Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S.

Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 06, 1962

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Freedom is sloppy. But since tyranny's the only guaranteed byproduct of those who insist on a perfect world, freedom will have to do.”

– Bill Willingham, Fables: Werewolves of the Heartland

"The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently."

– Friedrich Nietzsche

“You meet saints everywhere. They can be anywhere. They are people behaving decently in an indecent society.”

– Kurt Vonnegut.

1. Taiwan Is Not Ready for a War With China

2. Taiwan’s Ability to Defend Against China Invasion Thrown Into Question

3. Xi warned Biden during summit that Beijing will reunify Taiwan with China

4. China warns US ally about its "red line"

5. MARSOC, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers: SOF by the numbers

6. Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic

7. U.S. Releases Ally of Venezuelan President in Exchange for 10 Americans

8. War in Ukraine Has China Cashing In

9. General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

10. Fort Liberty completes redesignation with Schoomaker Road and Beckwith Lodge

11. The Blockade on Promotions Is Finally Over. Here's How to Ensure it Never Happens Again. (Opinion)

12. Biden’s Foreign Policy Had a Rough 2023, and 2024 Looks Rougher

13. Why the Defense Department attended COP28

14. Opinion: The largest fiscal cost of war is veterans' benefits. Honest budgeting can save lives.

15. Israel’s Muddled Strategy in Gaza by Daniel Byman

16. The Premature Quest for International AI Cooperation

17. After a Ceasefire, Would Russia Simply Fight Again?

18. Taking an Azimuth on the US Military’s Recruiting Crisis: What We Learned from MWI and TRADOC’s Essay Competition

1. Taiwan Is Not Ready for a War With China

Taiwan Is Not Ready for a War With China

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-12-20/taiwan-is-not-prepared-to-defend-itself-from-an-invasion-by-china?sref=hhjZtX76

By Alan Crawford

December 20, 2023 at 5:59 AM EST

Welcome to Balance of Power, bringing you the latest in global politics. If you haven’t yet, sign up here.

Walk through central Taipei in the evening and the malls are full, designer shops crowded, and teenagers with boom boxes perform K-pop dance routines in the street.

There’s little outward sign that Taiwan is an island at the nexus of global tensions between the US and China.

Presidential elections next month will go a long way to determining just how acute those strains become.

For all the outward calm, the threat of conflict is real.

China is “expanding military capabilities at scale,” according to Taiwan’s annual defense report. That includes constructing airfields along its eastern and southern coastline and stationing new fighters and drones there to “seize air superiority” in any engagement across the Taiwan Strait.

Building Threat

China sent far more warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense zone in 2023

Source: Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, Bloomberg

Note: 2022, 2023 data are according to a written report prepared by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry to lawmakers; 2021 number is based on daily public data from the Taipei ministry and calculated by Bloomberg

China claims Taiwan as its territory, although President Xi Jinping has said Beijing isn’t preparing for war.

For his part, President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of Chinese aggression. In addition, Taiwan’s world-leading chip industry makes it vital to global industry and society, enabling everything from iPhones to AI.

Yet, as Cindy Wang and Peter Martin report, Taiwan itself remains strangely unprepared for the worst-case scenario. Government officials openly concede that more needs to be done to deter any invader.

Issues include the size of Taiwan’s military, its training, and the kind of weaponry being purchased. Polls suggest almost half of Taiwanese are unwilling to defend their island if China attacks.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have shown that preparations need to go beyond the military field to areas including critical infrastructure, civil resilience and cybersecurity.

Taiwan is actively discussing efforts to beef up its defenses with the US.

Beijing and Washington have made efforts to dial down the enmity, and Xi hasn’t done or said anything to suggest war in the Taiwan Strait is imminent.

But in a world of geopolitical volatility, Taiwan remains arguably the greatest threat of all.

2. Taiwan’s Ability to Defend Against China Invasion Thrown Into Question

Taiwan’s Ability to Defend Against China Invasion Thrown Into Question

Cross-strait tensions are running high and January’s election might add to them. Yet officials say Taiwan’s military and civil defenses have a way to go if they’re to be able to deter an invading force.

By Cindy Wang and Peter Martin

December 19, 2023 at 6:01 PM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-12-19/how-ready-is-taiwan-for-a-potential-war-with-china?srnd=politics-vp&sref=hhjZtX76

When former US National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien visited Taipei earlier this year, he suggested that one million AK47-wielding Taiwanese “around every corner” and “in every apartment block” would be an effective deterrent to any Chinese invasion plans.

It didn’t go down well.

“Arming citizens is not the answer,” ran the headline in the Taipei Times, over an op-ed responding to his proposal to make the assault rifle widely available in a territory with one of the world’s lowest crime rates. “Ludicrous and unimaginable” was former President Ma Ying-jeou’s verdict, condemning what he called the island’s “weaponization” and a “tendency to turn Taiwan into a second Ukraine.”

The outcry over a remark by a straight-talking former US official points to the challenge of preparing Taiwanese society for the worst-case scenario with China. For all the support given by Washington, the reality is that when it comes to both civil and military defense, the democratically governed island still has a lot to do.

“Taiwan is far from ready,” former Chief of the General Staff Lee Hsi-min said in an interview, citing “lots of improvements” that are needed in areas from weapons acquisition to civilian training. Deterrence is key, and equipment can of course help, he said, “but the most important thing is whether you have the will to defend yourself.”

A decommissioned tank on Ou Cuo Beach in Kinmen, Taiwan, on Aug. 21.Photographer: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg

Conversations with US-based security analysts and former administration officials, as well as with members of the government in Taipei, cast doubt on Taiwan’s ability to deter, let alone resist China — with some even questioning the will to do so.

The US sees important progress being made by the government in Taipei, “but the administration is also concerned that the threat facing Taiwan is significant and growing, and as a result more is needed to ensure Taiwan is keeping pace with that threat,” said Jennifer Welch, chief geo-economics analyst with Bloomberg Economics, who served as director for China and Taiwan on the US National Security Council until this year.

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Those concerns have been fanned by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and are all the more acute going into January elections that are likely to determine the degree of strains with China across the Strait of Taiwan. Polls show a lead for Vice President Lai Ching-te, who wants to strengthen ties with Washington, suggesting no easing of tensions in sight.

The wars in Ukraine and in Gaza show that preparations need to go beyond the military field to areas including critical infrastructure security, civil resilience, cybersecurity, and continuity of operations and government, said Welch. “This is a massive undertaking that naturally requires significant time and resources,” she said.

An anti-landing drill on Bali beach during military exercises in New Taipei City, in July.Photographer: I-Hwa Cheng/Bloomberg

Among the issues officials and analysts cite are the size of Taiwan’s military, which has shrunk in recent years, with the number of voluntary recruits dropping to a four-year low. A 12.5% increase in defense spending this year on last has only amplified questions over the suitability of the kit being purchased. And the state of unreadiness is compounded by a backlog in US arms sales to Taiwan including F-16 fighter jets and Abrams M-1 tanks that the Cato Institute estimates at more than $19 billion.

“I don’t think Taiwan is in very good shape,” said Kevin McCauley, former senior China analyst for the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center. “They are not making the right modernization decisions,” from buying heavy M-1 tanks and large ships “that won’t survive” to poor training. “They’re talking about how they’ll improve these things,” he said. “But I don’t see it.”

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said that if it came to war with China, “Taiwan 200% will fall.”

“It’s an island. They run out of food and gas in 40 days,” she said. “A blockade is risky because it gives Taiwan time for the US to arrive. So the question is: can Taiwan hold off long enough to allow the US to arrive?” The assessment of the US government, she said, “is that they cannot hold out long.”

President Xi Jinping said during his November visit to San Francisco that China wasn’t preparing to “fight a cold war or a hot war with anyone.” But that’s done little to calm speculation over Beijing’s intentions, since it openly claims Taiwan as Chinese territory. For his part, President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the US would come to the self-governing island’s assistance if it was attacked.

US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Woodside, US, on Nov. 15.Photographer: Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images

Department of Defense spokesman Martin Meiners said the US is focused on preventing military conflict over Taiwan “with both deterrence and diplomacy,” adding that “our entire policy is geared toward that goal.”

There’s no current information to suggest a war in the Taiwan Strait is imminent, the director general of the National Security Bureau, Tsai Ming-yen, said in October. But he noted that the Chinese Communist Party “has not given up its intention to invade.”

Building Threats

China sent much more warplanes into Taiwan's air defense zone in 2023

Source: Taiwan's Defense Ministry, Bloomberg

Beijing and the People’s Liberation Army have used that grey zone of uncertainty to conduct a campaign of intimidation spanning the gamut from military harassment, economic coercion and diplomatic oppression to spreading fake news, according to officials in Taipei. Most visibly, it carries out frequent incursions across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, a tacit boundary that has separated the rivals for decades, and the government has warned it expects more intimidation heading into the elections.

The unveiling of the Taiwan Navy's Hai Kun submarine in September.Photographer: I-Hwa Cheng/Bloomberg

Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait “will require heightened urgency, attention, and resources in the critical years ahead,” US Assistant Defense Secretary Ely Ratner said in September.

Taiwan is actively discussing and exploring all possibilities with the US to strengthen its defenses, whether civil, military, or infrastructure, said a senior government official in Taipei, asking not to be named discussing private contacts. Some adjustments are ongoing, the official said, citing work with Taiwan’s tech sector to produce thousands of drones by 2024.

With China’s intimidation, Taiwan’s government concludes that it can’t discount any possibility — including that an unexpected accident triggers an escalation, said the official. So the emphasis is on preparing for the worst, something Taiwan has actively been doing since 1949 and its split from Communist China.

There is discussion over whether China would attempt a full-scale invasion or rely on a blockade to choke off Taiwan economically. Both carry risks for the aggressor, but analysts say that China doesn’t have the ships required to pull off an invasion – yet.

Concrete blocks scattered along breakwaters in Kaohsiung City.Photographer: I-Hwa Cheng/Bloomberg

Taiwan meanwhile needs anti-ship missiles, air-defense systems, air and sea drones, and smart mines “to make such invasion a virtual impossibility,” says Dmitri Alperovitch, executive chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator think tank.

Still, the island’s mountainous terrain, rivers, and shallow waters in the Taiwan Strait make it “one of the most defendable places in the world,” said Alperovitch, author of a forthcoming book, “World on the Brink: How America Can Beat China in the Race for the Twenty-First Century.”

Limited stretches of coastline where invaders could establish a beachhead, the location of fish farms behind those beaches, plus the fact that few highways lead to the capital would all further impede the progress of any invading force.

Walk through central Taipei of an evening and the malls are full, designer shops crowded, and teenagers with boom boxes perform K-pop dance routines in the street. There’s little outward sign that this is an island at the nexus of global tensions.

Taiwan has attracted over $70 billion from returning Taiwanese businesses since 2019, while foreign investment in 2022 was the highest in almost 15 years, outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen said at an opening ceremony for a Micron Technology Inc. plant on Nov. 6. The US memory chip company’s presence endorses Taiwan as a safe place to invest, she said.

Strong Inflows

Foreign investment in Taiwan reached the highest since 2007 last year

Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs

Note: 2023 data is as of Oct.

Equally, the island’s relative affluence may help inure its citizens to the threat of conflict.

Polls suggest that a little more than half of respondents are willing to defend Taiwan if China attacks, meaning that “some 40% of Taiwanese people are likely to choose capitulation or rapprochement,” said Puma Shen, associate professor at National Taipei University and the co-founder of Kuma Academy, a private organization dedicated to building civil defense. For Shen, the most important step for Taiwan “is to enhance the public’s awareness of friend and foe,” he said. “Without it, all other preparations are meaningless.”

An advertisement for the Kuomintang presidential candidate Hou You-yi above Ningxia Night Market in Taipei, in November.Photographer: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg

That ambiguity is reflected in Taiwan’s political landscape, with some presidential candidates more willing to engage with China than others, potentially influencing the response to any future collision with Beijing.

Eric Heginbotham, a principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues, said that he “wouldn’t be shocked if Taiwan threw up its hands in the first days of a conflict,” especially if the US was not “visibly committed.” At the same time, he acknowledged that many similarly expected an early surrender in Ukraine that failed to materialize. Even leaving that aside, he said, the Taiwanese are “not well prepared psychologically or materially, and their training is not sufficiently realistic.”

A children’s first aid and safety event held by the Kuma Academy in New Taipei, in November.Photographer: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg

It’s not just Taiwan. The pace of US preparation is “still inadequate to the scale of the challenge,” according to Bruce Jones, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute. Deficiencies include stockpiling relevant munitions as well as readying the US public for “a deep crisis in the western Pacific” that could mean the significant loss of American lives.

Xi warned Biden during summit that Beijing will reunify Taiwan with China

The Chinese leader's message in San Francisco got the attention of U.S. officials because it was delivered at a meeting that was intended to reduce tensions.

NBC News · by Kristen Welker, Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee and Andrea Mitchell

SHARE THIS —

Dec. 20, 2023, 5:00 AM EST

WASHINGTON — Chinese President Xi Jinping bluntly told President Joe Biden during their recent summit in San Francisco that Beijing will reunify Taiwan with mainland China but that the timing has not yet been decided, according to three current and former U.S. officials.

Xi told Biden in a group meeting attended by a dozen American and Chinese officials that China’s preference is to take Taiwan peacefully, not by force, the officials said.

The Chinese leader also referenced public predictions by U.S. military leaders who say that Xi plans to take Taiwan in 2025 or 2027, telling Biden that they were wrong because he has not set a time frame, according to the two current and one former official briefed on the meeting.

Chinese officials also asked in advance of the summit that Biden make a public statement after the meeting saying that the U.S. supports China’s goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan and does not support Taiwanese independence, they said. The White House rejected the Chinese request.

A spokesperson for the National Security Council declined to comment.

The revelations provide previously unreported details about a critical meeting between the two leaders that was intended to reduce tensions between their countries.

Xi’s private warning to Biden, while not markedly different from his past public comments on reunifying Taiwan, got the attention of U.S. officials because it was delivered at a time when China’s behavior toward Taiwan is seen as increasingly aggressive and ahead of a potentially pivotal presidential election in the self-governing democratic island next month.

After the initial publication of this story, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., issued a statement calling for Republicans and Democrats to work together to deter China.

“This story as reported is beyond unnerving,” Graham said. “I will be working with Democratic and Republican Senators to do two things quickly. First, create a robust defense supplemental for Taiwan and second, draft pre-invasion sanctions from hell to impose on China if they take action to seize Taiwan.”

President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their summit in Woodside, Calif., on Nov. 15.Brendan Smialowski / AFP - Getty Images file

Officials familiar with the conversation between Biden and Xi described the Chinese leader as blunt and candid, but not confrontational.

“His language was no different than what he has always said. He is always tough on Taiwan. He’s always had a tough line,” said a U.S. official with knowledge of the conversation.

Xi’s saber-rattling on Taiwan has been a top concern for Biden administration officials, who are aggressively trying to avoid a military conflict with China.

At last year’s Chinese Communist Party Congress, Xi stated publicly that China would attack Taiwan militarily if it declares independence with foreign support. The Chinese leader said the threat of force “is directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking" Taiwanese independence.

Xi, who has set a goal of doubling the size of the Chinese economy by 2035, also said that "we must continue to pursue economic development as our central task." Some experts believe it is doubtful that China would attack Taiwan if it does not declare independence because a military conflict would likely prevent Beijing from reaching its economic goals.

During the summit in San Francisco, Xi expressed concerns about the candidates running for president of Taiwan in next month’s election, according to U.S. officials. Xi also noted the influence that the U.S. has on Taiwan, they said.

When Biden asked that China respect Taiwan’s electoral process, Xi responded by saying that peace is “all well and good” but that China needs to eventually move toward a resolution, one U.S. official said.

Biden’s meeting with Xi, their first in a year, took American officials months to secure after relations between Washington and Beijing reached a low point in February after the U.S. shot down a Chinese spy balloon. The White House hoped the meeting would ease tensions, and afterward Biden stressed the need to avoid conflict.

“We’re in a competitive relationship, China and the United States, but my responsibility is to make this rational and manageable, so it doesn’t result in conflict,” Biden said. “That’s what I’m all about. That’s what this is about.”

CIA Director William Burns said earlier this year that U.S. intelligence shows that Xi has directed his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. “Now, that does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027, or any other year, but it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition,” Burns said.

Biden has said in the past that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan if China invaded, but the White House has walked back his comments.

Under its longtime “One China” policy, the U.S. recognizes Beijing as China’s sole legal government but maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory. Most of the island’s 24 million people favor maintaining the status quo, neither unifying with China nor formally declaring independence.

