Quotes of the Day:
"The Revolution... was the result of a mature and reflecting preference for freedom, and not of a vague or ill-defined craving for independence."
- Alexis De Tocqueville
“It is very nearly impossible to become an educated person in a country so distrustful of the independent mind.”
- James Baldwin (1924-1987), author
"The first article of the Bill of Rights provides that Congress shall make no law respecting freedom of worship or abridging freedom of opinion. There are some among us who seem to feel that this provision goes too far, even for the purpose of preventing tyranny over the mind of man. Of course, there are dangers in religious freedom and freedom of opinion. But to deny these rights is worse than dangerous, it is absolutely fatal to liberty. The external threat to liberty should not drive us into suppressing liberty at home. Those who want the Government to regulate matters of the mind and spirit are like men who are so afraid of being murdered that they commit suicide to avoid assassination."
- Harry Truman
1. Peace official calls for US, South Korea to postpone upcoming military drills
2. Ending the Korean War: Risky gambit, with little chance of payoff
3. Unification minister says security uncertainty could grow next year
4. N. Korean economy unlikely to face imminent crisis despite sanctions, COVID-19: experts
5. Biden bans nonhumanitarian aid to N. Korea for human trafficking
6. Cold wave to hit N. Korea as it prepares to mark leader's 10 years in power
7. U.N. Command investigating alleged armistice breaches following Yoon's DMZ trip
8. Putting South Korea’s proactive national defence strategy in perspective
9. How Will South Korea and the US Rewrite Their Operational Plan?
10. What Will North Korean Cybercrime Look Like in 2022?
11. No New Year Pardons for Jailed Ex-Presidents
12. A Growing Army of Hackers Helps Keep Kim Jong Un in Power
13. Korea to give $2 million in aid to typhoon-hit Philippines
14. Korea turns blind eye to Hong Kong, Taiwan issues
15. One N. Korean cadre’s view of the 10th anniversary memorial for Kim Jong Il
16. Hyesan copper mine suspends rations to workers amid North Korea’s wider economic troubles
1. Peace official calls for US, South Korea to postpone upcoming military drills
The military may have lost the initiative on this issue. The Security Consultative Meeting should have announced a change to the exercise schedule due to the upcoming presidential elections in March when the normally scheduled exercises occur. Now the ROK/US alliance will again be in the reactive information mode if there is a change to the dates of the exercise due to the elections.
Of course this official is not making that connection but instead simply wants to either do away with the exercises because they are "obstacles to peace" or change the focus to something like pandemic defense. But consider this a warning shot because politicians will begin to attack the timing of the exercises as we move closer to March. Can we adjust the dates of the exercise to minimize their influence and impact on the election?
It is not too late to control the narrative regarding changing exercises dates due to the elections but if we do not execute now we will again be in a reactive mode and will not be able to have much influence over the narrative.
Peace official calls for US, South Korea to postpone upcoming military drills
An F-16 Fighting Falcon flies over Seoul Air Base, South Korea, Oct. 17, 2021. (Allison Payne/U.S. Air Force)
The vice chair of a South Korean governmental council says an upcoming U.S.-South Korean military exercise is “not suitable for the spirit of peace” amid the ongoing negotiations for an end-of-war declaration between the two Koreas.
The U.S. and South Korea should postpone joint drills scheduled for March “in a bid to create a peaceful atmosphere for an end-of-war declaration for the Korean Peninsula,” executive vice chairman Lee Seok-hyun of the South Korean Peaceful Unification Advisory Council said in a year-end speech Tuesday.
U.S. Forces Korea had no comment or information to offer on a March exercise. USFK spokesman Army Col. Lee Peters, in an email Wednesday to Stars and Stripes, said the command does not comment “on planned or executed combined training” as a matter of policy.
USFK views training “as something all professional militaries conduct to maintain readiness, proficiency, credibility, and trust," Peters said.
U.S. and South Korean diplomats have met several times this year to discuss a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, whose term ends in March, has fast-tracked plans to finalize a declaration. He said earlier this month that the U.S., North Korea and China have agreed “in principle” on formally ending the war.
Lee said the joint exercise is scheduled shortly after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics in February and during the Paralympics and would interfere with the “spirit of peace of the U.N. truce resolution.”
The truce resolution, introduced at the U.N. General Assembly in early December by Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jun, seeks to “promote peace and human understanding” through sport. It was cosponsored by 173 of 193 member countries, including South Korea but not the United States.
The U.S., Canada, Britain and Australia have announced diplomatic boycotts of the Winter Olympics, citing human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party. No high-ranking officials from those countries will attend but the athletes can still compete.
In lieu of military exercises, Lee suggested South Korea and the U.S. “conduct their joint training for the prevention of epidemics” amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
The U.S. and South Korea have scaled back the annual drills since 2018. The two countries in March and August conducted roughly weeklong exercises that primarily consisted of computer simulations.
State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters Aug. 10 that the military drills with Seoul are “purely defensive in nature.”
North Korea has long condemned the exercises between the two allies. Pyongyang views them as a precursor of an invasion and frequently demands for the full withdrawal of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea.
Lee joins a growing list of other political operatives who take issue with the military exercises. In August, over 70 South Korean lawmakers called for postponing the drills after North Korea reopened its communications lines with the South the previous month.
A RealMeter poll Aug. 6 showed that 50.4% of South Korean respondents disagreed with postponing the drills, while 45.3% agreed. The poll surveyed 500 people and had a margin of error of 4.4 percentage points.
David Choi
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2. Ending the Korean War: Risky gambit, with little chance of payoff
Comments from a number of us below.
This is the first of a three-part series shedding light on Washington’s view of an end-of-war declaration. In the next part, The Korea Herald will examine the US’ preferred sequence, timing and conditions for declaring an end to the Korean War. Twelve US-based experts participated in on-the-record interviews.
Ending the Korean War: Risky gambit, with little chance of payoff
Premature declaration would have adverse security ramifications for alliance strength, UNC status
Published : Dec 21, 2021 - 17:47 Updated : Dec 22, 2021 - 11:53
There is a divergence of opinion on the utility of an end-of-war declaration as a means to reboot nuclear diplomacy with North Korea in Washington, but the majority sees more risk than opportunity. (Yonhap-123rf)
Will an end-of-war declaration bring us one step closer to a peaceful and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula?
In Washington, there is a divergence of opinion on the utility of an end-of-war declaration as a means to reboot nuclear diplomacy with North Korea.
But the majority sees more risk than opportunity, with adverse ramifications for the security of the Korean Peninsula, the South Korea-US alliance, American deterrence and the status of the United Nations Command.
There is also concern that a symbolic and nonbinding end-of-war declaration would legitimize North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.
Proponents, on the other hand, underscore that a declaration is the right way to widen the window of opportunity for diplomacy with North Korea and build confidence in the diplomatic solution to North Korean threats.
Particularly, an end-of-war declaration is a risk worth taking in view of the failures in previous risk-averse policies on North Korea, which have counted on deterrence, isolation, and pressure.
Security ramifications
Adverse consequences for South Korea-US alliance
US-based experts say that an end-of-war declaration would not guarantee that Pyongyang would reduce existential and direct military threats against the South and make progress toward denuclearization. But declaring an end to the Korean War would create a false sense of security.
“A simple, nonbinding declaration would also do nothing to address the real threat to peace, which is the North Korean threat to the South,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
“While the declaration would not have legal ramifications, it would create the false impression of a reduction of the threat to peace.”
A nonbinding declaration would provide a pretext for North Korea to undermine the rationale for the status of the United Nations Command and the Combined Forces Command, as well as the stationing of the US Forces Korea.
Pyongyang would ratchet up its rhetoric to withdraw US forces in Korea, terminate joint military exercises and the US extended deterrence guarantee, and abolish the 1953 South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty that legitimizes the stationing of the USFK.
