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Quotes of the Day:
"The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance. It is the illusion of knowledge."
– Stephen Hawking
"Nothing disturbs me more than the glorification of stupidity"
– Carl Sagan
"In the world, every addiction is bad, but the worst addiction is the addiction to power. Because its consequences are always suffered by the weaker person."
– Lord Acton
1. What Would OPCON Transfer Mean for the UN Command in Korea?
2. Korea's US security strategy test
3. VOA Korean Service Resumes After Nine-Month Suspension
4. N. Korea calls for standing up to U.S.-led 'Western coercion'
5. North Korea's Other TV: What You Don't See on KCTV
6. Senate confirms Korean American official as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security
7. Lee orders security ministers' meeting to coordinate N. Korea policy
8. S. Korean startup again delays 1st commercial orbit launch
9. Editorial: Government's North Korea Policy Resembles Event Planning
10. President gives unification ministry rein on NK policy
11. South Korean President Reiterates Necessity of Tipping Balance on Inter-Korean Relations
12. Talks with U.S. expose internal faultlines in South Korea's approach to North Korea
13. Ruling party-government push risks undermining the Armistice Framework and Korea-U.S. coordination
14. Lee criticizes hard-line policy over North Korea hostility
15. Why South Korea must not restrict information about the North
1. What Would OPCON Transfer Mean for the UN Command in Korea?
Summary:
Clint Work argues that wartime OPCON transition is inseparable from the United Nations Command’s future role. OPCON transfer shifts warfighting leadership from the U.S.-led CFC to a ROK-led Future CFC, but it does not change that the United States will still lead UNC, whose core missions remain armistice enforcement, sending-state cohesion, access to UNC-Rear bases in Japan, and force-flow coordination. Work warns that South Korean sovereignty politics and confusion about UNC authorities can politicize the command and spur challenges to its legitimacy. Experts highlight risks around multinational caveats, armistice compliance, and parallel command friction, alongside opportunities to clarify roles and strengthen coalition logistics in a wider Asia-Indo-Pacific contingency.
Comment: Another important essay on OPCON transition From Dr. Work.
One thing I would like to emphasize about the recent (renewed) controversy over the UNC. Those who are creating the controversy are actually supporting the objectives of KJU and his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. The Kim family regime has long attacked the legitimacy of UNC and still seeks its dissolution as a step toward achieving the key condition it seeks to be able to dominate the peninsula: the removal of US troops from Korea. So as this controversy proceeds we should be exposing what it means to the ROK/US alliance and the mutual security of the ROK and US if the UNC's status is challenged. Of course KJU's political warfare strategies ideal outcome is for the ROK to create the controversy and cause the dissolution of the UNC. In the end we need to recognize, understand, expose, and then attack the Kim family regime's strategy rather than experiencing the current potential fratricide and self-inflicted wounds over the UNC.
The second point I would like to emphasize is that we just need to complete OPCON transition. The ROK/US CFC needs to be commanded by a ROK general officer and any combat or humanitarian operations in north Korea need to be led by ROK general for myriad reasons but basically these two. The only logical outcome in a post conflict or post collapse scenario is a free and unified Korea. Such a political process must be supported by the military and the military must be led by a Korean general by a Korean general to ensure long term legitimacy of a free and unified Korea. Second, the US cannot afford the perception of another Iraq and Afghanistan with the US as an occupying power. We can and must provide military forces to support the ROK/US CFC but we cannot lead the effort as it will undermine Korean political legitimacy and and US credibility in support of an ally.
The third point I would like to make is that OPCON transition is focused on the fight on the Korean peninsula. Our thinking on OPCON transition is based on seven decades of narrow thinking and the "isolation" of the Korean peninsula based on the (extremely erroneous and fantastical) assumption that there would be no outside influence and intervention and if there is any it would be handled by USINDOPACOM. Another is the assumption that all nuclear activities would be handled by US INDOPACOM, USSTRATCOM, and the US National Command Authority. USINDOPACOM is incapable of addressing third party influence and intervention on the Korean peninsula. it is not addressing it now (in peace and armistice) and if there are simultaneous contingencies throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific it will be unable to handle Korea as well. Also, the fight on the Korean peninsula is not solely a Korean fight or only for the defense of Korea. A Korean fight will escalate to the region and the US homeland. We need to recognize this reality. Therefore, we need to organize to successfully defend US and allied national security (and the effects on mutual national prosperity). Additionally we have established the Nuclear Consultative Group to conduct strategic planning for extended deterrence and conventional nuclear integration. This cannot be accomplished with the middleman of USINDOPACOM. It requires a US combatant command with all Title 10 authorities on the Korean peninsula (and in Seoul). Lastly, ROK and US forces have to be prepared for support to potential contingencies throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific. The ROK/US CFC must focus on deterrence and defense against north Korea. A US Combatant Command combined with the ROK JCS serving a s de facto combatant command can conduct combined planning for off peninsula contingencies and task the right ROK and US forces for appropriate operations while ensuring that any forces deployed do not leave gaps in the deterrence and defense mission of the ROK/US CFC.
Finally, some will argue we do not need to establish another command when we are trying to reduce the numbers of commands and 4 star generals. Regardless of when OPCON transition occurs we will maintain a 4 star in Korea to command the UNC and to serve on the permanent Military Committee as the Senior US Military Office Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK). Through effective reorganization, redesign, and effective distribution of roles and responsibilities in Korea we can establish a Northeast Asia Combatant Command in Seoul without adding new personnel of general or flag officers.
Our frame of reference must change. This is no longer solely about the defense of Korea. It is the realization that a fight on the Korean peninsula is going to involve north Korea, China, and Russia as well as our allies, Japan, the Philippines and our partner Taiwan. We need a Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM).
Northeast Asia Command needed to support U.S. National Security Strategy
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/17/perspective-northest-asia-0combatant-command/5441765973062/
When Korea's next war will not stay in Korea
Here's why the Republic of Korea--U.S. alliance needs a Northeast Asia combatant command.
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/21/perspective-new-military-command-proposed/7291763740526/
Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/
What Would OPCON Transfer Mean for the UN Command in Korea?
The ongoing transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) in the South Korea-U.S. alliance is structurally linked to the role and status of the UNC.
By Clint Work
December 19, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/what-would-opcon-transfer-mean-for-the-un-command-in-korea/
https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/what-would-opcon-transfer-mean-for-the-un-command-in-korea/
U.S. and Republic of Korea Army soldiers stand guard near the border of North and South Korea during a Swedish Delegation visit to the Joint Security Area, Oct. 15, 2025. The Joint Security Area is maintained by the United Nations Command.
Credit: U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Joseph Liggio
The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition in one form or another has been an official alliance policy for two decades, if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.
Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.
This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. Previous articles explored the “control rod” logic, South Korean “sovereignty narrative,” variations in alliance command structures over the last 20 years, and how the language around the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) has evolved over time.
This article focuses on the role of the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment. The final article will examine how OPCON transition relates to the regional role of US forces and the alliance.
Originally, the United Nations Command (UNC) was the unified, multinational command established in the early stages of the Korean War. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – through UNSC Resolution 84 (UNSCR 84) and pursuant to UNSCRs 82 and 83 – recommended U.N. member states make available military forces or other assistance to a unified command, requested the United States designate the commander, and authorized the unified command to fly the U.N. flag during its operations against North Korea. Sixteen UNC Sending States provided forces to the command, and five others provided humanitarian or medical assistance.
Most ROK military forces were under the U.S.-led UNC’s OPCON during the Korean War and for a quarter century thereafter, during which the UNC was both the alliance’s warfighting command and enforced the armistice. Yet as UNC Sending States withdrew their forces and reduced their commitment to the UNC following the Korean War, and South Korea advanced its military capabilities, the South Korea-U.S. alliance developed a new command architecture.
With its establishment in 1978, the bilateral South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) became the alliance’s warfighting command. The defense of South Korea shifted from the UNC – which held mostly unilateral OPCON over ROK forces – primarily to the alliance’s combined command structure, within which OPCON was more jointly guided, albeit still under the strategic command of a four-star U.S. general. Thereafter, the UNC’s main priority was the enforcement and maintenance of the armistice.
With the 1994 transfer of peacetime or armistice OPCON, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) took over day-to-day security of the Korean Peninsula, fully removing its force from any form of UNC OPCON.
The current alliance policy of wartime OPCON transition is primarily about a shift in leadership from the current U.S.-led CFC to the South Korea-led Future CFC (F-CFC). While the transition could strengthen Seoul’s relative position within the alliance’s combined defense posture, it will not change the fact that the United States will continue to lead the UNC.
Nor will OPCON transition alter the UNC’s main priorities: enforcing and maintaining the armistice; maintaining UNC Sending States’ cohesion and international support for the South Korea-U.S. alliance; maintaining access to UNC-Rear bases in Japan; and establishing procedures to coordinate UNC Sending State force flow and force generation in coordination with the ROK JCS to support and sustain those forces in the theater.
Yet, some within South Korea see the evolution of the alliance’s command structure and Seoul’s gradually enhanced position as a sort of holistic, sovereignty-reclaiming process. And the fact that the same U.S. general commands the UNC and CFC (and USFK) results in a conflation of (or ignorance about) the differences between these institutions and their distinct roles and authorities. Consequently, discussion around completing wartime OPCON transition often galvanizes South Korean progressives’ impulse to move beyond or replace the armistice with a peace regime and more direct South Korean role on and around the DMZ. In these arguments, there’s a tendency to frame the UNC as another barrier to sovereignty.
In fact, President Lee Jae-myung recently tied the U.S.-led UNC’s OPCON of South Korean during the Korean War to Seoul’s lack of legal standing in the armistice. Although a very muddled view of history, such ideas are alive and well among the progressive base, and were strongly promoted under his progressive predecessor, Moon Jae-in.
Ignorance about the UNC opens space for its politicization and efforts to question its legitimacy, especially regarding how the UNC monitors and enforces access to and activities within the DMZ based upon well-established rules and procedures that fall under armistice obligations. Just this week, the Ministry of Unification and members of the Democratic Party have engaged in open disagreement with the UNC on this issue.
Given the political pressures and sovereignty-based arguments that swirl around wartime OPCON transition, and the extent to which the UNC often gets caught up in and politicized by them, I asked a group of U.S., South Korean, and UNC Member State experts if they could provide their topline thoughts on how the current wartime OPCON transition process relates to the U.S.-led UNC, and what challenges, opportunities, and potentially unintended consequences a post-transition UNC face might face.
It is important to acknowledge that this represents a small (albeit a very well informed) sample size. A more representative and fuller picture would be gained by speaking with a larger pool of experts, including those from all the other UNC Member States.
Nonetheless, as the responses below show, wartime OPCON transition and its links to the UNC involves a complex mix of political, military, operational, and diplomatic perspectives, which will impact stability on the peninsula and the strategic tapestry around it. Their insights cogently reinforce the underlying objective of this series of articles: namely, to consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future, to produce sound analysis and future policy.
A U.S. Perspective: Mike Bosack
Dr. Mike Bosack has extensive academic, military, and government experience in Korea and Japan, including over six years (2019-2025) as Deputy Secretary-International Relations Officer in the UNC.