After the summit, Biden reiterated long-standing U.S. policy. “We maintain an agreement that there is a 'One China' policy,” he said, adding, “I’m not going to change that. That’s not going to change.”

One Chinese official who attended the meeting, Hua Chunying, posted afterward on X that Xi had told Biden and other U.S. officials that the “Taiwan question remains the most important and most sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations.” Hua added that the U.S. should “support China’s peaceful reunification” and that “China will realize reunification, and this is unstoppable.”

Kristen Welker

Kristen Welker is the moderator of "Meet the Press".

Courtney Kube

Courtney Kube is a correspondent covering national security and the military for the NBC News Investigative Unit.

Carol E. Lee

Carol E. Lee is an NBC News correspondent.

Andrea Mitchell

Andrea Mitchell is chief Washington correspondent and chief foreign affairs correspondent for NBC News.

NBC News · by Kristen Welker, Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee and Andrea Mitchell

4. China warns US ally about its "red line"

Is the China -Philippines tinderbox going to be the spark of conflict in the INDOPACIFIC?

China warns US ally about its "red line"

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · December 19, 2023

China has warned the neighboring Philippines its patience is limited as the Southeast Asian country continues its efforts to push back against Chinese activity within its exclusive economic zone.

Manila has disregarded Chinese goodwill and restraint and "repeatedly challenged China's principles and red line," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at Monday's regular press conference.

The two countries are locked in a territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Half a dozen countries, including the Philippines, contest China's claim over most of the energy-rich sea. Washington has recently reiterated that an attack on Philippine ships or aircraft anywhere would trigger its Mutual Defense Treaty with Manila. This follows several clashes between Philippine forces and China's coast guard and maritime militia ships.

"Over the past few months, it has been the Philippines who is breaching the common understandings with China and heightening tensions in the South China Sea," Wang said.

Wang faulted the Philippines for trying to rally "external forces" to join it in piling on pressure on China. He also accused the country of trying to change the status quo at the Spratly Islands' Second Thomas Shoal through its regular supply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, a warship deliberately grounded there to stake Manila's claim.

China says the 1999 marooning of the Sierra Madre, where a contingent of Philippine troops is stationed, is illegal. In 2016, an international arbitral tribunal took no stance on the sovereignty of the unoccupied atoll but supported Manila's right to underwater resources within the Philippines' 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

Wang said that by "tying itself to some major power," Manila will not succeed in getting Beijing to "back down on issues concerning China's core interests."

The Chinese Embassy in the U.S. didn't immediately respond to Newsweek's written request for comment.

Chinese coast guard boats are pictured at the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea on November 10. China and the Philippines are locked in a territorial dispute in the sea. Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images

Wang was responding to remarks Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made to the press while in Japan on Saturday. He called the South China Sea the "most complex geopolitical challenge that the world faces."

Marcos, whose administration has been strengthening its ties with the U.S. as well as ally Japan, also stressed the importance of military-to-military interoperability between the two countries.

"For this, the US should weigh up carefully and not get burnt by playing with fire," said Chinese nationalistic tabloid the Global Times in an editorial this month, adding that the Philippines should be cautious about not becoming "a victim to be exploited."

The Times cited a Chinese professor who said that Philippine policymakers had "seriously misjudged the situation" in their efforts to pressure China and that Washington and Tokyo will throw the Philippines under the bus "when necessary."

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · December 19, 2023

5. MARSOC, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers: SOF by the numbers

A couple of errors though things could have changed since I was on active duty. I believe each of the 3 line SF battalions have 18 SFODAs, not six. There are six in each company and three companies per battalion. Also I believe a SEAL Team is commanded by a Commander (O-5)

MARSOC, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers: SOF by the numbers

How big is a SEAL team? How many Green Berets are there? We have answers.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED DEC 20, 2023 8:00 AM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · December 20, 2023

The U.S. military’s special operations forces (SOF) are home to some of the most highly trained soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen in the world. They must undergo grueling assessments and selections before they make it into one of the prestigious SOF units under the umbrella of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

But exactly how big is a SEAL team? Are Army Rangers the largest unit in SOCOM? How does MARSOC, a relative newcomer to the SOF world, compare in size? Cold, hard numbers aren’t easy to come by, but they do exist.

Each unit’s assessment and selection allows only the best to serve within their ranks, so only a few graduate out of the many that try out. That’s why there are not hundreds of thousands of service members in each SOF unit, but numbers alone don’t explain why they are elite. Special operations units are masters of the fundamentals of warfare, and they generally have better funding, better training, fewer restrictions, and a near carte blanche to select the very best while getting rid of anyone who no longer maintains the standard.

We aren’t discussing the number of personnel in units that fall under the secretive Joint Special Operations Command, as that information is still a close-held secret. But almost everyone else? We got you.

How many Navy SEALs are in a SEAL team?

The U.S. Navy’s Navy Special Warfare Command (NSW) is staffed by both SEALs and their sister unit, the Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen. As of Nov. 2023, there are over 10,000 people assigned to NSW, comprised of SEALs, SWCC, civilian employees, and Navy Reserve personnel.

There are ten different Navy SEAL teams. Each team is composed of a headquarters element and eight 16-man SEAL platoons. Odd-numbered teams 1, 3, 5, and 7 are assigned to NSW Group One in Coronado, California, while the even-numbered teams 2, 4, 8, and 10 are under NSW Group Two in Little Creek, Virginia.

An O-6 Navy Commander generally commands a SEAL team, and an O-3 commands each platoon. As of November 2023, approximately 2,900 active duty Navy SEALs are assigned to NSW, and around 200 SEALs are on Reserve or Selected Reserve status.

To earn the SEALs’ coveted trident, sailors must undergo a grueling training pipeline starting with the notoriously difficult BUD/S course.

How many Green Berets are in an A-Team?

U.S. Army Special Forces break down into active duty groups numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10. 19th and 20th Groups are on the U.S. Army National Guard side. Each group has a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Group Support Battalion, four Special Forces Battalions, and a Battalion Support Company.

Each group contains around 1,100 Green Berets who have endured the 12 to 24 months long Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) after they were selected during Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The length of the SFQC can vary by military occupational specialty (MOS). The support staff — who are not authorized a Special Forces tab or green beret — brings each group’s number up to approximately 3,000.

It’s important to understand that not everyone assigned to a group has earned the “long tab.” Support personnel cover down on a range of functions like counterintelligence and other capabilities. That’s not to be confused with the other Army SOF units, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, that may attach to an ODA during deployments and training.

Within each Special Forces battalion, there are six Special Forces Operational Detachments – Alpha (ODA), also known as an A-Team or SFOD-A. When fully staffed, Each A-Team is comprised of 12 soldiers: the team leader (usually a captain), a warrant officer who is the assistant commander, the team sergeant (usually a master sergeant), an intelligence sergeant, then two weapons sergeants, two medical sergeants, two communications sergeants, and two engineer sergeants.

Green Berets cross-train so that each member of an A-Team knows how to do another’s job — or multiple other jobs. It’s a testament to the highly diverse capabilities they bring to the battlefield.

They are supported by a 12-soldier Special Forces Operational Detachment – Bravo (SFOD-B), and one Special Forces Operational Detachment – Charlie (SFOD-C, or ODC) is the command and control element over the whole battalion.

How many Army Rangers are in the 75th Ranger Regiment?

Not to be confused with soldiers from across the military who have graduated Ranger School and returned to their units, Rangers are the premiere special operations direct action raid force. They are also among the only SOF units to make their support personnel undergo the same selection process as their “shooters.” So, everyone assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment has attended either Ranger Assessment and Selection Program 1 or 2, and earned the prestigious Ranger Scroll and tan beret.

Staff sergeants and above will attend RASP 2, while sergeants and below will attend RASP 1, which has a historical attrition rate of 47%. RASP 2 has a 28% attrition rate, but it should be noted that most soldiers attending RASP 2 are already serving in the 75th, and are assessing for a higher leadership role in the Regiment. Once you graduate, you don a tan beret and are assigned to one of five battalions. As of November 2023, just over 3,500 Rangers are assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment.

There are five battalions:

1st Ranger Battalion
2nd Ranger Battalion
3rd Ranger Battalion
Regimental Special Troops Battalion
Regimental Military Intelligence Battalion

Additionally, there is a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, which oversees the entire 75th Ranger Regiment.

There are generally four companies per battalion. Each line battalion is staffed by approximately 800 Rangers assigned to one of three rifle companies: A, B, or C. D company was originally a fourth rifle company but now is home to the specialty platoons like snipers and the mortar section, among others.

The Regimental Special Troops Battalion, Regimental Military Intelligence Battalion, and the Headquarters Company are staffed differently than the line battalions, and numbers fluctuate.

How many Marine Raiders are there?

Marine Raiders are organized as a single regiment comprising three battalions. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Raider Battalions rotate as the responsible party for conducting operations under AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and INDOPACOM.

Maj. Timothy Irish said approximately 1,000 Marine Raiders currently serving have undergone assessment and selection, including officers and enlisted. They are assigned throughout the three battalions. Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is staffed by 3,500 personnel in a variety of support roles. All sailors and Marines assigned to MARSOC are referred to as a Marine Raider, regardless of whether they have attended the assessment and selection process.

How many Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen are there?

Air Force Combat Controllers, known simply as CCTs, go through one of the most challenging training pipelines available in the U.S. military. Airmen undergo over two years of training to become one of the most lethal assets on the battlefield. CCTs can call in pin-point air strikes from fighter jets, naval gunfire, or even nuclear warheads.

There are approximately 660 CCTs on active duty, and in the Air National Guard and Air Reserve. They have a unique job that routinely takes them into the joint special operations environment throughout their entire career. They can be assigned to a Ranger strike force on one deployment and deploy with a SEAL platoon the next.

Pararescuemen, regularly referred to as PJs, endure arguably equally challenging training as their CCT brothers. They also can be attached to other SOF units or work independently on combat search and rescue missions out of various locations state-side and overseas. There are over 800 PJs on active duty, in the Air National Guard, or in reserve status.

Some PJ units are assigned to special tactics squadrons in the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), while others are assigned to Guardian Angel units. These specialized units are comprised of Combat Rescue Officers, Pararescuemen, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Specialists, and other uniquely trained support personnel.

AFSOC breaks down into one active component Special Operations Wing, two active Special Operations Groups, one active Special Tactics Group, and two reserve Special Operations Wings. You can learn more about the infrastructure of all the different units under AFSOC here.

FAQs about special operations forces

You have questions, Task & Purpose has answers.

Q: Are there any female special operators?

A: There are both female Rangers and Green Berets. Capt. Kate Wilder was the first female to earn the coveted Special Forces “long tab” of the Green Berets. Multiple women have graduated from RASP and served in the 75th Ranger Regiment as well.

Q: How do you become a Special Forces soldier?

A: It depends on what your actual goal is. If you want to join the ranks of Army Special Forces, then you must graduate from Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and the subsequent Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).

Q: What are special operations forces?

A: Special operations forces, or SOF, is a general term that describes the various special operations units and personnel assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command (US SOCOM).

Q: What SOF unit has saved the most SEALs?

A: Rangers have rescued SEALs more times than anyone can remember. Rangers lead the way.

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · December 20, 2023

6. Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic

Excerpts:

This thesis does not argue for the broad expansion of the SOF human inventory; “SOF cannot be mass produced after a crisis”, but the existing task organization requires restructure. This will indeed limit the availability and coverage of individual units enjoyed by the coalition during the war on terror, but one that ensures SOF offers the ability to self-sustain and achieve impactful operations in support of the greater conventional force.

Company-sized units operating from allied ’warm’ bases will enjoy better survivability, lethality, and sustainability in contested and hostile (both in terms of nature and the adversary) environments. When paired with better allied integration, these units will challenge strategic competitor interests and regional advantages, while supporting the mainline units, should conventional hostilities emerge. Short of open conflict, the strategic communication benefit and value of this pivot and integration is significant, demonstrating to Russia and China that the West is preparing for competition in this challenging theatre where Russia has most notably already begun preparations for the same.

Strategic competition in the arctic theatre does not eliminate the need for SOF. Rather, it forces SOF to become once again “special”—a force multiplier for conventional forces that focuses on maritime and littoral operations, and structures itself accordingly. By changing the mission focus and the unit structure to meet the unique demands of the operating environment, SOF will remain a key player in any conflict with a near-peer adversary.

Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic » Wavell Room

by Joshua C. Huminski and Ethan BrownDecember 20, 2023

wavellroom.com · by Joshua C. Huminski · December 20, 2023

Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version

Strategic competition has superseded the Global War on Terrorism as the central organizing principle for America’s military. Conflict has returned to the European continent with Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. The accession of Finland to NATO, and hopefully Sweden soon, the Arctic environment has taken on new importance in strategic calculus. As the defence enterprise writ large shifts to this new environment, so must Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Here, the unavoidable truth is that SOF, American and allied, will not have a primary role in the arctic theatre. These forces must return to a more traditional supporting role as ‘force multipliers,’ ending the primacy they enjoyed in the War on Terror as the supported entity. This means rethinking SOF missions, a re-orientation toward maritime and littoral operations and away from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Russia and China are placing increased emphasis on the polar regions in their strategic calculus and future planning. Russia, prior to its expanded invasion of Ukraine, undertook demonstrative military exercises in the Arctic, and was building up its forces in the High North. In its 2018 arctic policy, China declared itself a ‘near-arctic state’, seeking to assert its regional interests. While much of this activity from Moscow and Russia is predicated on securing economic and commercial interests, military interests and strategic competition-related power projection are clearly not far behind.

Russian paratroopers in the Arctic.

Professor Mark Galeotti notes, for instance, that ‘in Moscow’s calculus, SOF will have a limited role in the arctic theatre, focusing on a limited set of traditional “special” missions”’. The much-publicized April 2020 exercise on Alexandra Island saw Russian special operators, paratroopers, and FSB Special Purpose personnel seizing the island and conducting operations there, being much more about signalling maritime and littoral capabilities. A similar return to the traditional unconventional mission set is warranted for American and allied SOF—a focus on the “special” aspect of these units’ missions and a supporting function to the main force. There is, furthermore, an opportunity for allied SOF to prepare for interdiction and direct engagement with adversarial special operations units as a means of deterring their mobility, ability to enable competitor conventional forces, and achieve high-value interdiction against key nodes and competitor centers of gravity.

The End of the War on Terror, Strategic Competition, & SOF

The pivot to strategic competition acutely impacts the SOF enterprise, particularly within the United States and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom, but especially across those NATO countries bordering the Arctic region—the accession of Finland and Sweden’s pending membership to the alliance increases this reality. The degradation of Russia’s conventional ground forces and misuse of their SOF inventory in Ukraine notwithstanding, the Arctic will remain a key area of interest for Moscow, and likely an area in which it will want to assert both its interests and demonstrate its capabilities once those forces are reconstituted. In the interim, Russia’s naval forces (its Northern Fleet in particular) are largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, a key consideration when evaluating arctic strategy more broadly.

For allied SOF, after 20 years of counterterror and counter-insurgency-focused conflict, the reorientation from the main stage is an uncomfortable proposition. Yet, as operating environments, Iraq and Afghanistan were aberrations in the conduct of modern warfare. In both instances, the predominant paradigm was low-intensity conflict, with only a very minor conventional resistance at the opening stages of the Iraq war, and little, if any, conventional opposition in Afghanistan. Given the political dynamics within the United States, successive presidential commitments, and the unique skillset of SOF, these forces became increasingly attractive and expedient.

Their efficacy was predicated, however, on wholly atypical and unique environmental conditions—the absence of peer- and near-peer adversaries, uncontested air superiority, overwhelming fire support, persistent surveillance and intelligence collection, and more. While the actual physical environment was challenging, particularly in Afghanistan, it was not insurmountable. Moreover, the mission-set of both campaigns—dynamic and deliberate targeting of insurgents and their networks—played to SOF’s strengths and remained politically palatable for successive risk-adverse presidencies.

SOF & Pivoting to The Arctic

These conditions will be minimized in strategic competition and will certainly be absent in the arctic theatre. Competitors possess the ability to deny U.S. special operations forces the very enabling capabilities on which American overmatch rests. Strategic adversaries such as Russia and China have their own anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and, in the event of hostilities, will almost certainly work to deny allied SOF secure rear areas in proximity to contested domains. As a result, operations in the arctic theatre will depend primarily on the ‘big’ stand-off elements of the Air Force and Navy, and to a lesser degree the Army.