“It would be used by North Korea, China and some in South Korea to advocate for reductions of the South Korean and US force postures and deterrence capabilities while not addressing the North Korean military forces,” Klingner said.
US experts also warned that Beijing would use the declaration as a means to undermine the South Korea-US alliance.
“China sees this action as a way to drive a wedge in the ROK-US alliance and create conditions favorable to North Korea,” said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a retired US Army Special Forces colonel.
Endangering UNC status, armistice
In particular, North Korea could ramp up its argument for the disbandment of the UNC, whose major mission is to implement UN Security Council Resolution 84 by enforcing the 1953 Armistice Agreement and to provide international legitimacy to the associated activities and presence.
The UNC was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 82, 83 and 84 in July 1950, following the UN’s recognition of North Korean aggression against South Korea. The resolutions authorized the use of force in Korea, activated the UNC and designated the US as the leader of the UNC.
Roh Jeong-ho, director of the Center for Korean Legal Studies at Columbia Law School, said an end-of-war declaration would essentially enable North Korea to open up an argument that the UNC “no longer has a basis for continuing” by the terms of the resolutions.
“Simply declaring an end to the war through an end-of-war declaration has no legal effect at all. But it raises the possibilities of being challenged by North Korea on the status of the United Nations Command and the Armistice Agreement.”
Roh underscored that a sudden end-of-war declaration would create an environment conducive for Pyongyang to make arguments that could “put the actual legal basis for the United Nations Command at jeopardy.”
There are also concerns that an end-of-war declaration would lead to calls for rescinding relevant UNSC resolutions, which are the legal foundations for the UNC establishment.
More importantly, former USFK Commander Gen. Robert Abrams previously warned that the abolition of the UNC would lead to dissolving the Korean Armistice Agreement, which has served as the only internationally recognized legal instrument for preventing the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula for 68 years.
“I think that is not risk. I think that’s a gamble, and we ought to proceed very carefully,” Gen. Abrams said at an event hosted by the Korea Society.
Legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear weapons
A premature end-of-war declaration would also legitimize North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state, taking a step back from complete denuclearization.
“Not only will an end-of-war declaration not revive nuclear-related negotiations, it will almost certainly confirm the permanence of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and the irreversibility of Pyongyang’s status as a de facto nuclear power,” Evans Revere, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told The Korea Herald.
“Declaring ‘peace’ or the ‘end of war’ with a nuclear-armed North Korea would essentially accept the regime’s status as a nuclear power and remove any incentive for the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons,” Revere, who also served as acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, added, referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the formal name for North Korea.
Echoing the view, director Roh at Columbia Law School pointed to the pitfalls of the sequence of seeking denuclearization progress after declaring an end to the Korean War.
Roh explained the Korean Peninsula is at an “inflection point,” in which Pyongyang’s enhanced missile and nuclear capabilities have changed the nature of conflicts.
“The nature of the Korean War which started as a conventional war should now be viewed as a potential nuclear weapons war,” Roh said.
“Denuclearization has to be part and parcel of an end-of-war declaration. It is not denuclearization after an end-of-war declaration.”
The risk and dangers of an end-of-war declaration-first approach also emanate from Pyongyang’s pursuit of military and nuclear power buildup with a long-term strategic plan.
What are the opportunities?
Proponents, on the other hand, say that an end-of-war declaration is the right way to resuscitate nuclear negotiations and widen the window of opportunity for diplomacy.
“There are several risks in an end-of-war declaration, but opportunities outweigh the cost,” Jessica Lee, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told The Korea Herald.
The declaration could serve as the impetus to restore confidence in a diplomatic solution, especially by affirming the “US commitment to a diplomatic solution to North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons program.”
“An end-of-war declaration is not a panacea, but it could go a ways in building confidence in the diplomatic process after many years of failed promises by both sides,” Lee said.
Furthermore, Lee said a declaration to end the Korean War could also lead to a “more normal, and functional relationship” between the US and North Korea.
The fence-mending would enable Washington to have a better understanding of Pyongyang’s motives and calculus after years of absence in dialogue, eventually reducing the possibility of miscalculation.
Frank Aum, a senior expert on Northeast Asia at the US Institute of Peace, pointed to the upside and utility of an end-of-war declaration as a noncoercive, peaceful and proactive means to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table and revive nuclear negotiations without undermining “significant US and ROK national security interests.” The Republic of Korea is the formal name for South Korea.
“A declaration could help jump-start diplomacy with North Korea, improve US-ROK relations, and even advance US denuclearization goals,” Aum told The Korea Herald.
Aum also pointed out that Washington could branch out into a risk-taking approach in light of the “failed track record of other previous risk-averse policies” toward North Korea, which were pursued with an emphasis on deterrence, isolation, strategic patience and pressure.
“An end-of-war declaration could be a risk worth taking,” Aum said.
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This is the first of a three-part series shedding light on Washington’s view of an end-of-war declaration. In the next part, The Korea Herald will examine the US’ preferred sequence, timing and conditions for declaring an end to the Korean War. Twelve US-based experts participated in on-the-record interviews.
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3. Unification minister says security uncertainty could grow next year
Yes, because of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and Kim Jonf-un's deliberate decision making.
South Korea and the US have put out their hands and offered help, offered dialogue. But it is Kim who refuses aid and negotiations. Kim is the one who is causing the "basic bond of sympathy to shrink."
Excerpt:
"Considering the domestic and foreign circumstances, and the upcoming political schedule, there is a possibility of a basic bond of sympathy among the two Koreas and the United States on dialogue and cooperation shrinking, and the ground for mutual communication and trust weakening," he said at a meeting of the ministry's advisory panel in Seoul.
Unification minister says security uncertainty could grow next year | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Dec. 22 (Yonhap) -- The geopolitical situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula could face increased uncertainties next year if the current deadlock in nuclear negotiations and lack of dialogue continue, South Korea's minister in charge of inter-Korean relations said Wednesday.
Unification Minister Lee In-young warned the peninsula is at an "extremely critical juncture" between peace and tensions, citing a possible change in the country's policy direction with President Moon Jae-in's term set to end in May.
"Considering the domestic and foreign circumstances, and the upcoming political schedule, there is a possibility of a basic bond of sympathy among the two Koreas and the United States on dialogue and cooperation shrinking, and the ground for mutual communication and trust weakening," he said at a meeting of the ministry's advisory panel in Seoul.
South Korea is scheduled to hold the next presidential election in March.
Lee Jae-myung, the ruling Democratic Party presidential nominee, seeks a North Korea policy anchored in what he calls "realism and pragmatism," while Yoon Suk-yeol, the nominee for the conservative main opposition People Power Party, has stressed stronger deterrence against the North's nuclear threats.
The minister said the government will continue efforts to make sure the next administration can start its term in a mood for dialogue and peace.
He once again urged Pyongyang to respond to calls for talks, saying the "peace and fate of the Korean Peninsula" depend on how the upcoming year-end and the new year period is spent.
"We have finished preparations to start inter-Korean dialogue at any time, anywhere, regardless of agenda and its form," he said.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. N. Korean economy unlikely to face imminent crisis despite sanctions, COVID-19: experts
Muddling through has proven to be north Korea's strategy of resilience. (with help from sanctions evasion and global illicit activities). But let's think about the people. These economic numbers are not a fair indication of the amount of suffering caused directly by Kim Jong-un's policy decisions to prioritize his nuclear and missile programs over the welfare of the people.
N. Korean economy unlikely to face imminent crisis despite sanctions, COVID-19: experts | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan and Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Dec. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's economy is unlikely to face an imminent crisis despite struggles stemming from crippling sanctions and border restrictions due to anti-virus efforts, experts said Wednesday.
The North has continued imports of essential economic materials, such as crude oil and fertilizers, which lessens the chances of its industries becoming paralyzed, Choi Ji-young, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said.
