|
Quotes of the Day:
"Everyone has inside of him a piece of good news. The good news is that you don't know how great you can be! How much you can love! What you can accomplish! And what your potential is!"
– Anne Frank
"Honesty is the first chapter in the book of wisdom."
Thomas Jefferson
"Life's most persistent and urgent question is, "What are you doing for others?"
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
1. UPDATED: Joint Russian, Chinese Pacific Bomber Flight Prompts Japan and South Korea to Scramble Fighters
2. US announces more sanctions on North Korean and Russian nationals, companies
3. The dangerous empowerment of Russia and North Korea needs decisive counteraction
4. North Korea sends powerful rocket system to Russia for first time, Kyiv says
5. Zelenskyy says N.K. troops deployed to western Russia killed, injured
6. S. Korean Embassy in U.S. hires lobbying firm previously linked to Trump's new chief of staff
7. N. Korea demolishing S. Korean-built golf course clubhouse at Mount Kumgang resort: Seoul official
8. North Korea’s Kim Citing War in Ukraine as Rationale for Attacking Free Korea
9. S. Korea to tighten security rules for drones, undersea cables
10. New 8,200-ton Jeongjo the Great Aegis destroyer commissioned in Busan
11. North Korean food prices soar as currency crisis deepens
12. Kim Jong Un slams US support of Ukraine in talks with Russian defense chief
13. Israel’s New Approach to Tunnels: A Paradigm Shift in Underground Warfare
14. Supreme Court confirms mental damage compensation for Gwangju uprising victims
1. UPDATED: Joint Russian, Chinese Pacific Bomber Flight Prompts Japan and South Korea to Scramble Fighters
Creating opportunities or dilemmas for ROK-Japan - US trilateral security cooperation?
What effects are China and Russia seeking to achieve?
Photos and map at the link: https://news.usni.org/2024/11/29/joint-russian-chinese-pacific-bomber-flight-prompts-japan-and-south-korea-to-scramble-fighters?mc_cid=362eb90abf
UPDATED: Joint Russian, Chinese Pacific Bomber Flight Prompts Japan and South Korea to Scramble Fighters - USNI News
Dzirhan Mahadzir
November 29, 2024 10:10 PM - Updated: December 1, 2024 7:57 PM
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · November 30, 2024
Chinese and Russian aircraft flying on Nov. 29, 2024. JSO Photos
Russia and China conducted two days of joint bomber flights on Friday and Saturday. The first taking place on Friday over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea while the second took place over the East China Sea and Miyako Strait. Friday’s joint flight caused Japan and South Korea to scramble fighter jets while Saturday’s flight resulted in Japan scrambling fighter jets as the flight path, while in international airspace were in the vicinity of Japan’s southwest islands.
The joint bomber flight was the first time China deployed nuclear weapons capable bombers in the joint flight. It’s the second joint bomber flight this year following an earlier flight through the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone in July.
On Friday morning, two Chinese H-6 bombers along with two J-16 fighter aircraft flew from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan, Japan’s Joint Staff Office said. In the afternoon the two H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers flew together over a long distance from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. The JSO said one Russian Su-35 fighter joined the bombers as they flew together over the Sea of Japan. The release added that a Chinese Y-9 electronic intelligence aircraft flew from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan in the morning of the same day, and while the Chinese bombers were flying in the morning and afternoon, an estimated one presumed Chinese aircraft was flying over the East China Sea and during the time the Russian bombers were flying over the Sea of Japan, an estimated one presumed Russian aircraft was also flying over the Sea of Japan.
The JSO included a map of the flight paths by the Russian and Chinese aircraft along with photographs of taken by intercepting JASDF aircraft, , “In response to these, fighter jets from the Western Air Defense Force of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and other forces were scrambled to respond,” reads the release.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement five Chinese military aircraft and six Russian military aircraft sequentially entered and left the East Sea and South Sea Korean Air Defense Identification Zone on Friday and that there were no airspace violations.
JSO Image
“Our military identified the Chinese and Russian military aircraft before they entered KADIZ, and implemented tactical measures by deploying Air Force fighter jets to prepare for contingencies.”, concluded the release.
An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is a region that a country designates and uses to detect, identify and control aircraft entering the area in the interest of national security and usually extends well beyond a country’s territorial airspace, ADIZ’s are not recognized by international law and by other countries whose aircraft enter the area, which considers them as international airspace that may be freely flown through. Standard practice for most countries is to have fighters intercept and ‘escort’ the aircraft entering the ADIZ until it leaves the area.
Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense protested the joint bomber flight, stating in a release that Woo Kyung-seok, the head of the Regional Security Cooperation Task Force of the Ministry of National Defense made separate phone calls to the Chinese and Russian Defense Attaches in South Korea to lodge a strong protest on the joint flight urged China and Russia to make efforts to prevent a recurrence.
The release added that the Ministry of National Defense expressed regret to both countries for the Chinese and Russian military aircraft entering the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) without prior notice and flying for a long time, “The Ministry of National Defense strongly requested that appropriate measures be taken to prevent a recurrence, as such actions could unnecessarily create tensions in the region.”, concluded the release.
China’s Ministry of National Defense posted a short release on the joint bomber flight,
“According to the annual cooperation plan between the Chinese and Russian militaries, on Nov. 29, the two sides organized and implemented the ninth joint air strategic cruise in the relevant airspace of the Sea of Japan.”, read the release. China Bugle, the official social media network of the People’s Liberation Army posted images on its X social media account along with a video on its Weibo social media account. The Weibo posting also stated this was the first public release of footage of the H-6N’s combat cruise.
The H-6N is the nuclear weapons capable variant of the Xian H-6 bomber, a license-built version of the Russian Tupolev Tu-16, previous bomber flights had involved the conventional armed H-6K, the latest variant of the H-6 series. Friday’s flight marked the first time China has deployed a nuclear-capable bomber in the joint flight. Russia usually deploys nuclear weapons capable Tu-95MS bombers for the joint flights. Russia has yet to issue any release on the joint bomber flight at the time of writing.
The Ninth Joint Air Strategic Cruise is the second one carried out this year, with the previous Eighth Joint Air Strategic Cruise carried out on Jul. 24 in the Alaska ADIZ, prompting intercepts by Canadian and U.S fighter aircraft assigned to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) though no violations of U.S airspace occurred. The Eighth Joint Air Strategic Cruise was carried out on Dec. 14 last year in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan, which also led to Tokyo and Seoul scrambling their fighter jets in response.
On Saturday, the JSO said that two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers conducted a long-distance flight between the morning and afternoon of that day and that the bombers flew from the direction of China, passed between Okinawa and Miyako Island, entered the Philippine Sea and then turned around there and subsequently passed between Okinawa and Miyako Island again to enter the East China Sea.
The JSO also stated that during the flight, the bombers were joined by 4 Chinese J-16 fighters, 1 presumed Chinese fighter and 1 Chinese Y-20 tanker aircraft. Imagery released by the JSO showed the Y-20 conducting a mid-air refuelling operation with 2 of the J-16s. The mid-air refuelling is likely the first time China has carried out such in the vicinity of southwest Japan though the JSO made no mention of it. The JSO also stated that two more J-16 fighters joined the bombers as they departed the Philippine Sea.
The release also said that ahead of the joint bomber flight, two Chinese Y-9 electronic intelligence aircraft flew between Okinawa and Miyako Island the Philippine Sea and returned to the East China Sea the same way in the morning. Imagery released showed one of the Y-9s being the rarely seenY-9LG variant, which entered service in 2022 and can be distinguished from other Y-9 variants due to its top mounted beam antenna. China deployed the Y-9LG variant overseas for the first time in Thailand during the Joint China-Thai air exercise Falcon Strike carried out from Aug. 18 -29 at Udon Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) in Udon Thani in northern Thailand.