With these factors and limitations in mind, allied SOF must adapt. This necessitates two mutually reinforcing primary courses of action: first, re-prioritizing mission sets that focus on maritime and littoral activities, and integration with partner commands (both U.S. and international); and second, a concomitant enlargement of the base SOF unit to increase self-sustainment to ensure combat effectiveness.=

In the case of the former, the War on Terror’s “contemporary” mission-sets will not transfer to the Arctic theatre. In the place of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, maritime and littoral operations will take primacy. Consequently, the SOF community must reprioritize its operational focus from being the supported entity to a supporting, enabler role. ‘Big Navy’, ‘Big Air Force’, and Space operations will take primacy in the Arctic theatre. Here, expanded intelligence collection, interference and disruption of adversary capabilities and key operational nodes, and augmenting the ‘Big Service’ actors will replace direct action, foreign internal defence, and network dismantling missions. In a way, this is a return to the core SOF mission sets of truly “unique” operations that augment the main pre- and post-hostility activities while maintaining the modularity of present-day SOF and their unique adaptability, ‘jointness’, and innovation.

Royal Navy submarine HMS Trenchant breaks through the ice of the North Pole as Polar Ice Exercise 18 Royal Navy Photo.

SOF has proven its utilitarian value in the Ukraine theater as an enabling force, rather than the main effort. While Ukrainian defence forces engage Russian aggressors on all fronts, Ukrainian special forces have manifested this supporting role through innovative, high-impact operations which are supplemental to the main effort—using drones to target Russian armour and mobility units in ways that aid the greater conventional force—and such a model for operations is a living case-study for arctic SOF employment.

This pivot to maritime and littoral operations also necessitates a re-focusing on the interoperability with key arctic allies. These NATO and non-NATO allies will be of critical importance in the Arctic theatre, providing both invaluable regional and environmental knowledge, but also forward deployment and operating positions from which missions will launch and sustain.

This realignment demands increased cross-training, war-gaming, and force exchanges to maximize familiarity, command and control, and other critical functions in advance of a potential conflict in the Arctic theatre. In a battlespace that could feature a U.S. contingent operating parallel to coalition SOF elements, separated by hundreds of miles of open expanse, a unified chain of command under a dedicated combined joint task force must be implemented, tailored to the Arctic with relevant stakeholders, something presently absent.

By jointly operating and preparing for arctic-related strategic competition, allied SOF units will develop regional accessibility at the company level, tailored to the austere environments. Identifying and developing insertion and forward sustainment capabilities that are not handcuffed to warm-base support—something hitherto enjoyed in Iraq and Afghanistan—is critical for preparing the enterprise to fight in polar climates.

The Arctic & SOF Structure

More specifically for the United States and United Kingdom’s special operations community, this pivot to arctic-related strategic competition must include a fundamental reconsideration of the unit structure itself. While the main value of special mission units lay in their relatively small footprint, this size is predicated on the politically sensitive environments of GWOT and its operational considerations, not the least of which is theatre dominance.

Special Operations will, ironically enough, need to increase the base unit structure despite the downgrading of its mission-set and operational centrality. For example, within American SOF, deploying as a full company as opposed to a single platoon, strike force, or operational detachment to the arctic theatre, and in support of maritime or littoral operations, will prove to be more useful and beneficial than the small unit footprints used in late-stage Iraq and Afghanistan. Here again the reality of theatre considerations is felt—long logistics tails, uncertain air superiority or dominance, and adversaries that field similar operational and denial capabilities.

20th Special Forces Group perform a controlled ascent during a deep dive off the coast of Naval Station Mayport (National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Adam Fischman)

This thesis does not argue for the broad expansion of the SOF human inventory; “SOF cannot be mass produced after a crisis”, but the existing task organization requires restructure. This will indeed limit the availability and coverage of individual units enjoyed by the coalition during the war on terror, but one that ensures SOF offers the ability to self-sustain and achieve impactful operations in support of the greater conventional force.

Company-sized units operating from allied ’warm’ bases will enjoy better survivability, lethality, and sustainability in contested and hostile (both in terms of nature and the adversary) environments. When paired with better allied integration, these units will challenge strategic competitor interests and regional advantages, while supporting the mainline units, should conventional hostilities emerge. Short of open conflict, the strategic communication benefit and value of this pivot and integration is significant, demonstrating to Russia and China that the West is preparing for competition in this challenging theatre where Russia has most notably already begun preparations for the same.

Strategic competition in the arctic theatre does not eliminate the need for SOF. Rather, it forces SOF to become once again “special”—a force multiplier for conventional forces that focuses on maritime and littoral operations, and structures itself accordingly. By changing the mission focus and the unit structure to meet the unique demands of the operating environment, SOF will remain a key player in any conflict with a near-peer adversary.

Cover photo: WINTER DEPLOYMENT 2022 The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) exercised deploying Inflatable Raiding Craft’s (IRC) from a Royal Navy submarine at Lyngan Fjord in Northern Norway.. Photo: MOD

About the author Related Posts

Joshua C. Huminski

Joshua C. Huminski is Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a George Mason University National Security Institute Fellow. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.

Ethan Brown

Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow for Defense Studies at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. He spent 11 years in the U.S. Air Force as a Special Operations Joint Terminal Attack Controller with multiple combat deployments. He is the author of the book “Visual Friendlies, Tally Target” on the role of close air support in the War on Terror (slated for publication by Casemate in May 2024). He can be found at @libertystoic on X.

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Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic

wavellroom.com · by Joshua C. Huminski · December 20, 2023

7. U.S. Releases Ally of Venezuelan President in Exchange for 10 Americans

U.S. Releases Ally of Venezuelan President in Exchange for 10 Americans

The release of Alex Saab, a top ally of Venezuela’s president, comes as the United States is trying to push the authoritarian government to hold fair elections.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/20/us/politics/us-venezuela-prisoner-exchange.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

By Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Genevieve Glatsky and Lara Jakes

Zolan Kanno-Youngs reported from Washington, Genevieve Glatsky from Bogotá, Colombia, and Lara Jakes from Rome.

Dec. 20, 2023

The United States released a close ally of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela on Wednesday in exchange for 10 jailed Americans and a defense contractor known as “Fat Leonard,” who is at the center of one of the U.S. Navy’s largest corruption cases.

The Maduro government will also release 20 Venezuelan political prisoners and Roberto Abdul, an opposition leader in Venezuela, U.S. officials said.

The Americans who were released on Wednesday include six people deemed to be “wrongfully detained” by the Biden administration, a designation that indicates that the U.S. government sees them as the equivalent of political hostages. They had landed in Texas by Wednesday night, an administration official said.

“These individuals have lost far too much precious time with their loved ones, and their families have suffered every day in their absence,” President Biden said in a statement as the exchange was announced.

The swap comes as the Biden administration tries to improve relations with the authoritarian government in Caracas. The United States is increasingly interested in improving the economic situation in Venezuela to try to address the arrival of large numbers of Venezuelan migrants at the southern U.S. border.

The United States also recently restarted deportation flights to Venezuela and lifted some sanctions after the Maduro administration agreed to take tentative steps toward free and fair elections.

“It looks like Maduro, so far, is keeping his commitment on a free election,” Mr. Biden told reporters on Wednesday. “But it ain’t done yet. We’ve got a long way to go.”

U.S. officials cast the swap as necessary to reunite the Americans with their families in the United States. It came after months of negotiations between top U.S. and Venezuelan officials, which were brokered by Qatar, American officials said.

But for some in Venezuela, the deal was a win for Mr. Maduro because it resulted in the release of Alex Saab, who has been accused by the United States of “profiting from starvation” of Venezuelans. Many Venezuelans say Mr. Saab has become synonymous with the worst abuses of the Maduro government.

A Colombian businessman and financial fixer for Mr. Maduro, Mr. Saab was indicted in 2019 in connection with a bribery scheme that siphoned an estimated $350 million from a Venezuelan government housing project.

Mr. Saab, who landed in Venezuela on Wednesday afternoon, is one of several Maduro-linked officials and businessmen indicted by the U.S. government in recent years, including Mr. Maduro himself.

He was extradited from the West African island nation of Cape Verde to the United States in 2021 to face money-laundering charges, one of the highest-ranking supporters of Mr. Maduro to be taken into American custody. He pleaded not guilty.

Washington has accused Mr. Saab of involvement in a scheme in which he and others made off with large sums of government funds meant to feed Venezuela’s hungry.

Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat who has criticized the White House’s approach to Venezuela, called the exchange “unconscionable.”

But some foreign policy experts said securing the release of 10 Americans was a diplomatic win for the Biden administration. Christopher Sabatini, a senior research fellow for Latin America at Chatham House, a research group in London, said it is never ideal to negotiate with “criminal regimes.”

“Understandably, there are those that will call this a sellout,” he said, “but that’s diplomacy.”

Mr. Maduro’s government maintained that Mr. Saab’s detention was illegal, saying he was a diplomatic envoy and could not be prosecuted.

Under the terms of the deal, Venezuela also agreed to return to the United States the former defense contractor Leonard Glenn Francis, known as Fat Leonard. Mr. Francis, a Malaysian businessman, is at the center of a fraud and bribery case that has resulted in federal criminal charges against more than 30 U.S. Navy officials and defense contractors, according to the Justice Department.

He was set to be sentenced last year but escaped house arrest in September 2022 by cutting off his ankle monitor and fleeing to Venezuela. Two weeks later, he was stopped by Interpol agents at the airport in Caracas, trying to board a flight to Russia. He faces up to 25 years in prison and has agreed to forfeit $35 million in gains.

More than two dozen people have pleaded guilty in connection with the scheme. They have admitted that they accepted millions of dollars in luxury travel, accommodations, meals or the services of prostitutes from Mr. Francis in exchange for lucrative military contracts for his Singapore-based business, Glenn Defense Marine Asia.

Prosecutors have said that Mr. Francis’s gifts to Navy officials also included more than $500,000 in cash, Cuban cigars, Kobe beef and Spanish suckling pigs. He also threw lavish parties for senior officers at luxury hotels in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong.

In escaping to Venezuela, Mr. Francis may have believed that years of hostile diplomacy between Mr. Maduro and the United States would have shielded him from extradition. Mr. Maduro has an affable working relationship with Russia, and for months has been considering a visit to meet President Vladimir V. Putin.

But the American and Venezuelan governments raised cautious hope of easing tensions when they agreed to a deal in October that lifted some economic penalties against Venezuela.

In October of last year, Mr. Biden agreed to grant clemency to two nephews of Venezuela’s first lady to secure the release of seven Americans.

Among the Americans released on Wednesday were Jerrel Kenemore and Eyvin Hernandez, who had been arrested in March 2022; Joseph Cristella, who had been arrested in Venezuela in September that year; and Savoi Wright, a businessman from California whose family said he had been wrongfully detained after the F.B.I. learned in October he had been arrested. The United States had designated them all as wrongfully detained.

Senior U.S. officials declined to reveal details about the other Americans who were released, but they said the exchange meant that all the Americans believed to be wrongfully detained in Venezuela had been freed.

Mr. Wright’s family released a statement on Wednesday saying they were grateful to the Biden administration.

“These past few months have been some of the most difficult of our lives, and we are relieved that this ordeal has ended,” the statement said. “We are forever grateful.”

Isayen Herrera contributed reporting from Caracas, Venezuela.

Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House, including homeland security and extremism. He joined The Times in 2019 as the homeland security correspondent. More about Zolan Kanno-Youngs

Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years. More about Lara Jakes

A version of this article appears in print on Dec. 21, 2023, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. and Venezuela Make Prisoner Exchange. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

8. War in Ukraine Has China Cashing In

Excerpts:

Cheap Russian energy, bypassing sanctions imposed by the West, has helped Chinese factories compete in global markets even as their manufacturing rivals elsewhere, notably in Germany, have faced sharply higher energy costs for much of the past two years.

Russia has been ramping up natural gas shipments through its Power of Siberia pipeline to China, and has been negotiating to build a second one that would carry gas from fields that served Europe before the Ukraine war. China and Russia also agreed less than three weeks before the Ukraine war to build a third, smaller pipeline that would carry gas from easternmost Russia to northeastern China, and construction on that project has raced ahead.

The newest pipeline will cross land that Russia seized from China in the late 1850s and never returned. As recently as the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union were quarreling over the placement of their border and their troops skirmished. In a village near Heihe, a larger-than-life-size statue of an imperial Chinese general still glares across the Amur River.

Today Russia and China are building bridges and pipelines that cross it.

War in Ukraine Has China Cashing In

By Keith Bradsher

Reporting from Heihe, Aihui and Harbin, China

Dec. 21, 2023

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · December 21, 2023

A statue of an imperial Chinese general stands watch near Heihe, on the Chinese side of the Amur River marking the border with Russia. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

The country’s trade with Russia this year has exceeded $200 billion, and makers of cars and trucks are the big winners.

A statue of an imperial Chinese general stands watch near Heihe, on the Chinese side of the Amur River marking the border with Russia. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Reporting from Heihe, Aihui and Harbin, China

Dec. 21, 2023

On China’s snowy border with Russia, a dealership that sells trucks has seen its sales double in the past year thanks to Russian customers. China’s exports to its neighbor are so strong that Chinese construction workers built warehouses and 20-story office towers at the border this summer.

The border town Heihe is a microcosm of China’s ever closer economic relationship with Russia. China is profiting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has led Russia to switch from the West to China for purchases of everything from cars to computer chips.

Russia, in turn, has sold oil and natural gas to China at deep discounts. Russian chocolates, sausages and other consumer goods have become plentiful in Chinese supermarkets. Trade between Russia and China surpassed $200 billion in the first 11 months of this year, a level the countries had not expected to reach until 2024.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also gotten an image boost from China. State media disseminates a steady diet of Russian propaganda in China and around the world. Russia is so popular in China that social media influencers flock to Harbin, the capital of China’s northernmost province in the east, Heilongjiang, to pose in Russian garb in front of a former Russian cathedral there.

The former St. Sophia Cathedral in Harbin, China, a remnant of the city’s Russian past, has become a destination for social media influencers dressing in Russian costume. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

A Chinese shopper waiting to buy goods at a mall specializing in Russian products.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, have made numerous public demonstrations of the nations’ close ties. Mr. Xi visited Harbin in early September and declared Heilongjiang to be China’s “gateway to the north.” China’s exports to Russia soared 69 percent in the first 11 months of this year compared with the same period in 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine.

“Maintaining and developing China-Russian relations well is a strategic choice made by both sides on the basis of the fundamental interests of the two peoples,” Mr. Xi said as he met in Beijing on Wednesday with the Russian prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin.

China has filled a critical import need for Russia, which many European and American companies shunned after Mr. Putin started his war in February 2022. China has pursued its role as a substitute supplier of goods despite risking its close economic ties with many European nations.

Before the Ukraine invasion, leaders of Germany, France and other European countries mostly set aside differences with China over issues like human rights to emphasize commerce. Chinese officials, for their part, insist that they should not be forced to choose between Europe and Russia, and that China should be free to do business with both.

The biggest winners for China from the surge in trade with Russia have been its vehicle manufacturers.

Out to dinner at a Russian restaurant in Heihe. Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Russian paintings for sale at a mall.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

On a recent afternoon in Heihe, lines of diesel freight trucks with decals of snarling bears, a symbol of Russia, on their drivers’ doors waited to be driven across an Amur River bridge to Russia. The bridge is new, and so are the trucks, which wore Genlyon badges, a brand that belongs to the state-owned Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. The company, known as SAIC, also makes car brands like MG, acquired from Britain.

The sales helped China overtake Japan this year as the world’s largest car exporter. German manufacturers like Mercedes-Benz and BMW used to be strong sellers in Russia, but they have pulled out in response to sanctions on the country by Europe, the United States and their allies.

Sales of luxury cars in Russia have plunged, contributing to a decline in the overall size of the country’s car market, which is now less than half the size of Germany’s. But lower-middle-class and poor Russian families, whose members make up the bulk of the soldiers fighting the war, have stepped up purchases of affordable Chinese cars, according to Alexander Gabuev, the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

One reason, Mr. Gabuev said, are the death and disability payments that the Russian government and insurers are making to families of Russian soldiers — as much as $90,000 in the case of a death.

Russia has not released the number of its killed and wounded, but the United States estimates the total at 315,000.

Russians buy almost exclusively internal combustion cars. China has a surplus of them because its consumers have shifted swiftly to electric cars.

Chinese-made trucks lining up in Heihe for delivery to Russia.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

A Chinese-built excavator, about to be driven to Russia, sitting in front of offices in Heihe built for administrators of the cross-border trade.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

And the land border means China can transport cars to Russia by rail, an important factor because China lacks its own fleet of transoceanic carrier ships for vehicle exports.

