out fewer confirmed attacks this year, according to blockchain researchers, as Pyongyang refined its proven tactics to inflict more damage.

Driven largely by the record theft of $1.46 billion from the Dubai-based exchange Bybit in February, DPRK actors have pulled in at least $2.02 billion in stolen virtual currency so far this year, U.S. blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis said in a report Thursday.

In the process, North Korea comfortably surpassed its previous largest haul of $681 million last year, becoming the first nation-state actor to steal cryptocurrency worth over $2 billion in a single year. This year’s sum takes Pyongyang’s cumulative virtual currency theft to over $6.75 billion since 2016, the firm assessed. 

This figure represented almost 60% of all cryptocurrency theft worldwide in 2025, which amounted to $3.4 billion, according to the report. North Korea also accounted for 76% of all attacks compromising services such as exchanges, with other global actors mostly targeting personal wallets.

TRM Labs, another U.S. blockchain analytics company, offered a more conservative estimate of DPRK and global cryptocurrency crime in 2025, according to a report Thursday.

The firm said DPRK-linked actors were responsible for the theft of over $1.5 billion in virtual assets this year, more than half of the $2.7 billion stolen worldwide. This amount is almost double the $800 million TRM attributed to Pyongyang-backed actors last year.

TRM’s figure appears to suggest virtually all of Pyongyang’s stolen proceeds this year came from the Bybit attack, but the firm also highlighted North Korean actors’ broader focus on centralized exchanges and custodial service providers offering secure storage for digital assets.

Discrepancies in estimates between analytics firms are quite common as researchers attribute attacks differently based on the information available to them, which may change further if new data emerges later. 

North Korean actors’ expanding crypto crime operations highlight Pyongyang’s increased reliance on cybercrime to generate foreign currency for its weapons development.

“North Korea’s crypto theft operations function as a structured, state-directed revenue system — a coordinated apparatus that blends cyber activity, intelligence support, illicit finance infrastructure and partnerships with overseas facilitators,” TRM said.

SHIFTING TARGETS

North Korea appears to be the exception to the global norm favoring personal wallet compromises, with the Bybit heist representing more than 1,000 times the median theft value this year, according to Chainalysis.

“The DPRK continues to undertake significantly higher-value attacks than other threat actors,” the firm said. “When North Korean hackers strike, they target large services and aim for maximum impact.”

TRM assessed that North Korea has moved on from targeting decentralized bridges facilitating transfers between different blockchains to “centralized giants,” such as global exchanges, to maximize returns.

While the targets have shifted in recent years, North Korean cybercriminals’ methods have been “refined, not reinvented,” the firm said.

DPRK actors have long relied on social engineering skills that exploit human error, and TRM said they infiltrate target networks by deploying malware through fake job offers sent to unsuspecting developers.

After gaining access, they try to take control of systems that authorize withdrawals, after which they start converting stolen assets to other virtual currencies to throw investigators off their trail.

Chainalysis noted that DPRK actors are also increasingly pulling off “outsized” thefts by embedding remote IT workers inside cryptocurrency services to gain privileged access.

These overseas workers are also increasingly impersonating recruiters for prominent Web3 and AI firms to acquire credentials, source code and network access, the firm added.

LAUNDERING STRATEGIES

North Korean cybercriminals typically cash out their stolen cryptocurrency in three waves over the course of approximately 45 days, according to Chainalysis.

Initially, they try to distance the stolen assets from the source by moving them through decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols and mixers that combine them with other virtual tokens.

They then begin transferring funds to other services linked to the broader ecosystem, including exchanges, cross-chain bridges and other mixing services.

Finally, they move toward “off-ramps” designed for conversion to official currency, including financial services without know-your-customer (KYC) protocols, centralized exchanges and online marketplaces in less regulated markets.

North Korean cybercriminals are particularly reliant on what TRM Labs described as the “Chinese Laundromat,” a vast network of underground bankers, over-the-counter (OTC) brokers, money transmitters and traders who have stepped in to fill the void left by sanctioned mixers.

These “professional money-laundering organizations” launder stolen assets across different blockchains, jurisdictions and payment systems long before they enter the DPRK financial system, making it harder to shutter Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion activities.

This network has allowed Pyongyang to move its record cryptocurrency haul more effectively than its traditional toolkit, and TRM called for a unified strategy linking governments, financial institutions and technology firms to counter the world’s “most sophisticated, financially motivated cyber operator.”

Chainalysis also emphasized the need for “enhanced vigilance” and improved detection of DPRK laundering patterns to curb its financially-motivated cybercrime.

“As North Korea continues to use cryptocurrency theft to fund state priorities and circumvent international sanctions, the industry must recognize that this threat actor operates by different rules than typical cybercriminals,” the firm said.

