Quotes of the Day:

 “All history proves that there is no cheap and easy way to defeat guerrilla movements” 

- Henry Kissinger, 1962

"We thought that the dispatch of American forces to any of these threatened areas would, in fact, be self-defeating. The idea of strategic bombing as a weapon against communist infiltration and subversion would have been strange to us. What seemed to us desirable was to stimulate and encourage the rise of indigenous political resistance to communist pressures in the threatened countries. We believed that unless the people and governments of those countries operating through their own political systems, could be induced to pick up the great burden of this load, success was not likely. For us to attempt to carry that burden would have effects — such as the paralysis of local initiative and responsibility, or the negative impact which a great foreign presence inevitably has on the natives of a country — which would tend to defeat the purpose of the undertaking." 

- George Kennan, 1967

“The very massiveness of our intervention actually reduced our leverage. So long as we were willing to use U.S. resources and manpower as a substitute for Vietnamese, their incentive for doing more was compromised.”  

- Komer, Bureaucracy At War. 

1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: December

2. Biden Says He Is Willing to Talk to Putin About Ukraine, With Conditions

3. China brings in ‘emergency’ level censorship over zero-Covid protests

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 1

5. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (01.12.22) CDS comments on key events

6. Dave Johnson tribute essay published on The RAND Blog

7. Russia 'open' to talks on Ukraine but presses demands after Biden comment

8. Is the Army Misplacing the Blame for Its Recruiting Crisis?

9. Pentagon eyes major expansion of Ukraine military training

10. Why Russia’s cyber-attacks have fallen flat

11. Congress wants to arm Taiwan, but hasn’t figured out how to pay for it

12. Russia and China are Training Their Bombers Together. Why?

13. Americans Support U.S. Backing Ukraine, Despite Risk of Wider War, Survey Finds

14. Targeting Tiandy - The Case for Blacklisting a Chinese Tech Firm Tied to Crackdowns on Uyghurs and Iranian Protestors

15. The cost of war (Russia)

16. To deter Russia, EUCOM official stresses 'threat-informed' exercises

17. Just Half of Americans Trust the Military, Survey Finds

18. China easing 'zero-COVID' policy a 'rare display of weakness' from Xi Jinping, Tiananmen Square protester says

19. Blank paper movement shows Xi backlash: analysts

20. Xi Broke the Social Contract That Helped China Prosper

21.  Can America Really Envision World War III?

1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: December

December 1, 2022 | FDD Tracker: November 2, 2022-December 1, 2022

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: December

David Adesnik

Senior Fellow and Director of Research

John Hardie

Russia Program Deputy Director

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/12/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-december/?utm

fdd.org · · December 1, 2022

Trend Overview

Edited by David Adesnik and John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

In Iran, anti-regime protests continued into their third straight month despite the death of hundreds at the hands of security forces. The Biden administration has condemned this crackdown but refuses to endorse the protesters’ demand for an end to 40 years of clerical dictatorship. Nor will the White House rule out a resumption of talks with Tehran to revive some version of the 2015 nuclear deal.

The authoritarian regime in Beijing is also weathering a wave of protests sparked by its draconian efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The Biden administration offered tepid words of support for the protesters but appears to remain focused on reducing friction with Beijing. The Kremlin still controls the streets in Moscow but had another bad month in Ukraine, where Kyiv’s forces retook the strategic regional capital of Kherson with help from American and NATO weapons. Among the fraternity of anti-American autocrats, Kim Jong Un seemed most confident, testing a pair of intercontinental ballistic missiles, on one occasion with his nine-year-old daughter in tow.

Will December prove to be another rough month for America’s adversaries? Check back with us at the beginning of February, since the Tracker is taking off at the end of this month for the holidays. However, before we head out, we will be publishing a special year-end retrospective in mid-December that breaks down where the Biden administration has done well and where it has faltered in 2022.

Trending Positive

International Organizations

By Richard Goldberg

Trending Neutral

China

By Craig Singleton

Cyber

By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Jiwon Ma

Defense

By Bradley Bowman

Europe

By John Hardie

Indo-Pacific

By Craig Singleton

Iran

By Richard Goldberg and Behnam Ben Taleblu

Korea

By David Maxwell

Latin America

By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi

Russia

By John Hardie

Syria

By David Adesnik

Trending Negative

Gulf

By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Israel

By David May

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker

Sunni Jihadism

By Bill Roggio

Turkey

By Sinan Ciddi

Trending Very Negative

Lebanon

By Tony Badran

2. Biden Says He Is Willing to Talk to Putin About Ukraine, With Conditions

"Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

-John f. Kennedy

Biden Says He Is Willing to Talk to Putin About Ukraine, With Conditions

nytimes.com · by Zolan Kanno-Youngs · December 1, 2022

Showing a united front during a state visit, President Biden and President Emmanuel Macron of France affirmed their support for Ukraine ahead of a cold winter that will test the alliance.

Video player loading

WASHINGTON — Standing beside the French leader who has championed the need for dialogue with Moscow, President Biden said on Thursday that he would talk to President Vladimir V. Putin, but only in consultation with NATO allies and only if the Russian leader indicated he was “looking for a way to end the war.”

Mr. Biden’s public expression of conditioned willingness to reach out to Mr. Putin gratified French officials and provided unexpected support for President Emmanuel Macron’s outreach. Mr. Biden noted that Mr. Putin had shown no interest yet in ending his invasion, but said that if that changed, “I’ll be happy to sit down with Putin to see what he has in mind.”

Evidently determined to present a united front during a White House news conference that at times resembled a love fest, Mr. Macron said that France would increase its military support for Ukraine and “will never urge Ukrainians to make a compromise that will not be acceptable for them.”

In effect, the two leaders met each other halfway, with Mr. Biden showing more openness to a negotiated settlement and Mr. Macron more unequivocal support for the Ukrainian cause. If partially choreographed, the meeting of minds appeared to exceed expectations on both sides.

It was a significant show of trans-Atlantic unity on the eve of a winter that will put immense strain on the Ukrainian people, as well as pressure on Western economies, especially European states scrambling to find new sources of energy as prices rise sharply.

French officials said that during a three-hour closed meeting, Mr. Biden and Mr. Macron agreed that more Ukrainian battlefield gains would constitute important leverage in any talks with Moscow. In practice, the idea of negotiation seems far-fetched at a time when Mr. Putin has nothing he can call victory, and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, has military momentum.

“I’m not going to do it on my own,” Mr. Biden said of the possibility of talking to Mr. Putin, whose actions in Ukraine he called “sick.”

Mr. Macron was effusive in his support of Ukraine and its right to recover its full sovereignty, and there was no hint of his earlier calls for the need to avoid “humiliating” Russia. “If we want sustainable peace, we have to respect the Ukrainians to decide the moment and the conditions in which they will negotiate about their territory and their future,” Mr. Macron said.

The very friendly tone of the two leaders throughout reflected the ease they have established in several previous meetings. The two leaders, oozing camaraderie, referred to each other as “my friend,” “Emmanuel” and “Dear Joe,” throughout the day.

Mr. Biden hosted Mr. Macron, the leader of America’s oldest ally, for a day of elaborate pomp that began with an arrival ceremony.

Later, at a lunch in Mr. Macron’s honor at the State Department, Antony J. Blinken, the secretary of state, laid out the broader significance of the war in Ukraine. Declaring the post-Cold War era over, he said the world was “in a global competition to define what comes next.” In that struggle, he said, the United States and France stood shoulder to shoulder in the defense of liberty and democratic societies.

Mr. Macron responded by couching the struggle in Ukraine as one that the United States and France could only feel as part of “our souls and our roots,” in that it involved “fighting for liberty and universal values.”

His tone was strikingly different from the one he had chosen on Wednesday, when he sharply criticized Mr. Biden’s signature Inflation Reduction Act for potentially “killing” European jobs through its massive subsidies for green manufacturing, suggesting that this was a policy that could “fragment the West.”

Such fragmentation of the alliance as the war enters its 10th month is precisely what Western leaders are most concerned about avoiding.

Mr. Macron’s criticism was sharper than Biden administration officials had expected on the first day of Mr. Macron’s state visit, the first accorded to a foreign leader by the Biden administration.

But showing some muscle in the United States is a near necessity for French presidents, who like to say that the mark of the strength of America’s oldest alliance is its capacity to accommodate even marked differences at times.

Mr. Macron warned Wednesday of “commercial hostility that could break out in the next several weeks, and we do not need that. What we need is to go hand in hand” — a process the French call “synchronization.”

Today, the French president’s concerns seemed to have evaporated as, once again, each leader stretched to accommodate the other’s preoccupations.

Mr. Biden said he made “no apologies” for the Inflation Reduction Act and its billions of dollars in government funding for green energy initiatives. But he appeared eager to ease the French concerns, saying that the bill had “glitches” that could be solved. “There’s a lot we can work out,” he said.

Of the law that provides tax credits for U.S. automakers that manufacture electric vehicles, among a host of other measures, Mr. Biden said “it was never intended to exclude folks who are cooperating with us.”

Mr. Macron also moderated his previous criticisms, saying he had told Mr. Biden of the need to “re-synchronize” their economic partnership to “succeed together.”

The combination of the war in Ukraine and the need to transition to carbon-neutral economies to fight climate change has placed great pressure on European economies.

The warmth of the two presidents toward each other, and more broadly in celebrating what Mr. Blinken called the “unwavering” friendship between the two countries, came just 14 months after relations collapsed in vitriolic recrimination over a deal Mr. Biden reached with Britain to help Australia build nuclear-powered submarines.

Because the deal scuttled an earlier French contract to supply conventional submarines, France saw an “Anglo-Saxon” plot against its interests. Mr. Macron briefly recalled his ambassador to France but relations quickly began to warm again after Mr. Biden called American actions “clumsy.”

In a joint statement, the United States said it would support France’s maritime deployments in the Indo-Pacific region and both nations committed to working with China on combating climate change. Here again, past differences seemed to fade as the two leaders agreed to “coordinate on our concerns regarding China’s challenge to the rules-based international order.”

Mr. Macron has in the past suggested the United States was too confrontational toward China and that Europe must carve out a more measured position to ensure, among other things, that Russia not fall into the Chinese camp.

The two leaders also said they would focus on the need to bolster Europe’s defense capability.

“The presidents recognize the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense that contributes positively to trans-Atlantic and global security and is complementary to and interoperable with NATO,” the statement from Mr. Macron and Mr. Biden said.

This was an evident concession to Mr. Macron’s overriding conviction that Europe must establish “strategic autonomy,” even if the war in Ukraine and America’s decisive role in providing much-needed weapons to Kyiv have shown that the goal remains a chimera for now. There is no European army.

“Having the U.S. strongly supporting the Ukrainians in that time is very important not just for Ukrainians, but for the stability of our world today,” Mr. Macron said.

For today, autonomy was clearly off the table. On the table at a black-tie state dinner under a tent on the South Lawn of the White House were lobster, caviar and even American cheese (a test of the open-mindedness of the French) in celebration of a relationship in which, as Mr. Biden said, there may be “slight differences, but never in a fundamental way.”

nytimes.com · by Zolan Kanno-Youngs · December 1, 2022

3. China brings in ‘emergency’ level censorship over zero-Covid protests

PSYOP and influence professionals can hopefully learn useful lessons from the Chinese TTPs.

China brings in ‘emergency’ level censorship over zero-Covid protests

​

Crackdown on virtual private networks, which protesters used to access banned non-Chinese news and social media apps​

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · December 2, 2022

Chinese authorities have initiated the highest “emergency response” level of censorship, according to leaked directives, including a crackdown on VPNs and other methods of bypassing online censorship after unprecedented protests demonstrated widespread public frustration with the zero-Covid policy.

The crackdown, including the tracking and questioning of protesters, comes alongside easing of pandemic restrictions, in an apparent carrot and stick approach to an outpouring of public grievances. During an extraordinary week in China, protests against zero-Covid restrictions included criticism of the authoritarian rule of Xi Jinping – which was further highlighted by the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin.

Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin dies at 96

Read more

Leaked directives issued to online Chinese platforms, first published by a Twitter account devoted to sharing protest-related information, have revealed authorities’ specific concerns about the growing interest among citizens in circumventing China’s so-called “Great Firewall”. The protests have been strictly censored, but protesters and other citizens have this week used VPNs to access non-Chinese news and social media apps which are banned in China.

The directives, also published and translated by the China Digital Times, a US-based news site focused on Chinese censorship, came from China’s cyberspace administration, and announced a “Level I Internet Emergency Response, the highest level of content management”.

It ordered managers to take a “hands-on approach” and strengthen content management to rapidly identify, deal with and report information about what it termed “offline disturbances” and “recent high-profile events in various provinces”.

Jiang Zemin obituary

Read more

“The incident on November 24 triggered expressions of various grievances,” it said, according to CDT’s translation and in reference to the Urumqi building fire which killed 10 people.

“Pernicious political slogans appeared in Shanghai; college and university students held conspicuous political gatherings; smears by foreign media increased; and various websites have strengthened their content management.”

It noted upcoming dates during which managers should take particular care, including the one-week anniversary of the fire, World Human Rights Day, and International Anti-Corruption Day. They also ordered e-commerce platforms to “clean-up” the availability of products and apps and “harmful content” designed to circumvent internet restrictions, like VPNs and firewall-circumventing routers.

Protesters and residents who want to air grievances about the zero-Covid policy or other aspects of life in China have been playing a cat and mouse game with censors this week. The death of 96-year-old Jiang Zemin, announced on Wednesday, provided one avenue for some to creatively express dissatisfaction with Xi.

Flower bouquets placed by mourners seen outside Zemin’s former home in the eastern city of Yangzhou. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

Jiang left a mixed legacy. Elevated to leader of the Chinese Communist party during the Tiananmen protests and massacre in 1989, Jiang oversaw the subsequent crackdown, as well as repression of Falun Gong practitioners. He also shepherded China out of the international isolation that followed 1989, grew the country’s economy, and led it into greater international participation. He was also much more outwardly expressive, and participatory with media, in stark contrast to the notoriously closed-off Xi.

Under the increasingly authoritarian and globally isolated rule of Xi, young people have in recent years begun to look on the Jiang era more fondly.

More than half a million commenters flooded state broadcaster CCTV’s post on the Twitter-like platform Weibo within an hour of his death being announced, many referring to him as “Grandpa Jiang”.

“Toad, we blamed you wrongly before; you’re the ceiling, not the floor,” said one since-censored comment using a popular and mildly affectionate nickname for Jiang. In retirement, Jiang became the subject of lighthearted memes among millennial and Gen Z Chinese fans, who called themselves “toad worshippers” in thrall to his frog-like countenance and quirky mannerisms.

Some internet users had social media accounts suspended after they shared a song, titled “unfortunately it’s not you”. The word “unfortunately” in Chinese is “ke xi”, while “you” translates to “ni” – a reference to Winnie-the-Pooh which is itself a banned reference to Xi Jinping. Another popular post saw a book about Jiang, titled “He changed China” altered to say “He changed it back”, with “he” a common reference for Xi as naming him in criticism can attract swift punishment.

On Thursday, hundreds of people gathered in Jiang’s home town in the eastern city of Yangzhou to pay their respects to the former Chinese leader on Thursday evening, leaving a thick pile of bouquets around the perimeter of his former residence.

A roadside flower seller said she had “lost count” of the number of chrysanthemums – Chinese funeral flowers – she had sold on Thursday.

Reporters with Agence France-Presse witnessed people queueing to lay them against the grey stone wall of the traditional house, with some bowing and saying brief prayers.

“He was a great, patriotic and positive leader,” Li Yaling, a woman in her late 60s, told AFP in Yangzhou. “We admired him greatly, and feel loss and nostalgia now he’s gone.”

Security personnel at the site politely but firmly moved groups of mourners quickly down the narrow alley past the historic building in an apparent attempt to avoid people gathering. There is a tradition in China of using public mourning gatherings for past leaders to express discontent with the current regime.

A group of women carry chrysanthemums to pay their respects to the former Chinese leader. Photograph: Isaac Lawrence/AFP/Getty Images

In recent days there has been a distinct shift in messaging form officials and state media, regrading the pandemic. Officials appear to have stopped or at least reduced referencing the “dynamic zero Covid” policy by name. Lockdowns have lifted in major cities, even where relatively high case numbers are still being reported. The lower severity of Omicron compared to previous virus strains is being publicly discussed and emphasised for the first time.

Commentaries in the official state news outlet, Xinhua, on Friday urged greater individual responsibility around mask-wearing, hand washing, ventilation, and reduced gatherings. They also emphasised the need to protect vulnerable groups, and for local authorities to be faster at re-opening targeted lockdowns.

“Given that risks can be managed, what should be managed must be managed well, and there should also be relaxation when appropriate,” it said according to a translation by China analyst Bill Bishop.

Additional research by Chi Hui Lin

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · December 2, 2022

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 1

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1

Key Takeaways

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued to make incremental gains around Bakhmut and to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures and move personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest.
• Evidence persists regarding the continuation of partial mobilization in the face of low morale and high desertion rates amongst Russian troops.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation.
• Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian financial and legal spheres.
• Russian forces continued to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in support of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 1

Dec 1, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1

Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 1, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine by claiming that NATO is preparing to attack Belarus. Lukashenko blamed Ukraine and NATO for a growing number of provocations near the Belarus-Ukrainian border and stated that Ukraine is trying to drag NATO forces into the war.[1] Lukashenko stated that Belarusian officials managed to deter a potential adversary from using military force against Belarus and that NATO is building up forces and intensifying combat training in neighboring countries.[2] The Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin stated that there is no direct preparation for war and that Belarus will only defend its territory.[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that there are no signs of the formation of a strike group on Belarusian territory.[4] Lukashenko and Khrenin likely made the comments to bolster what ISW has previously assessed as an ongoing information operation aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces on the border with Belarus in response to the threat of Belarus entering the war.[5] Lukashenko and Khrenin also likely focused the information operation on supposed NATO aggression and provocative activities along the Belarusian border to suggest that the Belarusian military needs to remain in Belarus to defend against potential NATO aggression, and thus set informational conditions for resisting Russian pressure to enter the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian entry into the Russian war on Ukraine is extremely unlikely.