The result? Chinese carmakers have grabbed 55 percent of the Russian market, according to GlobalData Automotive. They had 8 percent in 2021.

“Never before have we seen automakers from a single country gobble up so much market share so quickly — the Chinese came into a windfall,” said Michael Dunne, an Asia automotive consultant in San Diego.

The United States has strongly warned China against sending armaments to Russia, and has not yet uncovered evidence that it is doing so. But some civilian equipment that China is selling to Russia, like drones and trucks, also has military uses.

Beijing’s embrace of Russia has also provided a modest but timely boon to China’s construction industry. The economy has struggled to heal from the scars left by almost three years of stringent “zero Covid” measures.

The real estate market is in crisis across China. Tens of millions of apartments are empty or unfinished, and new projects have stalled — depriving the construction sector of work that has long powered jobs.

“Many buildings have been built, but without anyone living inside,” said Zhang Yan, a wooden door vendor in Heihe.

Chinese tourists taking photos near the Amur River, with Russia as a backdrop.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Dining at a Russian-themed restaurant in Harbin.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

But some laborers are finding work on the 2,600-mile Russian border, which until this year had a dearth of truck stops, customs processing centers, rail yards, pipelines and other infrastructure. Construction moved ahead briskly over the summer in cities like Heihe, although it has paused for the frigid winter.

Pipelines are needed for one of the most crucial commodities traded between the two countries: energy.

Cheap Russian energy, bypassing sanctions imposed by the West, has helped Chinese factories compete in global markets even as their manufacturing rivals elsewhere, notably in Germany, have faced sharply higher energy costs for much of the past two years.

Russia has been ramping up natural gas shipments through its Power of Siberia pipeline to China, and has been negotiating to build a second one that would carry gas from fields that served Europe before the Ukraine war. China and Russia also agreed less than three weeks before the Ukraine war to build a third, smaller pipeline that would carry gas from easternmost Russia to northeastern China, and construction on that project has raced ahead.

The newest pipeline will cross land that Russia seized from China in the late 1850s and never returned. As recently as the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union were quarreling over the placement of their border and their troops skirmished. In a village near Heihe, a larger-than-life-size statue of an imperial Chinese general still glares across the Amur River.

Today Russia and China are building bridges and pipelines that cross it.

Pipes in the colors of the Russian flag. Cheap Russian energy has helped Chinese factories compete.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Li You and Olivia Wang contributed research.

Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He has lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic. More about Keith Bradsher

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · December 21, 2023

9. General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

How well will those shells work if the regime decides to attack the South?

General Staff: Russia using low-quality, defective North Korean shells

kyivindependent.com · by Nate Ostiller · December 20, 2023

Russian forces are using low-quality shells sourced from North Korea that are often defective, at times causing damage to the barrels of cannons and mortars and even injuring soldiers, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces wrote on Dec. 20.

In particular, the General Staff said that this appeared to be happening with Russian troops in the Dnipro Group under the command of Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky operating in southern Ukraine.

The U.S. confirmed increased weapons and ammunition transfers from North Korea to Russia following a meeting between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in September.

Washington said it's "deeply concerned" that North Korea may receive nuclear- or ballistic missile-related technology in exchange.

South Korean intelligence reports claim that North Korea has delivered more than a million shells to Russia.

The Ukrainian military news site Defense Express wrote on Dec. 9 that Russian troops have been complaining about the condition of North Korean shells, saying that some show evidence of crucial parts being cannibalized, as well as a general emphasis on quantity over quality. As a result, the shells can be less effective or even dangerous due to defects.

Russia, China and North Korea have new dynamics. And it’s bad for Ukraine

The White House announced on Oct. 13 that North Korea had delivered more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and ammunition to bolster Russia’s war against Ukraine. Washington published pictures tracking a set of containers as it traveled from Najin, North Korea, to Dunay, Russia, by a Russ…

The Kyiv IndependentKatie Marie Davies

kyivindependent.com · by Nate Ostiller · December 20, 2023

10. Fort Liberty completes redesignation with Schoomaker Road and Beckwith Lodge

Fort Liberty completes redesignation with Schoomaker Road and Beckwith Lodge

dvidshub.net

Photo By Jason Ragucci | McKellar’s Lodge was renamed to Beckwith Lodge in a ceremony Dec. 15. Beckwith’s...... read more

Photo By Jason Ragucci | McKellar’s Lodge was renamed to Beckwith Lodge in a ceremony Dec. 15. Beckwith’s family attended the ceremony on his behalf. His daughter Connie Howe said although Beckwith was very humble, her father, who passed away in 1994, would be pleased that the lodge will bear his name. (U.S. Army photo by Jason Ragucci, Fort Liberty Public Affairs) | View Image Page

FORT LIBERTY, NC, UNITED STATES

12.15.2023

Story by April Olsen

Fort Liberty Garrison Public Affairs Office

FORT LIBERTY, N.C. - Known as the “center of the universe” for Airborne and Special Operations Soldiers, Fort Liberty, North Carolina, has a history played out in books, television and movies. The people who have called it home since the early days of Camp Bragg are the stuff of legends.

Fort Liberty recognized two legendary Soldiers on Dec. 15 with a ceremony that renamed McKellar’s Road and Lodge to Schoomaker Road and Beckwith Lodge. The ceremony also served as the culmination of the year-long installation redesignation that included several roads named after Confederates.

Renaming the road and lodge for Gen. (Ret.) Peter Schoomaker and Col. (Ret.) Charles Beckwith reminds Soldiers that “we stand on the shoulders of giants” and owe our total dedication to defending our Republic, said Lt. Gen Christopher Donahue, the Commanding General of 18th Airborne Corps and Fort Liberty.

“This is really about people who have gone above and beyond … to help build this installation,” Donahue said.

Both Schoomaker and Beckwith have historical ties to multiple units on the installation. Both took part in Operation Eagle Claw, the mission to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980. Beckwith retired after almost three decades in uniform, leaving a legacy that includes service in 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups and serving as the Commandant of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.

Beckwith served multiple combat tours in Vietnam and Southeast Asia between stateside assignments. Using his combat experience and time as an exchange officer to the British Special Air Service Regiment, Beckwith created a SAS-type counterterrorist unit that would become 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - D and served as its first commander. Donahue said his efforts were foundational in forming the Joint Special Operations Command and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

“It was his tenacity, his ability to get something done … creating an organization that empowers people,” Donahue said. “Nobody else would have done it or could do it today.”

Beckwith’s family attended the ceremony on his behalf. Connie Howe said although he was very humble, her father, who passed away in 1994, would be pleased that the lodge will bear his name. She mentioned that it was near the pond behind the lodge that, in 1961, then-Brig. Gen. William Yarborough convinced President John F. Kennedy to make the Green Beret the headgear for Special Forces Soldiers.

“Thank you all, it’s a great honor and we appreciate it,” Howe said.

Schoomaker served under Beckwith’s command in 1st SFOD-A and later took command of the unit. Schoomaker also commanded JSOC, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command, from which he retired in 2000. But, in 2003, President George Bush recalled him to active duty to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Schoomaker returned to retired status in 2007 after more than 35 years of service.

Attending the ceremony with his family, Schoomaker said, “I’m tremendously honored by this … but this will always be the road to Range 19 out here. It was traveled by some extraordinary people every day, serving faithfully and honorably … I’m humbled to be a representative of them. I appreciate this very much. It’s a great honor.”

Retired Cmd. Sergeant Maj. and Green Beret Ronnie McCan participated in the review committee for redesignation efforts. Although some local veterans had some initial pushback, he said most have become supportive “now that they know and understand” and see individuals with ties to the installation recognized.

“General Schoomaker and Colonel Beckwith represent what the community is all about – patriotism and service,” McCain said.

With installation redesignation efforts now complete, Garrison Commander Col. John Wilcox said honoring Schoomaker and Beckwith is a capstone and a reminder of Soldiers' service to the nation throughout history.

“For anyone who knows anything about the SOF community, these two are synonymous with what Special Operations represents, honoring the best of the community,” Wilcox said. “Some names have changed, but there is no change in the focus and dedication of our Soldiers.”

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Date Taken: 12.15.2023 Date Posted: 12.20.2023 11:01 Story ID: 460437 Location: FORT LIBERTY, NC, US Web Views: 35 Downloads: 0

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11. The Blockade on Promotions Is Finally Over. Here's How to Ensure it Never Happens Again. (Opinion)

Don't re-elect "coach."

The Blockade on Promotions Is Finally Over. Here's How to Ensure it Never Happens Again. (Opinion)

military.com · by Military.com | By Sarah Streyder Published December 20, 2023 at 4:26pm ET · December 21, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

On Dec. 19, the U.S. Senate confirmed the last remaining four-star generals and admirals whose promotions had been blocked for the last 10 months. With these votes, we can finally close the book on Alabama Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville's one-person crusade against the U.S. military.

But before we move too quickly past this saga, it's important that we pause to analyze how our military community overcame this blockade. If we don't, we leave the door open to future lawmakers repeating the same shenanigans and worsening the permanent damage this political stunt has already done to U.S. national security.

The story of Tuberville's failed blockade is essentially the story of a schoolyard bully. For months, the senator picked on a group of people who couldn't fight back, over a policy disagreement they had nothing to do with. And he almost got away with it. A number of strong, powerful people tried to fight back with stern letters and press conferences, but to no avail.

What finally tipped the scales was a group of diverse voices who didn't seem that strong or powerful on their own but, by working together, they managed to win the day.

That group? Regular, everyday military spouses and families who finally said, "Enough! We are not your bargaining chips."

The beginning of the end for Tuberville's bullying started this summer. Our team at Secure Families Initiative (SFI) saw the harm that this block on promotions was having on folks within our network. From families indefinitely stuck in temporary lodging, to spouses losing job opportunities, to kids missing school registration deadlines -- the consequences were growing.

But the impacts didn't end with only those on the promotion list. All military families felt shock and despair that decision-makers with so much power over our lives would treat us so callously. How on earth were we supposed to tell the 18- and 19 year-olds in our lives to sign up for the military when this would be their future?

Yet these stories of impact weren't showing up in a lot of the media coverage. Military families didn't see ourselves in the news, even though we were the news.

So we did something about it. SFI wrote a petition that resonated with military families across the country, and we delivered that petition directly to Capitol Hill because it was time for us to hold the schoolyard bully accountable for his actions.

That step, combined with our ongoing outreach to key Senate offices, finally turned the tide. On Dec. 5, Tuberville folded, and two weeks later, all the remaining officers were approved by the Senate.

For a long time, military spouses have been told (either explicitly or by social norms) to keep our voices and opinions to ourselves. We shouldn't complain when things go wrong because we should have known what we signed up for.

The problem with that culture of silence, though, is that it leaves military service members completely helpless. If they can't speak up when something's happening, who's to stop someone from preying on that vulnerability for their own political gain?

This setup isn't new. But the norms around what political stunts are considered "acceptable" have changed; the traditional decency of treating military matters apolitically has vanished. If this is our new era, it's time for military spouses to rise to the occasion.

For too long, too many policy conversations about us have been happening without us. Military families are stakeholders and constituents, so we deserve to have our voices heard. Indeed, if this saga demonstrates something, it's that we need to make our voices heard if anything is expected to change.

This week's victory proves our theory that military families can have power and influence when we organize ourselves and push for change. It's crucial that we remember that power the next time a big issue arises that impacts us.

-- Sarah Streyder is the executive director of Secure Families Initiative and an active-duty Space Force spouse. Sarah was the 2022 AFI Military Spouse of the Year and a 2023 George W. Bush Veteran Leadership Scholar.

military.com · by Military.com | By Sarah Streyder Published December 20, 2023 at 4:26pm ET · December 21, 2023

12. Biden’s Foreign Policy Had a Rough 2023, and 2024 Looks Rougher

Excerpts:

Handling a world full of crises would test any president. But Biden will also be facing the forces of illiberalism at home. His democracy-versus-autocracy rhetoric has always been about former President Donald Trump as much as Xi or Putin. And if Biden liked to say, early in his tenure, that “America is back” — well, now Trump is back, and he’s barreling toward a rematch with a president who seems to have aged a decade in the last three years.

The specter of Trump’s return is already influencing global politics: It is fueling Putin’s belief that he can win in Ukraine by outlasting the West. America’s allies realize that if Trump triumphs, his animosity toward them might sunder the free world — that he would inject instability, incompetence and unilateralism into US statecraft at a time of growing danger. There are many ways he could even weaken the democratic pillars of America’s global strength: firing civil servants en masse; prosecuting his enemies; weaponizing the power of the state to entrench himself in office.

The year that is ending had its share of nasty surprises, from Hamas’s attack on Israel to the apparent waning of the free world’s will to aid Ukraine. The year that is dawning will be even more turbulent, not least because of the way that America’s unsettled politics will interact with the world’s.

Biden’s Foreign Policy Had a Rough 2023, and 2024 Looks Rougher

The president faces flagging support for Ukraine, an election in Taiwan and all sorts of nightmare scenarios in the Middle East.

December 21, 2023 at 12:00 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-12-21/gaza-taiwan-and-ukraine-will-make-2024-harder-for-biden-s-foreign-policy?srnd=opinion-politics-and-policy&sref=hhjZtX76

By Hal Brands

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

There hasn’t been much holiday cheer for Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy left Washington last week without any new US aid for his embattled state. That may be an omen of hard times ahead in 2024. The final year of President Joe Biden’s term will see the present world order facing trouble on every front — including the one on which it is most vulnerable, in the US itself.

Next year is shaping up to be ugly for Ukraine. Its much-touted counteroffensive has ended in disappointment. Its forces are bloodied and exhausted. Recriminations about whether Ukrainian timidity or Western avarice are to blame for that failure are playing out, predictably, in the US press.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, conversely, is feeling pretty smug. He has taken the best punch Ukraine and its Western allies can throw. His arsenal of autocracy is out-producing America’s arsenal of democracy. Now Washington is struggling to help Ukraine defend itself.

If Ukraine does receive a major infusion of US aid in 2024, it may still have to husband its strength, absorb Russian attacks, and prepare for the next big push — perhaps the last big push — in 2025. If it doesn’t get that aid, it may struggle to protect its cities from drone and missile attacks this winter and hold battlefield positions against superior Russian artillery and manpower next spring. The question going into 2023 was, how much land can Ukraine liberate? The question for 2024 is, can Ukraine hang on?

The outlook isn’t much brighter in the Middle East. Israel hopes it can wrap up the most intense phase of its war against Hamas by year’s end. The Biden administration hopes so, too.

Ending the conflict is key to lowering the diplomatic costs the US is paying as it supports an eminently justified Israeli offensive that has, nonetheless, claimed a reported 20,000 lives. Ending the war — and, perhaps, the tenure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — is also vital to restoring momentum toward creation of a Saudi-Israeli coalition against Iran.

Yet even in this optimistic scenario, lower-intensity conflict will probably continue for months to come. Meanwhile, the war has stoked violent, escalatory pressures on four fronts — the West Bank, the Israel-Lebanon border, the Red Sea, and in Iraq and Syria. It is also threatening to reinvigorate Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon, by unwinding the tacit agreement whereby Washington went easy on sanctions and Tehran went easy on uranium enrichment.

The demands on America’s military power and diplomatic savvy will remain significant in 2024 — as trouble gathers in the Western Pacific, as well.

With hindsight, we are likely to see last month’s meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping as a high point in the US-China relationship, not a foundation upon which the two sides subsequently build. There’s no sign of the People’s Liberation Army slackening the military buildup — nuclear and conventional — that is alarming the Pentagon. China keeps trying to push a US ally, the Philippines, off disputed features in the South China Sea. Then there is the primary flashpoint, Taiwan.

If Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te wins presidential elections next month — he presently has a narrow lead — Beijing won’t be happy. Chinese officials view Lai as a pro-independence firebrand. His victory, the third straight for the DPP, would force Xi to confront the fact that hopes for peaceful unification are fading fast. So Xi might turn up the military pressure next year — through aggressive exercises and shows of force — to remind Taiwan’s population that disobedience has a price.

Handling a world full of crises would test any president. But Biden will also be facing the forces of illiberalism at home. His democracy-versus-autocracy rhetoric has always been about former President Donald Trump as much as Xi or Putin. And if Biden liked to say, early in his tenure, that “America is back” — well, now Trump is back, and he’s barreling toward a rematch with a president who seems to have aged a decade in the last three years.