There are three issues for the UNC related to OPCON transition: national caveats for multinational forces (that is, nation-specific constraints and restraints that a country’s military forces must adhere to while operating as part of a coalition); ROK military adherence to UNC regulations; and South Korean political sentiments towards the UNC.
With regard to national caveats, the UNC has been a supporting command for military operations on the Peninsula since 1978, when the CFC formed. For the UNC’s multinational contributors, this still meant operating within a U.S.-led command and control structure. However, once OPCON transition happens, these multinational force providers must consider whether and how their militaries would function under ROK command and control. This is an unknown that presents more challenges than opportunities.
For ROK military adherence to UNC regulations, OPCON transition could affect the manner in which ROK forces approach their Armistice obligations. Currently, ROK military adherence to the Armistice is codified through bilateral arrangements with the U.S. government and implemented through their application of UNC Regulations. When wartime OPCON transition happens, it will create a new set of bilateral arrangements. The allies have an opportunity to reduce friction by ensuring that adherence to the Armistice and UNC Regulations is still a core provision within the new alliance framework, but they will need to take the conscious step to do so.
Finally, there is South Korean domestic political sentiments towards the UNC. There is a belief in several political camps that the United States intends to use the UNC as a means of subverting OPCON transition. In other words, rather than operating under a South Korea-led CFC in a time of crisis or contingency, the U.S. will focus on leading multinational forces via the UNC. The issue regarding multinational forces and their caveats presents a challenge because it inadvertently fuels these theories, however untrue they may be.
The other issue is that once OPCON transition occurs, political sentiment that the UNC is the last remaining affront to South Korea’s sovereignty will grow. The South Korean administration will likely argue that ROK forces are capable of leading Armistice implementation and demand that the UNC relinquish its responsibilities. While the Lee Jae-myung administration could seek to accomplish this in tandem with OPCON transition, its completion would certainly provide impetus for targeting the UNC’s authorities next.
A U.S. Perspective: Shawn Creamer
Col. (Ret.) Shawn Creamer has extensive experience serving in Korea and the Indo-Pacific, including as Deputy Director for Strategy, Policy and Plans at U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and has written extensively on the history and interconnections between the several theater commands in Korea and command and control issues within the South Korea-U.S. alliance. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
The current OPCON transition process under the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) aims to strengthen the alliance’s combined defense capabilities by enhancing South Korea ’s military capacity. The plan is intended to enable Korean forces to assume greater leadership and broader responsibilities within the combined defense. Sustained high levels of Korean defense spending – driven by COTP and its two predecessor transformation plans – have accelerated major military reforms and produced a modern, capable joint fighting force.
Although the COTP outlines the roles and responsibilities of the UNC after transition, significant misunderstandings persist within both the U.S. and Korean governments regarding the UNC’s authorities, responsibilities, and functions in armistice and wartime. The UNC has operated under structural constraints since 1978, when wartime defense responsibilities shifted to the Combined Forces Command and the UNC was reduced to skeleton staffing. Its position deteriorated further in 1994 when South Korea withdrew armistice OPCON, leaving the UNC with its armistice responsibilities, but lacking full authority or control of forces necessary to execute them.
Without another alliance-level course correction, the UNC risks slipping into irrelevance. The Armistice Agreement is already frayed, with key mechanisms – such as the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission – only partially functioning. North Korean participation is minimal, though some compliance remains. If implemented as written, COTP will likely further erode the UNC’s ability to meet its armistice responsibilities and manage escalation, increasing the risk of renewed hostilities.
A central obstacle is persistent South Korean skepticism toward the UNC and multinational operations, shaped by historical grievances and concerns about loss of control. Seoul has also resisted acknowledging that it faces strategic threats beyond North Korea – China and Russia. If Seoul believes its alliance with the United States is ironclad, it must also recognize that North Korea’s alliances with China and Russia will be honored. In a wider war, the South Korea-U.S. alliance will require reinforcement from UNC member states and access to its bases in Japan to fight and end a war on favorable terms against a North Korea-China-Russia coalition. COTP does not establish those conditions for UNC.
A South Korean Perspective: Sohn Hanbyeol
Dr. Sohn Hanbyeol is professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). He and I previously wrote a piece for Foreign Policy on the UNC.
From a South Korean perspective, the ongoing wartime OPCON transition is structurally linked to the role and status of the UNC. The transition represents a fundamental change in the bilateral command architecture, whereas the UNC retains its legal and institutional authority derived from the Armistice Agreement. As a result, the two structures will inevitably coexist. Core UNC functions – armistice maintenance, coordination with sending states, and management of rear-area bases – will continue even after the transition. Thus, the key question for South Korea is not a “change in the character” of the UNC itself, but how the relationship between the UNC and the future ROK-led Combined Forces Command will be recalibrated.
Three major challenges arise. First, the UNC’s peacetime armistice-management authority may create friction with South Korea’s exercise of its right of self-defense. Second, concerns persist – such as the debate over the UNC’s “creeping operational role” – that the United States may retain or expand influence through the UNC even after OPCON transition. Third, the post-transition coexistence of the Future CFC, UNC, and USFK could complicate command-and-support relationships, blur lines of responsibility, and slow crisis decision-making.
At the same time, the transition also creates opportunities. First, it allows the UNC to be institutionally separated from wartime operational command, enabling a clearer focus on its original functions such as armistice management and coordination with sending states. Second, coexistence between a ROK-led Future CFC and the UNC provides an opportunity to reinforce ties with sending states and build a more multilayered deterrence framework. Third, clearer differentiation between armistice management and theater operations can, if properly institutionalized, improve coordination mechanisms between the UNC and the Future CFC during crises.
There are also potential unintended consequences. First, as the UNC’s operational role diminishes, its political and diplomatic weight in armistice management may grow more than anticipated. Second, greater involvement from sending states could unintentionally increase coordination costs and complicate multinational decision-making in a crisis. Third, although functional division between armistice management and operations is intended to be clearer, real-world contingencies may blur these boundaries again, producing delays or friction in early crisis response.
A South Korean Perspective: Seol In-hyo
Dr. Seol In-hyo is a professor in the military strategy division at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU). He is currently engaged in a research project on wartime OPCON transition.
Under the current plan, the CFC will evolve into a new Future CFC , led by a South Korean four-star general. The USFK commander – traditionally serving as the CFC commander – would instead become the deputy. This inversion of command roles introduces potential institutional inconsistency, because the USFK commander also holds the title of UNC commander.
Some speculate that if that UNC role is transferred to the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) commander, the USFK commander could be downgraded to a three-star position. In effect, the U.S. commander stationed in Korea may lose authority while the commander in Japan gains increased wartime influence over combined operations.
U.S. forces in Korea, which are stationed in Korea during peacetime, would be placed under the operational control of the South Korean Future CFC commander in wartime. However, in wartime, U.S. reinforcements and UNC-designated support could shift under the control of the UNC commander, likely the USFJ commander. Such a divided command structure risks undermining the unity of effort that has been the cornerstone of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
This complexity presents two major concerns. First, negotiations over command realignment may delay the OPCON transfer itself and heighten friction between Seoul and Washington. Second, in South Korea, the symbolic downgrade of the USFK commander and the relocation of UNC authority could fuel public anxiety that the alliance and combined defense posture are weakening.
Yet uncertainty also creates strategic opportunity. Instead of settling for a temporary or awkward arrangement, Seoul and Washington may pursue a more forward-looking restructuring – one that clarifies authority, preserves U.S. extended deterrence, and strengthens the combined command architecture for future threats.
Ultimately, the success of OPCON transition will depend on aligning alliance reassurance with military effectiveness. A well-designed command reform could transform today’s concerns into a foundation for a stronger, more resilient South Korea -U.S. alliance.
A Japanese Perspective: Hideya Kurata
Dr. Hideya Kurata is a professor at the National Defense Academy in Japan. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the Japanese government.
When the transition of wartime OPCON is completed, the current U.S.-ROK CFC would turn into the ROK-led Future CFC. The alliance’s longstanding command relationship – wherein a U.S. commander possesses wartime OPCON of the alliance’s combined forces – would be reversed, with a ROK commander taking on wartime OPCON of those forces.
Challenges may arise if a conflict breaks out and escalates on the Korean Peninsula, and support from U.S. forces in the region, including those in Japan, is needed. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Japan would refuse a U.S. request for prior consultation regarding combat operations launched from U.S. bases in Japan, and USFJ would support South Korea.
However, while the ROK-led F-CFC will hold wartime OPCON of the alliance’s combined forces, the ROK military will not possess the authority to mobilize U.S. forces throughout the Indo-Pacific nor necessarily lead in the coordination of UNC Member States’ support for the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The latter responsibility would be that of the U.S. commander of the UNC.
In such a case, the seven U.S. bases in Japan designated as UNC-Rear bases would likely be utilized for support in the defense of South Korea. UNC Member States armed forces may also be mobilized, as was the case during the Korean War.
In fact, recent efforts to increase the number and commitment of UNC Member States to the UNC may be seen as a way to bolster deterrence or, if need be, multinational support in the event of a renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Given this reality, even were South Korea to take on wartime OPCON of the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s combined forces within the F-CFC, the shift in authorities would still be relative, and the transition itself would amplify the interconnections between the peninsula and wider region.
An Australian Perspective
This respondent, who asked to remain anonymous in order to speak freely, previously served as chief of the Australian Liaison Group to the United Nations Command.
A potentially complicated parallel command structure – with a U.S. four-star general in command of the UNC but a ROK four-star general in command of the CFC – is often raised as a key challenge in the wartime OPCON transition process. But transforming from a clear unified command structure to a differing structure can be relatively easily solved.
Aside from the question of the command structure, there are three inherent issues between the UNC and South Korea that provide more difficult challenges to overcome. The first issue is South Korea’s lack of coalition experience. South Korea, which has a primary reliance on its alliance with the United States, is inexperienced in operating as a member of a coalition. South Korea’s ability to operate effectively in a complex coalition headquarters is questionable – leading such a headquarters is immeasurably more difficult. South Korea’s appetite to share intelligence outside of its core alliance with the United States is also extremely limited.
The second issue is South Korea’s response to provocations. The current OPCON model has provided a level of reassurance that any North Korean military provocations would be handled appropriately and in consultation with UNC member states. South Korea’s response to significant provocations tends to be a counter-provocation plan devised in isolation. There have been cases of genuine concern by UNC member states regarding the proportionality and appropriateness of planned South Korean military responses.
The third issue revolves around South Korea’s frictions with the UNC. South Korea has shown a historical discomfort and contrariness in its relationship and dealings with the UNC. This was exacerbated from 2005 as a revitalized UNC transformed from a security management institution to a hybrid security organization. Original frictions were associated with sensitivities regarding UNCMAC’s enforcement of the Armistice Agreement on the South Korean military, and South Korea’s unwillingness to be part of a broad military coalition. These were compounded by South Korean sensitivities to the role of the UNC in perceived impingements of sovereign rights and confused suspicions about member states’ motives and objectives in a revitalized UNC.
