Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Freedom is sloppy. But since tyranny's the only guaranteed byproduct of those who insist on a perfect world, freedom will have to do.”

– Bill Willingham, Fables: Werewolves of the Heartland

"The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently."

– Friedrich Nietzsche

“You meet saints everywhere. They can be anywhere. They are people behaving decently in an indecent society.”

– Kurt Vonnegut.

1. Milestones and Momentum: A Banner 2023 for the US-ROK Alliance and the Path Forward

2. We’re a Happy Family: Decoding Kim Ju Ae’s Family Affiliations

3. N.K. leader says ICBM shows he won't hesitate nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations

4. N. Korea succeeded in ICBM flight test, re-entry technology unverified: defense chief

5. General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

6. N Korean leader, powerful sister issue nuclear threat to US, S Korea

7. Kim says ICBM shows he won't hesitate to launch nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations

8. N. Korea's Ri Son-gwon demoted from alternate member of party political bureau: Seoul

9. S. Korea, Japan agree to realize 'full potential' in economic cooperation

10. Seoul urged to bolster defense against Pyongyang's evolving cyber threats

11. UN General Assembly passes NK human rights resolution for 19th consecutive year

12. Korea donates 6 helicopters to Kenya for UN peacekeeping

13. Total Population of Two Koreas Inches Down in Risk for Both

14. Veterans minister nominee vows to improve support for people of distinguished service

15. Global Peace Convention highlights importance of peace-building

16. Sticking by our allies

17. US and North Korea: Testing the Water on Arms Control and Reduction

1. Milestones and Momentum: A Banner 2023 for the US-ROK Alliance and the Path Forward

This is an excellent wrap up of 2023 for the ROK US alliance by Dr. Hutchinson. My only quibble is that while he focuses (correctly) on military readiness deterrence as well as human rights and information, he did not mention the pursuit of a free and unified Korea which President Yoon and President Biden agreed as an objective at their April Summit and the three leaders of Japan, the ROK, and the US agreed to at the Camp David Summit in August. The way ahead needs to be a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea resting on a foundation of sustained military readiness to ensure deterrence.

Milestones and Momentum: A Banner 2023 for the US-ROK Alliance and the Path Forward

https://www.38north.org/2023/12/milestones-and-momentum-a-banner-2023-for-the-us-rok-alliance-and-the-path-forward/

BY: GEORGE HUTCHINSON
DECEMBER 20, 2023

The US-ROK alliance has experienced a banner year in 2023. The year has been marked not only by commemorative milestones that underscore the durability of the alliance, such as the 70th anniversary of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and the 45th anniversary of the establishment of the Combined Forces Command, but also by unprecedented progress that has substantively strengthened and upgraded the alliance. Progress has unfolded throughout the year, driven largely by the combination of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s vision for the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) as a “global pivotal state,” and the United States’ clear commitment to extended deterrence, resulting in striking developments at the geopolitical, regional and inter-Korean levels.

Reflecting on the geopolitical landscape of 2023, Seoul ended years of ambiguity over its stance with Beijing by overtly aligning with the principles of “like-minded democracies“ within the international rules-based order. Regionally, the year marked a significant intensification point where the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea)’ offensive tactical nuclear doctrine intersected with an unprecedented display of US extended deterrence. This was exemplified by the deployment of US air and naval nuclear-capable assets to South Korea, the first of their kind in decades. At the inter-Korean level, steps were taken in 2023 to reinvigorate the issue over North Korean human rights.

The upgrade to the alliance and its resulting developments are good news, but they come at a time when the international order is showing signs of considerable stress. Amid great power competition between the US and China, regional security alignments are now forming in Northeast Asia. While South Korea pursues its role as a global pivotal state in an international rules-based order among like-minded democracies, North Korea has aligned with like-minded nuclear autocracies in the region. Russia and China, meanwhile, have teamed to render the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ineffective in enforcing sanctions against North Korea even as its nuclear capabilities increase. On the domestic front in South Korea ahead of the 2024 national assembly elections, opposition politics are set to make red meat out of President Yoon’s policies as the cause of deteriorating relations with North Korea. Over in the US, depending on the outcome of the presidential election in November 2024, dramatic changes in foreign policy could occur that would disrupt gains made by the alliance in 2023.

Moving forward into 2024, it is crucial for the US-ROK alliance to solidify and institutionalize the achievements of the previous year at the most granular operational levels, all while maintaining flexibility in response to potential changes in both ROK and US foreign policy. As the global order experiences substantial shifts and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to evolve, the sustained success of the US-ROK alliance hinges on its capacity to adjust and uphold the positive momentum forged in 2023.

Standing up to China

Due to its geopolitical implications, the primary development that occurred in 2023 was President Yoon’s strategic decision to stand up to China. The 2022 year-end release of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy set the stage for the roll-out of Yoon’s vision throughout 2023. Although carefully worded so as not to antagonize Beijing, the document gets its point across with a strong message to China to reset its relations with South Korea based on mutual respect and reciprocity within a rules-based order. This no doubt alarmed Beijing because it ended years of strategic ambiguity over China and planted South Korea on the side of “like-minded” democracies” in the broader game of great power competition.

In April, Seoul continued to square up to Beijing. Presidents Yoon and Biden met in Washington and produced a Joint Statement accompanying the Washington Declaration. Together, these two deliverables operationalized President Yoon’s Indo-Pacific Strategy with specific language calling for: 1) maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific; 2) preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; and 3) deepening trilateral US-ROK-Japan cooperation on regional and economic security.

By June, the Yoon administration risked backlash from China by approving the permanent stationing of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province. While the ROK government was prudent to mention there were no plans for additional THAAD batteries, the move left the door open to fully reversing Moon Jae-in’s “Three No’s” vow to China made in 2017, which promised as follows: (1) no additional THAAD deployment, (2) no South Korean integration into a US-led regional missile defense system and (3) no trilateral alliance with the US and Japan.

Following the “normalization” of THAAD in August, the Yoon administration appeared to partially abrogate the “Three No’s” when the ROK, US and Japan formalized a strategic trilateral alignment on several issues, including deterrence, missile defense, North Korea’s denuclearization, North Korean human rights, and perhaps most importantly, economic security. Alarmed, China quickly announced its “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition“ to the trilateral formation of like-minded democracies.

The Yoon administration continued its pushback in October when the Ministry of Unification publicly rebuked China over the forced repatriation of North Korean escapees. Referring to China’s forced repatriation as a “violation of international norms,” the ministry officially placed China on the side of those countries that violate the international rules-based order.

Whether or not Yoon completely crossed the Rubicon with China in 2023 over his strategic decision to openly side with the international rules-based order where the ROK, US and Japan are on the “like-minded democracy” side of the power competition equation in Northeast Asia, the issue leaves an opening for there to be a potential misunderstanding between Seoul and a China-focused Washington.

Washington should work hard to manage its expectations with South Korea in the Indo-Pacific as the ROK continues to manage relations with its largest trade partner. With North Korea’s nuclear threat accelerating, it is premature to expect Seoul to jump headlong into contentious issues over the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait.

For South Korea, the time is ripe to continue increasing its range of options through an aggressive exploration of alternatives to China as part of its decoupling strategy. One item for the Yoon administration to consider is branding its mercurial, yet highly successful, democratic model using the same playbook it has perfected with other Korean wave market models. If told right, South Korea’s story of democracy—maybe call it “K-democracy”—could find a welcome market in countries caught on the fence contemplating a future choice between democracy and autocracy.

Strengthened US-ROK Deterrence

At the regional level, steps taken by the US-ROK alliance to strengthen conventional and extended deterrence comprise the second major development of 2023. After his US state visit in April, President Yoon flew back from Washington with a huge deliverable from the Biden administration. For his part, Yoon also delivered to Biden and the rules-based order.

The Washington Declaration not only reinforced a credible commitment to extended deterrence from the US, but also strengthened international nonproliferation thanks to President Yoon’s recommitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The declaration also committed real machinery for implementing strengthened deterrence, most notably the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the visible deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. During a Memorial Day speech at Seoul National Cemetery in June, Yoon proclaimed that relations with the US had been upgraded to a “nuclear-based alliance.”

In July, a high-level inaugural meeting of the NCG was held in Seoul, where both sides agreed to advance several lines of effort, including information sharing, planning, simulations, training, and, most importantly, investment. This was followed by the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David in August, where the US affirmed its extended deterrence commitment to the trilateral arrangement, and all three countries committed to participating in trilateral missile defense exercises. Finally, in November, the Military Committee and Security Consultative meetings were held in South Korea at a more granular level to discuss ways to operationalize and institutionalize bilateral and trilateral deterrence measures.

While great strides were made in 2023 to strengthen deterrence, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to surge, and the overall security atmosphere is deteriorating. Last month’s successful satellite launch by the North, possibly helped along by Russian technology, led to the South’s suspension of part of its commitment to the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) signed in 2018, and the North has already vowed to redeploy forces along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). In this deteriorating atmosphere, North Korea is rapidly fielding a dual nuclear concept where it will pose a coercive tactical dilemma against South Korea while keeping the US at bay with the threat of an ICBM strike.