The specter of Trump’s return is already influencing global politics: It is fueling Putin’s belief that he can win in Ukraine by outlasting the West. America’s allies realize that if Trump triumphs, his animosity toward them might sunder the free world — that he would inject instability, incompetence and unilateralism into US statecraft at a time of growing danger. There are many ways he could even weaken the democratic pillars of America’s global strength: firing civil servants en masse; prosecuting his enemies; weaponizing the power of the state to entrench himself in office.

The year that is ending had its share of nasty surprises, from Hamas’s attack on Israel to the apparent waning of the free world’s will to aid Ukraine. The year that is dawning will be even more turbulent, not least because of the way that America’s unsettled politics will interact with the world’s.

Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the co-author of “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China” and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He is a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.

More From Hal Brands at Bloomberg Opinion:

America’s Best Strategy for Cold War II Is 200 Years Old
The West’s Sanctions on Russia Aren’t Scaring China One Bit
Biden’s Foreign Policy Vision Is Officially Dead

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Terminal readers head to OPIN <GO>. Or you can subscribe to our daily newsletter.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

Hal Brands at Hal.Brands@jhu.edu

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

13. Why the Defense Department attended COP28

Why the Defense Department attended COP28

defenseone.com · by Brendan Owens

A closing plenary of COP28 on Dec. 13, 2023, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Wang Dongzhen/Xinhua via Getty Images

Climate change threatens our national security. We’ll face the challenge with allies and partners.

We recently represented the Defense Department as part of the U.S. delegation to the 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28), the global climate conference held this year in Dubai, UAE. Our delegation—the department’s second to COP in as many years—attended to discuss security implications of climate change and the energy transition.

Acknowledging the risks to national security posed by climate change isn’t new for DOD. The link between climate change and national security has been discussed in the Pentagon’s strategic guidance documents since the George H.W. Bush administration 30 years ago. But under the Biden Administration, the Department has sharpened its focus on this challenge—and with good reason.

DOD’s highest-level policy documents, the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), explicitly address the national-security threat posed by climate change. The NSS labels this as the “decisive decade” for action and calls the climate crisis “the existential challenge of our time,” for it puts at risk food and water supplies, public health, and infrastructure. The NDS describes how climate change transforms the context in which our military must operate, creates new geopolitical threats, and increases demands on the force while straining our bases, equipment, and readiness.

At COP28, we engaged with allies and partners from around the world about the profound readiness, operational, and resilience challenges we all face from climate change. Many DOD partners have called climate change their number one national-security threat. They noted that increasingly severe and frequent storms, extreme heat, and persistent drought drive instability. And when instability escalates to conflict, militaries are often expected to act.

Climate change is already increasing demands on U.S., allied, and partner forces to support civilian agency disaster response, both at home and abroad, straining the military readiness to perform core national security missions. National Guard troops from the Army and Air Force now spend more than 150,000 person-days per year responding to disasters like wildfires and flooding. Coastal installations like Naval Air Station Pensacola, Tyndall Air Force Base, and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune are rebuilding from damage caused by catastrophic storms, costing taxpayers billions and reducing mission readiness. Devastating floods at West Point and Offut Air Force Base compromised our ability to teach new officers and execute key strategic deterrence missions.

The need for action is simply put: adapting our forces and our installations in response to the climate crisis makes us better warfighters. The Department and each of the Services published strategies to address the climate threat, and we have taken decisive steps to build resilience against mounting climate impacts and decarbonize our operations in a way that prioritizes strengthening our operational capability.

Energy-resilient installations allow us to continue operations even when the commercial grid goes down. More energy-efficient ground forces and combat systems mitigate risk associated with fuel logistics while more efficient airplanes increase range and payload. Hybrid-electric tactical vehicles are more agile, less detectable, and more lethal. Optimizing ship routes to improve fuel efficiency enable us to operate longer between refuelings. Investing in these capabilities makes us more resilient, agile, and lethal—we are a stronger fighting force.

The NDS states that “mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage.” Partnership at all levels is essential to addressing threats posed by climate change. That is why we attended COP28—the place where the world gathers to engage on this shared challenge. In Dubai, we carried the following message: U.S. leadership on climate change—including from DOD—is essential to our collective security.

14. Opinion: The largest fiscal cost of war is veterans' benefits. Honest budgeting can save lives.

Opinion: The largest fiscal cost of war is veterans' benefits. Honest budgeting can save lives.

The $886 billion ‘defense’ bill making its way through Congress costs a lot more than $886 billion

BY MICHAEL F. CANNON

DEC. 19, 2023 5:58 PM PT

sandiegouniontribune.com · by Michael F. Cannon Dec. 19, 2023 5:58 PM PT · December 20, 2023

Cannon is director of health policy studies at the Cato Institute and lives in Alexandria, Virginia.

Military families are watching on tenterhooks to see if local militias resume attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. Why does President Joe Biden continue to absorb casualties and risk the lives of thousands of U.S. troops despite no clear mission? The deciding factor may be that Congress finances veterans’ benefits in a way that enables him to put U.S. lives at risk when public opposition would otherwise stop him.

Congress funds veterans’ benefits like it funds Social Security and Medicare. It promises all sorts of benefits now but does not fund those promises until they come due, often decades later.

This “promise now, pay later” approach encourages politicians to make more promises, leaving it to future politicians to deliver on them (e.g., when Congress expanded veterans’ benefits in 2022). It also leaves politicians free to renege on those promises after recipients become dependent on them (e.g., when congressional analysts suggest cutting projected spending on veterans to the tune of half a trillion dollars over the next decade).

In the case of veterans’ benefits, “promise now, pay later” also hides the largest fiscal cost of the decision to go to war. As a result, it allows and encourages the president and Congress to risk U.S. lives when public opposition would otherwise prevent it.

Veterans’ benefits are the largest fiscal cost of any war. Annual disability payments to 1.7 million Vietnam-era recipients reached $30 billion in 2022 yet still haven’t peaked, though that conflict ended 50 years ago. Congress didn’t stop paying Civil War-era benefits until 2020 — i.e., 155 years after Appomattox.

Official projections suggest that, were Congress to fund these promises when it makes them, it would have had to scrape up an additional $2 trillion in 2023. One trillion to cover new promises Congress made since 2022: active-duty personnel accruing benefits ($200 billion) plus new benefits Congress created for current veterans ($800 billion). The other trillion would cover promises Congress made in prior years but underestimated the cost of. These obligations rival the annual budgets of the Departments of Veterans Affairs ($300 billion) and Defense ($800 billion). The $886 billion “defense” bill making its way through Congress costs a lot more than $886 billion.

Hiding those costs increases policymakers’ willingness to risk the lives of U.S. troops.

Politicians are highly sensitive to the burden war imposes on taxpayers. In 2002, President George W. Bush fired economic adviser Larry Lindsey for projecting that invading Iraq could someday cost $200 billion. In 2012, President Barack Obama cited the $100 billion annual cost of keeping troops in Afghanistan when ordering a partial withdrawal. In 2021, Biden cited the $40 billion annual cost when ordering a complete withdrawal.

Concealing the cost of veterans’ benefits distorts congressional and public debates about the use of force. It hides both the largest fiscal obstacle to putting U.S. lives at risk and the largest fiscal benefit of reducing that risk. Hawks don’t have to justify the full cost of their policies. Doves cannot show the full benefits of theirs.

Heads, war wins. Tails, military families lose.

This asymmetry distorts U.S. foreign policy. If Congress had to reveal and justify the full cost of invading Iraq — which exceeded Lindsey’s pessimistic projections by a factor of four to 15 — the 4,505 U.S. soldiers who lost their lives in that conflict might not have (to say nothing of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis).

When Presidents Obama, Donald Trump and Biden rallied support for bringing U.S. troops home from Afghanistan, they did so with one arm tied behind their backs. Biden is sending thousands more soldiers and sailors into combat zones in the Middle East in part because he need not acknowledge, much less justify, the largest fiscal cost of his decisions.

Would Congress and the president keep exposing U.S. troops to current levels of risk if it meant either increasing taxes, increasing the deficit or cutting other spending by at least $200 billion?

Maybe. Then again, opposition to cutting just $10 billion from the least popular federal agency (the IRS) was enough to stall a package of military aid for Israel.

In a new book — “Recovery: A Guide to Reforming the U.S. Health Sector” — I propose funding veterans’ benefits in a way that reveals their cost (including real-time updates of how war would increase those obligations), requires policymakers to justify those costs, and prevents politicians from reneging on their promises to veterans. Pre-funding veterans’ benefits would not add a penny to the burdens taxpayers bear. It would make existing burdens transparent, and make politicians account for them.

Veterans’ benefits are a proxy for the costs war imposes on military families. When Congress and the president conceal the cost of veterans’ benefits, they are literally valuing those sacrifices at zero. You don’t have to be an economist to know that’s just wrong.

sandiegouniontribune.com · by Michael F. Cannon Dec. 19, 2023 5:58 PM PT · December 20, 2023

15. Israel’s Muddled Strategy in Gaza by Daniel Byman

Excerpts:

All of Israel’s goals are difficult to achieve, and some are at cross purposes. A continued military campaign, which would be necessary to severely degrade Hamas and to help rebuild public confidence in the military, will take months to succeed—and even then, it will be unlikely to kill every last Hamas leader and destroy every last tunnel. Releasing hostages and maintaining U.S. support, however, will be difficult to achieve without reducing military operations. And an intense campaign will not help find a solution to the long-term problem of who will govern Gaza: when the dust has settled, Israel will need a Palestinian partner to run the strip, and destructive military operations diminish its credibility among the population there.

Because its goals are difficult to achieve separately and even harder to achieve together, Israel is likely to fall short. Whatever happens, more of Hamas’s leaders and fighters will probably survive than Israel would prefer, and Hezbollah will probably continue its rocket attacks as the war rages in Gaza. Yet a lack of complete success does not mean failure. Hezbollah, like Israel, does not appear to want an all-out war. The October 7 attack has brought Israel and the U.S. government closer and diminished concerns that Washington will abandon the Middle East.

But what became clear from my conversations is that Israel’s current approach to Gaza is too ambitious, and the time has come to correct course. In the coming months, Israel should move away from high-intensity operations while continuing to eliminate Hamas’s top leaders through drone strikes, raids by special operations forces, and other means, doing so even if some of Hamas’s military infrastructure and regular forces remain. Israel needs U.S. backing, and that requires limiting civilian casualties in Gaza, greatly expanding humanitarian efforts in the strip, and avoiding an unprovoked war with Hezbollah. To reassure the Israeli population without fully destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel should station more military forces near Lebanon and Gaza. Perhaps most important, Israel and the international community should begin the long process of bolstering the PA and other alternatives to Hamas to govern Gaza.

Israel must also accept the reality that in many ways, it is damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t. Its leaders must make hard choices about which goals to prioritize and which to set aside. One Israeli security official put it to me best: “The only resource in the Middle East more plentiful than oil is bad options.”

Israel’s Muddled Strategy in Gaza

Time to Make Hard Choices

By Daniel Byman

December 21, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · December 21, 2023

If devastation is the goal, Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip has been a resounding success. More than two months after Hamas killed over 1,100 people on October 7, Israeli air and ground operations have killed some 20,000 Palestinians, many of them children, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry. Much of Gaza lies in ruins, with the United Nations estimating that almost 20 percent of the territory’s prewar structures have been destroyed. More than half of Gazans are experiencing severe hunger, unemployment has risen to 85 percent, and disease is spreading.

But the statements of a few extremist ministers notwithstanding, Israel’s goals in Gaza are broader and more strategic than inflicting pain on the Palestinians. On December 12, I landed in Israel for a weeklong research trip, joined by colleagues from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and several other experts. In an effort to understand Israel’s goals and strategy, we spoke with current and former Israeli military leaders, senior security officials, diplomats, and politicians, as well as ordinary citizens. The interviewees related their perspectives on October 7, the state of the war today, and the future of their country.

Israel’s war in Gaza differs from many other conflicts in that there is not a single finite objective. There is no invading force to be expelled, no territory to be conquered, no dictator to be toppled. Nonetheless, two months on, a more or less clear list of goals is emerging. Israel seeks to destroy Hamas, capturing or killing its leaders, shattering its military capacity, and ending its power in Gaza. It seeks the release of the hostages who were kidnapped on October 7 and remain alive, as well as the bodies of those who have been killed. It wants to prevent another attack, particularly by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It wants to maintain international support, especially from the United States, and safeguard the diplomatic gains it has made with Arab countries in recent years. And it seeks to rebuild the trust in security institutions that the public lost after the attacks.

Israel’s response can seem confusing to outsiders, but it makes more sense when these competing goals are considered. Each has its own metrics and complications, and some are in direct conflict with one another. So far, the results of Israel’s campaign have been mixed: Israel has hit Hamas hard, but it is falling short in many areas, inflicting a devastating toll on civilians in Gaza and paying a heavy price in terms of international support. Israel’s leaders are often trying to have it all. Instead, they need to make hard choices about which goals to prioritize and which to downplay.

Because maintaining U.S support is vital, Israel should focus on targeting Hamas’s leaders more than destroying the group’s broader military forces and infrastructure. It should make more of an effort to reduce civilian casualties. It should seek to deter, rather than destroy, Hezbollah, maintaining larger numbers of forces near Gaza and Lebanon even after active hostilities end to reassure the Israeli people. And it should focus more on who will replace Hamas in Gaza, which requires bolstering the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian technocrats. If Israel instead tries to have it all, it risks having nothing.

APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION

No visitor to Israel can miss the sense of pain, fury, and mistrust that pervades every conversation. The term “earthquake” came up again and again when I asked about October 7. One Israeli security official declared that “something fundamental broke” in the country that day. (To encourage candor, we agreed to not to identify our interview subjects.) Israelis believe that they cannot go back to a pre–October 7 world, with a hostile and intact Hamas across the border in Gaza. In their eyes, the brutality of the attacks showed Hamas to be beyond redemption, unable to be deterred or contained.

The problem goes beyond Gaza, however. With justification, many Israelis blame Iran for Hamas’s impressive arsenal and the innovative methods of its fighters. They fear that Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, will also attack Israel, using its exponentially larger rocket arsenal and far more skilled fighters to launch a much more devastating attack on Israel’s north. Since October 7, over 200,000 Israelis have fled areas near Gaza and Lebanon.

At the same time, Israelis no longer trust their own security institutions. As one Israeli security official explained, “Before October 7, intelligence told the country, ‘We know Hamas,’ while the military said, ‘We can handle Hamas.’” Both, he added, were wrong. It is now hard for Israeli leaders to reassure the public that next time, the military and intelligence services will keep them safe.

To rebuild public confidence, Israeli leaders have vowed to utterly destroy Hamas. Days after the attack, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant issued one such pledge. “We will wipe this thing called Hamas, ISIS-Gaza, off the face of the earth,” he said. “It will cease to exist.” But destroying Hamas can mean many different things in practice.

Israelis no longer trust their own security institutions.

The focus of Israel’s current military campaign is to destroy Hamas’s military wing, which boasted around 25,000 to 30,000 members before October 7. At the time of my interviews, most Israeli officials estimated that 7,000 of those fighters had been killed in the war. That figure is hard to verify, however, and it may include Palestinians who fought back against invading forces yet were not formally part of Hamas’s military wing. The number of fighters appears to be dwindling further: some Israeli officials told me that more and more are fleeing or surrendering.

Although the Israel Defense Forces are inflicting a steep toll on Hamas, the group’s large numbers and ability to blend in with the population make it difficult to eradicate, especially without killing a huge number of Palestinian civilians. Urban warfare is a nightmare for even the best militaries, and the IDF has already lost more than 100 soldiers in its current campaign. Adding to the difficulty, Hamas has located many of its military assets near or in civilian facilities such as mosques and schools. In addition, Gaza has a vast tunnel network, more extensive than Israeli intelligence had originally thought, where fighters can move undetected and leaders can hide. Hamas also has deep roots in Gaza, with decades-old ties to mosques, hospitals, schools, and charities, and since 2007, it has been the government there. The group permeates everyday life in Gaza: the doctor, the police officer, the garbage collector, and the teacher may all have links to Hamas, making it difficult to eradicate the group beyond its military wing.

Israel, of course, will not be able to kill every single Hamas fighter. But it may be able to kill enough members, especially leaders and veteran forces, to shatter the group’s military capacity. In this vision of victory, Hamas’s units would no longer be able to fight effectively and launch operations against Israel. And if there were a new government in Gaza, the remnants of Hamas would be more easily suppressed because that administration’s security forces would have a decent chance of finding and suppressing isolated cells of fighters.