Key Takeaways

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued to make incremental gains around Bakhmut and to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures and move personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest.
• Evidence persists regarding the continuation of partial mobilization in the face of low morale and high desertion rates amongst Russian troops.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation.
• Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian financial and legal spheres.
• Russian forces continued to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in support of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population, specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian ground assaults near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove) and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces prevented a Ukrainian advance in the direction of Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[7] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Ukrainian forces anticipate that Russian forces will attempt to restart offensive operations in the Lyman direction to regain the initiative.[8] Hromov added that the Russians are building defensive lines in the Svatove and Lyman directions to prevent Ukrainian advances.[9] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) ambassador to Russia, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed that Ukrainian forces are transferring elite Ukrainian brigades to the Lyman and Kupyansk directions to prevent Russian advances.[10] ISW offers no assessment of this claim.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on December 1. The Russian BARS-13 combat reserve Telegram channel claimed that Ukrainian forces have increased ground assaults around the Kreminna area.[12] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack around Kreminna in the direction of Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[14] One Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces made significant advances southwest of Chervonopopivka and expressed concern over the possibility that Ukrainian forces may reinforce their lines in the area in order to push through Russian defenses there.[15] Another Russian source claimed that a Russian drone had detected Ukrainian forces in Zhytlivka on the R66 highway to Kreminna.[16] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are fighting in the western part of Bilohorivka, but did not provide evidence for this claim.[17] Hromov added that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian assaults on Dibrova, approximately 5km southwest of Kreminna.[18] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued artillery fire in this area.[19]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces likely continued to make marginal advances in the Bakhmut area amidst ongoing offensive operations on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; within 22km northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, and Bilohorivka; and within 14km southwest of Bakhmut near Opytne, Mayorsk, and Kurdyumivka.[20] Social media sources and a Russian milblogger posted photos on December 1 showing Russian forces south of Bakhmut in Kurdyumivka and Ozarianivka.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely control Andriivka (within 10km south of Bakhmut).[22] Geolocated footage posted on December 1 shows Ukrainian forces reportedly withdrawing from positions on the western side of the highway that runs through Opytne (within 4km south of Bakhmut).[23] A Russian milblogger published footage claiming to show Russian forces conducting offensive operations west of Kurdyumvka and claimed that Russian forces now control most of the Horlivka-Bakhmut highway.[24] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces could now interdict all roads in the Bakhmut direction.[25] CNN published a video report on December 1 in which Ukrainian military commanders in the Bakhmut area tell a correspondent that their forces are outnumbered and facing serious supply issues.[26] The Ukrainian military commanders also told the CNN correspondent that Russian forces are committing significant forces to assaults in the Bakhmut area and are suffering heavy casualties.[27] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian effort to take Bakhmut is a high-cost effort concentrated on a city of limited operational significance.[28]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 37km southwest of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Marinka, Nevelske, and Novomykhailivka, and within 6km northeast of Avdiivka near Kamianka.[29] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that the DNR “Sparta” and “Somalia” Battalions repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Vodyane.[30] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Novomykhailivka.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to fight in the western part of Marinka.[32]

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces maintain defensive lines on this front.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Volodymyrivka, Donetsk Oblast (within 43km southwest of Donetsk City).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[35]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures, build fortifications, and move personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces on the east bank are continuing to hold defensive lines and construct fortifications.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces decreased the number of personnel and equipment in Oleshky and redistributed personnel to positions along the highway between Oleshky and Hola Prystan (further away from the Dnipro River).[37] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are withdrawing equipment, weapons, and units from unspecified populated areas on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[38] Ukrainian General Staff Chief Deputy Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated that the Ukrainian command expects Russian forces to maintain their positions on the east bank and conduct local offensive operations to improve those positions, however.[39] Social media sources published footage on December 1 purporting to show Russian positions on the Nova Kakhovka dam lock.[40] The contradictory reporting on Russian military positions on the east bank in relation to the Dnipro River suggests that Russian forces are currently repositioning their forces in Kherson Oblast, but it is unclear exactly how.

Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes on Russian force concentrations and logistics. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 1 that Russian forces withdrew or are currently withdrawing personnel from Polohy, Myhailivka, and Inzhenerne in Zaporizhia Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian occupation officials in Burchak are conducting a census in preparation for future evacuation measures.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces in the previous days struck Russian force concentrations in Myrne, Tokmak, Inzhenerne, Polohy, Yasne, and Kinsky Rozdory in Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Russian forces may be withdrawing personnel from positions closer to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast to reduce the impact of increasing Ukrainian strikes on Russian manpower and equipment concentrations. The potential withdrawal from Polohy is particularly notable as the settlement lies at a critical road junction, and Russian forces would likely have a harder time defending Tokmak from potential Ukrainian operations without control of that junction. The withdrawal from a critical position may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend the entire frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast and are prioritizing where to concentrate forces. It is just as likely that Russian forces are reorienting their grouping in Zaporizhia Oblast and may move different personnel back into these settlements, however.

Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Hromov stated that Russian forces are concentrating reserves in northern Crimea to reinforce troops on the east bank in Kherson Oblast and in the direction of Orikhiv in Zaporizhia Oblast.[44] Hromov stated that Dzhankoy and surrounding settlements have become the largest Russian military base in Crimea due to the amount of Russian military personnel and equipment transfers and deployments.[45] Russian forces may be holding reserves to support these sections of the front in Ukraine in the expectation that Ukrainian forces may conduct offensive operations in these areas soon.

Ukrainian officials continued to acknowledge that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations on the Kinburn Spit on December 1. Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct operations on the Kinburn Spit and that Ukrainian forces have not yet liberated the area.[46] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian forces would be better able to conduct potential operations on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast from the Kinburn Spit.[47]

Russian forces continued routine missile and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, in western Kherson Oblast, and in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on December 1.[48] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol, Marhanets, and Kherson City.[49]

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest. A Russian source shared footage that shows Oleg Mikhailov, a deputy from the Russian Communist Party, proposing to increase the payments to veterans at a government meeting in Komi Republic, to a hostile audience of his United Russia party peers.[50] This event exemplifies the growing rift between Russian nationalist parties under increasing economic strain. The Financial Times also reported on November 29 on the growing disenchantment of Russian businesses, reporting that unnamed owners and executives of large Russian companies stated that they believe mobilization would have been handled better if entrusted to businesses rather than the government.[51] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported that more than 100 mobilized personnel from Moscow Oblast did not receive promised payments.[52] ASTRA reported that a unit stationed in Belarus related that of its 408 members, 108 did not receive any payments in October and 200 did not receive full payments.[53]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation. Western media reported on November 29 that the United States is considering designating Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization.[54] Prigozhin responded by claiming that Wagner does not fit the criteria of a terrorist organization, while the United States clearly does.[55] Prigozhin proceeded to tout Wagner’s successes by falsely claiming that the Wagner Group defeated the Islamic State in Syria, stopped the (nonexistent) “genocide” of Russians in the Donetsk People’s Republic, prevented Western-funded terrorists from staging coups in Africa, and, notably, won a trial against the United States in the District of Columbia concerning Russian interference in the 2016 elections.[56] A Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Wagner Group’s training facility in the Russian Federation is designed to provide an accelerated three-week training course for new members.[57] Russian sources shared video footage purportedly showing Wagner Group recruits training in Molkin, Krasnodar Krai, and in Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts, under the tutelage of experienced Wagner Group fighters.[58]

Russian sources provided more evidence for the continuation of partial mobilization. One Russian milblogger reported that Orenburg Oblast officials allocated one million rubles for a mobilization hotline from December 15, 2022, to January 31, 2023.[59] A Russian media source reported that a soldier who had a contract with the Russian MoD that expired in October was told she is required to work “until the end of mobilization.”[60] Another Russian media source reported that the Russian MoD stated that it did not support a State Duma bill on December 1 that would defer any candidates and doctors of science who work in universities or research institutions.[61] Russian media also reported that workers at the Chelyabinsk sugar factory received mobilization summonses on November 28 including non-Russian nationals.[62]

The Russian military continues to contend with low morale and high rates of desertion and refusals to fight among its forces. The Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces have had to reinforce multiple regiments in Kherson Oblast with more mobilized personnel due to the high number of deserters and mobilized soldiers who refuse to fight.[63] Hromov also added that Russian security forces have reported an increased number of deserters in Luhansk Oblast – many of whom are now attempting to cross the border back into Russia and are being detained by security services in the dozens.[64] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported that Russian forces have held around 90 of the mobilized personnel who refused to fight in Luhansk Oblast at Beryozka children's camp in the village of Makarove, Luhansk for over a month.[65] A Russian local media page in Magnitogorsk reported on November 29 that family members of Magnitogorsk mobilized personnel who refused to fight are appealing to the Prosecutor’s office in an attempt to keep their family members from returning to the front.[66] The media page stated that the military leadership abandoned Magnitogorsk mobilized personnel on the front, causing them to retreat from their positions but not desert them.[67] Hromov reported that Russian forces are continuing to inflict friendly fire upon themselves and stated that a Russian artillery unit shelled a position of the 1st Army Corps on the southwestern outskirts of Tsukura, Kherson Oblast, on November 24.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian financial and legal spheres. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov stated that occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast plan to pull Ukrainian hryvnias from circulation on January 1, 2023.[69] Rogov declared that all enterprises in Zaporizhia Oblast have until the end of 2022 to exchange their hryvnias for rubles.[70] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that only Russian federal legislation can regulate mobilization protocols including restriction of movement within the occupied Donetsk Oblast.[71] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that occupation authorities, by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order, are working to simplify the process for obtaining housing certificates for legal residents of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts who had sought refuge in Kherson City prior to Russian withdrawal from the city.[72]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to face administrative problems. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that half of the residential buildings in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are without heat, partly due to a lack of personnel and water supplies.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that the mass mobilization of men in occupied areas of Donbas ignited personnel shortages.[74] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevheny Balitsky reported that occupation officials in the Zaporizhia Oblast are giving residents free coal, presumably in an effort to resolve the heating issue.[75]

Russian forces are reportedly continuing to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure to support their war efforts throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that occupation officials are demanding money from Crimean teachers to sponsor the Russian war effort.[76] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces continue to use civilian facilities and abandoned homes across the occupied territories, and have set up a field hospital in a school in the Zaporizhia Oblast.[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://interfax(dot)com/newsroom/top-stories/85598/ ;

[2] https://t.me/modmilby/20425 ; https://t.me/modmilby/20426 ; https://...(dot)com/newsroom/top-stories/85598/

[4] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/sohodni-oznak-stvorennia-potuzhnoho-udarnoho-uhrupovannia-na-terytorii-bilorusi-nemaie-skibitskyi.html

[8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/;

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/;

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35150; https://t.me/synegubov/4911; https://t.me/millnr/9816 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9746; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35144; ... https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5722; https://t.me/milchronicles/1354

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[38] https://suspilne dot media/328982-sist-miljoniv-ukrainciv-bez-svitla-zelenskij-zaprosiv-maska-v-ukrainu-281-den-vijni-onlajn/

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[46] https://suspilne dot media/328982-sist-miljoniv-ukrainciv-bez-svitla-zelenskij-zaprosiv-maska-v-ukrainu-281-den-vijni-onlajn/

[51] https://www.ft.com/content/893b76bd-b58e-4ae4-a5d5-12d45d825cec ; http...(dot)com/istories/news/2022/11/30/skazhite-biznesu-chto-dlya-zashchiti-suvereniteta-nuzhno-300-tisyach-chelovek-dumaete-mi-ne-nashli-bi-dobrovoltsev/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/1800

[60] https://zona(dot)media/article/2022/11/30/contract; https://t.me/mediazzzona/10192

[61] https://kommersant-ru(dot)turbopages.org/kommersant.ru/s/doc/5694328; https://t.me/military_ombudsmen/731

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-obstrilyaly-svij-zhe-pidrozdil-zagynulo-14-mobilizovanyh/

[73] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/01/okupanty-zirvaly-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-shodu-ukrayiny/

[74] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/01/okupanty-zirvaly-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-shodu-ukrayiny/

[76] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/12/01/v-krymu-okupanty-vymagayut-vid-vchyteliv-skydaty-groshi-na-armiyu-rf/

understandingwar.org

5. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (01.12.22) CDS comments on key events

From the producers of he CDS brief:

Dear subscribers,

Please note that because of power outages in Kyiv (due to Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure), our briefs might be delayed or missing some parts you get used to.

This is the link for our questionnaire to improve our brief if you missed it https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSd43_kICW-ZB8SY-XiZLAzpYG5CMh6gkiBTKVa70Ox5aCGXWA/viewform?usp=sf_link 

Please find attached the CDS Daily Brief on Russia's war against Ukraine. 

CDS Daily brief (01.12.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

Russian troops again fired at the DTEK Energo enterprise. As a result, two employees of the DTEK Energo power plant were injured. Since February 24, DTEK Energo enterprises have already suffered 16 Russian terrorist attacks.

According to the Oblasts Military Administrations’ (OMAs) morning round-up, two civilians were killed in Ukraine as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation over the past day, and 6 more people were injured.

The army of the Russian Federation shelled seven regions of Ukraine. Consequences of enemy shelling as of the morning of December 1, reported by the OMAs:

•      The Russian military shelled Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast. At least six houses were damaged. In the morning, the center of Avdiyivka was subjected to massive artillery. In Bakhmut, 2 people were injured, and a house, a warehouse and an administrative building were damaged. There is one injured civilian in Torske, and a house was destroyed.

•      In the morning, the Russians shelled Kherson; the city was left without electricity. During the day, Russian troops shelled Kherson 12 times, resulting in one person being killed and another being injured.

•      In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the Russian occupiers shelled the civil infrastructure of the Polohy and Vasylivka districts during the last day.

•      In Kharkiv Oblast, the enemy shelled the border communities of the Kupyansk, Vovchansk and Lipetsk districts. Fires broke out in houses, outbuildings, and warehouses.

•      The Russians shelled the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast all day long with "Hrads" and heavy artillery. Several private houses, commercial buildings, gas pipeline, and power lines were damaged in the Chervonohryhorivka community. In the afternoon of December 1, the Russian occupiers shelled Nikopol again. A 56-year-old man was injured. Several high-rise buildings and power lines were mutilated in the city.

Another 50 Ukrainian defenders returned from Russian captivity. Among them are defenders of Mariupol and "Azovstal", POWs who were in Olenivka, wounded, in particular, in battles in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia directions. President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine has already returned 1,319 Ukrainian defenders from Russian captivity.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war with Russia, more than 14.5 million Ukrainian citizens have left Ukraine, and at least 11.7 million of these people have gone to the countries of the European Union, Dmytro Lubinets, the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights, informed. In addition, 4.7 million internally displaced persons are registered in Ukraine

Kyiv remains the target of Russian aggression, Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko said at the Kyiv Security Forum. "In Kyiv, where there were no military operations and no front line, 678 buildings

were destroyed, 350 of which were residential buildings. More than 150 people were killed, four of them children. We could never have thought that the city center would be shelled, and rockets would fall even on a children's playground."

Occupied territories:

In Mariupol, temporarily captured by the Russian military, an increase in morbidity and mortality among the civilian population is registered, reported Petro Andryushchenko, adviser to the Mariupol city mayor. He also noted that the average weekly number of deaths from natural causes reached the mark of 250 cases, which is 100 cases more than in October or a 1.7-fold increase in deaths in just the last two weeks. Earlier, he reported that currently, in Mariupol hospitals, patients are left in corridors without normal conditions; there are also almost no pharmacies in the city, so it is very difficult to get medicines.

The enemy has flooded the main pumping station of the Kakhovka Main Canal, and there is a threat that the south [of Ukraine] will remain without irrigation, deputy of the Kherson Regional Council Serhii Khlan confirmed. As reported by the Center for Journalistic Investigations with reference to the management of the Kakhovka Main Canal, on November 30, all the underground premises located below the water level were flooded at the main pumping station; these are four floors with a total height of 16 meters. According to experts, the ventilation system, drainage pumps, all ten central pumping units, and elevator shafts were flooded. Control cabinets are damaged. Electricity supply has been stopped throughout the territory of the Canal. Divers' access to the main pumping station building is required to understand the nature of damages and their elimination. However, the [Russian] occupiers have not allowed the employees to enter the territory. Military personnel from the so-called "DPR" and "LPR" are stationed there, as well as the new "leadership" of the Canal, appointed by the invaders.

Operational situation

(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 30) developments)

It is the 281st day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues striking civilian infrastructure objects, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, the laws and customs of war. The Russian military concentrates its main efforts on conducting offensive actions in the Bakhmut and Avdiyivka directions.

Over the past day, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka and Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast and Bilohorivka, Yakovlivka, Bakhmut, Kurdyumivka, Krasnohorivka, Kamianka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske and Maryinka in Donetsk Oblast.