If the alliance intends to keep up with the DPRK’s nuclear strategy in 2024, it must move beyond reliance on “deterrence by punishment” by showcasing strategic assets and, through the NCG, develop concepts that also incorporate “deterrence by denial“ strategies that consider resiliency measures, positioning, and the integration of missile defense and command and control technologies.

The alliance should also consider a more pivotal role for the United Nations Command (UNC). Not only is there a need for the UNC to intensify monitoring of the Armistice agreement due to the breakdown of the CMA and the redeployment of North Korean forces along the MDL, but also to facilitate military-to-military dialogue with the DPRK and further galvanize the trilateral partnership to shore up the rear area and the UN’s sending state support.

Progress on North Korean Human Rights

At the inter-Korean level, 2023 saw considerable progress over the dormant issue of North Korean human rights. The Yoon administration prominently included human rights as a core line of effort in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which set the stage for policy direction throughout the year. In March, the Ministry of Unification released for the first time to the South Korean public a nearly 600-page report documenting 1,600 human rights violation cases committed by the Kim regime, as testified by 508 North Korean defectors. Then, in September, South Korea’s Supreme Court struck down the 2020 anti-leaflet law that criminalized NGOs for sending information via balloons into North Korea.

In the US, Ambassador Julie Turner was finally sworn in as the US Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues in October, completing a diplomatic triumvirate that includes Lee Shin-hwa, whom Yoon reappointed as South Korea’s North Korean human rights ambassador in July, and Elizabeth Salmon, who was appointed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as Special Rapporteur on DPRK human rights in August 2022.

With Ambassador Turner in place, Congress should move quickly to pass the North Korean Human Rights Act for reauthorization. While the US Senate passed a bill in December 2022 and the House introduced its version in April, reauthorization, which is essential for promoting accountability, providing humanitarian support, and sustaining efforts to address human rights issues in North Korea, has remained in limbo.

With the anti-leaflet law found to be unconstitutional, NGOs and other civic groups in South Korea will ramp up balloon campaigns to fly content into North Korea. Whether the actual law gets amended or repealed in full, groups should consider sending useful information about the outside world, such as concepts on freedom, “K-democracy,” and even entertainment content, over unnecessarily lewd, regime-threatening, or other inflammatory material that risks offending even those North Koreans who are opposed to the Kim regime.

In the meantime, the UN-US-ROK envoy triumvirate should align to block attempts by North Korea to frame criticism over its human rights abuses as an attack on its sovereignty. As alignment materializes on North Korean Human Rights, the US-ROK alliance can expect North Korea to lash out, which further underscores the need for doubling down on deterrence and supporting President Yoon’s message to China.

Looking Ahead to 2024

The year 2023 witnessed a remarkable upgrade to the US-ROK alliance marked by President Yoon’s strategic vision and Washington’s steadfast commitment to extended deterrence. The geopolitical landscape saw Seoul assertively aligning itself with like-minded democracies and dispensing with its stance of ambiguity toward Beijing.

Regionally, a visible showcasing of US extended deterrence converged with North Korea’s nuclear doctrine, thereby keeping pace with the threat and adding a new dimension to the security dynamic in Northeast Asia. At the inter-Korean level, a renewed focus on DPRK human rights issues signaled a renewed commitment to addressing the plight of North Koreans.

However, these positive developments unfold against a backdrop of unpredictable global challenges. Domestically, President Yoon’s policies will face increasing scrutiny in the lead-up to South Korea’s 2024 national assembly elections. In the US, the outcome of the 2024 presidential election could introduce radical foreign policy shifts that would impact the gains achieved in 2023.

Looking ahead, the key imperatives for the US-ROK alliance in 2024 are to consolidate and institutionalize the gains made in the previous year down to the deepest actionable levels while remaining agile in the face of potential shifts in both ROK and US foreign policy. As the global order undergoes significant transformation and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities grow, the enduring success of the US-ROK alliance lies in its ability to adapt and sustain the positive momentum established in 2023.

2. We’re a Happy Family: Decoding Kim Ju Ae’s Family Affiliations

For succession watchers or "Kimologists."

We’re a Happy Family: Decoding Kim Ju Ae’s Family Affiliations

https://www.38north.org/2023/12/were-a-happy-family-decoding-kim-ju-aes-family-affiliations/

BY: MICHAEL MADDEN
DECEMBER 20, 2023

November 18 marked the one-year anniversary of Kim Jong Un’s (KJU) daughter, Kim Ju Ae, being in the public eye. That first observed public appearance, and the 19 subsequent events in which she has participated, have raised the question of whether she has been selected as a hereditary successor to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) supreme leadership.[1] It is highly probable she has yet to be formally selected as a hereditary successor, and any assumption of power is years, if not decades, into the future. Her influence, given her age and lack of education, probably does not extend to policy at this point in time, but this is a person who has the Suryong’s (great leader) attention and affection, which can affect his mood and personality. Despite lacking a formal writ, position, experience or advanced education, Kim Ju Ae is part of North Korea’s politically active core elite cohort.

As such, it is necessary to examine her with some of the principles and methods with which we assess other DPRK elites. First will be a survey of the little biographical information available and an assessment of her amorphous public profile; second, an examination of her current and developing affiliations in North Korean political culture, shedding light on notable changes and offering insights into potential future leadership decisions. While Pyongyang watchers debate whether a woman can assume the leadership chair or the legitimacy of a fourth-generation power succession, analyzing her background, family dynamics and political affiliations highlights nuanced elements of the succession process, its implications, and how Kim Jong Un is likely already creating the preliminary conditions for Kim Ju Ae or one of her siblings to become the DPRK’s next Suryong.

Figure 1. Kim Ju Ae attends a February 7, 2023 pre-parade banquet with her parents and poses for a photo with members of the KPA’s high command. (Source: Korean Central News Agency [KCNA])

The Beloved Daughter of a Nuclear Family

Kim Ju Ae is estimated to be between 10 and 11 years old, which indicates that she was born between 2011 and 2013. She was first identified by retired US basketball player Dennis Rodman, who met her in 2013 at the Kim family compound in Wonsan. A retired Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) National Intelligence Service (NIS) senior manager, citing his own North Korean sources, claims that her name is not “Ju Ae” and that Rodman misheard this. She is the daughter of KJU’s wife and DPRK first lady, Ri Sol Ju. She is a member of the Kim family (Figure 4).Through her mother, she is related to the elite Ri family, of whom defense industry chieftain WPK Secretary and Korean People’s Army (KPA) Marshal Ri Pyong Chol is the most prominent member.[2]

Information about Kim Jong Un’s married life and children initially appeared in 2010 after his mass debut as Kim Jong Il’s (KJI) hereditary successor.[3] The first rumor about KJU was that he had a “big sister wife,” which is to say he married an older woman and that he may have children. Further speculation about KJU’s children appeared in 2011 when Ri Sol Ju appeared during calling hours at KJI’s funeral and when she made her formal public debut as KJU’s wife during the summer of 2012.

The best available current information claims that Kim Ju Ae is one of three children and that one of these children is a son. Sources conflict as to the birth order of the children, so it is not known if Kim Ju Ae is KJU’s eldest child. In March 2023, the NIS told the ROK parliament that KJU’s eldest child was a son kept out of the public eye due to some unknown disability. A retired NIS manager made a similar claim but said that the son was kept out of the public eye because he is “pale and thin,” and his appearance would be unappealing to North Korean citizens.[4]

There is very little other available information about Kim Ju Ae. According to NIS, she likes skiing and horseback riding. She is like most members of the Kim family, who participate in horseback riding and equestrian activities. Her reportedly favorite horse marched during the February 8, 2023 parade marking the foundation of the KPA.

Kim Ju Ae’s public profile has been somewhat amorphous. She alternates between being shown the family’s legacy as a media surrogate for her mother and kind of first lady figure. At her first two observed public appearances, Kim Ju Ae was identified in state media as KJU’s “beloved daughter.” A little over two months later, this expression was modified into “respected daughter,” and state media has alternated between “beloved” and “respected” when reporting about Kim Ju Ae’s attendance at events. Further observation of state media rhetoric around Kim Ju Ae is warranted to see if the difference between “beloved” and “respected” is a stylistic choice or if it carries some significance.

Following the successful satellite launch on November 21, 2023, political education materials were disseminated to party cells by the WPK Organization Guidance Department, which used the phrase “Morningstar of Korea” when talking about the “female general” Kim Ju Ae. This phrase has a high degree of significance in North Korea’s founding folklore; as a partisan fighter, Kim Il Sung was described as the Morningstar of Korea. “Morningstar General” was also a nickname given to Kim Jong Un by his mother, Ko Yong Hui. Some North Korean citizens have thus interpreted the usage of the “Morningstar” expression as an early indication that she is the successor.

Figure 2. Kim Jong Un (left), around the same age as Kim Ju Ae, receives tutoring from his mother, Ko Yong Hui. (Source: Korean Central News Agency [KCNA])Figure 3. Kim Jong Un talks to Kim Ju Ae at a November 2022 commemorative photo session. (Source: KCNA)

Consanguine Kim Family

Realistically, there are two Kim families. First, there is the “Paektusan family” (Figure 4), which is to say family members who are core elites prominently featured in state media and propaganda. Second, there are the consanguine members of the Kim family, the direct descendants of Kim Il Sung.