Authors
Contributing Author
Clint Work
Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U. S. Government.
2. Korea's US security strategy test
Summary:
Man-Ki Kim argues the new NSS recasts U.S. national security around economic security, making supply chains, industrial capacity, energy independence, and technology leadership core strategic goals. He says this is a structural shift for South Korea, which the document now treats not only as a peninsula ally but as a key industrial and technology partner, frequently paired with Japan. Kim highlights over $200 billion in planned Korean investment in the U.S. and a shipbuilding opportunity driven by U.S. naval industrial shortfalls, including the proposed $150 billion MASGA framework. He cautions that transactional projects will dilute Korea’s leverage, and urges de-risking from China, co-development terms with Washington, and expanded Global South engagement.
Comment. Economy and security. Security and economy. National prosperity provides the foundation for national security. National security provides the foundation for national prosperity. Yin – yang. Which comes first: the chicken or the egg?
But on a serious note we are expanding the notion of our alliances to include industrial and economic partnerships. It is a good thing that Korea (and Japan as well) is becoming a strong partner in the arsenal of democracies and that these economic and industrial relationships support our mutual national security.
[Man-Ki Kim] Korea's US security strategy test
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · December 18, 2025
The Donald Trump administration’s newly released National Security Strategy marks a fundamental redefinition of how the United States understands national power. Unlike previous strategies that emphasized military posture and alliance diplomacy, the revised NSS places economic security at the core of American national security. Supply chain resilience, industrial capacity, energy independence and technological leadership are no longer supporting instruments; they are now strategic objectives in their own right.
For South Korea, this shift is not incremental. It represents a structural transformation that requires a comprehensive reassessment of national strategy across economic, industrial and geopolitical domains.
One of the most striking features of the new NSS is the unusually frequent and explicit reference to South Korea, often mentioned alongside Japan. Traditionally, Korea has been viewed primarily as a front-line security ally on the Korean Peninsula. The updated strategy goes further, explicitly recognizing Korea as a core industrial and technological partner in Washington’s effort to rebuild critical supply chains and reduce strategic dependence on China.
Such direct inclusion in a US strategic document is rare and significant. It reflects not only rising expectations for Korea, but also growing recognition of Korea’s technological sophistication and industrial weight in the global system.
Korea’s industrial ecosystem — spanning semiconductors, shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals, automobiles, batteries and energy — is deeply embedded in global supply chains that now intersect directly with US strategic priorities. Against this backdrop, Seoul and Washington have announced plans for more than $200 billion in accelerated Korean investment in the United States, covering sectors such as semiconductor equipment, small modular reactors, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
These investments are substantial. Yet the scale of capital flows alone does not guarantee strategic benefit. Without a clearer and more institutionalized framework for coordination, there is a risk that Korea’s contributions will be absorbed in a fragmented, transactional manner — generating limited long-term leverage or reciprocal gains. Strategic alignment cannot be improvised project by project; it must be deliberately designed.
A similar shift is unfolding in the maritime and defense-industrial domain. The US Navy’s ambitious fleet expansion and modernization plans face serious industrial bottlenecks that US shipyards alone cannot resolve. As one of the world’s most advanced shipbuilding nations, Korea is increasingly viewed as an indispensable partner in naval construction, maintenance, repair and overhaul and long-term fleet sustainment.
Under the proposed $150 billion MASGA — Make American Shipbuilding Great Again — framework, Korean industry could support US naval ship construction and gradually participate in more advanced areas of naval modernization. If structured as genuine co-development rather than simple subcontracting, such cooperation could reshape the industrial foundation of the US-Korea alliance and elevate Korea’s role from supplier to strategic partner.
These opportunities, however, come with mounting expectations. The new NSS signals a transition from traditional “burden sharing” toward what increasingly resembles “burden shifting,” in which allies are expected not only to contribute, but to assume greater financial, industrial and security responsibilities in support of US strategic objectives.
For Korea, which continues to face direct and existential threats from North Korea, this shift carries serious implications. Meeting US expectations may require higher defense spending, expanded operational roles in the Indo-Pacific and deeper participation in regional deterrence architectures. While defending the Korean Peninsula remains Korea’s top priority, Seoul must now confront the challenge of balancing immediate security needs with broader alliance responsibilities.
A passive or reactive posture in the face of these evolving expectations would weaken Korea’s strategic position. The central challenge is not whether Korea can meet allied demands, but whether it can actively shape the terms under which it does so. Korea must move beyond being a policy taker and assert itself as a strategic actor.
Three imperatives stand out.
First, Korea must pursue de-risking — not decoupling — from China. Given Korea’s export-driven economy and deep integration with Chinese markets, abrupt disengagement is neither realistic nor economically sustainable. Instead, Seoul should adopt phased diversification strategies in critical sectors such as semiconductors, critical minerals and advanced batteries. This approach reduces strategic vulnerability while preserving economic stability and diplomatic flexibility.
Second, Korea should proactively position itself in sectors where the United States faces acute capacity gaps. Shipbuilding, small modular reactors, petrochemical infrastructure, offshore engineering and maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities represent areas of clear Korean strength. Rather than passively joining US-led initiatives, Seoul should insist on co-design and co-production roles that generate durable industrial and technological returns.
Third, Korea must extend the NSS’ economic-security logic toward a broader Global South strategy. As geopolitical blocs harden, new growth opportunities are emerging across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Through pragmatic, interest-based partnerships — sometimes independently, sometimes in close coordination with Japan, Europe and other allies — Korea can diversify economic ties, expand strategic influence and reduce exposure to intensifying US-China rivalry.
Ultimately, the new NSS confronts Korea with a defining question: Will Seoul remain reactive to external pressures, or will it emerge as a strategic actor capable of shaping the evolving global economic-security order?
If Korea leverages its industrial strengths, aligns domestic policy with shifting geopolitical realities and expands its strategic reach beyond traditional theaters, the NSS can become a catalyst for national transformation rather than an added burden. Korea’s competitiveness over the coming decade will depend not on how much it is asked to contribute, but on its ability to lead, innovate and define its own strategic future.
Man-Ki Kim
Man-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yulchon. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · December 18, 2025
3. VOA Korean Service Resumes After Nine-Month Suspension
Summary:
VOA’s Korean-language service has resumed after a nine-month suspension tied to restructuring following POTUS’ second-term inauguration. The service restarted online coverage on Dec. 10 and resumed its “VOA Korean” audio program on Dec. 16, though many articles now lack reporter bylines because much of the staff was laid off. The report says some broadcasts to north Korea had already restarted intermittently since September, with USAGM acting head Kari Lake citing a POTUS social media post as a trigger for renewed transmissions. Analysts warn shuttering VOA and RFA would leave an information vacuum authoritarian states will exploit.
Comment: Curiously, from what I have been told, none of the full time VOA Korean Service staff have been recalled to work. Supposedly the work is being done by part time employees only. I have not found anyone published online by the Korea Service.
I wonder if they are just providing content regurgitated from One America News Network.
I thought this was some good news but there does not seem to be any substantive work being conducted in messaging toward north Korea.
I do not know what to make of this excerpt other than it seems to fit into the category of people who ask: "Is that the good Korea or the bad Korea?"
In this context, it was revealed that some VOA broadcasts to North Korea resumed starting last August. Kari Lake, the acting representative of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees VOA, appeared in court and stated, "We are currently conducting some broadcasts to North Korea." When asked about the reason for resuming broadcasts, she said, "We decided to do so based on Trump’s social media post," adding, "I don’t remember the exact details of the post, but it was critical of events occurring in South Korea and expressed doubts about what is happening within the South Korean leadership." This appears to reference Trump’s ‘Truth Social’ post made just before his first meeting with President Lee Jae-myung on August 25th, in which he asked, "What is happening in South Korea?" and remarked, "It seems like a purge or a revolution."
VOA Korean Service Resumes After Nine-Month Suspension
chosun.com · Kim Eun-joong
Broadcasts to North Korea Restarted Following Trump's Social Media Post; Congress Backs Funding for VOA, RFA
By Kim Eun-joong
Published 2025.12.18. 04:36
Updated 2025.12.18. 11:12https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/12/18/XF3KDQ4IC5BL3GELACTEBBF5NQ/
View of the Voice of America (VOA) broadcast office in Washington, DC, USA. /Reuters-Yonhap
The Korean-language service of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasting, which had been suspended due to restructuring fallout following the inauguration of the second Donald Trump administration, resumed starting on the 10th. VOA, which began broadcasting in 1942 in response to propaganda from enemy nations Japan and Germany during World War II, has broadcast in over 50 languages to more than 300 million people worldwide. After Trump signed an executive order specifying the maintenance of "minimum personnel and functions," broadcasting was suspended since last March. Although a court later ruled the executive order unlawful, adequate funding has not been provided. It was also reported that broadcasts to North Korea have been intermittently conducted since last September.
The VOA Korean website has been covering major issues related to the U.S., the Korean Peninsula, and ROK-US relations in articles starting on the 10th. On the 17th, it covered news such as the construction of Korea Zinc’s refinery in Tennessee State and the launch of the supply chain initiative ‘Pax Silica’ attended by major allies including South Korea and Japan. Articles on domestic news include a hacking incident at South Korean virtual asset exchange ‘Upbit’ worth 30 million dollars and the conclusion of the 180-day investigation by the Cho Eun-suk Insurrection Special Prosecutors’ Team. The audio news program ‘VOA Korean’ also resumed starting on the 16th. However, the ‘byline’ indicating the reporter’s name at the end of articles is not visible, as the majority of personnel who had been working at VOA were laid off due to the restructuring fallout.
In March, the parking lot in front of the Voice of America (VOA) broadcast office in Washington, DC, USA, appears empty. /Courtesy of Kim Eun-jung
In this context, it was revealed that some VOA broadcasts to North Korea resumed starting last August. Kari Lake, the acting representative of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees VOA, appeared in court and stated, "We are currently conducting some broadcasts to North Korea." When asked about the reason for resuming broadcasts, she said, "We decided to do so based on Trump’s social media post," adding, "I don’t remember the exact details of the post, but it was critical of events occurring in South Korea and expressed doubts about what is happening within the South Korean leadership." This appears to reference Trump’s ‘Truth Social’ post made just before his first meeting with President Lee Jae-myung on August 25th, in which he asked, "What is happening in South Korea?" and remarked, "It seems like a purge or a revolution."
VOA, alongside Radio Free Asia (RFA), which also took a direct hit following the Trump administration’s inauguration, has served as a vanguard in disseminating information to North Korea and spreading democratic values. In Congress, there is a prevailing opinion across both Democratic and Republican parties that the U.S. must continue to support the budgets of these two institutions to emerge victorious in the systemic competition with China. Olivia Inos, a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute and a human rights expert in Washington, D.C., said last month, "If the U.S. government shuts down RFA and others, authoritarian states will seek to fill the void with propaganda," adding, "It would be a mistake to abandon our strategic advantage at a time when countries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are intensifying their threats against the U.S."