In order to prevent the advance of the Defense Forces in the Svatove and Lyman directions, the enemy is carrying out engineering equipment of the defense line, redeploying personnel, ammunition, and fuel to equip new units and those that have suffered losses.

Over the past day, the enemy launched 2 rocket attacks on civilian objects in Komyshuvakha, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and carried out 41 airstrikes and 28 MLRS shelling of Ukrainian troops' positions and populated areas, including the city of Kherson. The Russian military shelled Seredyna Buda, Bachivsk, Bilopillya, Budky and Krasnopillya of Sumy Oblast; and Veterynarne, Kozacha Lopan, Vysoka Yaruga, Strilecha, Krasne, Starytsia, Ohirtseve, Budarky, Chuhunivka, Dvorichna and Zapadne of Kharkiv Oblast. The enemy continues to keep its troops in the border areas of the Belgorod region.

Russian military continues training its separate units at the training grounds of the Republic of Belarus. There is still a threat of the enemy carrying out missile strikes on the objects of the energy system and critical infrastructure throughout the territory of Ukraine.

During the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 17 strikes on the areas of concentration of enemy personnel, weapons and military equipment and four strikes on the positions of anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian units shot down a UAV (probably of the "Orlan-10" type).

Over the past 24 hours, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery have hit 7 areas of concentration of enemy personnel and anti-aircraft weapons, a fuel warehouse, and 5 other important military targets.

Kharkiv direction

• Topoli - Siversk section: approximate length of combat line - 154 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 23-28, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 5.5 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments (TR), 245th motorized rifle regiment (MRR) of the 47th tank division (TD), 6th and 239th TRs, 228th MRR of the 90th TD, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRBr) of the 6th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 27th SMRBr of the 1st Tank Army, 252nd and 752nd MRRs of the 3rd MRD, 1st, 13th, and 12th TRs, 423rd MRR of the 4th TD, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th SMRBrs of the 2nd CA Army, 35th, 55th and 74th SMRBrs of the 41st CA Army, 275th and 280th MRRs, 11th TR of the 18th MRD of the 11 Army Corps (AC), 7th MRR of the 11th AC, 80th SMRBr of the 14th AC, 76th Air assault division, 106th airborne division, 2nd, 3rd, 14th, 24th and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, military units of the 1st AC of so-called DPR, 2nd and 4th SMRBrs of the 2nd AC, PMCs.

The enemy is on the defensive. Russian troops shelled the areas of Kupyansk, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, Berestovka, Druzhelyubivka in Kharkiv Oblast and Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka, Makiivka and Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 144 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments (TR), 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th TR of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 51st and 31st separate airborne assault brigades, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade of Baltic Fleet, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiments of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy concentrates its primary efforts on conducting offensive actions. Russian troops shelled with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery the areas of Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, Vyimka, Bilohorivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Opytne, Klishchiivka, Pivnichne, Zalizne, New York, Avdiivka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka and Novomykhailivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRBr) of the 29th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 38th and 64th SMRBrs, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th CA Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 19th motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 58th CA Army, 70th, 71st and 291st MRRs of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CA Army, 136th SMRB of the 58 CA Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps (AC), 39th SMRB of the 68th AC, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st AC of the so-called DPR, and 2nd AC of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military is on the defensive. The enemy's artillery shelled the areas of Vuhledar, Bohoyavlenka, Prechystivka, and Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast; Zagirne, Orikhove, Novoandriivka, Mali Shcherbaky, and Plavni in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

The Russian occupation forces continue to use civilian facilities in the temporarily occupied territories. Thus, they set up a field hospital in a school in one of the settlements of Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

During November 28-29, the evacuation of wounded Russian personnel by a convoy of trucks and buses moving towards Melitopol was recorded.

Tavriysk direction

• Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

• Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms (CA) Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps (AC); 35th and 36th CA Armies; 3rd AC; 90th tank division; the 22nd AC of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade

of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and the 98th airborne division, and the 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigades of the Airborne Forces, 10th separate SOF brigade.

The Russian troops defend previously occupied lines. They fired with artillery and tanks at the towns and villages on the right bank of the Dnipro River. The enemy does not stop shelling Kherson and its suburbs.

A decrease in the number of Russian soldiers and military equipment is observed in Oleshky. Enemy troops withdrew from certain settlements of Kherson Oblast and dispersed in forest strips along the Oleshky - Hola Prystan road. The majority of these troops are mobilized Russian personnel.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to stay ready to carry out two operational tasks against Ukraine:

•      to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine by launching missile strikes from surface ships, submarines, coastal missile systems, and aircraft at targets in the coastal zone and deep into the territory of Ukraine and readiness for the naval amphibious landing to assist ground forces in the coastal direction;

•      to control the northwestern part of the Black Sea by blocking Ukrainian ports and preventing the restoration of sea communications (except for the areas of the BSGI "grain initiative") by carrying out attacks on ports and ships and concealed mine-laying.

The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and extend and maintain control over the captured territory and Ukraine's coastal regions.

The enemy has 7 surface ships at sea. There are no "Kalibr" cruise missile carriers among them.

In the Sea of Azov, the enemy continues to control sea communications, keeping 2 boats on combat duty.

At the same time, there are currently 9 enemy ships in the Mediterranean Sea, 5 of them carrying Kalibr cruise missiles, with a total salvo of 76 missiles. It is worth noting that the use of Kalibr missiles at targets in Ukraine from the Mediterranean Sea is impossible due to the need for the missiles to fly through the airspace of NATO countries (Turkey or Greece).

Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 18 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were deployed.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 01.12

Personnel - almost 89,440 people (+560);

Tanks - 2,915 (+1)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,877 (+5);

Artillery systems – 1,904 (+2);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 395 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 210 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,441 (+12); Aircraft - 280 (0);

Helicopters – 261 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,562 (0); Intercepted cruise missiles - 531 (0);

Boats/ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the Ukrainian army has lost up to 13 thousand soldiers, stated the adviser to the head of the President's Office, Mykhailo Podolyak. "We have official estimates from the General Staff, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gives official estimates. And they range from 10 to 12.5-13 thousand KIA. That is, we are openly talking about the number of dead," Podolyak said. On November 30, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said that according to her estimates, "more than 20,000 civilians and 100,000 military personnel died in Ukraine." But later, the European Commission admitted they were mistaken and removed this information. "Undoubtedly, Ms Ursula made a mistake - that's obvious. That's why they deleted this video, removed these numbers," explained Podolyak.

The use of Soviet-made cruise missiles, equipped with a non-explosive warhead, is aimed at the distraction of the Ukrainian air defense system, Colonel Mykola Danylyuk, a representative of the Central Military Scientific Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said at a briefing. "The deliberate launch of these missiles is aimed at conducting demonstration actions, distracting the attention of the Ukrainian air defense system, exhausting it at the time when modern Russian Kh-101 and 3M-14 missiles of the Kalibr complex are directed at critical infrastructure objects, residential quarters, which can significantly increase the efficiency of their use."

The number of vacancies for Ukrainian IT specialists increased by 15% in the third quarter of 2022, with Game Development, .NET, Analytics, Java, PHP and Python becoming the most popular categories, reports Ukrinform with reference to the Just Join IT company. Among the companies that published vacancies in the "Friendly Offers" category in the third quarter of 2022 were: Netflix, Meta, Volvo, Brainly. Just Join IT is one of the largest job boards for IT professionals in Central and Eastern Europe. The "Friendly Offers" category was created in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and aims to help Ukrainian IT professionals looking for work in Europe. During the entire existence of the category, more than 800 companies from all over the world published 25,000 vacancies for Ukrainian programmers.

International diplomatic aspect

The US Army awarded a $1.2 billion contract to Raytheon Technologies for Ukraine's six National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS). Overall, the Biden Administration cleared the delivery of eight systems, with two NASAMS deployed in November. Germany sent to Ukraine three Biber Armoured Bridgelayer, eight naval surface UAVs, twelve border patrol vehicles, spare

parts for Мі-24 helicopters, and more. Berlin is expected to send seven more Gepard self- propelled anti-aircraft guns.

Sergey Naryshkin, Russia's chief spy [chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service], pushes the bizarre claim that Poland wants to annex Western Ukraine due to historical claims and as compensation for military aid to Kyiv. Russian intelligence used to push various dubious claims even before Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.

Uninvited to the Berlin Security Conference, Munich Security Conference, and the OSCE Foreign Minister's meeting in Poland, Sergey Lavrov decided to become a security conference himself. He repeated a weary claim that the US and NATO are "directly" participating in the war with Russia "not just by providing weapons but also by training personnel." He admitted that the reason behind targeting critical infrastructure, leaving millions of Ukrainians without heating, electricity, and water, is intended to "knock out energy facilities that allow you to keep pumping deadly weapons into Ukraine in order to kill the Russians." Such a confession of the blatant violation of humanitarian law will serve as material evidence in further trials over the crime of aggression.

The EU leadership intends to help set up, together with the International Criminal Court, a specialized court to prosecute war crimes committed during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. France has begun working with its European and Ukrainian partners on proposals to set up a special tribunal on Russia's crime of aggression against Ukraine. However, a mention of a tribunal is missing in the joint statement of the presidents of the US and France. The leaders "reiterate their steadfast resolve to hold Russia to account for widely documented atrocities and war crimes, committed both by its regular armed forces and by its proxies, including mercenary entities such as Vagner and others, through support for international accountability mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court, the Ukrainian prosecutor general, UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry, and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, sanctions, and other means."

In October, the Ukrainian Parliament called on the other states to set up a special tribunal to bring top Russian political and military figures to justice for the crime of aggression. Russia isn't a party to the Rome Statute. Therefore, Putin and his entourage hope to get on with the committed crimes because of immunity, not to mention a veto power in the UN Security Council to block any UN action and the nuclear weapons as an ultimate impunity "guarantee." So, a UN General Assembly and other international institutions, as well as individual countries' backed special tribunals, would make it possible to bring the criminals to justice. Seventy-five years ago, the international community had to establish the legal framework to make the Nazi criminals pay for their crimes. So, a Nurnberg-like trial is needed to fill the legal and institutional gaps to put an end to impunity, thus warning other powers that none can hide behind immunity and institutional hurdles.

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6. Dave Johnson tribute essay published on The RAND Blog

Dave Johnson tribute essay published on The RAND Blog

by Gian Gentile and John Gordon IV

November 10, 2022

rand.org · by Gian Gentile

On October 30th, Dr. David E. Johnson, Col U.S. Army (retired), a principal researcher at RAND and a leading intellectual in the field of national defense and military history, passed away following a long illness. Dave was known as someone who called the shots as he saw them. His deep knowledge of military history provided a perspective to analyze problems and make sound policy recommendations that were valued by the senior decisionmakers in the Army and elsewhere. As Christine E. Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, told us, “Dave was a friend, a mentor, a caring and generous colleague to so many of us, and was unafraid to speak truth to power.” As Wormuth also recalled, Dave's love for the Army was evident throughout his basement study, which, “was covered floor to ceiling with books, paraphernalia, paintings, models, and figurines all having to do with the Army throughout history.”

A native of Texas, Dave graduated from Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, in 1972 with a B.A. in history. Upon graduation, he received a Regular commission in the Army, serving in the Infantry, Quartermaster, and Field Artillery branches. As a field artillery officer, he commanded the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery in the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. While in the Army, Dave obtained a Ph.D. (1990) in history from Duke University; he also graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1994. His Ph.D. dissertation formed the basis of a highly successful military history book, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Innovation in the U.S. Army 1917–1945, published by Cornell University Press in 1998. Brian Linn, a professor of military history at Texas A&M, recalled “reading “Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers“ for the first time and knowing that I wanted to follow a similar path. When I finally met Dave at the 2015 AUSA convention, after listening to him speak about military affairs, I understood how he was able to write such a brilliant book.”This book was but one of a very long list of articles and book-length works that Dave produced at RAND over the years.

In 1997, after a 24-year career, Dave retired from the Army. The next year, he joined the nonprofit RAND Corporation, in its Northern Virginia office, where he went on to play major roles in countless high-level projects, mostly for the Army, but also for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force. Dave had leading roles in literally dozens of research projects, many of which involved examining the nature of future military operations and the future strategic environment. In these projects, Dave was the individual others often turned to. Col Ric Schulz, U.S. Army (ret) recalled meeting Dave in 2019, when Schulz was beginning work on the J7 Joint Warfighting Concept. “Dave immediately demonstrated an intellectual savvy that enabled the team to navigate operationally and politically challenging issues,” Schulz told us, adding that Dave's “counsel was always on the mark.”

Dave had leading roles in literally dozens of research projects, many of which involved examining the nature of future military operations and the future strategic environment. In these projects, Dave was the individual others often turned to.

LTC Michael B. Kim, Commander, 2-70 Armor, echoed what Schulz told us about Dave's knowledge and steadfastness, which never wavered, all the way up to the very end. Kim asked Dave to address the leaders of the 2-70 AR Thunder Battalion, 2ABCT, 1ID, to brief them on his observations in Ukraine before the Battalion's EUCOM deployment, at the end of this year. “I was not aware that Dr. Johnson was hospitalized the week prior to the presentation, and when I found out, I attempted to cancel the session,” Kim told us. Dave would not hear of it. “Dr. Johnson adamantly refused [to cancel] and stated that he would present from his hospital bed.” And sure enough, “on the morning of October 25th, 2022, Dr. Johnson briefed the Thunder Battalion on his observations in Ukraine, and his wisdom on combined arms warfare. His legacy as a warfighter, teacher, and mentor, will live on through the many that he influenced during his career,” Kim said.

Dave was, indeed, a teacher: from his hospital bed, within RAND and the Army, and from 2010 to 2020, as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, where he taught courses in Grand Strategy. He was also an adjunct scholar, beginning in 2016, at the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he continued teaching Grand Strategy, as well as the challenges of military innovation. As our colleague Mark Hvizda told us, “Dave's uncanny ability in the classroom [was] to pierce through complex subjects and ask the simple, direct questions that others struggled to articulate.” These questions, Hvizda went on, often paired sharp insights “with a sharper humor” and “refreshing humility.”

Over the years, one of Dave's most noteworthy traits was his strong desire to mentor junior staff and subordinates. Whether it was Army officers—from lieutenants to colonels—his students at Georgetown and West Point, or new staff at RAND, Dave took an interest, and devoted considerable time and effort to help. Dr. Nadia Schadlow, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, recalled how “Dave always read my essays, commented on them, and was a great source of encouragement and wisdom. He was a true intellect—someone who later in his career remained interested in the work of others.” And, Schadlow added, “he remained creative until the very end of his life—which means he was an optimist at heart. Dave—HR McMaster, U.S. Army (ret), former U.S. National Security Advisor told us—“was an empathetic, wise mentor to me and countless others. He would drop everything when someone needed assistance with a project, or just the sound advice that Dave always provided.” Our colleague Raphael Cohen put it simply: “When Dave spoke, people listened.”

Dave was also an avid reader who loved to travel, and always appreciated living in the Washington, D.C., area—particularly for all the Civil War battlefields within striking distance. Gettysburg was his favorite and, as is usually the case with military historians, he relished the opportunity to analyze the decisions made amid battle and debate various “what ifs” that might have changed the course of history. For those fortunate enough to visit Dave's home, it was always a great treat to see his huge collection of military models, prints, and memorabilia.

Dave's contributions to the U.S. military and the nation put him in a league of his own. His policy recommendations, writings, and the effect he had on the many people he mentored will stand as his legacy for many years to come.

Gen Charlie Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, recalled the friendship he formed with Dave during his command of U.S. Army Pacific. “Dave set the tone for deep thinking and discussion. He was selfless with his work, producing great reflective pieces on our national security that require our candid introspection. He understood the value of Theater Armies, the significance of the Asia Pacific, and the importance of strategic communications to the range of audiences that senior leaders must influence. His frankness was refreshing, and it spurred a level of open discussion that we critically need.”

Dave Johnson will be greatly missed. Gen Christopher G. Cavoli, commander U.S. European Command noted that there is “no real way to explain the weight of Dave's loss. Dave was a relentlessly critical thinker. He made everyone around him think better. He woke up every day thinking about how to make the Army better.” His contributions to the U.S. military and the nation put him in a league of his own. His policy recommendations, writings, and the effect he had on the many people he mentored will stand as his legacy for many years to come. As General Cavoli rightly observed, “Dave made each of us better. We will miss him.”

Gian Gentile is deputy director of the of the RAND Army Research Division at the nonpartisan, nonprofit RAND Corporation. John Gordon IV is a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

rand.org · by Gian Gentile

7. Russia 'open' to talks on Ukraine but presses demands after Biden comment

Russia 'open' to talks on Ukraine but presses demands after Biden comment

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

• Summary
• Companies
• Putin urges Scholz to rethink Germany's line on Ukraine
• EU tentatively agrees $60 price cap on Russian seaborne oil
• Fighting rages around eastern town of Bakhmut

KYIV, Dec 2 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is "open to negotiations" on Ukraine but the West must accept Moscow's demands, the Kremlin said on Friday, a day after U.S. President Joe Biden said he was willing to talk if Putin were looking for a way to end the war.

Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron said after talks at the White House on Thursday that they would hold Russia to account for its actions in Ukraine but the U.S. president also appeared to hold out an olive branch to Moscow while stressing he saw no sign of any change in Putin's stance.

Biden has not spoken directly with Putin since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24. In March, Biden branded Putin a "butcher" who "cannot stay in power".