"Crude oil has been introduced to the country regardless of sanctions, while local fertilizer production has increased after Kim Jong-un came to power," she said at a seminar in Seoul. "(North Korea) has also imported fertilizers this year by sea."
Choi Eun-ju, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said, the North is unlikely to make a shift in its foreign policy direction under the current situation.
"If North Korea is to change its stance at the international stage due to economic difficulties, the situation should be as bad as in the 1990s. But the situation won't get that bad," she said.
Choi added that the reclusive country's economy has undergone some reform under Kim, citing moves such as giving more responsibilities to its companies.
But efforts to improve its economic situation have faced limitations in recent years due to stronger U.N. Security Council sanctions and the impact from COVID-19.
North Korea's economy is estimated to have contracted 4.5 percent last year, compared with 1.3 percent growth in 2012.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Biden bans nonhumanitarian aid to N. Korea for human trafficking
Excerpts:
In a presidential memorandum for the secretary of state, posted on the White House website Tuesday (Washington time), Biden said the U.S. will not provide "nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance" or allow funding for participation in educational and cultural exchange programs by officials of North Korea and other designated countries.
The ban will remain in place until the designated foreign governments comply with the "minimum standards" or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards, the memorandum reads.
The minimum standards are stipulated in the U.S.' Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. The ban also applies to officials of Cuba, Russia, Syria and other countries.
Biden bans nonhumanitarian aid to N. Korea for human trafficking | Yonhap News Agency
WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Dec. 22 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden has banned the provision of nonhumanitarian aid to North Korea for fiscal year 2022, accusing the reclusive state of human trafficking, according to the White House.
It marks the 19th consecutive year for a U.S. president to take such a measure against Pyongyang.
In a presidential memorandum for the secretary of state, posted on the White House website Tuesday (Washington time), Biden said the U.S. will not provide "nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance" or allow funding for participation in educational and cultural exchange programs by officials of North Korea and other designated countries.
The ban will remain in place until the designated foreign governments comply with the "minimum standards" or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards, the memorandum reads.
The minimum standards are stipulated in the U.S.' Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. The ban also applies to officials of Cuba, Russia, Syria and other countries.
Issuing an annual Trafficking in Persons report in July, the State Department designated the North as one of the human trafficking nations for the 19th straight year, saying the country does not fully meet the "minimum standards" for the elimination of trafficking.
Earlier this month, Washington imposed fresh sanctions on North Korea's Defense Minister Ri Yong-gil and other entities for their alleged ties to human rights abuses in a move feared to dampen Seoul's hopes for the resumption of dialogue with Pyongyang.
(END)
6. Cold wave to hit N. Korea as it prepares to mark leader's 10 years in power
Not even the weather gods are showing favor on the regime. I wonder how the Propaganda and Agitation Department will spin this - I am sure it will be the US or the ROK/US Alliance's fault. But despite the cold they might report miracle events such as spring flowers blooming.
On a more serious note, keep in mind the soldiers along the DMZ who will be conducting day and night patrols in this weather and manning the guard posts. The coldest I have ever been has been on the Korean DMZ in the winter.
Cold wave to hit N. Korea as it prepares to mark leader's 10 years in power | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Dec. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea issued a cold wave alert Wednesday, forecasting strong winds and heavy snow over the weekend amid keen attention from the outside world about whether leader Kim Jong-un will again visit Mount Paektu on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of his ascension to power.
Extreme cold weather is expected from Friday night to Sunday, with the temperature in the region of Mount Paektu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula, likely to drop to as low as minus 35 C to 40 C on Saturday morning, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency.
Kim has a history of visiting the mountain, considered one of the most sacred places in the country, ahead of major political decisions.
Speculation arose he could do so again in the run-up to a plenary session of the North's ruling Workers' Party later this month where the North could announce its key domestic and foreign policy directions for the new year.
This month's meeting comes as the North is set to mark the 10th year since Kim took over the helm of the reclusive regime. The 37-year-old formally rose to power on Dec. 30, 2011, 13 days after his father Kim Jong-il died.
In October 2019, Kim rode a white horse to visit Mount Paektu -- eight months after his failed summit with the United States in Hanoi -- and slammed Washington for imposing "ceaseless sanctions and pressure" on Pyongyang.
He visited the mountain again in December that year followed by a four-day plenary session of the ruling party at which Kim said he no longer sees a reason to stick to his earlier commitment to suspend nuclear and long-range missile tests.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.N. Command investigating alleged armistice breaches following Yoon's DMZ trip
Oh no. We do not need this kind of controversy.
(LEAD) U.N. Command investigating alleged armistice breaches following Yoon's DMZ trip | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in 7th para; CLARIFIES unit name in 2nd para)
SEOUL, Dec. 22 (Yonhap) -- The U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC) is investigating alleged armistice rule violations in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, its officials said Wednesday after the main opposition People Power Party's presidential nominee visited a border unit there.
On Monday, Yoon Suk-yeol in military uniform visited a frontline observation post of the South Korean Army's 3rd Infantry Division, also known as Baekgol Unit, as he stepped up his campaign ahead of the March 9 presidential poll.
In a press release, the UNC did not mention his name, but said it is probing "unauthorized activities" in the DMZ that were permitted by a frontline division. The UNC oversees activities in the DMZ in line with the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War.
The command noted that the unit in question placed civilians "under greater threat than necessary" by putting them in military uniforms that would mark them as combatants in the heavily fortified border area.
"The UNC Commander has initiated an investigation into the incident to determine the root cause of failure and ensure there is neither a repetition of actions that undermine compliance with the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement nor actions that put civilians under greater risk than is absolutely necessary," the command said.
It stressed that under the armistice, the UNC commander, currently Gen. Paul LaCamera, is responsible for "civil administration and relief" in the southern portion of the DMZ, and is required to closely control all access into the DMZ for only essential activities.
The command also took issue with the Army unit having allowed people access outside of specially designated areas designed to minimize the potential for threats to civilians. It has designated 17 specific locations in the DMZ as approved for civilian access.
When the probe is complete, the UNC will take actions "as appropriate under the armistice" and other relevant agreements with the South Korean government, it added.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. Putting South Korea’s proactive national defence strategy in perspective
"Proactive National Defense"
Excerpts:
As South Korea seeks to consolidate its security cooperation with the United States and the Indo-Pacific region, it has pledged substantial defence technology collaboration with US counterparts as well as diversification of security partnerships with like-minded states, including Australia, India and ASEAN members.
South Korea’s proactive defence drive is a testament to heightened security anxiety, a resolve to deter nuclear and other complex threats while preserving autonomy and a desire to make meaningful contributions to the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
Concerns about whether South Korea’s strategic initiatives align with those of the United States, whether its advanced conventional capabilities will exacerbate the perceived military imbalance on the Korean Peninsula and create crisis instability, and whether a regional and potentially nuclear arms race might intensify highlight the delicate nature of this security dilemma in international relations.
The bottom line is that without a dramatic alteration in denuclearisation negotiations, North Korea will continue to drive South Korea down this path of proactive national defence.
Putting South Korea’s proactive national defence strategy in perspective
Author: Bo Ram Kwon, Korea Institute for Defense Analysis
South Korea is under the spotlight for unusual reasons. On 15 September 2021, North Korea tested a new long-range cruise missile and a submarine-launched ballistic missile. South Korea immediately tested its own capabilities including a ballistic missile, a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, a long-range air-to-surface missile, a solid-fuel engine for space rockets and then fired its own submarine-launched ballistic missile.
These competing military displays have raised questions about the strategic objectives of South Korea’s build-up of technology-intensive national defence capabilities.