On the 17th, the Voice of America (VOA) broadcast's Korean language service partially resumes. /Courtesy of VOA
chosun.com · Kim Eun-joong
4. N. Korea calls for standing up to U.S.-led 'Western coercion'
Summary:
north Korea’s foreign ministry urged countries to resist U.S.-led “Western coercion,” portraying sanctions and other unilateral measures as violations of sovereignty and U.N. noninterference principles. It cited the “Group of Friends in Defense of the U.N. Charter,” launched in 2021 with members including China and Russia, as a vehicle to rally Global South opposition.
Excerpts:
The ministry also said that the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the U.N. -- a new U.N. group of which North Korea is a member -- had a meeting earlier this month to mark the U.N. International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures.
...
The group was launched in 2021 by 18 countries, including China, Russia and Iran, to support what they say are the purposes of the U.N., but its members largely include some of the world's most repressive regimes.
The group is widely seen as an effort to rally developing nations critical of Western sanctions and human rights discourse, and seek to build a multipolar bloc led by China and Russia.
Comment: I find it ironic (hypocritical) to hear north Korea and these countries talk about self-determination which is something the people have a right to but which their citizens have never experienced.
But this collusion especially among the CRInK is what justified the congressional legislation in the form of the DISRUPT ACT which is specifically calling for activities to disrupt the CRInK. Unfortunately the 2026 NDAA did not include the DISRUPT ACT language though the legislation is still pending. I scrubbed the NDAA and could not find it. Here is an update:
Here is the current, verifiable status of the DISRUPT Act and whether it was enacted by Congress or included in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Legislative Status of the DISRUPT Act
The DISRUPT Act (Defending International Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships and Tactics Act), designated as H.R. 5912 in the 119th Congress, was introduced in the House of Representatives in November 2025 and referred to multiple committees for consideration. As of the latest congressional records, its status remains active but not enacted into law. It has not completed the full legislative process, meaning it has not been passed by both chambers of Congress and presented to the President for signature.
A companion or related bill, S.1883, has also been introduced in the Senate, but its procedural actions likewise indicate it remains in committee and has not become law.
Because the DISRUPT Act remains a standalone bill under consideration in both chambers, it has not been enacted by Congress as standalone statutory law.
Status with Respect to the 2026 NDAA
Public reporting on the Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA — which has now passed both chambers of Congress and been signed into law by POTUS — does not show inclusion of the DISRUPT Act’s text or substantive requirements as enacted provisions. Major summaries and coverage of the final NDAA focus on defense authorizations, military pay, alliance commitments, and other security provisions, but do not list the DISRUPT Act’s policy language as part of the enacted NDAA.
Summary
The DISRUPT Act:
- Was introduced in both the House (H.R. 5912) and Senate (S.1883) in 2025.
- Has not been enacted into law on its own.
- Was advocated for attachment to the 2026 NDAA, but was not ultimately included as enacted law in the final NDAA that POTUS signed.
N. Korea calls for standing up to U.S.-led 'Western coercion' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 20, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251220002300315
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday called for standing up to "Western coercion" led by the United States and its allies, accusing them of violating U.N. principles of respect for other countries' sovereignty and noninterference in their internal affairs.
North Korea made the call in a statement released by the foreign ministry, urging partner countries to continue raising their voices against such actions should they want to build "an equal and multipolar" world.
"Unilateral coercive measures that obliterate the rights to sovereignty, survival and development must be abolished," the ministry said in the statement posted on the website.
The ministry also said that the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the U.N. -- a new U.N. group of which North Korea is a member -- had a meeting earlier this month to mark the U.N. International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends a celebratory event marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea, in Pyongyang on Oct. 9, 2025, in this footage released by the Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The group was launched in 2021 by 18 countries, including China, Russia and Iran, to support what they say are the purposes of the U.N., but its members largely include some of the world's most repressive regimes.
The group is widely seen as an effort to rally developing nations critical of Western sanctions and human rights discourse, and seek to build a multipolar bloc led by China and Russia.
North Korea has stepped up its diplomacy with the Global South, which mostly refers to developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
At the meeting, the group "condemned hostile acts by the U.S. and its allies that undermine the sovereignty, survival and development rights of sovereign states," the ministry said.
The group also called for the international community to "firmly oppose and reject illegal and unilateral coercive measures that violate the principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter, including sovereign equality, noninterference in internal affairs and respect for the right to self-determination," it said.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · December 20, 2025
5. North Korea's Other TV: What You Don't See on KCTV
Summary:
Martyn Williams argues that Korean Central Television is only part of what north Koreans watch. Since roughly 2016, a four channel digital TV network has expanded beyond Pyongyang, adding Mansudae TV, Sport TV, and Ryongnamsan TV alongside KCTV. All remain state run and guided by Workers’ Party propaganda rules, but the additional channels carry lighter content and more variety, including foreign films and series. Williams reports seeing European football, Russian and Indian movies, Disney and Pixar films, domestic sports coverage, and foreign language lessons using clips from Western media.
Comment: Useful and important insights into the information ecosystem in north Korea. I wonder if this is an attempt to counter the desire for outside information by providing selective (e.g., closely controlled) viewing options. I think this could be an indication of the regime's recognition that its Propaganda and Agitation department content cannot compete with foreign content. Foreign content is having an effect on the Korean people in the north as well as the regime's decision making.
North Korea's Other TV: What You Don't See on KCTV - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · Martyn Williams
https://www.38north.org/2025/12/north-koreas-other-tv-what-you-dont-see-on-kctv/
This article was written as part of NK TechLab, a project of 38 North that serves as a central hub for ongoing investigation and analysis into how North Korea uses technology to serve and suppress its citizens. To read other research like this, visit NK TechLab here.
Among the many sources used to analyze North Korea is Korean Central Television (KCTV), the main, state-run television channel. The channel carries coverage of Kim Jong Un’s activities and key announcements and decisions from the Workers’ Party, provides updates on priority economic initiatives, and airs historical documentaries and cultural fare such as movies, children’s programming and education.
It is an important tool in understanding North Korea today, but it does not provide the whole picture of what North Koreans see on television and what they learn about the world. The country has three other state-run television channels that, while not as important for political analysis, offer a broader range of programming and create an opportunity to enhance our cultural understanding.
Until a decade ago, most homes across the country received only KCTV, which was on air from 17:00 to around 22:00. Two additional channels were available to solely Pyongyang audiences. However, beginning around 2016, KCTV began broadcasting earlier (first to 15:00 and then to the current 09:00) and the country began building a four-channel digital TV network that now appears to cover most of the country.
Certainly, all the channels are state run and subject to overview by the Propaganda and Agitation Department, meaning the programming still follows Workers’ Party guidelines and includes a good dose of ideological content. But the three additional channels offer programming that is lighter and less propaganda heavy. Moreover, unlike KCTV, the three additional channels are not available via satellite, so are rarely seen outside of the country.
I recently spent a weekend in South Korea near the northern border and was able to receive these channels. While three days of programming was not enough to come up with any serious conclusions, my glimpse at the programming revealed a more diverse range of content than appears on KCTV, including several foreign films and TV series. It was a helpful reminder to myself that there are many facets of North Korean society we don’t have access to that paint a more nuanced image of daily life. The following is a brief overview of the three additional channels and a taste of the content I was able to watch.
The Channels
Figure 1. Start-up graphics of (clockwise from top left) Korean Central Television, Ryongnamsan Television, Mansudae Television and Sports Television.
Mansusdae TV is the oldest of the three additional channels. It has been available in Pyongyang since December 4, 1983, and from launch has carried cultural programming, foreign films and international news. It originally began broadcasting only on Sundays, but is now also on air on Friday and Saturday. 1
The station signs on Friday and Saturday at 19:00 and broadcasts until 22:00. On Sundays its programming is split into two blocks, one from 10:00 to around 13:00 and the second from 16:00 to around 22:00. It is the only one of the channels to still broadcast in standard definition.
Sport TV is the newest channel in North Korea, having been launched on August 15, 2015. At the time of its launch, it offered three hours of sports-related programming each weekend night, but that has now been expanded to four hours. Sport TV begins broadcasting at 18:00 on weekend evenings and closes at around 22:00. It is available in high definition.
Ryongnamsan TV was launched on September 5, 2012, to replace the Korea Educational and Culture TV channel that had been on the air in Pyongyang since 1997 (and even earlier since 1971 as Kaesong TV). It is available each weeknight from 18:00 to 22:00 and is broadcast in high definition.
Taken together, this means North Korean homes have access to two channels from Monday through Thursday (KCTV and Ryongnamsan TV), three on Friday (KCTV, Ryongnamsan TV and Mansudae TV), and three on Saturday and Sunday (KCTV, Mansudae TV and Sport TV).
Figure 2. Testcards of (clockwise from top left) Korean Central Television, Ryongnamsan Television, Mansudae Television and Sports Television.
Mansudae Television
From an outside view, Mansudae TV is perhaps the most interesting of the three channels as it carries a larger proportion of foreign entertainment than the others. Korean Central Television rarely carries foreign content beyond sports, so an observer might get the impression North Korean TV is devoid of such programming. However, based on the sample I watched, foreign programming is much more common on the three additional channels.
On Saturday, November 29, Mansudae TV began with a European Champions League football match between Liverpool and Real Madrid. European football is regularly broadcast on KCTV in the afternoon, but this match does not appear to have been televised on that channel so it wasn’t a rerun. It was followed by the 2021 Russian movie “Лётчик” (The Pilot: A Battle for Survival).
Sunday morning programming included the 2016 Indian movie, “Pulimurugan,” and the highlight of the afternoon was the Disney/Pixar movie “Ratatouille,” dubbed into Korean.
Very little US content is available officially in North Korea, but Disney and Pixar movies are the exception as their storylines are usually tame and have little objectionable material. Several are available on DVD in the country, but such movies are never shown on KCTV.
Figure 3. The Disney/Pixar movie “Ratatouille” broadcast on Mansudae Television .
The day finished off with episodes 19 and 20 of the 2015 Chinese TV drama “于无声处” (In the Silence). Like the other foreign broadcasts, the program was dubbed into Korean.
Between the foreign fare, Mansudae TV broadcast the kind of small feature programs on nature, science and technology and general knowledge that make up a portion of the KCTV daily schedule. These filler programs are common across all channels and often have an educational message and sometimes an underlying propaganda message as well.
Sport Television
Sport TV’s programming was notable for coverage of sports not seen on KCTV.
On Saturday evening, after a couple of sports-related propaganda features, the channel broadcast the third in a series of compilation programs of 2025’s top domestic sporting moments. This is notable as KCTV has an afternoon sports block most days, but this is never filled with domestic coverage. It seems that North Korean TV is covering domestic competition, but its broadcast is limited to Sport TV.
On Saturday, November 29, the coverage included a basketball match between Myohyang Trade Bureau (묘향무역국) and Taehyung Trade Guidance Bureau (대흥무역지도국) and a domestic swimming contest.
Figure 4. A domestic basketball match broadcast on Sports Television.
Figure 5. A domestic swimming competition broadcast on Sports Television.
The main attraction for Saturday evening was a repeat of the Women’s Under 17 World Cup football match between North Korean and El Salvador. The match was played on November 5, and North Korea won 5-0. It was an early victory on their way to becoming world champions. KCTV showed four later-stage matches, but this one had not been broadcast there before.