Hamas also has a vast military infrastructure. This includes not only its tunnel network but also its rockets, missiles, launch pads, and ammunition depots. The assets are everywhere: Hamas has been preparing for an Israeli invasion for more than a decade. Part of the purpose of Israel’s invasion is to destroy this infrastructure, which in turn requires bombing or occupying much of Gaza. There isn’t much publicly available data for quantifying this progress, but it can be measured by the frequency and size of Hamas’s rocket and missile attacks, the quantity of ammunition Hamas fighters have, and the territory that Hamas controls—all of which, according to the officials I interviewed, are steadily shrinking. Some of these observations are visible to outsiders, whereas others require detailed intelligence to judge.

HIDE AND SEEK

Another metric of success is whether Hamas’s leadership has been destroyed. Israel has a long history of killing terrorist leaders, and Israeli officials have announced plans to assassinate Hamas’s leaders after the war ends. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called Hamas’s top official, Yahya Sinwar, a “dead man walking,” and even before October 7, Israeli forces had repeatedly tried to kill Hamas’s military leader, Mohammed Deif, as well as his second-in-command, Marwan Issa. The Israeli government reports that it has already killed many Hamas leaders in the current military campaign, with Netanyahu claiming that half of Hamas’s battalion commanders are now dead.

Yet like destroying Hamas’s military infrastructure, eliminating its leadership is difficult. Deif, Issa, and Sinwar are believed to be hiding underground. More junior leaders are clearly being killed, but at least some of them will be replaced by other competent leaders. Because of the difficulty of destroying infrastructure and killing Hamas members and leaders, most of the Israeli security officials I spoke to estimated that another six to nine months of high-intensity military operations are necessary.

Even if the current cohort of leaders is killed, however, Hamas has a deep bench of replacements. Ever since Hamas’s founding in 1987, Israel has routinely killed or jailed its high-level leaders, yet the organization has endured. It has ample lower-level leaders and large support networks to draw on. That said, killing Sinwar and Deif, in particular, would have political value for Israel, even if Hamas replaced them with equally competent and hostile leaders. Both have become symbols of October 7, and an Israeli government could more credibly claim victory if they were killed, even if many of their fellow leaders survived.

Beyond any individual leader, Hamas embodies an ideology that will be even harder to eliminate. The idea behind muqawama, or resistance, is that the way to defeat Israel (and, for that matter, the United States) is through persistent military force, a credo also embraced by Hezbollah and Iran. Should Israel devastate Hamas but a strong new organization with the same mindset take its place, Israel will only have replaced one foe with another. In the past, Israel has nearly eliminated individual Palestinian terrorist groups, such as Al Saiqa, a once-strong Baathist group backed by Syria in the 1960s and 1970s whose leader, Zuheir Mohsen, was gunned down by Israeli agents in 1979. Israel has greatly diminished others, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist group famed for its airplane hijackings in the 1960s and 1970s and a hang-glider attack on Israel in 1987. But would-be terrorists simply joined other groups, including Hamas.

Smoke rising in Gaza, December 2023

Ronen Zvulun / Reuters

The ideology of resistance is popular among Palestinians, and October 7 has made it even more so. Hamas deeply hurt Israel, which many Palestinians, humiliated by decades of occupation, regard with glee. Israel’s destructive military campaign, with its large civilian death toll, has further angered Palestinians, and Hamas’s seizure of hostages has forced Israel to release some detained Palestinians, a goal that past negotiations by moderate Palestinians were unable to achieve. A poll conducted in late November and early December by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 82 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank support the attack. Eventually, Palestinians may look at the destruction in Gaza and conclude that violent resistance makes their lives worse, and polls show that there is less support for October 7 in Gaza, which is paying the price of Hamas’s brutality. But so far, support for Hamas has grown.

A very different aspect of destroying Hamas involves its long-term replacement as the government of Gaza. Someone must govern the strip and prevent Hamas from returning to power, and Israel has no interest in being a long-term occupier. On this question, however, there is little progress, and if anything, the situation for Israel is worse than on October 7. No outside power wants to act as Israel’s police force in Gaza.

U.S. President Joe Biden has called for a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” to govern Gaza. The PA now controls the West Bank and works closely with Israel there on security, but its leadership is incompetent and unpopular. Israel’s harsh policies and expansion of settlements in the West Bank steadily undermined the PA there, and its invasion of Gaza has worsened the organization’s legitimacy problem, as Palestinians admire Hamas’s defiance and see the PA as complicit in Israel’s occupation. “There is no Palestinian leadership,” one interviewee noted acidly, even as he added, “Palestinians must control Gaza.” If the PA were put in charge of Gaza, Palestinians would see it as a handmaiden of the brutal Israeli occupiers. Without significant support from Israel, the PA’s forces would be overwhelmed even by a remnant of Hamas.

HELD HOSTAGE

Everywhere I looked in Israel, the faces of hostages stared out from posters. Their treatment in Gaza and the need for their release came up constantly in my conversations. Hamas took roughly 240 hostages on October 7, and a little under half have been freed. The remainder, estimated at 129 today, are still in Gaza, and it is unclear how many of them survive. (Israel believes at least 20 of them have died.) At a psychological level, the presence of over 100 hostages is an open wound for Israel. At a tactical level, it complicates the IDF’s operations.

To comprehend the scale of the trauma for Israelis, consider how Israel has handled hostage situations in the past. In 2011, it traded more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for a single Israeli soldier whom Hamas had captured, Gilad Shalit. Since October 7, it has already freed around 240 prisoners in exchange for Hamas’s liberating more than 100 of those captured on October 7, including 23 citizens of Thailand and one from the Philippines, as well as many dual nationals. Many of the remaining hostages are young Israeli men of fighting age, and Hamas has vowed to extract a high price for their release—part of the reason that talks collapsed after the initial releases. Remaining hostages also include women whom Israelis believe were raped or otherwise brutalized, and Hamas is reluctant to release them lest they publicize their abuse. Further complicating the hostage problem, perhaps around 30 of the remaining hostages are under the control of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, another terrorist group, or other factions in Gaza.

Conducting high-intensity military operations while trying to free prisoners is exceptionally difficult. Just as Hamas places its forces among civilians, it uses hostages as shields. Friendly fire by the IDF has killed some Israeli prisoners, and IDF bombing has undoubtedly killed more. If military operations continue, Israel will likely be able to liberate some of those kidnapped, but it will also lose many in the fighting.

THE NORTHERN FRONT

Israel has long relied on deterrence to counter its enemies, trying to convince them that any attack would leave them worse off. Measuring deterrence is difficult. Most Israelis would have said before October 7 that Hamas was successfully deterred, but Hamas nonetheless attacked, and its success may inspire other enemies to do so as well. In general, it is hard to understand the risk-reward calculus of a foe, especially a highly ideological one.

Even as Israel fights on in Gaza, it has engaged in a back-and-forth with Hezbollah on its northern border, with Hezbollah firing rockets and attacking Israeli border posts and the IDF bombing Hezbollah positions. Israeli leaders hope to demonstrate resolve by making Hezbollah pay a price for its aggression, but they also wish to avoid a larger war while their forces are occupied with fighting Hamas. For now, Hezbollah also seems to want to avoid full conflict, launching limited attacks to show solidarity with Hamas but avoiding a more intense campaign. The devastation of Gaza has probably reinforced deterrence: Hezbollah may not want to risk its strongholds in Beirut looking like the moonscape that is much of Gaza today.

Eventually, however, Israel may want to wage a larger war against Hezbollah in the belief that unless it does so, deterrence will not hold and Israel might be surprised again. As one Israeli security official put it to me, “Deterrence is something that lasts until the other side is ready for war.” Hezbollah keeps elite commando units—its Radwan forces—on the Lebanese border with Israel. It also has a substantial rocket arsenal that can reach targets throughout Israel and is big enough to overwhelm the country’s missile defense system.

Israel may be able to continue deterring Hezbollah from launching a war, but the threat of rockets and commando attacks—a repeat of October 7, but in the north and from a far more capable foe—keeps Israeli military planners up at night. In early December, in fact, Gallant, the defense minister, threatened to open up a second front against Hezbollah if the group didn’t remove its Radwan units from the border.

FOREIGN FRIENDS

Israel is a small country, and despite its military prowess, it cannot operate alone indefinitely. It also sees itself as a Western democracy and is sensitive to criticism from other members of that club. So Israeli leaders have looked on with worry as Western support appears to slip. Anti-Israeli protests have broken out across Europe, and 17 of 27 EU members supported a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a cease-fire.

Arab leaders, including ones who have recently signed peace treaties with Israel, are very critical of Israel publicly—even if they strongly oppose Hamas and its brand of political Islam privately—because Arab publics are outraged by the Palestinian death toll. Yet the new peace deals with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates have held, and there is little sign that they are in jeopardy, even as their leaders’ rhetoric grows more heated.

Israel can live with fraying European ties and growing criticism from Arab states, but losing American support would be an altogether different matter. The Israelis I spoke to were uniformly glowing about Biden—a “mensch,” in one interviewee’s words, and, in another’s, “the biggest friend of Israel since Harry Truman,” who was the first world leader to officially recognize Israel. On top of the more than $3 billion Israel receives from the United States in military aid every year, Congress and the White House are now considering a package that would provide a $14 billion supplement. Israel also depends on the United States for munitions, which it needs in Gaza and would need far more of in a war in Lebanon. The United States also regularly provides cover for Israel at the United Nations—for instance, vetoing a recent Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire in Gaza.

So far, support for Hamas has grown among Palestinians.

But many Israeli leaders worry that American support may not last forever, and those who don’t harbor that fear should. Biden’s own party is increasingly split over Israel’s conduct in the war, the president himself has now criticized “indiscriminate bombing” in Gaza, and officials in his administration are pressing for an end to major military operations. The Biden administration has also strongly discouraged a preventive war in the north against Hezbollah, with senior U.S. officials, including Biden, telling their Israeli counterparts not to expand the war. The United States deployed two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean Sea with the explicit purpose of deterring Iran and Hezbollah and the implicit goal of reassuring Israel that the United States has its back—a marked change from before October 7, when many in the Middle East believed the United States was turning its back on the region to focus on China.

To maintain strong U.S. support and avoid putting Arab leaders into a box from which they cannot escape, Israel will need to tone down its military operations in Gaza. But a less aggressive and less destructive campaign will make it harder to kill Hamas’s fighters and demolish its infrastructure. In the north, Israel is also constrained. Barring a serious act of provocation by Hezbollah, Israel cannot launch a war in Lebanon and maintain U.S. support.

KEEPING THE FAITH

Israel was a divided country before October 7, with Netanyahu’s extreme right-wing government pushing to weaken the judiciary, expand settlements in the West Bank, and protect the prime minister from allegations of corruption. Now, Israelis are united behind the goal of destroying Hamas, but many hold Netanyahu responsible for failing to prevent the attack and want to see him resign.

Israelis’ loss of faith in their leaders might simply seem like normal politics, not anything to do with counterterrorism, but in fact such an outcome represents a major goal of terrorists. Hamas was probably seeking to destroy Israelis’ confidence in their government institutions, and even if that wasn’t a goal, this consequence has surely been a welcome bonus for the group. Absent such confidence, displaced Israelis will not return to their homes near Gaza or Lebanon. And skeptics of the Israeli government will see some of its continued anti-Hamas operations as a way for Netanyahu to keep himself in power, not as a genuine necessity in the fight against terrorism.

When it comes to restoring faith in government, Israel has a long way to go. Although Netanyahu has brought some opposition figures into a war cabinet, his own support has plummeted, with a November poll finding that just four percent of Israeli Jews considered him a trustworthy source of information on the war. As operations in Gaza ebb, commissions will investigate the military and intelligence failure on October 7, and the revelations will in the short term no doubt cause Israelis to lose even more confidence in their security institutions. Some confidence will be restored as the IDF and Israeli intelligence services demonstrate their combat proficiency in Gaza, as most Israelis agree they have already by hitting Hamas hard and limiting Israeli casualties. And as a new generation of military and intelligence leaders replaces those who have taken responsibility for the October 7 debacle and promised to resign, some trust should be rebuilt. But in the end, it will probably take years of relative calm for Israelis to regain their faith.

NO WAY OUT

All of Israel’s goals are difficult to achieve, and some are at cross purposes. A continued military campaign, which would be necessary to severely degrade Hamas and to help rebuild public confidence in the military, will take months to succeed—and even then, it will be unlikely to kill every last Hamas leader and destroy every last tunnel. Releasing hostages and maintaining U.S. support, however, will be difficult to achieve without reducing military operations. And an intense campaign will not help find a solution to the long-term problem of who will govern Gaza: when the dust has settled, Israel will need a Palestinian partner to run the strip, and destructive military operations diminish its credibility among the population there.

Because its goals are difficult to achieve separately and even harder to achieve together, Israel is likely to fall short. Whatever happens, more of Hamas’s leaders and fighters will probably survive than Israel would prefer, and Hezbollah will probably continue its rocket attacks as the war rages in Gaza. Yet a lack of complete success does not mean failure. Hezbollah, like Israel, does not appear to want an all-out war. The October 7 attack has brought Israel and the U.S. government closer and diminished concerns that Washington will abandon the Middle East.

But what became clear from my conversations is that Israel’s current approach to Gaza is too ambitious, and the time has come to correct course. In the coming months, Israel should move away from high-intensity operations while continuing to eliminate Hamas’s top leaders through drone strikes, raids by special operations forces, and other means, doing so even if some of Hamas’s military infrastructure and regular forces remain. Israel needs U.S. backing, and that requires limiting civilian casualties in Gaza, greatly expanding humanitarian efforts in the strip, and avoiding an unprovoked war with Hezbollah. To reassure the Israeli population without fully destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel should station more military forces near Lebanon and Gaza. Perhaps most important, Israel and the international community should begin the long process of bolstering the PA and other alternatives to Hamas to govern Gaza.

Israel must also accept the reality that in many ways, it is damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t. Its leaders must make hard choices about which goals to prioritize and which to set aside. One Israeli security official put it to me best: “The only resource in the Middle East more plentiful than oil is bad options.”

DANIEL BYMAN is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Foreign Affairs · by Daniel Byman · December 21, 2023

16. The Premature Quest for International AI Cooperation

Excerpts:

The G-7 Code of Conduct and other proposals for AI governance are not the first attempts at multilateral cooperation. The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, founded in June 2020 and backed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, convenes researchers and practitioners from 25 countries to share their findings and discuss areas for cooperation. Given the geographical limitations of its membership and the lack of binding agreements, GPAI is often criticized as being neither representative nor effective. This modest progress of GPAI—or, recently, of the AI Safety Summit—underscores the difficulty of converging on global norms in a politically fragmented world. Norms will not simply fall into place when countries join a new international institution. Instead, best practices in AI governance will likely develop in one of two ways. In the first, adversarial governments, especially the United States and China, will find common ground on the limited areas of mutual concern, such as the military uses of AI. But if geopolitical rivals are unable to overcome their differences, likeminded democracies will need to lead the way by cementing initial agreements that address specific dimensions of AI regulation.

Either way, real progress on international AI oversight will take more than getting policymakers from key countries in the same room. In her account of the IAEA, the scholar Elisabeth Roehrlich identified two essential elements that made nuclear safeguards effective: legal agreements binding the agency and its member states, and technical tools to monitor compliance. AI safeguards, too, will require new and updated laws as well as the resources and technical capacity to enforce them. Today, many political and corporate leaders are trying to jump straight to the end, focusing on overarching institutions rather than the policies that make them work. History is a valuable guide, but it is not a shortcut.

The Premature Quest for International AI Cooperation

Regulation Must Start With National Governments

By Marietje Schaake

December 21, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Marietje Schaake · December 21, 2023

Political leaders are scrambling to respond to advances in artificial intelligence. With applications from marketing to health care to weapons systems, AI is expected to have a deep effect across society and around the world. Recent developments in generative AI, the technology used in applications such as ChatGPT to produce text and images, have inspired both excitement and a growing set of concerns. Scholars and politicians alike have raised alarm bells over the ways this technology could put people out of jobs, jeopardize democracy, and infringe on civil liberties. All have recognized the urgent need for government regulation that ensures AI applications operate within the confines of the law and that safeguards national security, human rights, and economic competition.

From city halls to international organizations, oversight of AI is top of mind, and the pace of new initiatives has accelerated in the last months of 2023. The G-7, for example, released a nonbinding code of conduct for AI developers in late October. In early November, the United Kingdom hosted the AI Safety Summit, where delegations from 28 countries pledged cooperation to manage the risks of AI. A few weeks after issuing an executive order promoting “safe, secure, and trustworthy” AI, U.S. President Joe Biden met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-November and agreed to launch intergovernmental dialogue on the military use of AI. And in early December, EU lawmakers reached political agreement on the AI Act, a pioneering law that will mitigate the technology’s risks and set a global regulatory standard.