Now, after more than nine months of fighting and with winter tightening its grip, Western countries are trying to boost aid for Ukraine as it reels from Russian missile and drone attacks targeting key energy infrastructure that have left millions without heating, electricity and water.

Fighting is raging in eastern Ukraine, with the town of Bakhmut the main target of Moscow's artillery attacks, while Russian forces in the southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions remain on the defensive, Ukraine's General Staff said in its latest battlefield update.

In a bid to reduce the money available for Moscow's war effort, the European Union has tentatively agreed to a $60 a barrel price cap on Russian seaborne oil, diplomats said. The measure will need to be approved by all EU governments in a written procedure by Friday.

In Moscow's first public response to Biden's overture, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters: "The president of the Russian Federation has always been, is and remains open to negotiations in order to ensure our interests."

Peskov said the U.S. refusal to recognise annexed territory in Ukraine as Russian was hindering a search for ways to end the war. Moscow has previously sought sweeping security guarantees including a reversal of NATO's eastern enlargement.

'DESTRUCTIVE'

Putin told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in a phone call on Friday that the Western line on Ukraine was "destructive" and urged Berlin to rethink its approach, the Kremlin said.

In Berlin's readout on the call, Scholz's spokesperson said the chancellor had condemned Russian air strikes against civilian infrastructure and called for a diplomatic solution to the war "including a withdrawal of Russian troops".

Putin has said he has no regrets about launching what he calls a "special military operation" to disarm and "denazify" Ukraine. He casts the war as a watershed moment when Russia finally stood up to an arrogant West after decades of humiliation following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and the West say Putin has no justification for what they cast as an imperial-style war of occupation in which thousands of civilians have been killed. Kyiv says it will fight until the last Russian soldier is ejected from its territory.

[1/7] A view shows an apartment building damaged by a recent Russian military strike in Kherson, Ukraine November 27, 2022. REUTERS/Anna Voitenko/File Photo

After their talks on Thursday, Biden and Macron said in a joint statement they were committed to holding Russia to account "for widely documented atrocities and war crimes, committed both by its regular armed forces and by its proxies" in Ukraine.

Biden said he was ready to speak with Putin "if in fact there is an interest in him deciding he's looking for a way to end the war", adding the Russian leader "hasn't done that yet".

Macron said he would continue to talk to Putin to "try to prevent escalation and to get some very concrete results" such as the safety of nuclear plants.

The International Atomic Energy Agency hopes to reach an agreement with Russia and Ukraine to create a protection zone at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe's largest, by the end of the year, the head of the U.N. atomic watchdog, Rafael Grossi, told Italian newspaper La Repubblica in an interview.

The head of Russia's state-run nuclear energy agency Rosatom was later quoted by RIA news agency as saying Moscow had outlined its position on creating a safety zone and was now awaiting a response.

Repeated shelling around the Russian-held plant has raised concern about the potential for a grave accident just 500 km (300 miles) from the site of the world's worst nuclear accident, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster.

ATTACKS

Three people were killed and seven wounded in Russian shelling of the southern Ukrainian region of Kherson over the past 24 hours, the regional governor said on Friday.

The regional capital of Kherson - liberated by Ukrainian forces in mid-November - and other parts of the region have been bombarded 42 times in the same period, Governor Yaroslav Yanushevych wrote on the Telegram messaging app.

Russian forces also shelled a building in the Ukrainian-held city of Zaporizhzhia, setting it ablaze, city official Anatoly Krutyev said.

Reuters could not independently confirm battlefield reports.

In a grisly development, several Ukrainian embassies abroad received "bloody packages" containing animal eyes, Ukraine's foreign ministry said on Friday, after a series of letter bombs were sent to sites in Spain including Kyiv's embassy in Madrid.

Russia has recently intensified a campaign to knock out power, water and heat supplies in Ukrainian cities. Ukraine and the West say the strategy deliberately intends to harm civilians, a war crime, something Moscow denies.

The attacks on infrastructure are likely to increase the cost to keep Ukraine's economy going next year by up to $1 billion a month, and aid to the country would need to be "front-loaded", IMF head Kristalina Georgieva told the Reuters NEXT conference on Thursday.

Additional reporting by Steve Holland in Washington and by other Reuters bureaux Writing by Gareth Jones Editing by Nick Macfie

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

8. Is the Army Misplacing the Blame for Its Recruiting Crisis?

Interesting article on recruiting. I know it is heresy among many but the non-HS degree should be reconsidered. Although anecdotal, I have known a number of soldiers who enlisted without a HS degree, earned their GED, and went on to not only successful military careers but also earned undergraduate and graduate college degrees. If we truly want to have talent management we need to look everywhere for talent and be able to measure talent in ways other than having a degree or not.

Is the Army Misplacing the Blame for Its Recruiting Crisis?

At least two of its oft-cited reasons are “red herrings,” experts say.

defenseone.com · by Elizabeth Howe

As experts and Army leaders work to boost the service’s sagging recruitment, they’re discovering that two oft-cited factors aren’t all that important: young people’s ineligibility rates and propensity to serve.

It’s true that only 23 percent of Americans are eligible for military service, and an even smaller portion of that percentage are interested in serving, as Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville often says when asked about his service’s recruiting woes. But these factors don’t explain the current crisis, RAND Corporation Senior Economist Beth Asche said at a Heritage Foundation event on Tuesday.

“Propensity is low, but propensity has always been low,” Asche said. “Another one is eligibility. That's a problem, and it's definitely worthy of concern and attention. But again, eligibility has also been a perennial problem for many years.”

These two factors are “red herrings that there's been attention paid to, but I don't think there's a cause of the recent crisis,” she said.

Last year was the “worst year for military recruiting in terms of meeting numerical goals since the start of the all-volunteer force in 1973,” Center for National Defense Director Thomas Spoehr said at the same event. The Army was 15,000 troops short of its fiscal year 2022 recruiting goal and has cut its end-strength goal for 2023 by 15,000, suggesting that service leaders don’t believe they can make up this year’s recruiting deficit.

Asche said the current crisis is driven less by propensity and eligibility rates than by other factors. She also poured cold water on theories that aren’t borne out by visible evidence.

“There are hypotheses going around about how [recruiting challenges are] due to sexual assault stories, food insecurity, the withdrawal from Afghanistan. My colleague, Mr. Spoehr, talked about the ‘woke military.’ There's all sorts of theories going on. We don't have evidence for that,” Asche said.

A recent survey from the Reagan Institute found that half of respondents believe “wokeness” is undermining military effectiveness. But asked in October whether public perceptions of Army wokeness were hurting recruiting, the service’s top recruiter—Maj. Gen. Johnny K. Davis of Army Recruiting Command—said he was “not seeing that at all.”

Both Asche and Davis, who also spoke at the Heritage event, avoided answering a question about whether the COVID-19 vaccine mandate was hurting recruiting.

Asche suggested the Army needs to do a better job of choosing, training, and motivating its recruiters.

Davis pointed to the roughly two years when the COVID pandemic kept students out of school buildings. That was tantamount to “cutting recruiters off from an entire generation,” the general said.

Asche and David agreed that recruiting is also being slowed by Americans’ misconceptions about military service—partly due to media representation and an overall decline in the public’s trust in the military.

Davis said he gets questions from potential recruits all the time that reveal the general population has little understanding of military life. Are you really not paid until you pass basic training? Can you have a family?

“So there are a lot of misconceptions that we have to address,” Davis said. “And we assume that many of our nation's youth understand [the military], but there's an awareness issue.”

Asche suggested the Army take another look at a policy change it announced in July then scrapped after outcry: waiving the requirement of a high school diploma or GED for “a limited number” of recruits. She said such waivers could boost recruiting without reducing the overall quality of the force.

“It does not mean every recruit needs to be a non-graduate, by any means. But when you're already at 95 percent high school grads, going down to 90 percent will not change the quality and performance of that entry cohort,” she said.

defenseone.com · by Elizabeth Howe

9. Pentagon eyes major expansion of Ukraine military training

Pentagon eyes major expansion of Ukraine military training

The plan would build on Western arms transfers by showing large Ukrainian formations how to wage a more sophisticated campaign, deepening U.S. involvement in the war

By Dan Lamothe and Karen DeYoung 

December 1, 2022 at 5:56 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · December 1, 2022

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other top Pentagon officials are weighing a major expansion in training for the Ukrainian military, a move that could significantly enhance its ability to evict Russian forces from occupied areas even as it deepens U.S. involvement in the war.

The plan, under discussion for weeks, according to senior U.S. defense officials, would build on the billions of dollars in weaponry and other aid Washington has provided Ukraine by showing its military how to wage a more sophisticated campaign against the struggling Russian army.

It would see Ukrainian combat units with hundreds, or possibly even thousands of troops, training together in Grafenwoehr, Germany, where the U.S. military has instructed Ukrainian forces in smaller numbers for years. Austin is keen to boost Ukraine’s ability to maneuver on the battlefield with a more modern style of warfare that relies less on launching thousands of rounds of artillery per day at Russian troops in what has become a grinding, bloody war of attrition.

Austin is known to favor the significantly expanded U.S. training program, along with similar programs for tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers to be undertaken by Britain, European Union countries and others such as Norway. Germany alone plans to train 5,000 troops by June under the E.U. initiative, at German military combat simulation centers and battalion command posts.

Since the beginning of the war, President Biden has said that the United States and NATO are not at war with Russia, but have a responsibility to assist a fellow democracy in defending itself against unprovoked aggression. Moscow has dismissed those statements, accusing the United States and its allies of using Ukraine as a disposable proxy for their own aims against Russia.

Russia already has escalated its rhetoric in response to the European training announcements. “Don’t say that the U.S. and NATO are not participants in this war,” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters Thursday. “You are directly participating, including not only with the supply of weapons, but also with the training of personnel. … You are training their military on your territory, on the territories of Britain, Germany, Italy and other countries.”

The new training, which Ukraine has requested, comes as the war’s tempo is expected to slow, albeit not stop, through Ukraine’s icy winter months and the allies consider how to best take advantage of the time. Counteroffensives south of Kherson, a strategic city on the Black Sea that Russian troops abandoned last month, and into separatist strongholds in the east are expected to be difficult, as the Russians use the time to strengthen their defensive lines.

Ukraine has been able to hand Russian forces battlefield losses in numerous locations, but with significant casualties on both sides. Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assessed last month that more than 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since Russia’s invasion Feb. 24, and “probably” an equivalent number of Ukrainian troops.

The Russians are expected to continue to outgun the Ukrainian military, launching tens of thousands of rounds of artillery each day in addition to salvos of missiles and other munitions, according to Western intelligence assessments. At the same time, Russian forces have been increased with the “mobilization” of thousands of additional troops whose effectiveness has so far been limited because of minimal training, low morale and logistics difficulties.

Even as training for Ukrainian forces on specific weapons systems will continue, the Western supply is not infinite. The goal of the new training is to teach the Ukrainians tactics that will enhance the effectiveness of armaments they have, and to use on a larger scale the nimbleness and adaptability they have displayed with small units.

Many of the Ukrainian trainees are expected to be recruits, according to U.S. and European officials, as the Kyiv government continues to mobilize virtually every available resource.

It was not clear whether the expansion of U.S. training would add significantly to the growing cost of aid to Ukraine, already under challenge from some lawmakers, primarily Republicans. While assistance to Ukraine still enjoys widespread bipartisan support, GOP lawmakers who will take over the House next month have vowed increased oversight.

Austin’s vision would in some ways resemble training that U.S. military units receive at their major training hubs, such as the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, Calif. Before deploying, units spend weeks certifying that they are prepared to fight in combined-arms warfare, where infantrymen, mechanized forces, artillery units and other troops coordinate to find, envelop and destroy enemy units. Discussion of expanded U.S. training for Ukrainian forces was reported earlier by CNN.

The U.S. military’s training of Ukrainian forces began on a large scale after Russia’s 2014 invasion and seizure of Crimea. But much of that instruction concentrated on special operations and resistance rather than full-scale offensives against a dug-in and powerful enemy. Since the invasion last winter, trainers have concentrated on teaching small numbers of soldiers at a time how to perform specific tasks, such as launching and maintaining the howitzer artillery they have been supplied.

A Pentagon spokesman, Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, said Thursday that the Defense Department, alongside Western allies and partner nations, “is constantly exploring ways to support Ukraine through a variety of security assistance efforts, to include training.” The department, he added, had no new announcements to make.

Loveday Morris in Berlin contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · December 1, 2022

10.  Why Russia’s cyber-attacks have fallen flat

Why Russia’s cyber-attacks have fallen flat

Ukraine benefited from good preparation and lots of help

The Economist

Wars are testbeds for new technology. The Korean war saw jet fighters employed at scale for the first time. Israel pioneered the use of drones as radar decoys in its war with Egypt in 1973. And the Gulf war of 1991 was a coming-out party for gps-guided munitions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first time that two mature cyber-powers have fought each other over computer networks in wartime. The result is a lesson in the limits of cyber-power and the importance of having a sound defence.

The popular notion of cyberwar has been shaped by lurid and dystopian scenarios of an “electronic Pearl Harbour”, first envisaged in the 1990s and accentuated by the relentless digitisation of society. Those fears have been fanned by glimpses of the possible. The American-Israeli Stuxnet worm, which came to light in 2010, inflicted damage on Iranian nuclear machinery with fiendish ingenuity. Russian malware sabotaged Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016.

Yet when a full-blown cyberwar came to Ukraine, the result was modest. This was not for want of trying. Russia has thrown vast amounts of malware at Ukraine—the largest onslaught ever, say some officials. There were some notable successes, such as the disruption of Viasat, a commercial satellite-communications service used by Ukraine’s government and armed forces, less than an hour before the invasion.

But, despite Russia’s cyber-warriors, Ukraine’s lights, power and water stayed on. The banks remained open. Perhaps most important, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, continued to make nightly television broadcasts to the nation. How?

Part of the answer lies in Russia’s missteps. It limited its initial strikes because it assumed that Ukrainian infrastructure would soon come under its control. Russia’s cyber-forces also have less experience of integrating cyber-operations with military ones than their American counterparts, who have been doing it for 30 years.

The conflict also shows how wartime cyber-power has been miscast. Spectacular cyber-attacks are rare because they are much more demanding than commonly thought. The Russian sabotage of Ukraine’s power grid in 2016, for instance, took more than two years to prepare. Viasat-like attacks are not mass-produced missiles that can be launched at any target. They are custom-made.

All this has two implications. One is that cyber-campaigns can run out of steam. Russia’s troops planned for a week-long war. So, too, did its hackers. When the invasion dragged on, they had to adjust their ambitions. They resorted to more basic attacks that could be launched at high tempo and scale. These were, and remain, a challenge for Ukrainian forces—but a manageable one.

The second implication is that elaborate cyber-offensives are often needed the most when raw violence is off the table. If a war is raging anyway, why use exquisite code when a missile will do? Russia’s recent air attacks show that Iranian drones are a cheaper and simpler way to knock out the power grid.

Wartime cyber-offensives tend to complement military action rather than replace it. The most important cyber-operations are not those aimed at shutting down banks and airports, but those which quietly carry on intelligence-gathering and psychological warfare—tasks that have been part of battle since long before the existence of computers or the internet.

But if the cyber-conflict has underwhelmed, it is Ukraine that ultimately deserves the most credit. Russia treated Ukraine as a cyber-testing-range in the years after its first invasion in 2014. Ukraine was thus prepared. On February 24th its cyber-teams fanned out across the country, so that they were dispersed. Much of Ukraine’s digital infrastructure migrated to servers abroad, beyond the reach of Russian bombs.

Western governments and their cyber-agencies also played a role, sharing intelligence, fortifying Ukraine’s networks and rooting out Russian intruders in December and January. So, too, did private firms like Microsoft, an American tech giant, and eset, a cyber-security company from Slovakia, which monitor traffic on Ukrainian networks, often using artificial intelligence to comb through huge volumes of code. “The cyber-defence of Ukraine relies critically on a coalition of countries, companies and ngos,” wrote Microsoft in a lessons-learned report in June.

It is still early to draw solid conclusions. The war is raging and new malware is appearing all the time. Russia may be keeping some of its most potent cyber-capabilities in reserve. Yet the first signs are encouraging. It has often been assumed that the cyber-domain is an attacker’s playground, and that malware will always get through and cause devastation. Ukraine has defied expectations and shown that even one of the planet’s best-resourced cyber-powers can be kept at bay with a disciplined and well-organised defence. ■

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis.

The Economist

11. Congress wants to arm Taiwan, but hasn’t figured out how to pay for it

Congress wants to arm Taiwan, but hasn’t figured out how to pay for it

Defense News · by Joe Gould · December 1, 2022

WASHINGTON ― Lawmakers eager to boost security aid to Taiwan may soon authorize as much as $10 billion in new State Department financing for Taipei to buy U.S. weaponry. But it’s an open question whether appropriators will approve the actual dollars.

A soon-to-be-released draft 2023 National Defense Authorization Act would authorize $2 billion in aid per year over five years and another $1 billion annually in equipment from U.S. military stockpiles.

But while authorization bills can create programs, only appropriations bills have the legal authority to spend U.S. funds. And key Democratic appropriators are expressing misgivings. Given the steady pressure from Republicans to lower the State Department’s budget, some worry adding new spending on Taiwan aid would mean cuts for other areas of diplomacy, potentially including security aid to other countries.

“Some of us, including myself, expressed the concern that if we put out the big authorizing number on Taiwan, but could not meet it [with appropriations], that would send the wrong signal,” Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., who sits on the Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department appropriations panel, told Defense News. “We were also concerned that unless we increased the overall authorization for foreign assistance, it would eat into other important security assistance programs.”

