Quotes of the Day:
“…but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the greater, not the perfect good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness, involves a discretion which may be misapplied an abused.”
- James Madison, Author, The Federalist Papers
"Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards... Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain."
- Sun Tzu
"The first and most important rule to observe...is to use our entire forces with the utmost energy. the second rule is to concentrate our power as much as possible against that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur disadvantages elsewhere, so that our chances of success may increase at the decisive point. the third rule is never to waste time. unless important advantages are to be gained from hesitation, it is necessary to set to work at once. by this speed a hundred enemy measures are nipped in the bud, and public opinion is won most rapidly. finally, the fourth rule is to follow up our successes with the utmost energy. only pursuit of the beaten enemy gives the fruits of victory.
- Carl von Clausewitz
1. 53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique
2. Korea National Diplomatic Academy chancellor urges end of war announcement
3. Canada spots ship-to-ship transfers, North suspected
4. US, SKorea to bolster alliance at talks amid NKorean nuke threats, challenges from China
5. N.Korea's Kim warns of 'very giant struggle' next year to boost economy
6. S.Korea, US agree to update war plans against growing N. Korean threats
7. Korea, U.S. vow to update outdated war planning
8. Korea joins diplomats for high-level talks with the Taliban
9. People in parts of Yanggang Province no longer have access to tap water
10. N. Korea’s Ministry of Social Security actively employs discharged soldiers to maintain social order
11. Moon’s end of war proposal faces multitude of challenges
12. Top S. Korean, Chinese officials meet amid Seoul's push to declare formal end to Korean War
13. Why Can’t the Japanese and Koreans Get Along?
1. 53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique
Time to parse this as LTG Chun in Bum said yesterday in an interview we did together on Arirang TV (HERE) we have to read between the lines.
A very comprehensive statement that covers a lot of important ground. In terms of the military alliance beyond the Korean peninsula this nests within the joint statement and fact sheet from the Biden-Moon summit. This communique provides a lot of continuity with diplomatic engagement over the past 11 months.
This appears to be a significant statement and I interpret it to mean that all diplomatic proposals within this statements and agreements are still in play (I still think we need to ack to the two 1991-1992 north-South agreements on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula non-aggression, reconciliation, and exchanges but I digress)
They reaffirmed their common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean, U.S.-DPRK, and multilateral commitments—such as the inter-Korean 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, the 2018 U.S.-DPRK Singapore Joint Statement, and the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement—are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The leaders committed to supporting diplomatic efforts by maintaining combined readiness and international sanctions. Both leaders urged the DPRK to uphold its international agreements.
A heard a learned Korea watcher comments this week that the CMA could be a stepping stone to a replacement process for the Armistice:
4. The Minister and the Secretary noted that the various measures carried out by the ROK and DPRK military authorities for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, Panmunjom Declaration, and the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) set conditions for easing tensions, reducing the threat of war and preventing accidental border clashes on the Korean Peninsula.
The Minister and the Secretary also shared a common understanding that the implementation of the CMA has effectively contributed to preventing accidental clashes on the Korean Peninsula.
Secretary Austin expressed support for robust inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation, and pledged to continue close coordination and cooperation between ROK and U.S. defense authorities on this matter.
This should not be the basis for the OPCON transition process - corporate the strategic guidance, develop the new OPLANs, and then have a change of command of the ROK/US CFC.
8. On this basis, the Minister and the Secretary approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) to guide Alliance planning efforts—which reflects changes to the strategic environment. The Minister and the Secretary assessed that the updated planning guidance will guide military OPLANs to more effectively deter—and as necessary respond to—DPRK threats to the U.S.-ROK Alliance.
Too often overlooked is the relocation issue and how the split between Seoul and Humphreys is degrading the foundational human relationships that are necessary for effective combined operations. I would recommend that until the ROK/US CFC is firmly established in one location and ROK and US personnel are working (and living) side by side 24/7 that there can be no OPCON transition.
11. The Minister and the Secretary expressed appreciation for the CFC, which has played a central role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and defending the ROK since its establishment in 1978. The Minister and Secretary reviewed preparations for—and acknowledged joint efforts towards—the relocation of the CFC Headquarters (HQ) to Camp Humphreys.
The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed that the CFC HQ relocation to Camp Humphreys will contribute to enhanced combined operational capabilities and a strengthened combined defense posture, and pledged to closely cooperate in order to complete the relocation by next year.
This is absolutely critical. I am very gratified to read this because it means that we can take a fresh look at the process and recognize that the evolution over the past nearly two decades since 2004 (or really January 2003 in Secretary Rumselfd's office where this all started) has resulted in patchwork quilt of conditions and capabilities as the plans have changed (from the dissolution of the ROK/US CFC in to separate supporting and supported war fighting commands to the current situation that will be a change of command of the ROK/US CFC and maintain the CFC in tact.). This has resulted in obsolete conditions and perhaps "mis-investment" in certain capabilities.
In parallel, the two leaders committed to complete the comprehensive joint study on COTP capabilities as well as the annex and appendix rewrites to COTP Change 1 by the Spring 2022 Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. They also pledged to complete a ROK-U.S. bilateral assessment on ROK critical military capabilities and Alliance comprehensive response capabilities against DPRK nuclear and missile threats by the 54th SCM.
Good to see this acknowledged but. we need more aggressive action under PSI:
17. Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for the ROK’s dedication and contribution to various global security efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
The Minister and the Secretary applauded the ROK-U.S. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) efforts to enhance the Alliance’s combined response capabilities to prevent the acquisition and use of WMD, and, if necessary, to respond to mitigate WMD threats.
They resolved to continue strengthening cooperation to enhance CWMD capabilities through measures including ROK-U.S. Counter WMD Committee (CWMDC) and U.S. DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which have enhanced Alliance CWMD capabilities.
53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique
1. The 53rd Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States (U.S.) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul on December 02, 2021. ROK Minister of National Defense Suh Wook and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On December 01, 2021, ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Won In-Choul, and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, presided over the 46th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).
2. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the vision of the leaders of both nations, for a region governed by democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law, as affirmed in the May 2021 ROK-U.S. Summit. They shared a common understanding that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is stronger than ever, and is based on shared values of mutual trust, freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
The Minister and the Secretary noted that the SCM has played a pivotal role in the continued development of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and will continue to be a cornerstone venue to discuss and affirm national commitments. Both sides pledged to continue to develop the Alliance—the linchpin of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Indo-Pacific region—in a mutually reinforcing and future-oriented manner.
3. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the current security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and discussed cooperative measures between the two nations. The Minister and the Secretary assessed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance is strong and reaffirmed the two nations’ mutual commitment to a combined defense as agreed in the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty to defend the ROK.
The leaders discussed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) recent missiles launches and emphasized the importance of increased cooperation to posture for and defend against omnidirectional threats. The Secretary reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence to the ROK utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. Both leaders committed to strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence posture by leveraging all available Alliance capabilities, including cyber and space capabilities.
The two sides pledged to continue coordination and cooperation toward their shared commitment to the complete denuclearization of and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, as well as their common objective to address the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The Minister and the Secretary stressed the importance of efforts to resume diplomacy and dialogue, and called for full implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions by the international community, including the DPRK. They reaffirmed their common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean, U.S.-DPRK, and multilateral commitments—such as the inter-Korean 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, the 2018 U.S.-DPRK Singapore Joint Statement, and the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement—are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. The leaders committed to supporting diplomatic efforts by maintaining combined readiness and international sanctions. Both leaders urged the DPRK to uphold its international agreements.