Despite broad acknowledgment of the need to shepherd an AI-powered future, when it comes to international cooperation and coordination, political leaders often turn to tools from the past. The most prominent proposals for global oversight of AI seek to replicate multilateral bodies built for other purposes: UN Secretary General António Guterres and others have called for an “IAEA for AI,” for example, that would monitor artificial intelligence the way the International Atomic Energy Agency monitors nuclear technology. Last month’s British-led AI Safety Summit renewed calls for an “IPCC for AI,” referring to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Although the impulse to borrow from previous successes of multilateralism is understandable, simply introducing a new agency will not solve the puzzle of AI governance. The commitments that participants made at the AI Safety Summit, similar to the G-7 guidelines, were mere pledges. And in the absence of binding measures, corporations are left to govern themselves. Investors and shareholders may prefer this outcome, but politicians and citizens should be under no illusion that private AI companies will act in the public interest. The recent fiasco at OpenAI is a case in point: the board of directors’ clash with the executive leadership over the societal effect of the company’s product showcased the fragility of in-house mechanisms to manage the risks of AI.

International regulatory bodies are only successful when there are rules to which they can hold companies and national governments accountable. Political leaders should first hammer out the preconditions and content of those laws—and only then fit agencies to oversee regulation. AI’s rapid development, opacity, and changing nature makes it substantively different than previous technologies, and it will require novel forms of international oversight. Rather than letting the scope of the challenge discourage them, lawmakers should take it as inspiration to innovate.

THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE

The achievements of existing international bodies may be worth emulating, but their oversight models do not translate easily to AI. Consider the IAEA. The UN-led watchdog was founded in 1957, but it was only after the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty came into force in 1970 that the agency was able to effectively monitor the nuclear weapons programs of participating countries and uphold safety standards. Current conversations around AI governance miss the NPT’s critical role. Political leaders are eager to dream up AI-focused institutions with monitoring capabilities, but an enforceable treaty on AI governance is nowhere in sight. Several major countries have barely made progress on domestic legislation.

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and others, including the former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, have taken inspiration from the IPCC, which synthesizes scientific research on climate change and hosts yearly Conference of the Parties summits. Even before the United Kingdom held its inaugural AI Safety Summit, plans for the new “IPCC for AI” stressed that the body’s function would not be to issue policy recommendations. Instead, it would periodically distill AI research, highlight shared concerns, and outline policy options without directly offering counsel. This limited agenda contains no prospect of a binding treaty that can offer real protections and check corporate power.

Establishing institutions that will “set norms and standards” and “monitor compliance” without pushing for national and international rules at the same time is naive at best and deliberately self-serving at worst. The chorus of corporate voices backing nonbinding initiatives supports the latter interpretation. Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, has echoed the call for an “IAEA for AI” and has warned of AI’s existential risks even as his company disseminates the same technology to the public. Schmidt has invested large amounts of money in AI startups and research ventures, and at the same time has advised the U.S. government on AI policy, emphasizing corporate self-governance. The potential for conflicts of interest underlines the need for legally enforceable guardrails that prioritize the public interest, not loosely defined norms that serve technology companies’ bottom lines.

Taking the IAEA or IPCC as models also risks ignoring the novelty of AI and the specific challenge of its regulation. Unlike nuclear arms, which are controlled by governments, AI capabilities are concentrated in the hands of a few companies that push products to market. The IPCC’s function as an independent research panel would be useful to replicate for AI, especially given the opacity of company-provided information on the technology. But facilitating research is only one step toward rule making—and effective AI governance requires rules.

Politicians and citizens should be under no illusion that private AI companies will act in the public interest.

No one can know what AI will be capable of in the future, so the policies and institutions that govern it must be designed to adapt. For one, oversight bodies must be able to enforce antitrust, nondiscrimination, and intellectual property laws that are already on the books. Governments and multilateral organizations should also agree on interpretations of first principles, such as respect for human rights and the terms of the UN Charter, in the context of AI. As AI becomes a greater part of daily life, many fundamental questions lack clear answers. Policymakers must delineate when data harvesting violates the right to privacy, what information should be made accessible when algorithms make consequential decisions, how people can seek redress for discriminatory treatment by an AI service, and what limits to free expression may be required when AI-powered “expression” includes churning out the ingredients for a deadly virus at the click of a mouse.

Although international initiatives have received a lot of recent attention, effective multilateralism depends on effective national laws. If the U.S. Congress were to put up legal guardrails for American AI companies, which include many of the leaders in the field, it could set an example for other countries and pave the way for global AI regulation. But with little chance of a deeply divided Congress passing meaningful regulation, the Biden administration’s tools for addressing AI are more limited. So far, the administration—like many governments around the world—has affirmed that AI is subject to existing laws, including consumer protection and nondiscrimniation rules. How regulators will apply these laws, however, is not at all clear. The U.S. government will need to issue guidelines on the contexts in which AI technologies must comply with current laws and ensure that regulators have the skills and resources to enforce them. Agencies that are equipped to determine whether a hotel rejected customers on the basis of their skin color, for example, will need a different set of capabilities to identify a discriminatory algorithm on a website for hotel bookings.

In some areas, existing laws have been applied to AI technologies with tentative success: plaintiffs seeking damages from autonomous vehicle manufacturers have drawn on product liability law to make their case. But further developing legal precedents may prove difficult. Regulators often lack access to companies’ data and algorithms, which prevents them from identifying violations of privacy rights, consumer protections, or other legal standards. If they are to govern AI effectively, these restrictions on proprietary information must loosen. Citizens, too, will need guidance on their legal rights when they encounter AI-powered products and systems.

In contrast to the United States, the EU will soon be in a strong position to engage other countries on binding rules for AI. The bloc’s AI Act, expected to come into force in 2026, contains measures to mitigate a wide range of risks from AI applications, including facial recognition systems and tools used to infer the likelihood of someone commiting a crime. As the most comprehensive policy of its kind in the democratic world, the EU law will serve as a starting point for multilateral discussions and could become a template for other countries’ domestic legislation. The AI Act does not address the use of AI in the military domain, however, because this policy area is reserved for national governments in the EU system. The EU’s market share gives the bloc significant leverage in international negotiations. But if its 27 member states take different positions on military applications, their disagreement will diminish the EU’s ability to push for global AI standards.

BUILDING CONSENSUS

Governments want to do something about AI, but their current efforts often lack direction and force. Before setting up new international agencies, officials should put in the hard work of drafting the laws that those agencies will monitor. To start, governments should build an international consensus around a few key points. First, AI must be identifiable. As the technology advances, it is becoming harder and harder to know whether the voice on a customer service line or a text, video, or audio message comes from a person or a computer. And with its use in automated decision-making systems, AI increasingly determines people’s ability to secure employment, loans, and educational opportunities. Whenever companies use AI for these purposes—particularly generative AI, whose output is often difficult to identify as synthetic—they should be legally obligated to disclose its role. To further reduce deceptive or misleading content, legislators should require authentic messages from political leaders to be watermarked as soon as such technology is reliable.

Countries must also set limits on the use of AI-enabled weapons, including cyberweapons. The application of international laws to cyber-operations is already a murky area, and AI adds new layers of complexity. The technology increases the advantages of cyberattackers, who can potentially use generative AI to quickly scan large volumes of software for vulnerabilities. An international agreement banning certain targets for weaponized AI, such as cyber-enabled espionage or the spread of disinformation during another country’s election campaign, would set necessary guardrails and promote best practices.

Finally, AI regulation cannot be divorced from environmental protection efforts. The massive data centers used for data storage and processing require large quantities of electricity, water, and other resources, and the environmental costs of these sites are growing. Today, companies share only vague estimates of their water and electricity use. A single global reporting standard, with compliance overseen by national governments, would make environmental data available to academic researchers and journalists. This would make it possible for the public to scrutinize AI companies’ consumption of natural resources and for policymakers to impose effective restrictions.

TOWARD COOPERATION

The G-7 Code of Conduct and other proposals for AI governance are not the first attempts at multilateral cooperation. The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, founded in June 2020 and backed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, convenes researchers and practitioners from 25 countries to share their findings and discuss areas for cooperation. Given the geographical limitations of its membership and the lack of binding agreements, GPAI is often criticized as being neither representative nor effective. This modest progress of GPAI—or, recently, of the AI Safety Summit—underscores the difficulty of converging on global norms in a politically fragmented world. Norms will not simply fall into place when countries join a new international institution. Instead, best practices in AI governance will likely develop in one of two ways. In the first, adversarial governments, especially the United States and China, will find common ground on the limited areas of mutual concern, such as the military uses of AI. But if geopolitical rivals are unable to overcome their differences, likeminded democracies will need to lead the way by cementing initial agreements that address specific dimensions of AI regulation.

Either way, real progress on international AI oversight will take more than getting policymakers from key countries in the same room. In her account of the IAEA, the scholar Elisabeth Roehrlich identified two essential elements that made nuclear safeguards effective: legal agreements binding the agency and its member states, and technical tools to monitor compliance. AI safeguards, too, will require new and updated laws as well as the resources and technical capacity to enforce them. Today, many political and corporate leaders are trying to jump straight to the end, focusing on overarching institutions rather than the policies that make them work. History is a valuable guide, but it is not a shortcut.

MARIETJE SCHAAKE is International Policy Director at the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford University and International Policy Fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence.

Foreign Affairs · by Marietje Schaake · December 21, 2023

17. After a Ceasefire, Would Russia Simply Fight Again?

Excerpts:

At some point, though, continuing the fight could risk straining society beyond its breaking point. Levada Center research concludes that even with the partial mobilization of September 2022, “the public mood drastically deteriorated” and that “the country had not seen such a dramatic and swift decline in public mood in thirty years of regular polls.” A recent Russian Field survey shows that 58 percent of those polled are opposed to a second mobilization, with 61 percent saying they would experience “negative emotions” as a result. The recent public protests by Russian women against the prolonged deployments of their loved ones further illustrate the challenge of mobilizing sufficient manpower for a protracted war.

Moreover, recent polling by the Levada Center shows a clear majority (56 percent) of Russians support negotiations to end the war, even if they do not support giving up the territory that Russia has seized. Similarly, according to Russian Field, 48 percent prefer an end to the “special military operation,” and only 39 percent want it to continue. Moreover, 70 percent of Russians polled in the Levada survey would support Putin’s decision to end the war “this week,” while in the Russian Field survey, 74 percent said they would support Putin doing so “tomorrow,” with only 18 percent opposed. The increased number over time of Russians supporting the end of the conflict suggests war fatigue is setting in among the population.

One assumption we can safely make is that Putin and his circle regard their self-interest as paramount. Should the war in Ukraine end, restarting it or engaging in another war would demand still more of the Russian population, including greater social and economic hardship. Any new foreign interventions will rely on an ever-smaller economic base. At the very least, Kremlin leaders will need to reckon with the following: Mobilizing dwindling manpower and financial resources for yet another conquest could create greater risks to regime stability. Should talks lead to a ceasefire, Western leaders should not automatically assume the Russian leaders are simply buying time for a new war. They may not be able to.

After a Ceasefire, Would Russia Simply Fight Again? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Paul Crowley · December 21, 2023

Given the current stalemate in Russia’s war with Ukraine, calls for a ceasefire have increased. Those opposed, however, argue that Russia will simply use a ceasefire to rest and rearm and then attack again. That can’t be ruled out. Yet there are grounds to question this assumption. In a post-conflict environment, President Vladimir Putin would face several internal challenges that could constrain his behavior, or at least make renewed warfare a more challenging proposition.

According to 40 national security figures in a recent memo to President Joseph Biden, “If not clearly defeated in Ukraine, Moscow will continue with its territorial conquests and threaten the security of the free world.” Biden apparently agreed, stating in a speech a few days later that “if we don’t stop Putin’s appetite for power and control in Ukraine, he won’t limit himself just to Ukraine.” Sill other prominent observers view Russia as a “threat to Europe writ large” and a “sophisticated autocracy with global ambitions.”

Putin has certainly given credence to these fears, clearly stating his imperial ambitions and demonstrating his willingness to violate negotiated agreements and international borders. But ambitions are not the same as capabilities. To understand the long-term risk Russia poses, it is vital to investigate the economic, social, and political challenges Putin would face if and when the fighting in Ukraine ends. True, these challenges won’t preclude further military interventions. But they will certainly create complications, which should serve as a caveat when making assumptions about Russia’s future belligerence.

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A Steadily Worsening Economy

First, consider the economic challenges. Before the war, Russia’s economy was already suffering from a decade or more of declining living standards. The causes were well known: an over-reliance on commodity exports and a dependence on imported technologies; a labor market hampered by low wages, low productivity, a declining population, and low levels of human capital; and greater state control of the economy aimed at oligarchic enrichment and social stability rather than greater efficiency. All this and more led to prolonged economic stagnation.

None of those challenges prevented the Kremlin from launching the war. And while the sanctions placed on the Russian economy after February 2022 were seen as unprecedented, Russia has shown a remarkable ability to adapt and work around them. The war exposed Russia’s dependence on not only imported computer chips but also precision machine tools and even ball bearings, yet parallel imports have helped fill the void, albeit at marked-up prices. The country’s auto industry — once fully integrated with Western brands — was largely gutted, but Chinese vehicles have now crowded the market. Russia has successfully evaded the West’s attempt to impose an oil price cap. Most importantly, high levels of state spending on the war economy and social benefits have kept the economy afloat.

Yet while Russia’s economy has remained relatively buoyant so far, 20 months into the war, the challenges are starting to accumulate. Three interrelated pressures – a labor shortage, inflation, and unsustainable spending — are already tightening their grip. The labor shortage fuels inflation, which in turn devalues the ruble, making imports even more expensive, further fueling inflation. Polling by the independent Levada Center finds that inflation is now the leading area of concern for the Russian public.

Further, the labor shortage is compounded by another enduring problem — very low levels of productivity, arguably the key driver of economic growth. Indeed, Russia has been on a downward trajectory: Whereas productivity in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries increased by 5 percent per year between 2011 and 2021, in Russia it decreased on average by 1 percent annually. The only way to raise levels of production is by adding more workers or more labor-saving technology, and Russia now increasingly suffers from a deficit of both. Not surprisingly, then, the state statistical agency Rosstat reported a further productivity decrease of 3.6 percent in 2022.

So far, the social impact has been tempered through high levels of government spending on the war and social welfare. But such expenditures on both guns and butter are unsustainable in the long run; otherwise, higher inflation and greater economic instability will ensue. How long such “military Keynesianism” can continue is subject to debate. The most dramatic example of military Keynesianism came from the United States, when spending for World War II mobilized workers and productive capacity left idle by the Great Depression. Yet Russia is currently suffering from the reverse problem: a labor shortage and an overheated economy.

Social Consequences

Even autocrats are concerned with maintaining legitimacy — hence, in Putin’s case, his well-known obsession with his approval ratings. For years, the Putin regime based its legitimacy on providing social stability and on what some called a “non-intrusion pact,” whereby society obtained a basic standard of living and was otherwise left alone as long as it stayed out of politics. Such non-intrusion ended with the war and military mobilization, especially for young men. The promise of stability has been replaced by increasing doses of nationalist propaganda, leading to a low-grade war fever among the population.

But when war ends, then what? The nation’s focus will of necessity turn inward. The true costs of the invasion, in terms of both casualties and economic hardship, will become harder to ignore. Moreover, barring substantial Russian concessions — a highly unlikely outcome — continued sanctions will make the path toward reviving economic growth even more narrow.

At least through August 2023, Levada Center surveys found that Russians overall had a positive assessment of their financial situation, achieved, the pollsters concluded, “through substantial government payouts to the public.” This suggests that the Kremlin’s ability to maintain those payments is crucial, particularly since polling has also consistently shown that those least well-off economically are less supportive of the war.

When high levels of state spending become unsustainable, Russia will require fundamental reforms to avoid stagnation or worse. Yet even well before the war, efforts at economic reform created their own challenges. Especially since the 2011–12 protests “For Fair Elections” centered in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Putin has styled himself as a defender of the “real Russians” in the industrial heartland in contrast to liberal cosmopolitans. But this has stymied arguments in favor of potentially painful reforms. For example, nearly 10 percent of Russians continue to live in struggling single-industry “monotowns” left over from the Soviet era, where factory closures would be especially fraught.