When Congress takes up a massive 2023 NDAA reconciled between the House and Senate, expected later this month, it will include security aid provisions derived from the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act, which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced 17-5 last month.

The $2 billion per year proposed for Taiwan is in Foreign Military Financing — a program that allows other countries to purchase U.S. military equipment with grants and loans. That could loom large in a State Department budget that totaled $56 billion for fiscal 2022, with roughly $6 billion for FMF. Of the 25-plus countries that receive FMF annually, the major recipients are Israel ($3.3 billion), Egypt ($1.3 billion), Jordan ($425 million).

Taiwan, whose wealth per capita was recently ranked first in Asia, is not among countries the State Department lists as an FMF recipient.

Fears the State Department budget will come under pressure are especially potent as Washington prepares for split rule with a GOP-led House. Although Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress last year, Republicans managed to kill the Biden administration’s proposed 12% increase to the State Department’s topline and kept its budget flat.

Van Hollen had called for an even higher increase of nearly 21%, noting the Pentagon, whose budget came in at $782 billion this year, receives multibillion increases every year.

Democratic Sen. Chris Coons, who chairs the Senate subpanel responsible for funding the State Department and foreign aid, told Defense News he supports a “more robust” U.S. security relationship with Taiwan, but the question is how.

“To the extent I have repeatedly raised some questions or concerns, one of them is: How will we pay for this?” Coons, of Delaware, said Tuesday.

Coons said the demand for new Taiwan aid comes as his subcommittee is already juggling “dramatically growing” responsibilities. That includes filling other pots of U.S. aid to counter China’s global influence and for humanitarian relief in the midst of a refugee and hunger crisis sparked by the war in Ukraine.

RELATED

Taiwan is buying US weapons, but Washington isn’t delivering them

Congress is moving to address multibillion-dollar arms sale backlogs to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Exactly Washington plans to quickly increase aid to Taiwan is not a settled matter. Coons said there’s still a “conversation underway” among the State Department, Pentagon, National Security Council and lawmakers.

“There are conversations about what are the defense needs of Taiwan,” he said. “That is distinct from, but needs to be connected to a meaningful conversation about ‘how do you best fund meeting those needs.’”

The Biden administration hasn’t fulfilled a two-month-old request from the armed service and foreign affairs committees for a list of critical capabilities Taiwan needs and whether foreign military financing, foreign military sales or drawdown authority would be the preferred means to meet those needs.

The White House previously expressed support. In September, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said there were elements of the Taiwan Policy Act that concerned the White House, but said others “with respect to how we can strengthen our security assistance for Taiwan … are quite effective and robust.”

“We raised our concerns with the legislation with Congress, many of which were addressed,” said a senior administration official.

Sen. Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a champion of the Taiwan bill’s inclusion in the NDAA, said Tuesday he plans to lobby for a matching appropriation, acknowledging that it would compete against other priorities as the lame-duck Congress negotiates an omnibus appropriations bill.

“That is my position, but that fight hasn’t started yet,” Risch told Defense News. “We’ve said it, we mean it, and of course my friends on the other side of the aisle will say ‘yes, but what about childcare, we need that too,’ but that fight will be had.”

Asked if he would lobby fellow Republicans to raise the State Department’s topline to accommodate the added Taiwan FMF, Risch stopped short, saying there were “too many unknowns” to consider.

He also floated the emerging emergency supplemental spending bill for Ukraine as a potential vehicle for the Taiwan funding. But Risch acknowledged that would be a one-off solution, when the Taiwan aid authorization covers five years.

Though China has publicly set 2027 as a target date for its military to be able to pursue unification with the self-ruling island China sees as a breakaway province, the Pentagon has assessed no invasion is imminent.

Still, Risch said there is wide bipartisan backing to ramp up security aid to Taiwan now before Chinese action heads off that option.

“Everyone is of the frame of mind that, at this point, sooner is better than later. Because who knows?” Risch said. “To a greater or lesser degree, everybody has signed on to that proposition.”

About Joe Gould and Bryant Harris

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

12. Russia and China are Training Their Bombers Together. Why?

Because they can?

Russia and China are Training Their Bombers Together. Why?

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · November 30, 2022

Russian and Chinese Bombers Conducted Joint Patrol Operations: Apart from the United States, Russia and China are the only nations that still operate long-range strategic bombers – and on Wednesday the two countries conducted an eight-hour-long joint patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.

The aircraft included a Russian Tupolev Tu-95 (NATO reporting name “Bear”) and a Chinese Xian H-6, a licensed version of the Soviet-designed Tupolev Tu-16 (NATO reporting name “Badger”).

In addition to flying together over the neutral waters, the strategic bombers also made cross-landings at the airfields of both countries for the first joint aerial patrol.

China’s Defense Ministry described Wednesday’s patrols as a “routine” part of an annual cooperation plan between the two militaries.

“For the first time in the history of aerial patrolling, Russian aircraft landed at an airfield in the People’s Republic of China and Chinese planes landed at an airfield on the territory of the Russian Federation,” the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement, reported by Tass.

It added that fighter jets of the two nations escorted the strategic missile-carrying bombers at some stages of the aerial patrol.

“In the course of accomplishing their missions, the aircraft of both countries acted in strict compliance with the provisions of international law. There were no violations of the airspace of foreign states,” the ministry said, and further stressed that the strategic bombers conducted their joint aerial patrol as part of the 2022 military cooperation plan and that the flight was not directed against any third countries.

After their joint aerial patrol, all the aircraft would return to their home airfields, the ministry stated.

Tu-95: The Russian Bear

The Tupolev Tu-95 was first flown in 1952 and is now among the oldest aircraft designs still in service with the Russian military. The Bear is also the only propeller-powered bomber in service anywhere in the world today.

However, despite the age of the platform, it is a highly-capable bomber – and much like the United States Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress, it has been steadily upgraded and will likely remain in service well into the 2040s or later.

The four-engine propeller plane was developed in the 1950s after Soviet military planners had requested a four-engine bomber that could fly five thousand miles and hit targets across the United States.

The choice of propeller-driven engines was made due to the fact that jet engines of the time burned through fuel too quickly, and the Soviet Air Force lacked the capability to refuel its bombers in flight. The Tu-95 has a range greater than 15,000km (9,300 miles).

H-6: The Chinese Badger

Beijing currently maintains the largest single-family of bombers in service with its Xian H-6. More than 260 were built since 1959, and it is believed that at least 230 remain operational.

In fact, the U.S. Air Forces’ B-52 and China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force H-6 now account for 60 percent of all bombers currently in service globally.

The H-6 is a dual conventional and nuclear threat aircraft. Several of the bombers have landed in the past on disputed territory such as Woody Island in the Paracels group of islands, rocks, reefs, and atolls in the northwestern part of the South China Sea, to which Beijing lays claim.

Closer Ties Between Beijing and Moscow

This week’s patrol followed a series of joint drills intended to showcase growing military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing as they both face increased tensions with the United States.

It was in September that Beijing deployed more than 2,000 troops along with more than 300 military vehicles, 21 combat aircraft, and three warships to take part in a large-scale joint exercise with Russian forces.

The maneuvers marked the first time that Beijing had sent units from three branches of its military to take part in a single drill with Kremlin forces.

Defense cooperation between the two nations has increased in recent years, and Beijing had previously declared a “no limits” friendship with Moscow – and has to date refused to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Instead, China has cast blame on the United States and NATO for provoking Moscow, while Beijing has also blasted the punishing sanctions that have been imposed on Russia.

China has further become one of the largest customers of Russian oil and gas, and its purchases in 2022 are more than double that of last year – in part as Chinese importers have taken advantage of discounts offered by Moscow. Russia overtook Saudi Arabia to become China’s top oil provider in June.

A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,000 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Want more 19FortyFive military, defense, and national security, as well as politics and economics analysis from the best experts on Earth? Follow us on Google News, Flipboard, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedin. Also, sign up for our newsletter here. You can also find our code of publishing ethics and standards here. Want to contact us? Email: [email protected].

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · November 30, 2022

13. Americans Support U.S. Backing Ukraine, Despite Risk of Wider War, Survey Finds

Americans Support U.S. Backing Ukraine, Despite Risk of Wider War, Survey Finds

Perceived politicization leads to less trust of American military leadership, poll suggests

https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-support-u-s-backing-ukraine-despite-risk-of-wider-war-survey-finds-11669869297?mod=hp_user_preferences_pos1&utm_source=pocket_saves

By Nancy A. Youssef

Dec. 1, 2022 2:00 am ET

WASHINGTON—Americans fear Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could lead to instability in Europe and even spur China to make a similar assault on Taiwan, but they still support the U.S. providing Kyiv weapons and financial support, according to a national defense survey. 

In addition, the survey found that Americans have less trust in their military leadership, in part because they feel it is becoming too politicized.

The survey was conducted by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. The 2,538 Americans reached by phone and online were polled by Beacon Research between Nov. 9 and Nov. 17, just after the midterm elections.

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Overall, 57% of respondents said the U.S. must continue to support Ukraine, while 33% said America should focus on its internal problems and avoid provoking Russia. The U.S. has sent more than $19 billion in military aid to Ukraine this year, which 39% of Americans said was the right amount. 

While Americans believed the current American strategy toward Ukraine was the right one, they feared that the war there could destabilize U.S. security and that of its allies. A majority feared the war could lead to a nuclear attack by Russia, expand into Eastern Europe, deplete U.S. stockpiles or distract policy makers from other threats, including from China.

“It’s an informed view. The respondents are supporting Ukraine [while] acknowledging the variety of contingencies that may play out with regard to Russia,” said Roger Zakheim, Washington director of the Reagan Institute.

The survey found that 13% fear China invading Taiwan, up from 7% in 2021.

PHOTO: AFP CONTRIBUTOR#AFP/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The U.S.’s attitude toward China also shifted, the survey found. Since 2018, when the survey was first conducted, Americans have described China as the nation that poses the biggest threat to the U.S. According to the survey, 22% of Americans believe economic threats such as technology theft and trade make Beijing the biggest danger to U.S. security, up from 20% a year earlier.

But Americans’ concerns about China appeared more diverse in this year’s survey. Poll respondents said military threats from China, including its buildup in the South China Sea—Beijing says it has sovereignty over much of those waters—and human-rights abuses toward the Uyghur minority group were among their top concerns. 

The survey also found that 13% fear China invading Taiwan, up from 7% in 2021. This year, China has conducted more military exercises around the island, renewing interest among some Taiwanese in preparing to resist an invasion by China. Beijing considers the island as part of its territory and has pledged to take control of it—if necessary, by force.

Despite the various ways they believe China could threaten U.S. national security, 54% of Americans aren’t confident the U.S. has a clear strategy to thwart Beijing’s ambitions, according to the survey.

Many of those polled saw a connection between what is happening in Eastern Europe and Asia. According to the survey, 71% of Americans are concerned that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inspire authoritarian regimes around the world to invade their democratic neighbors.

American, Polish and Estonian soldiers conducting a NATO exercise in October in Solina, Poland.

PHOTO: OMAR MARQUES/GETTY IMAGES

The survey has long measured American confidence in the U.S. military and its leadership. Where in 2018, 70% of Americans said they had a great deal of trust and confidence in the U.S. military, that figure has steadily declined, falling to 45% last year. It appeared to level off this year at 48%, the survey found.

“No other public institution asked about—including the Supreme Court, Congress, the presidency, the news media, or law enforcement—has seen as sharp a decline in public trust over this time,” the institute said about its findings.

But the reasons for those figures appeared to evolve and this year’s results appeared to be shaped not by warfare but by questions about leadership and the perception that the force is polarized.

According to the poll, 35% said they were confident that the military would “act in a professional and nonpolitical manner.” And 34% said politicization of the military’s leadership had eroded their confidence in the force, the survey found. 

“The top response is military leadership becoming overly politicized, with 62% overall saying that has decreased their confidence. This includes 60% of Democrats, 60% of Independents, and 65% of Republicans,” the institute said.

According to the survey, 30% said their confidence in the military decreased a great deal because of “woke” practices, while 23% said their confidence greatly decreased because of “so-called far-right or extremist individuals serving in the military.” This was the first year the survey asked the questions, which didn’t define those terms.

At the same time, 89% of respondents ranked the U.S. military as the best or one of the best in the world. And 65% said the U.S. military had the best “overall capabilities,” putting China second at 15% and Russia at 4%, a slight drop for all three countries compared with the 2021 survey. 

For the full sample of 2,538 respondents, the estimated margin of error is 2.0 percentage points. Most questions were asked of half the respondents and those questions had a margin of error of 2.8 points. 

Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

14.  Targeting Tiandy - The Case for Blacklisting a Chinese Tech Firm Tied to Crackdowns on Uyghurs and Iranian Protestors

December 1, 2022 | Memo

Targeting Tiandy

The Case for Blacklisting a Chinese Tech Firm Tied to Crackdowns on Uyghurs and Iranian Protestors

fdd.org · by Craig Singleton China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow · December 1, 2022

Introduction

China remains the undisputed leader in developing and fielding technologies that enable government control and manipulation of foreign and domestic populations, otherwise known as techno-authoritarianism. The firms that produce these technologies consist of both Chinese state-owned companies and China-based private entities susceptible to Beijing’s pressure to censor and surveil. One of those private firms is Tiandy Technologies Co., Ltd. (天津天地伟业数码科技有限公司), based in Tianjin province in northern China. Both Tiandy testimonials and Chinese government press releases advertise the use of the company’s products by Chinese officials to track and interrogate Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang province. According to human rights groups, Chinese authorities also employ Tiandy products, such as “tiger chairs,” to torture Uyghurs and other minorities.

The Chinese firms that equip Beijing’s surveillance state market facial recognition software, emotion-detecting artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, surveillance drones, and closed-circuit television (CCTV) capabilities to other autocratic regimes, including Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Tiandy Iran’s website and Instagram account, the company has sold surveillance equipment to Iran’s security, police, and military services. The Internet Protocol Video Market (IPVM), a U.S.-based security industry research group and trade publication, also obtained documents that report such sales. The products reportedly sold to Iran include network video recorders that digitize and store surveillance videos, using microchips that Tiandy produced in partnership with U.S. manufacturer Intel.

At present, Tiandy is not subject to U.S. sanctions or export controls. In light of Tiandy’s operations in both Xinjiang and Iran, policymakers should consider moving quickly to target Tiandy’s global operations to cut the company and its owner, Dai Lin, off from the international financial system and global supply chains.

In particular, Washington should examine whether Tiandy’s conduct meets the criteria for imposing sanctions under Executive Order 13818, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, targeting persons who are “responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.” U.S. allies, such as Britain and Canada, that have comparable global human rights sanctions regimes should also determine whether Tiandy meets criteria for sanctions. The U.S. government should consider sanctions and punitive actions pursuant to other laws and executive orders that specifically target the perpetrators of human rights abuses in Iran and China.

Tiandy’s Global Operations and Products

Founded in 1994, Tiandy has grown rapidly into China’s fourth largest CCTV company and a major supplier to the Chinese government, reporting revenues of approximately $620 million in 2019. According to Tiandy’s website, its products have reached over 500 “smart cities,” both in China and abroad, as well as security networks at London’s Heathrow Airport. Events such as the Davos World Economic Forum and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil have also employed the firm’s technology. Tiandy’s partnership network facilitates product distribution in more than 60 countries, including Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Poland, Albania, Greece, Georgia, Croatia, Uruguay, Kenya, Russia, and Egypt. Tiandy’s office in Alberta, Canada, is responsible for managing its U.S. operations and sales, and its products are available for purchase in the U.S. on Amazon.

Tiandy develops, produces, and markets cameras and related artificial intelligence-enabled software, including an ethnicity tracking tool that the company claims can digitally detect someone’s race. Chinese authorities have deployed ethnicity tracking tools against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, according to human rights groups and press reporting, along with Huawei’s facial recognition software, emotion-detecting AI technologies, surveillance drones, and a host of other techno-authoritarian tools.

Tiandy has not obfuscated its development of ethnicity tracking AI solutions. In fact, just the opposite. For instance, Tiandy’s 2020 software development kit (SDK) included explicit references to the company’s “race” analytics tool, including its ability to distinguish between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. Tiandy’s SDK code also includes an ethnicity minority estimator. This feature reportedly can determine whether an individual is an ethnic minority by analyzing their face and assigning them a score on a scale of 0 to 100, with a score above 50 indicating that they are an ethnic (i.e., non-Han Chinese) minority.

SDK “Race” Analytic Source Code. Source: Tiandy

SDK Ethnicity Minority Estimator Source Code. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy’s race-determining AI analytics can label photographs and other forms of static media. They can also be paired with certain Tiandy camera models to analyze dynamic CCTV footage. For instance, one of Tiandy’s 4K cameras supports “face detection [statistics] based on age, gender, number of people, and ethnicity of faces,” whereas one of its five megapixel (5MP) face recognition cameras “supports … ethnicity of faces,” although the company’s website cautions, “age and ethnicity statistics are imprecise.”

Tiandy’s public marketing materials also advertise “smart” interrogation tables, which integrate a series of peripheral devices used in the interrogation process, such as touch-screen central control systems, electronic evidence devices, and transcript verification machines. The company markets these tables alongside its “tiger chairs,” which feature affixed leg irons and handcuffs to restrain occupants.

Chinese officials have employed “tiger chairs” at Uyghur concentration camps in Xinjiang province. According to Human Rights Watch, former Uyghur detainees have claimed Chinese police strapped them into these metal chairs for hours and even days, depriving them of sleep, and immobilizing them until their legs were swollen. Similar findings were cited in the “Xinjiang Police Files,” a cache of internal Chinese government documents obtained by human rights advocates and published by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation detailing Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang province.