Edited by David Choi

15. Lee calls for preemptive efforts to reduce tensions with N. Korea

​Summary:

President Lee Jae Myung urged South Korean officials to take preemptive, proactive steps to reduce tensions with north Korea and to patiently rebuild trust even as Pyongyang refuses engagement. Speaking at a joint policy briefing by the foreign and unification ministries, Lee highlighted signs of intensified north Korean defensive posture along the Military Demarcation Line, including triple layers of barbed wire and the severing of roads and bridges linking north and south. He argued these measures suggest Pyongyang fears a southern incursion more than it is preparing one. Lee also tied the “two hostile states” rhetoric to political motives and called for a return to more normal inter-Korean relations.

Comment: Peace is good. Reducing tensions is good. But these effects cannot be attained through appeasement. Engagement should be part of a larger political warfare strategy 

Lee calls for preemptive efforts to reduce tensions with N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · December 19, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251219003900315?section=national/politics

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Friday called for officials to make preemptive efforts to reduce tensions with North Korea, saying that Seoul needs to patiently seek a path to restore trust with Pyongyang.

"We must be patient and spare no efforts to preemptively and proactively ease hostilities" between Seoul and Pyongyang, Lee told a policy briefing by the ministries of foreign affairs and unification.

Lee addressed concerns over rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, noting that North Korea has installed triple layers of barbed wire and barriers along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and cut roads and bridges connecting to the South.

"Since the Korean War in the 1950s, the two Koreas have confronted each other across the MDL, but this is the first time we have seen triple layers of barbed wire and the cutting of bridges," he said during a policy briefing by the ministries of foreign affairs and unification.

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a policy briefing by ministries of foreign affairs and unification held at the government complex in Seoul on Dec. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)

While there have been concerns in the South about a possible North Korean invasion, Lee said the reality appears to be the opposite.

"North Korea is said to be installing triple layers of barbed wire out of concerns over a South Korean invasion and building barriers in case tanks cross over," he said.

Lee also pointed to Pyongyang's hostile rhetoric defining the two Koreas as "two hostile states" and labeling South Korea as an "enemy," saying the deepening hostility appears to stem from political considerations and should be addressed to help normalize inter-Korean relations.

"In the past, the two sides pretended to be enemies, but these days it feels like we are becoming real enemies," he said. "It appears that this situation was created by political ambitions. Now we need to find our way back to where we belong."

Acknowledging that Pyongyang currently refuses to engage with Seoul, Lee stressed patience is essential to reduce tensions and rebuild trust.

"It is not easy, but we should not give up," Lee said, emphasizing the role of the unification ministry in that process.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · December 19, 2025

16. Unification minister pins hopes on Trump's planned visit to China for engagement with N. Korea

​Comment: To MInister Chung: Hope is not a course of action.

Unification minister pins hopes on Trump's planned visit to China for engagement with N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 18, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251218008600315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Dec. 18 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on Thursday pinpointed U.S. President Donald Trump's planned visit to China in April as a "decisive" moment to reopen engagement with North Korea, saying Seoul and Beijing have to play a mediating role.

Chung made the remarks during a lecture at a meeting of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council in Seoul, as Seoul is doubling down on efforts to resume stalled exchanges and dialogue with Pyongyang to build peace.

The minister referred to Trump's plan to visit Beijing in April for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, calling it a "decisive" period, as the U.S. president's Asia trip has fueled speculation that he may again seek to resume talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

If Trump and Kim meet on that occasion, "room for inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges could also be created," Chung said. "If (the chance) in April is missed, it would be difficult to find another opportunity."

He stressed that Seoul and Beijing should play the roles of "mediator and promoter" in facilitating reengagement with Pyongyang, while also mobilizing assistance from Japan and Russia to help bring Pyongyang back to dialogue.

The minister also threw his support behind a bill seeking to grant the South Korean government control of non-military access to the Demilitarized Zone, saying the U.N. Command's current control of such access to the military buffer zone "does not accord with the public sentiment."

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 18, 2025

​17. Introducing the Korean Regional Review

We hope to make this a resource that will benefit the national security community that focuses on Northeast Asia.

World News Dec. 18, 2025 / 10:58 AM

Introducing the Korean Regional Review

By David Maxwell, executive director, Korean Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/18/perspective-korea-regional-review-preview/7571766070567/

This is a view taken in 2017 of the ribbons of peace on the freedom bridge, symbolizing the division of Korea into North and South in Imjingak near the Demilitarized Zone in Paju, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea, File Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA

Dec. 18 (UPI) -- On Jan. 1, the Korean Regional Review will make a soft launch as a new, comprehensive public platform focused on security and strategy on and around the Korean Peninsula.