Russians are renowned for enduring hardship. Yet seemingly minor government attempts to raise taxes or reduce benefitshave provoked protests that have become rapidly politicized. Such protests were spontaneous reactions to reform attempts, without reliance on civil society or the political opposition, and involved large numbers of elderly and working-class Russians — that is, Putin’s purported base of support. Further, both the liberal Alexei Navalny and the far-right Yevgeny Prigozhin have demonstrated how populist denunciations of oligarchs and corrupt politicians can resonate deeply with the Russian public. The harsh treatment both men received underscores the extreme measures the regime will take to protect itself from such inflammatory rhetoric.

Political Challenges

To some, Russia might indeed appear to be a “sophisticated autocracy.” Yet viewed through a different lens, Putin faces considerable political challenges. To many observers, his decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022 made no sense. But if the 2014 seizure of Crimea was a “miracle cure” for Putin’s previously sagging legitimacy, perhaps he dreamed of a repeat performance. And indeed, with the war his ratings experienced a similar spike in approval. Yet while such “rally ’round the flag” effects can be substantial, they are also temporary. Almost two years into the war, Putin is now an aging personalistic ruler, fully in charge of a country that has endured a decade or more of declining social and economic conditions — conditions that will now visibly worsen.

Admittedly, other authoritarian regimes have proven their ability to endure severe hardship, sometimes for decades. Yet Cuba, Iran, and North Korea — the countries typically invoked as examples of withstanding harsh sanctions — are all revolutionary regimes, with a clear ruling ideology and a large body of cadres to support the political system. Russia, on the other hand, is a truly personalistic regime with a single individual at the helm. Evidence suggests personalistic rulers are more vulnerable to popular uprisings, in large part because when conditions become intolerable, it’s clear who is to blame.

Thus, economic hardship complicates another serious challenge facing personalistic regimes: succession. There is no doubt that Putin will win reelection next spring, probably overwhelmingly. But it is hard to envision that his campaign for a fifth term in office will generate much genuine enthusiasm. Moreover, recent mass uprisings in two neighboring states — both of which were facing worsening economic conditions — highlight the predicament. In Belarus in 2020, Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed a reelection victory one too many times. In Kazakhstan in January 2022, an increase in gas prices sparked substantial unrest that pointed to the problem of a long-term authoritarian handing power to a less charismatic successor. The leaders of Belarus and Kazakhstan remained in power, but arguably only through Russian backing. Should a similar uprising occur in Russia, who will prop up Putin?

Not surprisingly, then, Putin has demonstrated tremendous anxiety about “color revolutions.” Recall that Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea was sparked by Ukraine’s “Euromaidan revolution,” after which President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country for safe haven in Russia.

There is every indication that the Kremlin is keenly aware of such dangers and will most likely use every tool at its disposal — both stick and carrot — to prevent such an outcome. Yet doing so will make economic growth and reform still more difficult. Putin might well choose to double down on greater repression and anti-Western propaganda. But absent economic growth — so essential to the rise of China — doing so will lead Russia down a path that looks more like North Korea.

Putin’s Ceasefire Calculations

To be sure, none of this tells us whether Russia’s leadership might seriously consider a ceasefire. Accumulating domestic challenges could lead Putin to keep the country focused on war no matter the cost. Some observers suggest he has no interest in a ceasefire and that the Kremlin is “clearly happy to await the outcome of the U.S. election” in the hopes of ending the war on more favorable terms if Donald Trump is elected. Others have suggested that Russia could still envision defeating Ukraine through the “full mobilization of its economy and society for war.”

At some point, though, continuing the fight could risk straining society beyond its breaking point. Levada Center research concludes that even with the partial mobilization of September 2022, “the public mood drastically deteriorated” and that “the country had not seen such a dramatic and swift decline in public mood in thirty years of regular polls.” A recent Russian Field survey shows that 58 percent of those polled are opposed to a second mobilization, with 61 percent saying they would experience “negative emotions” as a result. The recent public protests by Russian women against the prolonged deployments of their loved ones further illustrate the challenge of mobilizing sufficient manpower for a protracted war.

Moreover, recent polling by the Levada Center shows a clear majority (56 percent) of Russians support negotiations to end the war, even if they do not support giving up the territory that Russia has seized. Similarly, according to Russian Field, 48 percent prefer an end to the “special military operation,” and only 39 percent want it to continue. Moreover, 70 percent of Russians polled in the Levada survey would support Putin’s decision to end the war “this week,” while in the Russian Field survey, 74 percent said they would support Putin doing so “tomorrow,” with only 18 percent opposed. The increased number over time of Russians supporting the end of the conflict suggests war fatigue is setting in among the population.

One assumption we can safely make is that Putin and his circle regard their self-interest as paramount. Should the war in Ukraine end, restarting it or engaging in another war would demand still more of the Russian population, including greater social and economic hardship. Any new foreign interventions will rely on an ever-smaller economic base. At the very least, Kremlin leaders will need to reckon with the following: Mobilizing dwindling manpower and financial resources for yet another conquest could create greater risks to regime stability. Should talks lead to a ceasefire, Western leaders should not automatically assume the Russian leaders are simply buying time for a new war. They may not be able to.

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Stephen Crowley is professor of politics at Oberlin College. His recent book is Putin’s Labor Dilemma: Russian Politics between Stability and Stagnation (Cornell University Press, 2021). www.stephencrowley.org

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Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Paul Crowley · December 21, 2023

18. Taking an Azimuth on the US Military’s Recruiting Crisis: What We Learned from MWI and TRADOC’s Essay Competition

With all this intellectual capital invested, I hope we can come up with some useful isolutions to this critical problem:.

Excerpts:

Despite this broad prompt, submissions focused overwhelmingly on the Army, though we hope the Department of Defense and the other services consider these findings as well. The number of submissions—318 in total, more than any essay competition at MWI to date—suggests passion across the military for solving this important problem. Submissions came from across the joint force, with a majority from the Army authors (249 essays), followed by the Air Force (twenty-two), the Navy (eighteen), and others.

Within these submissions, there was a varied representation of ranks, from junior enlisted personnel to senior officers, illustrating the depth and breadth of insights across the military hierarchy. Civilian perspectives also enriched the discourse, contributing twenty-four essays to the collection. A notable segment of these essays, specifically thirteen, hailed from the Army’s Recruiting Command, offering specialized insights from those with the most direct experience with the Army’s recruitment challenges. This range of backgrounds and experiences provided a comprehensive view of the challenges and potential solutions for the Army’s recruiting crisis.

Taking an Azimuth on the US Military’s Recruiting Crisis: What We Learned from MWI and TRADOC’s Essay Competition - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Zachary Griffiths, Laura Keenan, Max Margulies · December 20, 2023

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“One of the toughest recruiting landscapes I’ve seen in over thirty-three years of service.” That was how Major General Johnny K. Davis, the commanding general of US Army Recruiting Command, described the challenges facing the Army during his testimony, alongside his counterparts from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month. In the wake of consecutive recruitment shortfalls, the US Army is transforming its recruitment strategy. Despite setting an ambitious target of sixty-five thousand recruits for 2023, the Army managed to secure only fifty-five thousand enlistments, further solidifying the need for a recruitment overhaul.

Recognizing the changing social and economic landscape in America, the Army is recalibrating its focus. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth announced sweeping changes to the recruiting enterprise on October 3, 2023. After decades of focusing almost exclusively on a traditional recruitment pool of individuals with a high school education, officials are now aiming for at least a third of all new recruits to have a college education by 2028. This shift acknowledges the evolving labor market, in which nearly 40 percent of all those between twenty-five and thirty-four years old have a bachelor’s degree or higher—up almost nine percentage points from only 2010.

But it’s not just about the who; it’s about the how. Secretary Wormuth also revealed plans to introduce a specialized “talent acquisition” enlisted occupational specialty, under the designator 42T. This move aims to transition from a transient recruiting force to a permanent, specialized team, reflecting practices in the private sector. Furthermore, US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is set for a significant elevation, reporting directly to the Pentagon and transitioning its leadership from a two-star to a three-star general. This reorganization will integrate the Army Enterprise Marketing Office and the Army’s Cadet Command, emphasizing the critical nature of recruitment for the Army’s future.

As the Army’s senior leaders geared up for this comprehensive overhaul of recruiting, the Modern War Institute and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) launched an essay competition to mine the wisdom of the commons. Specifically, the prompt asked: What novel approaches can the United States military employ to solve the recruiting crisis? The responses we received describe the strategic environment and challenges against which the Army released this new recruiting plan and offer useful insights for what will surely be a continuing effort. Two rounds of judging by the essay contest committee, leaders in the recruiting enterprise, and TRADOC’s senior leaders selected our winners:

“Rethinking the Military’s Promotional Content Strategy to Address the Military’s Recruitment Crisis,” by Jonathan Li and Max Xie.
“Addressing Military Recruitment Challenges Through Data Sharing,” by Jake Steel and Chad Aldeman.
“Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force Means Streamlining Army Recruitment,” by Jesus M. Feliciano and Travis M. Prendergast.

Despite this broad prompt, submissions focused overwhelmingly on the Army, though we hope the Department of Defense and the other services consider these findings as well. The number of submissions—318 in total, more than any essay competition at MWI to date—suggests passion across the military for solving this important problem. Submissions came from across the joint force, with a majority from the Army authors (249 essays), followed by the Air Force (twenty-two), the Navy (eighteen), and others.

Within these submissions, there was a varied representation of ranks, from junior enlisted personnel to senior officers, illustrating the depth and breadth of insights across the military hierarchy. Civilian perspectives also enriched the discourse, contributing twenty-four essays to the collection. A notable segment of these essays, specifically thirteen, hailed from the Army’s Recruiting Command, offering specialized insights from those with the most direct experience with the Army’s recruitment challenges. This range of backgrounds and experiences provided a comprehensive view of the challenges and potential solutions for the Army’s recruiting crisis.

From forming formidable teams at Army bases to foster recruiting to fueling the future with entrepreneur loans for veterans’ ventures to fashioning a fresh approach that applies techniques from corporations with chief marketing officers, the depth and diversity of discussions in these essays are impressive. Overall, they tend to identify two broad categories of ways the Army needs to renew its recruiting efforts. First, the Army needs to embrace new methods of communicating its message to the American public so that more people know what it can offer. Second, it needs to adopt a more diverse and creative approach to how it incentivizes people to serve.

Embrace Modern Communications Channels

One recurring challenge throughout the essays is the notion that too few people think about the army as a job option, a concept that is often referred to as the propensity for military service. The idea here is that the public lacks familiarity with military service, but if there was more high-quality information available, people would realize the military is an attractive option. A large group of essays in this vein argued for more community partnerships with the military. Current practices, such as Air Force flyovers and servicemember tributes at sporting events, do not sufficiently educate potential recruits about military life. Essays here put forth a range of recommendations, including incentivizing veterans to volunteer as mentors, embedding military liaisons within secondary and postsecondary educational institutions, and organizing military base open houses and ride-along opportunities. Such strategies not only demystify military roles but also empower potential recruits to visualize their places within the Army.

In the evolving world of recruitment, understanding and adapting to the changing educational landscape is paramount. This perspective is underscored by ten essays that highlighted the value of targeting individuals with postsecondary education. The growing prevalence of higher education in the American workforce signifies that the Army can tap into a pool of candidates with diverse skill sets and perspectives; it just needs to reach them. These individuals’ analytical skills from rigorous academic training, combined with the discipline of military life, would make them valued contributors as servicemembers.

Suggestions did not limit themselves to expanding the physical presence of the military in society. The era of digital transformation is reshaping myriad sectors, and military recruitment is no exception. Among the submissions, eighty-six insightful essays converged around the pivotal role of modern communication channels in reaching potential recruits. In particular, many essays argued for meeting Generation Z—and soon Generation Alpha—where they already are, rather than expecting them to come to the military. These approaches prioritize marketing and recruiter outreach through digital platforms, especially social media, to exploit technology to its fullest potential.

Essay authors did not fail to notice that recruiters need additional tools for these new tactics. Several thought-provoking essays suggest that USAREC should delineate its recruiters based on their aptitudes for varied roles, such as social media engagement, contact management, administrative tasks, and content creation. By fine-tuning the training of recruiters and cultivating cross-functional teams that harness these diverse talents, the Army can foster a sense of accomplishment among its recruiters while optimizing recruitment outcomes for a twenty-first-century environment.

Redefine and Diversify Recruitment Approaches

Of course, getting the message out there is only helpful if people like what they hear. Many essays provided creative suggestions for how the Army can refine its value proposition, or what if offers to potential recruits. Part of this is recognizing that there are different reasons people join the Army. While combat arms may still require the most recruits, the Army needs troops with a variety of skills. Moreover, the Army should recognize that marketing campaigns emphasizing high operational tempos and dangerous and exciting opportunities may resonate with only some recruits.

In terms of branding and marketing, some essays applauded the return of the “Be All You Can Be” campaign as a way to appeal to broader populations. Others argued for additional narratives. By tapping into the universal “hero’s journey” motif, Army messaging could resonate with young individuals, aligning with their intrinsic desires to chart meaningful life trajectories.

But marketing cannot do it all. The Army needs to provide a wider array of incentives to attract people who are aware of the Army but are not convinced to serve. For example, the infusion of behavioral economics principles presents an intriguing proposition for refining recruitment strategies by targeting the subconscious decision-making processes of potential recruits. One essay introduces the notion of leveraging concepts like choice architecture and availability heuristics to address the Army’s recruiting challenges. By marrying these behavioral principles with a deep understanding of the unique environment, the Army can craft impactful and resonant campaigns. Many essays argued that more flexible career options and family stability could both strengthen the force and attract more recruits—not least by reinvigorating retention rates so that current servicemembers continue to pitch the military as an attractive career option. Other insightful submissions highlighted a multifaceted approach: not just new monetary and educational incentives, but also clear career pathways, mentorship opportunities, and other intangible benefits.

These essays emphasize the critical importance of continuous training and development, not just for the recruits but also for the recruiters. One noteworthy essay detailed the advantages of ensuring recruiters, as ambassadors of the Army, are armed with the latest knowledge, skills, and tools. Revisions to USAREC career incentives and structures, many of which seem to have been included in the Army’s recent announcement, would create stronger links between recruiters and their communities, so they can better identify what works for the population they work with. The incentive structure must be diversified and enhanced, incorporating a mix of tangible rewards and intangible benefits to cater to the varied aspirations of potential recruits.

Similarly, the importance of feedback and iterative improvement was a recurring theme in three essays. One such submission championed the idea of establishing channels for recruits and recruiters to voice their experiences. This feedback, coupled with evidence-based evaluation, can ensure recruitment strategies remain both effective and relevant. The recruiting enterprise can be a data-rich environment, and it is important to maximize what we can learn from it. Structured feedback mechanisms must be firmly established, with an emphasis on consistently collecting, analyzing, and integrating feedback into the recruitment process, ensuring strategies are always aligned with the changing needs and aspirations of the modern recruit.

The United States, and especially the US Army, stands at a waypoint in its recruitment journey. The challenges faced in recent years underscore the pressing need for a comprehensive overhaul of its recruitment strategies. As the United States’ social, political, and economic systems evolve, so too must the Army’s approach to attracting the best and brightest to its ranks. The essays submitted in response to MWI and TRADOC’s prompt have illuminated a rich tapestry of insights, strategies, and innovative solutions. They emphasize the importance of modern communication channels and the need to diversify recruitment approaches.

The Army’s recent announcements, including the shift toward recruiting more individuals with more advanced education and the introduction of specialized talent acquisition teams, are promising steps in the right direction. The journey doesn’t end here, but perhaps that is where it starts. The wealth of ideas presented in the essay competition serves as a testament to the collective wisdom and commitment of both military and civilian thinkers. Although only three winners were selected, our judges read all submissions carefully, and appreciated the view that these submissions provided in aggregate. Submissions not selected provide a collective azimuth to guide recruiting efforts into the future. Thanks to those who submitted.

As the Army embarks on this transformative journey, it must remain open to these diverse perspectives, ensuring that its recruitment strategies not only are effective but also resonate with the aspirations and values of the next generation. The future of the US Army, and by extension the nation’s security, hinges on its ability to adapt, innovate, and inspire.

Zachary Griffiths is a major in the United States Army and the director of the Harding Project to renew professional military writing.

Laura Keenan is a lieutenant colonel in the District of Columbia Army National Guard. She is a United States Military Academy graduate and a distinguished graduate of the National War College. In her civilian career, she has worked at LinkedIn for almost seven years in sales and employer branding.

Max Margulies is an assistant professor and director of research at the Modern War Institute at West Point.

Special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel TJ Spolizino, Lieutenant Colonel Adriana Ramirez-Scott, and Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Pallas for reviewing essays.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Jared Simmons, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Zachary Griffiths, Laura Keenan, Max Margulies · December 20, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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