4. The Minister and the Secretary noted that the various measures carried out by the ROK and DPRK military authorities for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, Panmunjom Declaration, and the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) set conditions for easing tensions, reducing the threat of war and preventing accidental border clashes on the Korean Peninsula.
The Minister and the Secretary also shared a common understanding that the implementation of the CMA has effectively contributed to preventing accidental clashes on the Korean Peninsula.
Secretary Austin expressed support for robust inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation, and pledged to continue close coordination and cooperation between ROK and U.S. defense authorities on this matter.
5. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in maintaining and enforcing the Armistice Agreement. Both leaders reaffirmed that the UNC has contributed to the successful maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for 68 years, and that it will continue to carry out its mission and tasks with the utmost respect for ROK sovereignty.
The Minister additionally conveyed the ROK position that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating ROK and DPRK military forces and preventing military tension to date.
6. The Minister and the Secretary assessed that U.S. forces in the ROK have played a critical role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for more than 68 years, and reaffirmed that going forward, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) are to continue to play an important role in preventing armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Secretary Austin noted that the Indo-Pacific region is the Department of Defense’s priority theater, and reaffirmed the unshakable commitment of the United States to the combined defense of the ROK—as enshrined in the Mutual Defense Treaty. He also highlighted the U.S. commitment to maintain current USFK force levels in order to defend the ROK.
In particular, the Minister and the Secretary assessed that the ROK-U.S. Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) tabletop exercise (TTX) held at the 20th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue strengthened the Alliance combined deterrence posture and enhanced the Alliance’s ability to execute the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS).
The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. extended deterrent remains ironclad. He and the Minister pledged to enhance the Alliance combined deterrence posture through the TDS to more effectively account for advancing DPRK nuclear, other WMD, and missile threats.
Moreover, the Minister and the Secretary noted ROK efforts to establish the conditions for the stable stationing of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery at Camp Carroll and committed to continuing close cooperation toward the final goal of routine and unfettered access.
7. The Minister and the Secretary received a report on the results of the ROK-U.S. MCM from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) Commander, General Paul J. LaCamera. On this basis, the leaders pledge to maintain Fight Tonight readiness, enhance combined defense capabilities, and update relevant operation plans (OPLANs). They also assessed that there was significant progress in effectively responding to a variety of security challenges following changes to the strategic environment.
8. On this basis, the Minister and the Secretary approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) to guide Alliance planning efforts—which reflects changes to the strategic environment. The Minister and the Secretary assessed that the updated planning guidance will guide military OPLANs to more effectively deter—and as necessary respond to—DPRK threats to the U.S.-ROK Alliance.
9. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the need to continue to conduct combined exercises and training events on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen Alliance readiness. Both sides assessed that the 21-1 and 21-2 Combined Command Post Trainings (CCPT), despite the COVID-19 pandemic, were conducted successfully in compliance with social distancing measures. They also assessed that in addition to CCPT, other combined training events performed throughout the year in a balanced manner added strength to the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture and military readiness. Both leaders pledged to closely cooperate to conduct both CCPTs in 2022, noting that they are critical component of maintaining Alliance readiness. The two sides assessed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance must continue to focus on military readiness and on the combined defense posture to address dynamic changes on the Korean Peninsula.
10. The Minister and the Secretary emphasized that continuous training opportunities for USFK are critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture. The Secretary and the Minister concurred in the importance of communication and cooperation between the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) and USFK to coordinate for more effective and productive joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for the USFK training required to maintain readiness within our strong combined defense posture. The two leaders also committed to continued cooperation toward the development of a combined joint multi-purpose live-fire training complex.
11. The Minister and the Secretary expressed appreciation for the CFC, which has played a central role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and defending the ROK since its establishment in 1978. The Minister and Secretary reviewed preparations for—and acknowledged joint efforts towards—the relocation of the CFC Headquarters (HQ) to Camp Humphreys.
The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed that the CFC HQ relocation to Camp Humphreys will contribute to enhanced combined operational capabilities and a strengthened combined defense posture, and pledged to closely cooperate in order to complete the relocation by next year.
12. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the progress on directed tasks from the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP). The two sides noted progress made in the COTP and discussed the way forward for wartime operational control (OPCON) transition to the Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC)
The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before the wartime OPCON is transitioned to the F-CFC. The Minister and the Secretary pledged to conduct a Full Operational Capability (FOC) assessment of the F-CFC in 2022.
In parallel, the two leaders committed to complete the comprehensive joint study on COTP capabilities as well as the annex and appendix rewrites to COTP Change 1 by the Spring 2022 Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. They also pledged to complete a ROK-U.S. bilateral assessment on ROK critical military capabilities and Alliance comprehensive response capabilities against DPRK nuclear and missile threats by the 54th SCM.
13. The Minister and the Secretary acknowledged that progress has been made toward meeting the conditions for wartime OPCON transition through ROK-U.S. joint efforts. Minister Suh emphasized that he will systemically and actively pursue the critical military capabilities necessary for wartime OPCON transition, while continuously expanding defense capabilities of the ROK military that are necessary for leading the future combined defense. Secretary Austin reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to bridging capabilities—until the ROK acquisition of these capabilities are completed—as well as enduring capabilities consistent with the COTP. Furthermore, the two leaders noted that the ROK plans to acquire and develop critical military capabilities, and decided to closely coordinate on ROK acquisitions plan for these capabilities.
The two sides committed to engage in regular evaluation and review of progress in OPCON transition implementation at the annual SCMs and MCMs in order to maintain a steadfast combined defense system.
14. The Minister and the Secretary decided to continue strengthening cooperation in various areas, including space and cyber, in order to ensure an effective response to emerging threats and to bolster comprehensive Alliance response capabilities. The Secretary and the Minister concurred that developing and cooperating in new domains will enhance the Alliance’s combined defense posture against a range of adversary threats.
The Minister and the Secretary acknowledged the efforts of the respective defense authorities working to promote critical infrastructure, including information and space systems, and to improve the security of such systems. The two leaders expressed their shared vision of fostering closer cooperation in high-tech domains such as cyber and space.
The two sides pledged to explore measures to strengthen space capabilities as an Alliance through the Space Cooperation Working group and the associated ROK-U.S. space policy joint study. This includes exploring means of improving space situational awareness information-sharing systems, and expanding bilateral and multilateral combined exercises and training events to improve the Alliance space operation capabilities. They also committed to exploring opportunities to develop Alliance space professionals.
The two sides committed to maintaining close communication and coordination regarding the cyber domain—including the Cyber Cooperation Working group scheduled to meet in February 2022—in order to share trends of cyber threats and discuss corresponding policy updates. They also pledged to progressively develop cooperation and exchanges between the respective cyber commands with the aim of discussing and promoting mutual interests.
15. The Minister and the Secretary pledged to continue exchange activities between ROK-U.S. consultative bodies that address defense research and development, as well as industrial cooperation, capability acquisition, lifecycle logistics, and technology security, and concurred on the necessity to advance Alliance priorities in the areas of capability development, interoperability, acquisition, and sustainment.
The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to prioritize revisions of bilateral consultative bodies in order to strengthen efficacy and timeliness of cooperation in areas of defense industries and research and development. The two leaders reaffirmed that ROK-U.S. science and technology cooperation has expanded in various domains such as space, quantum, sensor/electronic warfare, cyber defense, artificial intelligence, automation, and directed energy. They also pledged to seek cooperative measures in the area of 5G and next-generation mobile communications (6G). The two sides assessed that such cooperation is continuing to develop in a way that furthers ROK-U.S. mutual interests.