Following the joint bomber flight, the Russian bombers flew circuits between Okinawa and Miyako Island and subsequently passed through the Tsushima Strait and flew over the Sea of Japan before returning to the Russian continent and that while the bombers were operating over the Sea of Japan, it was confirmed that one presumed Russian aircraft and two presumed Russian fighter jets were flying over the Sea of Japan, according to the release which also stated that in response, fighter jets from the Southwestern Air Defense Force command and other units of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) were scrambled.
China’s MND issued a short release on Saturday stating that on Nov. 30, the air forces of China and Russia completed the second phase of the ninth joint air strategic cruise in the western Pacific airspace. In a separate release on Sunday, MND spokesperson Snr. Col Zhang Xiaogang stated that from Nov. 29-30, the Chinese and Russian air forces went to the relevant airspace of the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific Ocean to organize and implement a joint air strategic cruise, which effectively tested and improved the joint training and operational capabilities of the two air forces, “The China-Russia joint air strategic cruise is a routine project in the annual cooperation plan, is not targeted at any third party, and has nothing to do with the current international and regional situation”.
Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) on Saturday issued a release stating that the aviation group consisting of Tu-95ms strategic missile carriers of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Xian H-6 strategic bombers of the PLA Army Air Force carried out air patrols over the waters of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the western part of the Pacific Ocean.
The MOD said that the duration of the joint flight of Russian and Chinese aircraft was about 8 hours though it did not make clear as to whether this was combined number of hours for both days or for each day’s flights. South Korea’s JCS clocked Friday’s passage of the joint bomber flight through the KADIZ as taking place from 9.35 a.m. to 1.53 p.m making a total of 4 hours and 18 minutes.
The MOD release stated that fighter jet air cover was provided along the entire route of the joint patrol by Su-30sm and MiG-31 fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Shenyang J-16 fighters of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and that during the joint air patrol, Russian aircraft landed and took off from an airfield in the People’s Republic of China. It also said at certain stages of the route, the strategic missile carriers were escorted by fighter-jets of foreign states, “In carrying out the flight mission, the aircraft of both countries acted strictly in accordance with the provisions of international law. There were no violations of the airspace of foreign states.”, read the release.
The release also stated that during the flight, the Tu-95m bombers performed aerial refueling at night, footage from the video released by the Russian MOD showed the Tu-95s carrying out mid-air refuelling with each other and a Chinese H-6 bomber. At the end of the joint air patrol, all the aircraft involved returned to their departure airfields said the release, “The event was conducted as part of the implementation of the 2024 military cooperation plan and was not directed against third countries,” concluded the release.
Both Russia and China have repeatedly said that the joint bomber flights are part of their regularly planned schedule of cooperation activities and are not targeted at any countries, Japan however claims otherwise, the Japan Ministry of Defence’s 2024 Defence of Japan defence white paper reads that “The repeated joint flights of bombers and joint navigations of ships between China and Russia are obviously intended as demonstration activities against Japan and are a grave concern for Japan’s security.”
Related
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · November 30, 2024
2. US announces more sanctions on North Korean and Russian nationals, companies
US announces more sanctions on North Korean and Russian nationals, companies
Designations appear aimed at curbing military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow, while also blacklisting Chinese firm
Ifang Bremer December 2, 2024
https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/us-announces-more-sanctions-on-north-korean-and-russian-nationals-companies/
A KN-23 SRBM, a missile that North Korea is providing to Russia, launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) | Images: KCTV (March 28, 2023)
The U.S. Department of State has announced new sanctions on North Korean and Russian nationals, a Russian firm and a Chinese company, in an apparent attempt to counter increasing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The department published a document on Friday detailing the new designations under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), but it has yet to detail the specific grounds for sanctioning the targeted individuals and firms.
The sanctions individuals are:
- Kim Sang Chol (DPRK national)
- Ri Sung Chol (DPRK national)
- Igor Aleksandrovich Michurin (Russian national)
The designated firms are:
- Bearings on Lipetsk LLC (Russian entity)
- Dandong Mason-Age Trade Co Ltd. (Chinese entity)
The State Department already sanctioned DPRK national Ri in 2022 for “transferring sensitive items” related to North Korea’s missile program.
Michurin was also previously sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury in 2017 and later by the State Department in 2022, both times for aiding North Korea with its nuclear and ballistic missile program.
But it’s not clear who Kim Sang Chol is, or how this person might have violated sanctions. The name does not appear in past international or unilateral sanctions on North Korea, nor has DPRK state media mentioned the individual.
Bearings on Lipetsk LLC is a Moscow-based firm. Russian corporate records show the firm’s general manager is Ekaterina Aleksandrovna Michurin, who shares the same last name as the sanctioned individual Igor Aleksandrovich Michurin.
Dandong Mason-Age Trade is a Chinese import-export firm located on the border with North Korea, but little is known about its operations. The U.S. has previously sanctioned companies in Dandong, located right on the border with China, for involvement in facilitating the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction.
The State Department did not immediately respond to NK News questions on what prompted the designations, or what the individuals and entities listed are suspected of.
But the timing of the designations and the focus on Russia and North Korea suggest that the sanctions are related to countering military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang over the war in Ukraine.
The new designations went into effect on Nov. 20, according to the State Department records, just over a week before Russian defense chief Andrei Belousov visited North Korea and met with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un to discuss increasing military ties between the two countries.
North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery munitions and missiles as well as with large artillery systems and troops to support its invasion of Ukraine.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, told NK News on Saturday that Belousov’s visit to Pyongyang indicates that more troop and arms transfers are likely to follow.
“Russia is saying that they are ready to deepen their military partnership with North Korea even if it brings instability to the region,” the expert said.
The U.N. enacted INKSNA in 1999 to block the transfer of goods and technology related to missiles, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons to Iran, but it was later expanded to include North Korea and Syria.
The sanctions mean that no U.S. firms or individuals are allowed to do business with the listed companies and individuals for at least two years.
Edited by Alannah Hill
3. The dangerous empowerment of Russia and North Korea needs decisive counteraction
It is good to see the Foreign Minister of Estonia weigh in and call attention to this situation. But he does not sufficiently answer the headline or provide any significant new concepts. Like most he offers no concept for "decisive counteraction" except to support Ukraine in winning the war (which is necessary regardless of whether north Korea is involved) as well as what we long called for - e.g., attacking north Korea's illicit activities around the world.
Excerpts:
But more importantly, this deeper cooperation means great empowerment for North Korea, which gains access to cutting-edge military technologies to advance its nuclear program, hard currency that will further feed the aggressiveness of the regime and training from Russia that significantly enhances its capabilities. The North Korean units that have not fought a war in decades will acquire firsthand combat experience on the battlefield — even when not many of them are expected to return home — and Ukraine will serve as a testing ground, including for new weapons systems.
...
Ukraine is first on the line fighting North Korean units. Therefore, our first answer should be to step up military support to Ukraine without any restrictions. This would help Ukrainians to defend against increased military pressure from two aggressors and demoralize the addition of units to the frontline. Additionally, intelligence sharing must be increased and pressure toughened through new sanctions, along with better implementation of the existing ones. There must be an end to the situation where Ukraine is hit by North Korea’s missiles using crucial components produced by Western manufacturers. Also, North Korea’s illegal activities such as money laundering must be cracked down on.
...
It’s time to recognize that the battle for Ukraine is not just about that country’s future — it’s about the future of the global balance of power. Peace and stability in the U.S., Europe and Indo-Pacific can be achieved through projection of strength, otherwise the vacuum is filled by our adversaries. This dangerous alliance between Russia and North Korea must be decisively obstructed now, otherwise we risk allowing Russia and North Korea to reshape the international security landscape to their advantage.