Over the weekend, Sport TV also aired coverage of the Men’s Water Polo Final from the 2025 World Aquatics Championships, which took place in July, a match from the World Table Tennis Championships in May and a game from the FIBA Women’s Asia Cup basketball tournament in August.
Ryongnamsan Television
The schedule of the educational channel, Ryongnamsan TV, is full of short features on a diverse range of subjects. Many programs run around 5 to 10 minutes each. Some are based on video sourced from overseas, but most appear to be domestically produced.
On Monday, December 1, evening programming included programs on sweet potato cultivation, how to make a wind turbine, how to calculate area, and efficient marine transport methods.
One physics feature on the properties of sound waves was presented by a domestic educator. The program “소리의 세요소” (The Three Elements of Sound) was taught by Hang Song Hui, a teacher from Inhung Junior Middle School, in Pyongyang’s Moranbong District.
Figure 6. Hang Song Hui from Inhung Junior Middle School in Pyongyang in her classroom on Ryongnamsan TV.
The channel also includes foreign language learning programs. On Monday, three episodes of the “외국어학습시간” (Foreign Language Study) program were broadcast. Two focused on English and one on Chinese.
Figure 7. Title card for English Foreign Language Study program on Ryongnamsan Television.
The first of the English features was based around the Disney movie “Luca.” A five-minute clip from the movie was broadcast in the original English with no subtitles, then several phrases from the clip were explained, and then it was shown again with English subtitles.
Figure 8. Scene from the movie “Luca” with English subtitles from Ryongnamsan Television.
The second English study program used clips from a Discovery Channel series called “100 Greatest Discoveries” and covered medicine. Following that, several minutes from a Chinese nature series were broadcast and the format remained the same, with words explained and subtitles added for a second airing.
While programming from December 2 was not watched, a program guide for the day broadcast at the end of December 1 showed foreign language study programs would be aired for Russian and German. The Russian study was based around a program called The Deep Ocean and the German one the animated movie “Ballerina.”
The News
The 8 pm evening news on KCTV is the most important program of the day on North Korean television. It is used to make major announcements and detail party initiatives, and is the first place Kim Jong Un’s activities are usually seen.
Both Ryongnamsan and Sport TV simulcast the bulletin, but it appears Mansudae TV only carries it on Sunday evenings.
In the two days of Mansudae that I watched, the TV schedule only called for the news to be broadcast on Sunday. This is likely due to the channel’s relatively late start time of 19:00 and its movie and feature-heavy schedule. By the time the first program begins airing on Friday and Saturday evenings, at around 19:10, there is not enough time to run a movie without bumping into the evening news. On Sunday evenings, broadcasts begin at 16:00 making it much easier to schedule the bulletin.
On November 30, the evening news was preempted with a special report on Kim Jong Un’s attendance at a ceremony to mark the 80th anniversary of the KPA Air Force.
Figure 9. A special report on the 80th anniversary of the KPA Air Force smilucast on Korean Central Television, Mansudae TV and Sport TV at 20:00 on November 30, 2025. (Note: Mansudae TV takes a 4:3 feed of KCTV for the relay).
Mansudae TV also carries a 30-minute summary of world news from the week just before the main news on Sunday evenings.
Conclusion
Without a much larger sample, it is difficult to come up with any major conclusions. However, the access should remind analysts and observers that the North Korean media landscape is broader than the access offered overseas.
38north.org · Martyn Williams
6. Senate confirms Korean American official as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security
Summary:
The U.S. Senate confirmed Korean American official John Noh as assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Indo-Pacific security affairs, approving him 53–43. Noh, previously the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary for East Asia, will oversee defense cooperation with South Korea and other regional partners as Washington modernizes alliances amid north Korea’s advancing nuclear threats and China’s growing assertiveness. In Senate responses, Noh argued South Korean capabilities can help deter China and criticized Beijing’s Yellow Sea actions as intimidation.
Comment: Note that he is calling out Chinese malign activities in the West (Yellow) Sea that threaten South Korea. It is important to do that.
(LEAD) Senate confirms Korean American official as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251220000251315
(ATTN: CHANGES photo; ADDS more info in paras 4-5)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Senate has confirmed a Korean American official as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, a post that deals with defense cooperation with South Korea and other regional allies and partners, Congress' website showed Friday.
On Thursday, the upper chamber approved John Noh, who has served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, in a 53-43 vote.
The confirmation came as Seoul and Washington are working to deepen security cooperation and "modernize" the bilateral alliance amid North Korea's advancing nuclear and ballistic missile threats and China's growing assertiveness.
In his written answers to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee in October, Noh said that many South Korean defense capabilities could contribute to deterring China, as he stressed that the United States' defense priorities should focus on addressing the "most serious" military threat of the Asian superpower.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia John Noh speaks during a Senate confirmation hearing in Washington on Oct. 7, 2025, in this photo captured from a livestream from the Senate Committee on Armed Services' website. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Regarding China's naval activities in the Yellow Sea, Noh said that those activities appear to be aimed at "intimidating" South Korea. The activities apparently referred to China's installation of steel structures in the Provisional Maritime Zone, an overlapping sea zone between the two countries.
President Donald Trump nominated him for the assistant secretary post in June.
Before joining the Pentagon, Noh served as deputy general counsel on the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Prior to his stint on the committee, Noh was an attorney in private practice and worked on cross-border investigations.
Noh is a graduate of Brown University and Stanford Law School.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · December 20, 2025
7. Lee orders security ministers' meeting to coordinate N. Korea policy
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung ordered a security ministers’ meeting to better coordinate Seoul’s north Korea policy after closed-door briefings from the foreign and unification ministries. The move reflects apparent differences in approach, with foreign affairs stressing coordination with Washington and unification prioritizing inter-Korean dialogue. Lee said competing views are useful, widening policy options for diplomatic and security strategy.
Comment: POTROK seems to be trying to manage the rogue MOU. He is wise to welcome diverging views but the administration can only speak with one voice. The different views must be worked out behind closed doors.
Lee orders security ministers' meeting to coordinate N. Korea policy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · December 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251219009900320
SEOUL, Dec. 19 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Friday instructed officials to arrange a security-related ministers' meeting to better coordinate the government's North Korea policy, the presidential office said.
The instruction came after Lee attended closed-door policy briefings from the foreign and unification ministries, according to presidential spokesperson Kim Nam-jun.
Lee's instruction comes amid apparent policy direction differences between the ministries in their North Korea policies under the new administration.
The foreign ministry has traditionally emphasized the importance of consultation and coordination with Washington when dealing with Pyongyang, while the unification ministry has largely prioritized inter-Korean dialogue separate from U.S. involvement.
Lee said differing views among ministries should be viewed positively, noting that each ministry having its own position helps broaden policy options when choosing diplomatic and security strategies, according to Kim.
President Lee Jae Myung (C) salutes the national flag during a work report from the Overseas Koreans Agency and the unification ministry at the government complex in Seoul on Dec. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · December 19, 2025
8. S. Korean startup again delays 1st commercial orbit launch
Comment: Korea is diversifying its launch options.
S. Korean startup again delays 1st commercial orbit launch | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Sang-soo · December 20, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251220000500320
SEOUL, Dec. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korean space startup Innospace Co. said Saturday its first commercial orbit launch has been delayed again due to technical problems.
The Hanbit-Nano rocket was scheduled to lift off from the Alcantara Space Center in Brazil earlier in the day, but the launch was delayed. Innospace had originally aimed to launch the vehicle Wednesday.
The space startup said it will reschedule the liftoff in cooperation with the Brazilian Air Force.
The Hanbit-Nano vehicle will carry eight payloads, including five satellites, and deploy them into a 300-kilometer low orbit.
The two-stage vehicle employs a 25-ton thrust hybrid engine that powers the first stage, and the second stage is backed by a liquid methane and oxygen engine.
If successful, Innospace will become the first private South Korean company to place a customer satellite into orbit.
This photo, provided by South Korean space startup Innospace Co., shows its Hanbit-Nano space vehicle. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sam@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Park Sang-soo · December 20, 2025
9. Editorial: Government's North Korea Policy Resembles Event Planning
Summary:
Chosun Ilbo’s editorial argues President Lee Jae Myung’s team is treating north Korea policy like a staged diplomatic “event,” prioritizing engagement optics while neglecting hard security realities. It says the unification ministry’s “self-reliance” line is now driving policy, with foreign affairs relegated to enabling it. The piece criticizes proposals such as a peace envoy, sanctions easing, rail links, and tourism as unrealistic without broad sanctions relief. It faults Lee for framing current hostility as mutual “karma,” stressing north Korea’s long record of attacks and repression. It also questions reports of restrained frontline rules despite repeated MDL crossings.
Comnet: The Chosun Ilbo is not afraid to use the "A" word: appeasement. If this is accurate then we could see a weakening of the frontline defenses as well as the continued ROK/US alliance friction as policies diverge is led by the MOU.
Editorial: Government's North Korea Policy Resembles Event Planning
Critics question if appeasement measures, ignoring nuclear threats and human rights, are part of a staged diplomatic performance
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.12.20. 00:00
Updated 2025.12.20. 00:12https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/12/20/ZONRWCZHMBDCTCHYZ5LDFH2RBU/
Chung Dong-young, Minister of Unification, looks at attendees answering President Lee Jae-myung's question during a work report meeting held on the 19th at the annex of the Government Complex Seoul involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Overseas Koreans Agency) and the Ministry of Unification. /Yonhap
The 19th presidential briefing by the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ultimately concluded with the self-reliance faction within the Ministry of Unification securing policy leadership. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young stated, “We will strengthen our leading role as a direct party to the Korean Peninsula issue,” to which Foreign Minister Cho Hyun responded, “We will make our best diplomatic efforts to turn the ideals presented by the Ministry of Unification into reality.” This likely signifies that the self-reliance faction will take the lead, with the alliance faction providing support.
Minister Chung, who has been courting Kim Jong-un in every way, also announced on this day the establishment of a “Korean Peninsula peace envoy,” easing sanctions against North Korea, a high-speed rail plan connecting Seoul–Pyongyang–Beijing, and promoting tourism to Wonsan for overseas nationals. All of this requires lifting all sanctions against North Korea. Does the government believe the UN Security Council and the U.S. will agree to this?
President Lee remarked that day, “In the past, the two Koreas pretended to be enemies, but these days, they seem to be becoming real enemies.” He attributed this situation to “strategic desires” and “a form of karma.” Reducing hostility between the two Koreas is necessary. However, all this karma was accumulated by the Kim dynasty, which started wars, attacked Cheong Wa Dae, carried out the Rangoon bombing, bombed a KAL plane, provoked in the West Sea, sank the Cheonan, shelled Yeonpyeong Island, and kidnapped citizens—countless attacks and acts of violence.
President Lee added, “The North has built triple fences, fearing a South Korean invasion, and erected barriers to prevent even tanks from crossing.” However, North Korea’s triple fences are meant to block its residents from defecting. Why would North Koreans defect? Has President Lee ever tried to understand the sentiments of North Korean residents, even slightly?