South Korea’s defence budget shows its determination to build a more advanced and independent military force. The Ministry of National Defense’s Mid-Term Defense Plan for 2022–26 allocated 315.2 trillion won (US$271.5 billion) to defence — a 5 per cent increase over the previous five-year plan. The plan anticipates an average annual budget increase of 5.8 per cent: 106.7 trillion won (US$90 billion) will go towards Force Improvement Programs on cutting-edge technology in the military.
South Korea’s evolving threat perceptions, ongoing defence reform and global aspirations as a US ally and middle power inform its renewed focus on defence.
The security environment in Northeast Asia has become increasingly unstable. North Korea’s advance in nuclear and missile technology and its resolve to deploy tactical nuclear weapons poses an existential threat to Seoul. China’s regional and global hegemonic ambitions have led to rapid growth in its strategic capabilities, increasing the likelihood and impact of intervention should a contingency on the Korean Peninsula occur.
As competition between the United States and China intensifies, the North Korea nuclear issue risks being reduced to a peripheral problem or one to be ‘managed’ rather than solved. Together, these threat factors incentivise South Korea to pursue a multi-pronged national defence strategy that aims to strengthen deterrence against North Korea and China in the immediate and longer term.
South Korea is pursuing Defense Reform 2.0 to modernise its forces to maximise efficiency and compensate for demographic shifts that will reduce standing troop levels. The latest Mid-Term Defense Plan aims to conclude these reforms successfully. The main driver for reform is the notion that high-technology advancements lead to new military capabilities tailored to an increasingly uncertain future, and that the military should expand its traditional frontiers to include cyber and space domains. The directive is that South Korea should become less reliant on foreign defence sources while it grows independent conventional capabilities to respond to the North Korean nuclear threat.
South Korea recognises that conventional weapons have become more formidable against a nuclear arsenal with the advantage of higher credibility and technological advances that enable prompt response. Revised missile guidelines resulted in rapid advancements in precision-strike capabilities that invited queries about South Korea’s nuclear latency and end goal.
The main thrust of Seoul’s defence reforms have focused on force structure changes and weapons procurement. These reforms are a work in progress. There is a need for parallel advancements in qualitative military doctrine as well as in substantial C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Securing stable funding and prioritising areas of investment in close consultation with the United States is also an ongoing task.
The specific timing of South Korea’s targeted increase in military expenditure is a function of, but not limited to, Seoul’s political determination to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control. Note that South Korea’s investments in precision-strike capabilities and others were planned and initiated prior to 2017. Former US president Donald Trump administration’s disrespect for alliances and the underlying change of tone in US alliance strategy heightened a sense of urgency for Seoul to take national security matters in its own hands.
South Korea harbours global aspirations to be a credible US ally and middle power. Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden declared in May 2021 that the US–South Korea bilateral relationship ‘extends far beyond the Korean Peninsula’ and is ‘grounded in our shared values and anchors our respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region’.
As South Korea seeks to consolidate its security cooperation with the United States and the Indo-Pacific region, it has pledged substantial defence technology collaboration with US counterparts as well as diversification of security partnerships with like-minded states, including Australia, India and ASEAN members.
South Korea’s proactive defence drive is a testament to heightened security anxiety, a resolve to deter nuclear and other complex threats while preserving autonomy and a desire to make meaningful contributions to the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
Concerns about whether South Korea’s strategic initiatives align with those of the United States, whether its advanced conventional capabilities will exacerbate the perceived military imbalance on the Korean Peninsula and create crisis instability, and whether a regional and potentially nuclear arms race might intensify highlight the delicate nature of this security dilemma in international relations.
The bottom line is that without a dramatic alteration in denuclearisation negotiations, North Korea will continue to drive South Korea down this path of proactive national defence.
Bo Ram Kwon is an Associate Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
9. How Will South Korea and the US Rewrite Their Operational Plan?
CAPT Yoon and Mr Yu are discussing something very important and which really has been overlooked by most and that is the rewrite of the OPLAN (the defense plan for Korea). would submit that the referenced strategic planning guidance and the decision to develop a new OPLAN were the most important results from the 53d Security Consultative Meeting but overlooked by most. This is of course classified and rarely seriously or sufficiently discussed in public for obvious reasons. But they recognize that this rewrite is important as it will develop all the necessary concepts for successful defense, for contingency plans, and this should drive force structure, resourcing, and training priorities and decisions for both countries. It should also drive the OPCON transition process because this plan should be developed with the intent that it can be executed regardless of who is the commander of the ROK/US CFC. The same commitments of forces and resources from both the ROK and the US must be made regardless of whether there is a Korean or US general in command.
I will give my opinion here on the employment of a future ROK/US CFC for out of theater operations. I do not think it will happen under the command and control of a future ROK/US CFC. Forces from the CFC may be deployed but any out of theater operation will not be under the C2 of the future ROK/US CFC. This is because the Military Committee could not manage the employment effectively. It can do so for on peninsula operations but not for contingencies outside of the KTO and throughout INDOPACOM. The CFC does not have the resources and capabilities to operate out of theater. ROK and US forces will be employed under their national C2 structures and coordinated through a coalition arrangement, just the same as with all allies within the coalition. So I think an OPLAN will only likely only include contingency planning for the "if" ROK and US forces are operating out of theater for INDOPACOM contingencies but it will not include a plan for employment of the ROK/US CFC out of theater as an independent HQ and organization.
I do; however, think the authors may be making more out of the China issue. Yes, we need to plan for all contingencies in which China may intervene in north Korea across the spectrum from instability, to regime collapse, to major combat operations/war. But the question that will have to be answered (and we will not likely learn the answer in any detail) is to what extent can the alliance conduct out of theater operations as long as the existential threat exits in the north and as long as that threat remains tethered to the 600 pound gorilla of China?
In addition to all the questions CAPT Yoon asks is how effective we will be at developing the new OPLAN when the ROK/US CFC is not consolidated in a single location with the planners and staff working together 24/7 (that is a slight exaggeration). Having worked on or authored more than a few OPLANs in Korea, I can tell you that this requires a lot of work by ROK and US action officers. And the best planning processes will have immediate access to senior officers and most importantly the commander. But when the command is split between Humphreys and Seoul there will be issues.
Conclusion:
To summarize the outstanding questions about the rewriting of OPLAN 5015: Who will be the dominant partner in the update? What kind of offensive postures be added in to the existing defense posture? At present the CFC has a dual role, with South Korea involved in conventional deterrence and the U.S. providing extended and nuclear deterrence. Will this be changed? How much focus will there be upon China, especially the potential deployment of F-CFC in theaters beyond the Korean Peninsula?
The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is about to be negotiated, and this will likely mean significant changes. The current OPLAN is essentially concerned with deterring and dealing with North Korean conventional, nuclear, and missile threats, but the new OPLAN will also encompass threats from China. It is far from certain that South Korea and the United States will be able to reach a common position on the stance their military alliance should take toward the country that is both South Korea’s primary trading partner and the United States’ primary geopolitical rival.
How Will South Korea and the US Rewrite Their Operational Plan?
The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is about to be negotiated, and this will likely mean significant changes.
By Sukjoon Yoon and Yongweon Yu
December 22, 2021
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The 53th Security Consultative Meeting between South Korea and the United States, held in Seoul on December 2, committed to updating the two nations’ current Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5015. This is necessary to deal with new kinds of threats from North Korea, which now possesses enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities, and also to adapt to changes in the regional strategic environment. The key task is to integrate the combined defense postures of the Republic of Korea (ROK) military and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
This decision to rewrite OPLAN 5015 comes at a busy time on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea continues to show off new types of missiles and extend its nuclear capability; the transfer of Wartime Operational Control from USFK to the ROK military is still unresolved; it is becoming ever harder for South Korea to sustain its strategic balancing act between the U.S. and China; and a presidential election is due in South Korea next March.
The new OPLAN will be implemented by Future Combined Forces Command ROK-US (F-CFC) at Camp Humphreys, near Pyeongtaek. How will the ROK military and USFK go about writing a new OPLAN?