Tiandy “Smart” Interrogation Table and “Tiger Chair.” Source: Tiandy Marketing Materials, April 2021

Tiandy maintains a partnership with Intel, according to Intel’s website. The partnership centers on the use of Intel’s Celeron, Core, and Xeon processors in Tiandy’s networked video recording (NVR) technology. Users can pair the Tiandy product, known as SuperNVR*, with digital internet protocol (IP) cameras to create complex video surveillance systems involving thousands of closed-circuit cameras. Tiandy sells its NVR systems in Europe, North America, South America, Central America, China, the Asia Pacific, Japan, Africa, and the Middle East.

Additionally, Tiandy is listed on Intel China’s website as a “titanium level” Intel Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) partner, the top tier of Intel’s global membership program for partner companies that deliver Intel-based technology solutions to the marketplace. Intel awarded Tiandy a security industry strategic partner award in 2018, as well as the Intel Application Innovation Award in 2019.

Source: Intel, November 2022

Source: Intel China’s Website, November 2022

Tiandy’s Owner and Operations in China

Tiandy is owned almost exclusively by its founder and chief executive officer, Dai Lin, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who also served as one of 2,270 delegates to the CCP’s 18th Party Congress in 2012. Dai also serves as the head of Tiandy’s Party Committee, which, in accordance with the Chinese constitution, operates as a CCP cell within Tiandy’s corporate structure. In this capacity, Dai is responsible for ensuring that Tiandy implements CCP policies and that the company’s operations and hirings align with CCP priorities. The company adheres to 2017 guidance issued by China’s Ministry of Public Security outlining technical requirements for facial recognition and ethnicity tracking analytics in public security-related surveillance.

Tiandy’s website includes a page documenting Dai Lin’s meetings with senior CCP officials, including Xi Jinping, who visited Tiandy’s headquarters in 2016, and former Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang Province Wang Junzheng, whom the U.S. government sanctioned in 2021 pursuant to Executive Order 13818 for his direct role in perpetrating serious human rights violations in Xinjiang.

Xi Jinping visits Tiandy’s Headquarters and meets with Tiandy CEO Dai Lin in September 2016. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy CEO Dai Lin meets with former Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang Province and U.S. sanctions designee Wang Junzheng in 2014. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy employs approximately 2,000 individuals, most of whom work out of the company’s Tianjin-based headquarters. However, Tiandy also maintains an approximately 40-person office in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang region where Uyghurs are oppressed. The company touts its work in Xinjiang as providing “stability maintenance” and sustaining “safe cities, roads, hotels, courts, and mosques.” Tiandy’s Xinjiang website references the company’s “interrogation solution,” used by Chinese police and courts in Xinjiang. In 2014, Tiandy hosted a training session for Xinjiang procuratorate information technology personnel, an extension of the prosecutor’s office. In the session, trainees learned about Tiandy’s first-of-its-kind

Tiandy has been integral in selling and installing integrated police security solutions to many Chinese police and court systems, according to its website. Those solutions include building law enforcement, interrogation, and case management centers across Tibet, as well as the provinces of Inner Mongolia, Henan, Shandong, and Qinghai.

Tiandy interrogation system installed in Baotou Province, China, in 2020. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy’s integrated video technology prosecutorial interrogation system installed in Nanyang City, Henan Province, in 2021. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy’s Intelligent Law Enforcement Case Handling Management Center in Qinghai Province in 2021. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy’s “Intelligent Interrogation Table,” as installed in Haian City in Jiangsu Province, China, in May 2021. Source: Tiandy

Tiandy’s Operations in Iran

Iran has long relied on China to augment its digital surveillance capabilities, and Tehran was an early adopter of Beijing’s “social credit” system, which it wields to assess citizens’ behavior and trustworthiness. In 2020, the U.S. government accused Huawei of aiding Tehran by “installing surveillance equipment, including surveillance equipment to monitor, identify, and detain protesters” during bouts of unrest.

Iranian government representatives have publicized plans to leverage smart technologies, including AI-powered face recognition, to maintain regime stability and neutralize dissent. Enhanced cooperation with China is central to those efforts, and in April 2021, Mahmoud Nabavian, an Iranian parliamentarian, noted that cyber cooperation with China was a pivotal national security matter for the regime in Iran. He said it was important for Iran to “cooperate with China in the field of artificial intelligence” as well as “in the military and defense fields.”

In response to countrywide protests this year, Moosa Chazanfarabadi, the head of the Iranian Parliament’s judicial commission, suggested that a large police presence on the streets would not be necessary if the government accelerated efforts to equip security forces with smart technologies. Leaders representing Iran’s Border Guard Command (known as FARAJA or مرزبانی فراجا) have issued statements warning Iranian protestors that Iranian security services intend to use surveillance cameras to identify and arrest individuals involved in protests.

In 2021, according to contract documents obtained by IPVM, a research group and trade publication, Tiandy reportedly supplied Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), police, and military with several of its products. Tiandy’s partnership with Iran is overseen by its eight-person office in Tehran. In addition to the IRGC, Tiandy’s Iranian clients include the Qom and Zanjan Social Security Organization; Iran’s Armed Forces Social Security Organization; the Criminal Investigation Department of Khomam City’s Police Force; Iran Electronics Industries, an Iranian government organization affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Support; as well as other Iranian security and military entities.

Tiandy reportedly supplied the Iranian military with networked video recorders to digitize and store surveillance videos, according to a since-deleted Tiandy Instagram post. These recorders, including Tiandy’s K2000 “all in one” video management server, are powered by microchips produced by U.S. manufacturer Intel.

Tiandy’s products are available commercially in Iran. On Tiandy Iran’s website, Iran-based customers can purchase all of Tiandy’s surveillance offerings, which are distributed via Faragostar Persia Electronics Co., an Iranian firm. These include dozens of models of AI-enabled dome cameras, networked camera solutions, facial recognition terminals, and thermal imaging cameras. Tiandy Iran sells Video Management Systems that integrate with cameras, encoders, recording systems, underlying storage infrastructure, client workstations, gateway systems, and analytics software, mainly by providing a single interface for video surveillance infrastructure management.

Sample Tiandy Product Offerings for Purchase in Iran. Source: Tiandy

Policy Recommendations

At present, Tiandy is not subject to U.S. sanctions or export controls. In light of Tiandy’s operations in both Xinjiang and Iran, policymakers should consider removing the company, its owner, and stakeholders from the international financial system and global supply chains.

To that end, the United States and its allies should consider Magnitsky sanctions and work to shut Tiandy offices around the world. The Treasury Department should consider adding Tiandy and its CEO, Dai, to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List under its broad Iran human rights sanctions authorities. Executive Order 13606 imposes sanctions on those who employ “information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran.”

Similarly, Executive Order 13553, which implements the human rights sanctions contained in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, imposes sanctions on persons who have “provided financial, material, or technological support” for “the commission of serious human rights abuses” in Iran. Wielding these authorities would cut Tiandy off from U.S. banks and limit its ability to operate around the world.

Relatedly, the executive branch should determine whether Tiandy’s operations violate portions of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 and, if so, impose the sanctions mandated against foreign persons responsible for using torture, or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment and punishment against the Uyghurs and others.

Meanwhile, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security should consider including Tiandy on its Entity List, thereby restricting the export of U.S. technology and components to the company by subjecting them to license requirements and/or export bans on specific items, such as U.S.-produced semiconductors and associated parts. The Federal Communications Commission should explore banning Tiandy’s products in the United States, consistent with its authorities in the Secure Equipment Act of 2021. Lastly, the State Department should consider issuing visa revocations for Dai as well as select Tiandy officials.

For too long, companies like Tiandy have operated with impunity. Action against Tiandy would send a clear message that Washington takes Chinese techno-authoritarianism seriously and will hold accountable those who facilitate Beijing and Tehran’s abuses.

fdd.org · by Craig Singleton China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow · December 1, 2022

15. The cost of war (Russia)

The cost of war

The exorbitant war expenditures are starting to affect Russia’s state budget. Here are the first signs the mobilisation will make the economy go under

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/12/01/the-cost-of-war-en

10:36 PM, 1 December 2022Alexander Shirokov, exclusively for “Novaya Gazeta. Europe”

Mobilisation in Russia is going to resume in December or early 2023, Ukraine’s General Staff and sources of various Russian media say. President Vladimir Putin has ordered that an integrated database of all individuals liable for military service should be created, collecting data from all sorts of institutions, such as the Federal Tax Service or the Pension Fund. 

If the hostilities continue in 2023, the overall war and occupation budget might make it to 7 or 8 trillion rubles [€111.5-127.5 billion], according to Novaya-Europe’s calculations. If Russia’s losses stay on the current level, there will be soon no more money in the budget to pay out compensations for the killed and wounded combatants.

The authorities will be forced to cut expenditures on the welfare system, print more money, and boost Russia’s state debt precipitously, economists believe. Here is our insight into what is going to happen when the Kremlin has no more money for the war and when we should expect this.

How much is mobilisation worth

Vladimir Putin promised in October that all mobilised privates will receive a monthly wage of 195,000 rubles [€3,000] after joining their military unit. Those of higher ranks were promised to be paid even more: 225 to 244 thousand [€3600-3900], but the number of such draftees remains undisclosed.

If the authorities’ reports that around 320 thousand people have been mobilised are to be believed, and assuming that they will try to maintain this figure, then the monthly expenditures on wages for the mobilised will stand at 62 billion rubles [€973 million]. This is more money than the annual budgets of 20 Russia’s regions. Paying the wages for two months [€1.95 billion] will cost Russia more money than half of the country’s regions get to spend in a year.

Twelve months of such expenditures will cost the budget 745 billion [€11.9 billion], twice as little as the federal budget’s expenses on healthcare and education.

However, the salaries of the mobilised may become but a small proportion of the expenses compared to the compensation pay-outs for the wounded and killed. The authorities promise to pay 6 million rubles [€94,200] to each of the wounded, and 12 million [€190,000] the families of the deceased.

Shortly after the mobilisation was declared, Novaya-Europe published an article by Oleg Itskhoki and Maxim Mironov, two economists, about the economic and demographic losses Russia would suffer due to the mobilisation.

They noted that the losses among the mobilised would be higher than those of the contracted army due to poor training and motivation. Since the British intelligence estimated the casualties among the mobilised in the “DPR” at as high as 55% in the first three months of the war, the two suggested that Russia’s casualties among the mobilised could reach 60-70% in the next six months, 15-20% of those killed and 45-50% wounded.

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE DEATHS AMONG RUSSIAN DRAFTEES

If we take the lowest estimate at 15% killed (48 thousand people) and 45% wounded (144 thousand) and assume that these casualties will span over an entire year, the budget will require to spend 1.44 trillion rubles [€22.7 billion] on compensations. If Russia drafts 130 more people to make up for the losses, the expenses will go to as high as 2.2 trillion [€34.7 billion]. One trillion [€15.77 billion] would be required to pay wages to 450 thousand conscripts.

Bottom line: the more “optimistic” scenario will require an additional 2.2 trillion on wages and compensations from the budget next year, the “pessimistic” one would require 3.2 trillion.

What else is included in the war budget

Russia’s government had submitted a budget bill to the State Duma shortly before the mobilisation was declared, and the draft expenses were not included there, the economists Novaya-Europe interviewed say. The bill was adopted on 24 November.

An army of conscripts would need more weapons, equipment, food, fuel, and so on. According to the Electronic Budget portal, as of 2 November (more recent data is unavailable since the Ministry of Finance declared such data classified), with a grouping of approximately 200 thousand people, 1.97 trillion rubles [€30.8 billion] have already been spent on the purchase of weapons this year, 387 billion [€6 billion] was spent on weapons repair, salaries for the Defence Ministry amounted to 840 billion [€13 billion], and 385 billion [€6 billion] were spent on food, fuel, clothing, various services and the purchase of goods. This data is still incomplete since many budget expenditures are usually only reported at the end of each year.

Sergey Aleksashenko, an economist, suggests that the cost of the war and the occupation of Ukraine be estimated by the increase in expenditures on “national defence” and “national security”.

A total of 4.67 trillion rubles [€73.5 billion] was planned to be spent on national security this year, and a 300 billion [€4.7 billion] increase is planned in 2023. 

The expenditures on national security will rise by 58% in 2023 up to 4.41 trillion. This increase in expenditures on law enforcement is needed to “put things in order” on the occupied territories of Ukraine, Aleksashenko believes.

The overall increase in both areas combined is going to be 3.5 trillion [€54.5 billion] compared to 2021, or 3.2 trillion [€49.9 billion] deducting the 8% inflation. An additional 139.4 billion [€2.1 billion] is planned to be spent on reconstructing infrastructure on the occupied territories. Thus, the overall war and occupation budget, including wages and compensations for the mobilised, might go up to 5.5-6.5 trillion [€85.7 billion-101.2 billion] in 2023, or 7 to 8 trillion [€109 billion-124.8 billion] in 2022 and 2023 combined.

By way of contrast, it was planned to spend 6.4 trillion rubles [€99.9 billion] from the federal budget on social policy (this includes retirement money and welfare) in 2022.

At the same time, the authorities have a way to avoid a critical debt increase, which also looks quite risky given that there are riots among the conscripts. It will be easier for the government to partially refuse to fulfil promises on payments to conscripts, economist Maxim Mironov believes. One of the options is to pay the high wages only for participating in battles, something that will be difficult to prove to the officials a posteriori.

According to the Electronic Budget portal, as of October 27, the state allocated 189.7 billion [€2.9 billion] rubles to the Defence Ministry and the National Guard for compensations for the killed and wounded. The number of compensations remains undisclosed, but this money would be enough for 9,000 killed and 18,000 wounded soldiers, for example. This may not be the full amount since some of the killed soldiers are normally considered missing for several months. In addition, payments to the killed PMC mercenaries and conscripts from the DPR and LPR did not come directly from the Russian budget.

‘It’s an insane construct’

The next year’s budget deficit may be significantly higher than the forecasted 2.9 trillion [€45.1 billion], not only because of the mobilisation, but also because it relies upon an unrealistically optimistic revenue forecast, economists Sergey Aleksashenko and Igor Lipsits tell Novaya-Europe.

This is confirmed by Russia’s Accounts Chamber which criticised the budget bill. According to auditors, the volume of energy supplies and the price of Russia’s Urals oil may be lower than the bill predicts.

Russia’s oil and gas revenues hit record highs in April. The country’s budget was also in surplus in the early months of the Ukraine War, meaning that Russia’s income exceeded its expenditures due to the rising energy prices. In July, August and September, the oil and gas revenue were below pre-war levels, and the budget was in deficit.

A new surplus emerged again in October due to a one-time tax payment by Gazprom for the past year. Nonetheless, the budget that was planned this year implied that expenditure would exceed revenue by 1.3 trillion rubles [€20.2 billion]. This margin is most likely to be even higher because of the “new challenges”, Anton Siluanov, Russia’s Minister of Finance, said earlier.

Surprisingly enough, the government included a growth of all other revenues, i.e., non-oil and gas ones, into the 2023 budget. “This prediction lacks any proof; it’s an insane construct for the budget. It is most likely that non-oil and gas revenue will decrease,” Lipsits believes.

Where to get money for the war

The government was planning to cover the budget deficit mainly with the help of the National Welfare Fund.

This fund was intended to be a money stock for the future generations. Excess profits from oil exports had been added to it over years; some of this money was invested in various projects. Its liquid part (not invested in projects or stocks) was 7.5 trillion rubles [€116.8 billion] less in September, down more than 2 trillion [€31.1 billion] since the start of the war. An additional 2 trillion is planned to be spent in 2023.

If the government is going to spend the reserves this fast, then the money will run out quickly, so the authorities will look for other sources of covering the deficit, such as tax increases and loans.

The government expects additional budget revenues to come from an increase in the export duty and severance tax on gas, higher taxes on the oil industry, the introduction of an export duty on fertilisers and coal, an increase in revenue from tobacco excise tax, and a new excise tax on sweetened beverages.

As taxes rise and oil and gas exports revenue drops, the government has decided to index utility rates eight months ahead of schedule. The prices of utility services will rise starting 1 December 2022 instead of July 2023 as it was planned before. The maximum increase will not exceed 9% nationwide. This will be the second indexation of utility rates in one year.

Lending money to the motherland

Since reserves, tax hikes and already planned spending cuts are not enough to cover the deficit, the government will actively borrow money. “The holes in the budget will be patched up using two sources: the sale of federal loan bonds and inflation through excessive cash emission,” says Lipsits.

Russia’s treasury borrowed money at a record pace in November, fearing that the budget deficit would be much higher, and made record discounts after earlier attempts of borrowing money had failed. This may as well be described as “desperation”, says Dmitry Polevoy, an economist.

Russia’s pre-war national debt was 20.8 trillion [€325.8 billion], and it is planned that it will grow to 23.4 trillion [€367.4 billion] in 2022. Prior to the mobilisation, the government also budgeted for the growth of the national debt to 25.3 trillion [€394.2 billion] in 2023, and to 29.5 trillion [€459.7 billion] in 2025. According to the government’s plan, when the debt rises to this amount, its service will cost 1.8 trillion rubles [€28 billion] a year, exceeding the federal budget’s annual spending on education and healthcare.

However, the things that the government is doing now may significantly increase the costs of debt service. The government borrows money at a more than 10% interest rate, so debt service costs could potentially rise to 3 trillion [€46.7 billion] a year, Lipsits said. The rate might become even higher should the inflation increase.