The dangerous empowerment of Russia and North Korea needs decisive counteraction
by Margus Tsahkna, opinion contributor - 12/01/24 1:00 PM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/5015204-russia-north-korea-alliance/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/northkorea
It’s time for the international community to fully recognize the gravity of the deepening alliance between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which empowers them both and makes them growingly dangerous for the U.S., Europe and our allies in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of ridiculing the desperation of Russia having to turn to the North Koreans, we need to consider the fact that this may shape the trajectory of the war of aggression and tip the balance of power in favor of authoritarian regimes.
It’s a reality now that the forces of a totalitarian dictatorship with an illicit nuclear weapons program are directly supporting Russia in its aggression against Ukraine by participating in the fighting just few hundred miles from NATO’s border.
It’s alarming at first because it makes clear that Russia’s war effort is no longer solely reliant on its own resources, but is increasingly dependent on a network of authoritarian regimes that are strengthening each other’s military capabilities.
Already for too long, the extensive delivery of North Korea’s missiles and artillery shells has allowed Russia to preserve its own dwindling resources and offered Russia a cheap way to keep fighting without having to deplete its own stockpiles, buying time and space for its own production. Now, North Korea is making it possible for the war to drag on by sending its soldiers to the battlefield.
North Korea’s help provides an immediate and cheap military boost to Russia. It allows Moscow to postpone full-scale mobilization and therefore diminishes the risk of domestic unrest. Human life has no inherent value in Russia or in North Korea, whereas Ukraine tries to spare its forces as much as possible. This gives Russia an upper hand on the frontline.
But more importantly, this deeper cooperation means great empowerment for North Korea, which gains access to cutting-edge military technologies to advance its nuclear program, hard currency that will further feed the aggressiveness of the regime and training from Russia that significantly enhances its capabilities. The North Korean units that have not fought a war in decades will acquire firsthand combat experience on the battlefield — even when not many of them are expected to return home — and Ukraine will serve as a testing ground, including for new weapons systems.
North Korea, already one of the world’s most aggressive and unpredictable regimes, now finds itself emboldened and in a position to become an even greater threat to the strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula, to the security of the Indo-Pacific region as well as to the U.S. and Europe.
For the democratic world, the stakes could not be higher. A Russian victory in Ukraine, fuelled by North Korean support, would send a dangerous message to the world that the balance of power is tipping in favor of authoritarian regimes. It would show that the likes of Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un can start a war and get away with it and that global adversaries are emboldening.
This scenario would weaken the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. and its allies, making it more difficult to confront future threats and it could lead to a broader destabilization of the global order, where authoritarian regimes feel empowered to challenge the norms that have sustained international peace for decades.
The deepening alliance between two rogue actors that undermines Euro-Atlantic and global security needs a firm and quick response by the U.S. and its allies.
Ukraine is first on the line fighting North Korean units. Therefore, our first answer should be to step up military support to Ukraine without any restrictions. This would help Ukrainians to defend against increased military pressure from two aggressors and demoralize the addition of units to the frontline. Additionally, intelligence sharing must be increased and pressure toughened through new sanctions, along with better implementation of the existing ones. There must be an end to the situation where Ukraine is hit by North Korea’s missiles using crucial components produced by Western manufacturers. Also, North Korea’s illegal activities such as money laundering must be cracked down on.
It’s time to recognize that the battle for Ukraine is not just about that country’s future — it’s about the future of the global balance of power. Peace and stability in the U.S., Europe and Indo-Pacific can be achieved through projection of strength, otherwise the vacuum is filled by our adversaries. This dangerous alliance between Russia and North Korea must be decisively obstructed now, otherwise we risk allowing Russia and North Korea to reshape the international security landscape to their advantage.
Margus Tsahkna is the foreign minister of Estonia.
4. North Korea sends powerful rocket system to Russia for first time, Kyiv says
There has been a good bit of reporting on this over the past few days.
North Korea sends powerful rocket system to Russia for first time, Kyiv says
DPRK reportedly transfers dozens of 240mm MLRs in new shipment, as well as 100 ballistic missiles and at least 5M shells
https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/north-korea-sends-powerful-rocket-system-to-russia-for-first-time-kyiv-says/
Anton Sokolin December 2, 2024
240mm multiple launch rocket systems at a military parade on Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang in April 2017 | Image: NK News
North Korea has sent dozens of powerful rocket artillery systems to Russia for the first time, according to a Ukrainian official, a development that one expert said could provide a significant advantage to Russia on the battlefield.
In a Telegram post on Friday, Ukrainian official Andrii Kovalenko said the DPRK has transferred the M-1991 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRs) as part of a shipment of hundreds of units of military equipment, citing the Kyiv’s defense intelligence service.
The shipment also featured M-1989 Koksan self-propelled guns previously spotted in Russia, as well as 100 KN-23 medium-range missiles and “at least 5 million shells,” according to Kovalenko, who heads Kyiv’s Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council.
The military analyst Joost Oliemans told NK News the M-1991 MLRs could strengthen Russian forces by serving as a suitable replacement for “attrited Uragan/Smerch systems.”
The rocket system, developed and finalized in the 1980-1990s, was upgraded in the 2000s and can deliver payloads ranging from 60-70 km, firing its entire 22-round volley within 35 seconds, Oliemans wrote in his book “The Armed Forces of North Korea.”
“This family of MRLs is especially dreaded because it could theoretically reach targets well into South Korea and swiftly relocate after firing to avoid retaliation,” the book states.
The expert told NK News that apart from their long range and “impressive payloads,” the M-1991s are highly adaptable as they are capable of firing a wide range of munitions such as “flechette, cluster, thermobaric and precision-guided shells,” combining increased firepower and precision.
Russia is not the first country to acquire these systems, Oliemans noted in his book, qeirinf that North Korea previously supplied the MLRs’ predecessors — 240mm M-1985s and M-1989s — to Iran, Angola and the UAE from the 1980s to 2000s, while Myanmar acquired M-1991s in 2008.
Live-fire drills of 240mm multiple launch rocket systems in Oct. 2024| Image: KCNA (Oct. 9, 2024)
North Korea has invested heavily in the modernization of its MLRs in recent years, conducting at least five live-fire tests of its upgraded 240mm system this year alone. Pyongyang claims to have improved the system’s accuracy by introducing new guidance equipment and “controllable” shells.
NK News previously reported on the delivery of multiple Koksan large artillery systems earlier last month, when photos of the weapons being transported by rail westward through the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk emerged on Russian and Ukrainian social media.
KN-23/24 missiles, also known as Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B in the DPRK, have also contributed to Russia’s offensive against Ukraine, causing destruction and claiming civilian lives.
After recovering debris of these missiles in Ukraine, investigators found that Pyongyang actively integrates foreign components from the U.S., Japan and the U.K. among others, in their production, some of which were manufactured as recently as 2023-2024.
“Unfortunately, the enemy is increasingly using ballistic missiles from North Korea against civilians,” Kovalenko stated on Friday, calling on the West to boost export controls on tech used in DPRK weapon production and stop their re-export to Russia, Belarus, Iran and North Korea.
The news came the same day that Russian defense minister Andrei Belousov arrived in Pyongyang for military talks with his counterpart No Kwang Chol and DPRK leader Kim Jong Un, raising concerns about additional supplies of troops and weapons to support Russia’s offensive against Ukraine.
Notably, Belousov invited DPRK soldiers to participate in a large-scale military parade in Moscow on May 9 next year, when Russia will celebrate the 80th anniversary of its victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Meanwhile, Kim lauded Russia’s recent Oreshnik medium-range missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, calling it an appropriate response to the West approving Ukraine’s recent ATACMS and Storm Shadow attacks on Russian cities.
Chris Monday, a Russia expert at Dongseo University, called Belousov’s trip to Pyongyang a warning for the ROK not to get involved in the Ukraine conflict, as it came as a “counter” to Kyiv’s defense chief Rustem Umerov’s trip to Seoul for defense talks President Yoon Suk-yeol last week.