Kim Ju Ae is one of Kim Il Sung’s 15 currently known descendants, although there are probably between 20 and 30 grandchildren and great-grandchildren as well.

Kim Il Sung had six children from his two official marriages, four of whom produced children (Kim Jong Il, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Kyong Jin and Kim Pyong Il). He also fathered at least two children outside marriage.
Kim Il Sung has nine known grandchildren (Kim Jong Nam, Kim Sul Song, Kim Jong Chol, Kim Jong Un, Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jung Min, Kim Tong Min, Kim In Kang and Kim Un Song). There are likely several more grandchildren who are not known and an unknown number of great-grandchildren as well.
Kim Jong Il had at least seven children, five of whom (Kim Jong Nam, Kim Sul Song, Kim Jong Chol, Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong) have produced children.
Kim Jong Il has three known grandchildren (Kim Ju Ae, Kim Yo Jong’s child born in 2017, and Kim Han Sol, the eldest son of Kim Jong Nam). The overall number of KJI’s grandchildren is likely between 10 and 20, including the other two rumored children of Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un’s “Lessons Learned” About Succession

When KJU was formally designated successor in 2009, KJI’s close aides had several tasks in front of them—they had to expand his public profile, build support among core elites and garner leadership experience for him. If the regime had ironed out these kinks before the KJI-KJU transition in 2011, then perhaps KJU would not have needed to purge former Chief of the KPA General Staff Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho and KJU’s uncle Jang Song Taek by such brutal and dramatic means.

If there is truly a fledgling effort to establish Kim Ju Ae as a hereditary successor underway, then starting to create a public profile for her at a young age is a sensible decision. It provides a public relations advantage for her over her cousins and other family members and allows more time and effort to be spent building cohesive support for her among North Korean elites long before she would be expected to take power.

That said, if a faction of DPRK elites were to press a succession claim for another member of the Kim family, it would create the added work of trying to introduce that alternate successor to the North Korean population in the future.

In Kim Jong Un’s case, while core elites, particularly in the military, were aware of KJU’s identity and knew he was the favored successor, the hereditary succession picture in the 2000s was not fixed. In 2008, there were several “successor-qualified” candidates.[5] The criteria for this included: 1) being a direct descendent of Kim Il Sung; 2) having elite education and/or experience; and 3) ties to other core elites.[6]

Any of the elites listed in Figure 5 could have mounted a somewhat viable effort to become KJI’s successor by building elite support. While most of those listed were inclined to and eventually supported KJU’s succession, Kim Pyong Il (KJI’s half-brother) and Kim Jong Nam (KJI’s eldest son) could have made a case against the succession of an individual in his 20s.

In 2023, there are fewer “successor qualified” elites (Figure 6). Kim Kyong Hui and Kim Pyong Il are already retired, for instance, and somewhat removed from the social and patronage networks, which are vital parts of the regime’s connective tissue. This leaves only a few elites who could take up the mantle of a hereditary succession process, although all are either older or close to the same age as KJU himself. In terms of future planning, building the profile of a “successor qualified” elite from a young age may be prudent to avoid potential future conflicts between KJU’s children versus the children from other qualified elites his age.

Figure 7. Kim Jong Un (third from the right) poses with his siblings Kim Jong Chol (third from the left) and Kim Yo Jong (right) along with top WPK Propaganda and Agitation Department officials in May 2009. (Source: Korean Central Television)

Kim Ju Ae’s Growing Public Profile

Figure 8. Kim Yo Jong and her aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, ride horses in November 2012. (Source: Korean Central Television screen grab and KCNA)

Kim Ju Ae is one of only four of Kim Il Sung’s living descendants to appear in state media during the last five years. The other three are KJU, Kim Yo Jong and KJI’s sister Kim Kyong Hui. This places Kim Ju Ae in the extended Paektusan family. In North Korea’s foundational mythology, the Paektusan family consists of Kim Il Sung, his first wife Kim Jong Suk and Kim Jong Il.

In the DPRK’s official folklore, the Paektusan family merges with other select members of the Kim family—to wit, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong. One major and superficial trait of the protagonists of the Paektusan family is horseback riding. Seeing Kim Ju Ae riding with her father and/or aunt in the future would reinforce her place in the Paektusan line.

Figure 9. Kim Ju Ae, Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong at a Hwasong-18 test launch in April 2023. (Source: KCNA)

The most salient way that Kim Ju Ae has been associated with the Paektusan family legacy is through the public events themselves. Most of the events she has attended can be categorized as related to the KPA and military affairs. She has yet to don a dress uniform, but when we see images of Kim Il Sung’s children and grandchildren, granted, when they were much older, they wore military attire for formal family photographs.

Whether she becomes successor or not, Kim Ju Ae is forming (or compelled to form) ties to the KPA. This is not about winning “military support.” The KPA was founded by Kim Il Sung, and the DPRK links its origins to his partisan guerilla units. With many of her events tied to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, Kim Ju Ae is being associated with the new, or next, generation of the KPA.

Conclusion

Hereditary succession for North Korea is a long-term concern. Since Kim Jong Un assumed power when he was 27, it is reasonable to expect that Kim Ju Ae and/or one of her siblings will be, at least, holding senior posts by the early 2030s. Paving the way for that to take hold in an incremental and deliberate fashion is a luxury that Kim Jong Un did not have in his own succession story and one that he might be trying to extol to his children now, either focused on Kim Ju Ae or starting with her.

During his daughter’s first year in the public eye, KJU has singled her out among the wider Kim family, bolstered the prestige of his own family line and tied his daughter to the DPRK’s founding mythology, creating a place for her in the political narrative of the country. Kim Ju Ae’s introduction departs from the tradition of keeping the Kim family children hidden until they are older. It is not standard practice, and thus, as it unfolds, this process requires navigating uncertainties and gaps in information, and inherently carries a level of speculative analysis. While her portrayal in state media could be succession-oriented, it may also be a strategy to enhance KJU’s public image as part of the Paektusan line—especially since Kim Ju Ae emerged at a time of great hardship in the country. It could also serve as a means to divert public attention from daunting national challenges and portray KJU as a more compassionate and caring father, reinforcing the value of the Paektusan line.

[1]
Kim Ju Ae’s presence at a leader’s engagements is not extraordinary. Her father, along with his siblings and half-siblings, routinely attended Kim Jong Il’s on-site visits and inspections. The difference with Kim Ju Ae is that her presence is prominent at the events and is reported in real-time in state media.
[2]
Sources in the DPRK and Russia identified Ri Sol Ju as a direct relation to Ri Pyong Chol in the mid-2010s. Marshal Ri is either Ri Sol Ju’s grandfather or great-uncle.
[3]
It has been alleged and speculated that Kim Jong Il would not publicly formalize KJU’s succession until he married.
[4]
There is a possibility that the desired outcome in publicizing the scant information about Kim Ju Ae’s brother might draw a response from Pyongyang—either in the form of bringing the son to a public event or state media activity. It could also be a trial balloon whereby sketchy intelligence is disseminated into the media in the hopes that a foreign intelligence service will corroborate it or mobilize resources to do so. Additionally, Bringing out small children at North Korean elite events is somewhat rare unless the event involves the Korean Children’s Union or schooling. One factor in KJU bringing Kim Ju Ae to public events and his inspections may be that she has proven a degree of maturity, if not precociousness.
[5]
One elite who might merit inclusion as successor in 2008 is Kim Yong Ju, Kim Il Sung’s younger brother, who served in several leadership posts, including director of the WPK Organization Guidance Department. In 2008, Kim Yong Ju was 87 years old and, despite holding an honorary position (Honorary Supreme People’s Assembly Vice President), had not been involved in DPRK politics since the 1970s.
[6]
Omitted in these lists are the two children of Kim Hyong Jin and the two children of Kim Pyong Il, who have spent much of their lives in Europe. While they might present elite education credentials, they have all been largely withdrawn from the conditioning, personality dynamics and social landscape of their elite peers.

3. N.K. leader says ICBM shows he won't hesitate nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations

While we have to take these threats seriously and ensure we have a strong deterrent foundation, we have to be care not to overlook the regime's strategy. These activities support the regime's political warfare strategy to undermine the ROK government and society anas well as undermine the ROK/US alliance and trilateral cooperation. In addition these activities support the regime's blackmail diplomacy which is the use of increased tension, rhetoric , threats, and provocation to extort or coerce political and economic concessions.

(LEAD) N.K. leader says ICBM shows he won't hesitate nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS details throughout, photo, byline)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has said this week's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile demonstrated his commitment not to hesitate to launch a nuclear attack in the event of nuclear provocations from the enemy, state media said Thursday.

Kim made the remarks in an event held Wednesday to praise the Second Red Flag Company under the General Missile Bureau for Monday's successful launch of a solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Kim said the launch was "a clear explanation of the offensive counteraction mode and the evolution of the nuclear strategy and doctrine of the DPRK not to hesitate even a nuclear attack when the enemy provoke it with nukes," according to the KCNA.

DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name.

Kim stressed that a country's sovereign rights can only be guaranteed through "strong power."