16. In consideration of complex regional and global security situation, the Minister and the Secretary pledged to continue promoting defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the world where mutual interests align, in order to better respond to regional and global security challenges. In this context, the two leaders committed to seeking cooperation between ROK’s New Southern Policy and the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of the rules-based international order and adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight. They further expressed their intent to work together for that purpose. Additionally, the Minister and the Secretary acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as reflected in the May 2021 Joint Statement between President Biden and President Moon. They also reaffirmed support for Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture.
The two leaders decided to promote human rights and the rule of law both at home and abroad. They jointly condemned violence by the Myanmar military and police against civilians, and committed to continuing to press for immediate cessation of violence, the release of political prisoners, and a swift return to democracy. They called on all nations to prohibit arms sales to Myanmar.
The two sides highlighted their commitment to the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and pledged to work together towards the success of the upcoming UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Seoul. They also reiterated their commitment to efforts including counter-piracy operations, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, regional security cooperation initiatives, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Minister Suh expressed appreciation for the COVID-19 vaccine that the U.S. Government provided to the ROK military this year, and lauded this as a manifestation of the robustness of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The two sides committed to continuing close cooperation to address this global pandemic. Moreover, Minister Suh noted the close communication and coordination by the U.S. Department of Defense to actively support the ROK government’s “Operation Miracle,” during which Afghans who assisted the ROK Government, as well as their families, were transported to the ROK. Minister Suh expressed appreciation to the U.S. Government and all U.S. service members for their dedicated support in realizing humanitarian values.
17. Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for the ROK’s dedication and contribution to various global security efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
The Minister and the Secretary applauded the ROK-U.S. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) efforts to enhance the Alliance’s combined response capabilities to prevent the acquisition and use of WMD, and, if necessary, to respond to mitigate WMD threats.
They resolved to continue strengthening cooperation to enhance CWMD capabilities through measures including ROK-U.S. Counter WMD Committee (CWMDC) and U.S. DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which have enhanced Alliance CWMD capabilities.
18. The Minister and the Secretary assessed that trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, the United Sates, and Japan remains critical to regional stability, and committed to continuing trilateral defense cooperation such as information-sharing, high-level policy consultation—including the defense trilateral talks (DTT) and Trilateral Defense Ministerials—combined exercises, and personnel exchanges to achieve the complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to advance the peace and security of Northeast Asia.
19. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed that expedited USFK base relocations and land returns, including those of the Yongsan Garrison, are in the interest of both countries and pledged to work together closely on relevant matters, including environmental conditions and security requirements, to ensure timely base returns in accordance with the ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
In particular, the two leaders reaffirmed that both sides will seek to return considerable portions of Yongsan Garrison by early 2022, following ROK construction of appropriate security fencing. The two sides also pledged to pursue the return of sections of Yongsan Garrison no longer in use by the United States that can be returned, when all required transfer and force protection actions are complete.
The Minister and the Secretary applauded that various measures were discussed through SOFA channels, and pledged to continue discussion on relevant issues through the established processes of the ROK-U.S. SOFA Joint Committee.
20. Secretary Austin emphasized that the ROK is contributing toward ensuring a stable stationing environment for U.S. forces in Korea, and offered his appreciation for consent to the ratification of the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) by the ROK National Assembly. Furthermore, the two leaders assessed that the SMA has greatly contributed to the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. combined defense capabilities.
21. Minister Suh and Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for the courtesy, hospitality, and work by both sides that contributed to the success of this year’s SCM. The Minister and the Secretary both affirmed that the discussions during the 53rd SCM and the 46th MCM contributed to substantively strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance and further developing the bilateral defense relationship into a comprehensive and mutually-beneficial Alliance. Both sides expect to hold the 54th SCM and 47th MCM in Washington, D.C., at a mutually convenient time in 2022.
2. Korea National Diplomatic Academy chancellor urges end of war announcement
Comments from Scott Harold and me below. We pushed back on the EOW declaration.
But this is the kind of thinking that puts the security of the ROK at great risk and will drive a wedge in the alliance (playing right into the hands of Kim Jong-un):
During a press briefing with Washington correspondents after the seminar, Chancellor Hong said large-scale joint military drills by South Korea and the U.S. next spring should be postponed if negotiations with the North resume.
Korea National Diplomatic Academy chancellor urges end of war announcement
Posted December. 02, 2021 07:46,
Updated December. 02, 2021 07:46
Korea National Diplomatic Academy chancellor urges end of war announcement. December. 02, 2021 07:46. lightee@donga.com.
“The next summer will be very dangerous without the announcement of the end of the Korean War,” said Chancellor Hong Hyun-ik of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) during his visit to the U.S. on Tuesday. He also argued that the ROK-U.S. joint military training should be postponed next year if negotiations with North Korea resume.
“North Korea will wait and see until the 2022 Beijing Olympics in February and the presidential election in South Korea in March but not after that,” said Hong at a seminar on the projection of the U.S.-North Korea relations held by Woodrow Wilson Center, a think tank in Washington, D.C. “The U.S. should give a true opportunity to North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons,” he added. “It is President Moon Jae-in’s proposal to announce the end of the Korean War as the first step toward it.”
“North Korea sees the U.S. as an unreliable country with many words but no actions,” said Hong, asking for the U.S.’s accountability. The North has expressed its willingness to close its Punggye-ri nuclear test site and stop mid- to long-range missile launches but the U.S. has not taken any corresponding actions. “We need to make North Korean leader Kim Jong Un into Mikhail Gorbachev who led the reform and opening of Russia. But we might be actually turning him into”
Many leaders of national research institutes on unification, foreign affairs, and security in South Korea called for the announcement of the end of the war but academics in Washington and think tank leaders expressed concerns or criticism. “The end of the war announcement carries risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and the U.S., which can lead to a devastating end,” said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
“If South Korea pushes for the end of the war announcement too much, it can be damaging to the relationship between South Korea and the U.S.,” said Scott Harold, a senior fellow at RAND Corporation. “Complimenting North Korea for not launching a missile is like complimenting someone for not killing anybody today,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, reminding the audience of the fact that North Korea’s missile launches are banned by the U.N. sanctions against the country.
During a press briefing with Washington correspondents after the seminar, Chancellor Hong said large-scale joint military drills by South Korea and the U.S. next spring should be postponed if negotiations with the North resume.
3. Canada spots ship-to-ship transfers, North suspected
north Korea continues to aggressively evade sanctions. There is a strong coalition of Japan, the ROK, the US, and other partners such as Canada, Australia, the UK and more working out of a maritime operations center in Yokosuka to monitor north Korea sanctions evasion activities (which are conducted with the complicity of China and Russia).
Wednesday
December 1, 2021
Canada spots ship-to-ship transfers, North suspected
The North Korean oil tanker Sae Byol was tracked to a location 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) off the coast of Shandong Peninsula, eastern China, on Nov. 23. [VOA]
The U.S. State Department on Monday called for North Korea to abide by United Nations Security Council resolutions and re-enter denuclearization talks following media reports of Canada spotting numerous ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea involving North Korean vessels.
Canada has observed at least 24 ship-to-ship transfers and over a hundred “vessels of interest” in the waters off China’s eastern coast, particularly near the Shandong Peninsula, possibly abetting North Korean efforts to thwart sanctions since mid-October.