The current OPLAN 5015 was adopted in 2015. It mostly focuses on scenarios involving various North Korean military threats, but with the recent progress of North Korean conventional and nuclear weapons, and especially the development of missiles, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and even apparently hypersonic ballistic missiles, OPLAN 5015 is no longer fit for purpose.
The Security Consultative Meeting in December recognized the increased scale and lethality of North Korean threats, and the need for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to develop new countermeasures to deal with the changed situation. It is now possible that North Korea will use its conventional, nuclear, and missile capabilities simultaneously, which is a very different threat from the traditional thinking, in which individual provocations can be countered one by one. To maintain “Fight Tonight” readiness, the combined defense posture obviously needs to change in response to the changed environment.
Several different versions of the alliance OPLAN existed before their consolidation into OPLAN 5015. OPLAN 5026 assumes an all-out attack by North Korea, against which ROK-U.S. combined forces would conduct defense-oriented counter-attacks, reaching out to the so-called Hwarang line between Kaesong and Songaksan, beyond the current Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Joint forces in South Korea would then wait for substantial reinforcements from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, for up to 90 days.
OPLAN 5027 provides for a three-phase operational plan: first, to intercept a North Korean military invasion crossing the DMZ; second, to mount a counter-defense to prevent troops from crossing the DMZ; and third, for ROK-U.S. combined forces to cross the DMZ in a counter-attack to annihilate the North Korean forces. This last effort is to be supported by reinforcements within two to three months.
OPLAN 5029 was a conceptual OPLAN intended to address a situation in which North Korea is facing a political or military crisis, such as a military coup or a sudden economic collapse. South Korea might then provide some humanitarian assistance, primarily to deter Chinese intrusion beyond the northern part of the DMZ, but this OPLAN was never fully articulated.
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In 2015 these OPLANs were combined and enhanced, establishing OPLAN 5015, which contains both defensive and offensive postures, unlike OPLANs 5026/5027/5029, which were purely defensive. It covers both ROK forces and USFK, and assumes U.S. reinforcements will arrive within two to three months of the initial engagement. Early warning of North Korean military deployments is provided by ISRT assets, such as E-737 and JSTAR. OPLAN 5015 also encompasses preemptive strike operations against North Korean military command and control posts and other critical facilities near Pyongyang: more than 700 targets are identified, including nuclear arsenals and missile sites inside North Korea. This OPLAN also anticipates support from U.S. Carrier Strike Groups and strategic weapons such as F-22s, B-2s, B-52s, and nuclear-powered submarines. CFC’s operational responsibility terminates in the event of a Chinese intervention.
The Security Consultative Meeting in December approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) to reflect changes to the strategic environment and to guide the creation of new OPLANs that will more effectively deter and deal with North Korean threats. This raises several important questions regarding the necessary changes to OPLAN 5015. Who will lead the efforts to implement the SPG to update the plan? How will the SPG be implemented? What are the Strategic Planning Directions (SPDs) for the new OPLAN? What strategic goals will be included? Will this include a fully integrated F-CFC defense posture? To what extent is China a relevant, or even a crucial factor, in completing the implementation of the New OPLAN?
The role of the ROK military in updating OPLAN 5015 is critically dependent on whether it has Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) authority in the new command and control chain of F-CFC. The earliest that this transition can occur is now the second half of next year, but even this now looks unlikely, due to the failure to verify Final Operational Capability (FOC) and Full Mission Capability (FMC), as stipulated by the December meeting. Whichever administration is in place after next year’s South Korean presidential election, the second half of 2022 will be a crucial time for OPCON transfer, and thus for the revised OPLAN.
Given the current state of progress for OPCON transfer, the new OPLAN may reflect U.S. security priorities by including outreach beyond the Korean Peninsula to other theaters of the Indo-Pacific region. If this is the SPD proposed by the United States, then South Korea will face some difficult negotiations before a new OPLAN can be agreed.
The geographic situation of F-CFC will also likely impact the process of rewriting OPLAN 5015. The latest Security Consultative Meeting finalized the relocation of all headquarters to Camp Humphreys near Pyeongtaek by early next year. Camp Humphreys will therefore host the new headquarters of F-CFC, UNC, and USFK, the current commander of all three being Gen. Paul LaCamera of the U.S. Army.
But Camp Humphreys may not be the optimal place for South Korea’s F-CFC staff to redefine their roles and functions for an updated OPLAN. F-CFC facilities at Camp Humphreys are separated into two buildings: one for U.S. staff of F-CFC, and the other for the South Korean staff responsible for the ROK military command and control system, known as KJCCS. There will surely be substantial hurdles obstructing the formulation of the new OPLAN, since the staff in these two buildings rarely interact in person. The lack of frequent contact between ROK and USFK personnel may well slow down the rewriting process. The separation of staff into two different buildings also means that ROK staff lack easy access to U.S. intelligence about the North Korean military.
Although North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities are certainly worrying, on a regional or even global scale, some commentators see another motivation behind the U.S. desire to rewrite OPLAN 5015. Despite South Korea’s efforts to mitigate military tensions, including the anticipated end-of-war declaration, the United States wants to use F-CFC to deter and restrain Chinese military activities near the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military emphasized a rapid build-up of its nuclear arsenal.
The implementation of a new OPLAN will rely heavily upon U.S. ISRT assets. Although the current CFC structure makes use of some ROK Air Force assets, Global Hawk UAVs, and Paekdu ISR aircraft, this data is not integrated into the U.S.-led worldwide military intelligence network, which keeps track of Chinese military activities. And since it is USFK which have so far been monitoring North Korean military activities beyond the DMZ and in the seas around the Korean Peninsula, USFK are likely to play a dominant role in deciding and specifying the shape of the new OPLAN, for example by broadening the scope of ROK forces to address regional security issues, as outlined at the May summit between President Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden.
Indeed, the latest Security Consultative Meeting has already revealed some evidence of differing emphases. South Korea’s Minister of National Defense Suh Wook referred to changing ROK military postures and capabilities in response to the Defense Reform 2.0 initiative, and to changing the CFC structure as needed for OPCON transfer. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin gave different reasons for updating OPLAN 5015. He expressed concerns about North Korean progress in developing new and sophisticated missiles, speculating about the possibility of miniaturized nuclear warheads being mounted on SLBMs and launched from mini-submarines. These differences between South Korean and U.S. priorities will need to be reconciled in the new OPLAN, and U.S. interests will likely dominate the rewriting process.
To what extent the U.S. desire to contain China will feature in the updating of OPLAN 5015 is as yet unclear, but the December meeting did not release the details of the new SPG, which suggests that the two sides failed to reach consensus on a common version. Besides the China factor, there are many other issues relevant to the update of OPLAN 5015, including the recently published U.S. Global Posture Review, South Korea’s Defense Reform 2.0, and preparations for OPCON transfer in accordance with the Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan. The latter will require enhancement of South Korea’s ISRT capabilities, the reorganization of some ground units to make the ROK Army more agile, flexible and powerful, and also the adoption of 4th Industrial Revolution technologies.
To summarize the outstanding questions about the rewriting of OPLAN 5015: Who will be the dominant partner in the update? What kind of offensive postures be added in to the existing defense posture? At present the CFC has a dual role, with South Korea involved in conventional deterrence and the U.S. providing extended and nuclear deterrence. Will this be changed? How much focus will there be upon China, especially the potential deployment of F-CFC in theaters beyond the Korean Peninsula?
The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is about to be negotiated, and this will likely mean significant changes. The current OPLAN is essentially concerned with deterring and dealing with North Korean conventional, nuclear, and missile threats, but the new OPLAN will also encompass threats from China. It is far from certain that South Korea and the United States will be able to reach a common position on the stance their military alliance should take toward the country that is both South Korea’s primary trading partner and the United States’ primary geopolitical rival.