"It is the genuine defense capability and defense of durable peace to have the real capability for preemptively attacking the enemy anywhere and the war posture, making any enemy feel fear," he said in the KCNA report.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects the launch of a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Dec. 18, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim has earlier said that this week's missile launch showed what option he would take if "Washington makes a wrong decision." The launch marked the North's fifth ICBM test-firing this year, the highest number ever recorded in a single year.

The North said the missile flew 1,002.3 kilometers for 4,415 seconds at a maximum altitude of 6,518.2 km before coming down in the East Sea. Experts said the missile would have flown more than 15,000 km, long enough to strike any part of the continental United States, had it been fired on a normal trajectory.

The ICBM launch came amid strengthened efforts by Seoul and Washington to advance their nuclear strategy against Pyongyang's threats.

During the second session of the Nuclear Consultative Group last week, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to complete the establishment of guidelines on a shared nuclear strategy by mid-2024 and conduct joint military exercises simulating nuclear attacks from the North.

North Korea fires a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Dec. 18, 2023, with its leader Kim Jong-un observing the launch, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

4. N. Korea succeeded in ICBM flight test, re-entry technology unverified: defense chief

(LEAD) N. Korea succeeded in ICBM flight test, re-entry technology unverified: defense chief | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS more of Shin's remarks in paras 6-9)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense chief said Thursday that North Korea's recent launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) demonstrated its flight capability but its atmospheric reentry technology has not yet been verified.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik made the assessment after the North on Monday test-fired the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM at a lofted angle, which is considered to be capable of striking the U.S. territories if launched at a standard angle.

It was the North's fifth ICBM launch this year and the third Hwasong-18 following two tests in April and July.

"North Korea succeeded in flying a missile a long distance and developing a solid fuel missile, but it has not yet been verified whether it is capable of re-entering the atmosphere and accurately striking a target," Shin said during a parliamentary session.

"Although its multiple warhead technology has not yet been accurately verified, North Korea is believed to be moving in that direction," he added.

Shin said he finds incredible North Korea's claim that its Malligyong-1 spy satellite placed into orbit last month began to work on its mission early this month.

"It takes at least five to six months (after the launch) even for high-tech U.S. and South Korean satellites to start a mission," Shin said, confirming that the North's satellite is making contact.

Shin also said that a "Nikon camera" was used in the satellite.

"Since there are no signs of further improvement, we believe that what was launched this time is probably at that level, and we think that they will upgrade it," he said.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik speaks during a parliamentary defense committee meeting held at the National Assembly on Dec. 21, 2023. (Yonhap)

In response to the North's rising threats, Shin said he will "expedite" nuclear deterrence efforts with Washington to make their agreements in the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) "irreversible" regardless of the results of next year's U.S. presidential election.

During the second session of the NCG last week, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to complete the establishment of guidelines on a shared nuclear strategy by mid-2024 and conduct joint military exercises simulating nuclear attacks from the North, drawing protests from North Korea.

Concerns have risen that Pyongyang may pursue nuclear disarmament talks with Washington using its status as a nuclear power if former U.S. President Donald Trump is elected for a second term in the November 2024 election.

"If North Korea freezes or curtails its nuclear program, it will inevitably demand the dismantlement of the South Korea-U.S. alliance," he said. "If North Korea takes actions without preconditions, there is no reason we would not welcome it."

When asked whether South Korea should prepare its own nuclear weapons program to counter the North's evolving threats, Shin ruled out the option that could have negative implications on the alliance with the U.S.

"South Korea's independent nuclear armament is based on the assumption that the South Korea-U.S. alliance has been dismantled, so it is more realistic way to strengthen the extended deterrence with the U.S," he said.

North Korea conducted its sixth and last nuclear test in September 2017, and enshrined its nuclear power status in its constitution in September. Nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang remain stalled since the 2019 Hanoi summit between Kim and then U.S. President Donald Trump ended without a deal.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

5. General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

How well will those shells work if the regime decides to attack the South?

General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

kyivindependent.com · by Nate Ostiller · December 20, 2023

Russian forces are using low-quality shells sourced from North Korea that are often defective, at times causing damage to the barrels of cannons and mortars and even injuring soldiers, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces wrote on Dec. 20.

In particular, the General Staff said that this appeared to be happening with Russian troops in the Dnipro Group under the command of Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky operating in southern Ukraine.

The U.S. confirmed increased weapons and ammunition transfers from North Korea to Russia following a meeting between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in September.

Washington said it's "deeply concerned" that North Korea may receive nuclear- or ballistic missile-related technology in exchange.

South Korean intelligence reports claim that North Korea has delivered more than a million shells to Russia.

The Ukrainian military news site Defense Express wrote on Dec. 9 that Russian troops have been complaining about the condition of North Korean shells, saying that some show evidence of crucial parts being cannibalized, as well as a general emphasis on quantity over quality. As a result, the shells can be less effective or even dangerous due to defects.

Russia, China and North Korea have new dynamics. And it’s bad for Ukraine

The White House announced on Oct. 13 that North Korea had delivered more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and ammunition to bolster Russia’s war against Ukraine. Washington published pictures tracking a set of containers as it traveled from Najin, North Korea, to Dunay, Russia, by a Russ…

The Kyiv IndependentKatie Marie Davies

kyivindependent.com · by Nate Ostiller · December 20, 2023

6. N Korean leader, powerful sister issue nuclear threat to US, S Korea

N Korean leader, powerful sister issue nuclear threat to US, S Korea

It is rare for Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong to simultaneously make such threats.

By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA

2023.12.20

Seoul, South Korea

rfa.org

North Korean leader and his powerful sister have made a nuclear threat against the United States and South Korea, with both declaring that Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal will be practically deployed in retaliation to any actions that they consider to be “provocations.”

“We will not hesitate to launch a nuclear attack if provoked by nuclear weapons from our enemies,” the leader Kim Jong Un said, as cited by the North’s official Rodong Sinmun Thursday.

Speaking to soldiers who were responsible for its Monday intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, Kim praised the test-launch as a “bold move” against the U.S. and its main allies – which he claimed as “the destroyer of peace and stability.”

The launch was a “clear demonstration of our nation’s assertive response strategy to retaliate without hesitation with a nuclear attack if provoked by nuclear weapons, and an explicit explanation of the evolution of our nuclear strategy and doctrine,” he said.

North Korea fired its latest solid-fuelled ICBM, the Hwasong-18, Monday, with the launch reaching a maximum apogee approximately 6,500 kilometers, flying a distance of around 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) before hitting its target off its eastern coast.

Although the Monday test was conducted at a high angle, it still represents a potential threat to the U.S. If launched at a lower trajectory, this missile may be capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.

Separately, North Korean leader’s influential sister Kim Yo Jong also issued a sharp criticism against the U.S. and South Korea Thursday, targeting the allies for their coordinated actions during the United Nations meeting that took place Monday.

“It focused solely on condemning our self-defense actions, while neglecting the verbal and active provocations by the United States and South Korea, which directly provoked our response,” she said, as cited by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency.

“Hostile forces should contemplate how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea] will perceive, categorize, and react to the upcoming military plans against us by the United States and the Republic of Korea [South Korea],” she added.

It is rare for Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong to simultaneously make such threats. Typically, these statements of criticism come from either one or the other, but not both together on the same day.

Their remarks came as the U.S., South Korea and Japan conducted trilateral joint air drills off the southeastern coast of the Korean peninsula Wednesday. The drill included U.S.’s strategic asset, the supersonic B-1B, capable of carrying 57 tons of conventional armaments, according to the South’s Joint Chief of Staff.

North Korea has consistently protested the trilateral military exercises involving U.S. strategic assets near the Korean Peninsula, labeling them as “practice for invasion.” Pyongyang perceives these joint drills as a direct threat to its regime, especially given that its conventional military capabilities are significantly outmatched by those of the allied forces.

Edited by Taejun Kang.

rfa.org

7. Kim says ICBM shows he won't hesitate to launch nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations

Sure we must take Kim at his word and ensure we have sufficient defense capabilities to deter him. But we must also understand his rhetoric and these missile launches are a key part of the regime's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy.

(2nd LD) Kim says ICBM shows he won't hesitate to launch nuclear attack in event of enemy's nuclear provocations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS photos, state media commentary, details in last 5 paras)

By Lee Minji

DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name.

Kim stressed that a country's sovereign rights can only be guaranteed through "strong power."

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L) and his daughter, known as Ju-ae (C), meet soldiers of the Second Red Flag Company under the General Missile Bureau on Dec. 20, 2023, in this footage taken from the North's Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution)

The ICBM launch came amid strengthened efforts by Seoul and Washington to advance their nuclear strategy against Pyongyang's threats.

The participants also agreed on a plan to incorporate scenarios of nuclear operations in next year's allied military exercises, including the summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield, according to a Seoul official who requested anonymity.

In a separate commentary Thursday, the KCNA condemned the plan as an "exercise for a nuclear war to invade the North. It claimed such drills will be a "clear declaration of war" and that the North will make sure to show that its warnings are not "empty words."

"The U.S. should know surely that this land is no longer the Korean Peninsula of the 1950s," it said.

Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have recently bolstered security ties in response to evolving military threats from North Korea, fully activating a system to share North Korean missile warning data in real time and approving a multiyear plan for trilateral military drills.