Judging from President Lee and Minister Chung’s recent actions, it seems North Korea has no nuclear weapons. On this day as well, the two did not even mention the term “North Korean nuclear issue.” Have they abandoned denuclearization, lifted sanctions, respected the Kim dynasty, accepted its four-generation succession, provided dollars and rice to the Kims, ignored the human rights of North Korean residents—and what exactly are they trying to gain?
North Korean troops crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) 10 times last month alone. Despite this, the government reportedly instructed troops guarding the ceasefire line to respond “cautiously.” North Korea policy must be pursued cautiously, considering both the security perspective—guarding against the military threats of the Kim dynasty—and the political perspective of managing the Korean Peninsula situation. However, this administration is blind to the security perspective and is rushing forward blindly. It seems like they are staging some kind of event.
10. President gives unification ministry rein on NK policy
Summary:
President Lee Jae Myung signaled that the Ministry of Unification will take the lead on north Korea policy, sidelining the foreign ministry amid recent friction over Pyongyang-related initiatives. At a joint policy briefing on Dec. 19, Lee stressed patience, de-escalation, and trust-building, arguing that managing inter-Korean hostility is a core unification ministry responsibility given Korea’s divided status. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said his ministry would “strengthen the lead” as the primary actor on peninsula issues. The move follows a public disagreement over a proposed South Korea-U.S. coordination meeting, with the unification ministry opting for separate outreach. The presidential office said policy is being coordinated through the National Security Council.
Comment: I hope this is not accurate. If it is, our diplomats are going to have some challenges coordinating ROK/US policies toward north Korea. The Ministry of Unification has no counterpart in the US (nor in north Korea as well since the regime changed its policies).
President gives unification ministry rein on NK policy
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By Anna J. Park
- Published Dec 19, 2025 4:03 pm KST
- Updated Dec 19, 2025 5:25 pm KST
Lee addresses tensions between foreign, unification ministries over North Korea issues
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a policy briefing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification at Government Complex Seoul, Friday. Yonhap
President Lee Jae Myung emphasized the role of the Ministry of Unification, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in North Korea policy Friday, addressing the recent rift between the two ministries over Pyongyang-related policies.
In response, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said his ministry will “strengthen the lead” as the primary player in the Korean Peninsula issue.
During the two ministries’ policy briefing in Seoul, Lee stressed the need for patience and trust-building in inter-Korean relations.
“South Korea must act with patience and do its utmost to reduce hostility between the two Koreas and allow even a small seed of trust to sprout,” Lee said. “That role, I believe, is one the Ministry of Unification must play.”
His remarks followed a series of comments emphasizing engagement with Pyongyang and were seen as effectively endorsing the unification ministry’s position, reinforcing expectations that it will take the lead in shaping North Korea policy going forward. Lee repeatedly underscored the ministry’s significance, citing South Korea’s unique status as a divided nation.
“As a divided country, the role of the Ministry of Unification is extremely meaningful and important,” Lee said.
Lee expressed regret over Pyongyang’s recent stance advocating “two hostile states,” saying it leaves essentially no room for communication.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, left, speaks during a joint policy briefing at Government Complex Seoul, Friday. On the right is Foreign Minister Cho Hyun. Yonhap
Acknowledging that creating space for communication will not be an easy task, Lee emphasized the need for a strategic shift in how South Korea approaches the North.
“With patience, and through proactive and leading efforts, we must try to ease inter-Korean hostility and allow even a minimal level of trust to take root,” the president said. “That responsibility lies with the Ministry of Unification.”
Lee’s comments come amid friction between the unification and foreign affairs ministries over who should take the initiative on North Korea policy. Tensions surfaced earlier this month over a South Korea-U.S. policy coordination meeting on North Korea's nuclear issue.
While the foreign ministry was preparing to launch the consultative body by stressing policy coordination with Washington, the unification ministry decided not to participate in the meeting and instead held a separate session with foreign diplomats here to explain its North Korea policy. It said it would later pursue separate discussions with the U.S.
The disagreement has been widely seen as reflecting a broader divide within the administration between advocates of greater strategic autonomy and those favoring a strong alliance-based approach.
"The Korean Peninsula issue cannot be resolved by the 'bureaucratic thinking' waiting for the U.S. approval and permission," Chung said at a seminar in November.
Regarding the inter-ministerial rift, the presidential office played down suggestions of any deep-seated conflict.
“All matters related to diplomacy and security are being discussed and coordinated closely through the National Security Council as we seek solutions to issues on the Korean Peninsula,” a presidential official said.
Another key presidential official told The Korea Times that with no settled answer yet on North Korea policy, the president and his administration are “in the process of searching for the right path and, in that context, listening to a range of perspectives.”
A separate presidential aide added that the president encourages open debate. “He is watching both sides closely,” the aide said.
Anna J. Park
Anna Jiwon Park has been covering the politics at The Korea Times since the summer of 2024, when she joined the press pool for the Office of the President in Korea. Prior to that, she spent about five years reporting extensively on financial markets, regulatory authorities and the financial industry. She joined The Korea Times in 2019 after spending eight years as a broadcast journalist at Arirang TV, Korea’s leading global broadcaster, covering politics, defense and culture.
annajpark@koreatimes.co.kr
11. South Korean President Reiterates Necessity of Tipping Balance on Inter-Korean Relations
Summary:
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung again framed inter-Korean relations as dangerously degraded, warning at a joint foreign affairs and unification ministry briefing that the two Koreas “are becoming true enemies.” He urged patience and proactive steps to reduce hostility and rebuild trust, consistent with his campaign emphasis on peace as cheaper and more sustainable than an arms buildup. Lee has promoted his END initiative (Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization) as a pathway to peaceful coexistence and shared growth. But Pyongyang continues to reject engagement, treating Seoul as a subordinate actor unable to ease U.S. and U.N. sanctions. The article notes limits on the unification ministry’s authorities and argues Seoul may need bureaucratic reorientation to manage overlaps and improve effectiveness.
Excerpt:
Lee is aware of the challenges and obstacles in dealing with North Korea. The president emphasized the importance of the Ministry of Unification in enticing Pyongyang to respond to Seoul’s dialogue gestures. However, it is unclear how the Unification Ministry can make a breakthrough, considering its limited authorities. Also, as the roles of the Unification Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministry overlap in some areas, it seems that Seoul needs to reorient this bureaucracy in order to handle North Korea issues in an effective manner.
Comment: I think it is folly to bank on the MOU. I have to ask what the NIS is doing? Historically the most effective between north and South have been through the intelligence services.
South Korean President Reiterates Necessity of Tipping Balance on Inter-Korean Relations
During the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy briefing, Lee Jae-myung warned that the two Korea “are becoming true enemies.”
By Mitch Shin
December 19, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/south-korean-president-reiterates-necessity-of-tipping-balance-on-inter-korean-relations/?utm
Credit: Facebook/ Lee Jae-myung
In a policy briefing carried out by the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Friday, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung again highlighted the aggravated relations between the two Koreas.
Mentioning that South Korea and North Korea once acted as if they were enemies in the past, Lee shared his view that “they are becoming true enemies.”
“We must have patience and take a preemptive and proactive lead in doing our best to ease hostilities and allow trust to sprout between the South and the North,” Lee said during the policy briefing.
During his presidential campaign, Lee repeatedly stressed the need to create a peaceful Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas do not have to fight against each other. His approach on North Korea is embedded in his pragmatic view that constructing peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy is much cheaper than building up advanced missile programs to deter North Korea’s nuclear attack.
In this context, Lee proposed his “END” (Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization) initiative during his speech at the United Nations in September. Lee’s main goal is to end “the era of hostility and confrontation” on the Korean Peninsula and to open a new chapter of the relations between the two Koreas, where they can seek peaceful coexistence and shared growth.
As Lee mentioned during the policy briefing, however, North Korea views South Korea as a hostile state and this sentiment was aggravated during the previous conservative administration of South Korea. Despite Lee’s repeated olive branches, Pyongyang has made clear that it has no interest in dialogue with Seoul. North Korea views the South as an ineffective counterpart that does not have the power to lift the devastating economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations.
Lee is aware of the challenges and obstacles in dealing with North Korea. The president emphasized the importance of the Ministry of Unification in enticing Pyongyang to respond to Seoul’s dialogue gestures. However, it is unclear how the Unification Ministry can make a breakthrough, considering its limited authorities. Also, as the roles of the Unification Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministry overlap in some areas, it seems that Seoul needs to reorient this bureaucracy in order to handle North Korea issues in an effective manner.
Authors
Contributing Author
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula. He is also a non-resident research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies and associate fellow for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
12. Talks with U.S. expose internal faultlines in South Korea's approach to North Korea
Summary:
South Korea’s first follow-up talks with Washington on implementing the leaders’ joint fact sheet exposed a familiar split in Seoul over who should steer north Korea policy and how tightly it should be coordinated with the United States. The Dec. 16 consultation, led by the foreign and defense ministries, covered denuclearization, the 2018 Singapore statement, and efforts to bring Pyongyang back to talks. The unification ministry’s absence turned a technical session into a political fight, reviving memories of the 2018 working group. U.S. experts warned Pyongyang has long sought to exploit such seams, and urged Seoul to keep alliance coordination routine and disciplined while pursuing parallel initiatives.
Comment: Our diplomats have a lot of work to do. But the ball is nothe ROK court. It has to make its house right. We should keep in mind these five questions. Note 4 and 5.
- What do we want to achieve in Korea?
- What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?
- Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)
- Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
- In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
Talks with U.S. expose internal faultlines in South Korea's approach to North Korea
Published: 19 Dec. 2025, 07:00
Updated: 19 Dec. 2025, 08:32
Jeong Yeon-doo, right, vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence at South Korea's Foreign Ministry, and acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim shake hands before their talks at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Dec. 16, to coordinate their North Korea policy. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]
[EXPLAINER]
South Korea’s first follow-up talks with the United States on implementing a joint leaders’ fact sheet should have been an opportunity to follow up on the leaders' summits. Instead, it has exposed unresolved chasms in Seoul over how North Korea policy should be coordinated with Washington — and which government agency should take the lead.
The ROK-U.S. Consultation on Joint Fact Sheet Implementation, held Tuesday in Seoul, was a part of ongoing efforts to strengthen bilateral coordination on North Korea policy at a time when talks with Pyongyang are at an impasse despite the Lee Jae Myung administration's hopes for North-U.S. talks to make headway next year. The ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, the South's official name.
The ministry said both sides agreed that close coordination would remain essential in pursuing future Korea Peninsula policy, and pledged to maintain communication at various levels going forward.
Related Article
Missing from the talks were any representatives from the Unification Ministry, which has indicated it intends to play a more proactive and leading role in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. This quickly turned what was meant to be a fruitful technical consultation into a broader political debate.
U.S. experts said the controversy over alliance coordination reflects domestic political and bureaucratic tensions in Seoul, and warned that North Korea’s longstanding strategy has been to exploit precisely such divisions.