Edited by Alannah Hill
5. Zelenskyy says N.K. troops deployed to western Russia killed, injured
I still have not found any definitive reporting on what the nKPA forces are doing. It is mostly speculation and circular reporting. I look forward to finding out how they are really being employed and of course their effectiveness.
Zelenskyy says N.K. troops deployed to western Russia killed, injured | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 2, 2024
SEOUL, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said North Korean soldiers deployed to western Russia have been killed or injured during combat against Ukrainian forces, adding to global criticism they will be used as "cannon fodder" for Moscow, a Japanese report showed.
Zelenskyy shared the assessment during an interview with Japan's Kyodo news agency on Sunday without providing further details on the number of casualties, saying Kyiv needs "to have proof" before disclosing the figures.
He said the deployment of North Korean troops to the frontlines of combat will likely equip them with modern warfare experience, involving drones and recent technologies, which could have a "tremendous" impact on Asia should they return home.
The assessment came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met Russia's defense minister in Pyongyang last week and expressed his support for Russia's war against Ukraine, amid growing concerns over the protracted war further expanding.
North Korea has not publicly confirmed its troop deployment to Russia. But South Korea and the United States have said some of the North's deployed soldiers have already entered combat in Russia's western Kursk region.
Zelenskyy, meanwhile, reiterated the need for his country to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, noting that support from its partners is "not enough" and that the war with Russia has shifted to a "complicated period" with Moscow advancing faster in eastern Ukraine, according to the report.
This Jan. 9, 2024, file photo, provided by the Ukrainian presidential office, shows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 2, 2024
6. S. Korean Embassy in U.S. hires lobbying firm previously linked to Trump's new chief of staff
Probably a smart move.
Excerpts:
In a document filed with the department, Mercury described its agreement with the South Korean Embassy as providing "strategic consulting, lobbying, public affairs and government relations, including outreach to U.S. officials."
Under the contract, Mercury will advise the embassy on "the development, structure and planning of (the) embassy's economic policy agenda tailored to the second Trump administration," while introducing its leadership to "key stakeholders on the Trump transition team that may hold positions in the administration," the document showed.
S. Korean Embassy in U.S. hires lobbying firm previously linked to Trump's new chief of staff | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 2, 2024
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean Embassy in the United States has hired a public strategy company previously associated with President-elect Donald Trump's chief of staff nominee, a move seen as aiming to enhance communication with Trump's team.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice on Sunday, Mercury Public Affairs reported its contract with the South Korean Embassy to the department on Nov. 26.
Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of the U.S., individuals and entities are required to register with the department if they act on behalf of foreign interests in the country.
Mercury Public Affairs is a high-profile public strategy and consulting company, where Susie Wiles worked from 2022 until her recent nomination by Trump as his new chief of staff, according to the New York Times.
In a document filed with the department, Mercury described its agreement with the South Korean Embassy as providing "strategic consulting, lobbying, public affairs and government relations, including outreach to U.S. officials."
Under the contract, Mercury will advise the embassy on "the development, structure and planning of (the) embassy's economic policy agenda tailored to the second Trump administration," while introducing its leadership to "key stakeholders on the Trump transition team that may hold positions in the administration," the document showed.
Mercury also described identifying "strategic opportunities for relationship development with Trump transition officials" as part of its consulting services for the embassy.
The contract runs from Nov. 18 until Dec. 31, with a one-time project fee of US$40,000, according to the document.
The Korean embassy reportedly hired Mercury for a short period due to budget constraints as well as the need to assess its performance, with the choice of the lobbying firm reflecting apparent difficulties in reaching out to the Trump team.
This photo, published by the Associated Press, shows United States President-elect Donald Trump (R), next to his chief of staff nominee Susie Wiles. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 2, 2024
7. N. Korea demolishing S. Korean-built golf course clubhouse at Mount Kumgang resort: Seoul official
N. Korea demolishing S. Korean-built golf course clubhouse at Mount Kumgang resort: Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 2, 2024
SEOUL, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has been demolishing a golf course clubhouse built by a South Korean firm at the Mount Kumgang resort, leaving only a few facilities intact in the area, South Korea's unification ministry said Monday.
"Most facilities at the special Mount Kumgang tourist region have been dismantled or are being demolished, with demolition believed to be under way at the clubhouse of the Ananti Golf Resort," ministry spokesman Koo Byoung-sam said during a press briefing.
"Only a few facilities, including a meeting place for separated families, are believed to remain undemolished," he said.
It marks the latest in a series of demolitions by North Korea at the Mount Kumgang tourist area, which, established in 2002 to host South Korean tourists to the scenic mountain on the North's east coast, was once considered a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation.
Since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered officials to tear down all "unpleasant-looking" facilities built by the South during his 2019 visit to the mountain resort, North Korea has been dismantling facilities in the area one by one. Kim's visit came shortly after his summit with then U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi ended without a concrete result earlier that year.
In May, North Korea demolished a fire station in the resort area, which was built with the South Korean government's budget.
"The government will firmly hold North Korea accountable for an act that violates the property rights of our government and companies, no matter how long it takes," the ministry spokesman said.
Referring to Russia's recent invitation of North Korean forces to its military parade marking the 80th Victory Day in May next year, Koo said the North Korean military has never participated in Russia's previous Victory Day celebrations.
According to Russia's defense ministry, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov invited North Korean military forces to the 80th anniversary military parade scheduled to take place on May 9, 2025, in Red Square, Moscow, during his meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last week.
North Korea's only participation in such an event occurred in 2015, when Kim Yong-nam attended the 70th anniversary military parade as the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, according to the unification ministry.
Koo Byoung-sam, spokesman of the Ministry of Unification, speaks during a press briefing in Seoul on Dec. 2, 2024. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · December 2, 2024
8. North Korea’s Kim Citing War in Ukraine as Rationale for Attacking Free Korea
These threats should not be allowed to influence South Korean decision making on lethal aid to Ukraine. South Korea (and the US) should not show fear in the face of this rhetoric.
North Korea’s Kim Citing War in Ukraine as Rationale for Attacking Free Korea
Russ defense minister makes a visit to Pyongyang, where Kim says ‘right to self-defense’ obtains against nations providing weapons to Ukraine.
DONALD KIRK
Dec. 1, 2024 04:24 AM ET
nysun.com
The war in Ukraine is providing North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, with what he apparently reckons is a rationale for attacking South Korea. The link between Russia’s campaign against Ukraine and North Korea’s threats against South Korea emerged during a visit to Pyongyang by the Russian defense minister.
Mr. Kim told the visiting minister, Andrei Beloussov, that use of long-range weapons by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization gave Russia “the right to self-defense” against those providing the weapons. The NATO allies, led by President Biden, are to blame for Ukraine firing “long-range strike weapons,” Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency quoted Mr. Kim as saying.
Mr. Kim, meeting with Mr. Beloussov, urged “resolute action to make the hostile forces pay the price” and “signal that the provocative forces led by the U.S. will not benefit from their disregard for the warning of Russia.” Neither Mr. Kim nor Mr. Beloussov mentioned that North Koreans have joined the Russians in the war, but the conversation gave the impression that Mr. Kim was looking for a pretext to fire missiles against the South if his war of words turns to war.
Justifying the right of Russia and North Korea to strike back against their enemies, the Russian news agency Tass quotes Mr. Kim as calling Russia’s recent missile strike on a Ukrainian munitions plant “a timely and effective measure to notify the U.S., the West and Ukraine” of “Russia’s will for harsh countermeasures.”
It is no coincidence that, as Mr. Kim was offering unqualified support for the Russians in Ukraine, 11 Communist Chinese and Russian warplanes flew into South Korea’s air defense identification zone. Five Chinese aircraft entered the zone from the south while six Russian planes flew down from the north, linking east of South Korea’s territorial limits but within the area in which they’re supposed to identify themselves.