In another show of force, the countries conducted a joint aerial exercise involving U.S. B-1B strategic bombers on Wednesday.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (7nd from L) and his daughter, known as Ju-ae (6th from L), pose for a group photo with soldiers of the Second Red Flag Company under the General Missile Bureau on Dec. 20, 2023, in this footage taken from the North's Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

8. N. Korea's Ri Son-gwon demoted from alternate member of party political bureau: Seoul

N. Korea's Ri Son-gwon demoted from alternate member of party political bureau: Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- Ri Son-gwon, head of the North Korean unit handling inter-Korean relations, has been removed from his position as an alternate member of the political bureau of the ruling Workers' Party, South Korea's unification ministry said Thursday.

The assessment came as Seoul has been keeping tabs on a possible change in Ri's status within the party after he was identified in a separate location from members of the powerful group at key events.

Ri is the chief of the North's United Front Department (UFD) in charge of relations with South Korea.

"There is typically one seat for an UFD official as an alternate member of the party political bureau," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

"But we assumed that Ri Son-gwon has not been included as UFD adviser Kim Yong-chol has become an alternate member of the political bureau," the official said, raising views that the UFD's status may have weakened amid chilled inter-Korean relations.

This Feb. 9, 2023, file photo taken from footage from North Korea's Korean Central Television shows Ri Son-gwon (6th from R, front row), chief of the United Front Department, attending a military parade the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution)

Following a yearlong absence from key party posts, Kim, a former UFD chief known for his hard-line stance on South Korea, was elected as an alternate member of the party's political bureau in a reshuffle in June.

The ministry, meanwhile, said Kim Yong-hwan, a missile expert, appears to have been appointed to lead the North's Academy of Defense Science, which is tasked with the research and development of advanced weapons.

Kim is among the 11 North Korean individuals involved in satellite and ballistic missile development whom South Korea imposed unilateral sanctions on earlier this month.

Kim had been identified as the head of the 727 Research Institute, which is known to be part of the defense science institution.

The ministry updated the changes in the latest version of its who's who book on key officials in North Korea.

The book details changes in major organs and information of key officials in North Korea based on its state media reports from October last year and this year.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · December 21, 2023

9. S. Korea, Japan agree to realize 'full potential' in economic cooperation

S. Korea, Japan agree to realize 'full potential' in economic cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan agreed Thursday to work together to "fully realize" the potential in economic cooperation as they resumed high-level economic talks in nearly eight years amid a thaw in bilateral ties.

The two countries reached the agreement during the economic dialogue, led by Kang Jae-kwon, South Korea's deputy foreign minister for economic affairs, and Keiichi Ono, Japanese senior deputy foreign minister, Seoul's foreign ministry said.

The two sides "agreed to strengthen communications and cooperation at bilateral and minilateral levels to secure new markets, stabilize and diversify supply chains, and discussed ways to enhance cooperation in core and emerging technologies," the ministry said in a release.

Noting the resumption of the dialogue, the two sides agreed to "make efforts to cooperate in various fields to fully realize the potential of the bilateral cooperation," the ministry said.

They also agreed to work closely on multilateral stages, such as the World Trade Organization, the Group of 20 gathering and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to promote the rules-based economic order and expand the scope of cooperation in areas like climate change and energy.

The economic dialogue was launched in 1999 as a channel to discuss comprehensive economic cooperation, but it had remained suspended since early 2016 over the erection in South Korea of a girl's statue symbolizing Korean victims of Japan's wartime sexual slavery.

South Korea and Japan agreed to resume the dialogue in July this year amid a significant warming of the bilateral ties. In March, South Korea said it will compensate Korean victims of Japan's forced labor on its own without Japan's contribution.

Seoul's proposal for the resolution led to the resumption of reciprocal visits by the countries' leaders and the agreement to revive key high-level exchanges, including diplomatic dialogue channels.

In this photo, Kang Jae-kwon (R), South Korean deputy foreign minister for economic affairs, shakes hands with Keiichi Ono, Japan's senior deputy foreign minister, ahead of their bilateral economic dialogue at Seoul's foreign ministry on Dec. 21, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

10. Seoul urged to bolster defense against Pyongyang's evolving cyber threats

Not just Seoul. We all do.

Seoul urged to bolster defense against Pyongyang's evolving cyber threats

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

Gettyimagesbank

Editor’s note

This is the first in a two-part series about North Korea’s cyberattacks — ED.

By Kang Hyun-kyung

What do the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014, Bangladesh’s central bank heist in 2016 and the WannaCry ransomware strike targeting over 230,000 computers in 2017 all over the world have in common?

North Korea was the culprit behind all three notorious computer intrusions.

South Korea is no stranger to the North’s disruptive cyber operations. The South Korean government, media outlets, financial institutions and other private entities have suffered the consequences of North Korea’s cyber operations multiple times during the past two decades.

North Korea’s weaponization of its asymmetrical cyber capabilities to disrupt target entities, both in the private and public sectors, and steal technologies and money through ransomware attacks to finance its nuclear weapons and missile programs, has become a growing threat to South Korea.

Kim Heung-kwang, a North Korean defector who previously worked as a professor of computer science in the North, said South Korea is ill-prepared for North Korea’s cyberattacks.

“South Korea does not seem to be well informed about North Korea’s cyber capabilities and how they work,” he told The Korea Times. “It needs to have a clear picture of the enemy’s capabilities, either through human intelligence or other means.”

According to Kim, North Korea has approximately 6,000 cyber warriors, a number smaller than South Korea’s defense ministry’s estimate of 7,000.

Kim used the analogy of a gang of robbers to explain how North Korea’s cyber workers perform their roles under a division of labor.

He said hackers are based outside of North Korea to avoid their IP addresses being tracked, calling them robbers as they steal others’ assets by gaining unauthorized access to their networks.

Once they successfully obtain what they want from the intrusions, he said they pass on the stolen goods to their teammates based in Pyongyang.

“The roles of these stolen goods handlers vary. Some analyze data and files to produce reports, while others compile the data. There are some who are responsible for reporting the information to the person overseeing the cyber operations,” he said.

He said cyberattacks are not a numbers game.

“This is because all you need is a handful of highly-trained hackers capable of intruding target computers against all odds to get what they want,” he said.

Industry experts say North Korea’s cyber capabilities are world class.

According to Australian think tank Lowy Institute’s 2021-2022 expert survey on the offensive and defensive cyber capabilities of different countries, North Korea ranked 7th with 67.2 points. The U.S. topped the survey with 94.7 followed by Russia and China. South Korea ranked fourth with 74.5 points in the survey.

Another survey, conducted in 2023 by cybersecurity firm Humanize Security, paints a similar picture of North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities. The North came in 7th. The U.S. also topped the ranking, followed by China, Russia and the United Kingdom. South Korea is not included in the world’s top 10 countries list with the most powerful cyberwarfare capabilities. The survey is based on the National Cyber Power Index.

An official warns of North Korea's spear-phising emails posing as government employees and journalists among others during a press briefing held on Nov. 21 in the National Police Agency. Yonhap

It remains a mystery just how North Korea was able to become such a highly capable player in cyberwarfare, considering its weak information and technology infrastructure.

Unlike people in other parts of the world, North Korean residents are cut off from the outside world. They are not allowed to have access to the internet. Only those who are authorized can access the internet and their cyber activities are thoroughly monitored by the regime.

North Koreans have limited access to information and are only allowed to access state-controlled media outlets through a nationwide intranet network called Kwangmyong, which means guiding light.

According to DataReport, a website providing free reports about people’s online activities, 99.9 percent of North Koreans remain offline as of 2022.

“Our analysis of the available data suggests that fewer than 1,000 people in the country are able to access international websites, and it seems likely that a sizeable proportion of this small group will be made up of foreign expatriates and the country’s political elite,” it said in its annual report, Digital 2022, available on its website.

Given North Korea’s population is 28 million, the number of people with access to the internet is miniscule.

How did a country like North Korea, with no IT infrastructure, become a world-class player in cyber attacks?

The regime’s “choose and focus” tactic to discover and train promising computer programmers partially explains how that happened.

It seeks out math prodigies in their early ages and trains them through rigorous advanced education. At the age of 12 or 13, chosen students are sent to elite schools, such as the First and Second Keumseong senior or middle schools, and undergo intensive computer courses. The successful students then gain admissino into Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, or the Command Automation University, previously known as Mirim University, and receive intensive computer training.

Through this process, the best of the best are chosen as talented students are pitted against each other to compete and survive.

This undated photo released by the FBI shows Park Jin Hyok, a computer programmer accused of working at the behest of the North Korean government, who was charged in 2018 for his involvement in several high-profile cyberattacks, including the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and the WannaCry ransomware virus attack that affected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide. AP-Yonhap

North Korean programmer Park Jin-hyok, also known as Park Jin-hek, who has been wanted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since 2018 for “conspiracy to commit wire fraud and computer-related fraud,” is one of the most capable computer experts in the North.

“I don’t know him at all. But considering his educational background, I have no doubt that he would have proven programming skills,” said Kim.

Park is a graduate of Kim Chaek University of Technology. Between 2011 and 2013, he worked at Choseon Expo, a front company for the North Korean government based in Dalian, China. He is believed to have returned to North Korea in 2014, according to the FBI.