In a press briefing Monday, State Department spokeswoman Jalina Porter urged the North to obey sanctions when asked about the ship-to-ship transfers, which the North is likely conducting to obtain oil and other embargoed goods.
Porter also called on the international community to present a united front in pressuring Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile weapons tests, abide by Security Council resolutions and engage in negotiations with Washington to find a way out of the nuclear impasse on the Korean Peninsula.
In a possible prod at China – the main purchaser of the North’s exports and its main lifeline of vital supplies -- Porter added that international sanctions on North Korea remain in force, and that the United States calls on all United Nations member states to carry out enforcement of Security Council resolutions.
China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The Canadian observations of ship-to-ship transfers came not long after the British warship HMS Richmond also spotted “multiple ships of various nationalities” conducting similar activities in the East China Sea.
Illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels flying the flags of other countries have long been a method employed by Pyongyang to evade sanctions.
However, the latest United Nations report on North Korea noted that the country’s exports of coal and other commodities that are subject to sanctions have continued at a “much reduced level” compared to previous reporting periods, likely due to the North’s border closures as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In response to its position on the ship-to-ship transfers likely being conducted by the North, the South Korean Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that the government is “closely watching adherence to Security Council resolutions” and “will continue to work towards securing the international community’s close cooperation so that the resolutions are carried out.”
The Foreign Ministry’s statement did not mention North Korea by name.
While South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong in September suggested easing sanctions on the North as way to induce it back to the negotiating table, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden said repeatedly that it will meet North Korea without pre-conditions to discuss denuclearization,
James Kim, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, noted that while the Biden administration understands Seoul's stance towards Pyongyang's illicit activities and “tries not to highlight differences between the two allies’ approaches to the North,” he said that a continued divergence in their tone regarding the North could have a “negative influence on the U.S.-South Korea alliance.”
4. US, SKorea to bolster alliance at talks amid NKorean nuke threats, challenges from China
US, SKorea to bolster alliance at talks amid NKorean nuke threats, challenges from China
The U.S.-South Korea alliance “is the linchpin of peace and security in this region,” Austin tweeted after landing.
But how substantially the alliance, sealed in the bloodshed of the 1950-53 Korean War, can be solidified is in doubt as South Korea remains locked in thorny historical disputes with Japan — another key American regional ally — and hesitates to actively join U.S.-led efforts to curb China’s rising strength.
“The alliance faces some obstacles. It’s not desirable for the South Korea-Japan history issue and other problems to work as obstacles” in South Korea’s national security, said Moon Seong Mook, a retired South Korean army general and analyst at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.
The meeting Thursday between Austin and his South Korean counterpart, Suh Wook, comes after the Pentagon released the results of a global posture review earlier this week. The review directs additional cooperation with allies and partners to deter “potential Chinese military aggression and threats from North Korea,” while informing Austin’s approval of the permanent stationing of a previously rotational attack helicopter squadron and artillery division headquarters in South Korea.
Boo Seung-Chan, a spokesman at South Korea’s Defense Ministry, said Tuesday the U.S. decision to permanently deploy the helicopter and artillery units was proof that both countries highly value their alliance.
Some experts said the alliance was at risk in recent years as then-President Donald Trump threatened to withdraw the 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea if Seoul failed to drastically increase its financial support for them, and repeatedly complained of the cost of regular military drills with South Korea.
After his landmark first summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018, Trump baffled many by unilaterally announcing the suspension of major summertime military drills between the U.S. and South Korea, calling them “very provocative” and “tremendously expensive.”
But such worries have gradually eased since Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, said he would restore Washington’s alliances throughout the world.
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A host of scenarios could push China and the United States into some kind of conflict.
In Thursday’s meeting, the allies are expected to announce a strengthening of their ties and the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, Moon said. Although such announcements aren’t something new, Moon said it would still “discomfort North Korea, which basically aims to drive a wedge between South Korea and the U.S.” amid stalled nuclear disarmament talks.
South Korea has been struggling to strike a balance between the U.S., its most important security ally, and China, its biggest trading partner. South Korea suffered economic retaliation from China after allowing the U.S. to install a missile defense system in its territory in 2017 which Beijing views as a security threat.
“Washington is also looking for Seoul to do more beyond the (Korean) peninsula, which would involve trilateral cooperation with Japan despite tensions over history, and contributing to Asia’s maritime security despite objections from China,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Seoul’s Ewha University.
5. N.Korea's Kim warns of 'very giant struggle' next year to boost economy
Or this could be read as a giant struggle for regime survival while the people continue to experience extreme deprivation and hardship.
N.Korea's Kim warns of 'very giant struggle' next year to boost economy
Author of the article:
Reuters
Hyonhee Shin
Publishing date:
Dec 01, 2021 • 14 hours ago • 1 minute read •
Article content
SEOUL — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has said the country must be prepared for a “very giant struggle” next year to continue to make progress in areas including defense, agriculture and construction, state media reported on Thursday.
Kim made the remarks on Wednesday at a meeting of the central committee of the ruling Worker’s Party’s politburo, which decided to hold a plenary meeting of the committee next month.
N.Korea's Kim warns of 'very giant struggle' next year to boost economy Back to video
Kim said that while the country still faces economic difficulties, the party has had success in pushing to meet policy targets and implementing the five-year economic plan https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-politics-idUSKBN2A82KQ he unveiled early this year, the official KCNA news agency said.
“It is very encouraging that the positive changes were made in the overall state affairs including politics, economy, culture, and national defense as evidenced by the stable management of the state economy and big successes made in the agricultural and construction sectors,” Kim said.
“Next year will be an important one as we should wage a very giant struggle as much as we did this year,” he said.
Kim has sought to boost the economy and power supply with his plan, but U.N. agencies have said food and electricity shortages remain, exacerbated by sanctions imposed over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters.
North Korea has not confirmed any coronavirus cases, but has closed borders and imposed domestic travel restrictions and other measures, apparently to control or prevent an outbreak. (Reporting by Hyonhee Shin Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)
6. S.Korea, US agree to update war plans against growing N. Korean threats
Key points:
South Korea and the US also decided to conduct the assessment of Seoul’s Full Operational Capability during next year’s Combined Command Post Training in a move to take further steps to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea.
But notably, Seoul and Washington will carry out the test next fall, not during the term of the Moon Jae-in government, which has pledged to complete wartime OPCON transfer by May 2022.
The test is the second stage of assessing the South Korean military’s capabilities to command the future combined defense system in three phases. South Korea and the US completed the first stage in 2019, but the two countries have only conducted a rehearsal for the second stage mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
But South Korea’s defense official said it is too early to predict when Seoul will complete the process of retaking wartime OPCON.
S.Korea, US agree to update war plans against growing N. Korean threats
Postponed assessment to transfer OPCON to Seoul to begin next fall
Published : Dec 2, 2021 - 16:48 Updated : Dec 2, 2021 - 18:09
South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook (R) and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (L) at a joint press conference right after the 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on Dec. 2.
South Korean and US defense chiefs on Thursday agreed to update war plans against Pyongyang’s growing missile and nuclear threats and to conduct a long-postponed assessment required for Seoul to regain wartime operational control, or OPCON, next fall.
The announcement comes after South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin hosted the 53rd Security Consultative Meeting the same morning in Seoul.
Secretary Austin said Seoul and Washington discussed measures to enhance the US-South Korea “combined deterrence posture and to defend against a full range of threats” at a news conference following the security meeting.
New operational war plans
Notably, the defense chiefs approved a new Strategic Planning Guidance, which is the foundation for updating operational plans, the South Korea-US joint statement said.