“They met and flew side by side over waters south of the easternmost islets of Dokdo,” two huge rocks that South Korea — despite Japanese claims to them — occupies as Korean territory midway between Korea and Japan. Seoul’s Yonhap News said the South Korean military mobilized fighters “for a potential emergency” before concluding the Chinese and Russians were conducting “a joint air exercise.”
The exercise is the first between the air forces of the two countries in nearly a year. Although all 11 aircraft, including fighters and bombers, flew away without incident, they accomplished two goals.
First, the exercise showed China and Russia are cooperating closely despite the sense that China is not enthusiastic about the close ties Russia has made with North Korea. Second, as a show of force, it dramatized the commitment of both Moscow and Beijing to North Korea in case rhetoric flares into war.
Startlingly, though, President Putin and Mr. Kim appear to have agreed to avoid mentioning the role of North Korean troops in the war. There’s no mention in the Russian or North Korean press of any North Koreans sent to Ukraine to retake the Kharkiv region from Ukrainian forces.
The Russian defense minister’s visit to Pyongyang showed the relationship expanding rapidly, as Messrs. Putin and Kim see the bond as a life saver for both their regimes and their countries. Mr. Beloussov, meeting North Korea’s defense minister, No Kwang Choi, harked back to the pact signed by the two leaders at Pyongyang in June.
KCNA reports that he called for “strengthening the militant unity and strategic and tactical cooperation between the armies of the two countries” — a likely cover for Pyongyang sending more troops and arms to Russia and for Moscow providing more technology for nukes and missiles.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimates that North Korea has up to 12,000 troops in Ukraine, all merged into Russian units and fighting under the Russian, not the North Korean, flag. Tass issued a lengthy report on Ukrainian casualties but none on Russian. Nor did the report breathe a word about North Koreans. Radio Free Asia quoted a Pentagon official saying that North Koreans were killed or wounded in a missile strike, more ammunition for Mr. Kim’s call for Russia to strike at NATO.
nysun.com
9. S. Korea to tighten security rules for drones, undersea cables
S. Korea to tighten security rules for drones, undersea cables | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 2, 2024
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will tighten security regulations for drones, undersea cables and offshore wind power plants to mitigate security and supply chain risks to major infrastructure, the presidential office said Monday.
Wang Yun-jong, third deputy national security adviser, led an intragovernmental meeting with 13 agencies to discuss potential security threats to key infrastructure and draw up integrated responses.
"Reliance on foreign imports for key drone components could lead to supply chain risks due to export controls in the event of a contingency, as well as security concerns, such as information leaks," the office said in a release.
The presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul (Yonhap)
The participants discussed strengthening the drone industry's procurement system and improving information protection certification, and introduced integrated responses to protect industrial complexes near oil, gas and power plants from potential drone attacks.
They also agreed to designate major landing stations, which connect undersea communication cables and land-based communication networks, as national security facilities to protect them from potential security risks.
"Undersea communication cables are exposed to various risk factors, including intentional damage by malicious forces, physical severance due to geographical factors and cyber attacks aimed at stealing data," it said.
The latest move is seen as a response to growing security risks to global undersea infrastructure, following the sudden disruption of two undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea last month -- one linking Lithuania and Sweden, and the other connecting Finland and Germany.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · December 2, 2024
10. New 8,200-ton Jeongjo the Great Aegis destroyer commissioned in Busan
New 8,200-ton Jeongjo the Great Aegis destroyer commissioned in Busan
The Korea Times · December 2, 2024
The 8,200-ton Jeongjo the Great Aegis destroyer is commissioned in a ceremony at a naval base in the southeastern port city of Busan, Dec. 2. Yonhap
A new 8,200-ton Aegis destroyer armed with an advanced missile interception platform was commissioned Monday, the Navy said, in a move to bolster the Navy's air defense capabilities against North Korean missiles.
A commissioning ceremony for the Jeongjo the Great destroyer, named after a visionary king of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), took place at a key naval base in the port city of Busan, some 325 kilometers southeast of Seoul, according to the Navy.
The advanced destroyer was delivered to the Navy at a HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard last week. A commissioning ceremony is held to mark the beginning of a vessel's active service.
The 170-meter-long, 21-meter-wide destroyer is equipped with radar-evading functions and the newest Aegis combat system, capable of not only detecting and tracking ballistic missiles but also intercepting them.
The warship is expected to be fitted with the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) ship-based surface-to-air missile system that is capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles at altitudes above 100 kilometers.
The Jeongjo the Great destroyer is the first of three 8,200-ton Aegis destroyers that Seoul aims to acquire under the Gwanggaeto-III Batch-II project. It is South Korea's fourth Aegis destroyer after the ROKS King Sejong the Great, the ROKS Yulgok Yi I and the ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · December 2, 2024
11. North Korean food prices soar as currency crisis deepens
A Kim Family regime imposed crisis. Will this lead to instability and potential resistance?
North Korean food prices soar as currency crisis deepens - Daily NK English
Market surveys show unprecedented post-harvest price increases as merchants reject local currency in favor of dollars and yuan, pushing basic staples beyond reach
By Seulkee Jang - December 2, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · December 2, 2024
Image: Adobe Firefly
North Korean food prices have hit record highs, deepening hardship across the country.
According to Daily NK’s regular market survey, rice prices exceeded 8,000 North Korean won per kilogram in all major cities as of November 24. In markets across Pyongyang, Sinuiju (North Pyongan province), and Hyesan (Ryanggang province), rice sold for 8,000, 8,100, and 8,200 won respectively – representing increases of 6.7%, 7.3%, and 6.5% from the Nov. 10 survey. These are the highest prices recorded since Daily NK began tracking in 2009.
While rice prices had remained stable in the 7,000 won range since Oct. 27, they recently surged past the 8,000 won mark. Even more dramatically, corn prices – the staple food for low-income North Koreans – have risen faster than rice.
In Hyesan’s markets, corn reached a record 4,100 won per kilogram on Nov. 24, jumping 17.1% in just two weeks. This marks the first time corn prices have exceeded 4,000 won in Hyesan since late June 2021, when COVID-19 lockdowns caused prices to temporarily double compared to other regions. Similarly, Sinuiju saw corn prices hit 4,000 won per kilogram – a 17.6% increase and an unprecedented high for the city.
The scale of these increases is extraordinary – rice prices have surged 63.9% since January, while corn prices have shot up 70.7%. Such dramatic post-harvest price increases are virtually unprecedented, as prices typically decline after the autumn harvest.
Multiple factors appear to be driving the spike: state agencies monopolizing rice purchases after harvest, and more people using dollars or yuan to buy staples as exchange rates rise. Sources report that merchants increasingly refuse North Korean won due to its falling value, or charge premiums above current exchange rates. Even domestic agricultural products, traditionally sold only in local currency, are seeing rapid price increases.
The situation is further complicated by money changers trading foreign currency for rice and other goods rather than local currency, exacerbating grain shortages.
Cho Chung-hee, director of Good Farmers’ research institute and a North Korean agriculture expert, told Daily NK that people are preferring commodities like rice or corn to local currency as the won’s value drops. “Despite increased demand, dwindling supplies continue to drive prices up,” he explained.
“Even if this year’s harvest improved agricultural production somewhat, it would do little to stabilize food prices,” Cho predicted, “as the market grain price surge is fundamentally linked to the won’s devaluation and rising exchange rates.”
Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · December 2, 2024
12. Kim Jong Un slams US support of Ukraine in talks with Russian defense chief
Kim Jong Un slams US support of Ukraine in talks with Russian defense chief
Leader praises Russia for counterattack on Ukraine while Andrei Belousov invites DPRK troops to join parade in Moscow
https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/kim-jong-un-slams-us-support-of-ukraine-in-talks-with-russian-defense-chief/
Anton Sokolin November 30, 2024
Russian defense minister Andrei Belousov and DPRK leader Kim Jong Un at a patriotic concert on Nov. 29, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 30, 2024)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with Russian defense chief Andrei Belousov for talks on Friday, slamming the U.S. for enabling Ukraine to strike Russian territory and touting Moscow’s counterattacks.