Like Park, the selectively chosen programmers are recruited by the regime to work as cyber warriors at Unit 121, also known as Bureau 121, at the General Bureau of Reconnaissance. Unit 121 is responsible for North Korea’s covert cyberwarfare operations against targeted countries or their financial networks.

Unit 121

Unit 121 consists of several sub-divisions, including the hacking groups Andarial, Bluenoroff and Lazarus.

According to a U.S. Army report released in 2020, Andarial has 1,600 members who conduct “reconnaissance on enemy computer systems and map the enemy network for potential attacks.” The hacking group is responsible for cyberattacks on South Korea’s defense contractors, research institutes and other entities last year and stealing military technologies and encrypted data and files for a ransom. Some institutions paid a ransom in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin to recover their data and files, according to the police.

Bluenoroff conducts financial crimes and Lazarus is the hacking group behind the cyberattacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment and the Bangladesh central bank heist, among others.

Due to a lack of a solid IT infrastructure, North Korean hackers are stationed in several different countries, including Belarus, China, India and Russia to name a few.

On top of North Korea’s focused effort to discover and train talented students, experts say there are external factors that contributed to strengthening its cyber workforce.

Kwon Ho-cheon, a consultant, public speaker and columnist for IT Chosun who specializes in North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities, said the North took advantage of its permanent mission to the United Nations in New York to train computer scientists in the United States.

Citing a U.S. media report, he said some North Korean diplomats or attaches posted in New York enroll themselves at universities there as auditing students and attend computer courses to hone their programming and hacking skills.

Once they master the necessary skills, Kwon said they are sent back to the North and new people replace them to go through the same process. Some of them purchase computers and related equipment and send them in diplomatic pouches back to North Korea. These computers and materials help North Korean cyber workers upgrade their computer skills, he said.

China and Russia, among others, are two other countries that contributed to the development of North Korea’s cyber capabilities by training North Korean programmers.

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

11. UN General Assembly passes NK human rights resolution for 19th consecutive year

Every measure helps. But so much work needs to be done. This must help justify the need for a human rights upfront approach.

UN General Assembly passes NK human rights resolution for 19th consecutive year

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

Voting results are displayed as the United Nations General Assembly voted on a nonbinding resolution calling for a "humanitarian truce" in Gaza and a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Gaza's Hamas rulers at U.N. headquarters, Oct. 27. AP-Yonhap

The U.N. General Assembly has passed a resolution on North Korean human rights for the 19th consecutive year amid growing woes over the safety of North Korean escapees who were repatriated from China.

This year's resolution, highlighting concerns over the repatriation, was passed by consensus at the General Assembly in New York on Tuesday (local time), after it was unanimously adopted by the Third Committee handling human rights and social affairs on Nov. 15.

Seoul and Washington have voiced concerns on reports that hundreds of North Korean defectors in China have been forcibly repatriated as cross-border travel resumed following the North's full lifting of pandemic-driven border closures this year.

The resolution, led by the European Union, strongly urges all member states to respect the principle of non-refoulement, which guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face the risk of persecution.

As Pyongyang's key ally, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates them to their home country, where they could face harsh punishment.

The resolution condemns the "long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights" in the North.

North Korea has long been accused of grave human rights abuses, ranging from holding political prisoners in concentration camps to committing torture and carrying out public executions. However, North Korea claims its people are freely enjoying genuine human rights.

Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted the resolution condemning North Korea's dire human rights situation every year.

South Korea co-sponsored the latest resolution, as it did last year for the first time in four years. Since taking office in May last year, the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration has taken a proactive stance in dealing with the North's rights issues. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

12. Korea donates 6 helicopters to Kenya for UN peacekeeping

Global Pivotal State.

Korea donates 6 helicopters to Kenya for UN peacekeeping

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

Korean and U.S. military personnel inspect a retired 500MD helicopter loaded on a container in the southeastern port of Busan in this photo provided by the Ministry of National Defense, Thursday. Korea has donated the Army's six retired light attack helicopters to Kenya for U.N. peacekeeping missions. Courtesy of Ministry of National Defense

By Jun Ji-hye

Korea has donated six retired 500MD helicopters that were formerly used by the ROK Army to Kenya in support of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations there, the Ministry of National Defense said, Thursday.

The six choppers began their journey from the southeastern port of Busan to the United States, the ministry said, noting that the choppers will be delivered to Kenya after necessary repairs and maintenance in the U.S.

Kenya is expected to deploy the light attack helicopters for U.N. peacekeeping missions after consultations with the international body.

The donation came as Korea pledged to provide support for the peacekeeping missions during the U.N. peacekeeping forum hosted by Seoul in 2021. At the time, the defense ministry vowed to offer 16 helicopters, and the United States promised to offer repairs and maintenance in addition to transportation.

The ministry said it will closely cooperate with the U.S. and U.N. to complete the delivery of the remaining 10 helicopters.

“The latest donation shows Korea’s willingness to expand its contribution to global peace and security before the country begins its role as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in January next year,” a ministry official said.

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

13. Total Population of Two Koreas Inches Down in Risk for Both

For those who want to see the numbers. A graph at the link:

Total Population of Two Koreas Inches Down in Risk for Both

Combined figures fall for first time in data back to 2009
North Korea’s Kim also faces a looming demographic crunch

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-20/total-population-of-two-koreas-inches-down-in-risk-for-both?sref=hhjZtX76

By Sam Kim

December 20, 2023 at 12:44 AM EST

The combined population of North and South Korea inched down for the first time in statistics going back more than a decade in an indication of the demographic crunch facing both nations.

The total population edged down to 77,370,000 last year from 77,376,000 in the previous year, South Korea’s statistical office said Wednesday in a report. A closer look shows South Korea’s population fell for a second year in 2022 to 51,673,000 while North Korea’s edged up to 25,697,000, rising at the slowest pace in figures available back to 2009.

Shrinking Korean Nation

Two Koreas remain politically divided yet share demographic concerns

Source: Statistics Korea. Shows annual growth.

While South Korea has the world’s lowest fertility rate, North Korea is also struggling with a demographic challenge when it needs a booming population to support its labor-intensive economy and an army of about 1.2 million.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un told thousands of women earlier this month that it’s their duty to produce more children to stop a declining birth rate. His propaganda mill has in the past ridiculed South Korea for its demographic difficulties.

North Korea’s fertility rate, which refers to the number of babies expected per woman over her lifetime, stands at 1.61 as of 2022, a drop from 1.93 a decade earlier, according to Statistics Korea. South Korea’s rate is at 0.78 and is expected to worsen through 2025, adding to challenges for President Yoon Suk Yeol’s government.

South Korea and North Korea remain divided and face each other over a heavily armed border after their 1950-53 war that ended in a truce. South Korea has since prospered economically and now wrestles with first-world problems such as aging demographics while North Korea continues to struggle to feed its population and faces international sanctions for its nuclear arms development.

14. Veterans minister nominee vows to improve support for people of distinguished service

(2nd LD) Veterans minister nominee vows to improve support for people of distinguished service | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with Assembly's adoption of confirmation hearing report on Kang in 3rd para)

SEOUL, Dec. 21 (Yonhap) -- The nominee for South Korea's new veterans minister vowed Thursday to make efforts to improve the quality of support for people who have rendered distinguished service to the country.

Kang Jung-ai made the remark in a parliamentary confirmation hearing after being nominated for the position earlier this month to replace outgoing Veterans Minister Park Min-shik.

The National Assembly later adopted a confirmation hearing report for Kang as the veterans minister.

"By rationalizing the compensation system for people of distinguished service to the state, I will greatly improve the quality of compensation and support," she said, vowing to push for a "fundamental change" to the country's veterans affairs policy.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has sought to strengthen support for veterans, upgrading the veterans ministry into a full-fledged one in June this year.

People of distinguished service to the state, including soldiers and police officers killed in action or in the line of duty, are currently eligible for compensation, ranging from 568,000 won (US$435) to some 6 million won a month, excluding other benefits, according to the ministry.

As of last month, there were over 160,000 surviving people of distinguished service and nearly 260,000 bereaved family members, ministry data showed. Veterans of the 1950-53 Korean War are categorized separately.

Kang, a former president of Sookmyung Women's University, comes from a family of veterans, with her father being a recipient of the Order of Military Merit for his participation in the Korean War.

Her grandfather-in-law is known for being a member of the Heroic Corps, an independence organization against Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of Korea.

Veterans Minister nominee Kang Jung-ai speaks to lawmakers during her confirmation hearing at the National Assembly in western Seoul on Dec. 21, 2023. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · December 21, 2023

15. Global Peace Convention highlights importance of peace-building

Dr. Eberstadt gave a brilliant presentation on the economics of unification.

Excerpts:

“The export gap between North and South Korea has been growing greater over time. The longer the two Koreas are separated, the greater that gap will grow,” Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, said as he explained the economics of reunification during the International Forum on One Korea, on Dec. 12.

“The economic reconstruction of Northern Korea will be an immense project. But if the returns on investment in this project are high, the project can pay for itself in the long run.”