GUEST AUTHOR
Sukjoon Yoon
Navy Captain Sukjoon Yoon, retired, is a senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs.
GUEST AUTHOR
Yongweon Yu
Yongweon Yu is a reporter for The Chosun Daily covering military affairs.
10. What Will North Korean Cybercrime Look Like in 2022?
Kim Jong-un's all purpose sword. Beware. We all need to beware and our financial institutions and line buying services need to be really beware.
Excerpts:
As cryptocurrency technology innovation continues to outpace regulation of the crypto space, North Korean hackers will likely expand cyber operations targeting evolving financial platforms, such as decentralized finance (DeFi). The lack of custody and regulatory practices in DeFi, which allows individual crypto users to swap one type of cryptocurrency for another without a centralized platform ever facilitating the swap, often results in the poor collection of user-specific information that can help law enforcement identify cybercriminals, and their techniques, responsible for crypto hacks.
The Lazarus Group has already successfully exploited this vulnerability as recently as May 2020 in which they used DeFi platforms to launder a portion of the roughly $280 million worth of cryptocurrency stolen from a Singapore-based cryptocurrency exchange. Pyongyang will likely continue to exploit DeFi and other evolving financial technology that mostly remains outside mainstream regulation and U.S. law enforcement.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to increased online activity and more digital transactions, which Pyongyang and other illicit actors will likely continue to exploit to their financial benefit. In response, the Biden administration has taken several steps to improve national cybersecurity strategy with its allies and partners, such as a virtual counter-ransomware initiative meeting with 30 countries, a bilateral partnership with Israel to combat ransomware, an agreement to combat ransomware efforts with South Korea, and the creation of broad policy initiatives to disrupt ransomware networks. However, the international community has yet to create a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy to confront a state-sponsored hacking organization like the Lazarus Group, which will likely remain a major vulnerability for financial institutions into the new year.
What Will North Korean Cybercrime Look Like in 2022?
The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to increased online spending which Pyongyang and other illicit actors will likely continue to exploit.
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The international community often incorrectly correlates North Korea’s lack of public access to modern computer hardware within its borders with its inability to successfully execute software-reliant cyberattacks.
Over the years, however, North Korea has demonstrated remarkable growth in the breadth, success, and sophistication of its cyberattacks, ranging from hacking government websites and cryptocurrency exchanges to crippling national healthcare services and global financial networks. However, the most unique aspect of North Korean hacking is its focus on targeting financial institutions, a likely result of sustained U.S. and U.N. economic sanctions on the country.
The United Nations Panel of Experts on the DPRK assessed in its March 2021 report that North Korea-sponsored cybercrime both directly and indirectly supports the country’s weapons of mass destruction programs, which signals an urgent need for responsible nations to cooperate on mitigating this cyber-enabled global security threat. For 2022, recent analysis and developments in North Korean hacking suggest that Pyongyang will expand its cyber operations with increased focus in the following areas: phishing campaigns, ransomware attacks, foreign OTC brokers, and decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms.
More Phishing Campaigns
Most North Korea-sponsored hacks begin with some form of an email phishing campaign that targets untrained employees and vulnerabilities in a network’s operating system. Despite calls for greater company-wide cyber hygiene practices, Pyongyang continues to enjoy tremendous success in gaining access to financial networks by sending infected links in emails. Given its proven success across a wide range of platforms, North Korean hackers will likely continue to employ more phishing campaigns in the future while tailoring their level of obfuscation based on the target’s sophistication.
For example, the North Korea-based Lazarus Group created several fake social media accounts and websites to convince a cryptocurrency exchange that the information provided in a fraudulent email was correct. After clicking on the infected links, the hackers gained access to the target’s network and stole over $7 million worth of crypto assets from the exchange.
More Ransomware Attacks
The Lazarus Group has successfully employed ransomware attacks in the past and will likely continue to use this form of malware as long as it can extort funds from its victims. The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack compromised over 200,000 computers and disrupted banks, hospitals, and communication companies in 150 countries by targeting a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system. While the total number of funds generated from the ransom payments is unclear, this attack caused an estimated $4 billion in losses across the globe. Although Microsoft issued a patch that would have prevented the infection, hundreds of thousands of systems were not updated by the time of the hack, signifying a massive security oversight and need for mandatory company-wide computer system updates following the release of a security patch. The recent Russian cybercriminal-led ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline also calls for significant attention and action from responsible nations to strengthen their national cyber resilience against ransomware attacks.
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More Foreign OTC Brokers, But Perhaps Less China?
Since U.S. and U.N. sanctions have effectively cut off North Korea from the global financial system by restricting its access to the U.S. dollar, Pyongyang must rely on foreign partners and affiliates abroad to cash out stolen cryptocurrency funds into fiat currency through financial systems they can no longer legally access themselves. Over the counter (OTC) brokers specialize in facilitating cryptocurrency transactions and transfers, often using accounts on exchanges to hold and move crypto on behalf of their clients.
While not inherently illicit, OTC brokers can provide North Korea with valuable money laundering capabilities as seen in the indictment of two Chinese OTC brokers charged with laundering over $100 million in cryptocurrency for Pyongyang. However, North Korea may have to look elsewhere for OTC brokers as Beijing continues to crackdown on cryptocurrency exchanges, such as outlawing crypto trading and mining. While these regulations only apply to Chinese crypto users operating within the legal jurisdiction of China, meaning that willing Chinese OTC brokers abroad can still aid North Korea, Pyongyang will likely seek to diversify its usage of foreign OTC brokers by enlisting help from additional jurisdictions. Given that the Lazarus Group may have preexisting ties with Eastern European cybercrime groups, North Korea may look farther west than usual for assistance in its illicit cyber operations.
More Money Laundering Efforts Through New Financial Technologies
As cryptocurrency technology innovation continues to outpace regulation of the crypto space, North Korean hackers will likely expand cyber operations targeting evolving financial platforms, such as decentralized finance (DeFi). The lack of custody and regulatory practices in DeFi, which allows individual crypto users to swap one type of cryptocurrency for another without a centralized platform ever facilitating the swap, often results in the poor collection of user-specific information that can help law enforcement identify cybercriminals, and their techniques, responsible for crypto hacks.
The Lazarus Group has already successfully exploited this vulnerability as recently as May 2020 in which they used DeFi platforms to launder a portion of the roughly $280 million worth of cryptocurrency stolen from a Singapore-based cryptocurrency exchange. Pyongyang will likely continue to exploit DeFi and other evolving financial technology that mostly remains outside mainstream regulation and U.S. law enforcement.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to increased online activity and more digital transactions, which Pyongyang and other illicit actors will likely continue to exploit to their financial benefit. In response, the Biden administration has taken several steps to improve national cybersecurity strategy with its allies and partners, such as a virtual counter-ransomware initiative meeting with 30 countries, a bilateral partnership with Israel to combat ransomware, an agreement to combat ransomware efforts with South Korea, and the creation of broad policy initiatives to disrupt ransomware networks. However, the international community has yet to create a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy to confront a state-sponsored hacking organization like the Lazarus Group, which will likely remain a major vulnerability for financial institutions into the new year.
Jason Bartlett is a contributing author to The Diplomat and a research assistant in the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at CNAS. He tweets @jasonabartlett.
11. No New Year Pardons for Jailed Ex-Presidents
If a conservative is elected in March will he pardon them when he takes office in May?
No New Year Pardons for Jailed Ex-Presidents
There will be no New Year pardons for jailed ex-presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak.
The Justice Ministry on Tuesday reviewed the list of candidates for the traditional New Year's amnesty, and the two jailbirds were not among them.
Justice Minister Park Beom-kye said Tuesday that he is not considering a stay of execution of Park's sentence either even though she is in hospital with health problems.
Park was admitted to Samsung Medical Center on Nov. 22, the third time she has been hospitalized this year, and is being treated for anxiety.