Seoul and Washington will write new operational war plans reflecting “changes to the strategic environment,” with the aim to “more effectively deter — and as necessary respond to — DPRK threats to the U.S.-ROK Alliance.”
During the news conference, Austin said the approval of the SPG is an “important step forward to frame forthcoming alliance planning,” explaining that both sides shared the assessment that Pyongyang’s advanced missile and nuclear capabilities are “increasingly destabilizing for regional security.”
Thursday’s announcement is significant as South Korea and the US will write new war plans to replace or supplement the current OPLAN 5015 after 11 years.
Seoul and Washington previously agreed on the SPG on developing OPLAN 5015 in 2010 on the occasion of the 42nd SCM. Years later, the operational plan was officially signed by the two countries in 2015.
A three-stage process of devising the new OPLAN will take years. Specifically, the South Korean and US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will devise the Strategic Planning Directive as a follow-up measure. Then, the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command will write new war plans.
In a closed-door briefing, a South Korean defense official, who wished to remain anonymous, said both sides agreed to announce the fresh SPG after a yearslong consultation, pointing out that Washington suggested updating war plans.
The official added that it is unclear whether the fresh OPLAN will supplant or supplement OPLAN 5015 that has not been updated since 2015. Previously, OPLAN 5015 replaced OPLAN 5027, which was first established in 1974, on the assumption that Seoul would regain wartime OPCON by 2015.
OPCON transfer, FOC assessment
South Korea and the US also decided to conduct the assessment of Seoul’s Full Operational Capability during next year’s Combined Command Post Training in a move to take further steps to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea.
But notably, Seoul and Washington will carry out the test next fall, not during the term of the Moon Jae-in government, which has pledged to complete wartime OPCON transfer by May 2022.
The test is the second stage of assessing the South Korean military’s capabilities to command the future combined defense system in three phases. South Korea and the US completed the first stage in 2019, but the two countries have only conducted a rehearsal for the second stage mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
But South Korea’s defense official said it is too early to predict when Seoul will complete the process of retaking wartime OPCON.
The assessment is only one among three conditions for the wartime OPCON transition as stipulated in the bilaterally agreed transition plan. And the South Korean military should pass the second-stage FOC test to demonstrate core capabilities to lead the combined defense posture.
Indo-Pacific strategy, China challenge, Taiwan
At the security meeting, South Korea and the US committed to developing the alliance “in a mutually reinforcing and future-oriented manner.”
Washington affirmed its commitment to defend South Korea, including the provision of extended nuclear deterrence.
The joint statement restored the clause that reaffirms its commitment to maintaining the current level of personnel of the United States Forces Korea in order to “defend” South Korea. It was previously removed last year under the Trump administration.
Seoul and Washington also notably discussed how the alliance contributes to stability throughout the Indo-Pacific region, although the SCM joint statement did not make direct mention of China.
In the joint statement, “Secretary Austin noted that the Indo-Pacific region is the Department of Defense’s priority theater.”
Specifically, Seoul and Washington committed to promoting military cooperation between the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy and aligning their regional strategies.
Austin and Suh also reaffirmed the significance of the “rules-based international order and adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight.”
In the context, the SCM joint communique took note of the “importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” echoing the Biden-Moon joint statement in May.
This is the first time that the SCM joint statement makes reference to Taiwan, but the defense official said Suh and Austin did not discuss Taiwan-related issues at the meeting. Nonetheless, it is still noteworthy given that the Moon Jae-in government has maintained its strategic ambiguity amid the growing US-China rivalry.
Thursday’s announcement is in line with the Biden administration’s global posture review, which called for enhancing cooperation with allies and partners in maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific region and responding to challenges by China and North Korea.
The SCM also comes at a critical juncture as the Biden administration is in the process of drafting key strategy documents including a national security strategy and a nuclear posture review, which is expected to be completed early next year.
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
7. Korea, U.S. vow to update outdated war planning
Is the war plan "outdated?" If we have to "fight tonight" that is the war plan we will be going to war with.
Thursday
December 2, 2021
Korea, U.S. vow to update outdated war planning
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, left, and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook hold a joint press conference following the allies 53rd annual security consultative meeting at the Defense Ministry in Yongsan District, central Seoul on Thursday. [YONHAP]
The United States and South Korea will update their joint wartime strategy for the first time in 11 years to factor in North Korea's enhanced nuclear and missile weapons capabilities, the two countries' defense chiefs announced Thursday.
The announcement of a new strategic planning guidance (SPG) by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook came at a joint press conference that followed the allies’ 53rd annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at the Defense Ministry in Yongsan District, central Seoul on Thursday.
Current wartime operation plans (Oplans) 5027 and 5015 were drawn up in 1974 and 2010 and have faced criticism for being outdated in the face of recent developments in the North’s weapons programs, which are now believed to include nuclear arms, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles.
Oplan 5027 details the allies’ strategy to defend and counter-attack in case of a North Korean land invasion, while 5015 details over 700 targets in North Korea for pre-emptive strikes should hostilities break out.
However, Oplan 5015 focuses largely on neutralizing conventional attacks, which have diminished in importance as the North’s arsenal of nuclear arms and advanced missiles have grown.
The new SPG, which will authorize the allies to carry out a war plan written by the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), will incorporate the combined military capabilities of the United States and South Korea to respond to the North's use of either nuclear or conventional weapons.
In addition to the decision to adopt a new SPG, the defense minister and secretary agreed to conduct a full operational capability (FOC) assessment in 2022 for the pending transfer of wartime operational control (Opcon) to South Korea.
The FOC is the second phase of a three-part verification process to determine if South Korea is ready to lead the allies’ combined forces in wartime.
Although President Moon Jae-in wanted to accomplish the Opcon transfer before the end of his term next May, the scheduling of the FOC assessment for next year – following a long delay due to the Covid-19 pandemic – will likely leave the third and last part of the verification process, a full mission capability assessment, unfulfilled before he leaves office.
South Korea has not held wartime Opcon since the 1950-53 Korean War, when it handed all operational control over its troops to the U.S.-led United Nations Command. Opcon was subsequently transferred to the U.S.-led CFC when the command was launched in 1978.
The country regained peacetime Opcon in 1994, but the United States retains wartime operational control.
The Opcon transfer was previously set for 2015 but was pushed back in 2014 as North Korea escalated its nuclear and missile weapons tests.
Another notable change in this year’s SCM joint statement was the mention of Taiwan, which has emerged as a sensitive issue and potential flashpoint in U.S.-China tensions in recent months.
Both Suh and Austin noted the importance of maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, hinting at an expanding scope of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to cover the wider region beyond the Korean Peninsula.
The mention of Taiwan in the SCM joint statement suggests that Washington is working to build support from its regional allies against China, which considers the island a renegade province and has vowed to use force to unify it with the mainland if it attempts to declare independence.
The joint statement by Suh and Austin also re-affirmed the U.S. commitment to maintaining its current number of 28,500 troops in South Korea.
Last year’s SCM statement did not mention the U.S. troop level amid disputes between South Korea and the administration of President Donald Trump over cost-sharing.
The defense minister and secretary also pledged to cooperate on the relocation of the CFC’s headquarters to the U.S. Army base Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, by next year.
Following his meeting with Suh, Austin met with Moon at the Blue House in the afternoon.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. Korea joins diplomats for high-level talks with the Taliban
Korea is a player on the global stage.