According to the Rodong Sinmun on Saturday, Kim and Belousov exchanged “broad and satisfactory views” on deepening their comprehensive strategic partnership.
Belousov’s delegation arrived in Pyongyang a day earlier and held talks with DPRK defense chief No Kwang Chol and other ministry officials.
In their Friday meeting, Kim and Belousov also focused on concrete steps to protect North Korea and Russia’s “sovereignty and security interests” and “uphold international justice” in response to the rapidly changing international environment, according to the party daily.
Russian defense minister Andrei Belousov and members of his delegation during talks with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un on Nov. 29, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 30, 2024)
1
2
Kim criticized the U.S. and its Western allies for “escalating the Ukraine crisis” by allowing Kyiv to use ATACMS and other missiles for strikes on Russian territory, stressing that Washington’s “irresponsible actions will prolong the conflict and threaten all of humanity.”
The DPRK leader described such steps as “direct military involvement and an aggressive war against Russia,” calling for condemnation by the international community.
Kim lauded Russia’s response and recent counterstrikes on Ukraine as a “rightful exercise of self-defense,” likely referencing the Kremlin’s firing of its new medium-range Oreshnik missile at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro and other targets.
He reportedly called the response “timely and effective,” reflecting the “gravity of the situation and Russia’s determination to respond firmly to reckless military adventurism by the U.S., the West, and Ukraine.”
“The DPRK government, military, and people will continue to unwaveringly support Russia’s policies to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity against imperialist hegemony,” Kim reportedly said.
The DPRK leader vowed to strengthen North Korea-Russia ties as a “powerful security mechanism that promotes the well-being of both peoples, eases regional tensions, and ensures international strategic stability.”
Belousov, meanwhile, thanked Kim for his “dedication to strengthening ties with Russia” building on the new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by the two leaders in June, according to the Russian defense ministry.
“Today, Korea is one of the few nations that pursues a completely independent foreign policy,” the Russian minister said, calling it Kim’s personal achievement.
He also invited a “DPRK military unit” to join Russia’s annual May 9 parade on Moscow’s Red Square. Next year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) and Russia is expecting a “positive response” to the invitation from North Korean authorities, the ministry added.
Kim stated that Belousov’s visit to North Korea would contribute to ramping up the “defensive and security capacities” of the two countries while “fostering friendship, mutual cooperation, and relations” between their armed forces.
Concluding his remarks, Kim relayed greetings to Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as to the Russian government, military and people, “reaffirming that Pyongyang would always stand firmly with Moscow,” according to the report.
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told NK News that Kim and Belousov have likely discussed additional troop deployments and weapons supplies from North Korea to aid Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine.
“Belousov, known for his expertise in managing wartime economies, could facilitate discussions on circumventing sanctions and boosting North Korea’s industrial capacity,” Hong added.
In a separate article published on the same day, the party daily reported on Kim Jong Un taking Belousov’s delegation to a concert of patriotic songs at the April 25 House of Culture, which highlighted the “extraordinary courage and heroism” of the Russian and North Korean people “in defending the dignity and glory of their nations.”
“The event highlighted the unshakable victory and success of the just cause shared by the peoples of North Korea and Russia, as well as the combat friendship and solidarity that the DPRK military and people hold for their Russian counterparts,” the newspaper wrote.
Russian defense minister Andrei Belousov with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un at a patriotic concert on Nov. 29, 2024 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 30, 2024)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
At the same venue, the DPRK defense ministry hosted a reception banquet to welcome the Russian dignitaries, with Kim Jong Un also attending.
Other high-ranking party officials, including Pak Jong Chon and Jo Chun Ryong, as well as senior military brass, were present at the reception.
During the event, DPRK Defense Minister No Kwang Chol delivered a speech, extending greetings to the Russian military and praising the “comradely” bond between Kim and Putin.
Belousov’s delegation departed Pyongyang on Saturday, the Rodong Sinmun reported the following day, after paying respects at a monument for Soviet soldiers and visiting Mangyongdae, the alleged birthplace of North Korea’s first leader Kim Il Sung.
The visit came amid reports that North Korea has been supplying Russia not only with artillery munitions and missiles but also with large artillery systems and troops to support its offensive in Ukraine.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, told NK News that Belousov’s trip represents “Putin’s asymmetric response” to Ukraine’s use of Western missiles in its recent attack on Kursk, suggesting more troop and arms transfers are likely to follow.
He also argued that Belousov’s visit “offers a counter” to Ukrainian defense chief Rustem Umerov’s trip to Seoul this week, serving as both a warning and “punishment” for South Korea’s support of Ukraine.
“Russia is saying that they are ready to deepen their military partnership with North Korea even if it brings instability to the region,” the expert said.
Joon Ha Park contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Alannah Hill
Updated on Nov. 30 at 11:50 a.m. KST with statement from Russian defense ministry and on Dec. 1 at 9:09 a.m. with details on Belousov’s departure
13. Israel’s New Approach to Tunnels: A Paradigm Shift in Underground Warfare
I hope our South Korean allies (and US Forces Korea) are examining Israeli tunnel operations.
Excerpts:
It is unlikely that any military will face a tunnel system like that in Gaza, where an enemy’s political-military strategy rests on the tunnels and they are deliberately placed under civilian areas. But militaries will continue to encounter subterranean environments in warfare. State actors like China, Iran, and North Korea continue to invest in thousands of miles of military tunnels and bunkers to protect everything from nuclear sites, radar installations, and runways to full military bases. It is also hard to separate urban warfare from underground warfare in major cities that have existing civil infrastructure underground for transportation, water, and other essential services.
The lessons from the IDF’s adaptations and, ultimately, transformation of culture toward underground warfare are deeply important for other militaries—especially those whose own cultures are characterized by the notion that tunnels are obstacles that should be avoided or only dealt with when required. The lessons learned by the IDF will save the lives of other soldiers in other battlefields. The IDF have also shown others that subterranean environments can be used for more than only defensive tactics. With the right culture, understanding, intelligence, technologies, and tactics, they can be used for simultaneous maneuvers on the surface and subsurface. That changes everything.
Israel’s New Approach to Tunnels: A Paradigm Shift in Underground Warfare - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · December 2, 2024
Share on LinkedIn
Send email
Before the war against Hamas in Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces were one of the most prepared militaries in the world for underground warfare. The IDF were the only army to have a full brigade-sized unit dedicated to training, manning, equipping, researching, developing new technologies and tactics, learning, and adapting solely for underground warfare. Still, the challenges they faced early in their campaign in Gaza, many of which they struggled initially to overcome, speaks to the incredible complexity of subterranean warfare. Their responses to these challenges signal a paradigm shift in modern approaches to underground warfare.
The Long List of Underground Challenges
One of the main reasons the IDF were unprepared for Gaza’s underground spaces was simply that no military had faced anything like it in the past—not even Israeli ground forces. The IDF faced a Hamas military organization that had spent over fifteen years engineering the infrastructure of an entire region—to include over twenty major cities—for war, with the group’s political-military strategy resting on a vast and expensively constructed subterranean network under Gaza’s population centers. The Hamas underground network, often called the “Gaza metro,” includes between 350 and 450 miles of tunnels and bunkers at depths ranging from just beneath apartment complexes, mosques, schools, hospitals, and other civilian structures to over two hundred feet underground. There are estimates of over five thousand separate shafts leading down into Hamas subsurface spaces. In past wars, where underground environments were used, the tunnel networks were subordinate to the surface and were not built solely under population centers mostly to be used as massive human shields.