Jeong Yeon-doo, left, vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence at the Foreign Ministry, holds talks with acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on Dec. 16, to coordinate their North Korea policy. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]
What were the talks about, and was the root of the controversy?
Tuesday's meeting brought together officials from the foreign affairs and defense ministries on the South Korean side and representatives from the U.S. State and Defense departments, led by Jeong Yeon-doo, vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence at the Foreign Ministry, and by the acting U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, Kevin Kim.
The discussions covered a broad range of Korean Peninsula-related issues outlined in the joint fact sheet released after President Lee Jae Myung’s summit meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump in August and October. Those commitments include reaffirming the allies’ shared goal of the complete denuclearization of North Korea, cooperation to implement the 2018 Singapore joint statement, close coordination on North Korea policy and efforts to encourage Pyongyang’s return to dialogue and compliance with international obligations, according to South Korea’s Foreign Ministry.
The meeting, however, triggered heated political reactions, invoking memories of the controversial Korea–U.S. working group launched in late 2018 during a brief thaw in inter-Korean relations following the PyeongChang Winter Olympics held in the South.
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, right, talks with South Korea's Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon during their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul on May 10, 2019. [YONHAP]
Though designed to ensure that expanding inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation did not violate UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, the working group was criticized by some in then-President Moon Jae-in administration for blocking progress in inter-Korean relations for prioritizing sanctions coordination.
One frequently cited example was an effort by the Moon administration to send influenza medication to North Korea on humanitarian grounds in 2019, which was delayed amid questions over whether transporting the aid by truck would breach sanctions.
North Korea's Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of leader Kim Jong-un, later accused Seoul of allowing what she called "pro-U.S. subservience hanging around their necks" as the reason the "excellent" inter-Korean agreements have not seen a single step forward." The meeting ended in 2020.
Former President Moon Jae-in talks with North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un's younger sister Kim Yo-jong during a performance by North's Samjiyon Orchestra at the National Theater of Korea in Seoul in February 2018. [YONHAP]
A diplomatic source in Seoul said U.S. officials also conveyed during Tuesday's meeting that the consultation should not be framed as a revival of the previous working group, expressing puzzlement over why such a narrative had emerged.
Sydney Seiler, senior adviser and Korea Chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a former U.S. special envoy for the six-party talks, rejected the premise that the working group was responsible for the collapse of inter-Korean engagement.
“There is no legitimate analysis of the events of 2017, 2018 and 2019 that blames the U.S.–ROK working group for the failure of progress in inter-Korean relations,” he said.
According to Seiler, Pyongyang “lost interest in dealing with the Moon Jae-in administration once they had access to the United States” and repeatedly pressed Seoul to refrain from cooperating with the United States. In that context, Seiler said, the working group became “the scapegoat” — not the cause — of stalled diplomacy, echoing Pyongyang’s longstanding narrative.
Senior Foreign Ministry officials stressed that the talks were neither about enforcing sanctions nor approving policy, but rather an exchange of assessments at a time when dialogue with North Korea remains stalled, and the regional geopolitical environment has grown more complex.
“The establishment of the working group seven years ago was an exceptional case, created to address particular circumstances,” a senior Foreign Ministry official explained the following day, speaking on background. “[What we are doing now is] simply resuming director-general-level consultations to follow up on leaders’ agreements — nothing more and nothing less.”
“The follow-up consultations on the Korea–U.S. joint fact sheet are fundamentally different in purpose and context from the previous working group,” the official added. “There was a clear understanding on both the Korean and U.S. sides from the outset, and that remains the case."
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, right, and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young attend a plenary session of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee in Seoul on Aug. 18. [YONHAP]
Why did the Unification Ministry skip the meeting, and what does it mean?
Much of the domestic backlash centered on the Unification Ministry’s decision not to attend the talks.
Former unification ministers from progressive administrations issued a rare joint statement warning against allowing diplomatic engagement with the United States to constrain South Korea’s autonomy in inter-Korean affairs. The statement was signed by six former ministers who served under the liberal administrations of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in: Lim Dong-won, Chung Se-hyun, Lee Jae-joung, Cho Myoung-gyon, Kim Yeon-chul and Lee In-young.
Former unification ministers and inter-Korean affairs experts take part in a special roundtable evaluating the Lee Jae Myung administration’s unification and security policies at the Korea Press Center in central Seoul on Dec. 3. [NEWS1]
In unusually blunt language, the former ministers argued that South Korea’s Foreign Ministry lacked both the expertise and the historical understanding of inter-Korean relations to lead North Korea policy. They also said that in past episodes — including the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and discussions over sanctions relief — the Foreign Ministry had taken positions that were “more conservative than those of the U.S. government itself.”
Such criticism echoes concerns expressed by current Unification Minister Chung Dong-young.
Despite the public exchanges, both the foreign and unification ministries have formally denied that the episode reflects interministerial conflict, saying they are pursuing the same national interest through different approaches.
In a press statement issued Monday — one day before the meeting — the Unification Ministry said it understood the consultation as a "follow-up discussion" on the joint fact sheet and characterized it as a "bilateral foreign policy consultation" rather than a coordination meeting on North Korea policy. The ministry added that issues related to inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation would be "handled separately" by the Unification Ministry as needed.
On the day of the meeting, the ministry instead held a policy briefing for foreign diplomats and representatives of embassies and international organizations in Seoul, seeking support for its approach.
The Foreign Ministry rejected the idea that the Unification Ministry had been sidelined.
“The most important question is how to find a breakthrough for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula,” the senior Foreign Ministry official said. “That is a shared concern across ministries. The Unification Ministry has its own priorities and roles, and so does the Foreign Ministry. This does not mean there is a problem with communication.”
The official added that the Unification Ministry, as well as other relevant institutions, could participate in future meetings if the agenda warranted it, and that information from the talks would be shared through existing government channels.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, right, is greeded by U.S. President Donald Trump upon his arrival at the White House on Aug. 25 in Washington. [AP/YONHAP]
How did Washington respond?
Behind the scenes, the episode also prompted a quiet sense of surprise in Washington.
Diplomatic sources from Washington familiar with the matter told the Korea JoongAng Daily that some U.S. officials had expected broad interagency participation from Seoul, including the Unification Ministry, and were taken aback when internal differences in South Korea became publicly visible through media reports.
While public friction between ministries is not ideal, experts suggested the current situation remains manageable and poses no fundamental obstacle to policy execution.
“I would not worry that this is hindering or hurting or confusing our cooperation or formulation of North Korea policy,” Seiler said, noting that such bureaucratic dynamics are familiar territory for alliance managers in Washington.
He stressed that North Korea policy has always been a complex, multiagency issue — the Unification Ministry oversees inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges, the Foreign Ministry manages diplomacy with allies and the presidential office, through the National Security Office, sets overall strategic direction — emphasizing that close coordination within the alliance has been routine for decades and that Washington’s so-called “Korea hands” are well acquainted with Seoul’s internal dynamics drawing on his experience.
President Lee Jae Myung observes areas of Kaepung County in North Hwanghae Province, North Korea, through a VR observation viewer at the Ganghwa Peace Observatory in Incheon on Oct. 3. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
What challenges does this pose for Lee's North Korea initiatives?
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac sought to play down concerns on Tuesday, telling reporters before departing for the United States that the National Security Council was actively discussing and coordinating the issue.
“We will continue working to ensure the government responds to external issues with one voice,” Wi said.
Lee’s administration, in its early months, has pledged to play a “peace-maker” and “pace-maker” role in reviving dialogue on the Korean Peninsula — language echoed in the joint fact sheet with Washington.
Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung acknowledged the difficulties facing that effort, saying during a press briefing on Monday that the process of reopening dialogue with North Korea had been “frustrating,” and that, under such circumstances, the Foreign Ministry and the Unification Ministry were exploring “various approaches.”
Even the ruling Democratic Party (DP) weighed in on the apparent friction between the Unification Ministry and Foreign Ministry.
On Wednesday, DP leader Jung Chung-rae refuted reports of an interministerial conflict.
Jung still added he believed the policy direction chosen by Chung was “the right one,” adding that the party was moving to establish a special internal body to provide policy advice aimed at increasing South Korea's autonomy in its alliance with the United States and its independence in managing inter-Korean relations.
Calls have also emerged within the party for the presidential office to more clearly assert its role as a command center.
DP Rep. Park Jie-won, a former chief of the National Intelligence Service, urged Seoul's presidential office and the National Security Council to clarify the operational structure of the South Korea-U.S. consultation meeting, arguing that greater transparency was needed to reassure the public.
Lee is expected to receive policy briefings from both the Foreign Ministry and the Unification Ministry on Friday, in a session that will be broadcast live. The briefings could offer clues as to whether the administration is moving toward more precise alignment or allowing space for parallel approaches.
Even that moment of clarity, however, may be limited to Seoul.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un [RODONG SINMUN]
As Lee has made a series of conciliatory gestures — from adjusting military activities to signaling openness to engagement — Pyongyang has yet to show any sign of response. While South Korean ministries debate how best to break through what the president has described as a “needle’s eye,” domestic pressure has grown to attribute the lack of progress to external constraints rather than North Korea’s own refusal to engage.
“It provides a very easy excuse,” Seiler said, noting that such narratives allow critics to frame alliance coordination itself as the obstacle.
The current debate in Seoul, he suggested, risks becoming part of a scenario Pyongyang has long anticipated.
Seiler said North Korea has long sought to exploit internal divisions in South Korea and strain alliance cohesion, noting that in U.S. intelligence assessments, “one of North Korea’s longer-term objectives is trying to drive wedges in South Korea over time — and to drive wedges between the U.S. and the ROK, and to the degree they can, between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.”
BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
13. Ruling party-government push risks undermining the Armistice Framework and Korea-U.S. coordination
Summary:
The ruling party and Unification Ministry are pushing a bill to let Seoul approve nonmilitary civilian access to the DMZ, prompting a rare, blunt public rebuttal from the UN Command, which says the Armistice gives it exclusive authority, even for civil relief activities. The dispute escalated after Minister Chung framed DMZ access as a sovereignty issue. The episode revives earlier frictions over sanctions reviews and DMZ procedures, and now intersects with wider strains in Korea-US coordination, including the unification ministry’s boycott of joint follow-up talks and more cautious rules on MDL incidents. Critics warn unilateral moves risk weakening the armistice framework and allied crisis-response channels.
Comment: It seems like most of the major papers are criticising the ruling party of the UNC issue and north Korea policy issue and nting the friction within the alliance seesaw to stem from these two issues.
I would just remind Minster Chung that the perception of the so-called "sovereignty issue" exists because Korea remains a divided country and you have failed to solve the "Korea question" per paragraph 60 of the Armistice agreement.