The government will announce the final list of beneficiaries after a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 28.
12. A Growing Army of Hackers Helps Keep Kim Jong Un in Power
Someday the all purpose sword may be more important than the treasured sword (but Kim really needs both for his yin and yang and their synergistic effect.)
A Growing Army of Hackers Helps Keep Kim Jong Un in Power
North Korea relies on cybercrime to fund its nuclear arms program and prop up the ailing economy.
Bloomberg · by Jon Herskovitz · December 21, 2021
Kim Jong Un marked a decade as supreme leader of North Korea in December. Whether he can hold on to power for another 10 years may depend on state hackers, whose cybercrimes finance his nuclear arms program and prop up the economy.
According to the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, North Korea’s state-backed “malicious cyberactivities” target banks around the world, steal defense secrets, extort money through ransomware, hijack digitally mined currency, and launder ill-gotten gains through cryptocurrency exchanges. Kim’s regime has already taken in as much as $2.3 billion through cybercrimes and is geared to rake in even more, U.S. and United Nations investigators have said.
The cybercrimes have provided a lifeline for the struggling North Korean economy, which has been hobbled by sanctions. Kim has shown little interest in returning to negotiations that could lead to a lifting of sanctions if North Korea winds down its nuclear arms program.
North Korea real GDP under Kim Jong Un
Annual change
Data: Bank of Korea
Money from cybercrimes represents about 8% of North Korea’s estimated economy in 2020, which is smaller than when Kim took power, according to the Bank of Korea in Seoul. (The bank for years has provided the best available accounting on the economic activity of the secretive state.) Kim’s decision to shut borders because of Covid-19 suspended the little legal trade North Korea had and helped send the economy into its biggest contraction in more than two decades.
Kim’s regime has two means of evading global sanctions, which were imposed to punish it for nuclear and ballistic missile tests. One is the ship-to-ship transfer of commodities such as coal: A North Korean vessel will shift its cargo to another vessel, or the other way around, and both vessels typically try to cloak their identity.
The other is the cyberarmy. Its documented cybercrimes include attempts to steal $2 billion from the Swift (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system of financial transactions. North Korea has also illegally accessed military technology that could be used for financial gain, according to a UN Security Council panel charged with investigating sanctions-dodging by the government.
North Korea “is not afraid to be brazen and destructive in order to achieve the task at hand,” says Jenny Jun, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, who’s researched North Korea’s cyberoperations and cyberstrategies. “And this sets it apart from some of the other, more careful—and therefore more restrained—nation-state hackers.”
The government has deployed malware called AppleJeus that poses as a cryptocurrency trading platform to steal funds from people who try to use it. Since 2018 various versions of the malware have been used to target more than 30 countries. From 2019 to November 2020, AppleJeus hackers stole virtual assets valued at $316.4 million, according to UN and U.S. investigators. By comparison, North Korea’s coal exports are capped at $400 million a year under global sanctions.
Targets of the regime include central banks, the militaries of the world’s most powerful countries, and corner ATMs. It even tried to hack Pfizer Inc. for Covid vaccine data. South Korea said hacking attempts directed at it by its neighbor increased about 9% in the first half of 2021 from the second half of 2020.
The money North Korea gets from cybercrimes likely helps it to “fund government priorities, such as its nuclear and missile program,” the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence said in an unclassified report in 2021. The cyberprogram poses a growing threat, the report said, warning that the North Korean government probably has the expertise to cause “temporary, limited disruptions” of some critical infrastructure and business networks in the U.S.
Ji Seong-ho, who defected from North Korea to South Korea, where he’s now a member of the national assembly, says cyberactivity development under Kim is advancing rapidly. “The cybercapability in North Korea is bound to get more advanced, and the money it earns from hacking is likely to dramatically increase in the next decade,” says Ji, who sits on the assembly’s foreign affairs committee.
One of Kim’s top priorities when he took power was stepping up cyberwarfare capabilities. Operations under North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau have grown significantly since then. At present it has more than 6,000 members in its cyberwarfare guidance unit, also known as Bureau 121, according to assessments in U.S. and South Korean unclassified defense reports.
The bureau’s four main divisions include Bluenoroff, with about 1,700 hackers, “whose mission is to conduct financial cybercrime by concentrating on long-term assessment and exploiting enemy network vulnerabilities,” said a 2020 U.S. Army report on North Korean military capabilities. The Andariel group has about 1,600 members, who look at computer networks and try to find vulnerabilities, according to the same report.
Because North Korea’s hackers operate under the auspices of the isolated state and are rewarded at home for their thefts abroad, there is little that can realistically be done to punish those responsible. Counterstrikes on the country’s web infrastructure are limited because North Korea has few connected devices and its cellphone data network is mostly cut off from the rest of the world. “The fight against North Korea’s illicit activities is like a whack-a-mole game—cracking down will lead to displacement rather than cause [the regime] to stop or focus on legitimate economic activity,” the Atlantic Council’s Jun says.
Kim is using his sparse resources to invest in information technology training, sending experts abroad. He sees them as crucial for his survival, according to Kang Mi-jin, a North Korean defector who now runs a company in South Korea that watches the economy of her former home.
“The hackers consider what they are doing as being directly related to the fate of the Kim regime,” she says, “and what they are doing is likely to be one of [its] major sources of income.”
Bloomberg · by Jon Herskovitz · December 21, 2021
13. Korea to give $2 million in aid to typhoon-hit Philippines
Korea to give $2 million in aid to typhoon-hit Philippines
This photo provided by Greenpeace shows damaged homes due to Typhoon Rai along a coastal village in Surigao City, southern Philippines, Dec. 21. The Korean government said Wednesday it will provide the Philippines with $2 million worth of humanitarian aid. AP-Yonhap
South Korea said Wednesday it will provide the Philippines with $2 million worth of humanitarian aid, as the country has suffered major typhoon damage.
The powerful Typhoon Rai struck the southern and central parts of the Southeast Asian country last week, resulting in at least 375 deaths while leaving around 440,000 displaced.
"We hope that the aid will help the Philippines' efforts to recover from the damage and that its people will return to their daily lives at an early date," the foreign ministry said in a statement. (Yonhap)
14. Korea turns blind eye to Hong Kong, Taiwan issues
Sadly, I am not scratching my head on the issues between Korea and China.
Korea turns blind eye to Hong Kong, Taiwan issues
People enter a polling station to vote in Hong Kong, Sunday. Hong Kong voted in the first election since Beijing amended laws to reduce the number of directly elected lawmakers and vet candidates to ensure that only those loyal to China can run. AP-Yonhap
Moon's selective silence on democracy leaves other countries scratching heads
By Nam Hyun-woo
Korea is turning a blind eye to the democracy movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, in an apparent gesture to keep a low profile regarding issues that could irk China.
This approach contrasts starkly with its active voice on democracy issues in Myanmar, Nicaragua and Gambia. The Moon Jae-in administration's ambiguity on certain issues related to China are raising suspicions that Seoul is being selectively silent on democratic values overseas.
Taiwan's Digital Minister Audrey Tang / Yonhap
Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it summoned Hong Soon-chang, the deputy representative and acting chief of the Korean Mission in Taipei, Monday, and lodged an official protest over the Korean government's last-minute cancellation of a scheduled virtual speech to be made by Taiwan Digital Minister Audrey Tang.
Tang was set to speak at a conference held by Seoul's Presidential Committee on the Fourth Industrial Revolution on Dec. 16. However, just a few hours before the conference, its organizers informed Taiwan that Tang's scheduled address had been canceled, according to Taiwanese foreign ministry spokeswoman Joanne Ou.
Taiwan's Central News Agency quoted Ou as saying the conference organizers said the decision was made considering "various aspects of cross-Strait issues," possibly referring to Beijing expressing its displeasure over inviting Tang.