IDF investigations and captured Hamas documents produced reports that it took Hamas a year to dig one kilometer of standard tunnel at a per-kilometer cost of $275,000. A number of factors—size, type, and function, for examples—can raise the costs well beyond that of a standard mobility tunnel. The variety of tunnels in Gaza makes it difficult to estimate the underground network’s overall cost, but Hamas reportedly spent $90 million to build just three dozen tunnels in 2014, and some analysts place the network’s total cost at over $1 billion.
On October 7, 2023, the IDF had a brigade of special operations forces engineers, the Yahalom unit, fully equipped with technologies and tactics to accomplish the full range of underground warfare tasks, from detecting, securing, and mapping tunnels and bunkers to exploiting, clearing, neutralizing, and destroying them. This unit has spent decades researching, developing, testing, and purchasing technologies to overcome the challenge of military operations underground. This work includes a decade-long antitunnel cooperation and exchange program between Israel and the United States to jointly develop technologies and tactics that address the challenges of underground warfare. The IDF also has a robust military working dog program, the Oketz unit, that includes dogs trained for operating in subterranean spaces.
IDF units like Yahalom had plenty of work to do to prepare for underground warfare. Soldiers need special equipment to breathe, see, communicate, navigate, breach obstacles, and even shoot underground. Almost every piece of their standard military equipment designed for the surface will not work once they enter the subsurface. Line-of-sight and satellite-enabled technologies—including navigation, communication, and drones—are rendered useless. Night-vision goggles that rely solely on ambient light will not work in an environment where there is none. A blast from a weapon or explosive detonated in enclosed underground spaces can cause harmful pressures and blast injuries making it dangerous to even fire a personal weapon if the soldier is not wearing the proper protective gear.
The Culture Component
A unique challenge that all militaries face in dealing with underground warfare is one of culture. Any military force’s culture is guided by its history, priorities, and warfighting concepts. Whether that culture acknowledges and prepares for the underground challenges described above is determined by an institutional belief about whether or not underground spaces will be prominent features in future warfare. For example, the US Army’s cultural views surrounding tunnels and subterranean spaces is that they are obstacles to be dealt with when encountered. The service’s doctrine recommends that US soldiers “should avoid entering and operating in subterranean environments when possible.” If entering cannot be avoided, the doctrine describes the primary tasks as clearing and securing the subterranean environment.
The IDF have their own long history of dealing with tunnels, especially cross-border tunnels. Hamas and Hezbollah have used cross-border tunnels in the past to conduct surprise attacks on IDF outposts or small patrols in a bid to kidnap Israeli soldiers. This led to the IDF to develop advanced detection, mapping, and navigating capabilities, as well as—in an emergency such as a soldier being taken back into a tunnel—the tactics to follow an enemy underground.
The IDF also developed advanced tunnel-striking capabilities with a wide variety of bunker-busting munitions. In the 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls, the IDF believed they had destroyed sixty miles of Hamas tunnels in Gaza. Captured documents show that after this 2021 operation, the Hamas leadership authorized $225,000 to install more blast doors in tunnel segments to protect against IDF bunker-busting munitions collapsing more of the tunnel beyond the point where the bomb directly strikes. Hamas also increased production of handbooks showing their fighters how to survive and fight in tunnels.
In general, the IDF culture before 2023 was marked by the belief that tunnels should be dealt with by specially trained forces and that regular troops should only be sent underground as a last resort.
Adapting to Tunnels
At the beginning of the IDF operations against Hamas in Gaza after the October 7 attack, the IDF targeted many bunkers and tunnels with precision-guided bunker-busting munitions. These strikes were based on intelligence regarding the locations of tunnels, their purpose and value to the enemy, their contents, considerations about the presence of hostages or civilians, and other factors.
Once the ground campaign began, the IDF knew they would be encountering a lot of tunnels. They task-organized squad-sized elements of Yahalom to as many maneuvering units as possible. The force that entered Gaza rapidly learned how to identify visual indicators of tunnel shafts, such as markings on buildings, the presence of infrastructure needed in the tunnels for power or ventilation, and other identifying features.
Once a shaft was located, it was generally secured and then Yahalom was called forward to investigate it. Even identifying a shaft was dangerous and time-consuming. The IDF lost five soldiers in early November 2023 from a booby-trapped tunnel entrance. Hamas’s use of booby traps outside and inside their tunnels was pervasive. In some cases, Hamas tunnels were built with improvised explosive devices embedded into the walls. This allowed Hamas fighters to arm and then leave their booby-trapped tunnels quickly.
If a shaft was determined to be a tunnel it was carefully interrogated, mapped, and searched. Many advanced technologies were used in this process, including drones and robotic devices designed to work underground. In some cases, military working dogs with cameras mounted on their backs were deployed, but the risk of losing dogs to booby traps made this tactic rare. During this time, Israel continued to be reluctant to send troops underground and only did so after tunnels were searched for potential dangers.
In fighting Hamas defenders, the IDF immediately faced enemy brigades, battalions, and companies that each had tunnel networks supporting their operations. In northern Gaza, the IDF had weeklong battles over single neighborhoods because of Hamas’s ability to pop in and out these networks and avoid decisive engagement.
In one attempt to combat Hamas’s use of their tunnels, the IDF procured and deployed what is to reported to be at least five industrial pumps to push thousands of cubic meters of water per hour into the tunnels to literally flush Hamas fighters out of them. The flooding had minimal impact. In one case, as one IDF officer I spoke to during a research visit told me, it took two weeks for a small Hamas tunnel to fill before the IDF finally saw Hamas fighters on the surface where they could be targeted. Due to the tunnels’ porous concrete lining, the water simply drained out of them. Some tunnels were even built with drainage holes in them, while in others blast doors complicated the process. Flooding had little impact and was too time-consuming to use as a primary method to force Hamas fighters out of their tunnels. And ultimately, flooding would not destroy a tunnel.
The more the IDF engaged with the Hamas tunnel network, the more they adapted. Stopping for every suspected tunnel shaft and waiting for Yahalom to investigate severely slowed the momentum of maneuvering forces. Many of the suspected shafts were simply wells, civilian infrastructure, or other types of tunnels. The IDF quickly realized they had to push some of the specialized knowledge of Yahalom lower and to general-purpose soldiers. The regular IDF soldiers began to become proficient at dealing at least with shaft identification, site securing, and initial investigations.
The IDF began to realize that in many areas, the tunnels were a system of systems. Each Hamas company, battalion, and brigade had its own networks of tunnels that factored into how they would fight and move around. Some of these networks connected to each other while others were separate. Once the IDF were able to focus intelligence efforts on determining the classification and architecture of a tunnel system in a specific area or neighborhood, their success in finding and dealing with tunnels significantly increased.
The IDF also developed a typology of Hamas tunnels. Some Hamas tunnels were tactical, such as small-unit tunnels that ran from building to building giving Hamas fighters the ability to hold specific terrain. Some were more operational as they connected different battalions or brigades to each other or provided operational mobility—like the mile-long tunnels running underneath the river basin of central Gaza to connect the region’s northern and southern portions. What to do about a specific tunnel and the urgency of action could be determined by proper identification of the type of tunnel that had been encountered.
Despite the IDF adaptations, a challenge remained: that of Hamas forces using the tunnels for their defensive operations as long as they could and then simply lining the tunnels with booby traps as they fell back to different tunnels. The tunnels gave Hamas the ability to control the initiative of most battles in Gaza.
Transforming to Tunnels
One Israeli commander refused to allow Hamas fighters to control the initiative by using their tunnels. When the war in Gaza began, Brigadier General Dan Goldfus—a veteran of the Shayetet 13 unit, a naval special operations unit—commanded the elite 98th Paratroopers Division. In late November 2023, with some of the IDF’s best armor, artillery, and engineer units added to its paratroopers and commandos, the division was deployed into Hamas’s strongpoint city of Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. The city was considered to be the “center of gravity” of Hamas’s military forces.