Global Peace Convention highlights importance of peace-building

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

Hyun Jin Preston Moon, third from left, the founder and chairman of Global Peace Foundation, poses with speakers and moderators during the main plenary session for the Global Peace Convention 2023, held at Manila Marriott Hotel in Manila, the Philippines, Dec. 13. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation

By Lee Gyu-lee

MANILA, Philippines — The Global Peace Convention 2023, hosted by the U.S.-based non-profit organization Global Peace Foundation (GPF), wrapped up its six-week program, Dec. 14, with an in-person five-day event in Manila, the Philippines.

Under the theme of One Family under God: Vision for National Transformation and Civilization of Peace, this year’s convention, which kicked off with online sessions on Nov. 1, witnessed thousands of attendees, as well as over 6,000 participants who accessed the convention's content. The biannual event highlighted various issues in global peace-building from education and faith to human rights and security.

During the Main Plenary session, held at the Manila Marriott Hotel on Dec. 13, Hyun Jin Preston Moon, founder and chairman of GPF, called for building a new global identity with spiritual meaning to find solidarity in a society that is facing a crisis.

“Globalization promised to deliver a future of peace and prosperity, but it was focused purely on material values and needs. Understandably, it faced a serious backlash, because it failed to recognize the importance of the moral and spiritual dimension necessary for an ethical and cohesive global society,” Moon said during the keynote speech.

“Clearly, we need to forge a new global identity that can embrace and harmonize the positive elements of more localized identities. Such an identity must be rooted in the universal principles that all the great spiritual and ethical traditions share.”

Borrowing the phrase from the United States Pledge of Allegiance "One Nation Under God,” the chairman urged that people should acknowledge each other as members of one family under common principles to make an impact in society.

Hyun Jin Preston Moon gives a keynote speech during the Global Peace Youth Festival 2023, held at the Cuneta Astrodome in Manila, the Philippines, Dec. 10. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation

“'One Nation under God’ was meant to be a model on the national level of the world God desires — where people of all religions, nationalities, races, cultures and ethnicities could live together as one … The time is ripe for a movement that can unite these traditions on universal principles and values and establish a similar civilizational impact on a global scale; which builds on the American ideal of one nation under God and expands it to build one family under God on the world level,” he said.

“The pursuit and achievement of these aspirations can lead to the transformation of nations, guided by transcendent principles and the values grounded in them, and the emergence of a civilization of peace.”

In line with its vision toward global peace and unification on the Korean peninsula, the foundation has started a new initiative, the Global Peace Corps., marking its official launch with a ceremony during the plenary session.

“I am very happy to announce that today we are launching the Global Peace Corps to be an important force in transforming nations and addressing global challenges,” Moon said.

“The goal for the Global Peace Corps is to tap into the idealism of youth and give it the tools to become the moral and innovative leaders who can promote social transformation through service, development and peace-building projects.”

He explained that the program will invite youth from around the world to visit Korea to support the Korean Dream campaign, which calls for peace and reunification of the divided peninsula.

“Amazing breakthroughs are possible, with enormous positive impacts for peace and prosperity for the region and the entire world,” he added.

Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, speaks during the International Forum on One Korea, held at Manila Marriott Hotel, Dec. 12. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation

The culminating programs, which influenced the last five days of the convention from Dec. 10 to 14, commenced with the Global Peace Youth Festival, bringing over 5,000 local university and high school students together. Featuring speakers from various backgrounds, including a broadcaster and a department of education official, the event invited students to empower their vision and potential as future leaders and global peace-builders.

Programs included the International Forum on One Korea, focusing on the economic prospects of the two Koreas’ reunification, as well as the Youth Volunteerism and Service Learning Forum, and the Educators Congress to discuss the educational aspects of promoting global peace.

“The export gap between North and South Korea has been growing greater over time. The longer the two Koreas are separated, the greater that gap will grow,” Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, said as he explained the economics of reunification during the International Forum on One Korea, on Dec. 12.

“The economic reconstruction of Northern Korea will be an immense project. But if the returns on investment in this project are high, the project can pay for itself in the long run.”

Global Peace Awards Gala marked the finale of this year’s convention, recognizing figures from government, civil society and religion for their effort in advancing visions and the mission of building peace around the world. This year’s awardees included Manilal Chandaria, the Chairman of Comcraft Group, and Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, the former President of Guatemala, who both received the Legacy Of Service And Peace Award.

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

16. Sticking by our allies

From the always provocative and thought provoking, Don Kirk. He is one of the few journalists who can still reach back to his experiences in Vietnam.

Sticking by our allies

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

By Donald Kirk

WASHINGTON — The debate in the U.S. Congress over more funds for more arms for Ukraine evokes unpleasant memories. In 1975, as the “North” Vietnamese were roaring to victory over “South” Vietnam, the Congress refused to approve more appropriations for arms that the South badly needed for a last-ditch defense of at least the Saigon region.

The old Saigon regime, bereft of American troops and air support, may have been beyond salvation, but Washington ever since has had to deal with charges and claims of betrayal of friends and allies. The case of Afghanistan, which fell to the Taliban in August 2021, is a classic case in point, but now we’re confronted by Ukraine.

As Russia’s troops suffered from poor morale, dwindling ammunition and undying hostility at the hands of the Ukrainians, supported by NATO arms and ammunition, President Putin always knew he had an ace in the hole. Eventually, he figured, NATO’s most committed, richest member would lose interest and then give up.

That’s what’s in danger of happening now. Republican members of Congress are not all that committed to Ukraine and believe they have an excellent bargaining tool. Let’s balk at voting for more appropriations for Ukraine while demanding that President Biden pledge to close America’s porous southern border with Mexico. What a great way, they’re saying, to staunch the flow of illegal migrants into the U.S.

In essence, we’re talking about two very different kinds of invasions.

There’s the Russian assault on Ukraine, in which Putin refuses to give up his dream of conquering a huge, wheat-rich largely agricultural region that’s been periodically under Russia’s thumb from the day of Tsarist rule through to the Soviet era. Then there’s the invasion of the U.S. by hordes of largely Hispanic people from the impoverished nations of Central and South America in search of a better life.

The great difference, of course, is that the Russians are fully armed while the folks from south of the American border with Mexico are unarmed, impoverished and desperate. That’s not to say they should all be given a free pass into the land of milk and honey, but Republican malcontents, against America’s best interests, have no business mixing up the topics in a malicious bargaining game that’s against all sides, notably both Ukrainians and Hispanics.

The bargaining has implications far beyond either Ukraine or America’s southern borders. Think of all the other countries that Washington is committed to defend on the periphery of China beginning with South Korea, then Japan and Taiwan, and going around to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, including Israel, fighting terrorism in Gaza.

How sure can we be sure that Washington would live up to its long and deeply entrenched treaty deals with South Korea and Japan? American potentates are forever talking about the “ironclad” commitment to the defense of both countries, but nothing is certain in American politics. What if, by some awful circumstance, Donald Trump gets to return to the White House after all the damage he did to American foreign policy during his previous four years on the job? There’s no doubt, with Trump in charge, the U.S. would withdraw still more of its 28,500 troops now in South Korea while Trump hammered away at demands that Korea contribute several billion dollars a year for the privilege of hosting American bases, including Camp Humphreys, America’s largest overseas base, and nearby Osan Air Base.

That would not be all. Trump’s betrayal of American interests, and America's allies, would extend to Japan, from which he would pull most of America’s 50,000 troops while demanding that Japan, like Korea, vastly increase its share of the upkeep of America’s bases, notably Kadena, from which American fighter, recon and transport planes fly throughout the region.

Trump’s infatuation with dictators – not just Putin but China’s President Xi and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un – would doubtless mean he wouldn’t go to war with any of them in defense of America’s allies. Senior military officers to whom I’ve spoken think he would have long since abandoned Ukraine to Putin and fear he would want to pursue his love for Kim by letting down South Korea too. Nor would he rush to Taiwan’s defense against Xi’s People’s Liberation Army.

All of which is highly disturbing when you consider these troublesome Republicans, thinking nothing of abandoning Ukraine, rank among Trump’s stalwart friends and allies. We can only hope they come to their senses and realize it’s not a good idea for Washington to go on letting down its allies nearly half a century since the fall of the South Vietnamese regime for which Americans had been fighting and dying for over 10 years.

Donald Kirk (kirkdon4343@gmail.com) writes about war and peace from Washington and Seoul.

The Korea Times · December 21, 2023

17. US and North Korea: Testing the Water on Arms Control and Reduction

For those who advocate this approach, we have to acknowledge that in doing so we are giving Kim a victory for his blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategy. And what will Kim do when he assesses his strategy as successful? He will double down.

All that said, I could support such an approach if it was part of a superior political warfare strategy executed by the alliance that focused on supporting new emerging leadership in the north. But I seriously doubt there is the will for such a strategy.

US and North Korea: Testing the Water on Arms Control and Reduction - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Yong Suk Lee

Bottom Line

Denuclearization has been Washington’s North Korea policy goal since the 1990s, yet successive US administrations have failed to deter Pyongyang from developing, testing, and exporting nuclear weapons and missile technologies.
The United States must shift its policy focus from denuclearization to arms control and reduction.
Even though North Korea has proved to be an unfaithful negotiating partner in the past, an inspection regime that accompanies multilateral or bilateral talks with Pyongyang will cap parts of its strategic weapons program, as well as reduce stockpiles and proliferation risks.