Thursday
December 2, 2021
Korea joins diplomats for high-level talks with the Taliban
Korean Ambassador to Afghanistan Choi Tae-ho joins a group of 16 ambassadors and representatives for a meeting with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban government led by acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in a hotel in Doha, Qatar, on Wednesday. [TALIBAN’S FOREIGN MINISTRY]
Korea joined a group of diplomats from over a dozen countries for another round of high-level talks with Afghanistan's new Taliban government in the Qatari capital of Doha Wednesday.
Korean Ambassador to Afghanistan Choi Tae-ho attended the meeting between acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and a group of 16 ambassadors and representatives from countries including the United States, Britain, Japan, Australia, Germany and Canada, along with a European Union official, said a diplomatic source Thursday.
The foreign envoys discussed human rights, humanitarian assistance and other issues in talks that lasted around three hours.
This marks the second such meeting by a senior Korean diplomat with the interim Afghan government since the Taliban's takeover of the Western-backed Afghanistan in early August.
Officials from the South Korean embassy in Afghanistan evacuated from the country after the Taliban’s takeover and have moved to a temporary office in Doha.
Choi previously took part in a similar meeting between a group of diplomats from 14 countries and the Taliban on Oct. 27.
Diplomatic sources said the latest talks were a bit more concrete than the previous one.
Korea and the other countries focused on issues such as countering terrorism, providing humanitarian aid, and guaranteeing the rights and education for women in Afghanistan.
Muttaqi was said to have stressed that corruption has decreased and public security has stabilized after his government gained power. However, he emphasized that frozen assets must be released for the country’s economy to run smoothly.
The Taliban has pushed for the release of more than $9 billion in Afghan central bank assets frozen by the U.S government after its takeover of Afghanistan.
The U.S. State Department after two-day talks with Taliban representatives said last Thursday that Washington “remains committed to ensuring that U.S. sanctions do not limit the ability of Afghan civilians to receive humanitarian support from the U.S. government and international community while denying assets to sanctioned entities and individuals.”
The Taliban’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi tweeted after the meeting Wednesday, “The delegates reiterated that humanitarian and health support should be provided to Afghanistan and that problems should be resolved through dialogue.”
He said they discussed security, humanitarian, economic, political and health issues facing Afghanistan.
The Korean government announced Monday it will provide Afghanistan humanitarian aid worth $32 million through international organizations to help people in urgent need of food and health care services.
The fund will be delivered through United Nations agencies to provide food, shelter and health care services for Afghans, prioritizing children and women in a more vulnerable situation, according to Seoul’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Korea also pledged to direct some funds to emergency assistance for Afghan refugees in neighboring countries including Iran and Pakistan, and vowed to continue contributions to help resolve the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
The ministry noted that 95 percent of Afghans are suffering from food insecurity according to the UN World Food Programme, and 97 percent of the population are expected to live below the poverty line by 2022, according to the UN Development Programme.
In late August, Korea airlifted a group of 390 Afghans who have either made special contributions to Korean government humanitarian aid projects or were embassy staff, and their family members, out of the war-torn country in an evacuation plan codenamed “Operation Miracle.”
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
9. People in parts of Yanggang Province no longer have access to tap water
We are going to see deprivation, hardship, and suffering on a scale that is hard for us to imagine.
People in parts of Yanggang Province no longer have access to tap water
Citing COVID-19, the authorities have also stopped people from gathering water at the banks of the Yalu River
A view of Hyesan, in North Korea’s Yanggang Province. / Image: Daily NK
North Koreans living in parts of Yanggang Province, including Hyesan, have not had access to tap water since mid-November, a source in the province told Daily NK yesterday.
“While tap water was not available due to power outages in the past, it’s very rare for tap water to be unavailable for such a long time,” he said.
The source explained that tap water has usually been supplied to residents of Hyesan once or twice a month. From mid-November, however, there has not been enough water supplied for people to do laundry or even to drink.
North Korean elites – the 5-10% of the population classified as government cadres and donju, or wealthy entrepreneurs – have long resorted to buying bottled water instead of relying on the country’s tap water system.
Ordinary North Koreans, meanwhile, typically use tap water for cooking and drinking. Consequently, the cutoff of tap water is a serious problem for people in the country.
“[People] are complaining about the issue, but the relevant government agency is simply emphasizing the [country’s poor] electricity situation and the fact that it is winter,” the source said, adding, “[The agency] is avoiding the issue by telling people to ‘endure things a little longer.’”
Before the shuttering of the North Korea-China border last year, Hyesan residents went down to the Yalu River at times designated by the authorities to gather drinking water or do their laundry. The closure of the border, however, has led to an end of this practice.
“Getting water is just as important as acquiring food,” the source said. “The authorities, however, are not taking any measures to improve the water shortage situation.”
10. N. Korea’s Ministry of Social Security actively employs discharged soldiers to maintain social order
Note the photo at the link: Are these "auxiliaries wearing "brown shirts?"
N. Korea’s Ministry of Social Security actively employs discharged soldiers to maintain social order
For example, in Chongjin, auxiliary squads have now been enlarged to 15 to 20 men
With public discontent rising in North Korea due to the country’s economic difficulties, the Ministry of Social Security is focusing its complete attention on maintaining social order and stability.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on Monday, the State Affairs Commission — North Korea’s highest executive organ — ordered the Ministry of Social Security late last month to stop criminals “who destroy social order.”
Noteworthy is that the order called for party organizations to supplement Ministry of Social Security organs with squads composed of discharged soldiers to keep watch over people’s activities at night. It also called on party authorities to actively mobilize personnel from the paramilitary Worker-Peasant Red Guards for night time patrols.
Relatedly, the Ministry of Social Security ordered its provincial, city and county branches to bolster the size of auxiliary squads largely composed of discharged soldiers.
In fact, in the case of the ministry’s district branches and neighborhood police boxes in Chongjin, the auxiliary squads had been five to 10 men, but have now been enlarged to 15 to 20 men. That is to say, they have been supplemented with discharged soldiers between the ages of 25 and 35, as well as with ordinary young people.
In this undated file photograph, a group of North Korean security officers are seen at a park in Wonsan, Kangwon Province. / Image: Daily NK
However, discharged soldiers made up a considerable number of the new recruits. The ratio of discharged soldiers to ordinary young people was, generally speaking, nine to one or eight to two.
Moreover, recruits reportedly underwent strict screening during the selection process to ensure they met the authorities’ standards, with screeners looking at their military service and current circumstances. The authorities mostly chose earnest individuals who follow the rules.
The squads — commonly called ttaettu — are usually mobilized to bolster various crackdowns among ordinary people, including those involved in street commerce. Essentially, the authorities are making active use of the squads to draw public ire away from the Ministry of Social Security and Ministry of State Security.
The squads also leverage their own authority as much as they can to earn money during their crackdowns, even if it is just enough for a pack of smokes. Naturally enough, few North Koreans welcome the enlargement of these squads, the source said.
The source further reported that most of the recently recruited squad members are trained discharged soldiers “who unconditionally followed orders in the military.” He said a growing number of locals are expressing anxiety at news of the squads growing larger, complaining that the squads will “take even more” from them.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
11. Moon’s end of war proposal faces multitude of challenges
President Moon faces targets on a 360 degree firing range.
Excerpts:
Moon revived the issue, which had remained dormant since the failed 2019 US-North Korea summit -- at the United Nations in September. Since then, Seoul and Washington have discussed the issue, and are reportedly close to completing the declaration’s text.
However, the matter remains far from simple, as the North demands the US first end its “hostile policy against North Korea,” which the US is unlikely to accept.