"Cross-Strait issues" refer to the relations between Taipei and Beijing, which claims Taiwan as its territory. In line with its "One-China policy," Beijing opposes Taiwanese government officials making official exchanges with China's overseas counterparts.
Following the protest, Korean foreign ministry spokesman Choi Young-sam said, "I understand the decision was made after a comprehensive review of all related aspects," and reiterated Seoul's basic stance of "enhancing unofficial exchanges with Taiwan."
A senior Cheong Wa Dae official said, Wednesday, "The cancellation was decided based on our diplomatic principles, rather than taking China's stance into account."
Seoul also took a quiet stance on the Dec. 19 legislative election in Hong Kong, in which only candidates screened by the government as "patriots" could run, and ended in a record-low 30.2-percent voter turnout.
On Dec. 20, the foreign ministers of the G7 countries ― Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. ― released a statement expressing their "grave concern over the erosion of democratic elements" of Hong Kong's electoral system.
When asked if Korea agrees with that statement, Choi said, "We are paying attention to the election and other Hong Kong-related matters," without directly expressing concerns.
"Korea hopes that Hong Kong is able to maintain its security and development while enjoying a high degree of autonomy under the one country, two systems policy, as well as guaranteeing the basic rights and freedoms of residents," Choi said.
However, these moves contrast with the ministry's active voices advocating democracy in other countries.
On Dec. 13, the foreign ministry released the spokesman's comments on the Dec. 4 Gambian presidential vote, welcoming the election's democratic and transparent process.
On Dec. 7, it issued a statement regarding the guilty ruling on Myanmar's deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi and said it "expresses concerns on the aggravating situation in Myanmar, and hopes that the country returns to democracy promptly." Also on Nov. 11, the ministry expressed "deep concern that the presidential election held in the Republic of Nicaragua on Nov. 7 was not conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner."
Korea's ambivalent stance is interpreted as the Moon government's low-profile approach on issues that Beijing finds sensitive. President Moon has been resorting to a balancing act between the U.S., which is Korea's key ally, and China, which is its largest trade partner.
Despite the dilemma, calls are growing that Korea should raise its voice when it comes to democratic values.
After President Moon attended the G7 summit in June, his administration has been stressing that Korea is now at the level of the G7 countries, citing its strong quarantine measures and economic resilience. But as Korea remains silent on global issues related to democracy, it faces increasing criticism for seeking to enjoy its elevated status while neglecting the core values of democracy.
"In order to cope with geopolitical competition, Korea should seek strategic transparency depending on the issues, rather than strategic ambiguity," Ahn Ze-no, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, wrote in a Dec. 17 report.
15. One N. Korean cadre’s view of the 10th anniversary memorial for Kim Jong Il
We always have to take reports from the daily NK with a grain of salt. But there are some interesting comments in this.
One N. Korean cadre’s view of the 10th anniversary memorial for Kim Jong Il
People "whispered among themselves about [Kim Jong Un's] emaciated face, saying he could no longer move it," he told Daily NK
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended the memorial ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the passing of late leader Kim Jong Il at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Dec. 17. / Photo: Capture from KCTV’s YouTube channel
North Korea held a large event to mark the 10th anniversary of the passing of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on Dec. 17, despite the nation’s emergency quarantine efforts.
The authorities held a memorial rally in the square in front of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the bodies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are interred.
Kim Jong Un’s appearance drew particular attention. Dressed in a long, black leather trench coat, he not only looked a bit thinner, but he also wore a serious expression throughout the event, leading some to comment that he looked old.
At noon that day, all North Koreans had to observe three minutes of silence in remembrance of the elder Kim. Some were reportedly mobilized to present flower baskets or participate in the memorial rally. The younger Kim basically used the memorial of his forebear to promote internal unity.
Once the memorial atmosphere was largely concluded, Daily NK conducted a telephone interview with a provincial cadre to convey the general mood inside North Korea.
The following is an interview with Ryu Yong Gil (assumed name), a cadre who works at a government body in North Pyongan Province.
DNK: How did you see the event marking the 10th anniversary of the passing of Kim Jong Il?
“I watched it on TV in accordance with an order regarding organizational and government events. I also saw it in the Rodong Sinmun later.”
DNK: What caught your interest?
“I was deeply impressed by how solemn it was, the three minutes of silence, and how the people on the platform in the central memorial rally faced the audience but then turned around to pay silent tribute to a video of Kim Jong Il on the façade of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun.”
DNK: What was the significance of that?
“I felt with my innermost heart they organized the event so that all of society felt an atmosphere of mourning, as if Kim had passed away just a few days ago.”
DNK: But don’t you think the reality was a bit different?
“I do. They organized the event to produce an atmosphere of mourning, but many people in the provinces didn’t feel as strongly as they did when he actually died. I felt they were ritualistically taking part because it was a state event.”
DNK: Could you please explain that?
“The markets closed that day, and people nationwide took part in organized mourning events, but as soon as that was over, they jumped right back into their daily lives to make ends meet. Ten years has passed since [Kim’s] death, so it seems everything has become routine for people.”
DNK: Were there people crying?
“It was different from when Kim Il Sung died and when Kim Jong Il died 10 years ago. A decade has already passed. Hardly anyone excessively cried like a river this time.”
DNK: Did Kim Jong Un continue to wear a serious expression?
“It was really cold that day. I was worried because his face was red like it was really frozen. But families whispered among themselves about his emaciated face, saying he could no longer move it.”
DNK: Are people worried about his health?
“People wondered if he was sick since his complexion wasn’t good, generally speaking. And he wore a thin leather coat in the cold weather, not winter clothing. I wondered what the officials close to him were doing.”
DNK: It also looked like he lost a lot of weight.
“I think his health really isn’t good. In our country [North Korea], hardly anyone goes on a diet. In fact, I was really surprised when I saw how thin he was on TV this time.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
16. Hyesan copper mine suspends rations to workers amid North Korea’s wider economic troubles
Terrible suffering. Another potential indicator of instability.
Hyesan copper mine suspends rations to workers amid North Korea’s wider economic troubles
Some workers even collapse at work because they cannot eat regular meals
North Korea’s economic troubles, made worse by international sanctions and COVID-19, are having a major impact on Hyesan Youth Copper Mine in Yanggang Province, Daily NK has learned.
A source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Sunday that Hyesan Youth Copper Mine recently suspended rations to its workers. He said some workers even collapse at work because they cannot eat regular meals.
The Hyesan Youth Copper Mine produces copper concentrate. Since forming the Hyesan-China Joint Venture Mineral Company with China’s Wanxiang Resources Limited Company in 2011, the mine had reportedly been hitting its annual copper concentrate target of 5,000 tons.
However, with the border being closed last year due to COVID-19, production has plummeted and rations limited to personal rations, excluding worker families. For the last several months, moreover, personal rations have been suspended and the mine is failing to provide even meals to miners in the tunnels, according to the source.
An undated photo of Hyesan, Yanggang Province, on North Korea’s border with China. / Image: Daily NK
The source said as recently as March, workers who entered the mines received at least five kilograms of corn as personal rations. From April, however, they have received neither personal rations nor meals in the mines.
He said many people were entering the mines to collect more ore despite receiving no rations or meals, believing rumors that the border would soon open. Some people are collapsing as they work without eating.
Workers at Hyesan Youth Copper Mine earn a living by selling ore. For example, a kilogram of copper concentrate at Hyesan Youth Copper Mine sells for RMB 7 or 8, or USD 1.10 to USD 1.26.
In particular, workers sometimes leave work with more than 10 kilograms of copper concentrate. If you do this 20 days a month, you can sell over 200 kilograms of copper for RMB 1,500 (around USD 235).
With these potential profits in mind, workers continue to enter the mines to collect even a bit more ore, even though rations have been suspended, and sometimes collapse on the job from hunger, the source said.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