Ask US policymakers what America’s North Korea policy goal is and they will probably tell you it is denuclearization. After six nuclear tests from 2006 to 2017, the likelihood Pyongyang will denuclearize is unrealistic. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is growing and the country’s strategic weapons capability is improving. In 2017, eleven years after its first nuclear test, North Korea declared to the world that it successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Considering the advances in weapons technology the United States made from its first nuclear test in 1945 to 1956, it is not too far-fetched to think that North Korea has made similar advances. On one hand, Pyongyang proved that it perfected nuclear weapons and liquid-fueled missile technologies the United States mastered in the 1950s; on the other, a 1950s-era atomic bomb delivered on a primitive missile can still ruin your day in 2023.

North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test in seven years but regularly tests missiles that could deliver them. In 2022, North Korea conducted sixty-eight missile tests, a record number far exceeding its previous record of twenty-five tests in 2019. North Korea fired at least a dozen missiles so far in 2023, including six short-range missiles fired with Kim Jong Un in attendance with his daughter. Repeated tests advance research and development, help North Korean missile crews improve proficiency, and these two factors combined reduce warning time and improve accuracy.

However, each time North Korea conducts a nuclear test or launches a missile, the reaction from the United States and the international community is always the same: A formal statement condemning the test from the US, South Korea, Japan, and Western governments; additional sanctions designations against North Korea and regime officials; a White House statement that “all options are on the table,” alluding to the possible use of force; and a “show of force” military exercise, such as a B-2 bomber fly over or a US Navy ship visit.

Unfortunately, these measures will not prevent North Korea from conducting additional missile or nuclear tests. The United States and its partners are doing the same things again and again, hoping for different results—even though Pyongyang knows exactly what to expect. And one needs to be clear: the use of force is not on the table. The United States has little deterrence credibility because North Korea can safely bet that Washington does not want to risk war on the Korean Peninsula. For decades, the conversations in the White House Situation Room following a North Korean provocation were always the same: What if the US government response leads to further escalation and conflict with the North? Even former President Donald Trump, as brash as he acted by publicly belittling Kim as “little Rocket Man,” could not bring himself to act militarily against Pyongyang, instead deciding to meet with Kim in person.

America is not alone in shying away from military escalation or actions that could threaten North Korea. South Korea is reluctant as well. The administration in Seoul does not want to take a course of action that could jeopardize its economic prosperity or endanger a large number of citizens, most of whom live within North Korean artillery range in the capital city of Seoul. It is a prudent and understandable concern.

What about China or Russia? Can Beijing or Moscow reign in their neighbor and former client state? At this point, considering the current status of US relations with China and Russia, why should Xi or Putin do any favors for Washington? For Beijing and Moscow, Pyongyang frustrates Washington’s Asia designs and provides a useful strategic distraction, wasting valuable time and resources that could otherwise be used against China or Russia.

The United States was constantly engaged in some kind of talks with North Korea for most of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century: the Four-Party Talks, the Three-Party Talks, and the Six-Party Talks. Even after three US-North Korea presidential summits from 2018 to 2019, the North Korean expansion of its strategic arsenal continues unabated. The Obama administration used the phrase “strategic patience” to describe its North Korea policy, which best describes the Biden administration’s approach as well. It speaks about North Korea with others, but not to the North Koreans themselves.

A diplomatic resolution is seemingly at a dead end—yet there is a pathway. The United States and its allies must shift their policy focus from denuclearization to arms control and reduction. The first step in this process is to politically accept North Korea’s de facto status as a nuclear weapons state. Convincing North Korea to dismantle some of its nuclear program will be extremely difficult, but it is more realistic than complete, irreversible, verifiable disarmament which the United States insisted on during the Six-Party Talks.

North Korea is a desperately poor country and its nuclear weapons— and strategic ambiguity of whether it will use them against its neighbors or not— is what makes Pyongyang and the ruling Kim family relevant on the global stage. Asking North Korea to give up nuclear weapons is tantamount to asking the Kim Family to give up the basis of its legitimacy and commit regicide. Strategic weapons are the leadership’s only tangible achievement in the last 70 years, and if nuclear weapons are not necessary to defend against the U.S., it questions the martial wisdom of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and now Kim Jong Un, and undermines the sacrifice of the North Korean people through war and famine.

India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea?

Unsurprisingly, how the United States dealt with nations who developed and assembled nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) depended on the country’s relations with Washington. America never publicly pressed Israel, a close ally, to come clean or denuclearize, despite troublesome allegations of possible nuclear cooperation with South Africa’s apartheid government. Pakistan received billions of dollars in US military aid and assistance while continuing to grow its nuclear arsenal. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama signed landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India, a de facto recognition of New Delhi’s nuclear status. Washington demonstrated through these actions or non-actions that it is willing to look the other way or shelve denuclearization as an issue, as long as it serves Washington’s geopolitical interests. South Africa is the only country in the world to have developed and then dismantled its nuclear program; it gave up its six weapons in 1989 and joined the nonproliferation treaty in 1991 as part of the step-by-step process from 1990 to 1994 to end apartheid and rejoin the global community.

India is what North Korea wants to be; South Africa is what the United States wants North Korea to be. Washington can either achieve this goal through the use of force, continue what it has been doing and hope for the best, or take a bold step to cap some parts of North Korea’s strategic weapons program and reduce proliferation risks.

Six-Party Talks: Part II

As a multilateral framework, the Six-Party Talks between the United States., China, North and South Korea, Russia, and Japan were a remarkable achievement. This framework can be resurrected to serve as a first step toward testing the waters on arms control and reduction with the North, eventually leading to a bilateral inspection regime between the United States and North Korea. This would be hard for Seoul to swallow but, in the end, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is primarily used to deter the United States and not South Korea. Arms reduction talks are also between nuclear powers by nature; conventional force reduction talks or steps to improve inter-Korean ties can be a pre-condition or a corollary.

Before re-engaging in any negotiations, North Korea watchers and US policymakers need to first acknowledge that Pyongyang is an unfaithful dialogue partner. The Four-Party Talks between the United States., China, and North and South Korea capped the North’s plutonium weapons program by shutting down the reactor in Yongbyon. Yet, we now know North Korea cheated on the agreement, playing a key role in rogue Pakistani scientist AQ Khan’s illicit nuclear proliferation network and the development of a highly enriched uranium weapons program. Pyongyang also showed that it is willing to proliferate nuclear technology while it was engaged in the Six-Party Talks when it built a nuclear reactor in the middle of the desert in Syria (Israel subsequently destroyed in an air strike in 2007).

If the North proved to be an unreliable negotiating partner during past denuclearization talks, why should America bother with more talks? As stated before, military options are off the table. They were on the table for Israel against Syria in 2007 because Israel attacked before its neighbor acquired nuclear weapons. Four-Party Talks did not stop North Korea from developing a highly enriched uranium program, but it capped the production of fissile material for several years when the Yongbyon nuclear power plant was shut down and placed under International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring.

North Korea’s past behavior suggests it will probably obfuscate the truth, but the United States getting its foot in the door will provide an opportunity to take a peek, even briefly, into the room. Pyongyang may throw outlandish demands on the table during the talks, such as inspecting US bases. Even if North Korea demands reciprocity, the United States has more it can share at a lower risk of disclosure due to the size and maturity of its deterrence programs, and due to the open nature of American society in policymaking and scientific development. The North’s program is still new, smaller in scope, and ruled by a xenophobic regime that fears foreign influences. While talks are underway, the North will stop testing its weapons, preventing the regime from improving its arsenal, and parts of its program will be capped and monitored.

The Doomsday Clock and Nightmare Scenarios

The sense of urgency among the US policymakers negotiating with North Korea in the 1990s came from trying to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, but that ship has sailed. The urgency now is to cap parts of the strategic weapons program that the international community knows about and reduce stockpile and proliferation risks.

History is not on the side of North Korea. Pyongyang has an outsized influence in the world compared to its gross domestic product, estimated to be around $18 billion, according to the last estimate from the World Bank. Seoul’s last estimated economic output, in comparison, was around $1.8 trillion. Unless social science tools commonly used to measure North Korea’s economy are wrong, the arrow points to one direction for North Korea: a hereditary dictatorship that relies on international handouts to survive. The most valuable thing it has to export is nuclear weapons and missiles and there are plenty of countries who would be interested. For example, what if Iran successfully tests an atomic bomb and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decide to purchase nuclear weapons and missiles from North Korea? Will America go to war against the Gulf states? Will the United States and European Union sanction these countries by refusing to buy their gas and oil? What leverage will the United States have against North Korea or against the Gulf states, and how will Israel react?

This is a far-fetched nightmare scenario thus far. The policy and statecraft challenge is not to try to stuff the North Korean nuclear genie back in the bottle; it is to prevent the genie from breeding other genies, and the international community cannot afford to fail.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Yong Suk Lee

Yong Suk Lee is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Asia Program. He served for 22 years in various senior leadership positions with the Central Intelligence Agency as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.

Image: Defense Department

fpri.org · by Yong Suk Lee

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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