When Moon first brought up the issue, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, agreed it would be a good idea, but said the hostile US policy against North Korea and unfair double standards must be withdrawn first -- presumably relieving sanctions or suspending joint military training.
The proposal also faces opposition in the South, as well as the US.
Moon’s end of war proposal faces multitude of challenges
Time running too short to untangle complicated interests of all parties
Published : Dec 2, 2021 - 14:59 Updated : Dec 2, 2021 - 18:26
President Moon Jae-in (Yonhap)
President Moon Jae-in hopes to declare the end of the Korean War during his term, but such a declaration without corresponding denuclearization does not guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula and time is too short to untangle complicated interests of all involved parties, experts say.
Moon revived the issue, which had remained dormant since the failed 2019 US-North Korea summit -- at the United Nations in September. Since then, Seoul and Washington have discussed the issue, and are reportedly close to completing the declaration’s text.
However, the matter remains far from simple, as the North demands the US first end its “hostile policy against North Korea,” which the US is unlikely to accept.
When Moon first brought up the issue, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, agreed it would be a good idea, but said the hostile US policy against North Korea and unfair double standards must be withdrawn first -- presumably relieving sanctions or suspending joint military training.
The proposal also faces opposition in the South, as well as the US.
Ban Ki-moon, former secretary-general of the United Nations, said Tuesday the declaration would weaken security posture on the Korean Peninsula and give Pyongyang an excuse to claim the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. He said denuclearization should come first.
“Real peace is more important than a formal declaration of war or a peace agreement,” said Shin Beom-chul, director of the Center for Diplomacy and Security at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.
In order to do that, North Korea should start the denuclearization process, conduct practical exchanges with the South and build trust. In the process, the North’s security concerns should be resolved step by step, he said.
“As these negotiations (for real peace) proceed, an end-of-war declaration is needed in the process. But there is no guarantee for such a peace process right now,” he said.
The US is also in a difficult position to participate in the discussion actively.
If the declaration is made, it will inevitably bring about changes in the current US armistice system and the status of the UN Command that supervises it.
Asked about the end-of-war declaration, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said in a press briefing on Oct. 27, “We (South Korea and the US) may have a somewhat different perspective on the exact order, timing and conditions of each action.”
The gap in Seoul and Washington’s view was apparent in the meeting between First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in Washington on Oct. 16. While Korea’s Foreign Ministry said the peace process and communications on the Korean Peninsula, including the declaration of the end of the war, is being conducted thoroughly, the US counterpart did not mention the declaration. Instead, it said the two discussed a joint promise for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
“Biden is being criticized in the US for his foreign policy and is hitting the lowest approval ratings of his presidency in the low 40 percent range,” said Park Won-gon, a professor in the department of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
He added that Kim Jong-un is “probably the most unpopular person in America,” and that it would not be easy for Biden to hold a meeting with Kim.
The China variable
China’s willingness to intervene is another variable.
China has been unhappy about being excluded in the discussion between the US and South Korea over the peace talks and it has expressed dissatisfaction to South Korea in various ways against the issue, Park said.
Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming said in a local media interview last month, “China is a signatory to the armistice agreement. That’s why it’s right to discuss anything with China.”
Seoul’s national security adviser Suh Hoon, meanwhile, was set to meet with Beijing’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi on Thursday to talk about South Korea-China relations and Korean Peninsula issues. He could ask for China’s cooperation in drawing the North back to the negotiation table. They are expected to discuss ways to declare the end of the war in the wake of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Ahead of Suh and Yang’s meeting, China and North Korea met to coordinate related issues.
China’s cooperation is needed to draw favorable responses from North Korea to the end-of-war declaration. However, the possibility of the US boycotting the Beijing Olympics has complicated matters for Moon Jae-in.
Since Biden mentioned a potential “diplomatic boycott” of the Beijing Winter Olympics on Nov. 18, the UK and Australia have hinted at joining. European Union countries, Japan, Canada and New Zealand are also involved in the discussion.
The US is likely to openly demand the participation of its allies in the call for a diplomatic boycott, citing democracy and human rights.
Cheong Wa Dae has not made an official statement about a boycott.
“When most Western countries boycott, it is hard for Korea not to follow it. Otherwise, there will be consequences that Korea should encounter,” Shin said.
Some experts, including Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, however, believe the talks on the end-of-war declaration should proceed whether it occurs during Moon’s tenure or not.
“North Korea sympathizes with the push for an end-of-war declaration. And, the push for the declaration could catalyze denuclearization,” Yang said.
“The discussion is symbolic and if Moon’s administration fails to do it, the next government can push for it. It is meaningful that Korea leads the end of the war.”
Key presidential candidates are sharply divided on the North Korea policy.
Lee Jae-myung, presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea, said the declaration of the end of the war itself should not be prevented for any political reason. He said, “The state of war on the Korean Peninsula must be ended quickly for any reason.”
The main opposition People Power Party’s presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol has opposed the declaration, saying if a political declaration with only the end of the war is made separate from denuclearization, the consequences would be severe.
“If the end of the war is declared first, the UNC is likely to be neutralized and the rear base of the UN office in Japan is also likely to be neutralized,” he said. “It is highly likely to give the international community the wrong signal.”
12. Top S. Korean, Chinese officials meet amid Seoul's push to declare formal end to Korean War
Excerpts:
Asked about the prospects of discussions on the declaration, Suh replied the two sides will hold overall discussions.
The two sides "will discuss bilateral relations in general, as next year marks the 30th anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties," Suh told reporters.
Suh is expected to brief Yang on Seoul's latest efforts to formulate the declaration with Washington. He could also ask for China's cooperation in drawing the North back to the negotiation table.
Suh and Yang could also discuss President Moon Jae-in's possible visit to Beijing for the Winter Olympics in February. Seoul is believed to be considering the Olympics as a possible venue for declaring an end to the war.
(LEAD) Top S. Korean, Chinese officials meet amid Seoul's push to declare formal end to Korean War | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES paras 1-2 as talks begin; ADDS remarks in paras 6-8, photo)
TIANJIN, China, Dec. 2 (Yonhap-Joint Press Corps) -- South Korea's national security adviser Suh Hoon held talks with a top Chinese Communist Party diplomat in China's eastern city of Tianjin on Thursday, as Seoul steps up diplomatic efforts to declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
Suh and Yang Jiechi, head of the Chinese Communist Party foreign affairs, are expected to discuss a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including Seoul's push for an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula and supply chains of key industry materials.
The Korean War, in which South Korea and a U.S.-led United Nations Command fought against invading North Korean forces backed by China, ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.
The Moon Jae-in administration believes an end-of-war declaration will help revive stalled peace talks with North Korea.
China is believed to have expressed its willingness via diplomatic channels to join an end-of-war declaration as one of the signatories to the 1953 armistice agreement.
"The two nations have worked together to achieve the joint goals of the complete denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. I expect closer cooperation to maintain the peninsula situation in a stable manner and to move forward a peace process," Suh said in his opening remarks.
Suh expressed gratitude for China's cooperation with regard to the recent supply crunch of urea solution, a key fluid needed in diesel cars to cut emissions, and voiced hope for close consultations down the road to prevent any recurrences.
Yang stressed the importance of and need for close, strategic communications between the two nations, saying that Beijing seeks to further enhance bilateral ties so as to contribute to peace and development in the region and beyond.
Asked about the prospects of discussions on the declaration, Suh replied the two sides will hold overall discussions.
The two sides "will discuss bilateral relations in general, as next year marks the 30th anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties," Suh told reporters.