Ruling party-government push risks undermining the Armistice Framework and Korea-U.S. coordination
Published: 19 Dec. 2025, 00:00
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-12-19/opinion/editorials/Ruling-partygovernment-push-risks-undermining-the-Armistice-Framework-and-KoreaUS-coordination/2481429
The United Nations Command said on social media on Dec. 17 that it had approved access to the Demilitarized Zone for Kim Hyun-jong, first deputy director of the National Security Office. Earlier, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young criticized the command, linking the reported denial of Kim’s DMZ access to issues of territorial sovereignty. The command’s approval and public disclosure are widely seen as a response to that criticism. The photo shows Kim Hyun-jong, right, during a visit to the DMZ. [UNITED NATIONS COMMAND FACEBOOK CAPTURE]
The ruling party and the Ministry of Unification are pressing legislation that would allow the Korean government to approve nonmilitary access to the demilitarized zone (DMZ), drawing a sharp response from the United Nations (UN) Command, which oversees the armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula.
In a statement issued on Dec. 17, the UN Command said authority over DMZ access is exclusively vested in the command under the Korean War Armistice Agreement. Citing Article I, Paragraph 10, it added that even civil administration and relief activities within the DMZ fall under the UN commander’s authority. The unusually direct statement followed claims by ruling party lawmakers that the command's regulation of nonmilitary civilian access was excessive.
The command had earlier conveyed its opposition to the Ministry of Government Legislation. When Unification Minister Chung Dong-young framed DMZ access as an issue of territorial sovereignty and publicly backed the bill, the command escalated by going public.
Since the armistice was signed in 1953, access to the southern DMZ has been fully controlled by the UN Command. During the Moon Jae-in administration, tensions surfaced when humanitarian aid to North Korea stalled as the command reviewed potential sanctions issues. The government accused the command of obstruction. Controversy also followed when Seoul bypassed the command during the forced repatriation of North Korean fishermen.
Similar strains appear to be reemerging under the Lee Jae Myung administration. The Unification Ministry’s recent boycott of follow-up consultations to a Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet, dismissing them as a “second Korea-U.S. working group,” fits this pattern. So does the Defense Ministry’s guidance to “closely assess the situation” before warning shots are fired in response to North Korean troops crossing the military demarcation line.
The legislative push raises constitutional concerns. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that treaties and generally recognized international law carry the same force as domestic law. The Armistice Agreement clearly falls under this provision. The UN Command also remains a critical security channel, able to mobilize immediate support from 18 member states in a contingency.
Related Article
More troubling is the risk to Korea-U.S. coordination on North Korea policy, a principle reaffirmed through recent summits. By convention, the UN commander has always been a U.S. general. At the 57th Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in November, the two defense chiefs reaffirmed the command’s role and pledged close coordination to uphold and enforce the armistice. Unilateral attempts to alter that role run counter to those commitments.
Some within the ruling camp now argue Korea should act as a “peace maker,” not merely a “pace maker,” after a planned meeting between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un failed to materialize during Trump’s October visit. Those calls grew after Washington announced new unilateral sanctions last month.
North Korea, however, continues to reject dialogue with Seoul outright. Rather than acting out of impatience, the ruling party and government should reaffirm close Korea-U.S. coordination as the foundation of North Korea policy.
14. Lee criticizes hard-line policy over North Korea hostility
Summary:
President Lee Jae-myung blamed heightened inter-Korean hostility on the previous administration’s hard-line approach, arguing north Korea’s triple fences and anti-tank barriers show fear of a southern invasion. In a joint foreign affairs and unification briefing, he said the Koreas are becoming “real enemies” and questioned why access to Rodong Sinmun is blocked, rejecting the notion citizens will be turned into “reds” by propaganda. He supported Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s planned “peace package,” including sanction easing, and discussed possible pathways to repatriate long-term unconverted prisoners. Cho Hyun said Lee also queried lifting the May-24 sanctions.
Comment: We should not accept north Korean propaganda. KJU does not actually fear an invasion from the South. He creates the perception of one for domestic political purposes. He must have the external great to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north as he prioritizes his personal comfort and that of the elite, and the development tof advanced military capabilities over the welfare of the people in order to support his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies and ultimately the use of force to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime. Don't believe that any hardline or softline policies from the South or the alliance are the cause of north Korean hostility. It comes solely from KJU.
But as I have written I do strongly agree with POTROK that the Korean people in the South should have access to all information from the north. And of course the South must make sure the reverse is true and try to get access to all information from the South to the KOrean people in the north.
Why South Korea must not restrict information about the North
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/12/19/perspective-north-korea-information-unrestricted/8141766162270/
Lee criticizes hard-line policy over North Korea hostility
Posted December. 20, 2025 09:07,
Updated December. 20, 2025 09:07
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251220/6020383/1
President Lee Jae-myung said during a policy briefing on Tuesday that North Korea fears a possible invasion from the South, citing Pyongyang’s construction of triple layers of barbed-wire fencing and reinforced barriers designed to stop even tanks. He argued that the North’s hostile “two states” doctrine is rooted in the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s hard-line approach toward Pyongyang.
Lee made the remarks at a joint policy briefing for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification at the Government Complex Seoul. “In the past, the two Koreas pretended to be enemies, but these days it feels as though we are becoming real enemies,” he said. Lee added that South Koreans have long been taught to believe North Korea is preparing for a southward invasion, a claim that can appear plausible on the surface. “But when you look closely at reality,” he said, “North Korea is actually worried that the South might invade the North.”
Lee added that even without appealing to concepts such as a national community, there is no compelling practical reason for the two sides to engage in severe confrontation. He said that by unnecessarily adopting a hard-line, confrontation-oriented approach, “We appear to have truly come to hate each other.”
Lee also ordered the lifting of restrictions on access to North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun, questioning the rationale behind the policy. “Why is this being blocked?” he asked. He went on to ask whether the restriction stems from concern that citizens might be influenced by propaganda and become “reds,” criticizing the approach as one that treats the public not as independent actors but as people easily swayed by propaganda and agitation. On the issue of repatriating long-term unconverted prisoners to North Korea, Lee said some have discussed a plan to issue passports, route the individuals through China, and place them on flights bound for Pyongyang.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said during the briefing that he would prepare a “peace package” capable of prompting a response from North Korea, formally signaling a push to ease sanctions against the North. Lee voiced support for the initiative, saying that easing inter-Korean hostility “is a role the Ministry of Unification must play.” Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Lee also raised questions during a closed-door session about lifting the May 24 sanctions that halted inter-Korean trade. Cho added that the government plans to pursue the president’s state visit to China early next year.
People Power Party senior spokesperson Park Sung-hoon criticized Lee’s remarks, saying that President Lee’s perception, in which he worries about the possibility of a “northward invasion” by South Korea, raises doubts about whether he is truly serving as president of the Republic of Korea. He added that the Lee Jae-myung administration, which he said presents itself as a “spokesman for North Korea,” is taking a dangerous course that could hand the entire country over to the North.
Hoon-Sang Park tigermask@donga.com
15. Why South Korea must not restrict information about the North
Voices Dec. 19, 2025 / 12:17 PM
Why South Korea must not restrict information about the North
By David Maxwell
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/12/19/perspective-north-korea-information-unrestricted/8141766162270/
People watch the news at a station in Seoul in October the launch by North Korea of several ballistic missiles towards the east File Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun
Dec. 19 (UPI) -- President Lee Jae Myung seeks to allow Koreans in the South to read, listen to and watch information from North Korea. It is the right thing to do.
South Korea is a confident democracy. It should act like one. That means it must not fear information about North Korea. It must not restrict it. It must not presume its citizens are weak, gullible, or unable to judge propaganda for what it is.
A mature society does not protect itself by hiding facts. It protects itself by building citizens who can weigh evidence, reject lies and make sound judgments. Restricting access to North Korean media signals doubt about the Korean people in the South. It also concedes, in principle, that propaganda is stronger than lived experience. That is a bad assumption and a worse message.
National Security Act has produced strategic damage
The National Security Act, especially Article 7, was shaped by an earlier era. Its logic was deterrence through denial. But in practice, it has denied South Koreans direct exposure to the North and created a gap in public understanding.
This has not strengthened resilience. It has produced ignorance. Ignorance breeds apathy. Over time, that apathy erodes support for human rights in North Korea and weakens the case for unification.
When authority prohibits something, it increases its appeal. This is basic human behavior. For young people, a ban can make North Korean content feel taboo and therefore worth chasing.
That dynamic does not inoculate society against North Korean influence. It invites fascination. It gives the regime an artificial mystique. It also encourages conspiracy thinking, because what is hidden is assumed to contain dangerous truth.
Exposure demystifies the regime, defeats Its narrative
If South Koreans were given full access, there would be a surge of curiosity. People would read Rodong Sinmun. They would watch the broadcasts. They would sample the spectacle. Then the novelty would fade. They would see the repetition, the lies and the hollow claims. They would recognize that the North Korean system cannot compete with reality.
The likely outcome is not radicalization. It is boredom, rejection and sharper clarity about the morally and intellectually bankrupt nature of the Kim family regime.
The idea that reading North Korean propaganda could turn South Koreans into pro-North supporters misunderstands South Korea. People who live with freedom, dignity and opportunity do not abandon it because they read a newspaper from a dictatorship. They can compare. They can judge. They can reject.
The problem is not that South Koreans are too weak to resist propaganda. The problem is that many are not permitted to see the North clearly enough to care.
Information access rebuilds support for human rights, unification
Many young South Koreans have limited knowledge of the North -- not its ideology, not its daily life, not its internal control and not the human rights reality. When people cannot see injustice, they struggle to feel urgency about it. Over time, that becomes indifference. Indifference becomes a political fact. Support for unification declines. Support for human rights advocacy shrinks.
Access is not a luxury. It is a prerequisite for empathy and strategic clarity.
President Lee's comment on the fear of citizens becoming "commies" captures the core issue. Such a fear is not just mistaken. It is disrespectful. It treats citizens as if they are passive recipients rather than rational decision-makers. A free society cannot flourish on that assumption.
Trust is not naive. It is a strategic asset. It strengthens legitimacy at home and confidence abroad.
Strategic influence: what openness signals to Koreans in the North
There is also a strategic effect that reaches into the North. A former North Korean People's Army soldier described watching the South Korean drama, Crash Landing On You, and drawing a key conclusion. He did not only see a story. He saw confidence. He saw that South Korean society could portray Koreans in the North as human beings, not monsters, and it could do so without fear.
That mattered to him because it revealed something true. The South does not need censorship to sustain legitimacy. The Kim family regime does. The North survives by isolating its people and controlling the narrative. The South thrives by doing the opposite. That contrast is not abstract. It shapes perceptions. It influences choices. It encourages a desire for freedom.
Information must flow both ways
South Korea should not only allow access to information about the North. It should also protect and enable the flow of information into the North. Facts, truth, practical knowledge, outside news and entertainment all carry strategic weight. They expose lies. They provide alternatives. They make people think. They show what normal life looks like.
The ROK government and the U.S. government should treat this as a sustained campaign of truth, not a sporadic gesture.
Bottom line
South Korea should not restrict any information about the North. Restrictions weaken understanding, reduce empathy, and erode support for human rights and unification. Openness does the opposite. It demystifies the regime, strengthens democratic legitimacy and creates strategic influence effects that reach the Korean people in the North.
A free and unified Korea will not be achieved by shielding citizens from reality. It will be achieved by trusting them with it.
David Maxwell, executive director of the Korean Regional Review, is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he works on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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