The mission is simple: provide serious analysis, timely reporting and rigorous research for those who follow Korea closely. The scope is broad, the structure sharp and the ambition clear.

The Korean Regional Review will be hosted by United Press International. As one of the world's oldest and most respected news organizations, UPI brings global reach, editorial professionalism and a long record of serious international reporting. Hosting it on the UPI platform ensures that analysis of Korean security issues is accessible to a worldwide audience, while meeting established journalistic standards.

KRR is designed to be the go-to, one-stop website for understanding security dynamics that affect the Korean Peninsula. It is built for Korea watchers, journalists, policymakers, military professionals, researchers, scholars and citizens who want to understand what is happening, why it matters and what may come next.

This will not be an advocacy blog or a headline aggregator. It is to be a professional security and strategy platform grounded in evidence, experience and disciplined analysis.

Why Korean Regional Review now

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of intensifying strategic competition. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programs, while expanding cyber, information and political warfare activities.

China and Russia are increasing their influence and intervention around the peninsula, often in subtle and deniable ways. Alliance politics are under strain. Regional crises, from Taiwan to Ukraine, increasingly intersect with Korean security and Korea a focal point on the Eurasian land mass.

At the same time, public understanding of these issues is fragmented. News is fast, but often shallow. Analysis is scattered across think tanks, journals and social media. Primary-source insights from Koreans, including those from the North, remain limited and often misunderstood.

KRR will close that gap. It will bring together current news, expert analysis, original research and informed perspectives in one accessible location, updated daily and curated with purpose.

What the Korean Regional Review will offer

KRR will provide continuous coverage of security developments that affect the Korean Peninsula. This includes military affairs, alliance dynamics, deterrence, nuclear and missile issues, cyber and information operations, human rights, unification, and regional geopolitics across Northeast Asia and the broader Asia-Indo-Pacific.

Daily news briefs will synthesize reporting from Korean, regional and international sources. These briefs will focus on relevance rather than volume, highlighting what matters most for security and policy decision making.

Analytical essays and commentaries will go deeper. These pieces will be written by practitioners and scholars with direct experience in defense, diplomacy, intelligence, and regional affairs. The goal is clarity --explain complex issues in direct language without diluting rigor.

KRR will also host longer research papers and working studies. These will examine enduring challenges such as deterrence stability, third-party intervention, alliance transformation, crisis escalation and most importantly, pathways toward a free and unified Korea. All research will be clearly sourced and intended for serious reference, not advocacy soundbites.

Fundamentally, this will be a platform for authentic voices to write about critical issues and share their experience, knowledge, ideas and recommendations for the Korean region. Diverse perspectives from across the spectrum of views on Korean issues will be welcome. Korea watchers in particular can use KRR to offer their knowledge, research and recommendations to the wider community.

Signature Sections

The Korean Regional Review will feature several dedicated sections that reflect its core priorities.

• Voice for Unification will be a unique central pillar. This section will focus on the strategic, moral and human dimensions of Korean unification. It emphasizes that unification is not only a Korean issue, but also a matter of regional and global security.

• A companion section will present testimony, insights and reflections from Koreans from the North. These are individuals who lived under the regime and can speak with authority about life, control, resistance and aspiration inside the system. Their words matter. They provide context no satellite image or policy memo can replace.

• Additional sections will focus on military readiness and warfighting, gray zone competition, political warfare, alliance integration and the role of external actors, particularly China and Russia, in shaping outcomes on the peninsula.

Audience and purpose

KRR will be written for a wide, but serious, audience. Policymakers and congressional staff will find concise analysis relevant to decision making. Military professionals will find operational and strategic perspectives grounded in real-world experience. Journalists will find context and expert voices. Scholars and students will find research and references suitable for teaching and study. Informed citizens will find clear explanations without jargon or sensationalism.

The purpose is not to tell readers what to think. It is to give them the tools to think clearly about Korea in a time of growing uncertainty.

Standards and credibility

Credibility will be the foundation of KRR. Content will be curated and edited to professional standards. Sources will be identified. Assumptions will be stated. Arguments will be challenged. Disagreement will be welcomed when it is serious and informed.

Being hosted by United Press International reinforces these standards. UPI's global distribution network and editorial discipline provide an established platform for serious discussion of Korean security and regional affairs.

Looking ahead

The soft launch marks the beginning, not the end. Over time, KRR will expand its multimedia offerings, including interviews, roundtables and curated data resources. Partnerships with research institutions and media outlets are planned. The aim is to build a durable public resource that grows with events rather than chasing them.

The Korean Peninsula will remain one of the most dangerous and consequential regions in the world. Understanding it requires attention, discipline and respect for complexity. The Korean Regional Review will meet that challenge.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com