Suh is expected to brief Yang on Seoul's latest efforts to formulate the declaration with Washington. He could also ask for China's cooperation in drawing the North back to the negotiation table.
Suh and Yang could also discuss President Moon Jae-in's possible visit to Beijing for the Winter Olympics in February. Seoul is believed to be considering the Olympics as a possible venue for declaring an end to the war.
(END)
13. Why Can’t the Japanese and Koreans Get Along?
I don't understand Mr.Bandoww's criticism here.It appears to me there has been more trilateral engagement in the past 11 months than is normal in recent hsitory I think the administration is making an effort to "moderate" the ROK-Japan relationship. But that relationship can only improve if the ROK President and Japanese Prime Minster agree to put their national security and national prosperity first and pledge to work on the historical issues without those issues impacting national security and prosperity.
Why Can’t the Japanese and Koreans Get Along?
Perhaps the Biden administration should moderate relations between its two squabbling allies.
Another year is about to pass as a critical diplomatic stalemate continues. Some people had hoped that the recent political changes would jumpstart diplomatic talks, but so far there has been little movement. What can be done in the coming year to move diplomacy forward between Japan and South Korea?
Tokyo recently swapped one Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime minister for another. Newly installed Fumio Kishida is a “dove” within the LDP system, who, reported Kookmin University’s Yeo Hyun-jun, has “demonstrated significant interest in the Korean Peninsula, unlike his hawkish predecessors.” This triggered an upsurge of South Korean speculation that Tokyo might make the peninsula a priority.
So far, however, Japan has paid little attention to Korean issues. That is hardly surprising given current circumstances. Kishida took longer than usual for a new Japanese premier to call Seoul, but he and Moon did speak on October 15.
By their accounts, it was a correct if non-substantive conversation. Kishida said that he termed bilateral relations as being in a “difficult situation” and “strongly called for an appropriate response” on the highly combustible issue of wartime compensation. Meanwhile, Moon offered the anodyne: Relationships between the two countries are experiencing difficulties due to several issues, but I think that we can overcome them together if we have the will and make efforts.
If only it was that easy.
History hangs heavy over Northeast Asia. Although the behavior of none of the ancient states would meet modern standards, Japan was the most recent wannabe hegemon and deployed brutal force to advance its ends. Tokyo’s defeat of China in 1895 effectively left the Korean peninsula to Imperial Japan, which eventually turned Korea into a colony and treated Koreans accordingly. Out of World War II came the two most significant controversies: coerced labor and forced prostitution.
Of course, there is no excuse for Tokyo’s behavior, but that conflict was filled with horrific conduct—mass murder, barbaric warfare, concentration camps, ruthless aggression, organized looting, mob rape, and so much more. South Koreans endured much but consider what the Japanese army visited upon the residents of Nanjing, China. And how conquered peoples and prisoners-of-war were treated. Nazi Germany’s crimes were even greater. Tragically, there is no way to make so many victims of so much whole.
Moreover, the perpetrators are almost all dead. The leaders and organizers, certainly, are beyond the reach of human justice. A few foot soldiers might live on, but would have to be in their 90s, well on their way to their cosmic reward. Demands for apologies and compensation now fall on younger generations, who bear neither moral nor practical responsibility for what transpired.
Equally important, the victims, too, have largely passed away. Nothing diminishes the evil nature of the crimes committed and injustices done. However, those who deserve compensation are mostly gone. Rewarding the heirs of the departed with funds from the heirs of those responsible is an arbitrary wealth transfer that rests upon political, not moral, grounds.
Yet it is this controversy that causes two close U.S. allies to treat each other as adversaries, or close.
In theory, Seoul and Tokyo put the issue behind them with the 1965 normalization of relations, which included a significant aid package from Japan, reparations in all but name. That was sufficient during the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, who had served in the Japanese army, which positioned him for later service in the South Korean military. The issue still festered, however, and in 2015 the Republic of Korea—whose president, Park Geun-hye, was his daughter—reached an agreement over the ongoing controversy regarding the World War II “comfort women,” most of whom were forced into prostitution by the Japanese military.
However, the battle erupted again in the courts as South Koreans conscripted to make arms and provide sex sued Japanese companies and the Japanese government. The Moon administration stood aloof from the controversy, claiming that it could not influence the courts while privately applauding the outcome. With judges threatening to seize and sell the property of Japanese firms, Tokyo imposed trade sanctions. The Republic of Korea responded by suspending a trilateral pact, known as the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which provided for intelligence-sharing. Under pressure from Washington Seoul reinstated the agreement but refused to compromise on the broader issue.
This is where the controversy remains, even as U.S. and South Korean negotiations with North Korea stalled and American relations with the People’s Republic of China tanked.
“This crisis has left Tokyo-Seoul relations at the worst state in decades,” according to an op-ed written by Yeo Hyn-Jun and published by NK News.
However, nothing is likely to change, at least in the near term. The South Korean presidential election is just months away. Moon has two priorities: aiding his party’s candidate to succeed him and reviving talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. His interest in conducting discussions with Japan over historical issues, and especially making concessions as part of any negotiations, is minimal. Nor would he or his party’s majority in the National Assembly be inclined to make an unpopular deal with the presidency up for grabs in March.
Japan is even less likely to address the issue. “A cursory look at Japanese media indicates a major decline of interest in Korean Peninsula issues,” Yeo said. Angry over what Tokyo sees as the Moon government’s repudiation of prior settlements of historical issues, the former is prepared to wait. “Japanese society and the country’s political class have come to a near consensus opinion: No improvement of relations with the ROK is possible unless Seoul formally changes its position,” Yeo said.
What amounts to disinterest runs more broadly. Ironically, though Tokyo remains fearful of North Korea, Japanese interest in the peninsula has waned. During summit-mania when the DPRK’s Kim Jong-un met with China’s Xi Jinping, South Korea’s Moon Jae-in, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin as well as Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apparently also hoped to arrange a summit. However, since then Pyongyang has retreated from international diplomacy and the PRC has moved to the forefront of Japan’s strategic considerations. At this stage, little return is expected from dealing with the North. So the entire peninsula appears to have been assigned a secondary interest.
The best hope for change rests upon the upcoming Republic of Korea election. Japan is a minor concern but has been addressed by both candidates. Ruling party candidate Lee Jae-myung appears to disdain any accommodation with Tokyo. He advocated “two-track approaches” that would encourage economic ties while taking a strong stand on historical and territorial controversies—essentially Moon’s approach, which Japan decisively rejected. Lee also targeted Tokyo after winning his party’s nomination, pledging to adopt policies so the ROK “overtakes Japan, catches up with advanced countries, and finally leads the world. We will make Korea.” These sentiments will not endear him to Tokyo.
The opposition candidate, Yoon Seok-yeol, offered more hope of compromise. He made a mandatory pledge of playing tough—taking an “assertive stance”—on matters of history and territory. However, he pointed to better relations during the Kim Dae-jung presidency. And he said Japan shared “liberal democracy and free-market” values with the South. Whether and how Tokyo would respond is unknown, but Yoon appears more likely to press for a breakthrough.
The Biden administration should do its best to moderate relations between its two squabbling allies. Future threats from China and North Korea are more important than past grievances from South Korea and Japan.
Moreover, Washington should make clear that America’s military presence in both countries is not forever. They do not require permanent support, and the U.S. cannot afford to keep them as permanent military dependents. They will be better prepared for the inevitable drawdown if they work together. And the sooner they begin, the smoother the process will be.
Image: Reuters
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