“Many economists said that a default was impossible because there were large reserves of foreign currency, and the budget was not very much in the red, but that was before February. Now Russia is on a track that could lead it to default,” says Lipsits.

The state may also present the failure to fulfil debt obligations, for example, as a bond freeze, as was the case with debt securities issued under Stalin, Lipsits believes. In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev suggested postponing bonds repayment for 25 years. The Soviet propaganda said that workers met the proposal with applause, and that the support among the people was ubiquitous.

Russia’s treasury will still insist on not allowing too much of a hole in the budget, Aleksashenko thinks.

“I don’t believe they would use up the entire National Welfare Fund or let the deficit go down to 7 trillion [€109 billion]. I think Siluanov will go out on his shield not to let this happen. I don’t know what expenses he will be cutting. They will cut all sorts of expenses, investment ones to begin with, excluding those connected with [Vice PM] Marat Khusnullin. The usual thing the treasury does is that it tells all ministries to cut expenses by 7-10%. The ministries are up to decide what things they need to cut. Then each ministry starts complaining and asking not to cut expenses,” Aleksashenko says.

Mironov believes that the government may also start cutting expenses even more, including social benefits which are still being saved.

According to Lipsits, if Russia’s economy continues to go the same way it does now, then the risk of the government defaulting on its debt obligations may become true in 2025 or 2026. But if the sanctions work effectively next year, and war losses are high, this will happen even sooner, Lipsits believes, noting that the general picture will become clear in February or March 2023. “What we can see now are the first signs, first sketches of this disaster, but not the final outline,” he says.

16.  To deter Russia, EUCOM official stresses 'threat-informed' exercises

To deter Russia, EUCOM official stresses 'threat-informed' exercises - Breaking Defense

Maj. Gen. Jessica Meyeraan said an “interesting development that occurred over the course of the last 12 to 24 months in the NATO parlance is an acknowledgment that we need to focus on a real-world threat.”

breakingdefense.com · by Jaspreet Gill · December 1, 2022

U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade practice acquiring a target with a FIM-92 Stinger during an air defense live-fire exercise alongside soldiers with the Croatian Air Defense Regiment. This training is part of Exercise Shield 22 at Kamenjak near Medulin, Croatia on April 8, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. John Yountz)

I/ITSEC 2022 — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted to US forces in Europe the importance of “threat-informed” exercises with allies, according to a top European Command official.

Speaking Wednesday on a panel about deterring Russian aggression here at the I/ITSEC 2022 conference, Maj. Gen. Jessica Meyeraan, EUCOM’s director of exercises assessments, said an “interesting development that occurred over the course of the last 12 to 24 months in the NATO parlance is an acknowledgment that we need to focus on a real-world threat.

“And what I mean by that is there, for very important and for political reasons, there had been a practice, or still is, [that] we need to reassure political leaders within NATO that [exercises are] appropriate, safe to do and they need to give [their] blessing in order to do it,” she said. “But on the military side, there’s an acknowledgment that… if we’re going to be plans-based as we align our exercises, we need to be threat-informed as well, which is a very important, very powerful development that is going on right now.”

Meyeraan said there are about 150 exercise-related activities that occur in a single day in EUCOM, with 15 to 20 exercises focused on training the joint full force and keeping a globally integrated perspective. She also pointed to a joint exercise program funded by the Joint Staff J6, which is responsible for command, control, communications and computers/cyber requirements.

“In the odd years, it’s to the tune of about $80 million and in the even years it’s about $120 million, so it’s a good amount of money, and through that funding we’re able to bring exercises into that portfolio and use some of that joint funding to offset some of the expenses that the components may be struggling with in order to execute these exercise objectives,” Meyeraan said.

She added that three fiscal 2023 NATO exercises were brought into the joint exercise program and centered around command and control and computer-related exercise activities. The joint exercise program enables the J6 community to take Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) lines of effort and “create” specific EUCOM lines of effort that allows the US to collaborate and communicate with allies and partners.

The Pentagon’s JADC2 lines of effort include data enterprise, human enterprise, technology enterprise, integrating with nuclear command and control, and modernizing mission partner information sharing.

That last line of effort is something the J6 is focusing on right now, creating a NATO-focused mission partner environment that enables information-sharing across the alliance via a “persistent information domain” connecting EUCOM and NATO commands and NATO and allied partner nations in order to share data, Meyeraan said. But more work needs to be done.

“Is it where we need to be? No, but it’s certainly very powerful, very positive first steps in this journey to create this environment,” she said.

breakingdefense.com · by Jaspreet Gill · December 1, 2022

17. Just Half of Americans Trust the Military, Survey Finds

The letter from the Reagan Insitute poll is here: https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/359969/surveypressrelease.pdf?env=6c94d6f31d11030891993329059f41dc29c4a193311f055136747510b118f263&fbclid=IwAR3Wuu9r5KJ7lkUsp7kB6vxeW0_IJjjpIPL_IDBA3iuinjeyFNSWoGhOijE&mibextid=ncKXMA&rid=24309564&utm_source=pocket_saves

​The survey data and information can be accessed here: https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/centers/peace-through-strength/reagan-institute-national-defense-survey/

​

Just Half of Americans Trust the Military, Survey Finds

Most want to continue helping Ukraine—and most don’t think there’s a clear China strategy, according to the Reagan Institute poll.

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

U.S. Army soldiers attend the 103rd annual Veterans Day Parade on November 11, 2022, in New York City. Leonardo Munoz/VIEWpres

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Threats

Most want to continue helping Ukraine—and most don’t think there’s a clear China strategy, according to the Reagan Institute poll.

|

December 1, 2022 12:00 PM ET

By Marcus Weisgerber

Global Business Editor

December 1, 2022 12:00 PM ET

• Civilians
• Ukraine
• China
• Pentagon

Americans’ trust and confidence in the military increased slightly over the past year, but remains near a five-year low, according to a new survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute.

Conducted in early November after the U.S. midterm elections, the study found that 48 percent of the American public trusts and has confidence in the military, up from 45 percent last year but way down from 70 percent in 2018.

“No other public institution has seen this stark of a decline as we have seen for the U.S. military,” said Rachel Hoff, the institute’s policy director. “I'll note that it does still rank at the top of the list of the institutions we poll.”

Why the decline? The perceived over-politicization of military leaders was cited by 62 percent of respondents as the top reason for their decline in confidence. And 59 percent cited “the performance and competence of presidents, as the Commander-In-Chief.”

Also of note: 57 percent of those surveyed said the U.S. “must continue to stand with Ukraine and oppose Russian aggression.” But 33 percent said that “America has enough problems at home and cannot afford to spend more on the conflict.” More Democrats favored continued support for Ukraine (73 percent) than Republicans (51 percent). Some 76 percent of respondents said they view Ukraine as an ally, up from 49 percent one year ago. And 82 percent view Russia as an enemy, up from 65 percent last year. Recall: in 2019, one in four surveyed viewed Russia as an ally of the United States.

Some 77 percent of those surveyed said they were concerned that Russia might use a nuclear weapon, while 74 percent said they were concerned the war in Ukraine might spill over into Eastern Europe and force the U.S. to get involved. And some 70 percent said they were concerned that the war in Ukraine is distracting U.S. policymakers “from the threat posed” by China.

“To me, the way I read it, despite these very real concerns, and the survey makes the respondents aware of those concerns, there's still this continued support for Ukraine,” said Roger Zakheim, the institute’s Washington director.

Some 71 percent of those surveyed said they are concerned that Russian aggression “will inspire other authoritarians to invade their democratic neighbors,” Hoff said.

Finally, 54 percent of those surveyed said that the United States does not have a clear strategy for managing its relationship with China, while 27 percent said the U.S. does have a clear strategy. And 54 percent said they support efforts to reduce the amount of trade between the United States and China. Also: “a bipartisan majority of Americans support efforts to discourage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”

18. China easing 'zero-COVID' policy a 'rare display of weakness' from Xi Jinping, Tiananmen Square protester says

Perhaps. On the other hand it could be an indication of understanding the problems and being strong enough and smart enough to make adjustments (but I do not think that is the case, but it could be). And it takes a strong man to admit he is wrong.

China easing 'zero-COVID' policy a 'rare display of weakness' from Xi Jinping, Tiananmen Square protester says

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

Video

China deploys riot police in hazmat suits to crack down on COVID protests

Riot police in Guangzhou, China, were deployed in hazmat suits to crack down on COVID-19 lockdown protests, in video obtained by Reuters.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is showing a "rare display of weakness" as Beijing looks to roll back some of it’s more extreme COVID-19 policies, according to a former Tiananmen Square protest leader.

"It's hard to predict the outcome of the protests now," Zhou Fengsuo, a human rights activist and former student leader during the Tiananmen Square protests, told Newsweek. "But we are already seeing some loosening of the ‘zero-COVID’ policy, which is a rare display of weakness for Xi Jinping."

Protests have spread to a number of cities across China as residents pushed back against the country’s strict "zero-COVID" policy, in which local governments would lockdown cities and enforce mass testing after detecting just a few cases of COVID-19.

The policy limited the number of deaths to under 6,000 among its 1.4 billion people population, but residents have grown tired of the severe limitations the rules place on their lives three years after the virus first spread.

CHINA DEPLOYS RIOT POLICE IN HAZMAT SUITS TO CRACK DOWN ON COVID PROTESTS

Officials in the Xinjiang region over the weekend started to loosen restrictions in areas with low community spread, declaring that they had basically achieved "societal ‘zero-COVID.’" Experts believe that Beijing has changed course in order to help quell the protests.

Former Tiananmen student leader Fengsuo Zhou testifies during a hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China June 4, 2019 on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. The commission held a hearing on "Tiananmen at 30: Examining the Evolution of Repression in China." (Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images)

However, protests continued to spread across social media in a rare lapse from China’s censorship network, with videos surfacing on Twitter and TikTok showing demonstrations in cities across the country.

US INTELLIGENCE BELIEVES CHINA PROTESTS WILL FAIL TO SPREAD: REPORT

Some of the protests have included anti-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chants, which Zhou applauded as part of "going through a baptism of political activism."

Chinese student leaders hold a candlelight vigil outside the Chinese Embassy in Washington on June 3 to mark the seventh anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. The students who led the protests in Tiananmen later escaped from China, pictured left to right: Liu Gang, Zhou Fengsuo, Chen Tong and Wuer Kaixi. (Richard Ellis/AFP via Getty Images)

"As a survivor of Tiananmen massacre, I am in tears while watching the protesters chanting 'end CCP' in Shanghai, the birthplace of CCP," Zhou said.

TAYLOR LORENZ DEFENDING CHINA LOCKDOWNS LATEST INSTANCE OF MEDIA SHIELDING COMMUNIST REGIME

"Xi Jinping still has complete control within the CCP. But his tight control also means that the system can't deal with surprises because his underlings aren't willing to take initiatives without explicit instructions from Xi," Zhou argued. "Additionally, the ‘zero-COVID’ system is exhausted already. But at this stage, he is still entrenched."

A person holds a banner during a protest in solidarity over the COVID-19 restrictions in mainland China, during a commemoration of the victims of a fire in Urumqi outside the Chinese consulate in Toronto November 29, 2022. (REUTERS/Chris Helgren)

Experts have speculated that Beijing’s policies are unsustainable, but that the government cannot completely roll back its policies until more of the population is vaccinated, which means "zero-COVID" may remain for as long as another year.

Beijing has seen some local neighborhoods allow residents with mild or asymptomatic cases of COVID-19 to isolate at home rather than report to large quarantine facilities.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended its virus response, saying that "facts have proven that China’s epidemic response measures are science-based, correct and effective," adding that the U.S. has a far higher death toll and is in "no position to point fingers."

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Xi’s government has promised to reduce the disruption of its "zero-COVID" strategy by shortening quarantines and making other changes. However, it says it will stick to restrictions that have repeatedly shut down schools and businesses and suspended access to neighborhoods.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

19. Blank paper movement shows Xi backlash: analysts

I heard A4 paper was restricted from sales in China.

• Home Taiwan News

Fri, Dec 02, 2022 page3

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/12/02/2003789975

Blank paper movement shows Xi backlash: analysts

HOPE FOR REFORM: Public fury bottled up for decades was ‘bound to explode’ among protesters who see Taiwan as an example for China to follow, analysts said

• Staff Writer, with CNA
• 
  
•  
•  
• Widespread protests against China’s strict “zero COVID” policy and demanding political freedoms reflect public anger over Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) iron grip on power, some overseas Chinese activists said.
• Protests have broken out throughout China, and students and other residents have joined the “blank paper movement” in dozens of places after COVID-19 restrictions reportedly delayed rescue efforts in a deadly fire on Thursday last week in Urumqi, Xinjiang, leading to 10 deaths and nine injuries.
• Holding up blank sheets of paper has become a metaphor for speech censorship among Chinese.
• 
  

People hold blank sheets of white paper as a symbol of speech restictions in Beijing on Sunday.

• Photo: Reuters
• Han Wu (韓武), a US-based official of the China Democracy Party, which is banned by Beijing, said in Taipei on Tuesday that the protests were instigated by the Communist Youth League (CYL) faction known as tuanpai (團派), in response to Xi’s dominance of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
• Han said that Xi, after securing a third term as head of the CCP at the party congress in October, removed top officials of the CYL who he considered a threat — Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Yang (汪洋) and Second Vice Premier Hu Chunhua (胡春華).
• Subsequently stacking China’s leadership ranks with loyalists was “met with opposition within the CCP and Chinese society,” said Han, who traveled to Taiwan to observe Saturday’s local elections.
• University of Western Australia associate professor Jie Chen (陳杰) said he was surprised to see that the demonstrations went beyond COVID-19 restrictions as protestors chanted slogans to demand “democracy, the rule of law, freedom and the right to vote.”
• The bold acts have defied a stereotype of the post-1990’s generation being more obedient, having been raised in an education system that stresses nationalism and party loyalty to the CCP, said Chen, who left for Australia to study in 1989.
• For a leader such as Xi, who did not hesitate to use force to quell protests in Hong Kong — even at the cost of damaging the its status as an international financial center — there is no reason for optimism that Xi might yield to activist demands, Chen said.
• Nonetheless, the protestors have ignited a light of hope for reform in China, he said.
• Many people have also taken to WeChat, the main social media space in China, to counter a claim by Chinese authorities that the protests were linked to “foreign forces,” Chen said.
• Protesters have questioned how foreign forces could be involved in the protests given China’s censored Internet, the risks of using a virtual private network and restrictions on international travel, Chen said.
• Sheng Xue (盛雪), a participant in the Tiananmen Square movement in the late 1980s, said the uprising against COVID-19 restrictions represented a buildup of public anger over time driven by the CCP’s tightening control over society.
• After decades of economic growth, China has been able to use a variety of technologies to carry out mass surveillance, turning society into a “big prison” in which people struggle to live normal lives with dignity, autonomy and privacy, said Sheng, who now resides in Canada.
• Public fury bottled up for decades was “bound to explode when the time came,” and was sparked by a deadly fire in Urumqi that many people believed the authorities were responsible for, Sheng said.
• Chinese protesters have called on Taiwan and the international community to voice support for the “blank paper movement” in China and to urge Chinese authorities to reform national policies.
• China’s rights advocates view Taiwan as model for a Chinese transition to democracy, as Taiwan discredits Beijing’s argument that public involvement in governance is incompatible with Chinese culture, Chen said, adding that this highlights the importance of Taiwan voicing support for the movement.

20. Xi Broke the Social Contract That Helped China Prosper

Xi Broke the Social Contract That Helped China Prosper

nytimes.com · by Yasheng Huang · December 1, 2022

Pieces of white paper have become symbols of Chinese protests.Credit...Jerome Favre/EPA, via Shutterstock

The protests in China against the government’s draconian Covid controls have been compared to those in 1989, when students demonstrated for political reforms and democracy. The 1989 pro-democracy movement occurred in the most liberal, tolerant and enlightening period in the history of the People’s Republic of China, and the regime opened fire in Tiananmen Square — after the ouster of the liberal leader, Zhao Ziyang — because it had run out of every other control tool in its possession. This is called the Tocqueville paradox: An autocracy is most vulnerable when it is least autocratic.

But a closer analogy is April 5, 1976. On that day and the days before, protesters gathered in Tiananmen Square, demonstrating against the tyrannical rule, deteriorating economic conditions and political persecutions by the Gang of Four and, by implication, its patron, Mao Zedong. That was a movement born out of grievances, not aspirations.

The Covid protests are occurring at the height of China’s autocratic moment. While there are calls for free speech and elections, the rallying cry since Sunday has been against a jarring oppression: the incarceration of hundreds of millions of people in their homes and in field hospitals. Autocracies — whether in China or elsewhere — are oppressive, but has another autocratic regime ever taken away the rights of so many people to lead a normal life?

Politically, Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, has violated a time-tested technique his predecessors used to defuse social tensions: divide and conquer. After 1989, most of the Chinese protests were localized and issue-specific. Rural residents lost their land, but urbanites were showered with benefits. State workers lost their jobs, but private entrepreneurs were wooed to open businesses.

The benefits and losses evened out in the end. Different people harbored different grievances, and their grievances were not synchronized. Not only did the Communist Party survive those scattered protests; it grew and prospered. Today the party has some 96 million members. If it were a country, it would be the world’s 16th largest.