General Goldfus learned from what the other IDF divisions had encountered in northern Gaza but also oversaw a rapid learning initiative to study the Hamas tunnels in Khan Yunis. He had his soldiers study the details of each tunnel, traveled into the tunnels with his soldiers, and had soldiers collect on how Hamas protected certain tunnels. He also used his unique connections in the IDF and Israel’s intelligence service to develop what might be called all-source intelligence about types and locations of tunnels as well as other trends in Khan Yunis. Eventually, the division built the confidence that it understood the enemy’s tunnel network.
General Goldfus developed a plan to enter Hamas’s tunnels without Hamas knowing his soldiers were there. This was unlike any IDF unit’s approach to tunnels in Gaza yet. His plan was briefed to his superiors for approval. He was given the approval to take the calculated risks that other units had not to that point. He then started sending his special operations forces, engineers, and others into uncleared tunnels at the exact same time he was maneuvering on enemy forces on the surface.
IDF special operations forces, commandos, and others were equipped with all the specialized equipment needed to breathe, navigate, see, communicate, and shoot underground. General Goldfus’s division headquarters refined the ability to control forces moving underground with the tempo of the surface forces. Incrementally, the division refined its tactics to the point its soldiers were conducting raids with separate brigades attacking on the surface while more than one subterranean force maneuvered on the same enemy underground.
For the first time in the modern history of urban warfare, General Goldfus and his soldiers were conducting mauver warfare simultaneously incorporating the surface and subsurface in dense urban areas. They had turned tunnels from obstacles controlled by the defending enemy into maneuver corridors for the attacker.
More importantly, through General Goldfus’s leadership and his soldiers’ adaptations, innovations, and hard work, the division began to transform the IDF’s culture toward underground warfare. Its tactics were spread to other units, along with the understanding that the old culture of avoiding tunnels was no longer the IDF’s approach. The new culture of a deeper understanding of—and, in some cases, using—the enemy’s tunnels to facilitate maneuver warfare with simultaneous maneuver on the surface and subsurface is unlike that of any other military in modern history.
The Challenge That Remains
There is one subterranean challenge that even General Goldfus and his division could not overcome: destroying tunnels. Israel’s strategic goal in Gaza includes destroying Hamas’s major military capabilities. This logically requires destroying a certain percentage of the vast underground network the group has so heavily relied on.
Contrary to some reporting, removing Hamas’s ability to plan and conduct military operations does not require destroying all of Hamas’s tunnels. Not every tunnel is as important as others. The cross-border tunnels between Gaza and Egypt that served as Hamas’s strategic lines of communication—enabling vital weapons supplies—large tunnels linking northern and southern Gaza or connecting different cities or brigade areas of operations and allowing freedom of movement, and command-and-control tunnels like the data center found under a United Nations building in Gaza City do require destruction. The destruction of hundreds if not thousands of tactical tunnels that connect different buildings across the Gaza strip is not critical to achieving Israel’s military objective and may exceed any reasonable ability Israel has to remove those tunnels.
But there is a gap in military methods for destroying tunnels. Military history has generated far more knowledge about creating tunnels than destroying them. Modern bunker-busting bombs can penetrate the earth in a small area to strike at a target in a tunnel or bunker but cannot effectively destroy the full length of a tunnel.
From 2013 to 2019, Egypt used sewage and seawater to collapse primitive Hamas smuggling tunnels along its border with Gaza. As discussed earlier, however, this did not work on the more sophisticated tunnels found inside Gaza. In 2018, Israel pumped wet cement into cross-border Hezbollah tunnels along the northern border with Lebanon. The exact number of metric tons of wet cement required for a single tunnel, while not publicly reported, was substantial. This tactic may block tunnels under the right circumstances, but it is not practical where there are a lot of tunnels to address.
One of the few feasible methods to eliminate a tunnel, used historically and validated by modern case studies, is to place explosives through the full length of it. This is what Israeli forces have been doing in Gaza but they quickly ran into scaling and resourcing problems.
Israel has a couple of explosive options. One of these is injecting liquid TNT into tunnels. This involves drilling holes into the tunnel at 650-foot intervals—and requires twelve tons of explosives per kilometer. An alternative is methodically placing explosives along the inside of cleared tunnels. Reports show that to demolish just one kilometer of tunnel requires fifteen metric tons of TNT placed inside the tunnel. The amount of TNT needed for tunnels Israeli forces discovered in Gaza quickly exceeded their supplies of liquid or military-grade explosives like composition C-4. They therefore primarily relied on a field-expedient method of using both their own stockpile as well as captured Hamas explosives designed for other uses such as antitank mines to string together along tunnels.
The harsh reality is that there is likely not enough supply of explosives or enough time to destroy all the tunnels in Gaza. To find all the tunnels and then destroy them would potentially take years. The IDF seem to be focusing limited resources on destroying the tunnels that provided Hamas with the most military value to survive or conduct attacks against Israel.
The Future
The IDF have already taken their new understanding, culture, and approach to tunnels to another theater in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah also built a vast tunnel network of hundreds of miles and which is referred to as the “Land of Tunnels.” The 98th Paratroopers Division, with its pioneering and advanced underground warfare skills, was one of the first units to conduct raids into the Hezbollah tunnels found along Israel’s northern border.
It is unlikely that any military will face a tunnel system like that in Gaza, where an enemy’s political-military strategy rests on the tunnels and they are deliberately placed under civilian areas. But militaries will continue to encounter subterranean environments in warfare. State actors like China, Iran, and North Korea continue to invest in thousands of miles of military tunnels and bunkers to protect everything from nuclear sites, radar installations, and runways to full military bases. It is also hard to separate urban warfare from underground warfare in major cities that have existing civil infrastructure underground for transportation, water, and other essential services.
The lessons from the IDF’s adaptations and, ultimately, transformation of culture toward underground warfare are deeply important for other militaries—especially those whose own cultures are characterized by the notion that tunnels are obstacles that should be avoided or only dealt with when required. The lessons learned by the IDF will save the lives of other soldiers in other battlefields. The IDF have also shown others that subterranean environments can be used for more than only defensive tactics. With the right culture, understanding, intelligence, technologies, and tactics, they can be used for simultaneous maneuvers on the surface and subsurface. That changes everything.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He is also a founding member of the International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
Share on LinkedIn
Send email
mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · December 2, 2024
14. Supreme Court confirms mental damage compensation for Gwangju uprising victims |
Supreme Court confirms mental damage compensation for Gwangju uprising victims | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · December 2, 2024
SEOUL, Dec. 2 (Yonhap) -- The Supreme Court has upheld lower courts' rulings in favor of psychological damage compensation for hundreds of victims of the brutal crackdown on the 1980 pro-democracy uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju, judicial officials said Monday.
In the ruling finalized by the top court last Thursday, the government was ordered to pay 43 billion won (US$30.6 million) to 854 Gwangju uprising-related victims and their families to compensate them for their psychological sufferings.
District and appellate courts, recognizing the need for mental damage compensation in line with the Constitutional Court's ruling, set compensation for arrest, detention or imprisonment at 300,000 won per day, while awarding 5 million won for injuries without disabilities. In case of disabilities caused by injuries, a compensation of 30 million won was recognized, with 15 million won added for every 5 percent increase in the labor ability loss rate.
The lawsuit was launched in November 2021 after the Constitutional Court ruled in May of the same year that past compensation failed to properly address and heal the psychological pains of the victims.
On May 18, 1980, the military cracked down on demonstrators, including students, protesting against then President Chun Doo-hwan, who had taken power in a military coup a year earlier. The harsh quelling of the uprising left more than 200 dead and 1,800 others wounded.
The Supreme Court (Yonhap)
ycm@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · December 2, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