Now consider China’s zero-Covid policy. Its lockdowns put nearly everybody in exactly the same situation, and according to one estimate, almost 400 million people were put under some sort of lockdown in 2022. The affluent Shanghainese have very little in common with people in Urumqi in Xinjiang. Yet when 10 people died in a fire in a high rise in Urumqi, with building doors allegedly locked because of Covid restrictions, empathy, a crucial ingredient in collective actions, arose among Shanghainese who inhabit similar high rises. Never, not even in 1989, had a Chinese regime confronted protests in many cities at the same time.

Mr. Xi’s autocratic style has undermined the institutional interests of the Chinese Communist Party. After Tiananmen Square, Chinese leaders came up with a successful formula to preserve one-party rule while delivering growth, engineering innovations and seeding entrepreneurial success. That formula required loyalty from the Chinese citizens, but it also gave them space.

Young people could go to karaoke and rock ’n’ roll concerts and worship whichever K-pop stars they fancied. Intellectuals could vent their anger and frustration on China’s vibrant social media. And entrepreneurs were so busy making money that they could not even spell the word “politics.” This social contract, in which the Communist Party would observe certain boundaries in exchange for society observing its own, was instrumental in bringing China from the brink of disaster of the Tiananmen crisis and contributed to economic growth and prosperity. Whether we in the West like it or not, opinion surveys during those years showed that young people in China were more supportive of the government’s nationalistic policy agenda than older residents.

Mr. Xi broke that social contract. As early as 2013, his government began to channel bank credits to chronically inefficient state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. Then his government began to crack down on nongovernmental organizations such as feminist groups and on lawyers who helped rural migrant workers negotiate better wage contracts. Even environmentalists were not spared, despite the fact that one of Mr. Xi’s policy priorities was to combat China’s pollution. Censorship was tightened significantly on social media and at Chinese universities. In 2020 and 2021, his government began to target — through fines and regulatory restrictions — China’s crown jewels of technology and entrepreneurship, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and many others.

The crackdown on big tech was counterproductive. China’s private sector generated the tax revenues and appreciations of land assets that have underwritten the Communist Party and its many costly operations, including, yes, its mandatory coronavirus tests. China’s high-tech companies contributed critically to its early success in containing the virus by rolling out health codes at record speed. They also created millions of jobs for China’s young people, and the entrepreneurs who ran those companies became role models for the ambitious Chinese to go into entrepreneurship rather than agonize over human rights and free speech. The Communist Party had the best of both worlds: a private sector that increased the G.D.P. and, as academic research has shown, did not demand political openness.

Zero Covid is another example of a self-inflicted wound. In 2020, Mr. Xi’s government scored an early victory by locking down the city of Wuhan and quickly flattening the infection curve. Instead of using the window of opportunity in 2020 and 2021 to vaccinate its population with all available vaccines, including ones by Pfizer and Moderna, the Chinese government doubled down on the zero-Covid policy against the highly transmissible Omicron variant. It was an effort doomed to failure because it is like “trying to stop the wind,” as Michael Osterholm, an epidemiologist put it.

Mr. Xi’s decision spoke of hubris of the highest degree — a leader staking his reputation on a mission impossible. While the lockdowns brought untold misery, Covid infections rose to a record high, to around 30,000 a day in a recent count. He overpromised and, predictably, underdelivered.

Inadvertently, Mr. Xi has lowered the bar for democracy. When students were holding up blank pieces of paper at protests, they were not thinking of defending the rights of those voicing unpopular, contrary views. They were defending their right to be human — the right to take a walk in the park, to cross the street to get lunch or to visit friends to play a game together.

Chinese citizens just want their lives back, an argument John Stuart Mill never thought of as a defense of free speech. If that is the battleground on which debate on democracy and autocracy is waged, democracy wins every time, and we have Mr. Xi to thank for it.

Yasheng Huang is a professor of global economics and management at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and the author of the forthcoming book “The Rise and the Fall of the EAST: Examination, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology in Chinese History and Today.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

nytimes.com · by Yasheng Huang · December 1, 2022

21.  Can America Really Envision World War III?

No.

Conclusion:

As international relations have deteriorated in recent years, critics of U.S. global primacy have frequently warned that a new cold war was brewing. I have been among them. Yet pointing to a cold war in some ways understates the danger. Relations with Russia and China are not assured to stay cold. During the original Cold War, American leaders and citizens knew that survival was not inevitable. World-rending violence remained an all-too-possible destination of the superpower contest, right up to its astonishing end in 1989.

Today the United States is again assuming the primary burden of countering the ambitions of governments in Moscow and Beijing. When it did so the first time, it lived in the shadow of world war and acted out of a frank and healthy fear of another. This time, lessons will have to be learned without that experience.

OPINION

Can America Really Envision World War III?

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/opinion/america-world-war-iii.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

By Stephen Wertheim

Mr. Wertheim is a scholar and writer on U.S. foreign policy.

• Dec. 2, 2022
• 11 MIN READ

In March, as President Biden was facing pressure to intensify U.S. involvement in Ukraine, he responded by invoking the specter of World War III four times in one day.

“Direct conflict between NATO and Russia is World War III,” he said, “something we must strive to prevent.” He underscored the point hours later: “The idea that we’re going to send in offensive equipment and have planes and tanks and trains going in with American pilots and American crews — just understand, and don’t kid yourself, no matter what you all say, that’s called World War III, OK?”

More than any other presidential statement since Sept. 11, 2001, Mr. Biden’s warning signaled the start of a new era in American foreign policy. Throughout my adult life and that of most Americans today, the United States bestrode the world, essentially unchallenged and unchecked. A few years ago, it was still possible to expect a benign geopolitical future. Although “great power competition” became the watchword of Pentagonese, the phrase could as easily imply sporting rivalry as explosive conflict. Washington, Moscow and Beijing would stiffly compete but could surely coexist.

How quaint. The United States now faces the real and regular prospect of fighting adversaries strong enough to do Americans immense harm. The post-Sept. 11 forever wars have been costly, but a true great power war — the kind that used to afflict Europe — would be something else, pitting the United States against Russia or even China, whose economic strength rivals America’s and whose military could soon as well.

This grim reality has arrived with startling rapidity. Since February, the war in Ukraine has created an acute risk of U.S.-Russia conflict. It has also vaulted a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to the forefront of American fears and increased Washington’s willingness to respond with military force. “That’s called World War III,” indeed.

Yet how many Americans can truly envision what a third world war would mean? Just as great power conflict looms again, those who witnessed the last one are disappearing. Around 1 percent of U.S. veterans of World War II remain alive to tell their stories. It is estimated that by the end of this decade, fewer than 10,000 will be left. The vast majority of Americans today are unused to enduring hardship for foreign policy choices, let alone the loss of life and wealth that direct conflict with China or Russia would bring.

Preparing the country shouldn’t begin with tanks, planes and ships. It will require a national effort of historical recovery and imagination — first and foremost to enable the American people to consider whether they wish to enter a major war if the moment of decision arrives.

N

avigating great power conflict is hardly a novel challenge for the United States. By 1945, Americans had lived through two world wars. The country emerged triumphant yet sobered by its wounds. Even as the wars propelled the United States to world leadership, American leaders and citizens feared that a third world war might be as probable as it today appears unthinkable. Perhaps that is one reason a catastrophe was avoided.

For four decades, America’s postwar presidents appreciated that the next hot war would likely be worse than the last. In the nuclear age, “we will be a battlefront,” Truman said. “We can look forward to destruction here, just as the other countries in the Second World War.” This insight didn’t keep him or his successors from meddling in Third World countries, from Guatemala to Indonesia, where the Cold War was brutal. But U.S. leaders, regardless of party, recognized that if the United States and the Soviet Union squared off directly, nuclear weapons would lay waste to the American mainland.

Nuclear terror became part of American life, thanks to a purposeful effort by the government to prepare the country for the worst. The Federal Civil Defense Administration advised citizens to build bomb shelters in their backyards and keep clean homes so there would be less clutter to ignite in a nuclear blast. The film “Duck and Cover,” released in 1951, encouraged schoolchildren to act like animated turtles and hide under a makeshift shell — “a table or desk or anything else close by” — if nukes hit. By the 1960s, yellow-and-black signs for fallout shelters dotted American cities.

The specter of full-scale war kept the Cold War superpowers in check. In 1950, Truman sent U.S. troops to defend South Korea against invasion by the Communist North, but his resolve had limits. After Gen. Douglas MacArthur implored Truman to blast China and North Korea with 34 nuclear bombs, the president fired the general. Evoking the “disaster of World War II,” he told the nation: “We will not take any action which might place upon us the responsibility of initiating a general war — a third world war.”

The extreme violence of the world wars and the anticipation of a sequel also shaped President John F. Kennedy’s decisions during the Cuban missile crisis, when the Soviet Union moved to place nuclear weapons 90 miles from Florida. Kennedy, who had served in the Pacific and rescued a fellow sailor after their ship went down, grew frustrated with his military advisers for recommending preventative strikes on Soviet missile sites. Instead of opening fire, he imposed a naval blockade around Cuba and demanded that the Soviets withdraw their missiles. A one-week superpower standoff ensued. Approximately 10 million Americans fled their homes. Crowds descended on civil defense offices to find out how to survive a nuclear blast. The Soviets backed down after Kennedy secretly promised to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The world had come so close to nuclear Armageddon that Kennedy, citing the danger of a third and total war, took the first steps toward détente before his death in 1963.

B

ut memory is never static. After the Soviet Union collapsed and generations turned over, World War II was recast as a moral triumph and no longer a cautionary tale.

In the 1990s, an outpouring of film, history and literature celebrated the “greatest generation,” as journalist Tom Brokaw anointed those who won the war for America. Under their watch, the United States had saved the world and stopped the Holocaust — which retrospectively vaulted to the center of the war’s purpose, even though stopping the mass murder of European Jews was not why the United States had entered. A new generation, personally untouched by great power war, reshaped the past, revering their elders but simplifying the often varied and painful experiences of veterans.

In this context, the double lesson of the world wars — calling America to lead the world but cautioning it not to overreach — narrowed to a single-minded exhortation to sustain and even expand American power. Presidents began to invoke World War II to glorify the struggle and justify American global dominance. On the anniversary of Pearl Harbor in 1991, George H.W. Bush told the country that “isolationism flew escort for the very bombers that attacked our men 50 years ago.” Commemorating the 50th anniversary of D-Day in 1994, Bill Clinton recalled how the Allied troops gathered “like the stars of a majestic galaxy” and “unleashed their democratic fury,” fighting a battle that continued.

In 2004 the imposing World War II Memorial, one decade and $197 million in the making, went up between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. George W. Bush, a year into invading Iraq, gave the dedication: “The scenes of the concentration camps, the heaps of bodies and ghostly survivors, confirmed forever America’s calling to oppose the ideologies of death.” Preventing a repeat of World War II no longer involved exercising caution; it meant toppling tyrants.

Besides, why dwell on the horrors of global conflict at a time when no such thing even seemed possible? With post-Soviet Russia reeling and China poor, there were no more great powers for the United States to fight. Scholars discussed the obsolescence of major war.

It wasn’t just major war that seemed passé. So did the need to pay any significant costs for foreign policy choices. Since the Vietnam War roiled American society, leaders moved to insulate the American public from the harms of any conflict, large or small: The creation of an all-volunteer force did away with the draft; air power bombed targets from safe heights; the advent of drones allowed killing by remote control.

The deaths of more than 7,000 service members in the post-Sept. 11 wars — and approximately four times as many by suicide — devastated families and communities but were not enough to produce a Vietnam-style backlash. Likewise, although the wars have cost a whopping $8 trillion and counting, the payments have been spread over decades and passed to the future.

Not having to worry about the effects of wars — unless you enlist to fight in them — has nearly become a birthright of being American.

T

hat birthright has come to an end. The United States is entering an era of intense great power rivalry that could escalate to large-scale conventional or nuclear war. It’s time to think through the consequences.

The “acute threat,” as the new National Security Strategy states, comes from Moscow. President Vladimir Putin controls thousands of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy civilization many times over. Since invading Ukraine, he has threatened to use them.

Mr. Putin could plausibly act on that threat under several scenarios: if U.S. or NATO forces directly enter the conflict, if he believes his rule is threatened or if Ukrainian forces verge on retaking Crimea. No one knows precisely what might prompt the Kremlin to employ a nuclear weapon, but Mr. Biden recently said that the risk of Armageddon was the highest it has been since the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Biden has ruled out using force to defend Ukraine. His administration is pursuing a finely tailored objective: It seeks to strengthen Ukraine’s position on the battlefield in order to strengthen its hand in peace negotiations. That goal does not commit the United States to ensuring a complete Ukrainian victory. Yet the Ukrainian Army’s recent successes have prompted American commentators to redouble their backing for Kyiv and further marginalize talk of diplomacy (not that Mr. Putin has shown any readiness to stop the killing).

If the possibility of war with Russia was not enough, U.S. relations with China are in free fall, setting up the world’s two leading powers to square off for decades to come.

Despite Mr. Biden’s caution toward Russia, he is contributing to the rising chances of conflict with China. In a series of interviews, he asserted that the United States has a commitment to defend Taiwan (in fact, it is obligated only to help arm the island) and vowed to send U.S. troops in the event of a Chinese invasion. These repeated gaffes are likely intended to deter Beijing in light of its many recent military maneuvers around the island. But especially in tandem with high-level congressional visits to Taipei, they risk implying that the United States wishes to keep Taiwan permanently separated from the mainland — a position it is hard to imagine Beijing will ever accept.

Equally important, Mr. Biden seems to be saying that defending Taiwan would be worth the price of war with China. But what would such a war entail?

A series of recent war games held by think tanks help us to imagine what it would look like: First, a war will likely last a long time and take many lives. Early on, China would have incentives to mount a massive attack with its now highly developed long-range strike capability to disable U.S. forces stationed in the Pacific. Air Force Gen. Mark D. Kelly said that China’s forces are “designed to inflict more casualties in the first 30 hours of combat than we’ve endured over the last 30 years in the Middle East.”

In most rounds of a war game recently conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States swiftly lost two aircraft carriers, each carrying at least 5,000 people, on top of hundreds of aircraft, according to reports. One participant noted that although each simulation varied, “what almost never changes is it’s a bloody mess and both sides take some terrible losses.” At some stage, those Selective Service registrations required of young American men might need to be expanded and converted into a draft.

Second, each side would be tempted to escalate. This summer, the Center for a New American Security held a war game that ended with China detonating a nuclear weapon near Hawaii. “Before they knew it,” both Washington and Beijing “had crossed key red lines, but neither was willing to back down,” the conveners concluded. Especially in a prolonged war, China could mount cyberattacks to disrupt critical American infrastructure. It might shut off the power in a major city, obstruct emergency services or bring down communications systems. A new current of fear and suspicion would course through American society, joining up with the nativism that has reverberated through national politics since Sept. 11.

The economic consequences would be equally severe. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which produces most of the world’s advanced semiconductors, would profoundly damage the U.S. and global economy regardless of Washington’s response. (To this end, the United States has been trying to move more semiconductor manufacturing home.) But a U.S.-China war would risk catastrophic losses. Researchers at RAND estimate that a yearlong conflict would slash America’s gross domestic product by 5 to 10 percent. By contrast, the U.S. economy contracted 2.6 percent in 2009, the worst year of the Great Recession. The gas-price surge early in the Ukraine war provides only the slightest preview of what a US.-China war would generate. For the roughly three-fifths of Americans who currently live paycheck to paycheck, the war would come home in millions of lost jobs, wrecked retirements, high prices and shortages.

In short, a war with Russia or China would likely injure the United States on a scale without precedent in the living memory of most citizens. That, in turn, introduces profound uncertainty about how the American political system would perform. Getting in would be the easy part. More elusive is whether the public and its representatives would maintain the will to fight over far-flung territories in the face of sustained physical attack and economic calamity. When millions are thrown out of work, will they find Taiwan’s cause worth their sacrifice? Could national leaders compellingly explain why the United States was paying the grievous price of World War III?

These questions will be asked during a conflict, so they ought to be asked in advance. Even those who think the United States should fight for Ukraine or Taiwan have an interest in educating the public about the stakes of great power conflict in the nuclear and cyber age.

The last nuclear-related sign I saw, a few weeks ago, proudly declared a small liberal suburb of Washington, D.C., to be a “nuclear-free zone.” “Duck and Cover” deserves a 21st-century remake — something a bit more memorable than the Department of Homeland Security’s “Nuclear Explosion” fact sheet, which nonetheless contains sound advice. (For example, after the shock wave passes, you have 10 minutes or more to find shelter before the radioactive fallout arrives.) For every moral condemnation of adversaries’ actions, Americans should hear candid assessments of the costs of trying to stop them. A war game broadcast on “Meet the Press” in May offered one model. Even better to follow it with a peace game, showing how to avoid devastation in the first place. Without raising public awareness, political leaders risk bringing about the worst-case outcome — of waging World War III and losing it when the country recoils.

A

s international relations have deteriorated in recent years, critics of U.S. global primacy have frequently warned that a new cold war was brewing. I have been among them. Yet pointing to a cold war in some ways understates the danger. Relations with Russia and China are not assured to stay cold. During the original Cold War, American leaders and citizens knew that survival was not inevitable. World-rending violence remained an all-too-possible destination of the superpower contest, right up to its astonishing end in 1989.

Today the United States is again assuming the primary burden of countering the ambitions of governments in Moscow and Beijing. When it did so the first time, it lived in the shadow of world war and acted out of a frank and healthy fear of another. This time, lessons will have to be learned without that experience.

Stephen Wertheim is a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School and Catholic University. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.”

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com